S861 ,1 953' \/ SSSEIH ; 01105 5 , UNITED STATES COASTGUARD mummflufiufimtnuTquEufiuumfimmum CAPTAIN OF THE PORT 3.15. a..n:-3I=2M UJ EERKELEV [ MARITIME COUNTERTERRORISM ] TRASIT .LflO-CI'IOd TABLE OF CONTENTS SUBJECT PAGE Objectives, Purpose and Procedures 1 Introduction to Terrorism 2, The U.S. Government Anti—Terrorism Program 4, U.S. Coast Guard Counterterrorism Responsibilities 6, Background Scenario 8 Situation One 10 Situation Two 12 Situation Three 14, 15 Situation Four 16 Special Section (Memorandum of Understandings & 18 Interagency Agreement) Glossary of Acronyms 21 Bibliography List 22, 23 , 19, 20 OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSE On January 1984, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard pro— mulgated Commandant Notice 16602 which addressed Maritime Counterterrorism Contingency Planning. This notice was to be used as a model for District Commanders, COTPs/MSOs and other field units designated by District Commanders' to develop contin— gency plans for dealing with maritime terrorist acts within their areas of jurisdiction. The Coast Guard's objective in counterterrorism response is to minimize the threat to public safety through non-violent resolution of terrorist incidents and to enforce the laws. The Coast Guard's basic legal authority to conduct this contingency planning for terrorist incidents on the high seas and U.S. territorial waters is under Title 14, United States Code, Part 2 (14 USC 2). This Coast Guard Training Situation (TRASIT), which focuses on maritime counterterrorism contingency planning and operations by the Captain of Port, is designed as a continuation of the Commandant's concern in maritime terrorism and the vulnerability of the areas that are the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard. Therefore, the purpose of the TRASIT is to: o Create a further awareness of the terrorist threat in U.S. maritime areas over which USCG has port safety and security responsibilities. 0 Provide the user with a review of the USCG organization and the procedures with which the organization would respond to terrorist incidents. 0 Identify those areas where further planning and coordination may be required to enhance USCG readiness to carry out counterterrorism responsibilities. PROCEDURES ;7 ,gf. A" ‘L&Ewa After reading these procedures continue 1x) pages 2 Ehd 3. These pages contain the initial introduction to terrorism generally covering definitions, news media impact, weapons used, organiza— tion, and strategy and tactics employed by terrorists. The narrative section is supported by the visual aids on page 1. Following this, the next two sections address the U.S. Government Antiterrorism Program and U.S. Coast Guard Counterterrorism Respon- sibilities. Both of these sections are supported by visual aids, and the section on the U.S. Government Antiterrorism Program includes questions for the user to answer. These first sections are the basic introduction to the following sections which are the Background Scenario and introduce Four Situations. The scenario and situations are developed sequentially in describing a terrorist incident in a maritime environment. Each situation has a narrative of the events with supportive visual aids, followed by a series of questions for the user. This TRASIT was developed from available reference sources, as shown in the Bibliography Section. However, in order to expand the scope of this TRASIT, questions were selected that cannot be answered solely from the narrative contents, however the questions will stimulate the TRASIT user and with his professional knowledge he can provide an answer or solution to the question. An Answer Pamphlet is provided with the questions and answers. An Answer Workbook is provided that repeats the questions and provides the user adequate space for answering the questions. A special section is provided that includes the memorandums of understanding between the Coast Guard, the FBI and the Army and the interagency agreement between the Coast Guard and the FBI. A Glossary of Acronyms, and Bibliography are provided on pages 21, 22 and 23. 100-0103 TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 40—50 MEMBER ORGANIZATION TERRORIST TARGETS / VICTIMS (Selection Criteria) TERRORIST INCIDENT PHASES MARITIME TERRORIST TARGETS TACTICAL COMMAND ELEMENT l I l l INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SECTION SECTION UNITS (Each unit has 2—3 cells of 2-5 persons each.) 100—500 MEMBER ORGANIZATION COMMAND ELEMENT r SUB- COMMAND SUB— COMMAND l EXTORTION VALUE. 0 Severity of impact against the principal target/victim. EASE OF TAKE-OVER. o How well is the target/Victim protected from possible assault. EASE OF HOLDING. o How difficult is the target/victim to defend. WITHDRAWAL CAPABILITY. o How can capture be avoided after close of incident. Y NEGOTIATION PHASE ’- DEMANDS \ o TRADE-OFFS \ O OPEN-ENDED \ i 4 POST-INCIDENT PHASE SUB- COMMAND 1 INTELLIGENCE SECTION SUPPORT SECTION TACTICAL UNITS ‘ FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 PRE-INCIDEN INITIATION CLIMAX PHASE PHASE PHASE 0 PLANNING O MOVEMENT TO 0 MAY FOLLOW O RECON SCENE INITIATION O REHEARSAL O INITIATION OF PHASE ATTACK 0 MAY LAST WEEKS/MONTHS 0 END OF INCIDENT O REGROUP O CRITICISM/ CRITIQUE O LESSONS LEARNED FIGURE 3 Port Facilities 00 Military installations (including CG) .0 Civilian boat marinas o. Shipbuilding and repair yards Tank Farms 00 Oil and gas storage 0. Chemical storage Transportation Links on Bridges and tunnels Passengers and Cargo Carriers/Tankers oo Ferries (underway or in slips) 0. Ships underway, moored, or alongside piers Electric Power Facilities 0. Oil and coal fired generating plants 00 Nuclear generating plants Dams, Canal Locks, Levees Offshore Oil Rigs FIGURE 4 INTRODUCTION TO TERRORISM GENERAL Terrorism is by no means a new form of warfare; it has been wit— nessed in nearly every conflict of ideas, wills and national groups in history. In recent years terrorism has however, changed the way most of us live. Terrorists have clearly demonstrated that they have an impact on national and international events far beyond. what their limited numbers and resources would suggest. The term terrorism is usually misused and has many definitions. The following selected definitions of terrorism reflect varying points of view, although some commonalities between definitions are dis— cernible. 0 Violence for effect. . .not primarily, and sometimes not at all for the physical effect on the actual target(s) or victim(s), but rather for its dramatic impact on the general public. 0 The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation or coercion. It us- ually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims. 0 The culturally unacceptable use of threat of Violence directed toward symbolic targets to influence political behavior either directly through fear, intimidation, or coercion, or indirectly by affecting attitudes, emotions, opinions. . . 0 Violent, criminal behavior primarily to generate fear in the community, or a substantial segment of it, for political purposes. . . 0 National Terrorist: A terrorist who operates and aspires to political power primarily within a single nation. 0 Transnational Terrorist: A terrorist who operates across national borders, whose actions and political aspirations may affect individuals of more than one nationality. 0 International Terrorist: A terrorist who is controlled by, and whose actions represent the national interests of a sovereign state. For the purpose of this training material, the definition of terrorism is as follows: Terroriwn is the calculated use or threat of criminal vio- lence, motivated by political or ideological beliefs, for the principal purpose of influencing public opinion and the ac- tions of governments, rather than mainly for personal gain. The terrorist usually differs from a common criminal in that the will for self-preservation is subordinate to the desires for accomplishing the political or ideological objective. THE MEDIA The strategy of terrorism is to intimidate; to achieve political goals through the threat of violence. The real goal is the propaganda derived from terrorist acts, thus terrorism must have publicity, communications and weapon availability to succeed. Mass media, with its communication technology, now serves as a primary propaganda agent for terrorists. In view of the inability of terrorist organizations to disseminate their message through mass media outlets, terrorists seek to create news by communicating their existence, ideas and power to the general public, knowing full well that the news media will report their actions. Acts of terrorism command wide attention in the media, resulting in world wide instan- taneous reports advertising their demands and causes. Many of these acts are romanticized by the media. Thus, terrorists are becoming increasingly adept at projecting "well" on television and in the press. The media, by glorifying the acts and maintaining sympathetic portrayals of the terrorist, may contribute to the possibility of subsequent terrorists acts becoming even more violent. WEAPONS The essence of terrorism is violence. The terrorists communicate through viciousness, brutality and random mayhem. Their power is limited only by their access to weapons and targets. As their arsenal grows, so does the threat that they pose to organized societies. To date, however, terrorists have been inherently conservative in their choice of weapons. Despite advances in weapons technology, most terrorist still use guns, bombs, and knives. Nonetheless, there is no standard terrorist arsenal, and the use of more sophisticated weapons cannot ‘be dismissed. The array’ of available weapons is virtually limitless, ranging from firearms to radiological, chemical and bio- logical weapons capable of killing thousands. ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY The necessary ingredients for an organized terrorist group are hardcore leadership, active cadre, active support, and passive sup- port. Ieadership is necessary to make policy, lay plans, and give direction; active cadre are the members who carry out the orders from their higher commands; active supporters provide the logistic support needed to sustain terrorist operations; and passive support are those sympathetic to the cause who, although not willing to stand up and be counted through fear of becoming involved, often provide support unwittingly in the form of money through donations, and are relied upon heavily to "spread the word". Figure 1 illustrates typical terrorist organizations. The common strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence which will draw the attention of the people, government, and world to their cause. The target(s) or victim(s) (e.g., hostages, seized pro- perty, etc.) of the terrorists are seldom their principal objective. The principal objective, or focal point, is more often the general public or perhaps the business sector. TACTICS Acts of terrorism most commonly associated with terrorists are as follows: 0 BOMBING O ARSON O HIJACKING O HOSTAGE TAKING O HOAXES O AMBUSH O KIDNAPPING O ASSASSINATION Whatever terrorists' tactics may be, they are certainly simple to apply, dynamic in their effects, hit—and-run by nature, and designed for their impact upon the general public. Terrorist selection of target(s) or victim(s) is very critical in order to achieve the fullest impact. Figure 2 provides criteria that are probably considered by terrorists before selection is made. The discernible phases of a terrorist incident, as illustrated in Figure 3, are as follows: 0 Pre—Incident Phase - Terrorist plans the event, based on his intentions, short range objectives and long term strategy, and on information/experience from past incidents or opera- tions. Involves the terrorist in intelligence gathering activities through surveillance, target penetration and even use of informants; logistical preparation, including the acquisition of transportation, radios, arms and ammunition and explosives, and rehearsals. Secrecy and operations se- curity are vital during this phase. 0 Initiation Phase - Marks the beginning of the operation. Commences with movement to the scene, followed by perhaps the detonathmi of a bomb in an ambush or the seizure of hostages. o Negotiation Phase - Applicable only in situations in which negotiable items have been seized where there is possible trade-off of items between terrorists and the authorities. Negotiable items may be live hostages, a ship, a waterfront facility, or aircraft, etc. o Climax Phase — Marks the end of the incident. May last for days or weeks, as in a live hostage situation, or may rapidly follow the initiation phase, as in a single bomb incident. 0 Post-Incident Phase - Time when the terrorists regroup and indulge in self-criticism, which will provide valuable input for the pre—incident phase of subsequent operations. MARITIME TERRORISM There are numerous potential targets within the maritime envi- ronment that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. As examples, super- tankers and LNG/LPG vessels could be considered “floating bombs“. These vessels could be hijacked or boarded by terrorists on the high seas or in high density ports where terrorists could then threaten to blmd up the ship if authorities did not comply with their demands. Figure 4 contains a listing of potential maritime terrorist targets. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. Terrorist organizations in the U.S. are in a constant flux because of law enforcement pressures and the rapid Changes within societies that alter terrorist causes. For these reasons, an accurate, updated listing of active terrorist groups or organizations is not always complete. However, the following is a list of terrorist organizations "that have the potential to employ" terrorism as a tool in the U.S. o PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) 0 ASALA (Armenian Liberation Army) 0 RCYB (Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade) 0 IRA (Irish Republican Army) 0 Cuban Extremists (Omega 7, and others) 0 Puerto Rican Extremists (FALN, Machateros and others) 0 Environmental/Anti-Nuclear Extremists (Greenpeace and others) 0 Weathermen/Black Radicals (Black Liberation Army, New World Front and others) 0 JDL (Jewish Defense League) 0 International terrorism sponsored by governments such as the USSR, Libya, Bulgaria, Syria, which is directed against the U.S. .LOO-(I'IOJ TRI-LEVEL CONCEPT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM STRUCTURE Level 1 NATIONAL COMMAND AND POLICY SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE (NSC) Level 2 EXECUTIVE INTERAii§CY COORDINATION AGENCIES GROU AND CONTROL IDENT Level 3 PROTECTION INC OPERATION DIPLOMACY AND RESPONSE INTELLIGENCE SECURITY PREVENTION DETERRENCE REACTION PREDICTION FIGURE 1 PRESIDENT SPECIAL COORDINATIONW COMMITTEE (NSC) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM"—'—"‘—'—] INTELLIGENCE I l I COMMUNITY LJUSTICE] [ STATE 1 [DEFENSE] SUPPORT PREDICTION ITRANSPORTATIONI ' CIA lENERGYI INSC STAFH WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM 0 Agency for International Developuent 0 Center for Disease Control- HEN o Anus Control and Disarmament Agency 0 Joints Chiefs of Stat! 0 Central Intelligence Agency 0 Law Entorce-ent Assist Admin 0 Defense Intelligence Agency 0 Metropolitan Police Depart-em e Department of the Any 0 National Security Agency 0 Depart-vent of Co-erce e Nuclear Regulatory Co-nission e Depart-ent of Energy 0 Office of Management and Budget RESEARCH AND 0 Depart-(int of Justice 0 Office or the Secretary of Detense PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT 0 Depart-en! of State 0 United States Coast Guard RELATIONS COMMITTEE 0 Depart-ent of Transportation 0 United States Custo-s Service COMMITTEE 0 Depart-tent of Treasury 0 United States Mission to the 0.5. 0 Federal Aviation Ad-inistration 0 United States Postal Service 0 Federal Bureau of Investigation 0 United States Secret Service 0 Federal heparedneas Agency 0 United States larshals Service 0 l-igration and Naturalization Service l I l 1 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY INITIATIVES POLICY PLANNING & CRISIS COMMITTEE COMMITTEES MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES PREVENTION DETERRENCE REACTION I I I I DOMESTIC FOREIGN DOMESTIC FOREIGN COMMITTEE COMMITTEE COMMITTEE COMMITTEE FIGURE 2 6 .LOO-CI'IOJ THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM Shortly after President Carter's inauguration, a revamping of the institutional nachinery for dealing with terrorism was undertaken. After extensive review, it was obvious that there was a need for an antiterrorism program in the United States to respond to incidents; national and international. The antiterrorism program would have to be extremely flexible at the federal level to take into account both the contemporary nature of the terrorist threat and the wide range of federal resources that would be marshalled. A tri-level antiterrorism program concept was outlined based upon the existing federal organization and the command and control structure in which field operations could be linked, as necessary, with the Executive Office of the President. As illustrated in Figure 1 the tri-level concept envisions the following four basic program components at the operational level. 0 Prevention. International initiatives and diplomacy to discourage state support of terrorism and to build a broad consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissi— ble under international law irrespective of the cause in which they are used. 0 Deterrence. Protection and security efforts of the public and private sector to discourage terrorists acts. 0 Reaction. Antiterrorisul operations in response to specific major acts of terrorism. 0 Prediction. Intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in continuous support of the other three program components. In 1977, the National Security Council issued a presidential review memorandum. Most of the memorandum recommendations were rejected by Congress, however, two interagency groups were estab- lished to coordinate the federal response to terrorist crises. The first grOup is the working group; a broad—based group that draws membership from every agency of the federal government with even a remote connection to terrorism. The second group, and a more critical group, functions as an executive committee. This group is chaired by a representative of the Department of State. This group consists of representatives fronl the Department of Defense, Justice, Energy, Treasury, Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. Essentially, the two groups perform planning and coordination functions and policy formulation. Figure 2 illustrates the overall U.S. Government Antiterrorism Program structure. Also under the Carter administration the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created and was delegated the task of planning for and responding to terrorist acts. President Reagan quickly committed his administration to a far stronger posture with respect to terrorism» than Carter's administration. One of these commitments was the creation of an antiterrorism force known as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in 1980 after the failure of the Iranian rescue. The JSOC operating arm consists of Army, Navy and Air Force specialized units called Delta Forces. In May 1981 a declaration on terrorism was issued by NATO reflecting this new U.S. hard line on terrorism and its reinterpretation of human rights. The assembled. NATO foreign. ministers and representatives condemned all acts of terrorism regardless of origins, causes or purpose as flagrant violations of human dignity and rights. Thus, early in the new administration, the President put the administration on record as opposing terrorism and vowed strong action against the perpetrators and supporters of international terrorism whenever the U.S., its' citizens, or diplomatic personnel were targets of such violence. The new U.S. policy opposes any payment of ransom for the release of kidnapped Americans or other concessions to terrorists. It. maintains that the responsibility for dealing with threats to diplomatic personnel or the abduction of Americans must fall on the local, or host governments. Therefore, in opposing terrorism, the Reagan administration leaves little doubt that the U.S., choosing from a variety of economic, political and military sanctions, would respond decisively. Last year even though the number of terrorist incidents worldwide, many of them involving Americans, soared to a total of 499 there were relatively few in the U.S. In 1983, 86% of these took place in Western Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, with diplomatic and military sites and personnel being the most frequent targets. The State Department monitors more than 100 terrorist groups and tries to keep close tabs on about 30 of them. The FBI, armed with a computer system for tracking suspects, and authority for penetrating suspected groups have apparently crippled several dangerous factions including anti-Turkish Armenian nationalist, Puerto Ricans and Arabian separatists by jailing their leaders. Recently after Secretary of State Schultz suggested that the U.S. should consider preventive or pre-emptive actions against terrorist groups, President Reagan issued a still secret Executive Order for mobilizing the government to cope with terrorists, not only in the U.S. but also abroad. In conclusion, however, the administration's proposals for tough antiterrorists laws are actually just beginning the long journey through Congress, for action and approval. The U.S. remains vulnerable to terrorism. For example our power—supply networks, natural gas and petroleum pipelines, nuclear power plants, water supply systems, the telephone network, and congested maritime ports all contain choke points which are impossible to defend simultaneously against attacks by 'highly dedicated and well-armed terrorists. QUESTIONS 1. What federal department is responsible for responding to international terrorist incidents? 2. What federal department is responsible for responding to most domestic acts of terrorism? 3. What government agency has the investigation and operational responsibilities for responding to U.S. terrorist incidents? 4. What government agency has exclusive responsibility for the direction of any law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft in flight? 5. What federal agencies in the Department of Transportation could have key roles in counterterrorism response in the U.S.? 6. What federal department is the designated Executive Agent for the Department of Defense in all matters pertaining to the use of DOD resources to control civil disturbances and terrorism? 7. What options are available to the President for' employing military forces to counter terrorism in the U.S.? IOU-010:1 USCG ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN MARITIME CONTERTERRORISM PLANNING AND OPERATIONS N3 IOO-(I'IOcl CAPTAIN—OF-THE-PORT ZONES UNITED STATES CODES AND REGULATIONS _ _ COMMANDANT (G—C) 14 USC 2: BaSIc authority for the Coast Guard to engage . in contingency planning for terrorist inci- CHIEF—OF-STAFF (G—CCS) dents on the high seas and in U.S. waters. It states: "The Coast Guard shall enforce or ’ assist in the enforcement of all applicable ] 1 1 COAST GUARD AREA COMMANDER 0 Federal laws on the high seas and waters OFC OF MARINE subject to the jurisdiction of the United OFC~ OF OPERATIONS CFC 0‘“ COMMAND' States". (G_0) CONTROL. COMMS ENVIR- & SYSTEMS RESCUE AND COORDINATION CENTER (RCC) (G-T) (G-W) . 14 USC 89: Authority for the Coast Guard to enforce U.S. CG RESOURCES u/w OUTSIDE U.S. laws and to make searches, seizures and arreStS‘ INTELLIGENCE 8- HO COMMAND CENTER PREVENTION & . . SECURITY DIV FLAG PLOT ENFORCEMENT DIV 14 USC 141: Authority for the Coast Guard to aSSlSt any (G—OIS) ( (G—TGC) ) (G-WPE) Federal agency, state, or local government, to perform duties for which such forces are especially qualified- OPERATIONAL LAW DISTRICT COMMANDER (d) o° 34° ENFORCEMMMENT DIV l c. C) 50 USC 191: Magnuson Act. General grant of authority for (G‘OLE) CHIEF-OF-STAFF (dcs) subversive/terrorist planning/action for the HAwMMNlmAmm protection of vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities. I ”I I I 33 USC 1221: The Port and waterways Safety Act. GiVes the ll I MARINE SAFETY OPERATIONS I - PUERTO RICO District Commander and COTP broad discre- DIVISION (m) DIVISION (0) ' tionary powers to direct the movement and ‘ {:127 operations of vessels. -‘-__,. \ FIGURE 1 —— PORT SAFETY BRANCH (mPS) INTELL & LAW ENFORCEMENT BRANCH (oil) “Rm smmm nun) firm smmnfl COAST GUARD DISTRICT COAST GUARD DISTRICT COAST GUARD DISTRICT COAST GUARD DISTRICT COAST GUARD DISTRICT _ MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL nos-roN MA ST LOUIS MO NEW YORK NY HAMPTON ROADs/ M M PROTECTION BRANCH (mep) SEARCH 8' RESCUE PORTLAND, ME PADUCAH, {or PHILADELPHIA, PA (NORFOLK), VA mEsT’gn, sc SO COTP/OC I BRANCH (osr) PROVIDENCE, RI CINCINNATI, OH NE" LONDON, cr BALTIMORE. MD JACKSONVILLE, FL, HUNTINGTON, WV NEW HAVEN, (.‘1' WILMINGTON, NC SAN JUAN, p.11, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS MSO ALT COTP L fifiggf’hfi KY 333w“: G“ OPERATIONS CENTER (doc) mwmnum,TN PITTSBURG, PA 33 CFR 6&165: Implements the Magnuson Act. Authority for I the Captain of the Port (COTP) to set security ' am$f§fl§§ms MN“ “Emmm “mun“ SBEMTmfli ’ TRI CO ST GUARD DISTRICT zones and control access to vessels and ' PORT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT a A (mwTGmmDDmflum' GmmmemDmnum, ammwmumbmnum waterfront facilities. ‘ SEEIEELEANALS' LA gémeLOH 108(gglGiLgigégNGcgEACH SAN FRANCISCO, CA SOUTHEAST ALASKA/ L______, PORT ARTHUR, Tx MUSKEGON. MI SAN DIEGO, CA WESTERN ALASKA/ 33 CFR 160: Implements the Port and Waterways Safety Act. PORT ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY (PBS) flfigggéu‘jflx 3:332: :25 péfigzfifiih SOUND, CORPUS CHRISTI, TX DULUTH, MN (VALDEz) AK MILWAUKEE, WI SAULT STE. MARIE, MI CG DISTRICT GROUP/STATIONS OH THIRTEENTH FOURTEENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT COAST GUARD DISTRICT FIGURE 2 FOREIGN VESSEL BRANCH HONOLULU , HI TOLEDO, l_ DISTRICT RESOURCES IN PORT/ SEATTLE, WA U/W WITHIN TERRITORIAL SEAS pommn, on MARITIME EMERGENCY RESPONSE (MER) EXECUTIVE ORDERS OPERATIONS CENTER ’ Promulgates 33 CFR 6 and gives the Coast Guard access to the Magnuson Act. 3.0. 10173: FIGURE 4 FIGURE 3 (5 FIGURE 5 U.S. COAST GUARD COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSIBILITIES GENERAL The increasing incidents of terrorism throughout the world are becoming a concern to the maritime community, where there are an abundance of Vulnerable targets. These potential targets, if attacked, could seriously affect the environment and have a significant impact on the U.S. general public. Federal statutes provide the Coast Guard with broad guidance to counter terrorism through its authority in the areas of port safety and security. The applicable US Codes, Codes of Federal Regulations and Executive Orders are shown in Figure l, 2 and 3. The Coast Guard counterterrorism response is centered. on minimizing the threat to public safety through non-Violent resolution of incident(s) and enforcement of the law. The Coast Guard's primary responsibility in maritime counterterrorism is to support those agencies formally designated to lead federal count- erterrorism activity. The Coast Guard's status as an armed force of the U.S. is Viewed as secondary to law enforcement duties in counterterrorism matters. Although other federal, state and local authorities have cognizance over many crimes committed within the port area and would provide the initial response to terrorist acts occurring within their jurisdictions, the Coast Guard may be the lead agency and exercise federal control of the terrorist incident. The principal Coast Guard commands and the offices, departments, and branches within these command organizations that are instrumental in planning and supporting Maritime Counter— terrorism contingency operations in U.S. ports are illustrated in Figure 2. The individual counterterrorisnl planning and oper- ations responsibilities of these commands are addressed in the following paragraphs. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, as a member of the Working Group on Terrorism, coordinates with representatives from other federal agencies, such as the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, Energy, etc., to assure that counterterrorism planning and direction is promulgated and constantly updated to subor— dinate commands and agencies. CG Headquarters has promulgated counterterrorism contingency planning and operational guidance in COMDT NOTE 16602 of 23 January, 1984, which details requirements for District Commanders and Captains of the Port in developing contingency plans. The Commandant serves as the focal point for Coast Guard commands to make reports and submit special requests when responding to maritime terrorist incidents within their respective areas of jurisdiction. These reports will assist the Commandant in determining the coordination necessary with other federal agencies. AREA COMMANDERS The Area Commanders are responsible for planning, coordin— ating, and directing interdistrict counterterrorism operations, and coordinating interdistrict use of operational resources. If the terrorist incident occurs within a single district, there normally would not be a requirement to obtain additional Coast Guard resources outside that district. Therefore, the Area Commander would probably not become involved. However, the area may assume control of operational matters in maritime counter— terrorism which, because of the scope of Coast Guard involvement, is most effectively coordinated at that level. In the discharge of these responsibilities, Area Commanders report directly to the Commandant. DISTRICT COMMANDERS The District Commander has primary law enforcement respon- sibility involving maritime incidents in the area of his juris- diction. In discharging this law enforcement responsibility, he designates the Chief, Port Safety Branch in his organization to coordinate counterterrorist contingency planning efforts at the District level; and he designates the Captain of the Port in the Marine Safety Office to coordinate all local counterterrorist contingency planning. During a terrorist incident, the District Commander can be expected to provide the COTP the following: o A CG cutter to serve as the Forward Command Post (FCP) for the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), 0 Aircraft and vessel transportation for counterterrorism operations, and 0 Communications facilities between the Regional Command Post (RCP) and USCG FLAGPLOT and/or the FBI Crisis Management Center (FBI CMC). Throughout a terrorist incident, the District Commander submits situation reports (SITREPs) to the Commandant, keeps the FBI District Headquarters informed of pertinent USCG Regulations and Directives concerning maritime law enforcement operations, and supports the COTP as required. CAPTAIN OF THE PORT The Captain of the Port (COTP) is authorized by the Commandant to enforce certain Coast Guard law enforcement activities within his assigned geographic zone. Figure 3 lists and shows the location of the Captain of the Port Offices within the Coast Guard Districts. The COTP is under the supervision and general direction of the District Commander. COTP operations encompass many of the USCG's most important peacetime and wartime functions. During peacetime, COTP's are responsible for ensuring safety and security of all U.S. coastal and inland ports. Often supported by only a small staff, COTP's fulfill their responsibility by conducting harbor patrols, boarding cargo and commercial vessels, inspecting foreign flag vessels, inspecting and protecting waterfront facilities, inspecting U.S. vessels under construction and maintaining vessel movement status and cargo data. Thousands of vessels move millions of tons of cargo - - some dangerous - - in and out of U.S. ports each year. The safe and unimpeded flow of this cargo through U.S. ports is vital to the U.S. economy. Maximum effort is required by each COTP to carry out programs that prevent maritime accidents or incidents in U.S. harbors that may result in exposing the environment and the public to unacceptable levels of pollution. The COTP has a significant role with the Intergovernmental Agency Team in countering a terrorist incident in his area of jurisdiction. His responsibilities in counterterrorism greatly differ from his routine functions. As the Terrorism Response Coordinator (TRC), the COTP conducts maritime counterterrorism planning; provides the initial incident assessment; coordinates with the FBI and other Federal, state, local, and private organizations; co-chairs the Crisis Management Team (with the FBI); contains the incident; and may participate in an ultimate assault. The COTP coordinates all Coast Guard counterterrorism con- tingency planning in his zone. During a terrorist incident, the COTP will: 0 Provide a suitable location for a Regional Command Post (RCP). 0 Coordinate CG response at the RCP, and coordinate Federal response, until flhe designated lead agency arrives on the scene . 0 Request the District Commander designate a CG cutter as the Forward Command Post (FCP) for use by the on scene coordinator (OSC), if needed. 0 Designate the OSC. 0 Coordinate CG response support at the scene of the incident through the OSC. 0 Provide or arrange communications between terrorists and negotiators. 0 Provide communications between negotiators and the FCP (if not co-located). 0 Provide communications between the RCP and the FCP. 0 Contain the terrorist incident through the enforcement of a Safety or Security zone around the incident, main- taining contact with the terrorists if they are in a vessel, and taking other necessary actions. 0 Provide tactical cutter, boat, and aircraft support to the FBI Negotiating Team and Tactical Team(s) during the Negotiation Phase. 0 Coordinate with the Department of State through USCG FLAGPLOT for enforcement to be taken against foreign vessels, or" when proposed law enforcement actions may adversely affect foreign relations. 0 Submit SITREP's, action to COMDT, info to the District Commander. GROUP AND STATION COMMANDERS The Group Commanders and Station Officers-in-charge are responsible for the Coast Guard afloat and airborne resources that may be required either by the District Commander or the COTP in responding to a terrorist incident. They shall comply With requests made by the COTP either directly, in accordance with prior agreed procedures, or as requested by the COTP through the District Commander. These resources will normally remain under the operational control of the Group and District Commander, rather than being "chopped" to the COTP. .LnO-CI'IOJ MERCHANT VESSEL STATUS IN HIATUSPORT Location/Best. Vessel Type Flag MV Atlantic TKR U.S. Trader MV Lagos TKR NIG Express MV Massey B U.S. Ferguson MSS Comet RO—RO U.S. MV Colon Paar TKR PAN MV Altair CTR NOR MV Stanov B BUL MV Manitoba B/B CAN Star MV Erie TKR U.S. MV Aalborg s/s DEN MV Lackawanna B U.S. MV Atlantic TKR U.S. Sangria River Oil Refinery Anchorage "A"/Sangria River Oil Refinery, ETA 25 August Steel Plant Piers Military Ocean Terminal Chemical Co. Pier Commercial Piers Commercial Piers Commercial Piers Anchorage "D" Commercial Piers, ETA 25 August Steel Plant Pier, ETA 24 August Sangria River Oil Remarks/De arture Loading refined products, ETD 25 August Delivering crude petroleum Loading, ETD 24 August Loading vehicles, ETD 25 August offloading ammonia, ETD 26 August offloading lumber products, ETD 24 August Onloading grain, ETD 25 August Onloading manufactured products, ETD 25 August Scheduled to offload. vinyl chloride cargo by barge, commencing 24 August Onload manufactured products Deliver coke Load refined products Commerce Refinery, ETA 25 August MV Samar B/B PHIL Commercial Piers, Deliver raw lumber ETA 26 August FIGURE 1 USCG DISTRICT AND GROUP RESOURCES IN HIATUSPORT FULL LOAD LENGTH MAX. SPEED REMARKS NAME TYPE (TONS) (FT) (KNOTS) (STATUS) Bigh Endurance Cutters: (CCGD ASSETS) USCG INGHAM/WHEC 35 2656 327 19.8 U/w on SAR mission USCG TANEY/WHEC 37 2656 327 19.8 Overhaul Medium Endurance Cutters: (CCGD ASSETS) USCG CHEROKEE/WMEC 165 1731 205 16.2 Chopped to Area CDR USCG ALERT/WMEC 630 1007 210 18.0 Pierside, East H. Station Harbor Tugs: (CCGG ASSETS) USCG CHINOOK/WYTM 96 384 110 11.2 U/w invest. oil spill USCG CHOCK/WYTL 65602 72 65 10.5 Pierside, East H. Station Buoy Tenders: (CCGD ASSETS) USCG MADRONA/WLB 302 1025 180 12.8 U/w Ops USCG WHITE PINE/WLM 547 600 133 9.8 Overhaul USCG SAGINAw/WLIC 804 459 161 11.5 Port Visit New York Patrol Craft: (CCGG ASSETS) USCG CAPE CURRENT/WPB 95307 105 95 18.0 Pierside, West H. Station USCG POINT HURON/WPB 82357 69 82 23.7 Pierside, East H. Station Utility Boats: (CCGG ASSETS) USCG BOAT 44408 16 44 15.0 Pierside, East H. Station USCG BOAT 41302 12 41 14.0 Pierside, East H. Station USCG BOAT 41368 12 41 14.0 Pierside, West H. Station USCG BOAT 22145 6 22 15.0 Pierside, West H. Station USCG BOAT 19064 5 19 15.0 Sangria River Patrol FIGURE 2 / . SANGRIA RIVER BRIDGE’ / / ” / ’I / ANCHORAGE DEPTHS: 40 FT EXCEPT SPECIAL ANCHORAGE (LT 20 FT) CHANNEL DEPTHS: 40 FT EXCEPT SANGRIA RIVER CHANNEL: 37 FT .l..=l: DUKE ISLAND .z- \\\‘ \ >0 / ‘\T\\ BALLANTINE my \\ ‘ \ / CAR/FAX FERRY I 1.“! f 1! ‘iIIlI' , umnglI§HULvl A4 A _ .111 ___ _ _. comment. ems ' I...- ‘ . 1 TERMIEAL :11 EAST u.‘1, . HIATUS pom. ““‘“"“TM‘“f 1:1 1 11111111111 - LOO-(110:1 MSO (OCMI/COTP) TASKING Surveillance so Monitoring vessels in port so Harbor, anchorage and waterfront patrols so Vessel traffic management so Pollution, emergency response .0 Detection of vessel operating violations so Monitoring special interest vessels 00 Monitoring ocean dumping 0. Aerial surveillance Preventative (Inspection and Monitoring) so Vessel inspections, examinations, boardings .0 Factory inspections on Facility inspections and surveys so Monitoring bulk cargo transfers to Monitoring explosive overload Investigation and Reports so Marine accidents and casualties so Personnel misconduct, negligence and incompetence so Violations of navigation laws 00 Damage to NAVAIDs so Motorboat deaths 0. Marine pollution as Facility incidents Follow-up Investigations (Surveillance and Preventative Operations) Communications Services RoutinelAdministration so U.S. vessel certificates and amendments so Safety of life at sea (SOLAS) documents so Explosive loading permits so Hotwork permits 00 Cargo violation reports Specialized Adminstration so Issuance of vessel operating personnel licenses, seamen's documents and port security cards so Vessel documentation .0 Admeasurement (where appropriate) so Shipment and discharge of seamen Seaman and Vessel Documentation FIGURE 4 BACKGROUND SCENARIO Over the past year, there have been numerous incidents in which terrorists have threatened damage, destruction, injury and death within the U.S. The U.S. government was concerned about well publicized and largely attended public functions being targeted by terrorists. Such functions included the Olympic Games, the Democratic and Republican Conventions, and the World's Fair. Elaborate security measures were taken at federal, state and municipal levels to reduce the vulnerability of these potential targets. At the same time, U.S. government agencies renewed their plans to institute an effective counterterrorism organization from the federal through municipal levels. The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard was particularly concerned with the possi- bility of terrorist incidents in the maritime environment. Such incidents could result in wide—scale pollution of waterways and exposure of heavily populated areas to toxic or explosive fumes from seized tankers or bulk cargo ships. To ensure that responsible Coast Guard units were fully prepared to respond to maritime terrorist incidents within their jurisdiction, the Commandant forwarded a Maritime Counterterrorism Contingency (MCT) outline plan to all subordinate commanders on 1 August 198x. He directed District Commanders and COTPs to review and update their MCT plan, and discuss it with local, federal, state and munici- pal representatives of their area Crisis Management Team (GMT). From this effort, a plan of action is expected to be developed for directing a coordinated MCT response. On 3 August, the District Commander received an intel- ligence report from CG Headquarters reporting a maritime terrorism incident that occurred within the last twenty-four hours in a U.S. port 500 miles north of Hiatusport. The incident consisted of a threat, communicated through a local radio station, to seize a supertanker and set it ablaze in the middle of the harbor, unless an immediate embargo was placed on all military goods shipped from the U.S. to Israel. The originator of the threat indicated he was representing a faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and that if the threat were ignored, not only this port, but other ports would be targeted until the demands were met. While this threat did not result in an actual terrorist attack, it did reinforce the necessity of U.S. Maritime Counterterrorism response organizations to be on the alert. The District Commander relayed all the information available on this particular incident to his district commands. In response to the Commandant's direction and the terrorist incident report of 3 August, the Commanding officer of the Marine Safety Office (MSO) Hiatusport, met several times with city and county emergency planning and operations personnel. He informed the attendees of the Coast Guard assets available to assist state and local authorities in response to any local terrorist incident. He clearly defined the COTP's responsibilities, jurisdictions and authority regarding management of such an incident according to Federal Statutes. The COTP subsequently reported the results of these meetings to the District Commander. Additionally, he tmiefed the Commander, Coast Guard Group Hiatusport and officers-in-charge of local stations on the recent terrorist threat and the resources that might be required should a similar terrorist threat or incident occur locally. While the Coast Guard Group and Stations facilities are nearby, the District Office is located 200 miles south of Hiatusport. The adjacent District Commander who is also the Atlantic Area Commander, is located 225 miles north of Hiatusport. Hiatusport can be briefly described as a medium sized port in terms of shipping operations. There are an average of 8-12 ships in port at any one time. However, there is a wide diversity of economic activity associated with the port. Facilities range from piers adjacent to the commer- cial district accomodating breakbulk and container shipping, to outlying chemical, petroleum, liquid natural gas (LNG), and military ocean terminals. Each of the petroleum and chemical terminals normally can only accomodate one tanker at a time for discharge. As a result, there are usually two to three chemical or petroleum carriers lying at anchor. Figure 1 presents the status of shipping in Hiatusport, including expected arrivals and departures over the next seventy-two hours. Figure 2 lists Coast Guard district and group units assigned to the Hiatusport area. In addition to the shipping operations, the resort beaches of Hiatusport have a large influx of summer tourists through Labor Day. There are estimated to be about 20,000 vacationers in the area at this time, many staying in accomodations along the resort strip. Traffic at the local airport is directly related to the summer season with six daily flight arrivals and departures; after Labor Day it is reduced to two flights daily. The harbor is home to many small pleasure craft, both sailboat and powered craft. Weekly sailing races are held southeast. of the marina and. power craft are in the harbor throughout the day. The configuration of the harbor is such that the main communication link between the two centers of commercial business activity is a local ferry service. Roadway connection via the bridge—tunnel and bridge span is available, but this route is time—consuming compared to the ferry service. A harbor chart of the Hiatusport area is depicted in Figure 3. The COTP Hiatusport, although concerned with the apparent increase in threats of possible maritime terrorist incidents, was heavily involved in the daily routine of his organization. MSO/COTP routine tasking is outlined in Figure 4. The Group assets are conducting routine harbor, anchorage and waterfront patrols as directed by the M80 Port Operations Department, while MSO personnel are investigating a reported oil spill in the vicinity of the Military Ocean Terminal. The USCGC INGHAM is presently on a District directed SAR mission 50 miles north of Hiatusport, assisted by an HH—3F helicopter operating from the USCG Air Station 50 miles south of Hiatusport. The 44—foot motor lifeboat (MLB) from Station East Hiatusport has just returned to Station East Hiatusport after making a routine patrol off the Hiatusport beaches. inc-(110:1 HIATUSPORT HARBOR COMMUNICATIONS The following Marine Radio frequencies and their associated links are available for use in the harbor. Should an incident occur, Channel 6 FM (156.3 Mhz) is to be used as the working frequency for participating units under normal operating conditions. Marine units will guard Channel 13 FM (156.65 Mhz) or channel 16 FM (156.8 Mhz). TERRORIST STATEMENT HAZARDOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF VINYL CHLORIDE* 'THIS MESSAGE IS SENT BY NE, THE LIBERATORS OF THE OPPRESSED, TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THOSE IN AUTHORITY WHO CAN SATISFY OUR DEMANDS- HE HOLD Two VESSELS HOSTAGE IN THE HARBOR 0F HIATUSPORT- HE DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF OUR ESTEEMED LEADER, CHONDI FANDUR. AND OUR BROTHERS DONDIc HAHL AND KODAR SOLDEN, FROM 'THE MOULTREE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY- HE HILL RELEASE OUR HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE VESSELS INTACT ONLY AFTER OUR BROTHERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED AND FLONN T0 LIBYA AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE FOR US TO DEPART BY PLANE ALSO TO LIBYA- HE NILL NOT NAIT LONG FOR YOUR RESPONSE AND ARE PREPARED To TAKE ACTIONS THAT HILL CAUSE SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION THROUGHOUT THE HIATUSPORT AREA-' u w p u c w c o c w u o 0 E om u c 119 Q m m u on g u omG.H m m u U Q O M u -w u o m h o r4c>o w m H m u m . m C u w 3 u m +Im OJJLIm o m m u u o s mqq u c 3 mr4~4m m umumcaw4sosmmw© ouawzzD ma4r49E4m c:»: 045*!“ c o -H D m+Jm waiw+J>-ur+u EH 5 m ©r4U4u $4M HSJM n U-H w cuquO C OriO m-H O mmcbnomzmomeu -H o o m otnu m u p m Quaaazra SE45 w :02w 0 :44u WI» +’E+Jh EL _ o o m++o > MTJM Eruo E o Frequenc1es (Mhz) gagggagggsgfigg 33.74 East & West Hiatusport Fire Dept. O O. 44.74 State Dept. O O 0 159.89 E. Hiatusport Fire Dept. . .. 154.22 Hiatusport Police Dept. . . 154.265 W. Hiatusport Fire Dept. . 156.3 Channel 6 Intership Safety . . . . .... 156.5 Channel 10 Commercial .... 156.55 Channel 11 Commercial . .. 156.6 Channel 12 Port Operation . . . . 156.65 Channel 13 Navigational . . . . ... . 156.7 Channel 14 Port Operations . . . . ... 156.8 Channel 16 Distress, Safety & . . . . .... . Calling 157.1 Channel 22 Coast Guard MSO Hiatusport Work 0 O O 0 Frequency 157.075 Channel 81 Pollution . . . . Response Frequency 157.15 Channel 23 Group Hiatusport Work Freq. . . . . FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 GENERAL — Liquefied compressed gas; colorless; sweet odor — Liquid floats and boils on water; flammable, irritating visible vapor cloud is produced FIRE HAZARDS - Flammable. Gas is heavier than air and may travel considerable distance to a source of ignition and flashback - Poisonous gas is produced in fire. Forms highly toxic combustion products such as hydrogen chloride, phosgene and carbon monoxide. — May explode if ignited in an enclosed space. EXPOSURE HAZARDS — Vapor irritating to eyes, nose and throat; if inhaled will cause dizziness, anesthesia, lung irritation. WATER POLLUTION HAZARD — Not harmful to aquatic life. HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS (NAS Hazard Rating for Bulk Water Transportation) Category Ratin Fire 4 (Flashpoint below 100°F (—llO°F); boiling point below lOO°F (7.2°F)) Health Vapor Irritant 2 (Moderate irritation: temporary effect) Poisons 2 (Intermediate toxicity) RESPONSE TO REPORT OF DISCHARGE - Issue warning of high flammability - notify local health and pollution control agencies. - Avoid contact with liquid and vapor. — Shut off all ignition sources and notify Fire Department. — Evacuate area in case of large discharge. — Stay upwind and use water spray to "knock down" vapor. - Stop discharge, if possible — keep people away. - Response personnel in contact with liquid or vapor wear rubber gloves and shoes, gas—tight goggles, and use organic vapor canister or self-contained breathing apparatus. * Reference Source: Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS) Manuals — CG—446—l Series through CG—446—4 Series FIGURE 3 \\ ,/~""~’//I um: £3E::l(:)-‘:lrl‘:):l \~\\:::\ \\31 HIATUSPORT HARBOR SAFETY ZONE \ .— ————— I , . mam-IN: BAY\ / \\ q \ \\, “ECHOR‘GE 73' ,/ ’ USCG GROUP/STATION (EAST) I .l ‘e\\';.e / Safety /Zone Perimeter" ,-»¢ /“ / ~\ I / ' A ,2 ll USCG STATION (WEST) FIGURE 4 SITUATION ONE At 2345 on the 22nd of August, CG Group Hiatusport received a call from the West Hiatusport Ferry Terminal, indicating that they had observed a red flare in the channel between the west ferry terminal and the USCG Group Station East. The Group Command Duty Officer directed Station East Hiatusport to dispatch a boat to investigate. The boat checked in with the Group Operations Center on Channel 23 (see Figure 1) at 0015 on the 23rd and indicated that they were enroute to the area. At 0020 the West Hiatusport ferry terminal informed the CG Group that the SEASPRITE II ferry had not arrived at the terminal as scheduled. At 0035, WTTV, the local TV station in Hiatusport, received a telephone call from an individual claiming to be a representative of an organization called LOTO, the "Liberators of the Oppressed". He indicated that two vessels the chemical tanker, MV ERIE, and the ferry, SEASPRITE II, had been seized in the inner harbor by 'his organization, and if the following statement (see Figure 2) was not broadcast hourly, starting at 0600, and if suitable actions were not taken in response to the statement within 24 hours, authorities in charge would be responsible for the resultant consequences to vessels, crews, passengers, and population in the local vicinity. The manager of the TV station immediately' notified. the local police, who passed the information on to the MSO Hiatusport Duty Officer and the local FBI agent. The MSO Duty Officer immediately informed the Captain of the Port (COTP) and the Alternate COTP (ACOTP). The COTP directed that attempts be made to identify the vessels and their locations, and that preliminary steps be initiated to activate the MSO Maritime Counterterrorism Contingency Plan. He further directed the Duty Officer to report the incident to the Commandant (FLAGPLOT) and advise the District Operation Center. He indicated that he would arrive at the MSO in 15 minutes. At 0100, the MSO received a call from the Group Operations Center, reporting that the ‘boat dispatched to investigate the red flare sighting had taken gunfire from one of two ships nested along— side each other at anchor in Anchorage "D". One vessel was identified as a ferry. Apparently the CG boatcrew had observed that the two vessels in Anchorage "D" were completely darkened. with no anchor lights displayed. As they approached the anchorage, several shots were fired from one of the vessels, and the boat coxswain, a second class petty officer, was wounded in the shoulder. The boatcrew was now returning to Station East Hiatusport for medical assistance. At 0120, the COTP arrived at the MSO and. was briefed on the situation. He immediately directed the Group to dispatch USCGC POINT HURON to the scene of the incident, with an officer embarked from the M80 Port Operations Department. This officer was designated by the COTP as the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), with the POINT HURON serving as the Forward Command Post (FCP). At 0145, the COTP called the District Commander, via the District Operations Center (DOC), requesting an additional Coast Guard Cutter in Hiatusport be made available for COTP tasking in support of the MCT Contingency Plan. The POINT HURON got underway at 0200, and began conducting surveillance operations around Anchorge "D" at 0230. At 0300, the COTP personally contacted the Chief of Police, East Hiatusport, and advised him on the current status and extent of Coast Guard preparations. He offered to assist the state and local authorities, on request, in dealing with the incident. He volunteered the MSO for use as the Regional Command Post (RCP) and, subject to agreement of the members of the area Crisis Management Team (CMT), requested that the CMT be immediately assembled at the RCP to develop a plan of action. The Police Chief indicated that he had notified most of the CMT representatives, and that the local FBI agent, who had been assigned as the senior FBI representative on the CMT by the District FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), was with him at the present time. At 0305, the OSC reported over the radio to the MSO that the two 11 vessels in Anchorage “D" were identified as the chemical tanker, MV ERIE, and the car/passenger ferry, SEASPRITE II. The COTP immediately directed the MSO Duty Officer to check for the type of cargo contained in the MV ERIE. The duty officer reported that the MV ERIE carried vinyl chloride in bulk and that the chemical is classified as a "dangerous cargo". The COTP directed two officers to prepare a briefing for the CMT by 0515 on the hazardous characteristics of the chemical. Figure 3 provides the ‘hazardous characteristics of vinyl chloride. The POINT HURON remained outside a 1500 yard perimeter of the anchored vessels, and the OSC recommended to the COTP that a Security Zone of 1500 to 2000 yards radius be declared around the seized vessels. At 0400, the COTP instead ordered a Safety Zone of 2000 yard radius be established around the vessels (see Figure 4), and directed the POINT HURON to maintain station in the zone to both enforce the Safety Zone and attempt to establish communications with either vessel. At 0500, POINT HURON was able to establish radio communications with the MV ERIE on Channel 16, and verified that the vessels were under the control of an armed group of terrorists. At 0515, the CMT was briefed on the hazardous characteristics of vinyl chloride and its danger to the surrounding area if the chemical was released or an explosion occurred. After this briefing, the CMT decided to allow the TV station to broadcast the terrorist statement to gain more time for planning. At 0600, the TV station broadcasted the statement, and shortly thereafter, the telephone switchboards at both the local police stations and the MSO were jammed with inquiries concerning the situation. The phone lines were so congested that the MSO was required to make emergency arrangements with the telephone company to install dedicated phone lines for communicating with agencies and units directly involved in the contingency operation. At 0645, the OSC reported that a news service helicopter was hovering over the MV ERIE, and that the helo was shot at as it passed over the tanker. Several minutes later, a radio transmission from the MV ERIE threatened to “shoot the intruders out of the sky" and warned that should it happen again, they would "blow up" the vessels. The COTP immediately directed that the FAA be contacted to recommend establishing a restricted airspace above the Safety Zone. The COTP further requested that the Police Chief use a police heliCOpter to warn and escort any aircraft away from the area. At 0650, MSO H—P received a call from the District Operational Center approving the COTP use of the USCGC ALERT. At 0700, the COTP transmitted a SITREP to the Commandant and District, summarizing the events over the past six hours, and progress made in planning and coordination efforts. QUESTIONS 1. What are the basic Coast Guard reference sources for planning, coordinating and conducting maritime counterterrorism contingency operations? 2. What are the principal departments and divisions in the District Office and Marine Safety Offices that are responsible for contingency planning to counter possible terrorist incidents in U.S. ports? 3. How does the COTP receive intelligence information on potential terrorist activities in his area of jurisdiction? 4. What are the primary and secondary' objectives that need to be considered in planning and responding to a terrorist incident? 5. What are the immediate Coast Guard action requirements for responding to a terrorist incident occurring on board a U.S. or foreign, noncommercial, public vessel while moored, anchored, or underway in U.S. territorial seas or internal waters? a. Would the Coast Guard response differ if the incident occurred on a foreign commercial vessel? 6. Where are the COTP zones defined? 7. What Rules of Engagement apply to the crew of the POINT HURON after taking gunfire from the anchored vessels? 8. The COTP designated an OSC to accompany the POINT HURON to the incident. What are his responsibilities? 9. The COTP declared a Safety Zone rather than a Security Zone. What are the differences? a. How would the COTP promulgate the establishment of the Safety Zone? 10. As the OSC, what are some of the cautions you should be aware of when establishing communications with the terrorists? HIATUSPORT WEATHER (24 HOUR FORECAST) WINDS: WESTERLY AT 15 KNOTS, SHIFTING TO NORTHWESTERLY 15 TO 20 KNOTS BY 7 P.M. 24 AUGUST SEAS: 0.5 FEET SWELLS REACHING 1.5 FEET AIR TEMPERATURE: 88°F SEA TEMPERATURE: 720F VISIBILITY: 15 MILES, DECREASING TO 1 MILE IN EARLY MORNING FOG ON 24TH FIGURE 1 'li‘f‘(:)-’(Jlrl‘:’:l // / V/f/ \ / / ’ / / FLAMMABLE AND TOXIC HAZARD ZONE I‘,,d/ /,/ , "fl ,-0/";: /,/ cnmmwors ’ a” I.’/" / / "F ,g’ ’: ,‘ BRIDGE/TUNNEL sou-rs JETI'Y NELMHENEIEY I II USCG GROUP/STATION (gs/i \ / _ j; [I ».’ :4 ’ / ."II /’ I / f/ l l \ \ \ \ cdnnnnchL PIERSo \ Ill 7 ’ '0 Rasmu- srRIp EAST \ FERRY 0 . é 5t \9 TERMINAL FIGURE 2 A12 TOXIC HAZARD ZONE SUMMARY OF GAS FIRE AND DISPERSION HAZARDS (For a potential 500 ton spill of vinyl chloride venting as a gas through a 6 in. line in a lS—knot wind) BURNING HAZARDS Flame length = 85 feet Safe separation distances for: People = 150 feet People in fire—protective clothing = 50 feet Wooden structures = 10 feet GAS DISPERSION HAZARDS Maximum downwind flammability extent = .9 nautical miles Maximum half-width of flammability = 350 feet Duration of fire hazard = 4 minutes Maximum downwind toxic hazard = 7.5 nautical miles Maximum half—width of toxic hazard = 2500 feet Duration of toxic hazard = 30 minutes FIGURE 3 1110-0105 SITUATION TWO At 0700 on the 23rd, the Chief of Police and the other representatives of state and local emergency response organi- zations that comprised the CMT met with the COTP at the Marine Safety Office (MSO) to develop a plan for responding to the seizure of the MV ERIE and SEASPRITE II. Since the seized vessels were at anchor and only accessible by boat or helicopter and with limited numbers of harbor craft and helicopters available to the State or municipality it was readily agreed that the COTP and the FBI should assume the lead roles in responding to the incident. The senior FBI representative discussed the role that his agency was prepared to carry out in response to the incident, and he deferred the lead role as Federal Forces Commander (FFC) to the COTP, subject to CMT concurrence. His deferment decision was made because of the location of the seized vessels and the absence of Federal Marshalls, Negotiating Teams, and SWAT Teams. By 0800, the CMT had been briefed on the situation and had agreed to the designation of the COTP as the FFC. It was also agreed that the COTP, as the pre—designated Terrorism Response Coordinator (TRC), and the senior FBI agent assigned by the District FBI SAC, jointly chair the CMT. Handling of the media became a principal discussion item. The FBI and Coast Guard in accordance with an interagency agreement would issue news releases jointly. However other members of the CMT would be briefed on the contents for general approval. The COTP Public Affairs Officer (PAO) briefed the CMT on the action he was taking to accomodate the news media. By 0900, an estimate on the number of hostages held by the terrorists had been gathered by the joint investigative efforts of the FBI and the state and local police. The estimate was over 100 persons, including women and children (Hi the ferry and 28 13 crewmembers on the MV ERIE. There apparently was also a group of Japanese tourists, who had been observed boarding the SEASPRITE II at East Hiatusport. The COTP directed the OSC to attempt to obtain a more accurate count of the hostages from the terrorists over the radio. Later on, the OSC reported that the number of hostages on the ferry was 112, including 21 women and 23 children, and it was substantiated that 32 of the hostages were Japanese Nationals. Also there were 26 crewmembers on the MV ERIE. The terrorists further stated by radio to the OSC that they expected a positive response to their demands no later than 0800 the following day, or they intended to release small quantities of "poison gas" from the MV ERIE to demonstrate their resolve in carrying out their threat. If no actions were taken then, they would set time bombs in the MV ERIE and sail clear on the ferry with all the hostages to await reconsideration of their demands. This threat hastened the actions of the CMT. The primary consideration of the CMT now was the safety of the surrounding population from the toxic fumes of the vinyl chloride contained in the chemical tanker. The current meteorological information was examined (See Figure 1). With this information, the M80 assessed the probable coverage and 'hazards of vinyl chloride. (See Figures 2 and 3). From this, the state and municipal representatives on the CMT began determining the extent of evacuation required, methods of evacuation, evacuation routes, evacuee sheltering, support requirements, etc. The secondary consideration was the potential oil pollution to the environment, should the MV ERIE be blown up. Both of these hazards were reported to the National Response Center, Washington, D.C. by the COTP. Additionally, 'he requested that several Navy explosive ordnance disposal teams be made immediately available to board the MV ERIE and SEASPRITE II. At 1000, the COTP received an urgent message from the Commandant, requesting he submit a proposed plan of action approved by the CMT not later than 1400. He also informed the COTP that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had been notified and was in session to determine whether the agency's support was necessary. QUESTIONS 1. What Coast Guard assets are immediately available to the COTP for responding to this terrorist incident? 2. At 0700 the CMT met at the RCP. Who would you expect to be represented on the CMT? 3. How is the Federal Force Commander (FFC) designated? 4. What general parameters apply for designating a Coast Guard FFC? 5. What types of communications are available at the M80 for the COTP to coordinate the response efforts and communicate SITREPs to other involved commands and agencies? a. What are some of the communication limitations? 6. Who designates the TRC? a. What are his responsibilities? 7. The OSC is directly responsible to whom? 8. As the COTP PAO, what should have been included in your plans in the event of a terrorist incident? 9. Once it was confirmed as a terrorist incident, what actions should you take immediately as the COTP PAO? 10. What control would the CMT impose on the news media in this incident? 11. What procedures does the COTP and OSC follow in reporting, assessing and responding to the potential release of hazardous chemicals from a vessel in the harbor carrying "dangerous cargo"? lflO-G'IOEI NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN LEGEND DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF OF OF DEFENSE INTERIOR TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENTAL DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT PROTECTION OF OF AGENCY COMMERCE LABOR PARTICIPATING _. __ __ .. _. _. .1 [- AGENC I Es I DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT I OF OF 0p HEALTH/HUMAN I STATE JUSTICE SERVICES I I DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT FEDERAL I 0F OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT I LABOR ENERGY AGENCY NATIONAL I RESPONSE TEAM I 1 I NATIONAL I RESPONSE CENTER | I ' I o COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS I '— —— — _ -— STATES — — n. — — — — n— 1 I REGIONAL I I RESPONSE I I TEAM J I I REGIONAL I RESPONSE I CENTER I I ° DISTRICT 0" o COAST GUARD (CDT?) I I SCENE I COORDINATOR ’ EPA | 0 OTHER FEDERAL OFFICIAL I I SPECIAL I ON SCENE FORCES o ATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM I FORCES << I o PORT EMERGENCY TASK FORCE I o NATIONAL STRIKE FORCE I I I OTHFR FEDERAL STATE I I AGEN ‘ _____ .J RESOURCES CY RESOURCES " I RESOURCES I COORDINATION PARTICIPATION EMERGENCY VESSEL MOVEMENT CONTROL MEASURES Deny entry of vessel. 0 Close Port. 0 Prohibit Vessel Movement. 0 Prohibit Other Vessel Movement. 0 Delay Vessel Movement. 0 Delay Other Vessel Movement. 0 Advance Vessel Movement. 0 Advance Other Vessel Movement. 0 Escort Vessel With Commercial Tug. 0 Direct Vessel Out of Port. Prevent Vessel From Mooring. Shift Mooring of Vessel. Limit Anchorage. Close Waterway. Publish Notice to Mariners. Broadcast Notice to Mariners. Broadcast Security Message. Surveillance Patrols. FIGURE 1 Coast Guard Escort Vessel. 0 Limit Access to Facilities. Require Position Report. 0 Require Alternate Route. Restrict Vessel Speed. 0 Establish Security Zone. Restrict Other Vessel Speed. 0 Establish Safety Zone. Anchor Vessel. FIGURE 2 .LDO-(I'IOcl SITUATION THREE At 1030 on the 23rd, the National Response Center at the Coast Guard Headquarters directed the CG District to activate the Regional Response Team (RRT) under the provisions of the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan. The RRT was to make plans and preparations for dealing with a potential major hazardous substance incident and major oil spill in the Hiatusport Harbor. The District Marine Safety Office subse- quently notified the member's of the RRT to assemble at the District Office, which would serve as the Regional Response Center (RRC). Figure 1 shows the federal and state agencies and resources that support the On-scene Coordinator in responding to a potential major pollution incident under the provisions of the National Contingency Plan. The COTP initiated a request through the District for assis- tance from the Atlantic Strike Team (AST) He further requested the RRT contact the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) and obtain the HDSt current information on hazards associated with vinyl chloride and spill response procedures, and to obtain a Hazard Assessment Computer System (HACS) readout on the quantitative risks associated with the potential release of the vinyl chloride from the MV ERIE. The COTP now examined his available options in vessel move- ment control authorized by federal statutes and regulations. Figure 2 lists the COTP options. He decided to deny entry of any vessels into the port until the termination of the incident, and to advance vessel departure times if feasible and HDVE other selected vessels, if time permitted or their Crews, from ‘the hazard zone that would be effected by the explosion or release of vinyl chloride. At 1330, the CMT's proposed plan of action was forwarded to the Commandant. The Commandant reviewed and approved the plan with senior officials from the Department of Justice, State, Defense, etc. It was determined that the plan was suitable for the incident and active negotiations should proceed immediately, with parallel planning for an assault should negotiations fail. It was suggested that this would be an appropriate time for the senior FBI representative at the scene to assume the FFC. The CMT members and other federal agencies at the scene approved this recommendation . At 1500, the Department of Justice directed the FBI to assume the lead role at the scene. The FFC began immediate preparations for embarking the FBI Negotiation Team on a Coast Guard vessel. The FFC requested that additional Coast Guard boat transportation be made available for the FBI SWAT teams for a possible assault. The FFC also requested that an Air National Guard helicopter be made available for a possible vertical assault. The COTP suggested that an unarmed vessel, such as a tug or a buoy tender be used to trans- port the Negotiation Team and patrol boats for the SWAT Teams. At 1200, the COTP contacted the District Commander and requested that additional district assets be provided for the possible removal of the hostages. He requested the USCGC ALERT patrol the harbor entrance to keep vessels from entering the harbor. He advised the District that he had begun calling his Coast Guard Auxiliary in the Hiatusport area to support the emergency evacuation and was working with the Port Authority to advance movements of selected commercial vessels. A CMT member suggested that additional helicopters could possibly be used as a means to disperse the released vinyl chloride as it moved over the water surface toward land. Although this suggestion seemed far-fetched, the RRT concurred 15 and requested all agencies with helicopters in the vicinity to fly them to Hiatusport Airport not later than 0700 on the 24th. The State Air National Guard was requested through the Governor to provide a helicopter for the vertical assault, coordinate the arrival of helicopters, provide support facilities, and direct all the tasking through the FFC. The emergency evacuation began at 1600 on the evening of the 23rd. The Governor approved the use of the National Guard for security patrols in the evacuated areas, and the State Police to direct the routing of traffic. The Department of Defense was requested to provide temporary shelter for the evacuees at a nearby Army base, where provisioning would be administered by the State Office of Emergency Services. Evacuation of the areas over whidh the prevailing winds would carry the toxic clouds of vinyl chloride continued throughout the early morning hours of the 24th. At 0545 on the 24th, the terrorists demanded that a doctor be provided for several hostages requiring medical attention, and that the doctor be accompanied by newsmen. The newsmen were to verify that the hostages were being treated humanely, and to carry the terrorists demands for the release of their "brothers" directly to the President. QUESTIONS 1. What constitutes a "potential major spill" of oil or hazardous substances? 2. What is meant by the term "hazardous substance"? a. Where can one find specific details on hazardous substances that are carried by commercial vessels? 3. What pollution response measures need to be considered by the Coast Guard in responding to a maritime terrorist incident in which a "potential major spill" may result? 4. What are the COTP's responsibilities under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan? 5. What is the purpose of the Regional Response Team (RRT), and how does it interface with the COTP? 6. What determines who is the "lead agency" for a reported terrorist incident in a maritime area where the Coast Guard has been assigned maritime safety and security jurisdiction by Federal Statutes, i.e., 33 CFR Part 3? 7. What are the divisions of responsibility between the senior FBI representative at the scene and the COTP with respect to managing assets and reporting to higher authority? 8. Under what circumstances can Coast Guard forces be placed under the operational control of another agency? a. Can Coast Guard personnel ever exercise direct authority over FBI personnel or state and local agency personnel? 9. Could the Coast Guard Auxiliary be given "Posse Comitatus" status in order to assist the FFC in conducting either assault or post-assault operations against the terrorists? lflO-(l'IOzl NEWS MEDIA SUMMARY News coverage should be restrained and limited to the facts. Rumors and speculation should not be reported. Every effort should be made to avoid sensationalizing the events, and extreme caution must be taken to avoid using incendiary phraseology. Live coverage should be avoided under most circumstances inasmuch as it often provides an unedited platfonn to the terrorists. This does not preclude on-the-spot reporting so long as it is not broadcast live. Avoid the appearance of a media circus. Television coverage should be discreet and as low profile as possible lest it stimulate behavior intended solely for the cameras. Cameras and television equipment should be camouflaged, and high- intensity television lights, which can give away police posi- tions and the layout of the location, should be turned on only after checking with the authorities. News personnel should never inject themselves into the story or volunteer their services as intermediaries in hostage situations. Telephone calls to the terrorists only increase their sense of self-importance and tie up telephone lines. News personnel should perform as negotiators only when Specifically requested to act in that capacity by author- ities. If no deadline has been set or even mentioned, news personnel should never inquire about one. News organizations should never simulate terrorist acts, inasmuch as they could cause others to emulate the inci— dent. Likewise, reportage involving too much detail — for example, how to manufacture homemade weapons — must be avoided. No information should be reported that might aid terrorists in the commission of their crimes, like the disclosure of police positions. Similarly information that is likely to raise the collective anxieties of the terrorists or contri— bute to the tension at the scene of the problem - the arrival of a SWAT team, for example - should not be broadcast. Statements and obvious propaganda issued by the terrorists should be balanced by contrary information and interviews. Avoid the romantization of terrorists and their struggles; they never should be portrayed sympathetically. FIGURE 1 16 ASSAULT PHASE PLAN Underwater assault SWAT team from CHINOOK (SEASPRITE II), team from West Penguin Island (MV ERIE) — incapacitating gas. Fast patrol boats, SWAT team delivery approach from west; target MV ERIE - time 1610. Helicopter vertical assault by SWAT team on MV ERIE, time 1610 (incapacitating gas). Take off East Hiatusport, low level approach - pop up. EOD teams & pilots two fast patrol boats from West Penguin Island. Two teams MV ERIE, one SEASPRITE II upon notifi— cation all secure. POINT HURON & CHINOOK immediate evacuation of hostages to designated sites. Pilot & MV ERIE captain, if available, sail out of harbor; tug boats standing by for tow. Fireboats standing by to water down possible escaping vinyl chloride. FIGURE 2 COAST GUARD POST TERRORIST INCIDENT ACTIONS See to the well being of the hostages by providing or arranging emergency medical care, transportation to medi- cal facilities, notification of relatives, delivery to local agencies for care or escort home, delivery of any deceased to local authorities for custody and notification of next of kin. ‘ Assist FBI, if requested, in contacting EOD to make certain the facility is safe (no bombs, booby traps). Return control of foreign flag vessels to authorized agents of the foreign governments. Discontinue Safety/Security Zone. Provide water and air transportation to return personnel from the incident scene. Refuel and resupply all vessels, aircraft, and vehicles and return them to scheduled operations status. Desbrief CG personnel for case documentation and cooperate with FBI debriefing of CG personnel for eyewitness accounts. Compile case documentation and submit final SITREPs to districts and USCG FLAGPLOT. Issue statement to press jointly with FBI. Deactivate the FCP and RCP. FIGURE 3 .LOO-CI'IOcl SITUATION FOUR , At the Federal level, it was determined that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was not required for coordinating this particular emergency, although under its charter, FEMA could become involved with the FBI and DOJ when dealing with terrorism and civil disturbances. The incident was being efficiently managed and coordinated at all appropriate levels, i.e. federal, state and local. The COTP had taken the initiative to work closely with the Port Authority and the Pilots Association for arranging an orderly movement of commercial vessels berthed at the East Hiatusport commercial piers. One of the commercial vessels, MV STANOV, refused to depart the commercial piers prior to their scheduled departure date, and protested through the Bulgarian Embassy in Washington, D.C., that they were not-being accorded the "full protection" required under the formal agreement between the 0.8. and their flag nation. The Department of State queried the Commandant on the extent of "pro- tective actions" being carried out to minimize endangering MV STANOV and her crew. The Commandant directed the COTP to immediately prepare a reply. The terrorist demands for medical assistance and an inter— view by the news media was discussed by the CMT, and approved before 0600. Prior to the newsmen departing for the interview, the CMT requested the COTP‘ PAC to reiterate the previous guidelines given to all the assembled news media concerning the incident. These guidelines are summarized in Figure l. The CG harbor tug, CHINOOK, was dispatched to Anchorage "D" with a doctor, two newsmen, the FBI negotiating team and SWAT personnel trained in underwater tactics. Radio contact was established with the terrorists who stated they' would release the women, children and injured hostages after the conclusion of the news media interviews. They again threatened to release the "poison 17 gas“ after the hostages were free and indicated that explosives had been set and the MV ERIE would be blown up at 1800 if their demands were not met. This information was passed immediately to the FFC. The FFC requested the COTP to contact and make preparations for supporting an armed assault should negotiations fail. After a discussion with the CMT, the FFC established the assault time for 1600. Figure 2 contains the Assault Phase Plan. At 1000, the newsmen, women, children and several injured hostages departed the MV ERIE. The terrorists stated that the release of these hostages was "humanitarian", and that the government should make concessions based on this "action of leniency". Negotiations continued but to no avail. Shortly after 1545, the terrorists announced they would release “poison gas" and were prepared to carry out the remainder of their threat. The negotiating team on CHINOOK continued their dialogue with the terrorists over the radio. The assault phase began at 1600 and ended quickly with the SWAT underwater team taking the terrorists by surprise, resulting in only minor injuries to the hostage and a terrorist wounded and one killed. Immediately after the SWAT teams had control, EOD teams on board the MV ERIE and the Seasprite II commenced searching for explosives. The MV ERIE was taken under tow and the Coast Guard transported the hostages to the West Hiatusport ferry slip for further transportion to the hospital in West Hiatusport. By 1730 the navy EOD teams had located the explosives on the MV ERIE, and stated there were no explosives on the SEASPRITE II. The terrorist incident was terminated. The Coast Guard commenced the after incident phase. Figure 3 contains a list of action items that could be taken in concluding a terrorist incident. QUESTIONS 1. What is the specific mission of FEMA? 2. What kind of arrangements should the COTP have. made previously' with the masters of each vessel in. countering 'the potential threat of terrorist attacks in port? 3. What is the Special Interest Vessel (S.I.V.) program, and how does the COTP get involved? a. What are the COTP responsibilities regarding the complaint by the master of the MV STANOV? 4. What are some of the FBI standard objectives in negotiating with the terrorists? 5. Who is ultimately responsible for deciding when to conclude negotiations, and employ the tactical assault option? 6. Where and how would the FFC obtain EOD support for searching and defuzing of the explosives in the MV ERIE? 7. Would you consider the employment of Coast Guard helicopters as an assault platform for FBI SWAT teams an acceptable utili- zation of Coast Guard resources? a. What other options may be available for consideration? 8. Does the Coast Guard conduct any formalized training in counterterrorism tactics, i.e., SWAT team training, hostage negotiation? 9. What Coast Guard Headquarters Division maintains current information and contact with DOD and FBI Special Tactical Forces? 10. Would there be any significant modifications to the emergency response actions if the seized vessel were a LNG tanker vice a chemical tanker? .LnO-(I'IOd MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD CONCERNING A POLICY OF MUTUAL ASISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF COAST GUARD/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OPERATIONS TO COUNTERACT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT. In recognition of the U.S. Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement responsibility, and the operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in counteracting domestic terrorist activities, the following mutual assistance capabilities are identified. The Coast Guard maintains and operates a large number of strate— gically located floating units, aircraft, vehicles and shore stations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains a large number of strategically located Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT). Coast Guard personnel are trained to react to law enforcement activities in a maritime environment, while the FBI has personnel who are specifically trained to act as negotiators in dealing with terrorists demands and SWAT teams to use in suppressing terrorists actions during direct confrontation scenarios. The unique capabilities of the two forces in a com— bined effort to counteract a terrorist takeover in the maritime environment is recognized. Close coordination and cooperation between forces of both Agencies is necessary to insure adequate response to potential terrorist activities involving such targets as offshore platforms, port and harbor facilities, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and vessels, floating nuclear power plants, U.S. or foreign vessels within United States jurisdiction and any other target(s) which may require Coast Guard and FBI response. Accordingly, it is hereby understood and agreed upon that, subject to operational and budgetary constraints, the Agencies making this agreement will provide mutual support to each other in situations involving terrorist activities, threatened or real, and that each Agency will take necessary steps to establish local operating procedures to implement this agreement. It is further agreed that continued planning by the two concerned Agencies will include the development of a specific communications, command and control policy between Coast Guard Districts and FBI Regional offices. A basic objective of this agreement is to insure a coordinated effort to counteract terrorist activities in the maritime envi— ronment. Further, it is expected that this agreement will serve to eliminate delays in response time and insure continued development of procedures and contingency plans to counteract terrorist activities in the maritime environment. INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT Between the UNITED STATES COAST GUARD and the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Article I - General Information The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) share mutual interest and authority in the suppression of violations of federal law on the high seas, navigable waters and on areas adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States. The prevention of criminal activity and the successful prosecution of federal law enforcement efforts requires the cooperation between enforcement agencies. The efforts include but are not limited to, the gathering and dissemination of intelligence, deterring potential violators, interdicting contraband and the apprehension of violators. Article II - Reference and Authority Agreements between the USCG and the FBI are entered into under the authority of 14 USC 141. The authorities to perform the responsi— bilities comtemplated in this agreement are delineated in 14 USC 2, 14 USC 143, 14 USC 637 and 28 USC 531 et. seq. Article III — Purpose The parties have entered into the Agreement to: 1. promote the effective utilization of personnel and facil- ities through cooperative effort; 2. define the nature and extent of the services, systems, and facilities each agency will provide; 3. define command and control relationships while working from agency facilities; and 4. provide for the timely exchange of information to permit proper planning and evaluation. Article IV — Responsibilities of Agencies A. General. 1. The USCG and FBI will work in close cooperation in the national interest, supporting each other with respect to the suppression of the violation of federal laws and the apprehension of Violators. 2. It is anticipated that the operational planning and execution of most enforcement and intelligence efforts will be accomplished at the USCG District level and FBI field offices. 3. Nothing in this agreement is intended to restrict the authority of the USCG or the FBI to enforce federal law on the high seas, navigable waters or on areas adjacent to the navigable waterways of the United States. 1110-0103 B. U.S. Coast Guard. Within the limits of its budgetary and personnel capabilities, the USCG, to the extent practicable: 1. has primary responsibilities for high seas law enforcement as authorized by 14 USC 2; 2. will provide personnel and facilities, including aircraft. and vessels, necessary for effective at—sea surveillance and law enforcement; 3. will generally affect all arrests and seizures whenever law enforcement actions are initiated by (n: undertaken from 5: Coast Guard unit, except when USCG is acting in a purely supporting role; 4. will make every practical effort to meet all FBI requests for cutter and aircraft assistance including rapid response to urgent operational requirements, with the understanding that other Coast Guard missions may take precedence; 5. will provide communications support for units involved in maritime operations, with the exception of special equipment that may be more properly provided by FBI; 6. will designate a contact point(s) at the Washington, D.C. level to coordinate all law enforcement efforts which require coordination at that level; 7. will coordinate with the Department of State for enforce— ment action to be taken against foreign vessels when such action is to be taken by or from a Coast Guard unit, or when proposed law enforcement actions may have an adverse impact upon the conduct of foreign relations; 8. will provide guidance and instructions to FBI personnel in regards to applicable USCG regulations and instructions concerning the conduct of maritime law enforcement operations. C. Federal Bureau of Investigation. ‘Within the limits of its budgetary and personnel capabilities, the FBI, to the extent practicable; 1. has responsibility to investigate violation of laws of the United States and collect evidence in cases upon which the United States is or may be a party in interest; 2. operate the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory to provide technical and scientific assistance to federal law enforcement agencies. 3. will normally provide personnel to USCG units assigned to patrols for interdiction efforts related to matters of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and areas in which the FBI has a designated case interest. The FBI personnel so assigned shall be available to advise the unit commander and accompany the USCG boarding parties. 4. will provide enforcement information, as gathered, to USCG and other appropriate agencies, insuring the USCG is credited for law enforcement action taken within existing agencies guidelines; 5. will designate a contact point(s) at the Washington, D.C. level to coordinate all law enforcement efforts which require coordination at that level; 6. will, when operating from Coast Guard facilities, conform to existing Coast Guard operational guidelines and regulations. 19 Article V - Coordination and Planning A. FBI and USCG will, to the maximum extent practicable, coor— dinate at—sea enforcement activities. B. The USCG will plan effective employment of facilities and equipment for at-sea enforcement. C. The FBI will keep the USCG informed, on a continuing basis, as to both detailed and long range plans, related to the joint effort or which may affect the Coast Guard's personnel and facilty requirements. D. The USCG will, in turn, keep FBI similarly informed as to additional requirements and the outlook for the availability of USCG facilities subject to use in the joint effort. Article VI - Public Affairs Each agency will keep the other advised of all public affairs matters, including news release and major speeches, that concern the other agency. News releases of national interest will be coordinated between the appropriate public affairs information personnel in Washington, D.C. and released simultaneously whenever possible. Releases of local or regional interest will be coordin— ated and released jointly at the USCG Area or District level and the FBI Regional or District level, with copies sent to each agency's headquarters Public Affairs/Information office. Each agency will exercise its own discretions in responding to inquiries with factual information concerning its own actions. Article VII — Subsidiary Agreements Consistent with the purpose and provisions of this Agreement, a local working agreement or memorandum of understanding (MOU) may be developed by and between USCG Area or District Commandants, and FBI Regional or District Directors. No provision of any local agreement or MOU will contravene the spirit or letter of this Agreement. Copies of such working agreements or MOUs will be forwarded to the Commandant, USCG and the Director of FBI for approval. These agreements will not become effective until approved in writing by Commandant, USCG and Director of FBI. Article VIII — Amendments This Amendment and any local Agreement pursuant to Article VII may be amended from time to time as may be mutually agreeable to the parties thereto. Article IX - Termination This agreement may be terminated by either party upon 30 days advance written notice thereof to the other party. /0 U.S. ARMY-U.S. COAST GUARD CIVIL DISTURBANCE MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD CONCERNING CIVIL DISTURBANCE PLANS AND OPERATIONS INCLUDING TERRORIST INCIDENTS This memorandum establishes policies, procedures, and guidelines relating to employment of elements of the U.S. Coast Guard when Federal forces are committed to civil disturbance operations, including terrorist incidents. SECTION I GENERAL 1. Civil Disturbances are defined as group acts of violence and disorders prejudicial to public law and order within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof. Terrorist Incidents, a form of civil disturbance, are defined as distinct crim- inal acts committed or threatened to be committed by a group or single individuals in order to advance a political objective, and greatly endangering safety or property. For the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding this definition does not include aircraft piracy emer- gencies which are governed by separate directives. 2. The operational missions of the Coast Guard are paramount; use of its resources in civil disturbance operations is contingent upon the ability of the Coast Guard to continue to perform it statutory duties. 3. In civil disturbance operations except those in which the Coast Guard has direct involvement because of its statutory duties, employed Coast Guard elements will be responsible to the policies and proced- ures established by the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan. SECTION II RESOURCES TO BE EMPLOYED l. The Coast Guard will furnish such waterborne and airborne resources as are reasonably available to assist in civil disturbance operations. The Coast Guard will not be expected to form or maintain ground forces for employment in civil disturbance operations except to protect its own land facilities. 2. The Coast Guard may request assistance as required from other Federal civil disturbance forces in order to carry out its statutory obligations of securing and protecting areas over which it has juris- diction. 3. The Coast Guard will provide logistical support to other Federal civil disturbance forces within the limits of locally available resources. 4. The Army will provide the Coast Guard with riot control munitions, loan of special equipment, and technical assistance if, when, and as required for civil disturbance operations. SECTION III COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS The Federal civil disturbance task force commander will exercise operational control over Coast Guard elements committed to civil dis- turbance operations except those cases where the Coast Guard has para- mount statutory responsibility. Control will be received from and returned to the appropriate Coast Guard Area or District Commander. Disputes, if any, concerning employment of resources will be referred to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the Commandant, United States Coast Guard, for resolution. SECTION IV PLANS Coast Guard Area and District Commanders will prepare plans for employment of Coast Guard resources during civil disturbances. Coast Guard District Commanders will normally coordinate with designated task force commanders, Commanding General, Military District of Washington, and Commanding Generals of the United States numbered armies as appropriate. Coast Guard Area. Commanders will normally coordinate with the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Commanders in Chief of Unified Commands, and the Commanding Generals of the United States numbered armies as appropriate. SECTION V TRAINING The Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for the training of Coast Guard personnel for their civil disturbance role and will famil— iarize these personnel with the general guidance concerning use of force and the conduct and deportment expected of individual members of the Federal civil disturbance forces, as outlined in the DA. Civil Disturbance Plan. SECTION VI REPORTS The commander of Coast Guard elements employed as part of a Federal civil disturbance task force will render reports as requested by the task force commander. A standing operating procedure for submission of reports by Coast Guard elements will be included in the plan for employment of Coast Guard resources. SECTION VII COSTS 1. Costs incurred will be borne by the respective Services. 2. Logistical support will be on a reimbursable basis and ‘flill, wherever possible, be based upon cross-service agreements. GLOSSARY ACOTP AST ATF CFR CHEMTREC CHRIS CIA CMC CMT COE CONUS COTP CT CTR DHHS DOC DOD DOE DOI DOL DOS ECT EOC EOD EPA FAA FBI FCP FEMA FFC Assistant Captain of the Port Atlantic Strike Team Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bulk Break Bulk Code of Federal Regulations Channel Chemical Transportation Emergency Center Chemical Hazards Response Information System Central Investigation Agency Crisis Management Center Crisis Management Team U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Continental United States Captain of the Port Counterterrorism Container Department of Health and Human Services District Operations Center Department of Defense Department of Energy Department of Interior Department of Justice Department of Labor Department of State Department of Transportation Executive Committee on Terrorism Emergency Operations Center Explosive Ordnance Disposal Environmental Protection Agency Federal Aviation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation Foward Command Post Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Forces Commander JSOC LNG LPG NAVAIDS NRC NRT OCS OIC OPCON OSC PAD PETF RCP RORO RRC RRT SAC SAC FBI SITREP SOLAS SWAT TKR TRASIT TRC USC USDA Joint Special Operations Command Liquified Natural Gas Liquid Pressurized Gas Maritime Counterterrorism Contingency Motor Life Boat Memorandum of Understanding Marine Safety Office Navigational Aids National Response Center National Response Team Outer Continental Shelf Office—in-Charge Operational Control On-Scene Coordinator Public Affairs Officer Port Emergency Task Force Regional Command Post Roll on, Roll off Regional Response Center Regional Response Team Special Agent in Charge Special Agent in Charge, FBI Situation Report Safety of Life At Sea Special Weapons and Tactics Team Tanker Training Situation Terrorism Response Coordinator United States Code U.S. Department of Agriculture 21 H BIBLIOGRAPHY (COAST GUARD) COMDTNOTE l6602, 23 January 1984, Maritime Counterterrorism o COMDTINST M16465.12 (CG-446-2), Hazardous Chemical Data, 26 (MCT) Contingency Plan Model- June, 1974 w/ CH 4 of 8 July 1981. COMDTNOTE 3840' August 31' 1984' Threat Assessment to U'S° o COMDTINST Ml6465.l3 (CG-446-3), Hazard Assessment Handbook Ports and Waterways from Hostile Military Forces and 16 April 1974 w/ CH 1 of 23 April 1978. Terrorism, Report prepared by the CG Intelligence Center, April 1984- o COMDTINST Ml6465.l4 (CG-446—4), Response Methods Handbook. COMDTINST 16243.1A, Use Of Force and Weapons POliCY- o CG-463, CG Peacetime ROE for Encounters Involving Foreign _ . Vessels at Sea. COMDTINST 03821.3(ser1es), Intelligence Collection by CG “——“__——_—’_‘ M- o COMDTINST Ml6000.3 , , Vol II: Hazardous Materials COMDTINST 03880.1(86rles), ASSlStanCe t0 UoSo Intello Vol VI: Ports and Waterways Activities w- Vol VIII: Classified Supplement COMDTINST 551006(Series), Foreign Igtelligence collection . CFR 33, parts 1 to 199’ Navigation and Navigable Waters, Efforts directed against the USCG; (Rev. July 1’ 1983). Action Concerning. _ , _ o 40 CFR, Article 1510, National Response Team and National COMDTINST 5520.4(series), Operational Intelligence. Response Center, The National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan. COMDTINST M5400.7A dtd 9 February 1984, USCG Organization IEEEELL- 0 CFR 46, Parts 140-155, Shipping, Rev 1 October 1983. COMDTINST M02000.3l9 USCG Telecommunications Manual. . CFR 49’ Parts 100_177' Transportation, Rev 1 October 1982. COMDTINST M1001926 USCG Reserves Administrative Manual. . District Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) Manuals. COMDTINST M05000.3 USCG Port security Manual. . District Operation Center (DOC) Manuals. CG'3OO' USCG Re ulations. 0 Marine Safety School, RTC, Yorktown, On-Scene Coordinator- , , _ /Regional Response Team Simulation, (Oil Spill/Hazardous CG—368-l, C1Vll Disturbance Preparedness Plan. Substance Incident Gaming OutlineT. CG'368'2' Natural Diseeter Preparedness Plan- 0 Marine Safety School, RTC Yorktown, MSO HIATUSPORT, (Subregional Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan). CG—368—3, NBC Defense Preparedness Plan. _ 0 Marine Safety School, RTC Yorktown, Applicable Statues and COMDTINST Ml6465.ll (CG—446—l), A Condensed Guide to Coast Guard Interpretation. Chemical Hazards. o Commandant's Bulletin, Swatting Taclets, 26 October 1984. 22 BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued) MSC P504, Military Sealift Command Ship Register, January 1979. MARAD Pamphlet, Emergency Port Operations of the National Shipping Authority. CURRENT NEWS Special Edition, No. 1008, 31 May 1983, Terrorism. National Academy of Sciences, ISBN 0-309-02935-X, Regarding to Casualties of Ships Bearing Dangerous Cargo, 1979. Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1982. Army Corps of Engineers Port Series MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command), Ports for National Defense. MTMC Report 0A 77—11, An Analysis of CONUS Inland Waterways for National Defense. U.S. Army Field Manual 19-30, Physical Security. Army Training Circular 19—5, Bomb Threats. The Virginian Pilot, The Ledger Star, The Bloody Year for Terrorist, 4 December 1983. U.S. News and World Report, Rash of Terrorism Ahead? Is U.S. Ready, 16 July 1984. U.S. News and World Report, We are Better Prepared for Tomorrows Disasters, 10 September 1984. U.S. News and World Report, Is U.S. Prepared for a New Three Mile Island, 19 March 1984. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Counter-terrorism Program, November 1981. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Countering Tomorrows Terrorism, July 1981. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Comments and Discussion, September 1981. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, When the Going Gets Tough, October 1981. Wall Street Journal, Violent Tactics. 31 May 1983. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, The Nature of the Maritime Beast, February 1983. The United States Government Antiterrorism Program, Summar Report of the Executive Committee on Terrorism, June 1979. Current News Special Edition, No. 1008, Terrorism, 31 May 1983. 23 Q