THE

DEBATES

IN THE SEVERAU

STATE CONVENTIONS

ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

AS RECOMMENDED BY THE

GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA,

IN

1787.

TOGETHER WITH THE

JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,

' LUTHER MARTIN’S LETTER,
YATEST MINUTE&

CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS,

VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF ’95«39,
AND
OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

 

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL.H.

 

SECOND EDITION, WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS.

COLLECTED AND REVISED FROM CONTEMPORARY PUBLICATIONS,

BY JONATHAN ELLIOT.

FWBLISHED UNDER THE SANCTION OF CONGRESS.
(1 OF IHF -. . (x:
2:; 111“» j;

 

i

PHILADELPHIA'

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY.
1888.

 

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred
and thirty-six,

By JONATHAN ELLIOT,

In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the District of Columbia.

 

#fl 29—0

CONTENTS.

12-5175.

CONVENTION UF MASSACHUSETTS, . . . . 1 to 18?
.. —— OF CONNECTICUT, . . . . . .185 to 202
———— OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, . . . . 203 to 204

—-——————————OF NEW YORK,. . . . . . . 205 to 413
Circular, . . . . . . . . 413 to 414

——————'—-—OF PENNSYLVANIA, . . . .. . 415 to 542
Harrisburg Proceedings, . . . 542 to 546

OF MARYLAND.. . . . . . 547 to 556

INDEX.

BY SPEAKERS’ NAMES.

MASSACHUSETTS. P
ago.

Mr. ADAMS—For deliberate Discussion, 95. Ratification,123. Amendments, 130
Mr. AMES—Pref‘ers Biennial Elections, 7. Senatorial Term, 45. Elections,

48. Checks, 105. Approves with Amendments, .................... 154
“M Mr. BACKUS— Rights of Conscience, Slave Trade, &c., ............... 148
Mr. BARRELL — Opposes Adoption, ..................................... . 159
Mr. BISHOP — On the Conduct of Rhode Island, 23. Elections, ............. 25
Mr. BODMAN —— State Sovereignty, ....................................... 60
Mr. BOWDOIN—Preference for Biennial Elections, 12. General Review of

the proposed Constitution, 81. Continued, ..... . .................... 125
Gen. BROOKS — For Biennial Elections, 14. Religion, 44. Consolidation ill-

. founded, ......... . .................. - ............................ 99
Mr. CABOT — Elections, ................................... . ....... . . . .125
Mr. CARNES— For Adoption, ......................................... . . 21
Mr. CHOATE —Taxes, .................................................. 79

Mr. DANA — The Rules of Proceedings, 6. For Biennial Elections, 20. Rep-
resentation, 37. Taxes, 42. Elections, 49. Discussion not to be lim-
ited, 108. Amendments, ........................................ . 138

Mr. DALTON — Negro Cultivation, .................................. . . . . . 39

Mr. T. DA WES — 1n Favor of two Years’ Service, 5. Black Representation, 40.
Taxes, 41. Taxes, Commerce, &c. 57. Standing Armies, 97. Trial

by Jury, ........................................................ 113
Mr.DENCH-—-OnElections,.... ......... .................... 11
Mr. FULLER — Representation, ......... _ ................................. 44
Mr. GORE —For Biennial Term, 16. Taxes, 64. Judiciary, ................ 112

Mr. GORHAM (a Member of the Federal Convention) ——Animadverts on the
Conduct of Rhode Island, 21, 23. “ White Persons bound,” 37. Pub-

lishing Proceedings, 52. Impost, .................................. 106
JOHN HANCOCK (President) —- Ratification, 122. Address on the Report

of the Committee, ................................................ 174
Gen. HEATH — In Favor of Biennial Elections, 12. Slavery, ............... .114

Ratification, ...... . .......... . ............. . ..................... 120
Mr. HOLMES — Judiciary Power, ...................................... 109
Dr. JARVIS — Elections, 29. Representation, 29. Amendments, ........ 116, 151
Mr. J. C. JONES — Elections, ........................................... 28
Mr. J ON ES— Senatorial Term, 45, 47. Representation, ..................... 75

Mr. RUFUS KIN G (a Member of the Federal Convention) — For two Years’ Ser-
vice in House of Representatives, 18. Qualification, 35. Negro Tax-
ation, 36, 37. Taxes, 45. Senatorial Term, 47. Elections, 50. Powers
of Congress; “ We, the People,” contrasted with the Confederation,

“ We, the States,” 54., Requisitions, 56. Amendments, ......... . . . . . 101

Maj. KIN GSLEY — Taxes, Army, ....................................... . 61

a INDEX.

Maj. LUSK— Amendments, ............................. . ......... .Ll/J I
Mr. NASSON— Negro Representation, 39. Slave Trade, 107. ueneral R

view of the Constitution, ..........................................
Mr. N EAL fljricans, .............................................. 107’1‘.
Mr. PARSONS —Taxes, 54. Powers of the 8th Section, 88. Elections, . ..... ',
Rev. Mr. PAYSON —-— Religious Test, .................................... .I i
Mr. PIERCE — Place and Manner of Elections, 22. Taxes, 76. Amendments, 1'4U
Rev. Mr. PERLEY — Secrecy, ............................................ 52-. I,
Mr. PHILLIPS—Power of'l‘axation,.... ... 67E
Gen. PORTER—Pay, ...................................... . ............ 53/
Mr. RANDALL -— Carolina Crops, &c., ................................... [739
Mr. RUSSELL — Commerce, ............................................ ’ 139
Mr. SEDGWICK —- Annual Elections, 4. Qualification, 35. Wages and Sal-
aries, 53. Answers Objections to 8th Section, ...................... 96
Mr. SINGLETARY — Religion, 44. Guarantying Republican Govern—
Inent, 100. Impost, .............................................. 101
Mr. SHUTE — Religious Test, .................. ‘ ............ . ............ 118
Mr. SMITH —— Constitution, a Cure for Anarchy, ........... . ............... 102
Capt. SNOW — Elections, ................................................ - 34
Mr. SPRAGUE — For two Years’ Service, ................................. 5
Mr. STRONG — Term of Service in House of Representatives, 6. Elections, . . 24
Erection ot'a Federal Town, ...................................... 99
Mr. STILLMAN — General Review of the Constitution, ..................... 162
Judge SUMNER— Biennial Elections, 32. Taxes, 63. Habeas Corpus, 108.
Amendments, .................................................... 138
Mr. SYMM ES — Taxation, 70. Amendments, .............................. 172
Dr. TAYLOR — Annual Elections, 5. Representation, 36. Elections, 48. Pay,
52. Amendments, ............................................... 125
Mr. THACHER— Ad\ocates Adoption, ................................... 141
Gen. TIIOMPSON— For frequent Elections, 15, 16, 33 Bill of Rights, ...... 79
Taxes, .......................................................... 61
Mr. TURNER— For Annual Elections, 14, 30. View of the Constitution, . . . . 170
Col. VARNUM —- Bill of Rights, .......................................... 78
Rev. Mr. VVEST— Representation; Elections, ............................ 32
Mr. VVIDGERY— Elections, 28. Representation, 32. Taxes, 44. Secrecy, 52.
Taxes .......................................................... 105
Mr. WHITE— Qualifications, 28. Elections, for six Months, ................ 6
Gen. WHITNEY— Moved for a Committee to report on Amendments, ........ 41
Dr. WILLA RD —-Abuse of Power, ........................................ 68
ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS, on Ratification, ...................... 176
YEAS and NAYS, at large, (Yeas, 187; Nays, 168,) .............. . ........ 178
MINORITY — Their closing Remarks, .............................. . ..... 18]

CONNECTICUT.

OLIVER ELLSWORTH— On opening the Debates; a more energetic System
necessary, 186. Reference to ancient and modern History, 187. Pres-
ent Weakness, 189. On the Powers of Congress to lay Taxes, 190.
Reasonable Checks , Reference to Rhode Island, .................... 197

h‘rov. HUNTINGDON— Where supreme Power should be lodged, 197. Two
Branches necessary, 198. State Governments not endangered by the __
pr0posed Constitution ............................................ b 199

RICHARD LAW— For accepting the Constitution; great Benefit to flow
from it, oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo no... ..... o ....... o 200

7 1

 

i ”17’
a” i” ('
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.3 fl 1 ' 15,111“, 9
3 N ‘ "~’\“._,,-’1NDEX.

vii

\ i i b" fags.

' ul'mm WOLCOTT—Willigive his Voice in Favor of n; no Test neces-

'\ sary; Oath of Office, an Acknowledgment of the “ Great Truths,”. . . . .

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

.. (Fragment of Debate.)
r. JOSHUA ATHERTON —Against the Traffic of importing Slaves, &c , . .
r DOW — Opposed to Slave Importation, ................. . . . . . . . ...... . .

NEW YORK.

Gov. CLINTON —For a lar e Congressional Representation, that general local

Information be disc osed, 261. In large Confederacies, gradual En-
croachments often overlooked by the distant Members ; Georgia and
New York contrasted, . . . . . . .................................. . . . .
Confederation too weak, 359. A Friend to a strong Government, but not
obliged to accept of a dangerous One, ............. . .......... '. . . . . .

Mr. DUANE—Regulation of Elections, Districts, &c., 327. Requisitions a
fatal Effect; never answer Government Purposes, ...................

Mr. HAMILTON (a Member of the Federal Convention)—-Rejection may be
\/ fatal, thirteen different Bodies embarrassing Requisitions, 231. In ’79

and ’80, Sufferings for Want of a vigorous Government; New York
exposed to Invasion ; wholly complied with Requisitions, &c. ; Coercion,
232. Old Confederation could not be fashioned on Federal Principles,
233. Ampliictyonic League; Philip; Dutch, German, and Prussian
Governments—Lycian and Achzean Leagues, 235. Clashing of In-
terests, 236. Representation of three fifths of the Negroes and Taxa-
tion, 237. Representation; Number of the Whites, 238. State Gov-
ernments, their Advantages over the National Government; no Danger
from the Federal Head to the States, ......... '. . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... . . .
- Representation further considered, 25], 252, 253. Aristocrary animad-
verted on; large and small Districts, 256. Rich and Poor; old Con-
federation, 258. Notices the ConfederatiOn; Republics founded on

a firm Basis; Federal Constitution a Cure, and will answer beneficial
Purposes,. ........ . ............................................. .
Chances of Corruption under the new, less than under the old Govern-
ment, 262. No Danger of' a bare Quorum, as the Expense is defrayed
from the Federal Treasury, 263. Corruption; British House of Com-
mons; Rotten Boroughs; Georgia and South Carolina; Information of

a Few may be imperfect, 265. One intelligent Representative as capable

as Twenty; State Interests and Prejudices ; 'l‘axation, 266. State Legis-
latures, their Vigilance; Diversity of Habits of the States considered,. . .
Motives of the General Convention relative to navi ating and non-naviga-
ting, large and small States, and Representation, 273. The Plan aVVork

X

of “ Accommodation ; ” Alterations would have destro ed it, ..........
“ Alteration ” in Representation took Place on the Eve 0 the Federal Con-
, vention rising, .................................................. .

For some permanent Body, of limited Numbers; another to possess pop-
ular Features; Recall (G. Livingston’s Argument) would “make the
Senator a Slave,” 302. Unreasonable Apprehension of State Govern-
ments, 303. Local Prejudice's, 305. Senatorial Term of Service ; Sen-
ators will look up with Affection to the States; their Duties, 306. Re-
sponsibility, ......... . ............................................

Two Objects in Government, Safety and Energy; People irresistible;
Factions; Rhode Island, 315. Senate should be so formed as to check
State Governments, 316. Senatorial Term; Equal Votes in Senate, 318.
State Governments inviolable; Factions grow out of State Prejudices;

F Self-Interest, 319. Corruption in the President’s Disposal of Offices, ..
Theeks; “ free Representation and mutual Checks,” 347. Representatives
return to the People.'348. Sword and Purse explained, 348. Represen-
tation, 349. “.Division of Powers,” 350. Civil List; Exclusive Rev-
enues, 350. Loans, 352. Extent of Territory for a representative Gov-

201

203
203

2

379

239

259

267

273
274

307

L21

V111 . INDEX. ‘

Mr. HAMILTON —- continued —
ernment, 352. Not the Interest of the National, to destroy the State,
Governments, 353. Jurisdiction of the two Governments,. .. . ,. . . - . of

Introduces a Series of official Papers, as per List, to show the Misfort‘flie
of raising Revenue by Requisitions, .................... . . . . ...' . . . . . .
A Dictator proposed; Grant of an Impost for twenty-five Years by'Con-
ress, refused by the States, 360. Definition of“ Supreme,” 362. Taxes;
reference in Collection, 362. Objects of Revenue, 363. Poll Tax, 364.1
Sacrifices of the Netherlands, 365. State Governments; Non-Com-
pliance of Requisitions, 365. Unlimited Power of Taxation, 367. Man-
ufactures, in Connecticut and New York, ..................... . . . . . . 369

Mr. HARRISON -— Liberty not to be sacrificed to Union; Concession; Repre-
sentation; Delaware, 30,000; New York, 265,000; Interest of large

States to keep the Ratio uniform, 264. Approves the proposed Ratio, .. 268
Design of House of Representatives to represent the People ; no Danger of
Senators losing State Attachments; Reélection an Incentive to public

Virtue, ........... . ................... .......... ....298

Mr. JOHN JAY— Representation, 282. In Favor of large Representation, but
Willing to acquiesce in the proposed Number, 283. Corruption less
probable in the new than old Government; Senate a double Security ; a

 

peculiar Excellence in the Division of the Le islature, ............... . 285
Advocates the Power of Congress, relative to EIections, to preserve itself,. 326
The Will of the People ought to be the Law, .................. . ....... 327
General Government should have Access to the Resources of the Country;
Direct Taxes, 380. Difficulty on the Subject of Excise, .............. 381
Mr. JONES—Opposed to Congress prescribing the Time for Elections, 325.
Resolution submitted to that Effect, ................................ 325

fir. LANSING (a Member of the Federal Convention) — Confederated Republic
attainable; State Governments, 216. Requisitions; \Vestern Posts;
Extravagance at the Close of the War; Sins of the Israelites brought
Defeat; Dutch Government, 218. Sir W. Temple; Germanic Confed-

eracy; Dissolution of the Union, 219. His Motives; State Officers,. , . 220

For a large Representation, .......................................... 272
Discloses the “ Accommodation” which took Place, on the Apportion.
ment, in the Federal Convention, at the Time he left it, 272. Large and

small States, their Interests, .......................................
Committee of Details; proposed Equality in the Senate; Representation

not a Work of Accommodation, ................ . ..... . ............. 274
In Favor ofa Check on the Senators by Recall,. . . . . ..... . ............. 289
Opposed to Recall of Senators, ................................... 293, 299
Checks and Balances in Congress ; for Recall of Senators, .............. 307
Fears ought not to influence Adoption, ................... . ........... 324

Taxes; Requisitions ; Danger to State Governments; Sword and Purse, . 374
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON —General Peace among Nations, the Plan of
Henry IV., 209. Differences then decided by Arms; additional Se-
curity from the Division of Power, 210. Decline of' Commerce; Ex-
istence depends on an efficient Government; natural Advantages of the
State; back Lands, 211. Incapacity of New York to defend itself;
'Danger of Disunion, 212. Confederation ineffectual and defective, 2] 3.
The Holland League; Contest with Spain; unequal Burdens, 214.
Militia, Judiciary, Commerce, 216. Chan e of Government neces-
sary, 216. Resolution to consider Clause by lause, . . ..... . ......... 216
(In reply to Lansing,) 221. Defends State Officers; Disorder appre-
hended from Federal Officers, 222. Federal Republics heretofore have
contained the Seeds of their own Destruction, 274. Number of House
of Representatives; Constitution proposes the Medium; Number of Com-
mons in England; Difference of Feelings and Interest in Representa-
tion, 275. “Rich and Great,” their Su ra es; Aristocracy, 277. Cor-
ruption, 278. Present Congress; Purse and Sword; Ratio, ....... .. .. 278
Duties of Senators; Treaties, &c.; Power of Recall opens a Door to Fae
tion, 291. Publication of Expenditures; Rotation absurd; Ostracism;. ,.
drivin Experience into Obscurity, ...... . ............ . . . ......... . .
Power 0% Recall tends to bind Senators too closely to the Interests of their
States,..... ...................... . ............ . ......... ........
Announces the Dissolution of the Confederacy; States limited to regulate

'ORGANIZA'NON’J . ,
1 : ’ ‘ .- NDEX. 1X

}

aoBERT R LIVIl‘u. f‘ 7; “r—c'ohtinued—

civil Affairs, 392. Senate; Appointments; Impeachments; advisory
Power, .......................................................... 323
Revenue, Excise, direct Taxes, &c., 341. Indirect Taxes, sufficient in
Peace; Loans, 343. Jurisdiction, 345. Operation of State and Federal
TaXatirn, .. ..................................................... 346
State Governments opposing Opinions, whimsical Opinion on State and
Federal '1‘axes, 382. Regulating the Militia, Sword and Purse, 384.
Ingenuity of St. Athanasius to understand the Mystery of thirteen State
Governments one Government; Excise, ........................... 385
General Government not safe on the Score of Representation, Tax-col-
lecting Squabble, 394. Resources ought to be left the States, 395. Lib-
erty Emblems; Holt, &c., ........................................ 395
" ‘x A single League of States cannOt exist, ............................... 395

Mr G. LIVINGSTON —Importance of the Senate, 286. Objections, Judicial
Capacity , their Capacity for Council, Appointment may be for Life;
their Situation 1n “ a Federal Town , ” no State Laws there; girt with
a Wall of Adamant and Gold [9!] , an Eden! 287. May become Stran-
gers to the common People, for a Term less than Six Years; little or
no Check; in Favor of the Power of Recall by the State Legislatures ,

Page.

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not to be ree'li ible, ....... . ....................................... 289
Conflict of Tax ollectors, .......................................... 387
Holt and Vardel’s Liberty Caps, ..................................... 390
Mr. R. MORRIS— Advocates the Adoption, too many Checks may impede ,
opposed to Amendment to recall Senators, ..........................
Power to perpetuate the Government ought to belong to the Federal Rep-
resentatives, ............................. . ....................... 326

Mr. MELANCTON SMITH— For Union; replies to Objections of State Weak-
ness , Federal Republics , Montesquieu’ 3 Opinion, Perfection unattain-
able, 225. Israelites; Objections; Apportionment, opposed to Slave
Representation, 226. Composition of Representatives; Great Britain;

Defects of the Confederation, 228. Representation, .................. 229
Representation, 243. Difference of Expense, 244, 245, 246. Aristocracy

of Wealth; Yeomanry , Middling Class, ............................ 248
Recommends an increased Representation, and more limited Powers, 259.

Saw no Checks , Sparta; Rome, Aristocracy, ...................... 260
Feelings of the People, 280. Aristocracy; John Adams; true Represen-

tation; the Middling Class, 281. Confederation; Recall, ............. 28]
For a small Representation; Corruption, .............................. 286

Genuine Representation impracticable under the Federal Constitution, . . .309
Senatorial Term; Danger of Perpetuity; Rotation the best Remedy, 309.
Senators represent the State Legislatures , for Recall, 311. State Legis-
latures may dwindle into Insignificance; Federal Officers; Salaries;
“ Checks” should act silently, 5312. Local Interests; Recall may be
very seldom; Corruption; Congress- men may take Office; Bargains
may effect it, 314. A greater Scope for Corruption in no Government
in the World, Government Money unaccounted for; Confederation

preferable,.. . . . . ................................................. 315
Factions 1n the Senate, &.c. ., ................. . ................ . . . . . 321
Senate a Check; for six Years only, ........... . ...................... 324
Modification of his Motion, .......................................... 329

State and General Governments, 332. Complex Taxes, 333. Construc-
tion; State Constitutions, their Abolition fatal, 334. Difficulty of col-
lecting Representatives of general Knowledge of the Wants of the

States, ................................ . ........ . . . ........... . . 335
Amount ofRequisitions; unlimited Powers, 336
“From Time to Time,” &c., ..................................... 347

Ri ht to lay Taxes , Power to abrogate State Laws , State and Federal
fficers, ...................................................... . 377

Thought it wild and ridiculous to attempt a Navy, 381. Direct Taxes may
be modelled on the State Systems, ................................. 382
State Governments proper Depositories of Power, ..................... .382
Mr. TREDWELL— Contest between little and reat States, ................. 396
Reserved Powers, 398. Ambiguity of Pgarts of the Constitution, .309

Which departs widely from the political Faith of ’76; Ratification,. ... 401
VQL. ll. B

x IN DEX: I ‘a

I
tution, ........................................ 7 ....... ...........

Mr. WILLIAMS — Evils from Extravagance in Foreign Articles, 240. Repre-x ‘ '

l- ‘r ‘ Page é
Slaves; two distinct Sovereignties, laid. Y _ opposed to Consti- 4- ,

sentation too small; England ; for annual Elections; Sidney gnd Mon€ 35
tesquieu ............................. . ............. . ..... ‘.=.. , r. ...- . .._ ‘
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, ......................... It ..... l
Indefinite Powers, Common Defence, &c., . . . . . .......... .1... f ..... _,
Taxing Powers; Poll Tax, &c., . .................. . ..... '. .......... - #1
Ridiculing Powers of the Speakers, ..................................
AMENDMENTS— Loans ; Post-Offices; Armies; Militia ; Laws necessary '
regulating Commerce, 406. Declaring War; Habeas Corpus; ea: post
facto; Taxes; Receipts and Expenditures; Titles of Nobility; President; l
Powers, ........................................ 407, 408, 409, 410, 4] 1
ADJOURNMENT proposed, .................... . ........... . ............. 411
RIGHTS, BILL OF, to be prefixed, ......... . ............................. 411
RATIFICATI ON recommended, ......................................... 41]
Adopted, ................................................ . ....... . . 412
VOTES—Affirmative; Negative,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .................. 412, 413
LETTER — Circular to the Governors of the several States of the Union, signed
by George Clinton, .................. , ............................ 413
PENNSYLVANIA.
DELEGATES, LIST OF, returned, ...................................... 415
RULES, &c., for conducting the Business, ................................. 416

(FREDERICK AUGUSTUS MUHLENBERG, elected President; JAMES
CAMPBELL, elected Secretary.)

HARRISBURG PROCEEDINGS — Resolutions and Propositions adopted, . . 542

Mr. M'KEAN —— Moved to assent to and ratify the Constitution, .............. 417
Objections against the Constitution, .................................. 529
Election of Representatives, 530. Representation; Senate; Number of

Representatives; annual Congresses secured, 535. Taxes; Armies,
&c., 535—6. Reasons for supporting the Constitution, 541. The best
System “the World has ever seen,” ................................ 542

Mr. WILSON (a Member of the Federal Convention) — Difficulties in the Con-
vention enumerated ; Difficulty in forming a good System, 418. Diver-
sity of Sentiment, but unite in a keen Sense of Freedom, 420. Voted
according to his Judgment, however some Constituents were displeased;
Extent of Country to be considered, 421. Confederate. States of Eu-
rope; difi'er from the United States; Science of Government yet in its
Infancy, ........................................................ 422
Representation not the Principle of Government in Europe, 423. Line
between National and State Governments; Success of the Conven-
tion, 425. Civil Government necessary to Man; separate, a Prey to
Foreign Force; Division dangerous; one confederate Republic best, . . . 427
Federal Liberty the End of the System; States should resign a Part of their
olitical Liberty; States and Citizens represented; Illustration of the
nd proposed to be obtained by the Convention, 429. Wants of the
Confederation, 430. Supreme Power; Blackstone; Parliamentary
Power absolute, 432. In our Government, absolute Power remains in
the People; different Species of Government, 432. All Authority de-
rived from the People, ............................................ 434
Recognition of this Principle in “ We; the People,” 434. Bill of Rights, 436.
Magna Charta, 437. Arrangement of the Constitution, 438. Elections, 430
Number of Representatives ; Difference of a large and small N umber,. . . . 442
State Sovereignties; combats the Idea that Sovereign Power resides in the
State Governments, 443 The two taxing Powers, 444. Division of
Power in the Legislature, 445. Legislative Delay, 445. Two Branches
serve as Checks; qualified Negative of the President, 447. Responsi-
bility secured by Yeas and Nays; Libel, ........ . ............. . ..... 448
Wh the Term Slave was not admitted, 451. Importation of Slaves; Care

ta en in selecting the Language of the Constitution, ....... . ......... 452

URGANIZATIONJ "‘ ' ‘ v'r '~:" V' 3,
' ‘ iEX. Xl
{K 1 _:" x ' .o;
1' . Page.
‘ ("M i“ f 22/ oiZLi
:tj", 1' ' WI 11430 .l queCLmns urged against. the Constitution, ......... 453

ON; direct Motion ever made 1n Convention for one, 453.
LlD Blupo-V t1 Sovereign Powers , States made for the People, 6m. 455.
111 a .ependence, 457. Powers of the State Governments, 459.
OWL B11 [Self-Preservation independent of the States, 460. State
ly R1valsr'p ...................................................... 462
z nets of the States, 463 Elections, 464. Senate: Treaties; Impeach-
ments, 466. Taxation, 466. Troops , Laws necessary and proper, .. .468
udicial Department, 469. Letter accompanying the Constitution, ...... 70
British King’s Negative. New York Governor’s Veto; Eflect of the
Veto Power, ..................................................... 472
Senate’s Share in Appointments may tend to corrupt the Representa-
tives, 475. Powers of the Senate, Rotation, ....................... .476
Powers kept independent and distinct, 479. Independence of Judges, 480.
Disputes between General and State Governments, 481. Democracy;
Suffrage secured; Representation and direct Taxation, 482. Disqual-
ificatiobn of Office, 483. Picture of Slavery, 485. Bills of Credit; Con-
tracts, .......................................................... 486
Judicial Department; Views of the Convention in formin the Article, 486.
Jurisdiction; Controversies, 490. Improvement of omestic Naviga-
tion, 492. Appellate Jurisdiction, .................................. 493
Pennsylvania the first State whose Convention met, 494. Compact, Con-
tract; no Trace of'a Compact 1n the System, 497. Powers for inteinal
Purposes, 500. Taxes, State Sovereignty 502. Consolidated Govern-
ment, 503. Powers distinct, 504. Treaties, 505. Bribery, ........... 508
Executive Department, 510. Appointment of President, 511. No Reason
to suspect the President may be the Tool of the Senate , Deficiency of
Presidential Powers, 512. Judges to hold no other Office, ........... 514
Trial by Jury, 515. Expense of the General and State Governments, 519.
Armies, 520. Nature of an Aristocratic Government, 522. Free Gov-
ernment aptly compared to a Pyramid, 524. Benefits to flow from the

Constitution, .................................................... 527
M A R Y L A N D .
ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, disclosing the Conduct
of the late Federal Convention, .................................... 547
RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENTS,. . . . . . ........ . ......... 549 to 553
VOTES on Objections, and Adjournment, ............. . . . . ............ 554, 555

MEMBERS of Committee and Convention, .................... . . ....... . . 556

DEBATES

1.;
THE CONVENTION

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

x”?— -.
6N CONVENTION, BOSTON, January 9, 1788.

ON motion, Orde'r'e' , Luth§,,,_Hon.”Nathaniel Gorham,
John Carnes, Esq., Dr. Charles aiifi‘s‘fflorrr-‘Tristam' Dalton,
Hon. Walter Spooner, Hon. Caleb Davis, and Hon. John
Taylor, be a committee to receive the returns of the several
tovvns.

Ordered, That a committee of five persons be appointed
to collect, count, and sort the votes for a secretary , and the
H011. Caleb Davis, Tristam Dalton, Aaron Wood, Eleazer
Brooks, and Charles Turner, Esquires, were appointed.

The Convention then proceeded to the choice of a secre—
tary by ballot, and, the votes being taken, it appeared that
George Richards Minot, Esq. was chosen, who accepted of
the choice, and was duly sworn to qualify him for exercising
the duties of that office.

Voted, That Mr. Jacob Kuhn, the messenger of the Gen—
eral- Court, be appointed messenger to this Convention.

Voted, That five monitors be chosen, and the following
gentlemen were elected, viz., the Hon. Noah Goodman, Mr.
Phanuel Bishop, Mr. Daniel Cooley, Hon. Azor Orne, and
Mr. Thomas Davis.

Voted, That a committee of seven be appointed to pre-
pare rules and orders for the regulation of the Convention.
The Hon. Nathaniel Gorham, Dr. Charles Jarvis, Hon. John
Taylor, Mr. William \Vidgely, Hon. Tristam Dalton, Hon

1

VOL. 11.

 

2 " DEBATES. t \_ Raw.

. . ‘ 1
Theodore Sedgwick, ambient—1s W111,“ ‘,-ES(11‘-V$tl
then appointed on the said comfnlttee. '

Aftemoon. — The Convention p1oceeded to the choice (1'

p1eside11t by ballot, according to assignment; aildp‘
mittee of five being appointed to collect, count, and so ill
votes, it appealed t3that his Excellency, John Hancock,“
chosen.

Voted, That the Convention proceed to the choice of a Vice-
president. —Tl1e Convention then proceeded to the choice '
of a vice- piesident EN c01d1ngl), by ballot; and, a committc (1
being appointed to (.,ollect count, and smt the votes, it 1p-
pea1ed that the H011. William Cushing was chosen; who by
lequest took the chai1.

Voted, That a committee of five be appointed to w ait upon
his Excellency, John Hancock, and acquaint him that this
Convention have made choice of him fo1 their plesident, and
to 1equest his Excellency’ s acceptance ol that appointment.

On motion of the H011. M1. Adams, Voted, That the Con-
vention will attend morning prayels, daily, and that the gen-
tlemen of the cle1gy, of every denomination, be requested to
ofiiciate 111 tum.

The membe1s from Boston were appointed to wait upon
them, and acquaint them thereof.

A vote of the ChlllCll 111 Biattle Street, in Boston, olfering
the use of their meeting—house to the Convention, being
communicated by the H011. Mr. Bowdoin, Voted, That a con1—.
mittce of nine be appointed, to View the accommodations of
the said meeting—house, and report.

M1. Sedgwick, Mi. Lincoln, Dr. Taylor, Gen. Brooks of
Lincoln, D1. Ja1vis, D1. Holtoii, Mr. Strong, Mr. Nason, and
Mr. Thatcher, were then appointed on said committee

THURSDAY, January 10.—The committee appointed to
examine the returns of delegates, desired a rule, whereby
they might determine whether the towns had exceeded
their privilege to send members. After a long debate, a
motion was made, that the valuation of the different towns,
returned in 1784, should be the rule to determine the
numbei.

A11 offel having been made, by- the church 1n B1attle Street,
of that meeting-house, f01 the use of the Convention, and a.
committee having viewed the accommodation, it was voted '
that when the Convention do adjourn, that it adjourn to

'ORGANIZATIONJ . MASSACHUSETTS. _ 3

meet at three o’clock, at the meeting—house in Brattle
Street.

FRIDAY, Ulla—Committees were raised to inquire re
specting the contested elections, and enjoined to sit imme
diately.

Afternoon. ——The house in which the Convention were
sitting, on account of the difficulty of hearing, being found
inconvenient, a committee was raised to provide one more
suitable, after which it was voted to adjourn to Satu1day
morning, then to meet in the representatives’ chamber.

SATURDAY, 12t/L.—T he Honorable Convention met again in
the representatives’ chamber, where they decided all the dis-
puted elections in favor of the members returned. The sense
of the Convention was twice taken against removing to any
other place.

MONDAY, January 142. The Constitution fol the United
States of America, as 1eported by the Convention of dele-
gates, held at Philadelphia, 111 May last, together with the-
resolutions of the Gene1al Court of this commonwealth, fo1
calling a Convention, agreeably to the recommendation of
Congress, we1e oWread.-- ~

011 motion of M1. Strong, Voted, That this Convention,
sensible how important itb is that the great subject sub-
mitted to their determination should he discussed, and con-
sidered with moderation, (and01, and deliberation, will entel
into a free conversation 011 the several palts thereof, by
paragraphs, until every member shall have had an opp01-
tunity to eXp1ess his sentiments on thes same; after which
the Convention will conside1 and debate at large the ques-
tion whether this Convention will adopt and ratify the
ploposed Constitution, before any vote is taken expressive
of the sense of the Convention, upon the whole or any part
thereof.

The resolve of the General Court of this commonwealth,
of Ma1ch,l787, appointing delegates for the Convention of
the states, held at Philadelphia, was order-ed to be r.ead

A motion was made and passed, that the Hon. Elbridge
,Gerry be 1equested to take a seat in the Convention, to
answel any questions of fact, flom time to time, that the
Convention may ask, respecting the passing of the Consti-
tution.

Aflernoon. -—Oidered, That a committee of three be

 

4 DEBATES. [SEDGWICIL‘

appointed to wait upon the H011. Elbridge Gerry, and
acquaint him with the vote of this m0111ing,requesting him
to take a seat in the Convention, to answer toc any questions
of fact, from time to time, that the Convention may ask,
respecting the passing the Constitution.

Agreeably to the resolution passed in the forenoon, the
Gnnmnion proceeded to consider the first section of the
Constitution, and, after a short conversation, entered upon
the discussion of' the second section, the first paragraph of
which caused a lengthy debate.

The Convention entered upon the consideration of the
preposed Constitution, and, having debated thereon through
the day, postponed the further consideration thereof to the
next mornin.

It had been mentioned by some gentlemen, that the
int1oduction of tyranny into several nations had been by
lengthening the du1ation of thei1 palliaments or legislative
bodies; and the fate of those nations was urged as a caution
against lengthening the peliod f01 which Congress 18 to be
chosen. Mt. SEDG‘VICK wished to know 11 hat 11 me the
nations which had‘ been thus dept 11 ed of their libe1ties,he
believed they wele few 1n numbe1; in fact, he did not 1‘8( 01—
lect any. Aftel showing ,by several examples, how nations
had been dep1ived of thei1 libe1ties, he continued, —Is it
not necessary, Mr. President, that the federal representa
tives should be chosen for two years? Annual elections, in.
a single state, may be the best for a variety of reasons; but
when the great affairs of thirteen states—where their com-
merce may be extended, and where it is necessary to be
restricted—what measures may be most expedient, and
best adapted to promote the general prosperity thereof, are
to be the objects of deliberation, is not such a period too
short? Can a man, called into public life, divest himself of
local concerns, and instantly initiate himself into a general
knowledge of such extensive and weighty matters? After
several other arguments in favor of the section, he begged
the indulgence of the Convention while he made a personal
observation: “It has been given out, sir, by several persons,
that I have said the Constitution must go down, right or
wrong; I beg leave to declate, si1, 011 my honor, that, so far-
{10m having made such a declaration, the idea of it has not "
ever enteled my mind.”

0.1mm] MASSACHUSETTS. 5

Mr. G. DENCH wished to know how the representa—
tion was secured; as, by the 4th section, Congress were
empowered to make or alter the regulation of the times,
places, and manner of holding elections. Mr. D. was contin—
ui11g, but was called to order by Mr. Parsons, who said the
subject in debate was the expediency of biennial elections,
and that an answe1 to the gentleman fiom Hopkinton
would more properly be given when the 4th section was
under conside1ation.

Dr. TAYLOR. Mr. President, I am“ Opposed to bien-
nial, and am in favor of annual elections. Annual elections
have been the practice of this state ever Since its settlement,
and no objection to such a mode of electing has ever been
made. It has, indeed, si1, been considered as the safe-
guard of the liberties of the people; and the annihilation of
it, the avenue through which tyranny will enter By the
Alticles of Confederation, annual elections a1e plovided f01,
though We have additional securities in a right to recall any
or all of our members from Congress, andED a provision for
rotation. In the proposed Constitution, there is no pro-
vision for rotation; we have no right by it to recall our
delegates. I11 answer to the obse1vations, that, by liequency
of elections, good men will be excluded, I answel, if they
behave well, it is probable they will be,,continued.; but if
they behave ill, how shall we remedy the evil? It is possible
that rulers may be appointed who may wish to root out the
liberties of the people. Is it not, Mr. President, better, if
such a case‘should occur, that at a short period they should
politically die, than that they should he proceeded against by
impeachment? These considerations, and others, said the
doctor, make me in favor of annual elections; and the fur-
ther We deviate therefrom, the greater is the evil.

The Ho11.M1. SPRAGUE was in favor of the section as
it stood. He thought the same principles ought not to guide
us when considering the election of a body Whose juiis-
diction was coextensive with a great continent, as when
regulating that of one Whose concerns are only those of
a single state.

Mr. T. DAWES, after a short exordium, said he had not
heard it mentioned by any oentleman who had spoken in
the debate, that the right of electing representatives in the
Congress. as provided for in the probposed Constitution, will

6 DEBATES. [STRONG

be the acquisition of a new privilege by the people, as it
really will be. The people will then be immediately repre—
sented in the federal government; at present they are not;
therefore It will be in favor of the people, if they are chosen
for l01ty instead of two yea1s;—and he adduced many rea-
sons to show that it would not conduce to the interests of the
United States, 01 the security of the people, to have them
for a shorte1 pe1iod than two yea1s.

The H011. Mr. WHITE said he was opposed to the
section; he thought the security of the people lay 111 f1e—
quent elections; fo1 his palt he would rather they should
be 101 six months than for two years; —and concluded
by saying he Was in favor of annual elections.

Dr. JARVIS, Gen. BROOKS Gen. HEATH, and Mr.
TURNER, each spoke a few words on the subject, when a
motion 11 as made to pestpone the considelation of thede

section until the next meeting, which passing, the Conven— '

lion ad'jomned. ’

TUESDAY, January 15. -—-A motion was made by Mr.
DANA that the vote of yeste1day, prescribing the manner
of p1oceeding in the conside1ation of the Constitution,
should be reconsidered, for the purpose of making the
following addition thereto, viz. : —

“ It is, nevertheless, the opinion of this Convention, that,
if any member conceives any other clause or paragraph of
the Constitution to be connected with the one immediately
unde1 consideration, that he have full libelty to take up such
other clause or paragraph for that pu1 pose 7’ And the ques-
tion of1econsideration, being put, passed in the affirmative.

On the question whether the addition should be made, it
was determined in the affirmative.

The Hon. Mr. STRONG rose to reply to the inquiry of
the H011. Mr. Adams, why the alteration of elections from
annual to biennial was made; and to correct an inaccuracy
of the H011. Mr. Gorham, who, the day before, had said that
that alteration was made to gratify South Carolina- He
said he should then have ariSen to put his worthy colleague
light, but his memo1y was not sufficiently retentive to
enable him immediately to collect every circumstance. He-
had since recuired to the original plan. When the subject
was at first discussed in Convention, some gentlemen Were
for having the term extended for a considerable length of

Amps] MASSACHUSETTS. 7

time; others were opposed to it, as it was contrary to the
ideas and customs of the Eastern States; but a majority was
in favor of three years, and it was, he said, urged 11y the
Southern States, which a1e not so populous as the Eastern
that the expense of more 11 equent elections would be g1c at; -—
and concluded by saying. that a gene1 1l concession p1oduced
the te1m as it Stood 1n the section, although it was ag1eeable
to the practice of South Carolina.

Mr. AMES. I do not regret, Mr. President, that we are
not unanimous upon this question. I do not consider the
diversity of sentiment which prevails as an impediment in
our way to the ’discovery of truth. In order that we may
think alike upon this subject at last, we shall be compelled
to discuss it by ascending to the p1ii1ciples upon which the
doctiine of replesentation is grounded.

Without premeditation, 111 a situation so novel, and awed
by the respect which I feel for this venerable assembly,I
distrust ext1emely my own feelings, as well as my com-
petency to p1osecute this inqui1y. With the hope of an
indulgent healing, Iwill attempt to ploceed, I am sensible,
sir, that the doctiine of fiequent elections has been sanc-
tioned by antiquity, and 18 still mo1e endealed to us by our
recent experience and unilmm habits of thinking. Gentle-
men have expressed theit zealous paltiality for it. Ihey
consider this as a leading question in the debate, and that
the merits of many other parts of the Constitution are involved
in the decision. I confess, sir, and I declare that my zeal
for frequent elections is not inferior to their own. I consider
it as one of the first securities for popular liberty, in which
its very essence may be supposed to reside. But how shall
We makethe best use of this pledge and instrument of our
safety. P

A right p1inciple, carried to an ext1eme, becomes useless.
It IS apparent that a declalatlon foi a very short term, as for
a single day, would defeat the design of representation. The
election, in that case, would not seem to the people to be
of any importance, and the person elected would think as
lightly of his appointment. The other extreme is equally
to be avoided. An election for a very long term of years, or
for life, would remove the member too far from the control
of the people, would be dangerous to liberty, and in fact
repugnant to the purposes of the delegation. The truth, as

«‘1' DEBATES. [AMES

usual, is placed somewhe1e between the extlemes, and I
believe 1s included 111 this ploposition: The term of election
must be so long, that the 1ep1esentative may undelstand the
interest of the people, and yet so limited, that his fidelity
may be secured by a dependence upon their approbation.

Before I proceed to the application of this rule, I cannot
fo1bea1 to piemise some remarks upon two opinions, which
have been suggested.

Much has been said about the people divesting themselves
of power, when they delegate it to representatives; and
that all representation is to their disadvantage, because it is
but an image, a copy, fainter and more imperfect than the
original, the people, 111 whom the light of power is p1ima1y
and u11b01rowed,whicl11s only 1eflected by thei1 delegates.
I cannot agree to either of these opinions. The representa-
tion of the peOple is something more than the people. I
know, sir, but one purpose which the people can effect with-
out delegation, and that is to destroy a government. That
they cannot erect a government, is evinced by our being
thus assembled on their behalf. The people must govern
by a majority, W1th whom all power resides. But how is
the sense of this majority to be obtained? It has been said
that a puie democlacy IS the best government fo1 a small
people Who assemble in person. It 18 of small consequence
to discuss it, as it would be inapplicable to the great country
we inhabit It may be of some use in this a1 Hument how
eve1, to conside1, that it would be 1.te burdensome, subject
to faction and Violence; decisions would often be made by
su1p1ise, in the pleeipitancy of passion, by men who either
understand nothing or care nothing about the subject; or
by intelested men, or those who vote for their own indem-
nity. It would be a govelnment not by laws, but by men.

Such were the palt1y den1oc1ac1es of Greece and Asia
Mino1, so much extolled, and so often prOposed as a model
fo1 ou1 imitation. ldesi1e to be thankful that our people
(said M1. Ames) ate not unde1 any temptation to adopt the
advice. Ithink it will not be denied that the people are
gainers by the election of 1epresentatives. They may de-
stroy, but they cannot exe1cise, the po117e1s of government in ‘
person , but by their servants they govern: they do not
renounce their power; they do not sacrifice their rights;-
they become the true sovereigns of the country when they

AMEs.] MASSACHUSETTS. 9

delegate that power, which they cannot use themselves to
their trustees.

I know, sir, that the people talk about the liberty of
nature, and assert that we divest ourselves of a portion
of it when we enter into society. This is declamation
against matter of fact. We cannot live without. society;
and as to liberty, how can I be said to enjoy that which
another may take from me when he pleases? The liberty
of one depends not so much on the removal of all restraint
from him, as on the due restraint upon the liberties of others.
Without such restraint, there can be no liberty. Liberty is
so far from being endangered or destroyed by this, that it is
extended and secured. For I said that we do not enjoy
that which another may take from us. But civil lib-
erty cannot be taken from us, when any one may please
to invade it; for we have the strength of the society on
our side.

I hope, sir, that these reflections will have some tendency
to remove the ill impressions which are made by proposing
to divest the people of their power.

That they may never be divested of it, I repeat that I am
in favor of frequent elections. They who commend annual
elections are desired to consider, that the question is,
whether biennial elections are a defect in the Constitution;
for it does not follow, because annual elections are safe, that
biennial are dangerous; for both may be good. Nor is there
any foundation for the fears of those, who say that if we,
who have been accustomed to choose for one year only, now
extend it to two, the next stride Will be to five or seven
years, and the next for term of life; for this article, with all
its supposed defects, is in favor of liberty. Being inserted
in the Constitution, it is not subject to be repealed by law.
We are sure that it is the worst of the case. It is a fence
against ambitious encroachments, too high and too strong to
be passed. In this respect, we have greatly the advantage
ot'tlle people of England, and of all the world. The law
which limits their Parliaments is liable to be repealed.

I will not defend this article by saying that it was a mat-
ter of compromise in the federal Convention. It has my
entire approbation as it stands. I think that we ought,
r0 prefer, in thisarticle, biennial elections to annual; and my
reasons for this opinion are drawn from these sources: —-

VOL. II. 2

]U D EBATES. [Antes

From the extent of the country to be governed ;

The objects of their legislation;

And the more perfect security of 01117 liberty.

It seems obvious that men who are to collect in Congress
from this g1eat te177rito1y, perhaps from the Bay of Fundy, or
1111111 the btnks of the Ohio, and the sho1e of Lake Superim,
ought to have 21 louver te1m in office, than the delegates of
a single state, in thei1 01111 leotslattue it is not by riding
post to and 110m Congress that a man c2111 acqt1i1e a just
knowledge of the true interests of the Union. This term
of election is inapplicable to the state of a country as large
as Germany, 017 as the Roman empire in the zenith of its
power.

If we consider the objects of their delegation, little doubt
will remain. It is admitted that annual elections may be
highly fit for the state legislature. Evely citizen grows up
with a k11o117ledge of the local circumstances of the state.
But the business of the fede1a7l government will be very
different. Ihe objects of their pow e17 are few and nat1onai.
At least two 111113 in office will be necessary to enable a
man to'judge of the trade and interests of the state which
he ne17e1 saw. Ihe time, I hope, will come, when this
excellent cou711t1y will furnish food, and fr,eedom (which is
better than food, 11l11ch is the food of the soul,) f01 fifty
millions of happy people. Will any man say that the na—
tional business can be understood in one year?

Biennial elections appear to me, sir, an essential security
to liberty. These are my reasons : ——

Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments by which
popular governments are destroyed. We need not talk of
the power of an aristocracy. The people, when they lose
their liberties, are cheated out of them. They nourish fac—
tions in their hosoms, which will subsist so long as abusing
their honest eredulity shall be the means of acquiring power.
A democracy is a volcano, which conceals the fiery ma-
terials of its own destruction. These will produce an
eruption, and carry desolation in their way. The people
always mean right7 and, if time is allowed for reflection and
information, they will do ri717ht. I would not have the first
wish, the momentary impdise of the public mind, become
law; f01 it is not al11ays the sense of the people, with
whom I admit that all powe1 lesides. On gieat qUestions,

DENCH.] MASSACHUSETTS. 1]

we first hear the loud clamors of passion, artifice, and faction.
I consider biennial elections as 21 security that the sober.
second thought of the peOple shall be law. There is 21 calm
review of public transactions, which is made by the citizens
who have families and child11c11,the pledges of their fidelity
To provide for popular libe1ty, We must takec care tl1at_
measures shall not be adopted without due delibe1atio11.
The member chosen fOr two years will feel some independ-
ence in his seat. The factions of the day will expire before
the end of his term.

The people will be propo1tionably attentive to the merits
ofa candidate. Two years will affo1d oppo1tunity to the
member to deselve well of them, 21nd they will 111equi1e
evidence that he has done it.

But, sir, the representatives are the grand inquisition of
the Union. They are, by i111pe21ch111e11t, to bring great
offenders to justice. One year will not suffice to detect
guilt, and to pu1sue it to conviction; therefore they will
escape, 21nd the balance of the two branches will be de—
stroyed, and the peOple oppressed with impunity. The
senators will represent the sovereignty of the states. The
representatives are to represent the people. The offices
ought to bear some proportion in point of importance. This
will be impossible if they are chosen for one year only.

Will the people, then, blind the eyes of their own watch—
men? Will they bind the hands which are to hold the
sword for their defence? Will they impair their own power
by 2111 unreasonable jealousy of themselves ?

F01 these reasons, I am clearly of opinion that the alticle
is entitled to our 21pp1obation as it stands; and as it has
been demanded, why annual elections were not preferred to
biennial, permit me to 111eto1t the question, and to inqui1e, in
my turn, What reason c2111 be given, why, if annual elections
are good, biennial elections are not better?

The inquiry in the latter part of Mr. Ames’ 5 speech being
directed to the H011. Ml. Ad 211113, that gentleman said, he
only made the inquily for information, and that he had
heard sufficient to satisfy himself of its propriety.

M11. DENCH said his objections to biennial elections
were removed; but he wished to recur to the 4th section,
and to inquire. whether that election was secured, as, by this

I? DEBATES. [HEATH

section, Congress has power to regulate the time, place, and
manner of holding it.

[A question now arose, Whether the consideration inf.
the 11th section was in 011131;, and much debate was had
theIeon ;~ but the propriety, as expressed by a worthy mem-
ber, of “elucidating scripture by scripture,” being generally
admitted, the motion made by the H011. Mr. Dana passed,
which put an end to the conversation.]

The Hon. Mr. BOWDOIN remarked 011 the idea sug-
gested by the honorable gentleman from Scituate, [M13
Turner,] who had said that nature pointed out the p1opiiety
of annual elections, by the annual tenewal, and obse11ed,
that if the 1e1olution of the hea1enly bodies is to be the
p1i11ciple to 1egulate elections, it was not fixed to any p11—
llOd, as in some of the systems it 11ould be 1e1y she1t , and
in the last-discOvered planet it would be eighty of ouryears.
Gentlemen, he said, 1th had gone before him in debate,
had clearly pointed out the alteration of the election of our
federal representatives, from annual to biennial, to bejusti—
liable. Annual elections may be necessa11 in this state,
but in the choice of1ep1esentati1es flom the continent, it
ought to be longer 1; 1101 did he see any dange1 in its being
so. Who, he asked, me the men to be elected? Are they
not. to be from among us? If they 1ve1e to be a distinct
body, then the doct1ine of prce aution, 11 Inch gentlemen use,
11ould be necessary; but, sir, they can make no la11s, 11111
le1y any taxes, but those to 11 Inch they themselves must be
subservient; they themselves must bear a part; therefore
0111 s11c111ity is gua1antied by tl1ei1 being thus subject to the
12111 s, it by nothing else.

Gen. HEATH. M1. President, I consider myselfnot as
2111 inhabitant of Massachusetts, but as a citizen of the United
States. My ideas and views are commensurate with the
continent; they extend in length from the St. Croix to the
St. lVIaria, and in breadth from the Atlantic to the Lake of
the Woods ; for overall this extensive territory is the federal
government to be extended.

I should not have risen on this paragraph, had it not been
in! some 2111111111ents 11|1ieh gentlemen ha1e advanced 1e-
spt minr1 elections, and 11l1iel1, l think, tend to make dangemus-

impiessions 011 the minds ol the 1isi11g gene1ation. It has

HEATH.] MASSACHUSETTS. 13

been the general opinionthat the liberties of the people are
principally secured by the frequency of elections, and ])O\VC‘
returning again into their own hands. The first Parlia
ment ever called in Europe was called by Constantine the
Third, and to continue for one year. The worthy gentleman
from Boston [M13 Dawes] has mentioned a writer as a good
authority, and who, he says, was twenty years compiling his
works. I will produce one observation from this celebrated
writer, Baron Montesquieu; it is as follows: “The great—
ness of power must be compensated by the brevity of the
duration; most legislators have fixed it to a year; a longer
space would be dangerous.” Here, sir, we have not only 'the
opinion of this celebrated writer, but he has also mentioned
that most legislators were of the like opinion; but I shall
come to our own country, where we shall find in what re-
spect annual elections have always been held. This was the
wisdom of our ancestors; it has been confirmed by time;
therefore, sir, before we change it, we should carefully ex—
amine Whether it be for the better. Local circumstances
may render it expedient; but we. should take care not to
hold up to the rising generation, that it is a matter of in
difference whether elections be annual or not; and this is
what induced me to rise.

It is a novel idea, that representatives should be chosen
for a considerable time, in order that they may learn their
duty. The representative is one who appears in behalf of,
and acts for, others ; he oughtbtherefore, to be fully acquaint-
ed with the feelings, circumstances, and interests of the
persons whomhe represents; and this is learnt among them,
not at a distant court. How frequently, on momentary
occasions, do the members of the British Parliament wish to
go home and consult their constituents, before they come to
decision! This shows from what quarter they wish to obtain
their information. With respect to the obtaining a knowledge
of the circumstances and abilities of the other states, in or-
der to an equal taxation, this must be acquired from the
returns of the number of inhabitants, &c., which are to be
found on the files of Congress; for I know not how length
of time could furnish other information, unless the members
should go from state to state, in order to find out the cir-
cumstances of the different states. Ithink representatives
ought always to have a general knowledge of the interests of

- 2

l-L DE BATES. [Baoons

their constituents, as this alone can enable them properly to
rep1esent them.

But, $11, if tl1e1e be cha11ns 111 the pa1ag1aph 110w under
consideration, they a1e these: Congress, at piesent, a1e
continually sitting; but under the new Constitution, it is
intended that Congress shall sit but once annually, for such
time as may be necessary, and then adjourn. In this View,
every gentleman acquainted with the business of legislation
knows that there is much business, in every session, which is
taken up and partly conside1ed, but not finished; an ad—
jou1nmeflnt keeps all this buSiness alive; and at the next
session it is taken up and completed, to the benefit of the
people, 111 a great saving of expense, which would othemise
be lost; for a new legislatrne would not see tlnough the
e_y es of those who went I1ef01e them; consequently all busi-
ness p 11 tly finished would be time lost, to the 1nju1y oi the
public. Therefo1e, as it seems to be intended that C011-
gress shall hate but two sessions in the two years 101 11 hich
the representatives are to be chosen, this consideration has
'leconciled me to the parag1aph, and I am in fav01 of biennial ‘
elections.

Mr. TURNER, in reply to the Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, said
he thought it an important consideration whether the elections
wei'e to be for one or for two years. He was, he said, greatly
in favor of annual elections, and he thought, in the present
instance, it would be establishing a dangerous precedent to
adopt a change; for, says he, the principle may so operate,
as, in time, our elections will he as seldom as the revolution
of the star the honorable gentleman talks of.

Mr. DAWES, in answer to Gen. Heath, said, that the
passage quoted from Montesquieu applied to single govern—
ments, and not to confederate ones.

Gen. BROOKS, (of Medford,) in reply to Gen. Heath,
said, he recollected the passage of Montesquieu, but he also
recollected that that writer had spoken highly of the British
government. He then adverted to the objection to this sec—
tion of Gen. Thompson and others, that biennial elections
were a novelty, and said, we were not to consider whether
a measure wasnew, but whether it wasproper. Gentlemen
had said that it had been the established custom of this
count1y to elect annually , but, he asked, have we not Done
f1 om a colonial to an independent situation.- VVe wele then

THOMPSON.] MASSACHUSETTS. 15

provinces; we are 110w an independent empire; our measures,
therefore, says he, must change with our situation. Under
our old government, the objects of legislation were few and
divided; under our present, there are many, and must be
united; and it appears necessary that, according to the
magnitude and multiplicity of the business, the tD'dmation
should be extended, he did not, he said, unde1take to say
how far. He then went into a view of the histmy of Par-
liaments: the modern northern nations, he said, had Parlia-
ments; but they were called by their kings; and the time,
business, 810., of them, depended wholly 011 their Wills.

We can, therefore,says he, establish nothing from these.
One general remark was, that, in the reigns of weak princes,
the power and importance of Parliaments increased; in the
reigns of strong and arbitrary kings, they always declined,
and, says he, they have been triennial, and they have beeli
septennz'al. The general combated the idea that the liber—
ties of the people depended on the duration of Parliament,
with much ability. Do we hea1, asked he, that the people
of England are deprived of their libe1ties,? 01 that they me
not as free now as when they had short Parliaments? On
the contrary, do not writers agree, that. life, liberty, and
property, are nowhere better secured than in Great Britain,
and that this secutity arises f1om their Parliaments being
chosen f01 seven years? As such is the situation of the
people of England, and as no instance can be given wherein
biennial elections have been destiuctive to the libelties of
the people, he concluded by asking, Whether so much dan-
ger is to be apprehended from such elections as gentlemen
imagined.

Gen. THOMPSON Sir, gentlemen have said a g1eat
deal about the histo1y of old times. I confess I am not ac-
quainted with such histor 7; but I am, sir, acquainted with
the history of my own country. I had the honor to be in
the General Court last year, and am in it this year- I think,
sir, that had the last administration continued one year
longer, 0111 liberties would have been lost, and the (ountiy
involved 1n blood. Not so much, si1, fiom their bad conduct,
but from the suspicions of the peOple of them. But, si1,a
change took place; from this change pardons have been
granted to the people, and peace is restored. This, sir, I
say, is in favor of frequent elections.

16 DEBATES. [Gem

[Gen. T. was called to order, 011 the idea that he re—
flected on the last administ1ation. A debate ensued, which
ended 011 the H011. Mr. White’s saying, he wished to put
out every spark of the fi1e that appeared to be kindling;
therefore moved to adjourn]

Afiernoom—Dr. TAYLOR opened the conversation of
the afternoon, by calling upon Gen. Thompson to proceed.

Gen. THOMPSON accordingly said, that, howeverjust,
however good, and however upright the administration may
be, there was still a great necessity for annual elections.

He thought a change of election was for the best, even
if the administration pleased the people. Do the membe1s
of C011g1ess,s says he, displease us, we call them home, and
they obey Now, where 19 the differe11ce Of their having
been eleeted fo1 one or two yeals? It is said that the
members cannot learn sufficiently in that time. Sir, I hope
we shall never send men who are not learned. Let these
members know their dependence upon the people, and I say
it will be a check on them, even if they were not good men.
Here the gene1al broke out in the following pathetic apos-
trophe: “O my country, neve1 give up you1 annual elec-
tions! young men, neve1 gi1e up you1 jewel!” He apolo—
gized for his zeal. He then d1ew a comparison between the
judges, &c., of this eountly befo1e the 1evolution, who wele
dependent on Gleat B1itain f01 their salaries, and those
representatives dependent on the Continent. He concluded
by hopian that the representatives would be annually elect-

ed, and fhereby feel a greater dependence on the people.

Mr. GORE. It has been Observed, that, in considering
this great and momentous question, we ought to consult the
sentiments of wise men, who have written on the subject
of government, and thereby regulate our decision on this
business. A passage is adduced f1'om1Montesqu1eu, stating
that, where the people delegate great power, it ought to be
compensated for by the shortness of the ,duration. Though
strictly agreeing with the a11tl1o1'_,_WI doinot see that it applies
to the subject unde1 conside1ation. This might be perfeCtli’
applicable to the ancient gove1nments, where they had no
idea of representation, (11 different checks in the legislature
01 administration of government; but, in the proposed Con-
stitution, the powers of the whole government are limited to
certain national objects, and are accurately defined. [he

(30113.1 MASSACHUSETTS. 17

House of Representatives is but one branch of the system.
and can do nothing of itself. Montesquieu, in the sentiment
alluded to, must have had in his mind the Epistates of Ath-
ens, or theDictators of Rome; but certainly observations
drawn from such sources can have no weight in considering
things so efficiently different. Again, sir, gentlemen have
said that annual elections Were necessary to the preserva-
tion of liberty, and that, in proportion as the people of dif-
ferent nations have lengthened, beyond the term of a year,
the duration of their representatives, they have lost their
liberties, and that all writers have agreed in this. I may
mistake; but I know no such thing as a representation of
the people in any of the ancient republics.__l_ In England,
from whence we receive many of our ideas on this subject,
King John covenanted with his peOple to summon certain
classes of men to Parliament. By the constitution of that
country,‘the king alone can convoke, and he alone, previous
to the revolution, could dissolve, the Parliament; but in the
reign of William the Third, the patriots obtained an act lim—
iting the duration of Parliament to three years. Soon after,
a Parliament then sitting, and near expiring, a rebellion
broke out, and the tories and Jacobites were gaining strength
to support the Pretender’s claim to the crown. Had they
dissolved themselves, and a new Parliament been convoked‘,
probably many of the very opponents to the government
might have been elected, In that case they might have
effected by law What they in vain attempted by arms.

The Parliament, therefore, extended their duration from
triennial to septennial. This was acquiesced in by the peo~
ple, and the next Parliament sanctioned the act. No evil,
but great good, has been supposed to follow from their dura-
tion being thus extended; and if Montesquieu and Dr.
Adams think the British constitution so perfect, how much
greater must be our security, When we reflect that our rep-
resentation is equal ; that the powers of the government are
so limited, and the checks so nicely appointed! If there be
a representation of the' people in any other countries, and
annual elections therein have been considered as the basis of
their freedom, I pray gentlemen to mention the instances ;
I confess I know none. People adopt a position which is
certainly true, viz., that elections ought to be frequent; but,
then, as we have been in the custom of choosing our repre-

VOL.IL 3

18 DEBATES. [KING.

sentatives annually, we have determined annually to be fre-
quent,:111d that biennial, or any longer term than a1111ual,1'
not frequent; but if gentlemen will t)only considei the objetts
over which this govelnment is to have 1ule and authority,
and the immense and wide- extended t1acts of country 01e1
which the 1ep1esentatives are to pass befOIe they reach the_
seat of gov e111n1e11t, I think they will be convinced that t11o
yea1s is a sl101t time fo1 the 1ep1ese11tatives to hold thei1 office.
Further, sir, we must consider this subject with respect to
the general structure of the Constitution. The Senatec re pre—
sents the sove1eignty of the states; the House of Representa-
tives the people of the United States. The f01me1 ha1e a
ulonge1 te1m in their office; it is then necessaiy that that
bOdy which lepiesents the people should ha1e a per1man< nee
in their office, to 1esist any ope1ations of the Senate, 11 inch
might be i11ju1ious to the people. If they were annual, I
submit it to the good sense of this house whether they would
be able to p1ese11e that weight in the system which the
Constitution intended they should have, and which 1s abso-
lutely 1'1'1tcessa1v 101 the secu1ity of the lights of the people.
The H011. M1. KING said he 11 ould not detain the C011-
vention by any exordium for the purpose of obtaining their
attention. He declared, however, that he thought the sub-
ject might be freed from certain prejudices connected with
its examination, and that thereby the question might receive
a fairer decision : this should be the object of his address.
The honorable gentleman observed, that the ConventiOn
would do well to lay aside the terms annual or biennial, and
consider the subject as it could he supported by principles.
Much had been said of the instruction to be derived from
history on this point; he said he presumed to doubt Whether
this was the case. F1om the continent of Emope he be.-
lieved that we.could1eee1ve .110..instlfll§tior1. Theil ParliaA~
ments, after the overthrow of the Roman empile, we1e not
constructed upon the principle of a representation of the
people. The cenquetor of a given district of the countly
was, by the feudal s1 stem theb punce 01 king of the people
within his conqumed telritories. When he Wished the ad—
vice of any persons, he summoned usually a number of his
principal officers, or the barons of his kingdom, to give him.
their counsel; but the people, 01', as they were degradingly
called, the vassals, were never consulted. This certainly

KING.] MASSACHUSETTS. 10

cannot be consideled as a 1epresentation of the people”

1111s mode of assembhnw 11 Palhament p1obably obtained 111
the ea1ly stages of the English hist01y , but those who l1'1 1Ve
1V1itte11 011 this subject ag1ee that theit 1111011111111011 is 1e1y
impe11,ect 1elative to theb 01igin of English P1111111n1e11ts;
they are not certain who composed the Palliament, how long
they held the11 office, 01 co11ce1ning what points they we1e
consulted.

Nothing clear 011 this subject appears before the 12111
century. Magna Charta is the foundation of the imperfect
representation of England. Improvements have since been
made in favor of the more equal and certain representation
of the people; but it is still eXtremely imperfect and inse—
cu1e. Pe1haps the people of Ame11ca me the 111st, who, bv
the social compact, ever obtained a 1igl1t to a 11111 11nd 11111
1ep1esentation, 111 making the laws 01 their countIy.

11, then, [continued M1. K. ,] l11sto1y can a1101d little ()1
up insuuction 011 th1s subject the MC011Vent1011 111Ust deter—
mine the question upon its own p11110c1ples. It seems proper

that the Lplesentatlve should be 111 office time enough to,

acqui1e that infomnation which 18 11eccssa1y to 101m a 1igl1t
judgment; but that the time should not be so long as to
remo1e 110111 his mind the powe1ful check upon his conduct,
that 1111311s 110111 the flequency of electiOns, whe1e'b'y the
,people ale enabled to 1emove an u111aithful 1ep1esentative,
or to continue a faithful one. If the question is examined
by this standard, perhaps it will appear that an election for
. two years is short enough 101 a 1ep1esentat1ve in Cong1ess.
11 one 111.111 is necessary 101 11 representative to be use1ul111
the state leg1s11t1.11e,11l1e1 the objects of his delibelations
are local, and within his constant observation, two yea1s
do not appear too long, where the objects of deliberation
are not confined to one state, but extend to thirteen states;
11111-1 11111 the complicated interests of united America are min—
gled with those 01101eign nations; and 11 hele the g1eat duties
01 national sove1eignty will 1equire his constant attention.
When the 1ep1esentat1ves of the colony of Massachusetts
were first chosen, the country was not settled more than
twenty miles from Boston; they then held their offices for
one year. The e111igra11ts from Massachusetts, who settled
on Connecticut River, appointed the representatives to meet
111 the General Court 01 that colony 101' only siX months

‘ 1'».
NM mun-um.» —

20 DEBATES. [DANA.

Massachusetts, although her settlements have extended over
almost her Whole territory, has continued to depute repre-
sentatives for only one year, and Connecticut for only six
months; but as, in each of these colonies, when under the
British government, the duties of the representatives were
merely local, the great duties of sovereignty being vested in
their king, so, since the revolution, their duties l1a1e continued
local, many of the authorities of soveteignty being 1ested
in Congress. It 1s now propose 1d to inctease the 11o11ers of
Congress; this will inc1'21e se the duties of the 1'1ep1esenta-
tives, and they must have a reasonable time to obtain the
information necessary to a light discha1ge ol the 111' o lice.

Ith has been said that OLll ancestms 11e1er relinquished the
idea of211nual elections: this is an 2211211. In 16313, the
colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New
Haven, united in a confederaey, which continued about forty
ye a1s; each colony sent t11o commissioners as their 1111121-
sentatnes, and by the articles they new to he annually

elected. About the yeai 1650, he General Court of Mas-
sachusetts 111st1ueted theil commissioners to propose that the
elections, instead or being annual, should he only once in
three yeats. The alteration did not take place, but the
anecdote proves that our ancestors have not had a uniform
predilection for annual elections.

Mr. K. concluded by observing that, 011 a candid examinar
tion of this question, he presumed that the Constitution
11 ould not be objected to 011 account of the biennial election

olthe House of Re111esentati1es.

Judge DANA. M1. President, the feeble state of my
health will not permit me to enter so largely into the debates

of this house, as I should be other111ise inclined to do. The
intention of my risin g,at present, is to express my perfect
acquiescence in the sentiments ad anced by the honorable
gentleman from Ne111'1'l1uty1101t, [M1.Ki11g,] in l21101 of the
.mpetlzencg/ ofbiemual 6166120729 of our fedeial leptesenta ti1es.
F1om 1111 011111 expeiience, I think them 111efel able to annual
elections. I have, sir, seen gentlemen in Congress, and
delegates from this state too, sitting in that honorable bod1,
without a 1oice;111thout 11011 ei too open their months, or lift
1111 their hands, when matters of the highest importance to-
their state have been under consideration. I have seen,
members in Congress, for the space of three months, with—

NASONJ MASSACHUSETTS. 21

out power, si1, waiting for evidence of then 1eélection.
Besides, si1, that the 1‘1en01 frequent elections ar,e the oftener
states will be exposed to be deprived of then voice and
influence in national councils. I think annual elections are
too short for so extensive an empire. They keep the mem-
bers always travelling about; and I 11111 of opinion that
elections for two years are in no way subversive of the liber-
ties ol 1' the people. I, Sir, am one of the people, thank God. '
and am happy in I11ivin11 1111 oppmtunity of expressin11 my
peisonal satisfaction of such elections. F01 these and a vari—
ety of othe1 reasons, Mr. D. su1111est11 1d that he thought this
state ou11l1t to be the first to adopt this method of elections.

The Hon. M1. WHITE Still thou11l1t that Congress 111i11l1t
perpetuatet themselves, and so 1eign empeiois ovei us. '

Hon. M1. GORHAM obse1ved, (in continuation of M1.
Dana’s obse1vation,) that them was not now a Cong1ess;
although the time of their meeting had considerably elapsed.
Rhode Island, Connecticut, and several other states, had not
gone 011; that there was now only five states in Congress,
when there ought to have been thirteen two months ago.

Mr. CARNES rose to confirm it, and accordingly read
part of a letter from the Hon. Mr. Otis, the purport of which
was, that there was much business to do; that only five
states were re presented, and that the probability ot‘lndian
war, &c., evinced the 1111e11t necessity of the establishment
of an efficient federal goveinment, which will be the 1csult
ot the adoption of the pioposed Constitution.

Dr. T AYLOR 1ose to answei two objections which had
been made against annual elections. The distance ofplace
was not so great but the delegates might 1each Philadelphia
in a fortnight; and as they weie answerable to the people

rthei1 conduct, het thought it would p1event a vacancy,
111id concluded by s1ying, he did not conceive the arguments
in faV01 of biennial elections well founded.

A Iette1 from the Hon. Elbridge Geriy, info1ming that he
would attend the Convention, a111eeable to thei1 vote of
yesterday, was 1eceived and read.

On motion of Mr. NASON, Oitz'ered, That a committee
be appointed to piovide a more convenient place for the
Convention to Sit in.

WEDNESDAY, January 16. —The 2d part of the 2d sec- .
tion of the 3d article was read at the table 1 a desultory

22 DEBATES. [PORTEIL

013111'1 1'sation ensued 011 the 11101113 of conducting the discus-
sion; it 11215 11512111 215113011, that, 111 the debate 011 any para—
51'211311,5 11011110111011 1111:3l1t discuss 21111 other part theV 11115111
'su13130'Seb had relation to that under consideration.

Mr. PIERCE, (1 r0111 P211t1'11115eficld,) 211t1r 1eading the
«1th section, 11151101] to know the opinion 01 150ntle1nen 011
it, 21s C0115ress appeared th131'eb1 to 11211'0 21 13011 er to 1'e5ulate
the 1122104311106, and manner 01‘ 11011111113 elections. 111 respect
to the manner, said Mr. 1.,suppose the 105islature 01 this
state should 1310s01'ibe that the choice 01 the 113d131al repre—
se nt'1t1113s should be 111 the same 11121111101 as that 01 1501 01"———1101,
2111121jo1ity of all the votes 111 the state 1301115 necessat1 to
make it such,——and Congress should 1100111 it an improper
11212/11161', and should order that it be as practised 111 several
- 01‘ the Southern States, Where the hi5hest 111111113131' 01 votes
make a choice; — have they not power by this section to do
so? A15'ain, as to the place, continues Mr.1’., may not
Con15'1ess direct that the election for Massachusetts shall he
held 111 Boston? and 11 so, it is possible that, 131'e1ious to the
election, a number 01‘ the electors may meet, 2151'013 upon the
ei15'ht delegates, and propose the same to a 1'13111'1011'11s 111
the 1icinit1, 11110, a5reein15 in sentiment, may meet on the
11211 01 election, and carr1 their list b121 111211011010. He
did not, he said, $211 that this would be the case; but he
wished to know 11' it was not a possible 0110. As the federal
representatives, who 211'0 to form the 1113 11101'1'atical part of the
1513 31101'211 15010rnment, are to be a check 011 the 1e13113s1311tati1es
01 the s011311311311t1, the senate, he tl1orr5ht the utmost caution
13u1 ht to 1313 used to 112110 theit elections as 11'00 as possible.
He obs01'113d that, as men have eve1 been fond 011301101, 110
must suppose the1‘ 0101' will continue so; and concluded b1
obser1'1n5, that our caution ou15ht 111 the present case to be
5r0at131', as, 131 the proposed Constitution, no qualification 01
property was 113111111011 111 a 1"013res13ntative ; and it 11115111 131-3
in the 1301101 of some .13001310 thc113b1 to choose a bankrupt
1131 21 1'epr'esentati113, in 01d01 to 5110 such 1"eplesentati1'13s
12mployment, or that he might make laws 1211 01able to such
:1 description of the people.

Gen. 10R TER (110m Iladlev) 01111ea101'13d to 0b1iate
the objections 01 Mun Pierce, b1 showing the almost 271117135323
’nlzty of Congress 111211111113 21 law 111113113131 13113ht 111111 could“
be elected, as Mr. Pierce had supposed, and he thou5ht_it

111mm,] MASSACHUSETTS. 23

equally impossible for the people to choose a person to take
care of their property, who had none himself.

Mr. BISHOP rose, and observed that, by the 4th section,
Congress would be enabled to control the elections of repre—
Sent’at‘hes; It has been said, sa1s he, that this 11011 er was
given in o1de1 that 1cf121cto1y states maybe made to do thei1
duty. But if so, si1, why was it not so mentioned. 9 If that
was the intention, he asked why the clause (lid not r1111
thus: “ lhe times, places, and manne1 of holding elections
for senators and re1'11esentatives, shall be 11r'.esc1ibed 111 each
state by the legislature theieol; but, 7’ if (my state Shall .76
W 0’! 713517662" 30 Z0 do, “ Cohgress may,” 8.10. This, he

said, would admit of no 1111117 va1ication. Iam, says Mr. B.,
I01 giving Cong1ess as much po11e1 to do good as possible

It has been said, Mr. P1eside ent, that the conduct of Rhode
Island, in recalling its delegates from Congress, has demon-
strated the necessity of such a power being lodged in C011—
g1ess. I have been 111to1 med by people be longing to Rhode
Island, sir, that that state neve1 has 1ecalled he1 delegates
from Conmess. I do not believe it. has. And I call upon

D
the gentleman who mentloned it to authentlcate the fact.

The Hon. Mr. KING rose, and assured the Convention
that the state of Rhode Island did, by a solemn resolution,
some time since, 111 call its delegates hom Co1111ress.

Ihe [1011. M1. GORHAM confirmed what M1. K. had
said, and added, that, dining the session of the tede1al C011-
vention, when seven states only were represented in C011-
gress, application was made by two companies for the
purchase of lands, the sale of which would have sunk seven
or eight millions of dollars of the Continental debt, and the
most pressing letters were sent 011 to Rhode Island to send
011 its delegates; but that state refused: the consequence
was, the contract could not then be made.

Mr. BISHOP confessed himself convinced of the fact.
He proceeded to observe, that, if the states shall refuse to do
their duty, then let the power be given to Congress to oblige
them to do it. -BIltwifytheydo”their duty, Congress ought
not to have the power to control elections. In 2111 uncon-
trolled representation, says 'Mr. B.,”lies the security of
freedom; and he thought by these clauses, that that free-
dom was spo1ted with. In fact, says he, the moment we
give Cong1ess this powe1, the libeities ol the yeomanr v of

2’1 DEBATES [S'1‘RONG.

this country are at an end. But he trusted they would never
give it; and he felt a consolation from the reflection.

The 4111 section, which provides that the state legislatures
shall prescribe the time, place, and manner of holding elec—
tions, and that Congress may at any time make or alter
them, except in those of senators, [though not in regular
order,] under deliberation.

The Hon. Mr. STRONG followed Mr. Bishop, and
pointed out the necessity there is for the 4111 section.
Ihe power, says he, to regulate the elections of our fed-
eral 1epresentati1es must be lodged somewhere. I know of
but. two bodies wherein it can be lodged—the [effislalmesof
the save/(Ll slates and the gene/a! Countess It the legis-
lative bodies of tlie states, who must be supposed to know at
what time, and 111 what place and 111211111111, the elections can
best be held, should so appoint them, it cannot be supposed
that Congress, by the power ”ranted b‘f‘this section, will alter
them; but if the legislattne of a state should refuse to make
such legulations, thet consequence will be, that the leptesent-
2 ati1 es w ill not be chosen, and the geneial go1e1nment will be
"1dissol1'ed. In such case, can gentlemen say that a power to
rentedyt the evil is not necessary to be lodged somewhere
And 11 he1e can it be lodged but in Congress? I will con-
sidet its advantaue 111 another respect. \Ve know, sir, that
a newligenee 111 the appointment of 1ulels IS the chatactetistic
of all nations. In this state, and since the establishment of
our present. constitution, the first officers of government have
been elected by less than one tenth part of the electors of the
state. \\ e also know that 0111 town meetings, to] the choice
ofoftiee1s, are generally attended by an inconsiderable part of
"the qualified voters. People attend so much to their private
interest, that they are apt to neglect this 11<1 ht Nations 11211 e
lost tl1ei1 libe1ties by neglecting then plivileoes; consequently
Congress ought to ha1eb an inteiposing pow e1 to awaken the
people when0 thus ne ef1li<1e 1nt. Eve 1n supposing, si1, the pro-
Visional clause suggested bV the woitl11 gentleman from
Neiton should be added, would not. Congress then be the.
judges whether the elections in the several states were con-
stitutional and proper;D If so, it will then stand 011 the
same ground it now does. It appears evident that there
nlllSt be a gene1al power to regulate genetal elections.
Gentlemen have said, the proposed t3Constitution 11 as in some."

CABOT.] MASSACHUSETTS. 25

places ambiguous. I Wish they would point out the particu-
lar instances of ambiguity; for my part, I think the whole
of it is expressed in the plain, common language of mankind
If any p211ts are not so explie it as thev could be, it cannot I12
attributed to any design; for I believe 21 g1eat majority of
the men who fo1111ed it we1e sincere and honest men.

Mi. BISHOP said the g1eat difficulty with him 1121s, that
the powel given by the 4th section was unlimited: and he
did not yetb see that any advantage would a1ise from its
being so.

Mr. CABOT, (ofBeverly,) not having spoken upon the
question of biennial elections of representatives, begged leave
to revert to that subject, so far as to add to what had been
said by others that we should consider the particular business
which that body will be flequently called upon to 112111sact,
es 1c0121lly 111 the way of1evenue. We should conside1 that,
011 a question of supplies of money to suppo1t a war, 01 1110-
cu1e a t1eaty, it will be impossible t01 those 1e111esc11t21t11cs to
judge of the expediency 01 inexpediency of such supplies,
until they shall have had time to become acquainted with the
ge11e1al system of fede1al politics, 111 its connection 01 1el21-
tion to foreign powers ; because upon the situation of those
must depend the propriety or i111proprietyof granting sup-
plies. If to this be added a due attention to the easiest way
of raising such supplies, it must appear that biennial elec~-
[10118 are as frequent as is consistent with using the power
of the representatives for the benefit of their constituents.

‘ Mr. C. then turned to the 41th section, 11ow'u11der debate,
and said, It gives me pain to see the anxiety of different
gentlemen conce111ing this palagiapl1 under consideration, as
it evinces 21 conviction in thei1 minds of what I believe to be
true—that a flee and equal repiesentution 1.3 the best, if not
the only foundation upon which a free government can be
built; and, consequently, that the greatest care should be
taken 111 laying it. I am, si1, one of bthe people; such I shall
continue; and, with then feelings, I hold “that the right of
electing persons to 1ep1esent the6 people 111 the fedelal govern-
111e11t,is an important and sacred light. ’7 I he Opinions that
l1 we been offe1ed upon the n1a1111e1 in which the exe1c1se of
tlns light 18 111ovided fo1 by the 4th section, satisfies 111e 1211 1t
we me all solicitous for the same end, ai1d that we only
lilfe1 as to the means of attaining it; and f01 my own part,
VOL. 11. 4 3

26 DEBA 1113s. [11.112.521.111

I confess that I prize the 4111 section as highly as any in the
Constitution , because I consider the democ/alic branch of
the national government, the branch chosen immediately f01
the people, as intended to be a check 011 the fedeml b12111ch,
which latter° IS not an immediate re p1ese11tation of the peo-
ple of America, and is not chosen by them, but° 1s 211epr11-

sentation of the sovereignty of the individual states, and its
members delegated by the several state legislatures; and
if the state legislatures are suffered to regulate conclusively
the elections of the democratic branch, they may, by such
an interference, first 11‘eak1111, and at last destroy, that check,

they may at first diminish, andl finally annihilate, that cont1ol
ol the general gov11e1111111 111, 11l1i1h the people ought 21111211- to
have tlnough their immediate 11111111811 11tati1es. As one 11f the
people, 1hei11ef0111, I 11111112 1t, that, 111 my mind, the 4th settion
is to be as h ghly°1 piized as 211111 in the Constitution.

Mr. PXIISONS contended for 1estin11 in Congless the
po1ve1s contained in the 4th section, not only as those po11—
ers 111111111 necessary for p_111se11ing the union, but also f101
securin11 to the people thei1 equal rights of election. He
consid1red the subject very mm; but 11c a1e able to gi1e
our readels 11e1y impe1fec1tly the heads of his speech. In
the Con11ress, not onlywthe so11e1eignty of the states is 111p-
1.11se11te 1d 111 the Senate, but, to balance thei1 powel, and to
give the people a suitable and efficient cheek upon them,
the federal 1ep1esentati11es a1e 111t10du1 ed into Cong1ess.
The legislattnes of the seve1al states ale the constituents of
the Senate, and the people are the constituents of the Rep-
rese1'1tatives. These two branches, therefore, have differ-
ent constituents, and as the1 211e designed as mutual checks
upon each otl1e1, and to balance the levislative powers, there
will be frequent° stiuggles and contentions between them.
The Senate will wish to control, depress, and render i11—
efficient the Representatives; the same disposition in the
Representatives towards the Senate, will produce the like ex-
ertions on their part. The Senate will call upon their con-
stituents, the le11islatures, for aid, the Representatives Will
look up to the people fo1 suppOIt. If, the1efore, the pen e1
of making and alte1ing the 111gulations defined 111 this section,
is vested absolutely 1n the legislature the Repiesentatlves will _
11e1v soon be reduced to an undue dependence upon the Senate,
because the powei of influencing and contlolling the electiod"

PARSONS] MASSACHUSETTS. 27

of the representatives of the people, will be exerted without
control by the constituents of the senators. He further ob—v »
served, that there was much less d1n1ge1i11 trusting these
poweis in Congress, than 111 the state Eilegislatuies. For if
the 111 deial lepresentatives wished to introduce such 1e gula—
tions as would secure to them tl1ei1 places, 11nd a continu—
ance in office, the federal Senate would never consent,
because it would increase the influence and Check of the
Representatives; and, on the other hand, if' the Senate were
aiming at regulations to increase their own influence by de—
pressing the Rel‘n'esentatives, the consent of the latter would
never be obtained; and no other regulations would ever
obtain the consent of both branches of the legislature, but
such as did not affect their neutral rinhts and the balance of
g01111111nent; and those 1egul1tions would bet tor the benefit
of the people. But a state le1islat111e under the influence
of the i1 s11nato1s, who would have their fullest confidence, 01
under the influence of ambitious 01 popul; 11 characters, or in
times of popular commotion, and when faction and party
spirit run high, would introduce such regulations as would
render the rights of the people insecure and of little value.
They might make an unequal and partial division of the
states into Ddistiicts tor the election of representatives, or they
might even disqualify one third of the electors. \Vithout
these powers in Congress, the people c1111 have no remedy;
but the 4th section provides a remedy, a controlling power
in a legislature, composed of senators and representatives of
twelve states, without the influence of our commotions and
factions, who will hear impartially, and preserve and restore
to the people their equal and sacred rights ol‘ election. Per—
haps it then will be objected, that from the supposed oppo-
sition of interests in the federal legislature, they may never
agree upon any regulations ; but regulations necessary for-the
interests of the people can never be opposed to the interests
of eithe1 of the bianches of the fedeial le gislatu1e; because
that the interests of the people require that the mutual pow 018
of that legislatu1e should be p1eserved unimpaired, 111 Older
to b1lance the gove1nment. Indeed, it the Congress could
never a111ee 011 any regulations, then certainly no objection
to the 41th section can remain; for the 1eg11lations introduced
by the state legislatures will be the governing rule of eleCo
tions, until Congress can agree upon alterations.

28 DEBATES. [JONES

Mr. WIDGERY insisted that we had a right to be jeal-
ous of our rulers, who ought never to have a power which
they could abuse. The 4111 section ought to have gone
fu1the1; it ought to have had the provision in it mentioned
by Mr. Bishop , there would then be a mutual check. And
he still wished it to be further explained. The worthy gen-
tleman contested the similitude made by the honorable gen—
tleman from Newbu1y'po1t, between the pow e1 to be given
to Cong1ess by the 4111 section, to compel the states to z:send
replesentatives, and the powe1 given to the legislattnes by 0111
own constitution, to oblige towns to send 11>p1esentatiV es to
the General Conn by obse1V1111r that the 121se was mate1ially
different; as, in the latte1, if any town r1luses to send rep-
lesentatives, a powel of fining such tOVV 11s only is giVen.
It 13 in vain. said M1.\Vidge1V, to say that 1ule1s a1e not
subject to passions and prejudices. In the late Gene1al
Court, of which I was a member, I would VVillingly have de—
prived the three western counties horn sending delegates
to this house, as I then. thought it necessary. But, sir,
what would have been the consequence? A large part of
the state would have been deprived of their dearest privi-
leges. I mention this, sir, to show the force of passion and
prejudice.

"The Hon. Mr. \VHITE said, we ought to be jealous of
rulers. All the godly men we read of have failed; nay, he
would not trust a “ flock of Moseses.” If we give up this
section, says be, there is nothing left. Suppose the C011-
gress should say that none should be electors but those
worth 50 or a £100 sterling; cannot they do it. 9 Yes, said
he, they can; 21nd if any lawyer (alluding to M1. Parsons)
can beat me out of It, I will give him ten guineas.

Col. JONES (of I3ristol) thought, by this p011 er to regu-
late elections, Congress might keep themselves in to all
duration.

The Rev. Mr. PERLEY wished Mr. Gerry might be
asked some questions on this section. [But Mr. Gerry
was not in the house.]

Mr. J. C. JONES said, it was not right to argue the
possibility of the abuse cy‘ any measure a gainst its adoption.
The powerg 111anted to Congress by the 4th section, says he,
is 21 uecessmy. power , it VviIl p1OV1dc against negligence and,
dangerous designs. The senat01s and rep1esentatives ol

Lume] MASSACHUSETTS. 2&1

this state, Mr. President, a1e now chosen by a small numbel
of electtns; and it is likely we shall giow equally negligent
of our fede1al elections; 01, sh, a state may refuse to send
to Congiess its 1111111ese11tatives, 21s Rhode Island has done
Thus we see its necessity.

10 say that the power may be abused, is saying what will
apply to all power. The federal representatives will repre-
sent the people; they will be the people ; and it is not probable
they will abuse themselves. Mr. J. concluded with repeat—
ing, that the arguments against this power could be urged
against any power whatever.

Dr. JARVIS. Many gentlemen have inferred from the

right of regulating elections, by the 4th section, being i11—

vested in the federal head, that the powers of wresting.

this essential privilege from the people would be equally
delegated. But it appeared to him, he said, that there is a
very material distinction in the two cases; for, however pos-
sible it may be that this controlling authority may be abused,
it by 110 means followed that Congress, in any situat,ion could
st1ip the people of thei1 1ight to 21 di11-1 1et representation. If
he could believe 111 this, he should 1eadily 10in in sentiment
with gentlemen 011 the othe1 side of the house, that this sec-
tion alone would be 21 sufficient objection to the Constitution
itself. The right of election, founded 011 the principle of
equality, was, he said, the basis 011 which the Whole super—
structure was erected; this right was inherent in the people,

it was unalienable 111 its 11atu1e, and it could not be destloyed
without piesuming a powe1 to subve’it the Constitution, of
which this was the p1incipal , and by recurring to the
5211 section, it would appear that “representatives and
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states ac-
caldtng to their respectzve numbers, "7 it equally appealed
that 30, 000 inhabitants were entitled to send a 1ep1esenta—
tive, and that whe1eve1 this numhe1 was found, they would
h 11e a right to be lepiesented 111 the federal legislature. If
it was aigued that Cong1ess might abuse thei1 powei, and,
by varying the places of election, distress the people, it could
only be obse1ved,th1t such a wanton abuse could not be
supposed; but, if It could go to the annihilation of the 1ight,
he contended the people would not submit. He consideled
the Constitution as an elective demOCIacy, 111 which the sove-
leignty still rested 111 the people, and he by no means could

--:...-,

30 DEBATES. [TURNER

believe that this article was so alarming in its nature, 01' dan-
gerous in its tendency, as many gentlemen had supposed.

Mr. HOLMES S, in reply to Dr. Jarvis, said, the worthy
gentleman’ s super'st1uctuie must fall to the groimd: 101' the
Constitution does not 111o1ide that e1er 30, 000 shall send a
representati1e, but that it shall not exceed one f01 e1e1'y
30,000.

THURSDAY, January 17.—The 42th section still under
deliberation.
Hon. Mr. TURNER. Mr. President, I am pleased with
the ingenuity of some gentlemen in defence of this section.
I am so impressed with the love of our liberty, so dearly
bought, that I heartily acquiesce to compulsory laws, for the
people ought to be obliged to attend to their interest But
I do not wish to gi1e bCongress a 11011 01' which the1 c2111
abuse; and I 111511 to know 11hethe1 such a power is not
contained in this section.- I think it is. I 11011 11101eed,
sir, to the conside1'1tion of 2111 idea, that C011111ess 111211 altei'
the pl 1ce l01 choosing 1"e1nesentati1es in the general Con-
gress: they 111ay'ord11rbtl1at it may be at the ext1emit1 of2
state, 21nd, by thei1 influence, may there pievail that persons
may be chosen, who otherwise would not; by reason that 21
part of the qualified voters, in part of the state, would be so
incommoded the1eby, as to be deba11ed from their light as
111i1ch as if they 11111e bound at home. If so, such a circum-
stance would militate anainst the Constitution, 11 hich allo11s
e1e1y 1112111 to 10t11. Alte1ing the place will put it so tar in
the 11011 e1 of Congress, as that the leplesentati1es 11109111
1111 ill not be the true and genuine 1"e111esentati1 es of the 11110-
11le, but cleatules of the Congress; 21nd so far as they me so,
so far me the 11101110 depii1 ed of their rights, and the choice
11ill be made in an irregular and unconbstitutional manner.
\Vhen this alteration is made by Congress, may 110 not
suppose whose 1'111, "leetion will be provided for? VV ould it
not be for those who were chosen before? The great law
of self-preservation will prevail. It is true, they might, one
time in a hundred, provide for a friend; but most com—
monly for themselves. But, however honorable the C011—
vention may be who proposed this article, I think it is a gen-
uine power for Congrse s to perpetuate themselves—a 11011er
that cannot be unexceptionably exe1cised in any case 11 hat-
ever. Knowing the mimerous arts that designing men are: ~-

TURNER] MASSACHUSETTS. 3I

prone to, to secure their election and perpetuate themselves,
it is my hearty wish that 21 rotation may be provided for. I
respect and revere the Convention who proposed this Con-
stitution. In order that the power given to Congress may
be more palatable, some gentlemen are pleased to hold up
the idea, that we may be blessed with sober, solid, upright
men in Congress. I wish that we may be favored with
such rulers; but I fear they will not all, if most, be the best
moral or political characters. It gives me pain, and I believe
it gives pain to others, thus to characterize the country in
which I was born. lwill endeavor to guard against any
injurious reflections against my fellow—citizens. But they
must have their true characters; and if I‘ represent them
wrong, I am willing to make concessions. I think that the
operation of paper money, and the practice of privateering,
have produced a gradual decay of morals; introduced pride,
ambition, envy, lust of power; produced a decay of patriot—
ism, and the love of commutative justice; and I am appre—
hensive these are the invariable concomitants of the luxury
in which we are unblessedly involved, almost to our total
destruction. 111 the lower ranks of people, luxury and
avarice operate to the want of public duty and the payment
of debts. These demonstrate the necessity of an energetic
government. As people become more luxurious, they be-
come more incapacitated for g01c111i11g themselves. And are
we not so? Alike people, alike p1ince. But suppose it
should so happen, that the administ1ato1s ofthis Constitution
should be preferable to the corrupt mass of the people, in
point of manners, morals, and rectitude; power will give a
keen edge to the principles I have mentioned. Ought we
not, then, to put all checks and controls on governors for the
public safety? The1efo1e, instead of giving Cong1ess pow—
e18 they may not abuse, we ought to withhold 01.11 hands
fiom g1anting such as must be abused if eXe1cised. Ihis
is a gene1al observation. But to the point; at the time of
the 1esto1ation, the people of England “ere so veXed and
110111 11011711 by the anarc/chal and confused state of the
natTon, owing to the commonwealth not being well digested,
that tliey toobk an opposite ca1'”ee1 , they 11111 mad with loy al-
ty, and would have given Charles any thing he could have
asked. Pa1don me, sir, if I say I feel the want of 2111 ener-
getic government, and the dangers to which this dear

32 DE BATES. [111351.

country is reduced. as much as any citizen of the United
States; but I cannot. prevail 011 myself to adopt a govern—
ment which wears the face of power, without examining it.
Relinquishing 21/1air’s breadth in a constitution, is a great
deal; for by small degrees has liberty, in all nations, been
wrested from the hands of the people. I know great powers
are necessary to be given to Congress, but I wish they may
be well guarded.

Judge SUMNER, remarking 011 Gen. Thompson’s fre-
quent exclamation of “ O my country! ’7 expressed from an
apprehension that the Constitution would be adopted, said,
that expression might be used 11ith great propIietv,s ls1011ld
this Comention leject it. The honorable gentleman then
proceeded to demonstrate the necessity of the 4th section;
the absurdity of the supposition that Congress would remove
the places of election to remote parts of the states; combat-
ed the idea that Congress would, when chosen, act as bad
as possible; and concluded by asking, if a war should take
place, (and it was supposable,) if France and Holland should
send an army to collect the millions of livres they ha1e lent
us in the time of our distresses, and that a1my should be 111
possessron of the seat of government of any particular state,
(as was the case when Lord Cornwallis ravaged Carolina,)
and that the state legislature could not appoint electors, —
"is‘not a power to provide for such elections necessary to be
lodged 111 the general Congress?

Mr \V IDGERY denied the statement of D1.Ja1vis (that
ev e1y30, 000 persons can elect one representative) to be just,
as the Constitution provides that the number shall not
exceed one to every 30,000; it did not follow, he thought,
that the 30, 000 shall elect one. But, admitting that they
ha1e a right to choose one,—we will suppose Congress
should elder an election to be in Boston in January, and
from the scarcity of money, &c., not a fourth part could
attend; would not three quarters of the people be deprived
of their right ?

Rev. Mr. WEST. I rise to express my astonishment at
the 211guments of some gentlemen against this section.
The1 ha1e only started possible objections. I wish the gen-
tlemen would show us that what they so much deprecate is
probable. Is'it probable that we shall choose men to ruin
us 5’ Are we to object to all governments ? and because pow?

THOMPSON.] MASSACHUSETTS. 33

er may be abused, shall we be 111duced to an :11chy and a state
of natuie. What hinders our state legislatmes from abusing
their powe1s? They may violate the Constitution; the;
may levy taxes oppressive and intolerable, to the amount of
all our property A11 argument which proves too much, it is
said, proves nothing. Some say Congress may 1e111o1'e the
place of elections to the state of South C211olina. This IS
inconsistent with the words ofl the Constitution, \1hich says,
“that the elections, in each state, shall be prescribed by the
legzslatnre thereof,” &c. ., and that representation l1e'a11po1—
tioncd 21cc01ding to numbels; it will lrust1ate the end of the
Constitution, 21nd is a reflection 011 the gentlemen who
formed it. C2111 we, sir, suppose them so Wicked, so 1ile, as
to recommend an article so dange1o11s? Su111ly,gentl11 men
who argue these possibllitzes, show they have a ray weak
cause. That We may all be free fiom passions, p111posses—
sions, and paity spirit, I since1ely hope; otl111111’ise,1eason
Will have no effect. I hope there are none here but who are
open to conviction, as it is the surest method to gain the
suffiage of 0111 consciences. The honorable gentleman hom
Scituate has told us that the people of England, at the 1'11sto1a-
tion, on accomztofthc inconveniences (f the confizsecl state of the
commonwealth, ran mad with loyalty. Ifthe gentleman means
to apply this to us, we ought to adopt this Constitution; tor
if the people me running mad after an energetic gove L111-
ment, it is best to stop 110W, as by this 111le they may run
farther, and get a worse one; therefore the gentleman’s ar-
guments turn right against himself. Is it possible that
imperfect men can make a perfect constitution? Is it pos—
sible that a frame of goV'e1nment c2111 be devised by such
weak and flail c1'e21t111es, but what must sav01 of that we 21k-
ness. 9 Though there are some things that l do not like in this
Constitution, yet I think it necessaly it should be adopted.
For may we not rationally conclude, that the persons we shall
choose to administer it will be, in general, good men. P
Gen. THOMPSON. M1. P1esident, I have fiequently
heard of the abilities of the learned and reverend gentleman
last speaking, and now I am witness to them; but, sir, one
thing su11111s11s 11111. ' it is, to hem the worthy gentleman in-
sinuate that 0111' tezdmal rule1s would undoubtedly be good.
being intlusted with all power. This, sir, is quite contrarv
VOL. 11. 5

34 DEBATES. [sNLm

to the common language of the cle1g1 11 ho ale continually
1eplesentmg mankind as 1eprob211e and deceitful, and that we
really g1ow 11 o1se and wo1se day aftei day. I really believe
we do, si1, and I make no doubt to piove it beto1e I sit
down, and from the Old Testament. When I consider the
man that slew the lion and the bear, 21nd that he was a man
after God’s own heart, —wl1e11 I consider his son, blessed
11 ith all wisdom, and the e111'lo1st1ey fell into,—I ext1emely
doubt the inlallibility of human natme. Si1, I suspect my
01111 heait, and I shall suspect ou1 1uleis.

Dr. HOLTOI\I fhouOht this p'namaph necessary to a
complete 81 stem of go1e1nment. [But the honomble gen-
tleman spoke so low that he could not be heazd dISZtIZCZIy
throughout]

Capt. SNOIV. It has been said, Mr. President, that
there is too much power delegated to Congress by the sec-
tion, under consideration. I doubt it; I think power the
hinge on which the whole Constitution turns. Gentlemen
have talked about Congress moving the place of election
from Georgia to the Mohawk River; but I never can believe
it. I will venture to conjecture we shall have some honest
men in our Congress. We read that there were two who
brought a good report— Caleb and Joshua. Now, if there
a1e but t11o in Congless who are honest men, and Cong1ess
should attempt to do 11l121t the gentlemen say they 11ill,
(which 11111 be high treason ,) they will b1i11g a repmt of it;
andI stand 1e21dy to lea1e my wife and family, sling 1111'
knapsack, t1a1el westward, to cut their heads off. I, si1,
Since the war, have had commerce with six different nations
of the globe; I have inquired in what estimation America is
held; and ifI may believe good, honest, credible men, I find
this country held 111 thes same light, by foreign nations, as a
well— behaved neglo is in a gentleman’s t21mil1. Suppose,
M1. P1esident, I l1 1d a chance to make a good voyage, but
I tie my captain 11p to such st1ict 01de1s, that he c2111 go to
no otl1e1 island to sell my cargo, although the1e IS a ce1tainty
of -l]lS doing well , the consequence is, he rettuns, but makes
a bad voyage, because he had not power enough to act his
judgment; (for honest men do right.) Thus, sir, Congress
cannot save us from destruction, because we tie their hands,
and give themno power; (I think people have lost their prw- 'i
ileges by not unproving them ;) and I like this power being--

11:11:11.1 MASSACHUSETTS. 3:1

vested in (“ongress 21s well as any paragraph in the Consti—
tution; for, as the man is accountable for his conduct, I think
there is no danger. Now, Mr. President, to take all things
into consideration, something more must be said to convince
me to the contrary.

[Several other gentlemen went largely into the debate on
the 4th section, which those in fatoi of it demonstr atcd to
be necessary; first, as it may be used to correcta negligence
in elections; secondly, as it will p111vent the dissoltition ol
‘ the government by designing and lcfiactmy states; thiry,dl
as it Will operate as a check, 111 favor of the people, 21g 1inSt
any designs of the fede1al Senate, and thei1 constituentS,
the state ieo‘tshtureS to deprive the people of their right
of elec1ion, ' b"and fourthly, as it provides a remedy 101 the
evil, should any state, by invasion, or other cause, not have i

it in its power to appoint a place, whe1e the citizens there—
of may meet to CllOOSG thei1 fedeial 1epresentativcs. Those
againSt it urged that the power is unlimited and unnecessary ]

[The committee appointed to provide a more suitable place for the
Convention to Sit in, reported that the meeting-house in Long Lane, in
Boston, was prepared for that purpose; whereupon, Voted, That when
this Convention adjourn, they will adjourn to that place]

Afternoon.—The second paragraph of the 2d section of
the 1st article was reverted to, and some debate had thereon.

Gen. THOMPSON thought that the1e should have been
some qualification of property in a representative for, said
be when men have nothing to lose, they have not/ridg tofear.

Hon. Mr. SEDGWICK said, that this objection was
founded on an anti- democ1atical piinciple, and was sulpr~1iS1 1d
that gentlemen who appeaied so strenuously to advocate the
lights of the people, should wish to exclude 110111 the fed-
er ral government a good man, because he was not a Tic/1 one.

Mr. KING said, that gentlemen had made it a question,
Why a qualification of propeity in a. reptesentative is omitted,
and that they thought the plOVision of such a qualification
necessaty. He thought othe1 wise , he 11eve1 knew thatpmp:
mm was an index to abilities. We often see men, who,
though destitute 0? property, are superio1 in knowledge and
rectitude. The men who have most injured the country
have most commonly been rich men. Such a qualification
11215 proposed 111 Convention; but by the delegates of Massa-
chusetts it was contested that it should not obtain. He

3 i DEBATES. [TAYLOR

observed, that no such qualification is required by the Con—
federation. In reply to Gen. Thompson’s question, why
disqualification of age was not added, the honorable gen-
tleman said, that it would not extend to all 1121118 of the
continent alike. Lite, says he, 111 a. Great measure, depends
011 climate. \Vhat 111 the Southern States would be accounted
long life, would be but the mezidzan 111 the Northein; what
here is the time of ripened judgment is old age there. There-
fore the want of such a disqualification cannot be made an
objection to the Constitution. . ,.

I he third parag1aph of the: 2d section being read,

Mi. KING 1080 to eXplain it. The1e has, says he, been
much misconception of this section. It IS a principle of this
Constitution, that representation and taxation should go hand
in l1.a11d This paragraph states that the number of free
persons, including those bound to service for a term of 1e211s,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
pe1sons. These persons ale the slaves. By this 111111. a1e
repiesentation and taxation to be 21111101 tloned And it was
adOpted, because it was the language of all America. Ac-
cording to the Confederation, ratified in 178], the sums for
the general welfare and defence should be apportioned
accmding to the sur1eyed lands, and improvements theleon,
in the se1e121l states; but that it hath ne1'1e1 been in the
power of Congress to follow that 1ule, the letulns from the
sc1e121l states being so very imperfect.

D1. TAYLOR thought that the numbel of members to
be chosen for the House of Rep1esentati17es was too small
The 11 hole Union was entitled to send but 653whe1eas, by
the old Confederation, they send 91 —a reduction of 30 per
cent. He had heard it objected, that, if a larger 11uml11e1 11 as
sent, the house would be unwieldy. He thought our House
of Rep1esent21t11 (1s, 11l11ch sometimes consistsb of 150, was
not 111111ieldy , and if the number of the federal 1ep1e—
sentatives was enlarged to twice 65, he thought it would
not be too large. He then proceeded to answer a11-
other objection, “that an increase of’num'bers would be an '
increase of expense,” and b1 calculation demonstrated that
the salalies of the. full number he wished, would, 111 a year,
amount only to £2,980, about. one penny 011 a poll; and by
this increase, he thought every part of the commonwealth
would be represented. The distresses of the people would
thereby be more fully known and relieved.

mm] MASSACHUSETTS. 37

Mr. VVIDGERY asked, if a boy of six years of age was
to be considered as a flee pe1son.

Mr. KING, in answet, said, all peisons born hee W em to be
considered as fieemen; and, to make the idea of taxation by ‘
numbers mole intelligible, said that five negro children of
South Ca1olina me to pay as much tax as the th1ee gove1—
1101s of New Hampshile, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.

Mr. GORHAM thought the proposed section much in favor
of Massachusetts; and if it operated against any state, it
was Pennsylvania, because they have more white persons
bound than any other. Mr. G. corrected 2111 observation of
Dr. Taylor’s that the states now send 91 delegates to C011-
gress; which was not the case. The states do not, he said,
send near the number, and instanced Massachusetts, Which
sends but four. He concluded by saying that the Constie
tution p1ovides for an inc1ease of membe1s as numbe1s
111c1ease, and that 111 fifty yea1s the1e VV1ll be 360; in one
hundied years, 141 or 1500, if the Constitution last so long.

Judge DANA, rema1king on the asse1tions of D1. Taylor,
that the number of representatives was too small; that the
Whole Union was 110W entitled to send but 65, VViheteas by
the Confedei ation they might send 9], a leduction of30 pe1
cent.,—-said, if the Constitution under consideration was in
fact what its opposers had often called it, 21 consolidation of
the states, he should readily agree with that gentleman that
the representation of the people was much too. small; but
this was 21 charge blought against it without any foundation
in t1uth.So fai fiomb it, that it must be appa1ent to evely
one, that the fede1al goyetnment sp1ings out of, and can
alone be b1ought into existence by, the state gOVernments.
Demolish the latte1, and there is an end of the forniet. Had
the Continental Convention, then, doubled the 1ep1esen-
tation, agreeably to that gentleman’s ideas, would not the
people of this Commonwealth have been the first to complain
of- it as an unnecessary burden laid upon them—that, in
addition to their own domestic government, they have been
charged with the support of so numerous a national govern—
ment. 9 Would they not have contended for the demolition
of the one or the othei, as being unable to suppmt both?
Would they have been satisfied by being told that doubling
‘be leplesentation would yea1ly amount bonly “to about one
penny upon a poll”? Does not the gentleman know that

4

 

:58 DEBATES. [DANA

the expense of our own numerous repiesentation has exc1ted
much ill—will against the go1ernmcnt? H1 13 he nevei heard
it said among the people that our public affairs would be as
11 ell conducted by half the number of 1cplesent11t11es.P If
he has not, I ha1e, sir, and belie1e it to be true But the
gentleman says that them is a reduction of 30 per cent.

in the federal replesentation, as the 11 l1o1c Union can send
but 65,111l1en under the Confederation they may send 9].

Ihe gentleman has not made 11 fai1 calculation. For, if to-
the 65 representatives under the proposed Constitution we
add 2 senators from each state, amounting to ‘26 in all, we
shall have the same number, 91 ; so that in this respect there
is no difference. Besides, this representation will increase
with the population of the states, and soon become sufficiently
111111e to meet that gentleman’ s ideas. I 11 ould just obsc11 e,
that by the Confedeiation this state has a right to send se1 e11
members to Congless; yet, although theb legislatme hath
sometimes chosen the whole number, I believe at no time
have they had, or wished to have, more than four of them
actually in Congress. Have any ill consequences arisen
tic-n1 this small representation in the national council?
II111e 0111' liberties been endange1ed by it? No one 11ill
say they ha1e. The hono1able gentleman d1ew a parallel
l1et11een the Eastern and Southern States, and showed the
injustice done the former by the present mode of appmtioning
taxes, according to surveyed land and improvements, and
the consequent advantage therefrom to the latter, their
p1opelty not lying 111 i111p1o1ements, in buildings, &c.

I11 reply to the 1ema1'k of some gentlemen, that the South-
11111 States 11 ere t111o1cd in this mode of apj101ti0n111ent,l1y
l1a1in11' f11e of their negroes set against Z/uee persons in the
Eastcim the honorable judge obser1ed, that the nemoes of
the So1i1tl111'11 States 11 ork no longer than 11l1e11 the eye of
the d1'i1 er is on them. Can, askedb he, that land flourish like
this, which is cultivated by the hands of freemen? and are
net three of these independent freemen of more real advan-
ta11e to a st1te than five of those poor slaves. 1 As a f1ie11d
to eq 11l taxation, he rejoiced that an opportunity was pre-
sented, 111 this Constitution, to change this unjust mode of
apportionment. Indeed, concluded he, from a survey of
11'111111y pait of the Constitution, I think it the best that the
11 isdom of men could suggest.

RANDALL] MASSACHUSET'I‘S. 39

Mr. NASSON 1'ema1ked on the statement of the Hon. Mr
King, by saying that the hono1able gentleman should nave
gone fur'thel, and shown us the other side of the question.
It IS a good rule that 11701ks both ways ' ,2111d the gentleman
should also have told us, that £11766 of 0m mfants 171 the cm—
dle me to be rated asfive oft/Le working negroes of Vi1ginia.
Mr. N. advelted to a statement of Mr. King, who had: said
that five negro child1en of South Carolina we1e equally rata—
ble as three governors of New England, and wished, he said,
the honorable gentleman had considered this question upon
the other side, as it would then appear that this state will pay
as gieata tax for three children 111 the cradle, as any of the
Southern States will for five hearty, 1v 01k1nt1 neg10 men. He
hoped, he said, while we were making a new goveinment,
we should make it better than the old one; 101, it we had
made a bad bargain before, as had been hinted, it was a
reason why we should make a better one now.

Mr. RANDALL begged leave to answer a remark of the
Hon. Mr. Dana, which, he thought, 1eflected 011 the barren—
ness of the Soutl1e1 11 States. He spoke from his own per—
sonal knowledge, he said, and he could say, that the land in
general, in those states, was p1ete1able to any he eve1 saw.

Judge DANA 1ose to set the gentleman right; he said it
11 as not the quality of the land he alluded to, but the man-
7167' of tilling it that he alluded to.

FRIDAY, January 18. —Tl1e thiid parag1aph of the 2d
section of article one. still under conside1ation.

H011. Mr. DALTON opened the conveisation with some
remarks on M1. Randall’s positive asse1tions of the fertility
of the Southern States; who said, from his own observation,
and from accounts he had seen, which were better, he could
say, that the gentleman’s remark was not perfectly accur21.te
The honorable gentleman showed why it was not so, by
stating the inconsidelabIe product of the land, which, though
it might 111 part be owing to the faithlessness and 1gnorance
of the slaves who cultivate it, he said, was in a g1eater1neas—
ure owing to the want of healt 1n the soil.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. P1esident, liise to make an 01)-
selvation on the suggestion of the honorable gentleman from
Newbur.y I have, sir, travelled into the Sonthem States,
and should be glad to compaIe 0111' knowledge on the subject
together. In Carolina, Mr. President, if they don’t get

410 DEBATES. [DA WES.

more than twenty or thirty bushels of corn from an acre,
they think it a small crop. On the low lands they some-
times get forty. I hope, sir, these great men of eloquence
and lea1ning 1111] not by to make a1gume11ts to make this
Constitution go down, 1ight or 11rong. An old saying, si1,
is, that “a good thing don’t need praising; 7’ but, sir, it
takes the best men in the state to gloss this Constitution,
which they say is the best that human wisdom c2111 i111e11t.
I11 praise of it we hear the reverend cle1gy, the judges of
the Supreme Court, and the ablest la11‘ye1s, exe1ting thei1
utmost abilities. Now, sir, suppose all this artille rv turned
the ot'1e1 way, and these g1eat men would speak half as
much against it, we might complete ou1 business and go
home 111D'f01ty—eight hours. Let us consider, sir, .1 e are act-
i11g1‘01 the people, and fo1 ages unborn; let us deal fairly
and above board. Every one comes here to discharge his
duty to his constituents, and I hope none will be biased by
the best orators because we are not acting for ourselves.
I think Cong1ess ought to have 11011 e1, such as is for the
good of the nation; bout what it is, let a 111o1e able man than
I tell us.

M1. DA‘VES said, he was very s01ry to heal so many
objections 1aisod against the paragraph undei censidelation.‘
He thought them wholly unfounded; that the black zn/wbit-
ants of the Southern States must be consideled either as
sla1 es, and as so much 17101116713], 01 in the cha1acter of so
many freemen ; if the former, why should they not be wholly
represented? Our own state laws and constitution would
lead 11s to consider these blacks as freemen, and so indeed
would our own ideas of naturai justice. If, then, they are
freemen, they might form an equal basis for representation
as though they 11 me all 11 lute inhabitants. In either view,
thc1ef01e, he could not see that the Nmthern States 11 ould
suffer, blil d11ettly to the contrary. He thought, ho11ever,
that gentlemen would do well to connect the passage in
dispute with another article in the Constitution, that permits
Cong1ess, 111 the yea1 1808, wholly to p1ohibit the importa—
tion of slaves, and 111 the mean time to impose a duty ol ten
dollarsa head on such blacks as should be imported before
that pe1iod. Besides, by the new Constitution, every par-
ticular state is left to its own option totally to prohibit. the
introduction of slaves into its own territories. What could

DAWEs.] MASSACHUSETTS. 41

the Convention do 1n01e? The membe1s of the Southern
States, like ourselves, have their prejudices. lt would‘not
do to abolish slavely, by an act of Cong1ess, 111 a moment
and so desuoy what our southe111 b1eth1en consider as prop-
erty. But we may say, that, although slave1y IS not smitten
by an apoplexy, yet it has 1eceived a mo1tal wound, and
will die of a consumption.

Mr. D. said, the paragraph 111 debate 1elated only to the rule ,
of apportioning internal taxes; but the gentleman had gone
into a considelation of the queStion, whethe1 Congress should
have the power of laying 21nd collecting such ta.1"es, which,
he thought, would be more properly discussed under the
section relative to the powers of Congress; but as objections
had been suggested, the answers might be hinted as we
went along. t)By the old articles, said t311e, Congress have a
right to ascertain what 2ne necessary for the Union, and to
appropriate the same, but have no authority to draw such.
moneys from the states. The states are unde1 an honorary
obligation to raise the moneys, but Cong1ess cannot compel
a compliance with the obligation. So long as we withhold
that authority from Congress, so long we may be Said to
give it to other nations. DLet us contemplate the loan we
have made with the Dutch. Our ambassador has bound us'
all, jointly and severally, to pay the money borrowed. When
pay —day shall come, how 18 the money to be 1aised. P C011—
g1ess cannot collect it. If any one state shall disobey a
requisition, the Dutch are left, 111 such a case, to put their
own demand 1n fo1ce for themselves. They must 1aise by
arms What we are afraid Congress shall collect by the law
of peace. There is a prejudice, said Mr. Dawes, against di-
rect taxation, which arises from the manner in which it has
been abused by the errors of the old Confederation. Con-
gress had it not in their power to draw a revenue from com-
merce, and therefore multiplied their requisitions on the
states. Massachusetts, willing to pay he1 par,t made her
on 11 t1ade law, on which the trade departed to such of our
neighbors as made no such impositions on comme1ce , thus
we lost What little revenue we had, and our only course
was, to a direct taxation. In addition to this, foreign 11a
tions, knowing this inability of Congress, have 011 that
account been backward 111 their negotiations, and have lent
us money ata apremium which boreb some proportion to the

VOL. II.

’15.). DEBATES. [DAN/1.

lisk they had of getting payment; and this extraordinary
expense has fallen0 at last on the land.

Some gentlemen have said, that Congress may draw their
revenue wholly by direct taxes; but they cannot be induced
so to do; it is easier for them to have resort to the impost
and excise; but as it will not do to overburden the impost,
(because that would promote smuggling, 21nd he dangerous
to the revenue,) therefore Congress should have the power
of applving , in e\tr'aordinaiy cases, to direct taxation. War
may take place, in 11hich case it 11ould not be proper to
alter those appropriations of impost which may be made for
peace establishments. It is inexpedient to divert the public
funds; the power of direct taxation would, in such circum—
stances be a very necessaly po11 e1. As to the rule of 21p-
portioning such taxes, it must be by the quantity of lands,
or else in the manner laid down in the paragraph under de—
bate. But the quantity of lands is an uncertain rule of
wealth. Compare the lands of different nations of Europe ,
some of them have great comparative wealth and less quan-
tities of lands, whilst others have more land and less wealth.
Compare Holland with Germany. The rule laid down in
the parag1aph IS the best tl11t can be obtained f01 the appor~
tionment of the little direct taxes which Congress Will want.

A/te/noon—Mess1s.King,G01e, Palsons, and Jones, of
Boston, spoke of the advantage to the Northern States the
mic of apportionment in the third parag1aph (still undet
debate) ga1e to them, as also the Hon. Judge DANA the
sketch of whose speecli ]S as follows .

Ihe learned Judge began with answe1ing some objections
to this paragraph, and urging the necessity of Congress
being vested with power to levy direct taxes 011 the states,
and it was not to be supposed that they would levy such,
unless the impost and excise should be found insufficient in
case of a war. If, says he, a part of the Union is attacked
by a foreign enemy, and we a1e disunited, how is it to de-
fend itself? Can it by its own internal force? In the late
war, this state singly was attacked, and obliged to make the
fi1st defence. What has happened may happen again. The
state oppressed must exe1t its whole powei, and bear the
whole charge of the defence; but common danger points
out. for common exertion; and this Constitution is excel-
lently designed to make the danger equal. Why should one i

D1111] MASSACHUSETTS. 2152

state expend its blood and treasure for the whole? Ought
not a cont10lling autl101ity to exist, to call 101th, if necessa1V,
the whole fo1ce 21nd wealth of all the states? If disunited
the time may come when we may be attacked by 0111 natu—
ral enemies. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, filled with
tories 21nd refugees, stand ready to attack and devour these
States, one by one. This will be the case, if we have no
powe1 to d1aw f01th the wealth and stiength ot the VV hole,
for a. defence ofa p2nt. Then Shall we, continued the hon—
orable gentleman, see, but too late, the necessity of a power
being vested somewhere, that could command that wealth
and strength when wanted. I speak with earnestness, said
he, but it is for the good of my native country. B3 God and
nature made equal, it is with 1e11101se I have [1112 1d it sug-
gested by some, that those gentlemen who l1aV11 had the csu-
pe1io1 advantages of education, Vve1e enemies to the fights of
then count1y. A1e the1e any among this hono121bl11 body,
who are possessed of minds capableED of such nanow pleju~
dices? If there are, it is in vain to reason with them ; we
had better come to a decision, and go home.

After dilating 011 this matter a short time, the learned
judge begged gentlemen to look around them, and see who
we etheb men that composed the assembly. Are they not,
he asked, men who have been foremost in the cause of their
country, both in the cabinet and in the field? and who, with
halters about their necks, boldly and intrepidly advocated the
rights of America, and of humanity, at home and in foreign
countries? And are they not to be trusted ? Direct taxa-
tion is a tremendous idea; but may not necessity dictate it
to be unavoidable? \Ve all wish to invest Co11g1ess with
more power. We dis:1g1ee only 111 the quantum,ba11d man—
ner, in which Congressb shall levy taxes on the states. A
capitation tax is abhonent to the leeling‘s of human nature,
and, I venture to trust, will never be adopted by Congress.
The learned judge pointed out, on various grounds, the
utility of the power to be vested in the Cong1ess, and con—
cluded by observing, that the proposed Constitution was the
best that could be flamed; that, if adopted, we shall be a
great and happy nation; it2 1ejected, a weak and despised
one , we shall fall as the nations of ancient times have fallen;
that this was his firm belief; and, said he, I would 1athe1 be
annihilated than give my voice for, or Sign my name to, a

441 DEBATES. [BBOOKS

constitution which in the least should betray the liberties or
interests of my country.

Mr. WIDGERY. I hope, sir, the honorable gentleman
Will not think hard of it, if we ignorant men cannot see as
clear as he can. The strong must bear with the infirmities
of the weak; and it must be a weak mind indeed that
could throw such illiberal reflections against gentlemen of
education, as the honorable gentleman complains of. To
retu111 to the pa1ag1aph.- If Congress, continued M1 \‘1.,
have this powe1 of taxing ditectlv, it will be in tl1ei1 pone1
to enact a poll taX. Can gentlemen tell why they will not
attempt it, andby this method make the poor pay as much
as the lich? .

Mr. DEI\ CH was at a loss to know how Congress could
levy the taX, in which he thought the difficultby of money
consisted; yet had no doubt but that Cong1ess would di1ect
that these states should pay it m then“ can may.

The H011. M1. FULLER\ begged to ask M1. Geir,y
“why, 111 the last tequisition of C011g1ess, the pol t10n re-
qui1ed of this state was tl1i1tee11 times as much as of
Ge01rr1a and yet we have but eight leptesentatn es in the
genetal govel11111e11t,a11d Gemgiab has thr”ee. Until this
question was answe1ed, he was t3at a lo\ss to know how taxa-
tion and representation went handin hand.

' [It was then voted that this question be asked Mr‘:-Gerry. A long and
desultory debate ensued on the manner in which the answer should be
given : it was at. last voted that Mr. G. reduce his answer to writing]

SATURDAY, January 19, 1788, A. M.—The Hon. Mr.
SINGLETARY thought we were giving up all our privi—
leges, as there was no provision that men in power should
have any Telzgion ,' and though he hoped to see Christians,
yet, by the Constitution, a Papist, or an Infidel, was as
eligible as they. It had been said that men had not de-
gener r;ated he did not think men were better now than
when men after God’s own heart did wickedly. He thought,
in this instance, we were giving great power to we know
not whom.

Gen. BROOKS. (of Medford.)—If good men ale ap-
pointed, government will be administe1ed well. But what
will prevent bad men from mischief, is the question. If the1e
should be such in the Senate, we ought to be cautious oi.

Ame] MASSACHUSETTS. 1’15

giving power; but when that power is given, with proper
checks, the danger is at an end. When men are answerable,
and within then 1each of 1esponsihility, they cannot lo1 0e
tl11t thei1 political existence depends upon their good beha-
vior. lhe Senate can frame no law but by consent of the
Representativ'es, and is answerable to that house for its con-
duct. If that conduct excites suspicion, they are to be im-
peached, punished, (or prevented from holding any office,
which is great punishment.) If these cheeks are not suffi~
cient, it is impossible to devise such as will be so.

[Mr‘. Gerry’s answer to Mr.Fuller’s question was read, The purport is,
that Georgia had increased in its numbers by emigration; and if it had
not then, would soon be entitled to the proportion assigned hen]

Hon. Mr. KING. It so happened that l was both of the

Convention and Congress at the same time , and if I recollect

right, the answer of Mi. G. does not mate1ially Way. In
1778, Cong1ess 1equi1ed the states to make a 1etu1n of the
houses and lands su1veyed; but one state only complied the1e-
with—New Hampshire. Massachusetts did not. Congress
consulted no rule: it was resolved that the several states
should be taxed according to their ability, and if it appeared
any state had paid more than her just quota, it should be
passed to the credit of that state, with lawful interest.

MJ. DALTON said We had obtained a g1eat deal by the
new Constitution. By the Confede1atio11 each state had an
equal vote. Georgia is now content With three eighths of
the voice of Massachusetts.

Col. JONES, (of Bristol,) objected to the length of time.
If men continue in office four 01 siX yeals, they would forget
their dependence 011 the people, and be loath to leave their
places. Men elevated so high in power, they would fall
heavy when they came down.

M1. AMES observed, that an objection was made against
me Constitution, because the senators are to be chosen for
six years. It has been said, that they will be removed too
far from the-control of the people, and that, to keep them in
proper dependence, they should be chosen annually. It is
necessary to premise, that no argument against the new
plan has made a deeper impression than this, that it will
produce a consolidation of the states. This is an effect
which all good men will deprecate. For it is obvious, that,

126 DEBATES. [AMES

1f the state powers are to be destroyed, the representation is
too small. The trust, in that case, would be too great to be
confided to so few persons. The objects of legislation would
be so multiplied and complicated, that the government
would be unwieldy and im1n21cticable. The state go11e11n-
menisme essential pa1ts ol the s1 stem, and the defence of
this 211ticle 1s d1a1V 11 from its tendency to thei1 p111ser11atio11.
The senatms rep1esent the sovelezgnly oft/11,1 states, in the
other house, i11di1iduals are r11'ptese11ted. The Senate maV
not originate bills. It need not be said that they a1e prin-
cipally to direct the affairs of wars and treaties. They are
in the quality of ambassadors of the states, and it will not be
denied that some per111anency in their office is necessary to
a discharoe of their duty. Now, if they were chosen y 2111ly,
how could they peifo1m their t1ust. 9 If they 11oi1ld be
blought by that means more immediately unde1 the influence
of the people, then they will 1ep1esent the state legisl211t111es
less, and become the 1'1ep1ese11tati1es of i11di1iduals. This
belongs to the other house. T he absurdity of this, and its
1epu<11121ncy to the fcdc1al principles of the Constitution, 11ill
appear more fully, l)V supposing that they a1e eto be chosen
by the people at la1ge. It there is any force in the objec—
tion to this a1ticle, this 11ould be 1110111111. But 11110111, in
that case,11ould they repiesentP— Not the legislatures of
the states, but the people. This would totallyobliterate the
fetle1121l features of the Constitution. \Vhat would become
of the state go11e1111nents, and on whom would de1ol1e the
dut1 of defending them against the e11c1oachme11ts of the
federal go1er11me11t? A consolidation of the states 11 ould
ensue, which, it is conceded, would subvert the new Consti-
tution, and against which this vely article, so much e011-
de11111ed,ls our best SCCL‘lllty. Too much p101ision cannot
be made against a consolidation. The state go11e11111111nts
111ep1ese11t the 11ishes, and feelings, and local interests, of the
people. They me the safeguard and ornament ot the Con—
stitution, 1 they will protract the period of our liberties 1 ,they
will affo1d a shelte1 against the abuse of 11011 e1, and 111ll be
the natural aV enge1s 0'1 our violated lights.

A Very effectiial check upon the power of the Senate is
prmided. A third pa1t is to 1eti1e from office eve1y two
years. By this means, while the senators are seated for six
11ears,the11 a1e admonished of thei1 tesponsibility to the sta 111

K1N1:.] MASSACHUSETTS. 4:7

legislatures. If one third new members are introduced, who
feel the sentiments of their states, they will awe that third
Whose term will‘be near expiring. This article seems to be
an excellence of the Constitution, and affords just ground to
believe that it will be, in practice as in theory, a federal
republic.

Afternoon. ——The third section respecting the construc-
tion of the Senate under debate,—

Col. JONES said his objections still remained—that
senators chosen for so long a time will forget their duty to
therr constituents. We cannot, said he, recall them. The
choice of representatives was too long; the Senate was
much worse; it is, said he, a bad precedent, and is uncon-
stitutional.

Mr. KING said, as the Senate preserved the equality of the
states, their appointment is equal. To the objection to this
branch, that it is chosen for too long a period, he observed,
if the principle of classing them is considered, although it
appears long, it will not be found so long as it appears.
One class is to serve two years, another four years, and
another six years; the average, therefore, 1s four years. The
senators,s said Mr. K. ., will have a pou erful check 111 those
men who wish for their seats, who will watch their whole
conduct 111 the general government and will give the alarm
in c1se of misbeh 1Vior. And the state legislatures, if they
find their delegates erring, can and will instruct them. Will
not this be a check? Wlien they hear the voice of the peo—
ple solemnly dictating to them their duty, they will be bold
men indeed to act contrary to it. These will not be instruc-
tions sent them in a private letter, which can be put in their
pockets; they will he public instructions, which. all the
country will see, and they will be hardy men indeed to vio-
late them. The honorable gentleman said, the powers to
control the Senate are as great as ever was enjoyed in any
government; and that the members, therefore, will be found
not to be chosen for too long a time. They are, says he, to
assist the executive in the designation and appointment of
officers; and they ought to have time to mature their judg-
ments. lffor a shorter period, how can they be acquainted
with the \rights and interests of nations, so as to form ad-
vantageous t1eaties? To understand these rights is the
business of education. Their business being naturally dif-

48 DEBATES. [An/res.

ferent, and more extensive, than the other- 1111211116311,~ they ought
to have different qualifications; and their duration is not too
long for a light discharge of their duty.

D1. TAYLOR said, he hoped the hono1able gentleman
did not mean to decei1e us, by sa3ing, that the Senate a1e
not to be chosen for six 3ea1s; for they reall3 a1e to be
chosen for six years; and as to the idea of classing, he did
not know who, when chosen for that time, would go out at
a sho1tc1. He 1e1na1ked on M1. King’s idea of checks, and
obse1ved, that such indeed were the Articles of Confede1ation,
which piovide for delegates being chosen annually; for
1otatio11, and the right of recalling. But’ 1n this, they a1e to
be chosen for six years; but a shadow of rotation provided
for, and no power to recall; and concluded by saying, that
if they are once chosen, they a1e chosen fo1ever.

M1. STRONG mentioned the difficulty which attended
the const1uction of th 1e Senate 111 the Convention; and that
a committee, consisting of one delegate from each state, was
chosen to considel the subject, 11 he 1epo1te 1d as it now stands;
and that Mr. Gerly was 011 the committee f1om Massachusetts.

Mr. GERRY rose, and informed the president that he
was then p1epa1ing a lette1 011 the subject in debate; and
would set the matte1 in its true light; and which he wished
to (1 ommunicate. This occasioned considerable conversation,
which lasted until the Convention adjourned.

‘MONDAY, January 21.-—-Fourth section considered in
its order.

Mr. AMES rose to answer several objections. He would
forbear, if possible, to go over the ground which had been
already well trodden. The fourth section had been. he
said, well discussed, and he did not mean to offer any for-
mal argument or new observations upon it. It had been
said, the powel of regulating elections was gi1en to Con-
gress. He asked, if: a motion was brought forward in
Cong1ess, on that particular, subjecting the states to any
inconvenience, whether it was p1obable such a motion
could obtain. It has been also said, that our federal legis-
lature would endeavor to perpetuate themselves in office;
and that the love of power was predominant. Mr. Ames
asked how the gentlemen prevailed on themselves to trust
the state legislature. He thought it was from a deglee of
confidence that was placed in them. At present we trust

TA1’L0R.] MASSACHUSETTS. 119

Congress with powe1; nay, we t1ust the 1eplcscntat11cs of
Rhode Island and Geo1gia. He thought it was bette1 to
trust the gene1al govemment than a 101eign state. Ml. A.
acknowledged he came with doubts of the fourth section.
I'Iad his objections lemained, he would have been obliged to
vote against the Constitution; but now he thought, if all
the Constitution was as clea1 2is this section, it would meet
with little opposition.

.ludge DANA. This section, Mr. President, has been
subject to much dispute and difficulty. I did not come here
approving of every paragraph of this Constitution. I sup—
posed this clause dangerous; it has been amply discussed;
and I am 110W convinced that this paragraph is much better as
it stands, than with the amendment, which is, that Congress
be restricted in the appointing of “ time, place, 490.,” unless
when the state legislatures refuse to make them. I have
altered my opiniOn on this point; these are my reasons : ——
It is apparent, the intention of the Convention was to set
Congress 011 a different g1ound; that a pa1t should p1oceed
directly 110m the people, and not from their substitutes, the "
legislatures; the1efo1e the legislatme ought not to contlol
the elections. The legislature of Rhodeb Island has lately
formed a plan to alter their representation to cmpmations,
which ought to be by numbers. Look at Gleat B1itai11,
where the injustice of this mode 1s apparent. Eight tenths
of the people there have no voice in the elections. A
borough of but two or three cottages has a right to send
two lepresentatives to Parliament, While Binningham, a
lzrgc and populous manufacturing town, lately sprung up,
c111not send one. The legislature of Rhode Island are

:21:1o:t adopting this plan, 111 o1de1 to deprive the towns of

N11 .vport and DProvidence of tl1ei1 weight, and that tl1e1eby

elegislature may have a power to cou11te1act the will of a
majority of the people.

M1. COOLEY (of Amherst) thought Congless, in the
present instance, would, 110111 the powe1s gianted by the
Constitution, have auth01ity to contiol elections, and there-
by endanger libe1ty.

D1. TAYLOR wished to ask the gentleman fiom New-
l1ury"pmt, whether the two b1ancl1es of Congress could not
2121210 to play into each others hands; and, by making the
qualifications of electo1s £100 by their powe1 of regulating

vo.L 11. 7 5

.50 DEBATES. [K1NG.

elections, fix the matters of elections so as to keep them—
selves in.

Hon. M11. KING rose to pursue the inquiry why-the
“place and maI‘InCI ’7 of holding elections were omitted in
the section under debate. It 11 as to be observed, he said,
that, 111 the Constitutien of Massachusetts and-01111.1 states,
the manner and place of elections'Were previded for 3 the
111211111e1 was by ballot, and the places, towns; for, said he,
11e happened to settle OIiginally in to1111sl11ps. But it was
different 111 the Southcl 11 States: he 11 ould mention 2111 111-
stance. In V 11gi11ia, the1e ale but fifteen or twenty towns,
and seventy or eighty counties; therefore no rule could be
adopted to apply to the whole. If it was practicable, he
said, it would be necessary to have a district the fixed place;
but this is liable to exceptions; as a district that may now
be fully settled may in time be sc211cely inhabited, and the
back conntn‘, 110W sc211cely inhabited, may be fully settled.
Suppose this state thrown into eight dIstI'Icts, and a member
apportioned to each; if the numbers increase, the represent-
atives and districts will be increased. The matter, there—
fore, must be left subject to the regulation of the state
legislature, or the general government. Suppose the state
legislature, the circumstances will be the same. It is truly
said, that our representatives are but a part of the Union;
that they may be subject to the control of the rest; but our
'reprcscntatives make 21 ninth part of the whole; and if any
authority is vested in Congress, it must be in our favor.
But to the subject. In Connecticut they do not choose by
'11u1nbe1s, but b1 co1po1ations. Ila1tfo1‘,d one of their lalgcst
101111s, sends no more deleuates than one of their smallest
corpo1ations, each town sending two, except latterly, when
"a town 1121s di1idcd. The same rule is abOut to be adorned
in Rhode Island. The inequality of such 11epIesentatio11,
Where e1c1121‘1o1poration11ould have an equal 1ight to send
an equal numbe1 of 1eprescntatives, 11 as appa1ent. I11 the
Southeantates, the inequality IS g1eater. By the constitu
tion ofSDuth C2i1‘olina, the city of Charleston has a right to
send thirty representatives to the Genelal Assembly; the
Whole number of 11 hich amounts to two hundred. Theb back
p211ts of Carolina ha1e increased greatly since the adoption
ofthei1 constitution, and 1121111 trequentl1‘2'111c111pted an altet-
ation of this unequal mode of representation ; but the mem?

K1NG.] MASSACHUSETTS. bl

hers from Charleston, having the balance so much 111 their
favor, will not consent to an. alteration; and we see tha
the delegates from Carolina in Congress have always been
chosen by the delegates of that city. The representatives,
therefore, from that state, will not be (hosen by the people,
but Will he the lepresentatives of a faction of that state.
lfthe general government cannot control in this case, how
are the people secure? The idea of the honorable gentle-
man from Douglass, said he, transcends my understanding;
for the power of control given by this section extends to
the manner of election, not the qualifications of the electors.
The qualifications are age and residence, and none can be
preferable.

On motion, Resolved, as follows, viz. : ——

\Vhereas there is a publication in “ The Boston Gazette, and the
Country Journal,” of this day, as follows, viz. :—

‘-‘~'Bribcry and Corruption! .’ .’

“The most diabolical plan is on foot to corrupt the members of the
Convention, who Oppose the adoption of the new Constitution. Large
sums of mOney have been brought from a neighborina state for that pur-
pose, contributed by the wealthy. If so, is it Dnot probable there may be
collections for the same accursed purpose nearer home ?

“ CENTINEL.”

Resolved, That this Convention will take measures for
inquiring into the subJect of the said publication, and fo1
ascertaining the .truth or falsehood of the suggestion them-
in contained.

Ordered, That the messenger be directed to request the
printers of the said Gazette to appear bef01e this Conven-
tion fo1thwith, to give information respecting the said pub-
lication.

Aflernoon. ——The messengei informed the Convention that
he had acquainted the printeis of the Boston Gazette, &c.,
of the Older of the fo1enoon respecting them, and was
answered that one of them 11 ould attend the convention
this afternoon. ‘

A letter from Messrs. Benjamin Edes and Son, printers
of the Boston Gazette, &c., relative to the publication
entered this morning. Read, and committed to Mr. Par—
sons, ‘Mr. Nasson, Mr. Gorham, Mr. W idgery, Mr. Porter,
Mr. Gore, and Mr. Thomas of Plymouth.

52 DEBATES. [TAYLOR.

The 5th section being read, —

Dr. TAYLOR wished to know the meaning of the words
“from time to time,” in the third paragraph. Does it mean,
says he, from year to year, from month to month, or from
day to day?

The Hon. Mr. KINGrose, and explained the term.

Mr. VVIDGERY read the paragraph, and said, by the
words, “except such parts as may require secrecy,” Con—
gress might withhold the whole journals under this pre-
tence, and thereby the people be kept in ignorance of
their doings.

The H011. Mr. GORHAM exposed the absurdity of any
public body publishing all their proceedings. Many things
in great bodies are to be kept secret, and records must be
brought to maturity before published. In case of treaties
with foreign nations, would it be policy to inform the world
of the extent of the powers to be Vested in our ambassadoi,
and thus give our enemies opportunity to defeat our negoti-
ations? The1e is no plovision in the constitution of t:this
state, 01 of Gleat Britain, f01 any publication of the kind;
and yet the people suffer no inconveniency. The printers,
no doubt, will be intelested to obtain the journals as soon
as possible for publication, and they will be published in a
book, by Cong1ess, at the end of every session.

Rev. M1. PERLEY described the alarms and anxiety of
the people at the commencement of the war, when the w hole
country, he said, c1ied with one voice, “Why don’ t General
Washington march into Boston, and d1ive out the ty'.1ants 9 7’
But, said he, HeaV e11 gaVe us a commander who kneV w better
tha1i to do this. The leverend gentleman said, he was ac-
quainted with the Roman history, and the Grecian too, and
he believed there never was, since the creation of the world,
a greater general than \Vashington, except, indeed, Joshua,
who was inspired by the Lord of Hosts, the God of the
armies of Israel. \Vould it, he asked, have been prudent
For that excellent man, General Washington, previous to the
American army’s taking possession of Dorchester Heiohts,
to have published to the world his intentions of doing so?
No,s says he, it would not.

The fist paiagraph of the 6th section lead.

D1. TAYLOR. Mr. Piesident, it has hitl1e1to been cus-

tomaly for the gentlemen of Congress to be paid by the

' SEDGWICK.] MASSACHUSETTS. 5

(3‘)

several state legislatures out of the state treasury. As no
State has hitherto failed paying its delegates, why should we
leave the good old path? Before the revolution it Was con-
sidered as a grievance that the. governors, &c., received
their pay from Great Britain. They could not, in that
case, feel their dependence on the people, when they re-
ceived their appointments and salaries from the crown. I
know not Why We should not pay them now, as well as
heretofore.

Gen. PORTER. Have not delegates been retained from
Congress, Which is Virtually recalling them, because they
have not been paid? Has not Rhode Island failed to paV
their delegates? Should there not be an equal charge
throughout the United States, for the payment of the dele-
gates, as the1e IS in this state for the payment of the mem-
bers of this Convention, met for the general good? Is it
not advantageous to the peOple at large, that the delegates
to this Convention are paid out of the public treasury? If
any inconvenience, however, can be shown to flow from this
plan, I should be glad to hear it.

Hon. Mr. SEDGWICK hoped gentlemen would consider
that the federal officers of government would be responsible
for their conduct; and, as they would regard their repu-
tations, will not assess exorbitant wages. In Massachusetts,
and in every other state, the legislatures have power to
provide for their own payment; and, he asked, have they
ever established it higher than it ought to be? But, on the
contrary, have they not made it extremely inconsiderable?
The commons of Great Britain, he said, have the power to
assess their own wages; but for two centuries they have
never exercised it. Can a man, he asked, who has the least
respect for the good Opinion of his fellow-countrymen, go
home to his constituents, after having robbed them by voting
himself an exorbitant salary? This principle Will be a most
powerful check; and in respect to economy, the power
lodged as it is in this section Will be more advantageous to
the people than if retained by the state legislatures. Let
us see What the legislature of Massachusetts have done;
they vote the salaries of the delegates to Congress, and they
have voted them such as have enabled them to live in style
suited to the dignity of a respectable state ; but these salaries
have been four times as much, for the same time, as they

5311 DEBATES. [KIM

ever voted themselves. Therefore, concluded the honorable
gentleman, if left to themselves to provide for their own
payment, as long as they wish fo1 the good opinion of man-
kind, they will assess no mo1e than they leally dese1ve,as a
compensation for their services.

Hon. M1. KING said, if the a1 O‘uments 011 the 4th section
against an undue contiol, in theb state legislatuies, over the
ledeial 1ep1esentatives, were in any deglee satisfactory, they
are so 011 this.

Gen. THOMPSON. Mr. President, the honorable gen—
tleman means Well, and is honest in his sentiments; it is
a'l alike. When we see matters at large, and what it all is,
we will know what to do with it.

Mr. PARSONS. In 01de1 that the gene1al goVelnmemt
should preserve itself, it is necessaly it should pleserve jus-
tice between the several states. Under the Confederation,
the power of this section would not be just; for each state
has a right to send seven membels to Cong1ess, though
some of them do not pay one tenth as much tD'ot the public
expenses as others. It is a mele fede1a1 government. of
states, neither equal nor proportionate. If gentlemen would
use the same candor that the honorable gentleman from
Topsham (Gen. Thompson) does, considering all the parts
as connected with others, the Constitution would receive a
bettel discussion.

‘ The second paragraph of the 6th section read.

Ml. GORHAM said that this Constitution contained 1e
strictions which wele not to be found in any other 1; and he
wished gentlemen who had objected to every paragraph
which had been read, would, give to the Convention credit
for those parts which must meet the approbation of every
man.

The 8th section of article 1, containing the powers of
Congress being read, —

Gen. BROOKS (of Lincoln) said this article contained
more matte1 than any one yet read; and he wished to know ,
whether there are not to be some general restrictions to the
general articles.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, it is painful for me to ob-
trude my sentiments on the Convention so frequently.
However, sir, I console myself with the idea that my mo-_
tives are as good as those of more able gentlemen, who have

Kmeq MASSACHUSETTS. 55

remained silent. Sir, this is a very important clause, and of
the highest consequence to the future 101tune of the people
of Ame1ica. It 1s not my intention to go into any elaborate
discussion of the subject. I shall only offe1 those considera-
tions which have influenced my mind in favor of the article,
in the hope that it may tend to reconcile gentlemen to it.
It shall not be with a View of exhibiting: any pa"1ticula1
knowledge of mine; fo1 such 18 not my intention. Hithelto
We have t3considered the construction of the general gove1n—
ment. We now come, sir, to the consideration of the powers
with which that government shall be clothed. The intro-
duction to this Constitution is in these words: “We, the
people,” &c. The language of the Confederation is, “ We,
the states,” &c. The latter is a mere federal government of
states. Those, therefore, that assemble under it, have no
power to make laws to apply to the individuals of the states.
confederated; and the attempts to make laws for collective
societies necessarily leave a discretion to comply with them
or not. In no instance has there been so fiequent deviation
from filst principles, as in the neglect or refusal to comply
with the requisitions of general governments f01 the collec-
tion of moneys.

I11 the ancient governments, this has been the principal
defect. In the United Provinces of the Nethellands, it has
been conspicuously so.' A celeblated political W11te1 -—- 1
mean John Dewitt, formerly pensioner of Holland—said that,
in the confederacy of 1570, though the articles were declared
equ1l|y binding on the several provinces, yet any one had it
in its power to comply with the requisitions of the generality
or not; and some provinces,t taking advantage of this dis-- '
cretionary poweI. neve1 paid any thing. Duling f011y years
of wa1 with Spain, the province of Holland paid fifty -ei0l1t
parts of a hundred of all the expenses the1eof Two or
three of the provinces neve1 so much as passed a 1esolution
to pay any thing; and Dewitt says that two of them paid
not a single o*uilder. What was the consequence? 111 one
instance, Holland compelled a neighbming p1ovince to com—
ply with the requisitions, by marching a force into it.1l1is
was a great instance of usurpation, made in the time of a
war. The Prince of Orange, and the generality, found that
they could not continue the war in this manner. What
was to be done? They were obliged to resort to the ex—

56 DEBATES. [Km

pcdient of doubling the ordinary requisitions on the states.
Some of the provinces were prevailed upon to grant these
requisitions fully, in order to induce Holland to do the same.
She, seeing the other states appea1ing thus forward, not
only granted the requisitions, but paid them. The others
did not. Thus was a single province obliged to bear almost
the whole burdens of the wa1; and, one hund1ed yea1s after,
the accounts of this war were unsettled. What was the
reason? Holland had but one voice in the States—General.
That voice was feeble when opposed by the rest.

This fact is true. The history of our own country is a
melancholy proof of a similar truth. Massachusetts has paid
While other states have been delinquent. How was the
war carried 011 with the paper money? Requisitions on the
states for that money were made. Who paid them ? Mas-
sachusetts and a few others. A requisition of 29, 000, 000
dollais we1e quotaed 011 Massachusetts, and it was paid.
This state has paid in her proportion of the old money.
How comes it, then, that gentlemen have any of this money
by them? Because the other states have shamefully neg-
lected to pay their quotas. Do you ask for redress? You
are scoffed at. The next requisition was for 11,000,000 of
dollars, 6,000,000 of which were to be paid in facilities, the
rest in silver money, for discharging the interest of the 11a-
tional debt. If the legislatures found a difficulty in paying
‘the hard money, why did they not pay the paper? But
1,200,000 dollars have been paid. And six states have not
paid a farthing of it.

After mentioning another requisition, equally disregarded,
Mr. King said, two states have not paid a single farthing
from the moment they signed the Confederation to this day,
if my documents are to be depended 011, and they are open
to the inspection of all. Now, sir, what faith 1s to be put
in 1equisitions on the states, 101 moneys to pay our domes-
tic c1edito1s, and discha1ge ou1 foreign debts, for moneys lent
us in the day of difficulty and distress? Sir, experience
proves, as well as any thing can- be proved, that no depend-
ence can be placed on such requisitions. 1Vhat method,
then, can be devised to compel the delinquent states to pay
tl1ei1 quotas? Sir, I know Of none. Laws, to be effective,
therefore, must not be laid on, states, but upon individuals.
911‘, it has been objected to the proposed Constitution, that

wagsq MASSACHUSETTS. 57

the power is too great, and by this Constitution is to be
sacred. But if the want of power is the defect in the OM
Confederation,there is a fitness and propriety in adopting
What is here pr,oposed which gives the necessary powe1
wanted. Congress 110w have powe1 to call fo1 what moneys,
and in what- proportion, they please; but they l1 we no au—
thority to compel a compliance the1ewith. It is an objection
in some gentlemen’s minds, that Cong1ess should possess
the power of the purse and the sword. But, si1, Iwould
ask, whether anyg 0‘ove1nment can exist, 01 give security to
the people, which 1s not possessed of this powe1. The fi1st
levenue will be raised hom the impost, to VVhlt l1 the1e IS no
objection, the next from the excise; and if these a1e not suf-
ficient, direct taxes must be laid. To conclude, sir, if we
mean to support an efficient federal government, Which,
under the old Confederation, can never be the case, the pro-
posed Constitution is, in my opinion, the only one that can
be substituted.

Hon. Mr. WHITE said, in giving this power, we give up
eveiy thing; and Cong1ess, with the pu1se— —strings in their
hands, will use the sw01d with a witness.

Mr. DAWES said, he thought the powers in the para-
graph under debate should be fully vested in Congress. We
have suffered, said he, for want of such authority in the
federal head. This will be evident if we take a short view
of our agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. Our agri-
culture has not been encouraged by the imposition of national
duties on rival produce; nor can it be, so long as the several
states may make contradictory laws. This has induced our
farmers to raise only what they wanted to consume in their
own families; *I mean, however, after raising enough to pay
their own taxes; for I insist that, upon the old plan, the
land has borne the burden; for, as Congress could not make
laws, whereby they could obtain a revenue, in their own
way, from impost or excise, they multiplied their requisition
on the several states. When a state was thus called on, it
would perhaps impose new duties on its own trade, to pro-
cure money for paying its quota of federal demands. This
would drive the trade to such neighboring states as made no
such new impositions; thus the revenue would be lost with
the trade, and the only resort would be a direct tax.

As to commerce, it is well known that the different states

VOL. 11. 8

58 DEB A TES. [DAW ES

now pursue different systems of duties in regard to each
other. By this, and for want of general laws of prohibition
through the Union, we have not secured even our own domes
tic traffic that passes from state to state. This is contrary to
the policy of ev my nation 011 earth. Some nations have no
othel comme1ce. The g1eat and flourishing empi1e of China
has but little co111111e1ce beyond her own ter"'1it01ies , and no
country is better circumstanced than we for an exclusive traf—
fic from state to state; yet even in this we are rivalled by
foreigners—by those foreigners to whom we are the least in-
debted. A vessel from Roseway or Halifax finds as hearty a
welcome with its fish and whalebone at the southern ports, as
though it was built, navigated, and freighted from Salem or
Boston. And this must be the case, until we have laws c0111-
prehending and embracing alike all the states in the Union.

But it is not only our coasting trade —our whole commerce
is going to ruin. Cong1ess has not had powe1 to make even
a trade law, which shall confine the i111po1tation of foreign
goods to the ships of the p1oducing 01 consuming count1y.
If we had such a law, we should not go to England for the
goods of otl1e1 nations; nor would B1itish Vessels be the
carriers of American produce from our sister states. In the
states southward of the Delaware, it is agreed that three
fourths of the produce are exported, and three fourths of the
returns are made, in British bottoms. It is Said that, for
eXpo1ting timber, one half the p1ope1ty goes to the ca1rie1 ,
and of the p1oduce in general, it has been computed that,
when it is shipped fo1 London f1om a southern state, to the
value of one million of dolla1s, the B1itish merchant d1a11s
from that sum three hundred thousand dollars under the
names of f1 eight and charnes. This 13 money which belongs
to the NewP5 England states, because 11e can furnish the
ships as well as, and much bettet than, the British. Our
sister states are willing that we should receive these benefits,
and that they should be secured to us by national laws; but
until this is done, their private merchants will, no doubt, for
the sake of long credit, or some other such tempo1ary ad—
vantage, prefer the ships of foreigners; and yet. we have
suffered these ignominious burdens, rather than trust our
own representatives with power to help us; and we call
ourselves free and independent states! We are independ-
ent of each other, but we are slaves to Europe. We '

- DAWES.] MASSACHUSETTS. 59

have no uniformity in duties, imposs ,excises, or p1oh111~
tions. Cong1ess has no authority to withhold advantages
from foreigners, 111 o1de1 to obtain advantages from them.
By the 9th of the old a1ticleS, Congress may ente1 into
tieaties and alliances under ce1tain piovisoes , but Co11<11ess
cannot pledge that a Single state shall not rende1 the whole
t1eaty of commerce a nullity.

Our manufactutes are another great subject, which has
received no encouragement by national duties 011 foreign '
manufactures, and they never can by any authority in the
Confederation. It has been said that no country can pro-
ducefmanufactures until it be overstocked with inhabitants.
It is true that the United States have employment, except
in the winter, for their citizens in agriculture—the most
respectable employment under heaven; but it is now to be
remembered, that, since the old Confiederation, there is a
great emigration of foreign artisans hither, some of whom
are left here by the armies of the last war, and others who
have more lately sought the new world, from hopes of
mending their condition; these will not change their em—
ployments. Besides this, the very face of our country leads
to manufactures. Our numerous falls of water, and places
for mills, where paper, snuff, gunpowder, iron works, and nu—
merous other articles, are prepared, — these will save 11s im-
mense sums of money, that would otherwise go to Europe.
The question is, Have these been encouraged? Has Con-
gress been able, by national laws, to prevent the importation
of such foreign commodities as are made from such raw ma-
terials as we ourselves raise? It is alleged that the citizens
of the United States have contracted debts withm the last
three years, with the subjects of Great Britain, for the
amount of near six millions of dollars, and that consequently
our lands are mortgaged for that sum. So Corsica was once
mortgaged to the Genoese merchants for articles which her
inhabitants did not want, or which they could not have made
themselves; and she was afterwards sold to a foreign power.
if we wish to encourage our own manufactures, to preserve
our own commerce, to raise the value of our own lands, we
must give Congress the powers in question.

The honmable gentleman from Norton, last speaking.
says, that, if Congress will have the power of laying and col-
lectingjaxes. they will use the power of the sword. I hold

(‘10 DEBATES. [SEDGWICK.

the reverse to be true. The doctrine of requisitions, or of
demands upon a whole state, implies such a power; for
surely a Whole state, a whole community, can be compelled
only by an army; but taXes upon an individual imply only
the use of a collector of taxes. Ihat Cong1ess, howeve1,
will not apply to the power of direct taxation, unless in cases
of emergency, is plain— ;. because, as thirty thousand inhabit
ants will elect a 1ep1esentative, eight tenths of which elec-
to1s pe1l1aps are yeomen, and holdels of farms, it will be
thei1 own faults if they are not represented by such men
as will never permit the land to be i11ju1ed by unnecessa1y
taxes. '

Mr. BODMAN said, that the power given to Congress,
to lay and collect duties, taxes, &c., as contained in the
section under consideration, was certainly unlimited, and
therefore dangerous; and Wished to know whether it was
necessary to give Congress power to do harm, in order
to enable them to do good. It had been said, that the
sovereignty of the states remains with them; but if Congress
has the power to lay taxes, and, in cases of negligence or
non—compliance, can send a power to collect them, he
thought that the idea of sovereignty was destroyed. This,
he said, was an essential point, and ought to be seriously
considered. It has been urged that gentlemen were jealous
of their rulers. He said, he thought they ought to be so;
it was just they should be so; for jealousy was one of the
'greatest securities of the people in a republic. The power
in the 8th section, he said, ought to have been defined ; that
he was willing to give power to the federal head, but he
wished to know what that power was.

Mr. SEDGWICK, in answer to the gentleman last speak-
ing, said, if he believed the adoption of the proposed Con-
stitution would interfere with the state legislatures, he would
be the last to vote for it; but he thought all the sources of
revenue ought to be put into the hands of government, who
were to protect and secure 11s; and powers to effect this had
always been necessarily unlimited. Congress would neces-
sarily take that which was easiest to the people; the first
uould be impost, the next excise , and a direct taX will be
the last; f01, said the honorable gentleman, drawing money
f1on1 the people, by dilect taxes, being difficult and uncer-
tain, it would be the last source of revenue applied to by a'

,KINGSLEL] MASSACHUSETTS. 6]

Wise legislature; and hence, said he, the people may be
assured that the delegation of a power to levy them would
not be abused. ,Let us suppose,—and we shall not he
thought extravagant in the supposition, —continued Mr. S.,
that we are attacked by a foreign enemy; that in this di—
lemma our t1easu1y was exhausted, our c1edit gone, our
enemy on 0111 borders, and that there was no possible method

of raising impost or excise; in this case, the only remedy
would be a direct tax. Could, therefore, this power, being
vested in Congress, lessen the many advantages which may
be drawn from it. P

Mr. SINGLETARY thought no more power could be
given to a despot, than to give up the pu1se- -strings of the,
people.

Col. PORTER asked, ifa better rule of yielding power
could be shown than in the Constitution; for what we do
not give, said be, we retain.

Gen. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I totally abhor this
paragraph. Massachusetts has ever been a leading state;
now let her give good advice to her sister states. Suppose
nine states adopt this Constitution; who shall touch the
other four? Some cry out, Force them. I say, Draw them.
We love liberty. Britain never tried to enslave us until she
told us we had too much liberty. The Confederation wants
amendments; shall we not amend it?

The Convention were sent 011 to Philadelphia to amend
this Confederation; but they made a new creature; and the
very setting out of it is unconstitutional. In the Conven-
tion, Pennsylvania had more members than all New England,
and two of our delegates only were persuaded to sign the
Constitution. Massachusetts once shut up the harbors
against the British. There, I confess, I was taken in.
Don’t let us be 'in a hurry again. Let us wait to see what
our sister states will do. What shall we suffer if we adjourn
the consideration of it for five or six months? It is better to
do this than adopt. it so hastily. Take care we don’t dis-
unite the states. By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall.

Major KINGSLEY. Mr. President, after so much has
been said on the powers to be given to Congress, I shall‘say
but a few words 011 the subject. By the A1ticles of Confed-
eration the people have three checks on thei1 delegates in
Congress—the annual electzon of them their 70tation,and the

6 .

62 DEBATES. [KINGSLEY

power to recall any, or allpof them, when they see fit. In
view of our federal rulers, they are the servants of the peo-
ple. In the new Constitution, we are deprived ofannual
elections, have no rotation, and cannot recall our members;
therefore our federal rulers will be masters, and not servants.
I will examine what powers We have given to our inas-
ters. They have power to lay and collect all taxes, duties,
im posts, and excises; raise armies; fit out navies; to establish
themselves in a federal town of ten miles square, equal to
four middling townships; erect forts, magazines, arsenals, &c.
Therefore, should the Congress be chosen of designing and
interested men, they can perpetuate their existence, secure
the resources of war, and the people will have nothing left
to defend themselves with. Let us look into ancient history.
The Romans, after a war, thought themselves safe in a
government of ten men, called the decenwiri ,' these ten
men were invested with all power, and were chosen for
three years. By their arts and designs, they secured their
second election; but, finding, from the manner in which
they had exercised their power, they Were not able to secure
their third election, they declared themselves masters of
Rome, impoverished the city, and deprived the' people of
their rights.

It has been said that there was no such danger here. 1
will suppose they were to attempt the experiment, after we
have given them all our money, established them in a federal
‘town, given them the power of coining money and raising a
standing army, and to establish their arbitrary government;
what. resources have the peOple left? 1 cannot see any.
The Parliament of England was first chosen annually; they
afterwards lengthened their duration to three years; and from
triennial they became septennial. The government of Eng-
land has been represented as a good and happy government;
but some parts of it their greatest political writers much
condemn; especially that of the duration of their Parlia-
ments. Attempts are yearly made. to shorten theirduration,
from septennial to triennial; but the influence of the minis—
try is so great that it has not yet been accomplished. From
this duration, bribery and corruption are introduced. Not-
withstanding they receive no pay, they make great interest
for a seat in Parliament, one or two years before its dissolu-
tion, and give from five to twenty guineas for a vote; and.

SUMNERJ MASSACHUSETTS. 63

the candidates sometimes expend £10,000 to £30,000.
Will a person throw away such a f01tune, and waste so
much time, Without the probability of 1eplacing such a sum
with i11te1est? Or can there be security in such men?
Bribery may be introduced heie as well as in G1eat Britain;
and Congress may equally oppress the people; because we
cannot call them to an account, considering that there is no
annual electiOn, no rotation, no power to recall them, pro-
vided for.

TUESDAY, January 22. —Section 8th still unde1 con-
sideration.

Judge SUMNER. The poweis proposed to be dele-
gated in this section are very important, as they will, in
elfect, place the purse—stiings of the citizens in the hands of
Congi'ess for certain purposes. In order to know Whether
such powers are necessary, we ought, sir, to inquire What
the design of uniting under one government is. It is that
the national dignity may be suppoited, its safety p1ese1ved,
and necessary debts paid. Is it not necessaly, then, to
afford the means by which alone those objects can be at—
tained? Much better, it appears to me, would it be for the
states not to unite under one government, which will be
attended with some expense, than to unite, and at the same
time withhold the powe1s necessa1y to accomplish the design
of the union. Gentlemen say, the power to raise money may
be abused. I grant it; and the same may be said of any
other delegated power. Our General Court have the same
power ; but did they ever dare abuse it? Instead of voting
themselves 63. 8d., they might vote themselves £12 a day;
but there never was a complaint of their voting themselves
more than what was reasonable. If they should make an
undue use of their power, they know a loss of confidence in
the people would be the consequence, and they would not
. e reelected; and this is one security in the hands of the
people. Another is, that all money bills are to originate with
the House of Representatives. And can we suppose the
representatives of Georgia, or any other state, more disposed
to bur-den their constituents with taxes, than the representa-
tives of Massachusetts? It is not to be supposed, for,
whatever is for the interest of one state, in this particular,
will be the interest of all the states, and no doubt attended
to by the House of Representatives. But Why should we

64 DE BATES. [Gem

alarm ourselves with imaginary evils? An impost will prob-
ably be a principal source of revenue ; but if that should be
insufficient, other taxes, especially in time of war, ought to
supply the deficiency. It is said that 1equisitions on the
states ought to be made in cases of emc1 O‘cncy, but we all
know tl1e1e can be no dependence on requisitions. The
hono1able gentleman from NeWburyport gave us an in-
stance from the history of the United Provinces to prove it,
by which it appears they would have submitted to the arms
of Spain, had it not been for the surprising exertions of one
province. But there can be no need of recurring to ancient
records, when the history of our country furnishes an i11—
stance where requisitions have had no effect. But some
gentlemen object further, and say the delegation of these
great powers will destroy the state legislatures; but I trust
this neve1 can take place, for the genelal government de-
pends on the state legislatures for its very existence. The
P1esident is to be chosen by elect01s under the legulation
of the state legislature; the Senate is to be chosen by the
state legislatures; and the representative body by the peo-
ple, under like regulations of the legislative body in the
different states. If gentlemen consider this, they will, I
presume, alter their opinion; for nothing is clearer than that
the existence of the legislatures, in the different states, is
essential to the very being of the general government. I
hope, sir, we shall all see the necessity of a federal govern—
ment, and not make objections, unless they appear to us to
be of some weight.

Mr. GORE. This section, Mr. President, has been the
subject of many observations, founded on real or pretended
jealousies of the powers herein delegated to the general gov-
ernment; and, by comparing the proposed Constitution with
things in their nature totally different, the mind may be
seduced from a just determination on the subject. Gentle—
men have compared the authority of Congress to levy and
collect taxes from the people of America to a similar power
assumed by the Parliament of Great Britain. If we but
state the relation which these two bodies bear to America,
we shall see that no arguments drawn from one can be
applicable to the other. The House of Commons, in the
British Parliament, which is the only popular branch of that
assembly, was composed of men, chosen exclusively by the

Gem] MASSACHUSETTS. 65

inhabitants of Great Britain, in no sort amenable to, or de-
pendent upon, the people of America, and secured, by thei1
local Situation, from every burden they might lay on this
country. By impositions on this part of the empire, they
might be relieved from their own taxes, but could in no case
be injured themselves. The Congress of the United States
is to be chosen, either mediately 01 immediately, by the
people. They can impose no burdens but What they par-
ticipate in common with their fellow-citizens. The senators
and representatives, du1ing the time for which they shall be
elected, are incapable of holding any office which shall be
created, or the emoluments thereof be increased, during such
time.‘ This is taking from candidates every lure to office,
and from the administrators of the government every temp-
tation to create or increase emoluments to such degree as
shall be burdensome to their constituents.

Gentlemen, who candidly consider these things, will not
say that arguments against the assumption of power by
Great Britain can apply to the Congress of the United
States. Again, sir, it has been said, that because ten men
of Rome, chosen to compile a body of laws for that people,
remained in office afte1 the time for which they were chosen,
therefore the C0111 ess of Amerlta will perpetuate themselves
in government. glfihe decemviri, 1n their attainment to their
exalted station, had influence enough over the people to
obtain a temporary sovereignty, which superseded the au-
thority of the senate and the-consuls, and gave them un-
limited Control over the lives and fortunes of their fellow-
citizens. They were chosen for a year. At the end of this
period, under pretence of not having completed their busi—
ness, they, with the alteration of some few of their members,
were continued for another year. At the end of the second
year, notwithstanding the business for which they were
chosen was completed, they refused to withdraw from their
station, and still continued in the exercise of their power.
But to what was this owing? If history can be credited,
it was to an idea universally received by the Roman people,
that the power of the magistrate was supposed to determine
by his own resignation, and not by expiration of the time for
which he was chosen. This is one, among many instances,
which might be produced of the small attainments of the
Roman people in political knowledge ; and I submit it. sir,

VOL. II.

66 DEBATES [Gem

to the candor of this Convention, whether any conclusions
can be fairly drawn against vesting the proposed govern—
ment with the powers mentioned in this section, because
the magistrates of the ancient republics usurped power, and
frequently attempted to perpetuate themselves in authority.

Some gentlemen suppose it is unsafe and unnecessary to
vest the proposed govelnment with authmity to “lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” Let us strip
the subject of eve1y thing that is f01eign, and 1ef1ain from
likening it with governments, which, in their nature and
administration, have no affinity; and we shall soon see that
it is not only safe, but indispensably necessary to our peace
and dignity, to vest the Congress with the powers described
in this section. To determine the necessity of investing
that body with the authority alluded to, let us inquire what
duties are incumbent on them. To pay the debts, and
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States; to declare war, &c.; to raise and support
armies; to provide and maintain a navy ;——these are author-
ities and duties incident to everyb Government. No one has,
01, l plcsume, will deny, that nhatever gove1nment may be
established ovel America, ought to pe1fo1m such duties.
The expense attending these duties 18 not within the power
of calculation; the exigencies of government are in their
nature illimitable; so, then, must be the authmity which can
meet these exigencies. VVhele we demand an object, we
must afford the means necessary to its attainment. W hen—
ever it can be clearly ascertained what will be the future
exigencies of government, the expense attending them, and
the product of any particular tax, duty, or impost, then, and
not before, can the people of America limit their government
to amount and fund. Somehave said, that the impost and
excise would be sufficient for all the purposes of government
in times of peace; and that, in war, requisitions should be
made 011 the several states for sums to supply the deficien—
cies of this fund. Those who are best informed suppose
this sum inadequate to, and none pretend that it can exceed,
the expenses of a peace establishment. What, then, is to be
done? Is America to wait until she is attacked, before she
attempts a preparation at defence? This would certainly
be unwise; it would be courting our enemies to make war
upon us. The operations of war are sudden, and call for

PHILLIPs.] MASSACHUSETTS. 67

large sums of money; collections from states are at all times
slow and uncertain ; and, in case of refusal, the non—complying
state must be coerced by arms, which, in its consequences,
would involve the innocent with the guilty, and introduce
all the horrors of a civil war. But, it is said, we need not
fear war; we have no enemies. Let the gentlemen con-
sider the situation of our country; they will find we are
circumscribed with enemies from Maine to Georgia. I
trust, therefore, that, upon a fair and candid consideration
of the subject, it will be found indispensably requisite to
peace, dignity, and happiness, that the proposed govern-
ment should be vested with all the powers granted by the
section under debate.

Hon. Mr. PHILLIPS, (of Boston.) 1 rise to make a
few observations on this section, as it contains powers abso-
lutely necessary. If social government did not exist, there
would be an end of individual government. Therefore our
very being depends on social government. On this article
is founded the main pillar of the building; take away this
pillar, and where is your government? Therefore, I con-
ceive, in this View of the case, this power is absolutey
necessary. There seems to be a suspicion that this power
' will be abused; but is not all delegation of power equally
dangerous? If we have a castle, shall we delay to put a
commander into it, for fear he will turn his artillery against
us? My concern is for the majesty of the people. If there
is no virtue among them, what will the Congress do? If
they had the meekness of Moses, the patience of Job, and
the wisdom of Solomon, and the people were determined to
be slaves, sir, could the Congress prevent them? If they
set Heaven at defiance, no arm of flesh can save them. Sir,
I shall have nothing to do in this government. But we see
the situation we are in. We are verging towards destruc-
tion, and every one must be sensible of it. I suppose the
New England States have a treasure offered to them better
than the mines of Peru; and it cannot be to the disadvan—
tage of the Southern States. Great Britain and France
come herewith their vessels, instead of our carrying our
produce to those countries in American vessels, navigated
by our citizens. When I consider the extensive sea-coast
there is to this state alone, so Well calculated for commerce,
Viewmg matters in this light, I would rather sink' all this

(i8 DEBATES. [Gon HAM.

contlnent owes me, than this power should be Withheld
from Congress. Mention is made that Congress ought to
be restricted of the power to keep an army except in time
of war. I apprehend that great mischief would ensue from
such a restriction. Let us take means to prevent war, by
granting to Congress the power of raising an army. If a
declaration of war is made against this country, and the
enemy’s army is coming against us, before Congress could
collect the means to withstand this enemy, they would
penetrate into the bowels of our country, and every thing
dear to us would be gone in a moment. The honorable
gentleman f1om Topsham has made use of the expression,
“0 m3/ countr3/l ’7 from an apprehension that the Constitu-
tion should be adopted; I will cry out,“ 0 my count/3. ’ 7’
if it is not adopted. I see nothing but destruction and
inevitable ruin if it is not. The more I peruse and study
this article, the mom convinced am I of the necessity of
such a power being vested in Co'ngr.ess The more I hear
said against it, the m01e I am confilmed in my sentiments
of its expediency , f01 it is like the pu1e metal—the m01e
you rub it, the brighter it shines. It is with concern I hear
the honorable gentleman from Topsham make use of lan-
guage against the gentlemen of the law. Sir, I look on this
order of men to be essential to the liberties and rights of
the people, and whoever speaks against them as speaking
against an ordinance of Heaven. Mr. President, I hope
~every gentleman will offer his sentiments candidly on this
momentous affair; that he will examine for himself, and
consider that he has not only the good of this commonwealth
under consideration, but the welfale of the United States.
D1. WILLARD entered largely into the field of ancient
history, and deduced thelefrom arguments to prove that
where powe1 had been t1usted to men, Whether 1n great or
small bodies, they had always abused it, and that thus
republics had soon degenerated into aristocracies. He i11-
stanced Spalta, Athens, and Ro.me The Amphictyonic
league, he said, 1esembled the Confederation of the United
States; while thus united, they defeated Xerxes, but we1e
subdued by the gold of Philip, who brought the council to
betray the interest of thei1 count1y
Hon. M1. GORHAM (in 1eply to the gentleman from

leb1idge) exposed the absurdity of conclusions and hv-

pBownorN.] MASSACHUSETTS. 69

potheses, drawn from ancient governments, which bore no
relation to the confederacy proposed; for those governments
had no idea of representations as we have. He, however,
warned us against the evil which had ruined those states,
which he thought was the want of an efficient federal gov-
ernment. AS much as the Athenians rejoiced in the extir-
pation of a LaCedemonian, will, if we are disunited, a citizen
of Massachusetts at the death of a Connecticut man, or a
Yorker. With respect to the proposed government degener-
ating into an aristocracy, the honorable gentleman observed,
that the nature and Situation of our country rendered such a
circumstance impossible; as, from the great preponderance
of the'agricultural interest in the United States, that interest
would always have it in its power to elect such men as
would, he observed, effectually prevent the introduction of any
other than a pe1fectly democ1atical form of goveinment.

Hon. Mr. CABOT went fully into a continuation of the
arguments of the honorable gentleman last up. In a clear
and elegant manner, he analyzed the ancient governments
mentioned by Dr. Willard, and, by comparing them with
the proposed system, fully demonstrated the superiority of
the latter, and in a very particular manner the proposed
section under debate.

Mr. RANDALL said, the quoting of ancient history was
no more to the purpose than to tell how our forefathers dug
clams at Plymouth; he feared a consolidation of the thirteen
states. Our manners, he said, were widely different from
the Southern States; their elections were not so free and
unbiased ,' therefore. if the states were consolidated, he
thought it would introduce manners among us which would
set us at continual variance.

Mr. BOW DOIN pointed out other instances of dissimi-
larity, between the systems of the ancient republics and
the proposed Constitution, than those mentioned by the
honorable gentlemen from Charlestown and Beverly, in the
want of the important checks in the former which were to
be found in the latter; to the want of which, in the first,
u as owing, he said, the usu1pation which took place. He
instanced the decemviri, who, though chosen for a Short
peliod, yet, unchecked, soon subverted the liberties of the
Romans , and concluded With a decided opinion in fav01 of
the Constitution under debate.

7O DEBATES. [SYMMEs.

Afternoon—Mr. SYMMES. Mr. President, in such an
assembly as this, and on a subject that puzzles the oldest
politicians, a young man, sir, will scarcely dare to think for
himself; but, if he venture to Speak, the effort must certainly
be greater. This Convention is the first representative
body inwhich I have been honored with a seat, and men
will not wonder that a scene at once so new and so
august should confuse, oppress, and almost disqualify me
to proceed.

Sir, I wish to bespeak the candor of the Convention——
that candor, which, I know, I need but ask, to have it
extended to me, while I make a few indigested observa-
tions on the paragraph now in debate. I have hitherto
attended with diligence, but no great anxiety, to the rea—
soning of the ablest partisans on both sides of the question.
Indeed, I could have wished for a more effectual, and, if I
may term it so, a more feeling representation in the Lower
House, and for a representation of the people in the Senate.
I have been, and still am, desirous of a rotation in office, to
prevent the final perpetuation of power in the same men;
and I have not been able clearly to see why the place and
manner of holding elections should be in the disposal of
Congress. -

But, sir, in my humble opinion, these things are com-
parative by the lesser things of the law. They, doubtless,
have their influence in the grand effect, and so are essential
to the system. But, sir, I view the section to which we
have at length arrived, as the cement of the fabric, and this
clause as the keystone, or (if I may apply the metaphor)
the magic talisman, on which the fate of it depends.

Allow me, sir, to recall to your remembrance that yester-
day, when states were in doubt about granting to Congress
a 5 per cent. impost, and the simple power of regulating
trade—the time when, so delicate was the patriotic mind,
that power was to be transferred with a reluctant, with a
sparing hand, and the most obvious utility could scarcely
extort it from the people. It appears to me of some impor-
tance to consider this matter, and to demand complete sat-
isfaction upon the question, why an unlimited power in the
affair of taxation is so soon required. Is our situation so
vastly different, that the powers so lately sufficient are now
but the dust of the balance? I observe, sir, that many

SYMMES.] MASSACHUSETTS. 71

men, who, within a few years past, were strenuous opposers
of an augmentation of the power of Congress, are now the
warmest advocates of power so large as not to admit of a
comparison with those which they opposed. Cannot some
of them state their reasons then, and their reasons now, that
We may judge of their consistency? or shall we be left to
suppose that the opinions of politicians, like those of the
multitude, vibrate from one extreme to the other, and that
We have no men among us to whom we can intrust the
philosophic task of pointing out the golden mean?

At present, Congress have no power to lay taxes, &c.,
not even to compel a compliance with their requisitions.
May we not suppose that the members of the great C011—
Vention had severely felt the impotency of Congress, While
they were in, and, therefore, were rather too keenly set
for an effectual increase of power? that the difficulties
they had encountered in obtaining decent requisitions, had
Wrought in them a degree of impatience, which prompted
them to demand the purse—strings of the nation, as if we
were insolvent, and the proposed Congress were to com-
pound with our creditors? Whence, sir, can this great, I
had almost said, this bold demand have originated? Will
it be said that it is. but a consistent and necessary part of
the general system? I shall not deny these gentlemen the
praise of inventing a system completely consistent with itself,
and pretty free from contradiction; but I would ask,—I
shall expect to be answered,—how a system can be neces-
sary for us, of which this is a consistent and necessary part.
But, sir, to the paragraph in hand: Congress, 850. Here,
sir, (however kindly Congress may be pleased to deal with
us,) 18 a very good and valid conveyance of all the property
in the United States,—to certain uses indeed, but those
uses capable of any construction the trustees may think
proper to make. This body is not amenable to any tribu-
nal, and therefore this Congress can do no wrong. It will
not be denied that they may tax us to any extent; but
some gentlemen are fond of arguing that this body never
will do any thing but what is for the common good. Let
. us consider that matter.

Faction, sir, is the vehicle of all transactions in public
bodies; and when gentlemen know this so well, I am rather
surprised to hear them so sanguine in this respect. The

12 DEBATES. LSYM‘MES.

prevalent faction is the body; these gentlemen, therefore,
must mean that the prevalent faction will always be right,
and that the true patriots will always outnumber the men
of less and selfish principles. From this it would follow
that no public measure was ever wrong, because it must
have been passed by the majority; and‘so, I grant, no
power ever was, or ever will be, abused. In short, we know
that all governments have degenerated, and consequently
have abused the powers reposed in them; and why we
should imagine better of the proposed Congress than of
myriads of public bodies who have gone before them, I
cannot at present conce1ve.

Sir, we ought (I speak it with submission) to consider
that what we now grant from certain motives, well grounded
at present, will be exacted of posterity as a prerogative,
when we are not alive, to testify the tacit conditions of the
grant; that the wisdom of this age will then he pleaded by
those in power ; and that the cession we are now about to
make will be actually clothed with the venerable habit of
ancestral sanction.

Therefore, sir, I humbly presume we ought not to take
advantage of our situation in point of time, so as to bind
posterity to be obedient to laws they may very possibly dis-
approve, 11o1 expose them to a rebellion which, in that period
will ve1y probably end only 111 thei1 fu1the1 subjugation.

The paragraph 111 question is an absolute decree of the
people. lhe Cong1ess shall have powe1. It does not say
that they shall exercise it; but our necessities say they must,
and the experience of ages say that they will , and finally,
when the expenses of the nation, by thei1 ambition, are
grown e1101mous, that they will oppless and subject; for,
sir, they may lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises! One
would suppose that the Convention, sir, wele not at all
ahaid to multiply w01ds when any thing was to be got by
it. By a11otl1e1 clause, all imposts or duties on eXp01ts and
imports, whereve1 laid, go into the fedeial chest; so that
Congless may not only lay imposts and excises, but all i111-
posts and duties that ale laid on imp01ts and exports, by any
state, shall be a pa1t of the national revenue , and besides,
Congress may lay an impost on the produce and manufac-
tures of the country, which are consumed at home. And all
these shall be equal through the states. Here, sir, l raise

smmsq MASSACHUSETTS. 73

two objections; first, that Congress should have this power.
It is a universal, unbounded permission, and as such, I
think, no free people ought ever to consent to it, especially
in so important a matter as that of property. I will not de-
scend, sir, to an abuse of the future Congress, until it exists;
nor then, until it misbehaves; nor then, unless I dare. But I
think that some certain revenue, amply adequate to all neces-
sary purposes, upon a peace establishment, but certain and
definite, would have been better; and the collection of it might
have been gurantied by every state to every other. We
should then have known to what we were about to subscribe,
and should have cheerfully granted it. But now we may
indeed grant, but who can cheerfully grant he knows not
what 5’

Again, sir, I object to the equality of these duties through
the states. It matters not with me, in the present argu—
ment, which of them will suffer by this proportion. Some
probably will, as the consumption of dutied articles will not,
if we may judge from experience, be united in all.

But some say, with whom I have conversed, it was for
this reason that taxes were provided; that, by their assist-
ance, the defect of duties in some states ought to be supplied.
Now, then, let us suppose that the duties are so laid, that, if
every state paid in proportion to that which paid most, the
duties alone would supply a frugal treasury. Some states
will pay but half their proportion, and some will scarcely
pay any thing. But those in general who pay the least
duty, viz., the inland states, are least of all able to pay a land
tax; and therefore I do not see but that this tax would op-
erate most against those who are least able to pay it.

I humbly submit it, sir, whether, if each state had its pro-
portion of some certain gross sum assigned, according to its
numbers, and a power was given to Congress to collect the
same, in case of default in the state, this would not have been
a safer Constitution. For, sir, I also disapprove of the
power to collect, which is here vested in Congress. It is a
power, sir, to burden us with a standing army of ravenous
collectors,—harpies, perhaps, from another state, but who,
however, were never known to have bowels for any purpose,
but to fatten on the life-blood of the people. In an age or
two, this will be the case; and when the Congress shall be-
come tyrannical, these vultures, their servants, will be the

VOL.IL 10 7

74 DEBATES. [SYMMES

tyrants of the village, by Whose presence all freedom of
speech and action will be taken away.

Sir, I shall be told that these are imaginary evils; but I
hold to this maxim, that power was never given, (of this kind
especially,) but it was exercised; nor ever exercised, but it
was finally abused. We must not be amused with hand-
some probabilities; but we must be assured that we are in
no danger, and that this Congress could not distress us, if
they were ever so much disposed.

To pay the debts, 85c.

These words, sir, I confess, are an ornament to the page,
and very musical words; but they are too general to be un-
derstood as any kind of limitation of the power of Con-
gress, and not very easy to be understood at all. When
Congress have the purse, they are not confined to rigid
economy; and the word debts, here, is not confined to debts
already contracted; or, indeed, if it were, the term “general
welfare” might be applied to any expenditure Whatever.
Or, if it could not, who shall dare to gainsay the proceedings
of this body at a future day, when, according to the course
of nature, it shall be too firmly fixed in the saddle to be
overthrown by any thing but a general insurrection P — an
event not to be expected, considering the extent of this con-
tinent; and, if it were to be expected, a sufficient reason in
itself for rejecting this or any constitution that would tend to
produce it.

This clause, sir, contains the very sinews of the Constitu
tion. And I hope the universality of it may be singular
but it may be easily seen, that it tends to produce, in time,
as universal powers in every other respect. As the poverty
of individuals prevents luxury, so the poverty of public bodies,
Whether sole or aggregate, prevents tyranny. A nation can-
not, perhaps, do a more politic thing than to supply the
purse of its sovereign with that parsimony which results
from a sense of the labor it costs, and so to compel him
to comply with the genius of his people, and to conform
to their situation, whether he will or not. How different
will be our conduct, if we give the entire disposal of our
property to a body as yet almost unknown in theory, in
‘ practice quite heterogeneous in its composition, and whose
maxims are yet entirely unknown!

Sir, I wish the gentlemen who so ably advocate this in-

Jams] MASSACHUSETTS. 75

strument would enlarge upon this formidable clause; and 1
most sincerely wish that the effect of their reasoning may be
my conviction. For, sir, I will not dishonor my constituents,
by supposing that they expect me to resist that which is
irresistible—the force of reason. No, sir; my constituents
wish for a firm, efficient Continental government, but fear
the operation of this which is new proposed. Let them be
convinced that their fears are groundless, and I venture to
declare in their name, that no town in the commonwealth
Will sooner approve the form, or be better subjects under it.
Mr. JONES (of Boston) enlarged on the various checks
which the Constitution provides, and which, he said, formed
a security for liberty, and prevention against power being
abused ; the frequency of elections of the democratic branch ;
representation apportioned to numbers; the publication of
the journals of Congress, &c. Gentlemen, he said, had
compared the people of this country to those of Rome;
but, he observed, the comparison was very erroneous:
the Romans were divided into two classes, the nobility and
plebeians; the nobility kept all kinds of knowledge to their
own class ; and the plebeians were, in general, very ignorant,
and when unemployed, in time of peace, were ever ready
for revolt, and to follow the dictates of any designing patri—
cian. But, continued the worthy gentleman, the people of
the United States are an enlightened, well—informed people,
and are, therefore, not easily imposed on by designing men.
Our right of representation, concluded Mr. J ., is much more
just and equitable than the boasted one of Great Britain,
whose representatives are chosen by corporations or boroughs,
and those boroughs, in’ general, are the property, or at the
disposal, of the nobility and rich gentry of the kingdom.
[The Vice-president having informed the Convention, in
the forenoon, that he had received a long letter from the
Hon. Mr. Gerry, the same was read as soon as the Conven—
tion proceeded to business in the afternoon. When the vice—
president had read the letter, Mr. Gore rose, and objected to
the reading a state of facts respecting the construction of
the Senate in the federal Convention, which accompanied
the letter; not, he said, “from a wish to preclude informa-
tion from his own mind, or from the minds of the Conven-
‘ tion, but from his duty to his constituents, and the desire
he had to guard against infringements on the orders of the

76 DEBATES. [PIERCE

Convention.” Mr. Gore was interrupted, as being out of
order, but was proceeding on his objection, when the Hon.
Judge Dana begged Mr. Gore’s leave to say a few words.
which he did; after which he retired from the Convention,
until the consideration of the letter should be gone through
With.]

WEDNESDAY, January 23. —Mr. PIERCE rose, he said,
to make a few observations on the powers of Congress, in
this section.

Gentlemen, he said, in different parts of the house,
(Messrs. Dalton, Phillips, and Gore,) had agreed that Con-
gress will not lay direct taxes, except in cases of war; for
that, to defray the exigencies of peace, the impost and excise -
would be sufficient; and, as that mode of taxation would be
the most expedient and productive, it would undoubtedly be
adopted. But it was necessary Congress should have power
to lay direct taxes at all times, although they will not use it,
because, when our enemies find they have sufficient powers
to call forth all the resources of the people, it Will prevent
their making war, as they otherwise would. As the Hon.
Mr. Phillips used this proverb, “Astitch in time will save
nine,” his meaning, I suppose, was, that. we should have
war nine times, if Congress had not such powers, where we
should once if they had such powers. But. these arguments -
to me are not conclusive; for, if our enemies know they do
not use such powers except in a war, although granted to
them, what will be the difference if they have the powers
only in the time of war? But, Mr. President, if Congress
have the powers of direct taxes, in the manner prescribed in
this section, I fear we shall have that mode of taxation.
adopted, in preference .to imposts and excises; and the
reasons of my fears are these: When the impost was granted
to Congress in this state, I, then being a member of court,
well remember the gentlemen in trade, almost with One
consent, agreed that it was an unequal tax, bearing hard on
them; for, although it finally was a tax on the consumer,
yet, in the first instance, it was paid by persons in trade;
and also that they consumed more than the landed interest
of dutied articles; and nothing but necessity induced them to
submit to grant said impost, as that was the only way Con-
gress could collect money to pay the foreign debt, undcr'the '
regulations they were then under; and I fear part of this

PIERCE] . MASSACHUSETTS. 77

state’s members in Congress, when this Constitution 1s
adopted, will resume their own opinion, when they can lay
direct taxes; and, as Rhode‘Island has always been against
an impost, and as they have an equal representation in the
Senate, and part ofConnecticut will be interested with them,
and the Southern States having no manufactures of their
own, and consuming much more foreign a1ticles than the
Northerm it appears to me, we ale notPD ce1tain of availing
ourselves of an impost, if we give Cbngress power to levy
and collect direct taxes in time of peace.

WhileI am 11p, Mr. Piesident, Iwould make some ob-
servations on What has been passed over, as I think it is
Within the Oiders of the house. The Hon. Mr. Sedg—
wick said, ifl understood him 1ight, that, if he thought that
this Constitution consolidated the union of the states, he
should be the last man that should vote for it, but I take
his meaning to be this, according to the reasoning of Mr.
Ames —that it is not a consolidation of the Union, because
there are three branches in the Union; and therefore it is not
a consolidation of the Union ; but, sir, I think I cannot con-
ceive of a sovereignty of power existing within a sovereign
powe1, nor do I wish any thing in this Constitution to pre-
vent Congless being sove1eign in matters belonging to their
ju1isdiction , for I have seen tathe necessity of their powe1s in
almost all the instances that have been mentioned in this
Convention, and also, last winte1, in the rebellion, I thought
it would be better for Congiess to have stilled the people,
ratl1e1 than the people from amongst themselves, who am
more apt to be governed by temper than others, as it ap—
pealed to me we we1e, in the disqualifying act, as, 1n .my
opinion, we then did not keep stlictly to our own constitu~
tiOn; and I believe such a superior power ought to be in
Congress. But 1 would have it distinctly bounded, that
every one may know the utmost limits of it; and I have
sOme doubts on my mind, as to those limits, which I wish to
have solved. Ihave also an objection as to the term for
which the Senate are to be in office; for, as the democrati-
cal branch of the federal legislature is to continue in office
two years, and they are the only check on the federal, and
they, the Senate, to continue in office six years, they will
have an undue influence 'on the demOcratic branch; and I
think they ought not to continue in office for a longer time

78 DEBATES. [VARNUM

than the other; and also, that, if they conduct ill, we may
have a constitutional revolution in as short a period as two
years, if needed. The H011. Mr. King said, some days past,
that the Senate going out by classes, if rightly considered,
were not for but four years; because one third part was
never more than six, another four, and a third two; therefore
the medium was four; but I think that way of arguing
would argue ,that if they were all to go out at the end of six
yeals, that they were but t/uee years in office , because half
their time they were under the age of three years, and the
other half over the age of three years in office; therefore his
a1guing to me in that respect was not well fodnded.

Col. VARNU N1, in answer to an inqui1y, Why a bill of
rights was not annexed to this Constitution, said, that, by
the constitution of Massachusetts, the legislature have a right
to make all laws not repugnant to the Constitution. Now,
said he, if there is such a clause in the Constitution under
consideration, then there would be a necessity for a bill of
rights. I11 the section under debate, Congress have an ex—
pressed power to levy taxes, 810., and to pass laws to carry
their requisitions into execution: this, he said, was express,
and required no bill of rights. After stating the difference
between delegated power and the grant of all powe1, except
in ce1tain cases, the colonel proceeded to controvert the
idea that this Constitution went to a consolidation of the
Union. He said it was only a consolidation of strength, and
that it was apparent Congress had no right to alter the in—
ternal relations of a state. The designb in amending the
Confederation, he said, was to 1emedy 1ts defects. It was
the interest of the whole to confederate against a foreign
enemy, and each was bound to exert its utmost ability to
oppose that enemy; but it had been done at our expense in
a great measure, and there was no way to provide for a
remedy, because Congress had not the power to call forth
the resources of every state, nor to coerce delinquent states.
But under the proposed government, those .states which
will not comply with equal requisitions, Will be coerced;
and this, he said, is a glorious provision. In the late war,
said the colonel, the St'ttCS of New Hampshire and Massa-
chusetts, for two or three years, had in the field half the
Continental army under General VVashinoton. Who paid

b
those troops? The states whlch ralse'd them were called

'1 mmpsom] MASSACHUSETTS. 79

on to pay them. How, unless Congress have a power to levy
taxes, can they make the states pay their proportion? In
order that this and some other states may not again be
obliged .to pay eight or ten times their proportion of the pub-
lic exigencies, he said, this power is highly necessary to be
delegated to the federal head. He showed the necessity
of Congress being enabled to prepare against the attacks of
a foreign enemy; and he called upon the gentleman from
Andover, (Mr. Symmes,) or any other gentleman, to produce
an instance \vhe1e any government, consisting of three
branches, elected by the peOple, and having checks 011 each
other, as this has, abused the power delegated to them.

Mr. CHOATE said, that this clause gives power 1to C011—
gress to levy duties, excises, imposts, &c., considering the
trust delegated to Cong1ess, that they are to “provide for
the common defence, promote the general Welfare,” &c. If
this is to be the object of their delegation, the next question
is, Whether they shall not be vested with powers to prose-
cute it. And this can be no other than an unlimited power
of taxation, if that defence requires it. Mr. C. contended
that it was the power of the people concentred to a point;
that, as all power is lodged in them, this power ought
to be supreme. He showed the necessity of its being so,
not only for our common defence, but for our advantage in
settling commercial treaties. Do we wish to make a treaty
with any nation of Europe, We are told we have no stability
as a nation. AS Congress must provide for the common
defence, shall they, asked Mr. C., be confined for the i111 post
and excise? They are alone the judges Whether five or one
per cent. is necessary or convenient. It has been the prac—
tice of all nations to anticipate their resources by loans; this
will be the case of the United States in war; and he asked,
if our resources are competent and well established, and that
no doubt remained of them, whether, in that case, the individ-
uals who have prope1tv Will not cheerfully offer it for the
general defence. After adverting to the idea of some, of its
being a consolidation of the Union, M1. Choate concluded
by a brief display of the several checks contained, and secu-
rities for the people to be found, in this System.

Gen. THOMPSON. Sir, the question is, Whether Con-
gress shall have power. Some say that, if this section was
left: out, the Whole W'ould fall to the ground. I think so too,

80 DEBATES. [THOMPSON

as it is all of a piece. We are 110W fixing a national consol-
idation. This section, I look upon it, is big with misehiefs.
Congress will have power to keep standing armies. The
great Mr. Pitt says, standing armies are dangerous—keep
your militia in order—we don’t want standing armies. A
gentleman said, We are a rich state : I say so too. Then Why
shall we not wait five or siX months, and see What our sister
states do? We are able to stand our ground against a for-
eign power; they cannot starve us out; they cannot bring
their ships 011 the land; we are a nation of healthy and
strong men; our land is fertile, and we are increasing in
numbers. It is said we owe money: no matter if we do;
our safety lies in not paying it—pay only the interest.
Don’t. let us go too fast. Shall not Massachusetts be a me-
diator? It is my wish she may be one of the four dissenting
states; then we shall be on our old ground, and shall not
act unconstitutionally. Some people cry, It will be a great
charge; but it will be a greater charge, and be more dan-
gerous, to make a new one. Let us amend the old Confed-
eration. Why not give Congress power only to regulate
trade? Some say, that those we owe will fall upon us;
but it is no such thing: the balance of power in the old
countries will not permit it; the other nations will protect
us. Besides, we are a brave and happy people. Let us be
cautious how we divide the states. By uniting we stand,
by dividing we fall. We are in our childhood yet: don’t
let us grow too fast, lest we grow out of shape. I have
proved that we are a respectable people, in possession of
liberty, property, and virtue, and none in a better situation ‘
to defend themselves. Why all this racket? Gentlemen
say we are undone if we cannot stop up the Thames; but,
Mr. President, nations will mind their own interest, and not
ours. Great Britain has found out the secret to pick the
subjects pockets, without their knowing of it: that is the
very thing Congress rs afte1.Gentlemecn say this section is
as clear as the sun, and that all power is retained which 18
not given. But where 18 the bill of rights which shall check
the power of this Congress , which shalls say, Thusfar shall
ye come, and nofarthei. The safety of the people depends
on a bill of rights. If we build on a sandy foundation, 18 it
likely we shall stand. 9 I apply to the feelings of the Con-
vention. There are some parts of this Constitution which I

Bownomfl MASSACHUSETTS. 8]

cannot digest; and, si1, shall we swallow a large bone fo1
the sake of a little meat? Some say, Swallow the whole
now, and pick out the bone afterwards. But I say, Let us
pick off the meat, and throw the bone away.

T his section, si1, takes the ptnse- -strings from the people.
England has been quoted fo1 their fidelity; but did their
constitution ever give such a power as is contained in this
Constitution? Did they ever allow Parliament to vote an
army but for one year.P But here we are giving Congress
power to vote an army for two years—to tax us without
limitation; no one to gainsay them, and no inquiry yearly,
as in Britain; therefore, if this Constitution is got down, we
shall alter the system enti1ely, and have no bchecks upon
Congress.

Rev. Mr. NILES Wished the honorable gentleman would
point out the limits to be prescribed to the powers given in
this section.

Hon. M1. BOVVDOIN. Mr. Plesident, on the subject
of govelnment, which admits of so g1eat a variety in its parts
and combinations, a diversity of opinions is to be expected;
and it was natural to suppose that, in this Convention, re-
spectable for its numbers, but much more so for the characters
Which compose it, there would be a like diversity concerning
the federal Constitution, that is now the subject of our
consideration.

I11 considering it, every gentleman will reflect how inad-
equate to the purposes of the Union the Confederation has
been. When the plan of the Confederation was for,med the
enemy we1e invading us , and this inspired the several states
with such a spirit of union and mutual defence, that a mere
requisition, 01 recommendation of Congress was sufficient to
procure the needful aids, without any power of coercion;
and for that reason, among others, no such power was given
by the Confederation.~ But since that reason had ceased,
and the idea of danger being 1emoved by the peace, the
1equisitions of Congress have, 1n most of thes states, been
little rega1ded, notwithstanding they solemnly pledged thei1
faith to comply with them.

This non- -compliance has compelled Congress to inc1ease
the fomign debt of the Union, by procuring further loans to
pay the interest and instalments due on former loans , and
in that way to preserve the public faith, which had been

VOL 11. 11

82 DE BATES. [BownorN

pledged to foreign powets. It has compelled them, 111 order
to ptevent the consequences of a breach of faith, as 1elative
to those powers, to enter 1epeatedly into those ruinous
negotiations, by which “the United States jointly, and each
of them in particular, together with all their lands, chattels,
revenues, and products, and also the imposts and taxes
already laid and raised in the same, or in time to come to be
laid and raised, are for the whole,” mortgaged for the re

payment of those loans by instalments, and for the payment
of the inte1est on them annually. These debts must be paid,
bona fide, according to contract, or be fu1t1he inc1eastd by
procuring, if procurable, further loans; which, ruinous as
the measure is, must be continued, unless the states cm-
power Congress to raise money for the discharging those
debts. It will not be in the power of the United States,
and I am sure it will not be in their inclination, to rid them-
selves of those debts in the same base and ignominious
manner in which a faction, 1n one of them, are endeavoring
to get 1id of theits. To the same cause (a non— compliance

with cong1essional tequisitions) are owing the repeated but
necessa1y bleaches of public faith 111 legard to the payment
of the fedelal domestic debt. And l1e11ce,a as 1elative to the
joint consolidated debt, the inefficiency of the public finances,
and the bankrupt state of the federal treasury, Which can
never be remedied Without empowering Congress to levy
adequate duties and taxes. Without such a power, the ac-
cumulating debt will never be paid, but by a forcible collec-
tion, which our foreign creditors know how, and are able to
apply, if, unhappily? it should be necessary. The several
loans, which by contract ale to be paid by instalments, will,

in case of the failure of any of the stipulated payments, be-
come, the whole of them, immediately payable ; and any of
the p1ope1ty of any of the states. Whether public 01 pm ate.
that can he most easily come at, Will, in that case, be seized
and applied for that ptnpose.

This mode of reimbursement, or reprisal, will be upon the
trade and navigation of the United States; and in propor—
tion as ours of this state may be larger and more extensive
than the trade and navigation of other states, we shall be
the greatest sufferers. This ruin of our trade will involve
in it not only the ruin of the mercantile part of the state,
and of the numerous body of mechanics dependent upon it,

BOWDOIN.] MASSACHUSETTS. 83

but will most essentially affect every other class of citizens,
and operate most extensively to the injury of the com-
monwealth.

These are some of the consequences, certain and in
fallible, that will flow from the denial of that power to Con-
gress. Shall we then, we of this state, who are so much
interested in this matter, deny them that power—a power
so essential to our political happiness ?

But if we attend to our trade, as it is at present, we shall
find that the miserable state of it is owing to a like want of
power in Congress. Other nations prohibit our vessels from
entering their ports, or lay heavy duties on our exports car—
ried thither; and we have no retaliating or regulating power
over their vessels and exports, to prevent it. Hence a de-
crease of our commerce and navigation, and the duties and
revenue arising from them. Hence an insufficient demand
for the produce of our lands, and the consequent discourage-
ment of agriculture. Hence the inability to pay debts, and
particularly taxes, which by that decrease are enhanced.
And hence, as the necessary result of all these, the emigra-
tion of our inhabitants. If it be asked, How are these evils,
and others that might be mentioned, to be remedied? the
answer is short—By giving Congress adequate and proper
power. Whether such power be given by the proposed
Constitution, it is left with the Conventions from the several
states, and with us, who compose one of them, to determine.

In determining on this question, every gentleman will,
doubtless, consider the importance of cultivating a spirit of
union among ourselves, and with the several states. This
spirit procured our emancipation from British tyranny; and
the same spirit, by uniting us in the necessary means, must
secure to us our dear-bought, blood-purchased liberty and
independence, and deliver us from evils which, unless
remedied, must end in national ruin. The means for effect-
lng these purposes are within our reach; and the adoption
of the proposed Constitution will give us the possession of
them. Like all other human productions, it may be im-
perfect; but most of the imperfections imputed to it. are
ideal and unfounded, and the rest are of such a nature that
they cannot he certainly known but by the operations of l
the Constitution; and if, in its operation, it should in any
respect- be essentiallybad, it will be amended in one of the

84. DEBATES. [Bownoum

modes prescribed by it. I say, will be amended, because
the Constitution is constructed on, such principles, that its
bad effects, if any such should arise from it, will injure the
members of Congress equally with their constituents; and,
therefore, both of them must be equally induced to seek for,
and effectuate, if possible, the requisite amendments.

There have been many objections offered against the
Constitution; and of these the one most strongly urged has
been, the great power vested in Congress. On this subject,
I beg leave to make a few general observations, which ought
to be attended to, as being applicable to every blanch tD'of
that power.

It may, therefore, be observed, that the investiture of
such power, so far from being an objection, IS a most cogent
reason for accepting the Constitution. The power of Con-
gress, both in the legislative and executive line, 18 the power
of the people, collected through a certain medium, to a focal
point, at all times ready to be exelted for the general bene-
fit, acco1ding as ci1cumstances or exigencies may require.
If you diminish or annihilate it, you diminish or annihilate
the means of your own safety and prosperity; which means,
if they were to be measured like mathematical quantities,
would be in exact proportion, as the power is greater or less.
But this is not the case; for power that does not reach, or
is inadequate to the object, is worse than none. An exer-
tion of such power would increase the evil it was intended
to remove, and at the same time create a further evil,
which might be a very great one—the expense of a fruit—
less exertion.

If we consider the objects of the power, they are numer-
ous and important; and as human foresight cannot extend
to many of them, and all of them are in the womb of futurity,
the quantum of the power cannot be estimated. Less than
the whole, as relative to federal purposes, may, through its
insufficiency, occasion the dissolution of the Union, and a
subjugation or division of it among foreign powers. Their
attention is drawn to the United States; their emissaries
are watching our conduct, particularly upon the present most
important occasion , and if we should be so unhappy as to
reject the federal Constitution proposed to us, and continue
much longer our present weak, unene1getic federal gover 11-
ment, their policy will probably induce them to plan a

Bow.n01N.] MASSACHUSETTS. 85

division or partition of the states among themselves, and
unite their forces to effect it.

But, however that may be, this is certain—that the re—
spectability of the United States among foreign nations, our
commerce with them on the principles of reciprocity, and
our forming beneficial treaties with them on those principles,
their estimation of our friendship and fear of losing it, our
capacity to resent injuries, and our security against interior
as well as foreign attacks, must be derived from such a
power. In short, the commercial and political happiness,
the liberty and property, the peace, safety, and general
welfare, both internal and external, of each and all the
states, depend on that power; which, as it must be applied
to a vast variety of objects, and to cases and exigencies
beyond the ken of human prescience,must be very great;
and which cannot be limited without endangering the public
safety.

It will be, and has been said, this great power may be
abused, and, instead of protecting, may be employed by
Congress in oppressing, their constituents. A possibility of
abuse, as it may be affirmed of all delegated power Whatever,
is by itself no sufficient reason for withholding the dele—
gation. If it were a sufficient one, no power could be dele-
gated; nor could government of any sort subsist. The
possibility, however, should make us careful, that, in all
delegations of importance, like the one contained in the
proposed Constitution, there should be such checks provided
as would not frustrate the end and intention of delegating
the power, but would, as far as it could be safely done,
prevent the abuse of it, and such checks are provided In the
Constitution. Some of them were mentioned the last even—
ing by one of my worthy colleagues; but I shall here exhibit
all of them in one View. 1

The two capital departments of government, the legisla-
tive and executive, in which the delegated power resides,
Consisting of the President, Vice- President, Senate and Rep-
resentatives, are directly, and by the respective legislatures
and delegates, chosen by the people.

The President, and also the Vice- President, when acting
as President, before they entel on the execution of the office,
shall each “solemnly swear or affi1m, that he will faithfully,
execute the office of President of the United States, and

' 8

86 DEBATES. [Bownom

will, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend,
the Constitution of the United States.”

“The senators and replesentatives before mentioned,
and the members of the state legislatures, and all executive
and judicial officers, both of theb United States and of the
several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to sup-
po1t this Constitution.”

“ The President and Vice— P1esident, and all civil officers
of the United States, shall be lemoved f1om office, on im—
peachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other
high crimes o1 misdemeano1s.”

“No senat01 or 1epresentative shall, during the time fo1
Which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office,
which shall have been created, 01 the emoluments wheleof
shall have been 111c1 eased duriiig such time , and no person
holding any office under the United States shall be a mem
be1 of eithe1 house, du1ing his continuance in office.”

“No title of nobility shall be granted by the United
States, or by any particular state; and no person holding
any office of profit or trust under the United States shall,
without. the consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any
king, prince, or foreign state.”

“The United States shall gualanty to evely State in
this Union a lepublican fmm of government, and shall p1,o-
tect each of them against invasion and domestic violence.”

To these g1eat checks may be added several othe1 ve1y
essential ones, as, the negative which each house has
upon the acts of the othe1; tithe disapproving powel of the
President, which subjects those acts to a levision by the two
houses, arid to a final negative, unless two tl1i1ds of each
house shall agree to pass the 1eturned acts, notwithstanding
the President’s sobjections; the printing the Jou1nals of each
house, containing thei1 Joint and 1espective p1oceedings;
and the publishing, flom time to time, a 1egular statement
and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money,
none of which shall be drawn from the treasury but in c011-
sequence of appropriations made by law.

All these checks and precautions, provided in the Consti-
tution, must, in a great measure, prevent an abuse of power,
at least in all fiag1 ant instances, even if Congress should
consist 11 holly of men \1'lio1ve1‘e guided by no other principle

BownorN.] MASSACHUSETTS. 87

than their own interest. Under the influence of such checks,
this would compel them to a conduct which, in the general,
would answer the intention of the Constitution. But the
presumption is,—and, if the people duly attend to the objects
of their choice, it would be realized,—that the President of g
the United States and the members of Congress would, for
the most part, be men, not only of ability, but of a good
moral character; in which case, an abuse of power is not to
be apprehended, nor any error in the government, but such
as every human institution is subject to.

There is a further guald against the abuse of power,
which, though not expressed, is strongly implied in the lede1al
Constitution, and, indeed, in the constitution of eve1y gov—
ernment founded on the principles of equal liberty; and that
is, that those who make the laws, and particularly laws for
the levying of taxes, do, in common with their fellow—citi-
zens, fall within the power and operation of those laws.

As, then, the individuals in Congress will all share in the
burdens they impose, and be personally affected by the good
or bad laws they make for the Union, they will be under the
strongest motives of interest to lay the lightest burdens pos-
sible, and to make the best laws, or such laws as shall not
unnecessarily affect either the property or the personal rights
of thei1 fellow- citizens.

With legard to rights, the whole Constitution 13 a decla1a-
tion of 1igbhts, which primarily and principally respect the
geneial government intended to be tonned by it. The
rights of particular states, or private citizens, not being the
object or subject of the Constitution, they are only incident—
ally mentioned. In regard to the former, it would require a
volume to describe them, as they extend to every subject of
legislation, not included in the powers vested in Congress;
and, in regard to the latter, as all governments are founded
on the relinquishment of personal rights in a certain degree,
there was a clear impropriety in being very particular about
them. By such a particularity the government might be
embarrassed, and prevented from doing what the private, as
well as the public and general, good of the citizens and states
might requi1e.

'1he public good, in which private is necessarily 1m olved

might be hurt by too particular an enumeration; and the
privateg 0‘ood could suffer no injuly from a deficient enumera

‘i8 DEBATES. [PARs0N5.

tion, because Congress could not injure the rights of private
citizens without injuring their own, as they must, in their
public as well as private character, participate equally with
others in the consequences of their own acts. And by this
most important circumstance, in connection with the checks
above mentioned, the several states at large, and each citizen
in particular, will be secured, as far as human Wisdom can
secure them, against the abuse of the delegated power.

In considering the Constitution, we shall consider it, in all
its parts, upon those general principles which operate through
the whole of it, and are equivalent to the most extensive bill
of rights that can be formed.

These observations, which are principally of a general
nature, but will apply to the mosr essential parts of the Con-
stitution, are, with the utmost deference and respect, submit-
ted to your candid consideration; with the hope that, as
they have influenced my own mind decidedly in favor of
the Constitution, they will not be Wholly unproductive of
a like influence on the minds of the gentlemen of the Con-
vention.

If the Constitution should be finally accepted and estab-
lished, it will complete the temple of American liberty, and,
like the keystone of a grand and magnificent arch, be the
bond of union to keep all the parts firm and compactedto-
gether. May this temple, sacred to liberty and virtue,
sacred to justice, the first and greatest political virtue, and
built upon the broad and solid foundation of perfect union,
be dissoluble only by the dissolution of nature; and may this
Convention have the distinguished honor of erecting one of
its pillars on that lasting foundation!

Dr. TAYLOR said, the consideration of the 8th section
had taken up a great deal of time; that gentlemen had re—
peated the same arguments over and over again; and,
although the order of the Convention was, that the proposed
Constitution should be considered by paragraphs, he was
pleased, he said, to observe that the honorable gentleman
last speaking had gone into the matter at large, and there-
fore he. hoped that other gentlemen would take the same
liberty, and that all further observations might be on the
system at large.

Mr. PARSONS, (of Newburyport.) Mr. President. a great

variety of supposed objections have been made against vest-

PARSONS.] MASSACHUSETTS. . 89

ing Congress with some of the powers defined in the 8th
section. Some of the objectors have considered the powe:s
as unnecessary, and others, that the people have not the
proper security that these powers will not be abused. To
most of these objections, answers, convincing, in my opinion,
to a candid mind, have been given. But as some of the
objections have not been noticed, I shall beg the indulgence
of the Convention, while I briefly consider them. And, as
it is my intention to avoid all repetition, my observations
Will necessarily be unconnected and desultory.

It has been said that the grant in this section includes all
the possessions of the people, and divests them of every
thing; that such a grant is impolitic ; for, as the poverty of
an individual guards him against luxury and extravagance,
so poverty in a ruler is a fence against tyranny and oppres-
sion. Sir, gentlemen do not distinguish between the gov-
ernment of an hereditary aristocracy, where the interest of
the governors is very different from that of the subjects, and
a government to be administered for the common good by
the servants of the people, vested with delegated powers by
popular elections at stated periods. The federal Constitu—
tion establishes a 0'overnment of the last description, and in

a b o I o
thls case the people divest themselves of nothmO” the gov-

7
ernment and powers which the Congress can adriiinister, are
the mere result of a compact made by the people With each
other, for the common defence and general welfare. To
talk, therefore, of «keeping the Congress poor, if it means any
thing, must mean a depriving the people themselves of their
own resources. But if gentlemen will still insist that these
powers are a grant from the people, and consequently im-
proper, let it then be observed, that it is now too late to im-
pede the grant ; it is already completed; the Congress, under
the Confederation, are invested with it, by solemn compact;
they have powers to demand what moneys and forces they
judge necessary for the common defence and general welfare
—— powers as extensive as those proposed in this Constitution.
But it may be said, as the ways and means are reserved to
the several states, they have a check upon Congress, by re—
fusing a compliance with the requisitions. Sir, is this the
boasted check P -—_-— a check that can never be exercised but
by perfidy and a breach of public faith; by a violation of the
most solemn stipulations ? It is this check that has embar-
v0L.u. 12

90 DEBATES. [P.mSONS.

rassed at home, and made us contcmptible abroad; and will
any honest man plume himself upon a check which an honest
n1 an would blush to exe1cise. P

It has been objected that the Constitution provides no
religious test by oath, and we may have 1n power unprinci-
pled men, atheists and pagans. No man can wish mete
ardently than I do that all our public offices may be filled
by men who fear God and hate wickedness; but it must
remain with the electors to give the government this securi-
ty. A11 oath will not do it. Will an unprincipled man be
entangled by an oath P Will an atheist or a pagan dread the
vengeance of the Christian’s God, a being, in his opinion, the
creature of fancy and credulity? It is a solecism in expres-
sion. No man is so illiberal as to wish the confining places
of honor 01' profit to any one sect of Christians; but what
security is it to government, that every public officer shall
swear that he is a Christian? For what will then be called
Christianity? One man will declare that the Christian reli-
gion is only an illumination of natural religion, and that he is
a Christian ; another Christian will assert that all men must
be happy hereafter in spite of themselves; a third Christian
reverses the image, and declares that, let a man do all he
can, he will certainly be punished in another world; and a
fourth will tell us that, if a man use any force for the com-
mon defence, he violates every principle of Christianity.
Sir, the only evidence we can have of the sincerity of a
man’s religion is a good life; and I trust that such evidence
will be required of every candidate by every elector. That
man who acts an honest part to his neighbor, will, most
probably, conduct honorably towards the public.

It has been objected that we have not as good security
against the abuse of power under the new Constitution as
the Confederation gives us. It is my deliberate Opinion that
we have a better security. Under the Confederation, the
whole power, executive and legislative, is vested in one
body, in which the people have no representation, and where
the states, the large and the small states, are equally repre—
sented; and all the checks the states have, is a power to
remove and disgrace an unfaithful servant, after the mischief
is perpetrated. Under this Constitution, an equal repre-
sentation, immediately from the people, is introduced, who,
by their negative, and the exclusive right of originating

mason] MASSACHUSETTS 91

money bills, have the power to control the Senate, Where
the sovereignty of the states is represented. But it has
been objected that, in the old Confederation, the states could
at any time recall their delegates, and there was a rotation.
No essential benefit could be derived to the peOple from
these provisions, but great inconveniences will result from
them. It has been observed by a gentleman who has argued
against the Constitution, that a representative ought to
have an intimate acquaintance with the circumstances of
his constituents, and, after comparing them with the situa—
tion of every part of the Union, so conduct as to promote
the common good. The sentiment is an excellent one, and
ought to be engraved on the hearts of every represent1tive.
But What is the effect of the power of recalling? Your rep—
resentative, with an operating revoe ation over tDhis head, will
lose all ideas of the .gene1al good, and will dwindle to a
servile agent, attempting to serve local and paitial benefits
by cabal and intrigue. There are great and insup‘erable ob—
jections to a. rotation. It is an abridgment of the rights
of the people, and it may deprive them, at critical seasons,
of the services of the most important characters in the 11a—
tion. It deprives a man of honorable ambition, whose highest
duty is the applause of his fellow- -citizens, of an efficient
motive to g1eat and pati 10t1c exeltions. The people, indi-
vidually, have no method of testifying their esteem but by a
reelection, ' and shall they be deprived of the honest satisfac-
tion 01 wieathing for thei1 f1iend and patiiot a crown of
lau1el 1n01e du1able than monarchy can bestow.p

It has been objected that the Senate me made too de-
pendent upon the state legislatures. No business undet the
Constitution of the federal Convention could have been
mo1e embalrassing than the const1ucting the Senate; as that
body must conduct our foreign negotiations, and establish
and preserve a system of national politics, a uniform adhe-
1e11ce to Which can alone induce other nations to negotiate
with and confide in us. i It. is certain the change of the men
Who compose it should not be too-frequent, and should be
gradual. At the same time, suitable checks should be pro-
vided to prevent an abuse of power, and to continue their
dependence on their constituents. I think the Convention
have most happily extricated themselves from the embarrass—
ment. Although the senators are elected for six years, yet

92 DEBATES. [PARSONs.

the Senate, as a body composed of the same men, can exist
only for two years, without the consent of the states. If the
states think proper, one third of that body may, at the end
of every second year, be new men. When the Senate act
as legislators, they are controllable at all times by the rep-
resentatives; and in their executive capacity, in making
treaties and conducting the national negotiations, the con-
sent of two thirds is necessary, who must be united to a
man, (which is hardly possible,) or the new men biennially
sent to the Senate, if the states choose it, can control them;
and at all times there will also be one third of the Senate,
who, at the expiration of two years, must obtain a reelection,
or return to the mass of the people. And the change of
men in the Senate will be so gradual as not to destroy or
disturb any national system of politics.

It is objected that it is dangerous to allow the Senate a
right of proposing alterations or amendments in money. bills;
that the Senate may by this power increase the supplies, and
establish profuse salaries; that for these reasons the lords in
the British Parliament have not this power, which is a great
security to the liberties of Englishmen. Iwas much sur-
prised at hearing this objection, and the grounds upon which
it was supported. The reason why the lords have not this
power, is founded on a principle in the English constitution,
that the commons alone represent the whole property of
the nation; and as a money bill is a grant to the king, none
can make the grant but those who represent the property of
the nation; and the negative of the lords is introduced to
check the profusion of the commons, and to guard their own
property. The manner of passing a money bill is conclusive
evidence of these principles; for, after the assent of the
lords, it does not remain with the clerk of the Parliament,
but is returned to the commons, who, by their speaker, pre-
sent it to the king as the gift of the commons. But every
supposed control the Senate, by this power, may have over
money bills, they can have without it; for, by private com
munications with the representatives, they may as well insist
upon the increase of the supplies, or salaries, as by official
communications. But had not the Senate this power, the
representatives might take any foreign matter to a money
bill, and compel the Senate to concur, or lose the supplies.
This might be done in critical seasons, when the Senate

1111:530st MASSACHUSETTS. 93

might give way to the encroachments of the representatives,
rather than sustain the 0dium of embarrassing the aftaits of
the nation; the balance between the two branches of the
legislature would, in this way, be endangered, if not de—
stroyed, and the Constitution materially injured. This sub-
ject was fully considered by the Convention for forming the
constitution of Massachusetts, and the provision made by
that body, after mature deliberation, is introduced into the
federal Constitution.

It was objected that, by giving Congress a power of direct
taxation, we give them power to dest1oy the state govern-
ments, by prohibiting them from raising any moneys; but
this objection 18 not founded in the Constitution. Congress '
have only a concurlent right with each state, in laying
direct taxes, not an exclusive light; and the right of each
state to direct taxation is equally extensive and pe1fect as
the right of Cong1ess; any law, the1efore, of the United
States, for securing to Cong1ess more than a concurrent tight
with each state, is usurpation, and void.

It has been objected that we have no bill of rights. If
gentlemen who make this objection would consider what
are the supposed inconveniences resulting from the .want of
a declaration of rights, I think they would soon satisfy them-
selves that the objection has no weight. ls the1e a single
natural light We enjoy, uncontrolled by our onn legislattne.
that Cong1ess can infringe? Not one. Is there a single
political right secured to us by our constitution, against the
attempts of our own legislature, which we are deprived of
by this Constitution? Not one, that l recollect. All the
lights Congress can control we have surrendered to our
own legislatme; and the only question is, whether the peo-
ple shall take flom their own legislatures a certain p01tion
of the several sovereignties, and unite them in one head, for
the mote effectual securing of the national prosperity and
happiness.

The honorable gentleman from Boston has stated at large
most of the checks the people have against usu1pation, and
the abuSe of power, under the proposed Constitution; but
from the abundance of his matte1, he has, 1n my opinion,
omitted two or three, which I shall mention. The oath the
several legislative, executive, andjudicial officers of the sev-
eral states take to support the federal Constitution, is as

94 DEBATES. [DALTON

effectual a security against the usurpation of the general
government as it is against the encroachment of the state
governments. For an increase of the powers by usurpation is
as clearly a violation of the federal Constitution as a diminu-
tion of these powers by private encroachment ; and that the
oath obliges the officers of the several states as vigorously to
oppose the one as the other. But there is another check,
founded in the nature of the Union, superior to all the parch—
ment checks that can he invented. If there should be a
usurpation, it will not be on the farmer and merchant, em—
ployed and attentive only to their several occupations; it will
be upon thirteen legislatures, completely organized, pos-
sessed of the confidence of the people, and having the means,
as Well as inclination, successfully to oppose it. Under these ~
circumstances, none but madmen would attempt a usurpa—
tion. But, sir, the people themselves have it in their power
effectually to resist usurpation, Without being driven to an
appeal to arms. An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is
not law; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let
him be considered as a criminal by the general government,
yet only his own fellow—citizens can convict him; they are
his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the
powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they cer—
tainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted
was an act of usurpation.

Afternoon. —As soon as the Convention met this after—
noon, Mr. NASON, in a short speech, introduced a motion to
this effect: “That this Convention so far reconsider their
former vote to discuss the Constitution by paragraphs, as to
leave the subject at large open for consideration.” This
motion met with a warm opposition from several parts of
the house.

Mr. \‘VALES said, that the time which had been spent in
the discussion had been well spent, and that he was much
surprised to see gentlemen thus Wishing to hurry the matter.

Mr. VVIDGERY said, that necessity compelled them to
hurry. .

Mr. DALTON. Mr. President, we have been but six or
seven days in the discussion of the Constitution. Sir, has
not paragraph after paragraph been considered and ex-
plained .9 Has not great light been thrown upon the articles
we have considered P For my part, I profess to have received

ADAMS] MASSACHUSETTS. _ 95

much light 011 them. We me now discussing the powe1s of
Congless, si1; shall we pass them ove1. 9 Shall we pass ove1
the article of the judiciary powe1, without examination. 9—

I hope, sir, it will be pa1ticula1ly inquiled into. I am so11y
to hear gentlemen allege that they have been a long time
from home, and that the want of money necessitates them to
wish for an ea1ly decision. Si1, have not the Gene1al Court
provided for the payment of the members of this Conven-
tion? and the treasurer, I am informed, is collecting money to
comply with that provision. There are many parts which
ought to be explained. I hope we shall attend to them with
deliberation, and that, for the sake of saving a little money,
We may not, pass over the Constitution without well c011-
sidering it.

Judge SUMNER wished the motion might be withdrawn.

Mr. NASON said, he would withdraw his motion for the
present, but mentioned his intention of again making it at
ten o’clock to-morrow morning.

THURSDAY, January 24a—Ml'. NASON renewed his mo-
tion for 1e(onside1ing a forme1 vote to discuss the Constitu—
tion by pa1agraphs, so that the whole may be taken up.

The Hon. Mr. ADAMS said, he was one of those who had
had difficulties and doubts 1especting some pal ts of the p10—
posed Constitution. He had, he said, for several weeks
after the publication of it, laid by all the writings in the
public papers onthe subject, in order to be enabled leisurely
to consider them. He had, he said, still more difficulties 011
his mind; but that he had 'chosen rather to he an auditor
than an objector, and he had particular reasons therefor. As
this was the case with him, and others, he believed, were in
a similar situation, he was desirous to have a full investiga-
tion of the subject; that thereby such might be confirmed,
either in favor or against the Constitution; and was, there—
fore, against the motion. We ought not, he said, to be stingy
of our time, or the public money, when so important an
object demanded them ; and the public expect that we will
not. He was sorry, he said, for gentlemen’s necessities;
but he Would rather support the gentlemen who were so
necessitated, or lend them money to do it, than they should
hu11y so gleat a subject. He, therefo1e, hoped that the
question would be put, and that we should p1oceed as we
began

96 _ DEBATES. [SEDGWICKs

Mr. PITTS said, it was impossible to consider the whole
until the parts had been examined. Our constituents, said
he, have a right to demand of us the reasons which shall
influence us to vote as we shall do. He must, he said, there-
fore oppose the motion.

The Hon. Mr. KING, Col. SMITH, and several Other
gentlemen, spoke against the motion.

Mr. WIDGERY opposed the motion’ 3 being winked out
of sight. He wished, he said, the question might be put,
thatb the sense of the Convention respecting it might
be taken.

Gen. THOMPSON said, it was not essential how the
matte1 was conside1ed; but he wished to have the whole
subject at large open to discussion, so that ev e1y body might
speak to it. 23A member,s says he, gets up and speaks, but the
is called to or'del, as not confining himself to the particular
paragraph under debate; and this puts him out. In his
Opinion, he said, the Coi1stitution, and the 1easons which
induced gentlenien to frame it, ought to have been sent to
the several towns to be conside1ed by them. My town, said
he, considered it seven hou1s, and altel this there was not
one in favor of it. If this had been done, we should have
known the minds of the people 011 it ; and should we dare, he
asked, to act different from the sense of the people 3° It is
strange, he said, that a system, which its planners say is so
plain, that he that runs may read it, should want so much
explanation.

[The question being generally called for, the motion was
put, and negatived, without a retu1n of the house. The
endeavors of gentlemen to hush to silence a small buzz of
congratulation, among a few citizens in the gallery, being
mistaken by some of the members for a hiss, created a
momentary agitation in the Convention, which, however,
after a short conversation, subsided]

T he eighth section was again read.

The Hen. M1. SEDGVVICK went into a general answer
to the objettions which had been sta1ted against the powers
to be granted to Congress by this section. He showed the
absolute necessity there was that the body which had the
security of the whole for their object, should have the neces-
sary means allowed them to effect it; and in order to secure
the people against the abuse of this power, the representa-

19mm] MASSACHUSETTS. 97'

tives and people, he said, are equally subject to :the laws,
and can, therefore, have but one and the same interest;
that they would never lay unnecessary burdens, when they
themselves must beara part of them; and from the extent
of their objects, their power ought necessarily to be illi1nit—
able. Men, said :he, rarely do mischief for the sake of being
mischievous. With respect to the power, in this section, to
raise armies, the honorable gentleman said, although gentle—
men had thought itadangerous power, and would be used
for the purpose of tyranny, yet they did not object to the
Confederation in this particular; and by this, Congress could
have kept the Whole of the late army in the field, had they
seen fit. He asked, if gentlemen could. think it possible
that the legislature of the United States should raise an
army unnecessarily, which, in a short time, would be under
the cont1ol of other persons; f01, if it was not to be undei
their control, what object could they have in raising it? It
was, he said, a chimerical idea to suppose that a country
likethis could ever :be enslaved. How is an army forthat
purpose to be obtained from the ‘freemen of the United
States? They certainly, said he, will know to What object
it is to 'be applied. Is it possible, he asked, that an army
could he raised for the purpose of enslaving themselves and
their brethren? or, if raised, Whether they could subdue a
nation of freemen, Who :know how to prize liberty, and who
have aims in their hands? He said, it was a deception' in
gentlemen to say that this power could be thus used. The
hono1ahle gentleman said, that in the Constitution everV
possible provision against an abuse of power was made;
and if gentlemen would candidly investigate for themselves,
they would find that {the evils they lament cannot ensue
therefrom. '

Mr. DAVVES observed, Upon the authority of Congress to
raisean'd support armies, 'vthatall the Objections which had
been made 'by gentlemen against standing armies, were in-
applicable to thegpresent question, which was, that, as there
must he an authority somewhere to raise and support armies,
whether that authority ought to be in Congress. As Con-
gress are the legislature upon the p1oposed plan of govern—
ment, in them only, said he, should be lodged theb power
under debate. fiSome gentlemen seem to have confused
ideas about standing armies : that the legislature of a coun-

vor.. 11. 13 9

98 DEBATES. [TAYLOR

try should not have power to raise armies, is a doctrine he
had never heard before. Charles 11., in England, kept in
pay an army of five thousand men, and James ll.-augmented
them to thirty thousand. This occasioned a great and just
alarm through the nation; and, accordingly, when William
111. came to the throne, it was declared unconstitutional to
wise or keep a standing army, in time of peace, without the
consent oft/16 legislatme. Most of our own state constitu-
tions have borrowed this language from the English decla-
ration of rights, but none of them restrain their legislatures
from raising and supporting armies. Those who never ob—
jected to such an authority in Congress, as vested by the old
Confederation, surely ought not to object to such a power in
Congress, where there is to be a new branch of represen-
tation, arising immediately from the people, and which branch
alone must originate those very grants that are to maintain
an army. When we consider that this branch is to be
elected every two years, there is great propriety in its being
restrained from making any grants in. support of the army
for a longer space than that of their existence. If the elec—
tion of this popular branch were for seven years, as in Eng-
land, the men who would make the first grant, might also be
the second and third, for the continuance of the arm 1; and
such an acquaintance might exist between the representa—
tives in Congress and the leaders of the army as might be
unfavorable to liber.ty But the wisdom of the late Con-
vention has avoided this difficulty. The army must expire
of itself in two years after it shall be raised, unless renewed
by 1ep1esentatives, who, at that time, will have just come

flesh ftom the body of the people. It will share the same
fate as that of a temporary law, which dies at the time '
mentioned in the act itself, unless revived by some future
legislatu1e.

Capt. DENCH said, it had been observed, and he was
not convinced that the observation was wrong that the
giant of the powers in this section would produce a consoli-
dation of the states, and the moment it begins,a adissolu-
tion of the state governments commences. If mistaken, he
wished to be set right; '

Afternoon—Dr. TAYLOR asked why there was not
to be a fedeml town, 01 e1 which Congress is to exelcise
exclusive legislation.

13300st MASSACHUSET'I‘S. ‘ 99

Hon. Mr. STRONG said, every gentleman must think
that the erection of a federal town was necessary, wherein
Congress might remain protected from insult. A few years
ago, said the honorable gentleman, Congress had to remote,
because they were not protected by the authority of the
state in which they were then sitting. He asked whether
this Convention, though convened for but a short period, did
not think it was necessary that they should have power to
protect themselves from insult; much more so must they
think it necessary to provide for Congress, considering they
are to be a permanent body.

Hon. Mr. DAVIS (of Boston) said it was necessary that
Congress should have a permanent residence; and that it
was the intention of Congress, under the Confederation, to
erect a federal town. He! asked, Would Massachusetts, or
any other state, wish to give to New Yo1k, or the state in
which Congress shall sit, the power to iniiuence the pro-
ceedings of that body, which was to act {01 the benefit of the
whole, by leaving them liable to the outrage of the citizens
1 f such states?

Dr. TAYLOR asked, why it. need be ten miles square,
and whether one mile square would not be sulficient.

Hon. Mr. STRONG said, Congress was not to exercise
jurisdiction over a district of ten miles, but one not exceed-
ing ten miles square.

Rev. Mr. STILLMAN said, that, whatever were the
limits of the district, it would depend on the cession of the
legislature of one of the states.

Mr. DENCH said, that he wished further light on the
subject; but that from the words, “We, the people,” in the
first clause, ordainiug this Constitution, he thought it was an
actual consolidation of the states, and that, if he was not
mistaken, the moment it took place, a dissolution of the
state governments will also take place.

‘Gen. BROOKS (of Lincoln) rose, he said, to consider the
idea suggested by the gentleman last speaking, that this
Constitution would produce a dissolution of the state gov-
ernments, or a consolidation of the whole; which, in his
Opinion, he said, was ill founded—or rather a loose idea.
In the first place, says he, the Congress, under this Constitu-
tion, cannot be organized without repeated acts of the legis-
latures of the several states; and, therefore, if the creating

100 DEBATES. [SINGLETARY

power is dissolved, the body to be created cannot exist. In
the second place,s says the general, it is impossible the. gen-
eral government c2111 exist, unless the governments of? the
several states are t01eve1 existing; 21s the qualifications of
the electors of the federal representatives are to he the same
as those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the
state legislatures. It was, therefore, he said, impossible that
the state governments should be annihilated by 1the general
government, and it was, he said, strongly impliedgfi'om that
part of the section under debate which ga-Ve {Congress
power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the federal
town, that they shall have it over no other place. When we
attend to the Constitution, we shall see, says the general,
that the powers to be given to Congress amount only to a
consolidation of the strength of the Union, and that private
rights are not consolidated. The general mentioned the
1iJhts which Congress could not infringe upon, and said
that their powel to define what was t1eason was much less
than is vested in the legislature ot this state by 0111 own
constitution; as it was confined, in the third section of
article third, to levying war, or‘adh'ering ‘to and comforting
enemies, only. He mentioned the 1est1aint upon Cong1ess
in the punisliment of t1eason, and compared it with the ex-
tended powers lodged 1n the Pa1liament of Great Blitain on
lilxe crimes , and cencluded by observing ,-t.hat, as the United
States guaranty to each state a lepublican form of govern-
ment, the state governments were as effectually secured as
though this Constitution should never be in 'force.

H011. M1. KING said, in reply to the inquiry respecting
a fedetal town, that the1e was now no place t01 Congress to
'1eside in, and that it was necessa1y that they should haVe
a germanent 1esidence, Where to establish proper archives,
‘in which ’~they may deposit treaties, state papers, deeds of
cession, 81c. _

Hon. Mr. SINGLETARY said, that all gentlemen had
said about a bill of rights to the Constitution, was, that
what is written is written; but he thought we were giving
up all power, and that the states will be like towns in this
state. Towns, said he, have a 1ight to lay taxes, to 121ise
-money, and the states possibly may have the same. We
have now,“saidhe, a good republicanConstitution, and we
‘do not want it gnarantied to us. :He did not understand

.SINGLE’PARY.J MA SS'.11CH'~USETTS. IO];

what gentlemen meant; by Congress guarantying- a republi
can form of government; he wished they would not play
round the subject with their fine stories, like a fox round a
trap, but come to it. Why don’t they say that Congress
will guaranty our state constitution ?

Gen. THOMPSON said, Congress only meant to guar-
anty a form. of government. ‘

H011. Mr. KING asked whether, if the present constitu-
tion of this state had been guarantied by the United States,
the honorable gentleman from Sutton would not have con-
sidered it as a great defect in the proposed Constitution, as
it must have precluded the state from making any alteration
in it, should they see fit so to do at the time mentioned 1n
the Constitution,

[Several other gentlemen. spoke, in a desultory conversa-
tion, 011 various- parts of the Constitution; in which several
articles from. the constitution of this state, and the Confed—
eration, were read; many questions asked the honorable gen—
tlemen wl1o framed the Constitution, to which answers
app 11ently satisfactmy weie given. '

FRIDAY, January 25 -.— T he 8th section still undei debate ,
but the conversation continued desult01 y, and much atten-
tion was paid to the inquiries of gentlemen 011 different parts-
of the Constitution, by those who were in favor of it.

Mr. AM‘ES, in a short discourse, called on those who
stood forth in; 1775 to stand forth now; to throw aside all
interested and party views; to have one purse and one heart
for the whole ;; and to. consider that, as it was necessary
then, so. was it necessary now, to u-11ite,—or die we must.

. Hon. Mr. SINGLETARY. Mr. President, I should not
have troubled the Convention again, if some gentlemen had
not call-ed on them that were 011 the stage in the beginning
of our troubleS, in the year 1775. l_' was one of them. I
have had the honor- to be a member of the court all the
time, Mr, President, and I say that, if any body had pro-
posed such a constitution as this in that day, it would have
been thrown away at once. It would not have been looked
at, We contended with Great Britain, some said for a
thleepenny duty on tea; but it was not that; it was be-
c anse they claimed a 1ight to taX 11s and bind us in all cases
1Yh1tcver. And does not this Constitution do the same
Does it not~ take away all we have—all 0111 p10pe1ty ? Does

IOQ DEBATES. [SMITH.

it not lay all taxes, duties, imposts, and excises? And What
1no1e have we to give? They tell us Congress won’t lay
dry taxes upon us, but collect all the money they want by
impost. I say, there has always been a difficulty about im-
post. Whenever the General Court was goir‘rgto lay an
inrpost, they would tell us it was more than trade could
,bear, that it hurt the fair trader, and encouraged smuggling;
and there will always be the same objection: they won’t be
able to raise money enough by impost, and then they will
lay it on the land, and take all we have got. These lawyers,
and men of learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely,
and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor illit—
erate people swallow down the. pill, expect to get into Corr—
gress themselves; they expect to be the managers of this
Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into
their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little
folks, like the great Leviathan, Mr. President; yes,'just as the
whale swallowed up Jana/1. This is what I am afraid of;
but I won’t say any more at present, but reserve the rest to
another opportunity.

Hon. Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I am a plain man,
and get my living by the plough. I am not used to speak
in public, but I beg your leave to say a few words to my
brother ploughjoggers 111 this house. I have lived 111 a. part
of the country where I have known the worth of good gov-
ernrnerrt by the want of it. There was a black cloud that
rose in the east last winter, and spread over the west.
[Here Mr. Widgery interrupted. Mr. President, I wish to
know \\ hat the gentleman means by the east. ] I mean, sir,
the county of Biistol; the cloud rose there, and burst upon
11s, and produced a dreadful effect. It brought on a state of
anarchy, and that led to tyranny I say, it brought anarchy.
People that used to live peaceablr, and were before good
neighbors, got distracted, and took 11p arms against gov-
ernment. [Here M1. Ki1111sley called to order, band asked,
what had the history of last winter to do with the Constitu-
tion. Several gentlemen, and among the rest the Hon.
Mr. Adams, said the gentleman was in order—let him go on
in his 01111 way] I am going, Mr. President, to show you,-
my brotlrer farmers, whatb were the effects of anarchy, that
you may see the reasons why I wish for good government
People I say took up arms; and then, if you went to speak

SMI’I‘H.] MASSACHUSETTS. '03

ta them, you had the musket of death presented to your
breast. They would rob you of your property; threaten to
burn your houses; oblige you to be 011 your guard night and
day; alarms spread from town to town; families were broken
up; the tender mother would cry, “0, my son is among
them ! “7 hat shall I do for my child ! ’7 Some were taken
captive, children taken out of their schools, and carried
away. Then we should hear of an action, and the pom
prisoners were set in the f1ont, to be killed by their own
fiiends. How d1eadlul,how distressing was this! 0111
distress was so great that we should have been glad to
snatch at any thing that looked like a goveinment. Had
any person, that was able to protect us, come and set 11p his
standard, we should all have flocked to it, even if it had
been a monarch; and that monarch might have proved a ty-
rant;—so that you see that anarchy leads to tyranny, and
better have one tyrant than so many at once.

Now, Mr. President, when I saw this Constitution, 1
found that it was a cure for these disorders. It was just
such a thing as We wanted. I got a copy of it, and read it
over and over. I had been a member of the Convention to.
fonn ou1 own, state constitution, and had learnt something
of the checks and balances of power, and I found them all
here. Idid not go to any lawyer, to ask his opinion; we
have no lawyer in our town, and we do well enough without.
I formed my own opinion, and was pleased with this Consti-
tution. My honorable old daddy there [pointing to Mr. Sin-
gletary] won’t think that I expect to be a Congress—man,
and swallow up the liberties of the peeple. I never had any
post, nor do I want one. But Idon’t think the worse of
the Constitution because lawyers, and men of learning, and
-moneyed men, are fond of it. I don’t suspect that they want
to get into Congiess and abuse thei1 powei. Iam not of
sueha jealous make. They that ale honest men themselves
am not apt to suspect othe1 people. I don’t know why our
constituents have not a good right to be as jealous of us as
we seem to be of the Congress; and I thiiik those gentle-.
men, who are so very suspicious that as soon as a man gets
into power he turns rogue, had better look at home.

. We are, by this Constitution, allowed to send ten mem-
bers to Congress. HaVe we not more than that number fit

D
to go? .I dare say, 1f we pick 0111 ten, we shall have another

“)4: DEBATES. [DKLTUN‘

.1311 left, and I hope ten times ten; and" will not these be a
check upon those that go? Will they go to Congress, and
abuse their power, and do mischief, when they know they
must return and look the other ten in the face, and be called
to account for their conduct? Some gentlemen think that
our liberty and property are not safe in the hands of moneyed
men, and men of learning? I am not of that mind.

Brother farmers, let us suppose a case, now: Suppose
you had a farm of 50 ac res, and your title was disputed, and
there was a farm of 5000 acres joined to you, that belonged
to a man of learning, and his title was involved 111 the same
difficulty ; would you not be glad to have him for youi friend,
rather than to stand alone in the dispute? Well, the case
is the same. These lawyers, these moneyed men, these men:
of learning, are all embarked in the same cause with us, and:
we must all swim or sink together; and shall we throw the
Constitution overboard because it does not please us alike? .
Suppose two or three of you had been at the pains to break
up a piece of rough land, and sow it with wheat; would you
let it lie waste because you could not agree what sort of a
fence to make? Would it not be better to put up a fence
that did not please every one’s fancy, rather than not fence
it at all, or keep diSputing about it until the wild beasts came
in and devoured it? Some gentlemen say, Don’t be in a
hurry; take time to consider, and don’t take a leap in the
dark. I say, Take things in time; gather fruit when it. is
ripe. There is a time to sow and a time to reap; we sowed
our seed when we sent men to the federal Convention ; now
is the harvest, now is the time to reap. the fruit of our labor;
and if we won’t do it now, I am afraid we never shall have
another opportunity.

Mr. PARSONS considered the several charges of ambi-
guity which gentlemen had laid to the Constitution, and,
with a g1eat deal of acculacy, stated the obvious meaning
of the clauses thus supposed to be ambiguous. He c011—
cluded his explanation by saying, that no compositions, which
.men can pen, could be. f01 med but what would be liable to
the same charge.

Afternoon. —Hon. Mr. DALTON Mr. Ptesident, it
has been demanded by some gentlemen 111 Opposition to this
Constitution, why those who we 1e opposed to the augmenta-
tion of the. powe1s of Congress a few yeats since, should

_ Wmennnj MASSACHUSETTS. 105

now be the warmest advocates for the powers to be granted
by the section under debate. Sir, I was. opposed to the five
per cent. impost being granted toCongress; and I conceive-d
that such, a grant, under the Confederation, would produce
great difficulties and?embarrassments. But, sir, as Congress
is, by the proposed Censtitution, to be differently construct~
ed, as a proportionate voice of the states in that body is to
be substituted for the present equal (or rather unequal) one,
my objections will be removed. lin my opinion, the dele-
gating of power to a government in which the people have
so many checks, will be perfectly safe, and consistent with
the preservation of their liberties.

Mr. AMES said, that, in the course of the debates, gentle-
men. had justified the Confederation; but he wished to ask .
whether there was any danger in this Constitution which is ..
not in the Confederation. If gentlemen are willing to con-
federate, why, he asked, ought not Congress to have the
powers granted» by this section? In. the Confederation, said
Mr. A., the. checks are wanting which are to be found in
this Constitution... And the fears. of gentlemen: that this Con-
stitution will provide for a permanent aristocracy are there-
fore ill—founded; for the rulers will always be dependent on
the people, like the insects of a sunshiny day, and may, by
the breath of their displeasure, be annihilated.

Mr. WEDGERY. Mr. President, enough has, I think,
been said: on the 8th section. It has been. repeated, over
and over again, that the adoption of the Constitution will
please all ranks; that the present inefficiency of the Con-
federation is obvious; an-d that blessed things will: surely be
the result of this Constitution. Many say, Ask the mechan—
ics, ask the yeomanry. But they do not tell us What the
answer of these will be. All We hear is, that the merchant
and farmer will flourish, and that the mechanics and trades—
men are to make their fortunes directly, if the Constitution
goes. down. Is it, sir, because the seat of government is to
be carried to Philadelphia? Who, sir, is to pay the debts
of the yeom-anry and others? Stir, When oil will quench
fire, I will believe all this, and not till: then. On the con-
trary, I think the adopting this Constitution make-s against
them, though it may be something in favor of the merchants
Have not Congress power to tax polls,-—-—for there is no other
way of levying a dry tarry—and by. this means. the poor will

VOL. 11. 14

106 DEBATES. [6211111111.

pay as much as the rich. Gentlemen say we are undone,
and that there is no resource, unless this Constitution is
adopted. I cannot see why we need, for the sakeof a little
meat, swallow a great bone, which, if it should happen to
stick in our throats, can never be got out. Some gentlemen
have given out, that we are surrounded by enemies, that we
owe debts, and that the nations will make war against us,
and take our shipping, &c. Sir, I ask, Is this a fact ? Or
whether gentlemen think as they say? lbelieve they do
not; for I believe they are convinced that the nations we
owe do not wish us at present to pay more than the
Interest. -

Mr. W., after considering some other observations which
had dropped from gentlemen in the course of the debates
011 the 8th section, (oncluded by saying, that he could not
see the great danger that would arise from rejecting the
Constitution.

The H011. Mr. GORHAM adverted to the suggestion of
some gentlemen, that, by granting the impost to Congress,
this state would pay more than its proportion, and said that
it could be made an objection as much against one govern—
ment as another. But he believed gentlebmen would accede
that the impost was a very proper tax. As to the tax on
polls, which the gentleman from New Gloucester had said
would take place, he saw, he said, no article in the Consti-
tution whieh warranted the assertion; it was, he said, a
distressful tax, and would never be adopted. Byimpost and
excise, the man of luxury will pay; and the middling and the
poor parts of the community, who live by their industry will
go clear; and as this would be the easiest mode of raising a
revenue, it was the most natural to suppose it would be re-
sorted to. Twenty per cent., he said, may as well be paid
for some luxuries as five; nay, one hundred per cent. impost
on some articles might be laid on, as is done in England and
France. How often, observed tlie honorable gentleman, has
Mr. Adams tried to accOmplish a commercial treaty with
England, with but feeble power! They prohibit our oil, fish,
lumber, pot and pearl ashes, from being imported into their
territories, in order to favor Nova Scotia, for they know we
cannot make general retaliating laws. They have a design
in Nova Scotia to rival us in the fishery, and our situation
at present favors their design. From the abundance of (ur

NEAL] MASSACHUSETTS. 107

markets, we could supply them with beef, butter, pork, &c., ‘
but they lay what restrictions on them they please , which
they durst not do, were there an adequate power lodged in
the general government to legulate commerce.

Mr. JONES, Col. PORTER, and Col. VARNUM, said
a few words in favor of the article, when the Convention
proceeded to the consideration of the 9th section.

Mr. NEAL (from Kittery) went over the ground ofob-
jection to this section, on the idea that the slave trade was
allowed to be continued f01 twenty years. His profession, he
said, obliged him to bear witness against any thing that
should favor the making merchandise of the bodies of men,
and, unless his objection was removed, he could not put his
hand to the Const.it‘ution Othe1 gentlemen said, in addi-
tion to this idea, that there was not even a proposition that
the negroes ever shall be free; and Gen. IHOMPSON
exclaimed, Mr. President, shall it be said that, after we have
established our own independence and fieedom, we make
slaves of others? O! Washington, what a name has he had!
How he has immortalized himself! But he holds those 1n
slavery who have as good a 1ight to be free as he has. He
is still for self, and, in my opinion, his character has sunk
fifty per cent.

On the other side, gentlemen said, that the step taken in
this article towards the abolition of slavery was one of the
beauties of the Constitution. They observed, that in the
Confederation there was no provision whatever for its being
abolished; but this Constitution provides that Congress
may, after twenty years, totally annihilate the slave trade;
and that, as all the states, except two, have passed laws to
this effect, it might reasonably be expected that it Would
then be done. In the interim, all the states were at liberty
to prohibit it.

SATURDAY, January 26.—[The debate on the 9th sec-
tion still continued desultory, and, consisted of similar objec-
tions, and answers thereto, as had before been used. Both
sides deprecated the slave trade in the most pointed terms;
on one side, it was most pathetically lamented by Mr. Nason,
Major Lusk, Mr. Neal, and others, that this Constitution
provided for the continuation of the slave trade for twenty
vears ; and on the other, the Hon. Judge Dana, Mr. Adams,
and others, rejoiced that a door was now to be opened for

1.08 DEBATES‘. [Sunnis-a1.

the annihilation of this odious, abhorrent practice, in a 0617-.
tainv time]

The paragraph which provides that “the privilege. of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in»
cases of rebellion or invasion,” was read, when

Gen. THOMPSON asked the president to please to prop-
ceed. We have, said he, read the book often enough; it is
a consistent piece of inconsistency. '

Hon. Mr. ADAMS, in answer to an inqui1y of the Hon.
Mr. Taylor, said, that this power given to the general 0oveln-
ment to suspend this p1ivilege in cases of: Iebel‘lion and
invasion, did not take away the powe1 of: the seve1al states
to suspehd it, if they shall see fit.

D1. TAYLOR asked, why this da1ling privilege was not
explessed 111 the same ma11ne1 it was. in the Constitution of.
Massachusetts. [Here the honorable gentleman read the
paragraph respecting it, in the constitution of that state,
and then the one in the proposed: Co11stitu-tio11.] He re-
marked on the difference of expression, and asked why the
time was not limited.

Judge DAN A said», the answer, in part, to the honorable
gentleman, must be, that the same men did not make both
Constitutions; that he did not see the necessity or great
benefit of limiting the lime. Supposing it had been, as in
our constitution, “not exceeding twelve months,” yet, as
our legislature can, so might the Congress, continue the sus—
pension of the W1it fromb time to time, 01 from year to year.
The safest and best restriction, therefore, a1ises f1om the
nature of the cases in which Congress are autho1ized to
exercise that power at all, namely, in those of rebellion or
invasion. These are clear and certain terms, facts of public
notoriety, and whenever these shall cease to exist, the suspen—
sion of the writ must necessarily cease also. He thought, the
citizen had a better security for his privilege of the writ of ha-
beats corpus under the federal than unde1 the state constitu-
tion; f01 ou1 legislatme may suspend t‘ 1e writ as often as they
judge “the most urgent and pressing occasions’ ’call for it.
He hoped these short obsewations would satisfy the honor-
able- gentleman’ sinquiries; otherwise, he should be happy 111
cndeavoring to do it, by going more at large into the subject

Judge SUMNER said, that this was a restriction on Con~
gress, that the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended,

HOLMESJ MASSACHUSETTS. 109

except in cases of rebellion or invasion. The learned judge
then explained the nature of this writ. When a .person,rsaid
he, is imprisoned, he applies to a judge of the Supreme
"Court; the judge issues his writ to the jailer, calling 'u'pon
him to have the body 'of'the person imprisoned before him,
with the crime 011 which he was committed. If it then ap-
pears that the person was legally committed, and that he was
not bailable, he is remanded to prison ; if illegally confined,
he is enlarged. This privilege, he said, is essential to free—
dom, and therefore the power to suspend it is restricted.
:On the other hand, the state, he said, might be involved in
danger; the worst enemy may lay :plans to destroy us, and
so artfully as to iprevent=21ny evidence against him, and might
ruin the country, without the power to suspend the writ was
thus given. Congress have only power to suspend the privi—
lege to persons committed by their authority. A person
committed under the authority of the states will still havea
1ight to this writ.

bMOND‘AY, January 28. —This and the two following days
were taken up in considering the several sections 01 the
second and third articles, every one of which was objected
to by those who were opposed to the Constitution , and the
objections were obviated by gentlemen in favor of it. We
do not think it essential to go into a minute detail of the
conversation , as, in the speeches on the grand question, the
field is main gone over. We can only say that, with the
utmost attention, every objection, however trifling, was an
swered, and that 1the unremitted endeavors of gentlemen
who advocated the Constitution, to convince those who were
in error, were not without effect. The 'main objections to
the judiciary power are contained in the following speech
delivered on

WEDNESDAY, January 30. ' ML'HOLMES. Mr. Presi-
‘dent, l rise to-make some remarks on the paragraph under
consideration, which .treats of the-judiciary 'power.

-’It is a maxim universally admitted, that the safety of the
subject consists in having a right to a trial as free and 1m—
partial as the lot of humanity will admit of. Does the Con-
stitUtion make provision for such a trial? I think not; for
in a'r-criminal process, a person shall not have a right to insiSt
'011 a trial in the vicinity where the fact was committed,

10

 

1 l0 DEBATES. [HOLMES

Where ajury of the peers would, from their local situation,
have an opportunity to form a judgment of the character of
the person charged with the crime, and also to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses. There a person must be tried
by ajury of strangers ; a jury who may be interested in his
conviction; and where he may, by reason of the distance of
his residence from the place of trial, he incapable of making
such a defence as he is, in justice, entitled to, and 11l11ch
he could 2112111 himself of, if his trial was in the same county
where the crime is said to have been committed.

These circumstances, as horrid as they are, are rendered
still more dark and gloomy, as there is no provision made in
the Constitution to prevent the attorney-general from filing
information against any person, whether he is indicted by
the grand jury or not; in consequence of which the most
innocent person in the commonwealth may be taken by
Virtue of 21 warrant issued in consequence of such information,
and dragged from his home, his friends, his acquaintance,
and confined in prison, until the next session of the court,
which hasjurisdiction of the crime with which he is charged,
(and how frequent those sessions are to be we are not yet in-
formed of,) and afte1 long, tedious, and painful imptisonment,
though acquitted 011 t1i;1l, may have no possibility to obtain
any kind of satisfaction for the loss of his liberty, the loss of
his time, great expenses, and perhaps cruel sufferings.

But what makes the matte1 still mole ala1ming )8, that
the mode of criminal ptocess is to be pointed out by Con—
g1ess, and they have no constitutional check on them,
except that the trial 18 to be by ajmy: but who this jurv is to
be, how qualified, whe1e to live, bo11 appointed, or by 11 hat
rules to 1e1r11l21te theit ptocedure, we are ignorant of as yet:
111hethe1 the11aie to live in the county where the trial 18;
whe1her they ale to be chosen by certain districts, or
whether they are to be appointed by the sheriff ex aficio,
whethet they ale to be fo1 one session of the coutt only, 01
fot a cettain te1m of time, or for good behaviot, o1 d111ing
pleasu1e, a1e matters which we are entitely ignorant of
as yet.

The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; whether
the criminal Is to be allowed the benefit of counsel, whether
he is to be allowed to meet his accuser face to face;

Homes] MASSACHUSETTS. 1 1 1

Whether he is to be allowed to confront the Witnesses,
and have the advantage of cross—examination, we are not
yet told.

These are matters of by no means small consequence;
yet we have not the smallest constitutional security that we
shall be allowed the exercise of these privileges, neither is it
made certain, in the Constitution, that a. person charged with
the crime shall have the privilege of appearing before the
court or jury which is to try him.

On the whole, when we fully consider this matter, and
fully investigate the powers granted, explicitly given, and
specially delegated, we shall find Congress possessed of
powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less in-
auspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long
been the disgrace ofChristendom: I mean that diabolical
institution, the Inquisition.

What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy
circumstances is the consideration, that Congress have to
ascertain, point out, and determine, What kind of punishments
shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are
nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and un-
heard—of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and
there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and
gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their
discipline.

There is nothing to prevent Congress from passing laws
which shall compel a man, who is accused or suspected of a
crime, to furnish evidence against himself,land even from
establishing laws which shall order the court to take the
charge exhibited against a man for truth, unless he can
furnish evidence of his innocence.

I do not pretend to say Congress will do this; but, sir, I
undertake to say that Congress (according to the powers pro-
posed to be given them by the Constitution) may do it; and if
they do not, it will be owing entirely—I repeat it, it will be
owing entirely—to the goodness of the men, and not in the
least degree owing to the goodness of the Constitution.

The framers of our state constitution took particular care
to prevent the General Conrt from authorizing the judicial
authority to issue a warrant against a man for a crime, unless
his being guilty of the crime was supported by oath or
affirmation, prior to the warrant being granted; why it

T132 DEB'ATES. [GomBo

should be esteemed somuch more safe to intrust Congress
with the power 'of enacting laws, which it was deemed so
unsafe to intrust our state legislature with, I am unable
'to conceive.

Mr. GORE observed, in reply to Mr. Holmes, that it had
been the uniform conduct of those in opposition to the pro—
:posed form of government, to determine, in every case where
«it was possible that the administ1at01s the1eof could do
wrong, that they would do so, although it were demonstra— 7
'ble that such wrong would be against thei1 own honm and
intelest, and p1oductive'of no advantage to themselves. On
this principle alone have they determined that the trial by
jury would be taken away in civil cases; When it had been
clearly shown, that no words could be adopted, apt to the
situation and customs of'each state in this particular. Jurors
are differently chosen in different states, and in point of
qualification the laws (if-the several states are very diverse;
not less so in the causes and disputes Which are entitled to
trial by j.111y What is the result of this. P That the lans
'of Congress may and will be conformable to the local laws
.in this particulai, although the Constitution could not make
a. universal rule equally applying to the customs and statutes
of the different states. Ve1y few governments (ceitainly
not this) can be inte1ested in depriving the people of trial
by ju1y, in questions of meum ett1111m.ln criminal cases
alone me they interested to have the trial under their own
control; and, in such cases, the Constitution expressly stip-
ulates for trial by jury; but then, says the gentleman from
Rochester, (Mr. Holmes,) to the safety of life it is indis-
pensably necessary the trial of crimes should be in the vicin-
ity; and the vicinity is construed to mean county; this is
>ver~y incorrect,.and gentlemen Will see the impropriety, by
referring themselves to the diffetent local'divisions and dis-
t1icts of the seveIal states. But fu1the1, said the gentleman,
the idea that the ju1y coming from the neighborhood, and
knowing the cha1acte1 and circumstances of the party in
trial, is .promotive of justice, on reflection will appear not
founded in truth. If the jury judge from any other circum-
stances but What are part of the cause in question, they are
notimpartial. The great object is to determineon the real
merits of the cause, uninfluenced by any personal consider-
ations; if, therefore, the jury could be perfectly ignorant ot

11mm] MASSACHUSETTS. 113

the person in trial, a just decision would be more probable
From such motives did the wise Athenians so constitute the
famed Areopagus, that, when 1n judgment, this (ourt should
sit at midnight, and 111 total darkness, that the decision might
be on the thing, and not on the peison. Furthe1, said the
gentleman, it has been said, because the Constitution does
not exp1essly provide for an indictment by grand jury in
c1imi11al cases, therelo1e some office1 under this govemment
will be authorized to file inlormations, and bling any man
to jeopardy of his life, and indictment by grand jury will be
disused. If gentlemen who pretend such fears will look
into the constitution of Massachusetts, they will see that no
provision is the1ein made for an indictment by grand ju1y, or
to oppose the danger of an attormgney (reneial filing informa-
tions; yet no difficulty o1 dange1 has a1isen to the people
of this commonwealth from this defect, if gentlemen please
to call it so. If gentlemen would be candid, and not con-
sider that, wherever Congress may possibly abuse power,
they certainly will, there would be no difficulty in the minds
of any in adopting the proposed Constitution.

Mr. DAWES said, he did not see that the right of trial
by jury was taken away by the article. The word court
does not, either by a popular or technical construction, ex-
clude the use of a jury to try facts. When people, in corn-
mon language, talk of a trial at the Court of Common Pleas,
or the Supreme Judicial Court, do they not include all the
branches and members of such court—the jurors as well as
the judges? They certainly do, whether they mention the
jurors expressly or not. Our state legislators have con-
strued the word court in the same way; for they have given
appeals from a justice of peace to the Court of Common
Pleas, and from thence to the Supreme Court, without saying
any thing of the jury; but in cases which, almost time out
of mind, have been tried without jury, there the jurisdiction
is given expressly to the justices of a particular court, as may
be instanced by suits upon the absconding act, so called.

Gentlemen have compared the article under consideration
to that power which the British claimed, and we resisted, at
the revolution; namely, the powe1.of trying the Americans
without a jury. But surely there was no parallel in the
_ cases; it was criminal cases in which they attempted to
make this abuse of power. MI. D. mentioned one example

VOL. IV.‘ 15

114 DEBATES. [Hum

of this, which, though young, he well remembered; and that
was the case of N ickerson the pi1ate, who was tried with-
out a jury, and whose judges we1e the governors of Massa-
chusetts and of some neighbming provinces, togethe1 with
Admiial Montague, and some gentlemen of distinction.
Although this trial was without a Jury, yet, as it was a trial
upon the civil law, there was not so much clamor about it
as otherwise there might have been; but still it was dis-
agreeable to the peOple, and was one of the then complaints
But the trial by Jury was not attempted to be taken from
civil causes. It was no object of power, whether one sub—
ject’s property was lessened, while another’s was increased;
1101 can it be now an object with the federal legislatule.
What intelest can they have in constituting a Judiciaiy, to
proceed 1n civil causes without a t1ial by Jury. P In criminal
causes, by the pioposed government, the1e must be a 1111 y
It is asked, \Vhy 18 not the Constitution as explicit 111 securing
the right of J111y in civil as in criminal cases. 9 The answer
is, Because it was out of the power of the Convention. The
several states differ so widely in their modes of trial, some
states using a Jury in causes wherein other states employ only
their Judges, that the Convention have very wisely left it to
the federal legislature to make such regulations as shall, as
far as possible, accommodate the whole. Thus our own
state constitution authorizes the General Court to erect Judi-
catories, but leaves the nature, number, and extent of them,
wholly to the discretion of the legislature. The bill of
rights, indeed, secures the trial by Ju1y, in civil causes,
except in cases where a cont1a1y practice has obtained.
Such a clause as this some gentlemen wish were inse1ted
in the proposed Constitution, but such a clause would be
abused in that Constitution, as has been clearly stated by
the honorable gentleman fiom Charlestown, (Mr. Gorham,)
because the “exception of all cases where a Jtuy have not
heretofore been used,” would include almost all cases that
could be mentioned, ivhen applied to all the states, for they
have sevelally diffe1ed in the kinds of causes Whele they
have tried without a jury.

Gen. HEA TH Mr. President, by my indisposition and
absence, I have lost several impo1tant 0pp01tunities. I have.
lost the oppmtunity of expressing my sentiments with a
candid freedom, on some of the paragraphs of the system, '

{EATH.] MASSACHUSETTS. I 1.)

which have lain heavy 011 my mind. I have lost the Oppm-
tunity of expressing my warm approbation on some of the
paragraphs. I have lost the opportunity of asking some
questions for my own information, touching some bof the
paragraphs, and which naturally occuried, as the system
unfolded. I have lost the opportunity of hea1ing those ju-
dicious, enlightening, and convincing arguments, which haVe
been advanced during the investigation of the system. This
is my misfortune, and lmust be211 it. The paragraph 1e-
specting the migration 01 importation of such peISOI]S as any
of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, &c.,

is one of those considered during my absence, and I have
heard nothing on the subject, save what has been mentioned
this morning; but I think the gentlemen who have spoken
have carried the matter rather too far on both sides. I
apprehend that it is not in our poWer to do any thing for or
against those who are in slavery in the Southern States.
No gentleman, Within these walls, detests every idea of
slavery more than I do: it is generally detested by the peOple
of this commonwealth; and I ardently hope that the time
will soon come When our brethren in the Southern States
will View it as we do, and put a stop to it; but to this we
have no right to compel them. Two questions naturally
arise: If we ratify the Constitution, shall we do any thing
by our act to hold the blacks in slavery? or shall we become
the partakers of other men’s sins P I think, neither of them.
Each state is sovereign and independent to acertain degree,
and the states have a right, and they will regulate their own
internal affairs as to themselves appears proper; and shall-
we refuse to eat, or to drink, or to be united, with those who
do not think, or act, just as We do? Surely not. We are
not, in this case, partakers of other men’s sins; for in noth-
ing do .We voluntarily encourage the slavery of our fellow-
men. A restriction is laid on the federal government, which
could not be avoided, and a union take place. The federal
Convention went as far as they could. The migration or
importation, &c., is confined to the states now existing only;
new states cannot claim it. Congress, by their ordinance
for erecting new states, some time since, declared that the
new states shall be republican, and that there shall be no
slavery in them. Butwhether those in slavery in the South.

116 DEBATES. [JAnvrs.

ern States will be emancipated after the year 1808, I do not
pretend to determine. I rather doubt it.

After the 5th article was read at the table, —

The H011. Mr. KING observed, that he believed gentle-
men had 11ot, in their objections to the Constitution, recol-
lected that this article was a part of it; for many of the
arguments of gentlemen were founded on the idea of fmure
amendments being impracticable. The honorable gentle-
man observed on the superior excellence of the proposed
Constitution in this particular, and called upon gentlemen
to produce an instance, in any other national constitution,
where the people had so fair an opportunity to correct anv
abuse which might take place in the future administration
of the government under it.

Dr. JARVIS. M1. President, I cannot suffer the pres-
ent article to be passed, without rising to express my entire
and perfect approbation of it. Whatever may have been
my private opinion of any othe1 pa1t, or wl1ateve1 faults or
impellections I have 1ema1ked, or fancied I have seen, in
any othe1 instance, l1e1e, si1, I liave found complete satisfac-
tion: this has beena lesting place, 011 which I have reposed
myselfin the fullest security, whenever a doubt has occulled
in (Honside1ing any othe1 passage in the proposed Constitu-
tion. The hono1able gentleman last speaking has called
upon those pe1sons who are opposed to our 1eceiving the
present system, to show another government, in which such
a wise precaution has been taken to secure to the people
the right of making such alterations and amendme11ts,i11 a
'peaceable way, as experience shall have proved to be neces-
sary. Allow me to say, sir, as far as the narrow limits of
my own information extend, I know of no such example. In
other countries, sir,——1111happily for mankind,—the history
of their respective revolutions has been written in blood; and
it. is in this only that any; reat 01 important change 111 ou1
political situation has been effected, without public commo-
tions. When we shall have adopted the Constitution before
us, we shall have in this article an adequate provision for
all the purposes of political reformation. If, in the course of
its operation, this government shall appear to he too severe,
here are the means by which this severity may be assuaged
and corrected. If, on the other hand, it shall become too lan-

JARVIS.] MASSACHUSETTS. 1 l7

guid in its movements, here, again, we have a method desig-
nated, by which a new portion of health and spirit may be
infused into the Constitution.

There is, sir, another View, which 1 have long since taken
of this subject, which has produced the fullest conviction, in
my own mind, in favor of our receiving the government
which we have now in contemplation. Should it be re—
jected, I beg gentlemen would observe, that a concurrence.
of all the states must be had before a new convention can
be called to form another Constitution; but the present arti-
cle provides, upon nine states’ concurring in any altelation 01
amendment to be p1oposed either by Congless or any futule
convention, that this alteration shall be a part of the Consti-
tution, equally powerful and obligatory with any other part.
If it be alleged that this union is not likely to happen, will it
be more likely that a union of a greater. number of concur-
ring sentiments may be had, as must be, in case we reject
the Constitution in hopes of a better? But that this is
practicable, we may safely appeal to the h1sto1 y of this
country as a p1oof, in the last twenty years. We have
united against the British; we ehave united 111 calling the late
federal Convention; and we may certainly unite again in
such alterations as in reason shall appear to be important for
the peace and happiness of America.

I11 the constitution of this state, the article providing for
alterations is limited in its operation to a given time; but in
the present Constitution, the article is perfectly at large,
unconfined to any period, and may admit of measures being
taken in any moment after it is adOpted. In this point it
has undoubtedly the advantage. I shall not sit down, sir,
without repeating, that, as it is clearly more difficult for
twelve states to agree to another convention, than for nine
to unite in favor of amendments, so it is certainly better
to receive the present Constitution, in the hope of its being
amended, than it would be to reject it altogether, with, per—
naps, the vain expectation of obtaining another more agree-
able than the present. I see no fallacy in the argument,
Mr. President; but, if there is, permit me to call upon any
gentleman to point it out, in order that it may be corrected ;
for, at present, it seems to me of such force as to give me
entire satisfaction.

In the conversation on Thursday, on the sixth article.

l 18 DEBATES. [SIIUTE.

which provides that “ no religious test shall ever be re-
quired as a qualification to any office,” &c., several gen-
tlemen urged that it was a departure from the principles of
our forefathers, who came here for the preservation of their
religion; and that it would admit deists, atheists, &c. ., into
the t3genelal government; and, people being apt to imitate
the examples of the couit, these principles would be dis-
seminated, and, 01 course, a co1ruption of m01als ensue.
Gentlemen 011 the other side applauded the liberality of the
clause, and 1ep1esented,in st1iki11g colors, the implopriety,
and almost impiety, of the requisition of a test, as practised
in Great Britain and elsewhere. In this conversation, the
following IS the substance of the observations of the

Rev. Mr. SHUTE. Mr. President, to object to the latte1
part of the pa1agraph unde1 considelation, which excludes
a religious test, is, 1 am sensible, very popular; for the most
of men, somehow, are rigidly tenacious of their own senti—
ments in religion, and disposed to impose them upon others
as the standard of truth. If, in my sentiments upon the
point in view, I should differ from some in this honorable
body, I only wish from them the exelcise of that cand01,
with which true religion 18 adapted toi11spi1e the honest and
well- -disposed mind.

To establish a religious test as a qualification f01 offices
in the ploposed federal Constitution, it appears to me, sir,
would be attended with injurious consequences to some indi-
viduals, and with no advantage to the whole.

By the injurious consequences to individuals, I mean, that
some, who, in every other respect, are qualified to fill some
important post in government, will be excluded by their not
being able to stand the religious test; which I take to be a
privation of part of their civil rights.

Nor is there to me any conceivable advantage, sir, that
would result to the whole from such a test. Unprincipled
and dishonest men will not hesitate to subscribe to any thing
that may open the way for their advancement, and put them
into a situation the better to execute their base and iniqui-
tous designs. Honest men alone, therefore, however well
qualified to serve the public, would be excluded by it, and
their country be deprived of the benefit of their abilities.

In this great and extensive empire, there is, and will be,
a great variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabit-

wuss] MASSACHUSETTS. l 19

ants. Upon the plan of a religious test, the question, I think,
must be, Who Shall be excluded from national trusts?
Whatever answe1 bigotry may suggest, the dictates of can-
dor and equity, I conceive, will be, None.

Far from limiting my charity and confidence to men of
my own denomination in religion, I suppose, and I believe,
si1, that the1e ale worthy characters among men of every de-
nomination — among the Quakels, the Baptists, the Church
of England the Papists , and even among those who have
no other guide, in the way to virtue and heaven, than the
dictates of natural religion.

I must therefore think, sir, that the proposed plan of gov-
ernment, in this particular, is Wisely constructed; that, as
all have anequal claim to the blessings of the government
under which they live, and Which they support, so none
should be excluded from them for being of any particulal
denomination in religion.

The presumption is, that the eyes of the peOple will be
upon the faithful in the land; and, f1om a regard to their
own safety, they will choose for thei1 rulels men of known
abilities, of known plobity, of good moral characte.ls
The apostle Peter tells us that God is no respecter of per-
sons, but, in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh
righteousness, is acceptable to him. And I know of no
reason Why men of such a character, in a community of
whatever denomination in religion, cwteris paribus, with
other suitable qualifications, should not be acceptable to the
people, and why they may not be employed by them with
safety and advantage in the important offices of government.
The exclusion of a religious test in the proposed Constitu—
tion, therefore, clearly appears to me, sir, to be in favor of
its adoption.

Col. JONES (of Bristol) thought, that the rulers ought
to believe in God or Chlist, and that, however a test
may be prostituted in England, yet he thought, if 0111 pub-
lic men were to be of those who had a good standing in the
church, it would be happy for the United States, and that a
person could not be a good man without being a good
Christian.

The conversation on the Constitution, by paragraphs,
being ended,

120 DEBATES. [HEATIL

Mr. PARSONS moved, that this Convention do assent
to, and ratify, this Constitution.

Mr. NEAL rose, and said, that, as the Constitution at
large was now under consideration, he would just remark,
that the article which respected the Africans was the one
which lay 011 his mind; and, unless his objections to that
were removed, it must, how much soever he liked the other
parts of the Constitution, be a sufficient reason for him to
give his negative to it.

Col. JONES said, that one of his principal objections
was, the omission of a religious test.

Rev. Mr. PAYSON. Mr. President, after what has been
observed, relating to a religious test, by gentlemen of ac-
knowledged abilities, I did not expect that it would again
be mentioned, as an objection to the proposed Constitution,
that such a test was not 1equi1ed as a qualification fo1 office.
Such were the abilities and integrity of the gentlemen who
constructed the Constitution, as not to admit of the presump-
tion, that they would have betrayed so much vanity as to
attempt to erect bulwarks and barriers to the throne of God.
Relying 011 the candor of this Convention, I shall take the
liberty to express my sentiments 011 the nature of a religious
test, and shall endeavor to do it in such propositions as will
meet the approbation of every mind.

The g1eat object of religion being God supreme, and the
seat of 1eligio11 111 man being the heart or conscience, i. e. .,
the 1eason God has given us, employed 011 our moral actions,
in their most important consequences, as related to the t1ibu-
nal of God, hence I infer that God alone is the God of the
conscience, and, consequently, attempts to erect human
tribunals for the consciences of men are impious encroach? '
ments upon the prerogatives of God. Upon these princi—
ples, had there been a religious test as a qualification for
office, it would, in my opinion, have been a great blemish
upon the instrument.

Gen. HEATH. Mr. President, after a long and painful
investigation of the federal Constitution, by paragraphs, this
honorable Convention are drawing nigh to the ultimate
question—a. question as momentous as ever invited the
attention of man. We are soon to decide on a system of
gOVernment, digested, not for the people of the common-

Hana] MASSACHUSETTS. 121

wealth of Massachusetts only—not for the present people
of the United States only—but, in addition to these, for all
those states which may hereafter rise into existence within
thejurisdiction of the United States, and for millions of people
yet unboln , a system of gove1nment, not to1 a nation of
slaves, but for a people as free and vi1tuous as any on ear;th
not fo1 a conquered nation, subdued to 0111 will, but for a
people who have fought, Who have bled, and who have con—
quered; who, under the smiles of Heaven, have established
their independence and sovereignty, and have taken equal
rank among the nations of the earth. In short, sir, it is a
system of government for ourselves and for our children, for
all that is near and dear to us in life; and on the decision
of the question is suspended our political prosperity or infe-
licity, perhaps our existence as a nation. What can be
more solemn? What can be mo1e interesting? Every
thing depends on our union. 1 know that some have sup—
posed, that, although the union should be broken, particular
states may retain their importance; but this cannot be.
The strongest-nerved state, even the right arm, if separated
from the body, must Wither. If the great union be broken,
our country, as a nation, perishes ; and if our country so
perishes, it will be as impossible to save a particular state as
to preserve one of the fingers of a mortified hand.

By one of the paragraphs of the system, it is declared that
the ratifications of the conventions of nine states shall be
sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution between
the states so ratifying the same. But, sir, how happy will
it be, if not only nine, but even all the states, should ratify
it ! It will be a happy circumstance if only a small majority
of this Convention should ratify the federal system; but
how much more happy if we could be unanimous! It will
be a happy circumstance if a majority of the people of this
commonwealth should be in favor of the federal system; but
how much more so, if they should be unanimous! and, if
there are any means whereby they may be united, every ex-
ertion should be made to effect it. I presume, sir, that there
s not a single gentleman within these walls Who does not
wish for a federal government—for an efficient federal gov
ernment; and that this government should be possessed of
every power necessary to enable it to shed on the people
the benign influence of a good government. But I have

VOL. 11. 16 ll

.22 DEBATES [HAN-Coca

observed, from the first, that many gentlemen appear opposed
to the system; and this, l apprehend, arises from their ob-
jections to some particular parts of it. Is there not a way
in which their minds may be relieved from embarrassment?
I think there is; and if there is, no exertions should be
spared in endeavoring to do it.

If we should ratify the Constitution, and instruct our first
members to Congress to exert their endeavors to have such
checks and guards provided as appear to be necessary in
some of the paragraphs of the Constitution, communicate
what we may judge prOper to our sister states, and request
their concur1ence,—is the1e not the hiO‘hest probability that
every thing which we wish may be effectually secu1 ed 9 I
think there 1s; and I cannot but flattel my self that 111 this n ay
the gentlemeh of the Convention will have the difficulties
under which they now labor removed from their minds. We
shall be united: the people of this commonwealth and our
sister states may be united. l’ermit me, therefore, tnost
earnestly to 1ecomn1end it to the serious consideration of
every 0tentleman 111 this honorable Convention.

After Gen. Heath sat down, his excellency, the PRESI-
DENT, rose, and observed, that he was conscious of the
impropriety, situated as he was, of his entering into the de—
liberations of the Convention; that, unfortunately, through
painful indisposition of body, he had been prevented from
giving his attendance in his place, but, from the information
he had received, and from the papers, there appeared to him
to he a great dissimilarity of sentiments in the Convention.
To remove the objections of some gentlemen, he felt himself
induced, he said, to hazard a proposition for their considera-
tion; which, with the permission of the Convention, he
would offer in the afternoon. ,

Aflernoon.—When the Convention met in the after-
noon, his excellency, the PRESIDENT, observed, that a
motion had been made and seconded, that this Convention
do assent to and ratify the Constitution which had been
under consideration; and that he had, in the formei pait of
the day, intimated his intention of submitting a ptoposition
to the Convention. My motive, says he, arises ftom my
earnest desire to this Convention, my fellow-citizens, and
the public at large, that this Convention may adopt sueh a
form of government as may extend its good influence to

ADAMS. j MASSACHUSETTS. 123

every part of the United States, and advance the prosperity
of the whole world. His situation, his excellency said, had
not permitted him to enter into the debates of this Conven-
tion: it, however, appeared to him necessary, from what
had been advanced in them, to adopt the form of govern—
ment proposed; but, observing a diversity of sentiment in
the gentlemen of the Convention, he had hequently had
conversation with them on the subject, and from this c011-
versation be was induced to prOpose to them, Whether the
introduction of some general amendments Would not be at-
tended With the happiest consequences. For that purpose,
he should, With the leave of the honorable Convention, sub—
mit to their considelation a proposition, in order to remove
the doubts and quiet the apprehensions of gentlemen , and
if, in any degree, the object should be acqiiir,ed he should
feel himself pelfectly satisfied. He should the1efo1e submit
them; for he was, he said, unable to go more largely into
the subject, if his abilities would permit him ; relying 011 the
candor of the Convention to bear him Witness that his
Wishes for a good constitution were sincere. [Hi3 excellen-
03/ then read his proposition.]——This, gentlemen, concluded
his excellency, is the proposition which I had to make;
and I submit it to your consideration, with the sincere Wish
that it may have a tendency to promote a spirit of union.

[The proposition submitted by his excellency having
been committed to a large committee, who reported some
amendments, we think it expedient to refer the reader to the
form of ratification for it.]

Hon. Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I feel myself happy
in contemplating the idea that many benefits will result
from your excellency’s conciliatory proposition to this com-
monwealth and to the United States; and I think it ought
to precede the motion made by the gentleman from Newbu—
ryport, and to be at this time considered by the Convention.
I have said that I have had my doubts of this Constitution.
I could not digest every part of it as readily assome gentle-
men; but this, sir, is my misfortune, not my fault. Othel
gentlemen have had their doubts; but, in my opinion, the
proposition submitted will have a tendency to remove such
doubts, and to conciliate the minds of the Convention, and
the people without doors This subject, sir, is of the greatest
magnitude, and has employed the attention of every rational

124 DEBATES. [ADAMS.

man in tne United States; but the minds of the people art
not so well agreed on it as all of us could wish. A proposa,
of this sort, coming from Massachusetts, from her importance,
will have its weight. Four or five states have considered
and ratified the Constitution as it stands ; but we know there
is a diversity of opinion even in these states, and one of them
is greatly agitated. If this Convention should particularize
the amendments necessary to be proposed, it appears to me
it must have weight in other states, where Conventions have
not yet met. I have observed the sentiments of gentlemen
011 the subject as far as Virginia, and I have found that the
objections Were similar, in the newspapers, and in some of the
Conventions. Considering these circumstances, it appears
to me that such a measure will have the most salutary effect
throughout the Union. It is of the greatest importance that
America should still be united in sentiment. I think I have
not, heretofore, been unmindful of the advantage of such a
union. It is essential that the people should be united in
the federal government, to Withstand the common enemy,
and to preseive thei1 valuable lights and liberties. We find,
in the great state of Pennsylvania, one third of the Conv e11-
tion a1e opposed to it: should, then. theie be la1ge mino1ities
in the several states, I should fear the consequences of such
disnnion.

Sir, there are many parts of it I esteem as highly valuable,
particularly the article which empowers Congress to regulate
commerce, to form treaties, &c. For want of this power in
our national head, our friends are grieved, and our enemies
insult us. Our ambassador at the court of London is c011-
sidered as a mere cipher, instead of the representative of the
United States. Therefore it appears to me, that a power
to remedy this evil should be given to Congress, and the
remedy applied as soon as possible.

The only difficulty 011 gentlemen’ s minds IS, whether it is
best to accept this Constitution on conditional amendments,
or to rely on amendments 111 future, as the Constitution pro-
vides. When I look ove1 the a1ticle which p1ovides for a
revision, I have my doubts. Suppose, si1, nine states accept
the Constitution without any conditions at all, and the foul
states should wish to have amendn1ents,—Where will you
find nine states to propose, and the legislatures of nine states
to agree to, the introduction of amendments? Therefore it

Bow-Dom] MASSACHUSETTS. [25

seems to me that the expectation of amendments taking place
at some future time, will be frustrated. This method, if we
take it, will be the most likely to bring about the amend-
ments, as the Conventions of New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, have
not yet met. I apprehend, Si1, that these states will be
influenced by the proposition which yom excellency haS
Submitted, as the resolutions of Massachusetts have ever had
theil influence. If this Should be the case, the necessaiy
amendments would be introduced more early and more
safely. _ From these considerations, as your excellency did
not think it proper to make a motion, with submission, I
move that the paper read by your excellency be now taken
under consideration by the Convention.

The motion being seconded, the proposition was read by
the secretary at the table. _

Dr.- TAYLOR liked the idea of amendments; but, he
said, he did not see any constitutional door open for the in-
troduction of them by the Convention. He read the several
authorities which provided for the meeting of Conventions,
but did not see in any of them any power given to propose
amendments. We are, he said, therefore, treading 011 unsafe
ground to propose them; we must take the whole, or reject
the whole. The honorable gentleman was in favor of the
adjournment, and, in a speech of some length, deprecated
the consequences, which, he said, must arise, if the Consti-
tution was adopted or rejected by a small majority; and
that the expenses which would accrue from the adjourn-
ment would not exceed fourpence per poll throughout the
commonwealth.

H011. Mr. CABOT rose, and observed, on what fell from
the honmable gentleman last speaking, that the reason why
no provision for the introduction of amendments was made
in the authorities quoted by the honorable gentleman, was,
that they were provided for in the 5th article of the Con-
stltutlon.

FRIDAY, February 1, 1788. ——Mr. BOWDOIN (of D01—
chester) observed, that he could not but express his hearty
approbation of the propositions made by his excellency, as
they would have a tendency to relieve the fears, and quiet
the apprehensions, of some very respectable and worthy

126 DEBATES. [Bowoomx

gentlemen, who had expressed their doubts whether some
explanation of certain clauses in the Constitution, and some
additional reflections on Congress, similar to those proposed
by his excellency, were not necessary. But, he said, as the
propositions were incorporated with the great and important
question, whether this Convention will adopt and ratify the
Constitution, he conceived himself in order, and would, with
the permission of the Convention, make a few general obser4
vations upon the subject, which were as follows : —

It was an answer of Salon’s, when he was asked what
kind of a constitution he had constructed for the Athenians,
that he had prepared as good a constitution of government
as the people would bear; clearly intimating that. a consti-
tution of government should be relative to the habits, man-
ners, and genius of the people intended to be governed by
it. As the particular state governments are relative to the
manners and genius of the inhabitants of each state, so
ought the general government to be an assemblage of the
principles of all the governments; for, without this assem-
blage of the principles, the general government will not
. sufficiently apply to the genius of the people confederated;
and, therefore, by its meeting, in its operation, with a con—
tinual opposition, through this circumstance it must neces-
sarily fail in its execution; because, agreeably to the idea
of Solon, the people would not bear it. It may not, there—
fore, be impropcr to examine whether the federal Constitution
proposed has a likeness to the different state constitutions,
and such alone as to give the spirit. and features of the par-
ticular governments; for Baron Montesquieu observes, that
all governments ought to be relative to their particular prin-
ciples, and that “a confederative government ought to be
composed of states of the same nature, especially of the
republican kind; ’7 and instances that, as “the spirit of
monarchy is war and enlargement. of dominion, peace and
moderation are the spirit of a republic.” These two kinds
of government cannot naturally subsist in a confederate
republic.

From hence it follows that all the governments of the
states in the Union ought to be of the same nature —of the
republican kind; and that the general government ought to
be an assemblage of the spirit and principles of them all

BOWDOINJ MASSACHUSETTS. 127

A short comparison, pointing out the likeness of the general
to the pa1ticula1 constitutions, may sufficiently elucidate
the subject.

All the constitutions of the states consist of three branches,
except as to the legislative powers, which are chiefly vested
in two. The powers of government are separated in all,
and mutually check each other. These are laid down, as
fundamental principles, in the federal Constitution. All
power is derived, mediately or immediately, from the peo-
‘ ple, in all the constitutions. This is the case with the
federal Constitution. The electors of representatives to the,
state governments are electors of representatives to the fed-
eral government. The representatives are chosen for two
years; so are the representatives to the assemblies of some
of the states. The equality of representation is determined
in neally all the states by numbe1s; so it is in the federal
Constitution.

The second branch of the legislatu1e, in some of the
states, is similar to the federal Senate, having not only
legislative, but executive powers ;' being a legislating, and,
at the same time, an advising body to the executive. Such
are the assistants of Rhode Island and Connecticut, and the
councils of New J e1sey and Ge01gia The senato1s of Vir-
ginia and New York a1e chosen for four yea1s, and so elected
that a continual rotation is established, by which one qualter
of their respective senates is annually elected, and by which
(as one of the constitutions obseives) the1e are more men
t1ained to public business , and the1e will always be found a
number of pe1sons acquainted with the p1oceedings of the
foregoing years, and thereby the public business be more
consistently conducted. The federal senators are to be
chosen for six years, and there is a rotation so established,
for the reason-s above mentioned, that one third of the Senate
is to. be chosen every two years.

The President and Vice-President answer to offices of
the same name in some of the states, and to the office of
governor and lieutenant—governor in most of the states. As
this office is of the utmost importance, the manner of
choosing, for the better security of the interests of the
Union, is to be by delegates, to be expressly chosen for the
purpose, in such manner as the different legislatures may
direct. This method of choosing was probably taken from

l28 DEBATES. [BOWD01N.

the manner of choosing senators under the constitution of
Maryland.

The legislative powers of the President are precisely those
of the governors of this state and those of New York—
rather negative than positive powers, given with a View to
secure the independence of the executive, and to preserve
a uniformity in the laws which are committed to them
to execute.

The executive powers of the President are very similar to
those of the several states, except‘in those points which
relate more particularly to the UniOn, and respect ambassa-
dors, public ministers, and consuls.

Of the genius of the people of the states, as expressed by
their different constitutions of government, if the similarity
of each, and the general spirit of governments, concur to
point out the policy of a confederate government, by com-
paring the federal Constitution With those of the several
states, can we expect one more applicable to the people,
to the different states, and to the purposes of the Union,
than the one proposed, unless it should be contended that a
union was unnecessary?

“ If a republic is small,” says Baron Montesquieu, “it is
destroyed by a foreign force ; if it is large, it is ruined by an
internal imperfection ”—“ Fato polemiaa sua vi mime.”
And if mankind had not contrived a confederate republic,
says the same author, “ a constitution that has all the inter-
nal advantages of a republican, and the external force ofa
monarchical government,” they would probably have always
lived under the tyranny of a single person. Admitting this
principle of Baron Montesquieu’s, the several states are
either too small to be defended against a foreign enemy, or
too large for republican constitutions of government. If
we apply the first position to the different states, which
reason and the experience of the late war point out to be
true, a confederate government is necessary. But if we
admit the latter position, then the several governments,
being in their own nature imperfect, will be necessarily
destroyed, from their being too extensive for republican
governments.

From whence it follows, if the foregoing principles are
true, that We ought to adopt a confederation, presuming the
different states well calculated for republican governments;

BOWDOINJ MASSACHUSETTS. l29

for, if they are not, their corruption will work their deStI‘llt
tion separately; and it they are destined for destruction,
from their natuial impe1fection, it will certainly be more
advantageous to have them destroyed collectively than sep-
arately, as, in that case, we should fall under one great
national government.

But, if the advantages of a confederacy, admitting the
principles of it to be good, are duly considered,——that'is,
will give security and permanency to the sevelal states, not
only against internal disputes, but wars with one another; if
the wa1s in Europe, arising from jarring and opposing in-
terests, are a public calamity; if it is for the benefit of our-
selves, and future generations, to prevent their horrid devasta-
tions on this continent, —to secure the states against such
calamities, it will be necessary to establish a general gov-
ernment, to adjust the disputes and to Settle the differences
between state and state; for, without a confederacy, the
several states, being distinct sovereignties, would be in a
state of nature, with respect to each other; and the law of
nature, which is the right of the strongest, would determine
the disputes that might arise. To prevent the operation of
so unjust a title; to afford protection to the weakest state
against the strongest; to secure the rights of all against the
encroachments of any of the states; to balance the powers
of all the states, by each giving up a portion of its sover-
eignty, and thereby better to secure the remainder of it, are
amongst the main objects of a confederacy.

But the advantages of a union of the states are not con-
fined to mere safety from within or without. They extend
not only to the welfare of each state, but even to the inter-
est of each individual of the states.

The manner in which the states have suffered, for the
want of a general regulation of trade, is so notorious, that
little need be said upon the subject, to prove that the con
tinent has been exhausted of its wealth for the want of it
and, if the evil, from the not regulating it, is not Speedily
remedied, by placing the necessal y powers in the hands of
Congress, the liberties of the people, or the independence
of the states, will be irretrievably lost. The people feeling
the inconvenience of systems of government that instead of
relieving, increase their perplexities; instead of regulating
trade upon principle; instead of improving the natural ad-

VOL. 11.

I30 DEBATES. [Amms

vantages of our country, and opening new sources of wealth,
our lands have sunk 1n their value, our trade has languished,
our credit has been daily reducing, and our resources are
almost annihilated,—-—can we expect, in such a state, that
the people will long continue their allegiance to systems of
government, whether arising from the weakness of their ad—
ministration, or the insufficiency of their principles, which
entail on them so many calamities? I presume not. The
Well—being of trade depends on a proper regulation of it; on
the success of trade depends wealth; on wealth, the value
of lands; the strength, the welfare, and happiness of a
country, upon the numbers, the ease, and independence of
its yeomanry. For the want of this have our taxes most op-
pressively fallen upon the most useful of all our citizens—
our husbandmen; while trade, for the want of its being
confined to proper objects, has served rather to ruin than to
enrich those that have carried it on.

Shall we, then, let causelessjealousies arise, and distract
our councils? shall we let partial views and local prejudices-
influence our decisions? or shall we, with a becoming wis—
dom, determine to adopt the federal Constitution proposed,
and thereby confirm the liberty, the safety, and the welfare
of our country ?

I might go on, sir, and point out the fatal consequences of
rejecting the Constitution; but, as l have already intruded
too much upon the time and patience of the Convention, 1
shall, for the present, forbear any further observations, re—
questing the candor of the Convention for those I have
already made. .

Hon. Mr. ADAMS. As your excellency was pleased
yesterday to offer, for the consideration of this Convention,
certain propositions intended to accompany the ratification
of the Constitution before us, I did myself the honor to bring
them forward by a regular motion, not only from the respect
the to your excellency, but from a clear conviction, in my
own mind, that they would tend to effect the salutary and
important purposes which you had in View — “ the removing
the fears and quieting the apprehensions of many of the
good people of this commonwealth, and the more effectually
guarding against an undue administration of the federal gov—
crnment.”

I beg leai e, sir, more particularly to consider those

ADAMS] MASSACHUSETTS. l3]

propositions, and, in a very few words, to express my own
opinion, that they must have a strong tendency to ease tht
minds of gentlemen, Who wish for the immediate operation of
some essential parts of the proposed Constitution, as well as
the most speedy and effectual means of obtaining alterations
in some other parts of it, which they are solicitous should he
made. - I will not repeat the reasons I offered when the mo-
tion was made, which convinced me that the measure
now under consideration will have a more speedy as well
as a more certain influence, in effecting the purpose last
mentioned, than the measure proposed in the Constitution
before us.

Your excellency’s first proposition is, “ that it be explicitly
declared, that all powers not expressly delegated to Con-
gress are reserved to the several states, to be by them
exercised.” This appears to my mind, to be a summary of
a bill of lights, Which gentlemen ale anxious to obtain. It
lemoves a doubt which many have entertained respecting
the matter, and gives assurance that, if any law made by the
federal government shall be extended beyond the power
granted by the proposed Constitution, and inconsistent with
the constitution of this state, it will be an error, and adjudged
by the cou1ts of law to be void. It IS consonant with the
second article 1n the present Confederation, that each state
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by this Confed-
eration, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled. I have long considered the watchfulness of the
people over the conduct of theit rule1s the strongest guald
against the enc1oachments of power , and I hope the people
of this country will always be thus watchful.

Another of your excellencys p1opositions is calculated to
quiet the apprehensions of gentlemen lest Congress should
exercise an unreasonable control over the state legislatures,
with regard to the time, place, and manner of holding elec—
tions, which, by the 4th section of the 1st article, are to be
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof, subject to
the control of Congress. I have had my fears lest this
control should infringe the freedom of elections, which ought
ever to be held sacred. Gentlemen who have objected to
this controlling power. in Congress have expressed their
tiishes that it had been restricted to such states as may

[32 DEBATES. [ADAMS

neglect 01 refuse that power vested in them, and to be ex-
e1cised by them if they please. Yom excellency proposes
111 substance, thes same 1031111 tion, which, I should think,
cannot but meet with their full approbation.

The power to be given to Cong1ess to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, z=and excises, has alalmed the minds
of some gentlemen. They tell you, sir, that the exercise
of the powe1 of laying and collecting di1ect taxes might
greatly distress the several states, and render them incapable
of raising moneys for the payment of thei1 respective state
debts, or for any purpose. They say the impOSt and excise
may be made adequate to the public emergencies in the
time of peace, and ask why the laying direct taxes may not
be confined to a time of war. You are pleased to propose
to us that it be a recommendation, that “ Congress do not
lay direct taxes, but when the moneys arising from the im-
post and excise shall be insufficient for the public exigen-
cies. 7’ The p1ospect ot app1oz-1ching wa1 might. necessa1ily
create an expense beyond the p1odut tlons of impost and
excise. H011, then, 110uld the government have the neces-
sary means of providing for the public defence? Must they
not have recourse to other resources besides impost and
excise? The people, while they watch for thei1 own safetv,
must and will have a just confidence 111 a legislature of thei1
own election. The a~pp1oach of war is seldom, if eve1.
without observation: it is generally observed by the people
at large; and I believe no legislature of a free'country would
venture a measure which should directly touch the pu-rses of
the people, under a mere pretence, or unless they could show,
to ”the people’s satisfaction, that there had been, in fact, a
real public exigency ‘to justify it.

Year excellency’s next proposition is, to introduce the
indictment of a grand jury, before any person shall be tried
for any crime, by which he may incur infamous punishment,
or loss of life; and it is followed by another, which recom-
mends a trial by jury in civil actions between citizens of
different states, if either of the parties shall request it.
These, and seVeral others which] have mentioned, are so
evidently beneficial as to need no comment of mine. And
they are all, in every particular, of so general a nature, and
so equally interesting to eve1y state, that I cannot but per-
suade myself to think they 11011ld all 1eadily Join with us in

Neon] MASSACHUSETTS. 133

the measu1e proposed by your excellency, if we should now
adopt it. Gentlemen may make additional propositions if
they think fit. It is presumed that we shall exercise candor
towards each other; and that whilst, 011 the one hand,
gentlemen will cheerfully agree to any proposition intended
to promote a general union, which may not be inconsistent
with their own mature judgment, others will avoid the
making such as may be needless, or tend to embarrass the
minds of the people of this commonwealth and our sister
states, and thereby not only frustrate your excellency’s wise
intention, but endanger the loss of that degree of reputation,
which, I flatter myself, this commonwealth has justly
sustained.

Mr. NASON. Mr. President, I feel myself happy that
your excellency has been placed, by the free suffrage of your
fellow-citizens, at the. head of this government. I also feel
myself happy that your excellency has been placed in the
chair of this honorable Convention; and I feel a confidence
that the proposition submitted to our consideration yester—
day, by your excellency, has for its object the good of your
country. But, sir, as l have not had an opportunity leisu1e-
ly to consider it, I shall pass it over, and take a sho1t View
of the Constitution at laige, which is under consideration,
though my abilities, sir, will not permit me to do justice to
my feelinus or to my constituents. Great Britain, si1, filst
attempted to enslave us, by declaiing her laws supreme, and
that she had a right to bind us in all cases whatever. What,
sir, roused the Americans to shake off the yoke preparing
for them 9 It was this measure, the power to do which we
are now about giving to Congress. And l1e1e, sir, I beg the
indulgence of this honorable body to permit me to make a
short apostrophe to Libe1ty. 0 Liberty! thou greatestg Crood. '
thou fairest property! with thee I wish to livewwithb thee
[wish to die! Pardon me if I drop a tear on the peril to
which she is exposed: I cannot, sir, see this brightest of
jewels tarnished -—ajewel worth ten thousand worlds; and
shall wepart with it so soon? 0 no. Gentlemen ask,
“ Can it be supposed that a Constitution so pregnant with
danger could come from the hands of those who framed it 5""
Indeed, sir, I am suspicious of my own judgment, when l
contemplate this idea—when I see the list of illustrious
names annexed to it; but, sir, my duty to my constituents

' 12

184 DEBATES. [NAS'N .

obliges me to oppose the measure they recommended, as
obnoxious to thei1 libe1ty and safety.

\Vhen, sir, we dissolved the political bands which con-
nected us with Great. Britain, we wele in a state of nature.
\Ve then formed and adopted the Confederation, which
must be considered as a sacred instrument. This confeder-
ates us under one head, as sovereign and independent states.
Now, sir, if we give Congress power to dissolve that
Confederation, to what can we trust? If a nation consent
thus to treat their most solemn compacts, who will ever
trust them? ‘ Let us, sir, begin with this Constitution, and
see what it is. And first, “We, the people of the United
States, do,” &c. If this, sir, does not go to an annihilation
of the state governments, and to a perfect consolidation of
the whole Union, I do not know what does. What! shall
we consent to this? Can ten, twenty, or a hundred persons
in this state, who have taken the oath of allegiance to it,
dispense with this oath ? Gentlemen may talk as they
please of dispensing, in ce1tain cases, with oaths; but, sir,
with me they are s1c1ed things. we are under oath: we
have swom that Massachusetts is a sovereign and independ-
ent state. How, then, can we vote fo1 this Constitution,
that destroys that sovereignty?

Col. VARNUM begged leave to set the worthy gentleman
right. The very oath, he said, which the gentleman had
mentioned, provides an exception for the power to be
granted to Congress.

\Vell, continued Mr. NASON, to go on. Mr. President,
let us consider the Constitution Without a bill of rights.
When I give up any of my natural lights, it is for the secu-
rity of the 1est; but here 1s not one right secured, although
many are neglected.

With lespect to biennial elections, the paragraph is rather
loosely expressed. I am a little in favor of our ancient cus-
tom. Gentlemen say they are convinced that the alteration
is necessary: it may be so; when I see better, I Will join
with them.

To go on. Representation and taxation to be apportioned
according to numbers. This, sir, I am opposed to: it is un-
equal. I will show an instance in point. We know for
certainty that, 111 the town of Biookline, persons are better
able to pay their taxes than in the parts I represent. Sup-

NASON.] MASSACHUSETTS. 135

pose the taX is laid on polls: why, the people of the former
place will pay their tax ten times as easy as the latter --
thus helping that part of the community which stands in the
least need of help. On this footing, the poor pay as much
as the rich ; and in this a way is laid, that five slaves shall be
rated no more than three children. Let gentlemen consider
this: a farmer takes three small orphans, on charity, to bring
up ; they are bound to him: when they arrive at twenty—one
years of age, he gives each of them a couple of suits ofclothes,
a cow, and two or three young cattle: we are rated as much
for these as a farmer in Virginia is for five slaves, whom he
holds, for life —they and their posterity — the males and the
she ones too. The Senate, Mr. President, are to be chosen
two from each state. This, sir, puts the smaller states on a
footing with the larger, when the states have to pay accord—
ing to their numbers. New Hampshire does not pay a fourth
part as much as Massachusetts. We must, therefore, to
support the dignity of the Union, pay four times as much as
New - Hampshire, and almost fourteen times as much as
Georgia, who, we see, are equally represented with us.

The term, sir, for which the Senate is chosen, is a griev-
ance. It is too long to trust any body of men with power.
It is impossible but that. such men will be tenacious of their
places; they are to be raised to a lofty eminence, and they
will be loath to come down; and, in the course of six years,
may, by management, have it in their power to create offi-
cers, and obtain influence enough to get in again, and so for
life. When we felt the hand of British oppression upon us,
we were so jealous of rulers, as to declare them eligible
but for three years in siX. In this constitution we forget
this principle. I, sir, think that rulers ought, at short pe—
riods, to return to private life, that they may know how to
feel for and regard their fellow-creatures. In siX years, Sir,
and at a great distance, they will quite forget them :—

“ For time and absence cure the purest love.”

We are apt to forget our friends, except. when we are con.
versing with them.

We now come, sir, to the 4th section. Let Us see: the
time, place, and manner of holding elections, shall be pre
scribed in each state by the legislature thereof. No objec~
tions to this: but, sir, after the flash of lightning comes tin,

[36 DEBATES. [NasoN

pea! of thunder. “But Congress may at any time alter
them,” 8Lc. Here it is, Mr. President: this is the article
which is to make Congress omnipotent Gentlemen say,
this is the greatest beauty of the Constitution; this is the
greatest security for the people ; this is the all in all. Such
language have I heard in this house; but, sir, I say, bythis
power Congress may, if they please, order the election of
federal representatives for Massachusetts to be at Great Bar-
rington or Machias; and at such a time, too, as shall put it
in the power of a few artful and designing men to get them-
selves elected at their pleasure.

The 8th section,Mr. President, provides that Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises,
&c. We may, sir, be poor; we may not be able to pay
these taxes, &c.; we must have a little meal, and a little
meat, whereon to live, and save a little for a rainy day. But
what follows? Let us see. To raise and support armies.
Here, sir, comes the key to unlock this cabinet; here is the
mean by which you will be made to" pay taxes! But will
ye, my countrymen, submit to this? Suffer me, sir, to say
a few words 011 the fatal effects of standing armies, that bane
of republican governments. A standing army! Was it not
with this that Caesar passed the Rubicon, and laid prostrate
the liberties of his courrtr.y By this have seven eighths of
the once free nations of the globe been brought into bondage!
Time would fail me, were I to attempt to recapitulate the
havoc made in the wo1ld by standing armies. Britain at-
tempted to enforce he1 arbitrary measures by a standing
army But, sir, we had patriots then who alarmed us of our
danger who showed us the serpent, and bade us beware of it.
Shall I name them. 9 I fear I shall offend your excellency,
but I cannot avoid] t. Imust. We had a Hancock, an
Adams, and a Warren. Our sister states, too, produced 21
Randolph, a Washington, a Greene, and a Montgomery, 11l10
led us in our way. Some of these have given up tl1ei1 li1es
in defence of the liberties of their country; and my prayer
to God is, that, when this race of illustrious patriots shall
have bid adieu to the 11orld from their dust, as from the
sacred ashes of the phoenix, another race mav arise, who shall
take our posterity by the hand, and lead them 011 to trample
011 the necks of those who shall dare to infringe on their
liberties. Sir, had I 21 mice like Jove, I would proclaim 11

NASON.] MASSACHUSETTS. 137

throughout the world ; and had I an arm like Jove, 1 would
hurl from the globe those villains that would dare attempt to
establish in our country a standing army. 1 wish, sir, that
the gentlemen of Boston would bring to their minds the fatal
evening of the 5th of March, 1770, when by standing t1oops
they lost five of their fellow- townsmen. I will ask them,
What price can atone for their lives? What money can
make satisfaction for the loss? The same causes produce
the same effects. An army may be raised 011 pretence of
helping a friend; or many pretences might be used. That
night, sir, ought to be a sufficient warning against standing
armies, except in cases of great emergency. They are too
frequently used fer no other purpose than dragooning the
people into slavery. But I beseech you, my countrymen,
for the sake of your poste1ity, to act like those worthy men
who have stood forth 1n defence of the rights of mankind,
and show to the world that you will not submit to tyranny.
What occasion have we for standing armies. ? We fear no
foe. If one should come upon us, we have a militia, which
is our bulwark. Let Lexington witness that we have the
means of defence among ourselves. If, during the last win-
ter, there was not much alacrity shown by the militia in
turning out, we must consider that they were going to fight
their countrymen. Do you, sir, suppose that, had a British
army invaded us at that time, such supineness would have
been discovered? No, sir; to our enemie's’ dismay and dis—
comfort, they would have felt the contrary ; but against de-
luded, infatuated men they did not wish to exert thei1 valor
01 their st1ength. The1efo1e, sir, lam utterly opposed to a
standing a1 my in time of peace.

"Ihe palagraph that gives Congress power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus claims a little attention. This is a
great bulwark—a great privilege indeed. We ought not,
therefore, to give it 11p 011 any slight. pretence. Let us see:
how long is it to be suspended? As long as rebellion or i11-
vas1on shall continue. This is exceeding loose. Why is
not the time limited, as is 0111 Constitution? But, sir, its

esign would then be defeated. It was the intent, and by

we shall give up one of our greatest p1ivileges. M1. N.

ncluded by saying, he had much mo1e to say, but, as the

use were impatient, he should sit down f01 the present,
give other gentlemen an opportunity to speak.
VOL.H. 18

138 DEBATES. mm...

Judge SUMNER, adverting to the pathetic apostrophe
of the gentleman last speaking, said, he could with as much
sincerity apostrophize—O Government ! thou greatest good!
thou best of blessings! with thee ] wish to live —with thee
I wish to die! Thou art as necessary to the support of the
political body as meat and bread are to the natural body.
The learned judge then turned his attention to the proposi—
tion submitted by the president, and said, he sincerely hoped
that it would meet the approbation of the Convention, as it
appeared to him a remedy for all the difficulties which gentle-
men, in the course of the debates, had mentioned. He par—
ticularized the objections which had been started, and
showed that their removal was provided for in the proposi-
tion; and concluded by observing, that the probability was
very great, that, if the amendments proposed were recom-
mended by this Convention, they would, on the meeting of
the first Congress, be adopted by the general government.

Mr. WIDGERY said, he did not see the probability that
these amendments would be made, if we had authority to
propose them. He considered, he said, that the Convention
did not meet for the purpose of recommending amendments,
but to adopt or reject the Constitution. He concluded by
asking, whether it was probable that those states who had
already adopted the Constitution would be likely to submit
to amendments.

Afternoon. [When the Convention met, a short con-
versation ensued on the time when the grand question
should be taken. It was agreed that it should not be until
Tuesday. After this conversation subsided, another took
place on the division of the motion, in order that the question
of ratifying might be considered separately from the amend:
ments; but nothing final was determined upon.]

Judge DANA advocated the proposition submitted by his
excellency, the president. It contained, he said, the amend-
ments generally wished for, as they were not of a local na-
ture, but extended to every part of the Union. If they were
recommended to be adopted by this Convention, it was verv
probable that two thirds of the Congress would concur in
promising them ; or that two thirds of the legislatures of the
several states would apply for the call of a convention to
consider them, agreeably to the mode pointed out in
the Constitution; and said he did not think that gentle-

RUSSELL 1 MASSACHUSETTS. ' 189

men-would wish to reject the whole of the system, because
some part of it did not please them. He then went into
consideration of the advantages which would ensue, from it‘;
adoption, to the United States, to the individual states, and
to the several classes of citizens, and concluded by represent-
ing, in a lively manner, the evils to the whole continent, and
to the Northern States in particular, which must be the
unavoidable attendants 011 the present system of general
government.

Mr. RUSSELL rose, he said, with diffidence, to offer his
sentiments on the subject in debate; but he could not, he
said, forbear to give his sentiments 011 the advantage Which
he apprehended must result from the adoption of the pro
posed Constitution to this state, and to the United States, in
the advancement of their commerce. Mr. B. said, he believed
it had always been the policy of trading nations to secure
to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade. He
observed how tenacious France, Holland, and England, Were
in this particular, and how beneficial it had proved to them.
He then Went into an accurate and interesting statement of
the quantities of produce which were exported from the
several states, and showed the ability of the states to furnish,
from among themselves, shipping fully sufficient“ for the
transportation of this produce; which, he observed, if con-
fined, by the general government, to American vessels,—
While the restriction would not increase the rates of freight-
age to the Southern States, as the Northern and Middle
States could produce a surplusage of shipping, and a spirit of
competition would call forth their resources,— would greatly
increase our navigation, furnish us with a g1eat 11111se1y of
seamen; give employnient not only to the mechanics, in
constructing the vessels, and the trades dependent thereon,
but to the husbandmen, in the cutting down of trees for tim-
ber, and transporting them to the places of building; Increase
the demand for the products of the land, and fo1 our beef,
our pork, our butter, 8w. , and give such life and spirit to
our commerce as would extend it to all the nations of the
world These, he said, wete some of the blessings he an-
ticipated from the adoption of the federal Constitution; and
so convinced was he of its utility and necessity, that, While
he wished that, on the grand question being put, there might
not be one dissenting voice, if he was allowed, he would hold

140 DEBATES. [THOMAS

tp both hands in favor of it; and he concluded, if his left
hand was unwilling to be extended with his right, in this all-
important decision, he would cut it off, as unworthy of him,
and lest it should infect his whole body.

Mr. PIERCE. Mr. President, the amendments proposed
by your exeellency are very agreeable to my opinion, and I
should Wish to add several more, but will mention but one;
and that is, that the Senate should not continue in office
more than two years. But, sir, I think that, if the want of
these amendments were sufficient for me to vote against the
Constitution, the addition, in the manner proposed by your
excellency, will not be sufficient for me to vote for it, as it
appears to me to be very uncertain whether they ever are a
part of the Constitution.

Several gentlemen said a few words each, on the proposi-
tion of amendments, which it was acceded to, by gentlemen
opposed to the Constitution, was geod, but that it was not
probable it would be interwoven in the Constitution. Gentle-
men on the other side said there was a great probability that it
would, from its nature, be also recommended by the several
conventions which have not yet convened.

SATURDAY, February 2.—.—The Hon. Mr. STRONG went
into a particular discussion of the several amendments rec-
ommended in the proposition submitted by his excellency,
each of which he considered with much attention. He
anticipated the good effect it must have in conciliating the
various sentiments of gentlemen on the subject, and eX-
pressed his firm belief that, if it was recommended by the
Convention, it would be inserted in the Constitution.

Gen. THOMPSON said, we have no right to make
amendments. It was not, he said, the business we were sent
for. He was glad, he said, that gentlemen were now con-
vinced it was not a perfect system, and that it wanted
amendments. This, he said, was different from the lan-
guage they had formerly held. However, as to the amend—
ments, he could not say amen to them, but they might be
voted for by some men —he did not say Judases.

Mr; PARSONS, Col. ORNE, Mr. PHILLIPS, the
Rev. Mr. N ILES, and several other gentlemen, spoke
in favor of the proposition, as a conciliatory measure, and
the probability of the amendments being adopted. Mr.
NASSON, Dr. TAYLOR, Mr. THOMAS, (of Middleboro’,)

Trauma] MASSACHUSETTS. 1/1.]

and others, though 1n sentiment With gentlemen on the pro
pliety of their being admitted into the Constitution, did no
think it was plobable they would be inserted.

Before the Convention adjourned, Gen. Whitney movec
that a committee, consisting of two from each county, should
be raised, to consider the amendments, or any Other that
might be proposed, and report thereon. Hon. Mr. Sedgwick
seconded the motion.

Hon. Mr. DALTON. Mr. President, I am not opposed
to the motion; but, Sir, that gentlemen may not again say, as
has been the case this day, that the gentlemen Who advo-
cate the measure of the proposition were now convinced that
amendments to the Constitution are indispensable, I, sir,
in my place, say, that I am Willing to accept the Constitu-
tion as it is , and I am in favor of the motion of p1oposing
amendments, only as it is of a conciliating nature, and not
as a concession that amendments are necessary.

The motion was put, and carried unanimously. The fol-
lowing gentlemen were then appointed on the said commit-
tee, VIZ. :—

Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, Mr. Southworth, Mr. Parsons, Hon
Mr. Hutchinson—H011. Mr. Dana, Mr. Winn— Hon. Mr.
St1ong, Mr. Bodman—Hon. Mr. Turner, Mr. Thomas, of
Plymouth— Dr. Smith, M1. Boutn—Hon. Mr. Spooner, Mr.
Bishop—Rev. Dr. Hemmenway, Mr. Barrell—Mr. May-
hew, Hon. Mr. Taylor, Hon. Mr. Sprague—Mr. Fox, Mr.
Longfellow—Mr. Sewall, Mr. Sylvester—Mr. Lusk, Hon.
Mr. Sedgwick.

MONDAY, February 4, P. M.—Rev. Mr. THACHER.
Mr. President, While the different paragraphs of the pro- .
posed C‘onstitUtion have been debated, I have not troubled
this honorable Convention with any observations of my own
upon the subject. Conscious that there were men of deeper
political knowledge, and of better abilities, than myself,l con-
ceived it my duty to attend to their instruction, that, having
hea1d with attention, I might decide with integrity. I view
the object before us as of greater moment than ever was
known within the memory of man, or that hath been 1e-
C'o1ded by the historic page. Were we, Mr. President, this
day to decide on the lives and fortunes of a hundred of the
best citizens of this commonwealth, soltmn would that prov-
ince be -; but much more interesting is the present question;

I42 DEBATES. [THACHEIL

for, 111 this case, not a single city, not a s111g|e state, but a
continent, wide and extended, may be happy or wretched,
according to our judgment; and posterity will either bless us
for laying the foundation of a Wise and equal government,
or curse us for neglecting their important interests, and for
forging chains for bthem, bwhen We disdained to wear them
ourselves. Having the1efore, as It1ust, a full View of the
magnitude of the object, I hope I shall be pardoned ifl offei
my sentiments with freedom. Iam sensible of the preju-
dices that subsist against the profession to which I belong;
but yet, intrusted by my constituents with a. solemn charge,
I think they have a right to expect from me the reasons why
I shall finally consent to ratify the proposed form of govern-
ment.

There are three circumstances which deserve notice in
considering the subject. These are, the necessity that all
the states 23have of some grenel ral bond of union; the checks
upon the gove111ment in the f01m offered f01 0111 adoption;
and, lastly, the pa1ticula1 disadvantages to which we shall be
exposed if we reject it.

With respect to the first of these considerations, I trust
there is no man in his senses, but what will own, that the
whole country hath largely felt the want of energy in the gen-
eral government. While we were at War with Britain, c0111-
mon danger produced a common union ; but, the cause being
removed, the effect ceased also. Nay, I do not know but we
may safely add that that union, ploduced by uniform danger,
was still Inadequate to general and national purposes. This
con11110nwealth, with a genemns, disinterested legard to the
good of the whole, appeared foremost in the day of danger.
At the conclusion of the late war, two thirds of the Con-
tinental army Were from Massachusetts; their provision and
their clothing proceeded, also, in a great measure, from our
extraordinary exertions. The people did this in the fullest
confidence, that, when peace and tranquillity Were restored,
from the honor andjustice of our sister states our supernu—
merary expenses would be abundantly repaid. But, alas!
now much hath our expectation been blasted! The C011-
gress, though willing, yet had no power to do usjustice. The
small district of Rhode Island put a negative upon the
collected wisdom of the continent. This was done, not by
those “ho-are the patrons of their present infamous system of

THACHERJ MASSACHUSETTS. 143

paper currency, but by that part of them who now call
themselves honest men. We have made exertions to stop
the importation of foreign luxuries. Our brethren in the
neighboring states, from the View of local advantages, have
taken occasion to distress us upon the same account. They
have encouraged where we have prohibited; and by those
iniquitous measures have made our virtue and public Spirit
an additional cause of our calamity. Nor have our calamities
been local; they have reached to all parts of the United
States, and have produced dissipation and indigence at
home, and contempt in foreign countries. On the one
hand, the haughty Spaniard has deprived us of the naviga—
tion of the River Mississippi; on the other, the British
nation are, by extravagant duties, ruining our fishery. Our
sailors are enslaved by the pirates of Algiels. 0111 c1edit is
reduced to so low an ebb, that AmeIican faith IS a prove1b1al
expression for pe1fidy, as Punic faith was among the Romans.
Thus have we suffe1ed every species of infamy abroad, and
poverty at home. Such, in fact, have been our calamities,
as are enough to convince the most skeptical among us of the
want of a general government, in which energy and vigor
should be established, and at the same time, the rights and
libelties of the people p1ese1ved.

A Constitution hath been presented to us, which was com-
posed and planned by men, who, in the council and field,
have, in the most conspicuous offices, served their coun-
try in the late war. It comes authenticated by a man who,
without any pecuniary reward, commanded our army, and
who retired to a private station with more pleasure than he
left it. I do not say, Mr. President, that this proves the
form of government tobe perfect, or that it is an unanswer-
able argument that we should adopt it; but it is a reason
why we should examine it with care and caution, and that
“We ought not rashly and precipitately to reject it.

It will be objected, “There are mo1e powers granted than
are necessary, and that it tends to destroy the local govern-
ments of the particular states, and that it will eventually
end either in aristocracy or despotism.” To answer the
objection, two considerations should be taken into View—
the situation of the continent when a Constitution was
formed, and the impossibility of preserving a perfect sove-
reignty in the States, after necessary powers were ceded tO'a

I44 DEBATES. [THASHEF

suPreme council of the whole. As to the first, let us can-
didly examine the state of these republics from New Hamp-
shire to Georgia, and see how far vigor and energy were
required. During the session of the late Convention, Mas-
sachusetts was on the point of civil war. In Vermont and
New Hampshire, a great disaffection to their several govern-
ments prevailed among the people. New York absolutely
refused complying with the requisitions of Congress. In
Virginia, armed men endeavored to stop the courts of justice.
In South Carolina, creditors, by law, were obliged to receive
barren and useless land for contracts made in silver and gold.
I pass over the instance of Rhode Island: their conduct was
notorious. In some states, laws were made directly against
the treaty of peace; in others, statutes were enacted which
clashed directly against any federal union —new lands suf-
ficient to discharge a great part of the Continental debt
intruded upon by needy adventurers—our frontier settle—
ments exposed to the ravages of the Indians— while the sev-
eral states were unable or unwilling to relieve their distress.
Lay all those circumstances together, and you will find
some apology for those gentlemen who framed this Consti-
tution. I trust you may charitably assign other motives for
their conduct, than a design to enslave their country, and to
parcel out for themselves its honors and emoluments.

The second consideration deserves its weight. Can these
local governments be sufficient to protect us from foreign
enemies, or from disaffection at home P Thirteen states are
formed already. The same number are probably to be
formed from the lands not yet cultivated.

Of the former, yet smaller divisions may be made. The
province of Maine hath desired a separation; in time, a sep-
aration may take place. Who knows but what the same
may happen with respect to the 01d colony of Plymouth.
Now, conceive the number of states increased, their bound-
aries lessened, their interests clashing; how easy a prey to
a foreign power! how liable to war among themselves!

Let these arguments be weighed, and I dare say, sir,
there is no man but what would conceive that a coercive
power over the whole, searching through all parts of the
system, is necessary to the preservation and happiness of
the Whole people.

.But I readily grant all these reasons are not sufficient to .

Truman] MASSACHUSETTS. 145

surrender up the essential liberties of the people. But do
We surrender them? This Constitution hath been com-
pared, both by its defenders and opponents, to the British
government. In my View of it, there is a great difference.
In Britain, the government is said to consist of three forms
—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; but, in fact, is
but a few removes from absolute despotism. In the crown
is vested the power of adding at pleasure to the second
branch; of nominating. to all the places of honor and emolu-
ment; of purchasing, by its immense revenues, the suffrages
of the House of Commons. The voice of the people is but
the echo of the king; and their boasted privileges lie e11-
tirely at his mercy. In this proposed form, each branch of
power is derived, either mediately 01 directly, from the peo-
ple. The lower house are elected directly by those persons
who are qualified to vote for the representatives of the state;
and, at the expiration of two years, become private men,
unless their past conduct entitles them to a future election.
The Senate are elected by the legislatures of the different
states, and represent their sovereignty.

These powers are a check on each other, and can never
be made either dependent on one another, or independent
of the people. The President is chosen by the electors, who
are appointed by the people. The high courts of justice
arise from the President and Senate; but yet the- ministers
of them can be removed only upon bad behavior. The
independence of judges is one of the most favorable circum-
stances to public liberty; for when they become the slaves
of a venal, corrupt court, and the hirelings of tyianny, all
prope1ty is precarious, and personal seculity at an end; a
man may be stripped of all his possessions, and murdered,
without the forms of law. Thus it appears that all parts of
this system arise ultimately from the people, and’ are still
independent of each other. There are other restraints,
which, though not directly named in this Constitution, yet
are evidentlyb discerned by every man of common observation.
These are, the government of the several states, and the
spirit of liberty 1n the people. Are we wronged or injured,
our immediate representatives are those to Whom we ought
to apply. Their power and influence will still be great.
But should any servants of the people, however eminent
their stations, attempt to enslave them, fiom this spirit of

VOL. 11. 19 13

I46 DEBATES. lTHACHER.

libelty such opposition would arise as would bring them to
the scaffold. But, admitting that thele a1e dangers in
accepting this gene1al gov e111n1ent yet a1e there not greater
hazards in rejecting it? Such is, Mr. President, the state
of our affairs, that it is not in our power to carve for our-
selves. To avoid the greatest and choose the least of these
two evils, is all that we can do. What, then, will be the
probable effects if this Constitution be rejected? Have we
not reason to fear new commotions in this commonwealth?
If they arise, can we be always certain that we shall be
furnished with a citizen, who, though possessed of extensive
influence and the greatest abilities, will make no other use
of them than to quiet the tumult of the people, to prevent
civil wa1, and to lest01e the usual course of law and justice.P
Ale we not in danger from other states, when their interests
or prejudices are opposite to ours? And in such scenes of
hostile contention, will not some Sylla drench the land in
blood, or some Cromwell or Cmsar lay our liberties prostrate
at his feet? Will not foreign nations attack us in our weak,
divided condition, and once more render us provinces to
some potentate of Europe? Or will those powers to whom
we a1e indebted lie quiet. 9 They certainly will not. They
a1e now waiting for our decision; but when they once see
that our union is b10ken, and that we are determined to
neglect them, they will issue out letters of marque and
reprisal, and entirely destroy our commerce.

If this system is broken up, will thirteen, or even nine
states, ever agree to another? And will Providence smile
on a people who despise the privileges put into their hands,
and who neglect the plainest principles of justice and hon-
esty? After all, I by no means pretend that there is com-
plete perfection in this proposed Constitution. Like all other
human productions, it hath its faults. Provision is made for
an amendment, whenever, from practice, it is found oppres-
sive. I would add, the proposals which his exc'ellency hath
condescended to lay before this honorable Convention, re-
specting future alterations, are real improvements for the
better; and we have no reason to doubt but they will be
equally attended to by other states, as they lead to common
secmity and preservation.

Some of the gentlemen in the opposition have quoted
ancient history, and applied it to the question now under

cinema] MASSACHUSETTS. 1417

debate. They have shown us'the danger which arises from
vesting magistrates with too much power. I wish they had
gone on to tell the whole truth. They might have shown
how nearly licentiousness and tyranny are allied; that they
Who will not be governed by reason must submit to force ;
that demagogues, in all free governments, have at first held
out an idea of extreme liberty, and have seized 011 the lights
of the people unde1 the mask of patriotism. They might
have shown us a republic in which wisdom, viitue, and
order, were qualities fo1 which a man was liable to banisl -
ment; and, on the other hand, boasting, sedition, and false--
hood, the sure road to honor and promotion.

Iam sorry” that it hath been hinted by some gentlemen
in this house, as if there were a combination of the rich, the
learned, and those of liberal professions, to establish and
support an arbitrary form of government. Far be it from
me to retort so uncharitable and unchristian a suggestion.
. I doubt not- but the gentlemen who are of different senti-
ments from myself, are actuated by the purest motives.
Some of them I have the pleasure to be particularly ac—
quainted with, and can safely pronounce them to be men of
virtue and honor. They have, no doubt, a laudable con-
cern for the liberties of thei1 country; but I would beg them
to remember that ext1eme jealousy and suspicion may be as
fatal to freedom as security and negligence.

With respect to myself, I am conscious of no motive which
guides me in this great and solemn question, but what I
could justify to my own heart, both on the bed of death, and
before the tribunal of omnipotence. I am a poor man; I
have the feelings of a poor man. If there are honors and
emoiuments in this proposed Constitution, I shall, by my
profession and circumstances in life, be forever excluded
from them. It is my wish and player, that, in the solemn
veidict we are very soon to pronounce, we may be directed
to that measure which will be for the glory, fieedom, and
felicity of my country.

I shall trouble this house no further than by joining sin-
cerely in the wish of the honorable gentleman from Tops-
ham, that the people, in their day, may know the things
which belong to their peace.

[The committee appointed, on Saturday, to consider his
excellency’s propositions; by their chairman, honorable Mr

148 DE BATES. [BACKUS

Bowdom, reported a few alterations to the amendments
submitted to them; and that, at the decision, the corn-
mittee consisted of twenty—four, fifteen of whom agreed in
the report, seven were against it, one was absent, and one
declined giving his opinion. For the report, see the form
of ratification, at the end of the debates]

Major LUSK concurred in the idea already thrown out
in the debate, that, although the insertion of the amend-
ments in the Constitution was devoutly wished, yet he did
not see any reason to suppose they ever would be adopted.
Turning from the subject of amendments, the major entered
largely into the consideration of the 9th section, and, in
the most pathetic and feeling manner, described the mis—
eries of the poor natives of Africa, who are kidnapped and
sold for slaves, With the brightest colors he painted their
happiness and ease on their native shores, and contrasted
them with their wretched, miserable, and unhappy condition,
in a state of slavery. From this subject he passed to the
article dispensing with the qualification of a religious test,
and concluded by saying, that he shuddered at the idea that
Roman Catholics, Papists, and Pagans might be introduced
into office, and that Popery and the Inquisition may be
established in America.

Rev. Mr. BACKUS. Mr. President, I have said very
little in this honorable Convention; but I now beg leave to
offer a few thoughts upon some points in the Constitution
proposed to us, and I shall begin with the exclusion of any
religious test. Many appear to be much concerned about
it; but nothing is more evident, both in reason and the Holy
Scriptures, than that. religion is ever a matter between God
and individuals; and, therefore, no man or men can impose
any religious test, without invading the essential prerogatives
of our Lord Jesus Christ. Ministers first assumed this power
under the Christian name; and then Constantine approved
of the practice, when he adopted the profession of Chris-
tianity, as an engine of state policy. And let the history of
all nations be searched from that day to this, and it will
appear that the imposing of religious tests hath been the
greatest engine of tyranny in the world. .And I rejoice to
see so many gentlemen, who are now giving in their rights
of conscience in this great and important matter. Some
serious minds discover a concern lest, if all religious tests

BACKUS.] MASSACHUSETTS. . 149

should be excluded, the Congress would hereafter establish
Popery, or some other tyrannical way of worship. But it is
most certain that no such way of worship can be established
without any religious test.

Much, Sir, hath been said about the importation of slaves
into this country. I believe that, according to my capacity,
no man abhors that wicked practice more than I do; 1
would gladly make use of all lawful means towards the abol-
ishing of slavery in all parts of the land. But let us consider
where we are, and what we are doing. In the Articles of“
Confederation, no provision was made to hinder tl'1ein1porta—
tion of slaves into any of these states; but a door is now
open hereafter to do it, and each state is at liberty now to
abolish slavery as soon as they please. And let us remem-
ber our former connection with Great Britain, from whom
many in our land think we ought not to have revolted. How
did they carry 011 the slave trade.p I know that the bishop
of Gloucester, in an annual sermon in London, in Feb-
ruary, 1776, endeavored to justify their tyrannical claims
of power over us by casting the reproach of the slave trade
upon the Americans. But at the close of the war, the bishop
of Chester, in an annual sermon, in February, 1783, ingenu—
ously owned that their nation is the most deeply involved in
the guilt of that trade of any nation in the world; and, also,
that bthey have tleated their Slaves 111 the West Indies uo1se
th :111 the F1ench or Spaniards have done theirs. Thus slaveiy
grows 1n01e and more odious through the w01ld; and, as an
hono1able gentleman said some days ago, “ Though we can-
not say that slavery lS struck with an apoplexy, yet we may
hope it will die with a consumption.” And a main sou1ce,
sir, of that iniquity, hath been an abuse of the covenant of
(iicumcision, which gave the seed of Abraham to destroy the
inhabitants of Canaan, and to take their houses, Vineyards,
and all their estates, as their own; and also to buy and hold
others as servants. And, as Christian privileges are greater
than those of the Heb1ews 'weie, many have imagined that
they have a right to seize upon the 1.111ds of the heathen, and
to destroy or enslave them as far as they could extend their
powe1. And from thence the mystery of iniquity ca11i<d
many into the practice of making merchandise of slaves and
souls of men. But all ought to remember that, when God
promised the land of Canbaan to Abraham and his seed, he

150 ‘1 DEBATES. [BACKUS

let hnn know that they were not to take possession of that
land until the iniquity ot the Amorites was full; and then
1he1 did it under the immediate direction of Hea1e 11; and
they new as 1ea| executors ol the judgment of God upon
those heathens as 11111 person ever Was 1111 executo1 of a crim—
inal justly condemned. And in doing it they new not
allowed to i111ade the lands of the Edomites, who sprang
hom Esau, who 11 as not only of the seed ot Ab1ahan1, but
was 1101 11 at the same bi1th 11ith Is1ael; and yet the1 were
not of that church. Neither were lsrael allowed to invade
the lands of the Moabites, or of the children of Ammon, who
were of the seed of Lot. And no officer in Israel had any
leoislative po11e1, but such as Were immediately inspi1ed.
E1en David, the man alte1 God7s 011 11 heart, he d no legisla-
tive po11e1, but only as he was inspired from abo1e , and he
is expressly called aprop/Let in the New Testament. And
we are to remember that Abraham and his seed, for four hun-
dred years, had no warrant to admit any stranger into that
(hu1ch, but by buying of him as a servant, 11ith money.
And it 1111s a great p1ivilege to he bought, and adopted into
a religious tamily 1‘01 seven 1ea1s, and then to have thei1 free—
dom. And that covenant was expressly repealed in various
parts of the New Testament, and particularly in the First
Epistle to the Corinthians, where it is said, “ Ye are bought
with a price; the1efore glorify God 111 1on1 bod1, and 111101111
spirit, 11 inch are God7s. 77 And again, “ Ci1cumcision is
nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but keeping ol the
commandments of God. Ye are bought 11ith a price, be
not 111 the servants of men.” Thus the gospel sets all
men upon a level, very contrary to the declaration of an hon-
orable gentleman in this house, that “the Bible was con—
trived for the advantage of a particular 'order of men.”
Another great advantage, si1, in the Constitution belo1e

11s, is, its excluding all titles of nobility, or l1e1edita11 suc1 es-
sion 01 110111131, which hath been a main engine of tyranny in
foreign countries. But the American revolution was built
upon the principle that all men are born with an equal right
to liberty and property, and that officers have no right to any
power but what is fairly given them by the consent of the
people. And in the Constitution now proposed to us, a
power is reserved to the people constitutionally to reduce
every officer again to a private station ; and what a guard is

Jam] MASSACHUSETTS. 151

this against their invasion of others’ rights, or abusing of
their power! Such a door is now opened for the establish-
ment of righteous government, and for seculing equal liberty,
as nevel was before opened to any people upon earth.

Dr. JARVIS. Mr. President, the objections which gen-
tlemen have made to the form of ratification which has been
submitted by your exeellency, have arisen either from a doubt
of our having a right to propose alterations, or from the sup
posed improbability that, any amendments recommended by
this assembly will ever become a palt of the fedelal system
If we have no right, sir, to p1opose alte1ations,the1e 1emains
nothing fu1the1 to be attempted, but to take the final ques-
tion, independent of the propositions for amendment. But
I hope the mere assertion of any one is not to operate as an
argument in this assembly ;- and we are not yet waiting for
. evidence to prove this very singular position, which has been
so often. repeated. If We have a right, sir, to receive or re-
'eet ‘the Constitution, surely We have an equal authority to
dett- rmine in what way this right shall be exercised. It is a
maxim, I believe, univel sally adm1tted that, in eve1y instanc e,
the manne1 in which every pon er is to be exerted, must be
in its nature discretionary with that body to which this power
is delegated. If this principle be just, sir, the ground which
has been taken to oppose your excellency’s proposals, by dis—
puting the right of recommending alterations, must be neces-
sarily relinquished. But gentlemen say, that they find
nothing about amendments 1n the commission under which
they are acting ,and they com e1ve it neithe1 agreeable to the
resolution of the legislature, n01 to the sense of their constit-
uents, that such a scheme should be adopted. Let us inquire,
then, sir, under what authority we are acting, and to what
tribunal we are amenable. Is it, then, sir, from the late
federal Convention that we derive that authority? Is it
from Congress, or is it even from the legislature itself? It
is from neither, sir. We are convened in right of the people,
as their immediate representatives, to execute the most in].
portant trust which it is possible to receive; we are account-
able, in its execution, to God only, and our own consciences.
When gentlemen assert, then, that we have no right to
recommend alte1ations, they must have ideas strangely
derogatory to the influence and authority of our constituents,
whom we have the'honor of representing. But should it be

I52 DEBATES. LJARVIS.

thought there was even a part of the people who conceived
we were thus rest1icted as to the forms of 0m p1oceedings,
we are Still to recollect that thei1 aggregate sense, on this
point, can only be determined by the voices of the majo1ity
in this Convention. The arguments of those gentlemen
who oppose any propositions of amendments, amount simply
to this, sir, — that the whole people of Massachusetts,
assembled by their delegates, on the most solemn and inter-
esting occasion, are not at liberty to resolve in what form
this trust shall be executed. When we reflect seriously and
coolly 011 this point, I think, sir, we shall doubt no longer.
But, with respect to the prospect of these amendments,
which are the subject of discussion, being adopted by the
first Congress which shall be appointed under the new Con-
stitution, I really think, sir, that it is not only far from being
improbable, but is in the highest degree likely. I have
thought long and often 011 the subject of amendments, and I
know no way in which they would be more likely to succeed
If they were made conditional to our receiving the proposed
Constitution, it has appeared to me that a conditional
amendment must operate as a total rejection. As so many
other states have received the Constitution as it is, how can
it be made to appear that they will not adhere to their own
resolutions? and should they remain as warmly and pertina-
ciously attached to their opinion as we might be decidedly
in favo1 of our own sentiments, a lono andb painful intetval
might elapse bel01e we should have the benefit of a fede1al
Constitution. I have neve1 yet heald an argument to
remove this difficulty Permit me to inqui1e of gentlemen
what reason we have to suppose that the states which have
aheady adopted the Constitution will suddenly consent to
call a new convention at the request of this state. Are we
going to expose the commonwealth to the disagreeable
alternative of being forced into a compliance, or of remain-
ing in opposition, provided nine others should agree to
receive it? As highly as some persons talk of the force of
this state, I believe we should be but a feeble power, unas—
sisted by others, and detached from the general benefit of a
national government. \Ve are told that, under the blessing
of Providence, we may do much. It IS very t1 ue, si1, but It
must be proved that we shall be most likely to secure the
approbation of Heaven by refusing the proposed system.

Jam] MASSACHUSETTS. . 153

It has been insinuated, sir, that these amendments have
been artfully introduced to lead to a decision which would
not otherwise be had. Without stopping to remark on the
total want of candor in which such an idea has arisen, let us
inquire whether there is even the appearance of reason to
support this insinuation. The propositions are annexed, it
is true, to the ratification; but the assent is complete and
absolute without them. It is not possible it can be other-
wise understood by a single member in this honorable body.
Gentlemen, therefore, when they make such an unjust obser—
vation, do no honor to the sagacity of others. Supposing .it
possible that any single member can be deceived by such a
shallow artifice, permit me to do justice to the purity of in—
tention in which they have arisen, by observing, that I am
satisfied nothing can be farther from your excellency’s inten-
tions. The propositions are general, and not local; they
‘ are not calculated for the peculiar interest of this state, but,
with indiscriminate justice, comprehend the circumstances
of the individual on the banks of the Savannah, as well as
the hardy and industrious husbandman on the margin of the
Kennebeck. Why, then, they should not be adopted, I
confess I cannot conceive. There is one of them, in a par-
ticular manner, which is very agreeable to me. When we
talk of our wanting a bill of rights to the new Constitution,
the first article proposed must remove every doubt on this
head ; as, by positively securing what is not expressly dele-
gated, it leaves nothing to the uncertainty of conjecture, or
to the refinements of implication, but is an explicit reserva
tion of every right and privilege which 1s nearest and most
agreeable to the people. lhere has been scarcely an
instance where the influence of Massachusetts has not been
felt and acknowledged in the Union. In such a case, her
voice will be heard, sir, and I am fully in sentiment, if these
amendments are not ingrafted on the Constitution, it will be
our own fault. The remaining seven states will have our
example before them; and there 1s a high plobability that
they, or .at least some of them, will take our conduct as a
precedent, and will perhaps assume the same mode of pro—
cedure. Should this be the fact, their influence will be
united to ours. But your delegates will, besides, be sub-
jected to a perpetual instruction, until its object is com-
pleted ; and it will be always in the power of the people and

VOL. 11. 20

154 DEBATES. LAMS.

legislature to renew those instructions. But, if they should
fall, We must then acquiesce in the decision of the majority ;
and this is the known condition on which all free govern-
ments depend.

Would gentlemen who are opposed to the Constitution
Wish to have no amendments? This does not agree with
their reiterated objections to the proposed system. Or are
they afraid, sir, that these propositions will secure a larger
majority? On such an occasion we cannot be too generally
united. The Constitution is a great political experiment.
The amendments have a tendency to remove many objec-
tions which have been made to it; and I hope, sir, when it
is adopted, they will be annexed to the ratification, in the
manner which your excellency has proposed.

TUESDAY, February 5.—Mr. AMES observed that, at
length, it is admitted that the Constitution, connected with
the amendments, is good. Almost every one, who has ap-
peared against the Constitution, has declared that he approves
it, with the amendments. One gentleman, who has been
distinguished by his zealous opposition, has declared that he
would hold up both hands for it, if they could be adopted.
I admire this candid manner of discussing the subject, and
will endeavor to.treat it myself with equal care and fairness.
The only question which seems to labor is this: the amend-
ments are not a part of the Constitution, and there is nothing
better than a probability to trust to, that they will ever be
adopted. The nature of the debate is totally shifted, and
the inquiry is now, not what the Constitution is, but what
degree of probability there is that the amendments will here-
after be incorporated into it. '

Before he proceeded to discuss this question, he wished
to notice two objections, which had been urged against his
excellency’s proposition—that this Convention, being con-
fined in their powers to reject or ratify the Constitution as it
is, have no right to propose amendments; and that the very
propositions imply the Constitution is not perfect, and amount
to a confession that it ought to be rejected. It is well that
these objections were not made by-a lawyer: they would
have been called quibbles, and he would have been accused
of having learned them at the bar. Have we no right to
propose amendments? This is the fullest representation of
the people ever known, and if we may not declare the1r opin-

AMEs.] MASSACHUSETTS. 155

ion, and upon a point for which we have been elected, how
shall it eve1 be known? A majority may not fully approve
the Constitution, and yet they may think it unsafe to reject
it; and they may fully approve his excellency’ s propositions.
What shall they say. P That they accept, or reject, and no
moreP—that they be embarrassed, perhaps, to do either.
But let them say the truth, that they accept it, in the hope
that amendments will obtain. We are chosen to consider
the Constitution, and it is clearly incident to our appoint—
ment to declare the result of our deliberations. This very
mode of obtaining amendments is pointed out in the Con-
stitution itself. How can it be said that we have no right
to propose them? If, however, there was any irregularity
in this proceeding, the General Court would not delay
to conform it.

If it is insisted that the Constitution is admitted to be
imperfect, let those objectors consider the nature of their
own argument. Do they expect a perfect constitution. 9
Do they expect to find that perfection 1n government which
they well know 1s not to be found 1n nature? There 1s not
a man who is not more or less discontented with his con—
dition in life, and who does not experience a mixture of
good and evil; and will he expect that a whole society of
men can exclude that imperfection which is the lot of every
individual in it? The truth is, we call that condition good
and happy, which is so upon the whole. But this Constitu-
tion may be good without any amendments, and yet the
amendments may be good; for they me not repugnant to
the Constitution. It is a gratification to observe how little
we disaglee 1n our sentiments , but it is not my pu1pose to
compare the amendments with the Constitution. Whatever
opinion may be formed of it by others, Mr. Ames professed
to think it Comparatively perfect. There was not any gov-
ernment which he knew to subsist, or which he had ever
heard of, that would bear a comparison with the new Con—
stitution. Considered merely as a literary performance, it
was an honor to our country: legislators have at length con-
descended to speak the language of philosophy; and if we
adopt it, we shall demonstrate to the sneering world, who
deride liberty because they have lost it, that the principles
7 of our government are as free as the spirit of our people.

‘ I repeat it, our debates have been profitable, because,

I56 DEBATES. LAMBS

upon every leading point, we are at last agreed. Very few
among us now deny that a federal government is necessary
to save us from ruin; that the Confederation is not that
government; and that the proposed Constitution, connected
with the amendments, is worthy of being adopted. The
question recurs, Will the amendments prevail, and become
part of the system? In order to obtain such a system as
the Constitution and the amendments, there are but three
ways of proceeding—to reject the whole, and begin anew;
to adopt this plan upon condition that the amendments be
inserted into it; or to adopt his excellency’s proposition.

Those who propose to reject the whole, are bound to Show
that we shall possess some advantage in forming a system
which we do not enjoy at. present, or that some obstacles will
be removed which impede us now. But will that be the
case? Shall we adopt another constitution with more una-
nimity than we expect to find in this Convention? Do gen-
tlemen so soon forget their own arguments ? We have been
told that the new Constitution will be rebellion against the
Confederation; that the interests of the states are too dis-
similar for a union; and that Massachusetts can do without
the union, and is a match for all the world. We have been
Warned of the tendency of all power towards tyranny, and of
the danger of trusting Congress with the power of the purse
and of the sword ; that the system is not perfect ; there is no
religious test, and slavery is not abolished. Now, sir, if we
reject the Constitution, and, after two or three years’ exer-
tion, another constitution should be submitted to another
convention of Massachusetts, shall we escape the opposition
which is made in this assembly? Will not the same objec-
tions then apply with equal force to another system? Or
do gentlemen expect that a constitution may be formed
which will not be liable to those objections? Do they ex-
pect one which will not annul the Confederation, or that
the persons and properties of the people shall not be included
in the compact, and that we shall hear no more about armies
and taxes? But suppose that it was so framed, who is
there, even amongst the objectors, who would give his vote
for so paltry a system? If we reject, we are exposed to the
risk of having no constitution, of being torn with factions,
and at last divided into distinct confederacies.

If we accept upon condition, shall we have a right to send

Ame] MASSACHUSETTS. 107

members to the new CongressP We shall not; and, of
course, this state would lose its voice and influence in ob-
taining the adoption of the amendments. This is too absurd
to need any further discussion.

But, in objection to your excellency’s propositions, it is
said that it is no more than probable that they will be agreed
to by the other states. I ask, What is any future thing that
We devise more than probable? What more is another con-
stitution? 'All agree that We must have one; and it is easy
to perceive that such a one as the majority of the people ap—
prove must be submitted to by this state; for what. right
have an eighth or tenth part of the people to dictate a gov—
ernment for the Whole? It comes to this point, therefore:
Is any method more likely to induce the people of the United
States to concur with Massachusetts, than that proposed by
your excellency? If it is answered that there is none, as I
think it must be, then the objection, that the chance of ob--
taining the amendments is no more than probable, Will come
to the ground, and it will appear that, of all chances, we de-
pend upon th'it which is the safest. For when will the
voice, of Massachusetts have so powerful an influence as at
present? There is not any government now to counteract
or awe the people. The attention of the ‘people is excited
from one end of the states to the other, and they will watch
and control the conduct of their members in Congress.
Such amendments as afford better security to liberty will
be supported by the people. There will be a Congress in
existence to collect their sentiments, and to pinsue the ob-
jects of their Wishes. Nine states may insert amendments
into the Constitution , but if We reject it, the vote must be
unanimous. Our state, in that case, Would lose the advan-
tage of having representatives according to numbels, which
is allowed by the Constitution. Upon a few points, and
those not of a local nature, unanimity may be expected;
but, in discussing a Whole Constitution, in which the very
amendments, that, it is said, will not be agreed to by the
states, are to be inserted, unanimity will be almost a miracle.
“Either the amendments will be agreed to by the Union, or
they will not. If it is admitted that they will be agreed to,
theie 1s an end of the objection to your excellency’s propo—
sitions, and we ought to be unanimous for the Constitution.
lfit is said that they will not be agreed to, then it must be

14

l58 DEBATES. [AMES.

because they are not approved by the United States, or at
least nine of them. Why shall we reject the Constitution,
then, for the sole purpose of obtaining that unanimous vote
of thirteen states, which, it is confidently said, it is impossi—
ble we ever shall obtain from nine only? A11 object which
is impossible 1s out of the cquestion. The argument that the
amendments will not prevail, 1s not only without force, but
di1et1tly against those 11 110 use it, unless they admit that we
have no need of a government, or assert that, by ripping up
the foundations of the compact, upon which 11e now stand,
and setting the whole Constitution afloat, and introducing
an infinity of new subjects of controversy, we pursue the
best method to secure the entire unanimity of thirteen
states.

But shall we put every thing that we hold precious to
the hazard by rejecting this Constitution? We have great
advantages by it in respect of navigation; and it is the gen-
eral interest of the states that we should have them. But if
We reject it, what security have we that. we shall obtain
them 21 second time, against the local interests and prejudices
of the othe1 states. 9 \Vho 1s there, that really loves libelty,
that will not me mble fo1 its safety, it the federal 11ove111ment
should be dissolved. C2111 liberty be safe without govern—
ment ?

The period of 01111 political dissolution is approaching.
Anarchy and uncertainty attend our future state. But this
we know—that Liberty, which is the soul of our existence,
once fled, can return no more.

The Union is essential to our being as a nation. The
pillars that prop it are crumbling to powder. The Union is
the 1it21ls sap that nourishes the tree. If we reject the C011-
sltitution,——to use the language of the conntry,—we gi1dle
the tree, its lea1es will wiiheI, its branches drop off, and the
111011lde1iug tlunk will be torn down by the tempest. W hat
sec c111ity has this single state against foreign enemies? Could
we d1 fend the mast country, which the Blitons so much
desi1e? C2111 we protect 0111 fisheries, 011 secure hly t1eaties
as:1le for the produce of 0111 la11ds111 fore elgn markets? ls
thele no loss, no dangeI, by delay In spite of 0m newli-
gence and perverseness, are we to enjoy, at all times, the
p1ivilege of lormin111 a constitution, which no othe1 nation

D
has ever enjoyed at all- We. approve our own form of state

Human] MASSACHUSETTS. 159

government, and seem to think ourselves in safety unoer its
protection. We talk as if there was no danger in deciding
wrong. But when the inundation comes, shall we stand on
dry land? The state government is a beautiful structure.
It iS situated, however,.upon the naked beach. The Union
is the dike to fence out the flood. That dike is broken and
decayed; and, if we do not repair it, when the next spring
tide comes, We shall be buried in one common destruction.

Mr. BARRELL, (of York.) Awed in the presence of
this august assembly; conscious of my inability to express
my mind fully on this important occasion; and sensible how
little I must appear in the eyes of those giants in rhetoric,
who have exhibited such a pompous display of declama—
tion ; without. any of those talents calculated to draw atten-
tion ; without the pleasing eloquence of Cicero, or the blaze
of Demosthenian oratory,——I rise, Sir, to discharge my duty
to my constituents, who, I know, expect something more
from me than merely a silent vote. With no pretensions to
talents above the simple language adapted to the line of my

calling, —the plain husb;1ndman,——I hope the gentlemen
who compose this honorable body willfully understand me
when I attempt to speak my mind of the fede1al Constitution
as it now stands. I wish, sir, to give my voice fo1 its amend-
ment before it can be salutary for our acceptance; because,
sir, notwithstanding the Wilsonian oratory, and all the
learned arguments l have seen written, notwithstanding
the many labored speeches I have heard in its defence, and
after the best investigation I am able togive this subject, ——
I fear it is pregnant with baneful effects, although I may
not live to feel them.

Because, sir, as it now stands, Congress will be Vested
with more extensive powers than ever Great Britain exer-
cised over us; too great, in my opinion, to intrust with any
class of men, let their talents or Virtues be ever so conspicu—
ous, even though composed of such exalted, amiable charac-
ters as the great Washington; for, while we consider them
as men of like passions, the same spontaneous, inherent.
thirst for power with ourselves, great and good as they may
be, when they ente1 upon this all— impo1tant charge, what
security can we have that they will continue so? And, were
we sure they would continue the faithful guardians of our
liberties, and prevent any infringement 011 the privileges of

160 DEBATES. [Barman

the people, what assurance can we have that such men will
always hold the reins of government— that their successors
will be such. r History tells us Rome was happy under Au-
gustus, though WIetclied undeI Nero, who could have no
greater power than Augustus , and yet this same Nero, when
young in government, could shed tears on signing a death-
warrant, though afterwards he became so callous to the ten—
der Feelings of humanity as to behold, with pleasure, Home
in flames.

Because, sir, I think that six years is too long a term for
any set of men to be at the helm of government; for in that
time they may get so firmly rooted, and their influence be so.
great, as to continue themselves for life.

Because, sir, I am not certain we are able to support the
additional expense of such a goveIn.meIIt

Because, sir, I think a Continental collector will not he. so
likely to do usjustice in collecting the taxes, as collectors of
our own.

Because, sir, I think a flame of government on which all
laws are. founded, should be so simple and explicit, that the
most illiterate may uIIdeIstand it; whereas this appears to
me so obscure and ambiguous, that the most capacious mind
cannot fully comprehend it.

Because, sir, the'duties of excise and impost, and to be
taxed besides, appear too great a sacrifice; and when we
have given them up, what shall we have to pay our debts,
but a dIyt tax?

Because, sir, I do not think this will produce the efficient
goveinment we are in pursuit of.

Because, sir, they fix their own salaries, without allowing
any control.

And because, sir, I think such a government may be dis-
agreeable to men with the high notions of liberty we Ameri-
cans have.

And, sir, I could wish this Constitution had not been, in
some parts of the continent, hurried on, like the driving of
. Jehu, very furiously; for such important transactions should
be without force, and with cool deliberation. These. sir,
were my objections, and those of my constituents, as they
occur to my memory; some of VVhI( h have been removed, in
the course of the debates, by the Ingenious reasonings of tht
speakers. In 1sh I could say the whole were. But after

Pmsowsq MASSACHUSETTS. 16t

all, there are some yet remaining 011 my mind, enough to con
Vince me, excellent as this system is, in some respects it
needs alterations; therefore I think it becomes us, as wise
men, as the faithful guardians of the peOple’s rights, and as
we wish well to posterity, to propose such amendments as
will secure to us and ours that liberty without which life is
a burden.

Thus, sir, have I ventured to deliver my sentiments, in
which are involved those of my constitUents, on this im~
portant subject; cautiously avoiding every thing like meta—
phvsical reasoning, lest I should C‘invade then p1e100‘at1ve
of those respectable gentlemen of the law, who have so
copiously displayed their talents 011 the occasion. But, sir,
although you may perceive, by what I have said, that this IS
not, in my View, the most perfect system I could wish, yet,
as I am possessed with an assurance that the proposed
amendments will take place; as I dread the fatal effects of
anarchy , as Iam convinced the Confederation IS essentially
deficient, and that it Will be more difficult to amend that
than to reform this; and as I think this Constitution, with
all its imperfections, is excellent, compared with that, and
that it is the best constitution we can now obtain ; — as the
greatest good I can do my country at present, I could wish
for an adjournment, that‘l might have an opportunity to lay
it before my constituents, with the arguments which have
been used 1n the debates, which have eased my mind, and l
trust would have the effect on theirs so as heartily to join me
in ratifying the same. But, sir, ifI cannot be indulged on
this desirable object, I am almost tempted to risk their dis-
pleasme, and adopt it without their consent.

Dr. TAYLOR examined the observations of several gen-
tlemen, who had said, that, had the Constitution been so
predic ated as to require a bill of nights to be anneXed to it,
it would have been the work of a year, and could not be
contained but in volumes. This, if tine, he said, was an
argument in favor of one being annexed; but so fa1 from its
being the case, he believed any gentleman in that Conven—
tion could form one in a few hours, as he might take the bill
of rights of MassachUsetts for a guide. He concluded by
objecting to the amendments, because no aSSUrance was
given that they ever would become a part of the system.

M1. PARSONS demonstrated the impracticability oi

VOL. 11. 21

162 DEBATES. [STILLMAN.

forming a bill, 1n a national constitution, for securing indi-
vidual rights, and showed the inutility of the measure, from
the ideas, that no power was given to Congress to infringe
on any one of the natural rights of the people by this Con-
stitution; and, should they attempt it without constitutional
authority, the act would be a nullity, and could not be
enforced.

Several other gentlemen spoke in a desultory conversation
on the amendments. " It was urged again and again, on one
side, that it was uncertain whether they ever would be in-
terwoven in the Constitution, and that, therefore, they could
not vote for it, on that precarious condition. On the other
side, the importance of the opinion of Massachusetts, in
other states, in determining on great political questions, the
» general nature of the amendments proposed, &c., were
repeatedly urged in favor of their being a part of the rat-
ification.

[A motion was made by Mr. DENCH, and seconded,
“That, for the purpose of informing the good people of this
commonwealth of the principles of the proposed federal C011—
stitution. and the amendments offered by his excellency, the
president, and reported by the committee, and of uniting
their opinions respecting the same, this Convention do ad—
journ to a future day.” After debate, (which continued the
best part of the day,) the question was put, and was deter—
mined in the negative, 329 members being present, and 115
only \oting in the affirmative. ]

\VEDWSD 11', February 6. [The Hon. Mr. ADAMS i11-
troduced some amendments, to be added to those reported by
the committee; but, they not meeting the approbation of
those gentlemen whose minds they were intended to ease,
after they were debated a considerable time, the honorable
gentleman withdrew them.

Rev. Mr. STILLMAN. Mr. President, 1 rise, With def—
erence to gentlemen of superior abilities, to give my opinion
on the present all—important national question, and the
reasons on which it is founded —an opinion, the result of
tl e most serious deliberation.

Upon entering the Convention, it was my full determina-
tion to keep my mind cool and open to conviction, that so I 1
might profit by the discussion of thisinteresting subject, and
now, sir, return my sincere thanks to, the gentlemen who

STILLMAN.] MASSACHUSETTS. ‘ 163

have taken opposite sides in the course of the debates. From
both I have received advantage —1‘r0m one class in bringing
forward a great variety of objections; from the other class
in answering them. Whatever my previous opinion was, I
now stand on firmer ground than ever respecting the pro
posed Constitution.

But my present situation, sir, is to me extremely af-
fecting. To be called by the voice of my fellow—citizens
to give my vote for or against a constitution of government
that will involve the happiness or misery of millions of my
countrymen, is of so solemn a nature as to have occasioned
the most painful anxiety.

I have no interest to influence me to accept this Constitu-
tion of government, distinct from the interest of my count1y-
men at large. We are all emba1ked in one bottom, and
. must Sink or swim together.

Besides, sir, Heaven has fixed me in a line of duty that
precludes every prospect of the honors and the emoluments
of office. Let who will govern, I must obey. Nor would 1
exchange the pulpit. for the highest honors my country can
confer. I, too, have personal liberties to secure, as dear to
me as to any gentlemen in the Convention, and as numerous a
'family, probably, to engage my attention; besides which,
I stand here, with my very honorable colleagues, as a repre-
sentative of the citizens of this g1eat metropolis, who have
been pleased to honor me with their confidence — an honor, in
my View, unspeakably greater than a peerage or a pension.

The absolute deficiency of the Articles of Confedeiation
is allowed by all. Nor have I seen any publication that
places this subject in so convincing a point of View as a let-
ter written by his excellency, Governor Randolph,* which
has appeared in several of our newspapers; whom I the
rather introduce, on this occasion, because he was a delegate
in the late federal Convention, refused to Sign the Constitu-
tion before us, and has been twice mentioned by gentlemen
in the opposition. His candor, apparent in the letter referred
to, does him honor, and merits the esteem of every candid
mind. I declare, si1,I revere his character, while I differ
from him 1n opinion.

" Before my departure for the (federal) Convention,” says.
he, “I believed that the Confederation was not so eminentlv

1* See Vol. I. p. 482.

I64 REBATES. [SIIWLLMAN

defectne as it had been supposed. But after I had entered
into a free conversation with those who were best informed
of the condition and interest of each state, —- after I' had com.-
pared the intelligence derived from them with the properties
that ought to characterize the government of our Union,—

I became peisuaded that the Confederation was destitute of
every energy which a constitution of the United States ought
to possess.” And after he had, in- the most masterly man-
ner, proved its insufficiency, he adds, “ But now, sir, permit
me to declare that, in my humble judgment, the powers by
which alone the blessings of a general government can be
accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the Confederation,
without a, change of its very essence ,° or, in other words, that
the Confederation must be thrown aside.” Having stated
his objeetions to it, he proceeds thus: “ My inferencefrom
these facts and principles is, that the new powers must be
deposited in a new body, growing out of the consolidation
of the Union, as far as the circumstances of the states would
allow.” Thus fully and candidly does this gentleman insist
on the absolute necessity of a new constitution of general
government, at the very time that he objected- to the present
form; and concludes his letter with these memorable words,
which I most heartily Wish may make a deep impression on
the mind of every gentleman in the opposition : “I hesitate
not to- say, that the most fervent prayer of my soul? is, the
establishment of a firm, energetic government; that the
most inveterate curse that can befall us is a dissolution of
the Union; and that the present moment, if suffered to pass
unemployed, can NEVER be recalled. I shall the] ef01e cling
to the Union as the rock of 0m salvation, and urge Virginia
to finish the salutary work which she hath begun. And if,
afte1 our best effmts for amendments, they cannot be obtained,
I seiuple not to declare (notwithstanding the advantage the
declaration may give to the enemies of my proposal) that I
will, as an individual: citizen, accept the Constitution.”

I pause, sir, that every gentleman present may have time
to indulge these feelings which these excellent expressions
must occasion. May that God Who has the hearts of all
men under his cont1ol, inspile eveiy membe1 of this Conven-
tion with a similar disposition! Then shall we lay aside
every opposite interest, and: unite, as a band of brothers, in‘
the ratification of this Constitution of national government

STILLMAN.] MASSACHUSETTS. “)0

Then, sir, will your terms of conciliation be attended tL
with gratitude and candor. Your excellency, depressed with
bodily infirmity, and exercised with severe pain, has stepped
forth at the critical moment, and, from the benevolence of
your heart, presented us with a number of proposed amend-
ments, in o1der, if possible, to quiet the minds of the
gentlemen 1n the Opposition, and bring us together 1n amity
and peace —amendments which you, sir, declare you do not
think necessary, except f01 the sole purpose of uniting us in
a common and most important cause.

But what has been the consequence of your excellency’s
conciliatory propositions ? Jealousy —jealousy, sir, that there
was a snake in the grass, a sec1et- intention to deceive I
shuddeied at the ungenerous suggestion, n01 will I dwell a
moment longer on the distressing bidea. Be banished fo1ev—
er the groundless suspicion of him whose name stands
foremost in the list of American patriots! Let love and
harmony prevail I

The important hour isjust arrived when the die Will be
cast, that will in a great measure determine the. fate of this
commonwealth, and have a mighty influence on the general
interests of the Union; for, from the best information I have
been able to collect from gentlemen of observation and of
undoubted veracity, there is the greatest reason to fear that
the rejection of this Constitution will be followed with
anarchy and confusion.

The Convention, I doubt not, will bear with me while 1
take a general view of the Constitution before us.

From all that has been said on the subject of biennial
elections, it is my decided Opinion that two years in the
gene1al government will not be in propo1tion to one year in
the local governments because, 111 the former, the objects
of government will be great, numerous, and extensive; in
the latte1, comparatively small and limited. The general
government involves all the states now in the Union—-
all such as shall in future accede to it—all foreign na-
tions with whom we are now, or he1eafter shall be, in
alliance—an extensive and growing comme1ce——wa1 and
peace, Ste.

It has been said that this is a stride towards septennial
elections, or perpetuity in office. I answer, the Constitution
itself is to be the rule: that declares that “representatives

(66 DEBATES. [STILLMANL

shall be chosen every second year by the peOple of the several
states.” Elections, then, of representatives must be every
second year; nor can they be otherwise, without a direct
Violation of the Constitution. The men who shall be wicked
enough to do this, would not be restrained, had the elections
been annual; it being equally easy to violate the Constitu-
tion in one case as in the other. Elections, indeed, ought to
be so frequent as to make the representatives feel they are
dependent on and amenable to the peOple. The difference,
then, between annual and biennial elections is small, and, in
either case, will answer the end just mentioned.

The powers that are granted to Congress by this instru-
ment are great and extensive ; but, sir, they are defined and
limited, and, in my judgment, sufficiently checked; whichI
shall prove before I sit down. These powers have been the
subject of long and Ingenious debate. But the arguments
that have been made use of against delegating these powers
to the general government prove too much, being applicable
to all delegated power; I mean the possible abuse of it.
The very term government implies a supreme controlling
power somewhere; a power to coerce, whenever coercion
shall be necessary ; of which necessity government must be
the judge. This is admitted ; if so, the power may be
abused. Every gentleman must confess that we cannot give
a power to do good, but it may be abused to do evil. If a
merchant commits the care of a ship and cargo to the master,
he may dispose of both, and appropriate the money to his
own use. If we raise a body of men, and put arms into
their hands for our defence, they may turn them against us
and destroy us. All these things prove, however, that, in
order to guard as much as possible against the abuse of those
powers we delegate to government, there ought to be suffi—
cient checks on them; every precaution should be used to
secure .the liberties of the people 011 the one hand, and not
render government inefficient on the other. I believe, sir,
such security is provided in this Constitution : if not, no con-
sideration shall induce me to give my voice in its favor. But
the people are secured by the following circumstances : —

1st. All the offices in Congress are elective, not heredi-
t11v. The Plesident and senatms me to be chosen by the
111te1posrtion of the legislatures of the several states, who ‘
me the 1cpresentatives and guardians of the people, whose

STIL.LMAN.] MASSACHUSETTS. 167

honor and interest will lead them, in all human probability,
to have good men placed in the general government.

2d. The representatives in Congress are to be chosen,
every second year, by the people of the several states. Con
sequently, it lies with the people themselves to say who shal
represent them. It will, then, be their own fault if they do
not choose the best men in the commonwealth.

Who are Congress, then 5’ They are ourselves; the men
of our own choice, in whom we can confide ; whose interest
is inseparably connected with our own. Why is it, then,
that gentlemen speak of Congress as some foreign body, as
a set of men who will seek every opportunity to enslave us?
Such insinuations are repugnant to the spirit of the Con-
stltution.

But a worthy gentleman from Middleborough has told us,
that, though they may be good men when chosen, they may
become corrupt. They may so; nor is it in the power of
angels or men to prevent it; but should this be the case, the
Constitution has made provisions for such an event. When
it happens, we shall know what method to adopt, in order
to bring them to punishment. In all governments where
offices are elective, there ever has been, and there ever will
be, a competition of interests. They who are in office wish
to keep in, and they who are out, to get in; the probable
consequences of which will be, that they who are already
in place will be attentive to the rights of the people, because
they know that they are dependent on them for a future
election, which can be secured by good behavior only. Be-
sides, they who are out of office will watch them who are in,
with a most critical eye, in order to discover and expose
their malconduct, if guilty of any, that so they may step into
their places. Every gentleman knows the influence that a
desire to obtain a place, or the fear of losing it, hath on man-
kind. Mr. Borgh tells us, that, towards the close of the
seven years for which the representatives are chosen in the
British Parliament, they become exceedingly polite to the
people. Why ? Because they know there is an approaching
election dependinO'. This competition of interest, therefore,
between those persons who are in and those who are out of
office, will ever form one important check to the abuse of
power in our representatives.

3d. Every two years there will be a revolution in the

168 DEBATES. {STILLMAN

gene1al government in favor of the people. At the expira-
tion 0] the fi1st two years, there will be a new choice of
1"ep1esentatives; at the expiration of the second two years,
there will be a new choice of President and representatives;
and at the expiration of the third term, making six years
from the commencement of the Congress, there will be a new
choice of senators and representatives. We all know, sir,
that power thus frequently reverting to the people will prove
a security to their liberties, and a most important check to
the power of the general government.

4th. Congress can make no laws that will oppress the
people, which will not equally involve themselves in the op-
pression.

What possible motive, then, can Congress have to abuse
their power? Can any man suppose thatthey will be so
lost to their own interest as to abuse their power, knowing,
at the same time, that they equally involve themselves in the
difficulty? It is a most improbable supposition. This
would be like a man’s cutting off his nose to spite his face.
I place this, sir, among the securities of the liberties of my
fellow—citizens, and rejoice in it.

5th. Congress guaranty to every state in the Union a
1epublican fo1m of government, and engage to protect them
against all f01eign and domestic enemies , that 13, as it hath
been justly observed by the hono1able gentleman [M]. Adams]
nea1 me, of known and t1ied abilities as a politician, each
state shall choose such republican form of government as
they please, and Congress solemnly engage themselves to
protect it from every kind of violence, whether of faction at
home or enemies abroad. This is an admirable security of
the people at large, as well as of the several governments of
the states; consequently the general goveinment cannot
swallow up the local govemments, as some gentlemen have
suggested. Their existence is dependent on each othel, and
must stand or fall together. Should Congress ever attempt
the destruction of the particular legislatures, they would be in
the same predicament with Samson, who overthrew the house
in which the Philistines were making sport at his expense ;
them he killed, indeed, but he buried himself in the ruins.

6th. Another check in favor of the people is this—that
the Constitution provides for the impeachment, trial, and
punishment of every officer in Congress, who shall be guilty

STILLMAN.] MASSACHUSETTS. 169

of malconduct. With such a prospect, who will da-e to
abuse the powers vested in him by the people?

7th. Having thus considered several of the checks to the
powers of Congress, which are interwoven with the Consti-
tution, we Will now suppose the worst that can take place in
consequence of its adoption: I mean, that it shall be found
in some of its parts oppressive to the people; still we have
this dernier ressort—it may be amended. It is not, like the
laws of the Medes and Persians, immutable. The fifth arti-
cle provides for amendments.

It has been said, it will be difficult, after its ratification, to
procure any alterations. By no means, sir, for this weighty
reason—it is ageneral government, and, as such, will have a
general influence; all states in the Union will feel the diffi-
culty, and, feeling it, will readily concur in adopting the
method piovided by the Constitution. And having once
made the t1ial,expe1ience will teach us what amendments
a1e necessary.

Viewing the Constitution in this light, I stand ready to
give my vote for it, without any amendments at all. Yet, if
the amendments proposed by your excellency will tend to
conciliation, I readily admit them, not as a condition of
acceptance, but as a matter of recommendation only; know—
ing that blessed are the peace—makers. I am ready, sir, to
submit my life, my liberty, my family, my property, and, as
far as my vote will go, the interest of my constituents, to this
generalg o“overnment.

After all, if this Constitution was as perfect as the sacred
volume is, it would not secure the liberties of the people,
unless they watch their own liberties. Nothing written on
paper will do this. It is therefore necessary that the people
should keep a watchful, not an over-jealous, eye on their
rulers; and that they should give all due encouragement to
our colleges, schools of learning, &c., so that knowledge may
be diffused through every part of our country. Ignorance
and slavery, knowledge and freedom, are inseparably con-
nected. While Americans remain in their present enlight—
ened condition, and warmly attached to the cause of liberty,
they cannot be enslaved. Should the general government
“become so lost to all sense of honor and the freedom of the
people, as to attempt to enslave them, they who are the
descendants of a race of men who have dethroned kings,

VOL. 11. 2‘2 15

170 DEBATES. [TURN an

womd make an American Congress tremble, strip them of
their public ho11o1s, and 1educeb them to the lowest state of
degradation.

4me noon —— H011. M1. TURNER. Mr. President,
being advanced in life, and having e11deav01ed,I hope, with
a faithlul attention, according1 tob my ability, to assist my
count1y in their trying difficulties and dangeis 101' more than
twenty years; and as, for three weeks past, my state of health
has been such as to r-ende 11' me unable to speak 111 this11 1ssem—
bly,—I trust I shall be heard with some indulgence, \V h1le I
ex1111'ess a few sentiments at this solemn crisis. I have been
averse to the reception of this Constitution, while it was con—
sidered merely in its original form ; but since the honorable
Convention have pleased to agree to the recommendation of
ceitain amendments, I acknowledge my mind is reconciled.
But even thus amended, I still see, 01' thinkI see, seve1al 1m-
peifections 111 it, and some which give me pain. Indeed, I
never expect to see a constitution free from imperfections;
and, considering the great diversity of local interests, views,
and habits,—considering the unparalleled variety of senti-
ments among the citizens of the United States, -——I despair
of obtaining a meie perfect constitution than this, at p1esent.
And a constitution preferable to the Confederation must he
obtained, and obtained soon, or We shall be an undone peo-
ple. In myjudgment, there is a rational probability, a moral
certainty, that the proposed amendments will meet the ap-
probation of the several states in the Union. If there is any
respect due to the hoary head of Massachusetts, it will un—
doubtedly have its proper influence in this case. The minds
of gentlemen, throughout the nation, must be impressed with
such a sense of the necessity of all-important union, especial—
ly in our present circumstances, as must strongly operate in
favor of a concurrence. The proposed amendments are of
such a liberal, such a generous, and such a catholic nature
and complexion, —they are so congenial to the soul of eve1y
man who is possessed of patiiotic legard to the pr'eseivation
of the just rights and immunities of his country, as well as
to the institution of a good and necessary government,—
that I think they must, they will, be universally accepted.
When, in connection with this confidence, I consider the de-
plorable state of our navigation and commerce, and various
branches of business thereon dependent , the inglorious and

TURNER] MASSACHUSETTS. l7 1

p1ovoking figure we make in the eyes of our European cred—
itors; the degree in which the landed interest is burdened
and depreciated; the tendency of depreciating paper, and
tender acts, to destroy mutual confidence, faith, and credit, to
prevent the Circulation of specie, and to overspread the land
with an inundation, a chaos of multiform injustice, oppres-
sion, and knavery , when I consider what want of efficiencv
theie IS in our govelnment, as to obliging people seasonably
to pay their dues to the public, instead of spending their
money in support of luxury and extravagance, of consequence
the inability of government to satisfy the just demands of its
creditors, and to do it in season, so as to prevent their suffer-
ing amazingly by depreciation ; in connection with my anx-
ious desire that my ears may be no longer perstrirrged, nor
my heart pained, with the cries of the injured widow and
orphans; when I also consider that state of our finances
Which daily exposes us to become a prey to the despotic hu~
mor even of an impotent irrvader,—I find myselfconstrained
to say, before this assembly, and before God, that I think it
my duty to give my vote in favor of this Constitution, with
the proposed amendments; and, unless some further light
shall be thrown in my way to influence my opinion, I Shall
conduct accordingly. I know not whether this Convention
will vote a ratification of this Constitution, or not. If they
should do it, and have the concurrence of the other states,
may that God, who has always, in a remarkable manner,
watched over us and our fathers for good, in all difficulties,
dangers, and distresses, be pleased to command his almighty
blessing upon it, and make it instrumental of restoringjus-
tice, honor, safety, suppO1t,a11d salvation, to a sinking land!
But I hope it will be conside1ed, by persons of all b'o1ders,
ranks, and ages, that, without the prevalence of Christian
piety and morals, the best republican constitution can never
save us from Slavery and ruin. If vice is predominant, it
is to be feared we eshall have rulers whose grand object will
be (slyly evading the spirit of the Constitution) to ernich and
aggrandize themselves and their connections, to the injury
and oppression of the laborious part of the community; while
it follows, from the moral constitution of the Deity, that
prevalent iniquity must be the ruin of any people. The
world of mankind have always, in general, been’ enslaved
and miserable, and always will be, until there is a greater

172 DEBATES. [SYMMES

prevalence of Christian moral principles; nor have I any ex
pectation of this, in any great degree, unless some superior
mode of education shall be adopted. It is education which
almost entirely forms the character, the freedom or slavery,
the happiness o1 misery, of the w01ld. And if this Consti-
tution shall be adopted, I hope the Continental legislatme
will have the singular hono1, the indelible glory, of making it
one of thei1 first acts, in theii filst session, most eainestly to
recommend to the several states in the Union the institution
of such means of education as shall be adequate to the divine,
patriotic purpose of training up the children and youth at
large in that solid learning, and in those pious and moral
principles, which are the support, the life and soul, of repub-
lican government and liberty, of Which a free constitution is
the body; for, as the body, without the spirit, is dead, so a
free form of government, Without the animating p1inciples
of piety and vi1tue, is dead also, being alone. May 1eligion,
With sanctity of morals, p1evail and inc1ease, that the patli-
otic civilian and ruler may have the sublime, parental satis-
faction of eagerly embtacing every oppo1tu11ity of mitwatmcr
the ligors of govelnment, in piopmtion to that inelease ot
morality which may 1e11der the people more capable of being
a law to themselves! How much more blessed this than to
be employed in fabricating constitutions of a higher tone, in
obedience to necessity, arising from an increase of turbulent
vice and injustice in society! I believe you1 excellency’s
patience Will not be further exercised by healing the sound
of my voice 011 the occasion, when I have said, May the
United States of A111e1ica live before God! May they be
enlightened, pious, virtuous, free, and happy, to all gen-
erations!

Capt. SOUTHWORTH spoke a sh01t time against the
adoption of the Constitution, but the worthy gentleman.
f10m the indisposition of body, not being able to complete
his speech, we cannot give it to the public.

Mr. SYMMES. Mr. President: Ihope, sir, the Conven-
tion w111 indulge me with a few wmds, and I p1omise I will
not detain them long. It may be known to your excel-
'e11cy, that] have heretof01e had the honor to address the
Convention 1n opposition to a certain pa1ag1aph 111 the Con-
stitution. That fact is the sole occasion of my craving a
tu111 to be heard again.

174 L DEBATES. [HANCOCK.

of enjoying our most sanguine wishes in another? God
forbid!

But, sir, a great deal has been said about the amend—
ments. Here again I refer to the debates. Such has been
said to have been the past prevalence of the Northern
States in Congress, the sameness of interest in a majority
of the states, and their necessary adhesion to each other,
that I think there can be no reasonable doubt of the success
of any amendments proposed by Massachusetts. Sir, we
have, we do, and we shall, in a great measure, give birth to
all events, and hold the balance among the United States.

The honorable gentleman, my respected friend from Scit-
uate, has so fully entered into the expediency of ratifying
the Constitution upon the basis of the report, and so ably
stated the unanswerable reasons he finds for giving his
sanction to it, notwithstanding his former different opinion,
that 1 may decently waive a task I could not half so well
perform.

Upon the whole, Mr. President, approving the amend-
ments, and firmly believing that they will be adopted, 1
a recall my former opposition, such as it was, to this Constitu-
tion, and shall—especially as the amendments are a stand—
ing instruction to our delegates until they are obtained-—
give it my unreserved assent.

In so doinCr I stand acquitted to my own conscience; l

9

hope and trlijst I shall to my constituents, and [laying his
hand on his breast] I know I shall before God.

The time agreed upon for taking the question being ar-
rived, and the same being called for from every quarter,—

JOHN HANCOCK, the PRESIDENT, rose, and ad—
dressed the honorable Convention as follows : —

Gentlemen, being now called upon to bring the subject
under debate to a decision, by bringing forward the question,
I beg your indulgence to close the business with a few
words. I am happy that my health has been so far restored,
that] am rendered able to meet my fellow—citizens as repre-
sented in this Convention. I should have considered it as one
of the most distressing misfortunes of my life to be deprived
of giving my aid and support. to a system which, if amended
(as I feel assured it will be) according to your propOsals,

. . 33 ,
cannot fall to give the people of the United States a greater

HANCOCKJ . MASSACHUSETTS. ' I75

degree of political freedom, and eventually as much national
dignity, as falls to the lot of any nation on earth. I have net,
since I had the honor to be in this place, said much on the
important subject before us. All the ideas appertaining to
the system, as well those which are against as fol it, have
been debated upon with so much learning and ability, that
the subject 13 quite exhausted.

But you will permit me, gentlemen, to close the Whole
with one or two general observations. This I request, no‘
expecting to threw any new light 011 the subject, but be-
cause it may possibly prevent uneasiness and discordance
from taking place amongst us and amongst our constituents.

' That a. general system of government is indispensably
necessary to save our country from ruin, is agreed upon all
sides. That the one now to be decided upon has its defects,
all agree; but when we consider the va11cty of 1nte1ests, and
the different habits of the men it is intended f01, it would be
' ve1y singular to have an enti1e union of sentiment 1especting
it. Were the people of the United States to delegate the
powers proposed to be given, to men who were not depend-
ent on them frequently for elections — to men whose inter-
est, either from rank or title, would differ from that of their
fellow—citizens in common —the task of delegating authority
would be vastly more difficult ; but, as the matter now stands,
the powers reserved by the people render them secure, and,
until they themselves become corrupt, they will always have
upright and able rulers. I giVe my assent to the Constitu-
tion, in full confidence that the amendments proposed will
soon become a part of the system. These amendments
being 111 no wise local, but calculated to give seeu1ity and
ease balike to all the states, I think that all will agree to
them.

Suffer me to add, that, let the question be decided as it
may, there can be no triumph on the one side or chagrin on
the other. Should there be a great division, every good man,
every man who loves his country, will be so far from exhib-
iting extraordinary marks of joy, that he will sincerely lament
theb want of unanimity, and strenuously endeavor to cultivate
a spirit of conciliation, both in Convention and at home.
The people of this commonwealth a1e a people of great
light—of great intelligence 1n public business. They know
that we have none of us an interest separate from theirs;

SYMMES.] MASSACHUSETTS. I 73

Sir, it never was my opinion that we ought, entirely, to
abandon this Constitution. I thought it had great defects:
and I still think it by no means free from blemishes; but I
ever expected the worst consequences to follow a total re-
jection of it. I always intended to urge amendments, and
was in hopes that the wisdom. of this assembly would devise
a method to secure their adoption. Therefore, when your
excellency came forward, as well became your high office, in
the character of a mediator, a ray of hope shone in upon
the gloom that overs-pread my heart — of hope that we should
still be united in the grand decision.

Sir, a mortal hatred, a deadly opposition, can be deserved
by no government but the tyranny of hell, and perhaps a few
similar forms on earth. A government of that complexion,
in the present enlightened age, could never enter the heart
of man ; and if it could, and impudence enough were found
to propose it, -—-nay, if it should be accepted, ——I affirm, sir,
that in America it would never operate a moment. I should
glory in debating on my grounds for this assertion; but who
will dare to question the truth of it?

Mr. President, so ample have been the arguments drawn
from our national dis-tress, the weakness of the present Con‘
federation, the danger of instant disunion, and perhaps some
other topics not included in these, that a man must be obsti-
nate indeed, to say, at this period, that a new government
is needless. One. is proposed. Shall we reject it totally, or
shall we amend it ?’ Let any man recollect or peruse the
debates in this assembly, and I venture to say, he shall not
he a moment, if he loves his country, in making his election.
He would contemplate the idea of rejection with horror and
detestation. But, sir, it has been alleged that the necessary
amendments cannot be obtained 1n the way your excellency
has proposed. This matter has been largely debated. I;
beg a moment to consider it. Our committee, sir, were
pretty well agreed to the amendments necessary to be
made, and, in their report, it appears that these amend
ments are equally beneficial to all the citizens of America
There is nothing local in them. Shall we, then, totally
reject the Constitution, because we are only morally cer-
tain that they will be adopted? Shall we choose certain
misery in one way, when we have the best human prospect

I76 ' RATIFICATION.

that it must be our happiness to conduce to theirs; and that
we must all rise or fall together. They will never, there-
fore, forsake the first principle of society—that of being
governed by the voice of the majority; and should it be that.
the proposed form of government should be rejected, they
Will zealously attempt another. Should it, by the vote now
to be taken, be ratified, they will quietly acquiesce, and,
where they see a Want of perfection in it, endeavor, in a
constitutional way, to have it amended.

The question now before you is such as no nation on,
earth, Without the limits of America, has ever had the privi-
lege of deciding upon. As the Supreme Ruler of the uni-
verse has seen fit to bestow upon us this glorious opportunity,
let us decide upon it; appealing to him for the rectitude of
our intentions, and in humble confidence that he will yet
continue to bless and save our country.

' The question being put, Whether this Convention will
accept of the report of the committee, as follows,—

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of
flIassachusetts, 1788.

The Convention, having impartially discussed and fully
considered the Constitution for the United States of Ameri-
ca, reported to Congress by the Convention of delegates
from the United States of America, and submitted to us by
a resolution of the General Court of the said commonwealth,
passed the twenty-fifth day of October last past; and ac-
knowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Sn—
preme Ruler of the universe in affording the people of the
United States, in the course of his providence, an Opportu-
nity, deliberately and peaceably, Without fraud or surprise,
of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with each
other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in
order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, pro-
mote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty
to themselves and their posterity, D0, in the name and in
behalf of the people of the commonwealth of Massachusetts,’
assent to and ratify the said Constitution for the United
States of America.

MASSACHUSETTS. 1-7 7‘

And, as it is the opinion of this Convention, that certain
amendments and alterations in the said Constitution would
remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the
good people of the commonwealth, and more effectually
guard against an undue administration of the federal govern-
ment, the Convention do therefore recommend that the fol—
lowing alterations and provisions be introduced into the said
Constitution :— '

First. That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly
delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to- the several states,
to be by them exercised.

Secondly. That there shall be one representative to every thirty thou-
sand persons, according to the census- mentioned in the Constitution, until
the whole number of representatives amounts to two hundred.

Thirdly. That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by
the 4th section of the lst article, but incases where a state shall neglect
or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regu-
lations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal represen-
tation in Congress, agreeably to the Constitution.

Fourthly. That Congress do not lay direct taxes, but when the moneys
arising from the impost and excise are insufficient for the public exrgencies,
nor then, until Congress shall have first made a reqursrtion upon the states,
to assess, levy, and pay their respective preportron .of such requismons,
agreeably to the census fixed in the said Coastltutlon, in such way and
manner as the legislatures of the states shall think best, and, in such case,
if any state shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion, pursuant to such
requisition, then Congress may assess and levy. such state’s proportion,
together with interest thereon, at the rate of six per cent. per annum, from
the time of payment prescribed in such requisitions. .

Fgfthly. That Congress erect no company with exclusrve advantages
of commerce. '_ .

Sixthly. That no person shall be tried for any crime, by whichhe may
incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, until he be first indicted by
a grand jury, except in such cases as may arise in the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces. ‘

Seventhly. The Supreme Judicial Federal Court Shall have 110 MP
risdiction of causes between citizens of different states, unless the matter
in dispute, whether it concern the realty or personality, ho ofthe value
of three thousand dollars at the least; nor shall the federal Judicial powers
extend to any action between citizens of different state“, where the matter
in' dispute, whether it concern the realty or personalty, snot 0f the value
of fifteen hundred dollars at the least. .

Eighthly. In civil actions between citizens of different states, every
issue of fact, arising in actions at common law, shall be tried by a Jury,
if the parties, or either of them, request it. h ld'

Ninthly. Congress shall at no time consent thatvany person 0 mg at;
office of trust or- profit, under the United States, shall accept of a E11 0 0
nobility, or any other title or office, from any king, p11 leer 01' oreign
state. '

VOL II. 23

178 THE QUESTION.

And the Convention do, in the name; and in the behalf of
the people of this commonwealth, enjoiin it upon their repre-
sentatives in Congress, at all times, until the alterations and
provisions aforesaid have been considered, agreeably to the
5th article of the said Constitution, to exert all their influ
ence, and use all reasonable and lgegal methods, to obtain a
ratification of the said alterations; and provisions, in such
manner as is provided in the said "article.

* And, that the United States, in Congress assembled, may
have due notice of the assent land ratification of the said
Constitution by this Conventiofn, it is

Resolved, That the assent and ratification aforesaid be engrossed on
parchment, together with the recommendation and injunction aforesaid,
and with this resolution; and that his excellency, JOHN HANCOCK, Pres-
ident, and the Hon. WILLIAM CUSHING, Esq., Vice-President of this
Convention, transmit the same, countersigned by the Secretary of the
Convention, under their hands and seals, to the United States in Con-
gress assembled. 1'

The question was determined by yeas and nays, as fol-
lows:—

COUNTY or SUFFOLK. Wrentham—Mr. Thomas Man, Yea.

t —H's E . J h H 1 Y Mr. Nathan Comstock Nay
Bos onHonl. Jariiesongwdiiifioc {’ Y2: Walpole—Mn George Paysori, Yea-
Hon. Samuel Adams: Yea. Sharon_—-Mr. Benjamin Randall, Nay.

Hon. \Villiam Phillips, Yea. I‘ranklm—Hom J' F1311”, Yea.

Hon. Caleb Davis, Yea .Medway—M. Rlchardson, J un., Nay.

Ch- 1 J - E Y .Bellinlwham—Rev. Noah Alden Nay.
J01]: aggvji’nesmgsq. YZd. Chelsea—Rev. Phillips Paysbn: Yea.
John Winthrop, 133$qu ’ Yea. Forward—Mr. Ebenezer Warren, Yea.
Thomas Dawes, Jun., Yea. Hull—Mr. Thomas Jones, Yea.

Rev. Samuel Stillman, Yea. Yeas, 34‘ Nays, 5'

Thomas Russell, Esq., Yea.

Christopher Gore, Esq., Yea. COUNTY OF ESSEX'
Roxbury—Hon. \Villiam Heath, Yea. Salem—Richard Manning, Esq., Yea.

Hon. Increase Sumner, Yea. Edward Pulling, Esq., Yea.
Dorchestcr——James Bowdoin, J un., Yea. Mr. William Gray, J un., Yea.
Ebenezer Wales, Esq., Yea. Mr. Francis Cabot, Yea.

.Milion—Rev. Nathaniel Robbins, Yea. Danvcrs—Hon. Is. Hutchinson, Nay.
Weymouth—Hon. Cotton Tufts, Yea. Newbwy—Hon. Tristam Dalton, Yea.

 

Hingham—-Hon. Berj. Lincoln, Yea. Enos Sawyer, Esq., Yea.
Rev. Daniel Shute, Yea. E. March, Esq., Yea.
Braintree—Hon. Ricghard Cranch, Yea. Newburyport —-Hon. Rufus King, Yea.
Rev. Anthony7 VVibird, Yea. Hon. Benjamin Greenleaf, Yea.
Broolrline—Rev. J osfeph J ackson, Yea. Theophilus Parsons, Esq., Yea.
(led/zam—Rev. 'l‘hc mas Thacher, Yea. Hon. Jonathan Titcomb, Yea.
Fisher Ames, Esq., Yea . Beverly—Hon. G. Cabot, Yea.

.Vcea'Imm—Col. \Villiam M’lntosh, Yea. Mr. J oseph Wood, Yea.
.JIerlfield—John Baxter, J un., Yea. . Capt. Israel Thorndike, Yea.
Sioztghton_v..Hon..Elijah Dunbar, Yea. ; Ipswich—Hon. Michael Farley, Yea.

Capt. J edediah Southworth, Nay. J. Choate, Esq., Yea.

M ASSACHUSETTS. '

Yea.
Yea.
Yea.
Yea.

Daniel Noyes, Esq.,
Col. Jonathan Cogswell,

Marl lehea i—Isaac Mansfield,
J. Glover, Esq.,

Hon. AzorOrne, Yea.
John Glover, Esq., Yea.

Gloucester—Daniel Rodgers, Esq., Yea.

John Low, Esq., Yea.
Capt. W. Pearson, Yea.
Lynn and Lynnfield—J. Carnes, Yea.
Capt. John Burnham, Yea.
flndover—Peter OSg‘OOd, J an, Nay.
Dr. Thomas Kittridge, Nay.
William Symmes, Jun., Yea.
Rowley—Capt. Thomas M ighill, Nay.
Haverhill—Bailey Bartlett, Esq., Yea.
Capt. Nathaniel Marsh, Nay.
Tops/ield—Mr. Israel Clark, Yea.
Salisbury—Dr. Samuel, Nyre, Yea.
Mr. Enoch J ackman, Yea.

flmesbury—Capt. Benj. Lurvey, Yea.
Mr. Willis Patten, Yea.
Boxford—Hon. Aaron Wood, Nay.

Bradford—Daniel 'l‘liruston, Esq., Yea.

Methuen—Capt. E. Carlton, Nay.
Wenham—Mr. Jacob Herrick, Yea.
Manchester—Mr. Simeon Miller, Yea.
Yeas, 38. Nays, (5.
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX.
Cambridge—Hon. Francis Dana, Yea.
Stephen Dana, Esq., Yea.
Charlestown—Hon. N. Gorliam, Yea.
Watertown—Dr. Marshal Spring, Nay.
Woburn—Capt. Timothy Winn, Nay.
Concord—Hon. Joseph Hosmer, Yea.
Newtown-rHon. A. Fuller, Yea.
Reading—Mr. William Flint, Nay.
Mr. Peter Emerson, Nay.
.Marlborough—Mr. Jonas Morse, Nay.
Maj. Benjamin Sawin, Nay.

Billerica—Wm. Thompson, Esq., Nay.
E'amingham—CaptLBuckminster,Yea
Lerington—Benj. Browne, Esq., Yea.
'Chelmsjbrd—Maj. John Minot, Nay.
Sherburne—Daniel Whitney, Esq., Yea.
Sudbury—Capt. Asahel Wheeler, Yea.
ill-'tlden—Capt. Benjamin Blaney, Yea.
Weston—Capt. Abraham Blgelow, Yea.
.Mei/ind—Maj. Gen. John Brooks, Yea.
Hopkinton—Capt. Gilbert Dench, Yea.

West/‘ord—Mr. Jonathan Keep, Nay.
Stow—Dr. Charles Whitman, Yea.
Groton—Dr. Benjamin Morse, Nay.

- Joseph Slieple, Esq., Nay.
- Shirley—Mr. Obadiah Sawtell, Nay.
Peppercll—Mr. Daniel Fisk, Nay.

Waltham—Leonard Williams, Esq., Yea.
Townsend—Capt. Daniel Adams, Nay.

Dracut—Hon. Joseph B. Varnum. Yeti.

 

 

179
Bed/‘ord—Capt. John VVebber, Nay.

Holliston—Capt. St. Chamberlain, Nay.
.flclon (tn/l Carlisle—Mr. A. Parlin, Nay.

Dunstable—Hon. J. Pitts, Yea.
Lincoln—Hon. E. Brooks, Yea.
I'Vilmingtmz—Capt. J. H arn den, Nay.

Tcwksbury—Mr. Newman Scarlet, N ay.

Littleton—Mr. Samuel Reed, Nay.
.flshby—lVIr. Benjamin Adams, Nay.
.VutiC/c-—.\laj. Hezekiill Broad, N L_\'.
Stonehmn—Capt. Jonathan Green. Nay.
East Sudbury—Mr. Phi. Gleason, N a y.
Yeas, l7. Nays, 25. ‘

COUNTY OF HAMPSHIRE.
Springfield—VVm. Pynchon, Esq., Yea.
{Vest Springfield—Col. Benj. Ely, Nay.
Capt. John VVilliston, Nay.

lfilbraham—Capt. Phin. Stebbins, Nay.
Northampton and Easthampton—

Hon. Caleb Strong, Yea.
Benjamin Sheldon, Yea.
Southampton—Capt. L. Pomeroy, Yea.
Hadley—Brig. Gen. Elisha Porter, Yea.

lout/rHullcy—Hon. N. Goodman, Yea.
flmherst—Mr. Daniel Cody, Nay.

Granby—Mr. Benjamin Eastman, Nay.
Hatfield—Hon. J. Hastings, Yea.
Whatc/y—Mr. Josiah Allis, Nay.
W'illiamsbuzjg—Mr. W. Bndman, Nay.
West/ield—John Ingersoll, Esq., Yea.
Deerfirld—Mr. Samuel Field, Nay.
Greenfield—Mr. Moses Bascum, Nay.
S’qulburne—Mr. Robert Wilson, Nay.
Conway—Capt. Consider Arms, Nay.

Mr. Malachi Maynard, Nay.
Sunderland—-Capt. Z. Crocker, Nay.
.Montugue—Mr. M. Severance, Nay.
N'orthjieldé—Mr. Eben James, Yea.
Brimfield—Abner Morgan, Esq., Yea.
South Brim/ield—Capt. A. Fisk, Nay.
.Monson—Mr. Phineas Merrick, Nay.
Pelham—Mr. Adam Clark, Nay.
Greenwich—Capt. N. Whitcomb, Nay.
Blancl/‘ord—Mr. Timothy Blair, Nay.
Palmer—Mr. Aaron Merrick, Nay.
Granville—Mr. John Hamilton, Nay.

Mr. Clark Cooley, Nay.
New Salem—Mr. J. Chamberlin, Nay.
Belchertnmn—Mr. Justus Dwight, Nay.
Coleraine—Mr. Samuel Eddy, Nay.
W are—Mr. Isaac Pepper, Nay.

Warwick and Orange——

Capt. John Goldsborough, Nay.
Chester—-Capt. David Shepard, Yea.
Chm"emont—-Mr. J esse Reed, Yea.
flslg/ieM—Mr. Ephraim Williams, Nay.
Worthington—Nahum Eager, Esq., Yea.
Shufesbury ——Mr. Asa Powers, N ay.
Chesterfield—Col. Benj. Bonnev, Yea.

180

Southwz'nk—Capt. Silas Fowler, Nay.
.Vorthunck—Maj. T. J. Doglass, Yea.
Ludlow—Mr. John Jennings, Nay.

Levcrclt—Mr. Jonathan Hubbard, Nay.

West Hampton—Mr. A. Fisher, Yea.
Cunningham and Plain/Zeld—

M r. Edmund Lazell, Yea.
Buckland—Capt. T. Maxwell, Yea.
Long .Meadows—Mr. E. Colton, Yea.

Yeas, 33. Nays, 19.

COUNTY OF PLYMOUTH.

Plymouth—Joshua Thomas, Esq., Yea.
Thomas Davis, Yea.
John Davis, Yea.
Satuate—Hon. William Cushi'ng, Yea.
Hon. Nathan Cashing, Yea.
Hon. Charles Turner, Esq., Yea.

.llars/gfield—Rev. William Shaw, Yea.
Bridgewater—D. Howard, Esq., Yea.
Mr. Hezekiah Hooper, Yea.

Capt. Elisha Mitchell, Yea.

Mr. Daniel Howard, J un., Yea.
.MiddleboroL—Rev. Isaac Backus, Yea.
Mr. Benjamin Thomas, Nay.

Isaac Thompson, Esq., Yea.

Mr. Isaac Soule, Nay.
Barbary—Hon. G. Partridge, Yea.
Rochester—Mr. N. Hammond, Nay.
Mr. Abraham Holmes, Nay.
Plympton—Capt. F. Shurtlifl', Nay.

Mr. Elisha Bisbve, J un., ' Nay.
Pembroke—Capt. John Turner, Yea.
Mr. Josiah Smith, ' Yea.

Kingston—“7. Sever, J an, Esq., Yea.
Hanover—Hon. Joseph Cashing, Yea.
.flbington—Rev. Samuel Niles, Yea.
Halifax—Mr. F. Waterman, Yea.
Wureham—Col. Israel Fearing, Yea.

Yeas, 22. Nays, 6.

COUNTY OF BARNSTABm.
Bamstable—Shear. Browne, Esq., Yea.

Sandwich—Dr. Thomas Smith, Nay.
Mr. Thomas Nye, Nay.
l'armouth.-—D. Thatcher, Esq., Yea.
Capt. Jonathan Howes, Yea.

Harwich—Hon. Solomon Freeman, Yea.

Capt. Kimball Clark, Yea.
I’lelfleet—Rev. Levi Whitman, Yea.
Fulmouth—Capt. Joseph Palmer, Yea.

Yeas, 7. Nays, 2.

COUNTY OF BRISTOL.
Taunton—James \Villiams, Esq., Yea.

Col. Nathaniel Leonard, Nay.
Mr. Aaron Pratt, Nay.
Rehaboth—Capt. Phan. Bishop, Nay.
Maj. Frederick Brown, Nay.

VVilli-im W'inrlsor, Esq., Nay.

 

THE QUESTION.

Swansea—Mr. Christopher Mason, Nay

Mr. David Brown,
Dartmouth—Hon. Hol’r Slocum,

Mr. Melatiah Hathaway,
.N'orton—Hon. Abraham White,
fittleboro’—Hon. Elisha May,

Capt. Moses Wilmarth,

Nay
Nay
Nay
Nay
Yea.
Yea

Dighton—ColSylvester Richmond, Yea.

Hon. \Villiam Baylies,
Freetown—H on. Thomas Durfee,

Israel Washburn, Esq.,
Easton—Capt. Eben Tisdell,
Mansfield--Capt. John Pratt,

.N'ew Bradford—Hon. \V. Spooner,

Rev. Samuel West,
Westporb—Mr. William Almy,
Yeas. 10. Nays, 12.

COUNTY OF YORK.

York—Capt. Esaias Preble,
Nathaniel Barrel], Esq.,
Kiltery—Mr. Mark Adams,
Mr. James Neal,
Wells—Rev. Mr. Hemmenway,
Hon. Nathaniel \Vells,
Berwick—Dr. Nathaniel Low,
Mr. Richard F. Cutts,
Mr. Elijah Hays.
Pepperclboro’—'l‘. Cutts, Esq.,

Lebanon—Mr. T. M. Wentworth,

Sanford—Maj. Samuel N ason,
Burton—Jacob Bradbury, Esq.,
Fryeburg—Mr. Moses Ames,
Coxhall—Capt. John Low,
Shapleigh—Mr. Jeremiah Emery,
WaterboroL—Rev. Pel. Tingley,
Yeas, 6. Nays, 1].

COUNTY OF DUKES.

Edgartown—Mr. Wm Mayhew,
Tisbury—Mr. C. Dunham,
Yeas, 2.

COUNTY OF WORCESTER.

Worcester—Mr. David Bigelow,

Lancaster—Hon. John Sprague,

.Mendon—Ed. Thompson, Esq.,

Broolgfield—Mr. Daniel Forbes,
Mr. N. J enks,

Olford—Capt. Jeremiah Learned,

Charlton—Mr. Caleb Curtiss,
Mr. Ezra M’Intier,
Sutton—Mr. David Harwood,
Hon. Amos Singletary,
Leicester—Col. Samuel Denny,
Spencer—Mr. James Hathu n,
Rutlmul—Mr. Asaph Sherman,
Paxton—Mr. Abraham Smith,

Yea.
Yea.
Yea.
Nay.
Nay.
Yea.
Yea '
Yea

Nay.
Yea.
Nay.
Nay.
Yea.
Yea.
Nay.
Nay.
Nay.
Yea.
Nay.
Nay.
Yea.
Nay.
Yea.
Nay.
Nay.

Yea.
Yea.

Nay.
Yea.
Nay.
Nay.
Nay.
Nay.
N ay
Nay
N a y
N ay.
N a y
Nay.
Nay.
Nay.

Oakltam—Capt. Jonathan Bullard, Nay

Barre—Capt. John Black,

Nay

MASSACHUSETTS.

Hubbardston —-Capt. J. Woods, Nay.
New Brainhee—Capt. B. J oslyn, Nay.
Southboro’—Capt. Seth Newton, Yea.
Wt-stboro’—Capt. S. Maynard, Nay.
Northboro’—-Mr. Art. Brigham, Nay.
Shrewsbury—Capt. I. Harrington, Nay.

Luncnburg—Capt. John Fuller, Nay.
Fitchburg—Mr. Daniel Putman, Nay.
Uxbridge—Dr. Samuel Willard, Nay.

Harvard—Joshua Whitney, Esq., Nay.

Dudley—Mr. Jonathan Day, Nay.
Bolton—Hon. Samuel Baker, Yea.
Upton—~Capt. T. M. Baker, Nay.

Sturbri'lge—Capt. Timothy Parker, Nay.

Leominster—Maj. D. Wilder, Yea.
Hardwick—Maj. M. Kinsley, Nay.
Holden—Rev. Joseph Davi, Nay.
Western—Mr. Mat. Patrick, Yea.
Douglass—Hon. John Taylor, / Nay.
Grafton—Dr. Joseph Wood, N ay..

Pete-reham—Jonathan Grout, Esq., Nay.

Capt. Samuel Peckham, Nay.
Royalston—J oh-n Frye, Esq., Nay.
I’Vestmimler—Mr. Stephen Holden, Nay.
Templeton—Capt. J. Fletcher, Nay.
Princeton—Mr. Timothy Fuller, Nay.
fishburnham—Mr. Jacob Willard, Nay.

Winchendon—Mr. Moses Hale, Nay.
Northbridge—Capt. J. Wood, Nay.
Ward—Mr. Joseph Stone, Nay.
flthol—Mr. Josiah Goddard, Yea.
Milford—Mr. David Stearns, Nay.
_ Sterling—Mr. Ephraim Wilder, Yea.
Boylston—Mr. Jonas Temple, Nay.
Yeas, 8. Nays, 43.

COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND.
Falmouth—Daniel Isley, Esq., Nay.
John K. Smith, Esq., Yea.
Portland—Mr. John Fox, Yea.
Capt. Joseph M’Lellen, Yea.
North Yarmouth—D. Mitchell, Yea.
Samuel Merrill, Esq., Ye'a.
,S'carboro’—W. 'l‘hompson, Esq., Yea.
Brunswick—Capt. John Dunlap, Yea.
Harpswell—Capt. Isaac Snow, Yea.

Cape Eltzabeth—Mr. Joshua Dyer, Yea.
Gorham—Mr. S. Longfellow, J un., Nay.

 

l 8 I
New Gloucester—Mr. VVidgery, Nay.
Gray—~Rev. Samuel Perley, Yea.

Yeas, 10. Nays, 3.

COUNTY or LINCOLN.
Pownalbure’—Thomas Rice, Esq., Y ea.

Mr. David Sylvester, Yea.
Georgetown—Mr. N. Wyman, Yea.
Newcastle—Mr. David Murray, Nay.
Woolwich —Mr. David Gilmore, Yea.
Topsham—Hon. S. Thompson, Nay.
IVinslow—Mr. Jonah Crosby, Nay.
Bowdoinham—Mr. Zach. Bea], Nay.

Boothbay—VVilliam M’Cobb, Esq., Yea.
Bristol—William Jones, Esq., Nay.
V mesalboroL—Capt. Samuel Grant, Yea.

Edgecomb—Moses Davis, Esq., Yea.
Hallowell—Capt. James Carr, Nay.
Thomaslon—David Fayles, Esq., Yea.
Bath—Dummer Sewall, Esq., Yea.
Winthrop—Mr. Joshua Bean, Nay.
Yeas, 9. Nays, 7.

COUNTY OF BERKSHIRE.
Sheflield and .Mount IVashington—

John Ashley, J un., Esq., Yea.

Great Barringtrm—HonE. Dwight, Yea.
Stockbridge—Hon. T. Sedgwick, Yea.
P'tttq/ield—Mr. Val. Rathburn, Nay.
Richmond—$111 Comstock Betts, Nay.
Lazar—Mr. Lemuel Collins, Nay.
LanrsboroL—Hon. J ona. Smith, Nay.
Williamstown—Hon. '1‘. J. Skinner, Yea.
fldams—Capt. J. Pleroe, Nay.
Egremont—Ephraim Fitch, Esq., Nay.
Becket-—Mr. Elisha Carpenter, Yea.
IVcst Stockbzidge—Mai. T. Lusk, Nay.

fllford—Mr. John Hulbvrt, Nay.
New Marlborough—D. Taylor, Yea.
Tyringham—Capt. E. Herrick, Nay.
London—Mr. Joshua Lawton, Nay.
Windsor—Mr. Timothy Mason, Nay.
Partridfg‘ielde. Peirce, Esq., N ay.
Hancoc —Mr. David Vaughan, Nay.
Lee—Capt. Jesse Bradley, Nay.
Washington—Mr. Zenas Noble, Nay.
Sandisfield—Mr. J. Picket, J un., Nay.
Yeas, 6. N ays, 16.

TOTAL—Yeas, 187. Nays, 168. .

On the motion for ratifying being declared in the affirma-
tive, by a majority of nineteen, the

Hon. Mr. WHITE rose, and said that, notwithstanding
he had opposed the adoption of the Constitution, upon the
idea that it would endanger the liberties of his country, yet.
as a majority had seen fit to adopt it, he should use his

16

182 DEBATES. [RANDAL

utmost exertions to induce his constituents to live in peace
under and cheerfully submit to it.

He was followed by Mr. WIDGERY, who said, that he
should return to his constituents, and inform them that he
had opposed the adoption of this Constitution ; but that he
had been overruled, and that it. had been carried by a major-
ity of wise and understanding men ; that he should endeavor
to sow the seeds of union and peace among the people he
represented; and that he hoped, and believed, that no
person would wish for, or suggest, the measure of a PROTEST;
for, said he, we nrust consider that this body is as full a
representation of the people as can be convened. — After
expressing his thanks for the civility which the inhabitants
of this town have shown to the Convention, and declaring,
as his opinion, that they had not in the least influenced the
decision, he concluded by saving, that he shouldsupport, as
much as in him lay, the Constitution, and that he believed,
as this state had adopted it, that not only nine, but the whole
thirteen, would conre into the measure.

Mr. WHITNEY said that, though he had been opposed
to the Constitution, he should support it as much as if he
had voted for it.

Mr. COOLEY (Amherst) said, that he endeavored to
govern himself by the principles of reason; that he was
directed to vote against the adoption of the Constitution, and
that, 1n so doing, he had not only complied with his direc—
tions, but had acted according to the dictates of his own
conscience; and that, as it had been agreed to by a majority,
he should endeavor to convince his constituents of the pro
priety of its adoption.

Dr. TAYLOR also said, he had uniformly opposed the
Constitution; that he foui1d himself fairly beaten, and
expressed his determination to go home and endeavor to
infuse a spirit of harmony and love among the people.

Other gentlemen expiessed their inclination to speak;
but, It growing late, the Convention adjourned to the next
nrorrrrng.

THURSDAY, February 7, 1788. ——The Convention met,
when Major'NASON, in a short address, intimated his
determination to support the Constitution, and to exert him-
self to influence his constituents to do the same.

Mr RANDAL said, he had been uniformly opposed to

MASSACHUSETTS. 183

the Constitution. He had, he said, fought like a good
soldier; but, ashe was beaten, he should sit down con-
tented, hoping the minority may be disappointed in their
fears, and that the majority may reap the full fruition of the
blessings they anticipate. In the hope that the amendments
recommended by his excellency, the president, will take
place, I shall, says he, go home and endeavor to satisfy those
that have honored me by their choice, so that we may all live
1n peace.

Major SWAIN declared, that the Constitution had had a
fair trial, and that there had not, to his knowledge, been any
undue influence exerCised to obtain the vote in its favor;
that many doubts which lay on his mind had been removed;
and that, although he was in the minority, he should support
the Constitution as cheerfully and as heartily as though he
had voted on the other side of the question.

 

The Convention then passed the pay-roll, amounting to 564499 2 s. ; and,
after unanimously passing votes of thanks to his excellency, the president,
the honorable the vice-president, and the reverend clergymen of the town
of Boston, who officiated as chaplains, for their services, it was voted,
That, when the business of the Convention shall be completed, the mem-
bers will proceed to the state-house to proclaim the ratification, and to
take an affectionate leave of each other. An invitation from a number of
the inhabitants of Boston, requesting the members of the Convention to
take refreshment at the senate-chamber, when the ratification of the Con-
stitution should be declared, was read, and thereon voted, That the thanks
of' the Convention be given to the inhabitants of Boston for their polite
invitation, and that the Convention will attend, as requested.

The business being finished, the Convention proceeded to the state-
house, when the ratification was. proclaimed by Joseph Henderson, Esq.,
high sheriff of the county of Suffolk; after which, the Convention was
dissolved .

FRAGMENT

OF THE

DEBATES

IN
THE CONVENTION

OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Collected from contemporary publications, since the first edition of this work.

 

IN CONVENTION, HARTFORD, January 4, 1788.

SPEECH of OLIVER ELSWORTIJ, on opening the
Debates.
OLIVER ELSWORTH. Mr. President, it is observa-

ble that there is no preface to the proposed Constitution;
but it evidently presupposes two things: one is, the neces-
sity of a federal government; the other is, the inefficacy of
the Old Articles of Confederation. A union is necessary for
the purposes of a national defence. United, we are strong;
divided, we are weak. It is easy for hostile nations'to sweep
of a number of separate states, one after another. Witness
the states in the neighborhood of ancient Rome. They were
successively subdued by that ambitious city, which they
might have conquered with the utmost ease, if they had been
united. Witness the Canaanitish nations, whose divided
situation rendered them an easy prey._ ‘Witness England,
which, when divided into separate states, was twice con-
quer-ed by an inferior force. Thus it always happens to
small states, and to great ones, if divided. Or if, to avoid
this, they connect themselves with some powerful state, their
VOL. 11. 24

186 DEBATES. [ELSWOR'I‘H.

situat'on is not much bette1. This shows us the necessity
of combining our whole f01ce, and. as to national purposes,
becoming one state

A union, si1, is likewise necessary, considered with rela-
tion to economy. Small states have enemies, as well as
gleat ones. They must piovide for thei1 defence. The
expense of it, which would be mode1ate fo1 a la1ge king—
dom, would be intolerable to a petty state. The Dutch ale
wealthy; but they are one of the smallest of the Eulopean
nations, and their taxes are higher than in any other country
of Europe. Their tax-es amount to forty shillings per head,
when those of England do not exceed half that Sum.

We must unite, in order to preserve peace among our—
selves. If we be divided, what is to prevent wars from
breaking out among the states? States, as well as individ—
uals, are subject to ambition, to avarice, to those jarring
passions which disturb the peace of society. What is to -
check these? If there be a parental hand over the whole.
this, and nothing else, can restrain the unruly conduct of
the members.

Union is necessary to preserve commutative justice be-
tween the states. If divided, what is to prevent the large
states from oppressing the small? What is to defend us
from the ambition and rapacity of New York, when she has
spread over that vast territory which she claims and holds ?
Do we not already see in her the seeds of an overbearing
ambition? On our other side there is a large and powerful
state. Have we not already begun to be tributaries? If
we do not improve the present critical time, —ifwe do not
unite, —— shall we not be like lssachar of old, a strong ass
crouching down between two burdens? New Jersey and
Delaware have seen this, and have adopted the Constitution
unanimously.

A more energetic system is necessary. The present is
merely advisory. It has no coercive power. Without this,
government is ineffectual, or rather is no government at all.
But it is said, “ Such a power is not necessary. States will
not do wrong. They need only to be told their duty, and
they will do it.” I ask, sir, What warrant is there for this
assertion? Do not states do wrong ? Whence come wars ?
One of two hostile nations must be in the wrong. But it is
said, ‘ Among sister states, this can never be presumed.”

ELSWORTII.] CONNECTICUT. l87

But do we not know that, when friends become enemies,
their enmity is the most virulent? The seventeen provinces
of the Netherlands were once confederated: they fought
under the same banner. Antwerp, hard pressed by Philip,
applied to the other states for relief. Holland, a rival in
trade, opposed and prevented the needy succors. Antwerp
was made a sacrifice. Iwish l c01ild say there were no
seeds of similar injustice springing up among us. ls there
not in one of our states injustice too barefaced for Eastern
despotism? That state is small: it does little hurt to any ,
but itself. But it has a spirit which would make a Tophet
of the universe. But some will say, “ We formerly did well
without any union.” I answer, Our situation is materially
changed. While Great Britain held her authority, she awed
us. She appointed governors and councils for the American
provinces. She had a negative upon our laws. But now,
our circumstances are so altered, that there is no arguing
what we shall be, from what we have been.

It is said, that other confederacies have not. had the
principle of coercion. Is this so? Let us attend to those
confederacies which have resembled our own. Some time
before Alexander, the Grecian states confederated together.
The Amphictyonic council, consisting of deputies from these
states, met at Delphos, and had authority to regulate the
general inte1ests of Greece. This council did enforce its
dec1ees by coe1cion. The Boeotians once infringed upon a
decree of the Amphictyons. A mulct was laid upon them.
They refused to pay it. Upon that, their Whole territory was
confiscated. They were then glad to compound the matter.
After the death of Alexander, the Achaean league was formed.
The decrees of this confederacy were enforced by dint of
arms. The fEtolian league was formed by some other Gre-
cian cities, in opposition to the Achaean ; and there was no
peace between them until they were conquered and reduced
to a Roman province. They were then obliged to sit down
in peace under the same yoke of despotism.

How is it with respect to the principle of coercion in the
Germanic body ? In Germany there are about three hundred
principalities and republics. Deputies from these meet
annually 1n the general diet, to make regulations for the
empire. But the execution ofthese 13 not left voluntarily with
the members. The empire is divided into ten circles, ovel

.158 DI.‘ BATES. ELLst-ORTH.

each of which a superintendent is appointed, with the rank
of a major-general. It is his duty to execute the decrees of
the empire. with a military force.

The confederation of the Swiss cantons has been consid-
ered as an example. But their circumstances are far differ-
ent from ours. They are small republics, about twenty miles
square, situated among the Alps, and inaccessible to hostile
attacks. They have nothing to tempt an invasion. Till
lately, they had neither commerce nor manufactures. They
were merely a set of herdsmen. Their inaccessible-Hess has
availed them. Four hundred of those mountaineers defeated
15,000 Austrians, who were marchng to subdue them.
They spend the ardor of youth in foreign service : they
return old, and disposed for tranquillity. Between some of
the cantons and France, there has long subsisted a defenSive
treaty. By this treaty, France is to be a mediator to settle
differences between the cantons. If any one be obstinate.
France is to compel a submission to reasonable terms.

The Dutch republic is an example that merits attention.
The form of their constitution, as it is on paper, admits not
of coercion. But necessity has introduced it in practice.
This coercive power is the influence of the stadtholder— an
officer originally unknown to their constitution. But they
have been necessitated to appoint him, in order to set their
unwieldy machine of government in motion. He is com-
mander-in-chief of their navy, and of their army, consisting
of forty or fifty regiments. He appoints the officers of the
land and naval forces. He presides in the States-General,
and in the states of every province, and, by means of this, he
has a great Opportunity to influence the elections and decis-
ions. The province of Holland has ever been opposed to
the appointment of a stadtholder; because, by its wealth
and power, being equal to all the other provinces, it pos—
sesses the weight and influence of the stadtholder, when
that office is vacant. Without such an influence, their ma-
chine of government would no more move, than a ship
without wind, or a clock without weights.

But. to come nearer home. Mr. President, have we not
seen and felt the necessity of such a coercive power P What
was the consequence of the want of it during the late war,
particularly towards the close? A few states bore the bur-
den of the war. While we and one or two more of the

ELSWORTH.] CONNECTICUT. 189

states were paying eighty or a hundred dollars per man to
recruit. the Continental army, the regiments of some states
had scarcely men enough to wait 011 their officers. Since
the close of the war, some of the states have done nothing
towards complying with the requisitions of Congress. Others,
who did something at first, seeing that they were left to bea1
the whole burden, have become equally remiss. What is the
consequence? To- what shifts have we been driven? To
the wretched expedient of negotiating new loans in Europe,
to pay the interest of the foreign debt. And what is still
worse, we have even been obliged to apply the new loans to
the support of our own civil government at home.

Another ill consequence of this want of energy is, that
treaties are not performed. The treaty of peace with Great
Britain was a very favorable one for us. But it did not
happen perfectly to please some of the states, and they would
not. comply with it. The consequence is, Britain charges us
with the breach, and refuses to deliver up the forts On our
northern quar.ter -

Our being tributaries to our sister states is in consequence
of the want bof a federal sy.stem . The state of New Yo1k
raises 60 or £80,000 a year by impost. Connecticut con—
sumes about one third of the goods upon which this impost
is laid, and: consequently pays one third of this sum to New
York. If we import by the medium of Massachusetts, she
has an impost, and to her we pay a tribute. If this is done
when we have the shadow of a national government, what
shall we not suffer w hen even that shadow 1s gone. '

If we go on as we have done, what IS to become of the
foreign debt? Will sovereign nations forgive us this debt,
because we, neglect to pay? or will they levy it by reprisals,
as the laws of nations authorize them ? Will our weakness
induce Spain to relinquish the exclusive navigation of the
Mississippi, or the territory which: she claims on the east side
of that river ? Will our weakness induce the British to give
up the northern posts? If a war breaks out, and our situa—
tion invites our enemies to make war, how are we to defend
ourselves ?’ Has government the means to enlist a man or
buy an ox? Or shall we Ially the remainder of our old
army? The European nations I believe to be not friendly
to 11s. They were pleased to see us disconnected from Great
Britain; they are pleased to see us disunited among our-

l90 DEBATES. [ELSWOR'I‘H.

selves. If we continue so, how easy it is "for them to canton
us out among them, as they did the kingdom of Poland!
But supposing this is not done, if we suffer the union to
expire, the least that may be expected is, that the European
powers will form alliances, some with one state and some
with another, and play the states off one against another,
and that we shall be involved in all the labyrinths of Euro-
pean politics._ But I do not wish to continue the painful
1ecital; enough has been said to show that a p011 e1 in the
general government to enforce the decrees of the Union is
absolutely necessary.

The Constitution before us is a complete system of legis-
lative, judicial, and executive power. It was designed to
supply the defects of the former system; and I believe, upon
a full discussion, it will be found calculated to answer the
purposes for which it was designed.

JANUARY 7-, 1788. [On the Power of Congress to lay Taxes]
OLIVER ELSWORTH. Mr. President, this is a most

impmtant clause in the Constitution; and the gentlemen do
well to offe1 all the objections which they have against it.
Through the whole of this debate, I have attended to the
objections which have been made against this clause , and I
think them all to be unfounded. The clause is general;
it. gives thegeneral legislature “power to lay'and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and pro-
vide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States.” There are three objections against this
clause — first, that it is too extensive, as it extends to all the
objects of taxation; secondly, that it is partial; thirdly, that
Congress ought not to have powe1 to lay taxes at all.

The first objection is, that this clause extends to all the
lo1jects of taxation. But though it does extend to all, it
does not extend to them exclusively. it does not say that
Congress shall have all these sou1ces of revenue, and the
states none. All, excepting the impost, still lie open to the
states. This state owes a debt; it must provide for the
payment of it. So do all the other states. This Will not
escape the attention of Congress. When making calcula—
tions 'to 121ise a 1evenue, they will bea1 this in mind. They
will not take away llllt which 18 necessa1y for the states.
They me the head, and will take care that the members do

ELSWOR’I‘H.] CONNECTICUT ' 9]

not perish. The state debt, which 110W lies heavy upon
us, arose from the want of powers in the federal sys
tem. Give the necessary powers to the national govern-
ment, and the state will not be again necessitated to
involve itself in debt for its defence in war. It will lie
upon the national government to defend all the states, to
defend all its members, from hostile attacks. The United
States will bear the Whole burden of war. It is neces-
sary that the power of the general legislature should extend
to all the objects of taxation, that government should be
able to command all the resources of the country; because
no man can tell What our exigencies may be. Wars have
now become rather wars of the purse than of the sword.
Government must therefore be able to command the Whole
power of the purse; otherwise a hostile nation may look
into our Constitution, see what resources are in the power
of government, and calculate to go a little beyond us; thus
they may obtain a decided superiority over us, and reduce
us to the utmost distress. A government which can com-
mandfibut half its resources is like a man with but one arm
to defend himself.

The second objection is, that the impost is not a proper
mode of taxation; that it is partial to the Southern States.
[confess I am mortified when I find gentlemen supposing
that their delegates in Convention were inattentive to their
duty, and made a sacrifice of the interests of their constitu-
ents. If, however, the impost be a partial mode, this cir—
cumstance, high as my opinion of it is, would weaken my
attachment to it; for I abhor partiality. But 1 think the1e
are tlnee special reasons why an impost is the best way of
raising a national revenue.

Ihe fi1st is, it is the most fruitful and easy way. All
nations have found it to be so. Direct taxation can go but
little way towards raising a revenue. To raise money in
this way, people must be provident; they must constantly
be laying up money to answer the demands of the collector.
But you cannot make people thus provident. If you would
do any thing to the purpose, you must come in when they
are spending, and take a part with them. This does not
take away the tools of a man ’8 business, or the necessaly
utensils of his family: it only comes in when he is taking
his pleasure, and feels generous; when he is laying out a

I92 DEBATES. [Eston'rm

shilling for superfluities, it takes twopence of it for public
use-, and the remainder will do him as much good as the
Whole. [will instance two facts, which show how easily
and insensibly a revenue is raised by indirect taxation. I
suppose people in general are not sensible that we pay a
tax to the state of New York. Yet it is an incontrovertible
fact, that we, the people. of Connecticut, pay annually into
the treasury of New York more than fifty thousand dollars.
Another instance I will mention: one of our common river
sloops pays in the West Indies a portage bill of £60. This
is a tax which foreigners lay upon us, and we pay it: for a
duty laid upon our shipping, which transports our produce
to foreign markets, sinks the price of our produce, and op—
erates as an effectual tax upon those who till the ground,
and bring the fruits of it to market. All nations have seen
the necessity and propriety of raising a revenue by indirect
taxation, by duties upon articles of consumption. France
raises a revenue of twenty-four millions sterling per annum ;
audit is chiefly in this way. Fifty millions of livres they
raise upon the single article of salt. The Swiss cantons raise
almost the whole of their revenue upon salt. Those states
purchase all the salt which is to be used in the country: they
sell it out to the people at. an advanced price; the advance is
the revenue of the country. In England, the whole public
revenue is about twelve millions sterling per annum. The
land tax amounts to about two milliOns; the window and
some other taxes, to about two millions more. The other
eight millions are raised upon articles of consumption. The
whole standing army of Great Britain could not enforce the
collection of this vast sum by direct taxation. In Holland,
their prodigious taxes, amounting to forty. shillings for each
inhabitant, are levied chiefly upon articles of consumption.
They excise every thing, not excepting even their houses
of infamy. .

The experiments, which have been made in our own
country, show the productive nature of indirect taxes. The
imports into the United States amount to a very large sum.
They never will be less, but will continue to increase for cen-
turies to come. As the population of our country increases
the imports will necessarily increase. They will increase,
because our citizens will choose to be farmers, living inde-
pendently on their freeholds, rather than to be manufacturers.

Etswomnq CONNECTICUT. "’ “ 193
and work for a groat a day. I find by calculation that a
general impost of5 per cent. would raise the sum of£245.000
per annum, deducting 8 per cent. for the cha1ges of collect
ing. A further sum l”might he deducted for smuggling—a
business which 18 too well unde1stood among us, and which
1s looked upon in too favorable a light. But this loss in the
public revenue Will be overbalanced by an increase of im-
portations. And a further sum may be reckoned upon some
articles which Will bear a higher duty than the one recom-
mended by Congress. Rum, instead of 4d. per gallon, may
be set higher.without any detriment to our health or morals.
In England, it pays a duty of 4s. 6d. the gallon. Now, let
us compare this source of revenue with our national wants.
The interest of the foreign debt is £130,000 lawful money
per annum. The expenses of the civil list are £37,000.
There are likewise further expenses for maintaining the
frontier posts, for the support of those who have been dis-
abled in the service of the Continent, and some other con-
tingencies, amounting, together with the civil list, to
£130, 000. This sum, added to the interest of the foreign
debt, will be £260,000. The consequence follows, that the
avails of the impost will pay the interest of the whole for-
eign debt, and nearly satisfy those current national expenses.
But perhaps it Will be said that these paper calculations are
overdone, and that the real avails will fall far short. Let
me point out, then, What has actually been done. In only
three of the states, in Massachusetts, New York, and Penn-
sylvania, 160 or £180,000 per annum have been raised by
impost. From this fact, we may ce1tainly conclude that, if
a gene1al impost should be laid, it would raise a greater sum
than I have calculated. It is a st1ong argument in favor
of an impost, that the collection of it will interfere less with
the internal police of the states than any other species of
taxation. It does not fill the count1y with revenue officers,
but 1s confined to the sea— -coast, and 1s chiefly a water opera-
tion. Another weighty 1eason in favor of this b1anch of the
revenue is, if we do not give it to Congress, the individual
states Will have it. It will give some states an opportu-
nity of opp1essing others, and dest1oy all harmOny between
them. If we would have the states hiendly to each other,
let us take away this bone of contention, and place it, as
VOL. 11. 25 17

.911. DE BATES. [EstonTn

it ought in justice to be placed, in the hands of the general
government.

“But,” says an honorable gentleman near me, “the im—
post will be a partial tax; the Southern States will pay but
little in comparison with the Northern.” I ask, What rea-
son is there for this assertion? Why, says be, We live in a
cold climate, and want warming. Do not they live in a hot
climate, and want quenching? Until you get as far south as
the Carolinas, there is no material difference in the quantity
of clothing which is worn. In Virginia, they have the same
course of clothing that we have; in Carolina, they have a
great deal of cold, raw, chilly weather; even in Georgia, the
River Savannah has been crossed upon the ice. And it' they
do not wear quite so great a quantity of clothing in those
states as with us, yet people of tank wear that which is
of a much more expensive kind. In these states, we 111 mu-
facture one half of our clothing, and all out tools of husband-
ry; in those, they manufacture none, nor ever will. They
Will not manufacture, because they find it much more profit-
able to cultivate their lands, which are exceedingly fertile.
Hence they import almost every thing, not excepting the
carriages in which they ride, the hoes with which they till
the ground, and the boots which they wear. If we doubt
of the extent of their i_111portations,let us look at their ex-
ports. So exceedingly fertile and profitable are their lands,
that a hundred large ships are every year loaded with rice
and indigo from the single port of Charleston. The rich
return of these cargoes of immense value Will be all subject
to the impost. Nothing is omitted; a duty is to be paid
upon the blacks which they import. From Virginia, their
exports are valued at a million sterling per annum: the
single article of tobacco amounts to seven or eight hundred
thousand. How does this come back? Not in money; for
the Virginians are poor, to a proverb, in money. They an-
ticipate their crops: they spend faster than they earn : they
are ever in debt. Their rich exports return in eatables, in
drinkables, and in wearables. All these are subject to the
impost. In Maryland, their exports are as great in propor-
tion as those in Virginia. The imports and exports of the
Southern States are quite as great in proportion as those of
the Northern. Where, then, exists this partiality, which

ELSWORTH.] CONNECTICUT. l. 95

nas been objected ? It exists nowhere but in the uninformed
mind.

But there is one objection, Mr. President, which is broad
enough to cov e1 the whole subject. Says the objector, Con-
g1ess ought not to have power to raise any money at all
Why? Because they have the power of the sword , and if
we give them the power of the purse, they a1e despotic.
But I ask, sir, if ever there were a government without
the power of the swo1d and the pu1se? This is not a
new-coined phrase; but it is misapplied: it belongs to quite
another subject. It was brought into use in Great Britain,
Whe1e they have a king vested with hereditaly powe1.
Hele, say they, it is dange1ous to place the power of the
sword and the pmse in the hands of one man, Who claims
an authority independent of the people: therefore we will
have a Parliament. But the king and Parliament together,
the supreme powe1 of the nation, —— they have the sword and
the purse. And they must have both; else, how could the
country be defended. P For the sw01d without the pu1se is
of no effect: it isa sword in the scabbard. But does it fol-
low, because it is dange10us to give the power of the sw01d
and pu1se to an hereditary p1111ce, who IS independent of the
people, that therefore it is dangelous to give it to the Par-
liament—to Congress, which 1s your Pa1liament-—. to men
appointed by yourselves, and dependent upon yourselves?
This argument amounts to this: you must cut a man in two
in the middle, to prevent his hurting himself.

But, says the honorable objectOr, if Congress levies money,
they must legislate. [admit it. Two legiSlative powers,
says he, cannot legislate in the same place. I ask, Why can
they not? It is not enough to say they cannot. I wish for
some reason. I grant that both cannot legislate upon the
same object at the same time, and carry into effect laws
which are contrary to each other. But] the Constitution
excludes evei y thing of this kind. Each legislature has its
p1ovince; their limits may be distinguished. If they will
1un foul of each other, if they will be trying who has the
na1dest head, it cannot be helped. The 1oad is broad
enough; but if two men will jostle each other,‘the fault is
not in the road. Two several legislatures have in fact ex—
isted and acted at the same time in the same territory. It
is in vain to say they can-not exist, when they actually have

196 DEBATES. [Estom'iL

done it. In the time of the war, we had an army. Who
made the laws for the army.P By whose authority were
offenders tried and executed? Congress. By their author-
ity a man was taken, tried, condemned, and hanged, in this
very city. He belonged to the army; he was a proper sub-
ject of military law; he deserted to the enemy ; he deserved
his fate. Wherever the army was, in whatever state, there
Congress had complete legislative, judicial, and executive
power. This very spot where we now are is a city. It has
complete legislative, judicial, and executive powers; it is a
complete state in miniature. Yet it breeds no confusion, it
makes no schism. The city has not eaten up the state, nor
the state the city. But if there he a new city, if it have not
had time to unfold its Principles, 1 will instance the city of
New York, which IS, and long has been, an important part
of that state; it has been found beneficial; its powers and
privileges have not clashed with the state. The city of
London contains three or four times as many inhabitants as
the whole state of Connecticut. It has extensive powers of
government, and yet it makes no interference with the gen-
eral government of the kingdom. This Constitution defines
the extent of the powers of the general government. If the
general legislature should at any time overleap their limits,
the judicial department is a constitutional check. If the
United States go beyond thei1 powers, if they make a law
which the Constitution does not autho1ize, it is void; and
the judicial powe1, the national judges, who, to secure their
impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to
be void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their
limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon the
general government, the law is void; and upright, inde-
pendentjudges will declare it to be so. Still, however, if
the United States and the individual states will quarrel, if
they want to fight, they may do it, and no frame of govern-
ment can possibly prevent it. It is sufficient for this Con-
stitution. that, so far from laying them under a necessity of
contendmg, it provides every reasonable check against it.
But perhaps, at some time or other, there will be a contest;
the states may rise against the general government. If this
do take place, if all the states combine, if all oppose, the
whole will not eat up the members, but the measure which
is opposed to the sense of the people will prove abortive. In

HUNTINGDONJ CONNECTICUT. 197

.republics, it is a fundamental principle that the majo1ity
govern, and that the mi1101ity comply with the general voice.
How contrary, then, to republican principles: how humili-
ating, is our p1esent situation! A single state can rise up,
andb put a veto upon the most important public nlcasu1es.
We have seen this actually take place. A single state has
controlled the general voice of the Union; a miiiority, a
very small minority, has governed us. So far is this from
being consistent with republican principles, that it is, in
effect, the worst species of monarchy.

Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive
principle. No man pretends the contra1y: we all see and
feel this necessity. The only question is, Shall it be a coe1-
cion of law, or a coercion of arms. P There IS no othe1 pos-
sible alternative. Where will those who oppose a coercion
of law come out? Where will they end? A necessary
consequence of their principles is a war of the states one
against the other. I am for coercion by law— that coercion
which acts only upon delinquent individuals. This Consti-
tution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in
their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such
bodies, but that of an armed force. If we should attempt
to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force
against a delinquent state, it would involve the good and
bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same calamity.

B’ut this legal coercion singles out the guilty individual,
and punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union“ All
men will see the reasonableness of this , they will acquiesce,
and say, Let the guilty suffer.

How have the morals of the people been depraved for the
want of an efficient government, which might establish jus-
tice and righteousness! For the want of this, iniquity has
come in upon us like an overflowing flood. If we wish to
prevent this alarming evil, if we Wish to protect the good
citizen in his right, we must lift up the standard of justice;
we must establish a national. government, to be enforced
by the equal decisions of law, and the .peaceable arm of the
magistrate.

JANUARY 9, 1788. Gov. HUNTINGDON. Mr. Presi-
dent, I do not rise to detain this Convention for any length
of time. The subject has been so fully discussed, that very
little can be added to What has already been offered 1

198 DEBATES. [HUNTINGDON.

have heard and attended with pleasure to what has been
said 011 it. The importance of it merited a full and ample
discussion. It does not give me pain, but pleasure, to hear
the sentiments of those gentlemen who differ from me. It
is not to be expected from human natu1e that we should all
hate the same opinion. The best way to learn the nature
and effects of different systems of gove1nment, is not from
thco1etical dissertations, but from experience—from what
has actually taken place among mankind. From this same
source it is that mankind have obtained a more complete
knowledge of the nature of government than they had in
ages past. It is an established truth that no nation can
exist without a coercive power—a power to enforce the eX-
ecution of its political regulations. There is such a love of
liberty implanted in the human heart, that no nation ever
willingly O“ave up its liberty. If they lose this inestimable
bi1thright bof men, it is not for a want of the will, but of the
properb means to support it. If we look into history, we
shall find that the common avenue through which tyranny
has enteled in, and enslaved nations who were once free,
has been their not supporting gove1nment.

The great secret of p1eserving liberty is, to lodge the
supreme power so as to be well supported, and not abused.
If this could be effected, no nation would ever lose its liberty.
The history of man clearly shows that it is dangerous to i11-
trust the supreme power in the hands of one man. The
same source of knowledge p1oves that it is not only incon-
1011icut, but dange1ous to liberty, for the people of a large
community to attempt to exe1cise in pel son the supreme au—
thority. Hence arises the necessity that the people should
act by their representatives; but this method, so necessary
for civil liberty, is an improvement of modern times. Lib-
erty, however, is not so well secured as it ought to be, when
the supreme power is lodged in one body of representatives.
There ought to be two branches of the legislature, that one
111 (1y be a check upon the other. It is difficult for the peo-
ple at lalge to know when the supleme power is ve1ging
towards abuse, and to apply the p1oper remedy. But if the
gov e1nment be propelly balanced, it will possess a renovating
principle, by which it will be abie to light itself. The con-
stitution of the British nation affords us tagreat light upon the
subject of government. Learned men in other countries

IIL‘NTINGDON.] CONNECTICUT. I99

have admired it, though they thought it too fine-spun to
prove beneficial in practice. But a long trial has now shown
its excellence; and the difficulties which that nation new
experiences arise not from their constitution, but from other
c1rcumstances.

The Author of nature has given mankind a certain degree
of insight into. futurity. As far as we can see a probability
that certain events will happen, so far we do Well to provide
and guard. But We may attempt to go too far. It is in
vain to think of providing against every possible contingency.
The happiness of society depends not merely upon its con—
stitution of government, but upon a variety of circumstances.
One constitution may suit one particular nation exceedingly
well, whenla different one would suit another nation in dif-
ferent circumstances. Even among the American states,
there is such a difference in sentiments, habits, and customs,
that a government which might be verysuitable for one
might not be agreeable to the other.

I am fully of opinion that the great council of the Union
. must have a controlling power with respect to national con-
cerns. There is, at present, an extreme want of power in
the national government; and it is my opinion that this
Constitution does not give too much. As to the subject of
representation, at the first view it appears small; but, on
the Whole, the purposes of the Union could not be so well
answered by a greater number. It is impracticable to have
the number of the representatives as great, and times of
election as frequent, as they are in our state governments.
Nor is this necessary for the security of our liberty. It is
sufficient if the choice of our representatives be so frequent
that they must depend upon the people, and that an in-
separable connection be kept up between the electors and
the elected.

The state governments, I think, will not be endangered
by the powers vested by this Constitution in the general
government. While I have attended in Congress, I have
observed that the members were quite as strenuous advo-
. cates forthe rights of their respective states, as for those of
the Union. I doubt not but that this will continue to be the
case; and hence I infer that the general government will not
have the disposition to encroach upon the states. But still
the people themselves must be the chief support of liberty

‘200 DEBA’I‘ES. » [LAW.

While the great body of freeholders are acquainted with the
duties which they owe to their God, to themselves, and to
men, they will remain free. But if ignorance and depravity
should prevail, they will inevitably lead to slavery and ruin.
Upon the whole view of this Co11stitution,‘I am in favor of
it, and think it bids fair to promote our national prosperity.

This is a new event in the histo1y of mankind. He1eto~
fore most governments have been fo1med by tyrants, and
imposed on mankind by force. Neve1 befme did a people,
111 time of peace and tranquillity, meet together by their rep-
resentatives, and, with calm deliberation, frame for them-
selves a system of government. This noble attempt does
honor to our country. While I express my sentiments in
favor of this Constitution, I candidly believe that those gentle-
men Who oppose it are actuated by principles of regard to
the public welfare. If We will exercise mutual candor for
each other, and sincerely endeavor to maintain our liberties,
We may long continue to be a free and happy people.

Hon. RICHARD LAW. Mr. President, the important
subject before us has been examined so particularly, that I
do not expect to add any thing new. As we have been a
long time poring upon the defective parts of the Constitu-
tion, I think it will not he amiss to pay some attention to
its excellences. There is one clause in it which provides
a remedy for whatever defects it may have. The clause to
which I refer is that which provides that, Whenever two
thirds of Congress, or a convention to be called at the in-
stance of two thirds of the states, shall propose amendments,
and they be agreed to by three fourths of the states, such
amendments shall be valid, as part of the Constitution. This
is an easy and peaceable way of amending any parts of the
Constitution which may be found inconvenient in practice.

As this is a most important question, as it concelns not
only present but future generations, we ought to consider it
upon its real merits, without suffering our minds to be misled
by examples of other nations, Whose circumstances are very
different from ours. Some have been led into a mistake, by
comparing a part of this Constitution With that of Great
Britain. But this is very different from theirs. Our Presi-
dent is not a King, nor our Senate a House of Lords. They
do not claim an independent, hereditary authority. But the
whole is elective; all dependent 011 the people. The Presi-

WOLCOTT.] CONNECTICUT. 201

dent, the Senate, the Representatives, are all creatures of
the people. Therefore the people will be secure from op-
pression; though I admit that, if our President and Senate
were possessed of an independent, hereditary authority, the
democratical branch would be too weak for the others.

Some suppose that the general government, which extends
over the whole, will annihilate the state governments. But
consider that this general government rests upon the state
governments for its support. It is like a vast and magnifi-
cent bridge, built upon thirteen strong and stately pillars.
N ow, the rulers, who occupy the bridge, cannot be so beside
themselves as to knock away the pillars which support the
whole fabric. But, some say, a free government, like this, has
not energy enough to pervade a country of such vast extent.

We are not satisfied with this assertion. We want to try
the expeliment. A free system of government is now pre—.
sented to our acceptance. We shall be wanting to our-
selves, if, instead of adopting it, we wait for the arm of
tyranny to impose upon us a system of despotism. The
finger of Providence is evidently to be seen in the political
affairs of this country. The old Articles of Confederation
were once the best that we should have been willing to
adopt. We have been led on by imperceptible degrees to
see that they are defective; and now, if it be the design of
Providence to make us a great and happy people, I believe
that he who turns the hearts of the children of men as the
rivers of water are turned, will induce the people of the
United States to accept of a Constitution which is well cal-
culated to promote their national welfare.

H011. OLIVER WOLCOTT. M1. President, I do not
expect to throw any new light on a subject which has
been so fully discussed. Yet I cannot content myself with-
out giving my opinion more explicitly than by a silent vote.
It is generally agreed that the present Confederation is ill-
adequate to the exigencies of our national affairs. We must
therefore adopt this plan of government, or some other, or
risk the consequences of disunion. As the present Articles
of Confederation are inadequate, we ought to consider
whether this Constitution be as good as can be agreed 011
by so many different states, or whether it be a dangerous
system; whether it secuies the liberties of the people, or
whether its tendency be unfavorable to the rights of a free

VOL. 11. 26

202 DEBATES. [W ULCOT'I‘

people. I have given it all the consideration 1n my power,
and I have, a considerable time since, made up my mind on
the subject, and think it my duty to give my voice in favol
of adopting it. It is founded upon the election of the
people. If it varies from the former system, 01 if it is to be
alte1ed hereafter, it must be with the consent of the people.
This IS all the security in favor of liberty that can be ex-
pected. Mankind may become corrupt and give up the
cause of freedom; but I belic1e that love of liberty 11h1ch
prevails among the people of this country will prevent such
a direful calamity.

The Constitution effectually secures the states in their
several rights. It must secure them for its own sake; for
they are the pillars which Uphold the general system. The
Senate, a constituent branch of the general legislature, with—
- out whose assent no public act can be made, are appointed
by the states, and will secure the rights of the several states.
The other branch of the legislature, the Representatives, are
to he elected by the people at large. They will therefore
be the guaidians of the rights of the gleat body of the
citizens. So well guaided 18 this Constitution throughout
that it seems impossible that the rights eithel of the t:states
or of the people should be destmyed.

I do not see the necessity of such a test as some gentle-
men wish for. The Constitution enjoins an oath upon all
the officers of the United States. This 13 a di1ect appeal to
that God who IS the avenger of perjury. Such an. appeal
to him is a full acknowledgment of his being and providence.
An acknowledgment of these great truths is all that the
gentleman contends for. For myself, I should be content
either with or without that clause in the Constitution which
excludes test laws. Knowledge and liberty are so preva-
lent in this country, that I do not. believe that the United
States would ever be disposed to establish one religious sect,
and lay all others under legal disabilities. But as we know
not What may take place hereafter, and any such test would
be eXceedingly injurious to the rights of free citizens,I
cannot think it altogether superfluous to have added a clause,
which secures us from the possibility of such oppression. I
shall only add, thatI give my assent to this Constitution,
and am happy to see the states in a fair way to adopt a Con-
stitution which will protect their rights and promote their
Welfare.

NEW HAMPSHIRE CONVENTION.

 

[A friend has favored the editor with the following fragment, being the
only Speech known to be preserved in the [Vow Hampshire Convention
on adopting the federal Constitution of the United States]

=33 *1 *- =H= =5? =1? =l’F =33

PAGE 7, SEC. 9th. “ The migration or importation of such
persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper
to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the
year 1808 ; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such impor-
tation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”

The Hon. Mr.- DOW, from Weare, spoke very sensibly
and feelingly against this paragraph.

Several members, on the other side,'spoke in favor of it,
with remarks on What Mr. ’Dow had said ; after Which, the
Hon. JOSHUA ATHERTON, from Amherst, spoke as
follOWS:-—-

Mr. President, I cannot be of the opinion of the honor-
able gentlemen Who last spoke, that this paragraph is either
so useful or so inofl'ensiVe as they seem to imagine, or that
the objections to it are so totally Void of foundation. The
idea that strikes those, who are opposed to this clause, sodis—
agreeably and so forcibly, is, hereby it is conceived (if we
ratify the ConstitutiOn) that we become consenters to, and
partahers in, the sin and guilt of this abominable traffic, at
least for a Certain period, Without any positive stipulation
that it should even then be brought to an end. We do not
behold in it that Valuable acquisition so much boasted of by
the honorable member from Portsmouth, “that an end is then.
to be put to slavery.” Congress may be as much, or more,
puzzled to put a stop to it then, than we are now. The
_ clause has not secured its abolition. _

We do not think ourselves under any obligation to per-
‘orm works of supere'rogation in the reformation of mankind;
We do not esteem ourselves under any necessity to go to

204 DEBATES. [Amman

Spain or Italy to suppress the inquisition of those countries;
or of making ajourney to the Carolinas to abolish the detes-
table custom of enslaving the Africans; but, sir, we will not
lend the aid of our ratification to this cruel and inhuman
merchandise, not even for a day. There is a great distinc-
tion in nottaking a part in the most barbarous violation of
the sacred laws of God and humanity, and our becoming
guaranties for its exercise for a term of years. Yes, sir, it is
our full purpose to wash our hands clear of it; and, however
unconcerned spectators we may remain of such predatory
infractions of the laws of our nature, however unfeelingly
we may subscribe to the ratification of manstealing, with
all its baneful consequences, yet I cannot but believe, in jus-
tice to human nature, that, if we reserve the consideration,
and bring this claimed power somewhat nearer to our own
doors, we shall form a more equitable opinion of its claim to
this ratification. Let us figure to ourselves a company of
these manstealers, well equipped for the enterprise, arriving
on our coast. They seize and carry off the whole or a part
of the inhabitants of the town of Exeter. Parents are taken,
and children left; or possibly they may be so fortunate as to
have a Whole family taken and carried off together by these
relentless robbers. What must be their feelings in the hands
of their new and arbitrary masters P Dragged at once from
every thing they held dear to them—stripped of every
comfort of life, like beasts of prey — they are hurried on a
loathsome and distressing voyage to the coast of Africa, or
some other quarter of the globe, where the greatest price
may await them; and here, if any thing can be added to
their miseries, comes on the heart-breaking scene ! A parent
is sold to one, a son to another, and a daughter to a third !
Brother is cleft from brother, sister from sister, and parents
from their darling offspring! Broken with every distress
that human nature can feel, and bedewed with tears of an-
guish, they are dragged into the last stage of depression and
slavery, never, never to behold the faces of one another
again ! The scene is too affecting. I have not fortitude to
pursue the subject!
'36 * * * - *

THE

DEBATES

IN
THE CONVENTION

OF

THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

 

IN CONVENTION, POUGHKEEPSIE, June 17, [788.

ON the lst of February, 1788, the legislature of the state
of New York passed a resolution in the words following, to
wit:—

“ IV/m'eas the United States, in Congress assembled, did, on the 28th
day of September last. unanimously resolve, that the report of the Con-
vention of the states lately assembled in Philadelphia, with the resolutions
and letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the several legisla-
tures, in order to be submitted to a Convention of delegates, chosen in
each state by the people thereof, in conformity to the resolves of the Con-
vention, made and provided in that case, —- Therefore,

“ Resolved, as the sense of the legislature, that’the said report, with the
said resolutions and letter accompanying the same, be submitted-to a Con-
vention of delegates to be chosen by the people of this state; that it be
recommended to the. people of this state to choose, by ballot, delegates
to’ meet in Convention for the purpose aforesaid; that the number of del-
egates to be elected be the same as the number of members of Assembly
from the respective cities and counties; that all free male citizens of the
age of twenty-one years and upwards be admitted to vote, and that any
person of that description be eligible; that the election be held on the
last Tuesday in April next, at the same respective places where the elec-
tions for members of Assembly shall be held, and be continued by adjourn-
ment from day to day, until the same shall be completed, not exceeding
five days; that the inspectors, who shall inspect the election for members
of Assembly, be also inspectors of the election of delegates; that the in-
spectors do also appoint two clerks, each of whom shall keep a poll list
of the electors for delegates; that the inspectors do provide a box to re-
ceive the ballots for delegates; that the poll books or lists shall, after due i
examination and correction, be signed by the inspectors attending at the
closing of the poll, and theclerks who shall have kept the same poll books,

[8

2U6 DEBATES. [ORGANIZA'I ION.

respectively; and then the box containing the ballots for delegates shall be
opened, and the ballots therein contained taken out, and, without being
Inspected, shall, together with the poll books or lists for delegates, be im-
mediately put up under cover and enclosed, and the enclosure bound with
tape, and sealed in such manner as to prevent its being opened without
discovery; and the inspectors present at the closing of the poll shall then
put their seals, and write their names, upon the same enclosure, and one of
the inspectors then present, to be appointed by a majority of them, shall
deliver the same enclosure, so sealed up as aforesaid, to the clerk of the
county, without delay, who shall carefully preserve and keep the same,
unbroken and unopened, until the meeting of the persons who are to can-
vass and estimate the ballots therein contained, when he shall deliver the
same enclosure, unbroken and unopened, to them; that the person author-
,ized by law to canvass and estimate the votes for members of Assembly,
do, also, immediately after they shall have canvassed and estimated the
votes to be taken at the election to be held on the last Tuesday in April
next, for members of Assembly, proceed to open the said enclosures con-
taining the ballots for the delegates, and canvass and estimate the votes'
taken for delegates; and when, as soon as they shall be able to deter-
mine, upon such canvass or estimate, who, by the greatest number of votes,
shall have been chosen for delegates for the city and county, they shall
determine the same, and thereupon, without delay, make, and subscribe
with their own proper names and hand-writing, the requisite number of
certificates of such determination, and cause one to be delivered to each
of the persons so elected a delegate; and that the said election and can-
vass shall, in every other respect not herein provided for, be conducted in
like manner as is provided for by law for holding elections for members
of Assembly; that the delegates, so to be chosen, do meet in convention at
the court-house in Poughkeepsie, in the county of Duchess, on the third
Tuesday of June next; that the clerks of the Senate and Assembly do
forthwith, after the'Convention shall have assembled, deliver to them
copies of the said report, and of the letter and resolutions which accom-
panied the same to Congress, and of' the said resolution of Congress;
that the delegates be allowed the same wages as the members of Assem-
bly, and that it will be proper for the legislature, at their next meeting, to
provide for the payment thereof.”

In pursuance of the above resolution, an election was held
in the several counties, and the following gentlemen were
returned :—

From the City and County of New York—John Jay,
Richard Morris, John Sloss Hobart, Alexander Hamilton,
Robert R. Livingston, Isaac Roosevelt, James Duane, Rich-
ard Harrison, Nicholas Low.

From the City and County of Albany—Robert Yates,
John Lansing, Jun., Henry Outhoudt, Peter Vroman, Israel
Thompson, Anthony Ten Eyck, Dirck Swart.

From the County of S’zgfolh.— Henry Scudder, Jonathan
N. Havens, John Smith, Thomas Tredwell, David Hedges.

()RGANIZATIUNJ _ NEW YORK. 207

From the County of Ulster. -- Governor Clinton, John Can-
tine, Cor. C. Schoonmake1, Ebenezer Clark, James Clinton.
Dirck Wy11k00p..

From the County of Queens. —‘ Samuel Jones, John
Schenck, Nathaniel Lawrence, Stephen Carman.

From the County of Kings. — Peter Lefferts, Peter Van—
dervoort.

From the County of Richmond. “Abraham Bancker,
Gozen Ptyerss.

From the County of Westchester. — Lewis Morris, Philip
Livingston, Richard Hatfield, Philip Van Courtland, Thad-
deus Crane, Lott W. Sarls.

.From the County of Orange. —— John Haring, Jesse Wood-
.hull, Henry Wisner, John Wood.

From the County of Duchess. — Zephaniah Platt, Melanc-
ton Smith, Jacobus Swa1twout, Jonathan Akins, Ezra
Thompson, Gilbeit Livingston, John De Witt.

Front the County of Montgomery. —-William Harper,
Christopher P. Yates, John Frey, John Winn, Volkert
Veeder, Henry Staring.

From the County of Columbia. —Peter Van ,Ness, John
Bay, Matthew Adgate.

From the Counties of Washington and Clinton. ——- Ichabod
Parker, John Williams, Albert Baker, David Hopkins.

The Convention, having accordingly assembled on the
17th of June, unanimously elected his excellency, GEORGE
CLINT ON ,- president. After appointing the proper subor-
dinate officers, and having ordered that. the d001s should be
kept open, and the business of the Convention opened every
morning with prayer, Mr. Duane, Mr. Jones, Mr. R. Mor1is,
Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Harris, Were chosen a committee to
report rules for conducting the business.

Next day, the committee of regulations brought in their
report, on which the following resolves were passed, viz. :—

lst. That, at. the meeting of the Convention each day,
the minutes of the preceding day shall in the first place be
read, at which times, mistakes, if any, shall be corrected.

2d. That all motions and addresses be made to the chair,
and standing.
‘ 3d. That every motion made and seconded, except mo-
tions for adjournment, shall be handed to the chair in writing
and there read before any debate or question taken thereon

208 DEBATES. [LIVINGSTON.

4th. That, upon every question taken, the yeas and nays
shall he entered, if requested by any two members.

5th. That, if two members rise to speak, and there shall
be a dispute which of them rose first, it shall be determined
by the president.

6th. That no interruption shall be suffered while a mem-
ber is addressing the chair, but by a call to order by the
president, or by a member through the president.

7th. That no member be referred to by name in any
debate.

8th. That, if any member shall transgress the rules a
second time, the president may refer to him by name ; that
the Convention may examine and censure the member’s
conduct, he being allowed to extenuate or justify.

9th. That any member, making a motion, may withdraw
it before the question is put thereon; after which any other
member may renew the same motion, if he thinks proper.

10th. That the appointment of all committees shall be
by ballot.

11th. That none be admitted within the bar, excepting
the members and secretaries.

12th. That the preceding rules shall be observed when
the Convention resolves itself into a committee of the whole.

The Constitution reported by the general Convention was
then read, together with the resolutions and letter accom-
panying the same to Congress, and the resolve of Congress
thereon; after which the Convention, on motion of Mr.
Lansing, agreed to resolve itself, the succeeding day, into a
committee of the whole.

On the 19th of June, the Convention met, pursuant to
adjournment, and, the order of the day being read, resolved
itself into a committee of the Whole, and Mr. OUTHOUDT
was called to the chair.

The Constitution being again read, the Hon. ROBERT
R. LIVINGSTON rose, and addressed the chair as fol-
lows : —

Mr. Chairman, as the preamble of the plan under consid—
eration comprises the great objects of the Union, it will be
proper, at this place, to introduce such general observations .
as may with less propriety be noticed, when particular arti-
cles are under consideration, and which may serve, at. the
same time, to show the necessity of adopting some more

LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 209

efficacious plan of union, than that by which We are new
bound. In the course of the observations I shall make with
this View, many things will be urged that Will be of little
use to those gentlemen who have heard all that has been
said, who have read all that has been written on this subject,
and who have formed their judgments after mature consider-
ation. With such, all debate isunnecessary. But I trust,
sir, there are many gentlemen present, who have yet formed
no decided opinion on the important question before ,us, and
who (like myself) bring with them dispositions to examine
whatever shall be offered, and not to determine till after the
maturest deliberation. To such I address myself.

Ever since a pure and perfect religion has lent her mild
lights to philosophy, and extended her influence over the
sentiments of men, it has been a received opinion that the
happiness of nations, as Well as of individuals, depends on
peace, and that intimate connection which mutual wants
occasion. To establish this on the basis of a general union
of nations, has, at various times, employed the thoughts and
attention of Wise and virtuous men. It is said to have been
the last great plan of the illustrious Henry IV. of France,
who was justly esteemed one of the wisest and best of
princes. But, alas! sir, in the old world, every attempt of
this nature will prove abortive. There, governments are the
children of force or fraud, and carry with them strong fea-
tures of their parent’s character. Disputes Will not be
referred to a common umpire, unless that umpire has power
to enforce his decrees; and how can it be expected that
princes, jealous of power, will consent to sacrifice any por-
tion of it to the happiness of their people, who are of little
account in their estimation P Differences among them,
therefore, will continue to be decided by the sword, and the
blood of thousands will be shed before the most trifling con-
troversy can be determined. Even Peace can hardly be
said to bestow her usual blessings'on them; their mutual
jealousies convert peace into an armed truce. The husband--
man feels the oppression of standing armies, by whom the
fruits of his labor are devoured; and the flower of youth is
- sacrificed to the rigors- of military discipline. It has pleased
Heaven to afford the United States means for the attainment
of this great object, which it has withheld from other nations.
They speak the same language; they profess the same reli-

vor.. 11.

2 l D DEBATES. [LIVINGST0N.

gion; and, what is of infinitely more impo1tanee, they
acknowledge the same great plintiple of government—a
principle, it not unknown, at least little u11de1stood in the
old world — that all power 23 dclivedflom the people They
consider the state and the general governments as differ-
ent deposits of that power. In this View, itis of little
moment to them whether that portion of it which they
must, for their own happiness, lodge in their rulers, be
invested in the state governments only, or shared between
them and the councils of the Union. The rights they
reserve are not diminished, and probably their liberty acquires
an additional security from the division. ,

Let us not, then, sir, neglect to improve the advantages
we possess ; let us avail ourselves of the present moment to
fix lasting peace upon the broad basis of national union ; let
us, while it is still in our power, lay the foundation of our
own happiness, and that of our posterity. JealOusies may
spring up; the seeds of them are already sown; the present
moment may be the only one afforded for eradicating them.

I am too well satisfied, sir, of the virtue and patriotism of
those to whom I address n1yself,'to Suppose that their deter—
mination will be influenced by any unworthy motive. But,
sir, I dread the effect which a hasty or partial review may
have on their minds ; and, above all things, I dread lest the
chimerical ideas of perfection in government, which gentle-.
men may have formed, should induce them to reject this, as
falling short of their standard. Perfection, sir, is not the lot
of humanity , and perhaps, were the gentlemen on this flow ‘
to compare thei1 sentiments 011 this subject, no two of them
would be found to agree. Nay, such is the weakness of our
judgment, that it is more than probable that, if a pelteet plan.
was otfered to our choice, we should conceive it defective,
and condemn it. The only people whose government was
visibly directed by God himself, rejected his administration,
and induced him, in his \Vlath, to give them a king. Let.
us be cautious, si1, lest, by our negligence o1 eager pursuit
alter chimelical perfection, we should f01feit the blessings
we enjoy, and lose this precious opportunity of completing
what other nations have been unable to effect.

As, 011 the one hand, sir, our situation admits of a union,
so, 011 ”the other, our distresses point out its necessity. I
Will not, at this time, touch 011 the declining state 'of our

LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 21 l

commerce; nor will I remind you of our national bank-
ruptcy, of the effect it has upon our public measures, and the
private misery that it causes; nor will I wound you1 feelings
by a recapitulation of the insults we daily receive horn
nations whose injuries We a1e compelled to 1epay by the
advantages of our commerce. These topics have been fie-
quently Dtouched; they are in every man’s mind; they lie
heavy at every patriot’s heart. They have induced states,
the most independent in their situation, to unite in their
endeavors to remove them; they operate with peculiar force
on us. Permit me, however, to make some observations,
drawn from our particular situation, and which will show, in
the clearest light, that our existence, as a state, depends on
a strong and efficient federal government.

He went into a minute consideration of the natural advane
tages of this’state, drawn from its valuable and abundant
staples ; the situation of its principal seaport; the command
of the commerce of New Jersey, by the rivers discharging
themselves in our bay; the facility that the Sound afforded
for an intercourse with the Eastern States. He observed
upon the advantages resulting from the Hudson, which he
described as bearing upon its bosom thewealth of the remot—
est part of the state. He touched upon the prospects that a
lasting peace afforded of commanding the treasures of the
western world, by the improvement of our internal naviga—
tion. He said, that to these natural advantages we might
add many other adventitious circumstances. He observed,
that a considerable proportion of our domestic debt was
already in the treasury, and though we. were indebted for a
part of this to our citizens, yet that debt was c0mparatively
small, and could easily be extinguished'by an honest exer—
tion on the part of the government. ‘He observed, that our
back lands were competent to the discharge of our foreign
debt, if a vigorous government should be adopted, which
would enable us to avail ourselves of this resource ; so that
we might look forward to a day whenno other taxes Would
be requiredfrom us than such as would be necessary to sup-
port our internal government, the amount of the impost
being more than adequate to the other expenses of the Union.
He feared that. a prospect of these adVantage’s had excited
an impt'oper confidence in ourselves; that it. has produced
an inflexibility, which had rendered us regardless of the

?l‘i’. DEBATES. LL1VINGSTON.

wishes and expectations of the other states, and lessened
that respect which was due, as well from nations to each
other, as from individuals. We have insisted, says he, that
every knee shall how to the golden image we have set up.
But let us remember that, how valuable soever the materials
of which its nobler parts are composed, its feet (like those of
the image in the vision) are composed of iron and clay, of
materials that will not adhere together, and which the
slightest shock will tumble 011 the eaith.

He observed, that wealth excited envy, stimulated avarice,
and invited invasions , that, if the Union was dissolved, we
could only be protected by our domestic force. He then
urged the incapacity of the state to defend itself, from the
detached situation of its ports, remarking particularly upon
that of Staten Island and Long Island; their vicinity to
states, which, in case of a disunion, must be considered as
independent, and perhaps unfriendly powers. He turned
the attention of the committee to the north—east, where he
showed Vermont ready to avail itself of our weakness ,
speaking of the people of that state, as a brave and
ha1dy body of men, that we had neithe1 the spirit to subdue,
1101, what he more strongly 1econ1mended, the magnanimity
to yield to. 011 the north-west, he pointed to the British
posts, and hostile tribes of savages. He showed that, in
case of domestic war, Hudson River, that great source of our
wealth, would also be that of our weakness, by the intersec-
tion of the state, and the difficulty we should find in bring-
ing one part to support the other.

He then ran over the alliances that would be formed in
case of a disunion ; pointed out the connection between the
Eastern States, and urged various reasons to show that it
was neither the interest nor wish of the states, on the
east or west, to form a league offensive or defensive with 115.
Having dwelt largely on this subject, he deduced, as a con-
sequence from it, that our wealth and our weakness equally
required the support of a federal union. He observed that
this could only be found in the existing Confederation, or in
that under consideration; urging that, as union could only
be founded 011 the consent of the states, it should be sought
\\ here we had reason to expect that consent; that to
depart from this would be to investigate as many ideal
systems as there “PIC persons who had thought on the sub-

LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 213

ject of government. He observed that, in the then state
of things, it was problematical, at least, whether we would
recur to the old Confederation; but, as many gentlemen
thought it possible, he would proceed to investigate it. He
then went through the Confederation, and showed that the
powers intended to be vested in Congress were very similar
to those given by the new government, to wit: to raise
troops, possess a common treasure, borrow money, make
treaties, appoint civil officers, &c. He observed that as, on
the one hand, the want of these powers would not be ob-
jected to in the Confederation, so, on the other, the posses-
sion of them could not be urged as a fault in the new plan.

He asked Whether, with these powers, it had been able to
effect the purposes designed by the Union; whether it had
repelled invaders, maintained domestic peace, supported our
credit, or extended our commerce. He proved that not one
of these objects had been effected by it. He pointed to the
British possessions in the limits of this state, held in de—
fiance of the most solemn treaties, and contempt of our
government, as proof of its incompetentry to defend our
rights against foreign powers. How has it happened, said
he, that Vermont is, at this moment, an independent state ?
How has it happened that new states have been rent from
those on the west, that were entitled to protection? He
asked if any gentlemen would assert that our national credit
was fixed upon a proper basis; that our commerce enjoyed
the advantages We had a right to expect. If, then, said he,
experience has shown that the existing Confederation (if I
may use the term) has not answered the great ends of the
Union, it must either have arisen from an insufficiency in its
powers, or from some defect in the execution of them: if in-
sufficient, more should be added; if not executed, the cause
should be inquired into. He showed that, with the addition
of a few powers, those it possessed were competent to the
purposes ofthe Union; but that the defect of the system
rested in the impossibility of carrying into effect the rights
invested in them by the states. He then ran through every
power intended to be vested in Congress, and showed that
the exercise of them, by the intervention of the state gov-
ernments, and subject to their pleasure or their different
views of the matters recommended to them, would be at-
tended with insuperable difficulties, inconvenienCes, and

2141 DEBATES. ELIVINGS'I ON'

delays, even if they were disposed to ca1ry them into effect;

but that, if (which, experience had shown, would often be
the case) they should either neglett 01 refuse to comply with
the requisition, no means were pointed out by the Confed-
eration to coerce them, but that it was left, as all leagues
among nations, to militaly force. He showed, in a strong
point z30f View, the danger of applying this, and deduced
hom all those observations, that the old Confederation was
defective 111 its principle, and impeachable in its execution,
as it operated upon states in their political capacity, and not
upon individuals; and that it carried with it the seeds of
domestic violence, and tended ultimately to its dissolution.
He then appealed to our experience in the late war, to show
the operation of this system, and demonstrated that it must,
from its own construction, leave every state to struggle with
its own difficulties, and that. none would be roused to action
but those that were near the seat of war. He alleged that
tihs idea of a federal 1epublic, on the ground of a league
among independent states, had, in every instance, disap—
pointed the expectations ofits advocates. He mentioned its
effects 1n the ancient republics, and took a View ofthe union of
the Netherlands, and show ed that, even when they V1 ere snug-
gling for every thing that was dear to them, in the contest
with Spain, they permitted the burden of the war to be borne,
in a great measure, by the province of Holland ; which was, at
one time, compelled to attempt to force a neighboring province,
by arms, to acompliance with their fede1al engagements. He
cited the Germanic league, as a proof that no government,
formed on the basis of the total independency of its parts,
could produce the effects of union. He showed that, not—
withstanding the powe1 oftheir federal head, from his heredi-
tary dominions, the decrees of their general diet VV ere little
regarded, and different members of the Confederacy were
perpetually rushing upon each other 3 swords.

He then observed upon the necessity of adding to the
powers of Congress, that of regulating the militia, referring
to the article 111 the proposed plan, which he said he would not
anticipate. He urged the common consent of Ame1ica as a
proof of the necessity of adding the power of regulating com-
merce to those Congress alleady possessed, which, he said, not
only included those of fmming laws, but of deciding gupon
those laws, and carrying themb into effect, that thisb power

'LIVINGS'I‘ONJ NEW YORK. ' 215

could never be trusted to the individual states, whose inte1-
ests might, in many instances, clash with that of the Union. ‘
Flom hence he inferred the necessity of a fede1al judicia1y,
to which he would have referred not only the laws f01 legu-
lating commerce, but the construction of t1eaties and other
g1eoat national objects,——showing that, without this, It would
he 1n the power of any state to commit the honor of the Union,
defeat their most beneficial t1eaties, and involve them in a
war. He next adverted to the form of the federal govern-
ment. He said that, though justified when considered as a
mere diplomatic body, making engagements for its respective
states, which they were to carry into effect, yet, if it was to
enjoy legislative, judicial, and executive powers, an attention
as well to the facility of doing business as to the principles of
fieedom, called for a division of those powe1s. After com-
menting on each ofOthem, and showing the mischiefthat would
flow from their union in one House b'ot Rep1esentatives, and
those, too, chosen only by the legisl tures, and neithe1 rep1e-
sentingthe people nm the gove1 nment, (which he said consisted
of legislative, executive, a11djudicial, ) he proposed the Con-
stitution of this state as the model for the state governments.

From these observations he deduced, first, that the powers
which were, by common consent, intended to be vested
in the federal head, had either been found deficient, or
rendered useless by the impossibility of carrying them into
execution, on the principle of a league of states totally sepa—
rate and independent ; —secondly, that, if the principle was
changed, a change would also become necessary in the form
of the government; but if we could no longer retain the old
principle of the confederacy, and were compelled to change
its form, we were driven to the necessity of creating a new
constitution, and could find no place to rest upon in the old
Confederation; that he had urged these considerations to
fix gentlemen’ s attention to the Only true ground of inquiry ,
to keep them from reverting to plans which had no single
fe21tu1e that could now be se1viceable, and to lead the way
to a minute discussion of every article with cand01 and de-
liberation; and, in order that this might be the better
effected, and no gentleman pledged before he had fully
considered the subject, he intended, before he sat down, to
move the resolution he had in his hand. He considered the
question as one. that not only affected the happiness, and

3 l 6 DEBATES. ‘ [LANSING

perhaps the existence, of this state, but as one that involved
the great interests of humanity. Many of us, sir, said
he, are officers of government; many of us have seats in the
Senate and Assembly: let us, on this solemn occasion, forget
the pride of office ; let us consider ourselves as simple cit-
izens, assembled to consult on measures that are to promote
the happiness of our fellow-citizens. As magistrates, we
may be unwilling to sacrifice any portion of the power of the
state; as citizens, we have no interest in advancing the
powers of the state at the expense of the Union. We are
only bound to see that so much power as we find it neces-
sary to intrust to our rulers, be so placed as to insure our
liberties, and the blessings of a well—ordered government.

He then offered a resolution, the purport of which was,
“ That no question, general or particular, should be put in
the committee upon the proposed Constitution of govern-
ment for the United States, or upon any clause or article
thereof, nor upon any amendment which should be proposed
thereto, until after the said Constitution and amendments
should have been considered clause by clause.”

The said resolution, being taken into consideration, was
agreed to by the Convention.

The committee then rose, and the Convention adjourned
till next day, 10 o’clock, A. M.

FRIDAY, June 20, 1788. —Convention met pursuant to
adjournment. Went into committee of the whole, Mr. Out—
houdt in the chair.

The Hon. Mr. LANSING then rose, and addressed the
chair as follows : — .

Mr. Chairman, I am equally disposed with the honorable
gentleman from New York, who favored the committee with
his sentiments yesterday, to a candid and dispassionate inves-
tigation of the important business now under consideration,
and to receive every possible information on the occasion.

I do not mean to state any objections to the clause now
read, but wish the indulgence of the committee, While I
make some observations in answer to those which were given
to the committee by the honorable gentleman from New York.

Sir, the project devised by Henry IV., in his closet, to
form a confederated republic of the European states, may
perhaps be considered as visionary in its object, but originav
ing in motives which were in some measure peculiar to him-

LANSING] NEW YORK. 217

self, as, from the power and importance he possessed, ne
might have flattered himself that he should have been at the
head of it. But a difference in language, manners, religion,
and interests of their sovereigns, would have defeated it, if
it had been attempted. Here a confederated republic is only
more attainable from the circumstances of all the powers ex-
isting in, or originating from, the people, and a similarity of
language and manners. We ought, therefore, to be extremely
cautious how we establish a government which may give
distinct interests to the rulers and governed so as to induce
the former to pursuits adverse to the happiness of the United
States.

It has been observed, that, as the people must, of neces-
sity, delegate essential powers either to the individual or gen-
eral sovereignties, it is perfectly immaterial Where they are
lodged; but, as the state governments will always possess a
better representation of the feelings and interests of the peo-
ple at large, it is obvious that those powers can be deposited
with much greater safety with the state than the general
government. .

1 am equally averse to cherishing, on this occasion, the
idea of obtaininga ' aperfection which never existed, and to
despairing of making important amendments to the system
now offered for consideration; for, 5h, howeve1 much I may
be disposed to pelpetuate union, however sensible of the de-
fects of the existing Confederation, I cannot help differing
from those gentlemen who are of opinion it is incapable of
amelioration.

I would ask, What are the objections which have been so
ably urged against it. 9 They ale comprised under two heads.
First, it affo1ds no defence against foreign assault; second,
no security to domestic tranquillity. Both these objects
might be compassed if Congress could be vested with a
powe1 to raise men and money.

Requisitions made under the existing Confedeiation by
Congress, it is allowed, are insufficient; but this defect might,
in a great measure, have been remedied by permitting the
United States to legislate on individuals after the requisi-
tions had been made, and not been complied With. If the
requisition could be thus enforced, loans of money might
be negotiated when necessary, and Congress be author-
ized to raise money to replace them.

VOL. 11. 28 19

3? l 8 DEBATES. [LANSING

The languishing situation of our commerce has also been
attributed to the impotence of Congress; but l think their
journals will justify me in the assertion that all the states,
excepting two, had passed laws to enable Congress to
regulate commerce, and that those two were not indisposed
to vest that power.

The conduct of the king of Great Britain, with respect
to the western posts, has also been urged as the result of
the inefficiency of our government; but, however organized
our general government might be, I should doubt whether
it was either prudent or expedient to risk a war, which
would expose our coast to depredation by an enemy, against
Whose attacks in that point we must remain defenceless,
until we can create a fleet to repel their invasions. Will
any government enable us to do this in a few years? I
am convinced it will not.

That we have to encounter embarrassments, and are dis-
tressed for wa11t.of money, is undoubted ; but causes which
could not be controlled by any system of government, have
principally contributed to embarrass and distress us. On the
termination of war, which operated to exhaust our resources,
we launched into every species of extravagance, and imported
European goods to an amount far beyond our ability to pay.
The difficulties which arose from this and several other
causes, equally uninfluenced by the system of government,
were without hesitation attributed to its want of energy.

Sir, the instance adduced from the history of the Jewish
theocracy evinces that there are certain situations in com-
munities which will unavoidably lead to results similar to
those we experience. The Israelites were unsuccessful in
war; they were sometimes defeated by their enemies: in-
stead of reflecting that these calamities were occasioned by
their sins, they sought relief in the appointment of a king, in
imitation of their neighbor”.

The united Dutch provinces have been instanced as pos-
sessing a government parallel to the existing Confederation;
but I believe it will be discovered that they were never or-
ganized, as a general government, on principles so Well
calculated to promote the attainment of national objects as
that of the United States. They were obliged to resort to
subordinate societies to collect the sense of the state, before
the deputies were authorized to assent to any public meas

LANSING.] NEW YORK; 2‘] 9

ure binding on their states. Sir William Temple relates
that an important measure was prevented from taking place
by the dissent of a single town, till one of its citizens was
accommodated with a commission. _

The Germanic confederacy consists of a heterogeneous
mass of powerful princes, petty despots, and republics, differ-
ently organized, divided by religious jealousies, and existing
only in its forms by the pressure of the great controlling
powers of the emperor. I know not that history furnishes
an example of a confederated republic coercing the states
composing it by the mild influence of laws operating on the
individuals of those states. This, therefore, I suppose to be
a new experiment in politics; and, as we cannot always
accurately ascertain the results of political measures, and as
reasonng on them has been frequently found fallacious, we
should not too confidently predict thoSe to be produced by
the new system.

The dangers to which we shall be exposed by a dissolu-
tion of the Union, have been represented; but, however
much I may wish to preserve the Union, apprehensions of
its dissolution ought not to induce us to submit to any meas-
ure which may involve in its consequences the loss of civil
liber.ty Conquest can do no mo1e, in the state of civiliza-
tion, than to subject us to be ruled by persons in Whose
appointment we have no agency. This, sir, is the worst We
can apprehend at all events; and, as I suppose a government
so organized, and possessing the powers mentioned in the
proposed Constitution, will unavoidably terminate in the de-
priving us of that invaluable privilege, I am content to risk
a probable, but, 011 this occasion, a. mere possible evil, to
avoid a celtain one. But if a dissolution of the Uriion
should unfortunately ensue, what have we to applehend?
We are connected, both by interest and affection, with the
New England States; we harbor no animosities against each
other; we have no interfering territorial claims; our man-
ne1s are nearly simila1, and they are daily assimilating, and
mutual advantages Will plobably prompt to mutual conces-
sions, to enableb us to form a union with them. I, however,
contemplate the idea of a possible dissolution with pain, and
I make these remarks with the most sincere reluctance, only
.n answer to those which were offered by the honorable gen-
tleman from New Yo1 k.

220 DEBATES. LANSING.

Sir, I have formerly had occasion to declare to the public
my apprehensions that a consolidated government, partaking
in a great degree of republican principles, and which had in
object the control of the inhabitants of the extensive territo-
ry of the United States, by its sole operations could not pre-
serve the essential 1ights and liberties of the people. I have
not as yet discovered any reason to change that sentiment;
on the cont1a1y, 1eflection has given it additional f01ce. But
I stand here the representative of others, and, as far as I can
ascertain the views of my constituents, it is my duty to pro-
mote them W 1th the utmost assiduity , and 111 no one pu1suit
can I be bette1 supported by the almost unanimous opinion
of my fellow— citizens in the county I have the 1101101 to rep-
resent, than in proposing amendments to the Constitution
which is now the subject of our deliberations, as the mode
of introducing amendments was the only point of difference.
Influenced by these considerations, every amendment which
I am convinced will have a tendency to lessen the danger
of invasion of civil liberty by the general government, will
receive my sincere approbation. But none which can, in
the remotest degree, originate in local views, will meet my
concurrence ; and I trust an intention will not be attributed
to me to preserve the consequence of official state establish-
ments.

Sir, when motives of this kind are supposed to actuate
men in office, by persons who have imbibed prejudices from
a want of information—when they originate from an illib-
erality of sentiment which would disgrace the worst cause—
every man who feels the imputation, while he laments the
misguided zeal which aims, by the sac1ifice of private feel-
ings, to obtain a favo1ite object, will dis1egard the attempt,
and consign it to merited oblivion. But when an l1_on01able
gentleman, distinguished f01 his libe1al turn of thinking,
who 1s possessed of one of the most luc1ative offices of the
state, delibe1ately gives his name to the public, as impliedly
sanctionng the sentiment, silence must unavoidably be c011-
stiued into a tacit confession of itsjustice. The committee
will thelefore indulge me in rema1ki11g that, if the ope1a-
. tions of the general government will subvert those of the
individual states, the interest of the state officers may be
affected 111 some measure, otherwise thei1 emoluments will
remain undiminished —their consequence not so much 1m-

LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. ‘ 22]

paired as not. to compensate men of interested pursuits by
the prospect of sharing the offices of the general govern-
ment. Does this imputation only apply to the officers of
this state? Are they more discerning in distinguishing their
interest, or are they only capable of being warped by ap-
prehensions of loss? In the neighboring states, the officers
of government are among the warmest advocates of the new
system ; and even in this state they are perhaps more divided
in sentiment than any other class of men whatsoever.

But, sir, I trust we shall divest ourselves, on this occasion,
of every consideration of a private nature, and determine on
the Constitution with caution and moderation.

Mr. R. E. LIVINGSTON rose to reply.

The CHANCELLOR, in explanation, said, it gave him
pain to observe a meaning attributed to him which was
totally foreign from his mind. He by no means had in-
tended to insinuate that the opposition to the Constitution
flowed from interested or improper motives. He knew that
the officers of this state had taken different sides; he himself
held a public station, and many of the officers of the several
states were among its warmest advocates. He was sensible
that every man in place felt, in a delicate degree, the dignity
attached to his office. Far from aiming an improper sug»
gestion of the previous or present disposition of any member,
his only View was to express a hope, and at the same time
a caution, that, in the prosecution of this business, gentle-
men might not suffer themselves to be influenced by partial
views or private prejudices. For, said be, we sit here as
simple citizens, and every species of official authority is lost
in this equal assembly. But, sir, as the officers of govern-
ment were selected from the mass of the people,.with an
expectation that they would be their wisest and best friends,
it. is to be hoped that, if this Constitution is proved to be a
good one, and friendly to the liberties of the people, those
men who are highest in office will be the most urgent to
adopt, and most active to execute it. He begged leave to
take notice of an observation which had just been made
He should notice it, because it tended to establish a new
and singular opinion; that is, that, if a. conditional power of
coercion only was lodged in the government, the purposes of
the union micrht be answered. The idea was, that Con-

C
gress should make requisrtions on the states, and, on their

2252 DEBATES. [Sm-Tn.

non-compliance, the compulsory authority should be exer-
cised on individuals. This idea includes an acknowledg-
ment that the old Confederation is totally incompetent to
federal purposes.

But let us view, said he, the operation of a system founded
on such a principle. In the first place, the necessary revenue
officers must be appointed. Congress will then send out
the requisitions, and, on refusal or neglect, will r'esort to i11-
dividual coercion. if the states punctually comply with the
requisitions, an expensive establishment must be supported,
Without object or employment. If, on the contrary, they
are delinquent, what an alarming image of disorder is pre-
sented to our View! A body of federal officers, in the heart
of a state, acting in direct opposition to the declared sense
of the legislature! Would not this be a source of eter-
nal disorder? \Vould not a government, thus calculated
to promote a spirit of civil diss'ension, be forever impractica-
ble? Such a government must be attended with every
delay, with every expense—must defeat itself, and be its
own destruction.

The Hon. Mr. SMITH said, he conceived that the Con
stitution ought to be considered byparagraphs. An honor-
able gentleman yesterday had opened the debate with some
general observations ; another honorable gentleman had just
answered him by general observations. He Wished the
Constitution to be examined by paragraphs. ln going
through it, he should offer his objections to'such parts of it
as he thought defective.

. The first section of the first article was then read, and
passed by without remark.

The second section being read,

Mr. SMITH again rose. He most heartily concurred 111 .
sentiment with the honorable gentleman who opened the
debate, yesterday, that the discussion of the important'
question now before them ought to be entered on With a
spirit of patriotism; with minds open to conviction; with

adetermination to form opinions only on the merits of
the question, from those evidences which should appearr in
the course of the investigation.

How far the general observations made by the honorable
gentleman accorded with these principles, he left to the
house to determine.

SMITH.] NEW YORK. I 223

It was not, he said, his intention to follow that gentleman
th1ough all his remalks. He should only obseive that what
had been advanced did not appeal to apply to the subject
under consideration.

He was as strongly impressed with the necessity of a
union as any one could be. He would seek it with as much
a1do1 In the discussion of this question, he was disposed
to make every reasonable concession, and, indeed, to sz'1c1i-
fice every thing 1‘01 a union, except the liberties of his
country, than which he could contemplate no greater misfor—
tune. But he hoped we were not reduced [to the necessity
of sacrificing, or even endangering, our-liberties, to preserve
the Union. If that was the case, the alternative was dread-
. ful. But he would not now say that the ad0ption of the
Constitution would endanger our libe1ties , because that
was the point to be debated, and the premises should be laid
down previously to the drawing of any conclusion. He
Wished that all observations might be confined to this point,
and that deelamations and appeals to the passions might
be omitted.

Why, said he, are we told of our weakness? of the de-
fenceless condition of the southeln parts 01‘ our state? of the
exposed situation of our capital.P of Long Island, surrounded
by water, and exposed to the incmsions of om neighbors in
Connecticut? of Ve1mont having sep'a1ated flom us, and
assumed the powers of a distinct government? and of the
1101th- west parts of our state being in the hands of a foreign
enemy? Why are we to be zDalarmed with appiehen-
sions that the Eastern States a1e inimical, and disinclined to
fo11n alliances With us? He was s01ry to find that such
suspicions were entertained. He believed that no such dis—
position existed in theEastern States. - Surely it could not
be suppOsed that those states would make war upon us for
exercising the rights of fleemen, deliberating andjudging for
ou1selves, on a subject the most inteiesting that ever came
before any assembly If a wai with em neighbors was to
be the result of not acceding, there was no use in debating
here, We had better receive thei1 dictates, if We were 11n-
able to resiSt them. The defects of the oldConfederation
needed as, little proof as the necessity of a union. 'But there
was no-proof in all thisthat the-proposed Constitution was a
.good one. Defective as the oldI‘C'onfederation is, he said,

(32314 DEB ATES. [8111171111.

no one could deny but it was possible we might have a worse
government. But the question was not Whether the present
Confederation be a bad 011e, but whether the proposed Con-
stitution be a good one.

It had been observed, that no example of federal republics
had succeeded. It was true that the ancient confederated
republics were all destroyed; so were those which were not
confederated; and all ancient governments, of every form,
had shared the same fate. Holland had, no doubt, experi
enced many evils from the' defects in her government; but,
With all these defects, she yet existed: she had, under her
confederacy, made a principal figure among the nations of
Europe, and he believed few countries had experienced a
greater share of internal peace and prosperity. The Ger-
manic confederacy was not the most pertinent example to
produce on this occasion. Among a numbe1 of absolute
princes, who consider their“ subjects as their property, whose
will is law, and to whose ambition there are no bounds,
it was no difficult task to discover other causes from whicli
the convulsions in that country rose, than the defects
of their confederation. Whether a confederacy of states,
under any form, be a practicable government, was a ques—
tion to be discussed in the course of investigating the Con-
st1tut10n.

He 11 as pleased that, thus eally 1n debate, the honorable
gentleman had himself shown that the intent of the Consti—
tution was not a confedelacy, but a reduction of all the
states into a consolidated government. He hoped the gen-
tleman would be complaisant enough to exchange names
with those who disliked the Constitution, as it appeared from
his own concessions, that they were federalists, and those
who advocated it were anti-federalists. He begged leave
however, to remind the gentleman, that Montesquieu, witli
all the examples of modern and ancient republics in View,
gives it as his opinion, that a confederated republic has all
the internal advantages of a republic, with the external force
ofa monarchical gover11ment.He was happy to find an offi-
cer of such high rank recommending to the other officers of
gove1nn1ent,and to those who are members of the legisla—
ture, to be unbiased by any moti1es of interest or state
importance. Fortunately for himself, he was out of the
verge of temptation of this kind, not having the honor to

SMITH. 1 NEW YORK. 2125‘

hold- any office under the state. But, then, he was exposed,
in common with other gentlemen of the Convention, to
another temptation, against which he thought it necessary
that we should be equally guarded. If, said he, this Consti-
tution is adopted, there will be a number of honorable and
lucrative offices to be filled; and We ought to be cautious
lest an expectancy of some of them should influence us to
adopt without due consideration.

We may wander, said he, in the fields of fancy without
end, and gather flowers as we go. It may be entertaining,
but it is of little service to the discovery of truth. We may,
on one side, compare the scheme advocated by our 0ppo+
nents to golden images, with feet part of iron and part of clay;
and on the other, to a beast dreadful and terrible, and strong
exceedingly, having great iron teeth,—which devours, breaks in
pieces, and stamps the residue with his feet; and after all, said
he, we shall find that both these allusions are taken from the
same vision; and their true meaning must be discovered by
sober reasoning.

He would agree with the honorable gentlemen that per-
fection in any system of government was not to be looked
for. If that was the object, the debates on the one before
them might soon be closed. But he would observe, that
this observation applied, with equal force, against changing
any system, especially against material and ladical changes.
Fickleness and inconstancy, he said, were characteristic of a
free people; and, in framing a constitution for them, it was,
perhaps, the most difficult thing to correct this spirit, and
guard against the evil effects of it. He was persuaded it
could not be altogethe1 prevented without destroy 111g thei1
freedom. It would be like, attempting to correct a small 1n-
disposition i11 the habit of the body, fixing the patient in a
confirmed consumption. This fickle abnd inconstant spirit
was the more dangemus in blinging about changes in the
government. The: instance that had been adduced by the
gentleman from sac1ed hist01y, was an example in point to
prove this. The nation of Israel, having received a form of
civil goveinment from Heaven, enjoyed it fo1 a considelabie
pe1iod; but, at length, labo1ing Under pressures which were
brought upon them by theirb own misconduct and imp1u-
denee, instead of imputing their misfortunes to their true
causes, and making a plopei improvement of their calamities,

VOL. 11.

226 DEBATES. [SMITIL

by a correction of their errors, they imputed them to a defect
in their constitution; they rejected their divine Ruler, and
asked Samuel to make them a king tojudge them, like other
nations. Samuel was grieved at their folly; but still, by
the command of God, he hearkened to their voice, though
not until he had solemnly declared unto them the manner in
which the king should reign over them. “This (says Sam—
uel) shall be the manner of the king that shall reign over
you. He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself,
for his chariots, and for his horsemen, and some shall run
before his chariots; and he will appoint him captains over
thousands, and captains over fifties, and will set them to ear
his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instru-
ments of war, and instruments of his chariots. And he will
take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks,
and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your
vineyards, and your olive-yards, even the best of them, and
give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of
your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers and
to his servants, and he will take your 111en—servants, and
your maid—servants, and your goodliest young men, and your
asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of
your sheep; and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry
out in that day, because of your king which ye have chosen
you; and the Lord will not hear you in that day!” How
far this was applicable to the subject, he would not now say

it could be better judged of when they had gone through it.
On the \1l1ole,l1e wished to take up this matter with candor
and deliberation.

He would now proceed to state his objections to the
clause just read, (section 2, of article 1, clause 3.) _ His ob—
jections were comprised under three heads: lst, the rule of
apportionment is unjust; 2d, there is no precise number
fixed 011, below which the house shall not be reduced; 3d,
it is inadequate. In the first place, the rule of apportion-
ment of the representatives is to be according to the Whole
number of the white inhabitants, with three fifths of all
others; that 1s, in plain English, each state is to send rep-
resentatives in plopo1 tron to the numbe1 of fleetnen, and
three fifths of the slates it contains. He could not see any
rule by Which slaves were to be included in the ratio of rep-
resentation The principle of a representation being that

SMI I‘H.] NEW YORK. 227

every free agent should be concerned in governing himself,
it was absurd 1n giving that power to a man who could not
exercise it. Slaves have no will of their own. The very
operation. of it was to give certain privileges to those people
Who were so wicked as to keep slaves. He knew it would
be admitted that this rule of apportionment was founded on
unjust principles, but that it was the result of accommoda—
tion; which, he supposed, we should be under the necessity
of admitting, if we meant to be in union with the Southern
States, though utterly repugnant to his feelings. In the
second place, the number was 1101 fixed by the Constitution,
but left at the discretion of the legislature , perhaps he was
mistaken; it was his wish to be informed. He understood,
from the Constitution, that sixty-five members were to com-
pose the House Of Representatives for three years; that,
after that time, the census was to be taken, and the numbers
to be ascertained by the legislature, on the following princi-
ples: lst, they shall be apportioned to the respective states
according to numbers; 2d, each state shall have one, at
least; 3d, they shall never exceed one to every thirty
thousand. If this was the case, the first Congress that met
might reduce the number below what it now is—a power
inconsistent with every principle of a free government, to
leave it to the discretion of the rulers to determine the num-
ber of representatives of the people. There was no kind
of security except in the integrity of the men who were
intrusted; and if you have no other security, it is idle to
contend about constitutions. In the third place, supposing
Congress should declare that there should be one representa—
tive for every thirty thousand of the people, in his opinion,
it would be incompetent to the great purposes of representa—
tion. It was, he said,‘the fundamental principle of a' free
government, that the people should make the laws by which
they were to be governed. He who 1s controlled by another
is a slave; and that government which is directed by the
will of any one, or a few, or any number less than is the
will of the community, is a government for slaves.

'1 he new point was, How was the will of the community
to be exp1essed. P It was not possible for them to come to-
gether; the multitude would be too great. in order, therefore,
to provide against this inconvenience, the scheme of reple-
sentation had been adopted, 1 11y which the people deputed

228 DEBATES. [SMITH

others to represent them. Individuals entering into society
became one body, and that body ought to be animated by
one mind; and be conceived that every form of government
should have that complexion. It was true, notwithstanding
all the experience we had from others, it had appeared that
the experiment of representation had been fairly tried; there
was something like it in the ancient republics, in which,
being of smallb extent, the peOple could easily meet together,
though, instead of deliberating ,they only considered of those
things which were submittedb to them by their magistrates.
In Great Britain, representation had been carried much
further than 111 any Government we knew of, except our own;

but 111 that country it now had only a name. Arne1ica was
the only country in which the first fair opportunity had been
offered. When we were colonies, our representation was
better than any that was then known . since the revolution,
we had advanced still nearer to perfection. He considered
it as an object, of all others the most important, to have it
fixed 011 its true principle; yet he was convinced that it was
impracticable to have such a representation in a consolidated
government. However, said Ire, we may approach a great
way towards perfection by increasing the representation
and limiting the powers of Congress. He considered that
the great interests and liberties of the people could only be
secured by the state governments. He admitted that, if
the new government was only confined to great national
objects, it would be less exceptionable; but it extended to
every thing dear to human nature. That this was the case,
would be proved without any long chain of reasoning; for
that power which had both the purse and the sword had
the government of the whole country, and might extend its
powers to any and to every object. He had already observed
that, by the true doctrine of representation, this principle was
established—that the representative must be chosen by the
free will of the majority of his constituents. It therefore
followed that the representative should be chosen from small
districts. This being admitted, he would ask, Could 65
men for 3,000,000, or 1 for 30,000, be chosen in this marr—
ner? Would they he possessed of the requisite information
to make happy the great number of souls that were spread
over this extensive country? There was another objection
to the clause: if great alfairs of government were trusted to

SMITH.'] NEW YORK. 229

few men, they would be more liable to corruption. Corrup-
tion, he knew, was'unfashionable amongst us, but he sup-
posed that Americans were like other men; and though
they had hitherto displayed great virtues, still they were
men; and therefore such steps should be taken as to pre-
vent the possibility of corruption. We were now in that
stage of society in which we could deliberate with freedom;
how long it might continue, God only knew ! Twenty years
hence, perhaps, these maxims might become unfashionable.
We already hear, said he, in all parts of the country, gentle-
men ridiculing that spirit of patriotism, and love of liberty,
which carried us through all our difficulties in times of dan-
ger. When patriotism was already nearly hooted out of
society, ought we not to take some precautions against the
progress of corruption?

He had one more observation to make, to show that the
representation was insufficient. Government, he said, must
rest, for its execution, on the good opinion of the people:
for, if it was made heaven, and had not the confidence of
the people, it could not be executed; that this was proved
by the example given by the gentleman of the Jewish theoc-
racy. It must have a good setting out, or the instant it
takes place, there is an end of liberty. He believed that
the inefi‘icacy of the old Confederation had arisen from that
want of confidence; and this caused, in a great degree,
by the continual declamation of gentlemen of importance
against it from one end of the continent to the other, who
had frequently compared it to a rope of sand. It had per-
vaded every class of citizens; and their misfortunes, the con-
sequences of idleness and extravagance, were attributed to
the defects of that system. ‘At the close of the war, our
country had been left in distress; and it was impossible that
any government on earth could immediately retrieve it; it
must be time and industry alone that could effect it. He
said, he would pursue these observations no further at pres-
ent,—and concluded with making the following motion :—

“Resolved, That it is proper that the number of repre-
sentatives be fixed at the rate of one for eVery twenty thou-
sand inhabitants, to be ascertained on the principles men—
tioned in the 2d section of the 1st article of the Constitution,
until they amount to three hundred; after which they shall
be apportioned among the states, in proportion to the num—

20

2-30 DEB ATES. [HAMILTON

ber of inhabitants of the states respectively; and that, be-
fore the first enumeration shall be made, the several states
shall be entitled to choose double the number of representa-
tives, for that purpose mentioned 111 the Constitution.”

The Hon. Mr. HAMIL ION then rose. M1. Chairman,
the honorable member who spoke yesterday went into an
explanation of a variety of circumstances, to prove the expe-
diency ol a change in our national gove11,1n1ent and the
necessity of a firm union. At the same time, he deselibed
the great advantages which this state, in pa1ticular, receives
from the confederacy, and its peculiar weaknesses when ab-
stracted from the Union. In doing this, he advanced a
variety of arguments, which deserve serious consideration.
Gentlemen have this day come forward to answer him. He
has been treated as having wande1ed 111 the flowery fields of
fancy , and attempts have been made to take off from the
minds of the committee that sober imp1ession which might
be expected from his arguments. I trust, sir, that observa-
tions of this kind are not thrown out to cast a light air 011
this important subject, or to give any personal bias 011 the
great question before us. I will not agree with gentlemen
who trifle with the weaknesses of our country, and suppose
that they are enumerated to answer a party purpose, and to
terrify with ideal dangers. No. I believe these weaknesses
to be real, and pregnant with destruction. Yet, however
weak our country may be, I hope we never shall sacrifice
our liberties. If, therefore, on a full and candid discussion,
the proposed system shall appear to have that tendency, for
God’s sake, let us reject it! But let us not mistake words
for things, nor accept doubtful surmises as the evidence of
truth. Let us consider the Constitution calmly and dispas—
sionately, and attend to those things only which merit
consideration.

N o arguments drawn from embarrassment or inconvenience
ought to tD'pievail upon us to adopt a system of govemment
1adically bad; yet it is proper thatt these alguments, among
otheis, should he bought into view. In doing this, yeste1-
day, it was necessary to reflect upon ou1 situation; to dwell
upon the imbecility of our union; and to consider whether
we, as a state, could stand alone. Although I am persuaded
this Convention will be resolved to adopt nothing that is had.
yet I think every prudent man will consider the merits of the

Hmmom] NEW YORK. 2:5

plan in connection with the circumstances of our country,
and that a rejection of the Constitution may involve most
fatal consequences. I make these remarks to show that,
though We ought not to be actuated by unreasonable fear,
yet we ought to be prudent.

This day, sir, one gentleman has attempted to answer the
arguments advanced by my honorable friend; another has
heated him as having wandered from the subject. This
being the case, I trust I shall be indulged in reviewing the
1cma1 ks that have been made.

Sir, it appears to me ext1aordinary, that, while gentlemen
in one breath acknowledge that the old Confederation re-
quires many material amendments, they should in the next
deny that its defects have been the cause of our political
weakness, and the consequent calamities of our country. I
cannot but infer from this, that there is still some lurking fa-
vorite imagination, that this system, with correctness, might
become a safe and permanent one. It is proper that we
should examine this matter. We contend that the radical
vice in the old Confederation is, that the laws of the Union
apply only to states in their corporate capacity. Has not
every man who has been in our legislature experienced the
truth of this position? It is inseparable from the disposition
of bodies, who have a constitutional power of resistance, to
examine the merits of a law. This has ever been the case
with the federal requisitions. In this examination, not being
furnished with those lights which directed the deliberations
of the general government, and incapable of embracing the
genelal interests of the Union, the states have almost uni-
formly weighed the requisitions by their own local interests,
and have only executed them so far as answered their par-
ticular convenience or advantage. Hence there have ever
been thirteen different bodies to judge of the measures of
Congress, and the operations of government have been dis—
tracted by their taking different courses. Those which were
to be benefited have complied with the requisitions; others
have totally disregarded them. Have not all of us been
witnesses to the unhappy embarrassments which lesulted
from these proceedings? Even during the late .va1, While
the pressure of common danger connected strongly the bond
of on union, and incited tob vigorous exertion, we have felt
many distressing effects of the important system. How have

232 DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

ve seen this state, though most exposed to the calamities of
:he wa1, coo111plyi11g,in an unexampled manner, with the
fede1al 1equisitions, and compelled by the delinquency of
othe1s to bear most unusual b111dens! Of this t1uth 11e ha1e
the most solemn proof 011 our records. In 1779 and ’80,
when the state, from the ravages of war, and from her great
exertions to resist them, became Weak, distressed, and for-
lorn, every man avowed the principle Which we now contend
for—that our 111isfortunes, in a great degree, proceeded from
the want of Vigor in the Continental government. These
were our sentiments when we did not speculate, but feel.
We saw our weakness, and found ourselvesits victims. Let
us reflect that this may again, in all probability, be our situa-
tion. This is a weak state, and its relative state is danger-
ous. Your capital is accessible by land, and by sea is exposed
to every d211ing invade1 , and 011 the 11o1th- west you me open
to the inroads of a powerful fo1eign nation. Indeed, this
state, f1o111 its situation, will, 111 time of war, plobably be the
theatre of its operations.

Gentlemen have said that the non-compliance of the states
had been occasioned by their sufferings. This may in part
be true. But has this state been delinquent? Amidst all
our distresses, we have fully complied. If New York could
comply wholly with the requisitions, is it not to be supposed
that the other states could in part comply.P Certainly every
state in the Union might have executed them in some de-
gree. But New Hampshire, which has not suffered at all,
is totally delinquent. No1th Caiolina is totally delinquent.
Many others have contributed 111 a ve1y small p1oportion. And
Pennsylvania and New Yo1k me the only states which have
peifectly discha1ged thei1 fede1al duty.

F1om the delinquency of those states which have suffeIed
little by the W211, we 1121tu1ally conclude, that they have made
no eff01ts; and a knowledge of human natu1e will teach us
that then ease and security have been a plincipal cause of
thei1 11 ant of exe1tion. \Vhile dangel 1s distant, its i111p1es—
sion is weak; and while it affectsb only ou1 neighbo1s, we
have few motives to provide against it. Sir, if we have 11a—
tlonal objects to pi.',11sue we must have national revenues. If
you make lequisitions, and they me not comolied with. what
is to be done. 9 It has been observed, to coe1ce the states 18
one of the maddest p1ojects that was ever devised. A

HAMILTON] NEW YORK. 2-33

failure of compliance will never be confined to a single state
This being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil
war ? Suppose Massachusetts, or any large state, should re-
fuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them, would
they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from
those states which are in the same situation as themselgzes 3
What picture does this idea present to our View? A comply-
ing state at war with a non-complying state; Congress
marching the trOOpS of one state into the bosom of another;
this state collecting auxiliaries, and forming, perhaps, a ma—
jority against its federal head. Here is a nation at war with
itself. Can any reasonable man be well disposed towards a
government which makes war and carnage the only means
of supporting itself—a government that can exist only by
the sword? Every such war must involve the innocent with
the guilty. This single consideration should be sufficient. to
dispose every peaceable citizen against such a govern-
ment.

But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to
be used as an instrument of coercion? The thing 1s a dr'eam ,
it is impossible. Then We a1 e b1 ou0‘l1t to this dilemma— either
a federal standing a1 my is to enf01ce the requisitions, 01 the
federal treasury is left without supplies, and the government
without support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil?
Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate 011 indi—
viduals, in the same mannei as those of the states do. This
is the true reasoning upon the subject, si1. The gentlemen
appea1 to acknowledge its force; and yet, while they yield
to the p1inciple, they seem to tear its application to the
government.

. What, then, shall we do? - Shall we take the old Con-
federation, as the basis of a new system ?' Can this be the
object of the gentlemen? Celtainly not. Will any man,
who entertains a wish f01 the safety of his count] y, t1ust the
s.vo1d and the purse with a single assembly Olganized on
p1 inciples so defective—so 1otten. P Though we might give
to such a government certain poweis with safety, yet to give
them the full and unlimited poweis of taXation and the 111-
tionz 1l forces, would be to establish a despotism, the definition
of which Is, a government in which all power is concentred
in a single body. To take the old Confederation, and fashion
it upon these principles, would be establishing a power which
v01. II.

2344 DEBATES. [HAMILTON

would destroy the liberties of the peOple. These considera-
tions show clearly that a government totally different must
be instituted. They had weight in the Convention who
formed the new system. It was seen that the necessary
powers were too great to be trusted to a single body; they
therefore. formed two branches, and divided the powers, that
each might be a check upon the other. This was the result
of their wisdom; and I presume that every reasonable man
will agree to it. The more this subject is explained, the
more clear and convincing it will appear to every member of
this body. The fundamental principle of the old Confedera—
tion is defective; we must totally eradicate and discard this
principle before we can expect an efficient government. The
gentlemen who have spoken to- day have taken up the sub-
iect of the ancient contede1 -1c1es, but thei1 View of them has
been extremely partial and erroneous. The fact is, the same
false and impracticable principle ran through the ancient
governments. The first of these governments that we read
of, was the Amphictyonic confederacy. The council which
managed the affiurs of this league possessed powers of a
similar complexion to those of our present Congress. The
same feeble mode of legislation in the head, and the same
power of resistance in the members, prevailed. “7 hen a re—
quisition was made, it rarely met a compliance; and a civil
war was the consequence. Those that were attacked called
in foreign aid to protect them; and the ambitious Philip,
under the mask of an ally to one, invaded the liberties of
each, and finally subverted the whole.

The operation of this principle appears in the same light
in the Dutch republics. They have been obliged to levy
taxes by an armed force. In this confederacy, one large
province, by its superior wealth and influence, is commonly
a match for all the rest; and when they do not comply, the
province of Holland is obliged to compel them. It is ob-
served, that the United P10vinces have existed a long time ,
but they have been constantly the sport of their neighbors,
and have been supported only by the external pressme of
the surrounding powers. The policy of Europe, not the
policy of thei1 government, has saved them from dissolution.
Besides, the powe1s of the stadtholder have given energy to
the operations of this government, which is not to be found
in ours. This prince has a vast personal influence; he has

IIAMIL'I‘ON.] NEW YORK. 235

independent revenues; he commands an army of forty rnou-
sand men.

The German confederacy has also been a perpetual source
of wars. They havea diet, like our Congress, who have
authority to call for supplies. These calls are never obeyed;
and 1n time of war, the rrnper 1al army never takes the field
till the enemy are returning from it. The errrperor ’s Aus-
trian dorninions, in which he is an absolute prince, alone
enable him to make head against the common foe. The
members of this confederacy are ever divided and opposed to
each other. The king of Prussia 1s a member, yet he has
been constantly in opposition to the emperor. Is this a de-
sirable government?

I might go more particularly into the discussion of ex-
amples, and show that, wherever this fatal principle has pre-
vailed, even as far back as the Lycian and Achaean leagues,
as well as the Amphictyonic confederacy, it has proved the
destruction of the government. But I think observations of
this kind might have been spared. Had they not been
entered into by others, I should not hare taken up so much
of the time of the committee. No inference can be drawn
from these examples, that republics cannot exist: we only
contend that they have hitherto been founded on false prin-
ciples. We have shown how they have been conducted, and
how they have been destroyed. Weakness in the head has
produced resistance in the members; this has been the 1m-
mediate parentof civil war: auxiliary force has been invited;
and foreign power has annihilated their liberties and name.
'Ihus Philip subverted the Amphictyonic, and Rome the
Achaean republic.

We shall do well, sir, not to deceive ourselves with the
favorable events of the late war. Common danger prevent-
ed the operation of the ruinous principle, 1n its full extent;
but, since the peace, We have experienced the evils; we
have felt the poison of the system in its unmingled purity.

\Vithout dwelling any longer on this subject, I shall
proceed to the question immediately before the committee.

In order that the committee may understand clearly the
principles on which the general Convention acted, I think it
necessary to explain some preliminary circumstances. Sir,
the natural situation of this country seems to divide its
interests into different classes. There are navigating and

236 DE BATES. [HAMILTON

non— navigating states. The Northern are properly navigat-
ing states: the Southern appea1 to possess neithe1 the means
nor the spirit of navigation. This difference of situation
naturally produces a bdissimilarity of interests 21nd vietts
respecting foreign commerce. It was the interest 01 the
N01the111 Statesb that the1e should be no 1"est1ai11ts 011 their
navigation, and they should have full powel, by a majority
in Congress, to make commercial 1egulati011s in fa101 of
their own, and 111 1estraint of the navigation of foreigne1s.
The Southern States wish to impose a restraint on the
Nor'them, by requi1i11g that two thirds in Cong1ess should
be 1equisite to pass an act in regulation of) commerce.
They were app1ehe11sive that the rest1aints of a navio ation
law would discourage foreigners, and, by obliging them to
employ the shipping of the Northern States, would probably
enhance thei1 freivht. This being the case, they insisted
strenuously 011 having this provision ingrafted in the Con—
stitution; and the Northe1n States were as anxious in op-
posing it. On the other hand, the small states, seeing
themselves embraced by the Confederation upon equal
terms, wished to retain the advantages which they already
possessed. The large states, on the contrary, thought it
improper that Rhode Island and Delaware should enjoy an
equal suffrage with themselves. From these sou1ces a deli--
cate and difficult contest arose It became necessary, there-
fore, to compromise, 01' the Convention must have dissolved
without effecting any thing- Would it have been wise and
prudent in that body, in this critical situation, to have de—
serted their country.P No. Every man who hears me,
every wise man in the United States, would have con-
demned them. The Convention were obliged to appoint a
committee for accommodation. In this committee, the ar-
rangement was formed as it. now stands, and their report
was accepted. It was a delicate point, and it was necessary
that all parties should be indulged. Gentlemen will sec
that, if there had not been a unanimity, nothing could have
been done; for the Convention had no power to establish,
but only to recommend, a government. Any other system
would have been impracticable. Let a convention be called
to—1norrow; let them meet twenty times,—nay, twenty
thousand times; they will have the same difi‘iculties to e11~
counter, the same clashing interests to reconcile.

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 237

But, dismissing these leflections, let us consider how far
the arrangement is in itself entitled to the applobation of
this body. We will examine it upon its own Inelits.

The'first thing objected to is that clause which allows a
representation for three fifths of the negroes. Much has
been said of the impropriety of representing men who have
no will of their own. Whether this be reasoning or decla-
mation,l will not presume to say. It is the unfortunate
situation of the Southern States to have a great part of their
population, as well as property, in blacks. The regulation
complained of was one result of the spirit of accommodation
which governed the Convention; and without this indul-
gence no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir,
considering some peculia1 advantages which we deiive from
them, it is entiiely just that they should be gratified. The
Southern States possess certain staples, —tobacc0, lice, in--
digo, &c.,—which must be capital objects in treaties of
commerce with foreign nations; and the advantages which:
they necessarily procure in those treaties Will be felt through-
out all the states. But the justice of this plan will appear
in another view. The best writers on government have
held that representation should be compounded of pe1sons
and propelty. This rule has been adopted, as far as it (ould.
be, in the constitution of New Y01k.ltwill,howeve1, by
no means he admitted that the slaves a1e considered alto-
gether as property. They are men, though degraded to the
condition of slavery. They are persons known to the mu—
nicipal laws of the states which they inhabit, aswell as to
the laws of nature. But representation and taxation go
together, and one uniform rule ought to apply to both.
Would it be just to compute these slaves 1n the assessment
of taxes, and discard them from the estimate in the app01-
tionment of representatives? Would it be just to impose a
singular burden, without conferring some adequate advan-
tage?

Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule
we have been speaking of is a general. rule, and applies to
all the states. Now, you have a great number of people in
your state, which, are» not represented at all, and have no
voice in your government. These will be included in the
enumeration — not two fifths, nor three fifths, but the whole
This proves that the advantages of the plan are not con-

‘238 DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

fined to the Southern States, but extend to other parts of
the Union.

I now proceed to consider the objection with regard to
the number of representatives, as it now stands. I am per-
suaded the system, in this respect, stands on a better footing
than the gentlemen imagine.

It has been asserted that it will be in the power of Con-
gress to reduce the number. I acknowledge that there are
no direct words of prohibition, but contend that the true and
genuine construction of the clause gives Congress no power
whatever to reduce the representation below the number as
it now stands. Although they may limit, they can never
diminish the number. One representative for every thirty
thousand inhabitants is fixed as the standard of increase;
till, by the natural course of population, it shall become .ne-
cessary to limit the ratio. Probably, at present, were this
standard to be immediately applied, the representation would
considerably exceed sixty—five. In three years, it would
exceed one hundred. If I understand the gentlemen, they
contend that the number may be enlarged, or may not. I
admit that this is in the discretion of Congress; and I sub—
mit to the committee whether it. be not necessary and proper.
Still, I insist that an immediate limitation is not probable,
nor was it in the contemplation of the Convention. But, sir,
who will presume to say to what precise point the represen-
tation ought to be increased? This is a matter of opinion,
and opinions are vastly different upon the subject. A proof
of this is drawn from the representations in the state legis—
latures. In Massachusetts, the Assembly consists of about
three hundred; in South Carolina, of nearly one hundred;
in New York, there are sixty—five. It is observed generally
that the number ought to be large; let the gentlemen pro‘
duce their criterion. I confess it is difficult for me to say
what number may be said to be sufficiently large. On one
hand, it ought to be considered that a small numbe1 will act
W 1th mo1e facility, system, and decision , on the othel, that a
large one may enhance the difficulty of corruption. The Con—
gress is to consist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to
a reasonable man, may appear as near the proper medium
as any number whatever, at. least for the present. There is
one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon
any constructions of the Constitution}; it is the creation of

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 239

new states. Vermont, Kentucky, and Franklin,* will proba-
bly become independent. New members of the Union will
also be formed from the unsettled tracts of western territory.
These must be represented, and will all contribute to swell
the federal legislature. If the whole number in the United
States be, at present, three millions, as is commonly sup-
posed, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we
shall have, on the first census, a hundred representatives.
In ten years, thirty more will be added; and in twenty-five
years, the number will be double. Then, sir, we shall have
two hundred, if the increase goes on in the same proportion.
The Convention of Massachusetts, who made the same ob—
jections, have fixed upon this number as the point to which
they chose to limit the representation. But can we pron
nounce, with certainty, that it will not be expedient to go
beyond this number? We cannot. Experience alone must
determine. This matter may, with more safety, be left to
the discretion of the legislature, as it will be the interest of
the large and increasing states of Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, &c., to augment the representation. Only
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland, can
be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely cal-
culate upon a growing representation, according to the ad-
vance of population, and the circumstances of the country.

The state governments possess inherent advantages, which ?

will ever give them an influence and ascendency over the,
national government, and will forever preclude the possi—i

bility of federal encroachments. That their liberties, in-l

deed, can be subverted by the federal head, is repugnant to
every rule of political calculation. Is not this arrangement,
then, sir, a most Wise and prudent one ? ls not the present
representation fully adequate to our present exigencies, and
sufficient to answer all the purposes of the Union? I am
persuaded that an examination of the objects of the federal
government will afford a conclusiVe answer.

Many other observations might be made on this subject,
but I cannot now pursue them; for I feel myself not a little
exhausted. I beg leave, therefore, to waive, for the present,
the further discussion of the question.

SATURDAY, June 21, 1788.—-Convention met pursuant
to adjournment.

* Now Tennessee.

.._.

1240 DEBATES. [W1LLIAMS.

The Hon. Mr. WILLIAMS rose, and addressed the chair.
We are now, sir, said he, to investigate and decide upon a
Constitution, in which not only the present members of the
community are deeply interested, but. upon which the happi-
ness or misery of generations yet unborn is, in a great meas-
ure, suspended. I therefore hope for a Wise and prudent
dete1mination. I believe that this country has never before
seen sm 11 a elitical period in political affai1s. We have felt
the feebleness of those ties by which the states are held to-
getl1e1, and the want of that ene1gy which 1s necessaly to
manage our general concerns. Various are the expedients
which have been proposed to remedy these evils; but they
have been proposed without effect; though-l am persuaded
that, if the Confederation had been attended to as its value
justly melited, and propel attention paid to a few necessaly
amendments, it might have ca11ied us 011 fo1 a se1ies ofyeals,
and probably have been 111 as great estimation with succeed-
ing ages as it was in our long and painful war, notwith—
standing the fiightful picture that has been drawn of our
situation, and the imputation of all our difficulties to the
want of an energetic government. Indeed, sir, it appears
to me that many of our present distresses flow from a source
very different from the defects in the Confederation. Un-
happily for us, immediately after our extrication from a cruel
and unnatural war, luxury and dissipation overran the coun-
try, banishing all that economy, 'frugality, and industry,
which had been exhibited during the war.

Sir, if we were to reassume all our old habits, we might
expect to prosper. Let us, then, abandon all those foreign
commodities which have hitherto deluged our country, which
have loaded us with debt, and which, if continued, will for—
ever involve us in difficulties. How many thousands are
daily wearing the manufactures of Europe, when, by a little
industry and frugality, they might wear those of their own
country! One may venture to say, sir, that the greatest
part of the goods are manufactured in Europe by persons
who support themselves by our extravagance. And can we
believe a government ever so well formed can relieve us
from these evils? What dissipation is there from the im—_
moderate use of spi1its! Is it not notorious that men cannot
be hi1ed, in time of ha1vest, without giving them, on an
average, a pint of 111m pe1 day. 1‘ so that, on the lowest cal-

WILLIAMS.] NEW YO R K. 244-]

culation, every twentieth part of the grain is expended on
that article; and so, in proportion, all the farmer’s produce.
And what is worse, the disposition of eight tenths of the
commonalty is such, that, if they can get credit, they will
purchase unnecessary articles, even to the amount of their
crop, before it becomes merchantable. And therefore it
is evident that the best government ever devised, Without
economy and frugality, will leave us in a situation no better
than the present.

Sir, the enormous expense of the article of tea will
amount, in two years, to our Whole foreign debt. Much
more might be said on the subject; but I fear I have tres-
passed on your patience already. The time of the com-
mittee would not have been so long taken up, had there not
appeared a propriety in showing that all our present diffi-
culties are not to be attributed to the defects 1n the Confed-
eration; and, were the real truth known, part of its defects
have been used as an instrument to make way for the
proposed system; and whether or not it is calculated for
greater emoluments and more placemen the committee will
determine. However, from what has. been said, and the
mode agreed on for our proceedings, it appears probable
that the system of government under consideration is pre-
ferred before the Confederation. This being the case, let
us examine whether it be calculated to preserve the invalu-
able blessings of liberty, and secure the inestimable rights
of mankind. If it be so, let us adopt it. But if it be found
to contain principles that will lead to the subversion of lib—
erty, —if it tends to establish a despotism, or, what is. worse,
a tyrannical aristocracy,-—let us insist upon the necessary
alterations and amendments.

Momentous 1s the question, and We are called upon by
every motive to examine it well, and make up a wise and
candid judgment.

In forming a constitution f01 a free country like this, the
greatest care should be taken to define its powers, and

uard against an abuse of authority. The constitution

should be so formed as not .to swallow up the state gov-

ernments: the general government ought to be confined to

certain national objects; and the states should retain such

powers as concern their own internal police. We should
VOL 11. 31 21

242 DEBAT ES. [WILLIAMS

consider whether or not this system is so formed, as, directly
or indirectly, to annihilate the state governments. If so,
care should be taken to check it in such a manner as to pre-
vent this effect. Now, sir, with respect to the clause before
us, I agree with the gentlemen from Albany and Duchess,
who spoke yesterday. The number of representatives is,
in my opinion, too small to resist corruption. Sir, how
guarded is our state Constitution on this head I The num-
ber of the Senate and House of Representatives proposed in
the Constitution does not surpass those of our state. How
great the disparity, when compared with the aggregate
number of the United States! The history of representa-
tion in England, from which we have taken our model, is
briefly this: Before the institution of legislating by deputies,
the Whole free part of the community usually met for that
purpose: when this became impracticable by increase of
numbers, the people were divided into districts, from each
of which was sent a number of deputies, for a complete
representation of the various orders of the citizens within
them. Can it be supposed that six men can be a complete
representation of the various orders of the people of this
state 9 _

I conceive, too, that biennial elections are a departure from
the true principles of democracy. A well-digested democ—
racy has advantages over all other forms of government. It
affords to many the opportunity of being advanced, and
creates that desire of public promotion, and ardent affection
for the public weal, which are so beneficial to our country.
It was the opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu
that annual elections are productive of this effect. But
as there are more important defects in the proposed Con—
stitution, I shall desist making any further observations at
this time.

In order to convince gentlemen it is my sincere intention
to accede to this system, when properly amended, 1 give it
as my opinion that it will be best for gentlemen to confine
themselves to certain points which are defective.

Before I conclude, I would only mention, that while, on
one hand, I wish those endowed with a spirit of moderation
through the whole debate, to give way to small matters, yet,
on tht other hand, not to be intimidated by imaginary dan-

a-

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. 2443

gers; for to say that a bad government must ue established
for fear of anarchy, is, in realitv, saying that we must kill
ourselves for fear of dVing.

Mr. M. SMITH. Ihad the honor yesterday, ofsubmitting
an amendment to the clause under conside1ation, with some
observations in support of it. I hope I shall be indulged in
making some additional remarksin reply to what has been
offered by the honorable gentleman from New York.

He has taken up much time in endeavoring to prove that

E the great defect in the old Confederation was, that it oper-

ated upon states instead of individuals. It is needless to

dispute concerning points 011 which we do not disagree. It
is admitted that the powers of the general 0*ove1nment ought
to operate upon individuals to a ce1tain degree. How far
the powers should extend,and in what cases to individuals,
is the question.

As the different parts of the system will come into View in
the course of our investigation, an opportunity will be afforded
to consider this question. I wish, at present, to confine
myself to the subject immediately under the consideration of
the committee. I shall make no reply to the arguments
offered by the honorable gentleman to justify the rule of
apportionment fixed by this clause; for, though I am confi-
dent they might be easily refuted, yet I am persuaded we
must yield this point, in accommodation to the Southern
States. The amendment therefore proposes no alteration to
the clause in this 1espect.

The honorable gentleman says, that the clause, by obvious
construction, fixes the rep1esentation. I Wish not to torture
WOldS 01 sentences. I pelceive no such obvious construc-
tion.

I see clearly that, on one hand, the representatives cannot
exceed one for thirty thousand inhabitants; and, on the
other, that whatever larger number of inhabitants may be
taken for the rule of .‘apportionment, each state shall be
entitled to send one 1epresentative. Every thing else ap-
pears to me in the discretion of the legislature. If there be
any other limitation, it is certainly implied. Matters of mo-

ment should not be left to doubtful construction. It is u1ged
‘that the number of representatives will be fixed at one for

thirty thousand, because it will be the interest of the larger
states to do it. I cannot discern the force of this argument

244 DEBATES. * [M. SMITH.

To me it appears clear, that the relative weight of influence
of the different states will be the same, with the number of
representatives at sixty-five as at six hundred, and that of
the individual members greate1; for each member’ s sha1c
of power will decrease as bthe number of the House of Rep«
1esentatives increases. If, theref01e, this maxim be true,
that men are unwilling to relinquish powers which they once
possess, we are not to expect the House of Representatives
will be inclined to enlarge the numbers. The same motive
will operate to influence the President and Senate to oppose
the increase of the number of representatives; for, in pro-
portion as the House of Representatives is augmented, they
‘ will feel their own power diminished. It is, therefore, of,
the highest importance that a suitable number of representa-
tives should be established by the Constitution.

It has been observed, by an honorable member, that the
Eastern States insisted upon a small representation, on the
principles of economy. This argument must have no weight
in the mind of a considerate person. The difference of
expense, between supporting a House of Representatives
sufficiently numerous, and the present proposed one, would
be twenty or thirty thousand dollars per annum. The man
'who would seriously object to this expense, to secure his
liberties, does not deserve to enjoy them. Besides, by in-
creasing the number of representatives, we open a door for
the admission of the substantial yeomanry of our country,
who, being possessed of the habits of economy, will be cau-
tions of imp1udent expenditutes, by which means a g1eate1
saving will be made of public money than is sufficient to
support them. A reduction of the numbers of the state
legislatures might also be made, by which means there might
be a saving of expense much more than sufficient for the pur-
pose of supporting the general legislature; for as, under this
system, all the powers of legislation, relating to our general
concerns, ate vested 1n the gene1al government, the po“ e1
of the state legislatures will be so curtailed as to render it
less necessary to have them so numerous as they now am.

But an honorable gentleman has observed, that it is a prob—
,lem that cannot be solved, what the proper number is
which ought to compose the House of Representatives, and
calls upon me to fix the numbe1. I admit that this is a
question that will not admit of a solution “ith mathematit al

M. SMITH.J NEW YORK. 245

certainty; few political questions will; yet we may deter-
mine with certainty that certain numbers are too small or too
large. We may be sure that ten is too small, and a thou.-

sand too large a number. Every one will allow that the fi1st
gnumbeI is too small to possess the sentiments, be influenced
by the inte1ests of the people, 01 secure against corruption;
a thousand would be too numerous to be capable of deliber-
ating.

To determine whether the number of representatives pro-
posed by this Constitution is sufficient, it is proper to
examine the qualifications which this house ought to possess,
in order to exercise their power discreetly for the happiness
of the people. The idea that naturally suggests itself to our
minds, when we speak of representatives, is, that they
resemble those they represent. They should be a true pic-
ture of the people, possess a knowledge of their circum-
stances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and
be disposed to seek tl1ei1 true interests The knowledge
necessai y for the rep1esentative of a free peOple IlOt only
comprehends extensive political and commercial information,
such as is acquired by men of refined education, who have
leisure to attain to high degrees of improvement, but it
should also comprehend that kind of acquaintance with the
common concerns and occupations of the people, which men
of the middling class of life are, in general, more competent
to than those of a superior class. To understand the true
commercial interests of a country, not only requires just ideas
of the general commerce of the world, but also, and princi-
pally, a knowledge of the productions of your own country, ‘
and their value, what your soil is capable of producing, the
nature of your manufactures, and the capacity of the coun-
try to increase both. To exercise the power of laying
taxes, duties, and excises, with discretion, requires some-
thing more than an acquaintance with the abstruse parts of
the system of finance. It calls for a knowledge of the cir-
‘cumstanc es and ability of the people in general —a discern-
ment 110w the burdens imposed will bear upon the different
classes.

Flom these observations results this conclusion — that the
number of representatives should be so large, as that, while
it embraces the men of the first class, it should admit those
of the middling class of life. I am convinced that this gov-

246 DEB ATES. [M. SMITH.

ernment is so constituted that the represc ntatives will
gene1ally be composed of the fi1st class 111 the community,
which I shall distinguish by the name of the natural aristoc-
racy of the count1y.I do not mean to give offence by
using this te1m. I am sensible this idea IS t1e21ted by many
gentlemen as chimerical. I shall be asked what 18 meant by
the natural aristocracy, and told that no such distinction of
classes of men exists amomr us. It 1s true, it is our singulal
felicity that we have no legal 01 he1edit211y distinctions of
this kind; but still the1e a1e Ieal differences. Evuy society
natu1ally divides itself into classes. The Author of nature
has bestowed on some greate1 capacities than others; birth,
education, talents, and wealth, c1eate distinctions among
men as visible, and of as much influence, as titles, sta1s, and
ga1te1s. In eve1y society, men of this class will command a
superior degree of respect; and if the government is so c011—
stituted as to admit but few to exercise the powers of it, it
will, according to the natural course of things, be in their
hands. Men in the middling class, who are qualified as
representatives, will not be so anxious to be chosen as those
of the first. When the number is so small, the office will be
highly elevated and distinguished; the style in which the
members live will probably be high; circumstances of this
kind will render the place of a representative not a desirable
one to sensible, substantial men, who have been used to
walk in the plain and frugal paths of life.

Besides, the influence of the great will generally enable
,them to succeed in elections. It will be difficult to combine
a district of country containing thirty or forty thousand in-
habitants,—frame your election laws as you please,—in
any other character, unless it be in one of conspicuous mili-

ta1y, popula1, civil, 01 legal talents. The g1eat easily fo1 n1
associations; the poo1 and middling class b'fo1m them with
difficulty. If the elections be by plu1ality,—as p1obal1ly
will be the case in this state, —it is almost ce1tain none but
the great will be chosen, for they easily unite their interests:
the common people will divide, and their divisions will be
promoted by the others. There will be scarcely a chance of
tl1ei1 uniting in any other but some g1eat man, unless in
some popular demagogue, who will p1obably be destitute of
principle. A substantial yeoman, of sense and discernment,
will hardly ever be chosen. From these remarks,.it appears

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. 2417

that the government will fall into the hands of the few and
the great. This will be a government of oppression. I do
not mean to declaim against the great, and charge them i11—
discriminately with want of principle and honesty. The
same passions and prejudices govern all men. The circum-
stances in Which men are placed in a great measure give a
cast to the human character. Those in middling circum-
stances have less temptatlon , they are inclined by habit, and
the company With whom they assodate, to set bounds to
their passions and appetites. If this is not sufficie11,t the
want of means to gratify them will be a restraint: they are
obliged to employ their time in their respective callings;
hence the substantial yeomanry of the country are more tem-
perate, of better morals, and less ambition, than the great.
,The latter do not feel for the poor and middling class; the
reasons are obvious—they me not obliged to use the same
pains and labor to procule propelty as the othe1. They feel not
the 1nconveniences alising f1om the payment of small sums.
The gleat considel themselves above the common people,
entitled to more respect, do not associate with them; they
fancy themselves to have a right of preeminence in every
thing. In short, they possess the same feelings, and are
under the influence of the same motives, as an hereditary
nobility. I know the idea that such a distinction exists in
this country is ridiculed by some; but I am not the less
apprehensive of danger from their influence 011 this account.
Such distinctions exist all the world over, have been taken
notice of by all writers on free government, and are founded
in the nature of things. It has been the principal care of
free governments to guard against the encroachments of the
great. Common observation and experience prove the exist-
ence of such distinctions. Will any one say that there
does not exist in this country the pride of family, of wealth,
of talents, and that they do not command influence and
respect among the common people? Congress, in their
address to the inhabitants of the province of Quebec, in 1775,
state this distinction in the following forcible words, quoted
from the Marquis Beccaria: “In every human society there
is an essay continually tending to confe1 on one pa1t the
might of power and happiness, and to reduce the other to
rhea extreme of weakness and misery. The intent of good
laws is t( oppose this effort, and to difluse their influence

‘243‘ DEBATES. [M. SMITH

universally and equally.” We ought to guard against the
government being placed in the hands of this class. They
cannot have that sympathy With their constituents which is
necessary to connect them closely to their interests. Being
in the habit of profuse living, they will be profuse in the
public expenses. They find no difficulty in paying their
taxes, and therefore do not feel public burdens. Besides, if
they govern, they will enjoy the emoluments of the govern-
ment. The middling class, from their frugal habits, and
feeling themselves the public burdens, will be careful how
they increase them.

But I may be asked, Would you exclude the first class in
the community from any share in legislation P I answer, By
no means. They would be factious, discontented, and con~
stantly disturbing the government. It would also be unjust.
They have their liberties to protect, as well as others, and the
largest share of property. But my idea is, that the Consti-
tution should be so framed as to admit this class, together
with a sufficient number of the middling class to control
them. You will then combine the abilities and honesty of
the community, a proper degree of information, and a dispo-
sition to pursue the public good. A representative body,
composed principally of respectable yeomanry, is the best
possible security to liberty. When the interest of this part
of the community is pursued, the-public good is pursued,
because the body of every nation consists of this class, and
because the interest of both the rich and the poor are in-
volved in that of the middling class. No burden can be laid
on the poor but what will sensibly affect the middling class. ’
Any law rendering property insecure would be injurious to
them. When, therefore, this class in society pursue their
own interest, they promote that of the public, for it is in-
volved in it.

In so small a number of representatives, there is great
danger from corruption and combination. A great politician
has said that every man has his price. I hope this is not
true in all its extent ; but I ask the gentleman to inform me
what government there is in which it has not been prac-
tised. Notwithstanding all that has been said of the defects
in the constitution of the ancient confederacies in the Gre-
cian republics, their destruction is to be imputed more to
this cause than to any imperfection in their forms of govern-

M. swam] NEW YORK. 249

ment. This was the deadly poison that effected their dis
solution. This is an extensive country, increasing in pOpu-
lation and growing in consequence. Very many lucrative
offices Will be in the grant of the government, which will be
objects of avarice and ambition. How easy will it be to
gain over a sufficient number, in the bestowment of offices,
to promote the views and the purposes of those who grant
them! Foreign corruption is also to be guarded against.
A system of corruption is known to be the system of govern—
ment in Europe. It is practised without blushing , and we
may lay it to our account, it will be attempted amongst 11s.
The most effectual as well as natural security against this is a
strong democratic branch in the legislature, frequently chosen,
including in it a number of the substantial, sensible yeomanry
of the country. Does the House of Representatives answer
this description? I confess, to me they hardly wear the
complexion of a democratic branch; they appear the mere
shadow of representation. The Whole number, in both
houses, amounts to ninety-one; of these forty-six make a
quorum; and twenty-four of those, being secured, may carry
any point. Can the liberties of three millions of people be
securely trusted in the hands of twenty—four men? Is it
prudent to commit to so small a ”number the decision of the
great questions which will come before them? Reason
revolts at the idea. ,

The honorable gentleman from New York has said, that
sixty- -five members in the House of Repiesentatives are suf-
ficient for the present situation of the country , and, taking
it for granted that they will 1nc1 ease as one for thirty
thousand, in twenty-five years they will amount to two hun-
dred. It is admitted, by this observation, that the number
fixed in the Constitutibn is not sufficient without it is aug—
n1ented.lt 1s not declared that an increase shall be made,
but is left at the discretion of the legislature, by the gen-
tleman’ s own concession , therefore . the Constitution is
imperfect. We certainly ought to fix, in the Constitution,
those things which are essential to liberty. If any thinr
falls under this description, it is the number of the legisla—
ture. To say, as this gentleman does, that our security23 is to
depend upon the spirit. of the peOple, who will be watchful
if their liberties, and not suffer them to be infringed. is
absurd. It would equally prove that we might adopt anv

VOL. II. 32

250 DEBATES. [ll]. SMITH.

fo1 n1 of government. I believe, we1e we cto create a despot.
he would not immediately da1e to act the ty1ant; but it
would not be long before he would (lest1oy the spi1it of the
- people, or the peOple would destroy him. It 0111 people ha1e

a high sense of libe1ty, the gove1n1nent should be con-
genial to this spirit, calculated to cherish the love of libert1,
while yet it had sufficient fo1ce to 1"est1ai11 licentiousness.
Government operates upon the spirit of the people, as well
as the spi1it of the people operates upon it; and if the 11 are
1101. conformable to each otl1e1, the one 01' the othe 1' will pre-
1ail. In a less time than t—wenty —five years, the go1c111-
ment will receive its tone. What the spirit of the country
may be at the end of that period, it is impossible to foretell.
Our duty IS to frame a government friend|1 to liberty and the
rights of mankind, which will tend to cherish and cultivate
11 t3love of libelty among 0111 citizens. If this govennnent
becomes oppressive, it 11ill be by degrees: it will aim at. its
end by disseminating sentiments of government opposite to
r(-1publicanism, and proceed from step to step in depriving
the people of a share in the government. A recollection of
the change that has taken place in the minds of many in this
country in the course of a few years, ought to put us 011 our
guard. Many, who are ardent advocates for the new sys-
tem, reprobate republican principles as chimerical, and such
as ought to be expelled from society. Who would have
thought, ten years ago, that the very men, who risked their
lives and fortunes in support of republican principles, would
now treat them as the fictions of fancy? A few years ago,
we foue'ht for liberty; we framed a general government on
tree principles; we placed the state. legislatures, 111 11l1on1
the people have a full and a lai1 rep1esentation, bet11 (11111
Congress and the people. \Ve were then, it is true, too
cautious, and too much restricted the powers of the general
government. But now it is proposed to go into the contra-
ry, and a more dangerous extreme—to remove all barriers,
to give the new government free access to our pockets, and
ample command of our persons, and that without providing
for a genuine and fair representation of the people. No one
can say What the progress of the change of sentiment may
be in twenty—five years. The same men who now cry 111)
the necessity of an energetic government, to induce a com-
pliance with this system, may, in much less time, reprobate

-

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 25]

this in as severe terms as they now do the Confederation,
and may as strongly urge the necessity of going as far be-
yond this as this is beyond the Confederation. Men of this
class are increasing: they have influence, talents, and indus~
try. It is time to form a barrier against. them. And while
we are Willing to establish a govermnent adequate to the'
purposes of the Union, let us be careful to establish it on the
broad basis of equal liberty

Mr. HAMILTON then 1esumed his argument. \Vhen,
said he, I had the honor to address the committee yesterday,
1 gave a history ofthe circumstances which attended the Con-
vention, when forming the plan before you. I endeavored to
point out to you the principles of accommodation 011 which
this arrangement was made, and to show that the contend—
ing interests of the states led them to establish the rep1e-
sentation as it now stands. In the second pl 11 e, I attempted
to prove that, in point of number, the rep1esentation would
be pe1fectly secure. Sir, no man agrees mo1e perfectly than
myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen con-
tend. I aglee that the1e should be a bload democratic
branch in the national legislature. But this mattel, si1,
depends on circumstancesb It is impossible, in the first in-
stance, to be precise and exact with regard to the number;
and it is equally impossible to determine to what point it
may be proper in future to increase it. On this groundI
am disposed to acquiesce. In my reasonings on this subject
of government, I rely more on the interests and opinions of
men, than on any speculative parchment provisions What-
ever. I have found that constitutions are more or less
excellent as they are more or less agreeable to the natural
operation of things. I am, therefore, disposed not to dwell
long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes
and forms ; but to adopt a system whose principles have been
sanctioned by experience, adapt it to the real state of our
country, and depend on probable reasonings for its operation
and lesult. I contend that sixty-five and twenty— —siX, in two
undies, afford pe1fect security, in the present state of things;
>and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in
the contemplation of the general Convention, will leave not
an apprehension of danger in the most timid and suspicious
mind. It Will be the interest of the large states to increase
the representation. This will be the standing instruction to

'25}? DEBATES. [HAMILTONo

their delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the members of
Congress will be interested not to increase the number, as
it will diminish their relative influence. In all their reason-
ing upon this subject, there seems to be this fallacy: They
suppose that the representative will have no motive of action,
‘ on the one side, but a sense of duty; or on the other, but
corruption. They do not reflect that he is to return to the
community; that he is dependent on the will of the peOple,
and that it cannot be his interest to Oppose their wishes.
Sir, the general sense of the people will regulate the conduct
of their representatives. I admit that there are exceptions
to this rule: there are certain conjunctures, when it may be
necessa1y and proper to disregard the opinions which the
majority of the people have formed. But, in the 0reneral
comse of things, the popular views, and even p1ejudices, will
direct the actions of the 1ule1s.

All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a
great degree, on opinion. In free republics, it is most pecu—
liarly the case. 111 these, the Will of the people makes the
essential principle of the government; and the laws which
control the community receive their tone and spirit from the
public wishes. It is the fortunate situation of our country,
that the minds of the peOple are exceedingly enlightened
and 1efined. He1e, then, we may expect the laws to be
plopo1tionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy
and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the most
intimate confo1mity between the views of the 1ep1esenta
tive and his constituent. If the general voice of the peoplt
be fo1 an inc1ease, it undoubtedly must take place. They
have it in thei1 powe1 to instruct their representatives; and
the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enr
' join it also upon them. Sir, if I believed that the number
would remain at sixty-five, I confess I should give my vote
for an amendment, though in a different form from the one
ploposed.

The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twenty thou-
sand. Iwould ask by what rule or lea soning it is deter-
mined that one man is a bette1 representative for twenty
than thirty thousand. At present we have three millions of
people; in twenty-five years, we shall have six millions;
and in forty years, nine millions. And this is a short period,
as it relates to the existence of states. Here, then, accord~

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 6253

ing to the ratio of one forthirty thousand, we shall have, in
forty years, three hundred representatives. If this be true,
and if this be a safe representation, why be dissatisfied :’
\Vhy embarrass the Constitution with amendments that are
merely speculative and useless? I agree with the gentle-
man, that a very small number might give some color for
suspicion. I acknowledge that ten would be unsafe; on
the other hand, a thousand would be too numerous. But I
ask him, Why will not ninety-one be an adequate and safe
representation? This, at present, appears to be the proper
medium. Besides, the President of the United States will
be himself the representative of the people. From the com-
petition that ever subsists between the branches of govern-
ment, the President will be induced to protect their rights,
Whenever they are invaded by either branch. On whatever
side We View this subject, We discover various and powerful
checks to the encroachments of Congress. The true and
permanent interests of the members are opposed to corrup—
-t.ion Their number is vastly too large for easy combination.
The rivalship between the houses will forever prove an in~
superable obstacle. The people have an obvious and pow
1erlul protection in their state gove1rrments. Should any
:thing dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual
observation will be capable of forming and conducting plans
of regular opposition. Can We suppoSe the people’s love of
liberty will not, under the incitement of their legislative
leaders, be roused into resistance,vand the madness of tyran-
ny be extinguished at a blow? Sir, the danger is too dis-
tant; it is beyond all rational calculations.

It has bee-11 observed,‘by an honorable gentleman, that a
pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most
perfect government. Experience has proved that no po-
sition in politics is more false than this. The ancient
democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated,
never possessed one feature of good govemment. Their
very character was tyranny , their figure, delormity. When
they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungoverna-
ble mob, not .01in incapable of deliberation, but prepared for
every enormituy In these assemblies, the enemies of the
1 people brought forward their plans of ambition systematically.
The) were boppOsed by their enemies of another party , and
it became a matter of contingency, whether the people sun-

'22

254‘ DEB ATES. [HAMILTON

jected themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant or by
another.

It was remarked yesterday, that a numerous representa-
tion was necessary to obtain the confidence of the people.
This is not generally true. The confidence of the people
will easily be gained by a good administration. This is the
true touchstone. I could illustrate the positionby a variety
of historical examples, both ancient and modern. ln Sparta,
the ephori were a body of magistrates, instituted as a check
upon the senate, and representing the people. They con-
sisted of only five men; but they were able to protect their
rights, and therefore enjoyed their confidence and attach-
ment. In Rome, the people were represented by three
tribrrrres, who were afterwards increased to ten. Every one
acquainted with the history of that republic will recollect
110w powerful a check to the senatorial errcroachrnents this
small body proved ; how unlimited a confidence was placed in
them by the people, whose guardians they were; and to what
a conspicuous station in the government their influence a
length elevated the plebeiarrs. Massachusetts has three
hundred represent 1trres, New York has sixty—five. Have
the people in this state less confidence in their representa-
tion than the people ol that? Delaware has twenty-one.
Do the inhabitants of New York feel a higher confidence
than those of Delaware? 1 have stated these examples to
prore that the gentleman’ s principle 1s not just. The popu-
la1 confidence depends on circumstances Very distinct from
considerations of number Probably the public attachment
is more strongly secured by a train of prosperous events,
which are the result of wise deliberation and vigorous exe
cution, and to which large bodies are much less competent
than small ones. If the:3 representative conducts with pro
priety, he will necessarily enjoy the good—Will of the con-
stituent. It appears, then, if my reasoning be just, that the
clause 1s per lectly proper, upon the principles of the gentle
man who contends for the amendment; as there rs in it the
greatest degree of present security, and a moral certainty
ot an increase equal to our utmost wishes.

It has been further, by the gentlemen in the opposition,
observed, that a large representation is necessary to urrder—
st 1nd the interests of the people. _This principle is by no
n1e1rrs true in the extent to which the gentlemen seem to

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. . 255

carry it. I would ask, Why may not a man understand the
interests of thirty as Well as of twenty.P The position ap-
pears to be 'made upon the unfounded presumption that
a]; the interests of all parts of the community must be repre-
sented. No idea is more erroneous than this. Only such
interests are proper to be 1ep1esented as are involved in the
powers of the general gove'.1nment These interests come
completely unde1 the observation of one or a few men , and
the requisite 111f01mat10n is by no means augmented 1n plo-
portion to the inc1ease of number. What are the objects
of the govelnment. P Commerce, taxation, &c. In orde1 to
comprehend the inte1ests of commelce, is it necessary to
know how wheat 1s raised, and 111 what p1 oport10n it is pro-
duced in one district and in another? By no means. Neither
is this species of knowledge necessary in general calculations
upon the subject of taxation. The information necessary
for these purposes is that which is open to every intelligent
inquirer, and of which five men may be as perfectly posseSsed
as fifty. In royal governments, there are usually particular
men to Whom the business of taxation is committed. These
men have the forming of systems of finance, and the regu-
lation of the revenue. '1 do not mean to commend this prac—
, tice. lt proves, however, this point— that a few individuals
may be competent to these objects, and that large numbers
are not necessary to perfection in the science of taxation.
But grant, for a moment, that this minute and local knowl—
edge the gentlemen contend for is necessary; let us see if,
under the new Constitution, it will not probably be found in
the representation. The natural and proper mode of holding
elections will be, to divide the state into districts, in propor-
tion to the number to be elected. This state will conse-
quently be divided, at first, into six. One man from each
district will probably possess all the knowledge gentlemen
can desire. Are the senators of this state more ignorant of
the interests of the people than the Assembly? Have they
not ever enjoyed their confidence as much. 9 Yet, instead of
six dist1icts, they are elected in four; and the chance of
their being collected from the smaller divisions of the state
consequently diminishes. Their number is but twenty-four:
and their powers are coextensive with those of the As-
sembly, and reach objects which are most dear to the people
'—life, liberty, and property.

'12 v 6 DEBATES. [HAMILTON

Sir, we hear constantly a great deal which is rather cal-
culated to awake our passions, and create prejudices, than to
conduct us to the truth, and teach us our real interests. I
do not suppose this to be the design of the gentlemen. Why,
then, are we told so often of an 211istocracy. P For my part,
I hardly know the meaning of this word, as it is applied. If
all we hear be true, this government is really a very bad one.
But who are the aristocracy among us? \Vhere do we find
men elevated to 21 perpetual rank above their fellow-citizens,
and possessing powers entirely independent of them ? The
arguments of the gentlemen only go to prove that there are
men who are rich, men who are poor, some who are wise,
and others who are not; that, indeed, every distinguished
man is an aristocrat. This reminds me of a description of
the aristocratsI have seen in a late publication styled the
Federal Farmer. The author reckons in the aristocracy all
governors of states, members of Congress, chief magistrates,
and all officers of the militia. This description, I presume
to say, is ridiculous. The image is a phantom. Dees the
new government render a rich man more eligible than a poor
one 5’ No. It requires no such qualification. It is bottomed
on the broad and equal principle of your state constitution.

Sir, if the people have it in their option to elect their
most meritorious men, is this to be considered as an objec-
tion ? Shall the Constitution oppose their wishes, and abridge
their most invaluable privilege? While property continues
to he pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of in-
formation pervades the community, the tendency of the
people’s suffrages will be to elevate merit even from ob-
scurity. As riches increase and accumulate in few hands,
as luxury prevails in society, virtue will be 1n a greater de-
gree considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and
_ the tendency of things will be to depart from the republican
' standard. This IS the real disposition of human nature . it
is what neither the honorable member nor myself can correct;
It is a common misfortune, that awaits our state constitution
as well as all others.

There is an advantage incident to large districts of election,
w hieh perhaps the gentlemen, amidst all their apprehensions
of influence and blihely, have not adterted to. In large dis-
trit ts, the corruption of the electo1s is much more difficult;
combinations for the pill poses of intrigue me less easily

HAMILTON] NEW YORK. 257

formed; factions and cabals are little known. In a small
dist1ict, wealth will have a more complete influence, because
the people 111 the vicinity of a gleat man are mo1e immedi-
ately his dependants, and because this influence has lewel
objects to act upon. It has been rema1ked, that it would be
disagreeable to the middle class of' men to go to the seat
of the new government. lf this be so, the difficulty will be
enhanced by the gentleman’s proposal. lf his argument be
true, it proves that the larger the representation is, the less
will be your chance of having it filled. But it appears to me
frivolous to bring forward such arguments as these. It has
answered no other purpose than to induce me, by way of
’jreply, to enter into discussion, which I consider as useless,
and not applicable to our subject.

It is a harsh doctrine that men grow wicked in proportion
as they improve and enlighten their minds. Experience has
by no means justified us in the supposition that there is more
virtue in one class of men than in another. Look through
the rich and the poor of the community, the learned and the
ignorant. Where does virtue predominate? The difference
indeed consists, not in the quantity, but kind, of vices which
are incident to various classes; and here the advantage of
character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably
more favorable to the prosperity of the state than those of.
the indigent, and partake less of moral depravity.

After all, sir, we must submit to this idea, that the true
principle of a republic 1s, that the people should choose whom
they please to govern- them Representation 1s imperfect 1n
proportion as the current of popular favo1 1s checked. This
great source of free govelnment, popular election, should be
perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed.
Where this p11n01ple lS adhered to; whe1e, 1n the organiza-
tion of the government, the legislative, executive, and-judicial
branches are rendered distinct; where, again, the legislature
IS divided into separate houses, and the operations of each
are controlled by various checks and balances, and, above all,
by the vigilance and Weight of the state governments, -—to
talk of tyranny, and the subversion of our liberties, is- to speak
the language of enthusiasm. This balance between the‘na-
tional and state governments ought to be dwelt on with
peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost 1m1po1tanr e. It
fo1 ms a double security to the people. If one encroaches on

6‘

VOL. II. 0

258 DEBATES. ' [HAMILT )N.

their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the other.
Indeed, they will both be prevented from overpassing their
constitutional limits, by a certain rivalship, which will ever
subsist between them. I am persuaded that a firm union is
as necessary to perpetuate our liberties as it is to make us
respectable; and experience will probably prove that the
national government will be as natural a guardian of our
freedom as the state legislature themselves.

Suggestions, sir, of an extraordinary nature, have been
frequently thrown out in the course of the present political
controversy. It give 5 me pain to dwell 011 topics of this kind,
and I wisli they might be dismissed. We have been told
that the old Coirfederation has proved inefficacious, only be-
cause intriguing and powerful men, aiming at a revolution,
have been forever instigating the people, and rendering them
disaffected with it. This, sir, is a false insinuation. The
thing is impossible. lwill venture to assert, that 110 com-
bination of designing men under heaven will be capable of
making a government unpopular which is in its principles a
wise and good one, and vigorous in its operations.

The Corriedmation was bframed amidst the agitation and
tumults of society. It was composed of unsound materials,
put together in haste. Men of intelligence discOvered the
feebleness of the structure, in the first stages of its existence;
but the great body of the people, too much engrossed with
their distresses to contemplate any but the immediate causes
ofthem, were ignorant of the defects of their constitution.
But when the dangers of war were removed, they saw clearly
what they had suffered, and what they had yet to suffer, from
a feeble form of government. There was no need of dis
cerning men to convince the people of their unhappy situa-
tion; the complaint was coextensive with the evil, and both
were common to all classes of the community. We have
been told that the Spirit of patriotism and love of liberty are
almost extinguished among the people, and that it has become
a prevailing doctrine that republican principles ought. to be
heated out of the world. Sir, I am confident that such re-
marks as these are rathe1 occasioned by the heat of a1gu-
merrt than by a cool conviction of their truth and justice. bAs
far as my experience has extendtd I have hea1d no such
doctrine , no1 have I discovered any diminution of rega1d for
those rights and liberties, in defence of which the people

a...

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. (259

have fought and suffered. There have been, undoubtedly,
some men who have had speculative doubts on the subject of
government; but the principles of republicanism are founded
on too firm a basis to be shaken by a few speculative and
skeptical reasoners. Our error has been of a very different
kind. We have erred through excess of caution, and a zeal
false and impracticable. Our counsels have been destitute
of consistency and stability. I am flattered with the hope,

sir, that we have now found a cure for the evils under which
; we have so long labored. I trust that the proposed Consti-

l tution affords a genuine specimen of representative and 1e-

publican government, and that it will answer, in an eminent
degree, all the beneficial purposes of society.

The Hon. MELANCTON SMITH rose, and observed,
that the gentleman might have spared many of his remarks
in answer to the ideas he had advanced. The only way to _
remedy and correct the faults in the proposed Constitution
was, he imagined, to increase the representation and limit
the, powers. He admitted that no precise number could be
fixed upon. His object only was to, augment the number in

. such a degree as to render the government more favorable to

liberty. The gentleman had charged his argument, that it
would be the i11te1est of Congress to diminish the number of
representatives, as being puerile. It was only made in answer
to another of the gentleman’ s, which he thought equally weak
—that it would be their Interest to increase it. It appea1ed

.to him, he said, evident that the relative interests of the

states would not be in the least degree increased by aug«
menting the numbers. The honorable member had assured
the committee that the states would be checks upon the
general government, and had pledged himself to point out
and demonstrate the operation of these checks. F01 his
own part, he could see no possibility of checking a govern-
ment ol independent powers, which extended to all objects
and resources without limitation. What he lamented was,
that no constitutional checks were provided—such checks
as would not leave the exercise of government to the operation
of causes which, in their nature, are variable and uncertain

The honorable member had observed, that the confidence
of the people was not necessarily connected With the number
of their rulers, and had cited the ephori of Sparta, and the
tribunes in Rome, as examples. But it ought to be con-

260 DEBATES. [LANSING

sidered, that, in those places, the people were to contend
with a body of hereditary nobles; they would, therefore,
naturally have confidence in a few men who were their
leade1s 1n the constant struggle 101 liberty. The compari-
son between the replesentations of sevelal states did not
better apply. New York had but sixty-five representatives
in Assembly. But because sixty-five was a proper repre-
sentation of two hundred and forty thousand, did it follow
- that it was also sufficient for three millions? The state
legislatures had not the powers of the general government,
and were not competent to those important regulations
which might endanger liberty.

The gentleman, continued Mr. Smith, had ridiculed his
idea of an aristocracy, and had entered into a definition of
the wor.d He himself agreed to this definition, but the dis-
pute was not of w01ds, but things. He was convinced that
in ev ely society there were certain men exalted above the
1est. These men he did not consider as destitute of morality
or virtue. He only insisted that they could not feel sympa-
thetically the wants of the people.

The Hon. Mr. LANSING said that, in the course of the _
observations made on the paragraph under consideration, it
had been shown that the democratic branch ought to possess
the feelings of the people, and be above corruption. It was,
therefore, with propriety contended that the House of Rep-
resentatives ought to be large. This had been objected to,
he said, because it was difficult to ascertain the precise
number proper for this end. But though we could not al-
ways hit the exact medium, yet we could generally avoid the
extremes. Allowing that it 'was the interest of the larger
states to increase the representation, yet. it would be im-
prudent to trust a matter of such infinite importance to
possibilities, or the uncertain operations of interest. He
said, we had it now in our power to fix and provide for the
operations of this government and we ought to embrace
the opp01tunity. An honorable gentleman,a had said. that
the. state of New Ymk had t1usted her liberties to a few men.
But was this a reason why the rights of the United States
should be submitted to an equal number? The representa-
tives of New York, in Assembly, were chosen from all parts
of the state ; they were intimately connected with and de-
pendent on-the people. 111 the general government, they

CLINTON.] NEW YORK. 261

were to be selected from the superior class of citiz 5118, and
subject to little or no control. Would it be prudent, said he,
to trust the affairs of - this extensive continent to a body of
men, forty-six‘of whom would be competent to pass laws,
and twenty-four of these a majority? The House of Corn-
mons of Great Britain consisted of more than eight times
the number, and yet that house had been frequently cor-
rupted. How much more easily might so small a body as
the Congress be infected!

His Excellency, Gov. CLINTON. I rise, Mr. Chair-
man, to make a few observations, with a View to obtain in-
formation, and to discover on which side of this important
question the truth rests. I have attended, with pleasure, to
the gentlemen who have spoken before me. They appear,
however, to have omitted some considerations, which have
tended to convince my mind, that the representation in
Congress ought to be more comprehensive and full than is
proposed by this Constitution. It is said, that the repre-
sentation of this state in the legislature is smaller than the
representation of the United States will be in the general
government. Hence it is inferred that the federal govern-
ment, which, it is said, does not embrace more interesting
powers than that of the states, will be more favorable to the
liberties of the people, on the principle that safety consists
in numbers. This appears plausible at first view; but if we
examine it, we shall discover it to be only plausible. The
cases, indeed, are so different, as to admit of little Com-
parison; and this dissimilarity depends on the difference of
extent of territory. Each state is but a narrow district,
compared with the United States. The situation of its com-
merce, its agriculture, and the system of its resources, will
be proportionably more uniform and simple. To a knowl-
edge of these circumstances, therefore, every member of
the state legislature will be in some degree competent. He
Will have a considerable share of information necessary for
enacting laws'which are to operate in every part of the
state. The easy communication with a large number of
representatives, from the minute districts of the state, will
increase hisacquaintance with the public wants. All the
representatives, having the same advantages, will furnish a
mass of information, which will be the securest defence from
error How different will be the situation of the general

2633. DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

government! The body of the legislature will be totally
unacquainted with all those local circumstances of any par-
ticular state, which mark the proper objects of laws, and
especially of taxation. A few men, possessed of but a very
general knowledge of these objects, must alone furnish Con-
gress with that. information 011 which they are to act; and
011 these few men, in the most interesting transactions, must
they rely. Do not these considerations afford reasons for
an enlargement of the representation?

Another argument may be suggested to show, that there
will be more safety in the state than in the federal govern-
ment. 111 the state, the legislators, being generally known,
and under the perpetual observation of their fellow—citizens,
feel strongly the check resulting from the facility of com-
munication and discovery. In a small territory, maladmin-
istration is easily corrected, and designs unfavorable to
liberty frustrated and punished. But in large confederacies,
the alarm excited by small and gradual encroachments rarely
extends to the distant members, or inspires a general spirit
of resistance. When we take a View of the United States.
we find them embracing intelests as various as their telri-
tory is extensive. Theil habits, theil ploductions, their
resources, and their political and commercial regulations, are
as different as those of any nation upon earth. A general
law, therefore, which might be well calculated for Georgia.
might operate most disadvantageously and c1uelly upon
New York Howevel, I only suggest these observations,
101 the purpose of hearing them sat1sfactorily answered I
am open to conviction, and if my objections can be 1emoved,
I shall be ready frankly to acknowledge their weakness.

The Hon. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, 1 rise to
take notice of the observation of the honorable member
from Ulster. I imagine the objections he has stated are
susceptible of a complete and satisfactory refutation. But,
before I proceed to this, I shall attend to the arguments ad-
vanced by the gentleman from Albany and Duchess. These
arguments have been frequently urged, and much confidence
has been placed in their strength. The danger of corrup-
tion has been dwelt upon Will] peculiar emphasis, and pre-
sented to our View in the most heightened and unnatural
coloring. Events merely possible have been magnified, by
distempered imagination, into inevitable realities; and the

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 263

most distant and doubtful conjectures have been fo1med into
a serious and infallible prediction. In the same spirit, the
most fallacious calculations have been made. The lowest
possible quorum has been contemplated, as the number to
transact important business; and a majority of these to de»
cide in all cases on questions of infinite moment. Allowing,
for the present, the propriety and truth of these apprehen-
sions, it would be easy, in comparing the two Constitutions,
to prove that the chances of corruption under the new are
much fewer than those to which the old is exposed. Under
the old Confederation, the important powers of declaring
war, making peace, &c., can be exercised by nine states.
On the presumption that the smallest constitutional number
Will deliberate and decide, those interesting powers will be
committed to fewer men under the ancient than under the
new government. In the former, eighteen members, in the
latter, not less than twenty—four, may determine all great
questions. Thus, on the principles of the gentlemen, the
fairer prospect of safety is clearly visible in the new govern-
ment. That we may have the fullest conviction of the truth
of this position, it ought to be suggested, as a decisive argu-
ment, that it will ever be the interest of the several states
to maintain, under the new government, an ample represen—
tation; for, as every member has a vote, the relative influence
and authority of each state will be in proportion to the num-
ber of representatiVes she has in Congress. There is not,
therefore, a shadow of probability that the number of acting
members, in the general legislature, will be ever reduced to
a bare quorum; especially as the expense of their support is
to be defrayed from a federal treasury. But, under the ex-
lsting Confederation, each state has but one vote. It will
be a matter of indifference, on the score of influence, whether
she delegates two or six representatives; and the mainte-
nance of them, forming a striking article 1n the state expendi—
tures, will forever prove a capital inducement to retain or
withdraw from the federal legislatures those delegates which
her selfishness may too often consider as superfluous.

Thele is another source of colruption, in the old govern-
ment, which the proposed plan 1s happily calculatt d to 1eme-
dy. The concu1rence of nine states, as has been observed,
is necessary to pass resolves the most important, and on
which the safety of the public may depend. If these nine

2641 DEBATES. . [HAMILTON.

states are at. any time assembled, a foreign enemy, by divid-
ing a state, and gaining over and silencing a single member,
may frustrate the most indispensable plan of national policy,
and totally prevent a measure essential to the welfare or
existence of the empire. Here, then, we find a radical,
dangerous defect, which will forever embarrass and obstruct
the machine of government, and suspend our fate on the
uncertain virtue of an individual. What a difference be-
tween the old and new Constitution strikes our view! In
the one, corruption must embrace a majority; in the other,
her poison, administered to a single man, may render the
efforts of a majority totally vain. This mode of corruption
is still more dangerous, as its operations are more secret and
imperceptible. The exertions of active villany are com-
monly accompanied with circumstances which tend to its
own exposure; but this negative kind of guilt has so many
plausible apologies as almost to elude suspicion.

In all reasonings on the subject of corruption, much use
has been made of the examples furnished by the British
House of Commons. Many mistakes have arisen from falla-
cious comparisons between our government and theirs. It.
is time that the real state of this matter should be explained.
By far the greatest part. of the House of Commons is com-
posed of representatives of towns or boroughs. These towns
had anciently -no voice in Parliament; but on the extension
of commercial wealth and influence, they were admitted to
a seat. Many of them are in the possession and gift of the
king; and, from their dependence on him, and the destruc-
tion of the right of free election, they are stigmatized with
the appellation of rotten boroughs.* This is the true source
of the corruption which has so long excited the severe ani-
madversion of zealous politicians and patriots. But the
knights of the shire, who form another branch of the House
of Commons, and Who are chosen from the body of the
counties they represent, have been generally esteemed a
virtuous and incorluptible set of men. I appeal, si1, to the
history of that house: this will show us that the rights of
the people have ever been safely tlusted to their protection;

4“ By the British Parliamentary Reform Act, 9th June, 1833,56 rotten boroughs
have been disfmnchised; 30 others out down to a single member; 19 new bor
oughs of one member each, and 6'2 new county members, added. Total number
of 1”members, 655.

HAMILTON. J . NEW YORK. 265

that they have been the ablest bulwarks of the British com-
monS' , and that, in the conflict of parties, by throwing their
weight into one scale or the other, they have u111fo1mly sup-
ported and strengthened the constitutional claims of the
people. Notwithstanding the cry of cor1uptlon that has
been perpetually raised against the House of Commons, it
has been found that that house, sitting at first Without any
constitutional authority, became, at length, an essential
member of the legislature, and have since, by regular grada-
tions, acquired new and important accessions of privilege;
that they have, on numerous occasions, impaired the prerog-
ative, and limited the monarchy.

An honorable member from Duchess (Mr. Smith) has
observed, that the delegates from New York (for example)
can have very little information of the local circumstances of
Georgia 01' South Carolina, except f1om the representatives
of those states; and 011 this ground insists upon the expedi-
ency of an enlargement of the representation ; since, other-
wise, the majority must rely too much on the information of
a few. In order to determine whether there IS any weight
in this reasoning, let us consider the powers of the national
government, and compare them with the objects of state
legislation. The powers of the new government are general,
and calculated to embrace the aggregate interests of the
Union, and the general interest of each state, so far as it
stands in relation to the Whole. The object of the state
governments is to provide for their internal interests, as un-
connected with the United States, and as composed of
minute parts or districts. A particular knowledge, therefore,
of the local circumstances of any state, as they may vary in
different districts, is unnecessary for the federal representa-
tive. As he is not to represent the interests or local wants
of the county of Duchess or Montgomery, neither is it
necessary that he should be acquainted with their particular
resources. But in the state governments, as the laws regard
the interest of the people, in all their various minute divis-
ions, it is necessary that the smallest interests should be
represented. Taking these distinctions into View, I think it
must appear evident, that one discerning and intelligent man
will be as capable of understanding and representing the
general interests of a state as twenty; because one man
can be as fully acquainted with the general state of the com-

VOL. 11 34 23

5266 DEBATES . [HAMILTON

merce, manufactures, population, production, and common
resources of a state, which are the proper objects of federal
legislation. It is presumed that few men originally possess
a complete knowledge of the circumstances of other states.
They must rely, thelef01e, 011 the information to be collected
from the rcpiesentatives of those states. And if the above
reasoning be just, it appears evident, I imagine, that this
reliance will be as secure as can be desired.

Sir, in my experience of public affairs, I have constantly
remarked, in the conduct of membe1s of Congress,a stiong
and uniform attachment to the intelests of thei1 own state.
These interests have, 011 many occasions, been adhered to
with an undue and illiberal pertinacity, and have too often
been preferred to the welfare of the Union. This attach—
ment has given birth to an unaccommodating spirit of party,
which has frequently embarrassed the best measures. It is
by no means, however, an object of surprise. The early
connections we have formed, the habits and prejudices in
which we have been b1 ed fix our affections so st1ongly, that
no future objects of association can easily eladicate them.
This, togetliei with the entire and immediate dependence
the rern'escntative feels 011 his constituent, will generally in
cline him to prefer the particular before the public good.

The subject 011 which this argument of a small represen—
tation has been most plausibly used, is taxation. As to
internal taxation, in which the difficulty principally rests, it
is not p1obablc that any general regulation will o1iginate in
the national legislatme. lf Congress, 1n times of gleat dan-
gen and distress, should be driven to this lesource, they will
undoubtedly adopt such measules as me most confmmable
to the laws and customs of each state. They will take up
you1 own codes, and consult your own systems. This 1s a
source of 1nf011nation which cannot mislead, and which will
be equally accessible to every member. It will teach them
the most certain, safe, and expeditious mode of laying and
collecting taxes in each state. They will appoint the officers
of revenue agreeably to the spirit of your particular establish—
ments, or they will make use of your own.

Sir, the most powerful obstacle to the members of Con-
gress betraying the intelest of their constituents, is the state
legislatu1es themselves, who will be standing bodies of obser-
vation, possessing the confidence of the people, jealous of

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 267

federal encroachments, and armed with every power to check
the fi1st essays of t1eache1y. They will institute 1egular
modes of 1nquiry. The complicated domestic attachments,
which subsist between the state legislatms and their electo1s,
will ever make them vigilant guardians of the people’ s tights
Possessed of the means and: the disposition of resistance,
the spi1it of opposition will be easily communicated to the
people, and, under the conduct of an mganized body of
leadets, will act with weight and system lhus it appeals
that the ve1y structure of the confederacy affords the surest
preventives from error, and the most powerful checks to mis-
conduct

Sii, the1e is something in an a1gument that has been
urged, which, if it proves any thing, concludes against: all
union and all gover°nments , it. goes to plove that no powe1s
should be intrusted to any body of men, because they may
be abused. This is an argument of possibility and chance —
one that would render useless all reasonings upon the proba-
ble operation of things, and defeat the established principles
of natural and m01al causes. It is a species of reasoning
sometimes used to excite popular jealousies, but 1s generally
disca1ded by wise and discerning men. Ido not suppose
that the honorable membe1 who tDadvanced the idea had any
such design. He undoubtedly would not Wish to extend his
arguments to the destruction of union or government; but
this, sir, is its real tendency.

It has been asserted that the interests, habits, and man-
ners of the thirteen states are different; and hence it is
inferred that no general free government can suit them.
This diversity of habits, &c. ., has been a favorite theme with
those who a1e disposed for a division of our empire, and, like

many other pOpular objections, seems to be founded on
fallacy. I acknowledge that the local interests of the states
are in some degree various, and that the1e 18 some difference
in the manners and habits. But this I will presume to
affirm, that, from New Hampshire to Georgia, the people of
America are as uniform in their interests and manners as
those of any established in Europe. This diversity, to the
eye of a speculatist, may afford some marks of characteristic
discrimination, but cannot form an impediment to the 1egular

opeiation of those general powers which the Constitution
gives to the united govelnment. Were the laws of the

‘268 DEBATES. [HARRISON

Union to new- -model the internal police of any state; weie
they to alter, or ablogate at a blow, the whole of HS civil and
Ctiminal institutions , were they to penetlate the 1ecesses of
domestic life, and control, in all respects, the p1ivate conduct
of individuals, —there might be more force in the objection ;
and the same Constitution, which was happily calculated
for one state, might sacrifice the welfare of another. Though
the difference of interests may create some difficulty, and.
apparent partiality, 1n the first operations of government, yet
the same spirit of accommodation, which produced the plan
under discussion, would be exe1cised 1n lessening the weight
of unequal burdens. Add to this, that, under the regular
and gentle influence of general laws, these varying interests
will be constantly assimilating, till they emb1 ace each other,
and assume the same c0mplexion.

Gov. CLlN FON. The gentleman has attempted to give
an unjust and unnatural colo1ing to my observations. I5 am
really at a loss to determine whence he draws his inference.
I declare that the dissolution of the Union is, of all events,
the remotest from my wishes. That gentleman may wish
for a consolidated, I wish for a federal republic. The object
of both of us is a firm, energetic government; and We may
uoth have the good of our country in View, though we disa-
gree as to the means of procuring it. It is not fair reasoning
to infer that a man wants no government at all, because he
attempts to qualify it so as to make it safe and easy.

Mr. HAMILTON. I only rise to observe that the gen-
tleman has misunderstood me. What I meant to express
was this — that if we argued from possibilities only, — if we
reasoned from chances, or an ungovernahle propensity to
evil, instead of taking into view the control which the nature
of things, or the form of the Constitution, provided, —the
argument would lead us to Withdraw all confidence from our
fellow-citizens, and discard the chimerical idea of govern-
ment. This is a true deduction from such reasoning.

Mr. SMITH then made a few observations ; after which
the committee rose, and the Convention adjourned to Mon-
day morning at ten o’clock.

MONDAY, Junc23, 1788. —Mr. HARRISON. The sub-
iect under consideration, Mr. Chai1man, is of the highest
importance. It is a subject with which the liberties, the
prosperity, and the glory of our country are. most intimately

HARRISON.] NEW YORK. 269

connected. It has very properly employed the time and
attention of the greatest and wisest men. Impressed with
the most earnest desire to discover truth, and to acquit my-
self well in defence of its cause, I have listened with atten-
tion to the gentlemen who have spoken before me. It may,
at first View, appear unnecessary to enlarge on a point which
has undergone so thorough a discussion; but I trust the
committee will consider no time lost which is spent on this
interesting subject.

The gentlemen who have preceded me in the debate,
however they may have differed with respect to certain
points, they have agreed in others of capital importance, and
which I shall beg leave in a concise manner to review. It
is conceded that the old Confederation is inadequate to the
purposes of good government; that, for its supp01t, it has no
other resources but feeble requisitions, which may be com-
plied with or rejected by the states, as whim, caprice, or local
interest, may influence them. in this point, gentlemen have
agreed that remedy is necessary. The second point agreed
011, and which is of equal consequence, is, that a close union
is essential to the prosperity of the states; that, therefore,
some measures should be pursued to strengthen that union,
and prevent a dissolution. But, sir, interesting as these points
are, there is another, which, on all sides, has been con-
ceded, and which shall ever govern my conduct. It is, that,
although the union ought to be secured, we are by no means .
' to sacrifice to it the liberties of the people. It 18 our duty,
sir, to abandon prejudices, and examine the Constitution
closely and candidly; and if we find that it leads to the sac-
rifice I have mentioned, we shall undoubtedly reject it. But
if, on the contrary, we discover that its principles tend to
unite the perfect security of liberty with the stability of
union, we shall adopt it with a unanimity which will rec-
- ommend it to the confidence of the people.

I come now, sir, to offer a few ideas on the article undel
debate. Among the objections, that which has been made
to the mode of apportionment of representatives has been
relinquished. I think this concession does honor to the gen-
tleman who had stated the objection. He has candidly
acknowledged that this apportionment was the result of ac-
commodation, without which no union could have been
formed. But, sir, there are other objections, which are cer

270 DEBATES. [HARRISON.

tainly plausible, and which, were they made to the paragraph
in its genuine sense, I would acknowledge to be forcible.
The gentlemen first consider the House of Representatives
as too small, and not capable of representing the interests of
their constituents. I cannot, by any means, agree with
them, that there probably will be a time when six men can-
not, in this state, be found sufficiently honest and well i11-
formed to represent the feelings, as well as interests, of the
body of the people. The gentlemen should, 111 the debate,
have adverted to this circumstance, that the number, as well
as the apportionment, of representatives was a matter of
conciliation; that some states, impressed with a sense of the
public burdens, were willing to oppress the people as little
as possible: they were disinclined to have that body more
numerous than was requisite to insure and protect their lib-
erties and their true interests. We might suppose the num—
ber proposed in the Constitution to be inadequate: they
were of a different opinion. But, sir, though the number
specified in this article were barely sufficient, or even too
small, yet I contend that it is a thing merely temporary, and
that the article itself clearly provides a remedy. A11 honor-
able gentleman, who preceded me, has proved that the
article contemplates and secures a regular increase of the
representation. I confess that my mind is entirely satisfied
with his reasoning.
_ I beg leave, however, sir, to state the subject to the com-
mittee in one more point of light. It appears to me that
the gentlemen who have supposed that Congress have it in
their power to reduce the number, have not attended, with
sufficient care, to the language of the paragraph. It is de-
clared that the representation shall be in proportion to the
number of inhabitants, and that every state shall have at
least one. The state of Delaware may contain about thirty-
three thousand inhabitants. Every gentleman acquainted
with that state knows that it has been long settled, and
probably has been for some time stationary in point of popu-
lation. While the large tracts of vacant telritory in the state
which su1round it hold out so many allurements to emig1a—
tion, I am convinced them is no prospect of its increasing.
at least for a ve1y long peiiod of yeats. When I make this
obsetvation, I think I argue f1om established p1inciples.
From this I infer tl1:1t tl1e1e is the utmost piobability tl at

HARRISON. _| NEW YORK. 97]

the number of Delaware will be taken as the standard If
this be done, the number composing the House of Repre-
sentatives, after the first census, will be more than sixty-five,
which is the present number; because this specified num-
ber is calculated on the ratio of about one for forty thousand.
Upon the same principles, while Delaware is stationary,
and the population of the other states advances rapidly,
the number of Delaware will continue to be the standard.
Thus, if Delaware, at the first census, contains thirty-live
thousand inhabitants, New York may then contain about
two hundred and sixty-five thousand, and will be entitled to
eight representatives. To pursue the argument a little
furzther It will eve1 be the interest of the larger states to
keep the 1atio uniform, by assuming the numbei of the
smallest state as the standa1d;be(ause, by this, as the
smallest state will be confined to one, the relative influence
of the larger states will be augmented. For example: if
Delaware possesses thirty thousand, and Maryland a bun-
dred thousand, it will be the interest of Maryland to fix the
ratio at one for thirty, and not one for forty thousand, be—
cause, in the first case, she will have three representatives,
or two more than Delaware; in the latter, she will have only
two representatives, or one more than Delaware. This
reasoning appears to me to lead to mathematical certainty.
According to the ratio established in the Constitution, as
the number of the inhabitants in the United States increases,
the number of representatives would also increase to a great
degree,.and in a century would become an unwieldy mob.
It is therefore expedient and necessary that the Constitution
should be so f1amed as to leave to the general legislature a
dise1etionary powe1 to limit the representation by forming a
new ratio. These considerations have left no doubt 1n my
mind of the piopriety of the a1ticle under debate. I am
clear that It contemplates an ine1ease, till the extensive pop-
ulation of the country shall render a limitation indispensable.
What, then, is the object of our fears? I am convinced that
a legislature composed of ninety—one members is amply suf—
ficient for the present state of our country. I have too. high
an opinion of the integrity of my fellow—citizens to believe
they will or can be corrupted in three. years, and at the
expiration of this term, the increase I mention will most
assuredly take place. Let us, therefore, dispel all visionary

272 DE BATES. [LANSING.

apprehensions on this subject, and, disregarding possible
dangers, let us reason from the probable operation of things,
and rely on this for our safety.

The H011. Mr. LANSING. I do not rise, Mr Chairman,
to answer any of the arguments of the gentlemen, but to
mention a few facts. In this debate, much reliance has
been placed on an accommodation which took place in the
general Convention. I will state the progress of that busi—
ness. When the subject of the apportionment of representa-
tives came forward, the large. states insisted that the equality
of suffrage should be abolished. This the small states 0p-
pOsed, contending that it would reduce them to a state of
subordination. There was such a division that a dissolution
of the Convention appeared unavoidable, unless some con-
ciliato1y measure was adopted. A committee of the states
was then appointed, to agree upon some plan for removing
the embarrassment. They recommended, in their 1eport,
the inequality of representation, which IS the groundwork of
the section under debate. With respect to the ratio of rep-
resentation, it was at first determined that it should be one for
forty thousand. In this situation the subject stood when I
left the Convention. The objection to a numerous repre-
sentation, on account of the expense, was not considered as
a matter of importance. other objections to it, however,
were fully discussed; but no question was taken.

Sir, I rose only to state this subject 111 the point of view
in which it appeared to me: I shall, however, since I am up,
pay some attention to the arguments which have been ad-
vanced. It is acknowledged that this clause may be so
construed, as that, if the people of the smallest state shall
amount to fifty thousand, this number may be taken as the
ratio. What, then, is to control the general government?
lfl understand the gentlemen right, they grant that, by the
plain construction of the clause, Congress may fix the ratio
as high as they please: if so, they will have no other con-
trol than the precarious operation of interest. Now, the
very argument of the gentlemen on the point of interest
seems to imply that it will he the interest ofthe small states
to limit the representation , for these states, like Delaware,
not increasing, will be interested in allowing the growing
states as small a number of rep1esentatives as possible, 1n
proportion to their own. If, then, it be the interest of the

HAMILTON] NEW YORK. 273

larger states to augment the representation, it will be equal-
ly the interest of the smaller states to diminish it , and their
equal suffrage in the Senate will enable them to oppose the
policy of the la1ge states with success.

In the discussion of this subject it has been found neces—
sary to b1ing several objections into View, which will not be
very strongly insisted on. The gentleman who suggested
them declared that he did not intend they should embarrass
or prolong the debates. He only mentioned them to show
that it would be our disposition to conciliate in certain points
of inferior magnitude, provided We could secure such essen—
tial rights of the people as we supposed this Constitution
would have a tendency to infringe. The question has been
fully discussed; and I believe few new lights can be thrown
on it. Much time will be spent, if we pursue the investiga-
tion in so slow and minute a manner. However, if the
subject can receive any further elucidation, I shall not think
the time lost.

Hon. Mr. HAMILTON. It is not my design, Mr. Chair-
man, to extend this debate by any new arguments 011 the
general subjert I have delivered my sentiments so fully on
what has been advanced by the gentlemen this morning,
that any further reasoning from me bwill be easily dispensed
with. I only rise to state a fact with respect to the motives
which operated in the general Convention. I had the honor
to state to the committee the diversity of interests which
prevailed between the navigating and non-navigating, the
large and the small states, and the influence which those
states had upon the conduct of each. It is true, a difference
did take place between the large and the small states, the
latter insisting On equal advantages in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Some private business calling me to New York,
I left the Convention for a few days: on my return, I found
a plan, reported by the committee of details; and soon after,
a motion was made to increase the number of representa-
tives. On this occasion, the members lose fiom one side
and the other, and declared that the plan reported was en
tirely a wmk of accommodation, and that to make any
alteiations 1n it would destroy the Constitution. I discov-
ered that several of the states, particularly New Hampshir,e
Connecticut, and New Jersey, thought it would be difficult
to send a gleat number of delegates from the extremes of

vor.. 11. 35

2744 DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON

the continent to the national government: they apprehended
their constituents would be displeased with a very expensive
government; and they considered it as a formidable objec
tion. After some debate on this motion, it was withdrawn.
Many of the facts stated by the gentleman and myself are
not substantially different. The truth is, the plan, in all its
parts, was a plan of accommodation.

Mr. LANSING. I will enter no further into a discussmn
of the motives of the Convention; but there is one point in
which the gentleman and myself do not agree. The com-
mittee of details recommend an equality in the Senate.
[11 addition to this, it was proposed that every forty thousand
should send one representative to the general legislature.
Si1, if it was a system of accommodation, and to remain
untouched, how came that number afterwards to be reduced
to tl1i1ty thousand. P

Mr. HAMILTON. I recollect well the alteration which
the gentleman alludes to; but it by no means militates
against my idea of the principles on which the Convention
acted, at the time the report of the committee was under
deliber.ation This alteration did not take place till the
Convention was nea1 1ising, and the business completed;
when his excellency, the p1esident, expressing a wish that
the number should be reduced to thirty thousand, it was
agreed to without opposition.

Mr. Chancellor LIVINGSTON. The gentleman from
Duchess appears to have misapprehended some of the ideas
which dropped from me. My argument was, that a republic
might very properlybe formed by a league of states, but that
the laws of the general legislature must act, and be enforced
upon individuals. I am contending for this species of gov—
ernment. The gentlemen who have spoken in opposition to
me have either misunderstood or perverted my meaning;
but, si1, I flatter myself it has not been misunderstood by
the Convention at la1ge.

If we examine the histo1y of federal republics, Whose
legislative poweis weie exercised only in states, in their
tollective capacity, we shall find 1n their fundamental plin-
ciples the seeds of domestic violence and consequent anni-
hilation. This was the plincipal 1eason why I thought the
old Confederation would be f01ever imp1acticable.

Much has been said, si1, about the number which ought

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. .175

to compose the House of Representatives; and the question
has been debated with great address by the gentlemen on
both sides of the house. It is agreed that the representative
body should be so small as to prevent the disorder insepa-
rable from the deliberations of a mob, and yet sufficiently
numerous to represent the interests of the people, and to be
a' safe depository of power. There is, unfortunately, no
standard by which we can determine this matter. Gentle-
men who think that a hundred may be the medium, in which
the advantages of regular deliberation and the safety of the
people are united, will probably be disposed to support the
plan as it stands; others, who imagine that no number less
than three or four hundred can insure the preservation of
liberty, will contend for an alteration. Indeed, these effects
depend so much upon contingency, and upon circumstances
totally unconnected with the idea of numbers, that we ought
not to be surprised at the want of a standing criterion. On
so vague a subject, it is very possible that the opinions of no
two gentlemen in this Assembly, if they were governed by
their own original reflections, would entirely coincide. I
acknowledge myself one of those who suppose the number
expressed in the Constitution to be about the proper medium;
and yet future experience may induce me to think it too
small or too large. When I consider the objects and powers
of the general government, I am of opinion that one hundred
men may at all times be collected of sufficient information
and integrity to manage well the affairs of the Union. Some
gentlemen suppose that, to understand and provide for the
general interests of commerce and manufactures, our le—
gislators ought to know how all commodities are produced,
from the first principle of vegetation to the last polish of
mechanical labor; that they, ought to be minutely acquainted
with all the process of all the arts. If this were true, it
would be necessary that a great part of the British House
of Commons should be woollen—drapers; yet we seldom find
such characters in that celebrated assembly.

As to the idea of representing the feelings of the people,
I do not entirely understand it, unless by their feelings are
meant their interests. They appear to me to be the same
thing. But if they have feelings which do not rise out of
their interests,I think they ought not to be replesented.
What’ shall the unjust, the selfish, the unsocial feelings, in

276 DEBATES. [R. R. 'Lh-INGSTON.

represented? Shall the vices, the infirmities, the passions,
ot the people, be 1ep1esented. 9 Goveinment, sir, would be
a monster; laws made to encourage viitue and maintain
peace would have a preposterous tendency to subvert the
authority and outrage the principles on which they were
founded; besides, the feelings of the peeple are so variable
and inconstant, that our rulers should be chosen every day:
people have one sort of feeling to-da y, another to-morrow, and
the voice of the representative must be incessantly changing
in correspondence with these feelings. This would be
making him a political weathercock.

The honorable gentleman from Duchess, [Mr. Smith,]
who has so copiously declaimed against all declamation, has
pointed his a1tillery against the 1ich and the great. I am
not inte1ested in defending rich men: but what does he

b
mean by telhna us that the r1ch are Viclous and 1ntemper-

ate? Will he tpresume to point out to us the class of men
in which intemperance is not to be found? Is there less
intemperance in feeding 011 beef than 011 tu1tle. P or in d1ink
ing rum than wine. 9 I think the gentleman does not reason
f101n facts. If he will look round among the rich men of
his acquaintance, I fancy he will find them as honest and
virtuous as any class in the community. He says the rich
are unfeeling; I believe they are less so than the poor; for
it seems to me plobable that those who are most 0cc11pied
by their own cales and distresses have the least sympathy
with the dist1esses of others. The sympathy of the p001
is generally selfish, that of the 1ich a m01e disinte1ested
emot1on.

The gentleman further observes, that ambition is pecu-
l1a1'ly the vice of the wealthy. But have not all classes of
men their objects of ambition? . Will not a poor man c011-
tend for a constable’s staff with as much assiduity and
eagerness as a man of rank will aspile to the chief magis-
t1acy. 7” The g1 cat offices in the state a1e beyond the View
of the p001 and ignoiant man: he \11llthe1ef01e contemplate
an humbler office as the highest alluring object of ambition ;
he will look with equal envy on a successful competitor,
and will equally sac1ifice to the attainment of his wishes the
duty he owes to his f1iends or to the public. But, says the
gentleman, the rich will be always brought forward; thev
will exclusively enjoy the suffrages of the people. For my

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 277

own part, I believe that, if two men of equal abilities set out
together in life, one rich, the other of small fortune, the latter
will generally take the lead in your government. The rich
are ever objects of envy; and this, more or less, operates as
a bar to their advancement. What is the fact? Let us
look around us: I might mention gentlemen in office who
have not been advanced for their wealth; I might instance,
in particular, the honorable gentleman who presides over
this state, who was not promoted to the chief magistracy for
his riches, but his virtue. '

The gentleman, sensible of the weakness of this reasoning,
is obliged to fortify it by having-recourse to the phantom
aristocracy. I have heard much of this. I always consid-
ered it as the bugbear of the party. We are told that, in
every country, there is a natural aristocracy, and that this
aristocracy consists of the rich and the great: nay, the gen-
tleman goes further, and ranks in this class of men the wise,
the learned, and those eminent for their talents or great vir-
tues. Does a man possess the confidence of his fellow-citi-
zens for having done them important services? He is an
aristocrat. Has he great integrity? Such a man will be
greatly trusted: he is an aristocrat. Indeed, to determine
that one is an aristocrat, we need only be assured he is a
man of merit. ButI hope we have many such. I hope,
sir, we are all aristocrats. So sensible am I of that gentle-
man’s talents, integrity, and virtue, that we might at once
hail him the first of the nobles, the very prince of the Senate.
But Whom, in the name of common sense, will we have to
represent us? Not the rich, for they are sheer aristocrats.
Not the learned, the Wise, the virtuous, for they are all aristo-
crats. Whom then? Why, those who are not virtuous; those
who are not wise; those whoare not learned: these are
the men to whom alone we can trust our liberties. He
says further, we ought not to choose these aristocrats, because
the people will not have confidence in them; that is,-the
people will not have confidence in those who best deserve
and most possess their confidence. He would have his gov-
ernment composed of other classes of men: where will We
find them? Why, he must go out into the highways, and
pick up the rogue and the robber; he must go to the hedges
and ditches, and bring in the poor, the blind, and the lame.
As the gentleman has thus settled the definition of aristoc

24

278 DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON.

racy, I trust that no man will think it a term of reproach;
for who among us would not be wise? Who would not be
virtuous? Who would not be above want? How, again,
would he have us to guard against aristocracy? Clearly by
doubling the representation, and sending twelve aristocrats
instead of six. The truth is, in these republican govern-
ments, we know no such ideal distinctions. We are all
equally aristocrats. Offices, emoluments, honors, are open
to all.

Much has been said by the gentleman about corruption . he

calculates that twenty—tour may give the voice of Congress ,
that IS, they will compose a ham majority of a bale quorum of
both houses. He supposes here the most singular, and I might
add, the most improbable combination of events. First,
there is to be a power in the government who has the means,
and whose interest it is to be corrupt. Next, twenty—four
men are to compose the legislature; and these twenty-four,
selected by their fellow—citizens as the most Virtuous, are all,
in violation of their oath and their real interests, to be cor-
rupted. Then he supposes the virtuous minority inattentive,
regardless of their own honor, and the good of their country;
making no alarm, no struggle , a whole people suffering the
injury of a ruinous law, yet ignorant, inactive, and taking
no measures to redress the grievance.

Let us take a view of the present Congress. The gen—
tleman is satisfied with our present federal government, on
the score of corruption. Here he has confidence. Though
each state may delegate seven, they generally send no more
than three; consequently thirty-nine men may transact any
business under the old gove1nment; while the new legis—
lature, which will be, 111 all probability, constantly full, will
consist of ninety- one. But, say the gentlemen, ou1 present
Congress have not the same powers. I answer, They have
the very same. Congress have the power of making war
and peace, of levying money and raising men; they may in—
volve us in a wa1 at their pleasure; tDthey inay negotiate
loans to any extent, and make unlimited demands upon the
states. Here the gentleman comes forward, and says that
the states are to carry these powers into execution; and
they have the power of non—compliance. But is not. every
state bound to comply? What power have they to control
Congress in the exercise of those rights which they have

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 279

pledged themselves to support? It is true they have broken,
in numerous instances, the compact by which they were
obligated; and they may do it again; but will the gentle-
man draw an argument of security from the facility of vio-
lating their faith? Suppose there should be a majority of
creditor states, under the present government; might they
not combine, and compel us to observe the covenant by
which we had bound ourselves?

We are told that this Constitution gives Congress the
power over the purse and the sword. Sir, have not all good
governments this power? Nay, does any one doubt that,
under the old Confederation, Congress holds the purse and
the sword? How many loans did they procure, which we
are bound to pay! How many men did they raise, whom
We are bound to maintain ! How will gentlemen say, that
that body, which is indeed extremely small, can be more
safely trusted than a much larger body, possessed of the
same authority? What is the ground of such entire confi—
dence in the one—what the cause of so much jealousy of
the other?

An honorable member from New York has viewed the
subject 0f representation in a point of light which had
escaped me, and which I think clear and conclusive. He
says, that the state of Delaware must have one; and, as
that state will not probably increase for a long time, it will
be the interest of the larger states to determine the ratio
)y what Delaware contains. The gentlemen in opposition
say, suppose belaware contains fifty thousand, why not fix
3e ratio at sixty thousand? Clearly, because by this
he other states will give up a sixth part of their interests.
fhe members of Congress, also, from a more private motive,
vill be induced to augment the representation. The chance

i their own reelection will increase with the number of
.reir colleagues.

It has been further observed that the sense of the people
s for a larger representation, and that this ought to govern
us — that the people generally are of opinion, that even our
House of Assembly is too small. I very much doubt this
fact. As far as my observation has extended, I have found
very different sentiment prevail. It seems to be the pre-
dominant opinion of our state government; and I presume .
that the people have as much confidence in their Senate of .

280 DEBATES. [M. SMITH

twenty-four as in their Assembly of sixty—five. All these
considerations have united to give my mind the most perfect
conviction, that the number specified in the Constitution is
fully adequate to the present wants of the country, and that
this number will be increased to the satisfaction of the most
timid and jealous.

Hon. Mr. SMITH. I did not intend to make any more
observations on this article. Indeed, I have heard nothing
to-day which has not been suggested before, except the polite
reprimand I have received for my declamation. I should not
have risen again, but to examine who has proved himself the
greatest declaimer. The gentleman wishes me to describe
what I meant by representing the feelings of the people.
If I recollect right, I said the representative ought to under-
stand and govern his conduct by the true interest of the
people. I believe I stated this idea precisely. VVhen'he
attempts to explain my ideas, he explains them away to
nothing; and, instead of answering, he distorts, and then
sports with them. But he may rest assured that, in the pres-
ent spirit of the Convention, to irritate is not the way to
conciliate. The gentleman, by the false gloss he has given
to my argument, makes me an enemy to the rich: this is not
true. All I said was, that mankind were influenced, in a
great degree, by interests and prejudices; that men, in dif-
ferent ranks of life, were exposed to different temptations,
and that ambition was more peculiarly the passion of the rich
and great. The gentleman supposes the poor have less
sympathy with the sufferings of their fellow-creatures, for
that those who feel most distress themselves, have the least
regard to the misfortunes of others. Whether this be rea-
soning or declamation, let all who hear us determine. I
observed, that the rich were more exposed to those tempta—
tions which rank and power hold out to View; that they
were more luxurious and intemperate, because they had
more fully the means of enjoyment; that they Were more
ambitious, because more in the hope of success. The gen-
tleman says my principle is not true, for that a poor man will
be as ambitious to be a constable as a rich man to be a
governor ; but he will not injure his country so much by the
party he creates to support his ambition.

The next object of the gentleman’s ridicule is my idea at
an aristocracy; and, indeed, he has done me the honor to

M. SMITH.] ' NEW YORK. 28]

rank me in the order. If, then, I am an aristocrat, and yet
publicly caution my countrymen against the encroachments
of the aristocrats, they Will surely consider me as one of the
most disinterested friends. My idea of aristocracy is not
new; it is embraced by many writers on government. I
would refer the gentleman for a definition of it to the Hon.
JOHN ADAMS, one of our natural aristocrats. This writer
will give him a description the most ample and satisfactory.
But I by no means intended to carry my idea of it to such
a ridiculous length as the gentleman Would have me; nor
Will any of my expressions warrant the construction be im-
poses on them. My argument was, that, in order to have a
true and genuine representation, you must receive the mid-
dling class of people into your government, such as compose
the body of this assembly. I observed that a representation
from the United States could not be so constituted as to rep-
resent completely the feelings and interests of the people ,
but that we ought to come as near this object as possible.
The gentlemen say,t that the exactly p10pe1 number ol rep-
reSentatives is so indeterminate and vague, that it is impos—
sible for them to ascertain it With any precision. But surely
they are able to see the distinction between twenty and
thirty. I acknowledge that a complete representation would
make the legislature too numerous; and therefore it is our
duty to limit the powers, and form the checks on the govern-
ment, in p1oportion to the smallness of the number.

Ihe honorable gentleman next animadverts- on my appre-
hensions of corruption, and instances the present Congress,
to prove an absurdity in my argument. But is this fair
reasoning? There are many material checks to the opera
tions of that body, which the future Congress will not have.
[11 the first place, theyVare chosen annually. What more
powerful check? They are subject to recall. Nine states
must agree to any important resolution, which will not be
carried into execution till it meets the approbation of the
people in the state legislatures. Admitting What he says,
that they have pledged their faith to support the acts of
Congress, yet, if these be contrary to the essential interests
of the people, they ought not to be acceded to; for they are
not. bound to obey any law which tends to destroy them.

It appears to me that, had economy been a motive for
' ma’kFrrg the representation small, it might have operated
VOL. 11. 36 '

.282 DEBATES. [JAY

more properly 111 leaving out some of the offices which this
Constitution requires. 1 am sensible that a great many of
the common people, who do not reflect, imagine that a nu-
merous representation involves a great expense; but they
are not. aware of the real security it gives to an economical
management in all the departments of government.

The gentleman further declared that, as far as his ac-
quaintance extended, the people thought sixty-five a number
fully large enough for our state Assembly ;'and hence i11-
fer1ed that sixty— —five rs to two hundred and forty thousand
as sixty—five rs to th1ee millions. This 1s curious reasoning.

Ifeel that l have troubled the committee too long. t>1
should not have risen again upon this subject, had not my
ideas been grossly 111is1'epresented.

The H011. Mr. JAY. I will make a few observations or.
this article, Mr. Chairman, though I am sensible it may not
appear very useful to travel over the field which has been
already so fully explored.

Sir, it seems to be, on all sides, agreed that a strong, ener-
getic federal government is necessary for the United States.

It has given me pleasure to hear such declarations come
from all parts of the house. If gentlemen are of this opinion,
they give us to understand that such a government is the
favorite of their desire; and also that it can be instituted;
that, indeed, it is both necessary and practicable; or Why do
they advocate it?

The gentleman last 011 the floor has informed us that,
according to his idea of a complete representation, the ex-
tent of our country is too great for it. [Here he called on
Mr. Smith, to know if he had mistaken him; who replied,
My idea is not that a proper representation for a Strong
federal government is unattainable; but that such a repre-
sentation, under the proposed Constitution, is impracticable]
Sir, continued Mr. Jay, I now understand the gentleman in
a different sense: however, what I shall say will reach
equally his explanation. ltake it that no federal govern-
ment is worth having, unless it can provide for the general
interests of the United States. If this Constitution be so
formed as to answer these purposes, our object is obtained.
The providing for the general interests of the Union requires
(ertain powers in government, which the gentleman seems
to be willing it should possess; that is, the important pow-

' ' £W‘vfitm_ —--.—-

1.112.] NEW YORK. 286

ers of war and peace. These powers are peculiarly interest-
ing; their operation reaches objects the most dear 1.) the
peOpIe; and every man is concerned in them; yet, for the
exercise of these powers the gentleman does not think a
very large representation necessary. But, sir, if the pro-
posed Constitution provides for a representation adequate to
the purposes I have desc1ibed, why not adequate to all othe1
purposes of a fede1al government? The adversaiies of the
plan seem to conside1 the geneial goveinment as possessing
all the minute and local poweis of the state gove1nments.
The di1ect infeience from this, according to thei1 p1inciple,
would be, that the federal representation should be propor—
tionably large. In this state, as the gentleman says, we
have sixty- -five. 1f the national representation is to be
extended in proportion, what an unwieldy body shall we
have! If the United States contain th1ee millions of 111-
habitants, 1n this ratio, the Congress must consist of mo1e
than eight hundred. But, sir, let us examine whether such
a number is necessary or reasonable. What are the objects
of our state legislatures? Innumerable things of small
moment occupy their attention; matters of a private nature,
which require much minute and local information. The
objects of the general gove1nment a1e not of this nature.
They comp1ehend the inte1ests of the states in relation to
each otl1e1, and 111 relation to f01eig11 powers. Su1ely the1e
are men ,in this state fully informed of the general interests
of its trade, its agriculture, its manufactures. Is any
thing more than this necessary? Is it requisite that our
representatives in Congress should possess any particular
knowledge of the local interests of the county of Suffolk,
distinguished from thosé of ~Orange and Ulster? The
Senate is to be composed of men appointed by the state
legislatures: they will certainly choose those who are most
distinguished for their general knowledge. I presume they
. will also instruct them, that there will be a constant corre-
spondence supported between the senators and the state ex—
ecutives, who will be able, from time to time, to afford them
all that particular information which particular circumstances
may require. I am in favor of large representations: yet, as
the minds of the people are so various 011 this subject, I
think it best to let things stand as they are. The peOple
in Massachusetts are satisfied with two hundred: many

“284. DEBATES. [1.111.

others suppose either number unnecessarily large. There
is no point on which men’s opinions vary more materially.
If the matter be doubtful,—and much may be rationally
said on both sides, —gentlemen ought not to be very stren-
uous on such points. The Convention who decided this
question took all these different opinions into consideration,
and were directed by a kind of necessity of mutual accom-
modation, and by reasons of expediency; it would therefore
be unfair to censure them. Were I asked if the number
corresponds exactly with my own private judgment, l should
answer, No. But I think it is best, under our present cir-
cumstances, to acquiesce. Yet, sir, if I could be convinced
that danger would probably result from so small a number, I
should certainly withhold my acquiescence. But whence
Will this danger arise 5’ Sir, I am not fearful of my country-
men: we have yet known very little of corzluption we have
already expe1ienced gieat distresses and difficulties; We
have seen pe1ilous times, when it was the intelest of G1eat
Britain to hold out the most seducing temptations to every
man worth gaining. I mention this as a ci1cumstance to
show that, in case of a wa1 with any fo1eig11 powe1, there
can be little fear of couuption; and I mention it to the
honor of the American character. At the time I allude to,
how many men had you in Congress? Generally fewer than
sixty-five.

Sh, all the a1guments offered on the other side serve to
show that it will be easier to cor1upt under the old than
unde1 the new government: such arguments, the1ef01e, do
not seem to answer the gentleman’s purpose. I11 the federal
government, as it now stands, there are but thirteen votes,
though there may be sixty or seventy vo1ces. Now, what is
the object of corruption P To gain votes. In the new gov-
ernment there are to be ninety-one votes. Is it easier to
buy many than a few ? In the present Congress, you can-
not declare war, make peace, or do any other important act,
without the concurrence of nine states. There are rarely
more than nine present. A full Congress is an extraordi-

nary thing. ls it necessary to declare war, or pass a
requisition bof money to support it. P A foreign prince says,
this will be against my inte1est;I must prevent it. How.
By having recourse to corruption. If the1e ale eleven states
on the flow, it will be necessary to corrupt three. What

JAY.] NEW YORK. 285

measure shall I take? Why, it is common for each State to
have no more than two members in Congress. I will take
off one, and the-vote of that state is lost. IWilI take off
three, and their most important plan is defeated. Thus, in
the old government, it is only necessary to bribc the few;
in the new government, it is necessary to corrupt the many.
Where lies the greater security? The gentlemansays, the
election is annual, and you may recall your delegate when
you please. But how are you to form your opinion of his
conduct? He may excuse himself from acting Without giv-
ing any reason. Nay, 011 a particular emergency, he has
only to go home, for which he may have a thousand plausi-
ble reasons to offer, and you have no mode of compelling his
attendance. To detect corruption is at all times difficult,
but, under these circumstances, it appeals almost impossible
I give out these hints to show that, on the score of corrup~
tion, we have much the best chance under the new Con~
stitution; and that, if we do not reach perfection, we cer-
tainly change for the better. But, sir, suppose corruption
should infect one branch of the government,—for instance,
the House of Representatives; what a powerful check you
have in the Senate ! You have a double security; you have
two chances in your favor to one against you. The two
houses Will naturally be in a state of rivalship: this Will make
them always vigilant, quick to discern a bad measure, and
ready to oppose it. Thus the chance of corruption is not
only lessened by an increase of the number, but vastly
diminished by the necessity of concurrence. This is the
peculi 1r excellence of a division of the legislature.

Sir,I argue from plain facts. Here is no sophistry, no
construction, no false glosses, but simple inferences from the
obvious operation of things. We did not come here to carry
points. If the gentleman will convince me I am wrong,l
will submit. I mean to give my ideas frankly upon the sub-
ject. If my reasoning is not good, let them show me the
folly of it. It is from this reciprocal interchange of ideas
that the truth must come out. My. earnestwish is, that we
may go home attended with the pleasing consciousness that
we have industriously and candidly sought the truth, and
have done our duty. I cannot conclude without 1epeating
that, though I prefer a large 1epresentation, yet, considering
our present situation, I see abundant reason to acquiesce in

286 DEBATES. [G. LIVINGSTON.

the wisdom of the general Convention, and to rest satisfied
that the representation will increase in a sufficient degree to
answer the wishes of the most zealous advocate for liberty.

The Hon. Mr. SMITH rose, and said, it appeared to him
probable that it would be the interest of the state having
the least number of inhabitants to make its whole number
the measure of the representation; that it would be the
interest of Delaware, supposing she has forty thousand, and
consequently only one vote, to make this whole number the
ratio; so if she had fifty thousand, or any number under
sixty thousand. The interest also of some other of the small
states would correspond with hers; and thus the representa-
tion would be reduced in proportion to the increase of Dela"
ware. He still insisted that the number of representatives
might be diminished. .
He would make one observation more upon the gentle-
man’s idea of corruption. His reasoning, he said, went only
to prove that the present Congress might be restrained from
doing good by the wilful absence of two or three members.
It was rare, he said, that the people were oppressed by a
government’s not doing; and little danger to liberty could
flow from that source. '

After some further desultory conversation on this point,
the committee rose, and the Convention adjourned.

TUESDAY, June 21th, 1788. —Convention assembled; and
being resolved into a committee, the 1st paragraph 0f the
3d section of the 1st article was read; when Mr. G.
LIVINGSTON rose, and addressed the chair.

He, in the first place, considered the importance of the
Senate as a branch of the legislature, in three points of
View: —

First, they would possess legislative powers coextensive with
those of the House of Representatives except with respect
to originating revenue laws; which, however, they would
have power to reject or amend, as in the case of other bills.
Secondly, they would have an importance, even exceeding
that of the representative house, as they would be composed
of a smaller number, and possess more firmness and system.
Thirdly, their consequence and dignity would still further
transcend those of the other branch, from their longer con-
tinuance in office. These powers, Mr. Livingston contended,
rendered the Senate a dangerous body.

IG. LIVINGSTON] NEW YORK. 287

He went on, in the second place, to enumerate and
animadvert 011 the powe1s with whic h they were clothed in
their judicial capacity, and 1n their capacity of council to the
President, and 1n the terming of treaties. In the last place,
as if too much power could not be given to this body, they
were made, he said, a council of appointment, by whom am-
bassadors and other officers of state were to be. appointed.
These are the powers, continued he, which are vested in
this small body of twenty- -siX men; in some cases, to be
exe1cised by a bare quorum, which is fourteen; a majority
of which number, again, is eight. \Vhat are the checks
provided to balance this g1eat mass of power? Our present
Congress cannot serve longer than three years in six: they
are at any time subject to recall. These and other checks
were considered as necessary at a period which I choose to
honor with the name of virtuous. Sir, I venerate the spirit
with which every thing was done at the trying time in
which the Confederation was formed. America had then a
sufficiency of this Virtue to resolve to-resist perhaps the first
nation in the universe, even unto bloodshed. What was her
aim. 9 Equal liberty and safety. What ideas had she of this
equal liberty. P Read them in her Articles of Confede1ation.
True it is, sir, there are some powe1s wanted to make this
glorious compact complete. But, sir, let us be cautions that
we do not er1 more on the other hand, by giving power too
profusely, when, perhaps, it will be too late to recall it. ,Con-
sider, sir, the great influence which this body, armed at all
points, will have. What will be the effect of this. 9 Proba-
bly a security of their reelection, as long as they please.
Indeed, in my View, it will amount nearly to an appointment
for life. What will be their Situation in a federal town?
Hallowed ground! Nothing so unclean as state laws to
enter there, surrounded, as they will be, by an impenetra~
ble wall of adamant and gold, the wealth of the whole
country flowing into it. [Here a member, who did not
fully understand, called out to know vs hat WAI L the gentle-
man meant; on which he turned, and replied, “A wall of
gold —of adamant, which will flow in from all parts of the
continent.” At which flowing metaphor, a great laugh in
the house. ] The gentleman continued. Their attention to
their various business will probably require their constant
attendance. In this Eden will they reside with their fami-

288 DEBATES. [G. LIVINGSTON.

lies, distant f1om the obse1vation of the people. In such a
situation, men are apt to fo1 0‘et their dependence, lose their
sympathy, and contract selfish habits. Factions are apt to
be fo1mcd, if the body becomes permanent. The senators
will associate only with men of their own class, and thus
become strangers to the condition of the common peo-
ple. They should not only return, and be obliged to live
with the people, but return to their former rank of citizen-
ship, both to revive their sense of dependence, and to gain a
knowledge of the country. This will afford opportunity to
bring fo1wa1d the genius and 1nfo1mat10n of the states, and
will be a stimulus to acqui1e political abilities. It will be
the means of diffusing a more general knowledge of the
measures and spirit of the admi11ist1ation. These things will
confirm the people’ 8 confidence in gover r.nment When they
see those who have been hiuh 111 office 1esiding among them
as private citizens, they will feel more forcibly that the
government is of their own choice. The members of this
branch having the idea impressed 011 their minds, that they
are soon to return to the level whence the suffrages of the
people raised them, —this good effect will follow: they will
consider their interests as the same. with those of their con-
stituents, and that they legislate for themselves as well as
others. They will not conceive themselves made to receive,
enjoy, and rule, nor the people solely to earn, pay, and
submit.

Mr. Chairman, I have endeavored, with as much perspi-
cuity and-candor as I am master of, shortly to state my
objections to this clause. Iwould wish the committee to
believe that they are not raised for the sake of opposition,
but that I am very sincere in my sentiments in this impor-
tant investigation. The Senate, as they are now consti-
tuted, have little or no check on them. Indeed, sir, too
much is put into their hands. When we come to that part
of the system which points out their powers, it will be the
proper time to consider this subject more particularly.

I think, sir, we must relinquish the idea of safety under
this government, if the time for services is not further limited,
and the powe1 of recall given to the state legislatures. I am
st1engthened in my opinion by an observation made yester-
day, by an honorable membe1 flom New York, to this effect -—
"that the1e should be no fear of cor1uption of the members

LANSING.] NEW YORK. 6.389

in the House of Representatives; especially as they are, in
two years, to return to the body of the people.” I therefore
move that the committee adopt the following resolution, as
an amendment to this clause: —

“ Resolver], That no person shall be'eligible as a senator for more than
six years in any term of twelve years, and that it shall be in the power of
the legislatures of the several states to recall their senators, or either of
them, and to elect others in their stead, to serve for the remainder of the
time for which such senator or senators, so recalled, were appointed.”

Hon. Mr. LANSING. ' I beg the indulgence of the
committee, While I offer some reasons in support of the
motion just made; in dOing which, I shall confine myself to
the point, and shall hear with attention, and examine with
candor, the objections which may be opposed to it.

The representation of the United States, by the proposed
system, is vested in two bodies. On the subject of one of
these, we have debated several days, and now come to the
organization and powers of the other. I believe it was
undoubtedly the intention of the framers of this Constitution
to make the lower house the proper, peculiar representa-
tive of the interests of the people; the Senate, of the sove-
reignty of the states.

Some very important powers are given to the latter, to be
eXecuted without the concurrence of the representative
house. Now, if it was the design of the plan to make the
Senate a kind of bulwark to the independence of the states,
and a check to the encroachments of the general govemment,
certainly the members of this body ought to be peculia1ly
under the control, and in strict subordination to the state
who delegated them. In propo1tion to their want of de-
pendence, they will lose their respect for the power from
whom they receive their existence, and, consequently, will
disregard the great object for which they are instituted.
The idea of rotation has been taken from the articles of the
old Confederation. It has thus far, in my opinion, operated
with great advantage. The power of recall, too, ll'IS been
an excellent check, though it has, in fact, never been. exer-
cised. The thing is of so delicate a nature, that few men
wills step forward to move a recall, unless there 18 some strong
ground for it.

Sir, I am informed by gentlemen who have been conver-

v01..11. 37 2:3

290 DEBATES. [LANSINe.

sant 1n public affairs, and who have had seats in Congress,
that there have been, at different times, violent parties in that
body—an evil that a change of members has contributed,
m01e than any other thing, to remedy. lf, therefore, the
power 01 recall should he never exercised, if it should have
no other force than that of a ‘check to the designs of the bad,
and to destroy party spirit, ce1tainly no harm, but mucli
good, may result from adopting the amendment. If my
information be true, there have been parties in Congless
which would have continued to this day, if the members had
not been removed. No inconvenience can follow from pla-
cing the powers of the Senate on such a foundation as to
make them feel their dependence. It is only a check calcu-
lated to make them more attentive to the objects for Which
they were appointed. Sir, I would ask, Is there no danger
that the members of the Senate will sacrifice the interest of
their state to their own private views.P Every man in the
United States ought to look with anxious concern to that
body. Theirnumber is so exceedingly small, that they may
easily feel their interests distinct from those of the commu-
nity. This smallness of number also renders them subject
to a variety of accidents, that may be of the highest
disadvantage. If one of the members is sick, or if one or
both are prevented occasionally from attending, who are to
take care of the interests of their state?

Sir, we have frequently observed that deputies have been
appointed for certain purposes, who have not punctually
attended'to them, when it was necessary. Their private
concerns may often require their presence at home. In
what manner is this evil to be corrected? The amendment
provides a remedy. It is the only thing which can give the
states a control over the Senate. It will be said, there is a
power in Congress to compel the attendance of absent mem-
bers; but will the members from the other states he solicit-
ous to compel such attendance, except to answer some
particular View, or promote some interest of their own? If
it be the object of the senators to protect the sovereignty of
their several states, and if, at any time, it be the design of
the other states to make encroachments on the sovereignty
of any one state, will it be for their interest to compel the
members from this state to attend, in order to oppose and
check them? This would be strange policy indeed

R. R. LNINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 29']

A number of other reasons might be adduced on this
point; but those which have been advanced are sufficient, I
imagine, to convince the committee that such a provision is
necessary and proper. If it be not adopted, the interests
of any one state may be easily sacrificed to the ambition of
the others, or to the private advantage of individuals.

Mr. R. R. LlVlNGSTON. The amendment appears
to have 111 view two objects—that a rotation shall be estab-
lished in the Senate, and that its members shall be subject
to recall by the state legislatures. It is not contended that
six years are too long a time for the senators to remain in
office. Indeed, this cannot be objected to, when the pur-
poses for which this body is instituted are considered. They
are to form treaties with foreign nations. This requires a
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics, and an exten-
sive acquaintance with characters, whom, in this capacity,
they have to negotiate with, together with such an intimate
conception of our best interests, relative to foreign powers,
as can only be derived from much experience in this busi-
ness. What singular policy, to cut off the hand which has
just qualified itself for action! But, says the gentleman, as
they. are the representatives of the states, those states have
a control. Will this principle hold good? The members
of the lower house are the representatives of the people. Have
the people any power to recall them 5’ What would be the ten-
dency of the power contended for. P Clearly this: The state
legislatures, being frequently subject to factious and irregular
passions, may be bunjustly disaffected and discontented with
their delegates; and a senator may be appointed one day
and recalled the next. This would be a source of endless.
confusion. The Senate are indeed designed to represent
the state governments , but they are also the representatives
of the United States, and are not to consult the interest of
any one state alone, but that of the Union. This could
never be done, if there was a power of recall; for some-
times it happens that small sacrifices are absolutely indis—
pensable for the good and safety of the confederacy , but, if
a senator should presume to consent to these sacrifices, he
would be immediately recalled. This reasoning turns on
the idea that a state, not being able to comprehend the
interest of the whole, would, in all instances, adhere to her
own, even to the hazard of the Union.

292 DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON.

I should disapprove of this amendment, because it would
open so Wide a door for faction and intrigue, and afford such
scope for the arts of an evil ambition. A man might go to
the Senate with an incorru1’1tible integrity, and the strongest
attachment to the interest of his state. But if he deviated,
in the least deg1ee, from the line Which a prevailing party in
a pOpulal assembly had marked for him, he would be im-
mediately recalled. Under these ci1cumstances, hOW easy
would it be for an ambitious, tactious demagogue to mis1ep—
resent him, to dist01t the teatu1es of his chalacter, and gi1e
a false color to his conduct! How easy for such a man to
impose upon the public, and influence them to recall and dis-
grace their faithl‘ul delegate ! The general government may
find it necessary to do many things which some states might
never be willing to consent to. Suppose Congress should
enter into a War to protect the fisheries, or any of the north-
ern interests; the Southern States, loaded with their share
of the burden which it would be necessary to impose, would
condemn their representatives in the Senate for acquiescing
in such a measure. There are a thousand things which an
honest man might be obliged to do, from a conviction that it
would be for the general good, which would give great dis-
satisfaction to his constituents.

Sir, all the arguments drawn from an imaginary prospect
of corruption have little weight with me. From what source
is this corruption to be derived? One gentleman tells you
that this dreadful Senate is to be surrounded by a wall of
adamant—of gold, and that this wall is to be a liquid one,
and to flow in lrom all quaItels. Such arguments as these
seem 1athe1 the dreamings of a distempered fancy, than the
cool, rational deductionsb of a delibe1ate mind. VVheuce 18
this corruption to be de1ived. ? A1e the people to conupt
the senatms with thei1 own gold? Is bribery to entel the
federal czty, with the amazing influx of adamant the gentle-
man so pathetically contemplates? Are not. Congress to
publish, from time to time, an account of their receipts and
expenditures ? Can there be any appropriation of money by
the Senate, without the concurrence of the Assembly ? And
can we suppose that a majority of both houses can be cor-
rupted ? At this 1ate we must suppose a miracle indeed.

But to return. The people are the best judges who ought
to renresent them. To dictate and cont1ol them, tc tell

NJ

Lmsmeq NEW YORK. 3::
them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural
rights. This rotation is an absurd species of ostracism— a
mode of proscribing eminent merit, and banishing from
stations of trust those who have filled them with the greatest
faithfulness. Besides, it takes away the strongest stimulus
to public virtue—the hope of honors and rewards. The
acquisition of abilities is hardly worth the trouble, unless one
is to enjoy the satisfaction of employing them for the good
of one’s country. We all ‘know that experience is indis-
pensably necessary to good government. Shall we, then,
drive experience into obscurity? I repeat that this is an
absolute abridgment of the people’s rights.

As to the Senate’s rendering themselves perpetual, or
establishing such a power as to prevent their being removed,
it appears to me chimerical. Can theymake interest with
their legislatures, who are themselves varying every year,
sufficient for such a purpose ? Can we suppose two senators
will be .able to corrupt the whole legislature of this state?
The idea, I say, is chimerical. The thing 1s impossible.

Hon. Mr. LANSING. The objects of this amendment
a1e,first, to place the senators in such a situation of de—
pendence on their several state legislatures, as will induce
them to pay a constant regard to the good of their constitu-
ents; secondly, to oblige them to return, at ce1 tam periods,
to tlieir fellow- ~citizens, that, by mingling with the people,
they may recover that knowledge of their interests,a and re-
vive that sympathy with thei1 feelings, which power and an
exalted station are too apt to efface from the minds of rulers.

It has been urged that the senators should be acquainted
with the interests of the states in relation to each other, and
to foreign powers, and that they should remain in office, in
order to acquire extensive political information. If these
wete the only objects, the argument would extend to the
lendering their dignity perpetual—an idea which probably
none of the gentlemen will consent to; but, if one thlld of
the senators go out eve1y two years, cannot those who suc-
ceed them acquire information from the remaining members,
with respect to the relative interests of the states? It is to
be presumed that the Senate will be composed of the best
informed men, and that no-such men will be incapable of
comprehending the interests of the states either singly or col-
ectively. If it be the design of. representation that the sense

294 DEBATES. [LANSING

and spirit of the people’ s interests and feelings should be
car1ied into the gove111ment,it is obvious that this design can
be accomplished in no way so pe1lectly as by obliging our
ruleis, at ce1tain peliods, to 1elinquish thei1 offices and rank.
The people cannot be represented by men who are perpetu—
ally separated from them.

It is asked, Why not place the senators in the same situa
tion as the representatives? or, Why not give the people
a power of recall? Because, sir, this is impracticable, and
contrary to the first principles of representative government.
There is no regular way of collecting the people’s sentiments
But a power in the state legisla1u1es to 1ec21ll their senators,
is simple and easy, and will be attended with the highest
advantages.

An honmable gentleman, who has spoken la1gely 011 the
preceding question, has acknowledged that a variety of
views, and great diversity of sentiment, p1evailed 111 the fed-
eial Convention; that particulally there 11 as a diffe1ence of
inte1est between the navigating and non— navigating states.
The same opposition of interests will plobably eve1 remain;
and the members of Cong1ess will retain the same dispositiori
to regard as their principal object the genuine good of their
respective states. If they do not, if they presume to sacri-
fice the fundamental advantages of their state, they betray
the confidence reposed in them, and violate their duty. I
wish gentlemen would unifoImly adhe1e to the distinction
bet11een the g1and design of the House of Representatives
and that of the Senate. Does not one represent the indi-
1iduals, the people of a state, and the other its collective
so1e1eignty? This distinction is p1ope1ly noticed, when it
is convenient and useful to the gentlemen’ s argument; but
when it stands 111 their way, it is easily passedb by and dis—
rega1ded.

Sir, it is true there have been no instances of the success
of corruption under the old Confederation; and may not
this be attributed to the power of recall, which has existed
from its first formation ? It has operated effectually, though
silently. It has never been exercised, because no great oc—
casion has offered. The po11e1 has by no means p1oved a
discou1agement to individuals, 1n sewing their c'ount1y. A
seat in Congress has always been (onside1ed a distinguished
honor, and a fav01ite object of ambition: I belie1e no public

LANSINGJ NEW YORK. 295.

station has been sought with mo1e avidity If this pow er
has existed for so many years, and through so many scenes
of difficulty and danger, without being exerted, may it not
be rationally presumed that it never will be put in execution,
unless the indispensable interest of a state shall require it?
I am perfectly convinced that, in many emergencies, mutual
concessions are necessary and proper; and that, in some. in-—
stances, the smaller interests of the states should be sacrificed
to great national objects. But when a delegate makes such
sacrifices as tend to political destruction, or to reduce sove-
reignty to subordination, his state ought to have the power
of defeating his design, and leverting to the people. It IS
observed, that the appropriation of money is not in the
power of the Senate alone; but, sir, the exe1cise of cm tam
powers, which constitutionally and necessa1ily involve the
disposal of money, belongs to the Senate: they have, there‘
fore, a light of disposing of the property of the United States.
If the Senate declare war, the lower house must furnish the
supplies.

It is further objected to this amendment, that it will re-
strain the people from choosing those who are most deseiving
of their suffrages, and will thbus be an abridgment of their
rights. I cannot suppose this last inference naturally lollow.s
The rights of the people will be best supported by checking,
at a certain point, the current of popular favor, and prevent-
ing the establishment of an influence which may leave to
elections little mule than the form of freedom. The Consti-
tution of this state says, that no man shall hold the office of
sheriffor co1oner beyond a certain period. Does any one
imagine that the rights of the peoPle are infringed by this
provision? The gentlemen, in their reasoning on the sub-
iect of corruption, seem to set aside experience, and to con-
sider the Americans as exempt from the common vices and
frailties of human nature. It is unnecessary to particulznize
the numerous ways in which public bodies are accessible
to corruption. The poison always finds a channel, and
never wants an object. Scruples would be impertinent
arguments would be in vain, checks would be useless, if we
were certain ou1 rulers would be good men; but for the
virtuous government is not instituted. its object is to re-
strain and punish vice , and all free constitutions are fo1med

296 DEBAT ES. {MORRIS}

with two views —to deter the governed from crime, and the
gove11101s f1om tyranny.

The CHANCELLOR rose only to correct an mm which
had appeared 111 the cou1se of the debate. It had been 111-—
timated that the Senate had a right to declare war. This
was a mistake. The power could not. be exercised except
by the whole legislature; nor, indeed, had the Senate a
right alone to appoint a single federal officer. The Presi-
dent, with the advice and consent of the Senate, made these
appointments. He believed that the power of recall would
have a tendency to bind the senators too strongly to the i11-
terests of their respective states; and for that reason he
objected to it. It will destroy, said he, that spirit of inde-
pendence and free deliberation which ought to influence the
senator. Whenever the interests of a state clash with those
of the Union, it will oblige him to sacrifice the great objects
of his appointment to local attachments. He will be sub-
jected to all the caprices, the parties, the narrow views, and
illiberal politics, of the state governments, and become a
slave to the ambitions and factions at home.

These observations, continued the chancellor, are obvious

inferences from a principle which has been already explained
—that the state legislatlnes will be eve1 more 01 less in-
capable of complehending the intelests of the Union. They
cannot perceive the pr0p1iety, or feel the necessity, of ce1tain
great expedients in politics, which may seem, in their im-
mediate operation, to injure the private interests of the
members.

H011. R. MORRIS. 1 am happy, Mr. Chairman, to per-
ceive that it is a principle on all sides conceded, and adopted
by this committee, that an energetic federal government is
essential to the preservation of our Union; and that a c011-
stitution for these states ought to unite firmness and vigor in
the national operations, with the full security of our rights
and liberties. It is our business, then, to examine whether
the proposed Constitution be agreeable to this description.
I am pretty well convinced that, on this examination, the
system will be found capable of accomplishng these pur—
poses; but if the event of our deliberations should be differ-
ent, I hope we shall not adopt any amendments which will
defeat their own design. Let us be cautious, that, in our

HARRISON.] NEW YORK. 297

eager pursuit of the great object, we do not run into th..se
errors which disfigure the old Confederation. We may
render useless all our provisions for security, by urging and
straining them too far: we may apply checks which may
have a direct tendency to impede the most salutary operations
of the government, and ultimately deprive it of the strength
and vigor necessary to preserve our national freedom. 1
fear the proposed amendment, were it adopted, would have
such an effect. My reason has been anticipated by my
honorable colleague. It is, that it would create a 'slavish
subjection to the contracted views and prevailing factions of
the state governments, or, in its exercise, would deprive the
national council of its members in many difficult emergen-
cies, and thus throw the Union into disorder, take away the
means of defence, and expose it an easy prey to its enemies.

The gentlemen, in all their zeal for liberty, do not seem
'to see the danger to be apprehended from foreign power;
they consider that all the danger is derived from a fancied
tyrannical propensity in their rulers; and against this they
are content to provide. 1 am. sorry their views are so con-
fined and partial. An extensive and liberal survey of the
subject should teach us that vigor in the government is as
necessary to the protection of freedom, as the warmest at-
tachment to liberty in the governors. Sir, if the proposed
amendment had been originally incorporated in the Consti-
tution, I should consider it as a capital objection: I believe
it would have ultimately defeated the very design of our
Union. '

Mr. G. LIVINGSTON asked if any reasonable man
could suppose that the United States of America would
suffer a sister state to be invaded, and refuse to assist in
repelling the enemy? If so, we might conclude that they
would be so dishonorable as to recall their senators in such a
conjuncture. The gentleman’s reasoning would apply, when
such a flagrant Violation of the principles of the Union be-
came probable, and not till then.

Mr. HARRISON. l have but a few observations to
make, in addition to those which have been already offered.
It seems, sir, to be granted by all parties, not only that a
vigorous government is necessary, but that the national
'egislature ought to be divided into two branches, and that
these branches should be organized in a different mode, and

VOL. II. 38

298 DE BATES. [LIVINGSTON.

possess different powers. The object of this difference of
formation is a very important one. The design of the House
of Representatives 1s to represent the people of the United
States, and to protect their liberties. The design of the
Senate is to give stability and energy to the gove11.1ment
A single democratic assembly would be subject to changes
and inconstancy incompatible with a regular administration.
But the gentlemen carry thei1 amendment fulther than the
power of recall; they say that a iotation in office ought to
be established; that the senato1s may 1etu1n to the plivate
walks of life, 111 01de1 to 1ecove1 their sense of dependence.
[ cannot agree with them in this. If the senator is c011—
scious that his reelection depends only 011 the will of the
people, and is not fettered by any law, he will feel an am-
bition to deserve well of the public. On the contrary, if he
knows that no meritorious exertions of his own can procure a
reappointment, he will become more unambitious, and regard-
less of the public opinion. The love of power, in a repub—
lican government, is ever attended by a proportionable sense
of dependence. As the Constitution now stands, I see no
possible danger of the senators’ losing their attachment to the
states; but the amendment proposed would tend to weaken
this attachment, by taking away the principal incentives to
public virtue. We may suppose two of the most enlightened
and eminent men in the state, in whom the confidence of
the legislature and the love of the people are united, engaged,
at the expiration of their office, in the most important nego-
tiations, in which their presence and agency may be indis-
pensable. In this emergency, shall we incapacitate them?
Shall we prohibit the legislature from reappointing them?
It might endanger our country, and involve -us in inextrica-
ble difficulties. Under these apprehensions, and with a full
conviction of the imprudence of depiiving the community of
the services of Its most valuable citizens, I feel very strongly
the impropiiety of this amendment, and hope it may not be
adopted.

M1. Chancellor LIVINGSTON rose to suggest an idea
which had not been bef01e expressed It IS necessary, said
he, that every government should have the power of con-
tinuing itself. It ought never to be destroyed, or funda-.
mentally changed, but by the people who gave it birth; and
yet the gentleman’s amendment would enable the state

Lmsmaq NEW YORK. 299

legislatures to annihilate the government by recalling the
senators.

Hon. Mr. M. SMITH, in answer to the chancellor, observed
that, if the gentleman’s position was true, that every govern-
ment should have the power of continuing itself, it followed
that the Senate should be capable of perpetuating itself, and
assuming a complete independent authority. But, according
to his argument, the state legislatures had already a power
to destroy the government; for, at the expiration of six
years, they had only to neglect to reappoint, and the gov-
ernment would fall of course.

Hon. Mr. LANSING. I trust. the committee will indulge
me with a few additional observations. It has been an
argument urged with considerable zeal, that, if the state
legislatures possessed the power of recall, its exercise would
be governed by faction or caprice, and be subject to the im-
pulses of the moment. Sir, it has been sufficiently proved.
to the committee, that, although there have been factions in
the state governments—though they have been subject, in
some instances, to inconstant humors and a disaffected spirit,
--'they have never yet exercised the power of recall which
was vested in them. As far, therefore, as experience is
satisfactory, we may safely conclude that none of these fac-
tious humors will operate to produce the evils which the
gentlemen apprehend. If, however, the legislature should
be so deluded as to recall an honest and faithful senator,
certainly every opportunity would be allowed him of de-
fending himself, of explaining ”his motives which influenced
him, and of convincing them of the injustice of the imputa-
tion. If the state has been imposed upon by ambitious and
designing men, the intrigue, on full examination, will be de—
tected and exposed. If misinformation or false views have
produced the measure, the error may easily be corrected.

It has been observed, that the power of recall might be
exercised to the destruction of the Union. Gentlemen have
expressed their apprehensions that, if one part of the conti-
nent was invaded, the states most distant from the danger
might refuse their aid, and consequently the whole fall a
sacrifice. Is this reasoning upon probability 5’ Is not every
state fully convinced that her interest and safety are involved
n those of the Union? It is impossible, sir,.for such an
event to happen, till, in the decline of the human species,

300 DEBATES. [HAMILTON

the social printiples, on which our union is founded, are
utterly lost and forgotten. It is by no means necessary that
the state which exercises the power contended for, should
continue unrepresented. I have no objection that a clause
should be added to the amendment, obliging the state, in
case of a recall, to choose immediately other senators, to fill
the vacancy. Such a provision would probably, in some
measure, remove the apprehensions which are entertained.

In the gentlemen’s reasoning on the subject, there appears
an inconsistency which I cannot but notice. It is observed,
that one design of the Senate, as it is now organized, is to
form a counte1poise to the local prejudices which a1e incom-
patible with a libelal view of national objects, and which
commonly accompany the leplesentatives of a state. On
the othe1 hand, it is said, the amendment will have a ten-
dency to lessen the attachment of the senators to their con-
stituents, and make them regardless of the public sentiments,
by removing the motive to virtue; that is, a continuation
of honors and employments. This reasoning seems to be
calculated upon the idea of dependence 011 the state gov-
ernments, and a close connection between the interest of
the several states and that of their representatives. But
this dependence, say the gentlemen, is the very source of
all those local prejudices which are so unfavorable to good
government, and which the design of the Senate was to
corlect an d remove. I am, however, sir, by no means in
sentiment with the honorable gentleman, that the rotation
proposed would diminish the senator’s ambition to merit the
good-will of the people. Though, at the expiration of his
office, he would be incapacitated for a term of six years, yet
to the end of this term he would look forward with as earn
est ambition as if he were constantly the object of the public
sufii'ages. Nay, while in office, he would have an additional
motive to act well; for, conscious of the people’s inconstant
disposition, he would be obliged, in order to secure a future
election, to fix in thei1 minds the most lasting imp1ession of
his se1vices. It is enti1ely probable that local intelests,
opinions, and prejudices, will ever prevail in the genelal
govelnment, in a greater 01 less deg1ee. It was upon this
presumption that the small states were induced to join
themselves to the Union.

Hon. Mr. HAMILTON. I am persuaded, Mr. Chair-

IIAMILTON.] - NEW YORK. 30]

man, that I, in my turn, shall be indulged in addressing the
committee. We all, in equal sincerity, profess to be anxious-
for the establishment of a republican government on a safe
and solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every hon
est man in the United States; and I presume I shall not be
disbelieved, when I declare that it is an object, of all others,
the nearest and most dear to my own heart. The means
of accomplishing this great purpose become the most im—
portant study which can interest mankind. It is our duty
to examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to
choose the best and most effectual. It is our duty to draw
from nature, from reason, from examples, the best principles
of policy, and to pursue and to apply them in the formation
of our government. We should contemplate and compare
the systems which, in this examination, come under our
View; distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and ex~
cellences of each, and, discarding the former, incorporate
the latter,‘as far as circumstances will admit, into our Con---
stitution. If we pursue a different course, and neglect this
duty, we shall probably disappoint the expectation of our
country and of the world.

In the commencement of a revolution which received its
birth from the usurpations of tyranny, nothing was more
natural than that the public mind should be influenced by
an extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist these encroach-
ments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of all
our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty
became predominant and. excessive. In forming our C011—
federation, this passion alon’e seemed to actuate us, and We
appear to have had no other View than to secure ourselves
from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one,
and deserved our utmost attention; but, sir, there is another
object, equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered
us little capable of regarding: 1 mean a principle of strength
and stability in the organization of our government, and
vigor in its Operations. This purpose could never be ac-
complished but by the establishment of some select body,
formed particularly upon this principle. There are feW”
positions more demonstrable than that there should be, in
every republic, some permanent body to correct the preju-
dices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate the
fluctuations, of a popular assembly. It is evident that a body

26

302 DEBATES [Hmmox

instituted for these purposes must be so formed as to ex—
clude, as much as possible, from its own character, those
infirmities, and that mutability, which it is designed to
remedy. It is, therefore, necessary that it should be small,
that it should hold its authority during a considerable
period, and that it should have such an independence in
the exercise of its powers, as will divest it, as much as pos—
sible, of local prejudices. It should be so formed as to be
the centre of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady
line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity
to system. Without this establishment, we may make eX—
periments without end, but shall never have an efficient
gove1nment.

It IS an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people,
in eve1y country, desi1e sincerely its prosperity; but it is
equally unquestionable, that they do not possess the disce1n-
ment and stability necessary for systematic government. To
deny that they are frequently led into the grossest errors by
misinformation and passion, would be a flattery which their
own good sense must despise. That branch of administra
tion, especially, which involves ou1 political 1elation with
f01eign states, a community will ever be incompetent to.
These t1uths are not often held up in public assemblies; but
they cannot be unknown to any who hear me.

From these principles it follows that there ought to be two
distinct bodies in our government — one which shall be im—
mediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people.
and possess all the popular features; another formed upon
the principle and for the purposes before explained. Such
considerations as these induced the Convention who formed
your state Constitution to institute a Senate upon the present
plan. The history of ancient and modern republics had
taught them that many of the evils which these republics
suffered arose from the want of a certain balance and mutual
control indispensable to a wise administration; they were
convinced that popular assemblies were frequently misguided
by ignorance, by sudden impulses, and the intrigues of am
bitious men, and that some firm barrier against these opera-
tions was necessary: they, therefore, instituted your Senate,
and the benefits we have experienced have fully justified
their conceptions.

Now, sir, what is the tendency of the proposed amend-

. HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 303

ment? To take away the stability of government by de-
priving the Senate of its permanency; to make this body
subject to the same weakness and prejudices which are
incident to popular assemblies, and which it was instituted
to correct; and, by thus assimilating the complexion of the
two branches, destroy the balance between them. The
amendment will render the senator a slave to all the capri-
cious humors among the people. It will probably be here
suggested, that the legislatures, not the people, are to have
the power to recall. Without attempting to prove that the
legislatures must be, in a great degree, the image of the
multitude, in respect to federal affairs, and that the same
prejudices and factions will prevail, I insist that, in whatever
body the power of recall is vested, the senator will perpet‘
ually feel himself in such a state of vassalage and dependence,
that he never can possess that firmness which is necessary to
the discharge of his great duty to the Union.

Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the interests
of the several states, and those of the United States, in con-
trast; this is not a fair View of the subject; they must
necessarily be involved in each othe1. What we apprehend
is, that some sinister prejudice, or some prevailing passion,
may assume the form of a genuine interest. The influence
of these 1s as powerful as the most permanent conviction of
the public good; and against this influence werought to pro—
vide. The local interests of a state ought, in every case, to
give way to the interests of the UniOn ; for when a sacrifice
of one or the other is necessary, the former becomes only an
apparent partial interest, and should yield on the principle
that the small good ought never to oppose the gleat one.
When you assemble from your sevetal counties in the legis-
lature, we1e every membe1 to be guided only by the apparent
interest of his county, government would be impracticable.
There must be a perpetual accommodation and sacrifice of
local advantage to general expediency; but the spirit of a
mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by this im-
portant principle. It is therefore absolutely necessary that
the Senate should be so formed as to be unbiased by false
conceptions of the real interests or undue attachment to the
apparent good of their several states.

Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable apprehensions
of- danger to the state governments; they seem to suppose

304 DEB ATES. [HAMILTON

that, the moment you put men into a national council, they
become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all affection for their
fellow—Citizens. But can we imagine that the senators will
ever be so insensible of their own advantage as to sacrifice
the genuine interest of their constituents? The state
governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit
of the general system. As long ,the1efore, as Congress have
a full conviction of this necessity, they must, even upon prin-
ciples purely national, have as film an attachment to the one
as to the other. This conviction can never leave them,
unless they become madmen. While the Constitution con—
tinues to be read, and its principles known, the states must,
by every rational man, be considered as essential, component
parts of the Union; and therefore the idea of sacrificing the
former to the latter is wholly inadmissible.

The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and
resources of state governments, which will ever give them
an important superiority over the general government. If we
compare the nature of their different powers, or the means
of popular influence which each possesses, we shall find the
advantage entirely 011 the side of the states. This consider-
ation, important as it is, seems to have been little attended
to. The aggregate number of representatives throughout
the states may be two thousand. The personal influence
will, therefore, be proportionabl y more extensive than that of
one or two hundred men in Congress. The state establish-
ments of civil and military officers of every description,
infinitely surpassing in number any possible correspondent
establishments 111 the general gove1nment, will create such an
extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secu1e
the predilection and suppo1t of the people. Whenever, there-
fore, Congress shall meditate any infringement of the state
constitutions, the great body of the people Will naturally
take part with their domestic representatives. Can the
gene1al government withstand such a united opposition.P
Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their priv-
ileges. 9 Will they suffer their legiSlatures to be reduced to
a shadow and name? The idea is shocking to common
sense.

From the circumstances already explained, and many
others which miO‘ht be mentioned, results a complicated,

I O b O O
1rr0513t1ble check, whlch must ever support the ex1stence and

 

HAMtLTONJ NEW YORK. 305

importance of the state governments. The danger, if any
exists flows f1om an opposite source. The probable evil is,
that the general government will be too dependent on the
state legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and
too obsequious to their hurnors; that the states, with every
power in their hands, will make encroachments on the 11a-
tional authority, till the Union is weakened and dissolved.
Every member must have been struck with an observation
of a gentleman from Albany. Do what youwill, says he,
local prejudices and opinions will go into the government.
What! shall we then form a constitution to cherish and
strengthen these prejudices? Shall we confirm the dis-
temper, instead of remedying it. P It is undeniable that there
must bea control somewhere. Either the general interest
is to control the particular interests, or the contrary. If the
former, then certainly the government ought to be so framed,
as to render the power of control efficient to all intents and
purposes; if the latter, a striking absurdity follows: the con-
trolling powers must be as numerous as the varying interests,
and the operations of government must therefore cease, for
the moment you accommodate these different interests,
which is the only way to set the government in motion, you
establish a general controlling power. Thus, whatever con-
stitutional provisions are made to the contrary, every govern-
ment. will be at last driven to the necessity of subjecting
the partial to the universal interest. The gentlemen ought
always, in their reasoning ,to distinguish between the lea],
genuine good of' a state, and the opinions and prejudices
which may prevail respecting it. The latter may be opposed
to the general good, and consequently ought to be sacrificed ;
the former is so involved in it, that. it never can be sacrificed.
Sir, the main design of the Convention, in forming the
Senate, was to prevent fluctuations and cabals. With: this
view, they made that body small, and to exist for a consider—
able period. - Have they executed this design too far? The
senators are to serve six years. This is only two years
longer than the senators of this state hold their places. One
third of the members are to go out every two years ; and 111
six, the whole body will be changed. Prior to the revolution,
the representatives in the several colonies were elected for
different periods—For three years, for seven years, &c
Were those bodies ever considered as incapable of represent.-
VOL.IL 39

306 DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

ing the people, or as too independent of them? There is
one circumstance which will have a tendency to inc1ease the
dependence of the senators 011 the states, in proportion to
the drnation of their appointments. As the state legiSla-
tures are in continual fluctuation, the senator will have m01e
attachments to form, and consequently a greater difficulty of
maintaining his place, than one of shorter duration. He
will, therefore, be more cautious and industrious to suit his
conduct to the wishes of his constituents.

Sir, when you take a View of all the circumstances which
have been recited, you will certainly see that the senators
will constantly look up to the state governments with an eye
of dependence and affection. If they are ambitious to corr-
tinue in office, they will make every prudent arrangement
for this purpose, and, whatever may be their private senti—
ments or politics, they will be convinced that the surest
means of obtaining a reelection will be a uniform attach-
ment to the interests of their several states.

The gentlemen, to support their amendment, have ob-
served that the power to recall, under the old government,
has never been exercised. There is no reasoning in this.
The experience of a few years, under peculiar'circumstances,
can afford no probable security that it never will be carried
into execution with unhappy effects. A seat in Congress
has been less an object of ambition ; and the arts of intrigue,
corrset‘prently, have been less practised. Indeed, it has been
difficult to find men who were willing to suffer the mortifica—
tions to which so feeble a government, and so dependent a
station, exposed them.

Sir, if you consider but a moment the purposes for which
the Senate was instituted, and the nature of the business
which they are to transact, you will see the necessity of
giving them duration. They, together with the President,
are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations; they
must understand all their interests, and their political sys-
tems. This knowledge is not soon acquired; but a very
small part is gained in the closet. Is it desirable, then, that
new and unqualified members should be continually thrown
into that body? When public bodies are engaged 1n the
exercise of general powers, you cannot judge of the propriety
of their conduct, but from the result of their systems. They
may be forming plans which required time and diligence to

LANSINGJ NEW YORK. 307

bring to maturity. It is necessary, therefore, that they should
have a considerable and fixed duration, that they may make
their calculations accordingly. If they are to be perpetually
fluctuating ,they can never have that responsibility which IS so
1mpo1 tant in republican governments. In bodies subject to tie-
quent changes, great political plans must be conducted by mem-
bers 111 succession. A single assembly can have but 21 p211tial
agency in them,and, consequently, cannot properly be answer-
able for the final event. Considering the Senate, therefore,
with a View to responsibility, duration is a very interesting and
essential quality. There is another View in Which duration
in the Senate appears necessary. A government changeable
in its policy must soon lose its sense of national character,
and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators will not be
sulicitous for the reputation of public measures, in which they
had but a temporary concern, and will feel lightly the bur—
den of public disapprobation, in proportion to the number of
those who partake of the censure. Our political rivals will
ever consider our mutable counsels as evidence of deficient
Wisdom, and Will be little apprehensive of our arriving at any
exalted station in the scale of power.

Such are the internal and external disadvantages which
would result from the principle contended for. Were it ad—
mitted, I am fully persuaded, sir, that prejudices would gov-
ern the public deliberations, and passions rage in the coun—
sels of the Union. If it were necessary, I could illustrate
my subject by historical facts. I could travel through an ex-
tensive field of detail, and demonstrate that wher'evel the
fatal plinciple, of the liead suffeling the cont1ol of the mem-
bers, has operated, it has proved 21 fluitful sou1ce of commo-
tions and disorder.

This, sir, is the first fair oppmtunity that has been offered
of deliberately correcting the e1"'101s in gove1nment. Instabil-
ity has been a p10minent and very defective feature in most
1epubli(.an systems. It is the ~fi1st to be seen, and the last
to be lamented, by a philosophical inquirer. [t has operated
most l1111efully in 0111 infant republics. It is necessary that
We apply an immediate 1e111edy, and eradicate the poisonous
principle from 0111 government. If this be not done, si1,
We shall feel, and posterity will be Convulsed by, a painful
malady.

The Hon. Mr. LANSING said, he had very closely at—

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. .509

then, would be the situation of both ? His wish, he said, was
to prevent any enmity, by giving the states a constitutional
and peaceable mode of checking maladminist121tion, by 1e-
calling their senators, and not driving them into hostilities,
in order to obtain 1edress.

The Hon. M1. SMITH observed, that, when he had the
honor to address the committee on the preceding ques-
tion of the representation, he stated to them his idea, that it
would be impossible, under the new Constitution as it stands,
to have such a genuine 1epresentation of the people as would
itself form a check 1n the gove1nment; that therefo1e it be-
came our duty to provide checks of another nature. The
honorable gentleman f1om New Ymk had made many perti-
nent observations on the p1op1iety of giving stability to the
Senate. The general plinciples laid down, he thought, were
just. He only disputed the inferences d1awn from them, and
their application to the proposed amendments. The only
question was, whether the checks attempted in the amend-
ment were incompatible with that stability which, he ac-
knowledged, was essential to good Urovelnment. M1. Smith
said he did not 1ise to enter at present into the debate at
large. Indisposition compelled him to beg leave of the com-
mittee to defer what he had to offer to them till the succeed-
ing day.

WEDNESDAY, June 25.— Section the third was again read,
when

Mr. SMITH resumed his argument, as follows: The
amendment embraces two objects—first, that the senators
shall be eligible for only six years in any term of twelve
years; second, that they shall be subject to the recall of the
legislatures of their several states. It is prOper that we take
up these points separately. I concur with the honorable gen-
tleman that there is a necessity for giving this branch a
greater stability than the House of Representatives. I think
his reasons are conclusive on this point. But, sir, it does not
follow, from this position, that the senators ought to hold their
places during life. Declaring them ineligible d111ing a cer-
tain term after six years, is 1211 from rendering them less sta—
ble than necessary. We think the amendments will place
the Senate in 21 p1ope1 medium between a fluctuating and a
perpe ual body. As the clause now stands, there IS no doubt
that senators will hold their office perpetually; and in this

308 DEBATES. 1L’mma.

tended to the arguments which had been advanced on the
subject; but, however strongly and ingennously they had
been urged, he confessed they had not had a tendency to
change his sentiments. The principles which the gentle-
man had laid down, with respect to a division of the legisla-
ture, and the necessity of a balance, he admitted. If he had
been inclined to dispute the expediency of two distinct
branches in the government, he should not now be taking up
the time of the committee in a contest respecting the form
and powers of these two branthes. He granted, tl1e1efore,
that thete ought to be two houses, to afford a mutual check.
The gentleman seemed disposed to render the federal govern-
ment bentirely independent, and to prevent the possibility of
its ever being influenced by the interests of the several states ;
and yet he had acknowledged them to be necessary, funda-
mental parts of the system. Where, then, was the check?
The states, having no constitutional control, would soon be
found unnecessaryand useless, and would be gradually ex-
tinguished. When this took place, the people would lose
their liberties, and be reduced from the condition of citizens
to that of subjects It had been remarked, that there were
more than two thousand state representatives throughout the
Union, and that the number of civil and military obfficers on
the state establishments would far exceed those of the United
States; and these ci1cumstances, it has been said, would
create such an attachment and dependence on the state gov-
e111111e11ts, as would give them a superio1ity over the genetal
gm e111ment But, said he, we1e the states a1rayed 1n all the
powers of sove1eignty? Could they maintain a1m1es? Had
they the unlimited powe1 of taxation? Tl1e1e was no com-
pa1iso11,l1e said, between the powels of the two governments.
The ci1cumstances the gentleman had enume1ated,which
seemed to be 1n favm of the states, only proved that the peo-
ple would be under some advantages to disce1n the encroach—
ments of CongIess, and to take the ala1m; but what would
this signify P The gentleman did not mean that his piinciples
should encourage rebellion: what other 1esource had they

None, but to wait patiently till the long teims of their sena-
tors were expired, and then elect other men. All the boast-
ed advantages enjoyed by the states were finally reduced to
this. The gentleman had spoken of an enmity which would
subsist between the general and state governments: what,

310 DEBATES. LM. SMITH.

situation they must of necessity lose their dependence, and
attachments tothe people. It is certainly inconsistent With
the established principles of republicanism that the Senate
should be a fixed and unchangeable body of men. There
should be, then, some constitutional provision against this
evil. A rotation I consider as the best possible mode of
effecting a remedy. The amendment will not only have a
tendency to defeat any plots which may be formed against
the liberty and authority of the state governments, but Will
be the best means to extinguish the factions which often pre-
vail, and which are sometimes so fatal to legislative bodies.
This appears to me an important. c01'1sideration. We have
generally found that perpetual bodies have either combined in
some scheme of usurpation, or have been torn and distracted
with cabals. Both have been the source of misfortunes to
the state. Most people acquainted with history Will ac-
knowledge these facts. Our Congress would have been
a fine field for party spirit to act in. That body would
undoubtedly have suffered all the evils of faction, had it not
been secured by the rotation established by the Articles of
Confede1ation. I think a rotatlon in the government is a
very important and t1u|y 1epublican institution. All good
republicans, I presume to say, will treat it. with respect.

It is a circumstance strongly in favor of rotation, that it
will have a tendency to diffuse a more general spirit of emu-
lation, and to bring forward into office the genius and abili-
ties of the continent: the ambition of gaining the qualifica-
tions necessary to govern will be in some proportion to the
chance of success. If the office is to be perpetually confined
to a few, other men, of equal talents and virtue, but not pos-
sessed of so extensive an influence, may be discouraged from
aspiring to it. The more perfectly We are versed in the po-
litical science, the mom firmly will the happy principles of
1epublicanism be suppOIted. T he t1 ue policy of constitutions
will be to inc1ease the 111101 mat1on of the countly, and dissem—
inate the knowledge of govemment as universally as possi-
ble. If this be done, We shall have, 111 any dange1ous eme1-
gency, a numerous body of enlightened citizens, 1eadyfo1 the
call of thei1 country. As the Constitution now is, you only
give an oppmtunity to two men to be acquainted with the
public affairs. lt 1s a maxim with me that eve1y man em-
ploycd 111 a high office by the people, should, from time to

M. SMITH.| ~ NEW YORK. 31]

time, return to them, that he may be 111 a situation to satisfy
them with respect to his conduct. and the measuies of admin»
istration. If I recollect right, it was obseived by an honor-
able member from New York, that this amendment v1 ould be
an infringement on the natural rights of the [)(Ople. l hum-
bly conceive, if the gentleman reflects maturely 011 the nature
of his argument, he will acknowledge its weakness. What
is government itself but a restraint upon the natural rights of
the people. What constitution was ever devised that did
not operate as a restraint on thei1 original liberties? What
is the Whole system of qualifications, which take. place 111 all
free governments, but a restraint? Why 18 a certain age made
necessary? why a certain term of citizenship? lhisb Consti—
tution itself, sir, has restraints innumerable. The amend—
ment, it is true, may exclude two of the best men; but it can
rarely happen that the state will sustain any material loss by
this. I hope and believe that we shall always have more
than two men who are capable of dischai g1no' the duty of a
senator. But, if 1t should so happen that the state possessed
only two capable men, it would be necessary they should re-
turn home, from time to time, to inspect and regulate our
domestic affairs. 1 do not conceive the state can suffer any
inconvenience. The argument, indeed, might have some
weight, were the representation Very large ; but, as the
power is to be exercised upon only two men, the apprehen—
sions of the gentleman are enti1ely without foundation.

With reSpect to the second part of the amendment, I
would observe, that, as the senators are the repiesentatives
1f the state legislatures, it is reasonable and proper that they
should be under their control. .When a state sends an agent
commissioned to transact any business, or perform any ser-
vice, it certainly ought. to have a power to recall. These
are, plain principles, and so far as they apply to the case
under examination, they ought to be adopted by 11s. Form
this government as you please, you must, at all events, lodge
in it very important powers. These powers must be in the
hands of a few men, so situated as to procure a small degree
of responsibility. These circumstances ought to put us upon
our guar,d and the inconvenience of this necessary delega-
tion of power should be corrected, by p10viding some
suitable checks.

Against this part of the amendment a great deal of argu

312 DEBATES. [M. SMITH.

ment has been used, and with considerable plausibility. It
is said, if the amendment. takes place, the senato1s will hold
their office only during the pleasule of the state 1e01slatu1 es
and consequently will not possess the 11ecessa1y firmness and
stability. I conceive, si1, theie 1s a fallacy 111 this a1 D'ument
founded upon the suspicion that the legislature of a state will
possess the qualities of a mob, and be incapable of any
regula1 conduct. I know that the impulses of the multitude
a1e inconsistent with systematic government. The people
a1e frequently incompetent to deliberate discussion, and sub-
ject to errors and imprudences. Is this the complexion of
the state legislatules. P I presume it is not. I p1esume that
they a1e never actuated by blind impulses; that they rarely
do things hastily and without conside1ation. My apprehen—
sion is,b that the powe1 of lecall would not be exe1cised as
often as it ought. It is highly improbable that a man in
whom the state has confided, and who has an established
influence, will be recalled, unless his conduct has been noto—
riously Wicked. The arguments of the gentleman, therefore,
do not apply in this case. It is further observed, that it
would be improper to give the legislatures this power, be-
cause the local interests and‘prejudices ought not to be
admitted into the general government; and that, if the sena-
tor is rendered too dependent 011 his constituents, he will
sacrifice the inte1ests of the Union to the policy of his state.
Si1, the Senate has been generally held up, by all parties, as
a safeg11a1d to the rights of the seve1al states. In this view,
' the closest connection between them has been conside1ed as
necessary. But now, it seems, we speak in a different lan— ‘
guage; we now look upon the least attachment to their
states as dangerous; we are 110w for separating them, and
rende1ing them entirely independent, that we may root out
the last vestige of state sove1eignty.

An honorable gentleman f1on1 New York observed yester—
day, that the states would always maintain their importance
and authmity, on account of their supe1i01 influence ove1 the
people. To p1ove this influence, he mentioned the aggre—
gate numbe1 of the state repiesentatives throughout the
continent. But I ask him how long the people will retain
their confidence f01 two thousand replesentatives who shall
meet once in a year to make laws for regulating the height
of your fences and the repairing of your roads. Will they

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. 313

not, by and by, be saying, Here, we are paying a great num—
ber of men for doing nothing: we had better give up all the
civil business of our state, with its powers, to Congress, who
are sitting all the year round: we had better get rid of the
useless burden. That matters will come to this at last, I
have no more doubt than I have of my existence. The
state governments, Without object or authority, Will soon
dwindle into insignificanee, and be despised by the people
themselves. I am, sir, at a loss to know how the stale legis-
latures Will spend their time. Will they make laws to
regulate agriculture? I imagine this will be best regulated
by the sagacity and industry of those who practise it.
Another reason offered by the gentleman is, that the states
Will have a greater number of officers than the general gov-
ernment. I doubt this. Let us make a comparison. In
the first place, the federal government must have a complete
set of judicial officers of different ranks throughout the con-
tinent; then, a numerous train of executive officers, in all
the branches of the r,evenue both internal and external ; and
all the civil and military departments. Add to this, their
salaries will probably be larger and better secured than those
of any state officers. If these numerous offices are not at
once established, they are in the power of Congress, and
will all in time be created. Very few offices will be objects
of ambition in the states. They Will have no establishment
at all to correspond with some of those I have mentioned;
in other branches, they will have the same as Congress.
But I ask, What Will be their comparative influence and
importance? IWill leave‘ it, sir, to any man of candor to
determine whether there Will not probably be more lucrative
and honorable places in the gift of Congress than in the dis-
posal of the states altogether. But the Whole reasoning of
the gentlemen rests upon the principle that the states Will be
able to check the general government, by exciting the people
to opposition: it only goes to prove that the state officers Will
have such influence over the people as to impel them to
hostility and rebellion. This kind of check, I contend,
would be a pernicious one, and certainly ought to be p1e-
vented. Checks in government ought to act silently, and
without public commotion. I think that the harmony of the
two powers should by all means be maintained: if 1t be not,
the operation of government will be baneful; one or the
VOL. 11. 40 27

$514)” DEBATES. [M. SMITH.

other of the parties must finally be destroyed in the conflict.
The constitutional line between the authority of each should
be so obvious, as to leave no 100m for jealous apprehensions
or Violent contests.

It is f111the1 sa id, that the opelation of local interests
should be counteracted; for which pu1pose tilt Senate
should be 1e11de1ed permanent. I conceive that the true
intelest of every state is the interest of the whole , and that
if we should liave a well—1egulated govnelnment this idea
will prevail. \Ve shall, indeed, have bfew local inte1ests to
pursue, under the new Constitution, because it limits the
claims of the states by so close a line, that on their part
there can be but little dispute, and little worth disputing
about. But, sir, I conceive that partial interests will grow
continually weaker, because there are not those fundamental
differences between the real interests of the several states,
which will long prevent their coming together, and becom—
ing uniform. Another argument advanced by the gentlemen
is, that our amendment would be the means of producmg
factions among the electors; that aspiring men would mis-
represent the conduct of a faithful senator, and by intrigue
procure a recall upon, false grounds, in order to make room
for themselves. But, sir, men who are ambitious for places
will rarely be disposed to render those places unstable. A
truly ambitious man will never do this, unless he is mad. It
is not to be supposed that a state will recall a man once in
twenty years, to make way for another. Dangers of this
kind are very remote : I think they ought not to be brought
seriously into View. '

More than one of the gentlemen have ridiculed my appre-
hensions of corruption. How, say they, are the people to
be corrupted? By their own money? Sir, in many coun-
tries, the peOple pay money to corrupt themselves: why
should it not happen in this ? Certainly, the Congress will
be as liable to corruption as other bodies of men. Have
they not the same frailties, and the same temptations?
With respect to the corruption arising from the disposal of
offices, the gentlemen have treated the argument as insigni-
ficant. But let any one make a calculation, and see whether
there will not be good offices enough to dispose of to every
man who goes there, who will then freely resign his seat;
for can anv one suppose that a member of Congress will not

HAMILTON] ' NEW YORK. ' 315

go out and relinquish his four dollars a day, for two or three
thousand pounds a year? It is here objected that no man
can hold an office created during the time he is in Congress.
But it will be easy for a man of influence, who has in his
eye a favorite office previously created, and already filled, to
say to his friend who holds it, Here, I will procure you
another place of more emolument, provided you will relin-
quish yours in favor of me. The Constitution appears to be
a restraint, when, in fact, it is none at all. I presume, sir,
there is not a government in the world in which there is a
greater scope for influence and corruption in the disposal of
offices. Sir, I will not declaim, and say all men are dishon-
est; but I think, in forming a constitution, if we presume
this, we shall be on the safest side. This extreme is cer~
tainly less dangerous than the other. It is wise to multiply
checks to a greater degree than the present state of things
requires. 'It is said that corruption has never taken place
under the old government: I believe gentlemen hazard this
assertion without proofs. That it has taken place in some
degree is very probable. Many millions of money have been
put. into the hands of government, which have never yet
been accounted for: the accounts are not yet settled, and
Heaven only knows when they will be.

I have frequently observed a restraint Upon the state gov-
ernments, which Congress never can be under, construct
that body as you please. It is a truth capable of demonstra-
tion, that the nearer the representative is to his constituents,
the more attached and dependent he will be. In the states,
the elections are frequent, and the representatives numer-
ous : they transact business in the midst of their constituents,
and every man must be called upon to account for his con-
duct. In this state, the council of appointment are elected
for one year. The proposed Constitution establishes a
council of appointment who will be perpetual. Is there any
comparison between the two governments in point of secu-
rity? It is said that the governor of this state is always
eligible; but this is not in point. The governor of this state
is limited in his powers; indeed, his authority is small and
insignificant, compared to that of the Senate of the United
States.

The Hon. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, in debates

of this kind, it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a

3i 6 DEBATES. ' [HAMILTON.

great number of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged
that there is even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings
on both sides. In this situation, it is the province of judg—
ment and good sense to determine their force and applica-
tion, and how far the arguments advanced on one side are
balanced by those on the other. The ingenious dress in
which both may appear renders it a difficult task to make
this decision, and the mind is frequently unable to come to
a safe and solid conclusion. On the present question, some
of the principles 011 each side are admitted, and the conclu-
sions from them denied, While other principles, with their
inferences, are rejected altogether. It is the business of the
committee to seek the truth in this labyrinth of argument.

There are two objects in forming systems of gove1nment
—safety for the people, and energy in the administlation.
When these objects ale united, the certain tendency of the
system will be to the public welfare. If the latter object be
neglected, the people’s security will be as certainly sacrificed
as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are
formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual
with the strength of government: if the tone of either be
too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the
happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to insti-
tute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another
with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and
mutual control of these bodies, the government will reach,
in its operations, the perfect balance between liberty and
power. The arguments of the gentlemen chiefly apply
to the former branch— the House of Representatives. If
they will calmly consider the different nature of the two
branches, they Will see that the reasoning which justly ap-
plies to the representative house, will go to destroy the
essential qualities of the Senate. If the former is calculated
perfectly upon the principles of caution, Why should you
impose the same principles upon the latter, which 1s designed
for a different operation? Gentlemen, while they discover
a laudable anxiety for the safety of the people, do not attend
to the important distinction l have drawn. We have it con-
stantly held up to us, that, as it is our chief duty to guard
against tyranny, it is our policy to form all the branches of
government for this purpose.

Sir, it is a truth sufficiently illustrated by experience, thd?

HAMILTON._] NEW YORK. 317

When the people act by their representatives, they are com-
monly irresistible. The gentleman admits the position, that
stability is essential to the government, and yet enforces
principles which, if true, ought to banish stability from the
system. The gentleman observes, that there is a fallacy in
my reasoning, and informs us that the legislatures of the
states, not the people, are to appoint the senators. Does
he reflect that they are the immediate agents of the people,
that they are so constituted as to feel all their prejudices and
passions, and to be governed, in a great degree, by their
misapprehensions? Experience must have taught him the
truth of this. Look through their history: what factions
have arisen from the most trifling causes! What intrigues
have been practised for the most illiberal purposes! Is
not the state of Rhode Island, at this moment, struggling
under difficulties and distresses, for having been led blindly
by the spirit of the multitude? What is her legislature but
the picture of a mob? In this state, we have a senate,
possessed of the proper qualities of a permanent body.
Virginia, Maryland, and a few other states, are in the same
situation. The rest are either governed by a single demo-
cratic assembly, or have a senate constituted entirely upon
democratic principles. These have been more or less
embroiled in factions, and have generally been the image
and echo of the multitude. It is difficult to reason on this
point, without touching on certain delicate chords. I could
refer you to periods and conjunetures when the people have
been governed by improper passions, and led by factious and
designing men. 1 could show that the same passions have
infected their representatives. Let us beware that we do
not make the state legislatures a vehicle in which the evil
humors may be conveyed into the national system. To
prevent this, it is necessary that the Senate should be so
formed, as in some measure to check the state governments,
and preclude the communication of the false impressions
Which they receive from the people. It has been often
repeated, that the legislatures of the states can have only a
partial and confined View of national affairs; that they can
form no proper estimate of great objects which are not in
the sphere of their interests. The observation of the gentle-
man, therefore, cannot take off the force of argument.

Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a re-

318 DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

flection, that their future existence is absolutely in the power
of the states. W ill not this fo1m a powerful check? It is
a reflection which applies closely to tl1ei1 feelings and inter-
ests , and no candid man, who thinks deliberately, will
deny that it would be alone a sufficient check. The
legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President,
and must have a great influence over the elect01s. Indeed,
they convey their influence, through a thousand channels, into
the general government. Gentlemen have endeavored to show
that there will be no clashing of local and general intelests:

they do not seem to have sufficiently considered the subject.
We have, in this state, a duty of Sixpence per pound 011 salt,
and it operates lightly and with advantage ; but such a duty
would be very burdensome to some of the states. If Con-
gress should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt
tax, would it not be opposed by the Eastern States? Being
themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of the measure,
they could only feel its apparent injustice. \Vould it be
wise to give the New England States a power to defeat
this measure, by recalling their senators who may be
engaged for it? I beg theb gentlemen once more to attend
to the distinction between the 1eal and the apparent inter-
ests of the states. I admit that the aggregate of individuals
constitute the government; yet every state is not the gov-
ernment; every petty district 1s not the government. Sir,
in our state legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary
between the interests of counties: the same must happen,
in the general government, between states. In this, the few
must yield to the many; or, in other words, the particular
must be sacrificed to the general interest. If the members
of Congress are too dependent 011 the state legislatures, they
will be eternally forming secret combinations from local
views. This is reasoning from the plainest principles.
Their interest is interwoven with their dependence, and
they will necessarily yield to the impression of their situa-
tion. Those who have been in Congress have seen these
operations. The first question has been, How will such a
measure affect. my constituents, and, consequently, how will
the part I take affect my 1eélection. P This consideration
may be 111 some degree proper; but to be dependent from
day to day, and to have the idea perpetually present, would
be the source of numerous evils. Six years, sir, is a period

HAMILTON] NEW YORK. 319

short enough for a proper degree of dependence. Let us
consider the peculiar state of this body, and see under What
impressions they will act. One third of them are to go out
at the end of two years, two thirds at four years. and the
whole at six years. When one year is elapsed, there is a
number who are to hold their places for one year, others for
three, and others for five years. Thus there Will not only
be a constant and frequent change of members, but there
Will be some whose office is near the point of expiration,
and who, from this circumstance, will have a lively sense of
their dependence. The biennial change of members is an
excellent invention for increasing the difficulty of combina-
tion. Any scheme of usurpation will lose, every two years,
a number of its oldest advocates, and their places will be
supplied by an equal number of new, unaccommodating, and
virtuous men. When two principles are equally important,
we ought, if possible, to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither.
We think that safety and permanency in this government
are completely reconcilable. The state governments will
have, from the causes I have described, a sufficient influence
over the Senate, without the check for which the gentlemen
contend.

It has been remarked, that there is an inconsistency in
our admitting that the equal vote in the Senate was given to
secure the rights of the states, and at the same time holding
up the idea that their interests. should be sacrificed to those
of the Union. But the‘committee certainly perceive the
distinction between the rights of a state and its interests.
The rights of a state are defined by the Constitution, and
cannot be invaded Without a Violation of it; but the inter-
ests of a state have no connection with the Constitution, and
may be, in a thousand instances, constitutionally sacrificed.
A uniform tax is perfectly constitutional; and yet it may
operate oppressively upon certain members of the Union.
The gentlemen are afraid that the state governments willbe
abolished. But, sir, their existence does not depend upon
the laws of the United States. Congress can no more
abolish the state governments, than they can dissolve the
Union. The Whole Constitution is repugnant to it, and yet
the gentlemen would introduce an additional useless provis-
ion against it. It is proper that the influence of the states
should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual
states be thejudges how far P Shall an unlimited power be

320 ‘ DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

left them to determine in their own favor? The gentlemen
go into the extreme: instead of a Wise government, they
would form a fantastical Utopia. But, sir, while they give.
it a plausible, popular shape, they would render it impracti-
cable. Much has been said about factions. As far as my
observation has extended, factions in Congress have arisen
from attachment to state prejudices. We are attempting, by
this Constitution, to abolish factions, and to unite all parties
for the general welfare. That a man should have the
power, in private life, of recallng his agent, is proper; be-
cause, in the business in which he is engaged, he has no
other object but to gain the approbation of his principal. Is
this the case with the senator? Is he simply the agent of
the state? No. He is an agent for the Union, and he is
bound to perform services necessary to the good of the
Whole, though his state should condemn them.

Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen carry
their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced
that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can
operate well: I believe also that we shall be singular in this
proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting
from rotation that other states have; and we hardly know
the strength of their objection to it. There is no probabili-
ty that we shall ever persuade a majority of the states to
agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive them-
selves; the amendment would defeat. their own design.
When a man knows he must quit his station, let. his merit be
What it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own
emolument: nay, he will feel temptations, which few other
situations furnish, to perpetuate his power by unconstitu-
tional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is
as easy to change human nature as to oppose the strong cur-
rent of the selfish passions. . A wise legislator will gently
divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public
good.

It has been observed, that it. is not possible there should be
in a state only two men qualified for senators. But, sir, the
question is not, whether there may be no more than two men;
but whether, in certain emergencies, you could find two equal
to those whom the amendment would discard. Important ne-
gotiations, or other business to which they shall be most com-
petent, may employ them at the moment of their removal.
These things often happen. The difficulty of obtaining men

M. slime] NEW YORK. 32]

capable of conducting the affairs of a nation in dangerous
times, is much more serious than the gentlemen imagine

As to corruption, sir, admitting, in the President, a dispo-
sition to corrupt, what are the instruments of bribery? It
is said he will have in his disposal a great number of ofiices.
But how many offices are there, for which a man would re-
linquish the senatorial dignity? There may be some in the
judicial, and some in other principal .departments. But
there are few whose respectability can, in any measure,
balance that of the office of senator. Men who have been
in the Senate once, and who have a reasonable hope of a
reelection, will not be easily bought by offices. This reason-
ing shows that a rotation would be productive of many disad—
vantages: under particular circumstances, it might be ex-
tremely inconvenient, if not fatal to the prosperity of our
country. .

The Hon. Mr. SMITH. Few observations have fallen
from the gentleman which appear to be new. He supposes
factions cannot exist in the Senate without the knowledge of
the state legislatures, who may, at the expiration of their
office, elect other men. I believe, sir, that factions may pre-
vail to a considerable degree without being known. Violent
factions have sometimes taken place in Congress, respecting
foreign matters, of which the public are ignorant. Some
things have happened which are not proper to be divulged.
So it by no means appears probable that the clashing of
state interests will be the ‘only cause of parties in the gov-
ernment. It has also been observed that the Senate has
the check of the House of Representatives. The gentle-
men are not accurate in stating this matter. The Senate
is vested with certain great exclusive powers; and in the
exercise of these powers, factions may as probably take
place as in any transactions whatever. ‘ The honorable
member further remarks that, from the intimate connection
between the state legislatures and the people, the former will
be the image of the latter, andsubject to the same passions
. and prejudices. Now, I will ask every candid man if this is
a true position. Certainly, it cannot be supposed that a
small body of men, selected from the people for the purpose
of making laws, will be incapable of a calm and deliberate View
of political subjects. Experience has not proved that our
legislatures are commonly guilty of errors arising from this

VOL II. 41

322 DEBATES. [LIVINGSTON

source. There always has been, and ever will be, a con-
siderable proportion of moderate and well-informed men
among them. Though factions have prevailed, there are no
instances of tumultuous proceedings; no instances to prove
that they are not capable of wise deliberations. It is perhaps
useless for me to continue this discussion, in order to answer
arguments which have been answered before. I shall nor,
therefore, trouble the committee any more at present.

Mr. Chancellor LIVINGSTON observed, that it would
not, perhaps, be altogether impertinent to remind the com—
mittee, that, since the intelligence of yesterday,* it had
become evident that the circumstances of the country were
greatly altered, and the ground of the present debate
changed. The Confederation, he said, was now dissolved.
The question before the committee was now a question of
policy and expediency. He presumed the Convention would
consider the situation of their country. He supposed, how-
ever, that some might contemplate disunion Without pain
They might flatter themselves that some of the Southern
States would form a league with us; but he could not look
without horror at the dangers to which any such confederacy
would expose the state of New York. He said, it might
be political cowardice in him, but he had felt since yester-
day an alteration of circumstances, which had made a most
solemn impression on his mind. The amendment he con-
sidered as derogatory to the principles of the Constitution,
and contrary to the design of the institution of the Senate.
It was as clear as any position proved by experience, that
the people, in many instances, could not know their own
good; that, as a body, they were not capable of pursuing
the true road to happiness; and that they were rarely com-
petent to judge of the politics of a great nation, or the
Wisdom of public measures. This principle, he said, seemed
to be admitted. But the gentlemen had remarked that,
though the argument was a good one with respect to the
people at large, it did not apply to the state legislatures.
The chancellor acknowledged that the application in the last
case was not so forcible; yet he contended that the peo-
ple at large were little less capable of judging of the civil
interests of their state, than the state legislatures were of

" Alludmg to the adoption of the Constitution by New Hampshire.

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. 323

comprehending the great political interests of the Union-
He said that no single member of a body could judge prop-
erly of the affairs of that body. The sphere in which the
states moved was of a different nature; the transactions in
Which they were engaged were of a different complexion

the objects which came under their View wore an aspect
totally dissimilar. The legislatures of the states, he said,
Were not elected with a political View, nor for the same pur-
poses as the members of Congress. Their business was to
regulate the civil afia’irs of their several states, and therefore
they ought not to possess powers, to a proper exercise of
which they were not competent. The Senate was to trans-
act all foreign business: .of this the states, from the nature
of things, must be entirely ignorant. The Constitution of
New York (continued the chancellor) had contemplated a
deficiency of wisdom in the legislature, even in their domes-s
tic regulations : it had provided a council of revision, to cor-
rect their errors. Would the gentlemen, then, acknowledge
that the legislatures are liable to frequent mistakes in civil
affairs, and yet maintain that they are infallible with respect
to the general politics of the Union ?

One gentleman had enumerated the formidable powers of
the Senate, and closed the detail by a piteous description of
the flowing, adamantine wall. He had mentioned the power
to try impeachments. But the power of impeaehing was in
the House of Representatives, and that was the 1mportant
power. It could hardly be supposed that. the representatlves
Would exercise this power for the purposes of tyranny; but
if they should, it certainly cOuld be of no disadvantage to
enable the Senate to check them. In the next place, he
said, the power of appointing ofiicers was mentioned. This
was unfairly stated; the Senate had but a negatlve upon the
President; they had only an advisory power. In making
laws they had only a partial agency ; they were checked by
the representatives and President. To any unprejudlced
examiner,he said, it would appear that the Constltution had
provided everyreasonable check, and that the authorlty or
the Senate was sufficiently circumscribed. But the gentle-
men WOuld multiply checks till the new government was as
relaxed and nerveless as the old one. . ‘

The Hon. Mr. SMITH took notice of the remark of one
of the gentlemen, that a majority of the states would not

324 DEBATES. [LANSIML

agree to the amendment. He wondered whence the gentle-
man derived his knowledge. It was true no state had yet
proposed it; but it was equally true that we had not yet
fully obtained the sentiments of any Convention respecting
amendments. The Constitution had been carried in most
of the states, in such a manner that no opportunity was
afforded of bringing forward and discussing them.

With respect to the change of circumstances which had
such a solemn effect upon the honorable gentleman, he con-
fessed it had not altered his feelings or wishes on the sub-
ject. He had long been convinced that nine states would
receive the Constitution. The gentleman had taken great
pains to prove that the state legislatures would be influenced
by the same passions and erroneous views which actuated
the people at large” For his own part, he did not under—
stand such reasoning; he had always been taught that the
state legislatures were select bodies of men, chosen for their
superior wisdom, and so organized as to be capable of calm
and regular conduct. It had been observed, that the Senate
was only a check ,' if this was true, he begged to be informed
where the positive power was lodged. The House of Rep-
resentatives had been held up as a check; the Senate had
been held up as a check. At this rate, it was a government
of negative powers. It had also been remarked that no man
could be qualified for the office of senator till he had had a
long experience, because there was a certain kind of knowl-
edge necessary, which could only be acquired in the Senate.
But, if the policy of the government was such, said he, as
to keep in the senators till they died, or were displaced, we
should always have but a few men who were acquainted
with the duties of their office. The best way was to limit
them to six years; and then let them come home. We
should then always have a large number of men capable of
serving their country in any dangerous conjuncture.

Hon. Mr. LANSING. Mr. Chairman, I do not rise to
speak to the paragraph under consideration, but to make some
remarks on the sentiments of the honorable gentleman from
New York, respecting the change in our situation. That
our particular circumstances are in fact altered since yester-
day, I cannot agree. It is true, we have received informa-
tion that the ninth state has ratified the Constitution; but I
contend that no such event. ought to influence our delibera-

JONEs.] NEW YORK. 325

tions. I presume I shall not be charged with rashness, if I
continue to insistlthat it is still our duty to maintain our
rights. We acknowledge that our dissent cannot prevent
the operation of the government: since nine states have
acceded to it, let them make the experiment. It has been
said that some might contemplate disunion without terror. 1
have heard no sentiment from any gentleman that can war-
rant such an insinuation. We ought not, however, to suffer
our fears to force us to adopt a system which is dangerous to
liberty. The idea of the importance of this state has not
been entertained by any in sentiment with me. The sug-
gestion first came. from the other side of the house. It was
nothing more than a false construction of our argument,
that if, unfortunately, a disunion should take place, we were
not in so bad a situation that we could- not provide for our
safety independently of the other states. Sir, I know not
any gentleman who wishes for a dissolution of the Union.
‘I make this remark because an idea has been circulated,
that there are certain persons in this body who are disposed
to dissolve the Union, which I am persuaded is utterly false.
.1 Several paragraphs of section 3d being passed over with-
out debate, the 44th section of article 1 was read; when

Mr. JONES rose, and observed, that it was a fact uni-
versally known, that the present Confederation had not
proved adequate to the purposes of good government.
Whether this arose from the want of powers in the federal
head,- or from other causes, he would not pretend to de—
termine. Some parts of the proposed plan appeared to
him imperfect, or at least not satisfactory. He d1d not
think it right that Congress should have the power of pre-
scribing or altering the time, place, and mannenof holdlng
elections. He apprehended that the clause might be so
construed as to deprive the states of an essentlal rlght,
which, in the true design of the Constitution, was to be re-
served to them. He therefore wished the clause mightbe
explained, and proposed, for the purpose, the followmg
amendment: —

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothingin the Con-
stitution, now under consideration, shall be construed to authorize theCon—
gress to make or alter any regulations, in any state, respecting the tlmes,

places, or manner of holding elections for senators or representatives,
unless the‘legislature of such state shall neglect or refuse to make laws

. - c
or regulat ons for the purpose, or, from any circumstance, be Incapable o.

3626 DEBATES. LCLINTOK.

making the same, and then only until the legislature Of such State shall
make provision in the premises.”

The H011. Mr. JAY said that, as far as he Understood
the ideas of the gentleman, he seemed to have doubts with
respect to this paragraph, and feared it might be miscon—
strued and abused. He said that every government was
imperfect, unless it had a pewer of preserving itself. Sup-
pose that, by design or accident, the states should neglect to
appoint representatives; certainly there should be Some con«
stitutional remedy for this evil. The obvious meaning of
the paragraph was, that, if this neglect should take place,
Congr'bess should have power, by law, to support the govern-
merrt, and prevent the dissolution of the Union. He believed
this was the design of the federal Convention.

The Hon. R. MORRIS suggested, that, so far as the
people, distinct from their legislatures, were concerned in
the operation 0f the Constitution, it was absolutely necessary
that the existence of the general government should not de-
pend, for a moment, On the will of the state legislatures.
The power of perpetuating the government Ought23 to belong
to their federal representatives; otherwise, theb right of the
people would be essentially abridged.

His excellency, G0vernor CLINTON, rose, jUSt to notice
the attempts that had been made to influence the committee
by fear, 21nd to introduce gloomy reflections upOn the situa-
tion of the state. This had been done 1n heightened colors,
and, he thought, 111 an indelicate manner. He said, he had
observed also, in the coUrse of the debates, that a distinction
had been kept up between the state legislatures and the
representatives of the peeple, and also between the legisla-
tures and the senators. He did not think these distinctions
warrantable. They were distinctions which would never
appear in operation, while the g0vernment was well admin-
istered. It was true, he said, the representatives of the
people, and the senators, 1111011t deviate from their duty, and
express a will distinct from that of the people, or that of the
legislatures, but any body might see that this must arise
from corruption. Congress, 111 all its branches, was to speak
the will of the people, and that will Was law, and must be
uniform. The distinction, therefore, of the honorable gen-
tleman could haVe no pr'oper weight 111 the discussion 1. f th 3
question.

DUANE] NEW YORK. 327

Mr. JAY did not think the gentleman had taken up the
matter right. The will of the people certainly ought to be
‘ the law, but the only question was, How was this will to be
expressedz—whether the will of the people, with respect
to the time, place, and manner of holding elections, ought
to be expressed by the general government, or by the state
legislatures. . ‘

Mr. M. SMITH proposed the following addition to Mr.
Jones’s motion: ——

“And that each state shall be divided into as many districts as the
representativessit is entitled to, and that each representative shall be
chosen by a majority of votes.”

But on suggestion that this motion was ill timed, it was
withdrawn for the present.

THURSDAY, June 26.—Mr. SMITH again moved the.
additional amendment proposed the preceding day; when
the Hon. Mr. DUANE called on him to explain the motives
Which induced his proposal.

Mr..SMITH expressed his surprise that the gentleman
should Want such an explanation. He conceived that the
amendment was founded on the fundamental principles of
i’representatiVe government. As the Constitution stood, the
whole state might be a single district for election. This
would be improper. The state should be divided into as
many districts as it sends re presentatives- The whole num-
ber of representatives might otherwise be taken from a
small part of the state, and the bulk of the people, therefore,
might not be fully represented. He would say no more at
present on the propriety of the amendment. The principle
appeared to him so evident, that he hardly knew how to
reas0n Upon it, until he heard the arguments of the gentle-
men in opposition.

Mr. DUANE. I will not examine the merits of the
measure the gentleman recommends. If the proposed mode
of election he the best, the legislature of this state will un-
doubtedly adopt it. But Lwish the gentleman to prove
that his plan will be practicable, and will succeed. By the
Constitution of this state, the representatives are apportioned
among the counties, and it is Wisely left to the people to
choose whom they will, in their several counties, Without
any further division into districts. Sir, how do we know
the prOpOSal will be agreeable to the other states? Isevery

328 DEBATES. [DUANE

state to be compelled to adopt our ideas on all subjects? If
the gentleman will reflect, I believe he Will be doubtful of
the propriety of these things. Will it. not seem extraordi-
nary that any one state should presume to dictate to the
Union? As the Constitution stands, it will be in the power
of each state to regulate this important point. While the
legislatures do their duty, the exercise of their discretion is
sufficiently secured. Sir, this measure would carry with it
a presumption which I should be sorry to see in the acts of
this state. It is laying down, as a principle, that whatever
may suit our interest or fancy should be imposed upon our
sister states. This does not seem to correspond with that
moderation which I hope to see in all the proceedings of this
Convention. -

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman misunderstands me. I
did not mean the amendment to operate on the other states:
they may use their discretion. The amendment is in the
negative. The very design of it is to enable the states to
act their discretion, without the control of Congress. . So
the gentleman’s reasoning is directly 'against himself.

If the argument had any force, it would go against pro-
posing any amendment at all; because, says the gentleman,
it would be dictating to the Union. What is the object of
our consultations? For my part, I do not know, unless we
are to express our sentiments of the Constitution before we
adopt it. It is only exercising the privilege of freemen;
and shall we be debarred from this? It is said, it is left to
the discretion of the states. If this were true, it would be
all we contend for. But, sir, Congress can alter as they
please any mode adopted hy the states. What discretion is
there here? The gentleman instances the Constitution of
New York, as opposed to my argument. I believe that
there are now gentlemen in this house, who Were members
of the Convention of this state, and who were inclined for
an amendment like this. It is to be regretted that it was
not adopted. ‘The fact is, as your Constitution stands, a
man may have a seat in your legislature, who is not elected
by a majority of his constituents. For my part, I know of
no principle that ought to be more fully established than the
right of election by a majority.

Mr. DUANE. I neglected to make one observation
which I think weighty. The mode of election recommend-

LANsme'q NEW YORK. 329

ed .by the gentleman must be attended with great embarrass-
ments. His idea is, that a majority of all the votes should
be necessary to return a member.

I will suppose a state divided into districts. How seldom
Will it happen that a majority of a district will unite their
votes in favor of one man! In a neighboring state, Where
they have this mode of election, I have been told that it
rarely happens that more than one half unite in a choice.
The consequence is, they are obliged to make provision, by
a previous election, for nomination, and another election for
appointment; thus suffering the inconvenience of a double
. election. If the proposition was adopted, I believe we should
be seldom represented— the election must be lost. The gen-
tleman will, therefore, I presume, either abandon his project,
or propose some remedy for the evil I have described.

Mr SMITH. I think the example the gentleman adduces
is in my favor. The states of Massachusetts and Con-
necticut have regulated elections in the mode I propose; but
it has never been considered inconvenient, nor have the peo-
ple ever been unrepresented. I mention this to Show that
the thing has not proved impracticable in those states. If
not, why should it in New Y ork?

' After some further conversation, Mr. LANSING proposed
the following modification of Mr. Smith’s motion -—

“ And that nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent

the legislature of any state to pass laws, from time to time, to divide such
state into as many convenient districts as the state shall be entitled to
elect representatives for Congress, nor to prevent such legislature-from
making provision, that the electors in each district shall choose a Citizen
ofthe United States,'who shall have been an inhabitant of the district, for
the term of one year immediately preceding the time of his election, for
one of the representatives of such state.”
Which being added to the motion of Mr. Jones, the com—
mittee passed the succeeding paragraphs without debate, till
they came to the 2d clause of section 6. Mr. LANSING
then proposed the following amendment : —

“ No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any office under the authority of the United
States, and no person holding any office under the United States shall be
a member of either house during his continuance in office.”

011 which no debate took place. The 7th section Was;
also passed over, and the first paragraph of section 8 was
read; when

VOL. II. 4.2

330 DEBATES. [Wmme

The Hon. Mr. WILLIAMS spoke as follows: In the pre-
amble, the intent of the Constitution, among other things, is
declared to be, “to provide for the common defence, and
promote the general Welfare ; ” and in the clause under
consideration, the power is in express words given to Con-
gress “to provide for the common defence and general
welfare.” And in the last paragraph of the same section,
there is an express authority to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for the carrying into execution this
power. It is therefore evident that the legislature, under
this Constitution, may pass any law which they may think
proper. It is true, the 9th section restrains their power
with respect to certain objects. But these restrictions are
very limited, some of them improper, some unimportant, and
others not easily understood. Sir, Congress have authority
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and to
pass all laws which Shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing this pOWer into execution; and what limitation, if any, is
set to the exercise of this power by the Constitution?

Sir, to detail the particulars comprehended in the general
terms, taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, would take up more
time than would be proper at present; indeed, it Would be
a task far beyond my ability, and to which no one can be
competent, unless possessed of a mind capable of compre—
hending every possible source of revenue; for they extend
to every possible means of raising money, whether by direct
or indirect taxation. Under this clause may be imposed a
poll-tax, a tax on houses and buildings, on windows and
fireplaces, on cattle, and on all kinds of personal property.
It extends to duties on all kinds of goods, to tonnage and
poundage of vessels, to duties on written instruments, news-

apers, almanacs, &c. It comprehends an excise on all
kinds of liquOrs, spirits, wine, cider, beer, &c.; indeed,
on every necessary or convenience of life, Whether of foreign
or home growth or manufacture. In short, we can have no
conception of any way in which a government can raise
money from the people, but What is included in one or the
other of these general terms. Every source of revenue is
therefore committed to the hands of the general legislature.
Not only these terms are very comprehensive, and extend to
a vast number of objeCts, but the power to lay and collect
has great latitude : it will lead to the passing of a vast num-

WILLIAMsj NEW YORK. 331

ber of laws, which may afi‘ect the personal rights of the
citizens of the _state"s,“”and put their lives in jeopardy. It
Will’opena door to the appointment of a swarm of revenue
and eXcise officers, to prey upon the honest and industrious
part of the community.

Let us inquire also what is implied in the authority to
pass all laWs which shall be necessary and prOper to carry
this power into execution. It is perhaps utterly impossible
fully to define this poWer. The authority granted in the
first clause can only be understood, in its full extent, by de-
scending to all the particular cases in which a revenue can
be raised. The number and variety of these cases are so
endless, that no man hath yet been able to reckOn them up.
The greatest geniuses of the world have been for ages em—
ployed in the research, and when mankind had supposed the
subject Was exhausted, they have been astonished With the
refined impmvements that have been made in modern times,
and especially in the English natiOn, On the subject. If,
then, the objects of this power cannot be comprehended,
how is it possible to understand the extent of that pOwer
Which can pass all laWs that may be necessary and proper
l for carrying it into execution? A case cannot be conceived
which is not included in this pewer. It is well kI‘IOVVn that
the subject of revenue is the most difficult and extensive in
the science of government: it requires the greatest talents
of a statesman, and the most numerous and exact previsions
'of a legislature. _ The command of the revenues 0f astate
gives thecommand of every thing in it. He that hath the
purse will have the sword; and they that have both have
every thing, so thatC‘ohgreSs will have eVery source from
which money can be drawn.

I should enlarge on this subject, but, as the usual time
draws near for an adjd‘tjrnment, I conclude With this remark,
— that I conceit/e the paragraph gives too great a power to
Ceng‘ress; and in order that the state governments should
have some resource of revenue, and the means of sUpport, I
beg leave to offer the following resolution : '-——

“Res'ol'ved, That no excise shall be impOse'd on any article of the
growth or manufacture ‘of the United States, or any part of them; and
that Congress do not lay direct taxes, but when moneys arising from the
impost and excise are insufficient for the public exigenc1es; nor then,
'fihtil Congress shall first have made a requisition upon the states, to aSsess',

332 _ DEBATES. [M.. smm.

levy, and pay their respective proportion of such requisition, agreeably to
the census fixed in the said Constitution, in such way and manner as the
legislatures of the respective states shall judge best; and in such case, if
any state shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion, pursuant to such
requisition, then Congress may assess and levy such state’s proportion,
together with interest thereon, at the rate of six per cent. per annum,
from the time ofpayment prescribed in such requisition.”

FRIDAY, June 27, Section 8 was again read, and

The Hon. Mr. SMITH rose. We are now come to a
part of the system which requires our utmost attention and
most careful investigation. It is necessary that the powers
vested in government should be precisely defined, that the
people may be able to know whether it moves in the circle
of the Constitution. It is the more necessary in govern-
ments like the one under examination, because Congress
here is to be considered as only a part of a complex system.
The state governments are necessary for certain local pur-
poses; the general government for national purposes. The
latter ought to rest on the former, not only in its form, but
in its operations. It is therefore of the highest importance
that the line of jurisdiction should be accurately drawn; it
is necessary, sir, in order to maintain harmony between the
governments, and to prevent the constant interference which
must either be the cause of perpetual differences, or oblige
one to yield, perhaps unjustly, to the other. I conceive the
system cannot operate Well, unless it is so contrived as to
preserve harmony. If this be not done, in every contest,
the weak must submit to the strong. The clause before us
is of the greatest importance: it respects the very vital prin-
ciple of government. The power is the most efficient and
comprehensive that can be delegated, and seems in some
measure to answer for all others. I believe it will appear
evident that money must be raised for the support of both
governments. If, therefore, you give to one or the other a.
power which may, in its operation, become exclusive, it is
obvious that one can exist only at the will of the other, and
must ultimately be sacrificed. The power of the general
government extends to the raising of money, in all possible
ways, except by duties on exports; to the laying taxes on
imports, lands, buildings, and even on persons. The indi-
‘ vidual states, in time, will be allowed to raise no money at
' all: the United States will have a right to raise money from
every quarter. The general government has. moreover. this

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. 333

advantage —all disputes relative to jurisdiction must be
decided in a federal court.

It is a general maxim, that. all governments find a use for
as much money as they can raise. Indeed, they have com—
monly demands for more. Hence it is that all, as far as we
are acquainted, are in debt. I take this to be a settled
truth, that they will all spend as much as their revenue; that
is, will live at least up to their income. Congress will ever
exercise their powers to levy as much money as the people
can pay. They will not be restrained from direct taxes by
the consideration that necessity does not require them. If
they forbear, it will be because the people cannot answer
their demands. There will be no possibility of preventing
the clashing of jurisdictions, unless some system of accom-
modation is formed. Suppose taxes are laid by both gov—
ernments on the same article. It seems to me impossible
that they can operate with harmony. l have no more con-
ception, that, in taxation, two powers can act together, than
that two bodies can occupy the same place. They will
therefore not only interfere, but they will be hostile to each
other. ' Here are to be two lists of all kinds of officers—
supervisors, assessors, constables, &c., employed in this
business. ‘ It is unnecessary that I should enter into a mi-
nute detail, to prove that these complex powers cannot oper-
ate peaceably together, and without one being overpowered
by the other. On one day, the continental collector calls
for the tax; he seizes a horse: the next, the state collector
comes, procures a replevin, and retakes the horse, to satisfy
the state tax. I just mention this to show that the people
Will not submit to’such a government, and that finally it
must defeat itself.

It must appear evident that there will be a constant jarring
of claims and interests. Now, will the states, in this con—
test, stand any chance of success? If they will, there is
less necessity for our amendment. But consider the superior
advantages of the general government. Consider their ex—
tensive, exclusive revenues, the vast sums of money they
can command, and the means they thereby possess of
supporting a powerful standing forCe. The states, on the
contrary, will not have the command of a shilling or a soldier.
The two governments will be like two men contending for
a certain property. The one has no interest but that Wthll

333]: DEBATES. [M. 811111;.

is the subject of the controversy, while the other has money
enough to carry on the lawsuit for twenty years. By this
clause unlimited powers in taxation are given. Another
clause decla1es that Cong1ess shall have power to make all
laws necessary to ca1ry the Constitution into effeCt.Notl1—
ing, tl1e1efo1e, is left to construction, but the powels ale
most express. How far the state legislatures will be able
to command a revenue, every man, 011 viewing the subject,
can determine. If he contemplates the ordinary operation
of causes, he will be convinced that the powers of the con-
federacy will swallow up those of the members. I do not
suppose that this effect will be brought about suddenly. As
long as the people feel universally and strongly attached to
the state governments, Congress will not be able to accom-
plish it. If they act prudently, their powers will operate
and be increased by degrees. The tendency of taxation,
though it be moderate, is to lessen the attachment of the
citizens. If it becomes oppressive, it will certainly destroy
their confidence. While the general taxes are sufficiently
heavy, every attempt of the states to enhance them will be
considered as a tyrannical act, and the people will lose
their respect and affection for a government which cannot
support itself without the most grievous impositions upon
them. If the Constitution is accepted as it stands, I am
convinced that in seven years as much will be said against
the state governments as is 110w said in favor of the pro-
posed system.

Sir, I contemplate the abolition of the state constitutions
as an event fatal to the liberties of America. These liber—
ties will not be violently wrested from the people; they will
be undermined and gradually consumed. On subjects of
the kind we cannot be too critical. The investigation is
difficult, because we have no examples to serve as guides.
Ihe w01ld has 11eve1 seen such a government ove1 such a
countiy. If we consult authoiities 1n this matte1, they will
decla1e the impracticability of governing a flee people 011
such an extensive plan. In a countly whe1e a portion of
the people live mo1e than twelve hundred miles from the
centre, I think that one body cannot possibly legislate for
the whole. Can the legislature frame a system of taxation
that will operate with u11ifo1m advantages? Can they ca11y
any system into execution? IV 111 it not give occasion for

M. SMITHJ NEW YORK. 335

an innumerable swarm of officers, to infest our country and
consume our substance? People will be subject to impo-
sitions which they cannot support, and of which their com—
plaints can never reach the government.

Another idea is in my mind, which I think conclusive
against a simple government for the United States. It is
not possible to collect a set of representatives who are ac-
quainted with all parts of the continent. Can you find men
in Georgia who are acquainted with the situation of New
Hampshire, who know what taxes will best suit the inhabit—
.ants, and how much they are able to bear? Can the best
men make laws for the people of whom they are entirely
ignorant? Sir, we have no reason to hold our state govern-
ments in contempt, or to suppose them incapable of acting
.wisely. I believe they have operated more beneficially than
most people expected, who considered that those govern-
ments were erected in a time of war and confusion, when
they were very liable to errors in their structure. .It will be
,a matter of astonishment to all unprejudiced men hereafter,
who shall reflect upon our situation, to observe to what a
great degree good government has prevailed. It is true
some bad laws have been passed in most of the states; but
. they arose from the difficulty of the times rather than from
any want of honesty or wisdom. Perhaps there never was a
government which, in the course of ten years,.did not do some-
thing to be repented of. As for Rhode Island, I do not mean
to justify her; she deserves to be condemned. If there were
. in the world but one example of political depravity, it would
be hers; and no nation ever merited, or suffered, a more
genuine infamy than a wicked administration has attached
to her Character. Massachusetts also has been guilty of errors,
and has lately been distracted by an internal convulsion.
Great Britain, notwithstanding her boasted constitution, has
been a perpetual scene of revolutions and civil war. Her
Parliaments have been abolished; her kings have been ban-
ished and murdered. I assert that the majority of the
governments in the Union have operated better than any
body [had reason to expect, and that nothing but experience
and habit is wanting to give the state laws all the stability
and Wisdom necessary to make them respectable. If - these
things be-true, 1 think we ought not to exchange our condi-

. b . .
tron, with a hazard of losmg our state constitutions. We

336 DEBATES. [M. smm.

all agree that a general government is necessary; but it
ought not to go so far as to destroy the authority of the
members. We shall be unwise to make a new experiment,
in so important a matter, Without some known and sure
grounds to go upon. The state constitutions should be the
guardians of our domestic rights and interests, and should
be both the support and the check of the federal government.

The want of the means ofraising a general revenue has been
the principal cause of our difficulties. I believe no man will
doubt that, if our present Congress had money enough,'there
would be but few complaints of their weakness. Requisi-
tions have perhaps been too much condemned. What has
been their actual operation? Let us attend to experience,
and see if they are such poor, unproductive things as is com-
monly supposed. IfI calculate right, the requisitions for
the ten years past have amounted to. thirty-six millions of
dollars; of which twenty-four millions, or two thirds, have
been actually paid. Does not this fact warrant a conclusion
that some reliance is to be placed on this mode? Besides,
Will any gentleman say that the states have generally been
able to collect more than two thirds of their taxes from
the people? The delinquency of some states has arisen
from the fluctuations of paper money, Ste. Indeed, it is my
decided opinion, that no government, in the difficult circum-
stances which we have passed through, will be able to realize
more than two thirds of the taxes it imposes. I might sug-
gest two other considerations which have weight with me.
There has probably been more money called for than was.
actually wanted, on the expectation of delinquencies; and
it is equally probable that, in a short course of time, the in-
creasing ability of the country will render requisitions a
much more efficient mode of raising a revenue. The war
left the people under very great burdens, and oppressed with
both public and private debts. They are now fast emerging
from their difficulties. Many individuals, without doubt, still
feel great inconveniences; but they will find a gradual
remedy.

Sir, has any country which has suffered distresses like
ours exhibited, within a few years, more striking marks of
improvement and prosperity? How its population has
grown! How its agriculture, commerce, and manufactures
have been extended and improved ! How many forests have

WILLIAMS.] NEW YORK. 337

been cut down! How many wastes have been cleared and
cultivated! How many additions have been made to the
extent and beauty of our towns and cities ! I think our ad-
vancement has been rapid. In a few years, it is to be hoped
that we shall be relieved from our embarrassments, and,
unless new calamities come upon us, shall be flourishing and
happy. Some difficulties will ever occur in the collection of
taxes by any mode whatever. Some states will pay more,
some less. If New York lays a tax, will not one county or
district furnish more, another less, than its proportion P The
same will happen to the United States as happens in New
York, and in every other country. Let them impose a duty
equal and uniform, those districts where there is plenty of
money will pay punctuall y. Those in which money is scarce
will be in some measure delinquent. The idea that Congress
ought to have unlimited powers is entirely novel. I never
heard it till the meeting of this Convention. The general
government once called on the states to invest them with
the command of funds adequate to the exigencies of the
Union ; but they did not ask to command all the resources
of the states. They did not wish to have a control over all
the property of the people. If we now give them this con-
trol, we may as well give up the state governments with it.
I‘ have no notion of setting the two powers at variance; nor
would I give a farthing for a government which could. not
command a farthing. On the whole, it appears to me prob-
able, that, unless some certain specific source of revenue is
reserved to the States, their governments, with their inde-
pendency, will be totally annihilated.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yesterday I had the honor of laying
before the committee objections to the clause under con-
sideration, which I flatter myself were forcible. They were,
however, treated by the gentlemen on the other side as general
observations, and. unimportant in their nature. It is not
necessary, nor indeed would it consist with delicacy, to give
my opinion as to what cause their silence is imputable. Let
them now step forward, and refute the objections which have
. been stated by an honorable gentleman from Duchess, who
spoke last, and those which I expect will be alleged by gen-
tlemen more capable than myself—- by gentlemen who are.
able to advance arguments which require the exertion of their
own great abilities to overcome. In the mean time, I re-

vor.. 11. 43 29

338 DEBATES. [VVILLIAMS.

quest the indulgence of the committee, while 1 make a few
recapitulatory and supplementary remarks. _

Sir, 1 yesterday expressed my fears that this clause would
tend to annihilate the state governments. I also observed,
that the powers granted by it were indefinite, since the
Congress are authorized to provide for the common defence
ant general welfare, and to pass all laws necessary for the
attainment of those important objects. The legislature is
the highest power in a government. Whatever theyjudge
necessary for the proper administration of the powers lodged
in them, they may execute without any check or impedi-
ment. Now, if the Congress shouldjudge it a proper pro-
vision, for the common defence and general welfare, that the
state governments should be essentially destroyed, what, in
the name of common sense, will prevent them? Are they
not constitutionally authorized to pass such laws? Are not
the terms, common defence and general welfare, indefinite,
undefinable terms? What checks have the state govern-
ments against such encroachments ? Why, they appoint the
senators once in six years. So do the electors of Germany
appoint their emperor. And what restraint have they against
tyranny in their head? Do they rely on any thing but arms,
the ultima ratio .9 And to this most undesirable point
must the states recur, in order to secure their rights. But
have they the means necessary for the purpose ? Are they not
deprived of the command of the purse and the sword of their
citizens? Is not the power, both over taxation and the
militia, wrested from their hands by this Constitution, and
bestowed upon the general government? Yes, sir, it is.
But it may be said (I expect to be answered) that the states
have concurrent jurisdiction with Congress, as to taxation.
I answer, that the Constitution does not. say so : it is a mere
opinion, a mere construction, a thing of too much uncertainty
to risk the rights of the states upon, which I have heard,
with peculiar pleasure, an honorable gentleman from New
York acknowledge to be of great utility to the people. The
Constitution grants the power of taxation to Congress, but
is silent with regard to the power in the states. If it is in-.
fer-red from this that it is not taken away from the states,
we may, sir, with equal justice, deduce, from the positive
establishment of the trial by jury in criminal cases, that it
is annihilated in civil. ‘lngenious men may assign ingenious

WILLIAMS.'| NEW YORK. 339

reasons for opposite constructions of the same clause. They
may heap refinement upon refinement, and subtilty upon
subtilty, until they construe away every republican principle,
every right sacred and dear to man. I am, sir, for certainty
in the establishment of a constitution which is not only to
operate upon us, but upon millions yet unborn. I would
Wish that little or no latitude might be left. to the sophistical
constructions of men Who may be interested in betraying
the rights of the people, and elevating themselves upon the
ruins of liberty. Sir, it is an object of infinitely too much
importance to be committed to the sport of capriee, and the
construction of interested men. If we adopt this Constitu
tion, it is impossible, absolutely impossible, to know what
we give up, and What we retain. I Wish that this may, as
far forth as possible, be ascertained; and, for this purpose.
it is absolutely necessary that this clause should be
amended.

Suppose, however, that the states have concurrent juris—
diction With Congress in taxation; it is evident, as the laws
of Congress are the supreme laws of the land, that their
taxes, whenever they interfere with the taxes laid by the
states, must and will claim a priority as to the collection; in
.fact, that they may, in order to pass the laws necessary for
the end, abolish the state taxes ; and that they may constitu-
tionally monopolize every source of revenue, and thus in-
directly overturn the state governments; for how can the
latter exist Without revenue? How can they eXist, I say,
when they cannot raise one Sixpence for their support,
Without the sovereign will and pleasure of Congress? Let
us suppose, however, that both governments have and exer-
cise the right of taxation; ‘Will there not be a struggle
between them continually? Will there not be jealousies,
contentions, and animosities? Every man that knows
human nature will answer in the affirmative. Is this, then,
a desirable thing? Will it promote the public good, the
great end of all government? Sir, the questions admit of
easy answers. This must evidently be the result of two
taxing powers—either that the people are doubly taxed, or
that the state governments are destroyed. Both Wlll be
pernicious. There must necessarily be a double set of
revenue officers if the first happens, Which will be anOenor— '
mous expense. I know, sir, that these ideas will be consrdered

34m DEBATES. [WILLIAMS.

by some as bugbears; but, sir, if we reason from the prac-
tice of all governments, we must acknowledge at least the
probability of the thing. In England, for instance, the peo-
ple are not only oppressed with a variety of other heavy
taxes, but, if my information is right, absolutely pay taxes
for births, marriages, and deaths, for the light of heaven, and
even for paying their debts. What reason have we to sup-
pose that our rulers will be more sympathetic, and heap
lighter burdens upon their constituents than the rulers of
other countries ? If crossing the Atlantic can make men vir-
tuous and just, I acknowledge that they will be forever good
and excellent rulers; but otherwise, I must consider them
as I do the magistrates of all other countries. Sir, a capita-
tion is an Oppressive species of tax. This may be laid by
the general government. Where an equality in property ex—
ists, it is a just and good tax; it is a tax easy to assess, and
on this account eligible; but, where a great disparity of for-
tune exists, as in this state, I insist upon it, that it is a most
unjust, unequal, and ruinous tax. It is heaping all the sup-
port of the government upon the poor; it is making them
beasts of burden to the rich; and it is probable it will be
laid, if not stifled in the womb; because I think it almost
morally certain that this new government Will be adminis-
tered by the wealthy. Will they not be interested in the
establishment of a tax that will cause them to pay no more,
for the defraying the public expenditures, than the poorest
man in America?

The great Montesquieu says, that a poll tax upon the per-
son is indicative of despotism, and that a tax upon property
is congenial with the spirit ofa free government. These, sir,
are a few of the many reasons that render the clause defec-
tive, in my mind. I might here mention the dangers to free-
dom from an excise; but I forb'ear. I ought not to engross
the attention of the committee, when it can be more usefully
improved by gentlemen of more abilities than myself— gen-
tlemen who, I trust, will paint in the clearest colors the im-
propriety and danger of this, as well as they have done of the
other paragraphs. Sir, as l remarked before, if this power is
given to the general government, without some such amend-
ment as I proposed, it will annihilate all the powers of the
state governments. There cannot be a greater solecism in
politics than to talk of power in government Without the

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 34.1

command of any revenue: it is as absurd as to talk of an
animal Without blood, or of subsistence without food.

Mr. Chancellor LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I shall
readily agree with the honorable member from Duchess, that
no government can exist without revenues; that we ought to
avoid a consolidation of the states; and that the extent of our
country will not admit of a representation upon principles in
any great degree democratic. These concessions are entirely
indifferent to the point of dispute. But, sir, we will examine
the amendment particularly, and adduce only such principles
as immediately apply to it. ‘

The first proposition in the amendment is, that no excise.
shall be laid on the manufactures of the United States ; the.
. second, that a requisition shall precede the imposition of a
direct tax. The object of the first is to prevent our infant
manufactures from being overburdened. Sir, if the manu-
factures of this country were always to be in a state of in-
fancy, if the amendment were only a temporary expedient,
the provision might consist with good policy; but, at a future
day, an enlarged population will render us a manufacturing
people. . The imposts will then necessarily lessen, and the
public wants will call for new sources of revenue. These
sources will be multiplied with the increase of our wealth;
and necessity, as well as policy, will induce us to improve
them. We may naturally suppose that wines, brandy, spirits,
malt liquors, &c., will be among the first subjects of excise.
These are proper objects of taxation, not only as they will
be very productive, but as charges on them will be favora-
ble to the morals of the citizens. It should be considered
that the burdens of government will be supported by the
United States. They are to pay the interest of loans; they
are to maintain the army and navy, and the most expen—
sive civil establishment. If the individual states had any con-
cern in these capital expenses, it would be proper that they
should command the means of defraying them. But if you
impose upon the Union all the burdens, and take from them
a principal resource, what will they do when the imposts
diminish, and the expenses of government increase 5’. Why,
they must have recourse to direct taxes; that is, taxes on
land, and specific duties. Will this be a mode of raising
money the most agreeable and satisfactory to the people 3
The gentlemen seem to calculate only from present anpear-

34¢? DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON.

ances : they would insert in the Constitution a clause which
in time may deprive the United States of a fruitful and in
dispensable branch of revenue. I presume, sir, that, on de-
liberate reflection, they will see the impropriety of this part
of the amendment.

The second part is of the greatest importance ; its object
is to prevent Congress from laying direct taxes in any of the
states till they have previously made requisitions. Let us
examine whether this measure will be compatible with sound
policy: let us reason from experience. We have seen some—
thing of requisitions—-enough, one would suppose, to make
us exceedingly suspicious of them. We all know how they
have hitherto operated. There are no arguments so forcible
as those drawn from facts within our own knowledge. We
may form as many conjectures and hypotheses as we please,
but shall ever recur at last to experience as a sure guide.
The gentlemen will, without doubt, allow that the United
States will be subject to the same kind of expenses, and will
have the same demand for money, as other nations. ' There
are no governments that have not been obliged to levy direct
taxes, and even procure loans, to answer the public wants;
there are no governments which have not, in certain emer—
gencies, been compelled to call for all the capital resources
of the country. This may be the situation of the United
States: we hope not in our day; but we must not presume
it. will never happen. Indeed, the motion itself is made upon
the contemplation of this event. We conclude, therefore,
that the gentleman who brought it forward is convinced that
the necessities of govermnent will call for more money than
external and indirect taxation can produce. Our business,
then, is to consider the mode recommended by the gentle~
man, and see whether it can possibly furnish supplies ade-
quate to the exigencies of government. He says, Let requi—
sitions precede coercion. Sir, what are these’ reqursitions?
What are these pompous petitions for public charity, which
have made so, much noise, and brought so little cash into the
treasury? Have we not sported with the bubble longr enough
to discover its emptiness? What have requisitiom done?
Have they paid off our foreign and domestic debts? Have
they supported our civil and small military establishments?
The gentleman declares that a great sum has been paid ; he
includes the bounties given to the soldiers. V’Vere not these

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 343

obtained by coercion on individuals P Let him deduct these
bounties, and he will find the amount actually paid to be ex—
tremely small. We know that the states which have paid
most have not fully complied With the requisitions: some
have contributed little, and some nothing. The gentleman
also says, that delinquencies have been occasioned by the
distresses of the war. Facts prove the contrary. New Hamp-
shire has hardly felt the calamities of the war, and yet that
state has paid little or nothing to the treasury. These cir—
cumstances show that the motives for compliance, which, dur-
ing the contest, were as strong as they could be in any pos-
sible situation, have never been sufficient to produce any
conside1able exertions. Necessity of circumstances, which
operates with almost a physical energy, alone procured any
tolerable supplies. Thus the state of New York which was
continually the seat of wal, was more punctual than the other
states. The neighboring states afforded something g,appa-
rently in proportion to their sense of danger. When the
enemy appeared 111 any state, we find them making efforts,
and Wearing at once a ve1y federal complexion. If we look
at the accounts of South Ca1olina, we shall find that they
are credited for supplies furnished iri their own state, and fur-
nished only while the enemy were in the midst of them.

I imagine, sir, that indirect taxes will be generally suffi—
cient in time of peace. But a constitution should be calcu-
lated for all circumstances—for the most critical and danger—
ous conjunctures. Let us suppose a sudden emergency, in
Which the ordinary resources are entirely inadequate to the
public wants, and see What difficulties present themselves
on the gentleman’s plan. First, a requisition is to go out to
all the states. It is by no means probable that half their
legislatures will be in session; perhaps none of them. In
the next place, they must be convened solely to consider the
requisition. When assembled, some may agree to it; some
may totally refuse; others may be dilatory, and contrive
plausible excuses for delay. This is an exact picture of the
prroc eedings on this subject which have taken place for a num—
ber of years. While these complicated and lingeling ope1a
tions are going on, the crisis may be passed, and the Union

may be th1own into emba1rassments, or involved in ruin.
But immediately on refusal, the amendment proposes com
pulsion. This supposes that a complete establishment of ex

344 DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON.

ecutive officers must be constantly maintained, and that they
will have firmness enough to oppose and set aside the law of
the state. Can it be imagined, by any rational man, that
the legislature of a state, which has solemnly declared that
it will not grant a requisition, will suffer a tax for the same
to be immediately levied on its citizens? We are then
brought to this dilemma— either the collectors could not be
so hardy as to disregard the laws of the states, or an internal
war will take place. But, on either of these events, what
becomes of the requisition and the tax? Sir, is there a peo—
ple under heaven, who, countenanced and imboldened by the
voice of their state legislatures, will ever pay a farthing of
such a tax? They will resist it as they would a foreign
tribute, or the invasion of an enemy. Under such circum-
stances, Will Congress be able to borrow? We all know
what has been the difficulty of procuring loans : we are sen-
sible that foreign loans could not have been procured at all,
had not the lenders been greatly interested in the success of
the revolution. Besides, they undoubtedly expected such a
change in our government as would enable the United States
to provide efficient funds. Now, we are forming a constitu-
tion for ages, which will forever preclude the establishment
of any certain funds. What hopes have we of borrowing,
unless we have something to pledge for payment? And the
avails of direct taxes are the only positive fund which can be
pledged. I presume the impost and excise will not be more
than sufficient to fund the debts we now owe. lf future
wars should lead us into extraordinary expenses, it will be
necessary not only to lay direct taxes, but to procure new
loans, to support those expenses.

Sir, if these reflections should have little weight with
other states, they ought certainly to influence us, as we are
a navigating state, and, from our local situation, shall be the
first to suffer. This state will probably be the theatre of
war. Gentlemen should remember that for a time we were
compelled to bear almost the whole Weight of the last war.
lf we form this Constitution so as to take away from the
Union the means of protecting us, we must, in a future war,
either be ruined by the enemy, or ruined by our exertions
to protect ourselves. If the gentlemen acknowledge the
necessities l have described may exist, they should be willing
to give Congress the fullest power to provide for them

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 3415

But the point on which gentlemen appear to dwell with
most attention and concern, is the jurisdiction of the united
and individual states, in taxation. They say a concurrent
jurisdiction cannot exist, and that the two powers will clash,
and one or the other must be overpowered. Their argu-
ments are considerably plausible , but if we investigate this
matter properly, we shall see that the dangers they appre-
hend ale me1ely ideal. Their fears originate in a supposed
corruption of Congress; for, if the state goveinments are
valuable and necessary to the system, it cannot be imagined
that the representatives of the people, while they have a
single principle of honesty, will consent to abolish them. If
I proceeded here to prove the improbability of corruption, I
should only repeat arguments which the committee have
already heard most clearly and copiously detailed. The fact
is, that, in our p1esent state of society, and undei the opera-
tion of this Constitution, interest and integrity will be con-
nected by the closest ties. Inte1est will form a check which
nothing can overcome. O11 interest, sir, we rest our principal
hopes of safety. Your state government has the unlimited
power over the purse and the sword : why do you not fear
that your rulers will raise armies, to oppress and enslave the
citizens? Clearly, because you feel a confidence in the men
you elect; and that confidence is founded 011 the conviction
you haVe that tyranny is totally inconsistent with their inter-
est. You will give up to your state legislatures every thing
dear and valuable; but you will give no power to Congress,
because it may be abused ; you will give them no revenue,
because the public treasures may be squandered. But do you
not see here a capital check? Congress are to publish, from
time to time, an account of their receipts and eXpenditures.
These may be compa1ed togetl1e1, and if the f01mer, year
after year, exceed the latter, the corruption will be detected,
and the people may use the constitutional mode of redress
The gentleman admits that corruption will not take place
immediately: its operations can only be conducted by a long
series and a steady system of measures. These measures
will be easily defeated, even if the people are unapprized of
them They will be defeated by that continual change of
members, which naturally takes place in free governments,
arising from the disaffection and inconstancy of the people.
A changeable assembly will be entirely incapable of con-

vor '1. 441

346 DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON.

ducting a system of mischief; they will meet with obstacles
and embarrassments on every side.

It is observed that, if the general government are dis-
posed, they can levy taxes exclusively. But, sir, they have
not an exclusive right, except in a few specific cases. Their
right is only concu11ent. Let us see if the taxes will be
3xclusive in their operation. VVhatevel the gentleman may
:onjecture, I think it hardly possible that, when a state has
laid a large duty upon a particular article, the Congress will
be so unwise as to impose anothe1 upon the same, unless in
ethaOIdinary emergencies. There are ce1tain capital sub—
jects of taxation, which both the gene1al and state govern-
ments must improve. But it is remarked that two taxes
cannot operate together without confusion. Sir, experience
has proved the contrary. We have state taxes, county
taxes, and corporation taxes. How do these operate to—
gether? It is true that in some places they are collected by
the same man; and probably also the federal and state
taxes will be. But this is not material. It is the taxes, not
the collectors, that are to contend; and if the taxes are incom-
patible with each other, a single collector, acting in different
capacities, must go through the same ceremony of seizure,
replevin, &c., which the gentleman has so humorously de-
scribed. If the state collector gets the horse first, I suppose
he will have the first satisfaction; and so the federal col—
lector. Of What importance is it, whether a man pays forty
shillings to one, or twenty shillings each, to two officers. 9 I
have 11eve1 lealned that thete has been any clashing 01 c011—
fusion in the collection ol our taxes. It is to be supposed
that we have resources sufficient for the support of both the
general and state governments: if this be not. true, we may
as well discard the system altogether, and either dissolve our
Union, or form a simple consolidated government. But
We presume, very justly, that the system will find ample
resources for its support, as it stands. If this be acknowl-
edged, I see no difficultv 111 the matter. The people have
so much to pay; if they can afford this, if 1t be ready f01 the
proper officers, what should occasion a quar1el between
them. P As f01 the gentleman’ s p1inciple, that everyb O‘overn-
them can raise more money than it can use, I confess I do
not understand it.

It appears to me that the people cannot be very a11x10us

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 3417

about the particular channel th10ugl1 which their money
flows into the federal tieasury. They have such and such
taxes to pay: can it be a matter of concern to them whethe1
they are levied by a law of their state, or by a law of Con-
gless. P If they have any p1efe1ence, one would suppose it
would be for the latter mode; f01 that will be the least
expensive.

I11 this argument, sir, I have endeavored to confine myself
to the true point of dispute, and have taken notice of those
observations only which appeared to me to be applicable. I
beg the committee to keep 111 mind, as an impo1tant idea, that
the accounts of the general govemment a1e, “ f1om time to
time,” to be submitted to theb public inspection.

Hon. Mr. SMITH remarked, that “from time to time’
might mean from century to century, or any period of twenty
or thirty years.

The CHANCELLOR asked if the public were more anx-
ious about any thing under heaven than the expenditure of
money. Will not the representatives, said he, consider it as
essential to their popularity, to gratify their constituents with
full and frequent statements of the public accounts? There
can be no doubt of it.

The Hon. Mr. HAMILTON. This is one of those sub—
jects, Mr. Chaitman, 011 which objections ve1y naturally
a1 13c, and assume the most plausible shape. Its addless ]S to
the passions, and its first imp1essio11s cleate a prejudice,
before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It
is more eaSy for the human mind to calculate the evils than
the advantages. of a measure; and vastly more natural to
apprehend the danger than to see the necessity of giving
powers to our rulers. Hence I may justly expect that those
who hear me Will place less confidence in those arguments
which oppose, than in those which favor, their prepossessions.

After all our doubts, our suspicions, and speculations, on
the subject of government, we must return at last to this im-
portant truth—that, when .we have formed a constitution
upon free principles, when we have given a prOper balance
to the different branches of administration, and fixed repre-
sentation upon pure and equal principles, we may, with
safety, furnish it with all the powe1s necessary to answer, in
the most ample manne1, the purposes of gove1nment. The
file it desidemta me, free representation and mutual checks.

31118 DEBATES. LHAMILTON.

When these are obtained, all our apprehensions of the extent
of power are unjust and imagina1y. What, then, IS the
structu1e of this Constitution." One bianch of the legisla-
ture is to be elected by the people by the same people
who choose you1 state 1ep1esentatives. Its members are to ‘
hold thei1 offices two 1ea1s, and then return to then constitu-
ents. He1e, si1, the people govern , l1e1e they att by their
immediate representatives. You have also a Senate, c011-
stituted by your state legislatures, by men in Whom you
place the highest confidence, and forming another repiesent-
ative b1anch. Then, again, you have an executive magis-
trate, created by a. form of election which me1its unive1sal
admilation. I11 the form of this government, and in the
mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the g1eatest
politicians and the best writers have ever conceived. \Vhat
more can reasonable men desire? Is there any one b1a11ch
in which the whole legislative and executive powers are
lodged? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three
distinct branches, properly balanced; the executive is divided
between two branches; and the judicial is still reserved for
an independent body, who hold their office during good
behavibr. This organization is so complex, so skilfully con-
trived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or
wicked measure should pass the scrutiny with success.
Now, what do gentlemen mean by coming forward and de-
claiming against this government? Why do they say we
ought to limit its power, to disable it, and to destroy its
capacity of blessing the people 5’ Has philosophy suggested,
has experience taught, that such a government ought not to
be trusted with every thing necessary for the good of so-
ciety? Sir, when you have divided and nicely balanced the
departments of government; when you have strongly con-
nected the virtue of your rulers with their interest; when,
in short, you have rendered your system as perfect as human
forms can be,—you must place confidence; you must give
power.

We have hea1d a gleat deal of the sword and the purse.
It 18 said our liberties ale in danger, if both are possessed by
Congress. Let us see what is the true meaning of this
maxim, which has been so much used, and so little under-
stood. It is, that you shall not place these powers Glthtl 111
the legislative or executive, singly , neithc1 one n01 the other

 

HAMILTON] NEW YORK. .3419

shall have both, because this would destroy that division of
powers on which political liberty is founded, and would lur:
nish one body with all the means of tyranny. But where
the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in another,
there can be no danger. All governments have possessed
these powers: they would be monsters without them, and
incapable of exertion. What is your state government?
Does not your legislature command what money it pleases?
Does not your executive execute the laws without restraint?
These distinctions between the purse and the sword have
no application to the system, but only to its separate branches.
Sir, When we reason about the great interests of a free peo-
ple, it is high time that we dismiss our prejudices, and
banish declamation. In order to induce us to consider the
powers given by this Constitution as dangerous, in order to
render plausible an attempt to take away the life and spirit
of the most important power in government, the gentleman
complains that we shall not have a true and safe representa-
tion. I asked him What a safe representation was ; and he
has given no satisfactory answer. The Assembly of New
York has been mentioned as a proper standard; but if we
apply this standard to the general government, our Congress
will become a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse,
and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a system
afford security? Can you have confidence in such a body?
The idea of taking the ratio of representation, in a small
society, for the ratio of a great one, is a fallacy which ought
to be exposed. It is impossible to ascertain to what point
our representation Will increase; it may vary from one, to
two, three, or four hundred: it depends upon the progress of
population. Suppose it to rest at two hundred; is not this
number sufficient to secure it against corruption? Human
nature must be a much more weak and despicable thing
than I apprehend it to be, if two hundred of our fellow-.
citizens can be corrupted in two years. But- suppose they ,
are corrupted; can they, in two years, accomplish their de-
signs ? Can they form a combination, and even lay a
foundation for a system of tyranny, in so short a period?
It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any
gentleman ; but I must, in this most interesting discussion,
speak of things as they are, and hold up opinions in the light
in which they ought to appear: and I maintain that all that
30

350 DEBATES. [HAMILTON

has been said of c111ru11tion, of the purse and the sw 01d, and
of the d:1ngc1 of g1ving powers, is not supported b3 princi—
ples 01' fact; that it is me1e ve1biage and idle declamation.
The t1ue principle of government is this—make the S3 stem
complete 111 its stlucture, give a perfect propo1tion and bal—
ance to its 11111ts, and the powe1s you give it will never affect
y'ou1 se c111ity. T he question, then, of the division ofpowe/ 9
between the general and state governments, is a question of
convenience: it becomes sa piudential inquiry, what powe1s
11111. 1111111111 to be rose 1ved to the latter; and this immediatel3
involves anothe1 inquin into the proper objects of the two

gove 1nme11ts. This is the criterion by which we shall
determine the just distlibution of powers.

The great leading objects of the federal government, in
which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domestic peace,
and provide for the common defence. In these are compre-
hended the regulation of commerce,—that is, the whole
system of foreign intercourse, ——the support of armies and
navies, and of the civil ad1'ninist1'ation. It is useless to go
into detail. Every one knows that the objects of the general
government. are numerous, extensive, and important. Every
one must acknowledge the necessity of giving powers, in all
respects, and in every degree, equal to these objects. This
principle assented to, let us inquire what are the objects of
the state governments. Have they to provide against for-
eign invasion? Have they to maintain fleets and armies?
Have they any concern in the regulation of commerce, the
procuring alliances, or forming treaties of peace? No.
Their objects are merely civil and domestic — to support the
legislative establishment, and to provide for the administra—
tion of the laws.

Let any one compare the expense of supporting the civil
list in a state with the expense of providing for the defence
of the Union. The difference is almost beyond calculation.
The experience of Great Britain will throw some light on this
subject. 111 that kingdom, the ordinary expenses of peace
to those of war are as one to fourteen. But there they have
a monarch, with his splendid (ourt, and an enormous civil
establishment, with which we have nothing 1n this countly
to compare. If, in Great Britain, the expenses of war and
peace are so d1s11ro11o1t10ned, how wide will be their dispar-
ity in the United States! How infinitely wider between

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 351

the general government and each individual state! Now,
sir, where ought the great resources to be lodged? Every
rational man will give an immediate answer. To what
extent shall these resources he possessed? Reason says, As
far as possible exigencies can require ; that is, without limit—
ation. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation’s
wants; it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources.
Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand
all the possible abilities of the country. Shall not your gov-
ernment have power to call these abilities into action? The
' contingencies of society are not reducible to calculations.
They cannot be fixed or bounded, even in imagination.
Will you limit the means of your defence, when you cannot
ascertain the force or extent of the invasion ? Even in ordi-
nary wars, a government is frequently obliged to call for sup—
plies, to the temporary Oppression of the people.

Sir, if we adopt the idea of exclusive revenues, we shall be
obliged to fix some distinguished line, which neither govern—
ment shall overpass. The inconvenience of this measure
must appear evident on the slightest examination. The
resources appropriated to one may diminish or fail, while
those of the other may increase beyond the wants of govern-
ment. One may be destitute of revenues, While the other
shall possess an unnecessary abundance; and the Constitu-
tion will be an eternal barrier to a mutual intercourse and
relief. In this case, will the individual state stand on so
good a ground as if the objects of taxation were left free and
open to the embrace of both the governments? Possibly,
in the advancement of commerce, the imposts may increase
to such a degree as to render direct taxes unnecessary.
These resources, then, as the Constitution stands, may be
occasionally relinquished to the states; but on the gentle-
man’s idea of prescribing exClusive limits, and precluding all
reciprocal communication, this would be entirely improper.
The laws of the states must not touch the appropriated
resources of the United States, whatever may be their wants.
Would it not be of much more advantage to the states to
have a concurrent jurisdiction, extending to all the sources
of revenue, than to be confined to such a small resource, as,
on calculation of the objects of the two governments, should
appear to be their due proportion? Certainly you cannot
hesitate on this question. The gentleman’s plan would have .

352 DE BATES. [HAMILTON,

a further ill effect; it would tend to dissolve the connection
and correspondence of the two governments, to estrange
them f1om each othe1, and to destroy that mutual depend-
ence which f01n1s the essence of union.

Si1, a number of arguments have been advanced by an
honorable member from New York, which to every uncloud-
ed mind must carry conviction. He has stated that, in
certain emergencies, it may be necessary to borrow; and
that it is impossible to borrow, unless you have funds to
pledge for the payment of your debts. Limiting the powers
of government to certain resources, is rendering the fund '
precarious ; and obliging the government to ask, instead of
empowering them to command, is to destroy all confidence
and credit. If the power of taxing is restricted, the conse-
quence is, that, on the breaking out of a war, you must
divert the funds, appropriated to the payment of debts, to
answer immediate exigencies. Thus you violate your
engagements, at the very time you increase the burden of
them. Besides, sound policy condemns the practice of accu-
mulating debts. A government, to act with energy, should
have the possession of all its revenues to answer present
purposes. The principle for which I contend is recognized
in all its extent by our old constitution. Congress is author—
ized to raise troops, to call for supplies without limitation,
and to borrow money to any amount. It is true they must
use the form of recommendations and requisitions; but the
states are bound by the solemn ties of honor, of justice, of
religion, to comply without reserve.

Mr. Chairman, it has been advanced as a principle, that
no government but a despotism can exist in a very extensive
country. This is a melancholy considetation indeed. if it
were founded on t1utl1, we ought to dismiss the idea ofa
republican government, even for the state of New York.
This idea has been taken from a celebrated writer, who, by
being misunderstood, has been the occasion of frequent falla-
cies in our reasoning on political subjects. But the position
has been misapprehended; and its application is entirely
false and unwarrantable: it relates only to democracies,
where the whole body of the people meet to transact busi-
ness, and Where representation is unknown. Such 11 ere a
number of ancient and some modern independent cities.
Men who read without attention l1a1e taken these maxims

‘HAMIL'I‘ON.] NEW YORK. 353

respecting the" extent of country, and, contrary to their mean-
ing, have applied them to republics in general. This appli-
cation is wrong in respect to all re}')resentative governments.
but especially in relation to a confede1acy of states, in which
the supreme legislature has onlyg eneral powers, and the
civil and domestic concerns of the people are regulated by the
llWS of the several states. This distinction being kept in
View, all the difficulty will vanish, and we may easily con-—
ceive that the people of a large country may he represented
as truly as those of a small one. A11 assembly constituted
fo1 general pu1 poses may be fully competent. to every federal
regulation, Without being too numerous for deliberate con-
duct. If the state governments were to be abolished, the
question would wear a different face; but this idea is inad-
missible. They are absolutely necessary to the system.
Their existence must form a leading principle in the most
perfect constitution we could form.

I insist that it neve1 can be the interest or desire of the

national legislature to destroy the state governments. It can 3

derive no advantage ftom such an event; but, on the con-
trary, would lose an indispensable support, a necessary aid
in executing the laws, and conveying the influence of
' government to the doors of the people. The Union is

.3.

dependent on the will of the state governments for its chief "

magistrate, and for its Senate. The blow aimed at the-

members must give a fatal wound to the head; and the de-
struction of the states must be at once a political suicide.
Can the national government be guilty of this madness?
What inducements, What temptations,c can they have? Will
they attach new honors to their station? Will they 1ncrease
the national strength? Will they multiply the national
resources ? . Will they make themselves more respectable in
the view of foreign nations, or of their fellow-citizens, by
robbing the states of their constitutional privileges? But
imagine, for a moment, that a political frenzy should seize
the government; suppose they should make the attempt.
Certainly, sir, it would be forever impracticable. This has
been sufficiently demonstrated by reason and experience. It
has been proved that the members of republics have been, and
ever will be, stronger than the head. Let us attend to one
general historical example: in the ancient feudal govern—
ments of EurOpe, there were, in the first place, a monarch;
VOL. II.

35~1~ DEBATES. LHAMILTON.

subordinate to him, a body of nobles, ° and subject to these,
the vassals, 01 the whole body of the people. The authority -
of the kings was limited, and that of the barons con81de1abl y
independent. A great pa1t of the eally wars in Europe
were contests between the king and his nobility. In these
contests, the latter possessed many advantages derived from
their influence, and the immediate command they had over
the people; and they gene1ally prevailed. The history of
the feudal wars exhibits little more than a seriesof success-
ful encroachments 011 the prerogatives of monarchy. Here,
sir, is one great proof of the superiority which the members
in limited governments possess ovr r their head. As long as
the balons enjoyed the (onfidenee and attachment of the
people, they had the strength of the countty 011 theii side,
and were irlesistible. I may be told that, 111 some instant es,
the barons were overcome; but 110W did this happen P Sir,
they took advantage of the depression of the royal authority,
and the establishment of their own power, to oppress and
tyrannize over the vassals. As commerce enlarged, and as
wealth and civilization increased, the people began to feel
their own weight and consequence : they grew tired of their
oppressions, united their strength with that of the prince,
and threw off the yoke of aristocracy. These very instances
prove what I contend for. They prove that in Whatever
direction the popular weight leans, the current of power will
flow; wherever the pepular attachments lie, there will rest
the political superiority. Sir, can it be supposed that the
state will become the oppressors of the people P Will they
forfeit their affections? Will they combine to destroy the
liberties and happiness of their fellow-citizens, for the sole
purpose of involving themselves in ruin? God forbid ! The
idea, sir, is shocking. It outrages every feeling of humanity,
and every dictate of common sense.

There are certain social principles in human nature, from
which we may draw the most solid conclusion with respect
to the conduct of individuals and of communities. We love
our families more than our neighbors ; we love our neighbors
more than our countrymen-in general. The human affee
tions, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as they depart
from the centre, and become languid in proportion to the
expansion of the circle in which they act. On these prin-
ciples, the attachment of the individual will be first and for-

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 35:3

ever secured by the state governments: they will be a
mutual protection and support. Another source of influent e,
which has already been pointed out, is the various official
connections in the states. Gentlemen. endeavor to evade
the force of this by saying that these officers will be insig-
nificant. This is by no means true. The 'state officers will
ever be important, because they are necessary and useful.
Their powers are such as are extremely interesting among
the people; such as affect their property, their liberty, and
life. What, is more importantthan the administration of
justice and the execution of the civil and criminal laws?
Can the state governments become insignificant while they
have the power of raising money independently, and with-
out control. ? If they are 1eally useful, if they are calculated
to promote the essential. interests of the people, they must
have their confidence and support. The states can never
lose their powers till the whole people of Ame1ica are robbed
of their libelties. These must go together , they must sup-
port each other, or meet one common fate. On the gentle-
man’s principle wemay safely t1ust the state governments,
though we have no means of resisting them; but we cannot
confide in the national govelnment, though we have an ef-
fectual constitutional guard against eve1y encroachment.
This is the essence of their algument, and it is false and
.fallacious beyond conception.

With regard to the jurisdiction of the two governments, I
shall certainly admit that the Constitution ought to be so
formed as not to prevent the states from providing for thei1
own existence , and I maintain that it is so formed, and that
their powerof providing for themselves is sufficiently estab-
lished. This is conceded by one gentleman, and in the
next breath the concession is retracted. He says, Congress
have but one exclusive right 1n taxation -— that of duties on
imports; certainly, then, their other powers are only c011-
curlent. But, to take off the force of this obvious conclu-
sion, he immediately says that the laws of the United States
are supreme; and that where there is one supreme, there
cannot be concurrent authority; and further, that where the
laws of the Union are supreme, those of the states must be.
subordinate, because there cannot be two supremes. This
is curious sophistry. , That two supreme powers cannot act
together, is false. They are inconsistent only when thev

356 DEBATES. [IIAMILTON-

are aimed at each other, 01' at one indi1isible object. The
laws of the United States are csup1eme, as to all their proper,
constitutional objects: the laws of the states are supreme in
the same w.ay These suprenre laws may act on different
objects without clashino ,01' they may operate 011 different
parts of the same object, with perfect harmony. Suppose
both governments should lay a tax of a penny on a certain
article: had not each an independent and uncontrollable
plower to collect its own tax? The meaning of the maxim,
there cannot be two supremes, is simply this—two powers
cannot be supreme over each other This meaning is e11-
tirely perverted by the gentleman. But it is said, disputes
between collectors are to be referred to the federal courts.
This is again wandering in the field of conjecture. But
suppose the fact certain; is it not to be presumed that they
will express the true meaning of the Constitution and the
laws. 9 Will they not be bound to consider the concurrent
jurisdiction; to declare that both the taxes shall have equal
operation, that both the pOW'crs, in that respect, are sov-
ereign and coextensive. P If they transgress their duty, we
are to hope that they will be punished. tDSir, we can reason
from probabilities alone. When we leave common sense,
and give ourselves up to conjecture, there can be no certainty,
no security in our reasonings.

I imagine I have stated to the committee abundant reasons
to prove the entire safety of the state governments and of the
people. I would go into a 11101e minute consideration of the
nature of the concurrent jurisdiction, and the operation of
the laws, 111 relation to revenue; but at present l feel too
much indisposcd to proceed. I shall, with the leave of the
committee, improve another opportunity of expressng to
them more fully my ideas 011 this point. Iwish the com-
mittee to remember that the Constitution under examination
is framed upon truly republican principles; and that, as it is
expressly designed to provide for the common protection and
the general welfare of the United States, it must be utterly
repugnant to this Constitution to subvert the state govern-
ments, or oppress the people.

SATURDAY, June 28,1788.—The H011. Mr. HAMIL—
TON. Mr'. Chairman, in the course of these debates, it has
been suggested that the state of New York has sustained
peculiar misfortune from the mode of raising revenues by

CLINTON.] NEW YORK. 357

requisitions. I believe we shall now be able to prove that
this state, in the course of the late revolution, suffered the
extremes of distress on account of this delusive system. To
establish these facts, I shall beg leave to introduce a series
of official papers, and resolutions of this state, as evidence
of the sentiments of the people during the most melancholy
periods of the war. I shall request the secretary to read
these papers, in the order in which I point them out.

His excellency, Gov. CLINTON. I presume the int1o-
duction of this kind of evidence is occasioned by a conver
sation I had with one of the gentlemen yesterday. It would
have been fair to mention to me, at that time, the intention
of bringing these matters forward. Some new lights might
then have been thrown on the subject, relative to the par-
ticular circumstances which produced the resolutions alluded
to. An opportunity would also have been given of showing
what the sense of Congress and of this state was, after those
circumstances were changed. I believe these resolutions
were previous to the accession of all the states to the Con-
federation. I could wish that these matters might be set in
a clear point of light.

The'Hon. Mr. DUANE. .I hope the honorable member
will not suppose that I have dealt unfairly. It is true I had
some conversation with him yesterday, which led me to a
conclusion that it would be fair and proper that these papers
should be produced. But independently of that conversa-
tion, sir, I should have thought it my duty to bring them
forward, because I believe that the melancholy experience
of our country ought to have more influence on our conduct,
than all the speculations and elaborate reasonings of the
ablest men. I trust that this evidence will come home;
that it will be felt. I, am convinced that our greatest mis-
fortunes originated in' the want of such a government as is
now offered to us. I assure the gentleman that the Con-
versation I had with him yesterday was not the cause of
b1i1iging these papers into View. I declare that, if I know
my own heart, I have no intention of acting uncandidly.

Gov. CLINTON. I do not mean to create any dispute
respecting the subject of these 1esolutions. I did inform the
gentleman that there were several papers which would th1ow
light on this question. All I say is, it would have been fair
to produce all of them together, that the committee might

356 DEBATES. [TREDWELL

not be deceived by a partial statement. I observed that all
these resolutions were at a period antecedent to the com-
pletion of the Union, when Congress had no power at ail.
The gentlemen are mistaken if they suppose I wrsh to pre-
vent the reading of them.

Mr. DUANE. I believe we shall find that there are
resolutions subsequent, as well as antecedent, to the com-
pletion of the Confederation. This we shall endeavor to
show. I am clear, sir, that these exhibits Wlll furmsh more
effectual arguments than all that can be sald. But I shall
not enlarge. The papers will speak for themselves.

Mr. M. SMITH. I shall not oppose the reading of any
papers the gentlemen may think proper to produce. But
we shall reserve to ourselves the privilege of givmg what we
think to be the true explanation of them.

Mr. HAMILTON. We shall make the same reservation.
By the indisputable construction of these resolutions, we
shall prove that this state was once on the verge of destruc—
tion, for want of an energetic government. To this pomt
we shall confine ourselves. '

Mr. TREDWELL. It appears to me useless to read
these papers. lfl understand the matter, they are produced
to prove a point which is not contested. It is on all hands
acknowledged that the federal government is not adequate
to the purpose of the Union.

The papers were then read by the secretary, in the fol-
lowing order :—

lst. An extract from Governor Clinton’s speech to the legislature,
September 7, 1780.

2d. Extract from the answer ofthe Senate, September 9, 1780.

3d. Resolve of the Assembly, October 10, 1780.

4th. Resolve of both houses, October 10, 1780, respecting the Hart-
ford Convention.

5th. A letter from the legislature of New York to Congress, dated
Albany, February 5, 1781, describing the distresses of the state.

6th. A message from the governor to the legislature, March 9, 1781,
announcing the establishment of the Confederation.

7th. Resolve of the legislature, dated March 9.9, 178], relative to the
Hartford Convention.

8th. Resolve of the legislature, November ‘21, 1781, recommending a
five per cent. impost.

9th. A resolution of 20th July, 1782, lamenting the want of powers
in Congress, and pointing out the defect of the Confederation.

After these papers were read,

CLINTONJ NEW YORK. » 5 359

Gov. CLINTOIV rose, and observed, that there could
be no doubt that the representations made in them w:re
true, and that they'clearly expressed the sentiments of the
people at those periods.‘ vOur severe distresses, he said,
naturally led us into an opinion that the Confederation was
too weak. It appears to me, the design of producing these
papers. is something more than to show the sentiments of the
state during the war; that it is to prove that there now
exists an opposition to an energetic government. I declare,
solemnly, that .I am a friend to a strong and efficient gov-
ernment. But, sir, we may err in this extreme: we may
erect a system that will destroy the liberties of the people.
Sir, at the time some of these resolves were passed, there
was a dangerous attempt to subvert our liberties, by creating
a supreme dictator. There are many gentlemen present
who knowhow strongly I opposed it. My opposition was
at the very time we were surrounded with difficulties and
danger. The people, when Wearied with their distresses,
will, in the moment of frenzy, be guilty of the most impru-
dent and desperate measures. Because a strong govern—
”ment was wanted during the late war, does itfollow that we
should, now be obliged to accept of a dangerous one ? I ever
lamented the feebleness of the Confederation, for this rea—
son, among others, that the experience of its weakness would
one day drive the people into an adoption of a constitution
dangerous to our liberties. I know the people are too apt
to Vibrate from one extreme to another. The effects of this
disposition are What I wish to guard against. If the gentle-
man can show me that the proposed Constitution is a safe
one, I will drop all opposition. The public resolves, which
have been read to- you, are only expressive of the desire that
once prevailed to remove present difficulties. A general
impost was clearly intended, but it was intended as a tem—
porary measure. I appeal to every gentleman present, if I
have not been uniformly in favor of granting an. impost to
Congress. I confess, the-manner in which that body pro—
posed to exercise the power, I could not agree to. I firmly
believed, that, if it were granted in the form recommended,
it would prove unproductive, and would also lead to the
establishment of dangerous principles. I believed that grant-
ing the revenue, without giving the power of collection, or
a control over our state officers, would be the most wise and

.)50 DEBATES. [H.AMILTON.

prudent measure. These are and ever have been my sentl-
ments. I declare that, with lespect to the papers which
have been 1ead, or any which I have in my possessflion,I
shall be 1eady to give the committee all the 1nfo1mat1011 in
my power.

M1. DUANE. As I am sensible the gentleman last 011
the floo1 was in the confidence of the commander-in- chief, I
would wish to ask if he did not, at different times, receive
communications from his excellency, expressive of this idea
—that, if this state did not furnish supplies to the army, it
must be disbanded.

Gov. CLINTON. It is true, sir, I have received such com-
munications more than once. I have been sent for to attend
councils of war, Where the state of the army was laid before
me; and it was melancholy indeed. I believe that, at one
period, the exertions of this state, in impressing flour from
the people, saved the army f1om dissolution.

Mr. HAMILTON. The honorable gentleman f1om Ul-
ster has given a tu1n to the introduction of those papers
which was never in our contemplation. He seems to in-
sinuate that they were brought forward with a view of
showing an inconsistency in the conduct of some gentleman;
perhaps of himself. Sir, the exhibition of them had a very
diffiarent object. It was to prove that this state once expe—
rienced hardships and distresses to an astonishing degree, for
want of the assistance of the other states. It was to show
the evils we suffered since, as well as before, the establish-
ment of the Confederation, from being compelled to support
the burden of the war; that requisitions have been unable
to call forth the resources of the country; that requisitions
have been the cause ~of a principal part of our calamities;
that the system is defective and rotten, and ought forever to
be banished from our government. It was necessary—with
deference to the honorable gentleman—to bring forward
these important proofs of our argument, without consulting
the feelings of any man.

That the human passions should flow from one extreme
to another, I allow, is natural. Hence the mad project of
creating a dictator. But it is equally true that this project
was never ripened into a deliberate and extensive design
When I heard of it, it met my instant disapprobation. The
honorable gentleman’s opposition, too, is known and applaud-

HAMILI‘ONJ NEW YORK. 36]

ed. But Why bring these things into remembrance? Why
affect to compare this temporary effusion with theserious
sentiments our fellow—citizens entertained of the national
weaknesses? The gentleman has made a declaration of his
wishes for a stlong federal government. I hope this IS the
wish of all. But bwhy has he not given us his ideas of the
nature of this government, which is the object of his Wishes?
Why does he not describe it1D We have proposed a system
which we supposed would answer the purposes of strength
and safety. The gentleman objects to it, without pointing
out the g1ounds on which his objections are founded, or
showing us a better f011n. These gene1al surmises never
lead to the discovery of truth. It is to be desired that the
gentleman would explain particularly the errors in this sys-
tem, and fulnish us with their prope1 remedies. The com-
mittee remembe1 that a g1ant of an impost to the United
States, for twenty-five years, was 1equested by Congress.
Though it was a very small addition of power to the fed-
eral government, it was opposed in this state, Without any
reasons being offered. The dissent of New York and Rhode
Island frustrated a most important measure. The gentleman
says he was for granting the impost; yet he acknowledges
he could not agree to the mode recommended. But it is
well known that Congress had declared that they could not
receive the accession of the states upon any other plan than
that proposed. In such cases, propositions for altering the
plan amounted to a positive rejection. At this time, sir, we
were told it was dangerous to grant powers to Congress;
did this general argument indicate a disposition to grant the
impost in any shape? I should myself have been averse to
the g1anting of very extensive powe1s; but the impost was
justly considered as the only means of supporting the Union.
We did not then contemplate a fundamental change in gov-
e111ment. F1om my sense of the gentlemen’ s integrity, I
am bound to believe that they are attached to a strong
united government; and yet I find it difficult to draw th1s
conclusion from their conduct or their reasonings.

Sir, with respect to the subject of revenue, which was
debated yesterday, it was asserted :that, in all matters of
taxation, except in the article of imposts, the united and in-
dividual states had a concurrent Jurisdiction; that the state
governments had an independent authority to draw revenues

VOL. 11. 46 31

562 DEBATES. [HAMILTONL

from every source but one. The truth of these positions
will appear on a slight investigation. I maintain that the
word supreme imports no more than this —that the Constitu-
tion, and laws made in pursuance thereof, cannot be con-
trolled or defeated by any other law. The acts of‘the
United States, therefore, will be absolutely obligatory as to
all the proper objects and powers of the general government.
The states, as well as individuals, are bound by these laws;
but the laws of Congress are restricted to a certain sphere,
and when they depart from this sphere, they are no longer
supreme or binding. In the same manner the states have
certain independent powers, in which their laws are supreme;
for example, in making and executing laws concerning the
punishment of certain crimes, such as murder, theft, &c.,
the states cannot be controlled. With respect to certain
other objects, the powers of the two governments are con-
current, and yet supreme. I instanced yesterday a tax on
a specific article. Both might lay the tax; both might col-
lect it without clashing or interference. If the individual
should be unable to pay both, the first seizure would hold
the property. Here the laws are not in the way of each
other; they are independent and supreme.

The case is like that of two creditors: each has a distinct
demand; the debtor is held equally for the payment of both.
Their suits are independent; and if the debtor cannot pay
both, he who takes the first step secures his debt. The in—
dividual is precisely in the same situation, whether he pays
such a sum to one, or to two. No more will be required of
him to supply the public wants, than he has ability to afford.
That the states have an undoubted right to lay taxes in all
cases in which they are not prohibited, is a position founded
on the obvious and important principle in confederated gov-
ernments, that whatever is not expressly given to the fed-
eral head is reserved to the members. The truth of this
principle must strike every intelligent mind. In the first
formation of government, by the association of individuals,
every power of the community is delegated, because the
government is to extend to every possible object; nothing is
reserved but the unalienable rights of mankind: but, when
a number of these societies unite for certain purposes, the
rule is different, and from the plainest reason—they have
already delegated their sovereignty and their powers to their

Hmamm] ' NEW YORK. 363

. seve1al governments; and these cannot be recalled, and
given to another, without an exp1ess act. I submit to the
committee whether this 1easoning is not conclusive. Unless,
thelcfore, we find that the powers of taXation a1e exclusively
granted, we must conclude that the1e 1en1ai11s a concur1ent
authority. Let us, then, 111qui1e if the Constitution gives
such exclusive powers to the general gove1nment. Sir, the1e
is not a syllable in it that favors this idea ; not a word im-
po1ting an exclusive glant, except in thc a1ticle of imposts.
l am suppo1ted 111 my genelal position by this ve1 y exception.
_ If the states are plohibited f1om laying duties 011 impmts,
the implication is clear. Now, what p1oportion will the
duties 011 impo1ts bear to the other ordi11a1y 1esou1ces of the
country. ' We may 110W say one thir,d but this will not be
the case long. As our manufactures increase, foreign im—
portations moust lessen. i Here a1e two thirds, at least, of
the resources of our country open to the state gove1nments.
Can it be imagined, then, that the states will lose their
- existence or importance for want of revenues 5’9 The propri—
ety of Congress possessing an exclusive power over the
impost appears from the necessity of their having a consid—
' erable portion of our resources, to pledge as a fund for the
reduction of the debts of the United States. When you have
given a power-of taxation to the general government, none
“of the states individually will be holden for the discharge
of the federal obligations: the burden will be on the Union.
The gentleman says that the operation of the taxes
will exclude the states on this ground— that the demands
’of the community are always equal to its resources; that
Congress will find a use for all the money the people can
pay. This observation, if designed as a general rule, 13, in
every View, unjust. Does he suppose the general govern-
ment will want all the money the people can furnish, and
also that the state governments will want all the money the
people can furnish? What cOntradiction is this! But if
this maxim be true, how does the wealth of the country ever
increase ?- How a1e the people enabled to accumulate
fortunes. 9 Do the burdens regularly augment as its inhab—
itants grow prosperous and happy? But if, indeed, all the
1esources are required for the protection of the people, it
follows that the p1otecting power should have access to
them. The only difficulty lies in the want of resources. If

364 DEBATES. [Hmmom

they are adequate, the operation will be easy; if they are
not, taxation must be restrained. Will this be the fate of
the state taxes alone? Certainly not. The people will
say, No. What will be the conduct of the national rulers P
The consideration will not be, that our imposing the tax will
destroy the states, for this cannot be effected; but that it
will distress the people, whom we represent, and whose
protectors we are. It is unjust to suppose they will be
altogether destitute of virtue and prudence: it is unfair to
presume that the representatives of the people will be dis-
posed to tyrannize in one government more than in another.
If we are convinced that the national legislature will pursue
a system of measures unfavorable to the interests of the
people, we ought to have no general government at all.
But if we unite, it will be for the accomplishment of great
purposes: these demand great resources and great powers.
There are certain extensive and uniform objects of revenue
which the United States will improve, and to which, if pos-
sible, they will confine themselves. Those objects which
are more limited, and in respect to which the circumstances
of the states differ, will be reserved for their use: a great
variety of articles will be in this last class of objects, to
which only the state laws will properly apply. To ascertain
this division of objects is the proper business of legislation :
it would be absurd to fix it in the Constitution, both because
it would be too extensive and intricate, and because altera-
tion of circumstances must render a change of the division
indispensable. Constitutions should consist only of general
provisions: the reason is, that they must necessarily be
permanent, and that they cannot calculate for the possible
change of things. I know that the states must have their
resources ; but I contend that it would be improper to point
them out particularly in the Constitution.

Sir, it has been said that a poll tax is a tyrannical tax;
but the legislature of this state can lay it, whenever they
please. Does, then, our Constitution authorize tyranny? I
am as much opposed to capitation as any man. Yet who
can deny that there may exist certain circumstances which
will render this tax necessary? In the course of a war, it
may be necessary to lay hold of every resource; and for a
certain period, the people may submit to it. But on remova-
of the danger, or the return of peace, the general sense of

HAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 360

the community would abol1sh1t The United Netheilands
were obliged, on an emergency, to give up one twentieth of
their property to the gove1nment. It has been said that it
will be impossible to exercise this power of taxation: if it
cannot be exercised, why be alarmed ? But. the gentlemen
say that the difficulty of executing it with moderation will
necessarily drive the government into despotic measures.
Here, again, they are in the old track of jealousy and con-
jecture. Whenever the people feel the hand of despotism,
they will not regard forms and parchments. But the gen-
tlemen’s premises are as false as their conclusion. No one
reason can be offered why the exercise of the power should
be impracticable. No one difficulty can be pointed out
which will not apply to our state governments. Congress
will have every means of knowledge that any legislature can
have. From general observation, and from the revenue
systems of the several states, they will derive information as
to the most eligible modes of taxation. If a land tax is the
object, cannot Congress procure as perfect a valuation as
any other assembly? Can they not have all the necessary
officers for assessment and collections? Where is the diffi-
culty? ' Where is the evil? They never can oppress a par-
ticular state by an unequal imposition; because the Consti-
tution has provided a fixed ratio, a uniform rule, by which
this must be regulated. The system will be founded upon
the most easy and equal principles—to draw as much as
possible from direct taxation; to lay the principal burdens on
the wealthy, &c.» Even ambitious and unprincipled men
will form their system so as to draw forth the resources of
the country in the most favorable, and gentle methods,
because such will be ever the, most productive. They never
can hope for success .by adopting those arbitrary modes
which have been used in some of the states.

A gentleman yesterday passed many encomiums 011 the
character and operations of the state governments. The
question has not been, whether their laws have produced
happy or unhappy effects. The character of our confedera-
tion is the subject of our controversy. But the gentleman con—
cludes too hastily. In many of the states, government has
not had a salutary operation. Not only Rhode Island, but
several others, have been guilty of indiscretions and mis-
conduct—of acts which have produced misfortunes and .

366 DEBATES. [HAMILTON.

dishonor. I grant that the government of New York has
operated well, and I ascribe it to the influence of those ex—
cellent principles in which the proposed Constitution and
our own are so congenial. We are sensible that private
credit is much lower in some states than it is in ours. What
is the cause of this? Why is it, at the present period, so
low, even in this state? Why is the value of our land de—
preciated? It is said that there is a scarcity of money in
the community. I do not believe this scarcity to be so great
as is represented. It may not appear; it may be retained
by its holders; but nothing more than stability and confi—
dence in the government is requisite to draw it into circula-
tion. It is acknowledged that the general government has
not answered its purposes. Why? We attribute it to the
defects of the revenue system. But the gentlemen say, the
requisitions have not been obeyed, because the states were
impoverished. This is a kind of reasoning that astonishes
me. The records of this state — the records of Congress —
prove that, during the war, New York had the best reason
to complain of the non-compliance of the other states. 1
appeal to the gentleman. Have the states who have suffered
least contributed most? No, sir; the fact is directly the re-
verse. This consideration is sufficient entirely to refute the
gentleman’s reasoning. Requisitions will ever he attended
with the same effects. This depends on principles of human
nature that are as infallible as any mathematical calculations.
States will contribute or not, according to their circumstances
and interests. They will all be inclined to throw off their
burdens of government upon their neighbors. These posi-
tions have been so fully illustrated and proved in former
stages of this debate, that nothing need be added. Unan-
swerable experience -—, stubborn facts — have supported and
fixed them.

Sir, to what situation is our Congress now reduced! It
is notorious that with the utmost difficulty they maintain
their ordinary officers, and support the mere form of a federal
government. How do we stand with respect to foreign na-
tions? It is a fact that should strike us with shame, that
we are obliged to borrow money in order to pay the interest
of our debts. It is a fact that these debts are every day ac-
cumulating by compound interest. This, sir, will one day
endanger the peace of our country, andexpose us to vicissi-

fIAMILTON.] NEW YORK. 367

tudes the most alarming. Such is the character of requisi-
tions -4 such the melancholy, dangerous condition to which
they have reduced us! Now, sir, after this full and fair
experiment, with what countenance do gentlemen come
forward to recommend the ruinous plinciple, and makeit the
basis of a new government? Why do they affect to cherish
this political demOn, and present it once more to our em-
b1 aces P The gentleman observed that we cannot, even in
a single state, collect the whole of a tax; some counties
will necessarily be deficient. I11 the same manner, says he,
some states will be delinquent. If this reasoning were just,
I should expect to see the states pay, like the counties, in
proportion to their ability, which is not the fact.

I shall proceed now more particularly to the proposition
before the committee. This clea1ly admits that the unlimited
power oftaxation, which I have been contending for, 1s proper. '
It declares that, after the states have 1elused to comply with
the requisitions, the generalg Government may enforce its de-
mands. While the gentlemen’s proposition and principle ad-
mit this, in its fullest latitude, the whole course of the states is
against it. The mode they point out would involve many in-
conveniences against which they would wish to guard. Sup-
pose the gentleman’s scheme should be adopted; would not
all the resources of the country be equally in the p0wer of
Congress? The states can have but one opportunity of
refusal. After having passed through the empty ceremony
of a requisition, the general government can enforce all its
demands, without limitation or resistance. The states will
either comply, or they will not. If they comply, they are
bound to collect the whole of the taX from the citizens. The
people must pay it. What, then, will be the disadvantage .
of its being levied and collected by Congress, in the fi1st 1n-
stance? It has been proved, as far as probabilities can go, that
the federal government will, 111 general, take the laws of the
several states as its rule, and pursue those measures to which
the peOple are most accustomed. But if the states do not com-
ply, what is the consequence. P If the power of a compulsion
be a misfortune to the state, they muSt now suffe1 it without, '
opposition or complaint. I shall show, too, that they must
feel it in an aggravated degr.ee It may f1equently hap-
pen that, though the states fo1mally comply with the requi-
sitions, the avails will not be fully realized by COngress the

368 DEBATES. [HAMILT0N.

states may be dilatory in the collection and payment, and
may form excuses for not paying the Whole. There may
also be partial compliances, which will subject the Union to
inconveniences. Congress, therefore, in laying the tax, Will
calculate for these losses and inconveniences. They Will
make allowances for the delays and delinquencies of the
states, and apportion their burdens accordingly. They will
be induced to demand more than their actual wants.

In these circumstances, the requisitions will be made upon
calculations in some measure arbitrary. Upon the constitu-
tional plan, the only inquiry will be, How much is actually
wanted? and how much can the object hear, or the people
pay? On the gentleman’s scheme, it will be, What-will be
the probable deficiencies of the states ? for we must increase
our demands in proportion, whatever the public wants may
be, or whatever may be the abilities of the people. Now,
suppose the requisition is totally rejected; it must be levied
upon the citizens without reserve. This Will be like inflict-
ing a penalty upon the states. It will place them in the
light of criminals. Will they suffer this? Will Congress
presume so far? If the states solemnly declare they will
not comply, does not this imply a determination not to per-
mit the exercise of the coercive power? The gentlemen
cannot escape the dilemma into Which their own reasoning
leads them. If the states comply, the people must be taxed;
if they do not comply, the people must equally be taxed.
The burden, in either case, will be the same — the difficulty
of collecting the same. Sir, if these operations are merely
harmless and indifferent, why play the ridiculous farce? If
they are inconvenient, why subject us to their evils? It is
infinitely more eligible to lay a tax originally, which will have
uniform effects throughout the Union, which will operate
equally and silently. The United States will then be able
to ascertain their resources, and to act. with vigor and de—
cision. All hostility between the governments will be pre—
vented. The people will contribute regularly and gradually
for the support of government; and all odious, retrospective
inquiries will be precluded.

But the ill effects of the gentleman’s plan do not terminate
here. Our own state will suffer peculiar disadvantages from
the measure. One provision in the amendment is, that no
direct taxes shall be laid till after the impost and excise shall

HAMILTON] NEW YORK. 369

. be found insufficient for the public exigencies; and that no
excise shall be laid 011 articles of the growth or manufacture
of the United States Sir, the favorable maritime situation
of this state, and our large and valuable tracts of unsettled
land, will ever lead us to commerce and agricultu1e as our
proper objects. Unconfined, and tempted by the prospect
of easy subsistence and independence, our citizens, as the
country populates, Will retreat back, and cultivate the westeln
parts of our state. Our pOpulation, though extensive, Will
never be crowded; and consequently we shall remain an im-
porting and agricultural state. Now, what will be the oper-
ation of the proposed plan? The general government, re-
strained by the Constitution f1om a free application to other
resources, will push imposts to an extreme. Will excessive
impositions on our commerce be favorable to the policy of
this state? Will they not directly oppose our interests?
Similar will be the operation of the other clause of the
amendment, relative to excise. Our neighbors, not possessed
of our advantages for commerce and agriculture, will become
manufacturers: their property Will, in a great measure, be
vested in the commodities of their own productions; but a
small proportion will be in trade or in lands. Thus, on the
gentleman’s scheme, they will be almost free from burdens,
while we shall be loaded with them. Does not the partiality
of this strike every one ? Can gentlemen, who are laboring
for the interest of their state, seriously bring forward such
propositions? It is the interest of New York that. those
articles should be taxed, in the production of which the
other states exceed us. If We are not a manufacturing
people, excises on manufactures will ever be for our advan-
tage. This position is indisptltable. Sir, I agree that it is
not good p0licy to lay eXCises to any considerable am0unt,
while our manufactures are in their infancy; but are they
always to be so? In some of the states, they already begin
to make considerable progress. In Connecticut, such encour-
agement is given as Will soon distinguish that state. Even
at the present period, there is one article from which a
revenue may very properly be drawn: I speak of ardent
(spirits. New England manufactures more than a hundred
gallons to our one; conseqhently, an excise on spirits at the
still— head would make those states contribute in a vastly
greater proportion than ourselves. In every View, excises
vot. II.

370 DEBATES. [HA-MILTON.

011 domestic manufactures would benefit New York. But
the gentlemen would defeat the advantages of our situation,
by d1awing upon us all the burdens of government. The
natu1e of our union 1equires that we should give up our state
impost. Ihe amendment would forfeit every other advan—
tage. This part of the Constitution should not be touched.
The excises were designed as a recompense to the importing
states for relinquishing their imposts. Why, then, should we
reject the benefits conferred upon us? Why should we run
blindly against our own interest?

Sir, I shall no further enlarge on this argument: my exer—
tions have already exhausted me. I have persevered from
an anxious desire to give the committee the most complete
conception of this subject. I fear, however, that I have not
been so successful as to bestow upon it that full and clear
light of which it is susceptible. I shall conclude With a few
remarks by way of apology. I am app1ehensi1e, sir, that,
in the wa1mth of my feelings, I may have uttered expres-
sions Which were too vehement. If such has been my lan—
guage, it was from the habit of using strong phrases to ex-
press my ideas; and, above all, from the inte1esting nature
of the subject. I have ever condemned those cold, unfeel—
ing hearts, which no object can animate. l condemn those
indifferent mortals, who either never form opinions, or never
make them known. I confess, sir, that 011 no subject has
my breast been filled with stronger emotions, or more anxious
concern. If any thing has escaped me, which may be con-
strued into a personal reflection, I beg the gentlemen, once
for all, to be assured that I have no design to wound the
feelings of any one who is opposed to me. ‘

While I am making these observations, 1 cannot but take
notice of some expressions which have fallen in the course
of the debate. It has been said that ingenious men may

say ingenious things, and that those who a1e interestedi

raising the fe1v upon the ruins of the many, may give to
every cause an apliiearance of justice. I know not whether
these insinuations allude to the characters of any who are
present, or to any of the reasonings in this house. I pre-
sume that the gentlemen would not. ungenerously impute
such motives to those who differ from themselves. I declare
I know not any set of men who are to delive peculiar ad-
vantages from this Constitution. \V ere any permanent

LANSING.'| NEW YORK. 37]

honors or emoluments to be secured to the families of those
Who have been active in this cause, there might be some
grounds for suspicion. But what reasonable man, for the
precarious enjoyment of rank and power, would establish a
system Which Would reduce his nearest friends and hispos—
terity to slavery and ruin? If the gentlemen reckon me
amongst the obnoxious few, if they imagine that I contem-
plate with ambitious eye the immediate honors of the govern-
ment, yet let them consider that I have my friends, my family,
my children, to Whom ties of nature and of habit have at-
tached me. If, to-day, I am among the favored few, my
children, to-morrow, may be among the oppressed; these
dear pledges of my patriotism may, at a future day, be suf-
fering the severe distresses to which my ambition has reduced
them. The changes in the human condition are uncertain
and frequent: many, on Whom Fortune has bestowed her
favors, may trace their family to a more unprosperous station ;
and many, Who are now in obscurity, may look back upon
the affluence and exalted rank of their ancestors. But I
Will no longer trespass on your indulgence. I have troubled
the committee With these observations, to show that it can-
not be the Wish of any reasonable man to establish a govern-
ment unfriendly to the liberties of the people. Gentlemen,
ought not, then, to presume that the advocates of this Con-
stitution are influenced by ambitious views. The suspicion,
sir, is unjust ; the charge is uncharitable.

The Hon. Mr. LANSING. This clause, Mr. Chairman,
is, by every one, considered as one of the most important in
the Constitution. The subject has been treated in a very
diffusive manner. 'Among all the ingenious remarks that
have been made, some are little more than repetitions;
others are not very applicable or interesting. I shall beg
leave to pass a few strictures on the paragraph; and, in my
reply, shall confine myself to the arguments Which have
been advanced. The committee have been informed that it
embraces a great variety of objects, and that it gives the
general government a power to lay all kinds of lanes ,° that
it confers a right of laying excises 011 all alticles of American
manufacture, Cbf exacting an impost, in which the state
governments cannot interfere, and of laying direct taxes
- without restriction. These powers reach every possible
source of revenue. They will involve avariety of litigations,

37?. DEBATES. LLANSING.

which can come only under the cognizance of the judiciary
of the United States. Hence it must appear that these
powers will affect, in an unlimited manner, the property of
the citizens; that they will subject them, in a great degree,
to the laws of the Union, and git/e an extensivejurisdiction
to the federal courts. The objects of the amendment are,
to prevent excises from being laid on the manufactures of
the United States, and to provide that direct taxes shall not
be imposed till requisitions have been made and proved
fruitless.

All the reasoning of the gentlemen goes to prove that
government ought to possess all the resources of a country.
But so far as it respects government in general, it does not.
apply to this question. Giving the principle its full force, it
does not prove that our federal government ought to have
all the resources ; because this government is but a part of
a system, the whole of which should possess the means
of support. It has been advanced repeatedly by the gen-
tleman, that the powers of the United States should, like
their objects, be national and general. It appears to him
prOper, therefore, that the nature of their resources should
be correspondent. Sir, it has been declared that We can no
longer place confidence in requisitions. A great deal of ar—
gument has been spent on this point. The gentlemen con—
stantly consider the old mode of requisitions, and that pro-
posed, in the same View. But not one of us has ever
contended for requisitions in the form prescribed in the
existing Confederation: hence the reasoning about the in-
efficacy of the ancient mode has no application to the one
recommended; which rests on different principles, and has
a sanction of which the other is totally destitute. In the one
instance, it is necessary to execute the requisitions of Con-
gress on the states collectively. There is no way of doing
this but by coercing a whole community, which cannot be
effected. But the amendment proposes to carry the laws
of Congress to the doors of individuals. This circumstance
will produce an entire change in the operation of requisitions,
and will give them an efficiency which otherwise they could
not have. In this View, it will appear that the gentleman’s
principles respecting the character and effects of requisitions
can have no application in this dispute. Much pains has
been taken to show that requisitions have not answered the

Lénsmej NEW YORK. 37:)

public exigencies. All this has been fully admitted in fo1

mer stages of the debate. It was said by a gentleman
yesterday, that though considerable sums of money had been
paid by the people, it was by way of bounties to the soldims

which was a coercion on individuals. If, then, this coercion
had its effect, certainly its operation, upon the proposed plan.
will be much more forcible. It has been said that, in sudden
emergencies,a all the resou1ces of the count1y might be 1e-
qui1ed; and that the supreme head ought to possess the powel

of p1oviding f01 the public wants, in every degree. It IS an
undoubted fact, that, in all gove11,1ment it is ebXtremely diffi-
cult, on the spur of the occasion, to raise money by taxes.
N01 18 it necessary. I 11 a commercial country, pe1sons will
always be found to advance money to the government, and
to wait the regular operation of the 1evenue laws. It de-
pends on the security of the taxes, and the certainty of being
lefunded. This amendment does not diminish the secu1ity
or 1e11der the fund precaiious. The certainty of lepayment
is as well established as it the government could levy the
taxes oiiginally 011 individuals.

Sir, have the states ever shown a disposition not to com-
ply with the requisitions? We shall find that, in almost
every instance, they have, so far forth as the passing a law
of compliance, been carried into execution. To What, then,
are the delinquencies to be attributed? They must be to
the impove1ished state of the country. lf the state govein-
ments have been unable to compel the people to obey their.
laws, 1111] Congress be able to coerce them? Will the fed-
e121] taxes be bette1 paid. P But, sir, no reasonable man will
be apprehensive of the non- compliance of the states, under
the opeiatoion of the ploposed plan. The 1ight of enforcing
the 1equisitions Will tuniish the strongest motive for the per-
formance of the federal duty. With this powelful induce—
ment, there is hardly a possibility of failu1e. It has been
asked, Why give the individual states the pleference. 9 Why
not suffei the general government to apply to the people 111
the first instance, Without the fmmality of a 1equisition?
This question has been lepeatedly asked, and as often an-
swe1ed. It 18 because the state legislatu1es me more nearly
connected with the people, and more acquainted with their
Situation and wants. They bette1 know when to enforce 01
"elaX their laws; to embrace objects or relinquish them,

3'2

3741 DEBATES. [LANSING

according to change of circumstances: they have but a few
varying interests to comprehend in general provisions. Con—
gress do not possess these advantages; they cannot have so
complete 2111 acquaintanc e with the people; their laws, being
necessarily uniform, cannot be calculated for the gleat diver-
sity of ObJGClS which plesent themselves to government. It
is possible that the men delegated may have interests differ-
ent from those of the people. It is observed that We have
had experience of different kinds of taxes, which have been
executed by different officers, — for instance, county and state
taxes, — and that there has been no clashing 01 interference.
But, sir, in these cases, if any dispute arises, the pa1ties
appeal to a common tribunal ; but if collectors are appointed
by different governments, and authorized by different laws,
the federal officer will appeal to a federal court; his adver-
sary will appeal to the state court. Will not this create
contests respecting jurisdiction? But the Constitution
declares that the laws of the United States shall be supreme.
There is no doubt, therefore, that they must prevail in every
controversy ; and every thing which has a tendency to
obst1uct the force of the general government must give way.

An honorable gentleman 110111 New Ymk has r1 ema1ked
that the idea of ddngei to state gave/1111161113 can only o1igin-
ate in a distempered fancy : he stated that they were
necessary component parts of the system, and informed us
how the President and senators were to be elected ; his con-
clusion is, that the liberties of the people cannot be endan-
11111111 I shall only observe, that, however fanciful these
apprehensions 111 W appear to him, they have made serious
impressions upon some of the gleatest and best men. Our
tears 211ise from the experience of all ages and 0111 knowl-
edge of the dispositions of mankind. I believe the gentle-
man cannot point out an instance of the rights of a people
remaining lo1 a long1 peliod inviolate. The hist01y of hu-
rope has aflo1ded 1ema1kable examples of the loss of liberty
by the usu1pations of lUlClS. In the early peliods ol the
11o1e111ment of the United Nethe1lands, the n1a11istrates Were
elected by the people; but now they have become hereditary
The Venetians me, at. this day, governed by an a1istocracy.
lhc senators, once the rep1esentatives of the people, were
enabled, by gradual entroachments, at last to decla1e them-
selves perpetual. The office has since become hereditarv,

LANSING.] NEW YORK. 375

a11l the govemment entirely despotic. The gentleman has
adduced one histmical example, to p1ove that the 111e111be1s
of a government, in the contests with the head, ge11e1ally
prevail. He observed that, in the struggles between the
feudal sove1eigns of Europe and their barons, the latter were
usually victorious. If this we1e t1ue,I believe the ope1a-
tions of sucha system as the feudal will not warrant the
general inference he draws. The feudal barons were obliged
to assist the monarch, in his wars, with their persons and
those of their vassals. This, in the early periods, was the
sovereign’s sole dependence. Not possessed of pecuniary
revenues, or a standing military force, he was, whenever the
barons withdrew their aid, or revolted against his authority,
reduced to a very feeble situation. While he possessed not
the means of carrying on his wars, independently of his 110-
bles, his power was insignificant, and he was unsuccessful.
But, sir, the moment he gained the command of revenues
and an army, as soon as he obtained the sword and t/zepurse,
the current of success was turned; and his superiority over
his barons was regularly augmented, and at last established.
The barons, in their early wars, possessed other peculiar
advantages: their number was small, they were actuated
by one principle, and had one common object; it was to
reduce still lower the feeble powers of the monarch: they
were therefore easily brought to act in concert. Sir,
wherever the revenues and the military force are, there will
rest the power: the members or the head will prevail, as
one or the other possesses these advantages. The gentleman,
in his 1easoning, has taken the wrong part of the example——
that part which bears no resemblance to our system. Had
he come down to a later periOd, he would indeed have seen
the resemblance, and his historical facts would have directly
militated against his argument. Sir, if you do not give the
state governments a power to protect themselves, if you leavel‘;
them no other check upon Congress than the power of ap-
pointing senators, they will ce1tainly be overcome, like the 9
ba1ons of whom the gentleman has spoken. Neither our
civil nor militia officers will afford many advantages of oppo-
sition against the national government: if- they have any
powers, it will ever be difficult to concentrate them, or give
them a uniform direction. Their influence will hardly be
felt, while the greater number of lucrative and honorable

376 DEBATES. [M. SMITH.

places, in the gift of the United States, will establish an i11-
fluence which will prevail 111 every part of the continent.

It has been admitted by an honorable gentleman from
New Y01k, (Mr. Hamilton,) that the state governments are
necessary to secure the liberties of the people. He has
urged seve1al forcible 1easons why they ought to be p1e-
served under the new system; and he has treated the idea
of the general and state governments being hostile to each
other as chimerical. I am, however, firmly persuaded that
an hostility between them will exist. This was a received
opinion in the late Convention at. Philadelphia. That hon-
orable gentleman was then fully convinced that it would
exist, and argued, with much decision and great plausibility,
that the state governments ought to be subverted, at least
so far as to leave them only corporate rights, and that, even
in that situation, they would endanger the existence of the
general government. But the honorable gentleman’s reflec—
tions have probably induced him to correct that sentiment.

[ML Hamilton here- interrupted Mr. Lansing, and contra-
dicted, in the most positive terms, the charge of inconsist-
ency included in the preceding observations. This pro—
duced a warm personal altercation between those gentlemen,
Which engrossed the remainder of the day.]

MONDAY, June 30, 1788. —The personal dispute between
M1. Hamilton and Mr. Lansing was again brought for1',va1d
and occupled the attention of the committee for a considela-
ble pa1t of this day; 011 the termination of which, the debate
upon Mr. \V illiams’ s motion 11 as resumed, and continued by
Mr. Williams, Mr. Smith, Mr. Jay, M1. Jones, &c.

In the cou1sc of this debate, Mr. SMITH made the follow-
ing remarks, in a11s11er to Mr. Hamilton, that, though the
gent’sleman maxim was t1ue, that the means should bbe ade-
quate to the end, yet it did not, by any means, apply to a
complex system like ours, in which all the objects of govern-
ment were not to be answered by the national head, and
which, therefore, ought not to possess all the means. In
another View, he said, the rule would not apply. It was not
true that the power which was charged with the common
defence should have all the 1evenues. In the government
of Great Britain, the power to whom the common defence
was committed did not possess the means of providing for

it. The king had the whole po1ve1 of 1V'.a1 but the Rirlia-

M. SMITH.] NEW YORK. 377

ment only could furnish the money for conducting it. Still
the g vernment, taken all together, possessed all the powers
and all the means. He thought it ought to be on such a
footing here. The general government was one part of the
system, the state governments another. Now, it was true,
he said, that the system, taking all its parts together, ought
to have unlimited powers. It was not the design of the
amendment to prevent this: it was only to divide the powers
between the parts, in proportion to their several objects.

TUESDAY, July 1, 1788. -—Mr. SMITH observed, that he
supposed the states would have a right to lay taxes, if there
was no power in the general government to control them.
He acknowledged that the counties in this state had a right
to collect taxes ; but it was only a legislative, not a constitu-
tional right. It was dependent and controllable. This
example, he said, was a true one ; and the comparison the
gentleman had made was just; but it certainly operated
against him. Whether, then, the general government would
have a right to control the states in taxation, was a question
which depended upon the construction of the Constitution.
Men eminent in law had given different opinions on this
point. The difference of opinion furnished, to his mind, a
reason why the matter should be constitutionally explained.
-No such important point should be left to doubt and con-
struction. The clause should be so formed as to render the
business of legislation as simple and plain as possible. It
was not to be expected that the members of the federal
legislature would generally be versed in those subtilties which
distinguish the profession of the law. They would not be
disposed to make nice distinctions with respect to jurisdic-
tion. He said that, from general reasoning, it must be in,-
ferred that, if the objects of the general gOv'ernment were
without limitation, there could be no bounds set to their '
powers; that they had a right to seek those objects by all
necessary laws, and by controlling every subordinate power.
The means should be adequate to the end: the less should
give way to the greater. General principles, therefore,
clearly led to the conclusion, that the general government
must have the most complete control over every power which
could create the least obstacle to its operations.

Mr. Smith then went into an examination of the particn-p '
lar provisions of the Constitution, and compared them to—

VOL. n 48

378 DEBA'I 13s. [M. smu.

gether, to p1 ove that his remarks were not conclusions 110m
general p1i11ciples alone, but warranted by the language of
the Constitution. He conceived, tl1eref01e, that the national
government would have po11111s, on this plan, not only to
ray all species 01 taxes, but to control and set aside e1e1y
thing which should impede the collection of them. They
would l121111, po11 er to abrogate the laws of the states, and to
prevent the operation 01 theirt taxes; and all coults, belore
whom anv disputes on these points should come, whether
tedc 1211 01' not, would be bound by oath to give judgment 21c—
co1ding to the laws 01 the Union. A11 honorable gentleman
110111 New Yorl,1 he said, had d11elt 11ith great attention on
the idea that the state governments 11 ere necessary and use—
ful to the general system, 21nd that this would secule their
existence. G1anting that they 11 ould be 1e1'y con1enient in
the system, yet, if the oentleman’s position 11e1e true, that
the 1111) go1'e1nments would be rivals, we had no need to go
any fulther than the common feelings and passions of human
nature, to prove that they must be hostile, and that one or
the other must be finally subverted. If they were mutually
necessary to each other, how could they be rivals? For, in
this case, lessening the power of the states would be only
diminishing the ad1antages of the general government.
Anotlur source, from which the gentleman would derive
s1111111'it1 to the states, was the superior number of the state
11 111 11s1111t21ti1 11 Mr. Smith apprehended, however, that this
vety circumstance would be an argument for abolishing them
The people would be very apt to compare their small Impor-
tance and powers with the gzeat expense of their support
He then went into an examination of another sou1ce of secu—
rity 11 Inch the gentleman had pointed out, —that IS, the great
number of othcersd1—1pendent on the states,— and compared
them with those of the United States, and concluded with
observing, that he (Mr. Smith) was one who had opposed
the impost' . he was also opposed to the Constitution in its
present form. He said, he had opposed the impost, because
it gave too much power to a single bod1, organized as the
old Congtess \V'dS' , and he objected to this Constitution, be-
cause it gave too much powet to the general government,
h011eve1 it might be organized. In both, he said, he stood
011 the same ground, and his conduct had been uniform and
consistent.

DUANE.] NEW YORK. 379

The Hon. Mr. DUANE addressed the committee in a tong
and elaborate speech. He commenced with an explanation
of the motives which induced him to bring forward the pub-
lic papers, which have been lately read; declared that he
had, in that matter, been actuated by no personal designs, no
possible disposition to censure the conduct or wound the
feelings of any man; that his sole object was, to furnish the
committee with the most convincing evidence as to the merits
of the Constitution. He then went into a particular exami-
nation of the exhibits, painted the situation of the country
at the period in which they were written, and illustrated and
enforced their testimony. In the course of this investi-
gation, he introduced and commented upon General Wash-
i.1gton’s circular letter, and concluded, that all this evidence
afforded complete proof that requisitions had ever had an
unhappy and fatal operation, that they would never answer
the purposes of government, and that the principle ought to
be forever discarded from our system. He then proceeded
to enforce, by a variety of considerations, the argument re-
specting the propriety of the general government’s being un—
restricted in the exercise of those powers which were requi-
site for the common defence; spokeof the necessity, that
, might in future exist, of maintaining large armies and navies;
said that he, even in his old age, hOped yet to see the United
States able, as well by sea as by land, to resent any injuries
that might be offered them. It might very soon appear how
necessary a powerful military might be. Occasions the most
pressing were not even now wantinO'. The British, to this
day, in defiance of the treaty of peace, held possession of our
northern posts. This was the highest insult to our sov-
ereignty. He hoped that these daring Invasions would rouse
the indignation of the United States. He had heard it sur-
mised that the genelal govelnment would probably never
oblige the British to quit these posts; but whenever, said
he, I find the Union guilty of such pusillanimity, I shall regret
that l eve1 d1ew my breath in this country.

Mr. Duane thenanimadverted upon the reasoning of his
Opponents respecting the causes of the delinquencies of the
states, and compared the exertions of the states with their
different situations and circumstances, in order to prove that
the deficiencies could not have arisen from poverty or distress.
He declared that all which had been advanced by opposition

3811 DEBATES. [1.111.-

1n this head was totally unsuppmted by facts. The gentle-
man next proceeded to discuss the question of concurrent
ju1isdiction, and the particular advantages New York would
deiive from exciscs 011 our manufactmes , spoke of the diffi-
culties and e111ba11assments which would result from the pro-
posed amendment, and concluded with a comparison of the
new to the old system, and some general encomiums 011 the
excellences of the former.

The Hon. Mr. JAY rose, and said he would confine him-
self to a few remarks, as the question had been pretty fully
debated. He began with a description of the general char-
acteristics of a government. proper for the United States. It
had, he said, been juStly laid down, that a government which
was to accomplish national purposes should command the
national 1esources. Here a question had been raised. Would
it be proper that the state governments should limit the
powers of the general government, relative to its supplies?
Would it be right or politic that the sovereign power of a na-
tion should depend for support on the more will of the several
membe1s of that nation? that the inte1est of a part should
take place of that of the whole, 01 that the pa1tial views of
one of the members should interfere with and defeat the
views of all. ' He said that, after the most mature reflection,
he could see no possible impropriety in the general gove111-
rnent having access to all the resources of the cou11t1y. With
respect to direct taxes, it appeared to him that the proposed
amendment would involve great difficulties. Suppose a
state should refuse to comply ; would not the same motives,
the same reasons, which produced the non—compliance, induce
such state to resist. the imposing and collecting of the tax?
Would not a number of states, in similar circumstances,
be apt to unite to give their resistance Weight. 3 They
could not all be forced. These ideas of the impracticabilitv
and the danger of the measure, he said, had been already
fully illustrated, and they had made a deep impression on his
mind. He apprehended that ambitious men might be found,
in such emergencies, ready to take advantage zDof turbulent
times, and put themselves at the head of such an asso-
ciation. After dwelling some time on this point, he pro-
ceeded to take notice of the objection relative to the want of
that particular information in members of Congress, which, it
had been said, would alone render them capable of imposing

M. smmjj NEW YORK. 381

taxes with prudence and jusuce. The objection had some ‘
weight; but it ought to be considered that direct taxes were
of two kinds, general and specific. With respect to the lat-
ter, the objection could not apply. The national govern-
ment would, without doubt, usually embrace those objects
which were uniform throughout the states; such as all spe-
cific articles of luxury. No particular minute knowledge
could be necessary for this. For example, what difficulty
or partiality would there be in the operation of a tax of
twenty shillings On all coaches? The objection, then, could
only apply to the laying of general taxes upon all property.
But the difficulty on this scOr'e,""he said, might be easily
remedied. The legislatures of the several states would fur-
nish their delegates with the systems of revenue, and give
them the most particular information with regard to the
modes of taxation mest agreeable to the people. From the
comparison of these, COngress would be able to form a gen—
eral system, as perfect as the nature of things would admit.
He appealed to the good sense and candor of the gentle-
men, if this would not, in all probability, take plaCe. After
some considerations on the subject of concurrent jurisdiction,
he said, he was convinced that it was sufficiently secured and
established in the Constitution. But as gentlemen were of a
different opinion on this point, it. would be very easy, he said,
to insert in the adoption of the system an explanation of this
clause. Mr. Jay concluded by suggesting a difficulty 0n the
subject of excise, which has not been attended to. He asked
by what rule we should know an article of American from one
of foreign manufacture: how could American nails, Ameri-
can porter, and hundreds of other articles, be distinguished
from those of foreign production? He thought the proposed
measure would create embarrassments, and the various abuses
that would follow might be easily conceived.

The HOn. Mr. SMITH, after some introductory, cursory
remarks, took notice. of an honorable gentleman’s wishes
respecting a navy. He thought it would be wild and ridicu-
IOus to attempt a project of that kind for a considerable
length of time, even if the treasury were full of money. He
, thought it was our duty to calculate for the present period,
and not attempt to provide for the contingencies of two or
‘three centuries to come. In time, events might take place
which no human wisdom could foresee, and which might

382 DEBA'I‘ES. [11. R. Livmcsroiv

totally defeat and 1e11de1 useless these plovisions. He i11-
sisted that the present state of the country alone ought to he
conside1ed. I11 tlnee 01 four hundrc d years, its population
might amount to ahunthed millions: at this pe1iod,t11o o1
th1ee g1eat empi1es might be established, totally diffeient
from 0111 own.

Mr. Smith then made some remarks upon the circular let—
ter of the late commander—in—chief, which Mr. Duane had
produced. He asked whence the American army came:
how were they raised and maintained, if the complaints in
this letter were well founded? how had the country been
defended, and our cause supported, through so long a war,
if requisitions had been so totally fruitless? He observed
that one of the gentlemen had contemplated associations
among the states for the purpose of resisting Congress.
This was an imaginaiy evil. The opposers of the Constitu-
tion, he said, had been frequently charged with being
goveined by chime1ieal appiehensions, and of being too much
in eXt1emes. He asked if these suggestions were not pel-
fectly in the same style. We had had no evidence of a
disposition to combine for such purposes: 11c had no ground
to fear they ever would. But if they were, at any time,
inclined to f01m a league against the Union, in 01de1 to
1esist an op 111essive taX, thwould they not do it, when the taX
was imposed without a requisition? Would not the 52 me
danger exist, though requisitions were unknown. 9 He
thouth no powe1 ought to be given which could not be
eXelcised. The gentleman had himself spoken of the diffi-
culties attending geneial, direct taxes, and had p1esumed
that the general government would take the state systems,
and form from them the best general plan they could. But
this would but partially remedy the evil. How much better
11 ould it be to give the systems of the different states then
full fo1ce, by leaving to them the execution of the taX, and
the power of levying it on the people !

The Hon. Chancellor LIVINGSTON. When this sub—
ject came under discussion 011 Friday, Mr. Chairman, I did
myself the honor to express my sentiments to the committee.
1 considered the amendment as it would affect the general
government, and was favored with the support of my honor—
able. (olleague, who 11 ent more largely and ably into the
arn‘ument, and added weight to the ideas I had suggested.

- 1!” r ‘, -' "

. ..

‘. \‘Y D_I
'i.‘<, XA‘

\ ‘f. -.r ; ‘1

R. R. LIVINGSTON] NEW YORK. «-;’;~,.;..». 383
I shall now confine myself to a few o‘ursory and general
observations on the reasonings of our opponents. I do not
think it my duty to attempt to reconcile the gentlemen With
each other. They advance oppOsite principles, and they
argue differently. As they do not appear to have any fixed
maxims in their politics, it is not to be wondered at that
they talk at random, and run into inconsistencies. The gen-
tleman from Duchess went into a defence of the state gov-
ernments: he painted their good qualities in very warm
colors; described their stability, their wisdom, their justice,
their affection for the people. This was undoubtedly proper;
for it was necessary to his argument. On the contrary,
anOther gentleman took up the matter in a different point
of View. .He said the government of New York, which had
been acknowledged one of the best, was quite imperfect.
But this was all right, for it answered his purpose. A gen-
tleman from New York had remarked a great resemblance
between the government of this state and the new Constitu-
tution. To condemn the former, therefore, was giving a
death—blow at the proposed system. But, sir, though we
may pardon the gentlemenfor differing from each other, yet
it is difficult to excuse their differing from themselves. As
these inconsistencies are too delicate to dwell on, I shall
'mention but a few. Their amendment declares that Con-
gress shall lay direct taxes, and the whole drift of their argu-
ment is against it. In their reasoning, direct taxes are
odious and useless things; in their amendment, they are
necessary and proper. Thus their arguments and their
motion are at variance. But this is not the only contradic-
tion. The gentlemen say that Congress will be avaricious,
and will want every farthing of the people’s property. One
from Washington tells you that taxation will shut out the
light of heaven, and will pick your pockets. With these
melancholy ideas no wonder he mourns for the fair damsel
of American liberty, harassed with oppressive laws, shut up
in a dismal dungeon, robbed of the light of heaven, and, by
a beautiful anti-climax, robbed of the money in her pocket.
Yet, says the gentleman, though Congress will do all this.
they cannot do it. You are told that the collection of the
t.tX is impracticable. Is, then, this great mischief to arise
from an impracticable thing? It. is the reasoning among all
reasoners, that from nothing nothing comes; and yet this

3851 DEBATES. LR. R. meeswon

nothing IS to destroy the state govemments, and swallow up
the state rezvenue the tax 11 hich cannot 1ealize a farthing
is to rob the citizens of all their piopeity. This is fine
reasoning. 10 what shall Icompare it? Shall I liken it
to childien 111 the maiket- -place, or shall I liken it to children
making bubbles with a pipe? Shall I not rathei compare it
to two 5boys upon a balanced bond ? One goes up, the other
down , and so they go up1 and do11n, down and up, till the
sport is over, and the board is left exactly 011 the balance in
which they found it. But let us see if we cannot, from all
this rubbish, pick out something which may look like reason-
ing. I confess I am embarrassed by their mode of arguing.

They tell us that the state governments will be destroyed,

because they will have no powers left them. This is new.
Is the power over property nothing? Is the power over lite
and death no power? Let me ask what powers this C011-
stitution would take from the states. Have the state gov-
ernments the power of war and peace, of raising tr00ps, and
making treaties? The power of regulating commerce we
possess; but the gentlemen admit that we improperly pos-
sess it. What, then, is taken away? Have not the states
the right of raising money, and regulating the militia .9 And
yet these objects could never have employed your legislatures
four or five months in the year. \Vhat, then, have they
been about ?——making laws to regulate the height of fences
and the repairing of roads? If this be true, take the power
out of their hands. They have been unworthy servants;
they have not deserved your confidence. .Admit that the
power of raising money should be taken from them; does it
follow that the people will lose all confidence in their repre-
sentatives? There are but two objects for which money
must be raised—the support of the general government
and those of the states; and they have an equal right to levy
and collect their taxes. But if, as the amendment proposes,

they should be obliged to grant all that Congress should call
for, —— ifthey are to tbe compelled to comply with the requisi-
tions Without limitation,— they would be, on the gentleman’s
principles, in a pitiable situation indeed ! The mode alone
would be in their discretion. Is this the mighty matter
about which we differ? Contend about modes! I am
sorry to say, sir, that a rigid adherence to modes, in this
state, has been the cause of great injustice to individuals,

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 385

and has hurt the confidence of the people. It has led this
state, on one occasion, to raise the expectations of public
creditors, and to sink them again, by an unwarrantable
b1eacl1 of faith. Si1, if the powe1 of regulating the militia.
of 1aising money, of making and executing all the civil and
c1in1inalb laws,—laws which affect the tlife, libe1ty, and
p1ope1ty of individuals,—can insure or dese1ve the con-
fidence and 1espect ot the people, I think the gentleman’s
a1 oumcnt falls to the ground.

cMuch has been said, si1, about the swo1d and the purse.
These wo1ds convey very confused ideas on the gentleman’s
application of them. The honorable member from New
York has fully explained their meaning, as applied to the
British government. His reasoning was so conclusive that
it seems to have carried conviction to every mind. The gen-
tleman from Duchess, to elude it, has made use of a singular
shift. Says he, the general government and state govern-
ments form one government. Let us see how this matter
stands. 'The states of Pennsylvania and New York form
two distinct govemments; but New Y01k, Pennsylvania,
and the general gove1nment, togethel fo1m one goveinment.
The United States and New Yo1k make another gove1n-
ment; the United States and Connecticut another, and so
On. 'To the gentleman’s optics these things may be clear;
but to me they are utter darkness. We have thirteen dis-
tinct governments, and yet they are not thirteen governments,
but one government. It requires the ingenuity of St. Atha-
11asius to understand this political mystery. Were the
gentleman a minister of the gospel, I might have faith ,° but
I confess my reason is much too weak for it. Sir, we
are attempting to build one government out of thirteen;
p1'a'1-se1vi11g, however, the states, as pa1ts of the system, for
local purposes, and to give it support and beauty. The
t1uth is, the states, and the United States, haVe distinct
objects. They a1e both supreme. As to national objects,
the latter is supreme; as to internal and domestic objects,
the former. [ can easily conceive of twojoint tenures, and
of joint jurisdictions Without cont1ol. If I wanted an

example.l might instance the mine, Mr. Chairman, in which-

you and othe1s have a joint pioperty and concurrent ju1isdic-

tion. But why should the st -1tes hold the purse? How a1e

they to use it? They have not to pay the civil list, to main
v01-.. 11. 49 33

fl.-.¢.--..nmv-

386 DEBATES. [G. LIVINGSTON.

tain the army or navy. What will they do with it? What
is the sword, which the gentlemen talk of? How is Con-
gress to defend us without a sword? You will also keep
that. How shall it. be handled P Shall we all take hold of
it? I never knew, till now, the design of a curious image
I have seen at the head of one of our newspapers. I am
now convinced that the idea was prophetic in the printer.
It was a figure of thirteen hands, in an awkward position,
g1asping a pe1pendicular swor.d As the arms which sup-
ported it we1e on e1 my side, I could see no wav of moving
it, but by d1awing it th1OUgh, with the haza1d of daugmous-
ly cutting the fingers. Fo1 my own pa1t, I should bbe for
crying, “ bhands off! 7’ But this 311 01d of the gentlemen’ s is
a visiona1y swmd—a meie empty pageant; and yet they
would never trust it out of the state scabbard, lest it should
wound somebody. They wish for checks against what can
do no harm. They contend for a phantom. Gentlemen
should consider their arguments before they come here.
Sir, our reasoning on this ground is conclusive. If it be
necessary to trust our defence to the Union, it is necessary
that we should trust it with the sword to defend us, and the
purse to give the sword effect. I have heard not a shadow
of an argument to shake the truth of this. But the gentle-
men will talk—it is expected. It is necessary that they
should support, in this house, the opinions they have propa-
gated out of doors, but which perhaps they had themselves
too hastily formed.

Sir, one word with respect to excise. \Vhen I addressed
the committee on Fliday last, Iobserved, that the amend-
ment 11ould opei rate with g1eat inconvenience; that, at a
futu1e pe1iod, this would be a 111anufactu1ing country, and
then there would be many ptopel objects of excise. But
the gentleman, in answ e1 to this says 11e ought not to look
forward to a future pe1iod. W hat, then, must be this gov-
ernment of a day? [1 1s the thi1d time 11e have been mak-
ing a government, and God g1ant it may be the last.

VVEnNESDAY, July/9 H, 1788. —Mr. G. LIVINGSTON.
Sir, I pelfectly ag1ee,with everyg 0“entleman that has spoken
on this clause, that it is most impmtant; and I likewise
agree with those of the honorable membels who think that,
if this section is not amended, the1e111ll not the shadow of
lil1e1t) be left to the states, as states s. The honmable mem-

G. LIVINGSTON] NEW YORK. 387

her from New York, (Mr. Hamilton,) on Saturday, went
largely into the jurisdiction of the section as it stands; as-
serted that the government was truly republican — good and
safe; that it would never be the interest of the general gov—
ernment to dissolve the states , that there was a concu1ren.
jurisdiction, independent as to eve1y thing but 1mpo1ts

that the states had a supreme, uncontrolled, and uncont1oll

able power, in common with the general gove1nment, to evc1y
branch of revenue, except as to imposts, post—office, and the
restraint with respect to eXports; that, with respect to any
productive source of revenue left, whichever (the genera:
government or particular state) applied first would obtain it.
As to the safety in the general gove1nment, considered as a
complete republican government, several hon01able membe1s.
as well as my worthy colleague, have fully consideled, and
.in my humble opinion clearly shown, that it cannot be fully
depended on as safe, 011 the score of representation. There-
fore l Conceive the state governments are necessary as the
barrier between the people’s liberties and any invasion
which may be attempted on them by the general govern-
ment. . The honorable gentleman from New York has given
us a new kind of power, or rather endeavored to show that
power can be equally exercised in a way I believe never
before thought of; that is, two bodies, which have, or at
least may have, separate and indeed contrary interests, to
have at the same time uncontrollable power to derive support
from, and have complete direction of, the same branch of
revenue. _ _

'It seems, sir, to be agreed that state governments are
necessary. The state governments will undoubted-1y e11-
deavor to suppOrt themselves. It also seems to be agreed
that the general government will want all the money they
can 1aise: it is in my mind as true (if they possibly can)
that they will raise all they want. Now, sir, what will be
the consequence, the probable consequence, in this taxing,
collecting squabble? I think, sir, we may conclude, with
great certainty, that the people will, between them, be pretty
well taxed. An honorable member from New York (chan—
ccllo1,) on Friday last, endeavored to prove, and yestelday
again tauntingly mentioned it, that, because taxes are annu-
ally colleeted in our counties, for state and county pUrposes,
by the, same. collector, authorized by the same legislature,

388 DEB ATES. [G. LIVINGSTON.

appointed by the same assesso1s, and to support the same
gove1 11111ent —tl1at, theref01e, the same sou1ces of 1eve11ue
may safely be applied to, without any danger of clashing
inte1fe1ence, for diffe1ent purposes sand by different powers —
nay, by powers between whom, it seems to be agreed, there
will be a struggle for supremacy; and one of the gentlemen
(Mr. Hamilton) declares his apprehensions to be that, in the
1ss ue, the state gove1nments will get the victory, and totally
supplant the genelal government. Othels,l believe with
great probability of truth, think the states will cut but a
scurvy figure in the unequal contest. This, sir, however,
seems certain, that a contention there must be between
them. Is this wise, Mr. Chairman,—now, when we are de—
liberating on a formof government which we suppose will
affect our posterity to many ages,——to adopt. a system in
whith we see, clearly see, the seeds of feud, contest, jeal-
ousy, and confusion? Fu1the1, si1, it is aglecd that the
support of the general government is of the utmost impo1t-
ance 011 the great scale; it is contended by some, as before
mentioned, that, if both pow els—the supreme, coexisting,
coéqual powers—should tax the same objects, the state
taxes would be best paid. What, sir, would be the conse

quence? Why, the others would be badly paid, or not paid
at all. What, then, is to become of your government? In
this case, it must be annihilated indeed. Will this do?
This bantling, sir, ought to be better provided for. For my
p ' amended—to agree to a
plovision which is manifestly not sufficient f01 its support;

fo1, if the gentleman’s alguments have weight in them,
(and that I would not wish to contest,) this govelnment
must fail; the states will be too many for it. My opinion
is, si1, tliat a line be d1awn.Ce1tain and sufficient 1e-
sou1ccs ought to be left solely to the states, as states, which
the amendment does. And as the general gov e111me11t has
some particulal ones altogethe1 atb its command, so also
ought the1e to be a light of 1equisition for what the specific
funds may be deficient i11.Si1, this requisition will have,
in my opinion, dilectly a cont1a1y effect to what. some gen-
tlemen suppose. It will serve to impress both the genelal
govelnment, as well as the palticular state governments,
with this impmtant idea—that they conjointly ale the
guardians of the rights of the whole Amelican family, diffel-

                                     

G. LIVINGSTON] NEW YORK. 389

cm parts of the administration of the concerns of which being
intrusted to them respectively. In the one case, Congress,
as the head, will take care of the general concerns of the
Whole: in the other, the particular legislatures, as the stew-
ards of the people, will attend to the more minute affairs
Thus, sir, I wish to see the whole transacted in amity and
peace, and no other contest than what may arise in the
strife which may best answer the general end proposed, — to
wit, peace, happiness, and safety.

Further, sir. It has been frequently remarked, from one
side of the house, that most of the amendments proposed go
on the supposition that corruption may possibly creep into
the general government, and 'seem to discard the idea, as
totally improbable. Of What kind of beings, sir, is the gen-
eral government to be composed? If of men, I think it
probable, at least, they may be corrupt Indeed, if it wele
not f01 the depravity of human natu1e, we should stand in
no need of human government at all.

Sir, I should not have added, but I am led to do it,—thus
publicly to hold up my testimony to the world against the
illiberal treatment We met with yesterday, and that from a
quarter I little expected. Had I not been present, I should
hardly have believed it possible that the honorable member
from New York, who harangued the committee yesterday
with such a torrent of illiberality, was the same man who,
at the opening of the debates of this Convention, could wish
that we should investigate with candor.

Will men, sir, by being called children, be convinced there
is no reason in their arguments, or that there is strength in
those of their opponents? I confess, sir, in the case before
us, they will see strength in the gentleman’ s argument, (if
what was said might be called an argument ;) it was st1ong;
and (to use one of the member’s own similes) it consisted
wholly of brass, without any mixture of clay; and by a lux-
uriancy of fancy which that member is famous for, and I
suppose for the sake of variety, he has taken it from the feet
and toes, where, on another occasion, he had emphatically
placed it, and now has displayed it wholly 1n f1ont.

Ihe honorable member, sir, wrought himself up into such
a strain of ridicule, tha.,t after exhausting his admirable
talents in this sublime aiid gentlemanlikeij science on his
opponents, he finds another subject to display them on, in

390 DE BATES. [G. LIVINGSTON

the emblem of liberty, the pillar and cap, which the friend
and assertor of the rights of his fellow—citizens, John Holt,
late printer of the New York Journal, in perilous times dared
to use, as expressive of his own whiggish sentiments; who
must be hauled from his grave for the purpose— but whose
memory, maugre all the invectives which disdain may wish
to throw upon it, will be dear to this country as long as the
friends of liberty will dare to show their heads in it. In-
deed, sir, this is not the first time that this emblem of liberty
has been endeavored to be held up in a ridiculous point of
light. And let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, it has the same
effect on me now it had the first time. It roused every
spark of Whiggish resentment about my heart. In or about
the year 1775, this cap of liberty was the subject of the tory
wit of Vardel, or some of his associates about King’s Col-
lege, (as was supposed.) The member, who now exactly
follows their track, (if they were the authors of it,) at that
time found it not to his purpose openly to avow the
sentiment.

But, sir, from the light in which he appears to hold the
wavering conduct of up, up, up—and down, down, down-—
and round, round, roundp—we are led to suppose, that his
real sentiments are not subject to vary, but have been uni-
form throughout. I will leave the gentleman himself to
reflect, what are the consequences which will naturally fol—
low from these premises. If he does not like them, I cannot
help it; he must be more careful, in future, in laying down
propositions from which such consequences will follow.

I repeat, sir, that the member, in the first place, en-
deavors to ridicule the gentlemen opposed to him in senti-
ment. That was not enough; he must next attack the
memory of the distinguished emblem of that good old Whig,
Mr. Holt. But, sir, as he laughed at a worthy member for
making What. he termed an anti-climax, he appears to be
determined to make his own complete; and, for want of a
third part more to his purpose, he finishes by an indirect
though fashionable attempt to ridicule the" sacred gospel
itself, and the faith necessary for a sinner to partake of the
benefits contained in it.

Before I sit down, sir, I must. lament the occasion of the
remarks I have last made. When gentlemen will, for the
sake of displaying their own parts, or perhaps for worse

W1LLIAM3.] NEW YORK. 39]

purposes, depart from the line of propriety, then they are
fair game. I cannot suppose, however, that it is disagree-
able to the member himself, as he appears to delight to
dabble in dirty water.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, although I think the
speech of an honorable gentleman from New York totally
undeserving of notice, with regard to argument, yet, as he
has taken upon himself to misstate some of my sentiments,
and attribute improper motives to me, I shall make a very
short r.eply He observed, that I said the state government
was imperfect, because it answered my purpose. With
equal justice I might retort that the honorable gentleman
has been frequently talking of the defects of the articles of
the Confederation, because it answered his purpose. But,
sir, I said no more of the state Constitution than I can say
with propriety of every thing else — that nothing is perfect.
Even the honorable gentleman’s wit and fancy cannot lay
claim to perfection, or he would not have introduced the
vulgar idea of children’s tottering with boards. The gen-
tleman observed, that I alleged that the Congress would rob
”the people of the light of heaven, and pick their pockets.
This egregious misstatement I cannot account for. I have
heard that a great philosopher endeavored to prove that
ridicule was the test of truth; but, with the honorable gen-
tleman, misrepresentation is the test of ridicule.

I think, sir, that no prudent people will trust power with
their rulers, that cannot be exercised without injuring them.
This I suppose to be the case with poll taxes. But the
honorable gentleman hath not attempted to overthrow eith-
er the arguments of the honorable gentlemen who have
spoken in favor of the amendment I had the honor to pro-
pose, or my own. He hath indeed attacked us with wit
and fancy. If, however, we supposed him a formidable
adversary, upon these considerations, and attempted to com-
bat him with the same weapons, would it not be as ridicu-
lous as it was for Don QuiXOte to fight with a windmill,
upon the mad supposition that it was a giant? The gentle-
man had also observed, that every member of the committee
was convinced, by the arguments of an honorable gentleman
from New York, of the propriety of this paragraph, except the
honorable gentleman from Duchess. N ow, sir, how the hon-
orable gentleman came to discover this, I cannot say: this I

392 DEBATES. [M. smm

can say, for myself, that I am not convinced. The gentleman
must, indeed, possess some wonderful faculties, if he can
penetrate into the operations of the mind; he must, sir,
possess the second sight in a surprising degree. Sir, I
should, however, be very uncandid, if I attributed the gen-
tleman’s satirical remarks to a malevolent disposition: I do
not, sir. I impute them to his politeness, which is the art
of pleasing. Now, sir, every person must acknowledge that
the honorable gentleman gave a great deal of pleasure yes-
terday, if laughter is a sign of pleasure; consequently, he
was very polite. Sir, I shall not enter seriously into the
subject until I hear serious answers to what I have offered
to the committee. Sir, to conclude, the honorable gentle-
man, in my eye, from New York, may substitute his fanciful
notions in the room of arguments ; he may, sir, by his ridicu-
lous—I mean ridiculing—powers, excite laughter and oc—
casion smiles; but, trust me, sir, they will, instead of having
the desired effect—instead of frightening—be considered
with contempt.

The Hon. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, the honorable
gentleman who spoke yesterday animadverted, in a very lu-
dicrous manner, upon my arguments, and endeavored to
place them in a ridiculous point of View. Perhaps it was
necessary that the Convention should be diverted with some-
thing fanciful, and that they should be relieved from the
tediousness of a dull debate by a few flashes of merriment.
I suppose it was for this purpose that the gentleman was in-
duced to make so handsome a display of his comic talents,
to the no small entertainment of the ladies and gentlemen
without the bar. It is well known that, in theatrical ex-
hibitions, the farce succeeds the tragedy. Now, as another
honorable gentleman (Mr. Duane) had, but the day before,
called to our minds, in a most dismal picture, the tragic
scenes of war, devastation, and bloodshed, it was entirely
proper that our feelings should be relieved from the shock—
ing impression by a light and musical play. I think the
gentleman has acquitted himself admirably. However, his
attack seems to have thrown him off his guard, and to have
exposed him to his own weapons. The gentleman might
well have turned his strictures upon his own contradictions ;
for, at one time, he argues that a federal republic is imprac-
ticable; at another, he argues that the proposed government

M. smmq NEW YORK. 393

is a federal republic. At one time, he says the old Confed-
eration has no power at all; at another, he says it has
nearly as many as the one proposed. He seems to be an
enemy to creeds; and yet, with respect to concuuent ju1is
diction, he p1esents us with his creed, which we are bound
to believe. Let us hear it. “I believe that the gene1al
government is sup1eme, and that the state gove1nments a1e
supreme; and yet they are not two supremes, but one su-
preme; and this cannot be doubted.” He says there is a
concurrentjurisdiction in your mine, Mr. Chairman, and yet
you do not concur, for the gentleman himself claims the
soil, and there seems to be a difference between you. But,
as the honorable gentleman considers his harangue as c011—
taining some reasoning, I shall take notice of a few remarks.

The gentleman has said that the committee seemed to be
convinced by the arguments of an honorable member from
New York. I suppose it was only a fancy of the moment
that struck him, of which he can probably give no better
account than the rest of us. I can only say for mySelf, that,
the more I hear and reflect, the more convinced I am of the
necessity of amendment. Whether the committee have re-
ceived conviction can easily be settled by a vote.

The gentleman horn Washington has said that even the
state of New Yo1k was not a perfect f01m. In the coulse
of my a1gument, l obselved that the state legislatures were
competent to good government, and that it was not proper
to exchange governments at so g1eata risk Where is the
mighty cont1adiction. P I said that the state gove1nments
wele proper depositories of power, and were the p1oper
gua1dians of the people. I did not say that any gove1nment
was perfect,nor did I ascribe any extraordinary qualities to
the states. The gentleman endeavms to fix anothe1 contra-
diction upon me. He cha1ges me with saying that direct
taxes are dangerous and yet imp1acticable. This is an
egregious mis1ep1esentation. My decla1ation was, that
general direct taxes would be extremely difficult in the ap«
portionment and collection, and that this difficulty would
push the general governmentinto despotic measures. The
gentleman also ridicules our idea of the states losing their
powers. He says this Constitution adds little or no power
to the Union, and consequently takes little or nothing from
the states. If this be true, what are the advocates of the

vor.. II. 50

 

394 DEBATES. [R. R. LIVINGSTON

system contending about? it is tne reasoning among all
reasone1s, that nothing to something adds nothing. If the
new plan does not contain any new p0we1s, Why advocate
1t? If it does, whence are they taken? The honorable
membe1 cannot nnde1stand our a1 Orument about the swo1d
and the pluse, and asks, Why should the states hold them?
I say, the state governments ought to hold the pu1se, to keep
people’ s hands out of it. With: 1espect to the swor,d I say
you must handle it, thlough your general government but
the states must have some agency, 01 the people will not be
willing to put thei1 hands to it. It IS obse1ved that 11e must
talk a great deal, and that it is necessaly to suppo1t hele
what we have said out of doo1s. Si1, l conceive that we

ought to talk of this subject evely wheie. Several gentle-
men have observed that it is necessary these powers should
be vested 111 Congress, that they may have funds to pledge
fo1 the pavment of debts. This a1 Orument has not the least
weight 111 my mind. The gove1nment ought not to have it
in thei1 power to bonow with too g1eat facility. The funds
which we agree to lodge with Congress will be sufficient for
as much as they ought to borrow.

I submit to the candor of the committee, Whether any
evidence of the stlength of a cause is affmded, when gen-
tlemen, instead of 1easoning fairly, assert roundly, and use
all the powe1s of ridicule 21nd 1heto1ic to abuse their adver-
saries. A111 a1gument may be placed 111 a lidiculous light,
byt taking only detached parts. Iwish, M1. Chairman, tnat
ridicule may be avoided. It can only irritate the passions,
and has no tendency to convince the judgment.

The CHANCELLOR said, he was very unfortunate in
provoking so many able antagonists. They had given a
turn to his alguments and explessions which he did not ex-
pect. He was, however, happy that he could say, with Sir
John Falstaff, that if he had no wit himself, he had been the
occasion of wit in others; and therefore he supposed that
‘ the ladies, this day, had been as well entertained as yester-
day. He went. on to explain what the gentleman had
imputed to him as contradictions. He had charged him
with saying that a federal government could not exist, and
yet that he had contended for one. This was false , he had
maintained that a single league of states could not long exist,
and had proved it by examples. This was fai1 reasoning,

R. R. LIVINGSTON.] NEW YORK. 395

and he had not said any thing to contradict it. He then went
through a review of his arguments, to prove that he had
been misrepresented, and that he had been consistent
throughout. But, said the chancellor, what most deeply
wounds me is, that my worthy kinsman across the taole,
regardless of our common ancestry, and the tender ties of
blood, should join his dagger with the rest, and compel me
to exclaim, 111 the dying words of Caesar, “And thou, too
Brutus!” The gentleman alleges, first, that I have t1eated
the holy gospel with disdain. lhis IS a se1ious charge. I
deny it. IfI have used a phiase disagreeable to him, I cer-
tainly have expressed nothing disrespectful of the Scriptures.
If I have used a few words, there are gentlemen who have
quoted, not only verses, but chapters. He tells you I have
insulted the good Mr. Holt: I declare, I did not know the
newspaper I referred to was his. He then tells you that
my sentiments are illibe1al, and that I insinuate that the
Worthy printer did not act on sound principles of whi0 ggism.
Ifthis were true, my 1nsmuat10ns would indeed be both illibetal
and false. Sir, if gentlemen will come forward with absurd
arguments, imagine erroneous premises, and draw false con-
clusions, shall they not be exposed? and if their contradic-
tions render them ridiculous, is it my fault? Are not the
absurdities of public. speakers ridiculed in all countries? Why
not expose false reasoning? Why not pluck from Sophistry
the delusive veil by which she imposes on the people? If I
am guilty of absurdities, let them be detected and displayed
If the fool’s cap fits me, clap it on: I will wear it, and all
shall laugh. Sir, the very day after I made my first speech
to this committee, I was attacked with great severity, and
with unusual weapons. A dreadful and terrible beast, with
great iron claws and ghastly look, was made to grin horribly
in my face. I appeal to this committee, sir, whether gentle—
men have not said plainly, that the powers of Congress would
be dangerous, and yet impracticable. If they 5will speak
such nonsense, they must be exposed. Thei1 other argu-
'ments a1e equally ridiculous, they reason in confusion.

They fotm a government, to consist of thirteen governments;

one controls thirteen, and thirteen control one. tDWith regard
to the sword and the purse, I could have no conception of
Congress keeping a sword“, and the states using it; of Con-
gress using a purse, and the states keeping it; of Congress

396 DEBATES. rTREDWELL.

having power, and the states exercising it. I could not rec-
oncile these things to my reason. Sir, when any argument,
on such a subject as this, strikes me as being absurd and
ridiculous,l cannot conceal my emotions; I think it my
duty to expose it boldly; and I shall continue to do this,
Without any apprehensions from those virulent attacks which
have been aimed at me from every quarter.

Mr. TREDVVELL. Sir, little accustomed to speak 111
public, and always inclined, in such an assembly as this, to
be a hearer rather than a speaker, on a less important occa-
sion than the present I should have contented myself with
a silent vote ; but when I consider the nature of this dispute,
that it is a contest, not between little states and great states,
(as we have been told,) between little folks and great folks,
between patriotism and ambition, between freedom and
power; not so much between the navigating and non-navi-
gating states, as between navigating and non—navigating i11—
dividuals, (for not one of the amendments we contend for has
the least reference to the clashing interests of states ;) when
I consider, likewise, that a people jealous of their liberties,
and strongly attached to freedom, have reposed so entire a con-
fidence in this assembly, that upon our determination depends
their future enjoyment of those invaluable rights and privi-
leges, which they have so lately and so gallantly defended
at every risk and expense, both of life and property, — it ap-
pears to me so interesting and important, that I cannot be
totally silent on the occasion, lest lisping babes should be
taught to curse my name, as a betrayer of their freedom and
happiness.

The gentleman who first opened this debate did (with an
emphasis which I believe convinced every one present of the
propriety of the advice) urge the necessity of proceeding, in
our deliberations on this important subject, coolly and dis-
passionately. With how much candor this advice was given,
appears from the subsequent parts of a long speech, and
from several subsequent speeches almost totally addressed to
our fears. The people of New Jersey and Connecticut are
so exceedingly exasperated against us, that, totally regard-
less of their own preservation, they Will take the two rivers
of Connecticut and Delaware by their extremities, and, by
dragging them over our country, will, by a sweeping deluge,
wash us all into the Hudson, leaving neither house not

TRWWELLJ NEW YORK. 39?

inhabitant behind them. But if this event should not hap-
pen, doubtless the Vermontese, with the British and tories
0111 natural enemies, would, by b1inging down upon us the
great Lake Onta1io, sweep hills and mountains, houses and
inhabitants, 111 one deluge, into the Atlantic. These, i11-
deed, would be terrible calamities; but terrible as they are,
they are not to be compaled with the ho1rors and desolation
of tyranny. The arbitrary courts of Philip in the Nether-
lands, 1n which life and ploperty we1e daily confiscated with-
out a jury, occasioned as much misery and a mom rapid
depopulation of the province, before the people took up a1ms
in thei1 own defence, than all the armies of that haughty
monarch were able to effect afte1wards , and it is doubtful,
in my mind, whether governments, by abusing their powers,
have not occasioned as much misery and distress, and nearly
as great devastations of the human species, as all the wars
which have happened since Milton’s battle of the angels to
the present day. The end or design of government is,.or
ought to be, the safety, peace, and welfare of the governed.
. Unwise, therefore, and absurd in the highest degree, would
be the conduct of that people, who, in forming a government,
should give to their lulers power to dest1oy them and their
property, and thereby defeat the very pu1pose of thei1 institu-
tions ,or, in other words, should give unlimited pow er to their
rulers, and not 1etain in their own hands the means of their
own preservation. The first governments in the world were
parental, the powers of which were restrained by the laws .
of natu1e; and doubtless the early succeeding governments
were formed on the same plan, which, we may suppose,
answered tolerably well 1n the first ages of the world, while
the moral sense was strong, and the laws of natu1e well unde1-
stood, the1e being then no lawyers to explain them away.
But in after times, when kings became great, and co111ts
olowded, it was discoveled that governments should have a
light to tyrannize, and a power to opp1ess , and at the plesent
day, when the juris peiitz are become so skilful 111 their pro-
ft ss1on, and quibbling lS reduced to a science, it is become
extremely difficult to form a constitution which will secure
liberty and happiness to the people, or laws under which
property is safe. Hence, in modern times, the design of the
people, in forming an original constitution of government, is
not so much to give powers to their rulers, as to guard
34

...~._;

398 DEBATES. ' [TREDWELL

against the abuse of them; but, in a federal one, it is
different.

Si1, I introduce these observations to combat certain princ1-
ples which have been daily and confidently advanced by the
favorers of the present Constitution, and which appear to me
totally indefensible. The first and grand leading, 01 rather
misleading, principle in this debate, and 011 which the advo—
cates for this system of unrestricted powers must chiefly
depend for its support, is that, in forming a. constitution,
whatever powers are not expressly granted or given the
government, are 1eserved to the people, or that rulers cannot
exercise any powe1s but those expressly given to them by
the Constitution. Let me ask the gentlemen who advanced
this principle, whether the commission of a Roman dictator,
which was in these few words —to take care that the state
received no harm — does not come up fully to their ideas of
an energetic government; 01' whether an invitation from the
people to one (11'11101'e to come and rule over them, would
not clothe the 1ulers with sufficient powers. If so, the prin-
ciple they advance is a false one. Besides, the absu1dity
of this principle will evidently appear, when we consider the
great variety of o bjects to which the powers of the govern-
ment must necessa1ily extend, and that an eXpless enumera-
tiOn of them all would probably fill as many volumes as
Fool’s Synopsis of the C1itics. But we may reason with
sufficient certainty on the subject, from the sense of all the
public bodies in the United States, who had occasion to
form new constitutions. They have uniformly acted upon a
direct and contrary principle, not only in forming the state
constitutions and the old Confederation, but also 1n felming
this very Constitution, for we do not find in every state
constitution express resolutions made 111 favor of the people;
and it is clea1 that the late Convention at Philadelphia, 11hat-
ever might have been the sentiments of some of its members,
did not adopt the principle, for they have made certain 1ese1-
vations and 1estrictions,1vhiel1, upon that principle, 11 ould
have been totally useless and unnecessary; and can it be
supposed that that wise body, whose only apology for the
great ambiguity of many pa1ts of that performance, and the
total omission of some things which many esteem essential
to the secu1ity of libe1tyb, was a great desire of brevity,
should so fa1 ascrifice that gloat andb important object, as to
insert a numbe1 of plovisions which they esteemed totally

TREDWELLJ NEW YORK. 399

useless? Why is it said that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. 1
What clause in the Constitution, except this very clause
itself, gives the general government a power to deprive us
of that great privilege, so sacredly secured to us by our
state constitutions? Why is it provided that no bill of
attainder shall be passed, or that no title of nobility shall be
granted? Are there any clauses in the Constitution extend-
ing the powers of the general government to these objects?
Some gentlemen say that these, though not necessary, were“
inserted for greater caution. I could have wished, sir, that?
a greater caution had been used to secure to us the freedom\
of election, a sufficient and responsible representation, the
freedom of the press, and the trial by jury both in civil and
criminal cases.

These, sir, are the rocks 011 which the Constitution shouldl
have rested , no other foundation can any man lay, which
will secure the sacred temple of freedom against the power 3
of the great, the undermining arts of ambition, and the
‘blasts of profane scoffers—for such there will be in every
age --Wl10 will tell us that all religion is in vain; that is, that
our political creeds, which have been handed down to us by
our forefathers as sacredly as our Bibles, and for which more
of them have suffered martyrdom than for the creed of the
apostles, are all nonsense; who will tell us that paper con-
stitutions are mere paper and that parchment 1s but parch-
ment, that jealousy of our rulers 1s a sin, &c. I could have:
wished also that sufficient caution had been used to secure?
to us our religious liberties, and to have prevented the gen-
eral government from tyrannizing over our consciences by a
religious establishment— a tyranny of all others most dread-
ful, and which will assuredly be exercised Whenever it shall
be thought necessary for the promotion and support of their
political measures. It is ardently to be wished, sir, that these
and other invaluable rights of freemen had been as cautiously
secured as some of the paltry local interests of some of
the individual states. But it appears to me, that, in forming

sConstitution, we have run into the same error 11 hich the
lawyers and Pharisees of old weie charged with; that is,
While we have secured the tithes of mint, anise, and cumin,
We have neglected me weightier matters of the law, judg-

4.00 DEBAT ES. [TREDWELL

.ment, mercy, and faith. Have we not neglected to secure

to ourselves the weighty matters of judgment or justice,
by empowering the general government to establish one
supreme, and as many inferior, courts as they please, whose
proceedings they have a right to fix and regulate as they
shall think fit, so that we are ignorant Whether they shall be
according to the common, civil, the Jewish, or Turkish law?
What better provisions have we made for mercy, when a man,
for ignorantly passing a counterfeit continental note, or bill of
credit, is liable to be dragged to a distant county, two or
three hundred miles from home, deprived of the support and
assistance of friends, to be tried by a strange jury, ignorant
of his character, ignorant of the character of the Witnesses,
unable to contradict any false testimony brought against him
by their own knowledge of facts, and with whom the
prisoner being unacquainted, he must be deprived totally of
the benefit of his challenge? and besides all that, he may
be exposed to lose his life, merely for want of property to
carry his Witnesses to such a distance; and after all this solemn
farce and mockery of a trial by jury, if they should acquit
him, it will require more ingenuity than I am master of, to
show that he does not hold his life at the will and pleasure
of the Supreme Court, to which an appeal lies, and conse-
quently depend on the tender mercies, perhaps, of the
wicked, (for judges may be wicked ;) and What those tender
mercies are,I need not tell you. You may read them in
the history of the Star Chamber Court in England, and in
the courts of Philip, and in your Bible.

This brings me to the third and last weighty matter
mentioned in the text—to wit, faith. The word faith may,
with great propriety, be applied to the articles of our politi-
cal creed, which, it is absolutely necessary, should be kept
pure and uncorrupted, if we mean to preserve the liberties
of our country and the inestimable blessings of a free gov—
ernment. And, sir,l cannot but be seriously alarmed on
this head, as has frequently been the case during the pres-
ent discussion,—gentlemen of the first rank and abilities
openly opposing some of the most essential principles of
freedom, and endeavoring, by the most ingenious sophistry,
and the still more powerful weapons of ridicule, to shake or
corrupt our faith therein. Have we not been told that, if
government is but properly organized, and the powers were

TREDWELL] NEW YORK. 110'!

suitably distributed among the several members, it is unne—
cessary to provide any other security against the abuse of its
power? that power thus distributed needs no restriction!
Is this a Whig principle? Does not every constitution 011
the continent contradict this position? Why are we told
that all restrictions of power are found to be inconvenient?
that we ought to put unlimited confidence in our rulers.’
that it is not our duty to be jealous of men in power?
Have we not had an idea thrown out of establishing an
aristocracy in our own country,—a government than which
none is more dreadful and oppressive?

What the design of the preacher on this occasion is, I
will not attempt to determine; far be it from me to judge
men’s hearts. but thus much I can say, from the best au-
thority, they are deceitful above all things, and desperately
wicked. But whatever he the design of the preachers, the
tendency of their doctrines 18 clear ,they tend to corrupt our
political faith, to take us‘ off our guard, and lull to sleep that
jealousy which, we are told by all writers, -—and it is
preservation of lreedom. But notwithstanding the strongest
assertions that there are no wolves in our country, if we see
their footsteps in every public path, we should be very
credulous and unwise to trust our flocks abroad, and to
believe that those who advised us to do it were very anxious
for their preservation.

In this Constitution, sir, we have departed widely from
the piinciples and politital faith of ’76, when the Spirit of
liberty ran high, and danger put a curb on ambition. Here
we find no security tOr the rights of individuals, no security
for the existence of our state governments; here is no bill
of rights, no proper restriction of powe1 , our lives, our prop—
erty, and our consciences, are left wholly at the mercy of the
legislature, and the powers of the judiciary may be extended
to any degree short of almighty Sir, 1n this Constitution
we have not only neglected, ——-we have done worse, ——we
have openly violated, our faith,-—-—that is, our public faith.

The seventh article, which isin thesewords, “ The rati-
fication-s of the Conventions of nine states shall be sufficient
fur the establishment of this Constitution between the states
so ratifying the same,” issoflagrant a violation of the public
faith of these states, so solemnly pledged to each other in

VOL.1L 51

402 DEBATES. [TREDWELL

the Confederation, as makes me tremble to reflect upon; for,
however lightly some may think of paper and parchment
constitutions, they are recorded, sir, in that high court
of appeals, the Judge of which will do right, and I am con-
fident that no such violation of public faith ever did, or ever
will, go unpunished.

The plan of the federal city, sir, departs from every prin-
ciple of freedom, as far as the distance of the two polar stars
from each other ; for, subjecting the inhabitants of that dis-

l trict to the exclusive legislation of Congress, in whose ap-
pointment they have no share or vote, is laying a foundation
on which may be erected as complete a tyranny as can be
found in the Eastern world. Nor do I see how this evil Can
possibly be prevented, without razing the foundation of this
happy place, where men are to live, without labor, upon the
fruit of the labors of others; this political hive, where all the
drones in the society are to be collected to feed on the honey
of the land. How dangerous this city may be, and what its
operation on the general liberties of this country, time alone
must discover; but I pray God, it may not prove to this
western world what the city of Rome, enjoying a similar
constitution, did to the eastern.

There is another clause in this Constitution, which, though
there is no prospect of getting it amended, I think ought not
to be passed over in silence, lest such a silence should be
construed into a tacit approbation of it. I mean the clause

i which restricts the general government from putting astop,
for a number of years, to a commerce which is a stain to
the commerce of any civilized nation, and has already
blackened half the plains of America with a race of wretches
made so by our cruel policy and avarice, and which appears
to me to be already repugnant to every principle of human-
ity, morality, religion, and good policy. There. are other
objections to this Constitution, which are weighty and un-
answerable; but they have been so clearly stated, and so
fully debated, in the course of this discussion, that it would
be an unjustifiable intrusion on the patience of the house to
repeat them. I shall therefore content myself with a few
observations on the general plan and tendency. We are
told that this is a federal government. I think, sir, there is
as much propriety in the name, as in that which its advo-
cates assume, and no more; it is, in my idea, as complete a

TREDWELL.'| NEW YORK. 4:03

consolidation as the government of this state, in which legis
lative powers, to a certain extent, are exercised by the
several towns and corporations. The sole difference be-
tween a state government under this Constitution, and a
corporation under a state government, is, that a state being
more extensive than a town, its powers are likewise propor—
tionably extended, but neither of them enjoys the least share
of sovereignty; for, let me ask, what is a state government?
What sovereignty, what power is left to it, when the control
of every source of revenue, and the total command of the
militia, are given to the general gover.nment 9 That power
which can command both the piDoperty and the persons of
the community, is the sovereign, and the sole sovereign.
The idea of two distinct soveleigns in the same count1y,
separately possessed of sovereign and supreme power, in the
same matters at the same time, is as supreme an absuidity,
as that two distinct separate circles can be bounded exactly
by the same circumference. This, Si), is demonstration, and
from it I draw one corollary, which, I think, clearly follows,
although it is in favor of the Constitution, to wit—that at
'- least that clause in which Congress guaranties to the several
states a republican form of government, speaks honestly;
that IS, that no more is intended by it than is expressed;

and I think it is clear that, whilst the mere form is secured,
the substance—to wit, tlie whole power and sovereignty
of our state governments, and with them the liberties of the
country—is swallowed up by the general government;
for it is well worth observing, that, while our state govern-
ments are held up to‘us as the great and sufficient security
of our rights and privileges, it is carefully provided that they
shall be disarmed of all power, and made totally dependent
on the bounty of Congress for their support, and conse-
quently for their existence,—so that we have scarce a single
right secured under either.

Is this, sir, a government for freemen? Are we thus to
be duped out of our liberties. P I hope, ’si1, our affairs have
not yet arrived to that long-wished— for pitch of confusion.
that we are under the necessity of acceptmg such a system
of government as this.

I cannot, sir, exp1ess my feelings on a late occasion, when
1 consider with what unspeakable indignation the spirit of
a Montgomery, a Herkimer, a Paris, &c., must have fired

4044 DEBATES. [TREDWELL

at the insults offered to their memories on this floor, and
that not by a stranger, but by a brother, when their names,
which Will ever be dear to freemen, were profanely called
upon as an inducement for us to surrender up those rights
, and privileges, in the defence of which they so gallantly
fought, and so gloriously died. We are called upon at this
time (I think it is an early day) to make an unconditional
surrender of those rights which ought to be dearer to us than
our lives.

But I hope, sir, that the memory of these patriot heroes
will teach us a duty on this occasion. If we follow their
example, we are sure not to err. \Ve ought, sir, to con-
sider—and it is a most solemn consideration—that we
may now give away, by a vote, what it may cost the dying
groans of thousands to recover; that we may now surren-
der, with a little ink, what it may cost seas of blood to
regain; the dagger of Ambition is now pointed at the fair
bosom of Liberty, and, to deepen and complete the tragedy,
we, her sons, are called upon to give the fatal thrust. Shall
we not recoil at such a deed, and all cry out with one voice,
“ Hands off! ’7 What distraction has seized us? Is she not
our mother, and if the frenzy of any should persist in the
parricidal attempt, shall we not instantly interpose, and re-
ceive the fatal point into our own bosom? A moment’s
hesitation would ever prove us to be bastards, not sons.
The liberties of the country are a deposit, a trust, in the
hands of individuals; they are an entailed estate, which the
possessors have no right to dispose of; they belong to our
children, and to them we are bound to transmit them as
a representative body. The trust becomes tenfold more
sacred in our hands, especially as it was committed to us
with the fullest confidence in our sentiments, integrity, and
firmness. If we should betray that trust on this occasion, I
fear (think there is reason to fear) that it will teach a lesson
dangerous to liberty—to wit, that no confidence is to be
placed in men.

But why, sir, must we be guilty of this breach of trust I’
Why surrender up the dear-bought liberties of our country?
Because We are told, in very positive terms, that nothing
short of this will satisfy, or can be accepted by, our future
rulers? Is it possible that. we can be at a loss for an answer
to such declarations as these? Can we not, ought we not

TREDWELLJ NEW YORK. 4105

to speak like freemen on this occasion, (this perhaps may be
the last time when we shall dare to do it,) and declare, 1n
as positive terms, that we cannot, we will not, give up our
liberties; that, if we cannot be admitted into the Union as
fieemen, we will not come in as slaves? This I fully believe
to be the language of my constituents; this is the language
of my conscience; and, though I may not dare longe1 to
make it the language of my tongue, yet I trust it Will ever
be the language of my heart. If we act with coolness, firm-
ness, and decision, 011 this occasion, I have the fullest con-
fidence that. the God who has so lately delivered us out of
the paw of the lion and the bear, will also deliver us from
this Goliath, this uncircumcised Philistine. This govern-
ment is founded in sin, and reared up in iniquity; the foun-
dations are laid in a most sinful breach of public trust, and
the top—stone is a most iniquitous breach of public faith; and
I fear, if it goes into operation, we shall be justly punished
with the total extinction of our civil liberties. We are in—
vited, in this instance, to become partakers in other men’s
sins; if we do, We must likewise be content to take our
'share in the punishment.

We are told, sir, that a government is like a mad horse,
which, notwithstanding all the curb you can put upon him, will
sometimes run away with his rider. The idea is undoubted-
ly a just one. Would he not, therefore, justly be deemed a
mad man, and deserve to have his neck broken, who should
trust himself on this horse without any bridle at all? We
are threatened, sir, if we do not come into the Union, with-
the resentment of our neighboring states. I do not appre-
hend we have much to fear from this quarter, for 0u1 neigh—
bors must have the good sense to discover that not one of
our objections 1s founded on motives of particular state inter-
est. They must see likewise, from the debates, that every
selfish idea that has been thrown 'out has come f10m those
who ve1y irnp1"'0pe1ly call themselves the federal side of the
house. A union with our sister states I as a1dently desi1e
as any man, and that upon the most gene10us p1inciples;
but a union under such a system as this, I think, is not a
desirable thing. The design of a union is safety, but a
union upon the proposed plan 1s celtain destruction to liberty.
In one sense, indeed, it may bring us to a state of safety ,
for it may reduce us to such a condition that we may be

406 DEBATES. [AMENDMENTS.

very sure that nothing worse can happen to us, and conse-
quently we shall have nothing to fear.

This, sir, is a dreadful kind of safet '; but I confess it is
the only kind of safety I can see in this union. There are
no advantages that can possibly arise from a union which
can compensate for the loss of freedom, nor can any evils be
apprehended from a disunion Which are as much to be
dreaded as tyranny.

 

The committee then proceeded through sections 8, 9, and
10, of this article, and the whole of the next, with little or no
debate. As the secretary read the paragraphs, amendments
were moved, in the order and form hereafter recited.

To the paragraph respecting the borrowing of money,
Mr. LANSING proposed the following amendment :—

“Provided, That no money be borrowed on the credit of the United
States, without the assent of two thirds of the members of both houses
present.”

To the clause respecting the establishment of post-ofiices.
&c., Mr. JONES moved the following amendment :—

“ Resolved, as the opinion of the committee, that the power of Con-
gress to establish post-offices and post-roads is not to be construed to
extend to the laying out, making, altering, or repairing highways, in any
state, Without the consent of the legislature of such state.”

To the clause respecting the raising and supporting armies,

Mr. LANSING proposed- the following: —

“ Provided, That no standing army, or regular troops, shall be raised,
or kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the
members of both houses present.”

Respecting the organization and arming the militia, &c.,—

“Provided, That the militia of any state shall not be marched out of
such state without the consent of the executive thereof, nor be continued
in service out of the state, without the consent of the legislature thereof,
for a longer term than six weeks; and provided, that the power to or-
ganize, arm, and discipline the militia, shall not be construed to extend
further than to prescribe the mode of arming and disciplining the same.”

Moved by Mr. SMITH.

Respecting the power to make all laws necessary for the
carrying the Constitution into execution, —

“Provided, That no power shall be exercised by Congress, but such
as is expressly given by this Constitution; and all others, not expressly
given, shall be reserved to the respective states, to be by them exercised.’

Moved by Mr. LANSING.

AMENDMENTS.] NEW YORK. 407‘

To the clause respecting the power of regulating com.-
meme,—

“Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothing in the said
Constitution contained shall be construed to authorize Congress to grant
monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive advantages of com-

merce.”
Moved by Mr. M. SMITH.

.Relative to the right of declaring war, —

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the Congress ought
not to have the power or right to declare war, without the concurrence of‘
two thirds of the members of each house.”

Moved by Mr. TREDWELL.
Sec. 9. Respecting. the privilege of habeas corpus, ——
“Provided, That, whenever the privilege of liabeas corpus shall be sus

pended, such suspension shall in no case exceed the term of six months,
or until the next meeting of the Congress.”

Moved by Mr. LANSING.
Respecting ea: postfacto laws, —

“Provided, That the meaning‘of' ex post facto laws shall not be con-
strued to prevent calling public defaulters to account,but shall extend only

to crimes.” .
Moved by Mr. TREDWELL.

Respecting the ratio in Which taxes shall be laid, ——
“Resolved, as the opinion ofthis committee, that no capitation tax ought

ever to be laid.”
.Moved by Mr. TREDWELL.

Clause relative to the publication of the receipts and ex—
penditures,—-

“Provided, That. the words from time to time shall be so construed
as that the receipts and expenditures of public money shall be published
at least once in every year; and be transmitted to the executives of the
several states, to be laid before the legislatures thereof.”

Moved by Mr. T.REDWELL

Clause relating to the granting titles of nobility,—

“ Resolved, as theb opinion of this committee, that the Congress shall at
no time consent that any person, holding any office of profit or trust in
or under the United States, shall accept of any title of nobility from any

king, prince, or foreign state.”
Moved by Mr. M. SMITH.

FRIDAY, July 4, 1788. — Committee proceeded to article 2.
Sec. 1. Clause respecting the oflice of President, ——
“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the President of the

United States should hold his office during the term of seven years, and
that he should not be eligible a second time.”

Moved by Mr. SMlTH.

i408 DEBATES. [AM ENDMENTS.

Sec. 2. Clause 1, respecting the powers of the Presz-
aem’, — '

“Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the President of the
United States should never command the army, militia, or navy of the
United States, in person, without the consent of the Congress; and that
he. should not have the power to grant pardons for treason, without the
consent ofthe Congress; but that, in cases where persons are convicted of
treason, he should have authority to grant reprieves, until their cases can
be laid before the Congress.”

Moved by Mr. G. LIVINGSTON.

SATURDAY, July 5, l788.——Sec. 2. Clause 2. Amend-
ment moved by Mr. M. SMITH : —

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the Congress should
appoint, in such manner as they may think proper, a council to advisethe
President in the appointment of officers; that the said council should con-
tinue in oflfice for four years; that they should keep a record of their pro-
ceedings, and sign the same, and always be responsible for their advice,
and impeachable for malconduct in office; that the counsellors should have
a reasonable allowance for their services, fixed by a standing law; and
that no man should be elected a counsellor who shall not have attained to
the age of thirty-five years, and who is not either a natural-born citizen, or
has not become a citizen before the 4th day of July, 1776.”

Clause 3. Motion by Mr. M. SMITH :—

“ Provided, That all commissions, writs, and processes, shall run in the
name of the people of the United States, and be tested in the name of the
President of the United States, or the person holding his place for the time
being, or the first judge of the court out ofwhich the same shall issue.”

The committee then took up the 3d article.

Mr. JONES proposed the following amendments, which
he explained in a speech of some length, and was followed
by Mr. SMITH ; but no debate ensued: ——

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothing in the Con-
stitution now under consideration contained shall be construed so as to
authorize the Congress to constitute, ordain, or establish, any tribunals, or
inferior courts, with any other than appellate jurisdiction, except such as
may be necessary for trial of causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
and for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and
in all other cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends,
and in which the Supreme Court of the United States has no original ju-
risdiction, the cause shall be heard, tried, and determined in some of the
state courts, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, or other proper tribunal, to he established for the purpose by the
Congress, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Con-
gress shall make.”

As the secretary went on with this article, Mr. JONES
submitted the following amendments : ——

Resolve 1. “Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that all

AMENDMENTS.] NEW YORK. 409

appeals from any courts in this state, proceeding according to the course of
the common law, are to be by writ of error, and not otherwise.”

Res. 2. “ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that no judge ot
the Supreme Court ofthe United States shall, during his continuance in
office, hold any other office under the United States, or any of' them.” ‘

Res. 3. “ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicia.
power of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of the
same state, claiming lands under grants of different states, extends only to
controversies relating to such lands as shall be claimed by two or more
persons, under grants of different states.”

Res. ‘4. “ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothing in
the Constitution now under consideration contained, is to be construed to
authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner what
everf’

Res. 5. “ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial
power of the United States, in cases in which a state shall be a party, is
not to be construed to extend to criminal prosecutions.”

Res. 6. “Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial
power of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of differ-
ent states, is not to be construed to extend to any controversy relating to
any real estate not claimed under grants of different states.”

Res. 7. “ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial

power of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of the
same state, claiming lands under grants of different states, extends only
to controversies relating to such lands as shall be claimed by two or more
persons, under grants of different states.”
’ Res. 8. “Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the person
aggrieved by any judgment, sentence, or decree of the Supreme Court of
the United States, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as
the Congress shall make concerning the same, ought, upon application, to
have a commission, to be issued by the President of the United States, to
such learned men as he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoint, not less than seven, authorizing such com-
missioners, or any seven or more of them, to correct the errors in such
judgment, or to review such sentence and decree, as the case may be, and
to do justice to the parties in the premises.”

Res. 9. ‘»‘ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court ofthe United States, or of any other court to
be instituted by the Congress, ought not, in any case, to be increased, en-
larged, or extended, by any fiction, collusion, or mere suggestion.”

'MONDAY, July 7, l788.—The secretary continued reading
the 4th and 5th articles without interruption. To the 2d
clause of' article 6th, Mr. LANSING proposed the following
amendments : —'—

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that no treaty ought to
operate so as to alter the constitution of' any state; nor ought any com-
mercial treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the United States.”

To the 3d clause of article 6th, Mr. M. SMITH moved
the following addition : ~—
“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that all the officers of the
VOL. II. 52 85

410 DEBATES. [AMENDMENTS

United States ought to be bound, by oath or aflirmation, not to infringe
the constitutions or rights of the respective states.”

After the Constitution had been gone through, Mr. M.
SMITH moved for the following amendment to clause 17,
of sec. 8, art. 1 :—

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the right of the Con
grass to exercise exclusive legislation over such district, not exceeding ten
miles square, as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance
of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, shall
not be so exercised as to exempt the inhabitants of such district from pay-
ing the same taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, as shall be imposed 011 the
other inhabitants of the state where such district may be, nor shall it be so
exercised as to. prevent the laws of the state, and all process under those
laws, from extending to such district, in all cases of crimes committed
without the district, or in cases of contracts made between persons-resi-
ding within such district and persons residing without it. Nor shall it be
so exercised, as to authorize any inhabitant of the said district to bring
any suit in any court, which may be established by the Congress within
the same, against any citizen or person not an inhabitant of the said dis-
trict. And it is understood that the stipulations in this Constitution,
respecting all essential rights, shall extend as well to this district as to the
United States in general. Resolved, further, as the opinion of this com-
mittee, that the right of exclusive legislation, with respect to such places
as may be purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, and
dock-yards, and other needful buildings, shall not be construed to authorize
the Congress to make any law to prevent the laws of the states in which
they may lie, from extending to such places in all civil and criminal mat-
ters, except as to such persons as shall be in the service of the United
States, nor to them with respect to crimes committed without such places.”

Mr. LANSING then read, and presented to the com
mittee, a bill of'rtghls to be prefixed to the Constitution.

TUESDAY, July 8, 1788. — Convention met, and adjourned
Without doing business.

WEDNESDAY, July 9,1788.—Convention met, and ad-
journed.

THURSDAY, July 10, 1788. —Mr. LANSING submitted
a plan of amendments, on a new arrangement, and with
material alterations. They are divided into three— lst,
explanatory; 2d, conditional , 3d, recommendatory.

FRIDAY, July ll, 1788. —Mr. JAY moved the following
resolutions : —

“ Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the Constitution under
cons1deration ought to be ratified by this Convention.

“Resolved, further, as the opinion of this comm1ttee, that such parts
of the said Constitution as may be thought doubtful ought to be explained

and that whatever amendment may be deemed useful, or expedient, ought
to be recommended. ”

AMENDMENTSJ. NEW YORK. 411

Mr. JAY was supported by Mr. Chancellor Livingston
and Mr. Chief Justice Morris, and opposed by Mr. Melanc-
ton Smith. The debates on this motion continued till
Tuesday, the 15th of July; when Mr. SMITH moved, as
an amendment, to add to the first resolution prOposed by
Mr. JAY, so that thesame, when amended, should read as
follows : —

“Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the Constitution.
under consideration ought to be‘ ratified by this Convention: 1111011. con-l
dition, nevertheless, That until a convention shall be called and convenedi
for proposing amendments to the said Constitution, the militia of this state
will not be continued in service out ofthis state for a longer term than six
weeks, without the consent of the legislature thereof: That the Congress
will not make or alter any regulation in this state respecting the times,
places, and manner of holding elections for senators or representatives,
unless the legislature of this state should neglect or refuse to make laws or
regulations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of
making the same; and that, in those cases, such power will only be exer-
cised until the legislature of this state shall make provision in the premi-
es: That no excise will be imposed on any article ofthe growth, produc-
tion, or manufacture ofthe United States, or any of them, within this state,
ardent spirits excepted: And that Congress shall not lay direct taxes
within this state, but when the-moneys arising from the impost and excise
shall be insufficient for the public exigencies; nor then, until Congress
“shall first have made a requisition upon this state, to assess, levy, and pay
the amount of such requisition, made agreeably to the census fixed in the
said Constitution, in such way and manner as the legislature of this state
judge best; but in such case, ifthe state shall neglect or refuse to pay its
proportion porsuant to such requisition, then the Congress may assess and
levy this state’s proportion, together with interest at the rate of six per
centum, per annum, from the time at which the same was required to be
paid.”

WEDNESDAY, July 16, 1788. — The Honorable Judge
HOBART brought forward a motion for adjournment. On
this motion large debates took place, in wh1ch Mr. Hobart,
Mr. Duane, Mr. Lansing, Mr. Jay, the Chancellor, Mr.
Hamilton, and Mr. Bay, were engaged. The motion was
rejected.

Mr. DUANE then brought forward a plan of rattficatzon,
with certain explanations, and with a list of amendments to
be iecommended. This was 1ejected.

Mr. SMI TH’S ploposition was then resumed, and de-
bated till

SATURDAY, July 19, 1788; when Mr. LANSING moved
to postpone the seveial p1 opos1t1ons before the house, in
order to take into considelation a draft of a conditional 121ti-
ficatlon, W1th a bill of rights prefixed, and amendments sub-

112 DEB ATES. [QUESTIORL

joined. Debates a1ose on the motion, and it was calried
The committee then p1oceeded to consider separately the
amendments proposed in this plan of ratification.

WEDNESDAY, July 23, 1788. -——Mr. JONES moved, that
the words on condition, in the form of the ratification, should
be obliterated, and that the words in full confidence should
' be substituted—which was carried.

For the Afirmativc.

Mr. Jay, Mr. J. Smith, Mr. P. Livingston,
Mr. R. Morris, Mr. Jones, Mr. Hatfield,
Mr. Hobart, Mr. Schenck, Mr. Van Cortland,
Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Crane, ‘ -
Mr. Robt. R. Livingston, Mr. Carman, Mr. Sarls,
Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Lefi'erts, Mr. Platt,
Mr. Duane, Mr. Vandervoort, Mr. M. Smith,
Mr. Harrison, Mr. Bancker, Mr. Gilbert Livingston
Mr. Low, Mr. Ryerss, Mr. DeWitt,
Mr. Scudder, Mr. L. Morris, Mr. Williams.
Mr. Havens,
For the Negative.
Mr. R. Yates, Mr. Wynkoop, Mr. Winn,
Mr. Lansing, Mr. Haring, Mr. Veeder,
Mr. I. Thompson, Mr. Woodhull, Mr. Staring,
Mr. Ten Eyck, Mr. VVisner, Mr. Parker,
Mr. Tredwell, Mr. Wood, Mr. Baker,
Mr. PRESIDENT, Mr. Swartwout, Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Cantine, Mr. Akins, Mr. Van Ness.
Mr. Schoonmaker, Mr. Harper, Mr. Bay,
Mr. Clark, Mr. C. Yates, Mr. Adgate.
Mr. J. Clinton, Mr. Frey,

The committee contlnued the consideration of the amend-
ments till Thursday , when M1. LANSING moved to adopt
a 1esolution, that them should be reserved to the state of
New York a right to withd1aw herself from the Union after
a certain number of years, unless the amendments proposed
should previously be submitted to a general. convention.

This motion was negatived.

The committee proceeded in the consideration of the
amendments till

FRIDAY, July 25, 1788; when, the whole being gone
through and amended, the question was put, whether the
committee did agree to the same, which was carried in the
affilmative.

The committee then rose, and reported.

QUESTION] NE‘V YORK. 413

The report of the committee being considered, the Presi-
dent put the question, whether the Convention did agree to
the said report, which was carried 111 the affirmative.

The Convention then resolved, unanimously, that a circulai
letter be prepared to be laid before the different legislatures
of the United States, recommending a general Convention.

SATURDAY, July 26,1788— The bConventiou having met,
the bill of lights and form of the ratification of the Consti-
tution, with the amendments, we1e read, when the question
being put, whethe1 the same should pass, as agreed to and
ratified by the Convention, it was car1ied 1n the affirmative,
as follows. —-

For the Afirmative.

Mr. Jay, Mr. J. Smith, Mr. P. Livingston,

Mr. Hobert, Mr. Jones, Mr. Hatfield,

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Schenck, Mr. Van Cortland,

Mr. Robt. R. Livingston, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Crane,

Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Carman, Mr. Saris,

Mr. Duane, Mr. Lefferts, Mr. Woodhull,

Mr. Harrison, Mr. Vandervoort, Mr. Platt,

Mr. Low, Mr. Bancker Mr. M. Smith,

Mr. Scudder, Mr. Ryerss, Mr. G. Livingston,

Mr. Havens, Mr. L. Morris, Mr. DeVVitt. '
For the Negative.

Mr. R. Yates, Mr. Wynkoop, Mr. Veeder,

Mr. Lansing, Mr. Haring, Mr. Staring,

Mr. Outhoudt, / Mr. Wisner, Mr. Parker,

Mr. J. Thompson, Mr. Wood, Mr. Williams,

Mr. Tredwell, Mr. Swartwout, Mr. Baker,

Mr. Cantine, Mr. Akins, Mr. Hopkins,

Mr. Schoonmaker, Mr. Harper, Mr. Van Ness,

Mr. Clark, Mr, Frey, Mr. Bay,

Mr. J. Clihton, Mr. Winn, Mr. Adgge.

Convention adjourned Without day.

 

THE CIRCULAR LETTER,

from the Convention of the State of New York to the governors of the
several states in the Union.
POUGHKEEPSIE, July 28, 1788
SIR:

We, the members of the Convention of this state, have deliberately
and maturely considered the Constitution proposed for the United States.
Several articles in it appear so exceptionable to a majority of us, that
nothing but the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a

414 THE CIRCULAR.

general convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our
sister states, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number to ratify it,
without stipulating for previous amendments. We all unite in opinion,
that such a revision will be necessary to recommend it to the approbation
and support of a numerous body of our constituents.

We observe that amendments have been proposed, and are anxiously
desired, by several of the states, as well as by this; and we think it of
great importance that effectual measures be immediately taken for calling
a convention, to meet at aperiod not far remote; for we are convinced that
the apprehensions and discontents, which those articles occasion, cannot
be removed or allayed, unless an act to provide for it be among the first
that shall be passed by the new Congress.

As it is essential that an application for the purpose should be made to
them by two thirds of the states, we earnestly exhort and request the legis-
lature of your state to take the earliest opportunity of making it. We are
persuaded that a similar one will be made by our legislature, at their next
session; and we ardently wish and desire that the other states may con-
cur in adopting and promoting the measure.

It cannot be necessary to observe, that no government, however con-
structed, can operate well, unless it possesses the confidence and good-
will ofthe body ofthe people; and as we desire nothing more than that
the amendments proposed by this or other states be submitted to the con-
sideration and decision ofa general convention, we flatter ourselves that
motives of mutual affection and conciliation will conspire with the obvious
dictates of sound policy to induce even such of the states as may be con-
tent with every article in the Constitution to gratify the reasonable de-
sires of that numerous class of American citizens who are anxious to
obtain amendments of some of them.

Our amendments will manifest that none of them originated in local
views, as they are such as, if acceded to, must equally affect every state
in the Union. Our attachment to our sister states, and the confidence
we repose in them, cannot be more forcibly demonstrated than by ac-
ceding to a government which many of us think very imperfect, and de-
volving the power of determining whether that government shall be
rendered perpetual in its present form, or altered agreeably to our wishes,
and a minority of the states with whom we unite.

We request the favor of your excellency to lay this letter before the
legislature of your state; and we are persuaded that your regard for our
national harmony and good government will induce you to promote a
measure which we are unanimous in thinking very conducive to those
interesting objects.

We have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your excellency’s
most obedient servants.

By the unanimous order of the Convention,

GEORGE CLINTON ,
President.

THE

DEBATES

IN
.THE CONVENTION

OF THE

STATE(H?PENNSYLVANIA,

ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

 

PHILADELPHIA, TUESDAY, November 520, 1787, P. M

THIS being the day recommended by the legislature for
the meeting of this body, a number of gentlemen delegated
thereto met, accordingly, at the state—house, and adjourned
to three o’clock, P. M., to-morrow.

WEDNESDAY, November 21, 1787.— Sixty of the gentle—
men elected to serve in the Convention met.

The returns of the elections held for the city of Philadel-
phia, and the several counties of this state, Were read; by
which it appears that the following gentlemen Were returned
as delegates for the Convention for the said Cities and coun-
ties respectively, viz.

For the city of Philadelphia. George Latimer, Benjamin Rush, Hilary
Baker, James Wilson, Thos. M’Kean.

For Philadelphia county. William M’Pherson, John Hunn, George
Gray, S 1muel Ashmead, Enoch Edwards

For Bucks county. Henry Wynkoop, John Barclay, Thomas Yardly,
Abraham Stout. ‘

For Chester county. Thomas Ball, Anthony Wayne, William Gibbons,
Richard Downing, Thomas Cheney, John Hannum.

For Lancaster county. Stephen Chambers, Robert Coleman, Sebas-
tian Grafi‘, John Hubley, Jasper Yeates, John Whitehill.

For York county. Henry Slagle, Thomas Campbell, Thomas Hartley,
David Grier, John Black, Benjamin Pedan.

For Cumberland coun.ty John Harris, John Reynolds, Robert White-
hill, Jonathan Hoge.

For Berks county. Nicholas Lutz, John Ludwig, Abraham Lincoln,
John Bishop, Joseph Heister.

416 DEBATES.

For North Ifampton county. John Arndt, Stephen Balliott, Joseph
Horsefield, David Deshler.

For Bcclford county. James Martin, Joseph Powell.

For Nort/zumberland county. William Wilson, John Boyd.

For IVestmoreZand county. William Findley, John Baird, William
Todd.

For T'Vashington county. James Marshall, James Edgar, T. Scott,
John Nevill.

For Fayette county. Nicholas Breading, John Smilie.

For Franklin county. Richard Bard, John Allison.

For [Montgomery county. Jonathan Roberts, John Richards, Fred
erick A. Muhlenberg, James Morris.

For Dauphzn county. William Brown, Adam Orth.

For Luzerne county. Timothy Pickering.

For Huntingdon county. Benjamin Elliott.

The Convention proceeded to elect a president.

The ballots being counted, it appeared that Frederick
Augustus Muhlenberg, Esq., was duly elected.

An invitation to the president and members of the Con-
vention, from the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania,
requesting their company at a commencement to be held to-
morrow, wasread.

Agreed to attend in a body, at ten o’clock to-morrow.
Adjourned until nine o’clock, A. M.

THURSDAY, November 22, l787.—Convention met, and
proceeded to the University Hall, attended commencement,
and returned to their chamber.

- On motion of Mr. WAYNE, seconded by Mr. V’Vhitehill,

A committee was appointed to 1eport rules and regulations
fo1 conducting the business of the Convention.

The committee consisted of Benjamin Rush, James Wil—
son, George Gray, Anthony \Vayne, and Robert Whitehill.

Adjourned until half-past nine o’clock to-morrow, A. M.

FRIDAY, November 23,1787.— Convention met pursuant
to adjournment, and proceeded to elect a secretary.

The ballots being taken, it appeared that James Camp-
bell, Esq., was duly5 elected.

The (ommittee appointed, yestelday, to bring 1n rules and
regulations,m made report, and the same being read, was by
:plecial. Older taken up, read by paiagiaphs, and agreed to as
olows: —

1. When the president assumes the chair, the members shall take their
seats.

2. At the opening of the Convention of each day, the minutes of the
preceding day shall be read, and are then in the power ofthe Convention

M’KEAN.] PENNSYLVANIA. 417

to be corrected; after which any business addressed to the chair may be
proceeded to.

3. Every petition, memorial, letter, or other matter of the like kind, read
in the Convention, shall be deemed as lying on the table for further con-
sideration, unless any special order be moved thereon.

4. A motion made and seconded shall be repeated by the president.
A motion shall be reduced to writing, if the president or any two members
require it. A motion may be withdrawn by the member making it be-
fore any decision 18 had on it.

No member speaking shall be interrupted but by a call to order bV
the president, or by a member through the president.

6. No member to be referred to, in debate, by name.

'7. The president himself, or by request, may call to order any member
who shall transgress the rules. _ If the second time, the president may
refer to him by name. The Convention may then examine and censure
the member’s conduct, he being allowed to e'xtenuate or justify.

8. Every member, actually attending the Convention, shall be in his
place at the time to which the Convention stands adjourned, or within
half an hour thereof.

9. The name of him who makes,.and the name of him who seconds, a
motion, shall be entered on the minutes.

10. No member shall speak more than twice on a question without
leave.

11. Every member of a committee shall attend at the call of his chair-
man.

12. The yeas and nays may be called and entered on the minutes when
any two members require it.

On motion of Mr. M’KEAN, seconded by Mr. Smilie,—-

Ordered, That the doors of the Convention be left open during the
session

On motion of Mr. M’KEAN, seconded by Mr. Smilie, —

Ordered, That the Constitution, as proposed by the late federal Con-
vention, be read. It was read accordingly.

Adjourned until ten o’clockto—morrow.

SATURDAY, November 24, 1787, A. M. —The Convention
met pursuant to adjournment.

On motion of Mr. M’KEAN, seconded by Mr. Hannum,
the Constitution, as proposed by the late Convention, was
read a second time, together With a letter from the secretary
of Congress to the president of this state.

Adjourned until three o’clock on Monday next.

MONDAY, November 26, 1787, P. M.—-~The Convention
met pursuant to adjournment.

Mr. M’KEAN. The Subject now, Mr. President, comes
fully and fairly before us. Our first object must be to ascer-
tain the proper mode of proceeding to obtain a final decision.

We are Without precedent to guide us; yet those forms.

VOL. II. 53

$18 DEBATES. WILSON

obse1ved by other public bodies, so far as they are eligible,
may gene1ally be propel fo1 us to adhele to. So far, there-
fo1e, as the 1ules of the legislatu1e of Pennsylvania apply
with convenience to our circumstances, I acquiesce in their
adoption.

I now think it necessary, sir, to make you a motion — not
that I apprehend it can be determined until a full investi-
gation of the subject before us is bad. ‘The motion Will be,
sir, That this Convention do assent to, and ratify, the Consti-
tution agreed to on the 17th of September last, by the
Convention of the United States of America, held at Phila
delphia.

Upon this motion being seconded, sir, the conside1ation
of the Constitution will be necessarily d1awn 011. Every
objection that can be suggested against the Vv01k will be
listened to with attention, answered, and perhaps obviated;
and finally, after a full discussion, the ground will be ascer-.
tained, 011 which we are to receive or reject the system now
before you. I do not wish this question to. be decided to-day;
though perhaps it may be determined this day week. I offer
you this for the sake of form, and shall hereafter trouble you
with another motion, that may bring the particular parts of
this Constitution before you, for a regular and satisfactory
1nvest1gat1011.

111 this motion, Mr. M’KEAN was seconded by Mr.
Allison.

M1. WILSON. The system p1oposed, by the late
Convention, fo1 the gove1nment of the United States, is
now bef01e you. Of that ConV ention I had the hono1 to be
a member. As I am the only member of that body who
has the honor to be also a member of this, it may be ex-
pected that I should prepare the way for the deliberations
of this assembly, by unfolding the diffitulties which the late
Convention we1e obliged to encounter , by pointing out the
end whith they proposed to accomplish; and by tracing the
general p1inciples VV Inch they have adopted for the accOm-
plishment of that end.

To fo1m a good system of government for a single city or
state, however limited as to territory, or inconsiderable as to
numbers, has been thought to require the strongest efforts
of human genius. With What conscious ‘diffidence, then,
must the members of the Convention have revolved in their

W1LSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4.19

minds the immense undertaking which was before tnem.
Their views could not be confined to a small or a single com—
munity, but were expanded to a g1eat number of states;
several of which contain an extent 01 te1ritory, and resources
of population, equal to those of some of the most respecta«
ble kingdoms on the other side of the Atlantic. Nor were
even these the only objects to be comprehended within their
delibelations. Numerous states yet unformed, myriads of
the human race, who will inhabit regions hithe1to unculti-
vated, were to be affected by the result of their proceedings.
It was necessary, therefme, to form their calculations 011 a
scale commensurate to a large portion of the globe.

For my own pa1t,I have been often lost in astoniShment
at the vastness of the prospect before us. To open the
navigation of a single river was lately thought, 111 Europe,
an enterprise equal to impe1ial glory. But could the com—
mercial scenes of the Scheldt be compared with those that,
under a good government, will be exhibited on the Hudson,
the Delaware, the Potomac, and the numerous other rivers,
that water and are intended to enrich the dominions of the
United States 9 q
The difficulty of the business was equal to its magnitude.
No small share of wisdom and address is requisite to com-
bine and reconcile the janing interests that prevail, or seem
to prevail, 1n a single community. The United States con—
tain aheady thirteen governments mutually independent.
Those governments present to the Atlantic a front of fifteen
hundred miles in extent. Their soil, their climates, their
productions, their dimensions, their numbers, are different.
In many instances, a difference, and even an opposition,
su-bsists among their interests; and a difference, and even
an opposition, is imagined t0 subsist in many more. An
apparent interest produces. the same attachment as a real
one, and is often. pursued with no less perseverance and
vigor. \Vhen ‘all these circumstances are seen, and atten-
tively conside1ed,will any member of this honorable body
be summed that such a diversity of things p1oduced a pro-
portionate diversity of sentiment? Will he be surprised that
.such a diversity of sentiment rendered a spirit of mutual
forbearance and conciliation indispensably necessary to the
success of the great Work 5’ And will he. be surprised that
mutual concessions and sacrifices were the consequences of

420 DEBATES [WILSON

mutual forbearance and conciliation? When the springs of
opposition were so numerous and strong, and pound forth
their waters in courses so varying, need we be surprised that
the stream formed by their conjunction was impelled 111 a
direction somewhat different from that which each of them
would have taken separately?

I have reason to think that a difficulty arose in the minds
of some members of the Convention from another consider-
ation—their ideas of the temper and disposition of the
people for whom the Constitution is proposed. The citizens
of the United States, however different in some other
respects, are well known to agree in one strongly—marked
feature of their character — a warm 21nd keen sense of free-
dom and independence. This sense has been heightened
by the glorious result of their late struggle against ball the
efforts of one of the most powerful nations ofb Europe. It
was apprehended, I believe, by some, that a people so highly
spirited would ill brook the restraints of an efficient govern-
ment. I confess that this consideration did not influence my
conduct. I knew my constituents to be high-spirited, but. I
knew them also to possess sound sense. I knew that in
event they would be best pleased with that system of govern-
ment which would be best, to promote their freedom and
happiness. Ih21ve also often revolved this subject in my
mind. Iha1e supposed one of my constituents to ask me
11 by I gave such a vote 011 a particular question. I have
always thought it would be a satisfactory answer to say, Be-
cause Ijudged, upon the best consideration I could give, that
such 21 vote was right. I have thought, that it would be a
very. poor compliment to my constituents to say, that, 111 my
opinion, such a 1ote 11 ould have been proper, but that I sup-
posed a contrary one would be more agreeable to those 11110
sent me to the Convention. I could not, even in idea,
expose myself to such a retort, as, upon the last answer,
might have been justly made to me -——Pray, sir, what rea—
sons have you for supposing that a right vote would displease
10111 constituents? ‘ Is this the proper return for the high
tonfrdence they have placed in you.p If they have given

ause for such a surmise, it was by choosing a representative
11110 could entertain such an opinion of them. I was under
no apprehension that the good people of this state would
behold with displeasure the brightness of the rays of dele-

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 421

gated power, when it only proved the superior splendor of
the luminary of which those rays were only the reflection.

A very important difficulty arose from comparing the ex-
tent of the country to be governed with the kind of govern-
ment Which it would be proper to establish in it. It has
been an opinion, countenanced by high authority, “ that the
natural p1operty of small states is to be governed as a repub-
lic; of middling ones, to be subject to a monarchy; and of
large empires, to be swayed by a despotic p1i11ce;——and
that the consequence is, that, in order to preserve the prin—
ciples of the established government, the state must be sup-
ported 111 the extent it has acquired; and that the spirit of
the state will alter 111 propo1tion as it extends or contracts
its limits.” (ZVIontesquieu, b. 8, c. 20.) This opinion seems
to be supported, rather than cdntradicted, by the history of
the governments in the old world. Here, then, the difficulty
appeared in full View. On one hand, the United States
contain an immense extent of territory; and, according to
the foregoing opinion, a despotic government is best adapted
to that extent. On the other hand, it was well known, that,
however the citizens of the United States might with pleasure
submit to the legitimate 1est1aints of a republican constitu-
tion, they would reject with indignation the fetters of des-
potism. What, then, was to be done. 9 The idea of a con-
federate republic presented itself. This kind of constitution
has been thought to have “all the internal advantages of a
1epublica11 together with the external force of a monarchical
government.” (Mont. b. 9, c. 1,2. Paley, 199,2 ()2)

Its desc1iption is “a corivention, by which seve1al states
agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend
to establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that
constitute a new one, capable of 1nc1easing by means of
fn1the1 association. ”—(Montesqmeu, b. 9, c. 1.) The ex—
panding quality of such government is peculiarly fitted for
the United States, the greatest part of whose territory is
vet uncultivated.

But while this form of government enabled us to surmount
the difficulty last mentioned, it conducted us to anothe1, of
which 1 am now to take notice. It left us almost without
precedent or- guide, and, consequently, without the benefit
of that instruction which, in many cases, may be derived
from the constitution, and history, and experience, of other

36

4422 DE BATES. [WILSGN.

nations. Several associations have frequently been called by
the name of confederate states, which have not, in propriety
of language, deserved it. The Swiss cantons are connected
only by alliances. The United Netherlands are, indeed, an
assemblage of societies; but this assemblage constitutes no
new one, and therefore it does not correspond with the full
definition of a confederate republic. The Germanic body is
composed of such disproportioned and discordant materials,
and its structure is so intricate and complex, that little use—
ful knowledge can be drawn from it. Ancient history dis-
closes, and barely discloses, to our View, some confederate
republics — the Achzean league, the Lycian confederacy,
and the Amphictyonic council. But the facts recorded con-
cerning their constitutions are so few and general, and their
histories are so unmarked and defective, that no satisfactory
information can be collected from them concerning many par-
ticular circumstances, from an accurate discernment and com-
parison of which, alone, legitimate and practical inferences
can be made from one constitution to another. Besides, the
situation and dimensions of those confederacies, and the state
of society, manners, and habits, in them, were so different
from those of the United States, that the most correct de-
scriptions could have supplied but a very small fund ofapplica-
ble remark. Thus, in forming this system, we were de-
prived of many advantages which the history and experience
of other ages and other countries would, in other cases, have
afforded us.

Permit me to add, in this place, that the science even of
government itself seems yet to be almost in its state of in-
fancy. Governments, in general, have been the result of
force, of fraud, and accident. After a period of six thousand
years has elapsed since the creation, the United States ex
hibit to the world the first instance, as far as we can learn,
of a nation, unattacked by external force, unconvulsed by
domestic insurrections, assembling voluntarily, deliberating
fully, and deciding calmly, concerning that system of govern-
ment under which they would Wish that they and their pos-
terity should live. The ancients, so enlightened on other
subjects, were very uninformed with regard to this. They
seem scarcely to have had any idea of any other kinds of
governments than the three simple forms designed by the
epithets monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical. I know

was”, PENNSYLVANIA. 123

that much and pleasing ingenuity has been exerted, in modern
times, in drawing entertaining parallels between some of
the ancient constitutions and some of the mixed governments
that have since existed in EurOpe. But I much suspect that,
on strict examination, the instances of resemblance will be
found to be few and weak ; to be suggested by the improve-
ments which, in subsequent ages, have been made in govern—
ment, and not to be drawn immediately from the ancient con--
stitutions themselves, as they were intended and understood
by those who framed them. To illustrate this, a similar ob-
servation may be made on another subject. Admiring critics
have fancied that they have discovered in their favorite Homer
the seeds of all the improvements in philosophy and in the
sciences made since his time. What induces me to be of
this opinion is, that Tacitus—the profound politician Tacitus
— who lived towards the latter end of those ages which are
now denominated ancient, who undoubtedly had studied the
constitutions of all the states and kingdoms known before
and in his time, and who certainly was qualified, in an un—
1 common degree, for understanding the full force and opera-
tion of each of them, conside1s, after all he had kno \ n and
read, a mixed government, com posed of the three simple forms,
as a thing rather to be wished than expected. And he thinks
that, if such a government could even be instituted, its dura-
tion could not be long. One thing is very ce1tain—that F
the doct1i11e of replesentation in government was altogether .
unknown to the antients. Now, the knowledge and:7 p1ac- g,
tice of this doctrine is, in my opinion, essential to every sys-
tem that can possess the qualities of freedom, wisdom, and
energy.

It IS Worthy of remark, and the rema1k may, perhaps, ex-
cite some surprise, that representation of the peOple IS not,
even at. this day, the sole principle of any govemment in
Europe. Great Britain boasts—and she may well boast——
of the improvement she has made in politics by the admission
of representation; for the improvement is important as far
as it goes; but it by no means goes far enough. Is the
executive power of Great Britain founded on representation?
_ This is not pretended. Before the revolution, many of the
kings claimed to reign by divine right, and others by heredi-
tary right; and even at the revolution, nothing further was
effected or attempted than the recognition of certain parts of

4211 DEBATES. [W1LSON.

an original contract, (Blackstone, 233,) supposed, at some
former remote period, to have been made between the king
and the people. A contract seems to exclude, rather than
to imply, delegated power. The judges of Great Britain are
appointed by the em The judicial authority, therefore,
does not depend upon representation, even in its most 1emote
degree. Does representation p1evail in the legislative de-
pa1tment of the B1itish government. 9 Even here it does not
predominate, though it may se1ve as a check. The legisla-
ture consists of th1ee b1 anches—the king, the lords, and the
commons. Of these, only the latte1 are supposed by the con-
stitution to 1epresent the autho1ity of the people. This sl1o1t
analysis clea1ly shows to what a nanow c01ne1 of the B1itish
constitution the principle of 1ep1esentation is c.0nfined I
believe it does not extend farther, if so far, in any other gov-
ernment in Europe. For the American states were reserved
the glory and the happiness of diffusing this Vital principle
th1oughout the constituent parts of government. Represen-
tation is the chain of communication between the people and
ill( se to whom they have committed the exe1cise of the
pow e1s of govemment. This chain may consist of one or
more links, but in all cases it should be sufficiently strong
and discernible.

To be left without guide or precedent was not the only
diffeulty in which the Convention were involved, by propos-
ing to their constituents a plan of a confederate republic.
They found themselves embalrassed with another, of pecu-
lia1 delicacy and imp01tance.l mean that of drawing a
proper line between the national government and the gov—
crnments of the several states. It was easy to discover a
proper and satisfactory principle on the subject. Whatever
object of government is confined, in its operation and effects,
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered
as belonging to the government of that state; Whateve1
object of5 govemment extends, 111 its opelation 01 effects, be-
yond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered
as belonging to the government of the United States. But
though this plinciple be sound and satislactory, its applica-
tion to particular cases would be accompanied with much
diff: culty, because, 111 its application, room must be allowed
fo1 gleat discretionary latitude of construction of the prin-
ciple. In order to lessen 01 1emove the difficultv ar1sn1g

WILSON PENNSYLVANIA. 4125

from discretionary construction on this subject, an enumer-
ation of particular instances, in which the application of the
principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much
industry and care. It is only in mathematical science that
a line can be described with mathematical precision. But I
flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation, the enu-
meration will be found to be safe and unexceptionable, and
accurate, too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be ex-
pected in a subject of this natu1e. Particulals unde1 this
head will be mo1e p1ope1ly explained, when we descend to
the minute view of the enume1ation which is made 111 the
proposed Constitution.

After all, it will be necessary that, on a subject so pecu-
liarly delicate as this, much prudence, much candor, much
moderation, and much liberality, should be exercised and
displayed both by the federal government and by the gov-
ernments of the several states. It is to be hoped that those
virtues in government will be exercised and displayed, when
. we consider that the powers of the federal government and
those of the state governments are drawn from sources
equally pure. If a difference can be discovered between
them, it is in favor of the federal government, because that
government is founded on a representation of the whole
Union; whereas the government of any particular state is
founded only on the representation of a part, inconsiderable
When compared with the whole. Is it not more reasonable
to suppose that the counsels of the whole will embrace the
interest of eve1y palt, than that the counsels of any part will
embrace the inte1ests of the whole?

I intend not, si1, by this description of the difficulties with
which the Convention were surrounded, to magnify their
skill or their merit in surmounting them, or to insinuate that
any predicament in which the Convention stood should pre-
- vent the closest and most cautious scrutiny into the perform-
ance which they have exhibited to their constituents and to
the world. My intention is of far other and higher aim—
to evince, by the conflicts and difficulties which must arise
from the many and powerful causes which I have enumer-
ated, that it is hopeless and impracticable to form a consti-
tution which, in every part, will be acceptable to every
citizen, or even to every government, in the United States;
and that all which can be expected is, to form such a con-

VOL.IL 54

4420' DEBATES. [WILSON

stitution as, upon the whole, is the best that can possibly be
obtained. Man and perfectionl—a state and perfection!—
an assemblage of states and perfectlon! Can we reasonably
expect, however ardently we may wish, to behold the glori-
ous union P

1 can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey to
others, the impression which, on many occasions, was made
by the difficulties which surrounded and pressed the Con-
vention. The great undertaking sometimes seemed to be
at a stand; at other times, its motion seemed to be retro—
grade. At the conclusion, however, of our work, many of
the members expressed their astonishment at the success
with which it. terminated.

Having enumerated some of the difficulties which the
Convention were obliged to encounter in the course of their
proceedings, I shall next point out the end which they pro-
posed to accomplish. Our wants, our talents, our affections,
our passions, all tell us that we were made for a state of
society. But a state of society could not be supported long
or happily without some civil restraint. -It is true that, in a
state of nature, any one individual may act uncontrolled by
. others; but it is equally true that, in such a state, every
other individual may act uncontrolled by him. Amidst this
universal independence, the dissensions and animosities be-
tween interfering members of the society would be numerous
and ungovernable. The consequence would be, that. each
member, in such a natural state, would enjoy less liberty,
and suffer more interruption, than he would in a regulated
society. Hence the universal introduction of governments
of some kind or other into the social state. The liberty of
every member is increased by this introduction; for each
gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every other
member, than he loses by the limitation of his own. The
result is, that civil government is necessary to the perfection
and happiness of man. In forming this government, and
carrying it into execution, it is essential that the interest and
authority of the Whole community should be binding in every
part of it.

The foregomg principles and conclusions are generally
admitted to be just. and sound with regard to the nature and
formation of single governments, and the duty of submission
to them. In some cases, they will apply, with much pro-
priety and force, to states already formed. The advantages

WILSON.] ‘ PENNSYLVANIA. 4427

and necessity of civil government among individuals in
society, are not greate1 or stronger than, 1n some situation-s
and ci1cumstances, are the advantages and necessity of a
federal government among states. A natuiai and 1'e1y
important question now presents itself—ls such the situa-
tion, are such the circumstances, of the United States? A
p1ope1 answer to this question will unfold some very intel—
esting truths. .

The United States may adopt any one of four different
systems. They may become consolidated into one govern-
ment, in which the separate existence of the states shall be
entirely absolved. They may reject any plan of union or
association, and act as separate and unconnected states.
They may form two or more confederacies. They may
unite 111 one federal republic. Which of these systems ought
to have been formed by the Convention? To support, with
vigor, a single government over the whole extent of the
United States, would demand a system of the most unquali-
fied and the most unremitted despotism. Such a number
of separate states,contiguous in situation, unconnected and
disunited 111 government, would be, at one time, the pIey ol
feieign f01ce, fo1eign influence, and foreign i11t1igue; at
another, the victims of mutual lage, ranc'o1, and levenge.
Neither of these systems found advocates 111 the late Con-
vention. I presume they Will not find advocates in this.
Would it be proper to divide the United States into two or
more confederacies? It will not be unadvisable to take a
more minute survey of this subject. Some aspects under
which it may be Viewed are fa1 f1om being, at first sight,
uninvitinrr. Two or more confede1acies would be each more
compact and more manageable than a single one extending
over the same territory. By dividing the United States into
two or more confederacies, the great collision of interests
apparently or really different and contrary in the whole extent
of theii dominion, would be b1oken, and, in a g1eat measure,
disappear, in the several paits. But these advantages,
which ale discovered from ee1tain points of View, are greatly
overbalanced by inconveniences that will appear on a more
accurate examination. Animosities, and perhaps wars,
would arise from assigning the extent, the limits, and the
rights, of the different confede1acies. The expenses of gov-
erning would be multiplied by the number of federal govern.

4‘28 DEBATES. [W'Icsomz

ments. The danger lesulting flom fmeign influence and
mutual dissensions, would not, peihaps, be less gleat and
alarming in the instance of diffe1ent confedeiacies, than in
the inStance of different though more numerous unassociated
states.

These observations, and many others that might be made
on the subject, will be sufficient to evince thata division of
the United States into a numhe1 of sepaiate confede1acies
would probably be an unsatisfactory and an unsuccessful
experiment. The remaining system which the American
states may adopt, is a union of them under one confederate
republic. It will not be necessary to employ much time, or
many arguments, to show that this is the most eligible sys-
tem that can be prOposed. By adopting this system, the
vigor and decision of a wide—spreading monarchy may be
joined to the freedom and beneficence of a contracted re pub-
lic. The extent of territory, the diversity of climate and
soil, the number, and greatness, and connection, of lakes and
rivers with which the United States are intersected and
almost surrounded,—all indicate an enlarged government
to be fit and advantageous for them. The principles and
dispositions of their citizens indicate that, in this govern-
ment,libe1ty shall reign t1iumphant. Such, indeed, have
been the genel 1al opinions and wishes enteitained since the
e1a of independence. If those opinions and wishes ale as
well founded as they have been general, the late Convention
were justified in proposing to their constituents one confed-
erate republic, as the best system of a national government
for the United States.

In forming this system, it was proper to give minute atten-
tion to the interest of all the parts; but there was a duty of
still highei imp01t—to feel and to show a p1edominating
legard to the supe1io1 interests of the Whole. If this great
principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never
have made its appearance. The same principle that was so
necessary in forming it, is equally necessary in our delibera-
tions, whether we should reject or ratify it.

I make these observations with a design to prove and
illustrate this great and important truth—that, in our de-
cisions 011 the work of the late Convention, we should not
lim1t our views and legards to the state of Pennsylvania.
lhe aim of the Convention was to form a system of good

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4.29

and efficient government, on themore extensive scale of the
United States. In this, and in every other instance, the
work should be judged with the same spirit with which it
was performed. A principle of duty, as well as candor,
demands this.

We have remarked that civil government is necessary to
the perfection of society; we now remark that civil liberty
is necessary to the perfection of civil government. Civil
liberty is natural liberty itself, divested of only that part
which, placed in the government, produces more good and
happiness to the community than if it had remained in the
individual. Hence it follows that civil liberty, while it
resigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and gener-
ous exercise of all the human faculties, so far as it is com-
patible with the public welfare.

In considering and developing the nature and end of the
system before us, it is necessary to mention anothe1 kind of
liberty, which has not yet, as far as I know, 1eceived a
name. I shall distinguish it by the appellation of federal
liberty. When a single government is instituted, the indi-
viduals of which it is bcomposed surrendel to it a pa1t of their
natural independence, which they before enjoyed as men.
When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities
of which it is composed su11ende1 to it a part of their p1 111t1-
cal independence, which they before enjoyed as states. The
principles which directed, in the forme1 case, what part of
the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and
what part ought to be retained, will give similar directions
in the latter case. The states should 1esign to the national
government that part, and that part only, of their political
liberty, which, placed in that government, will produce more
good to the whole than if it had 1emained in the several
states. While they resign this part of their political liberty,
they retain the free and generous exercise of all their othe1
faculties, as states, so far as it is compatible with the welfare
of the general and superintending confederacy.

Since states, as well as cztizens, are represented in the
Constitution before us, and form the objects on which that
Constitution is proposed to operate, it was necessary to
notice and define federal as well as civil liberty.

These general reflections have been made in order to
introduce, with more propriety and advantage, a practical

430 DEBATES. [WlLsoN.

illustration of the end proposed to be accomplished by the
late Convention.

It has been too well known—it has been too severely
felt—that the present Confederation is inadequate to the
government, and to the exigencies, of the United States.
The great struggle for Libelty 111 this c1'ou11t1y, should it be
unsuccessful, will probably be the last one which she will
have for he1 existence and pr10spe1ity in any part of the
globe. And it must be confessed that this snuggle has, 111
some of the stages of its p111g1ess, been attended with sy 111p-
toms that foreboded no fortunate issue. To the iron hand
of Tyranny, which was lifted 11p against her, she manifested,
indeed, an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the
fetters which were forged for her, and showed that she was
unassailable by force. cBut she was enviloned with dangers
of another kind, and springing fiom a very different source.
While she kept he1 eye steadily fixed 011 the efforts of
oppression, licentiousness was secretly undermining the rock
011 which she stood.

Need I call to your 1emen1brance the contrasted scenes of
which we have been Witnesses. P On the glorious conclusion
of 01111 conflict with Britain, what high expectations were
formed concerning 11s by others! What high expectations
did we form concerning ourselves! Have those expectations
been realized. P No. \Vhat has been the cause. P Did our
citizens lose their per18eve1a11ce and magnanimity. P No.
Did they become insensible of resentment and indignation
at any high- -ha11dcd attempt that might have been made to
injure or enslave them? No. What, then, has been the
cause. P The truth is, we dreaded danger only 011 one side. 1
this we manfully repelled. But, on another side, danger, not
less formidable but more insidious, stole 111 upon us; and our
unsuspicious tempers were not sufficiently attentive eithe1 to
its approach or to its operations. Those whom fmeign
strength could not overpower, have 111 ell nigh become the
victims of internal anarchy.

If we become a little more particular, we shall find that
the fo1egoing representation is by no means exaggelwated
When We had baffled all the menaces of f01eign powe1, we
neglected to establish among omselves a government that
would 111sure domestic vigor and stability. What was the
tonsequcnce. P The commencement of peace was the com-

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 113-1

mencement of every disgrace and distress that could befall a
people in a peaceful state. Devoid of national power, we
could not prohibit the extravagance of our importations, nor
could we derive a revenue from their excess. Devoid of
national importance, we could not. procure, for our exports, a
tolerable sale at foreign markets. Devoid of national credit,
we saw our public securities melt in the hands of the holders,
like snow before the Sun. Devoid of national dignity, we
could not, in some instances, perform our treaties, 011 our
part; and, in other instances, we could neither obtain nor
compel the performance of them, on the part of others. De—
void of national energy, We could not carry into execution
our own resolutions, decisions, or laws.

Shall I become- more particular still? The tedious detail
would disgust me. The years of languor are now over.
We have felt the dishonor with which we have been covered
—We have seen the destruction with which we have been
threatened. We have penetrated to the causes of both, and
when we have once discovered them, we have begun to
search for the means of removing them. For the confirma-
tion of these remarks, I need not appeal to an enumeration
of facts. The proceedings of Congress, and 'of the several
states, are replete with them. They all point out the weak-
ness and insufficiency as the cause, and an (ficient general
government as the only cure, of our political distempers.

Under these impressions, and with these views, was the
late Convention appointed; and under these impressions,
and withthese views, the late Convention met.

We now see the great end which they proposed to ac—
complish. It was to frame, for the consideration of their
constituents, one federal and'national constitution —a con-
stitution that would produce the adVantages of good, and
prevent the inconveniences of bad government—a constitu-
tion Whose beneficence and energy would pervade the Whole
Union, and bind and embrace the interests of every patt—
a constitution that would insure peace, freedom, and happi-
ness, to the states and people of America.

We are now naturally led to examine the means by which
"they proposed to accomplish this end. This opens more
particularly 'to our View the discussion before us. But,
previously to our entering upon it, it will not be improper
to state some general and leadirig principles of govern-

432 DEBATES. [WILSON.

ment, which will receive particular application in the course
of ou1 investigations.

There necessarily exists, in every government, a power
fiom which the1e is no appeal, and which, for that reason,
may be te1med supreme, absolute, and uncontlollable.
Where does this power reside .9 To this question writers on
different governments will give difi‘erent answers. Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain the power is
lodged in the British Parliament; that the Parliament may
alte1 the form of the gove1nmei1t;and that its power is
absolute, without cont1ol. The idea of a constitution, limit-
ing and superintending the operations of legislative authority,
seems not to have been accurately understood 111 Britain.
There are, at least, no traces of practice conformable to
such a principle. The British constitution is just What the
British Parliament pleases. When the Parliament trans-
ferred legislative authority to Henry VIII., the act transfei-
ring could not, in the strict acceptation ol the term, be called
\ unconst1tutlonal

To control the power and conduct of the legislature, by an
overruling constitution, was an improvement in the science
and practice of government reserved to the American states.

Pe1haps some politician, who has not considered with
sufficient accuracy ou1 political systems, would answer that,
in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the
constitutions. This opinion approaches a step nearer to the
truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that, in our gov—
ernments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power
remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to
our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitu-
tions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last instance, is much
greater; for the people possess over our constitutions control
in act, as well as right.

The consequence is, that the people may change the
constitutions whenever and however they please. This
is a right of which no positive institution can ever de-
prive them.

These important. truths, sir, are far from being merely
speculative. We, at this moment, speak and deliberate
under their immediate and benign influence. To the
oper ration of these truths we are to ascribe the scene,
hithe1to unpa1alleled, which Ame1ica now exhibits to the

Witsom PENNSYLVANIA. 11.33

world ——a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary, and a deliberate
transition from one constitution of government to another.
111 other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in govern—
ment is, by a mournful and an indissoluble association, con-
nected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities at-
tendant 011 wars. But. happy experience teaches us to View
such revolutions in a very different light——to consider them
only as-progressive steps in improving the knowledge of
government, and increasing the happiness of society and
mankind.

0ft have 1 marked, with silent pleasure and admiration, the
force and prevalence, through the United States, of the princi-
ple that the supreme power resides in the people, and that they
never part with it. It may be called the panacea in politics.
There can be no disorder in the community but may here
receive a radical cure. If the error be in the legislature, it
may be corrected by the constitution; if in the constitution, it
may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy, there-
fore, for every distemper in government, if the people are not
wanting to themselves; if they are wanting to themselves,
there is no remedy. From their power, as we have seen,
there is no appeal; of their error there is no superior prin-
ciple of correction.

There are three simple species of government—mon-
archy, where the supreme pow er is in a single pelson;
aristocracy, whe1e the supreme power is in a select assem-
bly, the members of which either fill up, by election, the
vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it
by inheritance, property, or in respect of some personal right.
or qualification ; a republic or democracy, where the people
at large retain the supreme power, and act either collectively
or by representation.

Each of these species of government has its advantages
and disadvantages.

The advantages of a monarchy are, strength, despatch,
secrecy, unity of counsel. lts disadvantages are, t,yranny
expense, ignorance of the situation and wants of the people,
insecurity: unnecessary wars, evils attending elections or
successions.

The advantages of aristocracy are, wisdom, arising from
experience and education. Its disadvantages are, dissen-
- ,sions among themselves, oppression to the lower orders.
VOL. 11. 55 37

413-41 DEBATES. [WILSON

The advantages of democracy a1e, liberty, equality, cau-
tious and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, oppor~
tunities of exciting and producing abilities of the best
citizens. Its disadvantages are, dissensions, the delay and
disclosure of public counsels, the imbecility of public meas—
ures, retarded by the necessity of a numerous consent.

A government may be composed of two or more of the
simple forms above mentioned. Such IS the British govern—
ment. It would be an improper government for the United
States, because it is inadequate to such an extent of terri—
tory, and because it is suited to an establishment of different
orders of men. A more minute comparison between some
parts of the British constitution, and some pa1ts of the plan
before us, may perhaps find a proper place in a subsequent
period of our business.

What is the nature and kind of that government which
has been proposed for the United States by the late Corr-
vention? In its principle, it is purely democratical. But.
that principle is applied in different forms, in order to obtain
the advantages, and exclude the inconveniences, of the sim—
ple modes of government.

If we take an extended and accurate View of it. we shall
find the streams of power running in different directions, 111
different dimensions, and at different heights—watering,
adorning, and fertilizing, the fields and meadows through
which their courses are led , but if we trace them, we shall
discover that they all originally flow from one abundant
fountain.

In this Constitution, all authority is derived from the people.

Fit occasions will hereafter offer for particular remarks 011
the different parts of the plan. Ihave now to ask pardon
of the house for detaining them so long.

WEDNESDAY, October 28, 1787, A. M. —— Mr. WILSON.
This will be a proper time for making an observation or two
011 what may be called the preamble to this Constitution. I
had occasion. 011 a former day, to mention that the leading
princrple in the politics, and that which pervades the Ameri-'
can constitutions, is, that the supreme power resides in the
people. This Constitution, Mr. President, opens with a
solemn and practical recognition of that principle : —— “We,
the people of the United States, in order to form a more per-
feet union, establish justice, &c., do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.” It is

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 435

announced in their name—it receives its political existence
from their authority: they ordain and establish. What is
the necessary consequence? Those who ordain and estab-
lish have the power, il they think proper, to 1epeal and
annul. A plope1 attention to this principle may, pe1l1aps,
give ease to .the minds of some who have heard much con-
cerning the necessity of a bill of rights.

Its establishment, I apprehend, has more force than a
volume written on the subject. It tenders this t1uth evident
—-that the people have a light to do What they please with

regard to the government. bI confess I feel a kind of pride

in t)consideling the striking diffelence between the founda—
tion on which the lihe1ties of this country a1e declaied to
stand in this Constitution, and the footing on which the
liberties of England are said to be placed. The Magna
Charta of England is an instrument of high value to the
people. of that country. But, Mr. President, from what.
source does that instrument derive the liberties of the in-
habitants of that kingdom? Let it speak for itself. The
king says, “We have given and granted to all archbishops,
bishops, abbots, priors, earls, barons, and to all the freemen
of thisour realm, these liberties following, to be kept in our
kingdom of England forever.” When this was assumed as
the leading principle of that government, it was no wonder
that the people were anxious to obtain hills of rights, and to
take every opportunity of enlarging and securing their liber-
ties. But here, sir, the fee-simple remains in the people at
large, and by this Constitution they do not part with it.

I am called upon to give a reason why the Convention
omitted to add a hill of rights to the work before you. I
confess, sir, I did think that, in point of p1op1iety, the
honorable gentleman ought fi1st to have furnished some
reasons to show such an addition to be necessa1y; it is
natural to prove the affi1mative of a proposition; and, if he
had established the propriety of this addition, he might then
have asked why it was not made.

I cannot say, Mr. President, what were the reasons of
every member of that Convention for not adding a bill of
rights. I believe the truth is, that such an idea never e11-
tered the mind of many of them. I do not recollect to have
heard the subject mentioned till within about three days of
the time of our rising; and even then, there was no direct

-1«36 DEBATES. [VViLsom

motiOn offe1ed for any thing of the kind. I may be mis-
taken 111 this; but as tar as my n1en1o1y se1 ves me, I believe
it was the case. A p1oposition to adopt 21 measure that
11.1 ould have supposed that we wele th1owing into the general
gove1nment every powe1 not expressly reserved by the peo-
ple, would have been spu1ned at, in that house, with the
gleatest indignation. Even in a single government, it the
powers of the people lest 011 the same establishment as is
expressed in this Constitution, a bill of rights is by no means
a necessary measure. In a government possessed ofenume1-
ated powers; such a measule would be not onlv unnecessa—
11, but p1eposte1ous and dange1ous. W hence comes this
notion, that 111 the United States tl1e1e is no security Without
a bill of rights? Have the citizens of South Carolina no
security for their liberties:3 They have no bill of rights.
Are the citizens on the eastern side of the Delaware less
free, or less secured in their liberties, than thoSe on the
western side P The state of New Jersey has 110 bill of rights.
The state of New York has no bill of rights. The states
of Connecticut and Rhode Island have no Cbill of rights. I
know not whethe1 I have exactly enumetated the states who
have not thought it necessaly to add a bill ofrlg/Ils to thei1
constitutions ; but this enumeration, sir, will serve to show by
experience, as well as principle, that, even in single govern-
_ ments, a bill of rights is not an essential or necessary measure.
But in a government consisting of enumerated powers, such
as is proposed for the United States, a bill of rights would
not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble judgment, highly
imprudent. In all societies, there a1e many powers and
rights which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of
rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the
powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every
thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The
consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw
all implied power into the scale of the gove1nn1ent,and the
rights of the peOple would be 1ende1ed incomplete. On the
other hand, an imperfect enumeration of the pOWers of
government reserves all implied power to the people; and
by that means the constitution becomes incomplete. But
of the two, it is much safe1 to 11111 the risk 011 the side of
the constitution , for an omission in the enumelation of the
powers of government is neither so dangerous nor impor-

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. LL37

tant as an omlssion in the enumeration of the rights of the
peop’e.

Mr. P1esident, as we are drawn into this subject, I beg
leave to pursue its history a little farther. Ihe doctrine and
practice of declarations of rights have been borrowed from
the conduct of the people 01 England on some remarkable .
occasions; but the plinciples and maxims, on which their
government is constitute d, a1e widely different from those of
ours. I have already stated the language of Magna Charta.
After repeated confirmations of that instrument, and after
violations of it repeated equally often, the next step taken in
this business was, when the petition of rights was presented
to-Charles I. _ , .

It concludes in this manner: “All of which they most hum-
bly pray to be allowed, as their rights and liberties, according
to the laws and statutes of this realm.” (8th Par. Hist. 150.)
One of the most material statutes of the realm was Magna
Charta; so that We find they continue upon the old ground,
as to the foundation 011 which they rest their liberties. It
was not till the era of the revolution that the two houses
assume a highe1 tone, and “demand and insist upon all the
premises as btheir undoubted lights and liberties.” (Par.
Deb. 261.) But when the Whole transaction is considered,
we shall find that those rights and liberties are claimed only
011 the foundation of an original contract, supposed to have
been made, at some fo1mer period, between the king and the
people. (1 Blackstone, 233.)

But, in this Constitution, the citizens of the United States
appear dispensing a pat of their orininal power in What man-
ner and what proportion they think fit. They never part
with the Whole , and they retain the right of recalling what
they part with. When, therefore, they possess, as I have
already mentioned, the fee- -simple of authority, why should
they have recourse to the minute and subordinate remedies,
which can be necessary only to those who pass the fee, and
reserve only a rent-charge. P

To every suggestion conceming a bill of rights, the citizens
of the United States may alwaysb say, WE reselve the right
to do what we please.

I concur most sincerely with the honorable gentleman who
was last up in one sentiment—that if our liberties will be
insecu1e under this system of gov*,e1nment it will become our

438 DE BATES. [W1L50N.

duty not to adopt, but to reject it. On the contrary, if it
will secu1e the liberties of the citizens of Ame1ica, — it it will
not only secule their llbe1 tns, but p1ocure them happiness,—

it becomes our duty, 011 the other hand, to assent to and ratify
it. With a View to conduct us safely and gradually to the
determination of that important question, I shall beg leave
to notice some of the objections that have fallen from the
honorable gentleman from Cumberland, (Whitehill.) But,
before I proceed, permit me to make one general remark.
Liberty has a formidable enemy 011 each hand; on one there
is tyrannv, 011 the other licentiousness. In order to guard
against the latter, proper powers ought to be given to gov-
er:nment in orde1 to guard against the former, those powers
ought to be properly 25distributed. It has been mentioned,
and attempts have been made to establish the position, that
the adoption of this Constitution will necessarily be followed
by the annihilation of all the state governments. If this was a
necessary consequence, the objection would operate in my
mind with exceeding great force. But, sir, I think the i11—
fcrence is rather unnatural, that a government will produce
the atmihilation of others, upon the very existence of which
its own existence depends. Let us, sir, examine this C011-
stitution, and mark its proportions and arrangements. It is
composed of three great constituent parts—the legislative
department, the executive department, and the judicial de-
partment. The leuislative depaltment is subdivided into
two branches—the House of Repiesentatives and the Senate.
Can there be a House of Representatives in the general gov-
ernment, after the state governments are annihilated? Care
is taken to express the char'acteI of the electors 1n such a
manne1, that even the popular branch of the general govern-
ment cannot exist unless the governments ofb the states con-
tinue in existence.

How do I prove this? By the regulation that is made
(01 1t e1111ng the important subject of giving sufi‘iage. Article
l,sccti0112: “And the electors 111 each state shall have the
qilalifications for electors of the most numerous branch of the
state legislature.” Now, sir, in order to know who are
qualified to be electors of the House of Representatives, we
are to inquire Who are qualified to be electors of the legis-
lature of each state. If there be no legislature in the states,
there can be no electors of them: if there be no such elec—

- Wu.s0N.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4.59

tors, there is no criterion to know who are qualified to elect
members of the House of Representatives. By this short,
plain deduction, the existence of state legislatures is proved
to be essential to the existence of the general government.

Let us proceed now to the second branch of the legisla-
tive department. In the system before you, the senators,
sir, — those tyrants that are to devour the legislatures of the
states,——are to be chosen by the state legislatures them-~
selves. Need any thing more be said on this subject? So
far is the principle of each state’s retaining the power of
self-preservation from being weakened or endangered by
the general government, that the Convention went further,
perhaps, than was strictly proper, in order to secure it; for,
in this second branch of the legislature, each state, without
regard to its importance, is entitled to an equal vote. And
in the articles respecting amendments of this Constitution,
it is provided “That no state, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”

Does it appear, then, that provision for the continuance
of the state governments was neglected, in framing this
Constitution? On the contrary, it was a favorite object in
the Convention to secure them.

The President of the United States is to be chosen by
electors appointed in the different states, in such manner as
the legislature shall direct. Unless there be legislatures to
appoint electors, the President cannot be chosen: the idea,
therefore, of the existing government of the states, is pre-
supposed in the very mode of constituting the legislative and
the executive departments of the general government. The
same principle will apply to the judicial department. The
judges are to be nominated by the President, and appointed
by him, with the advice and. consent of the Senate. This
shows that the judges cannot exist without the President and
Senate. I have already shoWn that the President and Sen—
ate cannot exist Without the existence of the state legis-
latures. Have I misstated any thing? Is not the evidence
indisputable, that the state governments will be preserved,
or that the general government must tumble amidst-their
ruins? It is true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the
existence of state governments, yet this Constitution does
not suppose them to be the sole power to be respected.

In the Articles of Confederation, the people are unknown.

440 DEBATES. [W1LSON.

but in this plan they are represented; and in one of the
branches of the legislature, they are represented immediately
by persons of their own choice. .

I hope these observations on the nature and formation of
this system are seen in their full force; many of them were
so seen by some gentlemen of the late Convention. After
all this, could it have been expected that assertions such as
have been hazarded on this floor would have been made -—
“that it was the business of their deliberations to destroy
the state governments; that they employed four months to
accomplish this object; and that such was their inten—
tions ’7? That honorable gentleman may be better qualified
to judge~ of their intentions than themselves. I know my
own; and as to those of the other members, I believe that
they have been very improperly and unwarrantably repre—
sented. Intended to destroy! Where did he obtain his
information? Let the tree be judged of by its fruit. _

Mr. President, the only proof that is attempted to be
drawn from the work itself, is that which has been urged
from the fourth section of the first article. lwill read it:
“The times, places, and manner, of holding elections for
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each
state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as
to the places of choosing senators.”

And is this a proof that it was intended to carry on this
government after the state governments should be dissolved
and abrogated? This clause is not only a proper, but,
necessary one. I have already shown what pains have been
taken in the Convention to secure the preservation of the
state governments. I hope, sir, that it was no crime to sow
the seed of self-preservation in the federal government;
without this clause, it would not possess self-preserving
power. By this clause, the times, places, and manner of
holding elections, shall be prescribed in-each state, by the
legislature thereof. I think it highly proper that the federal
government should throw the exercise of this power into the
hands of the state legislatures; but not that it should be
placed there entirely without control.

If the Congress had it not in their power to make regula-
tions, what might be the consequences ? Some states might
make no regulations at all on the subject. And shall the

W1LS0N.] _ PENNSYLVANIA. 4141i

existence of the House of Representatives, the immediate
representatron of the people 1n Congress, depend upon the
will and pleasure of the state governments. 9 Another thing
may possibly happen; I don’t say it will; but we were
obliged to guard even against possibilities, as well as proba-
bilities. A legislature may be willing to make the nec essa1y
regulations;th the minority of thatb legislature may, by ab-
senting themselves, break up the house, and plevent the
execution of the intention of the majority. I have supposed
the case, that some state governments may make no regula-
tions at all ; it is possible, also, that they may make improper
regulations. I have heard it surmised by the opponents of
this Constitution, that the Congress may order the election
fo1 Pennsylvania to be held at Pittsburg, and thence con-
clude that it would be 1mp1oper for them to have the exer-
cise of the power. But suppose, on the other hand, that the
assemblyshould order an election to be held at Pittsburg;
ought. not the general government to have the power to alter
such improper election of one of its own constituent parts?
But there is an additional reason still that shows the neces-
sity of this provisionary clause. The members of the Senate
are elected by the state legislatures. If those legislatures
possessed, uncontrolled, the power of prescribing the times,
places, and manner, of electing members of the House of
Representatives, the members of one branch of the general
legislature would be the tenants at will of the electors of the
other branch; and the general government would lie pros-
trate at the mercy of the legislatures of the several states.
[will ask, now, Is the inference fairly drawn, that the
general government was intended to swallow up the state
governments? Or was it calculated to answer such end?
01' do its framers deserve such censure from honorable gen-
tlemen ? We find, on examining this paragraph, that it con-
tains nothing more than the maxims of self-preservation, so
abundantly secured by this Constitution to the individual
states. Several other objections have been mentioned. I
Will not, at this time, enter into a- discussion of them, though
I may hereafter take notice of such as have any show of
Weight; but I thought it necessary to offer, at this time, the
observations I have made, because I consider this as an im-
portant subject, and think the objection would be a strong
one, if it was Well founded.
' 'VOL. II. 56

46’ :3 DEBAT ES TWILson.

FRIDAY, November 30, 1787, A. M.*-—.l\/Il'. WILSON.
It is objected that the number of members in the House of
Representatives is too small. This is a subject somewhat
embarrassing, and the Convention who framed the article
felt the embarrassment. Take either side of the question,
and you are necessarily led into difficulties. A large repre-
sentation, sir, draws along with it a great expense. We all
know that expense is offered as an objection to this system
of government; and certainly, had the representation been
greater, the clamor would have been on that side, and per—
haps with some degree of justice. But the expense is not
the sole objection; it is the opinion of some writers, that a
deliberative body ought not to consist of more than one hun-
dred members. I think, however, that there might be safety
and propriety in going beyond that number; but certainly
there is some number so large that it would be improper to
increase them beyond it. The British House of Commons
consists of upwards of five hundred. The senate of Rome
consisted, it is said, at some times, of one thousand members.
This last number is certainly too great.

The Convention endeavored to steer a middle course;
and, when we consider the scale on which they formed their
calculation, there are strong reasons Why the representation
should not have been larger. On the ratio that they have
fixed, of one for every thirty thousand, and according to the
generally received opinion of the increase of population
throughout the United States, the present number of their
inhabitants will be doubled in twenty-five years, and accord-
ing to that progressive proportion, and the ratio of one mem-
ber for thirty thousand inhabitants, the House of Represen—
tatives will, Within a single century, consist of more than six
hundred members. Permit me to add a further observation
on the numbers —- that a large number is not so necessary in
this case as in the cases of state legislatures. In them there
ought to be a representation sufficient to declare the situation
of every county, town, and district; and if of every individ-
ual, so much the better, because their legislative powers
extend to the particular interest and convenience of each.
But in the general government, its objects are enumerated,
and are not confined, in their causes or operations, to a
county, or even to a single state. No one power is of such
a nature as to require the minute knowledge of situations

» WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4143

and circumstances necessary in state governments possessed
of ge11e1al legislative autho1ity. These were the reasons,
sir, that, I believe, had influence 011 the Convention, toc ag1ee
to the number of thirty thousand; and when the inconve—
niences and conveniences, on both sides, are compared, it
would be difficult to say What would be a number more.
unexceptionable.

SATURDAY, December 1, 1787, A. M.—Mr. WILSON.
The secret is now disclosed, and it is discovered to be a dread,
that the boasted state soverezgnties will, under this system,
be disrobed of partof their power. Before I go into the
examination of this point, let me ask one important ques-
tion. Upon What principle is it contended that the
sovereign power resides in the state goveinments? The
hono1able gentleman has said t1uly, that there can be no
subordinate soveleignty. Now, if there cannot, my position
is, that the sovereignty resides 111 the people , they have not
pa1 ted with it; they have only dispensed such po1tions of
power as were conceived necessary fo1 the public Welfare.
This Constitution stands upon this broad principle. I know
very well, sir, that the peOple have hitherto been shut out
of the federal gove1nment; but it is not meant that they
should any longer be dispossessed of their 1ig|1ts.ln order
to recognize this leading principle, the proposed system sets
outwith a declaration that its existence depends upon the
supreme authority of the people alone. 'We have heard
much about a consolidated government. I wish the honor-
able gentleman would condescend to give us a definition of
what he meant by it. I think this the more necessary, be—
cause I apprehend that the term, in the numerous times it
has been used, has not always been used in the same sense.
It may be said, and I believe it has been said, that a con—
solidated government is such as will absorb and destroy the
governments of the several states. If it is taken in this
View, the plan before us is not a consolidated government,
as I showed on a former day, and may, if necessary, show
further on some future occasion. On the other hand, if it is
meant that the general government will take from the state
governments their power in some particulars, it is confessed,
and evident, th 1t this will be its ope1ation and effect. '

When the principle is once settled that the people ale the
source of authority, the consequence is, that they may take

4.114 DEBATES. [WILSON

from the subordinate governments pow e1s with which they
have hitherto t1usted them, and place those powe1s in the
general gove11,1ment if it is thought that there they will be
productive of more good. They can distribute one portion
of power to the more contracted circle, called state gotern-
ments; they can also tu1nish anothet p1oportion to the
gove1nme11t of the United States. Who will unde1take to
say, as a state officer, that the people may not give to the
general government what powers, and for what purposes,
they please? How comes it, sir, that these state govern—
ments dictate to their superiors—to the majesty of the
people? When I say the majesty of the people, I mean the
thing, and not a mere compliment to them. The honorable
gentleman went fUrtlier, and said that the state governments
were kept out of this government altogether. The truth
is,—and it is a leading principle in this system,— that not
the states only, but the people also, shall be here represented.
And if. this is a crime, I confess the general government is
chargeable with it; but I have no idea that a safe system of
power in the government, sufficient to manage the general i11-
terest of the United States, could be drawn from any other
source, or vested in any other authority, than that of the peo-
ple at large; and Iconsider this authority as the rock 011
which this structure will stand. If this principle is un-
founded, the system must fall. If the honorable gentlemen,
befole they u11de1take to oppose this principle, will show that
the people have parted with their powe1 to the state gov—
e111ments, then I confess I cannot suppo1t this Constitution.
It is asked, Can there be two taxing powers? Will the
people submit to two taxing powers? I think they will,
when the taxes are required for the public welfare, by per-
sons appointed immediately by their fellow— citizens.

But I believe this doctrine is a very disagreeable one to
some of the state gove1nments. All the objects that will
furnish an increase of revenue are eageily seized by them.
Pe1haps this will lead to the reason why a state government,
11 hen she was obliged to pay only about an eighth pait of
the loan -office celtificates, should voluntarily undertake the
payment of about one thiid part of them. This powe1 of
taxation will be regulated in the general government upon
equitable principles. No state can have more than herjust
proportion to discharge; no longer will government. he

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4115

obliged to assign her funds for the payment of debts she
does not owe. Another objection has been taken, that the .
judicial powers are coextensive with the objects of the na-

tion 11 government. As far as I c2111 understand the idea ol
magistracy in every govemment, this seems to be a piopel
arrangement; the judicial depa1tment is considered as a part
of the executive authority ol government. Now, Ihave no
idea that the authority should be restricted so as not to be able
to perform its functions with full effect. I would not have the
legislature sit to make laws which cannot be executed. It
is not meant here that the laws shall be a dead letter: it is
meant that they shall be carefully and duly considered before
they are enacted, and that then they shall be honestly and
faithfully executed. This observation naturally leads to a
more particular consideration of the government before us.
In order, sir, to give permanency, stability, and security to
any government, I conceive it of essential importance, that
its legislature should be lestrained; that there should not
only be what we call a passive, but an active powe1 over it

f01, of all kinds of despotism, this is the most dreadf,ul and
the most difficult to be conected. With how much c011-
tempt have we seen the authmity of the people heated by
the legislature of this state! and how often have we seen it
making laws in one session, that have been repealed the
next, either on account of the fluctuation of party, or thei1
own impropriety.

This could not have been the case in a compound legisla-
ture; it is therefore proper to have efficient restraints upon
the legislative body. These restraints arise from different
sources. I will mention some of them. In this Constitution,
they will be produced, in a very considerable degree, by a
division of the power in the legislative body itself. Under this
system, they may arise likewise from the interference of those
officers who will be introduced into the executive and judicial
departments.’ They may spring also from another source—
the election by the people; and finally, under this Constitu- .
tion, they may proceed from the great and last resort—from
the people themselves. I say, under this Constitution, the
legislature may be restrained, and kept Within its prescribed
bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department. ' This
I hope, sir, to explain clearly and satisfactorily. I had occa-
sion, on a former day, to state that the power of the Consti-

38

11140 DEBATES [VVILSON.

tution Was paramount to the power of the legislature acting
under that Constitution; for it is possible that the legislature,
when acting in that capacity, may transg1ess the bounds
assitrned to it, and an an may pass, in the busual made, not-
withstanding that transg1ession; but when it comes to be _
discussed before the judges,—Wl1e11 they consider its prin-
ciples, and find it to be incompatible with the superior power
of the Constitution, — it is their duty to pronounce it void;
and judges independent, and not obliged to look to every
session for a continuance of their salaries, will behave with
intrepidity, and refuse to the act the sanction of judicial au-
thority. In the same manner, the President of the United
States could shield himself, and refuse to carry into effect an
act that violates the Constitution.

In order to secure the President from any dependence
upon the legislature as to his salary, it is provided that he
shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation
that shall neither be increased nor diminished during the
period for which he shall have been elected, and that he shall
not receive, within that period, any other emolument from
the United States, or any of them.

111 secure to the judges this independence, it is eldered
that they shall receive for their services a compensation which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
The Congress may be restrained by the election of its c011-
stituent parts. If a legislature shall make a law contrary to
the Constitution, 011 oppressive to the people, they have it in
their power, every second year, in one branch, and every
sixth year, in the other, to displace the men who act thus i11—
consistently with their duty; and if this 18 not sufficient, they
have still 21 furthe1 pow<r; they may assume into tl1ei1 own
hands the alteration of the Constitution itself; they may re—
voke the lease when the conditions are broken by the tenant.
But the most useful restraint upon the legislature, because it
operates constantly, arises from the division of its power
21111011g two branches, and from the qualified negative of the
President upon both. As this government is fo1med, there
are two sources from which the 1epresentation is drawn,
though they both ultimately flow f10m the people. Slates
now exist, and others will come into existence, 1 it. was thought
p1opc1 that thet should be 1eprc 1sented 111 the general 01011- :1111-
11111111. But gentlemen “ill please to remember this Consti

Wagon] PENNSYLVANIA. . 11.417

tution was not framed merely for the states; it was framed
for the people also; and the popular branch of the Congress
will be the objects of their immediate choice.

The two branches will serve as checks upon each other;
they have the same legislative authorities, except in one in-
stance. Money bills must originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives. The Senate can pass no law without. the con-
currence of the House of Representatives; nor can the House
of Representatives without the concurrence of the Senate.
I believe, sir, that the observation which I am now going to
make will apply to mankind in every situation: they will
act with more caution, and perhaps more integrity, if their
proceedings are to be under the inspection and control of
another, than when they are not. From this principle, the
proceedings of Congress will be conducted with a degree of
circumspection not common in single bodies, Where nothing
more is necessaty to be done than to carry the business
through amongst themselves, whethe1 it be light 01 wronu‘.
In compound legislatures, every object must be submitted i'o
a distinct body, not influenced by the arguments, or warped
by the prejudices, of the other; and I believe that the per-
s0ns who will form the Congress will be cautious in running
the risk, with a bare majority, of having the negative of the
President put 011 their proceedings. As there will be more
circumspection in forming the laws, so there will be more
stability in the laws when made. Indeed, one is the conse—
quence of the other; for what has been well considered, and
founded in good sense, will in practice be useful and salu-
tary, and, of consequence, will not be liable to be soon re-
pealed. Though two bodies may not possess m01e wisdom
or patriotism than what may be found 111 a single body, yet
they will necessarily introduce a gr‘eate1 degree of precision.
A11 indigested and inaccurate code of laws is one of the most
dangerous things that can be' introduced into any govern-
ment. The force of this observation is well known by every
gentleman who has attended to the laws of this state. This,
si1, is a very important advantage, that will arise f1om this
disision Of the legislative authority.

I will proceed: now to take some notice of a still further
restraint upon the legislature — I mean the qualified negative
of the President. I think this will be attended with vety
1m portant advantages f01 the security and happiness of the

21.1.8 'DEBA'I‘ES. [WILSON

people of the United States. The President, sir, will not
be a stranger to our country, to our laws, or to our wishes.
He will, under this Constitution, be placed in office as the
President of the whole Union, and will be chosen in such a
manner that he may be justly styled the man of the people. Be—
ing elected by the different parts of the United States, he will
consider himself as not particularly interested for any one of
them, but will watch over the whole with paternal care and
affection. This will be the natural conduct to recommend
himself to those who placed him in that high chair, and I
consider it as a very important advantage,- that such a man
must have every law presented to him, before it can become
binding on the United States. He will have before him the
fullest 111t01 matlon of our situation, he will avail himself not
only of 1ecords and official commuhications, foreign and do-
mestic, but he will have also the advice of the executive officers
in the differenfdepartments of the general government.

If, in consequence ‘of this information and advice, he exer-
cise the authority given to him, the effect will not be lost.
He leturns his objections, together with the bill, and, unless
tzto thin/5 of both blanches ot the legislature are now found
to app1ove it, it does not become a blaw. But, even if his
Ol)]€( t1ons do not prevent its passing into a law, they will
not be useless, they will be kept, together with the law, and,
in the alchives of Congress, will be valuable and practical
mateiials, to form the minds of posterity for legislation. If
it is found that the law operates inconveniently, or oppres-
sively, the people may discover 1n the Plesident’s objections
the source of that inconvenience or oppression. Further,
sir, when objections shall have been made, it is proxided, in
order to secure the greatest degree of caution and respon~
sibility, that the votes of both houses shall be determined by
years and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and
against the bill shall be entered in the journal of each house
respectively. This much I have thought proper to say, with
regard to the distribution of the legislative authority, and the
restraints under which it will be exercised.

The gentleman 111 opposition sttongly insists that the gen-
eral clause at the end of the eighth section gives to Congress
a power of legislating generally; but I cannot conceive by
what means he will render the words susceptible of that ex-
pansion. Can the words, “The Congress shall have power

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 11119

to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry
into execution the foregoing powers,” be capable of giving
them general legislative power? I hope that it is not meant
to give to Congress merely an illusive show of authority, to
deceive themselves or constituents any longer. On the con-
trary, I trust it is meant that they shall have the power of
carrying into effect the laws which they shall make under
the powers vested in them by this Constitution. In answer
to the gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Smilie,) 011 the subject
of the press, I beg leave to make an observation. It 1s vely
true, sir, that thisb Constitution says nothing with regard to
that subject, nor was it necessary; because it will be found
that there is given to the general government no power
whatsoever concerning it; and no law, in pursuance of the
Constitution, can possibly be enacted to destroy that liberty.

I heard the honorable gentleman make this general asser-
tion, that the Congress was ce1tainly vested with powe1 to
make such a law; t3but I would be glad to know by what
part of this Constitution such a powe1 is given. 9 Until that
is done, I shall not. enter into a minute investigation of the
matter, but shall at present satisfy myself with giving an an—
swer to a question that has been put. It has been asked,
If a law should be made to punish libels, and the judges
should proceed under that law, what chance would the print—
er have of an acquittal? And it has been said he would
drop into a den of devouring monsters !

I presume it was not in the View of the honorable gentle-
man to say there is no such thing as a libel, or that the wri-
ters of such ought not to be punished. The idea of the lib-
erty of the press is not carried so far as this 1n any country.
What is meant by the liberty of the press is, that there
should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every
author is responsible when he attacks the security 01 welfare
of the government, or the safety, character, and property of
the individual.

With regard to attacks upon the public, the mode of pro-
ceeding is by a prosecution. Now, if a libel is written, it
must be within some one of the United States, or the dis-
trict of Congress. With regard to that district, I hope it
will take care to preserve this as well as the other rights of
freemen; for, whatever district Congress may choose, the
cession of it cannot be completed without the consent of Its

VOL. 11. 57

450 DEBATES. [WILSON.

inhabitants. Now, sir, if this libel is to be tried, it must be
tried where the offence was committed; for, under this C011—
stitution, as declared in the 2d section of the 3d article, the
trial must be held in the state ; therefore, on this occasion,
it must be tried where it was published, if the indictment
is for publishing; and it must be tried likewise by ajury of
that state. Now, I would ask, is the person prosecuted in
a worse situation under the general government, even if it
had the power to make laws 011 this subject, than .he is at
present under the state government? It is true, there is no
particular regulation made, to have the jury come from the
body of the county in which the offence was committed;
but there are some states in which this mode of collecting
juries is contrary to their established custom, and gentlemen
ought to consider that this Constitution was not meant
merely for Pennsylvania. In some states, the juries are not
taken from a. single county. In Virginia, the sheriff, I be—
lieve, is not confined even to the inhabitants of the state, but
is at liberty to take any man he pleases, and put him on the
jury. In Maryland, I think, a set of jurors serve for the
Whole western shore, and another for the eastern shore.

I beg to make one remark on what one gentleman has
said, with respect to amendments being proposed to this
Constitution. To whom are the Convention to make report
of such amendments? He tells you, to the present Con-
gress. I do not wish to report to that body, the repre-
sentatives only of the state governments; they may not be
disposed to admit the people into a palticipation of thei1
power. It has also been supposed that a wonderful una-
nimity subsists among those who are enemies to the p10—
posed system. On this point I also differ from the gentleman
who made the observation. I have taken every pains in my
power, and read every publication I could meet with, in
order to gain information; and, as far as I have been able tc
judge, the opposition is inconsiderable and inconsistent.
Instead of agreeing in their objections, those who make
them b1ing forwald such as are diametrically opposite. On
one hand, it is said that the representation in Congress 1s
too small; on the othe1, it is said to be too numerous.
Some thilik the authority of the Senate too great; some,
that of the House of Replesentatives; and some, that of
both. Others draw their feals from the powers of the Pres-

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4.51

ident; and, like the iron race of Cadmus, these opponents
rise only to destroy each other. .

MONDAY, December 3, 1787, A. M.—Mr. WILSON.
Take detached parts of any system whatsoever, in the man-
ner these gentlemen have hitherto taken this Constitution,
and you will make it absurd and inconsistent with itself. 1
do not confine this observation to human performances alone ;
it will apply to divine writings. An anecdote, which I have
heard, exemplifies this observation. When Sternhold and
Hopkins’s version of the Psalms was usually sung in the
churches, a line was first read by the clerk, and then sung
by the congregation. A sailor had stepped in, and heard
the clerk read this line—

“ The Lord will come, and he will not

9,

 

the sailor stared, and when the clerk read the next line—

H

 

“ Keep silence, but speak out

the sailor left the church, thinking the people were not in
their senses.

This story may convey an idea of the treatment of the
plan before you; for, although it contains sound sense when '9
connected, yet, by the detached manner of conside1ing it, it 1
appears highly absurd.

Much fault has been found with the mode of expression
used in the 1st clause of the 9th section of the 1st article.
I believe I can assign a reason why that mode of expression
was used, and. why the term slave was not admitted in this
Constitution; and as to the manner of laying taxes, this is
not the fi1 st time that the subject has come into the View of
the United States, and of the legislatures of the several
states. The gentleman, (Mr. Findley) will recollect that,
in the present Congress, the quota of the fedelal debt, and
general expenses, was to be 1n proportion to the value of land.
and other enumerated property, within states. After trying
this for a number of years, it was found, 011 all hands, to be
a mode that could not be carried into execution. Congress
were satisfied of this; and, in the year 1783, recommended,
in conformity with the powers they possessed under the
Articles of Confederation, that the quota should be acCording
to the number of free people, including those bound to ser-
vitude, and excluding Indians not taxed. These were the
expressions used in 1783; and the fate of this recommenda-

152 DEBATES. [VViLsoN.

tion was similar to all their other resolutions. It was not
carried into effect, but it was adopted by no fewer than
eleven out of thirteen states; and it cannot but. be matter of
surprise to hear gentlemen, who agreed to this very mode of
expression at that time, come forward and state it as an
objection 011 the present occasion. It was natural, sir, for
the late Convention to adopt the mode after it had been
agreed to by eleven states, and to use the expression which
they found had been received as unexceptionable before.
With respect to the clause restricting Congress from pro-
hibitingthe migration or importation of such persons as any
of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, prior
to the year 1808, the honorable gentleman says that this
clause is not only dark, but intended to grant to Congress,
for that time, the power to admit the importation of stares.
N 0 such thing was intended. But I will tell you what was
done, and it gives me high pleasure that so much was done.
Under the present Confederation, the states may admit the
importation of slaves as long as they please, but by this ar-
ticle, after the year 1808, the Congress will have power to
prohibit such importation, notwithstanding the disposition
of any state to the contrary. I consider this as laying the
foundation for banishing slavery out of this country; and
though the period is more distant than I could wish, yet it
11111 produce the same kind, gradual change, which was pur-
sued in Pennsylvania. It is with much satisfaction I View
this power in the general government, whereby they may
lay an interdiction 011 this 1ep1oaclrful trade. but an imme-
diate advantage is also obtained; for a tax or duty may be
imposed 011 such importation, not exceeding ten dollars f01
each person; and this, sir, operates as a partial prohibition;
it was all that could be obtained. lam sorry it was no
more; but from this I think there IS leason to hope, that yet
a few years, and it will be prohibited altogether , and 111 the
mean time, the new states which are to be formed will be
unde1 the control of Congress 111 this particular, and slaves
will never be introduced amongst them. The gentleman
says that it is unfortunate in another point ofb view: it
means to prohibit the introduction of white people from
Europe, as this tax may deter them from coming amongst
us. A little impartiality and attention will discover the care
that t} e Convention took 111 selecting their language. The

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 1153

words are, “the migration or importation of such persons,
&c. , shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year
1808, but a tax 01 duty may be imposed on such importa-
tion.” It is obselvable he1e that the te1m migration is
dropped, when a tax or duty 1s mentioned, so that Con-
gress have power to impose the tax only on those im-_
ported.

TUESDAY, December 4, 1787, A. M.—Mr. WILSON.
I shall take this opportunity of giving an answer to the ob-
jections already urged against the Constitution ; I shall then
point out some of those qualities that entitle it to the atten-
tlon and approbation of this Convention; and, after having
done this, I shall take a fit oppouunity of stating the conse-
quences which, I app1ehend, will 1esult f1om rejecting it,
and those which will p1ob 11in result hom its adoption. I
have given the utmost attention to the debates, and the
objections that, from time to time, have been made by the
three gentlemen who speak in opposition. I have reduced
them to some order, perhaps not better than that in which
they were introduced. I will state them; they will be in
the recollection of the house, and I will endeavor to give an
answer to them : in that answer, I will interweave some re—
marks, that may tend to elucidate the subject.

A gOOd deal has already been said concerning a bill of
rights. I have stated, according to the best of my recollec-
tion, all that passed in Convention 1elating to that business.
Since that time, Ihave spoken with a gentleman, who has
not only his memory, but full notes that he had taken 1n that
body, and he assures me that, upon this subject, no direct
motion was ever made at all, and certainly, befo1e we heaid
this so Violently suppo1 ted out of doo1s, some pains ought to
have been taken to have tried its fate within , but the t1 uth
is, a bill of rights would, as I have mentioned already, have
been not only unnecessary, but- improper. In some govern-
ments, it may come within the gentleman’ s idea, when he
says it can do no harm; but even in these governments, you
find bills of rights do not uniformly obtain; and do those
states complain who have them not? Is it a maxim in
forming gove1nments, that not only all the powers which ale
given, but also that all those Whi( h are 1ese1ved should be
enumerated? Iapprehend that the powers given and re—
served form the whole rights of the people, as men and as

11254 DEBATES. [WILSON.

citizens. I tonsider that there are very few who understand
the whole of these rights. All the political writers, from
Grotius and Przgfendmf down to Vallel, have treated on this
subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate
of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights
.apl'1ertaining to the people as men and as citizens.

There are two kinds of government—that where general
power is intended to be given to the legislature, and that
where the powers are. particularly enumerated. In the last
case, the implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be
given than what is so enumerated, unless it results from the
nature of the government itself. On the other hand, when
general legislative po“ e1s are given, then the people part
with their >D'autho1ity, and, on the gentleman’s p1inciple of
gove1',11ment letain nothing. But in a govetnment like the
proposed one, tl1e1e can be no necessity for a bill of tights ,
for, on my p1inciple, the people neve1 palt with their power.
Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sir, that no
gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted
such a thing. I believe the honmable speakels in oppo-
sition on this flow were members of the assembly which
appointed delegates to that Convention , it it had been
thought proper to have sent them into that body, how lumi-
nous t)would the dark conclav e has e been! —so the gentleman
has been pleased to denominate that body. A1istoc1ats as
they were, they pretended not to define the rights of those
who sent them there. We ask, repeatedly, What harm
could the addition of a bill of rights do? If it can do no
good, Ithink that a sufficient 1eason to refuse having any
thing to do with it. But to whom me we to 1epo1t this bill
of 1ights, if we should adopt it? Have we autholity f1om
thoseb who sent us he1e to make one? _

It is true, We may propose as well as any other private
persons; but how shall we know the sentiments of the citi-
zens of this state and of the other states? Are we certain
that any one of them will agree with our definitions and
en 1.1 merations?

In the second place, we are told that there is no check
upon the govemment but the people. It is unfortunate, sir,
it thr 11 supe1intending autho1ity 1s allowed as a check; but
I app1ehend that, in the ve1y eonstmetion of this government,
theie a1e nume1ous cheeks. Besides those expressly enu-

WiLsoaj PENNSYLVANIA. 45! a

merated, the two branches of the legislature are mutual
checks upon each other. But this subject will be more
pr0perly discussed when we come to consider the form of
the government itself; and then I mean to show the reason
why the right of habeas corpus was secured by a particular
declaratiorb'1 111 its favor.

In the third place, we ale told that the1e is no security
for the 1ights of conscience. I ask the hono1able gentleman,
what part of this system puts it in the power of Congress to
attack those rights? When there is no power to attack, it is
idle to prepare the means of defence.

After having mentioned, in a cursory manner, the forego-
ing objections, we now arrive at the leading ones against
the proposed system.

The ve1y manne1 of int1oducing this Constitution, by the
recognition of the autho1ity of the people, is said to change
the p1inciple of the p1esent Confedeiation, and to introduce
a consohdating and absor [11110 government

In this coniederated republic, the sovereigntv of the states,
it IS said, is not piese1ved. We ale told that the1e cannot
be two sovereign powers, and that a subo1dinate sovereignty
1s no soverelgnty.

It will be worth while, Mr. President, to consider this
objection at large When I had the 1101101 of speaking for-
merly 011 this subject, Istated, in as concise a manner as
possible, the leading ideas that occu11ed to me, to ascertain
where the supreme and sovereign power resides. It has not
been, nor, I presume, will it be denied, that somewhere
there is, and of necessity must be, 21 supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable authority. This, I believe, may justly be
termed the sovereign power; for, from that gentleman’s
(Mr. Findley) account of the matter, it cannot be sovereign
unless it is supreme; for, says he, a subordinate sovereignty
is no sovereignty at all. I had the honor of observing, that,
if the question was asked, where the supreme power resided,
different answers would be given by different writers. I
mentioned that Blackstone will tell you that, in Britain, it
is lodged in the Blitish Pa1liameut; and I believe there is
no writer 011 this subject, on the other side of the Atlantic,
but supposed it to be vested 1n that body. I stated, further,
that, if the question was asked of some politician, who had
not considered the subject with sufficient accuracy, where

456 DEBATES. [WILSON

'the supreme power resided in our governments, he would
answer, that it was vested in the state constitutions. This
opinion approaches near the truth, but does not reach it; for
the truth is, that the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
authority remains with the people. I mentioned, also, that
the practical recognition of this truth was reserved for the
honor of this country. I recollect no constitution founded
011 this principle; but we have witnessed the improvement,
and enjoy the happiness of seeing it carried into practice.
The great and penetrating mind of Locke seems to be the
only one that pointed towards even the theory of this great
truth.

When I made the observation that some politicians would
say the sup1eme power was lodged 111 our state constitutions,
I did not suspect that the hono1able gentleman hom West—
rno1eland (M1. Findley) was included in that desc1iption;
but I find myself disappointed , lot I imagined his opposition
would arise from another consideration. His position is,
that the supreme power resides in the states, as governments;
and mine is, that it resides in the people, as the fountain of
government; that the people have not—that the people
meant not—and that the people ought not—to part with it
to any government whatsoever. I11 their hands it remains
secure. They can delegate it in such proportions, to such
bodies, on such terms, and under such limitations, as they
think proper. I agree with the membe1s 111 opposition, that
there cannot be two sovereign powe1s 011 the same subject.

I consider the people of the United States as lo1ming one
g1eat community; and I co11side1 the people of the diffet-
ent states as lorming communities, again, 011 a lessel scale.
From this great division of the peOpIe into distinct com-
munities, it will be found necessary that diffe1ent plopor-
tions of legislative powe1s should be given to the goveln-
ments, according to the nature, numbe1, and magnitude of
their objects.

Unless the people are considered in these two views, we
shall never be able to understand the principle on which this
system was constructed. 1 view the states as madefor‘ the
people, as well as by them, and not the people as made for
the states; the people, thelefore, have a right, whilst enjoy-
ing the undeniable powels sof society, to fmm eithet a gen-
eral gove1 nment 01 state governments, in what manne1 the1

‘ WILSON.] PEN N SY LVANIA. 457

please, or to accommodate them to one another, and by this
means preserve them all. This, I say, is the inherent and
unalienable right of the people ; and as an illustration of it,
I beg to read a few words from the Declaration of Inde—
pendence, made by the representatives of the United States,
and recognized by the whole Union.

“ We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 'men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit'of happiness; that, to
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or abolish it, and institute new government, laying its foundation
on such principles, and organizing its powers in such forms, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”

This is the broad basis on which our independence was
placed: on the same certain and solid foundation this sys—
tem is erected.

Slate sovereignty, as it is called, is far from being able to
support its Weight. Nothing less than the authority of the
people could either support it or give it efficacy. .1 cannot
pass over this subject without noticing the different conduct
pursued by the late federal Convention, and that observed
by the Convention which framed the Constitution of Penn
sylvania. On that occasion you find an attempt made to
deprive the people of this right, so lately and so expressly
asserted in the Declaration of Independence. We are told,
in the preamble to the declaration of rights, and frame of
government, that we “do, by virtue of the authority vested
in us, ordain, declare, and establish, the following declara—
tion of rights and frame of government, to be the Constitue
tion of this commonwealth, and to remain in force therein
unaltered, except in such articles as shall hereafter, on expe—
rience, be found to require improvement, and which shall, by
.he same authority of the peOple, fairly delegated as this
frame of government directs.—”—An honorable gentleman
(Mr. Chambers) was well warranted in saying that all
that could be done was done, to cut off the people from
the right of amending; for it cannot be amended by any
other mode than that which it directs ; then, any number more
than one third may control any number less than two thirds.

. But 1 return to my general reasoning. My position is, 331‘.
that, in this country, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrolla

VOL. II 58 39

458 DEBATES. ,[thsom

ble ptHMfl‘ resides in the people at large; that they have
vested certain proportions of this power in the state gov-
ernments; but that the fee—simple continues, resides, and
remains, with the body of the people. Under the practical
influence of this great truth, we are now sitting and deliber—
ating, and under its operation, we can sit as calmly and
deliberate as coolly, in order to change a constitution, as a
legislature can sit and deliberate under the power of a con-
stitution, in order to alter or amend a law. It is true, the
exercise of this power will not probably be so frequent, nor
resorted to on so many occasions, in one case as in the other;
but the recognition of the principle cannot fail to establish
it more firmly. But, because this recognition is made in the
proposed Constitution, an exception is taken to the Whole of
it ; for we are told it is a violation of the present Confedera-
tion — a Confederation of sovereign states. I shall not enter
into an investigation of the present Confederation, but shall
just remark that its principle is not the principle of free gov-
ernments. The people of the United States are not, as
such, represented in the present Congress; and, considered
even as the component parts of the several states, they are
not represented in proportion to their numbers and impor—
tance.

In this place I cannot help remarking on the general in'
consistency which appears between one part of the gentle-
man’s objections and another. Upon the principle we have
now mentioned, the honorable gentleman contended that the
powers ought to flow from the states ; and that all the late
Convention had to do, was to give additional powers to Con-
gress. What is the present form of Congress? A single
body, with some legislative, but little executive, and no effirc—
tive judicial power. What are these additional powers that
are to be given? In some cases, legislative are wanting;
in others, judicial; and in others, executive. These, it is
said, ought to be allotted to the general government. But
the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one
body of men is evident; yet in the same day, and perhaps
in the same hour, we are told by honorable gentlemen that
those three branches of government are not kept sufficiently
distinct in this Constitution; we are told, also, that. the
Senate, possessing some executive power, as well as legisla-
tive, is such a monster, that it will swallow up and absorb

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 459

every other body in the general government, after having
destroyed those of the particular states.

Is this reasoning with consistency ? Is the Senate, under
the proposed Constitution, so tremendous a body, when
checked in their legislative capacity by the House of Repre-
sentatives, and in their executive authority by the President
of the United States? Can this body he so tremendous as
the present Congress, a single body of men, possessed of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers? To what pur-
pose was Montesquieu read to show that this was a complete
tyranny? The application would have. been more properly
made, by the advocates of the proposed Constitution, against
the patrons of the present Confederation.

It is mentioned that this federal government willannihilate
and absorb all the state governments. I wish to save, as
much as possible, the time of the house : I shall not, there-
, fore, recapitulate what I had the honor of saying last week
on this subject. I hope it was then shown that, instead of
being abolished, (as insinuated,) from the very nature of
things, and from the organization of the system itself, the
state governments must exist, or the general governments
must fall amidst their ruins. Indeed, so far as to the forms,
it is admitted they may remain ; but the gentlemen seem to
think their power will be gone.

lshall have occasion to take notice of this power here—
after ; and, I believe, if it was necessary, it could be shown
that the state governments, as states, will enjoy as much
power, and more dignity, happiness, and security, than they
have hitherto done. I admit, sir, that some of the powers
Will be taken from them by the system before you; but it
is, I believe, allowed on all hands —at least it is not among
us a disputed. point—that the late Convention was ap—
pointed With a particular View to give more power to the
government of the Union. It' is also acknowledged that the
intention was to obtain the advantage of an efficient govern-
ment over the United States. Now, if power is to be given
by that government, I apprehend it must be taken from.
.some place. If the state governments are to retain all the
powers they held before, then, of consequence, every new
power that is given to Congress must be taken from the
people at large. Is this the gentleman’s intention? I
believe a strict examination of this subject will justify me in

4-60 DEBATES. [W1LSON.

asserting that the states, as gove1nments, have assumed too
much powe1 to themselves, while they left little to the peo-
ple. Let not this be called cajoling the people—the ele—
gant expression used by the honorable gentleman from
Westmmeland, (M1. Findley.) It is bald to avoid censu1e
on one side 01 the othel. At some time, it has been said
that l have not been at the pains to conceal my contempt
of the people; but when it suits a purpose better, it is as-
serted that I cajole them. I do neithe1 one 1101 the other.
The voice of app10bation,si1, when I think that applobation
well ea1ned,I confess, 1s grateful to my ears; but I would
disdain it, if it is to be purchased by a sacrifice of my duty
or the dictates of my conscience. No, sir; I go practically
into this system; I have gone into it practically when the -
doors were shut, when it could not be alleged that I cajoled
the people; and I now endeavor to show that the true and
only safe principle for a free people, is a practical recognition
of their original and supreme authority.

I say, sir, that it was the design of this system to take
some power from the state governments, and to place it in
the general government. It was also the design that the
people should be admitted to the exercise of some powers
which they did not exercise under the present federation.
It was thought p10pe1 that the citizens, as well as the states,
should be reb‘.p1esented How far the 1epresentation in the
Senate 18 a replesentation of states, we shall see by and by,
when we come to consider that b1anch of the fede1al gov-
ernment.

This system, it is said, “ unhinges and eradicates the
state governments, and was systematically intended so to
do.” To establish the intention, an argument is drawn
from art. 1st, sect. 4th, on the subject of elections. I have
already had occasion to remark upon this, and shall therefore
pass 011 to the next objection—-

That the last clause of the 8th section of the lst article,
gives the power of self-preservation to the general govern-
ment, independent of the states; for, in case of their aboli—
tion, it will be alleged, in behalf of the general government,
that self-preservation is the first law, and necessary to the
exercise of all other powers.

Now, let us see what this objection amounts to. th
are to have this SCIf—pl'6301V1110‘ powel. P The Congress.

WILSON PENNSYLVANIA. 11.61

W11) are Congress? It is a body that will consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Who compose
this Senate? Those who are elected by the legislature of
the different states? Who are the electors of the House of
Representatives? Those who are qualified to vote for the
most numerous branch of the legislature in the separate
states. Suppose the state legislatures annihilated; where is
the criterion to ascertain the qualification of electors? and
unless this be ascertained, they cannot be admitted to vote ;
if a state legislature is not elected, there can be no Senate,
because the senators are to be chosen by the legislatures only

This 1s a plain and simple deduction fiom Cthe Constitu-
tion , and yet the objection is stated as conclusive upon an
argument expressly drawn from the last clause of this section.

It is repeated with confidence, “ that this is not a federal
government, but a complete one, with legislative, executive,
and judicial powers. it is a consolidatian government.” I .
have already mentioned the misuse of tlieote1m;l wish the
gentleman would indulge us with his definition of the word.
If, when he says it isc a consolidation, he means so far as
relates to the general objects of the Union, —— so far it was
intended to be a consolidation, and on such a consolidation,
pe1haps, our very existence, as a nation, depends. If, on
the other hand, (as something which has been said seems to
indicate,) he (Mr. Findley) means that it will absmb the .
gove1nments of the individual states,—— so far IS this position
fiom being admitted, that it is unanswerably controvelted.

The existence of the state govelnments is one of the most
prominent features of this system. With legard to those
purposes which a1e allowed to be for the general welfaie of
the Union, I think it no objection to this plan, that we are
told it is a complete government. I think it no objection, i
that it is al'eged the government will possess legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial powers. Should it have only legislative
authority, we have had examples enough of such a govern-
ment to deter us from continuing it. Shall Congress any
longer continue to make requisitions from the several states,
to be treated sometimes with silent and sometimes with
deel ared contempt? For what purpose give the powe1 to
make laws, unless they are to be executed? and if they are
to be executed, the executive and .jud1c1al powers Will neces-
sarily be engaged in the‘business.

462 DEBATES. [wusom

Do we wish a return of those insurrections and tumults
to which a sister state was lately exposed? or a government
of such insufficiency as the present is found to be? Let me,
sir, mention one circumstance in the recollection of every
honorable gentleman who hears me. To the determination
of Congress are submitted all disputes between states con-
cerning boundary, jurisdiction, or right of soil. In conse-
quence of this power, after much altercation, expense of
time, and considerable expense of money, this state was
successful enough to obtain a decree in her favor, in a dif—
ference then subsisting between her and Connecticut; but
what was the consequence ?_ The Congress had no power
to carry the decree into execution. Hence the distraction
and animosity, which have ever since prevailed, and still
continue in that paclt ol the country Ought the gove1n-
ment, then, to remain any longer incompletf. P I hope not.
No person c2111 be so insensible to the lessons of eXperience
as to desire it.

It is brought as an objection “that there will be a rival—
ship between the state governments and the general govern—
ment; on each side endeavors will be made to increase
power.” '

Let us examine a little into this subject. The gentlemen
tell you, sir, that they expect the states will not possess any
power. But Ithink there is reason to draw a different con-
clusion. Under this system, their respectability and power
will increase with that of the generalg Government. I believe
their happiness and secu1it1 will increase in a still g1eate1
propo1tion. Let 11s attend a moment to the situation bof this
country. It IS a maxim of eve1y government, and it ought
to be a maxim with us, that the increase of numbers i11-
creases the dignity 21nd secu1ity, and the respectability, of all
governments. It is the fitst command given by the Deity
to man, Increase and multiply. This applies with peculiar
f01ce to this country, the smaller patt of whose te11it01y is
yet inhabited. \Ve are 1eptesentativcs, sir, not metelv of
the ptesent age, but of futule times; not merely of the te1-
ritory along the sea- co oast, but of regions immensely extended
11estwa1d. We should fill, as fastb as possible, this extensive
country, with men who shall live happy, free, and secme.
To accomplish this great end ought. to be the leading View
of all our patriots and statesmen. But how is it to be ac

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 463

complished, but by establishing peace and harmony among
ourselves, and dignity and respectability among fo1e10'n na-
tions? By these means, we may draw members from the
other side of the Atlantic, in addition to the natural sources
of population. Can either of these objects be attained with-
out a protecting head? When We examine history, we shall
find an important fact, and almost the only fact which will
apply to all confederacies :—

They have all fallen to pieces, and have not absorbed the
government.

In order to keep republics together, they must have a
strong binding force, which must be either external 01' inter—
nal. The situation of this country shows that no foreign
f01ce can press us together; the bonds of our union ought
therefore to be indissolubly strong.

The powers of the states, I app1ehend, will 1nc1ease with
the population and the happiness of their inhabitants. U11-
less we can establish a characte1 ab1oad, we shall be unhappy
f1om foreign restraints 01 internal violeiice. These reasons,
I think, prove sufficiently the necessity of having a federal
head. Under it, the advantages enjoyed by the whole Union
would he participated by every state. I wish honorable gen-
' tlemen would think not only of themselves, not only of the
present age, but of others, and of future times.

It has been said “that the state governments will not be
able to make head against the general government; 7’ but it
might be said, with more propriety, that the general govern-
ment will not be able to maintain the powers given it against
the encroachments and combined attacks of the state gov-
ernments. They possess some particular advantages from
which the general government is restrained. By this sys-
tem the1e1s a provision made in the Constitution, that no
senat01 or representative shall be appointed to any civil
office under the authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have
been increased, during the time for which he was elected;
and no pe1son holding any office under the United States
can be amembcr of either house. But thete 1s no similar
secu1ity against state influence, as a 1"ep1esentative may
enjoy places, and even sinecrnes, under the state govern-
ments. On which side IS the door most open to corruption?
lf‘a person in the legislature 18 to be influenced by an office,

464. DEBATES. [W1LSON.

the generalg Government can give him none unless he vacate
his seat. When the influence of office comes from the state
government, he can 1etain his seat and salary too. But it
is added, under this head, “that state governments will
lose the attachment of the people, by losing the power
of conferring advantages, and that the people will not be at
the expense of keeping them up.” Perhaps the state gov—
ernments have already become so expensive as to alarm the
gentlemen on that head. I am told that the civil list of this
state amounted to £40,000 in one year. Under the proposed
government, I think it would be possible to obtain, in Penn-
sylvania, every advantage we now possess, with a civil list
that shall not exceed one third of that sum.

How differently the same thing is talked of, if it be a favor-
ite or otherwise! When advantages to an officer are to be
derived from the genelal government, we hear them men-
tioned by the name of In May, but when we are told of the
state governments’ losing the pow er of confe1ring advan-
tages, by the disposal of t)offices, it is said they will lose the
attachment of the pe0ple. \Vhat is in one instance cor-
ruption and bribery, is in another the power of conferring
advantages.

We me informed “that the state elections will be ill at-
tended, and that the state gove1nments will become mere
boards of electors.” Those who have a due regard for their
country will discharge thei1 duty and attend; but those who
ale brought only from interest 01 persuasion had better stay
away; the public will not suffe1 any disadvantage from their
absence. But the honest citizen, who knows the value of
the privilege, will undoubtedly attend, to secure the man of
his choice. The power and business of the state legislatures
relate to the great objects of life, liberty and property; the
same are also objects of the general government.

Certainly, the citizens of America will be as tenacious 1n
the one instance as in the other. They will be interested.
and I hope will exert themselves, to secure their rights not
only from being injured by the state governments, but also
from being injured by the generalg Government.

“The power over elections, and of judging of elections.
g1ves absolute sovereigntv. ” This power is given to every
state legislature; yet bl see no necessity that the power of
absolute sovereignty should accompany it. My general posi-

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4165

tion is, that the absolute sovereignty never goes from the
people.

We are told “that it will be in the power of the Senate to
prevent any addition of representatives to the lower house.”

1 believe their power will be pretty well balanced; and
though the Senate should have a desire to do this, yet the.
attempt will answer no purpose, for the House of Represen-
tatives will not let them have a farthing of public money till
they agree to it; and the latter influence will be as strong as
the other.

“Annual assemblies are necessary,’ ’it is said; and I an—
swer, in many instances they are very proper. In Rhode
Island and Connecticut, they are elected tor six months. ln
larger states, that period would be found veryinconveniept;
but, in a government as large as that of the United States, I
presume that annual elections would be more disproportionate
than elections for six months would be in some of our largr st
states. .

“ The British Parliament took to themselves the prolonga-
tion of their sitting to seven years. But, even in the Bri ish
Parliament, the appropriations are annual.”

But, sir, how is the argument to apply here? How are
the Congress to assume such a power? They cannot ass 1me
it under the Constitution, for that expressly provides, “ The
membe1s of the House of Representatives shall be chosen,
eVery two years, by the people of the several states, and the
senators for siX years.” So, if they take it at all, they must
take it by usurpation and force.

Appropriations may be made for two years, though in the
British Parliament they are made but for one. For some
purposes, such appropriations may be made annually; but for
every purpose, they are not: even for a standing army, they
may be made for seven, ten, or fourteen years: the civil list
. is established during the life of a prince. Another objection
is,“ that the members of the Senate may e111ich themselves ,
they may hold their office as long as they live, and there IS
no power to prevent them; the Senate will swallow up every
thiiig.” I am not a blind admirer of this system. Some of
the powers of the senators are not, with me, the favorite parts
of it; but as they stand connected with other parts, there
is still security against the efforts of that body. It was
with g1eat difliculty that secuiity was obtained, and I may

1111. l[. 9

Z166 DEBATES. [WILSON.

risk the conjecture that, it it is not now accepted, it never
Will be obtained again from the same states. Though the
Senate was not a tav01ite of mine, as to some of its powers,
yet it was a favorite with a majority in the Union ; and we
must submit to that majority, or we must break 11p the Union.
It. is but fair to repeat those reasons that weighed with the
Convention: perhaps I shall not be able to do them justice ; but
yet I will attempt to show why additional powers were given
to the Senate rather than to the House of Representatives.
These additional powers,l believe, are, that oftrying impeach-
ments, that ofconcuning with the President in making treaties,
and that of concurring in the appointment 01‘ officers. These
are the powers that are stated as improper. It 1s fortunate,
that, in the extent of every one of them, the Senate stands
controlled. If it is that monster which it is said to be, it can
only show its teeth; it is unable to bite or devour. With
regard to impeachments, the Senate can try none but such
as will be brought before them by the House of Repre-
sentatlves.

The Senate can .make no treaties: they can approve of
none, unless the President of the United States lays it before
them. With regard to the appointment of officers, the Pres-
ident must nominate before they can vote; so that, if the
powers of either branch are perverted, it must be with the
approbation of some one of the other branches of govern-
ment. Thus checked on each side, they can do no one act
of themselves.

“The powers of Congress extend to taxation —to direct
taxation —to internal taxation — to poll taxes —to excises
—to other state and internal p11r.poses ’7 Those who pos-

isess the power to tax, possess all other sovereign power.

That their powers are thus extensive is admitted, and would
any thing short of this have been sufficient. 9 Is it the 11ish
of these gentlemen —if it is, let us hear their sentiments—
that the general gove1nment should subsist 011 the bounty
of the states? Shall it have the powe e1 to contract, and no
powe1 to fulfil the contract? Shall it have the power to bor-
10w money, and no power to pay the principal 01 interest.D
Must we go 011 in the track that we have hitherto pu1sued. 9
And mustb we again compel those in Europe, who lent us
money in ou1 distress, to advance the money to p31 them-
serves interest on the certificates ot the debts due to them. 1’

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 467

This was actually the case in Holland the last yea1. Like
those who have shot one a1 row, and cannot regain it, they
have been obliged to shoot anothe1 1n the same direction, 111
Older to recover the first. It was absolutely necessary,
sir, that this government should possess these rights; and
Why should it not, as well as the state governments? Will
this government be fonder of the exercise of this authority
than those of the states are? Will the states, who are equal—
ly represented in one branch of the legislature, be more
opposed to the payment of what shall be required by the
future, than What has been required by the present Con—
gress? Will the people, who must indisputably pay the
Whole, have more objections to the payment of this tax,
because it is laid by persons of their own immediate appoint-
ment, even if those taxes were to continue as oppressive as
they now are. P But, unde1 the general power of this system,
that cannot be the case in Pennsylvania. Throughout the
Union, direct taxation will be lessened, at least in propo1- ‘
tion to the increase of the other objects of revenue. In
this Constitution, a power is given to Congress to collect

0 O O 0 b I
imposts, Whlch IS not 0‘1ven by the present Art1cles of the

Confederation. A very considerable part of the revenue of
the United States Will arise from that source; it is the
easiest, most just, and most productive mode of raising rev—
enue; and it is a safe one, because it is voluntary. No man
is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and each buys
in proportion only to his consumption. The priceof the
commodity is blended with the tax, and the person is often
not sensible of the payment. But would it have been proper
to rest the matter them. 9 Suppose this fund should not
prove sufficient; ought the public debts to remain unpaid,
or the exigencies of government be left unpiovided for?
should our t1anquillity be exposed to the assaults of foreign
enemies, o1 violence among ourselves, because the objects
of commerce may not furnish a sufficient revenue to secure
them all. P Ce1tainly, Congress should possess the power of
raising revenue f1 om their constituents, f01 the purpose men-
tioned in the 8th section of the lst article ; that is, “ to pay
the debts and provide for the common defence and general
Welfare of the United States.” It has been common with i
the gentlemen, 011 this subject, to present us with frightful
pietures. We are told of the hosts of tax-gathercrs that Will .

463 DERA'I‘ 11% [WILSON

swarm tnrougn the land; and whenever taxes we mentioned,
milita1y forbce seems to be an attending idea. I thi11kI may
venture to predict that the taxes of the general gOV',e111111e11t
it any shall be laid, will be more equitable, and much less
expensive, than those imposed by state governments.

I shall not go into an investigation 01 this subject; but it
must he confessed that scarcelyb any mode of laying and col-
lecting taxes can be m01e bu1densome than the present.

Anothe1 objection is, “that Cong1ess may b01row money,
keep up standing a1mies, and command the militia.” The
p1esent Cong1ess possesses the powe1 of b01rowing money
and of keeping up standing a11nies.\Vhethe1 it will be
p1ope1 at all times to keep up a body of t1oops, will be a
question to be detennined by Congress; but I hOpe the
necessity will not subsist at all times. But if it should sub-
sist, where is the gentleman that will say that they ought
not to possess the necessa1y power of keeping them up.P

It is u1ged, as a general objection to this system, that
“the powers of Congress are unlimited and undefined, and
that they will be the judges, in all cases, of what is neces-
sary and proper for them to do.” To bring this subject to
your View, I need do no more than point to the words in
the Constitution, beginningat the 8th sect. art. lst. “The
Congress (it says) shall have power,” 810. I need not read
over the words, but I leave it to every gentleman to say
Whether the powers are not as accurately and minutely
defined, as can be well done on the same subject, in the
same language. The old Constitution is as strongly marked
011 this subject; and even the concluding clause, with which
so much fault has been found, gives no more or other pow-
eis; nor does it, in any degiee, go beyond the paiticu-
lar enume1ation;lor, when it is said that Congress shall
have power to make all laws which shall be necessal y and
proper, those words ale limited and defined by the following,
“f01 car1ying into execution the fmegoing powe1s. ” It is
saying no more than that the powe1s we haVe already partic
ula1ly given, shall be effectually car1ied into execution.

I shall not detain the house, at this time, with any further
observations on the liberty of the press, until it is shown that
Congress have any power whatsoever to interfere With it.
by licensing it to declare what shall be a libel.

I proceed to another objection, which was not so fully

Wagon] PENNSYLVANIA 4639

stated as I believe it will be hereafter ; I mean the objection
against the judicial department. The gentleman from W est—
moreland only mentioned it to illustrate his objection to the
legislative department.

He said, “ that the judicial powers were coextensive with
the legislative powers, and extend even to capital cases.” I
believe they ought to be coextensive; otherwise, laws would
be framed that could not be executed. Certainly, therefore,
the executive and judicial departments ought. to have power
commensurate to the extent of the laws; for, as I have al-
ready asked, are we to give power to make laws, and no
power to carry them into effect? '

I am happy to mention the punishment annexed to one
crime. You will find the current running strong in favor of
humanity; for this is the first instance in which it has not
been left to the legislature to extend the crime and pun-
ishment of treason so far as they thought proper. This
punishment, and the description of this crime, are the great
sources of danger and persecution, on the part of govern-
ment, against the citizen. Crimes against the state! and
against the officers of the state! History informs us that
more wrong may be done On this subject than on any other
whatsoever. But, under this Constitution, there can be no
treason against the United States, except such as is defined
in this Constitution. The manner of trial is clearly pointed
out; the positive testimony of two witnesses to the same
oVert act, or a confession in open court, is required to con—.
vict any person of treason. And, after all, the consequences
of the crime shall extend no further than the life of the
criminal; for no attainder of treason shall work corruption
of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted.

I come now to consider the last set of objections that are
offered against this Constitution. It IS urged that this 18 not
such a system as was within the powers of the Convention ;
they assumed the power of proposing. I believe they might
have made proposals without going beyond their powers. I
never heard, before, that to make a proposal was an exercise
1f power. But if it is an exercise of powe1, they certainly
did assume it; yet they did not act as that body who framed
the present Constitution of Pennsylvania acted; they did
not, by an Oldinance, attempt to rivet the Constitution on

40

4170 DEBATES. [WILSON '

me people, befo1e they could vote for membels of Assembly
under it. Yet such was the effect of the 01dinance that
attended the Constitution of this commonwealth.

I think the late Convention has done nothing beyond their
powers. The fact is, they have exercised no power at all,
and, 1n point of validity, this Constitution, ploposed by theni
for the govelnment of the United States, claims no more
than a ploduction of the same 1121tu1e would claim, flowing
h'om a private pen. It is laid before the citizens of the
United States, unfetteled by 1'est1aint;it is laid hef01e them
to be judged by the 11atu1al, civil, ai1d political rights of
men. By thci1fiat, it will become of value and authority' ,
without it, it will never receive the charatter of authentici-
ty and power. The business, we are told, which was i11-
trusted to the late Convention, was merely to amend the
present Articles of Confederation. This observation has
been frequently made, and has often brought to my mind a
st01y that is related of M1. Pope, who, it is well known,
was not a little defor.med It was c'ustomaly with him to
use this phrase, “God mend me ! ’7 when any little accident
happened. One evening, a link- -boy was lighting him along,
and, coming to a gutter, the boy jumpedD nimbly over it.
M1. Pope called to him to tu111, adding, ‘,‘ God mend me. ' 7’
The arch togue, tu1ni11g to light him, looked at him, and re-
peated, “Gobd mend you! He would soone1 make half—a-
dozen new ones.” This would apply to the p1ese11t C011-
federation; for it would be easier to make another than to
amend this. The gentlemen urge that this is such a gov-
ernment as was not expected by the people, the legislatures,
1101' by the honorable gentlemen who mentioned it. Perhaps
it was not such as was expected, but it may be better; and
is that a reason why it should not be adopted? It is not
worse, I trust, than the former. So that the argument of its
being a system not. expected, is an argument more strong
in its favor than against it.

The letter which accompanies this Constitution must
strike every person with the utmost force.

“The friends of our country have long seen and desired
that the power of war, peace, and treaties, that of levying
money and regulating commerce, and the cor1esponding
executive and judicial autho1ities s, should be fully and effect-
ually vested in the genelal gove1nment of the Union; but

W1LS0N.] PENNSYLVANIA. 117

the impropriety of delegating such extensive t1ust to one
body of men, is evident. Hence results the necessity of a
diflerent organization.” p

I therefore do not think that it can be urged, as an oojec-
tion against this system, that it was not expected bv the
people. We are told, to add greater force to these objec-
tions, that they me not on local but on general principles, and
that they are unifo1m throughout the United States. I con—
fess 1 am not altogether of that opinion; I think some of the
objections a1e inconsistent with others, a1ising from a differ-
ent quarter, and I think some are inconsistent even with
those derived from the same source. But, 011 this occasion,
'let us take the fact for granted, that they are all 011 general
principles, and uniform throughout. the United States. Then
We can judge of their full amount; and what are they, but
trifles light as air? We see the whole force of them; for,
according to the sentiments of opposition, they can nowhere
be stronger, or more fully stated, than here. The conclu-
sion, from all these objections, is reduced to a point, and the
plan is declaied to be inimical to ()UI libe1ties.l have said
nothing, and mean to say nothing, concelning the dispo—
sitions or cha1acters of those that flamed the work now
before you. I agiee that it ought to be judged by its own
intrinsic qualities. If it has not merit, weight of character
ought not to carry it into effect. On the other hand, if it has
merit, and is calculated to secure the blessings of liberty,
and to promote the general welfare, then such objectiOns
as have hitherto been made ought not to influence us to
reject it.

I am now led to consider those qualities that this system
of government possesses, which will entitle it to the attention
of the United States. But as I have somewhat fatiguet'
myself, as well as the patience of the honorable members of
this house, I shall defer what I have to add on this subjec
until the afternoon.

Eodem Die, P. M.—Mr. WILSON. Before I proceet
to consider those qualities in the, Constitution before us
which I think will insure it our apprObation, permit me tt
make some remarks—and they shall be very concise—o
upon the objections that were offered this forenoon, by the
member flom I'ayette, (M1. Smilie.) I do it at this time
because I think it will be better to give a satisfactOIy an

472 DEBATES. [Wmsom

swer to the whole of the objections, before I proceed tc
the other part of my subject. I find that the doctrine 'of a
single legislature is not to be contended for in this Constitu-
tion. 1 shall therefore say nothing on that point. I shall
consider that part of the system, when we come to view its
excellences. Neither shall I take particular notice of his
observation on the qualified negative of the President; for
he finds no fault with it: he mentions, however, that he
thinks it a vain and useless power, because it can never be
executed. The reason he assigns for this is, that the king
of Great Britain, who has an absolute negative over the laws
proposed by Parliament, has never exercised it, at least for
many years. It is true, and the reason Why he did not ex-‘
ercise it was that, during all that time, the king possessed
a negative before the bill had passed through the two houses
—a much stronger power than a negative after debate. I
believe, since the revolution, at the time of William 111., it
was never known that a bill disagreeable to the crown passed
both houses. At one time, in the reign of Queen Anne,
when there appeared some danger of this being effected, it
is well known that she created twelve peers, and by that
means effectually defeated it. Again: there was some risk,
of late years, in the present reign, With regard to Mr. Fox’s
East India Bill, as it is usually called, that passed through the
House of Commons; but the king had interest enough in the
House of Peers to have it thrown out; thus it never came
up for the royal assent. But that is no reason why this
negative should not be exercised here, and exercised with
great advantage. Similar powers are known in more than
one of the states. The governors of Massachusetts and New
York have a power similar to this, and it has been exercised
frequently to good effect.

I believe the governor of New York, under this power, has
been known to send back five or six bills in a week; and I
Well recollect that, at the time the funding system was
adopted by our legislature, the people in that state consid-
ered the negative of the governor as a great security that
their legislature would not be able to encumber them by a
similar measure. Since that time, an alteration has been
supposed in the governor’s conduct, but there has been It"
alteration 1n his power.

The honorable gentleman from \Vestmoreland, ( Mr 1' 'inu‘

WILSON.] PENNSYLV ANIA. £1373

ley,) by his highly—refined critical abilities, discovers a1. in-
consistency in this palt of the Constitution, and that which
declares, in section], “ All legislative powers, herein granted,
shall be vested in a Cong1ess of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Rep1esentatives; ’7
and yet here, says he, 18 a power of legislation g1ven to the
President of the United States, because every bill, before it
becomes a law, shall be p1esented to him. Thus he 18 said
to possess legislative powers. Sir, the Convention observed,
011 this occasion, strict propriety of language : “If he approve
the bill, when it is sent, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall
return it;” but no bill passes in consequence of having his
assent: therefore, he possesses no legislative authority.

The efl'ect of this power, upon this subject, is merely this :‘
if he disapproves a bill, two thirds of the legislature become
necessary to pass it into a law, instead of a bare majority.
And when two thirds are in favor of the bill, it becomes alaw,
not by his, but by authority of the two houses of the legis—
lature. We are told, in the next place, by the honOIable
gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Smilie,) that, in the diffe1ent
orders of mankind, there IS that of a natural a1istoc1acy
On some occasions the1e is a kind of magical exp1essi0n,
used to conjure up ideas that may create uneasiness and
apprehension. I hope the meaning of the words is under-
stood by the gentleman who used them. I have asked
repeatedly of gentlemen to explain, but have not been able
to obtain the explanations of what they meant by a consoli-
dated government. They keep round and round about the
thing, but never define. I ask now what is meant by a
natural aristocracy. I am not at a loss for the etymological
definition of the term; for, when we trace it to the language
from which it is derived, an aristocracy means nothing more
or less than a government of the best men in the community
or those who are recommended by the words of the C011-
stitution of Pennsylvania, where it is directed that the rep-
resentatives should consist of those most noted for wisdom
and vi1tue.ls there any danger 1n such representation " I
shall never find fault that such characters a1e employed.
How happy for us, when such characters can be obtained!
If this is meant by a natural aristocracy,-——and I know no
otl1er,-—can it be objectionable that men should be employed
bat a1e most noted for their virtue and talents? And are

VOL 11. 60

4’17 4 DEBATES. [WILSON

attempts made to mark out these as the most improper per-
sons for the public confidence?

I had the honor of giving a definition —- and I believe it
was a just one — of what is called an aristocratic government
It is a government where the supreme power is not retained
by the people, but resides in a select body of men, Who
either fill up the vacancies that happen, by their own choice
and election, or succeed on the principle of descent, or by
virtue of territorial possessions, or some other qualifications
that are not the result of personal properties. When I speak
of personal properties, I mean the qualities of the head and
the disposition of the heart.

We are told that the representatives will not be known to
the people, nor the people to the representatives, because
they will be. taken from large districts, where they cannot be
particularly acquainted. There has been some experience,
in several of the states, upon this subject; and I believe the
experience of all who had experience, demonstrates that the
larger the district of election, the better the representation.
It is only in remote corners of a government that little dema-
gogues arise. Nothing but real weight of character can give
a man real influence over a large district. This is remark-
ably shown in the commonwealth of Massachusetts. The
members of the House of Representatives are chosen in
very small districts; and such has been the influence of
party cabal, and little intrigue in them, that a great majority
seem inclined to show very little disapprobation of the con-
duct of the insurgents in that state.

The governor is chosen by the people at large, and that
state is much larger than any district need be under the pro—
posed Constitution. In their choice of their governor, they
have had warm disputes; but, however warm the disputes,
their choice only vibrated between the most eminent charac—
ters. Four of their candidates are Well known—Mr. Han-
cock, Mr. Bowdoin, General Lincoln, and Mr. Goreham, the
late president of Congress.

I apprehend it is of more consequence to be able to know
the true interest of the people than their faces, and of more
consequence still to have virtue enough to pursue the means
of carrying that knowledge usefully into effect. And surely,
when it has been thought, hitherto, that a representation, in
Congress, of from five to two members, was sufficient to

WILSON] ' PENNSYLVANIA 4:]

represent the interest of this state, is it not more than suffi
cient to have ten membe1s in that body—and those in a
greater comparative propmtion than heretofore? The cn‘
izens of Pennsylvania will be leplesented by eight, and the
state by two. This, celtainly, though not gaining enough,
is gaining a good deal, the members Will be m01e distlibuted
thlough the state, being the immediate choice of the people,
who hitherto have not been represented in that body. It is
said, that the House of Representatives will be subject to
corruption, and the Senate possess the means of corrupting,
by the Share they have in the appointment to office. This
was not spoken in the soft language of attachment to gov—
ernment. It is, perhaps, impossible, with all the caution of
legislatms and statesmen, to exclude couuption and undue i11-
fluence entirely from government. All that can be done, upon
this subject, IS done 1n the Constitution bef01e y.ou Yet it
behoves us to call out, and add eve1y gua1d and preventive in
our power. I think, sir, something ve1y 11111101 tant on this su b—
iect, is done 111 the present system; f01 it has been piovided,
effectually, that the man that has been b1ibed by an office shall
have it no longer in his power to ea1n his wages. The mo—
ment he 18 engaged to seive the Senate, 111 consequence of their
gift, he no longe1 has it in his powe1 to sit in the House of
Representatives; for “No representative shall, during the term
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office,
under the authority of the United States, which shall have been
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased,
during such time.” And the following annihilates cor—
ruption of that kind: “And no person holdng any office
under the United States shall be a member of either house
during his continuance in office.” So the mere acceptance
of an office, as a bribe, effectually destroys the end for which
it was offered. Was this attended to when it was mentioned
that the members of the one house could be bribed by the
other? “ But the members of the Senate may enrich them-
selves,” was an observation made as an objection to this system.

As the mode of doing this has not been pointed out, 1 ap-
prehend the objection is not much relied upon. The Senate
are incapable of receiving any money, except what is paid
them out of the public treasury. They cannot vote to them-
selves a single penny, unless the proposition originates from
the other house. This objection, therefore, is visionary, like

176 ' DEBATES. [VVthom

the following one — “ that pictured group, that numerous host,
and prodigious swarm of officers, which are to be appointed
under the general government.” The gentlemen tell you
that there must be judges of the supreme, and judges of the
inferior courts, with all their appendages: there will be tax—
gutherers swarming throughout the land. “ O !” say they,
"- if We could enumerate the offices, and the numerous officers
that must be employed every day in collecting, receiving,
and comptrolling, the moneys of the United States, tne num-
ber would be almost beyond imagination.”

I have been told, but I do not vouch for the fact, that
there are, in one shape or another, more than a thousand
persons, in this very state, who get their living by assessing
and collecting our revenues from the other citizens. Sir,
When this business of revenue is conducted on a general
plan, we may be able to do the business of the thirteen
states with an equal, nay, with a less number: instead 0.
thirteen comptroller-generals, one comptroller will be suffi-
cient. Iapprehend that the number of officers, under this
system, will be greatly reduced from the number now em-
ployed ; for, as Congress can now do nothing effectually, the
states are obliged to do every thing; and in this very point
I apprehend that we shall be great gainers.

Sir, I confess I wish the powers of the Senate were not as
they are. I think it would have been better if those powers
had been distributed in other parts of the system. I men—
tioned some circumstances, in the forenoon, that I had
observed on this subject. I may mention now, we may
think ourselves very well off, sir, that things are as well as
they are, and that that body is even so much restricted.
But surely objections of this kind come with a bad grace
from the advocates, or those who prefer the present Confed-
eration, and who wish only to increase the powers of the
present Congress. A single body, not constituted with
checks, like the proposed one, who possess not only the
power of making treaties, but executive powers, would be a
perfect despotism; but further, these powers are, in the
present Confederation, possessed without control.

As I mentioned before, so I will beg leave to repeat, that
this Senate can do nothing without the concurrence of some
other branch of the government. With regard to their
concern in the appointnn to offices, the President must

W1LSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. . 4.77

nominate before they can be chosen; the President must
acquiesce in that appointment. With regard to their power
in forming treaties, they can make none; they are only aux-
iliaries to the President. They must-try all impeachments '
but they have no power to try any until presented by the
House of Representatives ; and when I consider this subject.
though Iwish the regulation better, I think no danger to the
liberties of this country can arise even from that part of the
system. But these objections, I say, come with a bad grace
from those who prefer the present Confederation, who think
it only necessary to add more powers to a body organized in
that form. I confess, likewise, that by combining those
~ poWers of trying impeachments, and making treaties, in the
same body, it will not be so easy, as I think it ought to be,
to call the senators to an account for any improper conduct
in that business.

Those who proposed this system were not inattentive to
do all they could. I admit the force of the observation made
by the gentleman from Fayette, .(Mr. Smilie,) that, when
two thirds of the Senate concur in forming a bad treaty, it
will be hard to procure a vote of two thirds against them, if

they should be impeached. I think such a thing 1s not to be
expected , and so far they are without that unmediate degiee
of responsibility which I think 1equisite to make this pa1t
of the work perfect. But this will not be always the case.
When a member of the Senate shall behave criminally, the
criminality will not expire with his office. The senators
may be called to account after they shall have been changed,
and the body to which they belonged shall have been altered.
There is a rotation; and every second year one third of the
whole number go out. Every fourth year two thirds of them
are changed. In six years the whole body is supplied by a
new one. Considering it in this View, responsibility is not
entirely lost. There is another view in which it ought to be
considered, which will show that we have a greater degree
of security. Though they may not be convicted on impeach—
ment before the Senate, they may be tried by their country;
and if their criminality is established, the law will punish.
A grandjury may present, a petty jury may convict, and the
judges will pronounce the punishment. This is all that can
be done under the present Confederation, for Under it tnere
is 110 power of impeachment; even here, then, we gain.

t7 8 DEBATES. [WILSON

somethincr. Those parts that are exceptiouable, in this C011-
stitution, are improvements on that concerning which so
much pains are taken, to persuade us that it is preferable to
the other. -

The last, observation respects the judges. It is said that.
if they are to decide against the law, one house will impeach
them, and the other will convict them. I hope gentlemen
Will show how this can happen ; for bare supposition ought not
to be admitted as proof. The judges are to be impeached,
because they decide an act null and void, that was made
in defiance of the Constitution ! What House of Represen-
tatives would dare to impeach, or Senate to commit, judges
for the performance of their duty? These observations are-
of a similar kind to those with regard to the liberty of the

ress.

[will proceed to take some notice of those qualities in
this Constitution that I think entitle it to our respect and
favor. I have not yet done, sir, with the great principle on
which it stands; I mean the practical recognition of this
doctrine —that, in the United States, the people retain the
supreme powe1.

In giving a definition of the simple kinds of government
known throughout the world I had occasion to describe what
I meant by abde1n0(:1"°acy , and I think I termed it, that gov-
ernment in which the people 1etai11 the sup1eme power, band
exelcise it eithe1 collectively 01 by 1ep1esentation. This
Constitution declares this p1inciple,1n its terms and in its
consequences, which 18 evident from the manner in which 1t
is announced. “I’Ve, the People of the United States.”
Afte1 all the examination which I am able to give the sub-
ject, Iview this as the only sufficient and most honorable
basis, both fo1 the people and gove1nme11t,on which our
Constitution can possibly lest. What a1e all the contli-
vances of states, of kingdoms, and empi1es. P What are theV
all intended fo1. 9 They a1e all intended for man , and our
natural chaiacter and natural rights are certainly to take
place, 1n prefe1e11ce to all attificial 1efinements that human
Wisdom can devise.

I am astonished to hear the ill-founded doctrine, that the
states alone ought to be represented in the federal govei 11-
ment; these must possess sove1eign authority, forsooth,a11d
the peOple be fo1got. No. Let us reascend to fi1st prinri

W1LSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 479

ples. That expression is not strong enough to do my Ideas
JUSthC.

Let us retain first principles. The people of the United
States are now in the possession and exercise of thei1 origi-
nal rights , and w hile this doct1ine 1s known, and operates,
we shall have a cure for every disease.

I shall mention another good quality belonging to this
system. In it the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
are kept nearly independent and distinct. I express myself
in this guarded manner, because I am aware of some powers
that are blended in the Senate. They are but few; and
they are not dangerous. It is an exception; yet that ex-
ception consists of but few instances, and none of them dan-
gerous. I believe in no constitution for any country on‘
earth is this great principle so strictly adhered to, or marked
with so much precision and accuracy, as this. It is much
more accurate than that which the honorable gentleman
so highly extols: I mean, the constitution of England.
Thele, sir, one branch of the legislature can appoint mem-
be1s of another. The king has the power of int1oducing
members into the House of L01d.s I have aheady men-
tioned that, in order to obtain a vote, twelve peers were
poured into that house at. one time. The operation is the
same as might be under this Constitution, if the P1esident
had a right!3 to appoint the membels of the Senate. This
power of the king extends into the other b1anch, where,
though he cannot immediately introduce a membel, yet he
can do it remotely, by vi1tue of his pre1ogative, as he may
c1eate boroughs with power to send membels to the House
of Commons. The House of Lo1ds f01m a much st1onge1
exception to this principle than the Senate in this system;
for the House of Lords possess judicial powers —— not only
that of trying impeachments, but that of trying their own,
members, and civil causes, when brought before them from
the courts of chancery and the othe1 courts in England.

If we theref01e consider this Constitution with regard to
this special object, though 1t is not so pe1fect as I could wish,
yet it is more pe1fect than any government that I know.

I proceed to another property, which I think will recom
mend it to those Who consider the effects of beneficence and
wisdom; I mean the division of this legislative authority into
two branches. I had an opportunity of dilating somewhat

480 DEBATES. [W1LSON.

on this subject before; and as it is not likely to afford a sub-
Ject of debate, I shall take no further notice of it than
barer to mention it. The next good quality that I 1ema1k
is, that the executive authority is one. By this means we
obtain very important advantages. We may discover from
history, from reason, and from experience, the security which
this furnishes. The executive power is better to be trusted
when it has no screen. Sir, we have a responsibility in the
person of our President; he cannot act improperly, and hide
either his negligence or inattention; he cannot roll upon
any other person the weight of his criminality; no appoint-
ment can take place without his nomination; and he is
responsible for every nomination he makes. We secure
vigor. We well know what numerous executives are. \Ve
know there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility, 1n
them. Add to all this, that officer is placed high, and is
possessed of power fa1 from being contemptible; yet not a
single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being
above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private
character as a citizen, and in his public character by im-
peachment.

Sir, it has often been a matter of surprise, and frequently
complained of even in Pennsylv,ania that the independence
of the judges 1s not p1operly secured. The servile depend-
ence of the judges, in some of the states that have neg-
l((:t€d to make proper plovision on this subject, endangers
the liberty and property of the citizen; and I apprehend
that, whenever it has happened that the appointment has
been for a less period than during good behavior, this object
has not been sufficiently secured ; for if, every five or seven
years, the judges are obliged to make court for their appoint-
ment to office, they cannot be styled independent. This is
.not the ease with regard to those appointed under the gen-
eral government; for the judges he1e shall hold their offices
during good behavior. I hope no further objections will be
taken against this part of the Constitution, the consequence
of which will be, that private property, so far as it comes
before their courts, and personal liberty, so far as it is
not forfeited by crimes, will be guarded with firmness and
watchfulness.

It may appear too professional to descend into observations
of this kind; but I believe that public happiness, personal

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. _ A811

liberty, and private property, depend essentially upon the
able and upright determinations of independentjudges.

Permit me to make one more remark 011 the subject of the
judicial department. Its objects are extended beyond the
bounds or power of every particular state, and therefore
must be proper objects of the general government. I do
not recollect any instance where a case can come before the
judiciary of the United States, that could possibly be deter—
mined by a particular state, except one — which is, where
(itizens of the same state claim lands under the grant of
different states; and 1n that instance, the power of the two
states necessarily comes in competition; wherefore there
would be great impropriety in having it determined by
either. .

Sir, I think there is another subject with regard to which
this Constitution deserves approbation. I mean the accuracy
with which the line is drawn between the powers of the
general government and those of the particular state govern-
ments. We have heard some general observations, 011 this
subject, from the gentlemen who conduct the opposition.
They have asserted that these powers are unlimited and un-
defined. These words are as easily pronounced as limited and
defined. They have already been answered by my honorable
colleague, (Mr. M’Kean ;) therefore I shall not enter into an
explanation. But it is not pretended that the line is drawn
with mathematical precision; the inaccuracy of language
must, to a certain degree, prevent the accomplishment of
such a desire. Whoever views the matter in a true light,
will see that the powers are as minutely enumerated and
defined as was possible, and will also discover that the gen-
eral clause, against which so much exception is taken, is
nothing more than what was necessary to rend-er effectual
the particular powers that are granted.

But let us suppose --and the supposition is very easy in
the minds of the gentlemen on the other side —that there
is some difficulty in ascertaining where the true line lies.
Are we therefore thrown into despair? Are disputes between
the general g0vernment and the state governments to be
necessarily the consequence of inaccuracy? I hope, sir,
they will not be the enemies of each other, or resemble com-
ets in conflicting orbits, mutually operating destruction; but
that their motion will be better represented by that ol“ the.

v01.11.61 41

+82 DEB ATES. [Wusnw

planeta1y system, wl1e1e each part moves harmoniously
Within its p1ope1 sphere, and no i11ju1y arises by inte1fere111c
or Opposition. Eve1y pa1t, I t1ust, will be considered as a
part of the United States. Can any cause of distrust arise
here? Is there any increase of risk.P Or, rather, are not
the enumerated powers as well defined here, as in the
present Articles Of Confederation ?

Permit me to proceed tO what I deem another excellency
of this system: all authority, of every kind, is derived by
REPRESENTATIONfrom the PEOPLE, and the DEMOCRATIC prin-
ciple 13 carried into every part of the government. I had an
opportunity, when I spoke first, of going fully into an eluci
dation of this subject. I mean not now to repeat what I
then said.

I p1oceed to another quality, that I think estimable 111 this
system . 1t secures, m the stlongest manner, the rzght of suf-
fi‘age. flIontesquieu, book 2d, chap. 2d, speaking Of laws

relative to democracy, says, —

“ When the body of the peOple is possessed Of the supreme power, this
is called a democracy. When the supreme power is lodged in the hands
of a part of the people, it is then an aristorrary.

“In a democracy the people are in some respects the sovereign, and in
others the subject.

“ There can be no exercise of sovereignty but by their sufl'rages, which
are their own will. Now, the sovereign’s will is the sovereign himself.
The laws, therefore, which establish the right of suffrage, are fundamental
to this government. And, indeed, it is as important to regulate, in a re-
public, in what manner, by whom, to whom, and concerning what, suf-
frages are to be given, as it is, in a monarchy, to know who is the prince,
and after what manner he ought to govern.”

In this system, it is declared that the electors in each state
shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislature. This being made
the crite1ion of the 1ight of suffiage, it is consequently
seemed, because thes same Constitution guaranties to every
state in the Union a republican form of g01e1nment. The
1ight of suffiage lS fundamental to republics.

Sir, them 18 a11othe1 p1inciple that I beg leave to mention.
Representatzon and drrect taxation, under this Constitution,
are to be according to numbers. As this is a subject which
I believe has not been gone into in this house, it Will be
Worth while to show the sentiments of some respectable
writers thereon. [Wontesquiem in considering the requisites

Wagon] PENNSYLVANIA. 483

in a confederate republic, book 9th, chap. 3d, speaking of
Holland, observes, ‘1' It 1s difficult for the united States to be
all of equal power and extent. The Lycian (StIabo, lib. 131“
republic was an association of twenty—three towns; the large
ones had three votes in the common council, the middling
ones two, and the small towns one. The Dutch republic
consists of seven provinces, of different extent of territory,
Which have each one voice.

“The cities of Lycia (Strabo, lib. 14) contributed to the
expenses of the state, acco1ding to the proportion of suf-
frages. The p1ovinces of the OUnited Netherlands cannot
follow this proportion; they must be directed by that of
their power.

“ In Lycia, (Strabo, lib. 14,) the judges and town magis—
trates were elected by the common council, and accmding
to the proportion already mentioned. In the republic of
Holland, they ale not chosen by the common council, but
each town names its magistr.ates VVe1e I to give a niodel
of an excellent confederate republic, I should pitch upon
that of L ycia ”

I have endeaVOIed, in all the books that I have access to,
to acquire some inforination 1elative to the L yczan republic,
out its hist01y is not to be found, the few facts that relate
to it are mentioned only by Strabo; and however excellent
the model it might present, we were reduced to the neces—
sity of working Without it. Give me leave to quote the sen-
timents of another author, whose peculiar situation and ex—
tensive worth throw a lustre on all he says. I mean Mr.
Neckcr, Whose ideas are very. exalted, both in theory and
practical knowledge, on this subject. He approaches the
nearest to the truth in his calculations from experience, and
it is very remarkable that he makes use of that expression.
His Words are, (Necker on F inancc, vol. i. p. 308,) —

“ Population can therefore be only looked on as an exact measure of'
comparison when the provinces have resources nearly equal; but even
this imperfect rule of proportion ought not to be neglected; and of all the
objects which may be subjected to a determined and positive calculation,
that of the taxes, to the population, approaches_nearest to the truth.”

Another good quality in this Constitution is, that the
members of the legislature cannot hold offices under the
authority of this government. The operation of this, I ap-
prehend, would be found to be very extensive, and very

4-84 DEB ATES. [W-nsox.

salutuary, in this country, to prevent those intrigues,
those factions, that corruption, that would otherwise rise
here, and have risen so plentifully in every other country.
The reason why it is necessary in England to continue such
influence, is, that the crown, in order to secure its own in-
fluence against two other branches of the legislature, must
continue to bestow places; but those places produce the 0})—
position which frequently runs so strong in the British
Parliament.

Members who do not enjoy offices combine against those
who do enjoy them. It is not from principle that they
thwart the ministry in all its operations. N 0; their language
is, Let us turn them out, and succeed to their places. The
great source of corruption, in that country, is, that persons
may hold offices under the crown, and seats in the legislature,
at the same time.

I shall conclude, at present,—and I have endeavored to
be as concise as possible,—with mentioning that, in my
humble opinion, the powers of the general government are
necessary and well defined; that the restraints imposed on
it, and those imposed on the state governments, are rational
and salutary; and that it is entitled to the approbation of
those for whom it was intended.

I recollect, on a former day, the honorable gentleman from
Westmoreland, (Mr. Findley,) and the honorable gentleman
from Cumberland, (Mr. W hitehill,) took exceptions against
the lst clause of the 9th sect., art. 1, arguing, very un-‘
fairly, that, because Congress might impose a tax or duty of
ten dollars on the importation of slaves, within any of the
United States, Congress might therefore permit slaves to be
imported within this state, contrary to its laws. I confess,
Ilittle thought that this part of the system would be ex-
cepted to. '

lam sorry that it could be extended no farther; but so
far as it operates, it presents us with the pleasing prospect
that the rights of mankind will be acknowledge-d and estab-
lished throughout the Union.

If there was no other lovely feature in the Constitution
but this one, it would diffuse a beauty over its whole coun—
tenance. Yet the lapse of a few years, and Congress will
have power to exterminate slavery from within our borders.

How would such a delightful prospect expand the breast of

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4.85

a benevolent and philanthropic European! Would he cavil
at an expression? catch at a phrase .9 No, sir, that is only
reserved for the gentleman on the other side of your chair to
do. What would be the exultation of that great man.
Whose name I have just now mentioned, we may learn from
the following sentiments on this subject; they cannot be
expressed so well as in his own words (vol. 1, page 329.)

“ The colonies of France contain, as we have seen, near five hundred
thousand slaves; and it is from the number of these wretches the inhabit-
ants set a value on their plantations. What a fatal prospect, and how
profound a subject for reflection! Alas! how inconsequent we are, both
in our morality and our principles! We preach up, humanity, and yet go
every year to bind in chains twenty thousand natives ofAfrica. We call
the Moors barbarians and ruflians, because they attack the liberty of En-
ropeans at the risk of their own ; yet these Europeans go, without danger,
and as mere speculators, to purchase slaves, by gratifying the cupidity of
their masters, and excite all those bloody scenes which'are the usual pre-
liminaries of this traffic ! In short, we pride ourselves on the superiority
of man, and it is with reason that we discover this superiority in the won-
derful and mysterious unfolding of the intellectual faculties; and yet the
trifling difference in the hair ofthe head, or in the color of the epidermis,
is sufficient to change our respect into contempt, and to engage us to place
beings like ourselves in the rank of those animals devoid of reason, whom
we subject to the yoke, that we may make use of their strength and of
their instinct at command.

“ I am sensible, and I grieve at it, that these reflections, which others
have made much better than I, are unfortunately of very little use! The
necessity of supporting sovereign power has its peculiar laws, and the
wealth of nations is one of the foundations of this power : thus the sove-
reign who should be the most thoroughly convinced of what is due to hu-
manity, would not singly renounce the service of Slaves in his colonies :
time alone could furnish a population of free people to replace them, and
the great difference that would exist in the price of labor would give so
great an advantage to the nation that should adhere to the old custom, that
the others would soon be discouraged in wishing to be more virtuous.
And yet, would it be a chimerical project to propose a general compact, by
which all the European nations should unanimously agree to abandon the
trallic of African slaves! they would, in that case, find themselves exactly
in the same proportion, relative to each other, as at present; for it is only
on comparative'riches that the calculations of power are founded.

“ We cannot as yet indulge such hopes; statesmen in general think
that every common idea must be a low one; and since the morals of pri-
vate people stand in need of being curbed and maintained by the laws,
we ought not to wonder if those of sovereigns conform to their inde-
pendence.

“The time may nevertheless arrive, when, fatigued of that ambition
which agitates them, and of the continual rotation of the same anxieties
and the same plans, they may turn their views to the great principles of
humanity; and if the present generation is to be witness of this happy .
revolution, they may at least be allowed to be unanimous in offering up

486 DE BATES. [WILSOI‘L

their vows for the perfection of the social virtues, and for the progress of
public beneficial institutions.”

These are the enlarged sentiments of that great man.

Permit me to make a single observation, in this place, on
the restraints placed on the state governments. If only the
following lines Were inserted in this Constitution, I think it
would be worth our adoption: “ No state shall hereafter emit
bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a
tender in payment of debts; pass any bills of attainder, ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
Fatal experience has taught us, dearly taught us, the value
of these restraints. What is the consequence even at this
moment? It is true, we have no tender law in Pennsylvania;
but the moment you are conveyed across the Delaware, you
find it haunt your journey, and follow close upon your heels.
The paper passes commonly at twenty—five or thirty per cent.
discount. How insecure is property!

These are a few of those properties in this system,
that, I think, recommend it to our serious attention, and
will entitle it to receive the adoption of the United States.
Others might be enumerated, and others still will probably
be disclosed by experience.

FRIDAY, December 7, 1787, A. M.-——Mr. WILSON.
This is the first time that the article respecting the judicial
department has come directly before us. I shall therefore
take the liberty of making such observations as will enable
honorable gentlemen to see the extent of the views of the
Convention in forming this article, and the extent of its
probable operation.

This will enable gentlemen to bring before this house their
objections more pointedly than, Without any explanation,
could be done. Upon a distinct examination of the different
powers, I presume it will be found that not one of them is
unnecessary. lwill go farther—there is not one of them
but will be discovered to be of such a nature as to be attended
with very important advantages. I shall beg leave to pre-
mise one remark—that the Convention, When they formed
this system, did not expect they were to deliver themselves,
their relations, and their posterity, into the hands of such
men as are described by the honorable gentlemen in oppo-
sition. They did not suppose that the legislature, under this
Constitution, would be an association (y’ demons They

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 487

thought that a prOper attention would be given, by the citi~
zens of the United States, at the general election for mem~
bers to the House of Representatives; they also believed that
the particular states would nominate as good men as they
have heretofore done, to represent them in the Senate. II
they should now do otherwise, the fault will not be in Con-
gress, but in the people or states themselves. I have men-
tioned, oftener than once, that for a people wanting to them-
selves there is no remedy.

The Convention thought fu1the1, (for 011 this very subject
there will appear caution, instead of imprudence, in thei1
t1ansactions;) they considered, that if suspicions me to be e11-
tertained, they are to be entertained With regard to the objects
in Which government have separate interests and separate
views from the interest and views of the pe0ple. To say
that-officers of government will oppress, when nothing can
be got by oppression, is making an inference, bad as hu-
man nature is, that cannot be allowed. When persons can
derive no advantage from it, it can never be expected they
Will sacrifice either their duty or their popularity.

Whenever the genergal 0oveinment Can be a party against
a citizen, the t1ial 1s guarded and secu1ed 1n the Constitution
itself, and theref01e it is not in its power to oppress the citi-
zen. In the case of t1eason, for example, thoughthe prose-
cution is 011 the part of the United States, yet the Congress
can neither define nor try the crime. If we have recourse
to the history of the different governments that have hitherto
subsisted, we shall find that a very great part of their tyranny
over the people has arisen from the extension of the definition
of treason. Some very remarkable instances have occurred,
even in so flee a country as England. If] recollect 1ight,
there IS one instance that puts this matteI in a ve1y st1ong

oint of vieW. A person possessed a favo1ite buck, and, on
finding it killed, Wished the horns 1n the belly of the person
Who killed it. This happened to be the king. the inju1ed
complainant was tried, and convicted of treason for Wishing
the king’s death.

I speak only of free governments; for, in despotic ones,
treason depends entirely upon the will of the prince. Let
this subject be attended to, and it will be discovered Where
the dangerous power of the government operates 011 the op—
pression of tne people. Sensible of this, the Convention

$88 DEBAT ES. [WILSON

has guarded the people against it, by a particular and accu-
rate definition of treason.

[t is very true that trial by jury is not mentioned in civil
cases; but I take it that it is very impr0per to infer from
hence that it was not meant to- exist under this government.
Where the people are represented, where the interest of
government cannot be separate from that of the people, (and
this is the case in trial between citizen and citizen,) the
power of making regulations with respect to the mode of
trial may certainly be placed in the legislature; for I appre—
hend that the legislature will not do wrong in an instance
from which they can derive no advantage. These were not
all the reasons that influenced the Convention to leave it to
the future Congress to make regulations on this head.

By the Constitution of the different states, it will be found
that no particular mode of trial by jury could be discOvered
that would suit them all. The manner of summoningjurors,
their qualifications, of whom they should consist, and the
course of their proceedings, are all different in the different
states; and I presume it will be allowed a good general
principle, that, in carrying into effect the laws of the general
government by the judicial department, it will be proper to
make the regulations as agreeable to the habits and wishes
of the particular states as possible ; and it is easily discovered
that it would have been impracticable, by any general regu—
lation, to give satisfaction to all. We must have thwarted
the custom of eleven or twelve to have accommodated any
one. Why do this when there was no danger to be ap-
prehended from the omission? We could not go into a
particular detail of the manner that would have suited each
state.

Time, reflection, and experience, will be necessary to sug-
gest and mature the proper regulations on this subject; time
and experience were not possessed by the Convention; they.
left it therefore to be particularly organized by the legisla~
ture —the representatives of the United States—from time
to time, as should be most eligible and proper. Could they
have done better?

I know, in every part where opposition has arisen, what a
handle has been made to this objection; but I trust, upon
examination, it will be seen that more could not have been
dane with propriety. Gentlemen talk of bills of rights.

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 489

What is the meaning of this continual clamor, after what has
been urged? Though it may be proper, in a single state, whose
legislature calls itself the sovereign and supreme power,
yet it would be absurd in the body of the people, when they
are delegating from among themselves persons to transact
certain business, to add an enumeration of those things
which they are not to do. “But trial by jury is secured in
the bill of rights of Pennsylvania; the parties have a right
to trials by jury, which ought to be held sacred.” And what. is
the consequence? There have been more Violations of this
right in Pennsylvania, since the revolution, than are to be
found in England in the c0urse of a century.

I hear no objection made to the tenure by which the
judges hold their offices; it is declared that the judges shall
hold them during good behavior ;—nor to the security which
they will have for their salaries; they shall, at stated times,
receive for their services a compensation which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office.

The article respecting the judicial department is objected
to as going too far, and is supposed to carry a very indefinite
meaning. Let us examine this: “The judicial power shall
extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution and the laws of the United States.” Controver- ’
sies may certainly arise under this Constitution and the laws
of the United States, and is it not proper that there should
be judges to decide them? The honorable gentleman from
Cumberland (Mr. Whitehill) says that laws may be made
inconsistent with the Constitution; and that therefore the
powers given to the judges are dangerous. For my part,
Mr. President, I think the contrary inference true. If a
law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested
by this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence
of their independence, and the particular powers of govern
ment being defined, Will declare such law to be null and
void; for the power of the Constitution predominates. Any
thing, therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress contrary
thereto, will not have the force of law.

The judicial power extends to all cases arising under
treaties made, or which shall be made, by the United States.
I shall not repeat, at this time, what has been said with re-
gard to the power of the states to make treaties ; it cannot '
be controverted, that, when made, they ought to be observed

VOL. II. 62

’190 DEBATES. [WILSON

But 1t is highly prope1 that this regulation should le made:
for the truth 15,— and I am sorry to say it, —that, in order
to prevent the payment of British debts, and flom other
causes, our treaties have been violated, and violated, too, by
the express laws of several states in the Union. Pennsyl-
vania—to her honor be it spoken—has hitherto done no
act of this kind; but it is acknowledged 011 all sides, that.
many states in the Union have infringed the treaty; and it
is well known that, when the minister of the United States
made a demand of Lord Carmarthen of a surrender of the
western posts, he told the minister, with truth and justice,
“The treaty under which you claim those possessions has
not been performed 011 your part; until that is done, those
possessions will not be delivered up.” This clause, sir, will
show the world that we make the faith of treaties a c011—
stitutional part of the character of the United States; that
we secure its performance no longer nominally, for the
judges of the United States will be enabled to carry it
into effect, let the legislatures of the different states do what
they may.

The power of judges extends to all cases affecting ambas-
sadors, other public ministers, and consuls. I presume very
little objection will be offered to this clause; on the contrary,
it will be allowed proper and unexceptionable.

This will also be allowed with regard to the following
clause: “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”

The next is, “ t0 controversies to which the United States
shall be a party.” Now, I apprehend it is something very
incongruous, that, because the United States are a party, it
should be urged, as an objection, that their judges ought not
to decide, when the universal practice of all nations has, and
unavoidably must have, admitted of this power. But, say the
gentlemen, th's oveieig'nty of the states is destroyed, if they
should be engaged 111 a controvelsy with the United States,
because a suiter in a cou1t must acknowledge the julisdic-
tion of that court, and it is not the custom of sovereigns to
suffer thei1 names to be made use of 111 this manner. The
answer is plain and easy: the government of each state
ought to be subordinate to the government of the United
States.

“ To controversies between two or more states.” This pow-
cr is vested 1n the p1esent Congress; but they are unable, as

WILSON PENNSYLVANIA. 491

I have already shown, to enforce their decisions. The ad-
ditional power of carrying their decree into execution, we
find, is tlwrelore necessary, and I presume no exception will
be taken to it.

“Between a state and citizens of another state.” When
this power is attended to, it will be found to be a necessary
one. Impartiality is the leading feature in this Constitu-
tion; it pervades the whole. W hen a citizen has a contro—
versy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal/where
both parties may stand on a just and equal footing. '

“Between citizens of dififerent states, and between a state,
or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.”
This part of the jurisdiction, I presume, will occasion more
- doubt than any other part; and, at first View, it may seem
exposed to objections well founded and of great weight; but
I apprehend this can be the case only at first View. Permit
me to observe here, with regard to this power, or any other
of the foregoing powers given to the federal court, that they
are not exclusively given. In all instances, the parties may
commence suits in the courts of the several states. Even
the United States may submit to such decision if they think
proper. Though the citizens of a state, and the citizens or
subjects of foreign states, may sue in the federal court, it_
does not follow that they must sue. These are the instances
in which the jurisdiction of the United States may be exer-
cised; and we have all the reason in the world to believe
that it will be exercised impartially ; for it would be improper
to infer that the judges would abandon their duty, the
rather for being independent. Such a sentiment is con—
trary to experience, and ought not to be hazarded. If
the people of the United States are fairly represented, and
the President and Senate are wise enough to choose men of
abilities and integrity for judges, there can be no apprehen-
sion, because, as I mentioned before, the government can
have no interest in injuring the citizens.

But when we consider the matter a little further, is it not
necessary, if we mean to restore either public or private
credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have ajust and
impartial tribunal to which they may resort? I would ask
how a merchant must feel to have his property lie at the mercy
of the laws of Rhode Island. I ask, further, How will a creditor
feel who has his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other

[1.92 'DEBATES. [‘Wusou.

states ? l t is true that, under this Constitution, these partic-
ular iniquities may be rest1ained in future ,but, sir, there are
Other ways of avoiding payment of debts. There have been
instalment acts, and tiother acts of a similar effect. Such
things, sir, destroy the very sources of credit.

Is it not an important object to extend our manufactures
and our commerce .9 This cannot be done, unless a proper
security is provided for the regular discharge of contracts.
This security cannot be obtained, unless we give the power
of deciding upon those contracts to the general government.

I will mention, further, an object that I take to be of par-
ticular magnitude, and I conceive these regulations will pro
duce its accomplishment. The object, Mr. President, that
I allude to, is the improvement of our domestic navigation, the
instrument of trade between the several states. Private
credit, which fell to decay from the destruction of public
credit, by a too inefficient general government, will be
1esto1ed; and this valuable intercourse among ourselves
must give an increase to those useful implovements that will . .
astonish the world. At present, how are we circumstanced!
Merchants ofeminence will tell you that they cannot trust their
property to the laws of the state in which their corre-
spondents live. Their friend may die, and may be succeeded
by a representative of a very different character. If there
is any particular objection that did not occur to me on this
part of the Constitution, gentlemen will mention it; andI
hope, when this article is examined, it will be found to con-
tain nothing but what is proper to be annexed to the general
government The next clause, so‘far as it gives 01iginal
jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, I applehend, is
perfectly unexceptionable.

It was thought p10per to give the citizens of fo1eign states
full opportunity of obtaining justice in the general courts,
and this they have by its appellate .ju1isdiction; therefore, 111
order to restore credit with those foreign states, that part of
the article is necessary. I believe the alteration that will
take place in their minds when they learn the Operation of
this clause, will be a great and important advantage to our
country , n01 is it any thing but ‘jUStlLe they ought to have
the same security against the state laws that may be made,
that the citizens have; because regulations ought to be
equally just in the one case as in the other. Further, it is

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 4.9:)

necessary in order to preserve peace with foreign nations.
Let. us suppose the case, that a wicked law is made in some
one of the states, enabling a debtor to pay his creditor with
the fourth, fifth, or sixth part of the real value of the debt,
and this creditor, a foreigner, complains to his prince or sov-
ereign, of the injustice that has been done him. What can
that prince or sovereign do? Bound by inclination, .as well
as duty, to redress the wrong his subject sustains from the
hand of perfidy, he cannot apply to the particular guilty state,
because he knows that, by the Articles of Confederation, it
is declared that no state shall enter into treaties. He must
therefore apply to the United States; the United States
must be accountable. “ My subject has received a flagrant
injury: do me justice, or I will do myself justice.” If the
United States are answerable for the injury, ought they not
to possess the means of compelling the faulty state to repair
it? They ought; and this is what is done here. For now,
if complaint is made in consequence of such injustice, Con-
gress can answer, “Why did not your subject apply to the
General Court, where the unequal and partial laws of a
particular state would have had no force ? ”
' In two cases the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction ——
that affecting ambassadors, and When a state shall be a
party. It is true it has appellate jurisdiction in more, but it
will have it under such restrictions as the Congress shall
ordain. I believe that any gentleman, possessed of experi-
ence or knowledge on this subject, will agree that it was
impossible to go further with any safety or prOpriety, and
that it was best left in the manner in which it now stands.
“ In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and
fact.” The jurisdiction as to fact may be thought im-
proper; but those possessed of information on this head
see that it is necessary. We find it essentially necessary
from the ample experience we have had in the courts of
admiralty with regard to captures. Those gentlemen who,
during the late war, had their vessels retaken, know well
What a poor chance they would have had when those vessels
were taken in their states and tried by juries, and in what a
situation they would have been if the Court of Appeals had
not been possessed of authority to reconsider and set aside
the verdicts of those juries. Attempts were made by some
2

4941 DEBATES. [\VILSON.

of the states to destroy this power; but it has been con-
firmed in every instance.

There are other cases in which it will be necessary; and
will not Congress better regulate them, as they rise f10m
time to time, than could have 23been done by the Convention. '
Besides, if the regulations shall be attended with Inconve-
nience, the Congress can alter them as soon as discovered. But
any thing done in Convention must remain unalterable but
by the power of the citizens of the United States at large.

I think these reasons will show that the powers given to
the Supreme Court are not only safe, but constitute a Wise
and valuable part of the system.

TUESDAY, December 11, 1787, A. M.—Mr. WILSON
Three weeks have now elapsed since this Convention met.
Some of the delegates attended on Tuesday, the 20th
November ; a great majority within a day or two afterwards ;
and all but one on the 4th day. We have been since em-
ploy ed 111 discussing the business for which we a1e sent here.
I think it will now become evident to evely person who
takes a candid view of our discussions, that it is high time
our proceedings should draw towards a conclusion.

Perhaps our debates have already continued as long, nay,
longer than is sufficient for every good purpose. The busi-
ness which we were intended to perform is necessarily re-
duced to a very narrow compass. The single question to be
determined is, Shall we assent to and ratify the Constitution
proposed P

As this is the first state whose Convention has met on the
subject, and as the subject itself is of very great importance,
not only to Pennsylvania, but to the United States, it was
thought proper fairly, openly, and candidly to canvass it.
This has been done. You have heard, Mr. President, from
day to day, and from week to week, the objections that
could be offered from any quarter. We have heard these
objections once: we have heard a great number of them
1epeated much oftenet than once. Will it answer any
valuable end, sir, to protlact these debates longer? I sup
pose it will not. I applehend it may serve to promote very
pernicious and destiuctive purposes. It may, perhaps, be
insinuated to other states, and even to distant parts of this
state, by people 111 opposition to this system, that the expe-
diency of gdoi ting is at most very doubtful, and that the
busin 1ss lingers among the members of the Convention

WILSON ] PENNSYLVANIA. 1195

This would not be a true representation of the fact; for
there is the greatest reason to believe that there is a very
considerable majority who do not hesitate to ratify the C011—
stitution. We were sent here to express the voice of our
constituents 011 the subject, and I believe that many of them
expected to hear the echo of that voice before this time.

When I consider the attempts that have been made on
this floor, and the many misrepresentations of what has
been said among us that have appeared in the public papers,
printed in this city, I confess that I am induced to suspect
that opportunity may be taken to pervert and abuse the
principles on which the friends of this Constitution act. If
attempts are made here, will they not be repeated when
the distance is greater, and the means of information fewer?
Will they not at length produce an uneasiness, for which
there is, in fact, no cause? Ought we not to prohibit any
such uses being made of the continuance of our delibera-
tions? We do not Wish to preclude debate: of this our
conduct has furnished the most ample testimony. The
members in opposition have not been prevented a repetition
of all their objections that they could urge against this plan.

The honorable gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Smilie,)
the other evening, claimed for the minority the merit of
contending for the rights of mankind; and he told us that
it has been the practice of all ages to treat such minorities
with contempt; he further took the liberty of observing,
that, if the majority had the power, they do not want the
inclination, to consign the minority to punishment. I know
that claims, self-made, form no small part of the merit to
which we have heard undisguised pretences; but it is one
thing to claim, and it is anothei thing, very diffelent indeed,
to support that claim. lhe minority, si1, are contending
for the rights of mankind; What, then, ale the majority con-
tending fO1. ? If the minority are contending for the rights
of mankind, the majority must be contending fo1 the doc-
t1ines of tyianny and slaveiy. Is it p1obable that that IS the
case? Who are the majority in this assembly ? —— Are they
not the people? are they net‘ the representatives of the
people, as well as the minority? Were they not elected
by the people, as well as the minority? Were they not elected
by the greater part of the people? Have we a single right
separate from the rights of the people ? Can we forge fetters

496 DEBATES. [VVILSON

for others that will not be clasped round our own limbs 3 Can
we make heavy chains that shall not cramp the growth of
our own posterity? On what fancied distinction shall the
minority assume to themselves the merit of contending for
the rights of mankind?

Si1, if the system proposed by the late Convention, and
the conduct of its advocates who have appeared 1n this house,
deserve the declarations and insinuations that have been
made concerning them, well may we exclaim, “ Ill-fated
America! thy crisis was approaching! perhaps it was
come! Thy various interests were neglected—thy most
sacred rights were insecure. Without a government, with-
out energy, without confidence internally, without respect
externally, the advantages of society were lost to thee ! In
such a situation, distressed, but not despairing, thou desiredst
to reassume thy native vigor, and to lay the foundation of
future empire. Thou selectedst a number of thy sons, to
meet together for the purpose. The selected and honored
characters met ; but, horrid to tell, they not only consented,
but they combined in an aristocratic system, calculated and
intended to enslave their country! Unhappy Pennsylvania!
thou, as a part of the Union, must share in its unfortunate
fate; for when this system, after being laid before thy
citizens, comes before the delegates selected by them for its
consideration, there are found but three of the numerous
members that have virtue enough to raise their voices in
support of the rights of mankind!” America, particularly
Pennsylvania, must be ill-starred, indeed, if this is a true
state of the case. I trust we may address our country in far
othe1 language.

“Happy America! thy crisis was indeed alarming, but thy
s1tuation was not desperate. We had confidence in our
count1y; though, 011 whichever side we turned, we were
presented witht3 scenes of distress. Though the jarring in-
terests of the various states, and the different habits and
inclinations of their inhabitants, all lay in the way, and
rendered our prospect gloomy and discouraging indeed, yet
such. were the generous and mutual sacrifices offered up,
that, amidst forty-two members, who represented twelve of
the United States, there were only three who did not attest
the instrument, as a confirmation of its goodness. Happy

Pennsylvania! this plan has been laid befgre thy citizens for

WILSON.J PENNSYLVANIA. . 497

consideration; they have sent delegates to express their
voice; and listen —with raptule listen! — from only three
opposition has been heard against it. ”

Ihe singular unanimity that has attended the whole plog-
ress of their business, will, 111 the minds of those considerate
men who have not had opportunity to examine the general
and pa1ticu|a1 interest of then country, prove, to their satis-
faction, that it is an excellent Constitution, and worthy to
be adopted, o1dained, and established, by the peOple of the
United States.

After having viewed the arguments d1awn from probabili—
ty, whether this is a good 01 a bad system, whethe1 those
who (ontend for it, or those who contend against it, contend
for the rights of mankind, let us step forward and examine
the fact.

We were told, some days ago, by the honorable gentle
man from Westmoreland, (Mr. Findley,) when speaking of
this system and its objects, that the Convention, no doubt,
thought they were forming a compact, or contract, of the
greatest impor.tance Sh, I confess I was much surplised,
at so late a stage of the debate, to hem such principles
maintained. It was a matter of su1prise to see the great
leading p1inciple of this system still so very much misunder-
stood. “The Convention, no doubt, thought they were
forming a contract!” I cannot answer for What every
member thought; but I believe it cannot be said that they
thought they were making a contract, because I cannot dis-
cover the least trace of a compact in that system. There
can be no compact unless there are more parties than one.
It is a new doctrine that one can make a compact with
himself. '“ The Convention were forming compacts ! ” With
whom? I know no bargains that were made there. I am
unable to conceive Who the parties could be. The state
governmentsmake a bargain with one another; that is the
dortrine that is endeavored to be established by Gentlemen
in opposition,-.—that state soveleignties wish to be lepre-
sented! But far other were the ideas of the Convention,
and far other are those convey ed in the system itself.

As this subject has been often mentioned, and as often
misunde1stood, it may not he improper to take some furthe1
notice of it. This, Mr. President, is not a government
founded .upon compact; it ‘is founded upon the power of

VOL. 11.

498 DEBATES. [WILSON

the people They express in their name and their authority
-—“ We, the people, do ordain and establish,” &c. from
their ratification alone it is to take its constitutional authen—
ticity; without that, it is no more than tabula rasa.

I know very well all the common-place rant of state
sovereignties, and that government is founded in original
compact. If that position was examined, it will be found
not to accede very well with the true principle of free gov-
ernment. It does not suit the language or genius of the
system before us. I think it does not accord with experi-
ence, so far as I have been able to obtain information from
history.

The greatest part of governments have been founded on
conquest: perhaps a few early ones may have had their
origin in paternal authority. Sometimes a family united,
and that family afterwards extended itself into a community.
But the greatest governments which have appeared 011 the
face of the globe have been founded'in conquest. The
great empires of Assyria, Persia, Macedonia, and Rome,
were all of this kind. I know well that in Great Britain,
since the revolution, it has become a principle that the con—
stitution is founded in contract; but. the form and time of
that contract, no writer has yet attempted to discover. It
was, however, recognized at the time of the revolution,
therefore is politically true. But We should act very impru-
dently to consider our liberties as placed 011 such foundation.

If we go a little further on this subject, I think we shall
see that the doctrine of original compact cannot be support-
ed consistently with the best principles of government. If
we admit it, we exclude the idea of amendment; because
a contract once entered into between the governor and
governed becomes obligatory, and cannot be altered but by
the mutual consent of both parties. The citizens of united
America,I presume, do not Wish to stand on that footing
with those to whom, from convenience, they please to dele-
gate the exercise of the general powers necessary for sus-
taining and preserving the Union. They wish a p1inciple
established, by the operation of which the legislatures may
feel the diiect authority of the people. The people, pos—
sessingthat authority, will continue to exercise it by amendv
ing and 1mproving thei1 own work. TlllS Constltution may
be found to have defects in it; hence amendments may

W1LSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 1199

become necessary; but the idea of agovernment founded
on contract destroys the means of improvement. We hear
it eveiy time the gentlemen are up, “ Shall we violate the
Confederation, which directs every altelation that IS thought
necessary to be established by the state legislatmes only!”
Sir, those gentlemen must ascend to a higher sou1ce: the
people fetter themselves by no contract. If your state legis-
latures have cramped themselves by compact, it was done
without the authority of the people, who alone possess the
supreme power. '

I have already shown that this system is not a compact,
or contract; the system itself tells you what it is; it is an
ordinance and establishment of the people. I think that
the force of the introduction to the work must by this time
have been felt. It 18 not an unmeaning flou1ish. The ex—
pressions declare, 111 a practical manner, bthe principle of this
Constitution. It IS ordained and established by the peOple
themselves; and we, who give our votes for it, are merely
the p1oxies of our constituents. We sign it as tl1ei1 attor—
neys, and, as to ourselves, We agree to it as individuals.
. , We are told, by hono1able gentlemen 1n opposition, “that
the plesent Confede1ation should have been continued, but
that additional powers should have been given to it; that
such was the business of the late Convention, and that they
had assumed to themselves the powe1 of proposing another
in its stead; and that which is p1oposed is such a one as
was not expected by the legislatme 1101 by the people.” I
apprehend this would have been a ve1y insecu1c, very inade-
quate, and a very pernicious mode of p1oceeding. Under
the present Confede1ation, Congress certainly do not possess
. sufficient powe1 , but one body of men we know they ale;
and were they invested with additional powers, they must
become dangerous. Did not the honorable gentleman him-
self tell us that the powe1s of government, vested either in
one man or one body of men, lo1med the very description
of tyranny? To have placed in the present the legisla
tive, the executive, and judicial auth01ity, all of which a1e
essential to the general govemment, would indubitably have
p1oduced the severest despotism. From this sho1t deduc-
tlon, one of these two things must have appeared to the
Convention, and must appea1 to every man who is at the
pains of thinking on the subject. It was indispensably 11e-

500 DEBATES. [\‘V’iLso'N.

cessary either to make a new distribution of the powers of
government, or to give such powers to one bodyIOf menas
would constitute a tyranny. If it is proper to avoid tyranny,
it becomes requisite to avoid placing additional powers in
the hands of a Congress constituted like the present; hence
the conclusion is warranted, that a different organization
ought to take place.

Our next inquiry ought to be, whether this is the most
proper disposition and organization of the necessary powers.
But before I consider this subject, I think it proper to notice
one sentiment, expressed by an honorable gentleman from
the county ofCumberland, (Mr. Whitehill.) He asserts that
the extent of the government is too great, and this system
cannot be executed. \Vhat is the consequence, if this asser—
tion is true? It strikes directly at the root of the Union.

I admit, Mr. President, there are great difficulties in
adapting a system of good and free government to the
extent of our country. But I am sure that our interests, as
citizens, as states, and as a nation, depend essentially upon
a union. This Constitution is proposed to accomplish that
great and desirable end. Let the experiment be made; let
the system be fairly and candidly tried, before it is deter-
mined that it cannot be executed.

I proceed to another objection; for I mean to answer
those that have been suggested since I had the honor of ad-
dressingyou last week. It has been alleged, by hon01able gen-
tlemen, that this general government possesses powers for
internal pu1poses, tiand that the general government cannot
exe1cise internal powers. The honorable membe1 from West-
moreland (Mr. Findley) dilates 011 this subject, and instances
the opposition that was made by the colonies against Great
Britain, to prevent her imposing internal taxes or excises.
And before the federal government will be able to impose
the one, or obtain the other, he considers it necessary that it
should'possess power for every internal purpose.

Let us examine these objections: If this government does
not possess internal as well as external power, and that
power for internal as well as external purposes, I apprehend
that all that has hitherto been done must go for nothing. I
apprehend a government that cannot answe1 the purposes
for which it was intended 15 not a government for this coun-
try. I know that Congiess, under the present Articles of

WILSON-.1 PENNSYLVANIA. 501

Confederation, possess no internal power, and we see the
consequences: they can recommend —they can go further,
they can make requisitions; but there they must stop ; for,
as far as I recollect, after making a law, they cannot take a
isngle step towards carrying it into execution. I believe it
will be found in experience, that, with regard to the exercise
of internal powers, the general government will not be un-
necessarily rigorous. The future collection of the duties and
imposts will, in the opinion of some, supersede the necessity
of having recourse to internal taxation. The United States
will not, perhaps, be often under the necessity of using this
power at all ; but if they should, it will be exercised only in
a moderate degree. The good sense of the citizens of the
United States is not to be alarmed by the picture of taxes
collected at the point of the bayonet. There is no more
reason to suppose that the delegates and representatives in
Congress, any more than the legislatu1e of Pennsylvania, or
any other state, will act in this m21ni1'.e1 lnsinuations of this
kind, made against one body of men, and not against another,
though both the repiesentatives of the people, are not made
with propriety; 1101 will they have the weight of a1 Urument
I apprehend the greatest part of the levenue will arise from
external taxation. But certainly it would have been very
unwise in the late Convention to have omitted the addition
of the other powers; and I think it would be very unwise in
this Convention to refuse to adopt this Constitution, because
it grants Congress power to lay and collect taxes, for the
purpose of providing for the common defence and general
welfare of the United States.

What is to be done to effect these great purposes, if an
impost should be found insufficient? Suppose a war was
suddenly detlared against us by a foreign power, possessed
of a formidable navy , our navigation would be laid prostrate,
ou1 imposts must cease; and shall our existence as a nation
depend upon the peaceful navigation of 0m seas? A strong
exertion of maritime power, on tathe part of an enemy, might
deprive us of these sources of revenue in a few months. It
may suit honorable gentlemen, who live at the western ex-
tremity of this state, that they should contribute nothing, by
internal taxes, to the supportof the general government.
They care not What restraints are laid upon our commerce ;
for what is the commerce of Philadelphia to the inhabitants on

5094'» DEBATES. [WILSON.

the other side of the Alleghany Mountains ? But though it
may suit them, it does not suit those in the lower part of the
state, who are by far the most numerous. Nor can we agree
that our safety should depend altogether upon a revenue
arising from commerce.

Excise may be. a necessary mode of taxation; it takes
place in most states already.

The capitation tax is mentioned as one of those that are
exceptionable. In some states, that mode of taxation is
used; but I believe, in many, it would be received with
great reluctance; there are one or two states where it is
constantly in use, and'without any difficulties and incon-
veniences arising from it. An excise, in its very principles, is
an improper tax, if it could be avoided ; but yet it has been
a source of revenue in Pennsylvania, both before the revolu-
tion and since; during all which time we have enjoyed the
benefit of free government.

I presume, sir, that. the executive poWers of government
ought to be commensurate with the government itself, and
that a government which cannot act in every part is, so far,
defective. Consequently, it is necessary that Congress pos-
sess powers to tax internally, as well as externally.

It is objected to this system, that under it there is no
sovereignty left in the state governments. I have had occa-
sion to reply to this already; but I should be very glad to
know at What period the state governments became possessed
of the supreme power. On the principle on which I found
my arguments, —and that is, the principle of this Constitution,
— the supreme power resides in the people. If they choose
to indulge a part of their sovereign power to be exercised by
the state governments, they may. lf they have done it, the
states were right in exercising it; but if they think it no
longer safe or convenient, they will resume it, or make a
new distribution, more likely to be productive of that good
which ought to be our constant aim.

The powers both of the general government and the state
governments, under this system, are acknowledged to be so
many emanations of power from the people. The great
object now to be attended to, instead of disagreeing about
who shall possess the supreme power, is, to consider whether
the present arrangement is well calculated to promote and
secure the tranquillity and happiness of our common countrv.‘

W1LS0N.] PENNSYLVANIA. 503

These are the dictates of sound and unsophisticated sense,
and What ought to employ the attention and judgment ofthis
honorable body.

We are next told by the hono1able gentleman in oppos1—
tion, (as indeed We have been, flom the beginning of the
debates in this Convention, to the conclusion of thei1
speeches yeste1day,) that this is a consolidated gove1nment,
and will abolish the state governments.

Definitions of a consolidated government have been called
for; the gentlemen gave us what they termed definition, but
it does not seem to me, at least, that they have as yet ex-
pressed clear ideas upon that subject. I will endeavor to
state their different ideas upon this point. The gentleman
.from Westmoreland, (Mr. Findley,) When speaking 011 this
subject, says that he means, by a consolidation, that govern—
ment which puts the thirteen states into one. i

The honorable gentleman flom Fayette (M r Smilie)C Gives
you this definition. “ What I mean by a consolidated gov e1n-.
ment, is one that will transfer the sove1eignty f1om the state
gove1nments to the genelal gove1nment. ’7

The honorable member f1om Cumbe1land, (M1. W lute—
hill ,) instead of giving you a definition, si1, tells you again,
that “it is a consolidated government, and we have proved
it so.”

These, I think, sir, are the diffeient descriptions given to
us of a consolidated government. As to the filst, that it is
a consolidated gove1nment, that puts the thilteeh United
States into one, — if 1t is meant that the general gove1nment
Will destroy the governments of the states, I will admit that
such a government would not suit the people of America.
It would be improper for this country, because it could not
be proportioned to its extent, 011 the principles of freedom.
But that desc1iption does not apply to the system before
you. This, instead of placing the state gove1nments in
jeopa1dy, lS founded on thei1 existence. On this p11nc1ple
its organization depends , it must stand 01 fall, as the state
goveinments are seemed or ruined. Therefme, though this
may be a Very proper description of a consolidated govern-
ment, yet it must be disre galded, as inapplicable to the plo
posed Constitution. It isb not t1eated With decency when
such insinuations are offered against it.

504 DEBATES. [WILSON

The honorable gentleman (M1. Smilie) tells you that a
consolidated govemment “ is one that will transfe1 the sov-
eleignty f1o111 the state governments to the general gove1n-
ment. ’7 Under this system, the sovereignty is not in the
possession of the governments, therefore it cannot be trans-
ferred from them to the general government; so that in no
point of view of this definition can we discover that it applies
to the present system.

I11 the exercise of its powers will be insured the exercise
of their powers to the state governments; it will insure peace
and stability to them; their strength will increase with its
strength; their growth will extend with its growth.

Indeed, 11a11ow minds and some such thele me in every
0‘ove1 11111e11t—11a110w minds and int1iguing spilits will be
active in sow 1110‘ dissensions and pl omotmg discord between
them. But those whose understandings and whose hearts
me good enough to pu1sue the gene1al w elfale, will find
that what is the inte1est of the whole, must, 011 the g1eat
scale, be the i11te1est of eve1y pa1t. It will be the duty of a
state, as of an individual, to sacrifice her own convenience
to-the general good of the Union.

The next objection that I mean to take notice of is, that
the powers of the several parts of this government are not
kept as distinct and independent as they ought to be. I
admit the truth of this general sentiment. I do not think
that, in the powers of the Senate, the distinction is marked
with so much accuracy as I wished, and still wish; but yet
I am of opinion that real and effectual security is obtained,
which is saying a great deal. I do not consider this part as
wholly unexceptionable; but even where there are defects
in this system, they are improvements upon the old. I will
go a little further ; though, in this system, the distinction and
independence of pow’er is not adhered to with entire theo-
retical precision, yet it is more strictly adhered to than in
any other system of government in the world. In the Con~
stitution of Pennsylvania, the executive department exercises
judicial .powels in the t1ial of public officers; yet a similar
po“ e1, in this system, is complained of; at the same time,
the Constitution of Pennsylvania is 1efe11ed to as an ex-
ample for the late Convention to have taken a lesson by.

I11 New Jersey, 111 Gemgia, 111 South Carolina, and North

 

W1LSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 505

Carolina, the executive power is blended with the legisla~
tive. Turn to their constitutions, and see in how many
instances.

In North Carolina, the Senate and House of Commons
elect the governor himself: they likewise elect seven per-
sons to be a council of state, to advise the governor in the
execution of his office. Here we find the whole executive
department under the nomination of the legislature, at least
the most important part of it.

In South Carolina, the legislature appoints the governor
and commander-in-chief, lieutenant—governor and privy coun-
cil. “Justices of the peace shall be nominated by the legis
lature, and commissioned by the governor;” and what is
more, they are appointed during pleasure. All other judicial
officers are to be appointed by the Senate and House of
Representatives. I might go further, and detail a great
multitude of instances, in which the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers are blended; but it is unnecessary; 1
only mention these to show, that, though this Constitution
does not arrive at what is called perfection, yet it contains
great improvements, and its powers are distributed with a
degree of accuracy superior to what is termed accuracy in
particular states.

There are four instances in which improper powers are
said to be blended in the Senate. We are told that this
government is imperfect, because the Senate possess the
power of trying impeachments; but here, sit, the Senate are
under a check, as no impeachment can be tried until it is
made; and the House of Representatives possess the sole
power of making impeachments. We are told that the share
which the Senate have in making treaties is exceptionable;
but here they are also under a check, by a constituent part
of the government, and nearly the immediate representative
of the people ---I mean the President of the United States.
They can make no treaty Without his concurrence. The
same observation applies in the appointment of officers.
Every officer must be nominated solely and exclusively by
the President. ,

Much has been said on the subject of treaties; and this
power is denominated a blending of the legislative and ex.-
ecutive powers in the'Senate. It is but justice to represent
the favorable, as well as unfavorable, side of a question,

VOL. II. 64 43

506 DEBATES. [WILSON

and from thence determine whether the objectionable parts
are of a sufficient weight to induce a rejection of this C011-
stitution.

There is no doubt, sir, but, under this Constitution, trea—
ties Will become the supreme law of the land; nor is there
any doubt but the Senate and President possess the power
of making them. But though the treaties are to have the
force of laws, they are in some important respects very dif-
ferent from other acts of legislation. In making laws, our '
own consent alone is necessary. In forming treaties, the
concurrence of another power becomes necessary. . Treaties,
sir, are truly contracts, or compacts, between the different
states, nations, or princes, who find it convenient or neces-
sary to enter into them. Some gentlemen are of opinion
that the power of making treaties should have been placed
in the legislatule at la1ge; there are, howeve1, 1easons that
operate with g1eat force on the other side. Treaties are
frequently (especially 111 time of wa1) of such a natu1e, that
it would be exttemely improper to publish them, 01 even
commit the sec1et of their negotiation to any great number
of persons F01 my part, I am not an advocate for sec1ecy
in t1 ansactions relating to the public , not genelally even in
forming treaties, because I think that the history of the
diplomatic corps will evince, even in that great department
of politics, the truth of an old adage, that “honesty is the
best policy,” and this is the conduct of the most able negoti-
ators; yet sometimes secrecy may be necessary, and there-
fore it becomes an argument against committing the kno11l-
edge of these transactions to too many pe1sons. But 111 thei1
nature treaties Oliginate differently flom laws. They ale
made by equal pa1ties, and each side has half of the ba1ga1n
to make; they will be made between us and powe1s at
the distance of three thousand miles. A long series of ne-
gotiation will ftequently precede them; and can it be the
opinion of these gentlemen that the legislature should be
in session during this whole time. P It well deserves to be
remarked, that, though the House of Representatives possess
no active part in making treaties, yet their legislative au-
thority will be found to have strong 1est1aining influences
upon both President and Senate. I11 England, bif the king
and his ministers find themselves, during their negotiation,
to be embarrassed because an existing law Is not repealed,

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 507

or a new law is not enacted, they give notice to the leg1s-
lature of their situation, and inform them that it will be
necessary, before the treaty can operate, that some law be
repealed, or some be made. And will not the same thing
take place hele? Shall less prudence, less caution, less
mode1ation, take place among those who negotiate treaties
for the United States, than among those who negotiate them
for the othe1 nations of the earth. And let it bbe attended
to, that, even in the making of treaties, the states are im—
mediately represented, and the people mediately represented ;
two of the constituent parts of government must concur in
making them. Neither the President 1101' the Senate, solely,
can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other,
and are so balanced as to produce security to the people.

I might suggest other reasons, to add weight to what has
already been offered; but I believe it is not necessary; yet
let me, however, add one thing—the Senate is a favorite
with many of the states, and it was with difficulty that these
checks could be procured; it was one of the last exertions
of conciliation, in the late Convention, that obtained them.

It has been alleged, as a consequence of the small number
of representatives, that they will not know, as intimately as
they ought, the interests, inclinations, or habits, of their
constltuents.

We find, 011 an examination of all its parts, that the objects
of this government are such as extend beyond the bounds of
the particular states. This is the line of distinction between
this government and the particular state governments.

This principle I had an opportunity of illustrating 011 a
former occasion. Now, when we come to consider the ob—
jects of this government, we shall find that, in making our
choice of a proper charactei to be a. member of the House
of Replesentatives, we ought to fix on one whose mind and
heart are enla1ged; who possesses a general knowledge of
the interests of Ameiica, and a disposition to make use of
that knowledge f01 the advantage and welfane of his coun-
try. It belongs not to this gove1nment to make an act for
a particular township, county, or state.

A defect in minute inf01mation has not certainly been an
objection in the management of the business of the United
States; but the want bof enlarged ideas has hitherto been
chargeable on our cOuncils; yet, even with 1egard to minute

508 DEBATES. [WILSON

knowledge, I do not conceive it impossible to find eight
characters that may be very well informed as to the situation,
interests, and views, of every part of this state, and who may
have a concomitant interest With their fellow—citizens; they
could not materially injure others without affecting their own
fortunes.

I did say that, in order to obtain that enlarged informa-
tion in our representatives, a large district for election would
be more proper than a small one. When I speak of large
districts, it is not agreeably to the idea entertained by the
honorable member from Fayette, (Mr. Smilie,) who tells you
that elections for large districts must be ill attended, because
the people will not choose to go very far on this business.
It is not meant, sir, by me, that the votes should be taken
at one place; no, sir; the elections may be held through
this state in the same manner as elections for members of the
General Assembly , and this may be done, too, without any
additional inconvenience or expense.

If it could be effected, all the people of the same society
ought to meet in one place, and communicate fieely with each
other on the great business of representation. Though this
cannot be done in fact, yet we find that it is the most favorite
and constitutional idea. It is supported by this principle
too, that every member is the representative of the whole
community, and not of a particular part. The larger, there-
fore, the district is, the greater is the probability of selecting
Wise and virtuous characters, and the more agreeable it is to
the constitutional principle of representation.

As to the objection that the House of Representatives
may be bribed by the Senate, I confess I do not see that
bribery is an objection against this system; it is rather an
objection against human nature. I am afraid that bribes in
every government may be offered and received; but let me
ask of the gentlemen who urge this objection to point out
Where any power is given to tbribe under this Constitution.
Every species of influence is guarded against as much as
possible. Can the Senate procure money to effect such
design ? All public moneys must be disposed of by law, and
it is necessary that the House of Representatives originate
such law. Before the money can be got out of the treasury,
it must be appropriated by law. If the legislature had the
effrontery to set aside three or four hundred thousand pounds

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 509

'for this purpose, and the people would tamely suffer it,I
grant it might be done; and in Pennsylvania the legislature
might do the same; for, by a law, and that conformably to
the Constitution, they might divide among themselves what
portion of the public money they pleased. I shall just re-
mark, sir, that the objections which have repeatedly been
made with regard to “the number of representatives being
too small, and that they may possibly be made smaller; that
the districts are too large, and not within the reach of the
peeple; and that the House of Representatives may be
bribed by the Senate,” come with an uncommon degree of
impropriety from those who would refer us back to the Arti—
cles of Confederation; for, under these, the representation
of this state cannot exceed seven members, and may consist
of only two; and these are wholly without the reach or
control of the people. Is there not also greater danger that
the majority of such a body might be more easily bribed than
the majority of one not only more numerous, but checked by
a division of two or three distinct and independent parts?
The danger is certainly better guarded against in the pro-
posed system than in any other yet devised.

The next objections, which I shall notice, are, “ that the
powers of the Senate are too great; that the representation
therein is unequal ; and that the Senate, from the smallness
of its number, may be bribed.” Is there any propriety in
referring us to the Confederation on this subject? Because,
in one or two instances, the Senate possess more power than
the House of Representatives, are these gentlemen supported
in their remarks, when they tell you they wished and ex-
pected more powers to be given to the present Congress —
a body certainly much more exceptionable than any institu
ted under this system ?

That “the representation in the Senate is unequal,” I
regret, because I am of opinion that the states ought to be
represented according to. their importance ; but in this system
there is a considerable improvement; for the true principle
of representation is carried into the House of Representa-
tives, and into the choice of the President ; and without the
assistance of one or the other of these, the Senate is inactive,
and can do neithergood nor evil.

It is repeated, again and again, by the honorable gentle-
man, that “ the power over elections, which is given to the

5] 0 DEBATES. LVVILSON.

general government in this system, is a dangerous power.”
I must own I feel, myself, surprised that an objection of this
kind should be persisted in, after what has been said by the
honorable colleague in reply. I think it has appeared, by a
minute investigation of the subject, that it would have been .
not only unwise, but highly improper, in the late Conven-
tion, to have omitted this clause, or given less power than it.
does over elections. Such powers, sir, are enjoyed by every
state government in the United States. In some they are
ofa much greater magnitude; and why should this be the
only one deprived of them? Ought not these, as well as
every other legislative body, to have the power of judging of
the qualifications of its own members? “ The times, places,
and manner of holding elections for representatives, may be
altered by Congress.” This power, sir, has been shown to
be necessary, not only on some particular occasions, but
even to the very existence of the federal government. I
have heard some very improbable suspicions indeed sug-
gested with regard to the manner in which it will be exer—
cised. -Let us suppose it maybe improperly exercised; is
it not more likely so to be by the particular states than by
thegovernment of the United States? — because the general
government will be more studious of the good of the whole
than a particular state will be; and therefore, when the
power of regulating the time, place, or manner of holding
elections, is exercised by the Congress, it will be to correct
the improper regulations of a particular state.

I now proceed to the second article of this Constitution,
which relates to the executive department.

Ifind, sir, from an attention to the arguments used by
the gentlemen on the other side of the house, that there are
but few exceptions taken to this part of the system. I shall
take notice of them, and afterwards point out some valuable
qualifications, which I think this part possesses in an emi-
nent degree.

The objection against the powers of the President is not
that they are too many or too great; but, to state it in the
gentle-men’s own language, they are so trifling, that the
President is no more than the tool of the Senate.

Now, sir, I do not apprehend this to be the case, because
I see that he may do a great many things independently of
the Senate; and, with respect to the executive powers of

VVILSON.] - PENNSYLVANIA. 511

government in which the Senate participate, they can do
nothing without him. Now, I would ask, which is most
likely to be the tool of the other? Clearly, sir, he holds the
helm, and the vessel can proceed neither in one direction nor
another, Without his concurrence. It was expected by many,
that the cry would have been against the powers of the.
President as a monarchical powe1; indeed, the echo of such
sound was heard some time before the rise of the late Con—
vention. There were men, at that time, determined to
make an attack upon whatever system should be proposed;
but they mistook the point of direction. Had the President
possessed those powers, which the opposition on this floor
are Willing to consign him, of making treaties and appoint-
ing officers, with the advice of a council of state, the clamor
would have been, that the House of Representatives and the
Senate were the tools of the monarch. This, sir, is but
conjecture; but I leave it to those who are acquainted with
the current of the politics pursued by the enemies of this
system, to determine Whether it is a reasonable conjecture
or not.

The manner of appointing the President of the United
States, I find, is not objected to; therefore I shall say little
on that point. But I think it well worth while to state to
this house how little the difficulties, even in the most diffi-
cult part of this system, appear to have been noticed by the
honorable gentlemen in opposition. The Convention, sir,
'were perplexed with no part of this plane so much as with
the mode of choosing the President of the United States.
For my own part,I think the most unexceptionable mode,
next after the one prescribed in this Constitution, would be
that practised bythe Eastern States and the state of New
York; yet, if gentlemen object that an eighth part of our
country forms a district too large for election, 110w much
more would they object, if it was extended to the whole
Union ! On this subject, it was the opinion of a great ma-
jority in Convention, that the thing was impraCIicable;
othel embarrassments presented themselves.

Was the President to be appointed by the legislature?
\V as he to continue a certain time in office, and aftenvards
W as he to become ineligible?

To have the executive officers dependent upon the legis-

512 DEBATES. . [WILSON.

lative, would ce1tainly be a violation of that p11nc1ple, so neces-
say to pleserve the freedom of lepublics, that the legislative
and executive powers should be separate and independent.
Would it have been proper thathe should be appointed by the
Senate? I apprehend that still stronger objections could be
111 0‘cd against that. cabal — intrigue — corruption — evel y
thing bad, would have been the necessary concomitant of
eve1y election.

To avoid the inconveniences already enumerated, and
many others that might be suggested, the mode before us was
adopted. By 'it we avoid corruption; and we are little ex-
posed to the lesser evils of pa1tyint1igue; and when the
government shall be organized, proper care will undoubtedly
be taken to counteract influence even of that nature. The
Constitution, with the same view, has directed, that the day
011 which the electors shall give their votes shall be the same
throughout the United States. I flatter myself the experi-
ment will be a happy one for our country.

The choice of this officer is brought as nearly home to
the people as is practicable. With the approbation of the
state legislatures, the peOple may elect with only one remove ;
for “each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legisla—
ture thereof may direct, a number of' electors equal to the
whole number of senators and representatives to which the
state may be entitled in Congress.” Under this regulation,
it will not be easy to corrupt the electors, and there will be
little time or opportunity for tumult or intrigue. This, sir,
will not be like the elections of a Polish diet, begun in noise
and ending in bloodshed.

If gentlemen will look into this article, and read for them-
selves, they will find that there is no well-grounded reason to
suspect the President will be the tool of the Senate. “ The
President shall be commander-in—chief of the army and navy
of the United States, and of the militia of the several states,
when called into the actual service of the United States.
He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal
officers 1n each of the executive departments, upon any sub-
ject relative to the duties of their respective offices ; and he
shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences
against the United States.” Must the President, after all,
be called the tool of the Senate 5’ Ido not mean to insinuate

VV11.s0N.] PENNSYLVANIA. 5l3

that he has more powers than he ought to have, but merely
to declare that they are of such a nature as to place him
above expo1ession of contempt.

Iheie is another powe1 01 no small magnitude intrusted
to this office1.“ He shall take ca1e that the laws be faith-
fully executed.”

l apprehend that, in the administration of this government,
it Will not be found necessary for the Senate always to sit.
1 know some gentlemen have insinuated and conjectured that
this will be the case, ' but I am inclined to a contrary opinion.
If they had employnient eve1y day, no doubt but it 111ight be
the wish of the Senate to continue then session; but, from
the nature of their business, I do not think it will be neces-
sary for them to attend longer than the House of Rep1escnt
atives. Besides thei1 legislative powe1s, they possess th1ee
others, viz. ., trying impeachments, concur1ing in making
treaties, and in appointing officers. With 1ega1d to their
power in making treaties, it is of importance that it should
be veiy seldom exercised. We ale happily 1emoved fiom
the vortex of European politics, and the fewer and the mo1e
simple 0111 negotiations With Eu1opean poweis, the bette1
they will be. bIf such be the case, it Will be but once in a
number of years that a single treaty will come before the
Senate. I think, therefore, that 011 this account it will be
unnecessary to sit constantly. With regard to the trial of
impeachments, I hope it is what will seldom happen. In
this observation, the experience of the ten last years supports
me. Now, there is only left the power of concurring in the
appointment of officers; but care is taken, in this Constitution,
that this branch of business may be done Without their
p1esenc.e The president is autho1ized to fill 11p all vacan-
cies that may happen, during the recess of the Senate, by
granting commissions, which: shall expi1e at the end of their
next session , so that, on the whole, the Senate need not sit
longer than the House of Representatives, at the public ex-
pense; and no doubt, if apprehensions are enteitained of
the Senate, the House of Representatives will not provide
pay fo1 them one day longer than is necessary. But what
(it Will be asked) 1s this great. pou e1 ot the President? He

can fill the offices only by tempo1'a1y appointments. 'I1ue;
but eve1 y pe1son knows the advantage of being once intro
VOL.IL 65

514. DEBATES. [VVILSON.

duced into an office; it is often of more Importance than the
highest recommendation.

Having now done with the legislative and executive branches
of this government, I shall just remark, that, upon the Whole
question of the executive, it appears that the gentlemen in
opposition state nothing as exceptionable but the deficiency
of powers in the President; but rather seem to allow some
degree of political merit in this department of government.

I now proceed to the judicial department; and here, M11.
1 President, I meet an objection, I confess, I had not expected;
and it seems it did not occur to the honorable gentleman
(Mr. Findley) who made it until a few days ago.

He alleges that the judges, under this Constitution, are
not 1e11de1 ed sufficiently independent, because they may hold
othe1 offices , and though they may be independent as
judges, yet their other office may depend upon the legisla-
tu1e. I confess, sir, this objection appears to me to be a little
wire—drawn. In the first place, the legislature can appoint
to no office; therefore, the dependence could not be on them
for the office, but rather 011 the President and Senate; but
then these cannot add the salary, because no money can be
appropriated but in consequence of a law of the United
States. No sinecure can be bestowed 011 any judge but by
the concurrence of the whole legislature and the President;
and I do not think this an event that will probably happen.

It is true that there is a provision made in the Constitu—
tion of Pennsylvania, that the judges shall not be allowed to
hold any other. office whatsoever; and I believe they are
expressly lorbidden to sit in Congress; but this, sir, is not
introduced as a principle into this Constitution. There are
many states in the Union, whose constitutions do not limit
the usefulness of their best men, 01 exclude them f1om ren-
deling those se1V1t es to their countiy for which they are
found eminently qualified. New Y01k, far flom restlicting
their chancellor, 011 judges of the Suprenie Court, from a seat
in Congress, expressly p1ovide for sending them thele 011
extraordinary occasions. In Connecticut, the judges are not
precluded from enjoying other offices. Judges tiom many
states have sat in Congress. Now, it is not to be expected
that eleven or twelve states me to change thei1 sentiments
and p1actice, 011 this subjee,t to accommodate themselves to
Pennsylvania.

‘K

WILSON.J PENNSYLVANIA. 15

It is again alleged. against. this system, that the powers
of the judges are too extensive; but I will not trouble you,
sir, with a repetition of What I had the honor of delivering
the other day. I hope the result of those arguments gave
satisfaction, and proved that the judicial were commensurate
with the legislative powers; that they went no farther, and
that they ought to go so far.

The laws of Congress being made for the Union, no par—
ticular state can be alone affected ; and as they are to provide
for the general purposes of the Union, so ought they to have
the means of making the provisions effectual over all that
country included within the Union.

Eodem (lie, 1787, P. M.-—Mr. WILSON. Ishall now
proceed, Mr. President, to notice the remainder of the objec-
tions that have been suggested by the honorable gentlemen
who oppose the system now before you.

We have been told, sir, by the honorable member from
Fayette, (Mr. Smilie,) “that the trial by jury was intended
to be given up, and the civil law was intended to be intro-
duced into its place, in civil cases.”

Before a sentiment of this kind was hazarded, I think, sir,
the gentleman ought to be prepared with better proof in its
support than any he has yet attempted to produce. It is a
charge, sir, not only unwarrantable, but cruel: the idea of
such a thing, I believe, never entered into the mind of a
single member of that Convention; and I believe further,
that they never suspected there would be found, within the
United States, a single person that was capable of making
such a charge. If it should be well founded, sir, they must
abide by the consequences; but if (as I trust it Will fully
appear) it is ill founded, then he or they who make it ought
to abide by the consequences.

Trial by jury forms a large field for investigation, and
numerous volumes are written on the subject; 'those who
are well acquainted with it may employ much time in its dis-
' cussion ; but in a country where its excellences are so well
understood, it may not be necessary to be very prolix in
pointing them out. For my part, I shall confine myself to a
few observations in reply to the objections that have been
suggested. .

The member from Fayette (Mr. Smilie) has labored to‘
infer that, under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress

516 DEBATES. [WILSON

possessed no appellate jurisdiction; but this being decided
against him by the words of that instlument, by which is
glanted to Cong1ess the powei of “establishing courts {or
receiving, and determining finally, appeals in all cases of
capture, he next attempts a distinction, and allows the power
of appealing from the decisions of the judges, but not from
the verdict of a jury; but this is determined against him
also by the practice of the states, for, in every instance which
has occurred this pow er has been claimed by Congless, and
exercised by the Coults of Appeals. But what would he the
consequence of allowing the doctrinel for which he contends?
Would it not be in the power of a jury, by their verdict, to
involve the whole Union in a war? They may condemn
the property of a neutral, or otherwise infringe the law of
nations; in this case, ought their verdict- to be Without revi-
sal P Nothing can be inferred from this to prove that trials
byjury were intended to be given up. In Massachusetts, and
all the Eastern States, thei1 causes are tried by julies, though
they acknowledge the appellate jurisdiction of Congress.

I think I am not 110w to learn the advantages of a trial by
ju1y. It has excellences that entitle it to a superiority over
any other mode, in cases to which it is applicable.

Where jurors can be acquainted with the characters of the
parties and the witnesses, — where the Whole cause can be
brought Within their knowledge and their view,—l know no
mode of investigation equal to that by a j:u1y they hea1 eve1y
thing that IS alleged, they not only hezu the words, but they
see and mark the teatu1es ot the countenance; they can
judge of weight due to such testimony; and moreover, it is
a cheap and expeditious manner of distributing justice.
There is another advantage annexed to the trial by jury; the
jurors may indeed return a mistaken or ill-founded verdict, but
their errors cannot be systematical.

Let us apply these observations to the objects of the judicial
department, under this Constitution. I think it has been
shown, already, that they all extend beyond the bounds of
any particular state; but further, a great number of the civil
causes there enumerated depend either upon the law of 11a-
tions, or the marine law, that is, the general law of mercan-
tile countries. Now, sir, in such cases, I presume it will not
be p1 etended that this mode of decision ought to be adopted;
for the law with regard to them IS the same here as in every

SMILIE.] PENNSYLVANIA. 517

other Country, and ought to be administe1ed 111 the same man
ne1. The1e are instances in which I think it highly p1obal1le
that the trial by jury will be found proper; and if It is highly
probable that it will be found proper, is it not equally probable
that it will be adoptch There may be causes depending
between citizens of different states; and as trial by jury is
known and regarded in all the states, they will certainly pre-
fe1 that mode of mid] before any other. The Congress will
have the power of making proper regulations on this subject,
but it was impossible fo1btl1e Convention to have gone 111i-
nutely into it; but if they could, it must have been very im-
proper, because alterations, as 1 observed before, might have
been necessary; and Whatever the Convention might have
done would have continued unaltered, unless by an altera-
tion of the Constitution. Besides, there was another diffi-
culty With regard to this subject. .111 some of the states they
have courts of Chancery, and other appellate jurisdictions, and
those states are as attached to that mode of distributing
justice as those that have none are to theirs.

I have desired, repeatedly, that hono1able gentlemen, who
find fault, Would be good enough to point out what they deem
to be an impr.ovement The member flom Westmmeland
ng. Findley) tells us that the ttial between citizens of dif-
e1ent states ought to be by a jury of that state in which the
cause of action 1ose. Now, it is easy to see that, in many
instances, this would be veiy improper and Very pa1t1al for,
besides the diffeient manne1 of collecting and f01 111mg juries
in the seve1a| states, the plaintiff comes tDfrom another state;
he comes a stranger, unknown as to his character or mode
of life, While the other party is in the midst of his friends, or
perhaps his dependants. Would a t1ial by jury, in such a
case, insu1e justice to the st1ange1. P But again: Iwould ask
that gentleman Whethe1, if a g1e21t part of his fortune was in
the hands of some person in Rhode Island, he would Wish
that his action to recover it should be determined by a jury
of that country, under its present circumstances.

The gentleman from Fayette (Mr. Smilie) says that, if the
Convention found themselves em b1r121ssed, at least they might

have done thus much— they should have declaIed that the
substance should be secu1ed by Congress. [his would be
saying nothing unless the cases were bparticuiarized.

Mr. SMILIE. I said the Convention ought to have de-
44

513 DEBATES [WILSO_N.

cla1ed that the legislature should establish the trial byjury
by p1oper regulations.

Ml. WILSON. Ihe legislatu1e shall establish it by
propel 1egulations! So, after all, the gentleman has landed
us at the very point from which we set out. He wishes
them to do the ve1y thing they have done — to leave it to
the discretion of Congress. The fact, sir, is, nothing more
could be done.

It is well known that there are some cases that should not
come before juries; there are others, that, in some of the
states, never come before juries, and in those states where
they do come before them, appeals are found necessary, the
facts reexamined, and the verdict of the jury sometimes is set
aside; but I think, in all cases where the cause has come
originally before a jury, that the last examination ought to
be before a ju1y likewise.

The pow er of having appellate jurisdiction, as to facts, has
been insisted upon as a proof, “ that the Convention intended
to give up the trial by ju1y in civil cases, and to introduce
the civil law.” I have already declared my own opinion on
this point, and have shown not merely that it is founded on
reason and autho1ity , — the expless declaration of Congress
(Journals ofCongress, Ma1ch 6,1779) is to the same pul-
pose. They insist upon this power, as 1equisite to pleselve
the peace of the Union ,ce1tainly, thelef01e, it ought always
to he possessed by the head of the contederacy. We a1e
told, as an additional proof, that the trial by jury was i11-
tended to be given up; “ that appeals are unknown to the
common law; that the term is a civil—law term, and with it
the civil law is intended to be introduced.” I confess I was
a good deal surprised at this observation being made; for
Blackstone, in the ve1y volume which the honolable member
(M1. Smilie) had in his hand, and read us seve1al ext1acts
lrom, has a chapter entitled “ Of Proceeding 111 the Nature
(:f Appeals,”— and in that chapter says, that the plincipal
method of redress for erroneous judgments, in the king’s
«ourts of record, is by writ of error to some superior “ court
(f appeal.” (3 Blackstone, 406.) Now, it is well known
that his book is a commentary upon the common law.
Here, then, is a strong refutation of the assertion, “that ap-
peals are unknown to the common law.”

I think these were all the circumstances adduced to show

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. i 519

the truth of the assertion, that, in this Constitution, the t1ial
by my was intended to be given 11p by the late Convention
in flaming it. Has the assertion been ploved. 9 I say not:
and the allegations offered, if they apply at all, apply ina
contraly direction. I am glad that this objection has been
stated, because it is a subject upon which the enemies of
this Constitution have much insisted. We have now had
an opportunity of investigating it fully; and the result is,
that there is no foundation for the charge, but it must pro-
ceed from ignorance, or something worse.

I go on to another objection which has been taken to this
system : “ that the expense of the general government and of
the state governments will be too great, and that the citizens
will not be able to support them.” If the state governments
are to continue as cumbersome and expensive as they have
hitherto been, I confess it would be distressing to add to
their expenses, and yet it might be necessary; but I think I
can draw a different conclusion on this subject, from more
conjectures than one. The additional revenue to be raised
by a general government will be more than sufficient for ad—
ditional expense; and a great part of that revenue may be
'so contrived as not to be taken from the citizens of this
country; for I am not of opinion that the consumer always
pays the impost that is laid on imported articles; it is paid
sometimes by the importer, and sometimes by the foreign
merchant who sends them to us. Had a duty of this nature
been laid at the time of the peace, the greatest part of it
would have been the contribution of foreigners. Besides,
whatever is paid by the citizens is a voluntary payment.

I think, sir, it would be very easy and laudable to lessen
the expenses of the state governments. [have been told
(and perhaps it is not very far from the truth) that them are
two thousand members of assembly in the several states.
The business of revenue is done in consequence of 1equisi—
tions from Congress; and whether it is furnished or not, it
commonly becomes a subject of discussion. Now, when this
business 1s executed by the legislature of the United States,
I leave it to those who are acquainted with the expense of
long and frequent sessions of Assembly. to determine the
great saving that will take place. Let me appeal to the cit-
.zens of Pennsylvania, how much time is taken up in this
state every year, if not eve1y session, in providing for the

5.20 DEBATES. [WrLSON
payment of an amazing interest due 011 her funded debt.
There will be many sources of revenue, and many opportu-
nities for economy, when the business of finance shall be ad-
ministered under one government: the funds will be more
productive, and the taxes, in all probability, less burdensome,
than they are now.

1 proceed to another objection that is taken against the
power, given to Congress, of raising and keeping up standing
armies. I confess I have been surprised that this objection
was ever made; but l am more so that it is still repeated
and insisted upon. I have taken some pains to inform myself
how the other governments of the world stand with regard
to this power, and the result of my inquiry is, that there is
not one which has not the power of raising and keeping up
standing armies. A government without the power of
defence! it is a solecism.

I well recollect the principle insisted upon by the patliotic
body 111 Great Blitain; it is, that, in time of peace, a stand—
ing army ought not to be kept up without the consent of
Parliament. Theil only apprehension appears to be, that it
might be dangerous, it e1e the army kept up without the con—
currence of the represe1‘1tatives of the peOple. Sir, We are
not in the millennium. Wars may happen; and when they
do happen, who is to have the power of collecting and
appointing the force, then become immediately and indis-
pensably necessary?

It is not declared, in this Constitution, that the Congress
shall raise and support armies. No, sir : if they are not driven
to it by necessity, why should we suppose they would do it
by choice, any more than the representatives of the same
citizens in the state legislatures? For we must not lose
sight of the great principle upon which this work is founded.
The authority here given to the general government flows
from the same source as that placed in the legislatures of the
several states.

It may be frequently necessary to keep up standing armies
1n time of peace. The present Congress have experienced
the netessity, and seven hundred troops are just as much a
standing army as seventy thousand. The principle which
sustains them is precisely the same. They may go fulther,
and raise an army, without communicating to the public the
prrpose for which it is raised. On a particular oreasion

W1LSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 521

they did this. When the commotions existed Ill Massacnu--
setts, they gave orders for enlisting an additional body of
two thousand men. I believe it is not generally known on
what a perilous tenure we held our freedom and independence
at that period. The flames of internal insurrection were
ready to burst out in every quarter; they were formed by
the correspondents of state officers, (to whom an allusion
was made on a former day,) and from one end to the other
of the continent, we walked on ashes, concealing fire beneath
our feet; and ought Congress to be deprived of power to
prepare for the defence and safety of our country? Ought
they to be restricted from arming, until they divulge the
motive which induced them to arm? I believe the power
of raising and keeping up an army, in time of peace, is essen-
tial to every government. No government can secure its
citizens against dangers, internal and external, without pos—
sessing it, and sometimes carrying it into execution. I con-
fess it is a power in the exercise of which all wise and
moderate governments Will be as prudent and forbearing as
possible. When we consider the situation of the United
States, we must be satisfied that it will be necessary to keep
up some troops for the protection of the western frontiers,
and to secure our interest in the internal navigation of that
country. It will be not only necessary, but it will be econom-
ical on the great scale. Our enemies, finding us invulner-
able, will not attack us; and we shall thus prevent the
occasion for larger standing armies. I am now led to con—
sider another charge that is brought against this system.

It is said that Congress should not possess the power of
calling out the militia, to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ; nor the President
have the command of them when called out for such
purposes.

I believe any gentleman, who possesses military experi-
ence, will inform you that men without a uniformity of arms,
accoutrements, and discipline, are no more than a. mob in a
camp; that, in the field, instead of assisting, they interfere
with one another. If a'soldier drops his musket, and his
companiOn, unfurnished with one, takes it up, it is of no
service, because his cartridges do not fit it. By means of
this system, a uniformity of arms and discipline will prevail
throughout the United States.

VOL.IL 66

I.

‘32 Z DEBATES. [WILSO‘AL

I really expected that, for this part of the system at least,
the framers of it would have received plaudits instead of
cerrsures, as they here discover a strong anxiety to have this
body put upon an effective footing, and thereby, in a great
measure ,to supersede the necessitv of raising or keeping up
standing armies.

The militia formed under this system, and trained by the
several states, will be such a bulwark of internal strength,
as to prevent the attacks of foreign enemies. I have been
told that, about the year 1744, an attack was intended by
France upon Massachusetts Bay, but was given up 011 read-
ing the militia law of the province.

If 21 single state could deter an enemy from such attempts,
what influence will the proposed arrangement have upon the
different powers of Europe?

In every point of View, this regulation is calculated to pro—
duce good effects. How powerful and respectable must the
body of militia appear under general and uniform regulations !
How disjointed, weak, and inefficient are they at present!
1 appeal to military experience for the truth of my observa-
tlons.

The next objection, sir, is a serious one indeed; it was
made by the honorable gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Smilie.)
“The Convention knew this was not a free government;
otherwise, they would not have asked the powers of the purse
and sword.” I would beg to ask the gentleman What free
government he knows that has not the powers of both?
There was, indeed, a government under which we unfortu-
nately were for a few years past, that had them not ; but it
does not now exist. A government without these powers is
one of the improvements with which opposition wish to
astonish mankind.

Have not the freest governments those powers? And are
they not in the fullest exercise of them? This 18 a thing so
clear, that 1eally it is impossible to find facts or reasons
more clear, in order to illustrate it. C2111 we create a
government Without the power to act? How can it act-
without. the assistance of men. ? And how are men to be
procured without being paid for their services? Is not the
one powe1 the consequence of the other?

We are told,-—and it is the last and heaviest charge,—
‘- that this government is an aristocracy, and was intended

WILSON.] PENNSYLVANIA. 523

so to be by the late Convention;” and We are told (the
truth of Which is not disputed) that an aristocratical govern-
ment is incompatible With freedom. I hope, before this
charge is believed, some stronger reasons Will be given in
support of it than any that have yet been produced.

The late Convention were assembled to devise some plan
for the security, safety, and happiness of the people of the
United States. If they have devised a plan that robs them
of their power, and constitutes an aristocracy, they are the
parricides of their country, and ought to be punished as such.
What part of this system is it that warrants the charge ?

What is an aristocratic government? I had the honor of
giving a definition of it at the beginning of our debates. It
is, sir, the government of a few over the many—elected by
themselves, or possessing a share in the government by in-
heritance, or in consequence of territorial rights, or some
quality independent of the choice of the people. This is an
aristocracy, and this Constitution is said to be an aristocrat-
ical form of government; and it is also said that it was
intended so to be by the members of the late Convention
Who framed it. What peculiar rights have been reserved to
any class of men, on any occasion? Does even the first
magistrate of the United States draw to himself a single
privilege or security that does not extend to every person
throughout the United States? Is there asingle distinction
attached to him, in this system, more than there is to the
lowest officer in the republic? ls there an office from which
any one set of men whatsoever are excluded? Is there one
of any kind in this system but is as open to the poor as to
the rich? to the inhabitant of the country, as well as to the
inhabitant of the city? And are the places of honor and
emoluments confined to a few? And are these few the
members of the late Convention? Have they made any
particular provisions. in favor of themselves, their relations,
or their posterity? If they have committed their country to
the demon of aristocracy, have they not committed them—
selves also, With every thing they held near and dear to
them ?

Far, far other is the genius of this system. I have had
already the honor of mentioning its general nature ;~ but I
Will repeat it, sir. In its principle it is purely democratical;
but its parts are calculated in such manner as to obtain those

524 DEBA’I‘ES. [WILSON

advantages, also, which are peculiar to the other forms of
government in other c.ount1ies. By appointing a single
magistrate, we secule strength, vigor, energy, and responsi-
bility 111 the executive departnient. By appointing a Sen-
ate, the membeis of which are elected for six yea1s, yet, by
a rotation aheady taken notice of, changing eve1y second
year, we secule the benefit of expe1ience, while, on the
other hand, we avoid the inconveniences that arise from a
long and detached establishment. This body is periodically
renovated from the peOple, like a tree, which, at the proper
season, receives its nourishment from its parent earth.

In the othei branch of the legisla'tu1e, the House of Rep-
resentatives, shall we not have the advantages of benevolence
and attachment to the people, whose immediate 1epresenta-
tives they are. P

A f1ee government has often been compaled to a pyramid.
This allusion IS made with peculiar propriety in the system
before you; it is laid on the broad basis of the people; its
powers gradually rise, while they are confined, in propo1tion
as they ascend, until they end 111 that most permanent of all
forms. When you examine all its paits, they will invariably
be found to preserve that essential n1a1k of free governments
— a chain of connection with the people.

Such, sir, is the nature of this system of government, and
the important question at length p1esents itself to our view
—Shall it be 1'atilied,01 shall it be rejected, by this C011-
vention. P In or'de1 to enable us still further to form ajudg-
ment on this truly momentous and inte1esting point, 011
which all we have, 01 can have, dear to us 011 earth lS mate-
rially depending, let us for a moment consider the conse-
quences that will 1esult from one 01' the other measu1e.
Suppose 11e reject this system of government; 11 hat will be
the consequente. 9 Let the farmer say, he whose produce
remains unasked for; nor can he find a single maiket for its
consumption, thougli his fields are blessed with luxuriant
abundance. Let the manufacturer, and let the mechanic,
say, they can feel, and tell thei1 feelings. Go along the
wharves of Philadelphia, and observe the bmelancholy silence
that reigns. I appeal not to those who enjoy places and
abundance under the present government; they mav Well
dilate upon thee easv and happy situation of our country.
Let the merchants tell you What IS our commerce' , let them

W1LS0N.] PENNSYLVANIA. 525

say What has been their situation since the return of peace
—an era which they might have expected would furnish
additional sources to our trade, and a continuance, and even
an increase, to their fortunes. Have theseideas been realized?
or do they not lose some of their capital in every adventure,
and continue the unprofitable trade from year to year, sub
sisting under the hopes of happier times under an efficient
general government? The ungainful trade carried on by
our merchants has a baneful influence on the interests of the
manufacturer, the mechanic, and the farmer; and these, I
believe, are the chief interests of ‘the people of the United
States.

I will go further. Is there now a government among us
that can do a single act that a national government ought
to do? Is there any power of the United States that can
command a single shilling? This is a plain and a home
question.

Congress may recommend; they can do no more : they may
require ; but they must not proceed one step further. Ifthings
are bad now, — and that they are not worse is only owing to
hopes of improvement or change in the system,—will they
become better when those hopes are disappointed? We have
been told, by honorable gentlemen on this floor, (Mr. Smilie,
Mr. Findley, and Mr. VVhitehilL) that it is improper to urge
this kind of argument in favor of a new system of government,
or against the old one: unfortunately, sir, these things are
too severely felt to be omitted; the people feel them; they
pervade all classes of citizens, and every situation from New
Hampshire to Georgia: the argument of necessity is the
patriot’s defence, as well as the tyrant’s plea.

Is it likely, sir, that, if this system of government is re-
jected, a better will be framed and adopted? I will not
expatiate on this subject; but I believe many reasons will
suggest themselves to prove that such expectation would be
illusory. If a better could be obtained at a future time, is
there any thing essentially wrong in this? I go further. ls
there any thing wrong that cannot be amended more easily
by the mode pointed out in the system itself, than could
be done by calling convention after convention, before
the organization of the government? Let us now turn to
the consequences that will result if we assent to and ratify the
instrument before you. i shall trace them as concisely as

526 DEBATES. [WILSON

I can, because I have trespassed already too long on the
patience and indulgence of the house.

I stated, on a former occasion, one important advantage ;
by adopting this system, we become a nation; at present, we
are not one. Can we perform a single national act? Can
we do any thing to piocu1e us dignity, or to preserve peace
and tranquillity: ? Can we relieve the distress of our citi-
zens? Can we provide for their welfare or happiness?
The powers of our government are mere sound. If we offer
to treat with a nation, we receive this humiliating answer:
“ You cannot, in propriety of language, make a treaty, be—
cause you have no power to execute it.” Can we borrow
money? There are too many examples of unfortunate
creditors existing, both 011 this and the other side of the
Atlantic, to expect success from this expedient. But could
we borrow money, we cannot command a fund, to enable us
to pay either the principal or interest; for, in instances
where our friends have advanced the principal, they have
been obliged to advance the interest also, in order to prevent
the principal f1om being annihilated; 111 their hands by de-
p1eciation. Can we 1aise an army? The p1ospeet of a
wa1 is highly probable. T he accounts we reteli e, by eve1y
vessel from Europe, mention that the highest exertions are
making in the ports and arsenals of the greatest maritime
powers. But whatever the consequence may be, are we to
lie supine? We know we are unable, under the Articles
of Confederation, to exert ourselves; and shall we continue
so, until a stroke be made on our commerce, or we see the
debarkation of a hostile army on our unprotected shores?
Who will guaranty that our property will not be laid waste,
that our towns will not be put under contribution, by a small
naval force, and subjected to all the horror and devastation
of war? May not this be done without Opposition, at least
effectual opposition, in the present situation of our countly?
There may be safety over the Appalachian Mountains, but
the1e can be none on our sea- coast. With what p1opriety
can we hope ou1 flag will be 1espected, while we have not a
single gun to fi1e 111 its defence?

Can we expect. to make internal improvement, or accom-
plish any of those great national objects 11 hichl formerly
alluded to, when we cannot find money to remove a single
lock out of a 1iver. ?

WILSON] PENNSYLVANIA. 527

This system, sir, will at least make us a nation, and put it
in the power of the Union to act as such. We shall be con-
sidered as such by every nation in the world. We shall
regain the confidence of our citizens, and command the
respect of others.

As we shall become a nation, I trust that we shall also
form a national character, and that this character will be
adapted to the principles and genius of our system of gov-
ernment: as yet We possess none; our language, manners,
customs, habits, and dress, depend too much upon those of
other countries. Every nation, in these respects, should
possess originality ; there are not, on any part of the globe,
finer qualities for forming a national character, than those
possessed by the children of America. Activity, persever—
ance, industry, laudable emulation, docility in acquiring in-
formation, firmness in adversity, and patience and magna-
nimity under the greatest hardships; ———from these materials,
What a respectable national character may be raised! In
addition to this character I think there is strong reason to
believe that America may take the lead in literary improve-
ments and national importance. This is a subject which, I
confess,I have spent much pleasing time in considerinou
That language, sir, which shall become most generally
known in the civilized world, will impart great importance
over the nation that shall use it. The language of the
United States Will, in future times, be diffused over a greater
extent of country than any other that we know. The
French, indeed, have made laudable attempts toward estab-
lishing a universal language; but, beyond the boundaries of
France, even the French language is not spoken by one in a
thousand. Besides the freedom of our country, the great
improvements she has made, and will make, in the science
of government, will induce the patriots and literati of every
nation to read and understand our writings on that subject;
and hence it is not improbable that she will take the lead
in political knowledge.

If We adopt this system of government, I think we may
promise security, stability, and tranquillity, to the govern--
ments of the different states. They would not be exposed
to the danger of competition on questions of territory, or any
other that have heretofore disturbed them. A tribunal is
here found to decide, justly and quietly, any intefering claim ;

528 DEBATES. [WILSON

and now is accomplished what the great mind of Henry IV. of
France had in contemplation —a system of government for
large and respectable dominions, united and bound together,
in peace, under a superintending head, by which all their
differences may be accommodated, without the destruction
of the human race. We are told by Sully that this was the
favorite pursuit of that good king during the last years of his
life; and he would probably have carried it into execution,
had not the dagger of an assassin deprived the world of his
valuable life. I have, with pleasing emotion, seen the wis-
dom and beneficence of a less efficient power under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, in the determination of the controversy
between the states of Pennsylvania and Connecticut; but I
have lamented that the authority of Congress did not extend
to extinguish, entirely, the spark which has kindled a danger:
ous flame 1n the distiict of Wyoming.

Let gentlemen turn their attention to the amazing conse-
quences which this principle will have in this extended coun-
try. The several states cannot war with each other; the
generalg 0‘ove1nment is the great arbiter in contentions be-
tween them; the 11 hole fo1ce of the Union can be called
forth to reduce an aggtessor to reason. What a happy ex-
change for the disjointed, contentious state soveieignties. ’

The adoption of this system will also secure us from dan-
ger, and procu1e us advantages from foreign nations. This,
in 0111 situation, is of gteat consequence. We are still an
inviting object to one European pow er at least; and, if We
cannot defend ourselves, the temptation may become too
alluring to be resisted. I do not mean that, with an efficient
government, we should mix with the commotions of Eur0pe.
No, sir, we are happily removed from them, and are not.
obliged to throw ourselves into the scale with any. This
system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard
against it. It will not he 1n the powet ot a single man, or a
single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the im-
portant power of declaring war is vested in the legislature
at large : this declaration must he made with the concurrence
of the House of Representatives. ' from this circumstance we
may draw a certain COI]( lusion that nmhing but our national
interest can draw us into a war. I cannot forbear, on this
occasion, the pleasure of mentioning to you the sentiments
of the great and benevolent. m 11, whose 11'01ks I have already

M'KEANJ PENNSYLVANIA. 529

quoted on another subject. Mr. Necker has addressed this
country in language important and applicable in the strictest
degree to its situation and to the present subject. Speaking
of war, and the greatest caution that all nations ought to use
in 01der to avoid its calamities,-— “ And you, rising nation,”
says he, “whom gene10us efforts have f1ecd from the yoke of
Europe! let theb 1111ive1se be st1 [1(k with still greater rever—
ence at the sight of the privileges you have acquirer], by see-
ing you continually employed for the public felicity: do not
offer it as a sacrifice at the unsettled shrine of political ideas,
21nd of the deceitful combinations of warlike ambition ; avoid,
01', at least, delay, participating in the passions of our hemi-
sphere; make your own advantage of the knowledge which
experience alone has given to our old age, and preserve, for
a long time, the simplicity of childhood; ins s',h01t honor hu—
man nature, by showing that, when left to its own feelings,
it is still capable of those virtues that maintain public orde1,
and of that prudence which 111sures public tranquillity.’

Permit me to offer one conside1 ation more, that ought to
induce our acceptance of this system. I feel myself lost 1n
the contemplation of its magnitude. By adopting this Sys-
tem, we shall probably lay a foundation for erecting temples. ,
of liberty in every part of the earth. It has been thought by
many, that 011 the success of the struggle America has made
for f1eedom Will depend the exertions of the brave and en-
lightened of other nations. The advantages resulting from
this system will not be confined to the United States, but 111“
draw f10m Europe many worthy characters, who pant f01 the
enjoyment of freedom. It will induce princes, in order to
preseive their subjects, to 1est0re to them a portion of that
liberty of which they have for many ages been deprived.
It will be subservient to the great designs of Providence
with regard to this globe—the multiplication of mankind,
their improvement int3 knowledge, and their advancement i1i
happiness.

Mr. M’KEAN.‘ Sir, you have under your consideration
a matter of very great weight and importance, not only to
the present generation, but to posterity ; for where- the rights
and liberties of the people are concerned, there certainly it

sfit to proceed with the utmost caution and regard. You
li we done so hitherto. The power of this Convention being
derived f10m the people of Pennsylvania, by a positive and

VOL. 11. 67 45

530 DEBATES. [M’KEAN.

volzmtaryg r,ant cannot be extended fartbe1 than What this
positive grant hath conveyed. You have been chosen by
the people fo1 the sole purpose of “ assenting to and ratifying
the Constitution proposed fo1 the futu1e government of the
United States, with respect to their general and common
concerns,” or of rejecting it. It is a sacred trust; and as,
on the one hand, you ought to weigh well the innovations it
will c1eate in the governments of the individual states, and
the dangers which may a1ise by its adoption, so, upon the
other hand, you ought fully to consider the benefits it may
promise, aird the consequences of a rejection of it. You
have hitherto acted strictly conformably to your delegated
power; you have agreed that a single question can come
before you; and it has been acrordingly moved that you re-
solve “to assent to and ratify this Constitution.” Three
Weeks have been spent in hearing the objections that have
been made against it, and it is now time to determine
whether they are of such a nature as to overbalance any
benefits or advantages that may be derived to the state of
Pennsylvania by you1 accepting it.

Si1, I have as yet taken up but little of you1 time, notwith-
standng this, I will endeavor to contract What occurs to me
on the subject. And in what I have to offer, I shall observe
this method: I will first consider the arguments that may
have been used against this Constitution, and then give my
reasons why I am fo1 the motion.

The a1guments against the Constitution are, I think,
chiefly these. —

Fi1st. That the elections of representatives and senators
are not frequent enough to insure responsibility to their con-
stitucnts.

Second. That one representative for thirty thousand per-
sons is too few.

Third. The Senate have a share in the appointment of
certain officers, and are to be the judges on the impeach-
ment of such ofi‘icers. This is blending the executive with
the legislative and judicial department, and is likely to screen
the offenders impeached, because of the concurrence of a
majority of the Senate in their appointment.

Fourth That the Congress may, by law, deprive the
electors of a fair choice of their representatives, by fixing
imptoper times, places, and modes 0' election.

M’KnANJ PENNSYLVANIA. _ 58‘

Fifth. That the powers of Congress are too large, par
ticularly in laying internal taxes and excises, because they
may lay excessive taxes, and leave nothing for the support
of the state governments.

In raising and supporting armies; and that the appropri-
ation of money, for that use, should not be for so long a term
as two years.

In calling forth the militia on necessary occasions; be-
cause they may call them from one end of the continent to
the other, and wantonly harass them; besides, they may
coerce men to act in the militia, whose consciences are
against bearing arms in any case.

In making all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government
of'the United States, or in any department or office thereof;

And in declaring that this Constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof,
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
theland.

The migration or importation of such persons as any of
the states shall admit shall not be prohibited prior to 1808,
nor a tax or duty imposed on such importation exceeding
ten dollars for each person.

Sixth. That the whole ofthe executive power is not lodged
in the President alone, so that there might be one responsi-
ble person.

That he has the sole power of pardoning offences against
the United States, and may therefore pardon traitors, for
treasons committed in consequence of his own ambitiOus
and wicked projects, or those of the Senate.

That the Vice-President is a useless officer, and, being an
executive offiCer, is to be president of the Senate, and in
case of a division is to have the casting voice.

Seventh. The judicial power shall be vested in one Su»
preme Court. An objection is made, that the compensation
for the services of the judges 'shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office; and this is contrasted with the
compensation to the President, which is to be neither in-
creased nor diminished during the period for which he shall
have been elected; but that of the judges may be increased,

532 DEBATES. [MTQMN

and the judges may hold other offices of a lucrative nature,
and their judgments be thereby warped.

That in all the cases enumerated, except Where the Supreme
Cou1t has original julisdiction, “they shall have appellate
jurisdiction both as to law and facts, with such exceptions,
and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.”
From hence IS infened that the tiial by jury is not secured.

That they havejurisdiction between citizens of diffeient
states.

Eighth. That there is no bill or declaration of rights in
this Constitution. .

Ninth. That this is a consolidation of the several states,
and not a confederation.

Tenth. It is an aristocracy, and was intended to be so by
the framers of it.

The first objection that. I heard advanced against this
Constitution, 1 say, sir, was, that. “ the elections of represent-
atives and senators are not frequent enough to insure responsi-
bility to their constituents.”

This is a subject that most men differ about ; but there are
more considerations than that of more responsibility. By
this system the House of Representatives is composed of
persons chosen every second year by the people of the
several states; and the senators every siX years by the
legislatures. Whether the one or the other of these periods
is of too long duration, is a question to which various a11-
swers Will be given. Some persons are of opinion, that three
yeais in the one case, and seven in the other, would be a
mo1e eligible term than that adopted in this Constitution.
In Grbeat Britain, we find the House of Commons elected
for seven yeals; the House of L01ds is perpetual, and the
king never dies. The Parliament. of Ireland is octennial.
In various other parts of the British dominions, the House of
Representatives sit during the royal pleasure, and have been
continued twenty years. This, sir, is a term undoubtedly
too long. In a single state, I think annual elections most
proper; but then there ought to be more branches in the
legislature than one. A11 annual legislatu1e, possessed of
supreme power, may be propeily termed an annual despot-
1.9,m and, like an individual, they are subject to capiice, and
act as pa1ty spirit or spleen dictates; hence that instability
to the laws which is the bane of republican governments.

M’KEAN.] PENNSYLVANIA. 533 .

The framers of this Constitution wisely divided the legis-
lative department between the two houses, subject to the
qualified negative of the P1esident of the United States,
though this government embraces only enumerated powels.
In a single state, annual elections may be proper; the more
so, when the legislative powers extend to all cases; but in
such an extent of country as the United States, and when
the powers are circumscribed, there is not that necessity, nor
are the objects of the general government of that nature as to
be acquired immediately by every capacity. To combine the
various interests of thirteen different states, requires more ex-
tensive knowledge than is necessary for the legislature of any
one of them. Two years are therefore little enough for the
members of the House of Representatives to make them-
selves fully acquainted with the views, the habits, and inter-
ests, of the United States. With respect to the Senate,
when we consider the 'trust reposed in them, we cannot
hesitate to plonounce that the period assigned to them is
short enough; they possess, in common wiih the House of
Representatives, legislative pow er ;with its concurrence they
also have power to declare war; they are joined with the.
President in concluding treaties; it therefore behoves them
to be conversant with the politics of the nations of the
world, and the dispositions of the sovereigns and their
ministers; this requires much reading and attention. And,
believe me, the longer a man bends his study to any partic-
ular subject, the more likely he is to be master of it. EX-
perience and practice will assist genius and education. I
therefore think the time allowed, under this system, to both
houses, to be extremely proper. This objection has been
made repeatedly; but it can only have weight with those
who are not at the pains of thinking on the subject. When
any thing, sir, new or great,_is done, it is very apt to create
a ferment among those out of doors, who, as they cannot
always enter into the depth and wisdom of counsels, are too
apt to censure what they do not understand ; upon a little re-
flection and experience, the people often find that to be a
singular blessing which at first they deemed a curse.

Second. “That one representative for thirty thousand
persons is too few. 7’

There will be, sir, sixty- -five 1n the House of Representa-
tives, and twenty- six in the Senate—in all nine y-one.

534. DEBATES. [M’KEAN

who, together with the President, are to make laws in the
several particular matters intrusted to them, and Which are
all enumerated and expressed. I think the number suffi-
cient at the present, and in three years’ time, when a census
or actual enumeration must take place, they will be increased,
and in less than twenty- -five years they will be more than
double. “ ith respect to this, different gentlemen in the
sever ral states will differ, and at least the opinion of the ma-
jority must govern.

Third. “ The senators have a share in the appointment
of certain officers, and are to be the judges 011 the impeach-
ment of such officers. This is blending the executive with
the legislative andjudicial department, and is likely to screen
the offenders impeached, because of the concurrence of a
majority of the Senate in their appointment.”

The President is to nominate to office, and, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, appoint officers, so that he
is the responsible person ; and when any such impeachment
shall be tried, it is more than probable that not one of the
Senate, who concurred in the appointment, will be a senator,
for the seats of a third part are to be vacated every two
years, and of all 111 six.

As to the senators having a share 111 the executive power,
so far as to the appointment of ce1tain officers, I do not
know where this restraint on the President (ould be more
safely lodged. Some may think a privy counsello1 might
have been chosen by every state: but this could little amend
the matter, if any, and it would he a considerable additional
expense to the people. Nor need the Senate be under
any necessity of sitting constantly, as has been alleged; for
there is an express provision made to enable the President
to fill up all vacancies that may happen during their recess
— the commissions to expire at the end of the next session.

As to the impeachments, the objection lS much stronger
against the supreme executive council of Pennsylvania.

t)The House of Lords, 111 Great Britain, are judges 1n the
last 1esort in all cmlcauses, and, besides, have the power of
trying irnpeachments.

On the trial of impeachments, the senators are to be under
the sanction of an oath or affirmation, besides the other ties
upon them to do justice; and the basis is more likely to be
against the officer accused than in his favor, for there are

M’KEAN.] PENNSYLVANIA. 535

always more persons disobliged, than the contra1y, when an
office IS given away, and the expectants of office are more
nume1ous than the possessors.

Fourth. “That the Congress may by law deprive the
electors of a fair choice of their representatives, by fixing
impioper times, places, and modes of election.”

Every House of Representatives a1e of necessity to be the
judges of the elections, 1etu1ns, and qualifications of its own
member.s It is therefore their plovince, as well as duty, to
see that they are fairly chosen, and me the legal members;
for this pu1pose, it is propel they should have it in their
powe1 to plovide that the times, places, and manner of elec-
tion should be such as to insure free and fair elections.

Annual Congresses are expressly secured; they have only
a power given to them to take care that the elections shall
be at convenient and suitable times and places, and con-
ducted in a proper manner; and I cannot discover why we
may not intrust these particulars to the representatives of the
United States with as much safety as to those of individual
states.

I11 some states the-electors vote viva voce, in others by
ballot. They ought to be uniform, and the elections held
on the same day throughout the United States, to prevent
corruption or undue influence. Why are we to suppose that
Congress will make a bad use of this power, more than the
representatives in the several states?

It is said, “ that the powers of Congress, under this Con-
stitution, are too large, particularly in laying internal taxes
and excises, because they may lay excessive taxes, and leave
nothing for the support of the state governments.” Sit, no
doubt but you will discover, 011 consideiation, the necessity
of extending these powers to the gove1nment of the Union.
If they have to bo1row money, they am certainly bound, in
honor and conscience, to pay the interest, until they pay the
principal, as well to the foreign as to the domestic creditor;
it therefore becomes our duty to put it in their power to be
honest. At present, sir, this is not the case, as experience
has fully shown. Congress have solicited and required the
several states to make provision for these purposes. Has
one state paid its quota? I believe not one of them. And
wnat has been the result? Foreigners have'been compelled
to advance money to enable us to pay the interest due them

586 DEBATES. lM’KEAN.

on what they furnished to Congress during the late war. I
trust we have had experience enough to convince us that
Congress ought no longer to depend upon the force of requi-r
sition. I heard it urged, that Congress ought not to be an-
thorized to collect taxes, until a state had refused to comply
with this requisition. Let us examine this position. The
engagements entered into by the general government render
it necessary that a certain sum shall be paid in one year;
notwithstanding this, they must not have power to collect
it until the year expires, and then it is too late. Or is it
expected that Congress will borrow the deficiency 5’ Those
who lent us, in our distress, have little encouragement to
make advances again to our government; but give the power
to Congress to lay such taxes as may be just and necessary,
and public credit will revive. Yet, because they have the
power to lay taxes and excise, does it follow that they must 9
For my part, I hope it may not be necessary , but if it is, it
is much easier for the citizens of the United States to con-
tribute their proportion, than for a few to bear the weight
of the whole principal and interest of the domestic debt;
and there is perfect security on this head, because the regu-
lation. must equally affect every state, and the law must
originate with the immediate representatives of the people,
subject to the investigation of the state representatives. But
is the abuse an argument against the use of power? I think
it is not; and, upon the whole, I think this power wisely
and securely lodged 1n the hands of the general gove1n;ment
though, 011 the first View of this work, I was of opinion they
might have done without it; but, sir, 011 reflection, I am
satisfied that it is not only proper, but that our political sal—
vation may depend upon the exercise of it.

The next objection rs against “the power of raising and
supporting armies , and the appropriation of money for that
use should not be for so long a term as two years.” Is it
not necessary that the authority superintending the general
concerns of the United States should have the power of rais-
ing and supporting armies? Are we, sir, to stand defence—
less amidst conflicting nations? Wars are inevitable, but
war cannot be declared Without the consent of the immediate
representatives of the people. They must also originate the
law which appropriates the money for the support of the
army; vet they can make no appropriation for a longer term

M’KEAN.] PENNSYLVANIA. 537

than two years : but does it follow, because they may make
appropriations for that period, that they must, or even will.
do it? The power of raising and supporting armies is not
only necessary, but is enjoyed by the present Congress, who
also judge of the expediency or necessity of keeping them
up. In England there is a standing army : though in words
it is engaged but for one year, yet is it not kept constantly
up B Is there a year that Parliament refuses to grant them
supplies? Though this is done annually, it might be done
for any longer term. Are not their officers commissioned
for life 5’ And when they exercise this power with so much
prudence, shall the representatives of this country be sus-
pected the more, because they are restricted to two years?

- It is objected that the powers of Congress are too large,
because “ they have the power of calling forth the militia on
necessary occasions, and may call them from one end of the
continent to the other, and wantonly harass them; besides,
they may coerce men to act in the militia whose consciences
are against bearing arms in any case.” It is true, by this
system power is given to Congress to organize, arm, and dis—
cipline the militia, but every thing else is left to the state gov-
ernments ; they are to officer and train them. Congress
have also the power of calling them forth for the purpose of
executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections,
and repelling invasions; but can it be supposed they would
call them, in such case, from Georgia to New Hampshire 9
Common sense must oppose the idea.

Another objection was taken from these words of the Con
stitution — “to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the gow
ernment of the United States, or in any department or office
thereof.” And, in declaring “ that this Constitution, and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall he the supreme law
of the land,” this has at last been conceded, that, though it is
explicit enough, yet it gives to Congress no further powers
than those already enumerated. Those that first said it gave
to Congress the power of superseding the state governments,
cannot persist in it; for no person can, with a tolerable face,

VOL II.

5 38 DEBATES [M’KEAJ

read the clauses over, and infer that such may be the con-
sequence.

Provision is made that Congress shall have power to pro-
hibit the importation of slaves after the year 1808; but the
gentlemen in opposition accuse this system ofa crime, be-
cause it has not prohibited it at once. I suspect those
gentlemen are not well acquainted with the business of the
diplomatic body, 'or they would know that. an agreement
might be made that did not perfectly accord with the will
and pleasure of any one person. Instead of finding fault
with what has been gained, 1 am happy to see a disposition
in the United States to do so much.

The next objections have been against the executive power.
It is complained of, “because the whole of the executive
power is not lodged in the President alone, so that there
might be one respOnsible person. He has the sole powe1s of
pa1doning offences against the United States, and may there-
fore pardon traitors, for treasons committed in consequence
of his own ambitious or wicked projects, or those of the
Senate.”

Observe the contradiction, sir, in these two objections.
One moment the system is blamed for not leaving all execu-
tive authority to the President alone, the next it is censured
for giving him the sole power to pardon traitors. I am glad
to hear these objections made, because it forebodes an amend-
ment in that body in which amendment is necessary. The
President of the United States must nominate to all offices,
before the persons can be chosen ; he here consents and be-
comes liable. The executive council of Pennsylvania appoint
officers by ballot, which effectually destroys responsibility.
He may pardon offences; and hence it is inferred that he may
pardon traitors, for treason committed in consequence of his
own ambitious and wicked projects. The executive council
of Pennsylvania can do the same. But the President of the
United States may be impeached before the Senate, and
punished for his crimes.

“The Vice-President is a useless officer.” Perhaps the
govemoment might be executed without him, but there is a
necessity of having a person to pleside 1n the Senate, to con-
tinue a full representation of each state in that body. The
chancellor of England 1s ajudic ial office] , vet he sits in the

House of Lords '

M’KEAN] PENNSYLVANIA. 539

The next objection is against the judicial department.
“ The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court."
An objection is made that the compensation fo1 the services
of the judges shall not be diminished dining their continuance
in office; and this IS cont1asted with the compensation ofthe
P1esident, which is to be neither increased 1101 diminished
during the period for which he shall be elected. But that of
the judges may be increased, and thejudge may hold other
offices of a lucrative nature, and his judgment be thereby
walped.

Do gentlemen not see the leason why this dififelence 1s

made. P Do they not see that the Piesident 1s appointed but
for four years, whilst the judges may continue for life, if they
shall so long behave themselves well? In the first case,
little alteration can happen in the value of money; but in
the course of a man’s life, a very great one may take place
from the discovery of silver and gold mines, and the great
influx of those metals; in which case an increase of salary
may be requisite. A security that their compensation shall
not be lessened, nor they have to look up to every session
for salary, will certainly tend to make those officers more
easy and independent.

“ The judges may hold other offices of a lucrative nature.”
This part of the objection reminds me of the scheme that
was fallen upon, in Pennsylvania, to prevent any person from
taking up large tracts of land. A law was passed restricting
the purchaserto a tract not exceeding three hundred acres ;
but all the difference it made was, that the land was taken
up by several patents, instead of one, and the wealthy could
procure, if they chose it, three thousand acres. What though
the judges could hold no other office, might they not have
brothers, children, and other. relations, whom they might
wish to see placed in the offices forbidden to themselves?
I see no apprehensions that may be entertained on this
account.

That, in all cases enumerated, except whe1e the Supieme
Court has original jurisdiction, “they shall have appellate
jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” 1* rom
this it is infe1red that the trial by jury is not secured; and
an objection 1s set up to the system, because they have j111is-
diction between citizens of diffeient states. Regulations

4..

~—

5111. DEBATES. [M’KEAN.

under this head, ale necessary; but the Convention could
form no one that would have suited each of the United
States. It has been a subject of amazement to me to hear
gentlemen contend that the verdict of a jury shall be without
revision in all cases. Juries are not infallible because they
are twelve in number. When the law is so blended with
the fact as to be almost inseparable, may not the decision of
a jury be erroneous? Yet, notwithstanding this, trial by
jury is the best mode that 1s known. Appellate jurisdiction,
sir, is known 1n the common law, and causes ale removed
hom infe1i01 courts, by units of erlo1, into some cou1t of ap-
peal. It is said that the lord chancellor, in all cases, sends
down to the lower courts when he wants to determine a faCt ;
but that Opinion is not well founded, because he dete1mines
nineteen out of twenty without the inte1vention of any ju1y.

The power to try causes between citizens of diffe1ent states
was thought by some gentlemen invidious; but I app1ehend
they must see the necessity ofit,f10m what has been already
said by my honorable colleague.

“ That there IS no bill or declaration of rights 1n this Con—
stitution. ’7

To this I answer, Such a thing has not been deemed
essential to liberty, excepting in Great Britain, where there
is a king and a House of Lords, quite distinct,- with respect
to power and interest, from the rest of the people; or, in P0-
land, the pacta conventus, which the king signs before he is
crowned ; and in six states of the American United States.

Again, because it is unnecessary; for the powers of Con-
gress, being derived from the people in the mode pointed
out by this LfiConstitution, and being thelein enumelated and
positively granted, can be no other than what this positive
grant conveys. (Locke on Cwil Government, vol. ii, b. 2,
chap. 2, sect. 140, and in the 13th chap. ., sect. 152.)

With lespect to executive officers, they have no manner
of authority, any of them, beyond what 15 by positive glant
and commission delegated to them.

“That this is a consolzdation of the several states, and
not a confederation.’

To this I answer, the name is immaterial; the thing
unites the several states, and makes them like one, in partic-
ular instances and for particular purposes— which is what is
ardently desired by most of the sensible men in this country.

M’KEANJ PENNSYLVANIA. ' 531.]

I care not. Whether it is called a consolidation, confederation,
or national government, 01 by what other name, if it is a
goodb 0"overnment, and calculated to p1omote the blessings of
libelty, tranquillity, and happiness.

“ It IS an arzstocracy, and was intended to be so by the
flameis of it. ’7

He1e, again, si1, the name is immaterial, if it is a good
system of govemment for the gene1al and common concerns
of the United States. But after the definition which has
already been given of an aristocratic government, it becomes
unnecessary to repeat arguments to prove that this system
does not establish an aristocracy.

There have been some other small objections to, or rather
criticisms 011, this work, which I rest assured the gentlemen
Who made them Will, on reflection, excuse me in omitting
to notice.

Many parts of this Constitution have been wrested and
tortu1ed, in orde1 to make way for shadowy objections, which
must have been obse1ved by eve1y auditm. Some other
things were said with acrimony; they seemed to be person-
al ; I heard the sound, but it was inarticulate. I can com-
pare cit to nothing better than the feeble noise occasioned by
the wo1k1ng of small bee1.

It holds in argument, as Well as natu1e, that destructio
unius est generatio alterius— the refutation of an 211gument
begets a proof.

The objections to this Constitution having been answered,
and all done away, it remains pure and unhurt; and this
alone is a forcible argument of its goodness.

Mr. President, I am sure nothing can prevail with me to
give my vote for ratifying this Constitution, but a conviction,
from comparing the arguments on both sides, that the not
doing it is liable to more inconvenience and danger than the
doing it.

1. If you do it, you strengthen the government 21nd peo-
ple of these United States, and will thereby have the wisdom
and assistance of all the states.

2. You will settle, establish, and firmly perpetuate, our
independence, by destroying the vain hopes of all its ene-
mies, both at home and abroad.

3. You will encourage your allies to join with you; nay, to

depend, that What hath been stipulated, or shall hereafter be
46

M'Z HARRISBURG MEETING.

stipulated and agreed upon, will be punctually performed, and
other nations will be induced to enter into treaties with you.

4. It will have a tendency to break our parties and
divisions, and, by that means, lay a firm and solid foundation
f01 the future tranquillity and happiness of the United States
in gener,al and of this state in particula1.

5. It will invigorate our comme1ce, and encourage ship-
building.

6. It will have a tendency not only to prevent any other

nation from making War upon you, but from. offering you
any wrong, 01 even binsult.

111 sho1t, the advantages that must result from it a1e ob-
viously so numelous and impo1tant, and have been so fully
and ably pointed out by others, that it appea1s to be un-
necessary to enlarge on this head.

Upon the Whole, sir, the law has been my study from my
infancy, and my only profession. I have gone through the
circle of offices, in the legislative, executive, 21nd judicial de-
partments of government; and from all my study, observa-
tion, and experience, I must declare that, from a full
examination and due consideration of this system, it appears
to me the best the world has yet see-11.

I congratulate you on the fair prospect of its being adopt-
ed, and am happy in the expectation of seeing accomplished
What has been long my aldent wish -— that you will hereafter
have a salutary permanency in nza01strac J, and stab1l1ty 1n
the laws.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING AT HARRISBURG, IN PENN-
SYLVANIA.
HARRISBURG, Sept. 3, 175:5.

Agreeably to a circular letter which originated in the county of Cum-
berland, inviting to a conference such of the citizens of this state who
conceive that a revision of the federal system, lately pr0posed for the gov-
ernment of these United States, is necessary,-—-a number of gentlemen
from the city ofPhiladelphia, and counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, Ches— .\
ter, Lancaster, Cumberland, Berks, Northumberland, Bedford, Fayette,
Washington, Franklin, Dauphin, and Huntingdon, assembled at this place
for the said purpose, viz. : —

Hon. George Bryan, Esq. Robert VVhitehill, John Kean,

Blair M’Clenahan, William Sterrett, Jonathan Hoge,

James Hanna, Adam Orth, Daniel Montgomery,
James Mercer, Thomas Murray, John Dickey,

PENNSYLVANIA. 543

Albert Gallatin, Joseph Gardner, John Bishop,
Benjamin Elliot, Benjamin Blyth, John Lytle,
James Crooks, John Jordan, Hon. John Smilie,
Daniel Bradley, William Rodgers, James Marshall,
James Anderson, John Rodgers, Richard Baird,
Charles Pettit, Robert M’Kee, . John A. Hanna,
Richard Backhouse, William Petricken, Robert Smith.

Blair M’Clenahan, Esq., was unanimously elected chairman, and John
A. Hanna, Esq., secretary. ‘

After free discussion, and mature deliberation, had upon the subject
before them, the following resolutions and propositions were adopted ——

The ratification of the federal Constitution having formed a new era in
the American world, highly interesting to all the citizens of the United
States, it is not less the duty than the privilege of every citizen to exam-
ine with attention the principles and probable effect of a system on which
the happiness or misery of the present as well as future generations so
much depends. In the course of such examination, many of the good
citizens of the state of Pennsylvania have found their apprehensions ex-
cited that the Constitution, in its present form, contains in it some prin-
ciples which may be perverted to purposes injurious to the rights of free
citizens, and some ambiguities which may probably lead to contentions
incompatible with order and good government. In order to remedy these
inconveniences, and to avert the apprehended dangers, it has been thought
expedient that delegates, chosen by those who wish for early amendments
in the said Constitution, should meet together for the purpose of delib-
erating on the subject, and uniting in some constitutional plan for obtain-
ing the amendments which they may deem necessary.

We, the conferees, assembled for the purpose aforesaid, agree in
opinion, — ‘

That a federal government, only, can preserve the liberties and se-
cure the happiness of the inhabitants of a country so extensive as these
United States; and experience having taught us that the ties of our-
union, under the Articles of Confederation, were so weak as to deprive
us of some of the greatest advantages we had a right to expect from
it, we are fully convinced that a more efficient government is indis-
pensably necessary. But although the Constitution proposed for the
United States is likely to obviate most of the inconveniences we labored
under, yet several parts of it appear so exceptionable to us, that we are
clearly of opinion considerable amendments are essentially necessary.
In full confidence, however, of obtaining a revision of such exception-
able parts by general convention, and from a desire to harmonize with
our fellow-citizens, we are induced to acquiesce in the organization of
the said Constitution.

We are sensible that a large number of the citizens both of this and
the. other states, who gave their assent to its being carried into execution
previous to any amendments, were actuated more by fear of the dangers
that might arise from delays, than by a conviction of its being perfect;
we therefore hope they will concur with us in pursuing every peaceable
method of’obtaining a speedy revision of the Constitution in the mode 7
therein provided; and, when we reflect on the present circumstances
of the Union, we can entertain no doubt that motives of conciliation,

544 HARRISBURG MEETING.

and the dictates of policy and prudence, will conspire to induce every
man of true federal principles to give his support to a measure which
is not only calculated to recommend the new Constitution to the appro-
bation and support of every class of citizens, but even necessary to pre-
vent the total defection of some members of the Union.

Strongly impressed with those sentiments, we have agreed to the fol-
lowing resolutions :—

1. Resolved, That it be recommended to the people of this state to
acquiesce in the organization of the said government; but, although we
thus accord in its organization, we by no means lose sight of the grand
object of obtaining very considerable amendments and alterations, which
we consider essential to preserve the peace and harmony of the Union, and
those invaluable privileges for which so much blood and treasure have
been recently expended.

II. Resolved, That it is necessary to obtain a speedy revision of said
Constitution, by a general convention.

III. Resolved, That, in order to effect this desirable end, a petition
be presented to the legislature of this state, requesting that honorable
body to take the earliest Opportunity to make application, for that purpose,
to the new Congress.

The petition preposed is as follows :—

To the Honorable the Representatives of the Freemen of the Common~

wealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met:

The petition and representation of the subscribers humbly show —

That your petitioners possess sentiments completely federal; being
convinced that a confederacy of republican states, and no other, can se-
cure political liberty, happiness, and safety, throughout a territory so ex-
tended as the United States of America. They are well apprized of the
' necessity of devolving extensive powers to Congress, and of vesting the
supreme legislature with every power and resource of a general nature ; and
consequently they acquiesce in the general system of government framed by
the late federal Convention,— in full confidence, however, that the same
will be revised without delay; for, however worthy of approbation the
general principles and outlines of the system may be, your petitioners
conceive that amendments in some parts of the plan are essential not
only to the preservation of such rights and privileges as ought to he re-
served in the respective states, and in the citizens thereof, but to the fair
and unembarrassed operation of the government in its various depart-
ments. And as provision is made, 111 the Constitution itself, for the
making such amendments as may be deemed necessary, and your peti-
tioners are desirous of obtaining the amendments which occur to them as
more immediately desirable and necessary, in the mode admitted by such
prov1s1on, —

They pray, that your honorable house, as the representatives of the
people in this commonwealth, will, in the course of your present session,
take such measures as you, in your wisdom, shall deem most effectual
and proper to obtain a revision and amendment of the Constitution ofthe
United States, in such parts, and in such manner, as have been or shall
be pointed out by the conventions or assemblies of the respective states‘
and that such revision be by a general convention of representatives trom
the several states in the Union.

Your petitioners consider the amendments pointed out in the proposi-

PENNSYLVA NlA. 53115

tions hereunto subjoined as essentially necessary; and as such they
suggest them to your notice, submitting to your wisdom the order in which
they shall he presented to the consideration of the United States.

The amendments proposed are as follows, viz.

I. That Congress shall not exercise any powers whatever, but such as
are expressly given to that body by the Constitution of the United States:
nor shall any authority, power, or jurisdiction, be assumed or exercised
by the executive or judiciary departments of the Union, under color or
pretence of construction or fiction; but all the rights of sovereignty,
which are not by the said Constitution expressly and plainly vested in
the Congress, shall be deemed to remain with, and shall be exercised
by, the several states in the Union, according to their respective consti-
tutions; and that every reserve of the rights of individuals, made by the
several constitutions of the states in the Union, to the citizens and in~
habitants of each state respectively, shall remain inviolate, except so far
as they are expressly and manifestly yielded or narrowed by the national
Constitution.

Article I, section 2, paragraph 3.

II. That the number of representatives be, for the present, one for
every twenty thousand inhabitants, according to the present estimated
numbers in the several states, and continue in that proportion until the
whole number of representatives shall amount to two hundred; and then
to be so proportioned and modified as not to exceed that number, untr-
the proportion of one representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants
shall amount to the said number of two hundred.

Section 3. III. That senators, though chosen for six years, shall be
liable to be recalled, or superseded by other appointments, by the re-
spective legislatures ofthe states, at any time.

Section 4. IV. That Congress shall not have power to make or alter
regulations concerning the time,.place, and manner of electing-senators
and representatives, except in case of neglect or refusal by the state to
make regulations for the purpose; and then only for such time as such
neglect or refusal shall continue.

Section 8. V. That when Congress shall require supplies, which are
to be raised by direct taxes, they shall demand from the several states
their respective quotas thereof, giving a reasonable time to each state to
procure and pay the same; and if any state shall refuse, neglect, or omit
to raise and pay the same within such limited time, then Congress shall
have power to assess, levy, and collect the quota of such state, together
with interest for the same, from the time of such delinquency, upon the
inhabitants and estates therein, in such manner as they shall by law di-
rect; provided that no poll tax be imposed.

Section 8. VI. That no standing army of regular troops shall be raised
or kept up in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of both
houses in Congress.

Section 8. VII. That the clause respecting the exclusive legislation
over a district not exceeding ten miles square be qualified by a proviso
that such right of legislation extend only to such regulations as respect
the police and good order thereof.

Section 8. VIII. That each state, respectively, shall have power
to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia there-
of, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the

VOL. 11. 69

546 HARRISBURG MEETING.

same. That othe militia shall not be subject to martial law, but when
in actual service, in the time of war, invasion, or rebellion ; and when not
in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject to such fines,
penalties, and punishments, only, as shall be directed or inflicted by the
laws of its own state: nor shall the militia of any state be continued in
actual service longer than two months, under any call of COngress, with-
out the consent of the legislature of such state, or, in their recess, the
executive authority thereof.

Section 9. IX. That the clause respecting vessels bound to or from
any one of the states he explained.

Article 3, section 1. X. That Congress establish no other court than
the Supreme Court, except such as shall be necessary for determining
causes of admiralty jurisdiction.

Section 2, paragraph 2. XI. That a proviso be added at the end of
the second clause of the second section of the third article, to the follow-
ing effect, viz. : Provided, that such appellate jurisdiction, in all cases of
common-law cognizance, be by a writ of error, and confined to matters
of law only; and that no such writ of error shall be admitted, except in
revenue cases, unless the matter in controversy. exceed the value of three
thousand dollars.

Article 6, paragraph 2. XII. That to article 6., clause 2, be added
the following proviso, viz.: Provided always that no treaty, which shall
hereafter be made, shall be deemed or construed to alter or affect any law
of the United States, or of any particular state, until such treaty shall
have been laid before and assented to bythe House of Representatives in
Congress.

Resolver], That the foregoing proceedings be committed to the chair-
man for publication.

BLAIR M’CLENAHAN, Chairman.
Attest, JOHN A. HANNA. Secretary.

A FRAGMENT OF FACTS,

DISCLOSING THE CONDUCT OF

THE MARYLAND CONVENTION,

ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

 

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND.

ANNAPOLIS, April 21, 1788.

THE following facts, disclosing the conduct of the late

Convention of Maryland, are submitted to the serious con-
sideration of the citizens of the state.
‘ On Monday, the 21st of April, the Convention met. in
Annapolis, and elected the Hon. George Plater, Esq., presi-
dent. On Tuesday, they established rules for the conduct
of business; and, on the same day,_ the following question
was propounded to the Convention:

“ When a motion is made and seconded, the matter of the motion shall

receive a determination by the question, or be postponed, by general con-
sent, or the previous question, before any other motion shall be received.”

And the following question, viz., -—

“Every question shall be entered on the journal; and the yeas and
nays may be called for, by any member, on any question, and the name
of the member requiring them shall be entered on the journal.”

Which two questions the Convention determined 1n the
negative.

On Wednesday, the proposed plan of government was
read the first time, and thereupon it was resolved, “That
this Convention Will not ente1 into any resolution upon any
particular part of the proposed plan of federal government
for the United States , but that the Whole theleof shall be
read through a second time, after which the subject may be
fully debated and (onsidered; and then the president shall
put the question ,5“ That this Convention do assent to and

511.8 ADDRESS.

ratify the same Constitution.” On which question, the yeas
and nays shall be taken.

On Thursday, the members who were opposed to the rati-
fication of the Constitution, Without such previous amend-
ments could be obtained as they thought essentially necessary
to secure the liberty and happiness of the people, (being
confined, by the last resolution, to consider, in one view, the
whole of the plan of government) stated some of their ob-
jections to the Constitution. The Convention met in the
evening, when Mr. Paca, member from Hartford, having
just taken his seat, rose, and informed the president that he
had great objections to the Constitution proposed, in its
present form, and meant to propose a variety of amendments,
not to prevent, but to accompany the ratification; but, hav-
ing just arrived, he was not ready to lay them before the
house ; and requested indulgence, until the morning, for that
purpose. The proposal being seconded, and the house asked
if they would give the indulgence, it was granted without a
division; and they adjourned for that purpose. On Friday,
at the meeting of the house, Mr. Paca rose, and informed
the president, that, in consequence of the permission of the
house, given him the preceding evening, he had prepared
certain amendments, which he would read in his place, and
then lay on the table; when he was interrupted, and one
member from each of the following counties, viz., Frederic,
Talbot, Charles, Kent, Somerset, Prince George’s,VVort:ester,
Queen Anne’s, Dorchester, Calvert, and Caroline, and one
member from the city of Annapolis,* and one from Baltimore
town, arose in their places, and declared, for themselves and
their colleagues, “ that they were elected and instructed, by
the people they represented, to ratify the proposed Constitu—
tion, and that as speedily as possible, and to do no other act;
that, after the ratification, their power ceased, and they did
not.consider themselves as authorized by their constituents
to consider any amendments.” After this, Mr. Paca was
not permitted even to read his amendments. The opponents
continued to make their objections to the Constitution until
Saturday noon.. The advocates of the government, although
repeatedly called on, and earnestly requested, to answer the

* The member from the city of Annapolis did not give it as his opinion that he
was not at liberty tn consider amendments. but said he had consulted his colleague,
and that his colleague had informed him the citizens were against amendments.

MARYLAND. 549

objections, if not just, remained inflexibly silent, and called
for the question, that “the Convention assent to and ratify
the proposed plan of fede1al government for the United
States; "7 Which was canied 111 the affiunative, by Sixty-three
to eleven.

The vote of ratification having thus passed, Mr. Paca
, again rose, and laid before the Convention his propositions
for amending the Constitution thus adopted, which he had
prepared by leave of the house; declaring that he had only
given his assent to the government under the firm pe1sua-
sion, and 1n full confidence that such amendments would be
peaceably obtained so as to enable the people to live happy
under the government; that the people of the county he
represented, and that he himself, would support the govern-
ment, with such amendments; but, without them, not a man
in the state, and no people, would be more firmly opposed
to it than himself and those he represented. Sentiments
highly favorable to amendments were expressed, and a general
murmur of approbation seemed to arise from all parts of the
house, expressive of a desire to consider amendments, either
in their characters as members of convention, or in their i11—
dividual capacities as citizens; and the question was put on
the following motion : —

“Resolved, That a committee be appointed to take into consideration,
and report to this house on Monday morning next, a draught of such
amendments and alterations as may be thought necessary, in the proposed
Constitution for the United States, to be recommended to the considera-
tion of the people ofthis state, if approved of by this Convention; and Mr.
Paca, Mr. Johnson, Mr. S. Chase, Mr. Potts, Mr. Mercer, Mr. Golds-
borough, Mr. Tilghman, Mr. Hanson, Mr. J. T. Chase, Mr. Lee, Mr. W.

Tilghman, Mr. M’Henry, and Mr. G. Gale, be appointed a committee for
that purpose.”

A division was called for on this resolution, when there
appeared sixty—six members for, and not more than seven
agalnst It.

And then it was resolved, “That the amendments pro-
posed to the Constitution by the delegate from Hartford
county should be referred to the above committee.”

The committee thus appointed, the Convention adjourned
to give them time to prepa1e their p1opositions; and they
proceeded, with every appearance of unanimity, to execute
the trust reposed 1n them.

The following amendments to the proposed Constitution

550 ADDRESS.

were separately agreed to by the committee, most of them by
a unanimous vote, and all of them by a great majority.

1. That Congress shall exercise no power but what is expressly delen
gated by this Constitution.

By this amendment, the general powers given to Congress
by the first and last paragraphs of the 8th sect. of art. 1,
and the 2d paragraph of the 6th article, would be in a
great measure restrained; those dangerous expressions, by
which the bills of rights, and constitutions, of the severa-
states may be repealed by the laws of Congress, in some
degree moderated; and the exercise of constructive powers
wholly prevented.

2. That there shall be a trial byjury in all criminal cases, accordmg
to the course of proceeding in the state where the offence is committed;
and that there be no appeal from matter of fact, or second trial after ac-'
quittal; but this provision shall not extend to such cases as may arise in
the government of the land or naval forces.

3. That, in all actions on debts or contracts, and in all other contro-
versies respecting property, of which the inferior federal courts have juris-
diction, the trial of facts shall be by jury, if required by either party ; and
that it be expressly declared that the state courts, in such cases, have a
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, with an appeal from either,
only as to matter of law, to the Supreme Federal Court, if the matter in
dispute be of the value of dollars.

4. That the inferior federal courts shall not have jurisdiction ofless than

dollars; and there may be an appeal, in all cases of revenue, as
well to matter of fact as law; and Congress may give the state courts
jurisdiction of revenue cases, for such forms, and in such manner, as they
may think proper.

5. That, in all cases of trespasses done within the body of a county,
and within the inferior federal jurisdiction, the party injured shall be en-
titled to trial by jury in the state where the injury shall be committed; and
that it be expressly declared that the state courts, in such cases, shall have
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, and there shall be no appeal
from either, except on matter of law; and that no person be exempt from
such jurisdiction and trial but ambassadors and ministers privileged by
the law of nations.

6. That the federal courts shall not be entitled to jurisdiction by fictions
or collusion.

7’. That the federal judges do not hold any other office of profit, or re-
ceive the profits of any other office under Congress, during the time they
hold their commission.

The great objects of these amendments were, lst. To
secure the trial by jury in all cases, the boasted birthright of
Englishmen and their descendants, and the palladium of civil
liberty; and to prevent the appeal from fact, which not only

MARYLAND. 5b.

destroys that trial in civil cases, but, by construction, mar
also elude it in criminal cases—a mode. of proceeding both
expensive and burdensome, and which, by blending law with
fact, will dest1oy all check 011 the judiciary authority, render
it almost impossible to convict. judges of co11uption, 21nd may
lay the foundation of that g1 adual and silent attack on indi-
viduals, by which the approaches of tyranny become irre-
sistible. 2d. To give a concurrent jurisdiction to the state
courts, in order that Congress may not be compelled, as they

will be under the presecnt form, to establish inferior federal
courts, which, if not numerous, are very expensive ; the cir-
cumstances of the people being unequal to the increased ex-
pense of double cou1ts and double offic ers — an arrangement
that will render the law so complicated and confused, that
few men can know how to conduct themselves with safety to
their pe1sons or property, the g1eat and only security of
f1eemen. 3d. To give such jurisdiction to the state cou1ts
that transient foreigners, and persons from other states, com-
mitting injuries in this state, may be amenable to the state
Whose laws they violate and whose citizens they injure. 4th.
To prevent an extension of the federal jurisdiction, which
may, and in all probability will, swallow up the state juris-
dictions, and consequently sap those rules of descent and
regulations of personal p1ope1ty, by which men hold thei1
estates. And lastly, to secure the independence of the
federal judges, to whom the happiness of the people of this
great continent will be so greatly committed by the extensive
powers assigned them.

8. That all warrants without oath, or affirmation of a person conscien-
tiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to search suspected places, or seize
any person or his property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general
warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any person suspected,
without naming or describing the place or person in special, are dan-
gerous, and ought not to be granted.

This amendment was considered indispensable by many
of the committee , for, Congress having the power of laying
excises, (the horror of a free bpeople, ) by which our dwellingb
houses, those castles considered so sacred by the English
law, will be laid open to the insolence and oppression of
office, there could be no constitutional check plovided that
would prove so effectual a safeguard to our citizens. Gen
eral warrants, too, the great engine by which power may
destroy those individuals who resist usurpation, are alsc

552 ADDRESS.

hereby forbidden to those magistrates who are to administer
the general government.

9. That no soldier be enlisted for a longer time than four years, except
in time of war, and then only during the war.

10. That soldiers be not quartered, in time of peace, upon private

houses, without the consent of the owners.
11. That no mutiny bill continue in force longer than two years.

These were the only checks that could be obtained against
the unlimited power of raising and regulating standing
armies, the natural enemies to freedom ; and even with these
restrictions, the new Congress will not be under such con-
stitutional restraints as the Parliament of Great Britain—
restraints which our ancestors have bled to establish, and
which have hitherto preserved the liberty of their posterity.

12. That the freedom ofthe press be inviolably preserved.

In prosecutions in the federal courts for libels, the const1-
tutional preservation of this great and fundamental right
may prove invaluable.

13. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, except in time
of war, invasion, or rebellion.

This provision to restrain the powers of Congress over
the militia, although by no means so ample as that provided
by Magna Charta, and the other great fundamental and
constitutional laws of G1eat Britain, (it being cont1ary to
Magna Cha1ta to punish a fleeman by martial23 law, 1n time
of peace, and murder to execute him,) yet it may prove an
inestimable check; for all other provisions in favor of the
rights of men would be vain and nugatory, if the power of
subjecting all men, able to bear arms, to martial law at any
moment should remain vested in Congress.

Thus far the amendments were agreed to.

The following amendments were laid before the com-
mittee, and negativcd by a majority.

1. That the militia, unless selected by lot; or voluntarily enlisted, shall
not be marched beyond the limits of an adjoining state, without the con-
sent of' their legislature or executive.

2. T hat theD ()0 ongress shall have no pow er to alter or change the time,
place, or manner of holding elections for senators or representatives, unless
a state shall neglect to make regulations, or to execute its regulations, or
shall be prevented by invasion or rebellion, in which cases only, Congress
may interfere, until the cause be removed.

3. T,hat in every law of Congress imposing direct taxes, the collection
thereof shall be suspended for a certain reasonable time therein limited

MARYLAND. 553

and 011 payment of the sum by any state, by the time appointed, sue'1
taxes shall not be collected

4. That no standing army shall be kept up in time of peace, unless
with the consent of two thirds of the members present of each branch of
Congress.

5. That the President shall not command the army in person, without
the consent of Congress.

6. That no treaty shall be elfectual to repeal or abrogate the constitu-
tions or bills of rights of the states, or any part of them.

7. That no regulation of commerce, or navigation act, shall be made,
unless with the consent of two thirds of the members of each branch of
Congress.

8. That no member of Congress shall be eligible to any office of profit
under Congress, during the time for which he shall be appointed.

9. That: Congress shall have no power to lay a poll tax.

10. That no person conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, in
any case, shall be compelled personally to serve as a soldier.

11. That there be a responsible council to the President.

12. That there be no national religion established by law ; but that all
persons be equally-entitled to protection in their religious liberty.

13. That. all imposts and duties laid by Congress shall be placed to the
credit of the state in which the same shall be collected, and be deducted
out of such state’s quota of the common or general expenses of govern-
ment.

14. That every man hath a right. to petition the legislature for the
redress of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner.

15. That it be declared, that all persons intrusted with the legislative
or executive powers of government are the trustees and servants of the
public; and, as such, accountable for their conduct. Wherefore, when-
ever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly
endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people
may, and of right ought to, reform the old, or establish a new govern-
ment. The doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and op-
pression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind.

The committee having proceeded thus far, all the mem-
bers Who voted for the ratification declared that they would
engage themselves, under every tie of honor, to supp01t the
amendments they had agreed to, both in their public and
private characters, until they should become a part of the
general government; but a great majority of them insisted
on this express condition, that none of the propositions re-
jected, or any others, should be laid before the Convention
for their consideration, except those the committee had so
agreed to.

Thegentlemen of the minority, who had made the pr0po
sitions which had been rejected, reduced to the necessity of
accommodating their sentiments to the majority, through
fear of obtaining no security Whatever for the people, '-—not—

VOL. 11. 70 47

5511 ADDRESS.

withstanding they considered all the amendments as highly
important to the welfare and happiness of the citizens of
the states, — yet, to conciliate, they agreed to confine them-
selves to the first three of those propositions, and solemnly
declared and pledged themselves, that, if these were added,
and supported by_ other gentlemen, they would not only
cease to oppose the government, but give all their assistance
to carry it into execution so amended. Finally, they only
required liberty to take the sense of the Convention on the
first three propositions, agreeing that they would hold them-
selves bound by the decision of a majority of that body.

The first of these objections, concerning the militia, they
considered as essential; for, to march beyond the limits of
a neighboring state the genelal militia, which consists of
so many poor people that can illy be spaled from their
families and domestic conce111s, by power of Congress,
(who could know nothing of their ci1cumstances,) without
consent of their own legislatu1e or executive, ought to be
restrained.

The second objection, respecting the power of Congress
to alter elections, they thought indispensable. Montesquieu
says that the 1ights of elections should be established un-
alterably by fundamental laws, 111 a f1ee government.

The tl1i1d objection, concerning previous requisitions, they
conceived highly important: they thought, if the money re-
quired by dilect taxation could be paid with certainty, and
in due time, to Congress, that every good consequence
would be secured to the Union, and the people of the state
theleby relieved from the great inconvenience and expense
of a double collection, and a double set of tax-gathereors,
and they might also get rid of those odious taxes by excise
and poll, without 1nju1y to the general government.

They we1e, however, again proposed and rejected.

Afirmative.—Mr. Paca, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Mercer, Mr. J. T. Chase,
Mr. S Chase.

Negative —Mr. Lee, Mr. Potts, Mr. Goldsborough, Mr. J. T. Tilgh-
man, Mr. W. Tilghman, Mr. Hanson, Mr. G Gale, Mr. M’ Henry.

Previous to this, a motion was made on Monday, the
29th, in the Convention, while the committee were sitting,
in the following words, to wit : —

“Resolved, That this Convention will consider of no propositions for

amendment of the federal government, except such as shall be submitted
to them by the committee of thirteen.”

MARYLAND. 5.35

The committee being sent for by the Conxention, the
gentlemen of the majority in committee then determined
that they would make no report of any amendments what-
ever, not even of those which they had almost unanimously
agreed to; and the committee, under those circumstances,
attended the house. Mr. Paca, as chairman, stated to the
Convention what had passed in the committee, read the
amendments which had there been agreed to, and assigned
the reason why no report had been formally made. A
member then rose, and proposed that a vote of thanks to
the president, which had been once read before the attend-
ance of the committee, should have a second reading; and
upon the second reading thereof, the previous question was
called for by the members who wished to consider the
amendments agreed to by the committee, and such other
amendments as might be proposed. The house thereupon
Jivided, and the yeas and nays were called for by the
minority; the sense of the Convention was taken thereon;
and a majority determined that the yeas and nays should
not be taken, nor would they permit the vote to be entered
on the journal, by which the yeas and nays were prohibited;
to preclude the consideration of any amendments.

A. motion was then made, “ that the Convention adjourn
without day,” on which the yeas and nays were taken, and
appeared as follOws : —

Aflirmatz'vc. — The Hon. the President, Messrs. Barns, Chilton, Sewel,
W. 'l‘ilghman, Yates, Granger, Chesly, Smith, Brown, Turner, Stone,
Goldsborough, Stevens, G. Gale, Waggaman, Stewart, J. Gale, Sulivane,
Shaw, Gilpin, Hollingsworth, Heron, Evans, 0. Sprigg, Hall, Digges,
Hanson, J. Tilghman, Holliday, Hemsley, Morris, Lee, Potts, Faw, J.
Richardson, Edmondson, M’Henry, Coulter, T. Sprigg, Stull, Rawlins,
Shryoch, Cramphin, Thomas, Deakins, Edwards. 47.

Negative. — Messrs. Perkins, J. T. Chase, S. Chase, Mercer, Wilkin-
son, Grahame, Parnham, Ridgely, Cockey, Cromwell, Lloyd, Hammond,
Bowie, Carroll, Seney, Chaile, Martin, Done, Johnson, Paca, Love, Pinck-
ney, L. Martin, W. Richardson, Driver, and'Harrison. 27.

 

We consider the proposed form of national government
as very defective, and that the liberty and happiness of the
people Will be endangered if the system be not greatly
changed and altered. The amendments agreed to by the
committee, and those proposed by the minority, are now
laid before you for your consideration, that you may express

Dbb ADDRESS.

your sense as to such alterations as you may think proper
to be made in the new Constitution.

We remain persuaded that the importance of the altera—
tions proposed, calculated to preserve public liberty by those
checks on power which the experience of ages has ren-
dered venerable, and to promote the happiness of the peo—
ple, by a due attention to their case and convenience, will
justify the steps we have taken, to obtain them, to our con-
stituents and the world. ’

Having no interest that can distinguish us from the rest
of the community, we neither fear censure nor wish ap-
plause. Having thus discharged the duty of citizens and
trustees of the public, we shall now submit to the people
those precautions and securities, which, on mature reflection
on this momentous subject, we deem necessary for that safety
and happiness.

May the all-wise and omnipotent Being, who made us
masters of a fair and fruitful empire, inspire us with wis-
dom and fortitude to perpetuate to posterity that freedom
which we received from our fathers!

Members of the Committee.——VVilliam Paca, Samuel Chase, John F.
Mercer, Jeremiah T. Chase.

Members of the Convention—John Love, Charles Ridgely, Edward

Cocsey, Nathan Cromwell, Charles Ridgely, of Wm., Luther Martin.
Benjamin Harrison, Wm. Pinckney.