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A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY ‘
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- A L DA PAM 550-18 3)
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEYS OF OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD

The following additional bibliographic surveys of literature, are on
sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC. 20402.

NUCLEAR 'WEAPONS AND NATO, 1970, DA PAM 50—1

COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE, 1971, DA PAM 550—8

COMMUNIST CHINA, 197.1, DA PAM 550—9

PACIFIC ISLANDS AND TRUST TERRITORIES, 1971,- :DA PAM
550—10

COMMUNIST NORTH KOREA, 1971, DA PAM 550—11

INS'ULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1972, DA PAM 550—12

JAPAN, .OKINAWA, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN), AND
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1972, DA PAM 550—13

PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASHE HWZ,DA.PANI5&L&4

SOUTH ASLA AND THE STRATEGH:INIHAN'OCEAN,197a
inprM£w045

MIDDLE EAST: THE STRATEGIC HUB; AND NORTH AFRICA,
1973, DA PAM 550—16

AFRHL&ZW7& DA PANI5HTT7

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1974, DA PAM,
550_7_1

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publicatio‘n'Data
Unit-ed States. Dept... of the Army.

Scandinavia : .a bibliographic survey of literature.

“DA Pamphlet 550—18”

1. Scandinavia—Bibliography. I. Title.
Z7165.S4U-54 1975 016.9148 74—14935

’w—v~\

Sumol 4 mm a]

ANALYSTS’ NOTE

This unclassified bibliographic survey was prepared to fill the need
for information on Scandinavia, a strategically important area of Europe,
about which, generally speaking, there is considerable lack of current
literature in the English language, suitable for inclusion in DA pamphlets.

This survey emphasizes two main subjects: 1. Scandinavia as a
region of Europe; and 2. Individual Scandinavian countries (and terri-
tories under their jurisdiction). The majority of publications included
in this DA Pamphlet are located on the open shelves of The Army Library,
Pentagon. Others are identified by symbols indicated below. However,
those identified by an asterisk were not available in the Army library
at the time. of listing. Others identified by the letters “LI” indicate ref-
erence material may be found at institutions mentioned in text.

The materials delve into the military, political, economic, and'socio-
logical aspects from both friendly and unfriendly sources. No effort has
been made to delete or exclude references by reason of their controversial
nature. On the other hand, inclusion of entries does not represent an
official endorsement of the views expressed.

The main body of information in this DA Pamphlet is supported by,

eight maps and 23 appendixes.

The assistance and cooperation of the specialists in the various agen-
cies is gratefully acknowledged. Special appreciation is extended to the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency Topo-
graphic Center for their excellent maps. Permission to reprint extracts
from the 1972 edition of The Almanac of World Military Power, T.N.
Dupuy Associates, Dunn Loring, Virginia, is also gratefully acknowledged.
Special appreciation is extended to the National Geographic Society,
Washington, D.C., for its contribution of the two maps.

*—Not available in The Army Library at the time of listing.
LI—Library of the institution.

 

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PAMPHLET I

No. 550—18 i

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HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 30 May 1975

SCANDINAVIA: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF LITERATURE

CHAPTER I

A REGIONAL OVERVIEW

(See also by Country and Appendixes)

Miscellaneous Aspects ......................................
The Lands and the Peoples (See also Background Notes by
Country) ...............................................
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ...................................
2. Demographic Aspects ...................................
Economic Aspects ..........................................
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ...................................
2. Civil Aviation ..........................................
3 Maritime Aspects .......................................
4 Petroleum .............................................
5 Other Resources and Industries ...........................
6 Scandinavia and the European Economic Community
(See also by Country) ................................
Military Aspects (See also Appendixes) .......................
Scandinavia and the‘World ..................................
1. The Strategic Import of Scandinavia (See also Map of
Arctic Waters in Appendix CC) ........................
2. Scandinavia, Europe, and NATO (See also Appendixes) . . ..
a. Miscellaneous Aspects ...............................
b. Scandinavian Security and the Defense of Europe .......
(1) Miscellaneous Aspects ..........................
(2) Military Balance ...............................
c. NATO and the Soviet Threat in the North ..............
d. Defense of NATO’s Northern Flank (See also
Appendixes) .....................................
3. United States Military Assistance to Scandinavia ...........
4. Limits of the Seas ......................................
5. Participation in International Agreements .................
6. Scandinavia—Communism (See Appendixes) ..............
History ...................................................

Page

1

9
9
11
12

14
16
17
17
17

17

iii

iv

CHAPTER II

DENMARK (INCLUDING GREENLAND AND THE FAEROES)

P3909“?

HHFQ

PU

(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)

Page
An Overview .............................................. 18
The Land and the People .................................... 18
Government and Politics .................................... 19
Strategic Import ........................................... 19
Foreign Relations .......................................... 20
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 20
2. Denmark and NATO (See also Appendixes) ................ 20
3. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf ...... _ ................ 20
Economic Aspects ........ . .................................. 21
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 21
2. Denmark and the European Economic Community .......... 21
3. Foreign Trade ........................................ 22
Sociological Aspects . . ; .................................... 22
History ................ ’ ................................... 23
Greenland ................................................. 23
The Faeroes ............................................... 23

CHAPTER III
FINLAND
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)

Miscellaneous Aspects ...................................... 24
An Overview .............................................. 24
Government and Politics .................................... 24
1.. Miscellaneous .................. 24
2. President Kekkonen .................................... 24
3. Communism and Finnish Politics .............. ‘ ........... 25
Foreign Policy ............................................. 26
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ............... l . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .- ..... 26
2. Finnish-Soviet Relations ................................ 26
Economic Aspects ....... . ................................... 27
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 27
2. Finland and the European Economic Community ........... 28
3. Currency and Finance .................................. 29
4. Industries . . . .' ......................................... 29
Sociological Aspects ....................... , ................. 29
History ................................................... 3O

PWQPQW?

CHAPTER IV

ICELAND
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)
. Page
Miscellaneous Aspects ......................... . ............. 31
Land and the PeOple ........................................ 31
Government and Politics .................................... 31
Strategic Import (See also Appendixes I and J) ................ 32
Iceland, Europe, and Nato ............ ‘ ....................... 33
Economic Aspects ................ ' .......................... 34
Fishing Limits ............................................. 35
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 35
2. Regulations and Agreements ............................. 35
3. Icelandic-British Disputes ............................... 36
History ................................................... 37
CHAPTER V
NORWAY
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)
The Land and the People .................. ’ .......... . ....... 38
Government and Politics . . .‘ ................................. 38 -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 38
2. The Role of the Church .................................. 38
Armed Forces ............................................. 39
Foreign Policy ............................................. 39
Economic Aspects .......................................... 40
1. Miscellaneous Aspects .......................... . ......... 40
2. Norway and the European Economic Community ............ 40
3. Economic Development ................................. ' 42
4. Maritime Industry ..................................... 42
5. Labor ................................................. 43
6. Petroleum ............................................. 43
Sociological Aspects ........................................ 43
History ................................................... 43
CHAPTER VI
SWEDEN
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)
An Overview .............................................. 44

The Land and the People .................................... 44

vi

Page

Government and Politics .................................... 44
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 44
2. The Monarchy .......................................... 45
3. The Politics of Olof Palme .............................. 45
4. The Social Democratic Party ............................. 46
5. The Communist Party ................................... 46
6. Church-State Relations ................ ‘ .................. 46
Internal Conditions: Causes and Effects ....................... 47
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 47
2. Education ............................................. 48
Strategic-Import of Sweden ................................. 48
National Defense and the Armed Forces ............ ~ ........... 49
Foreign Relations ................................... . ....... 49
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 49
2. Swedish-United States‘Relations ......................... 50
3. Foreign Aid ........................................... 51
4. Policy of Neutrality ..................................... 51
Economic Aspects ......................................... 52
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ................................... 52
2. Sweden and the European Economic Community ........... 53
3. Banking and Finance . ..... " ............................. 53
4. Foreign Trade ......................................... 53
History ......................... ’ .......................... 53
CHAPTER VII

MATERIALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND REFERENCE

WOW?

93.5.5395?

Atlases ................................................... 54
Encyclopedias ............................................. 54
Yearbooks ................................................. 55
Bibliographies ................................. '. ........... 55
1. Miscellaneous Bibliographies ............................. 55
2. Scandinavia ............................................ 55
3. Denmark .............................................. 55
4. Finland ............................................... 55
5. Norway ............................................... 55
6. Sweden ................................................ 55
APPENDIXES
Western Europe: Regional Survey ........................... 57
Country-By-Country Data ................................... 6O
Denmark—Background Notes . . . . . . . ........................ 61
Denmark—Military Power .................................. 68
Denmark—Strength of the Communist Party Organization. . . . . 7 O

Page

F. Finland—Background Notes ................................. 72
G. Finland—Military Power ................................... 78
H. Finland—Strength of the Communist Party Organization ....... 80
I. Iceland—Background Notes .......................... . ...... 83
J. Iceland—Military Power .................................... 87
K. Iceland—Strength of the Communist Party Organization ........ 88
L. Norway—Background Notes ................................. 91
M. Norway—Military Power .~ ................................... 95
N. Norway—Strength of the Communist Party Organization ....... 97-
O. Sweden—Background Notes ....... . .......................... 100
P. Sweden—Military Power . . . . . . . . . ........................... 104
Q. Sweden—Strength of the Communist Party Organization ........ 107
R. Structure of NATO (Chart) ................................. 109
S. NATO Areas—Outline Chart of Boundaries .................... 110
T. NATO Military Structure (Chart) ........................... 111
U. NATO Allied Command Europe (Chart) ...................... 112
V. NATO and USAREUR (Chart) ............................ ~. .113
W. NATO Allie-d Command Atlantic (Chart) ..................... 114
X. NATO Northern Region (Chart) ............................ 115
Y. Total Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries
(Statistical Table) ....................................... 116
Z. United States Collective Defense Arrangements . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .117
AA. The World Less Polar Regions (ColOr Map—
Scale 1:40,000,000) ...................................... 118
BB. Top of the World (Color Atlas Plate—Scale 1 :14,000,000) ....... 119
» CC. Arctic Ocean and Arctic Ocean Floor (Color Map—
Scale 1:9,757,000) ....................................... 120
MAP INDEX
Denmark ..................................................... 62
Greenland .............................. In envelope in back of manual
Faeroe Islands ................................................. 64
Finland ...................................................... 73
Iceland ....................................................... 84
Norway ...................................................... 92
Sweden ....................................................... 101
United States Collective Defense
Arrangements ........................ In envelope in back of manual
The World Less Polar Regions 1 :40,000,000. .111 envelope in back of manual
Top of the World 1 :14,000,000 ............ In envelope in back of manual
Arctic Ocean and Arctic Ocean Floor
1 :9,7 57 ,000 ........................... In envelope in back of manual

vii

SCANDINAVIA: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF LITERATURE

CHAPTER I

A REGIONAL OVERVIEW
(See also by Country and Appendixes)

 

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

EUROPE’S NEW SPECTER: SOCIALISTS
AND THE COMMON MARKET, by Bernard K.
Johnpoll, in The Nation, (18 December 1972)
620—622.

“A specter is haunting Europe’s Socialists;
it is the Common Market. At least three powerful
Socialist parties in Western Europe are being
torn apart by internal feuding over the Common
Market, and bitter strife has developed between
pro- and anti-EEC Socialists across national
borders. Two Socialist prime ministers have
resigned, directly or indirectly, because of the
Common Market. And a Socialist member of
Parliament has resigned in Britain in order to
force an unwanted by-election. The hardest hit
of the parties are in Norway, which voted in a
referendum against entry; Denmark, which voted
in favor of entry; and Great Britain, whose par-
liamentary Labour leadership opposes only the
terms of entry accepted by Prime Minister
Edward Heath’s Conservative government, but
whose recent annual convention made clear that
a majority of its 6.5 million members oppose
British membership under any conditions. The
Norwegian situation is particularly serious.”

GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE; A REGIONAL
ANALYSIS, by Vincent H. Malmstrom. Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.
165 p. .

Chapter 7, The Northern Frontier, deals
with Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland.
“In characterizing place, the author has dipped
into history, politics, and literature to capture its
personality.”

B. The Lands and the People
(See also Background Notes by Country)

1. Miscellaneous Aspects
FODOR’S SCANDINAVIA, 1974, ed. by
Eugene Fodor. New York, David McKay Co.,
1974. 526 p.
Illustrated edition with atlas and city

plans. Contents: The Scandinavian Scene; The
Face of Denmark; The Face of Norway; The
Face of Sweden; The Face of Finland; The Face
of Iceland; etc.

(*)—SCANDINAVIA, by W. R. Mead and
Wendy Hall. London, Thames and Hudson, 1972.
208 p.

The Scandinavian Background; The Scan-
dinavian Countries; and The Scandinavian Con-
tribution: “The significance of the natural
environment, particularly the human and eco-
nomic hardships and costs of winter and the
glories of the short summer, is dealt with for
the region as a whole. Traits which vary more
strongly among the five countries are analysed
country by country.” With map and illustrations.

SCANDINAVIA; AN INTRODUCTORY
GEOGRAPHY, by Brian Fullerton. and Alan F.
Williams. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972.
374 p.

Contents: Structure and Surface; Climate
and Vegetation; Historical, Social, and Economic
Background; Emerging Nations—The Basis of
Modern Society; The Internal Economy of Den-
mark; Southern, Western, Northern, Central, and
Eastern Jutland; The Danish Archipelago and
More Distant Islands; Zealand ‘ and Greater
Copenhagen; Sweden—An Economic Introduc-
tion; Sweden—Southern Lowlands and Uplands,
East, West and North Midlands; Northern Swe-
den; Finland—An Economic Introduction; South-
ern and Northern Finland; Finnish Lake Plu-
teau; Norway—An Economic Introduction; Aslo-
fjord; Valleys of Eastern Norway; Southern and
West Norway; Trondelog; Northern Norway;
and International Trade and Relations. With
bibliography, maps, diagrams, and tables.

2. Demographic Aspects

CLOUDS IN THE MIDNIGHT SUN, in
Newsweek, v.82, no.10 (3 September 1973) 44—45.

“Besieged by tourists and ‘progress,’ the
Lapps find themselves in the midst of a wrench-
ing identity crisis. ‘We are not Norwegians,

1

Swedes or Finns,’ explodes one angry young
Lapp. ‘We are different—and we intend to stay
that way.’ . . . Fed up with their second-class
citizenship, a group of young Lapps in Norway
has founded a Lapp-power movement and de—
manded restoration of their lands as well as
reparations. Recently, another group decided to
run candidates in Norway’s parliamentary
elections.”

POPULATION PRESSURES AND RE-
SOURCE EXPLOITATION IN THE NORTH-
EAST ATLANTIC, by Jon McLin. Hanover,
NH, American Universities Field Staff, 1973.
15 p. (Fieldstaff Reports, West Europe Series,
v.8, no.1.)

“The intensity with which the resources
of the sea are exploited provides an indicator of
the acuteness of population pressures on land-
based resources. The population variable con-
tinues to be one to which policy responds, not
one which policy uses to render other problems
more manageable. . . . The central fact from
which most of these issues arise is that there
has been in recent years a significant increase
in the level of human activity, predominantly
commercial in character, in the North-East Atlan-
tic, especially the North Sea.” The several activ-
ities involved in the discussion revolve around
commercial fishing and petroleum exploitation,
among others.

C. Economic Aspects

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

FOCUS ON SCANDINAVIA, in New Com-
monwealth, no.8/9 (1972) 9—18.

“What Norway, Denmark and Sweden have
to offer Europe and the Third World. An anal-
ysis of aid, trade, finance, industry and national
achievement.” This section of the periodical
focuses on Scandinavia in the following collection
of articles: Swedish Banking and the Developing
Countries; Contribution of Swedish Industry;
Social Change and Economic Advancement;
Sweden’s Birth As Industrialised Nation; Den-
mark—A Model of Achievement for the Develop-
ing World; Denmark’s Industry Seeks New
Markets in Developing World; New Banking
Approach; Effects of Danish Membership of
EEC; Norway’s Economic Relations with EEC,
Britain and the Commonwealth; Norway’s Aid
Programme; and Trade Relations with the Third
World.

2. Civil Aviation
AIRLINES OF THE WORLD; PART 2, in
Interavia, v.25, no.2 (February 1970) 192—195.

A listing (with brief description) of the

major airlines of European countries, including

2

among others, airlines of Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden.

SAS INAUGURATES TRANSSIBERIAN
SERVICE, in Aviation Week & Space Technol-
ogy, (19 April 1971) 25-27.

“Tokyo-Scandinavian Airways System’s
new service here over the long-sought transsiber-
ian route puts Copenhagen 4.5 hr. closer to the
Japanese capital and is expected to draw major
passenger traffic from the carrier’s 7,840-mi.
polar route via Anchorage. The transsiberian
route, which includes a 1-hr. 10-min. refueling
stop in Moscow, is 5,718 mi. long. But SAS will
not abandon its polar service, which continues to
draw good traffic, according to Knut Hagrup,
SAS president. The polar route also will continue
to have value as a cargo or mixed passenger-cargo
service between Copenhagen and Tokyo, even if
the time advantage shifts most passenger traffic
to _ the transsiberian route.”

3. Maritime Aspects

RESOURCES AND AUTHORITY IN THE
NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC, by Jon McLin. Han-
over, N.H., American Universities Field Staff,
1973. 2 pts. (Fieldstaff Reports, West Europe
Series, v.8, nos. 5 and 6.)

Part I—The Evolving Politics and Law of
the Sea in Northern Europe. Part II—Fisheries
Conservation. “Expansion and intensification of
resource exploitation in the North Sea have given
new impetus to the international effort to regu-
late practices, reduce the incidence of conflict,
and resolve that which occurs. The nature and
limits of national jurisdiction over the continen—
tal shelf and over marine fisheries are two of
the most stubborn issues commanding initial
attention. . . . The exercise of conservation autho-
rity over fishing activities in North-West Europe
dates at least from the tenth century. Today the
ICES-NEAFC (International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea—North-East Atlantic
Fisheries Convention and Commission) machin-
ery embodies a serious attempt to base interna-
tional policy on scientific understanding. But the
real test is just beginning.”

4. Petroleum

AGE OF REASON, in Forbes, v.106, no.10

' (15 November 1970) 21.

“The North Sea oil discoveries show prom-
ise—not wild promise, but good promise. Maybe
that’s all to the good . . . Many of the ballyhooed
wonders of the 1960s, such as Alaska’s North
Slope, are turning out to have been less than
earth shattering. The North Sea has no such
glamour, but it promises a better return.”

THE GUSHER IN NORTH SEA OIL; THE
PROFIT POTENTIAL LOOKS BETTER ALL

THE TIME, in Dzm’s, v.98, no.3 (September
1971) 50—52 plus.

“There is no doubt that this murky sea
contains some of the hottest exploration property
in the world, and the scramble among the world’s
oil companies for a piece of the action is getting
more intense all the time. So many want a crack
at these waters, in fact, that the British govern-
ment has gone in for an Alaska—style auction to
see who will get the choicest fifteen blocks on
which it is granting licenses this year . . . The
North Sea looks more important all the time to
the internationals. And with Mideast oil prices
dictating world prices, the sharp increases caused
by last February’s settlement increases the prof-
itability of the North Sea oil too and helps
compensate for the serious drawback of high
drilling expenses.”

GUSHING EXPECTATIONS AROUND
THE NORTH SEA, in Fortune, v.82, no.2 (Au—
gust 1970) 178.

“A series of oil strikes in recent months
in the bleak and unfriendly waters of the North
Sea has put Europe firmly on the energy map
of the world. Three widely separated oil discov-
eries have been announced. More than a hundred
companies, singly or in partnerships, have per-
mits to probe the sea for more, and it seems
likely that quite a few of them will do some
probing. The deposits already found appear to
be greater than Western Europe’s meager known
reserves of 1.8 billion barrels. Some oilmen are
speculating that the North Sea’s potential could
be on a par with that of Alaska’s North Slope.
If the glittering hopes pan out, production from
the North Sea could supply an important share
of Europe’s oil needs—about 4.5 billion barrels
this year—and so perhaps considerably change
the international patterns of oil distribution. The
discoveries will certainly affect the fortunes of a
number of American and European corporations.
And the major finds promise a large windfall
for already thriving Norway.” .

MOST ATTENTION FOCUSED ON U.S.,
U.K., FAR EAST WATERS, by Robert E. King,
in World Oil, v.179, no.1 (July 1974) 73—78.

“The northern North Sea is the world’s
most active offshore area, with a string of giant
new oil fields found in the last three years.
Drilling off the northwest coast of Florida on
high-priced leases may open a new producing
province with giant'gas and oil reserves. Recent
oil discoveries in the huge Gulf of Thailand basin
hold promise for major production off Southeast
Asia. Some of the world’s largest reserves prob—
ably lie in basins out of bounds at present for
political reasons.”

MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR GAMBLE:

 

“WILDCATTING” IN THE NORTH SEA, in
U.S. News & World Report, v.72, no.23 (5 June
1972) 88—89.

“Oil and gas—produced on its doorstep——
promise to make western Europe less dependent
on imports. Risks are great, but prospects
bright.” .

NORTH SEA BUBBLE, by Peter Paterson,
in New Statesman, v.84, no.2178 (15 December
1972) 889—890.

“Oil is money, and jobs, and the environ-
ment, and therefore politics. In Britain, the oil
and gas discoveries in the North Sea are regarded
by the Scottish Nationalist Party as the fuel that
will propel them to a victory in the forthcoming
Dundee East by-election—a doubtful return on
an investment by the oil industry over the next
decade estimate-d at £2,500m. For the Conserva-
tive government the North Sea harvest spells big
savings in the balance of payments, better cre-
dentials for European partnership and some
lucrative pickings for their friends in industry.
. . . Even the Norwegians, with their own oil-
fields in abundance, have been attracted by the
Scottish boom and are planning to buy land to
establish supply bases in the Orkneys—something
the Scots could not do in Norway, where the gov-
ernment is careful not to sell land to foreigners.”

NORTH SEA OIL BOOM, in Newsweek,
v.80, no.14 (2 October 1972) 80—82.

“Of all the world’s tempestuous waters,
none is more cruel than the North Sea. Its 100-
mile-an-hour gales and IOO-foot waves have ter-
rified mariners and fishermen for centuries. But
for all its dangers, the sea is almost crowded
these days. Lights of towering oil rigs dot the
darkness, and supply boats and helicopters churn
through the sea and sky between the rigs and
the surrounding shores. After five years of fren-
zied exploration, it appears that this harsh body
of water may produce an oil bonanza beyond
anyone’s early dreams. In one tingling four-week
period during August and September, no fewer
than four major fields were announced by the
big international consortiums probing the seabed
—two by a Shell/Esso group in the sea’s most
hazardous waters off the Shetland Islands, and
two by a Phillips Petroleum-led group in Norwe-
gian waters. The dizzying pace of discoveries is
cause for jubilation in Europe, for both the loca-
tion and timing of the North Sea strikes are
nearly perfect. The oil lies within a short pipe-
]ine’s length of the enormous West European
market, and it is coming at a time when Europe’s
thirst for oil is growing even faster than the
feistiness of its big Mideast suppliers. Moreover,
the oil boom could put an abrupt end to Great
Britain’s chronic balance-of-payments problems,

3

bring unprecedented riches to Norway and yield
smaller but significant benefits to Denmark,
West Germany and the Netherlands.”

THE NORTH SEA OIL SCRAMBLE;
SCORES OF AMERICAN SUPPLIERS ARE
COMPETING FOR A WEALTH OF BUSINESS,
in Dun’s, v.100, no.6 (December 1972) 109 plus.

“Today, conservative oilmen estimate that
the North Sea contains commercial reserves of
perhaps over 30 billion barrels, plus another 8.5
billion barrels of sub-commercial oil. By 1980,
they see production hitting 3 million-plus barrels
a day—a volume that would supply about 156}
of Western Europe’s oil needs. About one-third
of that oil is in Norwegian waters. But the
cautious Norsemen have imposed many delays on
exploration and development, so the buildup at
Stavanger, Norway is consequently modest. In
Scotland, though, the government is actively
encouraging the establishment of an oil industry,
and it is every man for himself. Already, the
Moray Firth area has been dubbed ‘The Texas
of the North’.”

POWER FROM THE SEA; THE SEARCH
FOR NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS, by Clive
Callow. London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973.
190 p.

“This book provides an . . . account of
just What is happening . . . in . . . North Sea
waters. It begins by examining how much oil
there is likely to be in the North Sea.” Contents:
A Sea of Oil; The North Sea Begins to Change
Colour; Oil Is the Prize; Now the Money Men
Move In; The Violent Sea; Who Are the Oil
Hunters?; What Lies in Store?; etc.

RAISING THE ANTE ON NORTH SEA
OIL, in Business Week, no.2191 (28 August 1971)
32—33.

“International oilmen are making ever-
larger estimates of the oil and gas reserves lying
beneath the North Sea, and they are putting
money on the line to back up their calculations.
. . . Near Britain’s coast, output may someday
climb as high as 4—million bbl. a day.”

STRIKING IT RICH IN THE NORTH SEA,
in Business Week, no.2124 (16 May 1970) 45.

“Oil seems to turn up in the world’s least
accessible spots, so it is hardly surprising that
the latest major strike is beneath the turbulent
North Sea . . . Oil experts estimated the strike’s
worth at $4-billion, and said it could produce at
least 600,000 bbl. a day for 10 years. The strike
is situated 185 mi. off the Norwegian coast and
200 mi. from the Scottish port of Aberdeen, and
' Petrofina’s partners in the venture are the U.S.’s
Phillips Petroleum Co. (which owns 36.96%),
France’s Petronord (20%), and Italy’s AGIP
(13.04%). The four partners are close-mouthed

4

about their discovery but the confirmation well,
known as Ekofisk No. 2, is tapping a field appar-
ently capable of doubling Western Europe’s
reserves of 300—million tons of oil.”

WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT ’74, v.20
(1974) 92 p.

An annual review of international oil
operations. The first part deals with special
reports and area studies, including a world sum-
mary and review, and reports on Europe, among
many others. The second part is devoted to
national studies, including studies for the follow-
ing Scandinavian countries, among others: Den-
mark, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden.

5. Other Resources and Industries

ZIMMERMAN’S WORLD RESOURCES
AND INDUSTRIES, by W. N. Peach and James
A. Constantin. 3rd ed. NeW,York, Harper &
Row, 1972. 575 p.

This book which contains numerous tables
provides information on resources and industries
of many countries of the world, including Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. ,

6. Scandinavia and the European Economic

Community (See also by Country)

EEC: SCANDINAVIA’S PROBLEM, by
Olga Timashkova, in New Times (Moscow), no.33
(August 1972) 23-24.

“The Scandinavian countries are about to
take some decisions with far-reaching implica-
tions. In September and October referendums
are to be held in Norway and Denmark on entry
into the Common Market. And Sweden is to work
out concrete measures to give effect to the tariff
agreement it has concluded with the EEC. All
in all, the attitude to be taken to the Common
Market has become the great divide in Scandi-
navian political life. Sweden, Denmark and Nor-
way with their ‘Open economy’ and low customs
tariffs are interested in maximum liberalization
of foreign trade, for the high degree of speciali-
zation characteristic of their economy has made
them particularly dependent on foreign markets.
The ruling quarters of all three count on associa-
tion with a ‘large-scale economic organism’ enabl-
ing them to overcome their ‘small-country
complex’ engendered by their limited national
markets and production potential, accelerating
modernization of the economy, giving new impe-
tus to scientific, technological and trade links
with other West European countries, and ensur-
ing more favourable conditions for the marketing
of their specialized production. The crux of the
matter, however, is that the proposed alliance
with the EEC is bound to benefit primarily Big
Business, which already is closely linked with the
monopolies of Little Europe. It is not by chance

that the Swedish government’s decision to refrain
from seeking full membership in the EEC as
incompatible with the country’s policy of neutral-
ity has greatly irked the Swedish financial and
industrial tycoons . . . Quite a different view
is held by spokesmen of those sections of the
national bourgeoisie which do not expect to gain
from association with the Common Market and
have realized that the move is fraught with seri-
ous economic complications.”

EUROPE’S NEW SPECTER: SOCIALISTS
AND THE COMMON MARKET, by Bernard K.
Johnpoll, in The Nation, (18 Dec-ember 1972)
620—622.

“A specter is haunting Europe’s Socialists;
it is the Common Market. At least three powerful
Socialist parties in Western Europe are being
torn apart by internal feuding over the Common
Market, and bitter strife has developed between
pro- and anti-EEC Socialists across national
borders. Two Socialist prime ministers have
resigned, directly or indirectly, because of the
Common Market. And a Socialist member of
Parliament has resigned in Britain in order to
force an unwanted by-election. The hardest hit
of the parties are in Norway, which voted in a
referendum against entry; Denmark, which vote-d
in favor of entry, and Great Britain, whose par-
liamentary Labour leadership opposes only the
terms of entry accepted by Prime Minister
Edward Heath’s Conservative government, but
whose recent annual convention made clear that
a majority of its 6.5 million members oppose
British membership under any conditions. The
Norwegian situation is particularly serious.”

THE NINE AND THE NORTH, in The
Economist, v.245, no.6737 (7 October 1972)
14—15.

“Mr. Krag has quit politics after leading
Denmark into a European community that can
now hope for other Scandinavian recruits . . .
So, in the end, only one into Ten would not go.
Just a week after Norway’s ‘no’ to joining the
European community, the referendum in Den-
mark produced an unexpectedly resounding ‘yes.’
An Opinion poll taken only a month earlier had
indicated that, if the Norwegians decided not to
join, the Danes would be left evenly divided about
entry; but on Monday, when nearly 90 per cent
of the electorate turned out despite the fact that
it was a working day, the vote was almost two
to one in favour of EEC membership. So the
enlarged community is to be the Nine.”

SCANDINAVIA OR NORTHERN EU-
ROPE ?, by Andreas Oplatka, in Swiss Review
of World Affairs, v.21, no.12 (March 1972) 6—8.

“For Denmark and Norway the question

of Common Market membership was not finally
decided with the recent signing of treaties of
accession in Brussels. In both countries a qualified
parliamentary majority is needed for ratification
of the treaty: five-sixths in the Folketing in
COpenhagen and three-quarters in the Storting
in Oslo. Moreover a referendum will be held in
each country. In Denmark it will take place
following the last vote in parliament and its out-
come will be binding. In Norway the sequence
is reversed and the referendum will have purely
consultative character, but its result will doubt-
less exert a strong influence on the final position
taken by the legislators. Originally set for early
summer of this year, the date for the referendum
was postponed to September in Denmark since
the Social Democratic government of Premier
Krag apparently believes that it needs more time
to educate and persuade the people. Norway, on
the other hand, hopes that a positive decision in
Denmark will have a favorable effect on its own
debate and it appears that the referendum in
Norway will take place only after the Danes have
had their final say.”

D. Military Aspects (See also Appendixes)

WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMA-
MENT, SIPRI YEARBOOK 1973. Stockholm,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
1973. 510 p.

The yearbook is about armaments and dis-
armament. “The aim is to describe . . . the major
quantitative and qualitative changes that take
place in the world’s arsenals, and to analyse the
efforts made to control these arsenals.” Informa-
tion is included on the following Scandinavian
countries, among many other countries of the
world: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

WORLD MILITARY AVIATION; AIR-
CRAFT, AIRF-ORCES AND WEAPONRY, ed.
by Nikolaus Krivinyi and others. New York,
Arco Publishing Co., 1973. 224 p.

This book is divided into the following
chapters: Air Forces (The world’s airforces with

individual strengths, aircraft types and bases,

including those of Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway; and Sweden, among many others) ; Air-
craft (aircraft dimensions and performance
arranged alphabetically within country of manu-
facture, with 321 three-view drawings); weap-
onry (missiles, bombs, guns and torpedoes in
service with the world’s airpowers); Glossary
and Abbreviations; Insignia (roundel and fin
flash designs, as used by the world’s airforces) ;
and Index (index of numerical designations and
popular names of aircraft).

E. Scandinavia and the World

1. The Strategic Import of Scandinavia (See
also Map of Arctic Waters in Appendix CC )
SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY IN TRANSI—
TION: THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL THREAT,
by Nils Orvik, in Orbis, v.16, no.3 (Fall 1972)
720—742.

“Trends and events on the international
scene in 1971-1972 have awakened fresh interest
in the old concept of a balance of power. As yet,
there is no agreement whether emerging constel-
lations will conform to President Nixon’s pen-
tagonal design or appear as modifications of a
continued bipolar power structure. What does
seem clear is that the postwar pattern of
American world dominance, based on strategic
superiority, is changing; we have arrived at a
crossroad in international affairs where several
new directions seem possible. Among the East-
West border areas likely to be affected by these
new developments is the Nordic region, and par-
ticularly the Scandinavian countries, whose secur-
ity has been closely related to the distribution of
power among the major states. Looking at their
position on the map and the characteristics of
their respective security arrangements, one won-
ders how possible reshuffles of world power
might influence Northern Europe and Scandi-
navia . . . Comparing the components that formed
the security balance twenty-five years ago with
those we find today will give some indication of
whether there has been an increase or a decrease
in the security and stability of the Scandinavian
nations.” ‘

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE NORTHERN CAP, by B. C. Cuthbertson,
in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v.117,
no.666 (June 1972) 45—48.

“The term ‘northern cap,’ used to describe
the northern regions of Fenno-Scandinavia and
north-western Russia, first came into common use
in the fifties. In its strategical use it includes
those parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and the
Soviet Union north of the 66th Parallel and
extending from the Norwegian Sea in the west
to the White Sea in the east. Also included are
the ocean areas and islands (notably the Svalbard
archipelago) between the northern coasts of these
four countries and the North Pole. The term
‘northern cap’ should not be confused with the
NATO use of the term ‘northern flank’ which
includes the complete NATO front line from
northern Germany to North Cape in Finnmark,
the northernmost point of mainland Norway . . .
The most fundamental change in the strategic
significance of the northern cap came with the
large expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet and

6

the general growth of the maritime power of the
Soviet Union. The Northern Fleet is today the
largest of the fOur Soviet fleets and contains over
50 per cent of the Soviet submarines. Its opera-
tions have gradually expanded westward and now
extend to all the Norwegian Sea and into the
Atlantic. In case of war or in a crisis situation
it seems probable that a Soviet ‘forward defensive
zone’ would be established in the Greenland-
Iceland-Faeroe Islands gap covering the access
routes to and from the Atlantic. The Norwegian
Sea affords the Soviet Union with its most impor-
tant transit zone for its strategic missile carrying
submarines. However, the Soviets have no bases
in the area to support operations in the Norwe-
gian Sea. Air cover is severely limited by the '
increased range of naval operations. There is
some dispute about whether there is harbour
space not only for the Northern Fleet but also
the fishing and merchant fleets that use the ports
on the Kola Peninsula. The general consensus is
that there is a space problem but how serious it
is remains a matter for speculation. More impor-
tant than the presumed lack of harbour space is
that geography seriously restricts operations of
the Northern .Fleet . . . Strategically, Swedish
Lappland has little to offer the Soviets except
depth if they controlled north Norway. The
Swedes have made it abundantly clear that they
would not fight to preserve the territorial integ-
rity of north Norway; their aim would be only
to preserve their own neutrality. In the last two
decades there has been an increasing effort to
provide for the security of north Norway and its
flanking waters without being provocative. Geog-
raphy complicates Norwegian defence planning.”
2. Scandinavia, Europe, and NATO (See also
Appendixes)
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
FIFTEEN ALLIES OR LESS, in THE
FUTURE OF NATO, by Alastair Buchan. New
York, Carnegie Endowment, for International
Peace, 1967. pp. 32—36.
“Europe is beginning to be regarded as
‘an area of tranquility in an increasingly troubled
world.’ Willful Soviet aggression appears rather
unlikely, and thus security considerations are
expected to play a lesser role in both transatlantic
and East-West relations. Nonetheless, security
problems do exist in Europe, and they have to be
taken into consideration prior to any speculation
about NATO or any other cooperative. form of
European security. Twenty years ago, NATO
founders were vacillating between a multilateral
security organization and a working alliance of
powers with similar objectives. Today diverse
security problems and different diplomatic lean-
ings are dividing the alliance into three groups:

the central European, the Mediterranean, and the
strategic or geographical ‘outliers.’ None of the
Western European powers really considers its
security closely related to the Greek and'Turkish
problems, which stem from local or internal con-
flicts and do not pose a general threat to Europe.
NATO membership is of little advantage to an
‘outlier’ country like Iceland. Canada’s security
is closely linked with that of the continental
United States; hence continued NATO member-
ship doesn’t directly serve Canada’s interest.
Actually the future of the NATO alliance rests
on 10 countries—the United States, Great Britain,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux
countries, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. They
have in common their exposure to risk in case
of a European crisis plus the fact that their
‘long-term security is directly related to a solution
of the German problem.’ NATO may be regarded
‘as a form of inter-state obligations and relation-
ships between the United States and Western
Europe.’ In the 1970’s a new arrangement may
emerge for NATO: one in which the 10 countries
would take on the features of a commonwealth;
a European-American relationship close to Presi-
dent Kennedy’s ‘partnership of equals’; or an
alliance that would serve as an instrument of a
European security system covering the central
and northern parts of Europe. In any case, ‘con-
siderations of security, political freedom, and
finance have to be balanced in different
measure’.”

NATO FACTS AND FIGURES. Brussels,
NATO Information Service, 1969. 354 p.

Part I—Origins and Evolution of the Alli-
ance (Origins of the Alliance, Analysis of the
North Atlantic Treaty, The Atlantic Alliance
from 1949 to 1968, Defence Policy and Financing,
Soviet Military Capability); Part II—Activities
of the Council (Political Consultation, Machinery
for Crisis Management, Economc Cooperation,
Defense Support and Infrastructure, Scientific
Cooperation, Cultural Cooperation, Civil Emer-
gency Planning, Coordination of Air Traffic,
Press and Information); Part III—Structure of
NATO (Civil Organization, Military Organiza-
tion, Financial Control); Part IV—Chronology,
Statistics, Appendices. With maps, charts, and
statistical tables.

NATO HANDBOOK. Brussels, NATO Infor-
mation Service, February 1974. 79 p.

Contents: North Atlantic Council—Per-
. manent Representatives (including those of Den-
mark, Iceland, and Norway, among others) ; The
North Atlantic Treaty; Analysis of the Treaty;
An Alliance for Peace; Development of the Alli-
ance (Chronology) ; The Organization; Annexes;
and Documentation.

NATO—VIABLE POLITICAL ALLIANCE
THROUGH 1975, by Col. Robert E. Lynch. Car-
lisle Barracks, Pa., US. Army War College, 1969.
60 p. (Student Thesis.)

“The purpose of this thesis is to study the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an insti-
tutional arrangement for collective security, and
to make some judgment as to its political viability
through 1975. The paper recalls the events which
brought NATO into being. Next a (study of the
principles of collective security as they exist in
a scholar’s model, and a critical View of the theory
are presented. Following this, a comparison of
NATO to the model is undertaken. The subse-
quent chapter considers the strengths of NATO
as discerned from a brief study of a representa-
tive number of crises which have beset the Alli-
ance. The study concludes that NATO will
continne, as it is today, through 1975.” Contents:
Introduction; Background; Theory of Collective
Security; NATO As a Collective Security Organi—
zation; The Strength of NATO; The Future of
NATO; Bibliography.

NEW HOME FOR AN OLD DILEMMA,
by Robert A. Cameron, in Air Force and Space
Digest, v.51 (May 1968) 48—52.

“Now that NATO’s top management
apparatus has been streamlined because of expul-
sion of the NATO Council from French soil, per-
haps the members of the alliance will consider
other much needed changes. For the first time
since the alliance was established, the Military
Committee and NATO Council are headquartered
under the same roof. NATO’s military control
system should be altered to adjust to the assump-
tion of greater power by the military-civilian
hierarchy. The division of the Supreme Allied
Command Europe [SACEUR] into SACNorth
and SACSouth would greatly facilitate control of
forces in time of crisis. Even though General
Beaufre’s plan for Europeanizing NATO’s com-
mand structure is not feasible at this time, the
Europeans should begin assuming more responsi-
bility for their own defense by filling more of
the key military management posts. In addition
to revising its command structure, NATO should
reassess its strategy of flexible response, which
is of doubtful value since it reduces the credibility
of NATO’s nuclear deterrent by indicating a
reluctance to use nuclear weapons under all cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, the strategy is not
backed by adequate manpower and equipment.
As long as NATO is committed to a strategy of
flexible response, it should bolster its conven-
tional defenses by increasing the number of
national units stationed on European soil and
deploying them along the whole of the European
frontier instead of just the flanks.”

NORDIC COOPERATION AND HIGH POL-
ITICS, by Nils Orvik, in International Organiza-
tion, v.28, no.1 (Winter 1974) 61—88.

“The 1972 decision of the Norwegian peo-
ple to reject admission to the European Commu-
nity has raised some fresh questions about the
Nordic countries and Nordic integration. Was
the Norwegian decision a protest vote on mainly
domestic grounds? Or was it a rejection of the
whole structure, system, and ideology of the Euro-
pean Community—as having grown too bureau-
cratic, too self-centered, and too concerned about
economic gains and trade and growth rates rather
than about human values? Yet, if the Community
was no longer an attractive alternative, what
were Norway’s other alternatives? The ocean-
oriented, outgoing Norwegians could hardly have
turned isolationists. Should we read the Norwe-
gian referendum as a ‘yes’ to Nordic cooperation
rather than as a ‘no’ to continental Europe?
Whatever tipped the scales in Norway’s, 1972
referendum, the so-called Nordic alternative
seems bound to become more prominent in Scandi-
navia, since Norway has reached a Swedish-
modelled trade agreement with the European
Community as a substitute for membership . . .
The last couple of decades have indicated changes
in directions, priorities, and political constella-
tions that may affect and dislodge the variables
we have tried to place in this paper. The seven-
ties may well become a watershed in Nordic
regional cooperation. For the time being, how—
ever, it still seems legitimate to concentrate on
the policies of the individual national actors,
rather than on Nordic cooperative organizations,
and to focus on their interactions in situations
where institutionalized cooperation presents itself
as a viable policy alternative.”

THE NORDIC COUNTRIES IN A CHANG-
ING EUROPE, by Egil Ulstein, in Military
Review, v.52, no.9 (September 1972) 50—63.

“This article was condensed from Part III
of the original which appeared in the ADELPHI
PAPERS, Number 81, published by The Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies (Great
Britain), November 1971, under the title, Nordic
Security . . . The security problems of the Nordic
area are first and foremost functions of the
changing international environment. In this
respect, the area does not differ from most other
parts of the world. It might be held that its
problems are of marginal interest in European
developments. Equally, one might question
whether the area has anything substantial to
contribute to West European integration or the
liquidation of the legacy of World War II: a
Europe split in two with ,a dividing line along
ostensibly ideological frontiers. In some ways,

8

the Nordic countries may be said to straddle the
split of Europe. At the same time, their destiny
may transcend purely European affairs. Although
their security is closely linked with the problems
of Central Europe, they might ultimately find
themselves pawns in the game of global super-
power confrontation. The imponderables of these
external factors, which will determine not only
the attitude of outside powers to the Nordic area
but also its own reactions to them, make it diffi-
cult to determine future trends. There is much
to be said for the View that, in the Nordic capi-
tals, one awaits the great decisions in Europe,
decisions which will be the outcome of events,
not in the north, but in Brussels and Berlin.

.Both the Seidenfaden Report and the trend of

informed public debate in the Nordic countries
lead to the conclusion that Denmark and Norway
can be expected to remain members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization throughout the
1970s. This view is confirmed by the fact that
all the major political parties at present repre-
sented in Parliament, both in Denmark and in
Norway, support this policy. Public opinion polls
over recent years point in the same direction. In
this respect, it appears that opinion is influenced
by a markedly conservative attitude to matters
of national security and would look warily at
possible changes in international alignments:
‘Better the devil we know . . .’.”

THE NORTH SEA——SOURCE OF RICHES
AND GIANT RUBBISH DUMP, by Elise Nouel,
in NATO Review, v.22, no.2 (April 1974) 24—29.

“An important step was recently taken
towards gaining a better scientific knowledge of
the North Sea, and how its newly assessed riches
can be rationally exploited. This achievement has
resulted from a study conference'held in 1971 at
Aviemore, Scotland, under the aegis of NATO’s
Science Committee, which brought together nearly
70 experts from member countries of the Alli-
ance (Belgium. Canada, Denmark, the FRG, the
Netherlands, Norway, UK and USA). The major
purpose of the NATO Science Committee Con-
ference was to provide a list of research priorities
for the concerned scientific community. The pro-
ceedings of this conference have now been pub-
lished and some major aspects are outlined . . .
[in this article].”

PAST AND FUTURE TASKS OF THE
ALLIANCE, by Manlio Brosio, in NATO Letter,
v.17, no.3 (March 1968) 8—13.

.Full text of Harmel Report with an analy-
sis by Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO.
—“In December 1966, the Ministers of the 15
NATO countries decided ‘to study the future tasks
which face the Alliance, and its procedures for
fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alli-

ance as a factor for a durable peace.’ Thereafter,
a report presented to the Council of Ministers
by a Special Study Group appointed for this pur-
pose, was approved in December last year. From
the outset the Study was envisaged as an attempt
to define future tasks of the Alliance, not to
reform or transform it.”

SCANDINAVIA FACES EUROPE, by H.
Peter Dreyer. Paris, The Atlantic Institute for
International Affairs, 1973. 77 p.

The Uncertain Future—Between Integra-
tion and Diversity; Security and the Nordic
Balance; Natural Independence and Natural Co-
operation; Expanding Trade and Withering
Nordek; The Difficult Way to Brussels; After
the Norwegian “No”; Sweden—Beyond Associa-
tion?; Finland’s Fragile Neutrality; The Danish
Connection; Towards a New Scandinavian Rela-
tionship; Northern Security Reappraised; Doubts
about the Welfare State; Scandinavia and Europe
——Closing the Gap. “Mr. Dreyer’s . . . analysis
points out not only the growing tendency towards
different foreign policies inside Scandinavia, but
also the fact that this does not necessarily mean
the dissolution of Scandinavian fellow feeling or
sense of community among the Scandinavian
countries. More likely, it means a diversifica-
tion of Scandinavia’s political possibilities. Mr.
Dreyer has a . . . sense of the moralizing under-
tone in the foreign policy of some of the Nordic
countries and of the very special self—righteous
idealism which is abundant above all in Denmark
and Sweden. The ‘our morals are not for sale’
style is rather sharply commented upon and
viewed in its standng conflict with realism and
egotism. His paper studies with great care the
balance between a certain amount of idealism

and a greater amount of healthy pragmatism. .

Moreover, it shows the author’s understanding
of the strong connection between internal political
considerations and the foreign policies of the
Nordic countries. In all democratic countries, the
political problem of seeking votes to remain in
power has considerable bearing on foreign policy.
But there are very few countries where the
domestic situation dominates the attitude towards
international problems more visibly than in Den-
mark and Sweden. Mr. Dreyer documents this
crucial point very well. The author also reflects
upon the peripheral situation of the Scandinavian
countries. Very little attention is paid in the
other European capitals to developments in the
remote areas north of Germany’s border. Europe
is, however, more than ever on the minds of the
Scandinavians. Denmark’s solitary march into
Europe, and her becoming a kind of ‘Nordic
bridgehead’ in the enlarged Community, has cre-
ated a new interest all over Scandinavia in Euro-

pean affairs. Unfortunately this interest is not
yet reciprocated. Western Europe still attaches
little importance to the thoughts and deeds of the
Scandinavians. But times change rapidly, and a
new era is beginning for the five small countries
high up in north. The era of isolation is defi-
nitely over.”
b. Scandinavian Security and the Defense of
Europe
(1) Miscellaneous Aspects
THE CORK IN THE BALTIC BOTTLE,

by Lawrence Griswold, in Sea Power, v.15, no.1
(January 1972) 9—13. '

“As primary and secondary reservoirs of
Russian sea power, the Baltic and Black Seas
open to the world’s oceans only through bottle-
necks controlled by NATO allies. Open in peace-
time to all shipping, in a time of acute stress
between Warsaw Pact and NATO nations they
could, nominally, be closed. Turkey’s Bosporus
is one and the international strait of Ore Sund
(Sound), flanked by Sweden at the east and Den-
mark’s Jutland at the west, is the other. Denmark
is a NATO ally; Sweden is not. The strength of
NATO’s control depends on NATO’s prestige. At
its present low ebb, Moscow’s, efforts to dominate
those bottlenecks by all means short of force are
unrelenting. Early last November, an editorial
in the official Moscow publication, ‘Soviet Diplo-
matic Lexicon,’ by Russian Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko demanded that all NATO war-
ships be excluded from the Baltic Sea which, it
declared, ‘must be reserved for the use of nations
bordering it.’ Excepting Finland, Sweden, east-
ern Denmark and West Germany, the rest of the
Baltic is a Communist lake, although US. war-
ships now make occasional ‘show the flag’ cruises
there. Such an editorial demarche, if new, would
have stirred considerably more apprehension in
Western Europe than it did. But it was not a
novelty; the same periodical has been issuing the
same demand since 1962. What alerted NATO
nations this time, however, was the published
reply by the new Danish Defense Minister in
answer to a question put by a German corre-
spondent. According to this, he stated ‘unilat-
erally’ that Denmark would henceforth restrict
NATO maneuvers to areas west of the Danish
island of Bornholm. Since that would comply
with the Russian demand, Denmark’s fellow
NATO allies were understandably startled. The
following day, however, Copenhagen declared that
Defense Minister Kjeld Olsen had been ‘mis-
quoted’ and that Denmark’s loyalty to NATO
remained unchanged. But a renewed Danish
trend to the left might create a different situation.
If the misinterpretation did nothing else, it
sharpened Western attention to the fact that the

9

international strait of Ore Sund between southern
Sweden and northern Denmark was a very
narrow bottleneck through which all maritime
traffic, merchant or warship, must pass and,
moreover, it is under a form of attack.”

THE DEFENSE OF NORTHWEST
EUROPE AND THE NORTH SEA, by Maj.
Gen. J. L. Moulton, in United States Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings, v.97, no.819 (May 1971) 70—97.

“The defense of Northwest Europe will
require powerful armies. But without logistic
support, most of which must come through the
North Sea, those armies will be as nothing. To
assure that such support can pass through the
North Sea will be one of the tasks of the North
Sea navies . . . Six NATO nations have coastlines
on the North Sea, Norway, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Britain. As long as the threat of Western
escalation to nuclear war remains credible, it is
not very likely that any of them could be detached
from NATO by brute force. If for any reason
Western resort to nuclear weapons became incred-
ible and the danger of conventional attack became
immediate, pacifist pressure towards nonresist—
ance might be intensified, but, as was seen after
Munich and thirty years later when again a hos-
tile army marched into Czechoslovakia, the dis-
play of naked force alerts those who, like so many
in the Western democracies, would otherwise
prefer to ignore unpleasant possibilities . . . A
neutral and weakly armed Scandinavia, unable to
expect NATO support and dependent on an iso-
lated Sweden, would find itself under pressure
to accept Russian surveillance systems spreading
to Spitzbergen, the Faeroes, and Iceland, and
might eventually be reduced to the semi-satellite
status of Finland. The only stable alternative to
the adherence of Scandinavian members to NATO
seems, therefore, to be a neutral Scandinavian
bloc armed more heavily than Sweden is today
and in some way guaranteed by what was left
of NATO against isolation and blockade. It could
hardly be either as cheap or as effective as the
present arrangement.”

NORDIC SECURITY, by Egil Ulstein. Lon-
don, The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1971. 34 p. (Adelphi Papers Number
Eighty-One.)

“The ‘Nordic Area’ considered in this paper
comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway
and Sweden. In View of its geographical remote-
ness from the rest of the area, Iceland’s security
problems are examined only rather summarily
and mainly in the context of the control of the
North Atlantic Ocean . . . The Nordic Area can
hardly expect to remain unaffected by current
developments when these include the search for

10

political solutions to the problems of Central
Europe through East-West co-operation and
detente, the beginning of a new phase in West
European integration with the enlargement of
the European Community, the decline in the cer-
tainty that the American commitment to Europe
can permanently be taken for granted and Soviet
naval expansion in the Northern coastal areas.
Can these developments be expected fundamen-
tally to influence Nordic co-operation which has

'an historical background and has expanded

remarkably over recent decades? Can they lead
to changes in alignments away from the present
position where three of the countries, Denmark,
Iceland and Norway, are in NATO and two, Fin-
land and Sweden, are neutral? Could former
traditions of neutrality and aloofness in inter-
national power politics reappear as the memories
of World War II fade and the political climate
on the world stage changes? This paper attempts
to discuss these questions. Contents: The Tra-
ditions; The Nordic Balance Since the War; and
The Nordic Countries in a Changing Europe.”
A NORTH SEA ALTERNATIVE; WITHIN
A NEW NATO? by Nils Orvik, in Military
review, v.47, no.1 (January 1967) 78—85.
This article was translated and digested
from the original, published in The Norsk Mili-
taert Tidsskrift (Norway) no.4, 1966.—“NATO,
created for solving specific problems, is an orga-
nization concerned with a means and not an aim.
The choice of the security means for a given
situation depends on the situation and the
demands which it poses. In 1949, Norwegian
authorities concluded that NATO offered the
greatest possibility to cover Norway’s needs, but
this does not necessarily prove that this is the
case today. If one could prove that there no
longer exists a threat to Norway’s security, there
would be no need for security measures. But so
far, it has not been shown that this is true.
Proponents of unilateral disarmament take the
opposite view; they believe that Norwegian dis-
armament would cause the threat to disappear
because other countries would follow Norway’s
example . . . Why not, within the framework of
NATO, try a regional cooperation arrangement
between the group of NATO countries which
border the North Sea? There seems little doubt
that conditions exist that should furnish a better
basis for sustained security cooperation than has
been possible in NATO . . . [The author’s pro-
posal] of a reorganization of NATO after the
pattern of a North Sea alternative, with lesser
regional groupments within the framework of the
Western defense alliance, offers no patent solu-
tion. It must be regarded as an effort to get away
from the. somewhat habitual mode of thinking

which has dominated NATO dissussions for too
long.”

THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFENSE OF
EUROPE, by Maj. E. Hinterhoff, in NATO’s
Fifteen Nations, v.12, no.5 (October-November
1967) 39 plus.

“Since the setting up of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in April 1949, the problem
of the defence of Europe still remains as topical
as ever. Before trying to analyse some of the
aspects of this problem it must first be said that
the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe has to
a great extent become a hypothetical one . . . Yet,
this bogey of Soviet numerical superiority still
lingers in the minds of many Western military
planners . . . The main mission of NATO—as the
threat of Soviet aggression has been increasingly
fading away—must be . . . [considered in the
following 1ight:| ‘The basic objective of allied
policy in Europe is not strength for strength’s
sake but to create an environment for a genuine
European settlement serving the legitimate inter-
ests of all concerned’.”

PROBLEMS OF NORTH EUROPEAN
SECURITY, by Y. Goloshubov, in New Times
(Moscow), no.4 (27 January 1971) 20—21.

“There are now favourable conditions in
Europe for active preparation of a continent-wide
security and co-operation conference. The greater
the importance of the Finnish government’s pro-
posal of last November that preparatory meetings
of representatives of interested states on matters
relating to holding the conference should begin
in Helsinki. The Soviet government observed with
satisfaction in its reply that this proposal was a
positive step contributing to practical preparation
of the conference. The Finnish proposal was wel-
comed at the December meeting of the Warsaw
Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Berlin.
It was also received with approval in all the
North European countries. The Finnish initia-
tive demonstrates anew the great importance of
the activity of all countries, big and small, in
strengthening European peace . . . Scandinavia
is an integral part of Europe, and its security is
intimately bound up with that of Europe as a
whole. And so the Scandinavian peoples have
no less an interest than others in normalizing the
political climate of the entire continent, a thing
for which favourable conditions now exist. The
firmer the foundations of peace in Europe, the
more secure will be the peace of the North. Thus,
the contribution this or that northern country
makes to the common cause of European security
serves its own national interests too.”

WESTERN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; PUBLIC
OPINION STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS, ed.

@

by Richard L. Merritt and others. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 552 p. (Praeger
Special Studies in International Politics and Pub-
lic Affairs.)

Sponsored by the Yale Political Data Pro-
gram, Yale University and the Institute of War
and Peace Studies, School of International Af--
fairs, Columbia University.—“How men perceive
the world around them, how they react to this
world, and the relationship between human per-

ception and human behavior are topics of vital

and continuing concern in the study of interna-
tional relations . . . For two decades policy direc-
tors, analysts, and social scientists in the United
States Information Agency have concerned them-
selves with the average citizen’s new role in
domestic politics and his heightened influence
over foreign policy in many countries. This con-
cern . . . stimulated the USIA in the early 1950’s
to launch a program of international public opin-
ion surveying. This program has continued for
over fifteen years . . . The data gathered in this
way were designed to answer the questions of
American policy-makers about foreign attitudes
and reactions toward many issues and events.
Some of these answers produced important policy
recommendations . . . One of the purposes of this
volume is to introduce these data to the research
community in tabular form a categorized inven-
tory of some of the more important questions
asked in France, West Germany, Italy, and Great
Britain from 1952 to 1963.” Of particular inter-
est are the following: I. Perceptions of World
Politics (East-West Competition, Commitment to
East or West, Trust in Allies). III. European
Integration (Military Integration: European
Defense Community, The London Conference,
West German Participation). IV. NATO and the
Defense of Europe. V. Arms Control and Dis-
armament. VI. Specific International Issues
(German Issues, Eastern Europe).
(2) Military Balance

AIRCRAFT, SHIPS, AND WEAPONS IN
NATO’S NORTHERN COMMAND, by Charles
Latour, in NATO’s Fifteen Nations, v.18, no.1
(February-March 1973) 62—65 plus.

“There are of course many different types
of aircraft, ships and weapons in use in the
Northern Command. All that has been done here
is to pick out some of the more interesting and
give a brief description of each.”

ASPECTS OF NATO: DEFENCE POLICY.
Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1969. 26 p.

“This brochure contains extracts from the
book ‘NATO—Facts and Figures’ published in
the Spring of 1969.” Early Problems, Strategy
and Technology, Nuclear Problems, The Concept
of Graduated Response, New Strategic Concept,

11

Crisis Management, Force Planning, NATO
Nuclear Policy, Soviet Military Capability
(Strength of .Forces, Air Forces, Missile Force,
Soviet Navy, Strength and Weakness).

EXERCISE STRONG EXPRESS, by John
Marriott, in NATO’s Fifteen Nations, v.18, no.1
(February-March 1973) 7 4—80.

‘.‘The largest NATO exercise ever staged
took place from September 11th to the 28th last
year. The areas involved were the Atlantic, the
Channel and Northern Norway and all the NATO
nations bordering these areas took part. Code
named Strong Express, it was designed to simu-
late the opening stages of a war. The two sides
taking part were designated Blue (NATO) and
Orange and an imaginary Blue/Orange border
was drawn across northern Norway behind which
Orange land forces massed.”

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1972—1973—
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, in Air
Force Magazine, v.55, no.12 (December 1972)
59—67.

Includes some of the following information
on the military posture of Denmark and Norway,
among others: military service, total armed
forces, defense budget, army, navy, and air
force. See also the following which includes
similar information for Finland and Sweden:
The Military Balance 1972—73—Other European
Countries, in Air Force Magazine, v.55, no.12
(December 1972) 72—74.

THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1973—1974.
London, The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1973. 96 p.

Provides the following type of information
for Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, among
many others: military service, defense budgets,
break-down of armed forces, military equipment,
etc. With tables, including among others, infor-
mation such as “Defense Expenditure of NATO
Countries, 1968-1972.”

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1973-1974—
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, in Air
Force Magazine, v.56, no.12 (December 1973)
71—79.

Includes some of the following information
on the military posture of Denmark and Norway,
among others: military service, total armed
forces, defense budget, army, navy, and air force.
See also the following which includes similar
information for Finland and Sweden. The Mili-
tary Balance 1973-1974—Other European Coun-
tries, in Air .Force Magazine, v. 56, no. 12
(December 1973) 86-88.

c. NATO and the Soviet Threat in the North

NORDIC BALANCE IN THE 1970s, by Col.
Albert Leo Romaneski, in United States Naval

12

Institute Proceedings, v.99, no.8 (August 1973)
32—41.

“ ‘Nordic Balance is a theory of regional
equilibrium maintained by the Nordic nations
between the major power blocs of NATO vis-a-vis
the Warsaw Pact by reasons of geography, polit-
ical, military, and economic factors, and most
importantly, by the roles of the Nordic countries
themselves.’ . . . Soviet activities in the Mediter-
ranean have focused the attention of the Western
Alliance there. The Arab-Israeli dispute has
heightened the tension and the danger of a major
power confrontation on this southern flank of
NATO. By contrast, little or nothing is being
written or discussed about the growing Soviet
naval threat on NATO’s northern flank and more
particularly about the Nordic region, largely
because few crises have arisen in this area.
Nordic balance is a delicate phenomenon which
operates only within the limits of relatively low
level crises confined primarily to the Nordic
area.” '

THE NORTH ATLANTIC: THE NORWE-
GIAN SEA, A SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY
PROBLEM, by Capt. Christer Fredholm, in
Naval War College Review, v.24, no.10 (June
1972) 56—64.

“Growing Soviet naval activity in the vital
Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic received little
notice despite the region’s strategic importance
and relative vulnerability. Caught in the dilemma
occasioned by an expanding Soviet Fleet and a
US. overseas force reduction, NATO and more
particularly small nations like Norway and Den-
mark which lie within Moscow’s sphere of interest
may soon face a choice between accommodation
to Soviet political goals or precipitating a direct
confrontation between the superpowers. A firm
commitment in this strategic part of the world
by NATO and the United States is the best insur-
ance against such a situation ever becoming real-
ity . . . Iceland would play a vital role in the
protection of any allied shipping across the Atlan-
tic. Should NATO find itself in the position of
not having access to bases'On Iceland, the Soviets
would find it far less difficult for their northern
fleet units to reach their patrol areas in the Atlan-
tic undetected. Any Soviet occupation of Iceland
would breach a vital link in NATO’s defense line
and greatly facilitate the undetected passage of
SOViet submarines into the Atlantic. In terms of
air operations, the establishing of a Soviet base
on Iceland would be a major strategic disaster for
NATO as the Soviet Fleet would then be assured
of extended air support in the Atlantic. In
essence, an Iceland defended by powerful Soviet
fighter and missile units would constitute a gigan-

x-:-:-.-:- ......

tegic position. The strategic significance of
Iceland today cannot be overemphasized. The
confined waters in the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-
Scotland region might be likened to a lock, and
whoever holds the key controls the North Atlan-
tic. That key is Iceland. A change in the existing
situation would result in an entirely new politico-
military picture both in Europe and the north.”

THE PROJECTION OF SOVIET MILI-
TARY POWER IN THE NORTH; MARGINS
OF WESTERN SAFETY IN THE NORWE-
GIAN SEA ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC ARE
WEARING THIN, by Eivind Berdal, in NATO’s
Fifteen Nations, v.19, no.1 (February-March
1974) 58—64.

“The quantitative and qualitative growth
of Soviet military power has been remarkable in
recent years, and nowhere in the world has the
discrepancy between sheer military might and
professed intentions become more glaring than
in the North. Governments and public opinion
in the three countries of NATO’s Northern Euro-
pean Command, Norway, Denmark and Germany,
are becoming increasingly aware of this disturb-
ing trend . . . The Director of Research of the
Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Johan J orgen Holst, described the Soviet build-up
in an article in the following words: ‘It is the
intention of the Soviets to push their naval
defence line outwards to Iceland and the Faroes.
If this is a likely development, then it indicates
that the Russians would, to an increasing degree,
come to regard the Norwegian Sea as a Soviet
lake, behind which, of course, Norway would lie.’
This has not come to pass yet: Indigenous forces,
combined with powerful NATO reinforcements
in emergencies, are there to keep the balance.
But a potential ‘Mare Sovieticum’ must have
crossed the mind of the Norwegian Prime Min-
ister Trygve Bratteli when, in a remarkable
departure from normal reticence about Soviet
military activity, he told United Press interna-
tional in an interview in July 1971: ‘The Soviet
Union has carried out a colossal military build-up
on the Northern Flank of NATO, where her mili-
tary forces are greater than ever before with the
possible exception of the Second World War. It
is quite clear that the Soviet military build-up,
not far from the Norwegian border, is not a
bilateral Norwegian-Soviet issue, but part of a
global strategy of the Soviet Union. The fact
that such great military strength is deployed so
near to our country underlines the seriousness of
the international strategic situation.”

THE SOVIET BUILD-UP IN THE NORTH-
EAST ATLANTIC, by Johan Jorgen Holst, in
NATO Review, v.19, nos.9 and 10 (September/
October 1971) 21—23.

“The Ministers of Defence attending the
NATO Defence Planning Committee at Brussels,
last May, noted the continuing build-up of Soviet
forces in the North-East Atlantic. They stressed
the need for further planning for external rein-
forcements and other measures to improve the
situation on the Northern flank. At a Seminar
organised recently in Oslo by the Atlantic Treaty
Association, the Research Director of the Nor-
wegian Institute for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Johan
J orgen Holst, gaVe his views on this subject. We
give . . . extracts from his speech.”

THE SOVIET THREAT TO NATO’S
NORTHERN FLANK, in Time, (18 October
1.971) 39.

“On the bleak coast of the Barents Sea,
where the Soviet Union shares a common border
with Norway near the roof 'of the world, the
Norwegian defense force of 400 men is frequently
witness to a disturbing scene. They watch on
radar as the Soviets practice assaults on the coast
of their Kola Peninsula, some 300 miles away.
In the Soviet war games, the attacking force is
always victorious and the defenders are always
defeated. That spectacle points up a growing
Soviet threat to the northern flank of NATO,
which extends from Norway’s North Cape to
West Germany’s Baltic coast . . . NATO’s north-
ern command is outnumbered by the Soviets four-
to-one on the ground, seven-to-one in aircraft and
six-to-one in ships in the north. “The Russians
are very'busy displaying raw military power on
the northern flank,’ reports TIME Correspondent
John Mulliken, who recently toured the region.
‘It is a significant example of how the Soviets
intend to use the pressure of their operational
armed forces to achieve their political policies in
the 1970’s and 1980’s’.”

TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ARC-
TIC: THE SOVIET POSITION, by S. M. Oleni-
coff. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., July 1972.
52 p. (R-907-ARPA.)

Partial contents: Arctic Basin Territorial
Claims; Soviet Reactions to US. Activities in the
Arctic; The Current Soviet Position on Arctic
Waters (The “Soviet Sector” Claim; Territorial
Waters in The Soviet Arctic; Internal Waters of
the Soviet Arctic; Closed Seas; The Northern
Sea Route). With bibliography.

THE THREAT TO THE NORTH EURO-
PEAN COMMAND, by Col. K. A. Kristensen, in
NATO’s Fifteen Nations, v.18, no.1 (February-
March 1973) 32-39.

“The Northern European Command
(NEC), because of its geography, climate and
political environment, is a complex military area.
This article, before reviewing the potential threat
to the NEC, will attempt to describe these fea-

l3

tures which make the NEC, in a military sense,
a unique area in Europe . . . A glance at the map
will show that, except at the peripheries of the
Command, the NEC is screened from the USSR
by two neutral countries, Sweden and Finland.
Sweden which shares a common border with Nor-
way over most of its length, follows a policy of
non-alignment in peace to permit neutrality in
war. Her own armed forces are substantial, how-
ever, should her neutrality be challenged. Fin-
land’s situation, with her relatively short common
border with Norway and her long common border
with Russia, is very different. The ‘Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance’
with the Soviet Union restricts her armed forces
to a level which could pose little opposition to
the Soviets should they wish to make use of Fin-
nish territory. Thus Finland’s situation might
be better deScribed as one of enforced neutrality.”

d. Defense of NATO’s Northern Flank (Se

also Appendixes) '

DEFENCE OF THE NORTHERN EURO-
PEAN COMMAND; THE WAYS AND THE
MEANS, by Col. T. H. Ostendorf, in NATO’s
Fifteen Nations, v.18, no.1 (February-March
1973) 50—53 plus.

“The tasks of the Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINC-NORTH)
are clearly defined, but the forces at his disposal
to carry out these tasks are not so easily quanti-
fied. This article continues the review of NATO’s
Northern Flank and will describe CINC-NORTH’s
tasks, and discuss the forces at his disposal and
the way they are exercised to ensure readiness
to meet the potential threat . . . CINC-NORTH’S
forces are those of the command’s nations—Nor-
way, Denmark and Germany—and those of other
NATO member nations whose commitment to
collective security has been manifested in obligat-
ing considerable striking power in direct defence
of Northern Europe. Knitting this collated capa-
bility, diverse in strengths, weapons training,
even language, into a cohesive force is CINC-
NORTH’s continual concern.”

THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTHERN
FLANK, by Gen. Walker, in RUSI, v.118, no.3
(September 1973) 21—30.

A lecture before the Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies (England) in which
the lecturer stressed the strategic importance of
NATO of the northern flank. He said: “If the
countries of the northern flank are to survive in
a free society, there is a massive job for them
and us to do in educating their people in the need
for defence. This is the first problem affecting
the northern flank which I want to put before
you this afternoon. Call it the information battle
or the information gap, or whatever you like . . .

14

I hope I have convinced you of the importance of
NATO’s northern flank. It is an area growing in
importance and, for the reason I have given, the
situation has changed dramatically for the worse
in the last few years. I am absolutely certain that
the defence of this flank is vital to the very sur-
vival of the West as a whole, and there is no time
to waste because time is not on our side.”

THE FUTURE OF NATO, by Alastair
Buchan, in International Conciliation (November
1967) 61 p.

“NATO should be viewed today as a matrix
from which some new arrangement will emerge
during the 1970s. The Alliance may move in any
of three directions: (1) The present multilateral
system might improve steadily—in crisis manage-
ment, resolution of force level problems, defense
procurement and standardization—so that the
relations of the members would have something
of the characteristics of commonwealth. (2) A
European political and defense community might
develop, making the European-American relation-
ship in NATO more equal. (3) NATO might be
used as an instrument in the creation of a Euro-
pean security system covering both halves of Cen-
tral and Northern Europe. Considerations of
security, political freedom, and finance have to
be balanced in different measure for the three
arrangements. Objections and difficulties would
exist with each. But N ATO’s role is central and
will remain so if it is refashioned to change the
European confrontation into a broader system of
European security in the next 10 to 20 years.
Should this be accepted as NATO’s aim, then the
alternatives noted above might prove to be steps
in the consolidation of detente within the devel-
oped world.”

NATO’S NORTHERN FLANK, in The Royal
Air Forces Quarterly, v.10, no.2 (Summer 1970)
133—143.

“The flanks of NATO have long been
accorded less priority than the central region of
Europe. There are sound reasons for this: with
the Alliance’s limited resources it makes obvious
sense to concentrate forces in the area where the
threat is greatest. However, even if a more uni-
form allocation of resources were militarily and
economically possible, the northern and southern
flank countries of NATO could well have political
reasons for playing down the East-West military
confrontation, as opposed to emphasising it by
allowing Allied troops to be permanently stationed
on their territory. Thus the defence of NATO’s
flanks offers both politician and military planner
a number of special problems, which are likely
to remain with us for several years to come. This
article discusses some of these problems as they

relate to the northernmost part of NATO’s north-
ern flank, that is North Norway.”

NATO’S NORTHERN FLANK—VITAL
BUT INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE, by
Stefan Geisenheyner, in Air Force Magazine,
v.54, no.7 (July 1971) 56—61.

“Also critical to the security of the West—
ern alliance are the approaches from the north,
which in tactical terms can be considered equally
important. Ths article . . . draws a gloomy pro-
file of the forces guarding . . . NATO’s Northern
Flank . . . The broad term, ‘northern flank,’
applies to the southern littoral of the Baltic Sea,
which includes the coastlines of Germany, Den-
mark, and its Baltic islands; the Norwegian coast
from Oslo to the North Cape; and, finally, the
approximately 100 miles of land frontier between
the USSR and Norway, located far above the
Arctic Circle, west of Murmansk. The strategic
value of this northern flank rests on two vital
anchors. The first is NATO’s blocking position
in the western Baltic, which serves to contain
the Soviet Baltic Sea .Fleet. The second is the
North Cap-e region, stretching from Narvik to
the Soviet border. NATO forces in that area
would counter any Soviet thrust toward the west
through northern Norway. They also could
threaten Murmansk, the USSR’s only year-round,
ice-free harbor in the west with free access to
the open seas. The Norwegian coastline between
these two anchors is of only minor strategic
value.”

(LI)—POLICY AND POSTURE OF
NATO ON THE NORTHERN FLANK: AN
APPRAISAL, by Comdr. Herman L. Hunt. New-
port, R.I., US. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpub-
lished Thesis.)

“This is a study of the relationship of
Norway and Denmark to NATO, including their
military posture and political policies. The his-
torical Soviet interest in Scandinavia has been
highlighted in recent years through the increased
Soviet military activity on the frontiers of the
strategic northern flank of NATO. Even though
the northern flank geographically includes all of
Scandinavia and Iceland, only Denmark and Nor-
way, being members of NATO, are examined.
The author finds that the contribution of Den-
mark and Norway to the military strength of
NATO’s northern flank is not as meaningful as
is their geographic position. A significant con-
clusion is that Denmark’s and Norway’s policies
of prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops
and nuclear weapons on their territories in peace
time increase their vulnerability and that their
survival depends to a great extent on the timely
arrival of effective reinforcements.”

PROBLEMS OF THE DEFENCE OF

NATO’S NORTHERN FLANK, by Gen. Walter
Walker, in The Royal United Service Institution
Journal, v.115, no.659 (September 1970) 13—23.

A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 25 March
1970, in which the Commander-in-Chief, Allied
Forces, Northern Europe, said “Today it is my
task to introduce a highly intelligent British audi-
ence to some of the problems of the defence of
Northern European Command, NATO’s northern
flank . . . I will take you on a ‘Cook’s Tour’ of
the Command; show you some of the problems
which confront us, and try to explain the stra-
tegic importance of NATO’s northern flank.”

SCANDINAVIA AND THE FUTURE OF
NATO, by Col. John E. Dwan II, in Military
Review, v.48, no.4 (April 1968) 54—62.

“The future of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization alliance is a major issue despite the
war in Vietnam, turmoil in Communist China,
the disaffection of France from the Western alli—
ance, the dilemmas of the underdeveloped world,
and the crisis in the Middle East. When we think
of NATO in this country, we tend to focus pri-
marily on France, Germany, and the United King-
dom. It is a fact, however, that the Scandinavian
countries comprise one-fifth of the membership
of the alliance, and they occupy NATO’s strategic
nOrthern flank which we may have been taking
too much for granted. Since, under the terms of
the North Atlantic Treaty, members may with-
draw from the alliance after 1969 with one year’s
advance notice . . . it is important to know what
these northern partners are thinking, and what
they will do. How do the Scandinavians, from
their rather remote northern perspective out of
the mainstream of events, look at what is hap-
pening to NATO and at their own security in a
changing world?”

SCANDINAVIA, NATO AND NORTHERN
SECURITY, by Nils Orvik, in International
Organization (Summer 1966) 380-396.

“Scandinavian debate on security has
focused on membership in NATO after 1969 . . .
The Nordic region has not had in modern times
a centralized source of authority or even one of
coordination. In major matters, the countries
within the area have moved independently, each
according to its interests and location. For a
century, Norway was almost exclusively con-
cerned with the Atlantic powers. Denmark was
obsessed with Germany and the Continent. Fin-
land was involved with Russia. Only Sweden,
sheltered by the others in the middle of the region,
was able to develop a more detached view of the
three power groups bordering on Scandinavia.
The end of World War II changed Scandinavia’s
relationship with the world . . . The new Soviet
predominance posed a threat to the power sta-

15

bility of the Nordic region. That region could
move three possible ways to counter the threat:
neutrality, joint regional defense, or Western
alignment. Once again, Scandinavia split up.
Norway and Denmark joined NATO, although
with reservations by denying allied bases on their
territory. Sweden kept its neutrality. Finland,
already deprived of their northern port, Petsamo,
entered into a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ with the
USSR in 1948. These diverse moves are part of
what has become known as ‘the Nordic balance.’
The combination of rising Soviet power and the
increased nuclear capability among the major
powers have caused the alliance alternative to
lose some of its force on the Nerdic side of the
ledger. The Scandinavians do not feel capable,
nor willing to compete. Norway and Denmark
have reinforced their long standing reservations
on foreign bases with a tightened ban on nuclear
weapons. They have also reduced the terms of
military service from 16 to 12 months. Sweden
has postponed its decision on whether it will enter
the military nuclear field. While the theory of
‘the Nordic balance’ may be useful as a political
instrument on the domestic level, in terms of
strategy it can hardly be fruitful for handling
Scandinavian-Soviet relations, because troops and
nuclear weapons must come from other NATO
countries. Also, after de Gaulle’s recent move to
leave NATO, it seems unlikely that the balance
theory would apply to possible future crisis situ—
ations or contribute to stability. The rather sud-
den interest in the ‘Nordic balance’ coincided with
the 1960-61 decision by the NATO Scandinavian
members not to receive nuclear weapons on their
territories. Yet, the Scandinavian countries have
made it clear that they do not wish to lose the
option of threatening to introduce nuclear weap-
ons. Neutralism through a nuclear-free zone or
joint regional defense would result in Soviet
domination. Security necessary for stabilization
must be sought in two centers of power: (1)
France and Germany, and (2) the US and Great
Britain. Even with organizational reforms the
attempt to maintain a NATO on the previous
model may not be sufficient for political, as
opposed to military, reasons. What Scandinavians
will have to consider is a Euro-Atlantic alterna-
tive—a tightly organized European entity which
would work together with the North American
nations.”

THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF NATO’S
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FLANKS, by

L. L. Lemnitzer, in Orbis, v.13, no.1 (Spring

1969) 100—110.

“As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
I am charged with the defense of territory that
stretches from the northern cape of Norway to

16

the eastern reaches of Turkey, a distance of 3,600
miles. When you consider the magnitude of the
area involved, it becomes readily apparent that
a discussion of ‘the flanks’ is no simple matter.
Thus, prior to examining the strategic problems
of these outlying expanses it might be wise to
define exactly what is meant by ‘the flanks’ in
terms appropriate to Allied Command Europe.
For purposes of military planning, we can say
that the flanks are composed of three general
zones: the Northern Region, the Southeastern
Region, and the Mediterranean. But even within
these sea and land masses there can be no easy
delineation of flank areas. For example, in the
Northern Region the two most critical areas of
concern are, first, the Finnmark/Troms area in
the very north of Norway and, second, the area
in the Vicinity of the Baltic Straits . . . With . . .
Ia| brief discussion of the overall threat posed
by the Warsaw Pack before us and with the
definition of the flanks of NATO Europe in mind,
we may now turn more directly to an assessment
of the specifics involved in each of the three flank
areas. The remainder of this article will focus
on each area in turn, examine the external prob-
lems occasioned by the aggressive actions of the
Warsaw Pact, and then study such internal prob-
lems as may'exist and may be considered germane
to the strategic considerations of Allied Command
Europe.”

THE WESTERN FRINGE OF SCANDINA-
VIA; GUARDING THE NORTHERN GATES
TO THE ATLANTIC—ALLIED FORCES
NORTHERN EUROPE, by Col. L. R. Heyerdahl,
in NATO’s Fifteen Nations, v.18, no.1 (February-
March 1973) 24—30.

“Denmark, Norway and NATO are mutu—
ally dependent on one another. The Northern
European Command is the side door through
which an enemy of the West could strike at the
heart of Allied Command Europe and the sea
lines of communication across the Atlantic. By
themselves, neither Norway nor Denmark have
the forces to enforce neutrality, nor to defend
their homeland should an aggressor decide to use
this entrance. It is NATO which is the padlock
that keeps this door secure. The strategic impor-
tance of the NEC to the whole of the defensive
alliance that is NATO is thus plain to see.”

3. United States Military Assistance to Scan-
dina'via,

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND MILI-
TARY ASSISTANCE FACTS. Washington,
Department of Defense, Security Assistance
Agency, April 1974.

Among the various information provided,
some of the statistical tables include, among
others, the following information: US. military

assistance program for Finland; students trained
under MAP FY 1950—1973 in Denmark and Nor-
way; U.S. Military sales deliveries to Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; U.S. Mili—
tary assistance program deliveries/expenditures
to Denmark, Finland, and Norway.
4. Limits of the Seas

LIMITS IN THE SEAS. NO. 36 —'NA-
TIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDIC-
TIONS. Washington, Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of
the Geographer, 1974. 141 p.

Provides this information for the major
countries of the world, including the following
among many others: Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden.

5. Participation in International Agreements

BE‘LGIUM-DENMARK-FINLAND-
FRANCE - FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY - ICELAND - NETHERLANDS - NOR-
WAY - PORTUGAL - SPAIN - SWEDEN -
UNITED KINGDOM: CONVENTION FOR
THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION
BY DUMPING FROM SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT,
in International Legal Materials, v. 11, no. 2
(March 1972) 262—266.

Text of convention “done at Oslo, Febru-

ary 15, 1972.”

DENMARK-FINLAND-FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY-GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC - POLAND - SWEDEN - UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: CONVEN-
TION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE BALTIC
SEA AREA, in International Legal Materials,
v.13, no.3 (May 1974) 544—545.

Text of Final .Act of convention “done at
Helsinki, March 22, 197 4.” For text of convention
and annexes see pp. 546—590.

DENMARK - FINLAND - GERMAN DEMO-
CRATIC REPUBLIC-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY - POLAND - SWEDEN - UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: CONVEN-
TION ON FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF
THE LIVING RESOURCES IN THE BALTIC
SEA AND THE BELTS, in International Legal
Materials, v.12, no.6 (November 1973) 1291—1297.

Text of convention “done at Gdansk, Sep-
tember 13, 1973.”

DENMARK - FINLAND - NORWAY -
SWEDEN: CONVENTION ON THE PROTEC-
TION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, in Interna-
tional Legal Materials, v.13, no.3 (May 1974)
591—597.

Text of convention “done at Stockholm,
February 19, 1974.”

THE-NORTH SEA, by Comdr. R. 0. Plan-
char, in United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, v.96, no.1 (January 1970) 94—96.

“The judgment of the International Court
of Justice, concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf of the North Sea between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdoms
of the Netherlands and Denmark, delivered in
the Hague on 20 February 1969, has just been
published; This judgment, covering 53 pages and
comprising 101 paragraphs can be read . . . [in
summary here].”

6. Scandinavia—Communism (See Appendixes)

F. History

THE HORIZON CONCISE HISTORY OF
SCANDINAVIA, by Ewan Butler. New York,
American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1973.
215 p.

Contents: Of Ice and Iron; Scandinavia’s

Middle Ages; Royal Union; Peasant Separatism;

Vasa and Sweden’s-Rise; Reformation and Reli-
gious Wars; Age of Absolutism; Eighteenth-Cen-
tury Enlightenment; Joining the Continental
System; .Four in Freedom. With chronology and
photos and illustrations.

l7

CHAPTER II

DENMARK, (INCLUDING GREENLAND AND THE FAEROES)
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)

 

A. An Overview

DENMARK; AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK.
Copenhagen, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Press and Information Department, 1970.
806 p.

“This book is intended to provide the
reader of English with concise and accurate
information about Denmark: its geography and
history, its institutions and occupations, its sci-
ence, art, and general culture.” Contents: The
Monarchy, Symbols, National Anthems; Land and
People; Prehistory, History, Language; The
Constitution; Government and Administration;
Foreign Affairs; Domestic Affairs; The Law;
Religion; Defense; Education; Public Finance;
Social Security; Family and Planning; Transport
and Communications; Mass Communications,
Currency, Weights, Measures; Trade and Indus—
try; Manpower and Employment; Living Stan-
dards; Science, Research, Technology; The Arts;
Sports and Games; and Bibliography.

B. The Land and the People '

DENMARK: A LAND OF PARADOXES,
by Alan Bird, in Contemporary Review, v.220,
no.1234 (March 1972) 150-154.

“The Scandinavian countries—Norway,
Sweden and Denmark—enjoy an international
reputation for the good sense, decency and ration-
ality they show in their outlook on the world
around them; and among them it is, perhaps,
Denmark which we respect the most. Norway,
currently enjoying astonishing financial prosper-
ity, is content to play a minor part in the Euro-
pean area and is happily and uncritically allied
to American policy; Sweden during the last war
maintained a position which if not exactly pro-
German was somewhat equivocal especially
towards her neighbour Norway; a biased and
profitable neutrality which continues to lay her
moral judgments in world affairs open to skepti-
cism; but Denmark, which resolutely and morally
opposed her German invaders and saved the
greater number of her Jewish citizens (no
excuses here as in Poland, Italy and elsewhere),

18

continues to declare her resistance to any form

' of tyranny in the world and more particularly in

southern Europe. The Resistance museum in
Copenhagen demonstrates as much as anything
Denmark’s gratitude to Britain for help during
the war years; and in turn we have always had
an admiration for the Danish way of life to which
we are linked by history as well as a common
taste . . . Denmark is clearly entering an era in
her history in which she will need all her gifts
as well as her enviable inheritance from the past
of sincerity and goodwill towards other nations.
She still has considerable moral authority in
Scandinavia and her voice is respected throughout
Europe. But she has not yet completely emerged
from the cocoon of isolation which has protected
her for so long; and her people have not yet
learnt to live with other nationalities in’ their
midst. Is not that introspection which we find
in the writings of Kierkegaard also evident in
paradoxical fashion, in the Danish determination
to explore publicly, ruthlessly and earnestly every
possible action and desire of the human being in
the field of sexual choice? The fairy tale, Bieder-
meir world of Hans Andersen has dominated the
Danish mentality for too long.”

DENMARK: AN ARCHEOLOGICAL
GUIDE, by Elisabeth Munksgaard. New York,
Praeger, 1971. 144 p.

“The author has divided the map of Den—
mark into twenty-two areas. For each area, the
places of archeological interest are given alpha-
betically, with brief notes on how to get there
and a short description of what is to be seen . . .
The section on each area concludes with . . . travel
information: towns which form convenient start-
ing-points for visiting a number of sites, railway
connections, addresses of Tourist Information
Offices, Coach Stations and Hotels.” With:
chronologies, and bibliography.

STATUS OF THE WORLD’S NATIONS.
Washington, Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, 1973. 20 p. (Geo-
graphic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)

The chapter on Nations, Dependencies,

Areas of Special Interest lists information on
capitals, population, and area for many countries
of the world, including Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden, among others.

C. Government and Politics

DENMARK: SOMETHING ROTTEN, in
Newsweek, v.82, no.25 (17 December 1973) 50
plus.

“Their standard of living is one of the
highest in the world—but so are their taxes, and
thus it is hardly surprising that many disen-
chanted Danes have come to the conclusion that
something is rotten in the welfare state of Den-
mark. Last week, they carried their pent-up
anger to the polls and dealt a devastating blow
not only to their Social Democratic government,
but to all the opposition parties in Parliament
as well.”

FAIRY TALE? OR WAVE OF THE
FUTURE ?, in Forbes, v.110, no.9 (1 November
1972) 49—50.

“The new Prime Minister, trade union
leader Anke Jorgensen, may be the man who
takes this small democratic country [Denmark]
beyond the welfare state and well down the road
to workers’ control of industry. And, if he does,
the trade unions of all Europe—perhaps of the
US. as well—will be watching. New Prime Min-
ister Jorgensen is an enthusiastic backer of a
startling proposal beloved of the Danish Federa-
tion of Trade Unions. It would gradually transfer
ownership and control of Danish business to the
trade unions and to the workers and away from
the capitalists and managers.”

SWINGING TO THE LEFT, in Time, v.100,
no.16 (16 October 1972) 33.

.“As Danes voted last week in favor of
joining the European Common Market, they little
guessed that they were also ensuring a change
in the country’s leadership. Jens Otto Krag, 58,
had campaigned long and arduously for a yes
vote, and now chose the moment of victory as
‘a good occasion to step down.’ In his place as
Prime Minister, the Social Democratic Party con-
firmed Krag’s personal choice: Anker Henrik
Jorgensen, 50, plump and goateed president of
the 250,000—member Unskilled Workers’ Union,
Denmark’s largest . . . A member of the Folketing
since 1964, Jorgensen has never held a Cabinet
post. But his proletarian background should calm
the worries of Danish workers and Socialists over
the EEC vote, which he supported.”

THE TO-HELL—WITH-IT VOTE, in The
Economist, v.249, no.6798 (8 December 1973)
18 plus. '

“The upsurge of Mogens Glistrup’s new
anti-tax, anti-pretty-well-everything party in

Denmark can happen—and may be happening—
in other western countries. The shambles is
worth looking at . . . The times are out of joint
in Denmark, and maybe Denmark contains a
warning for other European democracies. By'
delivering on Tuesday one of the most eye-catch-
ing protest votes ever seen in any country, the
Danish electorate has placed nobody in a position
to set right what it thinks has gone wrong. A
year after the Danes entered the common market
on which so many of their hopes had been pinned,
they find themselves in a political as well as an
economic mess.”

D. Strategic Import

AIR FORCES OF THE WORLD—PART 1:
EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS, in Interavia,
v.28, no.9 (September 1973) 1003—1007.

A summary of “outlining defence spending
and listing equipment inventories of the various
nations,” including, among others, Denmark and
Norway. See also Part 2: Europe’s Neutral and
Non-Aligned Nations, in Interavia, v.28, no.10
(October 1973) 1117—1120, which includes infor-
mation on Finland.

ON NATO’S NORTHERN FLANK, by Capt.
Erik B. J ohansen, in Military Review, v.51, no.8
(August 1971) 63—69.

“As in many countries, Denmark’s foreign
and security policy is largely determined by its
geographical situation. In the case of Denmark,
it is an off-shoot of central Europe, and it com-
mands the exits from the Baltic Sea to the Atlan-
tic Ocean; it is the cork in the Baltic bottle. The
Jutland Peninsula borders the Federal Republic
of Germany on the south, and contains 2.1 million
of Denmark’s nearly five million population.
Approximately 400 islands of various sizes con-
taining another 2.7 million people are scattered .
freely in the North Sea, the Skagerrack, the
Kattegat, The Sound, and the Baltic. Greenland
and the Faroe Islands in the Atlantic are also
parts of the country and combined have about
85,000 people. An analysis of the problems of
Denmark, with special attention to the specific
military and strategic circumstances, may con-
clude that, because of its geographic position,
Danish territory is strategically of such land,
sea, and air importance to both East and West
that there is no possibility whatsoever of remain-
ing outside a conflict . . . Danish defense strength
—that is, the strength of the standing forces—
is an important instrument in its foreign rela-
tions, even in the absence of conflict. When a
conflict arises, the situation can no longer be
described by the classical extremes of war and
peace because modern practical politics have
developed a system representing a continuous

19

numb-er of possibilities between those extremes.
This coherence should not be forgotten, and an
insight into the position and status of the armed
forces of the country in peacetime is, therefore,
of great importance.”

E. Foreign Relations

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

BELGIUM-DENMARK-FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY-IRELAND-ITALY-LUX-
EMBOURG - NETHERLANDS - EUROPEAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY-INTERNA-
TIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY - AGENCY:
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS UNDER
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, in
International Legal Materials, v.12, no.3 (May
1973) 469—536.

Text of agreement “done at Brussels, April
5, 1973.”

2. Denmark and NATO (See also Appendixes)

DENMARK AND NATO, by K. B. Andersen,
in The Atlantic Community Quarterly, v.11, no.3
(Fall 1973) 322—326.

“Denmark’s foreign policy has, for years,
been based on the facts that our country is both
Nordic and European, is situated close to the
Atlantic, and has a strong wish to participate
in the global cooperation in the United Nations
and other international organizations. To under-
stand Denmark’s policy in relation to NATO it
is necessary to have these elements in mind and
remember the historical and geographical factors
behind its security policy as well as the eco-
nomic conditions and cultural background of the
country. Denmark is relatively poor in natural
resources and situated at the crossroads between
Scandinavia and the continent of Europe, and
between the oceans and the Baltic Sea. Our
straits are the only access to the oceans from the
Baltic. This geographical situation and the lack
of raw materials make us dependent on a large
volume of foreign trade and on the maintenance
of free communications across the oceans with
our trading partners in other continents. Our
history, culture, traditions and our basic way of
thinking tend to bind us closely to the Western
world. All these factors predispose Denmark to
seek her security in cooperation with the other
Western countries.”

(LI)—DENMARK: THE CORK IN THE
BALTIC BATTLE, by Maj. Robert L. Nesbitt.
Maxwell Air Force Base, A1a., Air Command and
Staff College, 1973. 51 p. (N458d Research
Study.) .

“Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation was established a great deal of change has
transpired in European Relations. This change
has been possible because of the basic stability

20'

provided by nuclear bipolarity between the US
and USSR. This study examines some of those
changes and the effects they are having on Den-
mark, a NATO ally. Particular attention is paid
to the effects of membership in the Common
Market, SALT I, and Ostpolitik. From this exam-
ination the conclusion is that Europe has changed
from a system dominated by military issues to
one in which economic matters are paramount.
In such a system NATO no longer appears to
have a viable role.”

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DANISH
STRATEGY.‘ Die Entwicklung der danischen

' Strategie, by M. L. Lauesen, in Wehrkunde, v.16

(September 1967) 472—476. In German.

“Traces the history of Danish strategy
since 1864. Lauesen considers the reasons which
caused Denmark to join NATO, the nation’s role
in NATO defense, its interest in preserving a
measure of independence from West German
security interests.”

WHY DENMARK SHOULD STAY IN
NATO, by Per Haekkerup, in The Atlantic Com-
munity Quarterly, v.6, no.3 (.Fall 1968) 347—351.

Reprinted from the NATO Letter, April
1968.—“There are actually people in the world,
says the former Danish Foreign Minister . . . ,
who ask if NATO was ever necessary. He answers
that it was necessary in 1947, 1948 and 1949, it
brought security to Western Europe, it still pro-
vides security and it has already overcome the
blow of France’s withdrawal from the integrated
armed forces. Dealing specifically with Den-
mark’s relation with NATO, he states that the
only feasible management of his country’s secu-
rity is steadfast adherence to NATO.”

3. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf

DENMARK-UNITED KINGDOM: AGREE-
MENT ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF, in International Legal
Materials, v.11, no.4 (July 1972) 723—725.

Text of agreement “done at London, No-
vember 25, 1971.”

NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY-DEN-
MARK - THE NETHERLANDS, P R O T O C O L
SIGNED AT COPENHAGEN JANUARY 28,
1971, in American Journal of International Law,
v.65, no.5 (October 1971) 901—914. ,

“The Federal Republic of Germany, the
Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands have, on the basis of the judgment
of the International Court of Justice of 20 Febru-
ary 1969, conducted tripartite negotiations on the
delimitation of the continental shelf under the
North Sea. In those negotiations the two treaties
signed ‘today’ were drawn up, viz: (a) the Treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and

the Kingdom of Denmark relating to the Delimi-
tation of the Continental Shelf under the North
Sea, (b) the Treaty between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
relating to the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf under the North Sea.”

F. Economic Aspects

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

BELGIUM - CANADA - DENMARK -
FRANCE - FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY - IRELAND - ITALY-JAPAN-LUXEM-
‘BOURG- NETHERLANDS - NORWAY- UNITED
KINGDOM-UNITED STATES: COMMUNIQUE
ON THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFER-
ENCE [FEBRUARY 13, 1974], in International
Legal Materials, v.13, no.2 (March 1974) 462—464.

Text of the communique.

DENMARK, ICELAND, in E.I.U. Quarterly
Economic Review, no.3 (1973) 14 p.

An analysis of current economic trends,
including accompanying information on the polit-
ical scene. With statistical tables.

DENMARK, ICELAND, in E.I.U. Quarterly
Economic Review, (Annual Supplement 1973)
30 p.

This Annual Supplement provides basic
economic information. Contents for Denmark:
Government and General; Population and Em-
ployment; Exchange Rates; National Accounts;
Agriculture and Fishing; Mining, Fuel, and
Power; Manufacturing Industry; Transport and
Communications; Finance; Foreign Trade and
Payments; and Trade and Exchange Regulations.
Contents for Iceland: Government and General;
Exchange Rates; Population, Employment, and
National Accounts; Production and Transport;
Finance; Foreign Trade and Payments; and
Bibliography.

HOW A FOREIGN WORKER FARES IN
DENMARK, in Atlas, v.20, no.4 (April 1971)
28-29.

Translated from N.B.!, Copenhagen . . .
“In nearly every large city in Western Europe,
the wretched treatment of foreign laborers has
become, to one degree or another, a scandal. For-
eigners seeking work in more highly developed
nations are treated like cattle. Denmark’s policies
are no more ruthless than those elsewhere, but
in socialized Scandinavia, the inequities seem
greater . . . N.B. !, an experimental newsweekly
which closed shortly after this article was pub-
lished, reports on conditions in late 1970.”

LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMES-
TIC OPERATIONS, by Lawrence J. Eckstron.
rev. 3rd ed. New York, Clark Boordman Co.,
Ltd., 1973. 2 v.

Provides pertinent information also for

operations in the following foreign countries,
among others: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden.

STERLING STUDIES. LONG-HAUL AIR-
CRAFT NEEDS, by Donald E. .F-ink, in Aviation
Week & Space Technology, v.95, no.1 (5 July
1971) 28—30.

“Copenhagen-Sterling Airways, Europe’s
largest charter carrier, is conducting equipment
evaluations to determine what aircraft it will
need to exploit the new long-haul charter market
it hopes to develop over the next five to ten years.
Selection of new aircraft to supplement its pres-
ent basic fleet of Aerospatiale Caravelles probably
will be made this fall. At the other end of the
range spectrum, Sterling also has begun organiz-
ing a fleet of helicopters and light business twins
for a move into the air taxi market. If this ser-
vice develops according to present projections, the
carrier probably will build a future taxi fleet
using one of the new twin-turbofan utility trans-
ports now under development in Europe.”

2. Denmark and the European Economic

Community

THE DANISH AND" NORWEGIAN APPLI-
CATIONS, by T. C. Archer, in The World Today,
v.27, no.10 (October 1971) 448—456.

“Although much of the discussion about
the proposed enlargement of the European Com-
munities has been focused on the case of the
United Kingdom, the Danish and Norwegian
applications for membership are not without
interest for observers of the West European
scene. The treatment of the two Scandinavian
countries by their larger British, French and
German neighbours will reflect the attitude of
the planned new Community not only towards
to the smaller ‘non-Continental’ States but also
to the problems of those groups living on the
periphery outside the industrial Golden Triangle
of Western Europe. For the Danes and Norwe-
gians, their present applications represent an

. important step on the long and uncertain post-war

road towards closer West European co-operation.
Their activities in this area have mostly been
dominated by the relative possibilities open to
them in their relationships with three groups—
the other Nordic countries, the Continental ‘Six,’
and the other West European States, the most
important of which is the United Kingdom. The
present negotiations for enlargement of the Com-
munity seem to represent the prospect of a new
relationship with the Six (to what extent it is an
improved relationship is a matter for discussion),
and a continued mutually beneficial trade part-
nership with Britain, but also the possibility of
a division within the Nordic trading area.”
DENMARK AND THE COMMON MARKET

21

—THE DELIGHTED MEMBER, by Alan Bird,
in Contemporary Review, v.223, no.1291 (August
1973) 69—71.

“Denmark’s entry into the Common Market
was by no means certain. Her own history since
the seventeenth century has been increasingly
isolationist . . . But, while Denmark’s interest in
self-preservation is strong in the determination
of her foreign and domestic policies, it would be
unjust to deny that Denmark has in the years
since the 1939—1945 war displayed an altruism
and public idealism that have put her in the ranks
of what might be called the ‘civic-minded’ Euro-
pean states . . . Having chosen to join, what
rights has Denmark in the organisation of the
European Community and what can she be
expected to contribute to its wellbeing and
development ?”

NORWAY’S ‘NO’ AND DEN MARK’S ‘YES,’
by T. C. Archer, in The World Today, v.28, no.11
(November 1972) 467—470.

“The Norwegian rejection of membership
of the European Community in the referendum
of 24-25 September led to the resignation of the
Labour Government soon afterwards. The Danish
vote a week later gave a large majority in favour
of EEC membership, but was also followed by
the surprise retirement of the Danish Prime
Minister, Mr. King. Norway’s referendum, in
accordance with the Constitution, was merely
consultative and would have needed the intro-
duction of EEG legislation in the parliament
(Storting) where a three-quarters majority would
have had to pass it. Denmark’s Constitution
requires laws giving decision-making powers to
international organizations either to be endorsed
by a five-sixths majority in the parliament
(Folketing) or to have a straight parliamentary
majority backed up by a positive referendum
result . . . Norway now finds herself outside the
EEC and, unlike Sweden, without even a trade
agreement. Denmark, on the other hand, has
made sure of her place within the Community,
where she could play an important role as a
bridge between Scandinavia and the Continent.”

3. Foreign Trade

DENMARK 'AND ASIA, ‘in Far Eastern
Economic Review, v.75, no.11 (11 March 1972)
23—47.

A special section dealing with Danish
export, technology and industry and including the
following articles: Foreign Policy—An Ear to
the East Wind; Exports of Technology—Turnkey
to International Prosperity; Foreign Investment
and Joint Ventures—4Setting Up Shop in the Far
East; Aid—Emphasis on Multilateral Projects;
EEC—Worth the Price; Burma—Once Bitter;
Cambodia—Active Entrepreneurs; Ceylon—Prac-

22

tical Samaritan; Hongkong—Machinery to the
Fore; India—The Quiet Revolutionary; Indonesia
—Successful Joint Ventures; Japan—Conceptual
Identity?; Maylasia—A Need for Salesmanship;
New Zealand—Northerners Together; Singapore
—Greater Diversity; South Korea—Trading Milk
for Socks; and Taiwan—Definitely Not Enemies.

DENMARK IN ASIA, in Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, v.67, no.16 (16 April 1970) 23—90.

The following collection of articles deals
with the various aspects of “Denmark in Asia”:
Towards Prosperity Through Trade; Ancient
Monarchy Now a Leader; Trade—The Field Is
Growing; Industry—A Lead Built on Ideas; Ship-
ping—Changing with the Times; Danish Design
—A Proud Tradition; Hot Lines a Century Ago;
Seven Decades of Trade; Building Systems for
Export; Reports from the Region (Bangkok—
Oldest Port of Call; Karachi—No Problems;
Kuala Lumpur—Learning from Denmark; Manila
—Linking Up with Europe; New Delhi—Ready
Market in India; Singapore—Bigger Deals to
Come; Taipei—Danes Well Received; Tokyo—
Trade in Japan’s Favour; Hongkong—Danish
Gold).

DENMARK IN ASIA, in Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, v.72, no.17 (24 April 1971) 25—54.

This special section deals with trade and
relations as surveyed in the following articles:
Denmark Enters the Seventies; Housing Asia in
Danish; Financing Danish Foreign Trade; Invest-
ing in the Future; Food—A Maturing Market;
From Ploughs to Pints; Denmark and the Region
(Bangkok—Aid the Balance; Bombay—Effi—
ciency Block; Colombo—Help from the Danes;
Djakarta—Freudulent Image; Hongkong—Well
Hatched; Kuala Lumpur—Viking Tenacity; Seoul
—Lends Enchantment; Taipei—Licit Liaison;
and Tokyo—Flavour of Romance).

DENMARK; OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS.
Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1972. 73 p.

Annual economic review of Denmark.
Balance-of—Payments trends and policy attitudes;
Nature and origin of the external imbalance; The
external adjustment problem; Prospects and P01-
icy Issues; The Danish export performance. With
tables and diagrams.

G. Sociological Aspects

CRIME IN DENMARK—A STATISTICAL
HISTORY, by K. O. Christiansen and S. G. Jen-
sen, in Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and
Police Science, no.1, v.63 (March 1972) 82—92.

The article is “devoted to a survey of crime

, in Denmark based on 1) statistics of Sanctions,

2) police statistics, 3) prison statistics and 4) the
extent of criminality within the Danish popula-

tion. Finally, . . . [the authors] offer a few
summarizing observations on the trend of crime
in Denmark.”

QUANDARY OF AFFLUENCE; THE
DANISH APPLECART, by Brian Patrick
McGuire, in The Nation, (23 February 1974) 241—
244.

“Denmark’s expansion of the 1960s, on
both personal and state levels, after so many dull
and limited years, has ended on the brink of dis-
illusionment and social chaos. For the first time
since the crises of the early 1920s, Denmark might
see its democratic system challenged by a right-
wing coalition, dedicated to ‘cleaning up’ the
economy and perhaps using left-wing machina-

tions as an excuse. Polarization is the word of

the day, as in America in the late 1960s. The
split means that Denmark may develop along the
line of British and French society, where the
distance between middle and working classes and
the bitterness between them have increased. A
less upwardly mobile society and a decline in the
standard of living could have consequences that
even the most astute social researchers cannot
anticipate. Already some facets of the welfare
state, such as free admittance to universities
regardless of high school—are being discarded.
At the same time, the slowdown of the 197 Os will
probably bring a more fruitful debate about the
quality of life—near democracy, as it is called
here—and growing concern with community pol-
itics. Now that the big visions have been crushed,
many Danes realize that they still live in a basic-
ally good society, that smallness and centraliza-
tion give the individual and the group great
possibilities to assert themselves in the media,
and that some social experiments will be able to
continue on a limited level.”

H. History

DENMARK, by W. Glyn Jones. New York,
Praeger, 1970. 256 p.
r “A . . . glance at the history and present
politics of Denmark . . . Beginning with the age
of the Vikings in 850, this book recounts the
history of Denmark, the part it played as a major
European power from the fourteenth century
until the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814, the
rise of liberalism and reform, and the nation’s
transformation into the welfare state of 1970.”
With bibliography. Four appendixes consist of
brief summaries on social legislation, the Faroe
Islands, Greenland, and the former .West Indies.
A SHORT HISTORY OF DENMARK, by
Stewart Oakley. New York, Praeger, 1972. 269 p.
“Account of the Danish society and land—
a country seldom studied by English-speaking

historians. More than four-fifths of the work is
devoted to the period from earliest times to World
War I. Contains plates, maps, tables and a com-
prehensive bibliography of English and Danish
sources.” ,

THE STORY OF DENMARK, by Stewart
Oakley. New York, Praeger, 1972. 269 p.

“A survey of Danish history from the
migrations of the earliest inhabitants, through
the Viking Period and the'medieval kings, ending
with a description of Denmark’s place in the
modern world of the 19703.” With bibliography.

I. Greenland

GREENLAND’S POLICY IN THE SEVEN-
TIES, by Claus Bosnemann, in Arctic, v.26, no.4
(December 1973) 334—335.

“The year 1971 marked the beginning of
an epoch in Greenland’s policy. The colonial
status of the island had been abolished a couple
of decades before, and efforts had been initiated
to introduce comprehensive reforms. The goal to
be achieved was a rapid improvement of the pop-
ulation’s standard of living, and during the fol-
lowing years the political authorities in Denmark
and Greenland were generally agreed on the
course of development, which was supported by
substantial contributions of Danish capital and
manpower . . . The development of Greenland’s
policy during the coming years will be exciting.
Quite a few Greenlanders are opposed to the
outspokenness of the new politicians and find
their views too radical. It is now a question of
whether the young politicians can manage to
stick together and whether they will be able to
win the sympathy of the general public in Green-
land for their views before the election of the
Provincial Council in 1973.”

J. The Faeroes

THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, 1971. 45th ed. London,
Oxford University Press, 1973. 536 p. (Pub-
lished for The Royal Institute of International
Affairs.)

Provides information, among many others,
for Iceland and The Faeroes.

THE .FAEROES, ISLES OF MAYBE, by
Ernle Bradford, in National Geographic, v.138,
no.3 (September 1970) 410—442.

Denmark’s Faeroe Islands are made up of
18 islands which are self—governing. The author
in text and with numerous color photos provides
a survey of the land and the people, including
agriculture, fishing, and the other pursuits of life
of these Danish citizens whose ancestors were
Norwegians.

23

CHAPTER III

FINLAND
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)

 

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

AIR FORCES OF THE WORLD—PART 1:
EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS, in Interavia,
v.28, no.9 (September 1973) 1003—1007.

A summary of “outlining defence spending
and listing equipment inventories of the various
nations,” including, among others, Denmark and
Norway. See also Part 2: Europe’s Neutral and
Non-Aligned Nations, in Interavia, v.28, no.10
(October 1973) 1117—1120, which includes infor-
mation on Finland.

STATUS OF THE WORLD’S NATIONS.
Washington, Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, 1973. 20 p. (Geo-
graphic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)

The chapter on Nations, Dependencies,
Areas of Special Interests lists information on
capitals, population, and area for many countries
of the world, including Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden, among others.

B. An Overview

AREA HANDBOOK FOR FINLAND, by
Theodore L. Stoddard and others. Washington,
Department of the Army, 1972. 259 p. (DA
PAM 550—167.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Polit-
ical Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Secu-
rity; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and
Tables.

THE FINNISH POLITICAL SYSTEM, by
J aakko Nousiainen. Cambridge, Harvard Univer—
sity Press, 1971. 454 p.

“A study of the nation’s society, govern-
ment, external factors, and national economy . . .
[There are] chapters on foreign policy, local ad—
ministration, and judiciary.” With bibliography.

STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF FINLAND.
Helsinki, Central Statistical Office, 1971. 548 p.
In Finnish and English.

Contains numerous statistical tables.

C. Government and Politics

1. Miscellaneous
SWINGING HELSINKI, in The Economist,
v.242, no.6704 (26 February 1972) 37—38.

24

“There is much idiosyncrasy in the polit-
ical life of Finland, where a minority Social Dem-
ocratic government was formed this week after
the failure of lengthy efforts to form a new
coalition. As in the neighbouring Scandinavian
countries, the Social Democratic party is the
largest in Finland, but it does not loom so large
in Helsinki as in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen.
Yet this is not the consequence of the challenge
of a massive and monolithic Communist party
. . . Constitutionally, Mr. Kekkonen has primary
authority in foreign policy. And politically he
provides the safety net that Finland needs every
time its squabbling parties fail to form a work-
able coalition. A caretaker cabinet, widely known
as a ‘president’s ministry,’ then holds the ring
while the president struggles to get the parties
back in line. Over the past two years, with a
caretaker regime operating for four months in
1970 and another one appointed last October,
Finland has seemed to oscillate between the
French Fourth Republic’s style of multi-party
minuets and the Fifth Republic’s strong personal
rule.”

2. President. Kekkonen

FINLAND—PRESIDENTIAL PRICE TAG,
in The Economist, v.247, no.6750 (13 January
1973) 31.

“Mr. Urho Kekkonen, who is now 72 and
has already been Finland’s president for nearly
17 years, went on television on Tuesday to con-
firm that, when his third six-year term ends in
March, 1974, he will be willing to stay in office
for a further four years—provided that he does
not have to fight an election to do so. A good
many Finns feel uneasy about all this. The presi-
dent seems very fit, and may well remain vigorous
until 1978. But it is Finland’s constitution, not
his, that the worriers are worrying about. Some
exceptional legislation is needed to accommodate
Mr. Kekkonen’s plans.”

PRESIDENT KEKKONEN. OF FINLAND
VISITS THE UNITED STATES, in The Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, v.68, no.1625 (17 August
1970) 194—197.

“President Urho Kekkonen of the Republic

of Finland visited the United States July 23-27.
He met with President Nixon, Secretary [of
State] Rogers, and other US. officials at Wash-
ington July 23-24 . . . [Included here] are remarks
by President Nixon and President Kekkonen at a
welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the
White House on July 23 and their exchange of
toasts at a dinner at the White House that
evening.”
3. Communism and Finnish Politics
COMMUNISTS CAN BE CHRISTIAN;
CHRISTIANS, COMMUNIST—IN FINLAND,
by W. Seward Salisbury, in The Christian Cen-
tury, v.87, no.50 (16 December 1970) 1519—1520.

“In Finland Christianity and communism
stand side by side as important strands in the
social fabric. Well executed studies produced by
Finnish social scientists show how communism
and religion function within the social milieu.
Since World War II from 16.6 per cent to 23.4
per cent of the vote in national Finnish elections
has been cast for the Communist ticket. Ninety-
two per cent of the Finnish people are members
of the Evangelical Lutheran (State) Church, so
it is obvious that a Finn can be a political com-
munist and at the same time a practicing Christ-
ian, seeing nothing wrong or inconsistent in his
dual allegiance. This seemingly ambivalent stand
cannot be dismissed by the suggestion that those
who take it are neither good communists nor good
Christians. Numerous examples belie such a con-
clusion. Take, for instance, Martti Liinia, a Com-
munist party member in the parliament who is at
the same time a lay leader in the Evangelical
Lutheran Church and a member of a small par-
liamentary group that meets regularly for Bible
study and meditation.” 4

COMMUNISTS IN THE FINNISH DIET,
by Taisto Sinisalo, in World Marxist Review, v.15,
no.5 (May 1972) 30—38.

“The parliamentary system in our country
goes back to the days of the revolutionary up-
heavals of 1905-1906 in Russia, of which Finland
was then a part. Until then more than 70 per cent
of the Finns had no civil rights, for the old Diet,
elected by four electoral bodies, was a legislature
of the estates of the realm. When universal suf-
frage was proclaimed in 1906, however, the
electorate increased from the previous 125,000
to 1,125,000, with Finland becoming the first
European country to introduce woman suffrage. . .
The present form of government was instituted
in 1918, after the workers’ defeat in the civil war.
Legislative and executive power, and the judici-
ary, have been separated. The structure of the
Diet is almost the same as in Tsarist times, with
the President vested with important powers. . .
The present challenge faced by the Communist

Party is to advance a genuinely Left alternative
envisaging satisfaction of all workers’ demands,
animating the peace policy and expanding friendly
relations with the Soviet Union. For this, increas-
ing importance attaches to building up a mass
movement of different classes and strata. The
political instability and the deepening political
crisis set higher demands on the Finnish Com-
munists’ activity in the parliament.”

FINNISH COMMUNISM AND ELECTORAL
POLITICS, by John H. Hodgson, in Problems of
Communism, v.23, (J anuary—February 1974)
34—35.

“In 1916, Lenin departed from his general
advocacy of violent revolution and suggested that
socialism might be achieved peacefully in a small
country sharing a common frontier with a large
country that has already undergone the transfor-
mation from capitalism to socialism. Irrespective
of whether Lenin had Finland in mind, this coun-
try seems to fit his explicit and implicit criteria.
Not only does Finland share an 800—mi1e border
with the Soviet Union, but it also boasts a strong
labor movement. Moreover, a majority of the
members of the Finnish Communist Party (Suo-
men Kommunistinen Puolue—SKP) appear to
accept the notion of a transition to socialism via
the ballot box. Thus, Finland provides an interest-
ing and important case study of the possibilities
and problems facing a Communist party com-
mitted to a ‘peaceful path’ to socialism. Operating
through the Communist—dominated Finnish Peo-
ple’s Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demo-
kraattinen Liitto—SKDL) , the SKP has achieved
considerable electoral success, polling more than
20 percent of the popular vote in seven of the
nine postwar Finnish national elections. This per-
formance, surpassed in the West only by the
French and Italian Communist parties. . ., has
led one noted Western scholar to classify Finland
and Italy among the world’s ‘unstable democra-
cies.’ Another study has included the SKP among
the 13 ‘most influential’ of the nonruling Com-
munist parties committed to the ‘peaceful path.’
Indeed, the SKDL shares with the Social Demo-
cratic Party and the Center (Agrarian) Party
the distinction of having dominated the Finnish
electoral scene since World War II, although Fin-
nish politics in the postwar period have been
characterized by competition between a minimum
of seven parties. In one election (that of 1958),
the League emerged with a plurality of seats, but
the Social Democrats have proved the most con-
sistent vote-getters, winning a plurality of seats
in six elections. The Center Party captured the
most seats in two others (1948 and 1962). The
dominance of these three parties has been reflec-
ted in the composition of the Finnish Cabinet. A

25

coalition including all three ruled during two
periods: 1944—48 and 1966—1970. In the 1950’s,
the Agrarians exercised prime influence in the
government, and the Social Democrats have
enjoyed the upper hand thus far in the 1970’s.”

THE .F-INNISH COMMUNIST PARTY, by

John H. Hodgson, in Slavic Review, v.29, no.1
' (March 1970) 70—85.

“Interest in Finnishcommunism has been
high in recent years and seems to be, at least in
part, a reflection of two facts. First, the Finnish
party, like the Communist parties of Italy and
France, has been able to poll at least 20 percent
of the popular vote in parliamentary elections.
Second, the father of Finnish communism, Otto
Kuusinen, was from 1957 until his death in 1964
a member of the Secretariat and Presidium
(Politburo) of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The
reader should, however, keep in mind that Finnish
communism has a long and dramatic history
dating back to the formation of the party in 1918.
This history falls logically into three periods:
1918—30, when the party was in theory legal but
in practice illegal; 1930—44, when the party was
formally proscribed; and 1944 to the present, a
period during which the party has been able to
act in the open as a registered, legal organization.”

D. Foreign Policy

1. Miscellaneous Aspects
AUSTRIA - BELGIUM — FEDERAL REPUB -
LIC OF- GERMANY - FINLAND - FRANCE —
GREECE - IRELAND - ITALY - LIECHTEN -
STEIN - LUXEMBOURG - MONACO - NETH -
ERLANDS - NORWAY - PORTUGAL - SPAIN —
SWEDEN - SWITZERLAND-TURKEY- UNITED
KINGDOM-YUGOSLAVIA: CONVENTION ON
THE GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS, in
International Legal Materials, v.13, no.2 (March
1974) 268—341.
Text of the convention “done at Munich,
October 5, 1973.”
FINNISH NEUTRALITY, by Max J akobson.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 116 p.
A study of Finnish foreign policy since the
Second World War. Contents: The Rebellious
Pawn; Facts of Power—1917—1944; 1948; Neu-
trality—Finnish Style; The Best of Both Worlds;
A Most-Favoured Nation; From Honolulu to
Novosibirsk; The Finnish Missile Gap; The Scan—
dinavian Balance; Keeping the Peace; and No
Cause for Pity.
NEUTRALITY WITH A TILT, in Time,
(27 July 1970) 19—20.
“Though it sounds like a rural rail route,
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line is in fact the name
of the foreign policy that has guided Finland since

26

World War II: seeking accommodation with its
mighty eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union. In
pursuit of this policy, Finnish President Urho
Kaleva Kekkonen, 69, flew to Moscow last week
for the 16th time since he became Finland’s head
of state in 1956. This week, in keeping with his
country’s enduring but slightly off-balance neu-
trality, he will make his second state visit to the
US. to discuss such matters as a proposed Euro-
pean security conference.”
2. Finnish-Soviet Relations

FINLANDIZATION IS NOT A CURSE
WORD, by Anne .Fried, in Worldview, v.16, no.1
(January 1973) 17—21.

“The story of one nation’s determined pur-
suit of her own way in something short of the
best of all possible worlds. . . In almost all the
literature about the future of Europe, whether
hopeful or doom-laden, it is assumed that a
Europe of real independence or of genuine part-
nership with other nations is not possible. Europe,
we are told, can only be shaped by the struggle
between the two superpowers. More particularly,
wherever the US. withdraws we can be sure the
USSR will move in, thus creating the unhappy
situation which the international press has come
to describe as Finlandization. But what does Fin-
landization mean? What, really, does it have to
do with Finland? Anyone familiar with Finnish
character and political history suspects that talk
about Finlandization reflects either a gross mis-
understanding of a country’s determination to
maintain independence, neutrality and, if possible,
peace in Europe, or deliberate anti-Soviet propa-
ganda. Such propaganda is common abroad as
well as in certain political circles in Finland. To
answer a slogan with a slogan, one may challenge
talk about Finlandization with the title of the
first chapter of Max Jakobson’s book ‘.Finnish
Neutrality: The Rebellious Pawn.’ . . . While
Finlandization seems to Russia a dangerous
example, it serves as a desirable model to East
European states. To a Western diplomat I ques-
tioned about it, Finlandization, incorrectly used,
implied a process of progressive deterioration in
the degree of independence and autonomous choice
exercised by Finland due to Soviet pressure. Cor-
rect use of the word would underscore the great
strides Finland has made in the field of construc-
tive neutrality, within the structure of the north-
ern balance.”

FINLAND’S POLITICS IN .MOSCOW’S
SHADOW, by Andreas Oplatka, in Swiss Review
of World Affairs, v.23, no.1 (April 1973) 4—7.

“Consideration for the uncommonly hyper-
sensitive neighbor to the East is a leitmotif of
Finnish policy. This April marks the 25th anni-
versary of the signing of a twice-renewed ‘treaty

of friendship and mutual defense’ between Fin-
land and the Soviet Union, and shortly before
these lines were written the Finnish press carried
unconfirmed reports that the Kremlin’s troika of
leaders would pay an official visit to Helsinki
to mark the occasion. The pact, conclude-d in 1948,
was suspected at first of serving Stalin’s interest
in muzzling Finland, but has unquestionably also
served Finnish interests in the years gone by.
One can hardly gainsay the official Helsinki posi-
tion that the pact, and Moscow’s confidence in
Helsinki created by strict adherence to it, has
given the country a period of undisrupted devel-
opment. The fact that the Soviet Union disman-
tled its naval base at the gateway to the Finnish
capital in 1955 and returned it to Finnish sover-
eignty, is still one of the more impressive
examples to which anyonemust point in trying to
make out a case for the Kremlin’s willingness to
make concessions. But the pact with the Soviet
Union involves two difficult problem areas for
Finland.”

(*)—SECURITY IN FINNISH: FINLAND
AND THE SOVIET UNION. SICHERHEIT
AUF FINNISCH: FINLAND UND DIE SOW—
JETUNIAN, by Nils Orvik Stuttgart, Seewald,
1972. 210 p. In German.

“A . . . study of the interaction of Finland’s
neutrality and its Treaty of Friendship and Coop-
eration with the Soviet Union, which details the
effects on Finland’s security and defense, eco-
nomic relations and domestic politics as well as
the implications for Scandinavia and other Euro-
pean countries.”

WHAT FINLANDISATION MEANS, in
The Economist, v.248, no.6780 (4 August 1973)
15—16.

“Other Europeans will have only them-
selves to blame if they get into the position that
fate has thrust upon the Finns . . . the term
‘finlandisation’ is misleading and unfair to Fin-
land, in an important respect. Finland has had
little choice. Geography and history have so boxed
it in that what is remarkable about it is its sur-
vival in freedom, not its inhibitions. If other west
European countries allow themselves to be ‘fin-
landised,’ it will be by their own choice. If they
choose to squander their strength and squabble
away their cohesion, they may well sink one after
another into a state of such feebleness that each
in turn could be leant on and manipulated by the
Soviet Union. In these circumstances, one can
imagine that Russia would be quite happy to see
them retain their democratic institutions and
would refrain from such crude tactics as making
territorial demands. Its priority demands would
be the kind it makes on Finland: suppression of
direct criticisms of Soviet policies and actions,

discouragement of escapers, ‘trustful cooperation’
and all that, including the making of big deals
designed to give Russia more economic leverage.
The reduction of western Europe to such a condi-
tion would make it much easier for the Soviet
rulers to hold down their own empire—and then,
of course, in due time they would be tempted to
expand it.”

E. Economic Aspects

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

FINLAND, in E.I.U. Quarterly Economic
Review, no.4 (1973) 20p.

An analysis of. current economic trends,
including accompanying information on foreign
trade and payments. With statistical tables.

FINLAND, in E.I.U. Quarterly Economc
Review, (Annual Supplement 1973) 18 p.

This Annual Supplement provides basic
economic information. Contents: Constitution
and Government; Foreign Relations; Area and
Population; Employment; Exchange Rates;
National Accounts; Agriculture and Forestry;
Mining; Fuel and Power; Manufaéturing Indus—
try; Transport and Communications; Construc-
tion of Buildings; Finance; Foreign Trade and
Payments; Trade and Exchange Regulations; and
Bibliography.

.FINLAND’S FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIA-
BILITIES, by Markus Fogelholm, in UNITAS
Economic Review, Finland, v.45, no.1 (1973)
8—19.

“During the past two years the most sig-
nificant development affecting Finland’s foreign
assets and liabilities was the substantial inflow of
long-term loan capital. In 1971, the import of
capital was more the result of tightness on the
domestic financial market, but in 1972 capital
flowed into the country because the exceptionally
easy international capital market made it possible
to obtain loans on rather favourable terms. On
the other hand, the easiness of the Finnish money
market last year reflected the marked increase
in short-term net foreign assets. This latter fea-
ture meant that the growth in the net foreign
debt last year was considerably less than in 1971.
The inflow of long-term capital increased foreign
exchange reserves and thus strengthened Fin-
land’s external liquidity.”

FINLAND’S FORMULA FOR DEFLATING
INFLATION, in Nation’s Business, v.58, no.8
(August 1970) 36—38.

The Finns asked—and received—coopera-
tion from labour unions and business in a struggle
to stabilize prices, says a prominent economist. . .
How do you fight persistent inflation? What are
the roles of business and labor in the battle? What
about government fiscal policy? These and other

27

important questions are answered in the following
.interview .by a NATION’S BUSINESS editor
with Dr. Klaus Waris, a top authority on causes
and effects of inflation. . . Inflation in Finland,
which averaged 5 per cent for years and reached
an 8.4 per cent rate in 1968, apparently has been
tamed. It was kept to 2.4 per cent last year.
Meantime, the Finmark, four years ago a weak
currency, is now one of the world’s strongest.
Dr. Waris was a central figure in both achieve-
.ments.”

FINLAND’S SUMMER OF DISCONTENT,
by Desmon Smith, in The Nation, (9 October
1972) 305—308.

“For all its old-fashioned virtues, the coun-
try seems gripped by a bad case of discontent.
Going to Helsinki from Copenhagen is like leaving
an amusement park and arriving at a seminar.
By any measure Finland ought to be a vigorous
and stable society. The standard of living has
been steadily rising in the last decade; the
nation’s 4.6 million people are as energetic as any
in the world. The country has no ethnic troubles;
92 per cent speak Finnish, about 7 per cent speak
Swedish, and there are no more than a few thou-
sand Lapps. In spite of the fact that every fifth
voter in Finland supported the Communist Party
in the last election, there is not the remotest
prospect of a Communist take-over. What, then,
has brought about the quibble and doubt? . . . To
put it succinctly, Finland is in a financial bind.”

THE FINNISH ECONOMY SHROUDED
IN UNCERTAINTY, by Mika Tiivola, in
UNITAS Economic Review, Finland, v.45, no.1
(1973) 3—7.

“Despite many uncertainty factors 1972
may best be described as an economic turning
point. The recession which began at the end of
1970 proved to be of relatively short duration
and the international upswing is, via exports,
accelerating Finland’s economic activity also.
Regrettably, however, certain internal factors
and disputes have so far checked the strength-
ening of the upswing and the actual boom still
appears to lie somewhere in the future. It would
appear extremely difficult for Finland to get rid
of economic disequilibrium phenomena. Last year
the most disturbing of these was the rapid
advance of inflation . . . Another sign of the
lack of equilibrium in the Finnish economy is
the continuous and extensive unemployment . . .
In the present situation it is of prime importance
to concentrate on achieving a moderate incomes
policy solution. In this connection it should once
again be emphasised that only wage increases
within the bounds of the rise in productivity
would motivate the continuation of price controls.
It cannot be sensible to tie prices if at the same

28

time wages increase by more than ten per cent
as during the past two years. 1972 showed clearly
that such a simple economic reality should be
borne in mind when drawing up economic policy.”

ICE-BUCKET TEMPEST, in Time, v.99,
no.3 (17 January 1972) 28.

“In Finland, Cabinet-making is almost a
folk art, primarily because there are too many
parties . . . Despite the frequent Cabinet changes,
Finland has a remarkable record of political sta-
bility . . . While it must give guarded political
glances to the East, economically Finland looks
to the West. The country has a forest-based
economy that suffered a letdown after the boom
of 1968—70 and is now faced with inflation, rising
unemployment, a drop in G.N.P. growth from
8% to 1% in 1971, and a trade gap that last
year topped $250 million. The country is counting
heavily on the favorable outcome of free-trade
agreements now being hammered out with the
Common Market—particularly important when
Britain, Finland’s most important trading part-
ner, joins the ECC.”

LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMES-
TIC OPERATIONS, by Lawrence J. Eckstron.
rev. 3rd ed. New York, Clark Boordman Co., 3
Ltd., 1973. 2 v.

Provides pertinent information also for
operations in the following foreign countries,
among others: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden.

2. Finland and the European Economic

Community

FINLAND AND CMEA, by Y. Zhuravlev,
in New Times (Moscow), no.51 (December 1973)
11.

“Last spring Finland concluded an agree-
ment with the CMEA on co-Operation in diverse
fields of the economy, science and technology,
the first capitalist country to do so. In signing
the agreement 'the parties proceeded from the
conviction that its realization, based on interna-
tional division of labour, would promote general
economic progress and strengthen peace.”

FINLAND, COMECON, AND THE EEC,
by .F. Singleton, in World Today, v.30, no.2 (Feb-
ruary 1974) 64—72. .

“Finland has been trying to find a modus
vivendi with the new Europe, and in the process
Finlandization is changing its meaning. Finland
was the last Efta country to sign a treaty regu-
lating her trade with the EEC. In July 1972,
faced with the prospect that her second most
important trading partner, Britain, was about
to join the Common Market, she initialled a
free trade agreement with the EEC which was
intended to safeguard essential Finnish commer-
cial interests. The agreement was finally ratified

by the Eduskunta (Parliament) on 16 November
1973. The treaty with Finland differs from those
with the other Efta countries in that it is strictly
limited to the lowering of trade barriers and
does not have an ‘evolutionary clause.’ It excludes
‘both membership in the Community and any
form of association or any commitment that might
eventually lead to the membership.’ . . . The rea-
son why Finland’s attempt to come to terms with
the new European economic realities has been so
controVersial can only be understood in the con-
text of her special relationship with the Soviet
Union and of the delicate balance of her internal
political forces.”

FINLAND: FIGHTING FOR ITS LIFE
WITH THE EEC, in Business Week, no.2224 (15
April 1972) 54 plus. ,

“Finland has the desolate feeling that it is
being left out in the economic cold by the West.
Three of its major trading partners—Britain,
Norway, and Denmark—leave the European Free
Trade Assn. (EFTA) for the Common Market
(EEC) next January and thus will raise tariff
barriers against Finnish exports. Since exports
account for 25% of Finland’s $10.5 billion gross
national product, the repercussions of lost jobs
and idle plants could severely shake an already
ailing economy. As a result, the Finns are busily
trying to negotiate a better deal for their valuable
exports, especially forest products, with the
enlarged EEC.”

3. Currency and Finance

FOREIGN CURRENCIES AND THE
FINNMARK IN CROSSFIRE, by Kari Nars, in
UNITAS Economic Review, Finland, v.45, no.4
(1973) 209—218.

“As long as the stable foreign exchange
system was in existence, changes in exchange
rates occurred only rarely but were of a con-
siderable magnitude. In the present system of
unstable exchange rates Finland has also switched
to a more flexible exchange rate policy which
has been aligned with cyclical conditions. Size-
able devaluations have given way to an exchange
rate development characterised by daily changes
in the exchange rates of other currencies often
in different directions together with minor
changes—in an upward and downward direction
—in the value of the Finnmark. As far as Fin—
land is concerned it may be concluded from recent
exchange rate history that the country’s external
liquidity position and longterm solvency cannot
be secured by major exchange rate changes nor
by a continuous increase in the external debt.
This task has to be pursued by incomes, fiscal
and monetary policies, which, however, may be
appropriately supplemented but not replaced by
foreign exchange rate policy.”

4. Industries

THE DEMANDS PLACED ON FINNISH
INDUSTRY BY THE EEC AGREEMENT, by
Olli Ikkala, in UNITAS Economic Review, Fin-
land, v.45, no.4 (1973) 199—208.

“For more than ten years now Finnish
industry has had to adjust to free trade condi-

' tions within the EFTA framework. The EFTA

decision taken at the beginning of the 19608 was
designed particularly to protect the export inter-
ests of the Finnish forest industry in the free
trade area which included the principal buyer of
Finnish forest products, Britain, and its Euro-
pean competitors in exports, Sweden, Austria and
Norway. Of secondary importance was the desire
to create prerequisites for the expansion and
diversification ‘of other industrial 'exports, for-
merly of relatively little significance. Few imag-
ined at the time of the signing of the FINEFTA
agreement that exports of other industrial prod-
ucts would develop so strongly. At present other
industry’s share of exports is already approach-
ing that of the forest industry.”

THE TECHNOCHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN
FINLAND, by Kaj Svensson, in UNITAS Eco-
nomic Review, Finland, v.45, no.3 (1973) 144-
150.

“The term technochemistry is generally
used to refer to the manufacture of a rather
heterogeneous range of chemical products in-
tended primarily for personal or household use
but also for large-scale households and institu-
tions . . . The production of certain technochemical
companies includes the entire range of products,
whereas others have concentrated on a narrower
sector, often solely on cosmetics. Finland’s tech-
nochemical industrial plants are small or at most
medium-sized. The annual turnover of most of
them is 2—8 million marks and only a few have
an annual turnover in excess of ten million marks

. During the past two decades the techno-
chemical branch has undergone considerable
development. Growth has been distinctly faster
than in industry as a whole. Changes in the.
extent and quality of the product range have also
been very positive. Consumption in Finland con-
tinues to be lower than in many other industrial
countries. The rise in the standard of living is
likely to ensure continued growth and develop-
ment in the branch.”

F. Sociological Aspects

SEX-ROLE ATTITUDES IN FINLAND,
1966—1970, by Elina Haavio-Hannila, in Journal
of Social Issues, v.28, no.2 (1972) 93—110.

“Debate on the position of women and men
in Scandinavian society reached Finland in 1965.

29

Since then the roles of men and women actively
discussed in the mass media, and a state commit-
tee report on the position of women was presented
in 1970. Though Finnish women are internation-
ally seen as emancipated there are still many
practical problems with regard to the position of
both women and men. Attitudes concerning vari-
ous aspects of sex-roles, surveyed in 1960 and
1970, have in general changed toward a more
egalitarian viewpoint. However, half of the male
respondents still think that household tasks should
be left to women. Further, though it seems to be
accepted that women should have an opportunity
to occupy leading positions, a great majority of
both men and women still state that they prefer
jobs with male superiors. Personally held atti-
tudes have thus remained more traditional than
the more superficial ones. Popular movements
like the current sex-role debate seem'to have an
effect on general public opinion, but deeper atti-
tudes and actual behavior may be more difficult
to change.”

30

G. History

A HISTORY OF FINLAND, by Eino J utik—
kala and Kauko Pirinen. rev. ed. New York,
Praeger Publishers, 1974. 293 p.

The Settlement of Finland Begins; Finland
Is Drawn into the Western Cultural Sphere; Fin-
land in the Scandinavian Union; From the Middle
Ages to the Modern Era; Finland As Part of a
Great Power; Sweden or Russia; Finland Be-
comes an Autonomous State; National Awakening
in the Shelter of Autonomy; Autonomy Lost and
Independence Gained; and Independent Finland.
With four substantiating maps.

THE WHITE DEATH: THE EPIC OF
THE SOVIET-FINNISH WINTER WAR, by
Allen F. Chew. East Lansing, Michigan State
University Press, 1972. 313 p.

“This account of the 105-day war between
Finland and the Soviet Union in the winter of
1939—1940 . . . [describes the] Finnish victories
at Tolvajarvi, Suomussalmi, and other battlefields

. [and discusses also] the political and social
aspects of the conflict.” With bibliography.

CHAPTER IV

ICELAND

(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)

 

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, 1971. 45th ed. London,
Oxford University Press, 1973. 536 p. (Pub-
lished for The Royal Institute of International
Affairs.)

Provides information, among many others,
for Iceland and The Faeroes.

MODERN ICELAND, by John C. Griffiths.
New York, Praeger, 1971. 226 p.

The story “of the occupation period in
Reykjavik, . . . the development of the Iceland
marshes, . . . the founding of the republic, the
setting up of the University of Iceland in Reyk-
javik, etc.” Appended: constitution of Iceland,
and some statistics.

B. Land and the People

LIVING IN ICELAND; IT’S COLD AS
YOU MAKE IT, by Andrew Schneider, in Air
Force Times, Family Supplement (3 November
1971) 10-16 plus. ’

A review of life at the Iceland Defense
Force and NATO Base, including Iceland’s out-
look towards the military stationed there. “For
those Americans stationed at Keflavik who
haven’t gained that [more accurate] perspective,
Iceland can be a depressing experiment. But it
is not an irreversible depression. The sadness is
not a result of the country, but of a failure to
understand it, and this can be the case anywhere.”

STATUS OF THE WORLD’S NATIONS.
Washington, Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, 1973. 20 p. (Geo-
graphic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)

The chapter on Nations, Dependencies,
Areas of Special Interest lists information on
capitals, population, and area for many countries
of the world, including Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden, among others.

WHEN SUMMER COMES TO ICELAND,
DAYTIME NEVER ENDS: THE LONG LIGHT
OF MIDNIGHT, in Life, v.71, no.5 (30 July
1971) 42—49.

“Only one percent of Iceland’s land mass
is under cultivation. Most of it lies near the
rocky coast, close to villages from which fisher-
men set out in small boats to comb the North
Atlantic’s richest fishing banks . . . In the short
hot summer, a sudden bloom of ripeness [occurs] .”

C. Government and Politics

ICELAND BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ELECTION, by George Soloveytchik, in Contem-
porary Review, v.219, no.1269 (October 1971)
185—190. .

“The spotlight seldom shines upon Iceland.
Yet it is a fascinating country. With a population
of only 205,000, Iceland belongs to the United
Nations and most of its specialised agencies; to
N.A.T.O., to the O.E.C.D., to E.F.T.A., to the
Nordic Council, the Council of Europe and a
variety of other organisations. Yet the Foreign
Office in Reykjavik has only 12 people while the
11 Icelandic Ambassadors stationed abroad rep-
resent their country in 55 foreign countries. But,
because of Iceland’s strategic importance, a very
large number of countries have their full-time
Ambassadors in Reykjavik. And the U.S.A. also
has, a naval air base there. June, 1971, will remain
a memorable month in Iceland’s history since
three important developments occurred almost
simultaneously and are, moreover, very much
intertwined. On Sunday, June 13, parliamentary
elections took place which brought to an end the
government, originally formed by the late Olafur
Thors in November, 1959, which was a coalition
of the Independence Party (moderate Conserva-
tives) and the Social Democratic Party. The
second important issue was—and still is—that
Icelandic fishing rights have suddenly once more
become an international problem. For Iceland,
this is a matter of life and death in the most
literal sense of the word: fishing is the nation’s
main industry and, until the middle 1960s, 95 per
cent of Iceland’s total exports consisted of fish
and fish products. Thanks to the recent estab-

' lishment of a few new industries, fishing has

now dropped to some 80 per cent of total exports;

31

its importance therefore remains overwhelming.
The handling of Iceland’s fishing rights in the
future was one of the main electoral issues. The
third vital question is the future of E.F.T.A. now
that—after the Paris, Luxembourg and Brussels
meetings—the likelihood of Great Britain, Den-
mark and Norway joining the Common Market
looks imminent. What will happen to the rump
of E.F.T.A. if these countries abandon-it, or what
the position of Iceland will be in the new regroup-
ing of Europe’s economic powers, is a matter
of very great concern to the government in
Reykjavik.”

ICELAND: HEATED DEBATES, by I.
Snezhanov, in New Times (Moscow), no.6 (Feb-
ruary 1972) 23—24.

“Only a relatively short time ago few peo-
ple outside Iceland gave much thought to the
island country in the North Atlantic . . . With
the development of modern communications, espe-
cially air transport, however, the importance of
this island located on vital sea and air routes
halfway between Europe and North America
grew notably. The strategic value of Iceland’s
location became more apparent than ever during
World War II . . . The evolution of the overall
situation in Europe under the influence of the
peace policy of the socialist countries, the trend
towards detente, has created favourable condi-
tions for. the Icelanders to uphold their indepen-
dence and, in particular, to achieve the revision
of the agreement with the U.S. The growing
demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces to no
small extent decided the outcome of the general
election of July 1971 which was won by a coali-
tion of three parties . . . What is the complexion
of the new ruling parties? The Progressive Party
represents mostly the urban middle and small
bourgeoisie and the farmers. The People’s Union
speaks for broad sections of the working people.
The Liberal Left Party, which first entered the
electoral arena in last year’s polling, has a fol-
lowing of workers and liberal intellectuals.”

D. Strategic Import
(See also Appendixes I and J)

BASE PACT SET BY U.S. AND ICELAND,
by Marilyn Berger, in Washington Post, (27 Sep-
tember 1974) 15.

“Iceland agreed yesterday to permit the
United States to continue operating a key NATO
base at Keflavik that permits surveillance of
Soviet submarine routes into the Atlantic. The
agreement calls for a token reduction of the
3,300-man American contingent and the separa-
tion of military and civilian facilities, which will
serve to lower the U.S. profile that had become
an irritant in the small island nation. . . . The

32

United States also agreed to spend $60 million
for airport improvements, including new access
roads, ramps and taxiways and an additional
unspecified sum to build 468 new family units.
Iceland. will build a new civilian airport separate
from the military airport. All American military
personnel will be required to reside within a
specified defense area. The agreement modifies
the 1951 defense agreement under which the
United States operated a naval air base which
maintains a squadron of F—4s to carry out its
primary surveillance mission. Iceland has no
armed forces of its own, although it has been a
member of NATO since 1949.” See also: Iceland
Rescinds Plan to Close U.S.—Operated Base at
Keflavik, in New York Times, (30 August 1974)
3.

(LU—ICELAND AND NATO: PROB-
LEMS AND PROSPECTS, by Lt. Comdr. R.
Scott McCartney and Lt. Comdr. William L.
Triemer. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College,
1972. (Unpublished Group Research Project
Report.) .
“A study of Iceland’s role in. NATO,
including an analysis of Iceland’s strategic impor-
tance and a review of the problems which have
characterized her involvement in military alli-
ances. The political crisis of 1971 is used as a
focus for an analysis of the implications of the
loss to NATO of the Iceland Defense Force
(IDF). The Icelandic people, their culture and
political structures, are examined to determine
the roots of the Icelandic attitude towards mili-
tary alliances. The evolution of Iceland from a
policy of neutralism to membership in NATO is
traced and the mission and organization of the
IDF is described. The paper finds that Iceland’s
strategic importance, particularly in the ASW
realm is increasing but that certain aspects of
the IDF mission could be relocated without loss
of capability. Continuing political and cultural
problems within the Iceland/NATO relationship
are forecast, keyed principally to the state of
East-West tensions. The study recommends dip-
lomatic and military actions designed to retain
certain vital capabilities of the IDF forces while
lessening the political and cultural impact of those
forcesf’

ICELAND AND THE MARITIME THREAT
TO NATO, by F.P.U. Croker, in Royal United
Service Institution Journal, v.117, no.666 (June
1972) 51—54.

“Although the theory has been advanced
that the Red Fleet is intended firstly for the sea-
ward defence of the Soviet Union, there is noth-
ing, in a primarily maritime war, to prevent it
being used offensively, almost in its entirety,
since Russia and her satellites are economically

self-sufficient and hence independent of the sea-
borne supplies whose protection, in the case of
NATO, must absorb so much naval effort. That
this is in fact the Soviet intention is proved
beyond all doubt by the following extract from
the textbook ‘Military Strategy’ issued under the
authority of the veteran Marshal Sokolovsky:
‘One of the Navy’s main tasks in a future war
will be to sever the enemy’s ocean and sea trans-
port routes. . . Operations against enemy lines
of communication should be developed on a large
scale from the very beginning of the war . . . by
destroying convoys and transports at sea.’ To
implement this policy, one thing only is lacking—
an advanced operating base—for the home ports
of the Red Fleet are so remote from the vital
North Atlantic shipping routes that dependence
upon them would entail a very large replenish-
ment at sea effort, itself vulnerable to NATO
counter-attack. Nor could land-based maritime
air support be effectively provided from the
equally distant Warsaw Pact air bases. A glance
at the map of Northern Europe suggests that Ice-
land is the ideal and, indeed, the only feasible site
for the advanced base. From this island, all the
North Atlantic shipping routes and local areas
are within easy reach of the medium-range sub-
marines, surface warships and strike aircraft
which the USSR possesses in such abundance;
moreover, effective air and sea cover can then be
provided for seaborne follow-on supplies from
.Murmansk — a continuing commitment which
could be further eased by the seizure of Northern
Norway and its airfields, though this is not man-
datory, especially if the Iceland bases can be
obtained by peaceful means. The expressed desire
of the new left-wing Iceland government to review
or terminate its existing military protection agree-
ment with the United States may represent the
measure of the success of Soviet diplomatic
efforts in this direction, and could result in the
loss to NATO of the Keflavik air base. Iceland
would then be left internally undefended—a fruit
ripe for plucking, since it could be seized by a
quite small airborn operation if base rights could
not be secured by negotiation.”

THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLI-
TICS OF THE DEFENSE POLICY OF ICE-
LAND, by Lt. Comdr. Craig S. Campbell, in
Naval War College Review, v.23, no.4 (December
1970) 76—97.

“Prior to World War II the pe0ple of Ice-
land were, to a great extent, isolated from world
affairs. The occupation of their island in 1940
by the British began three decades of controversy
in Icelandic politics over the presence of a foreign
military force. Today the continued presence of
the US. Defense Force in Iceland—a key facility

for projecting U.S. antisubmarine warfare power
in the Atlantic—is directly dependent upon the
interaction of this issue with internal domestic
politics in Iceland and the quality of the U.S.
Armed Forces’ community relations program
there. . . In this study of the defense policy of Ice-
land, only selected factors will be considered in
the examination and analysis of domestic politics
on that policy. These factors are: The physical
and political geography, the strategic significance
of Iceland and its role in conflicts between other
nations. The military and domestic policies and
public opinion. The intangible known as the
national mind and its associated complex of
nationalism, neutralism, and xenophobia.”

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRI-
ATIONS FOR 1974. HEARINGS BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-
THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION. Wash-
ington. Government Printing Office, 1973. Pts.3
and 4.

Among other information, includes con-
struction appropriations for particular facilities
at the Naval Station in Keflavik, Iceland.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORI-
ZATION, FISCAL YEAR 1974. HEARINGS
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE NO.5 OF THE
ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST
SESSION ON H.R.9005. 7973. 691 p. (H.A.S.C.
No.93—18.)

Includes, among others, information on the
Naval Air Station at Keflavik, Iceland.

E. Iceland, Europe, and NATO

ICELAND, EUROPE AND NATO, by Ashe
Sparring, in The World Today, v.28, no.9 (Sep-
tember 1972) 393—403.

“The shift in Iceland’s foreign policy and
her demand for the extension of fishing limits is
part of the fight for national and economic sur-
vival of a small country of less than a quarter
of a million inhabitants. . . From a common-sense
standpoint, the security of Iceland (the only
unarmed country in the Western world) is based
on (1) membership in NATO; (2) her value for
NATO; (3) the American presence; and (4) the
possibility of moving up reinforcements quickly.
This should be thought sufficient protection
against any coup-like venture, even though it
would be easy enough to land a force secretly on
the island, given its long coastline, inland desola-
tion, and small population. On the other hand,
if Iceland seeks security in NATO, it is evident
that she shares the risks of the other NATO coun-
tries. . . . History has situated Icelanders on a
barren and unfriendly island, which political and

33

technical developments have turned into a cross-
roads between Soviet and American security inter-
ests. All Iceland can hope for is new techniques
and different policies, which would again place
the island in a backwater.”

ICELAND’S CLOSURE OF U.S. BASE
WILL CRIPPLE U.S./ NATO DEFENSE, by Col.
Robert D. Heinl, Jr., in Armed Forces Journal,
v.108, no.23 (August 1971) 20.-

“The announced decision of Iceland’s new
left-wing government to close out the U .S. / NATO
base at Keflavik is, in strategic terms, the worst
blow sustained by NATO since the defection of
Charles de Gaulle and the French armed forces. . .
Every one of the approximately 175 submarines
(roughly half of the Soviet undersea fleet) based
at Murmansk has to get by Iceland before it can
seriously threaten Europe,'the United States, or
the Atlantic. Because of this, we and all NATO
have counted heavily on Iceland as the cork in the
bottle to deny Murmansk subs free access to and
free run of the Atlantic.”

SMALL STATES IN ALLIANCES: ICE-
LAND, THAILAND, AUSTRALIA, by Donald E.
Nuechterlein, in Orbis, v.13, no.2 (Summer 1969)
600—623.

“During the past fifteen years scholars
have devoted an increasing amount of research to
the study of new states in the international com-
munity. Part of this research has dealt with the
foreign policies of new states, but in most cases
the emphasis has been on states that have chosen
non'alignment as a policy. This article is con-
cerned with the reasons why certain small states
join alliances with great powers, instead of adopt-
ing nonalignment, and the factors that cause them
to remain in alliance after the passage of time.
For purposes of comparison, three small states
that are allied with the United States were chosen
for discussion: Iceland (NATO), Thailand
(SEATO), and Australia (ANZUS). All three
decided between 1949 and 1954 to accept a mili-
tary alliance with the United States, and other
Western powers, rather than follow a nonaligned
or neutralist policy, each for a different reason.
Their reasons are analyzed in terms of seven
major factors that influenced their foreign policy
decisions: ( 1) historical, (2) geographic, (3)
economic, (4) external threat, (5) internal securi-
ty, (6) military capability, and (7) receptivity
to foreign bases. A section entitled ‘Prospects
for the Alliances’ assesses the relevance of these
factors to the foreign policies of these states
today.”

WHERE A “COD WAR” IS THREAT TO
NATO, in U.S. News &: World Report, v.74, no.24
(11 June 1973) 33.

“Iceland is a small island country steering

34

a collision course toward some big nations—
including the U.S. The major issues are these:
Iceland is threatening to kick American forces
out of a strategic air base in Keflavik—a base
used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to keep watch on Russian movements
in key shipping routes of the North Atlantic
Ocean. There is growing concern that Iceland
may even decide to pull entirely out of member-
ship in NATO. Although smaller in size than
South Carolina, with a population—210,000—
barely bigger than that of Des Moines, 1a., and
with no forces of its own, Iceland is considered a
valuable link in the NATO defense line simply
because of its strategic location. Also heating up
is a battle between Iceland and Great Britain that
is known as the ‘cod war.’ This is a dispute over
fishing rights—but it threatens to involve Ice-
land’s role in NATO.”

F. Economic Aspects

THE AIRLINE THAT THRIVES ON DIS-
COUNTING, in Business Week, no.2186 (24 July
1971) 68 plus. '

“Icelandic Airlines has come a long way
since the day when its principal officers dug an
abandoned DC—3 out of a glacier and sold it to
buy a bigger airplane for transatlantic service.
In the 20 years since, Loftleidir, as it is known in
Icelandic, has become so solidly established among
young people on both sides of the Atlantic that
this spring’s round of cut-rate fares for youth

. hasn’t hurt it a bit . . . Icelandic pegs its fares

10% below most others and still earns a profit.”

THE CASE OF THE AGILE FLEA, in
Forbes, v.108, no.2 (15 July 1971) 20—21.

“For years Icelandic Airlines made out
just fine as the only price-cutter in the crowd.
Can it last? . . . For years, Icelandic, a flea among
airlines, danced pretty much to itself. If you
didn’t mind landing in Luxembourg rather than
in more popular European capitals and were will-
ing to book far in advance, Icelandic would sell
you a round-trip flight to Europe, complete with
good food and friendly hostesses, for at least a
third less than the big airlines charged. The big
airlines didn’t like the competition, but they could
bear it. After all, Icelandic Airlines was small,
had ,a limited route structure (which was why it
could defy the airline industry’s fixed rates) and
it mounted no high-pressure promotion. Besides,
it carried just 3% of the transatlantic air-passen-
ger market. . . But now that the big airlines have
broken $200 on round-trip ‘youth’ fares, loosing
hordes of raunchy American youth on European
capitals, what happens to Icelandic, the little
pioneer of transatlantic ratecutting ?” -

DENMARK, ICELAND, in E.I.U. Quarterly
Economic Review, no.3 (1973) 14 p.

An analysis of current economic trends,
including accompanying information on the politi-
cal scene. With statistical tables.

DENMARK, ICELAND, in E.I.U. Quarterly
Economic Review, (Annual Supplement 1973)
30 p.

This Annual Supplement provides basic
economic information. Contents for Denmark:
Government and General; Population and Employ-
ment; Exchange Rates; National Accounts; Agri-
culture and Fishing; Mining, Fuel, and Power;
Manufacturing Industry; Transport and Com-
munications; Finance; Foreign Trade and Pay-
ments; and Trade and Exchange Regulations.
Contents for Iceland: Government and General;
Exchange Rates; Population, Employment, and

National Accounts; Production and Transport; '

Finance; Foreign Trade and Payments; and
Bibliography.

HOT SPRINGS FUEL ICELAND’S HOPES,
iii Business Week, no.2171 (10 April 1971) 124.

“Iceland’s inhabitants live atop a boiling
cauldron of underground hot springs. Indeed,
the steam generated by the local springs gave the
island’s capital city, Reykjavik, its name, which
means ‘smoking bay.’ Geothermal steam heats
half of Iceland’s homes, and if hydroelectric power
were not so abundant, it would also run the
island’s power plants. Now the government would
like to tap this largely unused resource to build
a basic chemicals industry.”

VISIT TO ICELAND, by I. A. Anderson, in
Air Pictorial, v.35, no.2 (February 1973) 40—46.

“The October 1971 issue of Air Pictorial
carried a Loftleidir, Icelandic Airlines advertise-
ment ‘Calling all Aircraft Enthusiasts’ and offer-
ing a ‘Special six-day inclusive tour of air inter-
est.’ Never having been to Iceland the idea
appealed tome and I made bookings for my son
and myself. Was it worthwhile?” The author
describes his tour listing and identifying all types
of Icelandic aircraft he viewed during this period.

ZIMMERMANN’S WORLD RESOURCES
AND INDUSTRIES, by W. N. Peach and James
A. Constantin. 3rd ed. New York, Harper & Row,
1972. 575 p.

This book which contains numerous tables
provides information on resources and industries
of many countries of the world, including Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

G. Fishing Limits
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
ICELANDERS AND THE SEA, by Unnstein
Stefansson, in The UNESCO Courier, (February
1974) 26-30.

“Few nations are so dependent on the
bounties of the ocean for their economic pros-
perity. . . . Fishing is Iceland’s principal industry
employing one sixth of the nation’s labour force
and accounting for over 80 per cent of total
exports. . . The rich fishing grounds around Ice-
land have long been a favourite haunt of the fish—
ing fleets of various foreign nations. The con-
tinuous intensification of the fishing has resulted
in a severe reduction of the fish stocks. The death
rate of some species has reached dangerous levels.
This is particularly true of cod, where the mor-
tality is at least 7 0 per cent and the proportion of
small fish in the catch is rising rapidly. Thus a
point had been reached some time ago where it
Was clear that the stocks were seriously overfished
and the preductivity of the seas around Iceland
gravely endangered. On September 1, 1972 the
Icelandic Government and the Althing (Parlia-
ment) decided to extend the Icelandic fisheries
jurisdiction to 50 miles. This decision has not
been accepted by all nations and has been the
cause of some tensions and disputes with certain
European fishing nations.”

ICELAND’S FISHERY LIMITS: THE
LEGAL ASPECT, by E. D. Brown, in The World
Today, v.29, no.2 (February 1973) 68—80.

“Though there must be widespread sympa-
thy for Iceland’s predicament, her unilateral
extension of the fishing limits is a disturbing
infringement of international law as it stands
today. . . Last year this journal published an
examination of the economic, political, and stra-
tegic aspects of Iceland’s decision to extend her
fishery limits to 50 miles as from September 1972.
The present article is concerned with the inter-
national legal aspect of this decision and falls into
four parts. First, the historical background to
the present dispute is briefly reviewed. Second,
an examination is made of the 1961 Exchange of
Notes between Iceland and the United Kingdom
as the basis of the-jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice (hereafter called ‘the Court’) in
this case. Third, the Court’s Order of August
1972, indicating interim measures of protection,
is commented upon. Finally, the merits of the
case now before the Court are examined and an
attempt is made to present the dispute in a wider
perspective.”

2. Regulations and Agreements

BELGIUM-ICELAND: AGREEMENT ON
FISHING WITHIN FIFTY MILE LIMIT OFF
ICELAND, in International Legal Materials, v.11,
no.5 (September 1972) 941—946.

Text of agreement “done at Reykjavik,
September 7, 1972.”

ICELAND-NORWAY: AGREEMENT CON-
CERNING FISHING RIGHTS, in International

35

Legal Materials, v.12, no.6 (November 1973)
1313—1314.

Text of agreement “done at Reykjavik,
July 10, 1973.”

ICELAND: REGULATIONS CONCERN—
ING THE .FISHERY LIMITS OFF ICELAND,
in International Legal Materials, v.11, no.5 (Sep-
tember 1972) 1112—1114.

Text of regulations, July 14, 1972.

ICELAND: RESOLUTION ON FISHERIES
JURISDICTION, in International Legal Mate-
rials, v.11, no.3 (May 1972) 643—644.

Text of “Resolution of the Althing on Fish-
eries Jurisdiction,” February 15, 1972.

ICELAND-UNITED KINGDOM: AGREE-
MENT CONCERNING FISHING RIGHTS, in
International Legal Materials, v.12, no.6 (Novem-
ber 1973) 1315—1318.

Text of agreement “done at Reykjavik, Novem-
ber 13, 1973.”
3. Icelandic-British Disputes

BRITISH FISHING AND THE ICELAND
SAGA, by C. C. Hood. in The Political Quarterly,
v.44, no.3 (July-September 1973) 349—352.

“The story of the Anglo-Icelandic fishing
quarrel has become familiar since Iceland
increased its fishing limits from twelve to fifty
miles last September. But it is by no means a
simple case of ‘blackmail by the weak’; and fish-
ing limits are themselves only the tip of an ice-
berg in fishing politics. For example, tariffs,
quotas, minimum prices, grading rules and the
treatment of migrant fish are among the other
issues.”

BRITISH-ICELANDIC CONFLICT, by B.
Svetlov, in New Times (Moscow), no.22 (June
1973) 24.

“NATO circles are again in a flurry. This
time on account of the sharp deterioration of rela-
tions between Iceland and Britain, both of them
members of the Atlantic bloc. The old fishing
dispute, which has come to be known as the ‘cod
war,’ has grown into a grave political conflict.
Many Western observers agree with UPI cor-
respondent Joseph W. Grigg that this conflict
‘has faced the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion with a major crisis.’. . . The significance of
what is taking place off the Icelandic coast tran-
scends the bounds of the dispute over the fishing
rights. The sharp conflict on the northern flank
of NATO testifies to deep contradictions within
this bloc in which the ‘equal partnership’ NATO
propaganda is prone to eulogize exists only on
paper. The events in the North Atlantic are con-
vincing world public opinion once again that this
1s so.”

COLD WATER CONFRONTATION, in
Time, v.101, no.23 (4 June 1973) 37—38.

36

“It seemed a strange way for allies to
behave. Britain, a member of NATO, dispatched
three gunships into what Iceland, a fellow NATO
member, regards as its own territorial waters.
Iceland retaliated by issuing a strongly worded
protest accusing its ally of aggression, recalling
its ambassador for consultations, and threatening
to take the issue to the UN. Security Council.
The squabble between the two seafaring neighbors
was the latest episode in a long-running argu-
ment over valuable fishing rights in the cold
waters near the Arctic Circle. For the third time
since World War II, Iceland and Britain are near
blows in what citizens of both nations call the cod
war.”

ICELAND, in World Survey, (April 1973)
1—13.

“Interest in Iceland has been stimulated
by the current fishing dispute, and in this Survey,
Mr. Sigurdur A. Magnusson, Editor of SAMVIN-
NAN, a monthly review published by the Icelandic
Co-operatives, provides a description of his coun-
try and pe0ple. He also discusses the Icelandic
point of view with regard to the fishing dispute,

.and states the Icelandic case for extending the

fishing limit to 50 miles.”
ICELAND—A COD SUMMIT, in The Econo-
mist, v.249, no.6789 (6 October 1973) 40 plus.
“Iceland and Ireland have, it seems, even
more in common than a similarity in name and
a recurring tendency to be at loggerheads with
their neighbour island, Britain. The Prime Minis-
ter’s unprecedented visit to Dublin on September
17th was nicely timed to divert interest from those
menacing Liberals’ party conference. And on
Wednesday Mr. Heath was on the front pages
again, sharing attention with the Harold Wilson
show at the Labour party conference, thanks to
his dramatic personal intervention in the cod
war. Statesmanship or datesmanship? . . . The
year-long dispute has cost both sides dear; against
Iceland’s loss of British markets and of the bene-
fits of its EEC agreement may be balanced the
cost to Britain of maintaining the watching pres-
ence of tugs and frigates. And before Iceland
broke off negotiations in May the British, who
had been taking around 200,000 tons of_ fish a
year from the disputed waters, were offering to
limit their annual catch to 145,000 tons. Iceland
offered only 117,000; but in the first year of the
conflict it saw the British trawlers take, despite
all the 170,000 tons to which they would have
been limited by the International Court’s interim
ruling and left them undisturbed. . . More
immediate external pressure for a settlement has
been applied from another direction. It has been
no coincidence that NATO’s secretary—general,
Mr. Joseph Luns, visited Iceland on September

17th, talked with Mr. Heath at Chequers last Sun-
day, and reported next day to an emergency meet-
ing of the NATO council.”

TIP OF THE ICEBERG, by Robin Burton,
in Oceans, v.6, no.5 (September-October 1973).

“A frontline report on the Iceland/ Britain
‘Cod War’. . . Iceland needs fish to survive, for
the economy is virtually ‘one-shot.’ In the past
there has been no difficulty because the ocean
had fish enough for all, but now the signs are that
the cod, which forms the mainstay of the fishing
industry, may be suffering from overexploita-
tion. . . Icelandic waters are a popular fishing
area for trawlers from Britain and Germany, and
in a world of diminishing options there are few
other areas to which these ships could profitably
sail. . . . Attempts have been made to settle the
matter according to international law. . . So far,
more than a year of talking has failed to produce
any fundamental agreement between the contend-
ing parties. . . In international terms the Icelandic
dispute may well be the tip of the iceberg on
which many ships of state will run ashore as they
sail hopefully on through a shrinking fishery
world.” '

H. History

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF ICE-
LAND, 1940-1946, by Donald Bittner, in The
Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, v.103, no.1
(October 1972) 81-90.

“One of the least known incidents of World
War II is the Allied occupation of Iceland. This
occurred in two phases, the first the period of the
British occupation from 10th May, 1940, to 22nd
April, 1942, and then the American occupation
which lasted from 22nd April, 1942, to 7th Octo-
ber, 1946, although the last American forces were

not withdrawn from the island until April, 1947.
The importance of Iceland lies in its location in
the North Atlantic. Situated along the great circle
route from Halifax to Scotland, whoever controls
Iceland dominates the shortest and most direct
convoy routes to Europe from the western hemi-
sphere. This basic fact explains the island’s
importance to the Western Allies in World War
II. For the British, engaged in a life and death
struggle with Germany, with long supply lines
stretching all over the globe and especially to
North America, and for over a year standing
alone against victorious Germany, Iceland assumed
an even more important role than it had in previ-
ous wars. Iceland presented two basic problems
to British military planners during World
War II.” .

THE ICELANDIC SAGA, by Sigurdur

.Thorarinsson, in' The UNESCO Courier, (Feb-

ruary 1974) 4—30.

“Eleven centuries ago, the westward wave
of Scandinavian migration reached a new land,
just south of the Arctic Circle, where ice con-
tended with fire, where glaciers, volcanoes and
boiling springs seemed to hurl defiance at man
and at each other. This was Iceland. In this issue
of ‘UNESCO Courier’ we recount the saga of the
Icelandic people’s unending struggle with a hostile
climate, the splendours of the literary heritage
of a unique culture, and the beauty and geological
contrasts of a country still shrouded in legend but"
in which myth has blended into the modernity of
the 20th century.” Contents: Living On a Vol-
cano; The Vikings Settle a New Land; The Birth
of an Original Form of Literature; ‘Geysir’—The
Grandfather of All Geysers; The Glaciers in
Retreat for Half a Century; The Volcanoes Erupt;
Cheap. City Heating from Natural Hot Springs;
and The Icelanders and the Sea.

37

CHAPTER V

NORWAY
(See also Chapter I and. Appendixes)

 

A. The Land and the People

LAPP DETENTE, by Nika Hazelton, in
National Review, (15 March 1974) 327).
“Kirkenes, Norway—I’ve always been fas-
cinated by the way things look and work, and as
I came to northern Norway for a series of articles,
I thought I would like to see the beginning of the
Iron Curtain, and how the border between Nor-
way and the USSR is run. . . Up here the Iron
Curtain is merely a short reindeer fence and a
12-yard clearing. . . The local population is well
disposed toward the Russians, largely because of
the experience of 1944.”

(*)—NORWAY, by Philip Caraman. New
York, Paul S. Eriksson, Inc., 1971. 266 p.

“The author, a Jesuit Priest, writes about
his three years in the country. [He states] The
sources of the book are my own experience, my
reading and conversation with persons of all
classes, and a long journey from Oslo to the Nor-
wegian-Russian border in the Arctic in the spring
and summer of 1966. The last provides the frame-
work of the book. I have tried to show the his-
torical interest and associations of places . . .
[and] to answer the questions, what is life like in
Norway? What kind of people are the Nor-
wegians ?” With: chronology of dates and kings
of Norway, bibliography, and maps.

NORWAY, by Ronald G. Popperwell. New
York, Praeger, 1973. 335 p.

“After a brief survey of the country, its
inhabitants, economy and arts, showing the influ-
ence of terrain and climate, there follow sections
on history, language and literature, and con-
temporary 1ife and culture.” With bibliography.

NORWAY; LAND OF THE GENEROUS
SEA, by Edward J. Linehan, in National Geo-
graphic, v.140, no.1 (July 1971) 1—43.

This article, accompanied by numerous
color photos depicts the land and the people,
including fishing, industry, recreational activities,
culture, history, etc. '

STATUS OF THE WORLD’S NATIONS.
Washington, Department of State, Bureau ‘of

38

Intelligence and Research, 1973. 20 p.
graphic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)
The chapter on Nations, Dependencies,

(Geo-

Areas of Special Interest lists information on

capitals, population, and area for many countries
of the world, including Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden, among others.

B. Government and Politics

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN
IN NORWAY, in The Western Political Quarter-
ly, v.25, no.3 (September 1972) 491—521.

“The purpose of this article is to examine
the recruitment of females for elective office at
the national level of the Norwegian political sys-
tem during the postwar period. After a brief his-
torical review of the general position of women
in Norway, it focuses first on some structural
variables which have a bearing on their nomina-
tion and election, and then on the women them-
selves; their backgrounds, their rise to political
prominence, their perceptions of the' problems
relating to women’s positions in politics, and their
prognoses for the future.”

(*)—THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY
AND SCANDINAVIAN COMMUNISM: THE
NORWEGIAN CASE, by Trond Gilbert. Oslo,
Universitetsforlaget, 1973. 271 p.

“This . . . study of the relations between
Russian communism and the Norwegian Party
concludes that enforced subservience to Moscow
squelched any real hope for a revolutionary move-
ment in Norway. The author, a Norwegian-
American scholar, sees this as a case study of the
general problem of European radicalism in rela-
tion to Soviet communism.”

2.. The Role of the Church

NORWAY EXPLORES NEW CHURCH-
STATE MODELS, in The Christian Century, v.89,
no.36 (11 October 1972) 1023—1024.

“There is a saying in Norway that what-
ever happens in Sweden will be reflected in Nor-
way ten years later. That may be true in some
areas, but to judge from the recent report of the

State-Church Commission of the Church of Nor-
way (Lutheran), it is likely to be considerably
longer before Norway follows Sweden’s lead in
regard to separation of church and state. To the
commission was delegated—by the church in 1969
—the task of reporting on the state-church sys-
tem and possible alternatives to it should the
present cooperative arrangement be abandoned.
A second commission, appointed by the Storting
(parliament) in 1971 with the same mandate, has
yet to make a report; and the present report has
yet to be sent to diocesan councils, bishops and
the voluntary organizations within the church for
reaction and comment prior to final formulation.”

C. Armed Forces

AIR FORCES OF THE WORLD—PART 1:
EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS, in Interavia,
v.28, no.9 (September 1973) 1003—1007.

A summary of “outlining defence spending
and listing equipment inventories of the various
nations,” including, among others, Denmark and
Norway. See also Part 2: Europe’s Neutral and
Non-Aligned Nations, in Interavia, v.28, no.10
(October 1973) 1117—1120, which includes infor-
mation on Finland.

MILITARY UNIONS: THE ADVANTAGES
OF UNIONIZATION WITHIN THE ARMED
FORCES. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, Air
Force Institute of Technology, 1971. 63 p.
( SLTR—25—7 1. )

“The possibility exists that a labor union
within the military services of the United States
could become a reality with the advent of an all-
volunteer armed forces. The actual probability
of such an event being indeterminant at this time,
the situation should be closely studied to deter-
mine the advantages and disadvantages of mili-
tary unionization are presented along with the
possible limitations on a military union should it
become a reality. Two military unions operating
with some degree of success in West Germany and
Norway, respectively, are analyzed. Limitations
common to both the Norwegian and West German
unions are discussed to determine their possible
applicability to the armed forces of the United
States.”

NORWAY’S SEA KINGS AND THE
SQUADRON THAT OPERATES THEM, by
J .D.R. Rawlings, in Air Pictorial, v.35, no.1 (J an-
uary 1973) 2—5.

“Activities now going on at H.M.S. Sea:
hawk (R.N.A.S. Culdrose) serve as a successful
example of industry/ service cooperation to pro-
vide export customers of the British aircraft
industry with a product fully usable by trained
crews. The Westland Sea King is currently one
of Britain’s most exportable products and is sell-

ing in two basic roles: anti-submarine and search-
and-rescue. This helicopter is in full-scale service
with the Royal Navy and has also been sold to the
Indian Navy for ASW, the Royal Norwegian Air
Force and the West Germany Navy for SAR and
the Royal Australian Navy for ASW—and this
certainly does not look like the end of the line..
These export aircraft are now going through the
Westland shops at Yeovil, while down at Culdrose
the .Fleet Air Arm is providing a comprehensive
training programme, drawing upon the extensive
experience that has been gained in its operation
of the Sea King. The Indian Navy course has
already been completed, the R. Norwegian A.F.
crews are now undergoing training and will be
followed by the Germany Navy in the summer of
1973. Ten Sea King Mk. 43s are being built for
Norway (serials 060, 062, 066 and 068—074). In
August 1972 the R. Norwegian A.F. Training
Unit was formed at Culdrose, given a hangar and
one of the new office blocks adjoining, and was
in business as soon as its first Sea King arrived. . .
This small team is, in effect responsible for
launching the Sea King into R. Norwegian A.F.
service. To carry out this task the unit received
four of the Sea King 43s initially, reducing to
three in October (Nos. O66, 068 and 070), and
these three will remain at Culdrose until the
training is complete. The others are being
delivered direct from Yeovil to Norway as the
courses complete.”

D. Foreign Policy

(*) —— GREAT POWER POLITICS AND
NORWEGIAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Nils Mor-
ten Udgaard. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1973.
318 p.

“A Norwegian scholar-journalist traces the
evolution of Norwegian foreign policy from war-
time cooperation through postwar hopes of
‘bridge-building’ between the emergent blocs, to
the reappraisal of options occasioned by the
Marshall Plan.”

ICELAND-NORWAY: AGREEMENT CON-
CERNING FISHING RIGHTS, in International
Legal Materials, v.12, no.6 (November 1973)
1313—1314.

Text of agreement “done at Reykjavik,
July 10, 1973.”

WHY NORWAY SHOULD STAY IN NATO,
by Guttorn Hansen, in NATO Letter, v.16 no.12
(December 1968) 2—5.

“The public discussion in Norway about,
NATO reached its climax in June 1968, following
a rather hectic debate during the winter and
spring. On 13 and 14 June, the Norwegian Parlia-
ment considered a White Paper on Norway’s con-
tinued participation in NATO. At the end of a

39

two—day debate, an opposition back bencher pro-
posed that Norway should withdraw from NATO
as soon as possible after 24 August 1969. Only
6 out of the 150 members voted for this motion.
An overwhelming majority of MPs thus implicit-
ly supported the Government White Paper which
concluded: ‘Continued membership of NATO
would preserve the policy for the safeguarding of
Norway’s security, which in 1949 was laid down
by Parliament and Government, 'and which has
subsequently been adhered to by the Government,
supported by a strong majority in Parliament.
The Government is of the opinion that no justifi-
cation exists in the present situation for proposing
a change in Norway’s position vis-a-vis the West-
ern Defence Alliance.’ ”

E. Economic Aspects

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

BELGIUM - CANADA - DENMARK -
FRANCE -FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY - IRELAND - ITALY - JAPAN-LUXEM-
BOURG - NETHERLANDS - NORWAY - UNIT-
ED KINGDOM-UNITED STATES: COMMUN-
IQUE ON THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CON-
FERENCE (FEBRUARY 13, 1974), in Interna-
tional Legal Materials, v.13, no.2 (March 1974)
462—464.

Text of the communique.

A CHANGE OF MOOD IN NORWAY AND
SWEDEN, by George Soloveytchik, in Contempo-
rary Review, v.217, no.1259 (December 1970)
323—328.

“During 1969/ 1970 a great change of mood
has come to the Scandinavian countries which for
many years had been ‘Europe’s quiet corner.’
Even at the best of times, however, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden were by no means one solid
entity. Despite many similarities in the handling
of their domestic affairs, especially in social and
cultural matters, there were many differences in
economic _ policy; while in foreign affairs and
national defence there was hardly a common
denominator. The national character, the tradi-
tions, the wartime experiences and the postwar
interests of the Nordic countries are not at all the
same. This is particularly striking in the case of
Norway and Sweden today. Despite the unprece-
dented growth of trade between them, which
began in 1960 but took an enormous leap forward
after 1967, the present mood of these neighbour-
ing nations could hardly be more dissimilar.
Whereas Sweden has turned ‘sour,’ Norway is
enjoying a most impressive period of expansion.
Activity in every field seems suddenly to have
replaced the usual atmosphere of tranquillity. Not
only in Oslo but throughout the country the people

40

are on the move, and their prosperity is visible to
the naked eye.”

LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMES-
TIC OPERATIONS, by Lawrence J. Eckstron.
rev. 3rd ed. New York, Clark Boordman Co.,
Ltd., 1973. 2 v.

Provides pertinent information also for
operations in the following foreign countries, .
among others: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden. ,

NORWAY, in E.I.U. Quarterly Economic
Review, no.4 (1973) 16 p.

An analysis of current economic trends,
including accompanying information on the politi-
cal scene. With statistical tables.

NORWAY, in E.I.U. Quarterly Economic
Review, (Annual Supplement 1973) 17 p.

The Annual Supplement provides basic
economic information. Contents: Government
and General; Population; Employment; Exchange
Rates; National Accounts; Agriculture; Forestry,
and Fishing; Mining, Fuel, and Power; Manufac-
turing; Industry; Transport and Communica-
tions ; Finance; Foreign Trade and Payments;
Trade Regulations and Exchange Regulations;
Weights and Measures; and Bibliography.

NORWAY; OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS.
Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1973. 67 p.

Annual economic review of Norway. The
acceleration of inflation; causes of inflation;
recent trends and prospects; policy issues and con-
clusions. With tables and diagrams. .

NORWAY-UNITED K I N G D O M : PIPE-
LINE AGREEMENT TO CARRY PETROLEUM
FROM THE NORWEGIAN CONTINENTAL
SHELF TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, in Inter-
national Legal Materials, v.13, no.1 (January
1974) 26—30.

Text of agreement “done at Oslo, May 22,
1973, entered into force May 22, 1973.”

2. Norway and the European Economic
Community

THE DANISH AND NORWEGIAN APPLI-
CATIONS, by T. C._Archer, in The World Today,
v.27, no.10 (October 1971) 448—456.

“Although much of the discussion about the
proposed enlargement. of the European Communi-
ties has been focused on the case of the United
Kingdom, the Danish and Norwegian applications
for membership are not without interest for
observers of the West European scene. The treat-
ment of the two Scandinavian countries by their
larger British, French and German neighbours
will reflect the attitude of the planned new Com-
munity not only towards the smaller ‘non-Con-
tinental’ States but also to the problems of thOse
groups living on the periphery outside the indus-

trial Golden Triangle of Western Europe. For the
Danes and Norwegians, their present applications
represent an important step on the long and uncer-
tain post-war road towards closer West European
co-operation. Their activities in this area have
mostly been dominated by the relative possibilities
open to them in their relationships with three
groups—the other Nordic countries, the Continen-
tal ‘Six,’ and the other West European States, the
most important of which is the United Kingdom.
The present negotiations for enlargement of the
Community seem to represent the prospect of a
new relationship with the Six (to what extent it
is an improved relationship is a matter for discus-
sion), and a continued mutually beneficial trade
partnership with Britain, but also the possibility
of a division within the Nordic trading area.”

(*) — FEARS AND EXPECTATIONS:
NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD EURO-
PEAN INTEGRATION, ed. by Nils Arvick. Oslo,
Universitetsforlaget, 1972. 370 p.

“Norway’s recent decision not to join the
European Economic Community can be better
understood after reading this book. The authors
(of the individual papers) have analyzed the
Norwegian debate on this question over the past
decade, giving particular attention to elite atti-
tudes toward loss of sovereignty and political
integration.”

NORWAY—ALMOST SCOT-FREE, in The
Economist, v.246, no.6755 (10 February 1973)
54 plus.

“A sigh of relief whistled up the fiords of
Norway on Monday when the terms of the com-
mission’s mandate to negotiate a free trade agree-
ment were announced in Brus sels. The
Norwegians had managed to persuade the foreign
ministers of the nine member countries not to
extract even a token punishment for Norway
having voted against membership. And the man-
date included some things—like a mention of
frozen fillets (politically touchy back home),
which was more than any of the other ex-Efta
countries had achieved. After a rather naive
start, the Norwegian negotiators played a more
astute hand in Brussels in the manoeuvrings that
led up to the foreign ministers’ meeting. . . The
other lesson quickly learned by the Norwegians
was that without North Sea oil and gas, many of
the nine community countries would have been
much less interested in what happened to these
remote northern people. The Norwegian govern-
ment has managed to maintain publicly its insist-
ence that oil was not being traded in Europe as
part of the deal.”

NORWAY MAKES THE BEST OF ITOUT
IN THE COLD, in The Economist, v.247, no.677 5
(30 June 1973) 56—58.

“Norwegian public opinion now rather
favours the common market again, but even the
staunchest Norwegian marketeers are reconciled
to the depressing conclusion that Norway will still
be out for years to come. . . One day Norway will
have to face up to the question of whether it can
really be independent and sovereign when it is
growing more and more dependent on political
decisions taken in institutions in which it has no
direct influence. In the end it may be obliged
to enter the community, paradoxically, to try to
regain some of its sovereignty. But by then many
of the big decisions will have been taken and
Norway will be faced with a series of faits
accomplis.”

N ORWAY’S ‘N 0’ AND DENMARK’S ‘YES,’
by T. C. Archer, in The World Today, v.28, no.11
(November 1972) 467—470.

“The Norwegian rejection of membership
of the European Community in the referendum of
24—25 September led to the resignation of the
Labour Government soon afterwards. The Danish
vote a week later gave a large majority in favour
of EEC membership, but was also followed" by the
surprise retirement of the Danish Prime Minister,
Mr. King. Norway’s referendum, in accordance
with the Constitution, was merely consultative
and would have needed the introduction of EEC
legislation in the parliament (Storting) where a
three-quartersmajority would have had to pass
it. Denmark’s Constitution requires laws giving
decision-making powers to international organiza-
tions either to be endorsed by a five-sixths majori- '
ty in the parliament (Folketing) or to have a
straight parliamentary majority backed up by a
positive referendum result. . . Norway now finds
herself outside the EEG and, unlike Sweden, with-
out even a trade agreement. Denmark, on the
other hand, has made sure of her place within the
Community, where she could play an important
role as a bridge between Scandinavia and the\
Continent.” ' '

THE PRICE OF A LIE, in Time, v97, no.11
(15 March 19-71) 38—39.

“Aboard a Scandinavian Airlines flight
from Oslo to Copenhagen last month, Borten
handed a document marked fortrolig (confiden-
tial) to another passenger, saying: ‘This is inter-
esting, Read it.’ The document was a report
indicating that the Eur0pean Economic Commun-
ity would probably balk at the special terms Nor-
way demands as a condition of its entry 'into the
Common Market. The other passenger was Nor-
way’s leading Common Market opponent, Arne
Haugestad, head of a pressure group called the
People’s Resistance Movement Against Member-
ship in the EEC. ‘For your private information,’
Borten cautioned as he gave the paper to Hauge-

41

stad. Within four days, the gist of the report was
in the papers, and rumors soon followed that the
Prime Minister himelf was responsible for the
leak. . . The incident brought to a head the issue
of whether Norwegians want to join the Common
Market at all.”

WHAT NORWAY OFFERS THE EEC, by
D. J. Sinclair, in The Geographical Magazine, v43,
no.9 (June 1971) 630-631.

“Since June 1970 the member countries of
EFTA have been involved in'talks with the Euro-
pean Economic Community, some applying for
full membership, others seeking formulae to
improve bilateral contacts with the Common Mar-
ket. Norway and Denmark are candidates for full
membership. Both are in the course of rapid
economic and' cultural transition, and are heavily
dependent on international trade. Norway’s
economic policy is outward looking, designed to
overcome the market division which in Western
Europe stems from the progressive integration of
the EEC behind its common tariff barriers. The
free market created by EFTA would be drastical-
ly reduced if Britain alone became a full member
of the EEC. Britain is Norway’s most important
customer and the fate of Brtain’s application is
of vital concern to Norway, as it is to the other
applicants. Norway has put much effort into
cooperation with the countries of Northern
Europe but, with EFTA reduced by half to a mar-
ket of 50,000,000 people, the benefits of a Nordic
Economic Union would be small beer indeed. Nor-
way has benefited greatly from membership of
EFTA and is well aware of the issues now facing
her. She needs to look after the future of her
exports, nearly 80 per cent of which go to EFTA
and EEC countries. For, significantly, 40 per
cent of Norway’s GNP cOmes from this trade in
goods and services—a trade which has grown
and changed in structure within a developing
industrial economy.”

3. Economic Development
NORWAY: SMALL COUNTRY PLANS
CIVIL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, by
James Brian Quinn and Robert Major, in Science,
v.183, no.4121 (18 January 1974) 172—179.

“Experience suggests how cooperative
applied science programs can be linked to national
goals and needs. . . A 21/2-year project to develop
coordinated, long-range plans for a major portion
of Norway’s civil science and technology pro-
grams has recently been completed. This exer-
cise, undertaken by the Royal Norwegian Council
for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF),
illustrates many of the problems and opportunities
of such planning in a small country (Norway’s
population in 1970 was 3.9 million). Norway’s
situation regarding science and technology is simi-

42

lar to that of many other countries. Norway has
limited scientific and technical manpower
resources—some 9000 degree-holders primarily
engaged in research and development (R&D)—
yet it must compete in its major export markets
with large, technologically advanced countries.
Norway’s industrial structure contains few large
companies, but many small ones. Consequently,
government and private industry must coopera-
tively support R&D in many fields. Even so, Nor-
way must, of necessity, import most of its scien-
tific and technological knowledge. Since its
natural resources are already being extensively
exploited—except for recently discovered hydro-
carbons in the North Sea—Norway must depend
on knowledge industries for future economic
growth. Like many other countries, Norway faces
the modern challenges of continued economic
growth, maintenance of a good quality of life in
its cities, and enlightened development of its
extensive rural areas. Sophisticated application
of science and technology will be necessary to
attack these problems. Norway’s approaches and
experiences could be of interest to many.”
4. Maritime Industry

NORWAY AS A SEAFARING NATION, by
Andreas Oplatka, in Swiss Review of World
Affairs, v.23, no.5 (August 1973) 7—9.

“N umerically a small nation, Norway has
the fourth largest merchant fleet in the world,
after Japan, Great Britain and Liberia, the latter
offering a ‘flag of convenience’ under which ships
from all parts of the world sail. The approximate-
ly 22 million gross registered tons of the Nor-
wegian vessels amount to 9% of the world’s
merchant marine tonnage. The cargo space which
this fleet offers is far in excess of the needs of the
motherland; each year the ships transport about
four times as much cargo as Norway’s total
imports. The tankers alone have a capacity of 21
million tons of oil, while Norway needed to import
only 8.8 million tons of the fuel in 1971. In fact
the largest part of the Norwegian merchant fleet
does not sail into home ports at all; 92% of the
ships transport the goods 0f foreign countries
exclusively. The question of how such a small
country with a population of barely 4 million
people has managed to secure such a place for
itself in international maritime navigation, usual-
ly brings a reaction of thoughtful silence at first,
even from Norwegians themselves. Gradually,
however, the answer comes piece by piece. The sea
along the coastline where Norway’s population has
always tended to concentrate remains even today,
in many parts of the country, the most impor-
tant traffic artery. Particularly in the north-
ern regions the trackless wastes of the interior

are a barrier to communication and transporta-
tion.”

WHY IT’S FAIR WEATHER FOR NOR-
WAY’S SHIPPING, by James N. Sites, in
Nation’s Business, v.60, no.12 (December 1972)
7 0—71.

“In a little country whose merchant fleet
has grown gigantically, union and management
agree: ‘We’re ,all in the same boat.’ . . . While the
United States struggles to resurrect and mod-
ernize its deteriorating merchant marine, a coun-
try whose population of 3.8 million roughly equals
that of metropolitan Philadelphia has developed
the world’s fourth largest cargo fleet—a highly
competitive flotilla of modern, efficient ships.
Norway did it, Without government subsidies, in
a world cluttered with government-owned or gov-
ernment-supported merchant fleets. How has
such a startling success been attained?”

5. Labor

NEW MANPOWER PROGRAM IN NOR-
WAY, in Monthly Labor Review, v.95, no. 8
(August 1972) 51—52.

“A number of measures are being under-
taken in Norway to reorient its manpower policy
toward current economic and social conditions.
The broad lines of reform, set forth in a White
Paper in 1969 and approved by the Parliament,
are intended to implement recommendations of
the ILO (International Labor Office) on full
employment and of the OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) on an
active manpower policy. Many of the measures,
although originally designed to cope with the
tight labor market in the 1960’s, are also relevent
to periods of greater unemployment.”

6. Petroleum

OIL FEVER STRIKES THE NORWE-
GIANS, in Business Week, no.2182 (26 June
1971) 40.

“Norway’s oil boom is on, and all that oil
under the North Sea’s choppy waters has made
the usually reserved Norwegians as mad with
speculative fever as Klondike prospectors. No
less than former prime minister Per Borten
secretly bought a piece of the action for the gov-
ernment late last year, and now even King Olaf
has caught the bug.”

F. Sociological Aspects
CHANGING ROLE OF LAW AND LAW-

YERS IN NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH-
CENTURY NORWEGIAN SOCIETY, by V.
Aubert, in Judicial Review, (August 1972) 97
plus. , .

NORWAY, by Ronald G. Popperwell. New
York, Praeger, 1972. 335 p.

“Among other Scandinavian-s, the self-
preoccupation of the Norwegians is proverbial.
That acute concern with ‘N orwegian-ness’ is well
conveyed in this addition to the ‘Nations of the
Modern World’ series; only about one-fifth of the
text covers the post-World War II years.”

G. History

THE FASCIST ECONOMY IN NORWAY,
by Alan S. Milward. London, Oxford University
Press, 1972. 317 p.

“This book is intended as a study of
German economic policy in Norway from 1940
to 1945, of its results, and of the light it throws
on fascism.” With bibliography.

A HISTORY OF MODERN NORWAY 1814—
1972, by T. K. Derry. New York, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1973. 506 p.

“The author . . . discusses the political
developments and growth of nationalism in 19th-
century Norway and describes economic, social,
and cultural development against this background
and devotes a chapter . . . to the 1905 dissolution
of the Norwegian-Swedish union. The major bulk
is on the 20th century where industrialization
and economic growth, the troubles of the Labor
Party, Norwegian politics of the ’20s and depres-
sion take most print, although both World Wars
assume a large share.” With bibliography.

N ORWAY’S NEW SAGA OF THE SEA, by
Lise Lindbaek and others. New York, ExpositiOn
Press, 1969. 251 p.

The story of Norway’s merchant marine
in World War II.

(*)—QUISLING, ROSENBERG UN TER-
BOVEN, by Hans-Dietrich Loock. Stuttgart,
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970. 587 p. In
German.

“An analysis of the abortive attempt to
establish a national socialist regime in Norway.
Using much new material, a German historian
portrays the lives of Quisling and of his German
partners against the background of political and
military conditions.”

CHAPTER VI

SWEDEN
(See also Chapter I and Appendixes)

 

A. An Overview

SWEDEN, by Irene Scobbie. New York,
Praeger, 1972. 254 p.

“An . . . analysis of modern Sweden,
including . . . [a] section dealing with historical
background and perspectives. Descriptions of the
social, cultural and psychological milieu of modern
Sweden as well as an analysis of its political and
economic status are presented. Events and
developments since the parliamentary reforms of
1866 are emphasized, and special consideration
is given to social change.” With bibliography.

SWEDEN; PROTOTYPE OF' MODERN
SOCIETY, by Richard F. Tomason. New York,
Random House, 1970.‘ 302 p.

“An American sociologist presents a . .
survey of Sweden today, covering ‘inter alia’
education, sex and politics.” ‘

B. , The Land and the. People

MALMO: SWEDEN’S WINDOW ON THE

CONTINENT, by Andreas Oplatka, in Swiss
Review of World Affairs, v.23, no.8 (November
1973) 19—21.
‘ “Aside from Stockholm, the administrative
district of Malmohus has Sweden’s highest popu-
lation density. with 148 people per square kilo-
meter, and though it is the second smallest of the
24‘ Swedish provinces it has a population of
700,000, almost one-tenth of Sweden’s total. The
people of this region are quite aware of their own
significance and prefer to call themselves Skanes
rather than Swedes. ‘The History of the People
of Skanes’ is the title of a newly-published book
recently put on sale in Malmo. Despite the
Swedish sobriety evident in Malmo (and most
blatant when one comes there from Copenhagen),
the city is strongly reminiscent of its Danish
origins . . . In recent years Malmo has lost some
population to the surrounding suburbs, but with
250,000 inhabitants it remains Sweden’s third-
largest city, behind Stockholm and Goteborg. In
terms of the occupations of its labor force Malmo
should be characterized as an industrial and
commercial city.”

44

STATUS OF THE. WORLD’S NATIONS.
Washington, Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, 1973. 20 p. (Geo-
graphic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)

The chapter on Nations, Dependencies,
Areas of Special Interest lists information on
capitals, population, and area for many countries
of the world, including Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden, among others.

C. Government and Politics

1. Miscellaneous. Aspects
DEAD HEAT IN SWEDEN; AN ELEC-
TION THAT DEFIES ANY TRADITIONAL
ANALYSIS, by Armand Schwab, in Common-
weal, v.99, no.3 (19 October 1973) 58—60.

“There was something post-industrial
about the Swedsh election last month: new kinds
of issues and a lineup of voters that defies any
traditional analysis along spectrums such as left-
right, country-city, rich-poor. What happened
was simply that Prime Minister Olof Palme and
his Social Democratic Party lost their majority
in the single-chamber parliament. When the new
Riksdag convenes next January (there is still a
Fall session to be played out with the present
membership), the Social Democrats and their
passive supporters, the Communists, will have 175
seats instead of 180. The three-party ‘bourgeois’
opposition will have 175 seats instead of 170. If
there is a tie vote on any issue it will be settled
by lot. Aside from the un-Swedish drama of a
dead heat, the election drew attention because the
Social Democrats have governed Sweden for 41
years, since before the New Deal, before Hitler.”

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
SWEDEN, by Joseph B. Board, Jr. Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970. 270 p.

The Land and the People; History and
Constitution; A Pluralist Society; Parties and
Elections; The Riksdag; the Executive; Law and
Justice in Sweden; Foreign Policy and_Defense;
Local Government; and Welfare Capitalism.
With: glossary of abbreviations, and bibliograph,

HOW MUCH CLIFF-HANGING CAN SWE-

DEN STAND ?, in The Economist, v.248, no.6787
(22 September 19-73) 59—60.

“On June 6th the Riksdag, which since
1970 has been a 350-seat single chamber approved
a'new constitution changing the number of its
seats to 349 in order to avert the risk of .17 5—17 5
deadlocks, and relieving the king of the duty of
naming new prime ministers—a decidedly invidi-
ous duty now that Swedish republicans and
monarchists have virtually settled their old dis-
pute by agreeing to retain the monarchy but to
abolish its few remaining functions. But the new
constitution still has to be endorsed by the new
Riksdag that was elected on September 16th
before it can come into effect on January 1, 1975.
A further provision that the changes affecting
the monarchy should not take effect until the
death of King Gustaf VI Adolf lapsed with the
90-year-old king’s death on September 15th . . .
The newly elected Riksdag will not, however, be
convened until January. For the time. being
Mr. Olof Palme’s Social Democratic government
is still in office. Mr. Palme is showing an
understandable lack of enthusiasm about sug-
gestions that fresh elections should be held early
next year . . . Mr. Palme has been quick to
point out that the constitution. makes specific
provision for the breaking of deadlocks in an
evenly divided parliament by the drawing of lots.
But this procedure has hitherto been used only
on relatively unimportant occasions. Swedes find
it hard to visualise the business of government
being carried on for three years on such a dicey
basis.”

‘ LESSON OF SWEDEN’S VOTE—PEOPLE
EVEN GET TIRED OF PROSPERITY, in U.S.
News &: World Report, v.75, no.14 (1 October.
1973) 72—73.

“The outcome of general elections in
Sweden on September 16 points up a lesson for
politicians elsewhere—even a Government that
produces exceptional material prosperity, and the
world’s most lavish welfare state, can fail to
retain a popular mandate. Sweden’s Social Demo-
cratic Party is now in that predicament. The
Socialists, in the 41 years that they have governed
the country, have built an extraordinary record
of economic and social achievement. The Swedish
people boast a per capita income that now is
almost the highest in the world, above that of the
United States. Cradle-to-grave welfare benefits
are unmatched by any other country. SWedes,
under the Socialists, have enjoyed uninterrupted
tranquility through tension and international

violence. Yet the Government of Prime Minister

Olof Palme, claiming credit for these achieve-
ments, has failed to win a clear-cut electoral man-
date to remain in office for another term.”

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SWEDEN, by
T. Sandalov, in American Journal of Comparative
Law, v.19, no.4 (Fall 1971) 766—785.

“The . . . aim of this paper is to report the
major outlines of Swedish law relating to local
government and, at least in a preliminary way,
the means by which Sweden has attempted to
strengthen its local governments and to accommo-
date national and local objectives.”

SWEDEN: THE POLITICS OF POSTIN-
DUSTRIAL CHANGE, by M. Donald Hancock.
Hinsdale, Ill., The Dryden Press, 1972. 298 p.

Modernity and Political Change; Sweden
in Perspective; The Cooperative Individualist;
Toward a Participatory Political Culture; The
Communal Link; A Multiparty System in Transi-
tion; The New Pluralism; Majority Parliamen-
tarism and' Policy-Making Roles; Conflict and
Compromise; “The Country Shall Be Built With

'Law”; Active Neutralist and Regional Coopera-

tion; and The Politics of Postindustrial Change.
With bibliography.
2. The Monarchy
SWEDEN’S NEW KING—WILL HE BE
THE LAST ?, in U.S. News & World Report, v.7 5,
no.14 (1 October 1973) 72.

“Newest member of Europe’s small and
shrinking circle of reigning monarchs is Carl XVI
Gustaf, King of Sweden. In a country governed
by Socialists for 41 years, no royal pageantry
marked the accession of a new king. Crown
Prince Carl Gustaf, 27, quietly assumed the throne
September 15 on the death of his grandfather,
90-year-old King Gustaf VI Adolph. The change
in kings came during the closing days of a crucial
election campaign in Sweden, but most observers
believed it had little effect on the outcome. The
royal prerogatives in Sweden—as well as in other
constitutional monarchies in Europe—have been
steadily whittled down. and are likely to diminish
still further.”

3. The Politics of Olof Palme
OLOF PALME FACES SWEDISH REALI-
TIES, by Francis P. Walsh, in Contemporary Re-
view, v.220, no.1272 (January 1972) 6—8.

“ ‘The Kennedy of Sweden—Europe’s Most
Exciting Politician’—so ran the headlines around
the world in 1969 when Olof Palme, aged 42,
became the continent’s mostboyish head of gov-
ernment. How is the Kennedy today, a’little more
than one general election later? Does Sweden
want —— or need -— exciting politicians ? Snappy
headlines are one thing, inflation and strikes quite
another. If Palme had been up for election by the
international media, the result would have been
quite different from those in the general election
last Fall when his party pulled its poorest poll but
one since it came to power forty years ago. . .

45

Lately, there have been signs of mellowing ‘co-
operation,’ more verbal restraint and fewer Ken-
nedy-visions. Erlander is still in Parliament,
available for advice. Palme is the ablest young
politician around, and under his alert leadership
the Social Democrats may be able to pull up their
socks and scrape through once again in 1973.”

PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME OF
SWEDEN, by Henry J. Abraham, in Orbis, v.15
(1971) 953—962.

‘ “Olof Palme, Sweden’s controversial Prime
Minister and leader of the Social Democratic
Party, is very much a Swede. . . He is undoubtedly
a leader embattled but he remains convinced that,
notwithstanding contemporary political reverses,
he will emerge triumphant in the long run. In a
number of intriguing ways his model—at least in
his conversations with Western Hemisphere ob-
servers—would seem to be Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who was a master in the game of parlaying short-
run reverses into long-run gains.”

4. The Social Democratic Party

SWEDEN’S SOCIALISTS: HOIST WITH
THEIR OWN SUCCESS, by Bernard K. J ohnpoll,
in The Nation, (4 December 1972) 552—555.

“More than forty years ago, on September
24, 1932, the Swedish Social Democrats took over
the government of what was then a poverty-ridden
country. They have held. power ever since, and
Sweden has become the most affluent country in
Europe, with the world’s highest standard of
living. And they have accomplished a revolution
without bloodshed, dictatorship, or political up-
heaval. The Socialists accomplished that fact by
preferring pragmatism to doctrine and dogma.
Now, forty years later, there are rumblings of
discontent, and public opinion polls indicate that
the popularity of the Social Democrats is at its
lowest level in thirty-five years. Although the
most recent signs point to a slight revival it seems
unlikely that the Social Democratic Labor Party
(Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti) will
maintain its near majority of the popular vote in
next year’s Riksdag election. It is even possible
that the three ‘bourgeois’ parties—the Moderates
(conservative), Liberals and Centrists (agrarian)
—may be able to form a coalition which would
end the Socialist rule. That prospect, though re-
mote, is causing great concern in Socialist circles.”

(*) — THE SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMO-
CRATS; THEIR IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOP-
MENT, by Herbert Tingsten. Totowa, N.J., Bed-
minster Press, 1973. 719 p.

“This study of the ideological transforma-
tion of the Swedish Social Democratic Party from
its radical beginnings in the 1880s and 1890s
down to the Second World War is. . . . [an account

46

of the] Social Democratic movement in Western
Europe. [It is an analysis] of the changing ideas
of the leadership and rank and file as the party
became larger and assured greater power. . .
[This] work first appeared in 1941 [in Swedish] .”

5. The Communist Party

THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE SWEDISH
CP, by Daniel Tarschys, in Problems of Com-
munism, v.23, no.3 (May-June 1974) 36—44.

“The key position that the Swedish Com-
munists have occupied for the last three years,
and may retain if Mr. Palme chooses to satisfy
the Social Democratic left wing, makes it timely
to take a fresh look at the recent development of
the party and to assess its role in the Swedish
political system. The direct influence of the small
Communist parliamentary delegation, to be sure,
is slight, since the government never enters into
negotiations with it or consults its members before
laying down government policy. As a social and
political force, however, the Communists have
certainly had at least a limited impact on Social
Democratic conduct, and their presence centinues

to affect the chemistry of political decisions in
Stockholm.”

6. Church-State Relations

SWEDEN FACES CHURCH-STATE ECU-
MENICAL PROBLEMS, in The Christian Ceri-
tury, v.88, no.8 (24 February 1971) 258—259.

“If recent statistics can be believed Sweden
is indisputably the most Christian country in the
world. The Church of Sweden (Lutheran) reports
that 96.4 per cent of the total Swedish population
are members of that church, and the various free
churches, the Roman Catholic Church and the
Orthodox communions report an aggregate mem-
bership of more than 5 per cent of the population.
So it would seem that Sweden is very religious
indeed. The ancient and rather peculiar relation-
ship between the Swedish government and the
churches has been under parliamentary investiga-
tion for more than ten years. The most recent
commission, appointed in 1968, is chaired by
Sweden’s deputy foreign minister Mrs. Alva
Myrdal. The commission is expected to make rec-
ommendations to Parliament by 1972 about the
future relationship between the state and the vari-
ous churches in Sweden. Tragically, although
there has been plenty of time for them to do so,
the churches have not yet been able to get together
in order to present to the government an ecu-
menical proposal as to what the church-state set-
up should be. It seems that the churches are
expecting Parliament not only to solve the perti-
nent legal questions but alsto to adjudicate
matters which should be exclusively the responsi-
bility of the churches.”

D. Internal Conditions: Causes and Effects

1. Miscellaneous Aspects
GUNNAR M Y R D A L TALKS ABOUT
TROUBLES IN “UTOPIA,” in Nation’s Business,
v.59, no.4 (April 1971) 44—45 plus.

Way-out welfarism and unionism have pro-
duced a smorgasbord of troubles for the Swedes,
and many of them are having second thoughts
about government goodies and how they’re . con-
sumed. . . The impossible happened in the welfare
state of Sweden not long ago. Tens of thousands
of Swedes—professionals, including judges, doc-
tors and' teachers; various white collar workers,
including municipal employees; and railwaymen—
went on strike. It was class strife in an egalitaran
society and it came at a time when taxes were
incredibly high and when inflation in a nation so
often called ‘Utopia’ roared up and up and up. As
springtime arrived, it was obvious that changes
could be expected in Swedish welfarism, and in
the public’s attitude towards unions. One man
who saw a need for changes was an architect of
this welfare state: Gunnar Myrdal, the interna-
tionally renowned thinker and economist. In his
small office near the top of a Stockholm sky-
scraper, he talked to a NATION’S BUSINESS
editor about his views.”

THE “MODEL” WELFARE STATE RUNS
INTO TROUBLE, in U.S. News (Q World Report,
v.70, no.19 (10 May 1971) 92—94.

“Strikes . . . soaring taxes . . . rising crime.
Those are just some of woes plaguing once-tran-
quil Sweden—and no easy solutions are in sight.”

THE NEW TOTALITARIANS, by Roland
Huntford. New York, Stein and Day, 1972. 354 p.
“The author seeks to show that Sweden is
totally controlled by a bureaucracy which actively
discourages all signs of individuality. . . [The
author evaluates] Sweden from the traditional
values of British liberal individualism.”

POLITICS IN THE POST-WELFARE
STATE; RESPONSES TO THE NEW INDI-
VIDUALISM, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and
Gideon Sjoberg. New York, Columbia University
Press, 1972. 335 p.

The third part“ of this collection of essays
deals with Sweden and consists of: Post—Welfare
Modernization in Sweden—The Quest for Cumula-
tive Rationality and Equality; Individualism and
Collectivism; Swedish Radicalism in the 1960s—
An Experiment in Political and Cultural Debate;
and Democracy and Large Organizations.

THE RICH AND UNHAPPY SWEDES—
WHAT’S TROUBLING THEM, in U.S. News &:
World Report, v.75, no.5 (30 July 1973) 68—7 1.

“A visit to Sweden turns up some big sur-
prises these days, as detailed in a cabled dispatch

from Joseph Fromm, this magazine’s Senior Euro-
pean Editor. . . Prosperity is not as impressive as
it first seems, and the price Swedes pay for securi-
ty is greater than appears on the surface.”
SWEDEN: HOW MUCH GOVERNMENT
IS TOO MUCH ?, by Irwin Ross, in Reader’s Di-
gest, v.104, no.624 (April 1974) 168-169 plus.
“Her cradle-to-grave social benefits are
inordinately generous. But taxes are astronomical,
and signs of popular disenchantment are mount-
ing. . . Sweden’s election last September 16 was
so close that the country had to wait for three
days until 50,000 postal votes were counted and
the extraordinary outcome was confirmed—an
outright tie. . . Behind the stalemate lies an ironi-
cal story of disenchantment in the world’s show-
case welfare state. .For years, Sweden’s ‘middle
way’—designed and carried through by the Social

Democrats—has been held up as a model of how a

modern industrial society should be run. Simply
put, it meant an economy, directed by a strong
government acting in concert with an enterprising
private sector and a well-developed cooperative
movement. Everyone pretty much agreed on the
goals of full employment, a high rate of growth
and abundant welfare measures. Sweden’s crad-
dle—to—grave social-security system became the
object of envy; Swedes enjoyed Europe’s highest
wages and living standards. Yet paradoxically, a
visitor encounters one of the world’s highest
decibel counts of complaints—about inflation, ex-
cessive bureaucracy, high taxes.”

SWEDEN’S QUEST FOR EQUALITY, by
Paul Dickson, in The Progressive, v.36, no.11

‘ (November 1972) 23—25.

“Zealous cliches to the contrary, Sweden is
no utopia. However, as a nation it has come to
grips with the fundamental problems of hunger,
unemployment, and poverty and offers its citizens
a high level of security, amenities, and opportuni-
ties through a series of social systems ranging
from day care for infants to a national pension
program. . . The important news from Sweden is
not that it is an imperfect, prospering Western
society but that it is attempting new solutions to
those problems which still exist—in short, that
this experimental society is continuing to experi-
ment. The latest and perhaps most exciting de-
velopment in the course of the Swedish Social
Democrat ‘experiment’ is an attempt to enact a
series of reforms which fall under the banner of
greater equality. It is a difficult task, which,
among other things, means rethinking and reform-
ing earlier innovations such as a national pension
system, national health insurance, and educational
opportunities. To illustrate: Sweden’s detonation
of an education explosion over the last two decades
has advanced the opportunities and skills of the

47

young but left those of the older generations Iag-
ging. Under its new equality program Sweden
is priming a similar explosion in adult education.
The equality issue has brought with it more than
a little anguish as the nation confronts the ques-
tions of the limits of equality and its costs. By all
accounts, equality has become and will continue
to be the most fundamental issue for Sweden in
the 1970s.”

SWEET SWEDEN; SILENCE, SCHNAPPS
AND SOCIALISM ON THE ROAD-TO UTOPIA,
in Atlas, v.20, no.11 (December 1971) 22—24.

From Maclean’s Toronto. . . “ ‘Eight mil-
lion characters in search of an author,’ says Peter
C. Newman about the Swedes. In offering his
personal reactions to Sweden, Newman, the lively
new editor-in-chief of ‘Maclean’s,’ a quickly ex-
panding Canadian monthly, goes a long way
toward providing them with the author he thinks
they need.”

THEY EARN $16,000 — THEIR TAXES
ARE $8,000, by Leonard Gross, in Look, v.34,
no.6 (24 March 1970) 21—27.

“Meet the Edstroms. They live in Sweden.
Runo produces television programs. Cay markets
literary properties. What they keep of what they
earn will make most Americans shudder. Why,
then, that contented glow? . . . They each enjoy
their work. And they’ve just bought a house, to
shelter a growing brood. But a decisive per-
centage of their contentment is profit from an
asset we Americans have suddenly found missing
—a sound, secure environment. With just $8,000
to spend a year, Runo and Cay Edstrom live well
in a livable town, Stockholm. . . The one incontro-
vertible point is that Runo and Gay Edstrom seem
to be getting their money’s worth for the taxes
they pay their city. At least they can live there. . .
Nor are Stockholm’s solutions perfect. But they
do suggest what can happen when a city is or-
ganized to deal with its problems, and its people
give it the means. Their contribution is founded on
broad national policy. That policy may, at points,
be at philosophical odds with our own. But some
of its features are worth considering—particular-
ly the national government’s concept of its re-
sponsibility to the city. Where problems are of
national origin, like crime, is not the national
government obliged to furnish cities the means to
cure their woes? Sweden’s answer is yes—it sup-
ports its cities directly, for example, by payment
of policemen’s salaries. Its support is indirect, as
well, in the consideration it gives each taxpayer
for the taxes he pays to his city.”

TROUBLE IN PARADISE, in Forbes, v.109,
no.7 (1 April 1972) 22—23.

“Sweden has a fine industrial system,
almost full employment, no slums, no poverty——

48

but the middle class is getting tired of paying
the price . . . Do businessmen and executives
work for money alone? Or for the thrill of the
battle for the sense of power and accomplish-
ment? For both, of course. But would the- busi-
nessman work as eagerly and with the same—
concentration if his income wasn’t much higher
than that of his subordinate who quits promptly
at five? Can you blend economic equality with
incentive? Sweden has been trying. It has
achieved some impressive successes. The US.
can and should learn from them. But the basic
conflict remains: The Swedes, like the Russians
(and, in the long run, probably, the Chinese),
have failed to change human nature. Faced with
a near-confiscatory tax burden for the middle
class, many Swedish executives practice more or
less open evasion. Others seek jobs outside the
country so that their families can live better. Far
more than their American counterparts, Swedish
executives resort to double expense account-s,
houses and investments overseas and overseas
assignments to ease the burden of taxation.”
2. Education

SWEDEN’S NEW COMPREHENSIVE-
NESS, by Christopher Price, in New Statesman,
v.79, no.2041 (24 April 1970) 576—577.

“Cold logic . . . seems to govern all deci-
sions in Sweden’s educational network. It has
been applied to the whole school system for over
20 years and has put Sweden educationally well
ahead of every other Western nation. Of course
the Swedes are lucky in being the sort of cohesive
community in which you can carry out rational
reform. With no coloured immigrants and hardly
any Catholics, they have only a few immigrant
Finns, Turks and Greeks to disturb the tidy pat-
tern of institutional and curricular organisation
which the Ministry of Education lays down. All
the same, their achievement has been impressive.”

E. Strategic Import of Sweden

SWEDEN AND NORDIC BALANCE, by
Col. Albert Leo Romaneski, in Parameters, v.1,
no.2 (Fall 1971) 54—65.

“How can a non-aligned country contribute
to the military and political balance between the
great power blocs in its own region? . . . Although
relegated to the status of a third rate power,
Sweden has continued to a surprising degree, to
influence world events in the Twentieth Century.
This influence is exerted largely by its national
vigor, by its example of social and industrial
progress, by its contributions to humanitarian
causes, by its activist participation in interna-
tional organizations, and by its military involve-
ment in the peacekeeping operations of the United
Nations. Modern Sweden occupies a central posi-

tion at the head of the Baltic, on NATO’s northern
flank . . . Although less volatile, the Baltic and
the Scandinavian peninsula are in many respects
significant to western defense. There are some
who contend that the buildup of the Soviet Navy
and Merchant Marine in the Baltic is occurring
simultaneously with a parallel expansion in the
Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. These
observers see the Soviet naval threat to Western
Europe as naval pincers, with the southern arm
through the Mediterranean and the northern arm
through the Baltic. Sweden, an armed neutral,
provides a military and political balance between
NATO Norway and Denmark, and non-aligned
Finland, which lies under close Soviet scrutiny.
The Scandinavian states thwart direct Soviet
access through the narrow exits of the Baltic, and
they lie directly beneath the shortest air and mis-
sile route between Soviet and North American
population and industrial centers. An analysis of
the SWedish Armed Forces emphasizes the degree
to which Sweden contributes to the delicate bal-
ance in the Scandinavian region. The power
equation of Scandinavia, generally termed Nordic
Balance, minimizes the amount of resources that
NATO nations must devote to the region’s secu-
rity. Similarly, the goals of the Soviet Union
seem to favor a. neutral, non-nuclear Scandi-
navia which does not seriously threaten Soviet
access to the Atlantic through the Baltic straits.
Because Denmark and Norway are NATO coun-
tries, a non-aligned Sweden is essential to Soviet
security.”

F. National Defense and the Armed Forces

SWEDEN, in Armed Forces International,
v.110, no.6 (February 1973) 22-80.

A great portion of this issue of the journal
deals with a review of various aspects concerning
Sweden, including the following: Sweden—Les-
sons Worth Learning?; To Stay Neutral, Be
Ready to Fight; Budget Crunch in Sweden Too;
Sweden’s Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air
Force); Materiel R&D and Procurement; New
Approaches in R&D for the Future; Arms Export
Policies May Ease; and Sweden’s Aerospace
Industry.

(LI) SWEDEN—WELFARE COSTS VS.
NATIONAL DEFENSE, by Henry R. Mills.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College,
1973. 58 p. (M6573S—Professional Study.)

“A review of the economic, political and
defense situation in Sweden for the purpose of
illustrating how the high cost of social welfare
benefits is now interfering with the country’s
ability to maintain a modern defense establish-
ment. It indicates that this development is in
turn having an impact on the country’s political

thinking which could eventually result in modifi-
cation of its traditional neutralistic policies. The
study speculates on the future policies of Sweden,
particularly regarding defense, and onhow they
could influence the policies of other Western
European countries as well asthe United States.”

‘WITH UNDERSTANDING AND
STRENGTH’; SWEDEN’S NAVAL SOCIETY
CELEBRATES ITS 200TH ANNIVERSARY, by
Stephan A. Schwartz, in Sea Power, v.15,no.1
(January 1972) 14—16.

“As the headlines of the day turn more
and more to the Soviet naval buildup, especially
their interest in the Baltic, it is worth remem-
bering for a moment the naval traditions of the
countries other than Russia which border those
northern waters. In a time when the seas seem
dominated by two superpowers, one tends to for-
get that control of the seas has passed from hand
to hand and that the same principles which rule
international relations today have done so since
long before the advent of steam, let alone nuclear
power. And yet, the world’s oldest society dedi-
cated exclusively to the study of all phases of the
naval sciences does not find its headquarters in
any of the European countries which would come
easily to mind. It is not Britain, France, Portugal
or Spain, although certainly the maritime tradi.
tion figures strongly in those countries’ pasts.
Instead it lies in Sweden, today a country sym-
bolizing the neutral middle road. Although
Sweden has not had a war since 1814—over 150
years—she nonetheless maintains a strong inter-
est in the seas, for her size a powerful naval
force, and an institute to study naval sciences
which has an unbroken continuity dating back
200 years.”

G. Foreign Relations

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

AFTER VIETNAM— SWEDEN MAKES
PLANS, by Richard Dudman, in War/Peace
Report, v.9, no.4 (April 1969‘) 11 plus. 7

“Having becomethe‘ first Western country
to recognize Hanoi diplomatically, Sweden is now
spearheading a joint Scandinavian effort to plan
ahead for the rebuilding 0f both Northand South
Vietnam after the war ends.’

FOCUS ON SWEDEN. ASIA REPORTS,
in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 78, no. 47 (18
November 1972) 17—24 plus. A -

A brief review of Sweden’s relation with
Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, North Vietnam, New Zea-
land, Philippines, PakiStan, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. '

LETTER FROM ‘ STOCKHOLM, ' by ,SteVen

49

Kelman, in The New Yorker, v.46, no.45 (26
December 1970) 36—46 plus.

“ ‘Sverige ar j u ett litet land’——these are
probably the most common words. in the Swedish
language. They mean ‘Sweden is a small country,’
and they are used' to explain almost everything
about Sweden, from its internal achievements to
the sense of frustration arising from the gap
between its self-image as a guardian of interna-
tional morality and the impotence of its foreign
policy. If a Swede wants to express sympathy
for the problems the United States faces, he finds
it sufficient to say, ‘Your country is so big.’ And
when students in Stockholm stage demonstrations
against the ‘ Vietnam war, although they like to
imagine that they are shaking United States
imperialism to its foundations, they know, deep
down, that nobody is listening. Those features of
Sweden that the Swedes do not explain by size
they chalk up to isolation. ‘Vi ar ju sa isolerade
har uppe’ (‘We are so isolated up here’). Sweden
has indeed been largely isolated from the rest of
Western Europe for most of the two hundred and
fifty years since it ceased to be a great power,
and any Swede will tell you that Stockholm is far
less Continental than even Copenhagen . . . One
result of the country’s smallness and isolation is
that events in Sweden reCeive very little coverage
in the world press . . . I came to Stockholm to
check vague and fragmentary reports to the
effect that Sweden was being racked by an almost
Italianate political instability.”

SWEDEN; NEUTRALITY, NOT SILENCE,
by Olof Palme, in Vital Speeches of the Day, v.36,
no.19 (15 July 1970) 578—580.

Delivered before the National Press Club,
Washington, DC, June 5, 1970 . . . The Prime
Minister of Sweden devotes “this introduction to
Swedish foreign policy to some general remarks
on the relations between small countries and great
powers and finally a few words about our internal
problems. [He states] We usually describe the
fundamental principle of our Swedish foreign
policy as freedom of alliances in peacetime aiming
at neutrality in case of war.”

2. Swedish-United States Relations
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS B E T W E E N
UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN. Washing-
ton, Government Printing Office, 19-73. 2 p.
(93d Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Calendar
no.354, Report 93.374.)

Report from the Committee on Foreign
Relations to accompany S.Res.149. This report
shows that the committee considers favorably the
resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that
the U.S. Government and Sweden should restore
their normal friendly relations.

INTERVIEW WITH OLOF PALME,

50

SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER: WHY
SWEDEN IS CRITICAL OF U.S. ROLE IN
VIETNAM, in U.S. News. & World Report, v.68,
no.25 (22 June 1970) 48—49.

“Friendship between Sweden and U.S. has
been badly chilled over war in Asia. GI deserters
find a haven in Sweden. Americans wonder:
Can such a country call itself neutral? Sweden’s
Prime Minister came to the conference room of
‘U.S. News & World Report’ to discuss the ques-.
tion in this interview.”

THE PALME BRANCH, in Newsweek, v.81,
no.3 (15 January 1973) 26-27.

“When the subject of United States policy
in Vietnam surfaces, the flinty blue eyes 'of
Sweden’s Prime Minister 'Olof Palme, 45, grow
frostier than an Arctic winter. In his latest out-
burst, Palme compared the U.S. bombing of North
Vietnam to the worst work of the Nazis in World
War II. Now he has followed that up with a
campaign to enlist 2 million Swedes behind a
petition urging President Nixon to end the bomb-
ing once and for all. Predictably enough, diplo-
matic relations between the U.S. and Sweden have
plunged totheir lowest point in years.”

PALME’S PICNIC, in Newsweek, v.75, no.25
(22 June 1970) 44.

“When Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme
arrived at New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel last
week, he was greeted on the sidewalk by an
unfriendly crowd of burly, flag-waving longshore-
men. In protest against what they considered to
be Sweden’s pro-North Vietnamese bias, the dock
workers had already refused to unload a cargo of
Volvos, forcing the freighter which carried the
cars to take them back to Sweden . . . Palme had
been angling for an invitation to meet with Presi-
dent Nixon. The call never came . . . Palme fore-
swore the protocol of a state visit and pressed on
with a busy nine-day tour . . . All this was, in a
sense, a selling job aimed over the head of Presi-
dent Nixon at the American people. But why,
many wondered, had Palme felt that such a high-
powered sales effort in the U.S. was necessary at
all? Some observers in Sweden chalked it up to

.domestic politics . . . Another reason for Palme’s

unusual visit was undoubtedly economic. Since he
came to power last October, the once smoothly
functioning Swedish economy has developed some
disturbing tremors, and there is even speculation
that the country’s currency may have to be
devalued after the elections. As a consequence,
Palme came under severe pressure from both
industry and labor to try to appease anti-Swedish
feeling in the U.S. in order to avert the possi-
bility of a bochtt of Swedish products by Amer-
ican consumers.”

SWEDEN’S OLOF PALME: “NEUTRAL

BUT NOT SILENT,” in Time, (29 January 1973)
35.

“No political figure in the Western world
was more critical of President Nixon’s decision
to resume the bombing of North Viet Nam than
Sweden’s Prime Minister Olof Palme. In an
emotional statement last December, Palme, 45, an
intense, dedicated socialist, compared the aerial
attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong to the past atroci-
ties of ‘Guernica, Oradour, Babi Yar, Katyn,
Lidice, Sharpeville, Treblinka.’ Washington, long
annOyed by Sweden’s harsh criticism of the U.S.
role in the war, reacted sharply, telling Stock-
holm, in effect, not to bother sending a new
ambassador to the U.S. capital for the time being.
Will those ill feelings last into the peace? Palme
for one does not think so.”

THE SWEDISH VIEW OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY, by Barbara Guthrie, in Govern-
ment Executive, v.4, no.8 (August 1972) 67.

“Sweden, officially, is not anti-American,
but anti-war, and advocates a political solution
to Vietnam. Sweden does not permit sale of arms
to any country involved in armed conflict. Ship-
building is not competitive to the U.S. on the
international scene. Many Swedes are emigrating
to’ Australia but about half of these have returned.
Officially, Sweden claims its interests in the U.S.
are much stronger than most people realize. But,
to many Americans, Sweden’s claimed ‘neutrality’
over U.S. policy and actions elsewhere in the
world often look as though it is biased, even
strongly, in favor of U.S. adversaries.”

U. S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH
SWEDEN. HEARING, SEPTEMBER 12, 1973,
U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE. Wash-
ington. Government Printing Office, 1973. 20 p.
(93d Congress, 1st Session.)

Interruption of diplomatic relations follow-
ing Swedish criticism of the United States role
in Vietnam; possibilities of their restoration.

3. Foreign Aid

AID AND DEVELOPMENT; A HAND-
BOOK FOR SMALL DONORS, by Marian Radet-
ski. New York, Praeger, 1973. 323 p.

Part I—Principles and Methods (What Is
Aid?; Development and Its Bottlenecks; The

Interrelationships Between Aid and Develop-.

ment) ; Part II—Problems of Application (The
Specific Characteristics of Swedish Aid; Swedish
Aid to East Africa—Factors That Hamper De-
velopment in. Kenya and Tanzania; Swedish Aid
to East Africa—and Overall Assessment; Swedish
Aid to East Africa—Individual Project Assess-
ments; A Case for New Directions in Swedish
Aid?) . With appendixes, notes, and bibliography.

PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT, by Ernst

Michanek, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.78,
no.47 (18 November 1972) 7—8.

“Sweden has endeavoured, so far, to keep
its development assistance programme as far as
possible distinct from its trade relationship with
the outside world, on which it is so dependent for
its own economic development. When Swedish aid
officials speak of foreign relations, they touch
only briefly, or not at all, on trade but stress the
united ‘pure’ air concept. Trade officials discuss
aid, if at all, in terms of levels of quantitative
restrictions on trade, preferential treatment and
the like. The two groups meet too rarely. In Asia,
a' potential ‘donor’ government representative is
often met with question-s like this: How can we,
right from the beginning of our relationship,
direct our efforts towards the repayment—one
day, in some form—of transfers that you may be
willing and interested to make now? The donor

representative may have little to say, for, in eco-

nomic terms, his is primarily a grant programme,
and the repayment is considered a distant or non-
existent eventuality. This is not the place to dis-
cuss in-depth or even question Swedish aid policy
—an evaluation will be undertaken soon by a
Royal Commission.”-
4. Policy of Neutrality
SWEDISH NEUTRALITY: ITS IMPACT
ON NATO, by Lt. Col. Peter J. Gaustad, in Mili-
tary Review, v.54, no.4 (April 1974) 46-53..
“Within historical perspectives, the con-
cept of neutrality is relatively recent. Presently
accepted laws of neutrality are based upon treaties
made during the 17th and 18th Centuries. These
concepts are not particularly specific. . . Sweden’s
very existence as a small but powerful neutral in
the critical Baltic area has a definite impact on
the credibility and, to a lesser extent, on the via-
bility of the NATO deterrent. Even though the
offer to form a Northern Defense Union was re-
jected by Norway and Denmark, this offer appar-
ently still stands. The Soviets would be delighted
to see these two countries split off from NATO,
even if the purpose were to form an armed neutral
bloc whose existence is dedicated to countering
Soviet expansion into Scandinavia. . . The disrup-
tive influences which Swedish neutrality has on
NATO result primarily from the apparent attrac-
tion Sweden exercises to draw the two Scandi-
navian members of NATO off to join it in a
neutral bloc. While this possibility receives con-
siderable public consideration, it has never been
realistically attractive to the two NATO coun-
tries. Even though Sweden has not found it in
its interests to join NATO, its basic interests are
aligned with those of the West. Although NATO
cannot count on Sweden’s military assistance,
there is virtually no possibility it Would ever be

51

used against the NATO countries. The Soviets
cannot make this assumption. In addition, as
German influence in Europe increases, there is
the definite possibility that Swedish neutrality
will again be slanted toward the German cause
and against that of the Soviet Union.”

H. Economic Aspects

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

A CHANGE OF MOOD IN NORWAY AND

SWEDEN, by George Soloveytchik, in Contem-
porary Review, v.217, no.1259 (December 1970)
323—328.
' “During 1969/1970 a great change of mood
has come to the Scandinavian countries which for
many years had been ‘Europe’s quiet corner.’
Even at the best of times, however, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden were by 'no means one solid
entity. Despite many similarities in the handling
of their domestic affairs, especially in social and
cultural matters, there were many differences in
economic policy; while in foreign affairs and na-
tional defence there was hardly a common denomi-
nator. The national character, the traditions, the
wartime experiences and the postwar interests of
the Nordic countries are not at all the same. This
is particularly striking in the case of Norway and
Sweden today. Despite the unprecedented growth
of trade between them, which began in 1960 but
took an enormous leap forward after 1967, the
present mood of these neighbouring nations could
hardly be more dissimilar. Whereas Sweden has
turned. ‘sour,’ Norway is enjoying a most impres-
sive period of expansion. Activity in every field
seems suddenly to have replaced the usual atmos-
phere of tranquillity. Not only in Oslo but
throughout the country the people are on the
move. and their prosperity is visible to the naked
eye.”

THE ECONOMY OF SWEDEN: A STUDY
OF THE MODERN WELFARE STATE, by Mar-
tin Schnitzer. New York, Praeger, 1970. 252 p.

“In this study of the banking, public
finance, stabilization policies, social welfare legis-
lation, labor-management and government-busi-
ness relations of Sweden, the author describes how
this "showcase country has achieved its high stan-
dard of living, eradicated poverty, maintained a
high level of employment 1n the postwar era, and
combined many of the institutions of capitalism
and socialism into a well-developed economic and
political system.”

LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMES-
TIC OPERATIONS, by Lawrence J. Eckstron.
rev. 3rd ed. New York, Clark Boordman Co., Ltd.,
1973. 2 v.

Provides pertinent information also for op-
erations in the following foreign countries, among

52

others: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

SWEDEN, in E.I . U. Quarterly Economic Re-
view, no.3 (1973) 13 p.

An analysis of current economic trends, in-
cluding accompanying information on the political
scene. With statistical tables.

SWEDEN, in E] . U. Quarterly Economic Re-
view, (Annual Supplement 1973) 21 p.

This Annual Supplement provides basic
economic information. Contents: Government
and General; Population; Employment; Curren-
cy; National Accounts; Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fishing; Mining, Fuel, and Power, Manufactur-
ing Industry; Transport and Communications;
Finance, Foreign Trade and Payments; Trade
Regulations and Exchange Regulations; Weights
and Measures; and Bibliography.

SWEDEN. A BUSINESS SURVEY, in The
Economist, v.249, no. 6795 (17 November 1973)
7 7 —7 8 plus.

“The new governor of the Swedish central
bank is to be Mr. Krister Wickman, the present
foreign minister. Swedish businessmen have re-
ceived the news with less than delight. . . Until
recently smooth and very Swedish relations be-
tween an almost permanently socialist government
and a highly monopoly-capitalist business have
been one of the three main foundations of Swedish
economic success. . . Throughout forty years of
almost unbroken socialist rule, Swedish business
has been in the hands of a Japanese-style zaibat-
su. . . . Mr. Wickman may try to use the state’s
considerable indirect influence over credit to
channel funds to the wrong places. None of these
risks looks very serious right now. But Swedish
businessmen will not forget them. Certainly not
if Mr. Palme regains his majority next year—and
if the moderate, respected and long-serving Mr.
Strang (age 67) then finally retires from the
finance ministry. It takes three to make a con-
sensus. Sweden’s danger is that government and
business may fall out again—and seriously next
time.”

SWEDEN: A LID ON EXPANSION OF
MULTINATIONALS, in Business Week, no. 2320
(2 March 1974) 32.

“Sweden is taking a tough new line with
multinational corporations. . . The Social Demo-

. cratic government of Olof Palme pr0posed a law

that would require Swedish multinationals such
as Volvo and L. M. Ericsson to submit all foreign
expansion plans. A government board will then
judge whether the expansion will impair Swedish
employment.”

SWEDEN; OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS.
Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1973. 51 p.

Annual economic review of Sweden. De-

parture from past trends; changes in the labour
market; the Swedish economy in 1973; etc. With
tables and diagrams.
2. Sweden and the European Economic Com»
munity
SWEDEN, 'SCANDINAVIA, AND THE
EEC, by M. Donald Hancock, in International
Affairs, v.48, no.3 (July 1972) 424—437.
“Denmark and Norway’s determination to
follow the British lead in joining the EEC pose a
serious dilemma for Swedish foreign policy
makers. If they also sought membership of the
Common Market, with its overlapping member-
ship of NATO, the result might be to impose limits
on Swedish neutrality. Alternatively, a decision to
remain outside the EEC could result in the disrup-
tion of regional solidarity. Fully aware of the
negative implications of both policy extremes, the
Swedish government opted in March 1971 for a
middle solution: a trade agreement with the EEC
that falls short of formal membership (and hence
does not jeopardise neutrality) yet fulfills
national aspirations ‘to participate in the expan-
sion of the European communities through
comprehensive, close, and enduring economic
relations.’ From the Swedish point of view the
urgency of a satisfactory arrangement was
emphasized in January 1972 when Britain,
Ireland, and the two western Scandinavian
states signed agreements with the EEC on full
membership. Negotiations opened between Swe-
dish officials and representatives of the Euro-
pean Commission in March and continued into
the summer. It was hoped that Sweden would
be able to conclude a satisfactory treaty by the
end of July and that it would enter into force at
the same time as the anticipated expansion of the
EEC on January 1, 1973. The policy chosen by
Sweden illuminates two closely related issues af-
fecting national foreign policy and regional rela-
tions: (1) the significance of neutrality as a
central factor dictating the decision taken in
March 1971; and (2) the substance of the Swedish
as well as the Norwegian and Danish debate on
the membership question. In broader perspective,
both of these issues raise a question of a more
speculative nature. What is likely to be the effect
of the disparate Nordic response to the enlarge-
ment of the EEC on future patterns of Scandi-
navian co-operation and relations with the rest
of Europe? A preliminary analysis suggests sev-
eral conceivable regional systems, each of which
remains open to choice.” '
3. Banking and Finance
ACTIVITIES BY VARIOUS CENTRAL
BANKS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS. A STAFF

REPORT PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 91ST CONGRESS, SEC-
OND SESSION. Washington, Government Print-
ing Office, 1971. 322 p. (Committee Print.)

Includes, among others, the description of
the monetary instruments of Sweden, policy,
liquidity ratios, annual credit agreements, the
bond queue, and control of overdrafts. One of the
appendixes describes the banking system of
Sweden and includes a bibliography.

4. Foreign Trade
EXPORTING KNOWLEDGE, by Goran Eng-
blom, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.78,
no.47 (18 November 1972) 9 plus.

“Swedish industry has always regarded
foreign trade as necessary and natural. Like
many other countries, it has become dependent
on the world“ market which has stimulated its
economic expansion in postwar years. The volume
of foreign trade has increased about twice as fast
as the volume of production. Exports and im-
ports today correspond to about one-fifth of our
total production. Swedish industry sells about
45% of its products to foreign-countries. But our
international contacts are not limited to trade in
goods; to a growing extent they take the form
of an exchange of knowledge, and trade in patents
and licences is growing fast. Another indication
of our dependence on the world market is that in
increasing numbers Swedish firms are establish-
ing subsidiaries abroad. Sweden is very much an
open market. Our import duties are among the
lowest in the world. In accordance with the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) agreement in 1971, all import
duties on capital goods from developing countries
have been abolished. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that Sweden is an easy market; there is keen
competition, not only in prices but also with re-
gard to quality, design, packaging, terms of pay-
ment and other factors. Our industry has become
accustomed to being exposed to severe competi-
tion—even on the domestic market. Without this
competition, Swedish industry would not have
been able to hold the place it does in world trade
today.”

I. History

(*)-—DIPLOMAT, by Gunnar Hagglof. Lon-
don, Badley Head, 1972. 221 p. .

“. . . Memoirs of distinguished Swedish
diplomat who played a crucial part in Sweden’s
policy of neutrality during the Second World War.
Strongly anti-Nazi himself, Hagglof’s story pro-
vides a valuable account of Sweden’s role in the
war.”

53

CHAPTER VII

MATERIALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND REFERENCE

 

A. Atlases

BRITANNICA ATLAS. Chicago, Encylo-
paedia Britannica, Inc., 1974. Various paging.

In treating the entire world scene, this
Atlas also covers, among many others: Denmark,
Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the
Faeroe Islands, the North Atlantic Ocean, the
Arctic Ocean area, etc.

HAMMOND CITATION WORLD ATLAS.
Maplewood, N. J ., Hammond, Inc., 1973. 352 p.

Aside from covering the World and Polar
Regions in general, the Atlas covers the specific
areas, including among many other countries,
those of Northern Europe, such as Norway,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland.

OXFORD WORLD ATLAS. New York, Ox-
ford University Press, Inc., 1973. 190 p.

Ocean Maps (including the Atlantic
Ocean); The Physical Environment (Including
the Arctic Region and all of Europe) ; The Human
Environment (including all of Europe); Topo-
graphic Maps (including Scandinavia); Urban
Maps; and Thematic Maps.

(*)—PICTURE ATLAS OF THE ARCTIC,
by R. Thoren. New York, American Elsevier Pub-
lishing Co., 1970. 449 p.

“The author has organized his book by
area: the Arctic Ocean, drifting ice stations, Arc-
tic Alaska . . . the Norwegian arctic islands, Arctic
Scandinavia and the Soviet Arctic. Discussed
under each region are such topics as ice condi-
tions, transportaton, mineral resources, settle-
ments, physical geography, etc.” With bibliog-
raphy. '

B. Encyclopedias

A DICTIONARY OF POLITICS, ed. by
Walter Lacqueur and others. rev. ed. New York,
The Free Press, 1973. 565 p.

“This dictionary, arranged alphabetically,
has assembled over 3,000 entries and covers all
the major nations and areas [including, among
others, Denmark, The Faeroe Islands, Finland,
Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, NATO, etc.]
and alliances of the world, leading statesmen and

’54

politicians, important political ideas and concepts,
and crucial events in world history.”

THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK, 1973; A
WORLD SURVEY. VOLUME I—PART I—
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; PART
II — EUROPE. London, Europa Publications
Limited, 1973. 1546 p.

The introduction includes a chart providing
the following information for all European coun-
tries, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Nor-
way, and Sweden: area, population; population
density, population annual increase, average life
expectancy, gross national product, etc. Part I
provides detailed information about the following
international organizations of which-at least some
of the Scandinavian countries are members: The
United States, NATO, Nordic Council. Part II
provides the following type of information for all
the European countries including the Scandi-
navian countries: Land and the people, recent
history, government, defense, economic affairs,
transport and communications, social welfare,
education, tourism, and statistical surveys of area
and population, agriculture, forestry, fishing,
mining, industry, finance, external trade, trans-
port, education, etc. Also provides information on
the constitution, government and politics, religion,
the press and publishers, etc.

WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
NATIONS; EUROPE, ed. by Louis Barron. New
York, Harper & Row, 1971. 340 p.

A practical guide to the geographic, his-
torical, political, social, and economic status of all
nations (including Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden, among others), their inter-
national relationships, and the United Nations
system. For each country the following informa-
tion is provided: location, size, and extent;
topography; climate; flora and fauna; popula-
tion; ethnic groups; language; religion; transpor-
tation; communications; history; government;
political parties; local government; judicial sys-
tems; armed forces; migration; international co-
operation; economy; income; labor; agriculture;
animal husbandry; fishing; forestry; mining;

energy and power; industry; domestic trade;
foreign trade; balance of payments; banking; in-
surance; securities; public finance; taxation; cus-
tom and duties; foreign investments; economic
policy; health; social welfare; housing; education;
libraries and museums; organizations; press;
tourism; bibliography; etc.

C. Yearbooks

JANE’S ALL THE WORLD’S AIRCRAFT,
19-73—74, 'comp. and ed. by John W. R. Taylor.
New York, Jane’s Yearbooks, 1973. 810 p.

Descriptions, technical data, manufactur-
ing companies, and photos of aircraft produced
by the following Scandinavian countries, among
many others of the world: Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden.

JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1973—74, ed. by
Capt. John E. Moore. London, Jane’s Yearbooks,
1973. 670 p.

Includes descriptions, technical data, and
photos of such craft produced by the following
Scandinavian countries, among many other coun-
tries of the world: Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden.

JANE’S FREIGHT CONTAINERS, ed. by
Patrick Finlay. London, Jane’s Yearbooks, 1973.
662 p. .

Information and photos of ports and inland
transport of the following countries, among
others: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
Section two provides information on ship opera-
tors of those countries, among others. Section
seven gives information on airports of Denmark,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, among others.

JANE’S SURFACE SKIMMERS; HOVER-
CRAFT AND HYDROFOILS, 1973—74, ed. by
Roy McLeavy. London, Jane’s Yearbooks, 1973.
411 p.

Includes descriptions, technical data, and
photos of such craft produced by Sweden, among
many others.

JANE’S WORLD RAILWAYS, 1973—74, ed.
by Henry Sampson. London, Jane’s Yearbooks,
197 3. 602 p.

Provides information on manufacturers of
locomotives and rolling stock of the following
Scandinavian countries, among many other coun-
tries of the world: Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden. Also includes descriptions, technical
data, railway lines, and photos of railways of the
following countries, among many others: Den-
mark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1971—1972—
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, in Air
Force Magazine, v.54, no.12 (December 1971)
66—74.

Includes some of the following information
on the military posture of Denmark and Norway,
among others: military service, total armed
forces, defense budget. army, navy, air force, and
reserves. See also the following which includes
similar information for .Finland and Sweden: The
Military Balance 1971—1972—Other European
Countries, in Air Force Magazine, v.54, no.12
(December 19-71) 7 5-77 .

D. Bibliographies

1. Miscellaneous Bibliographies
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in TERRITORIAL
WATERS IN THE ARCTIC: THE SOVIET
POSITION, by S. M. Olenicoff. Santa Monica,
Calif., Rand Corp., 1972. pp. 44—52 (R—907—
ARPA.)

2. Scandinavia .
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SCANDINAVIA;
AN INTRODUCTORY GEOGRAPHY, by Brian
Fullerton and Alan F. Williams. New York,
Praeger Publishers, 1972. pp. 355—363.

3. Denmark

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in DENMARK; AN
OFFICIAL HANDBOOK. Copenhagen, Royal
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press and
Information Department, 1970. pp.766—7 85.

[SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READ-
IN G], in A SHORT HISTORY OF DENMARK,
by Stewart Oakley. New York, Praeger Publish-
ers, 1972. pp.245—253.

4. Finland
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK
FOR FINLAND, by Theodore L. Stoddard and
others. Washington, Department of the Army,
1974. pp.221.—244. (DA Pam 550—167.)

5. Norway

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE FASCIST
ECONOMY IN NORWAY [FROM 1940 TO
1945], by Alan S. Milward. London, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1972. pp.304—309.

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in NORWAY,
by Ronald G. Popperwell. New York, Praeger
Publishers, 1972. pp.311—315.

[A SHORT SURVEY OF BOOKS AVAIL-
ABLE IN ENGLISH], in A HISTORY OF MOD-
ERN NORWAY, 1814—19-72, by T. K. Derry. Ox-
ford, Clarendon Press, 1973. pp.473—482.

6. Sweden

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AID AND DEVEL-
OPMENT; A HANDBOOK FOR SMALL
DONORS [SWEDEN], by Marian Radetski. New
York, Praeger Publishers, 1973. pp.304—317.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SWEDEN: THE
POLITICS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL CHANGE,
by M. Donald Hancock. Hinsdale, Ill., The Dryden
Press, 1972. pp.278—287.

55

[BIBLIOGRAPHY—SWEDEN] , in ACTIVI-
TIES BY VARIOUS CENTRAL BANKS TO
PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WEL-
FARE PROGRAMS. A STAFF REPORT PRE-
PARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND CURRENCY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, 91ST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.

56

Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971.
pp.280—281. (Committee Print.)

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SWEDEN,
by Joseph B. Board, Jr. Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1970. pp.263—265.

APPENDIX A

WESTERN EUROPE:

REGIONAL SURVEY

 

VII LITARY GEOGRAPHY

Western Europe is a mountainous peninsula from which
project a number of other peninsulas, and adjacent to which
are a number of large and populous islands. This peninsu-
lar—insular geography contributed to the development in
:arly history of a number of isolated, self-contained socie-
ties, from which emerged the modern nations of Western
Europe. The peninsular-insular geography also stimulated
the maritime interest which eventually became a prime
factor in Europe‘s world predominance for more than four
centuries.

The tides of war have flowed across Europe generally
along the routes most feasible for transport and trade: the
rivers, the corridors between mountain ranges, and the
coastal lowlands. Principal among these routes have been
the Danube basin and the North European Plain.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

In addition to the influence of geography, a combination
of climatological, demographic, and possibly cultural fac-
tors led to the dominant importance of Western Europe in
world affairs beginning late in the fifteenth century. This
predominance has not entirely disappeared even as the loci
of world power have shifted east and west in the mid-twen-
tieth century. Save for the United States and Canada,
Western Europe still has the largest collection of highly
skilled and educated manpower in the world, has the high-
est overall standard of living in the world outside North
America, has the greatest accumulation of economic and
financial power outside the United States, and has the
greatest combined military potential aside from the United
States and the Soviet Union.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

During the years immediately following World War II,
Soviet truculence posed an ever-increasing threat to the
postwar recovery of the nations of Western Europe. Ameri-
can economic assistance through the Marshall Plan helped
Western Europe avoid the economic chaos that indigenous
and Russian Communists apparently expected would result
in internal turmoil and revolution. Full economic recovery
in these nations was hampered by fears that Soviet Russia,
whose armed strength had increased rather than decreased
after the war, would take by invasion what its Communist
agents had been unable to subvert from within. Although
the United States still possessed a monopoly of nuclear wea-
pons, most Western Europeans feared overt Soviet military
aggression that could overrun the militarily impotent
nations of Western Europe in less than a week. They recog-
nized the weakness of their own defense efforts, and
doubted that America would be able to react in time to
prevent a sudden Soviet take-over.

This situation led to negotiations that resulted first in the
Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, to establish the Western
European Union (see below). and that culminated in the
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in a treaty signed April 4, 1949, in Washington,
effective August 24, by Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Greece and Turkey joined later (February 1952 ,
and Western Germany became a member on May 5. I955.

The members agreed to settle disputes by peaceful
means, to develop their individual and collective capacity to
resist armed aggression, to regard an attack on one as an

[Excerpted with permission from: The Almanac of world Military Power,
by Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret. and C01. Wendell Blanchard, U.S.

Army, Ret. Second Edit ion.

1972 .]

Dunn Loring, Va., T.N. Dipuy Associates,

57

attack on all, and to take necessary action to repel such an
attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. NATO defense
areas are divided into three major commands—Europe,
Atlantic, and Channel—with a number of subsidiary com-
mands and a US-Canada Regional Planning Group.

Until 1966 the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) was located near Paris, but when France
withdrew from the NATO Military Committee, SHAPE
moved to a new location at Casteau, Belgium, near Mons.
NATO headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels at the
same time.

The Allied Command Europe (ACE) defends the ter-
ritory of all continental European members except France
and Portugal, and also that of Turkey. Iceland, Canada,
and the United States. The Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEU R), heads this command and also serves as
Commander-in-Chief, US Forces Europe (ClNCUSFE).
At present SACEUR is US General Andrew J. Goodpaster;
Deputy SACEUR is British General Sir Desmond Fitzpa-
trick. ACE subsidiary commands are Allied Forces Central
Europe (AFCENT), with headquarters at Brunssum,
Netherlands; Allied- Forces Northern Europe
(AFNORTH) with headquarters at Kolsaas, Norway; and
Allied Forces Southern Europe, headquarters at Naples.
There is also a small air-mobile, air-supported ACE Mobile
Force (AMF), combat-ready for deployment to points of
strain, especially on the northern and southeastern flanks,
on short notice.

AF CENT comprises all land and air forces in the Central
EurOpe Sector (West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg; since I966 France has been excluded), and is
commanded by a German. general. There are 21 divisions
assigned by seven’countries (forces of the four continental
states plus American, British, and Canadian forces) and
about 2,000 aircraft in the command (about 350 of the air-
‘ craft are US Air Force fighter-bombers). US and German
forces have “Sergeant” and “Pershing“ SSMs at the corps
and army -‘-level. Thereare 28 “Hawk” and “Nike” SAM
battalions in AFCENT. Within AFCENT are the Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG) and the Central Army Group
(CENTAG). NORTHAG is composed of all the British,
Belgian, and Dutch divisions on the Continent, four Ger-
man divisions, and a Canadian brigade. These forces are
supported by the Second Allied Tactical 'Air Force, com-
posed of British, Belgian, Dutch, and German 'air units.
CENTAG includes all American ground forces and seven
German divisions and is supported by the Fourth Allied
Tactical. Air Force (American, German, and Canadian
units plus the American Army Air Defense Command).

AFNORTH prOVides for the defense of Norway, Den-
mark, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Baltic Approaches and
is under the command of a British general. It is composed
of most of the Danish and Norwegian land, sea, and tacti-
cal air forces, one German division (in Schleswig), two
German combat air wings. and the German Baltic Fleet.

AFSOUTH defends Italy, Greece, and Turkey, safe-
guards communications in the Iviediterranean, and is
responsible for the Turkish territorial waters of the Black

58

Sea. It is under the command of an American admiral.
There are 14 Turkish divisions, nine Greek divisions, and
seven Italian divisions in the command, plus the tactical air
forces of these countries. The US Sixth Fleet in the Medi-
terranean, while under national command in peacetime, is
NATO-committed for wartime. Ground defense is divided,
under the Southern Command at Naples, and the South-
Eastern Command at Izmir, Turkey. There is an overall air
command at Naples, and a single naval command
(NAVSOUTH) under an Italian admiral, also at Naples.

The Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) extends from
the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, and from the
coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and
North Africa. The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
(SACLANT) is US Admiral Charles K. Duncan; his head-
quarters is at Norfolk, Virginia. Under ACLANT are the
Western Atlantic, Eastern Atlantic, and Iberian Atlantic
Commands, the Striking Force Atlantic (the nucleus of
which is the US Second Fleet), the Submarine Command,
and STANAVFORLANT (Standing Naval Force Atlan-
tic - a multinational naval squadron).

The Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) includes the
English Channel and the southern portion of the North Sea.
Naval forces are those of Britain, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands.‘ACCHAN is commanded by British A'dmiral Sir

. Edward Ashmore, with headquarters at Northwood, Mid-

dlesex.

NATO air defense is to be supported by the NADGE
(NATO Air Defense Ground Environment).system, which
will be completed by the end of 1972. This is essentially a
sophisticated, computerized system for tracking aircraft
and correlating target information with locations of inter-
ceptor aircraft and missiles, using data supplied by numer-
ous ground radar stations.

OTHER ALLIANCES

Western Eumpean Union.The Brussels Treaty of March
17, 1948, established a 50-year alliance “for collaboration
in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective
self-defense” among Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The obvious princi-
pal objective was military: mutual security against feared
Soviet-Communist aggression. The defensive military
aspects of the alliance were merged with NATO when. that
alliance was created one year later. When France rejected
the proposed European Defense Community in [954, the
existence of the Western European Union provided a useful
means of integrating West Germany intthe Western Alli‘
ance. thus facilitating the end of the Allied occupation of
West Germany, her rearmament, and her eventual incin-
sion within NATO. This was accomplished when West
Germany and Italy adhered to the Brussels Treaty on May
6, 1955. After the breakdown of negotiations for Britain's
entry into the Common Market, in 1963, the Western
European Union provided a useful vehicle for continuing,
meetings between the six members of the Common Market
and the UK “to take stock of the political and economic
situation in Europe.”

In

European Communities. Pursuant to the Treaty of Rome
of March 25, I957, the European Economic Community
was established on January l, 1958, by Belgium, France,
West Germany, 'Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands

(“the Inner Six"). The objective was to move gradually .

toward integrating and strengthening the economies of the
members, and ultimately to move toward political unity.
The EEC, or Common Market, as it is more generally
known, has achieved substantial success in moving toward
economic integration. The opposition of France to British
membership in the EEC subsided after the resignation of
President Charles de Gaulle, and the UK Parliament ap-
proved entry to EEC in October l97l: because of necessary
changes in British laws to permit participation in EEC
affairs, actual entry will probably not take place before
January 1973.

On July I, 1967, the Common Market was merged with
two other related organizations with the same membership:
the European Coal and Steel Community, established on
August IO, I952, pursuant to the Treaty of Paris of April
18, I951; and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), which was established on January I, 1958,
pursuant to the Treaty of Rome of March-25, l957.

While the purposes of these communities are primarily
economic, and secondarily political, their military implica-
tions are great,.as they tend to weld the EEC increasingly
into what is in effect the third most powerful eConOmic en-
tity in the World.

RECENT INTRA- AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICTS

There have been no international armed conflicts in
Western Europe since World War II. There have been two
instances of internal hostilities, and several of the members
have been engaged in conflict or crisis operations outside the
region. There have been several crises between Western
European nations (individually, or as members of the West-
ern Alliance) and members of the Communist Bloc, the
most serious being those involvingthe Western Powers and
the USSR in Berlin. A list of relevant hostilities, or crises
involving military operations, fellows:

I945— I947

I945— I949
1945-1967

I946- I954
[946-1949
I947- I953

' 1948- I949

I948- I960
1949-1963

1950-1953

l952-1956
1954-1962
l955-l967

I956
I961
I961
I963

I964

I964

I966
I967

I968-date

l968-date

I969
‘I970-date

Pacification operation in Greece (Greece:
UK)

Indonesia revolt (Netherlands)

Intermittent strife in southern Arabia,
including frontier disputes and uprisings
in Aden (UK)

Revolt in Indochina (France)

Greek Civil War (Greece; UK)

Trieste crisis with Yugoslavia (Italy; UK)

Berlin Blockade (France: UK) - *-

Revolt in Malaya (UK)

Defense of Western New Guinea
(Netherlands)

Korean War (Belgium, France, Greece,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey,
UK)

Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya (UK)

Algerian revolt (France)

Revolt and internal strife in Cyprus
(Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, UK)

Assault on Suez Canal (France, UK)

Hostilitiesin Tunisia (France)

'Berlin crisis (France, West Germany, UK)

Intervention in Congo, Brazzaville, at
local request (France)

Intervention in East Afriéa, at local
request (UK)

Intervention in Gabon, at local request
(France)

Reinforcement of Zambia (UK)

Intervention in Central African Republic,
at local request (France)

Intervention in Chad, at local request
(France)

Defense of overseas territories of Mozam-
bique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea
(Portugal)

UK intervention in Anguilla

Violence in Northern Ireland '

 

.APPENDIX B.
ICOUNTRYéBY-COUNTRY'DATA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAND PEOPLE
' . . Labor
Agricultural Population Force Infant Average
COUNTRY . deaths Life daily ,
. Total Percent Acres Growth Density , per expect- caloric Official
sq mi ' of per (19,13 rate per ”823'" ":93?! “:3?” 1,000 ancy intake language
(000) total capita m' 1%)1 sq mi ° ° live (yrs) (1969-
1969 births‘ 70)
hDenmark 17* 72 1.5 4.9 0.6 296 so 12 99 15 75. 3,140 banish
Finland? 130 8 1.6 4.7 9.4 36 61 25 99 14 73 2.960 Finn,Swed_
Iceland 40 22 27.5 0.2 1.0 5 72 19 99 12 76 2,900 Iceland
Norway 125 _ - 5 0.6 3.9 0.7 1 ‘ 31 . 53 15 99 14 , 21 2_,_900 _ Norweg
__geg_e_n 174 9 1.1 8.1 | 1.1 1 47 . 30 9 99 13 I 76 2750 .l 5W“
ECONOMY GOVERNMENT
Gross National Product 2 I Imports Exports Transportation' Communist Party
P“ , couurnv
Growth 1970 capita Per- Per- 7 Position
1970 rate per growth 1970 cent 1970 cent Roads Rails Type Status N°' of on Sina-
($ bill) (1960- capita avg-96 l$ mill) from l$ mill) to (miles) (miles) "WNW Soviet
70 avg 96) is) (1960- 0.8. 0.8. 1970 dispute
70) 1970 1970
16 ""47“ ”“5397" M :19 4,400 8 3,300 8' 38,275 9,999" const r1565“ 7317,51” ”6.966 Bio-30v Denmark
10 4.8 2,166 4.2 2,640 5 2,300 5 44,200 3,720 rep legal 47,000 pro-80v Finlano
0.5 4.4 2,319 2.9 160 8 150 30 7,400 none rep legal 1,000 pro-80v Iceland
11 4.9 2,879 1.1 3,700 7 .. 2,500 6,, 44L1_§9 4 2,711 oonst mon . legal _2,000 pro-3011 NOI'WQY
31| 4.6 I 3.896 I . 3.9 I 7.000) 9 F 6.800] R l 60,925 I 7,767) constmon | legal | 17,000) split 5918:1911

60

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Excerpted from: World Data Handbook; Issues in United States Foreign
Pol icy, Current Informt ion Supplement .
Publication 8665.]

State, August 1972.

Washington, Department of

 

 

APPENDIX C

 

. i , a. (m. wag)

DEPARTMENT or ‘ ‘

    

‘V '

 

 

Population: 5 million (I972 est.)
Capital: Copenhagen

Denmark is located strategically at the mouth
of the Baltic Sea. It consists of the Jutland Penin-
sula projecting north from the Federal Republic of
Germany and about 500 islands, of which 100 are
inhabited. The straits between these islands con-
nect the Baltic and the North Seas.

Denmark proper has an area of 16,619 square
miles and together with the 1'7 Faroe Islands (540
square miles) covers an area slightly smaller than
Vermont. and New Hampshire combined. Green-

'land, the largest island in the world (857,159

square miles) became an integral part of Denmark
under the Constitution of June 5, 1953.

Denmark has a low elevation with aflat or un-
dulating landscape. Nearly the whole area is in
productive use. The climate is temperate with mild
winters (20° - 40° F . ) and comparatively cool sum-
mers (50° — 70°F. ); the prevailing westerly winds
are strong.

The Danish flag, the Dannebrog, consists of a
white cross on a red field. It is among the oldest
national flags in continuous use.

THE PEOPLE

Population: 5 million, increasing at a low rate
of 0.6 percent annually. Population density is about
296 persons per square mile. Copenhagen, with
its suburbs, has about 1.4 million inhabitants.

The Danes are a homogeneous people of the
Gotho-Germanic race who inhabited Denmark
since prehistoric times. Danish is the principal
language. There is a small German-speaking
minority in southern Jutland; an Eskimo dialect
is spoken in Greenland; and Faroese is usedinthe
Faroe Islands. Education is compulsory from ages
7 to 16 and is free through the university level.
Literacy is virtually complete.

The Lutheran Church is the established church
in Denmark. It is supported by the state and ac-
counts for approximately 97 percent of religious
affiliation. Religious freedom exists and there are
several other denominations.

HISTORY

During the Viking period (9th-11th centuries),
Denmark was a great pOWer based on the Jutland
Peninsula, the island of Zealand, and the southern
part of what is now Sweden. In the early 11th

 

BACKGROUND, NoTEs’ , ' ' .

 

 

 

KINGDOM OF DENMARK

century, King Canute united Denmark and England,
a union which lasted almost 30 years.

Viking raids brought Denmark into contact with
Christianity, and in the 12th century crown and
church influence increased. By the latter part of
the 13th century royal power had waned, and the
King was forced by the nobles to granta constitu—
tion, Denmark’s ”Magna Carta.” The struggle
between the crown and the nobility continued inthe
14th century, but Queen Margaret succeeded in
uniting Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the
Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland under the
Danish crown. This union lasted until 1814 al-
though Sweden and Finland seceded in 1520.

The Reformation was introduced in Denmark in
1536. Denmark’s provinces in southern Sweden
were lost in 1658, and Norway was transferred
from the Danish to the Swedish crown in 1814,
following the defeat of Napoleon with whom
Denmark was allied. The Danish liberal move-
ment gained momentum in the 1830’s, and in 1849
Denmark became aconstitutional monarchy. After
the war against Prussia and Austria in 1864
Denmark was forced to cede Schleswig-I-Iolstein
to Prussia and adopt a policy of neutrality. In the
latter part of the 19th century Denmark inaugu-
rated important social reforms laying the basis
for the present welfare state.

Denmark maintained its neutrality in World
War 1. Despite a declaration of neutrality at the
beginning of World War II, it was invaded by the
Nazis in 1940 and occupied until its liberation by
the British in May 1945. Denmark became a
charter member of the United Nations and was
One of the original signers of the North Atlantic
Treaty.

GOVER NME NT

Denmark is a limited, or constitutional mon-
archy. Queen Margrethe II (Chief of State) has
largely ceremonial functions; probably her most
significant independent power lies in her right
to appoint the Prime Minister (Head of Govern-
ment) and Cabinet Ministers, who are responsible
for administration of the Government. But she
must consult with parliamentary leaders to de-
termine the public will, since the Cabinet may be
dismissed by a vote of no confidence in the
Folketing (parliament). Cabinet members may be
recruited outside of the ranks of the Folketing,
but this is not customary.

Washington, Department o't‘ State, October 1972. mblication 8298.]

 
 
 

61

 

62

 

 

GREENLAND
(MAP)

(Map in envelope in back of manual)

64

 

IN

According to the Constitution (promulgated
June 5, 1953), the unicameral _1§‘_ol_k_gti_ng
consists of not more than 179 members, of
whom two'must be elected from the Faroe Islands
and two from Greenland. Elections are held at
least every 4 years, but the Prime Minister can
dissolve the Folketing at any time and call for
new elections.

The judicial branch of the Government con-
sists of about 100 local courts, two high courts,
several special courts (arbitration, maritime,
etc.), and a Supreme Court of 15 judges appointed
by the Queen.

Directly below the national level, Denmark is
divided into 14 Provinces Amter). Each Province
is made up of a varying number of rural munici-
palities of which there are nearly 1,300 in all.
The chief official of the Province, the Governor,
is appointed for an indefinite term by the Queen
on the recommendation of the Cabinet. Existing

outside this regular structure and answerable
directly to the Ministry of Interior are 80 urban
municipalities, plus C0penhagen, with an inde-
pendent status dating from ancient times, with a
structure all its own. The Faroe Islands are par-
tially self-governing and the Queen is represented
by a High Commissioner. In Greenland she is
represented by a Governor. '

POLITICAL CONDITIONS.

Political life in Denmark is carried on in an
orderly and democratic fashion. Political changes
occur gradually, and political methods and atti-
tudes are generally moderate. Compromise is an
essential element in Danish political life, as no
single party since 1945 has been able to command
a majority in the Folketing. '

65

66

The elections of. September 1971 resulted in
a minority Social Democratic Government. In
order to maintain this government in power, the
Social DemOCrats, who have only 70 seats in the
Folketing, depend on the 17 votes of the Socialist
People’s Party .plus one Greenlander and one
Faroese. The coalition which formed the previous
Government (1968-71) consisted of Radical Lib-
erals, Moderate Liberals, and Conservatives.
One Greenlander and one Faroese remain unaf-
filiated. Party strengths in parliament following
the 1971 elections are as follows:

197; 1968
Social DemOcrats 70 ‘ 62.
Conservatives , 31 37
Moderate Liberals 3O 34
Radical Liberals ' 27 27
Socialist People’s Party ' 1'7 11
Greenland . 2 2
Faroes , ‘2 2

ECONOMY 1

Since World War II the Danish economy has
been characterized by a high level of economic
activity, a rapidly expanding industrial sector,
continued heavy dependence on foreign trade (in-
volving more than one-fourth of the gross na-
tional product), and recurrent balance-of-pay-
ments problems.

In 1971 gross national product (GNP) totaled
U.S. $17.2 billion, or $3,460 per capita. This was
an increase of about 3 percent over 1970. Unem-
ployment is averaging only about 2 percent annu-
ally—principally seasonal unemployment.

Because of favorable terms of trade and idle
capacity, the postwar economic boom did not
generate major inflationary pressures until 1961,
when prices and wages began to climb steeply and
growing deficits on the current balance of pay-
ments deve10ped. Stern fiscal measures tempo-
rarily halted this development in 1963 but also
curtailed overall economic growth. With resump-
tion of economic activity and growth in the follow-
ing years, inflation again set in. From 1961 to
1971 Denmark’s consumer prices have risen more
than 80 percent (65 percent-without sales taxes),
although import prices rose only 30 percent.
During the same period hourly wages in manu-
facturing almost tripled, and unit labor costs,
despite productivity gains, rose at an annual
average of about 3.5 percent. Rising costs of
administration and ambitious public programs
have weakened fiscal restraint and strong mone-
tary measures have been necessary. Quantitative
restrictions have been imposed on bank credits,
and Denmark’s interest level has reached a
record high of about 11 percent. The rising cost
level has made Denmark increasingly susceptible
to international competition and economic fluctua-
tions. Shrinkage in major Danish export markets
affected the economy in 1966-67 and again in

1970-71, and the Government’s efforts to control

the economy have not prevented stop-go effects. ’

Since 1962 economic growth has averaged 4.5
percent annually, but with fluctuations from 0.5 to
8.9 percent. The growth rate has not been suffi-
cient to finance rising domestic demand, particu-
larly in the public sector and in residential
construction; foreign exchange reserves have been
preserved only through liberal capital imports.

About three-fourths of the land is devoted to

agriculture, and 86 percent of the farmland is.

cultivated, largely for animal feed. Ninety percent
of farmers’ gross income derives from animal
production, the chief products being butter,
cheese, bacon, beef, veal, poultry, and eggs. The
export market for these agricultural products is
divided principally between the United Kingdom
and the Federal Republic of Germany. ,

Denmark is poorly endowed with fuel re-
sources. The only ferrous mineral is alow-grade
iron oreround in southern Jutland. Denmark is
entirely dependent on imports for its supply of
nonferrous metals.

Rapid industrialization is gradually reducing
the significance of agricultural production and ex-
ports; of the $3.8 billion exports in 1971, farm
products, including canned goods, accounted for
less than 30 percent; manufactured goods for more
than 65 percent. The balance was made up by fish
and furs. -

Denmark continuously has a large import sur-
plus, only in part covered by shipping and tourist
earnings. Imports in 1971 amounted to $4.9 bil-
lion. Major import items are industrial raw
materials, fuels, and machinery and equipment.
Consumer goods aCcount for less than 17 percent.

Major trading partners are Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany,
with about 16 percent of total trade each. The
United States is Denmark’s fourth largest trading
partner with about 8 percent of total trade. Only
about 4 percent of Danish global trade is with the
Communist bloc. Denmark supports economic and
political integration of Western EurOpe to improve
economic prospects in apolitically stable Europe.
Denmark is a member of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and is expected to become a
member of the European Communities (European
Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic
Community, and the European Atomic Energy

, Community) as of April 1, 1973. Denmark signed

the accession treaty, together with the United
Kingdom, Norway, and Ireland. in January 1972,
and it was ratified by referendum in October
1972.

Denmark has abolished literally all quantita-
tive import restrictions for nonagricultural com-
modities and is an active supporter of the liberal
trade policies in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and other international or-
ganizations. The price review authority and
monOpolistic agreements registration require-
ments are administered leniently by the MonOpoly
Review Board. Agricultural subsidies were intro-
duced in 1961 for the first time ona major scale,

it

partly as direct subsidies and partly as fixed
home market prices on food products. These will
be replaced by the European Communities’ com-
mon agricultural policy if or when Denmark be-
comes a member of that organization. There are
approximately 225 U.S. firms with offices, affili-
ates, or subsidiaries at C0penhagen. There is no
American Chamber of Commerce, but there is an
American Club, most of whose members are
from the American business community, along
with Danes having an interest in trade with the
United States.

Denmark is p0pular with American tourists,
with about 350,000 U.S. visitors annually.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Danish foreign policy has four cornerstones:
U.N. membership; NATO membership; support of
European economic and political integration; and
Nordic cooperation.

Denmark places great emphasis on its mem-
bership in the United Nations, and‘strongly sup-
ports U.N. programs. While seeking peaceful
resolution of international problems, Danish se-
curity is based on membership in NATO.

Denmark is a member of the Nordic Council,
(Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden) and Danish
ties—economic, political, and social—are strong
with the Nordic countries, all of whom view
Nordic COOperation as a means of achieving
greater economic and political strength.

Denmark also supports the concept of eco-
nomic and political integration of Europe as a
means of improving conditions for Denmark.
Denmark recently recognized North Viet-Nam
and the People’s Republic of China.

U. S. POLICY

It is the aim of the United States to cooperate .

with Denmark, a European friend of long standing.

In the NATO context, the Danish defense effort
is important to the United States and the alliance.
U.S. bases in Greenland continue to be of great
value to Western defense.

In April 1970 Prime Minister Baunsgaard
visited the United States. On that occasion,
President Nixon said that “. . .Denmark and the
United States have had such close and friendly
relations over a long period of time. We have
been allies and friends over 160 years. We work
together in the United Nations and NATO. Our
commercial relations and bilateral relations are
among the very best in the world.”

In 1972 the President sent his personal emis-
sary, Governor Ronald Reagan, to bringthe greet-
ings of the American peOple to the Danish people
on the occasion of the July 4 celebration of Danish-
American friendship at Rebild. Denmark. In his
message on that occasion the President pointed
out that “a half-million Americans of Danish
descent link our two countries and reinforce
Danish-American friendship.” ‘

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Monarch—Queen Margrethe II

Prime Minister—Anker J orgensen
Foreign Minister—K. B. Anderson
Economic and Budget Minister—Per Haekkerup
Finance Minister—Henry Grunbaum
Defense Minister—Kjeld Olesen

Commerce Minister—Erling Jensen

Labor Minister—Erling Dinesen

Foreign Economic Minister—Ivar Norgaard
Ambassador to the U.S.—Eyvind Bartels
Ambassador to the U.N.—Otto Borch

Denmark maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 3200 Whitehaven Street, N.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20008. There are also Consulates
General at Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and
San Francisco.

PRINCIPAL U. S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—

Counselor—Thomas J. Dunnigan ,

Chief, Political Section—Edward L. Killham

Chief, Economic Section—Paul K. Stahnke

Defense and Naval Attache—Capt. Patrick F.
Hussey

Army Attache—Col. Robert F. Tugman

Air Attache—Col. Orse Brewer, Jr.

Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Peter Heller

Agricultural Attache—Harlan J. Dirks

The U.S. Embassy in Denmark is located at
Dag Hammarskjolds Alle 24, Copenhagen.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material
currently being published on this country; the Department of State does
not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing
the position of the U.S. Government.

Anderson, Stanley V. The Nordic Council: AStudy
of Scandinavian R_egionalism. Seattle: Univer-
sity of Washington Press, 1967.

Bjornsen, Mette, and Ludvig Bramsen. Facts
About Denmark, 15th ed. Copenhagen: Politikens
Forlag, 1966.

Department of State. “NATO and the Defense of
Europe.” No. 2 in Issues in United States For-
eign Policy series. Pub. 8476. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, Revised 1970.

Lauring, Palle. A History of the Kingdom of
Denmark. Copenhagen: Host, 1960.

Lauwerys, J. A. Scandinavian Democracy. COpen-
hagen: A/S J. H. Schultz, Universitets-Bog-
trykkeri, 1958. ‘

O’Dell, Andrew C. The Scandinavian World. Lon-
don: Longmans, Green, 1957.

Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Den-
_mark. Copenhagen: Ag’S H. P. Hansens~Bog-
frykkeri, 1970.

Simpson, Colin. The Viking Circle: Denmark,
Greenland, Norway, Sweden. Finland, Iceland.
New York: Fielding, 1968.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8298, Revised October I972

67

APPENDIX D
DENMARK-MI LITARY POWER

 

DENMARK

Kongeriget Danmark

Kingdom of Denmark

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 16,629 square miles (excluding Faroe Islands
and Greenland); Greenland, 840,000 square miles

Population: 4,990,000

Total Active Armed Forces: 40,500 (0.81% popula-
tion)

Gross National Product: $16.0 billion ($3,206 per cap-
ita) ,

Annual Military Expenditures: $410.3 million (2.56%
GNP)

Electric Power Output: 16.23 billion kwh

Merchant Marine: 1,194 ships; 3.49 million gross tons

Civil Air Fleet: 24 jet, 1'! propjet, and 21 piston trans-
ports (exclusive of Danish-owned portion of SAS)

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The Monarch (Queen Margrethe II) is nominal com-
mander in chief of the armed forces. Civilian control in the
conventional parliamentary government of a constitutional
democratic monarchy is exercised by the Defense Minister,

responsible to the Prime Minister. Full command of the
three services rests in the Chief of Defense, the ranking
military officer, who, with his Chief of Defense Staff, the
Army, Navy, and Air ForceCommanders (with appropri-
ate staff), form an integrated Defense Command. The
Defense Minister is advised by a Defense Council of the
above officers, plus a Chief of Danish Operational Forces.

POLITI CO-MI LITA RY POLICY

For three-quarters of a century prior to World War II
Denmark had adhered to a policy of strict neutrality in
European power politics. After having been a victim of
German aggression in World War 11, Denmark espoused
the concept of collective Security, and was an original
member ofNATO.

The armed forces consist mainly of conscripted men,
serving 12 months, between the ages of 19 and 25; the
annual call-up is about 30,000 men. After active service,
they may be recalled for refresher training.

STRATEGIC'PROBLEMS

Denmark’s position astride the entrance to the Baltic Sea
makes it one of the most strategically located nations of the
world. Its small size and the lack of natural obstacles (save
for relatively narrow channels between the islands) make it
vulnerable to invasion from Germany, both overland
through Jutland, and by amphibious attack from the coasts
of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenberg;

 

Greenland is a special strategic problem. This vast frozen
land mass lies athwart the probable trajectories of any
intercontinental missile exchange between the USSR on the
one hand, and Canada and the United States on the other.
There is a small Greenland Defense Command, but as a
member of the NATO alliance Denmark has granted vir-
tually full responsibility for the defense of Greenland to the
United States, despite the fact that in most other respects
Denmark is one of the most independent of all the Euro-
pean members of NATO.

Denmark is ethnically homogeneous, and there are no
significant internal security problems. The Communist
Party has an estimated 5,000 members.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

‘ Denmark received $617.9 million in military assistance
from the United States from 1950 to 1970. The US Military
Advisory Grow) in Denmark numbers about 20.

ALLIANCES

Denmark is a member of the UN and of NATO. Danish
armed forces are earmarked for the Northern European
Command, within which the German-Danish Combined
Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (COM BALTAP) has been
established.

ARMY

Personnel: 24,000
Organization:
4 armored infantry brigades, each with 3
infantry, l tank and l artillery battalion
1‘ battalion group
2 light artillery battalions
1 heavy artillery battalion (203mm howitzers)
2 SSM battalions'(“Honest John")
1 light aircraft squadron

[Excerpted with permission from: The Alumnae of hbrld. Military Power,
by 001. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Amy, Ret. and-Col. headell Blanchard, U.S.

Amy, Ret.
‘ 1972.]

68

Second Edition. Dunn Loring, Va., T.N. Dupuy Associates,

1A

(h

0

Major Equipment Inventory:
200 medium tanks (mostly “Centurion," some
M-47 and M48)
light tanks (M-41)
APCs(M-1 13)
self-propelled 155mm howitzers (M -109)
12 heavy artillery pieces (203mm self-propelled
howitzers)
“Honest John” SSM
48 light artillery pieces (plus 100 in reserve)
45 light aircraft (including 17 helicopters)

., Reserves: Two armored infantry brigades and support
units to be formed from 40,000 reservists within 72
hours. Local defense reservist units form 15 infantry
battalion groups and 15 artillery batteries. There is a
volunteer Army Home Guard of 52,000.

NAVY

e Personnel: 6,500

Major Units:
2 destroyer escorts (DE)
6 diesel submarines (SS)
4 helicopter frigates
4 patrol escorts/corvettes (PF)
4 fleet minelayers (MMF)
4 coastal minelayers (M MC)
8 coastal minesweepers (M SC)
4 inshore minesweepers (M 81)
16 torpedo boats (PT)
9 submarine chasers (SC)
16 patrol boats (YP), plus 37 for Naval Home
Guard
21 auxiliaries
8 helicopters (“Alouette” 111)

Reserves: The Volunteer Naval Home Guard of 4,000
operates some small patrol boats (see above). There

it:
I

3

are 3,000 trained reservists. The Navy also mans cer-
tain fixed fortifications—organization and weaponry
unknown.

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 10,000

Organization 3 major commands (Tactical Air, Air
Materiel, and Training)
3 interceptor squadrons (F-104G, “Hunter")
3 fighter-bomber squadrons (F-100D/ F,
SAAB F-35 “Draken") . . ~
1 reconnaissance squadron (RF-3S “Draken”)
1 transport squadron
1 air-sea rescue squadron (S-61 helicopters)
4 SAM squadrons (“Nike-Hercules”)
4 SAM squadrons (“Hawk")

Major A ircraft Types:
12.1 combat aircraft
32 F-lOOD/ F fighter-bombers
27 F104G interceptors and TF-104G train-
ers (to be supplemented by 15 CF-104s
and 7 CF-104Ds)
16 F-51 “Hunter" fighters
20 F -35 “Draken” fighter-bombers
20 RF-35 “Draken” reconnaissance aircraft
6 TF-35 “Draken” trainers
110 other aircraft
14 transports (C-47, C-54, “Catalina”)
70 trainer/ support aircraft
26 helicopters
Major Air Bases: Vedbaek, .Karup Bodo, Salb‘org,
Vaerlose, Vandel, Torstrup, Middlegremden, Ama-
ger, Stevns. On Greenland: Thule, Avno, Narssar—
suak, Godthaab.
Reserves: A volunteer Air Force Home Guard of
8,000.

69

APPENDIX E
DENMARK-STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

 

National Political Status:

 

Date of

last election - September 21, 1971.

 

 

 

tinued its largely ineffectual ways
in 1972. It attracted at most about
7,000 members out of a population of

% more than 5 million and remained on
Votes of No. %of h f . f th 1.1:. l
Nameofparty cast total of total t e ringes o e po 1 1ca scene.
votes seats seats
Organized in 1919 from the left
Cwmwfist . wing of the Social Democratic Party
033:1; 591612391515 39.344 1-4 0 0 (SDP) , the DKP has sagged in appeal
y since its electoral peak after World
Non-Comunist Left War II and the formation of the late
Left SociaHst 45,330 1.6 o 0 Aksel Larsen's Socialist People's
Soclahst Pe0p1e's 263,116 9.1 17 9.7 Party (SF) in 1959. It received
5°61“ Dem°°rat 1,075,758 37'3 7° 40-0 only 1.4% of the vote at the last
Cmnm‘ national election, September 21,
Radical Libera1 412,695 14.3 27 15.4 l971--thus falling short of the 2%
Moderate Libera1 451,073 15.6 30 17.1 of the turnout necessary for parlia-
. mentary representation.
Conservative
Conservative 481,338 16.7 31 17.7
Christian peop1els 56,923 2.0 0 0 . The DKP's loss was the SF'fs
gain. The Communists' chief rival
PEEL 56.830 2.0 o 0 jumped from 11 to 17 seats in the
1 179-seat Folketing (Parliament) and
Tota1 2’882’957 100'0 175 ‘00") thus provided the tacit backing

 

 

 

 

 

1P1us two seats each from Green1and and the

Faroe Is1ands.

Communist Party Membership:
7,000 (estimate)

5,

000-

Leadin Part Figures and Positions:

needed to give the SDP a one-vote
edge in Parliament. The Social
Democrats kept power in 1972, al-
though leftist labor leader Anker
J¢rgensen replaced Jens Otto Krag as
Prime Minister on October 5, follow-
ing Denmark's favorable referendum
on entry into the European Community.

A]

JESPERSEN, Knud - Chairman
NORLUND, Jorgen Ib - Secretary-
General and leading theoretician

Opposition to EC entry dominat-
ed DKP activity at home and abroad
in 1972. Knud Jespersen, DKP Chair-
man since 1958, established the par-
ty stance with the statement "We
cannot improve the Common Market and
we have nothing to gain by entering
it." (Land 09 Folk, January 1,
1972.) The Communist press promoted
the book A Clear "No" to the Common
Market.

Principal Publications:

Land 09 Folk (Nation and People) -
daily newspaper

Tiden (The Times) - monthly journal

 

Areas of Communist Activity: Den-
mark's tiny Communist Party (Dan-
marks Kommunistiske Parti--DKP) con-

[Excerpted from: World Strength of the Commmist Party Organizations.
25th Annual Report, 1973 Edition. Washington, Departmentoof State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1973. Publication 8732.]

reh

When two-thirds of the Danes
voted "yes" in their binding EC ref-
erendum October 2, the DKP promised
to use the other one-third of the
electorate as a continuing base for
the "struggle against monopolies."
Danish Communists hosted a meeting
of their Nordic colleagues November
9-10, in which they pledged resist-
'ance to the turning of Denmark into
an EC bridge to the northern flank.

Promotion of a Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) and opposition to U.S. policy
in Southeast Asia remained prime
foci in DKP international activities.
Central Committee meetings in May
and October stressed the value of a
CSCE as a means to "open the road to
security and cooperation by all
European countries." Recognition of
the German Democratic Republic,
opposition to NATO, and promotion of
Denmark as a “non-nuclear, militari-
ly reduced area" were continuing
variants of this detentist theme.

DKP criticism of U.S. policy in
Indochina emerged most conspicuously
in outcries against renewed U.S.
bombing in North Vietnam in late
December 1972 and at an internation-
ally sponsored "War Crimes Tribunal"
held in Copenhagen October 10-16.

At home, the Communists seemed
hard pressed to outflank a Sobial
Democratic government dependent on
the Marxist SF and sensitive to its
own leftist constituents. Yet, in
an "Open Letter to the Ruling Par-
ties," Chairman Jespersen did con-
demn the government for ignoring
society's weakest citizens. He pro-
posed that the government "move
against those responsible for the
'difficulties' in affluent Denmark--
big capital, its profits and power."
(Land 0g Folk -- April 14, 1972.)
Included in his 12-point program
were pleas to expand public works,
launch progressive tax reform, guar-

antee the right to work, and support
an effective cost-of-living increase
for workers. Such proposals re-
curred in Land 09 Folk, the DKP's
daily newspaper, and were intended
as preparation for the 24th Party’
Congress, scheduled to be held in
Copenhagen, January 12-24, 1973.

The Communists did succeed in
upping their influence on two major
fronts within Denmark. J¢rn
Christensen, Chairman of the Commu-
nist Youth of Denmark (Danmarks
Kommunistiske Ungdom--DKU), became
vice president of the Joint Council
of Danish Youth at that organiza‘
tion's congress in May. The DKP'
helped move the Metalworkers
Union--the nation's most important
labor organization--to the left at
the union's congress in September.
J¢rgen Jensen was elected to the
union's counci1--a first for Danish
Communists. Besides promoting the
Metalworkers' decisive 281-82 vote
against Danish EC membership, the
DKP helped adopt a resolution con-
demning U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia.

Within the international Commu-
nist movement, the DKP maintained
its traditional loyalty to Moscow—-
a continuing deterrent to Communist
appeal among young Danes. DKP offi-
cials stressed Opposition to Pe—
king's "anti-Soviet" line in meet-
ings with their East German and
Soviet party colleagues. The most
notable sessions were visits with
members of the CPSU (Communist Party
of the Soviet Union) Central Commit-
tee (including Politburo members
Mikhail Suslov and Aleksandr
Shelepin) in January; a meeting with
Boris Ponomarev, alternate Politburo
member and secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, in late October;
and Jespersen's talks with East
Germany's Erich Honecker, First Sec-
retary of the SED (Socialist Unity
Party) Central Committee, in November.

71

72

APPENDIX F

 

rarinnth; '*
Mir-""5

Population: 4.7 million (I972 est.)
Capital: Helsinki

Finland, about the size of New England, New
York, and New Jersey combined, is situated
between the 60th and 70th parallels of latitude.
It is the most northerly state on the European
Continent. One-third of its length lies northofthe
Arctic Circle. It has a common frontier in the
west with Sweden (335 miles), in the north with
Norway (453 miles), and in the east with the
U.S.S.R. (788 miles). Its sea boundaries are the
Gulf of Finland in the south, the Baltic in the south-
west, and the Gulf of Bothnia inthe west. The area
of the country is 130,160 square miles, placing it
fourth in size among European states (excluding
the U.S.S.R.).

The lay of the land is generally lower than in
the regions to the west in Sweden andNorway and
to the east in northern Russia. The average alti-
tude in Finland does not exceed 600 feet above sea
level. Most hills are in the north and do not rise
above 1,500 feet. The highest mountain, in the far
northwest next to the Norwegian border, is less
than 5,000 feet.

Although Finland extends far into the frigid
zone, its climate is moderated by the influenceof
the Gulf Stream off the northern Norwegian coast
and the Baltic Sea in the south, the extensive
forests, and the tempering effect of the more than
60,000 lakes which make up 9 percent of its total
area.

A blue cross on a white background comprises
Finland’s national flag. The colors represent the
country’s myriad lakes and the deep snow of its
long winters.

THE PEOPLE

The population is fairly evenly divided between
those living in towns and urban districts (55 per-
cent) and those living in rural areas (45 percent).
The largest cities are Helsinki (513,254), Tampere
(158,731), and Turku (155,834). Population density
is much greater in southern Finlandthan innorth-
ern Finland.

Like the rest of Scandinavia, Finland is ethni-
cally homogeneous. Over 93 percent of the people
speak Finnish as their native language and a
similar proportion of the population belongs to the
Evangelical Lutheran Church. Finns who claim
Swedish as their mother tongue number fewer than
7 percent. They are concentrated in the southern
and western coastal areas and inthe and Islands.
Lapps, who speak a Finno-Ugric language related

Washington, Department of State, Nay 1973.

 

to Finnish, are less numerous innorthern Finland
than in the neighboring Swedish, Norwegian, and
Russian north. Approximately 2,500 live in Finnish
Lapland. Besides the Lapps there are Russians,
Jews, Gypsies, and Tatars, altogether making up
fewer than 1 percent of the population. Finland’s
literacy rate is about 99 percent.

H I STORY

Finland began its nearly 700-year association
with the Kingdom of Sweden with the introduction
of Christianity by Sweden’s Klng .Eric around
1154. During the ensuing centuries Flnlandplayed
an important role in the political life of the
Swedish-Finnish realm, and Finnish soldiers often
predominated in the armies of the SwedishKings.

In 1809 Finland was conquered by the armies
of Alexander I and thereafter remainedanautono-
mous Grand Duchy connected with the Russian
Empire until the end of 1917. On December 6,
1917, shortly after the Bolshevik revolution in
Russia, Finland declared its independence. In 1918
Finland experienced a brief but bitter civil war.
The country’s present Constitution dates from
July 1919. During World War II Finland twice
fought the Soviet Union—in the Winter War of
1939-40 and again in the Continuation War of
1941-1944. The Treaty of Peace signed at Parison
February 10, 1947, provided for the cession to the
Soviet Union of the Petsamo area on the Arctic
coast in addition to the Karelian Isthmus insouth-
eastern Finland and some other territory along
the former eastern border; for the lease of the
Porkkala area near Helsinki to the U.S.S.R. for
use as a naval base,- and for free access to this
area across Finnish territory. The treaty also
provided that Finland pay the Soviet Union rep-
arations amounting to an estimated $570 million
(completed in 1952). Finland’s defense forces are
limited by the Treaty of Peace. The United States
was not a signatory to the treaty since it had not
been at war with Finland. In late 1955 the Soviet
Union returned the Porkkala area to Finland.

In April 1948 Finland signed with the U.S.S.R.
an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance designed to align both countries
against possible future German agg‘ess ion against
Finland or the U.S.S.R. through Finland. The
agreement complemented the mutual pledge con-
tained in the 1947 Treaty bf Peace not to conclude
any auiances or join any coalition directed against

Publication 8262.]

9L

 

 

—F

74

either party. This agreement was extended for
20 years in 1955 and again in 1970.

Finland joined the United Nations and the
Nordic Council in 1955 and in 1961 became an
associate member of the European Free Trade
AssociatiOn. In 1972 Finland negotiated a Free-
Trade Agreement with the EurOpean Communities.

GOVERNMENT

Finland is a constitutional republic with a
parliamentary form of government. The Govern-
ment is divided into executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Legislative power is vested in
the Parliament. Under the Finnish parliamentary
system a multitude of political parties have de-
veloped, none of which approaches a majority
position. Supreme executive authority is vested in
the President (Chief of State), who is assisted by
the Council of State (cabinet).

The President is elected by universal adult
suffrage for a term of 6 years, and there are no
legal limits on the number of times he may suc-
ceed himself. The President’s powers are sub-
stantial and have continued to increase since
World War II. Foreign policy is reserved to him,
except for certain international agreements and
decisions of peace or war which must be submitted
to Parliament. The President is Commander in
Chief of the armed forces and has wide decree
and appointive powers. He may initiate legisla-
tion, block legislation by pocket veto, dissolve
Parliament, and call extraordinary sessions of
that body. His authority in the appointment of the
Cabinet is often of substantial significance be-
cause of inability On the part of the several
parties to agree among themselves on the
Cabinet’s composition. President Kekkonen’s cur-
rent term of office expires in 1974.

The Council of State is made up of the Prime
Minister (Head of Government) and Ministers for
the various departments of the Central Govern-
ment as well as an ex-officio member, the
Chancellor of Justice. Ministers are not obliged
to be members of Parliament, and it often happens
that one or more of them are not formally iden-
tified with any political party.

The Parliament of Finland is a ZOO-member
unicameral body elected by citizens aged 18 and
over on the basis of universal suffrage and pro-
portional representation. All persons of voting
age, except military personnel on active duty and
a few high judicial officials, are eligible for elec-
tion to Parliament. The regular parliamentary
term is 4 years. The President may, however,
dissolve Parliament and order new elections at
any time.

Constitutionally, Parliament is the supreme
authority in Finland. It may alter the Constitu-
tion, bring about the resignation of the Council of
State, and override presidential vetoes. Its acts
are not subject to judicial review. Legislation
may be initiated by the President, the Council of
State, or one of the members of Parliament.

The judicial system is divided between courts
with regular civil and criminal jurisdiction on the
one hand, and special courts with responsibility
for litigation between the public and the adminis-
trative organs of the state on the other. Judicial
procedure differs from that in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. Finnish law is codified. While there is no
writ of habeas corpus or bail, formal charges
must be brought within 3 days of detention on
suspicion. Courts of first instance must hear a
case within 8 days of arrest. The Finnish court
system consists of local courts, regional appel-
late courts, and a Supreme Court.

For administrative purposes, Finland is di-
vided into 12 Provinces. These, in turn, are
divided into cities, townships, and communes
which are administered by municipal and com-
munal councils elected by proportional repre-
sentation once every 4 years. The 11 mainland
Provinces are administered by provincial boards
composed of civil servants, each headed by a
presidentially appointed Governor. The boards
are responsible to the Ministry of the Interior and
play a supervisory and coordinating role within
the Provinces.

The island Province of Aland enjoys local
autonomy by virtue of the Act on Aland Self-
Government of 1951. The islands are further set
apart by the fact that they are almost entirely
Swedish-speaking. Government is vested in the
provincial council which consists of 30 delegates
directly elected by Aland’s citizens.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The multitude of political parties, encouraged
by the proportional representation system, has
resulted in a number of short-lived coalition
governments. The country has averaged one a
year since independence.

The last parliamentary elections were held in
January 1972. The distribution of seats is as
follows:

Social Democrats 55
People’s Democratic League 37
Center Party 35
Conservatives 34
Finnish Rural Party (see below) 18
Swedish People’s Party 10
Liberal People’s Party 7
Christian League 4

The Social Democratic Party advocates a
parliamentary Socialist program. Its main support
comes from the working class, but it has some
strength among small farmers, white-collar
workers, and professionals.

The People’s Democratic League (SKDL) is
the front party in Parliament for the Finnish
Communist Party. The SKDL was formed in 1944
to attract left wing and other protest groups. It
favors the closest possible c00peration with the
U.S.S.R., greater government control over the
economy, far-reaching changes in the Finnish
social welfare programs, and opposes a Finnish
tie to the European Community (EC).

 

 

Al

(0

DJ

b.

riv

The Center Party, to which President Ke-k-
konen belongs, is primarily representative of
rural interests. It approves' of limited govern-
ment regulation and participation in the economy
and supports government-sponsored social serv-
ices. The Center Party fosters a network of
farmer-oriented producer and consumer c'oop-
eratives.

The Conservative Party is a strong advocate
of free enterprise'and competition but also en-
dorses social welfare programs. The Conserva-
tives receive their main support from the busi-
ness community, professionals, landowners, the
military and other elements of the urban middle
and upper classes.

The Finnish Rural Party (SMP) began as a
Center Party splinter organization and itself split
in two in late 1972. The Finnish Unity Party now
has the allegiance of 12 of the 18 deputies elected
as SMP members. The Rural Party enjoyed
considerable strength as a protest movement in
the late 1960’s but lost strength in the October
1972 communal elections asaresult of its internal
strife.

The Swedish People’s Party primarily repre-
sents the Swwish-speaking minority in Finland.
This party is split betweenliberals and conserva-
tives on many political and social questions.

The Liberal Party is the product of a merger
between the Finnish People’s Party and the Lib-
eral Union. It receives its main support from
government workers and certain white-collar
groups.

The Christian League is dedicated to the
advancement of Christian ideals in public life.

 

 

 

 

ECONOMY

Despite its scarcity of natural resources—
except for abundant forests and some mineral
deposits—Finland has a high standard of living.
As do the other Scandinavian countries, it depends
heavily on foreign trade to maintain this level and
to insure further economic growth. Forestry is
the backbone of the economy, producing slightly
more than one-half of Finnish exports. Finland
combines a free enterprise economy with exten-
sive government social welfare programs, similar
to those of Sweden and Denmark.

Although Finland suffered less physical dam-
age in World War II than some other countries,
a relatively large number of casualties was in-
curred and, as a result of the cession of territory
to the Soviet Union, approximately one-tenth of
the country’s productive capacity was lost and the
relocation of 420,000 displaced persons was
necessary. However by 1947 Finland’s gross
national product (GNP) had regained its prewar
peak level.

Since 1964 the GNP, in terms of constant
prices, has increased by an average of 3.9 per-
cent annually; in 1971 it reached an estimated
total of U.S. $11.3 billion. Per capita GNP in 1971
was approximately $2,449.

Finland is the world’s foremost producer of
plywood, the second of paper products, and the
third of paper pulp. Forestry accounts for more
than 5 percent of the GNP. Moreover, the process-
ing of forest products constitutes about one quarter
of Finland’s industrial production. Many farmers
own small forests and combine farming and for-
estry. The engineering industry has developed
partly to service forestry, and Finland now pro-
duces about one-tenth of the world’s machines
used in forestry. V

Finland is more than self-sufficient in meat
and dairy products and is virtually self-sufficient
in grains. About two-thirds of the fruits and one-
fifth of the vegetables consumed are imported.
Some 17 percent of the working population is
employed in agriculture which contributes about
9 percent to the GNP. The farm population is now
declining at a rate of nearly 4 percent annually.
Finnish farms are small, averaging about 22
acres. ,

Manufacturing has been an increasingly im-
portant sector of the Finnish economy since-World
War II. The share of manufacturing, mining, and
construction in the GNP was 42.8 percent in 1971
compared with 23 percent in 1938. Some 26 per-
cent of the working pOpulation was employed in
manufacturing in 1970 as compared with17 per-
cent in 1938.

The transportation equipment, machinery, and
electrical equipment industries were expanded
and diversified after World War II, principally
in order to make reparations deliveries to the
Soviet Union. The most important items produced
are machinery for the pulp, paper, and wood
products industries; ships, buses, and other
transportation equipment; electric motors; gen-
erators; and cables. While deliveries to the Soviet
Union account for more than 50 percent of these
industries’ total exports, a number of products,
such as paper, machinery, ships and certain types
of electrical equipment, are finding increasing
acceptance in other markets.

Finland’s well-trained labor force of 2.2 mil-
lion constitutes about half of the pOpulation. Since
World War II, there has been a marked shift of
workers from agricultural to nonfarm occupa-
tions. About 34 percent of the labor force is
currently engaged in manufacturing, mining, and
construction. Agriculture, forestry, andfisheries
employ 20 percent of the workers; commerce 9
percent; and services, transportation and com-
munication 25 percent. -

International Economic Relations

Foreign trade is a vital factor in Finland’s
economy since all of its fuel, many of its indus-
trial raw materials and sophisticated machinery
and technology, and some food must be imported.
Ninety-one percent of this trade is with Western
Europe, Eastern EurOpe, and the Soviet Union;
59 percent writh Finland’s four largest trading
partners: Sweden, West Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. During a period of

75

7.6

growing regional integration in Europe, Finland
has been faced with the problem of securing its

‘ access to the variOus EurOpean markets, without

compromising its foreign policy of neutrality. In
1961, Finland Obtained associate membership in
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and
at the same time extended EFTA tariff treatment
to the Soviet Union under the most-favored-nations
clause of Finland’s economic agreement with that
cOuntry. With the restructuring of EFTA brought
about by the decision of some of its members to
apply'for membership in the European Communi—
ties, Finland negotiated a free-trade agreement
with the EC which was initiated on July 22,1972,
but which has not yet been formally approved by

‘ Finland.

Finland is an active participant in the General

‘ Agreement On Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a

member of the Organization for Economic C00p-

‘ eration and Deve10pment (OECD) and the Asian

Development Bank (ADB).

-_, Imperts and EXports

' » Finnish imports in 1971 totaled slightly more
than $2.8 billion. Sweden is Finland’s largest sup-
plier, followed closely by the Federal Republic of

- Germany (F.R.G.), the United Kingdom, and the

Soviet Union. Finnish exports in 1971 totaled$2.4

‘ billion. About one-fifth of all exports, consisting

largely of wood and paper products, went to the
United Kingdom. Other major markets are Sweden,
the Soviet Union, and the F.R.G., in that order.

Sweden’s share ‘of Finland’s trade has risen

dramatically in recent years. Although Finland’s
trade with the Communist world is important
(about 15 percent of the total) and is the mainstay
of certain industries, in recent years it has re-
mained ‘roughly constant in preportion to total
trade, or has declined slightly. Trade with the
United States accounts for about 5 percent of the
total.

Balance (if Payments

Like the other Scandinavian countries, Finland
has had difficulty in preventing a balance-of-
payments deficit without reducing the volume of
its imports. Therefore, emphasis has been placed
on expanding exports. The chronic deficit of the

I 1960’s forced a devaluation of the m___arkka in 1967

The balance-of-payments position—_ was reversed
and Finland realized surpluses in the two subse-
quent years. The economic boom in 1970- 71, how-
ever, led to deficits of increasing magnitude in
both years and the government has taken steps to
meet this development.

Social Welfare

Finland’s social legislation and services cover
child and family allowances, workers’ accident
insurance and pensions, unemployment insurance
and compensation, pensions for widows and chil-
dren 'of civil servants, support of families of men
in military service, general public assistance to

needy persons, old-age and'disability pensions,
and a cOmprehensive health insurance program
covering the entire population. The cost of most
of these 7' benefits is shared by the state, local
governments, employers, and employees. Taken
as whole the total cost is about one-fifth of the
national income.

In addition to old-age and disability pensions
provided for all persOns by the National Pensions
Fund, employers are required to contribute annu-
ally amounts equal to 5 percent of employees’
wages to pension plans for all employees.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Finnish foreign policy emphasizes neutrality,
friendship with all countries and especially the
Soviet Union, cooperation with the other Scandi-
navian countries, and membership in the United
Nations. ‘

Fundamental to Finland’s foreign relations is
a policy of neutrality with special emphasis on the
maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviet
Union. While Finland is a Western nation—cul-
turally, socially, and pol itically—the Finns realize
the need to live in peace with their giant eastern
neighbor and to refrain from any action that the
U.S.S.R. might interpret as a threat to its security.

The principal architect of this postwar policy
of neutrality and friendly relations with the Soviet
Union was the late President J. K'. Paasikivi.
After his death in 1956 and the further develop-
ment of his policy under the direction of President
Urho Kekkonen, the “Paasikivi Line” gradually
became popularly known as the “Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line.’ ’

On his visit to the United States in July 1970
President Kekkonen emphasized that neutrality is
the keystone of Finnish foreign policy: “As a
neutral country, Finland seeks security not

‘ through military alliances or the protection of one

group of powers against another but through a
foreign policy designed to keep us outside of any
possible conflict. Such a policy does not mean a
withdrawal from international life. On the con-
trary, Finland has a vital national interest in
working actively, together with other nations, for
the containment of international conflicts and the
peaceful settlement of disputes between nations.”

Finland is not a member of any military
alliance. It has interpreted its foreign policy to
exclude membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or in the Warsaw Pact
alliance of East European Communist states.
Under the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Coop-
eration and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet
Union, however, Finland is obligated to resist
armed attacks by Germany or its allies against
Finland or against the U.S.S.R. through Finland
and, if necessary, with the aid of the Soviet Union.
At the same time, the agreement recognizes the
Finnish desire to remain outside the conflicting
interests of the great powers.

Finland, which maintains close and cordial
relations with its fellow Scandinavian states, is a

n)

6‘.

member of the Nordic Council. Under its auSpices,
the Scandinavian countries have abolished pass-
ports and visas among themselves, created a
common labor market, and coordinated social and
cultural policies. The rapid growth of trade among
the Scandinavian states has led to attempts to
create common economic, commercial, trade, and
investment policies.

Finland is an active member of the United
Nations and has made particularly useful contri-
butions to the work of that organization, especially
through the participation of Finnish troops in U.N.
peacekeeping activities. In November 1972 the
Multilateral Preparatory Talks to prepare for a
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
were convened in Helsinki.

U. S. ~FINLAND RELATIONS

Finns and Americans have long regarded each
other with mutual respect, and relations between
the two countries are warm and friendly.

President Kekkonen made official visits to the
United States in 1962 and 1970. On both occasions
American officials expressed sympathy and
understanding for Finnish neutrality. In welcoming
the Finnish leader, President Nixon cited the con-
tributions Finland has made toward world peace
through its participation in U.N. peacekeeping
forces and by acting as cohost to the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
strategic arms limitation talks.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

President of the Republic—Dr. Urho K. Kekkonen
Prime Minister—Kalevi Sorsa

'Foreign Minister—Ahti Karjalainen

Ambassador to the U.S.—Leo Tuominen
Ambassador to the U.N.—Aarno Karhilo

Finland maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 1900 24th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20008.

PRINCIPAL U. S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—Val Peterson

Deputy Chief of Mission—Rollie H. White, Jr.

Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs—
Martin Y. Hirabayashi

Chief of the Political Section—Theodore Sellin

Chief of the Administrative Section—Royal E.
Carter

Defense and Air Attache—Col. Wallace G.
Matthews

Army Attache—Col. Lloyd A. Corkan
Naval Attache’—Cmdr. Sidney E. Wood
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Victor L. Stier

The U.S. Embassy in Finland is located at
It'ainen Puistotie 21, 00140 Helsinki 14. Telephone
11931.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material cur-
rently being published on this country; the Department of State does not
endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the
position of the U.S. Government.

Bradley, David. Lion Among Roses. New York:
Holt, Reinhardt & Winston, 1965.

Hall, Wendy. The Finns and Their Country.
London: Parrish, 1967.

Hallas, Hillar & Nichels, Sylvies, eds. Finlandz
Creation and Construction. New York: Praeger,
1968.

Hodgson, John H. Communism in Finland. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Jakobson, Max. The Diplomacy of the Winter War.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Jakobson, Max. Finnish Neutrality. New York:
Praeger, 1969.

Jensen, Bartell C. The Impact of Reparations on
the Post-War Finnish Economy. Homewood:
Irwin, 1966.

Jutikkala, Eino, and Kauko Pirinen. A History
of Finland. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Kekkonen, Urho. Neutrality. London: Heinemann,
1970.

Knoellinger, Carl Erik. Labor in Finland. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, '1960.

Linna, Vaino. The Unknown Soldier. New York:
Putnam’s, 1958.

Mannerheim, Carl G. The Memoirs of Marshall
Mannerheim. New York: Dutton, 1954.

Mead, Williar R. An Economic Geography of the
Scandinavian States and Finland. London: Uni-
versity of London Press, 1958.

Nousiainen, Jaakko. The Finnish Political System.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Sobel, Robert. The Origins of Interventionism:
The United States and the Russo- Finnish War.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New York: Bookmm, 1961.

Sykes, J. Direction North: A View of Finland.
New York: Chilton, 1967.

Tanner, Vaino. The Winter War: Finland Against
Russia, 1939-40. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1957.

Wuorinen, John H. A History of Finland. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8262
Revised May 1973

77

APPENDIX G

FINLAND

Suomen Tasavolta - Republiken Finland

Republic of Finland

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 130,128 square miles

Population: 4,600,000

Total Active Armed Forces: 42,500 (including frontier
guards; 0.92% population)

(Eros; National Product: $10.3 billion ($2,240 per cap-
tta

Annual 'Military Expenditures: $153.8 million (1.49%
GNP)

Steel Production: 907,000 metric tons

Electric Power Output: 19.94 billion kwh

Merchant Marine: 338 ships; 1.33 million gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 19 jet and 18 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The President of the Republic of Finland is the com-
mander in chief of the Finnish armed forces, and as the
nation's chief executive has considerably more direct per-

sonal authority and responsibility for military affairs than.

does the head of state or of government in most other
nations. The Defense Minister has no command authority;
his is an essentially administrative position. The armed
forces are integrated, and the nation’s senior military offi-
cer, with the title of Commander of the Defense Forces, is
responsible directly to the President. The Prime Minister
acts as Chairman of the National Defense Councrl
(comparable to the US National Security Council), which
includes the Minister of Defense, four other ministers, the
Commander of the Defense Forces, and the’Chief of the
General Staff.

FINLAND-MILITARY POWER

POLITICO-MILITARY POL! CY

Finland’s location has forced it to shape its military pol-
icy and strategy with primary reference to the Soviet Union.
The events of World War 11 proved conclusively to the
Finns that no amount of Finnish valor and military skill can
deny Russian might. Thus, Finnish foreign policy is
designed to preserve independence, while assuring Russia
that (1) Finland is firmly neutral in international affairs,
and will not attempt to thwart or to oppose Soviet interests,
(2') Finland poses no military threat to Russia, and (3) its
defenses are strong enough to make it unlikely that any
other power will be able to establish an anti-Soviet base in
Finland easily before the USSR can intervene.

Finland’s armed forces are limited in size by the 1947
post-World War, II peace treaty with the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers (USSR, UK, Australia, Canada, Czechoslo-
vakia, India, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa)

Under the treaty the maximum strength allowed for the
Army is 34,400; the Navy is limited to 10,000 tons and
4,500 men; the Air Force cannot exceed 60 combat aircraft
and 3,000 men. Among the prohibitions of the treaty are
nuclear weapons, guided missiles, submarines. motor tor-
pedo boats, and aircraft with internal bomb-carrying capa-
bility. Conscript service is for eight to eleven months. By
treaty, no military training may ‘be conducted outside the
services.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Finland ‘5 principal strategic problem is proximity to the
power centers of the USSR. Because of its far northerly
location, Finland has traditionally stressed the development
of a capability to operate efficiently in cold weather. This
capability had much to do with the initial and dramatic
successes that the Finns won over the Russians in the early
weeks of the 1939-1940 war with the USSR. Finland’s
defensive capability is enhanced by the obstacles created by
the Arctic north, and a vast area of forests and lakes in the
east and central portions of the country. The obstaclesare
less formidable, however, on the direct but narrow
approaches to Finland’s heartland from the Soviet power
center of Leningrad.

- Exce ted with mission from: The Alnanac of librld Military Power,
[by 00111). T.N. orgy, U.S. Army, Ret. and Col. Wendell Blanchard, U.S.

Amy, Ret. Second Edition.

1972.]
78

Dunn Loring, Va., T.N. Dupuy Associates,

1“

ALLIANCES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Finland’s bilateral treaties with the USSR specifically
exclude it from any foreign alliances and military assistance
other than Russian. As a member of the UN, however,
Finland has contributed contingents' or observers to UN
forces or missions in Cyprus, Kashmir, Jerusalem, and
Lebanon.

ARMY

Personnel: 34,000 (about 10,000 are permanent, regu-
lar cadre; the. remainder are conscripts)
Organization:
1 armored brigade (about half strength)

6 infantry brigades (about 35% of full
strength)

8 independent . infantry battalions (reduced
strength)

1 field artillery r/egiment

2 coast artillery regiments
3 coast artillery battalions
1 AA regiment

4 AA battalions

Major Equipment Inventory:

medium tanks (T-54, T-55, and “Chariv

oteer”) -
light tanks (PT-76)
APCs (BTR-SOP)
105mm, 122mm, and 130mm guns
122mm and 152mm howitzers
81mm and 120mm mortars
AA (ZSU-57/ 2, 35mm Oerlikon, 40mm
Bofors, 30mm Hispano-Suiza, and 23mm
Soviet)
“Vigilant” and 88-11 antitank missiles
Reserve Forces: About 150,000 trained reserves; could
be increased to over 500,000.

NAVY
Personnel: 2,500

Major Units:
3 frigates (PF; one used as a training ship)
2 gunboats (PG)
15 fast patrol boats (PTF)
20 patrol ves'sels/ boats
2 coastal minelayers (M MC)
5 inshore minesweepers (M81)
12 landing craft utility (LCU)
l6 auxiliaries
Major Naval Bases: Hanko, Helsinki, Turku

Reserves: About 8,000 trained reservists
AI R F0 RCE

Personnel: 3,000 .
Organization:
3 regional wings: Hame, Satahunta, and Kar-
jala
3 fighter squadrons (MiG-21F and “Gnat”)
1 transport lsquadron
M ajorA ircraft Types:
45 combat aircraft
29 fighters/interceptors
“Gnat” Mk I)
16 “M agister” armed trainers
172 other aircraft
10 transports (C-47, “Pembroke,” “Bea-
ver”)
4 MiG-21 UTI trainers
4 MiG-15 UTI trainers
129 trainer/ support aircraft
25 helicopters (A3204,
“Hound”)
Equipment on Order: 12 SAAB 35x5 “Draken”
Major Air Bases: Dissala, Pori, Luonetjarvi, Parote,
Kuopio, J yvaskyla, Utti; Tampere, Kauhava
Reserves: About 1 1,000 men

PA RAMILITARY

(MiG-21F and

“Alouette” II,

The national police force of 5,000 provides for‘ internal

security. There is a frontier guard organization numbering
3,000 men.

79

APPENDIX H
FINLAND—STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

 

National Political Status: Date of
last election — January 2—3, 1972.

 

Votes % of NO. % of

Name of Pa total of total
"Y ca“ votes seats seats

 

Communist

Finnish PeopIe‘s
Democratic League
(SKDL-Communist
Front)

438,414 17.0 37 18.5

Non-Communist Left

Socwal Democratic
hrw

Workers' and Small
Farmers' Social
Democratic League

663,799 25.8 55 27.5
25,442 1.0 O O

 

Center
Center Party 423,032 16.4 35 17.5
(Agrarian) .
Rural Party 235,477 9.1 18 9.0
Christian League 65,225 2.5 4 2.0
Liberal Party 132,634 5.2 7 3.5
Swedish People's 137,325 5.3 10 5.0
Party
Conservative
National Coa ition 452,403 17.6 34 17.0
Party
Tota1 2,573,751 100.0 200 100.0

 

 

 

 

 

Communist Party Membership:
(estimate)

49,000

Leading Party Figures and Positions:

SAARINEN, Aarne - SKP Chairman (for'
"reformist" majority)

HANNINEN, Olavi - SKP Vice Chairman
(for "reformist" majority)

SINISALO, Taisto - SKP Vice Chairman
(for "Stalinist" minority)

AALTO, Arvo - SKP Secretary-General

Principal Publications:

Kansan Uutiset (People's News) -
daily newspaper

Kommunisti - monthly theoretical
journal

Tiedonantaja - regional party organ
(controlled by Stalinists)

Areas of Communist Activity: Intra-
party war raged on unabated in 1972
and dictated much of the Communists'
political strategy for the year.

 

The 16th Congress of the Finnish
Communist Party (Suomen Kommunisti-
nen Pquue, SKP), March 31-April 2,
confirmed the existence of two
parties within the SKP--a "liberal“
majority and a "Stalinist" minority.

The congress adhered to the
ratio of relative strength set at an
extraordinary SKP congress in 1970.
The proportion of liberals to
Stalinists was established at 20 to
15 on the Central Committee, 9 to 6
in the Politburo, and 5 to 3 in the
Secretariat. Aarne Saarinen, a
former union leader and a "liberal,"
was reelected as Party Chairman, and
the two deputy slots were balanced
between Stalinist Taisto Sinisalo
and liberal Olavi Hanninen.

At year's end, with a campaign
in the offing to update party
membership books and a struggle to
assert control over the Communist-
front Finnish People's Democratic
League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen
Liitto, SKDL), there was no end in
sight for the tension which was
triggered by Khrushchev's attacks
on Stalin back in 1956 and which
has racked the SKP since 1966.

 

Aarne Saarinen, Chairman
Finnish Communist Party

[Excerpted from: World Strength of the Commist Party Organizations.

25th Annual Report, 1973 Edition.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1973.

Washington, Department of State,
Publication 8732.]

Despite internal friction, the
party continued to fare well in pub-
lic appeal. It boasted an estimated
membership of 49,000 in a population
of 4,685,000. It gained slightly
in two elections held during the
year--winning 17% of the vote in the
parliamentary election January 2- 3
and 17. 3% of the turnout in munici-
pal elections October 1-2.

Although the Communists won 37
places in the ZOO-seat Eduskunta
(Parliament), they did not rejoin
the government. The SKP last par-
ticipated in government under Ahti
Karjalainen' s center-left coalition
(July 15,1970-March 17,1971). In
1972 it opted against participation
in both Rafael Paasio's minority
Social Democratic government (Feb-
ruary 22-July 19) and Kalevi Sorsa' s
four-party coalition (September 4-
present), presumably because of
the SKP' s own internal problems and
its desire to stand aside as Finland
decided whether to affiliate with
the European Community (EC).

That decision became part of
a "package," which also included
the extension by extraordinary meas-
ures of President Urho Kekkonen's
term of office (due to expire in
1974) and approval of special eco-
nomic legislation proposed by the
Social Democrats.

SKP sentiment on components of
this package was mixed. The party
clearly opposed any agreement with
the EC as antithetical to a foreign
policy based on the 1948 treaty of
friendship, cooperation, and mutual
assistance with the Soviet Union.
While the SKP favored extending
Kekkonen's tenure because of his
high standing with Soviet leaders,
it did not want that extension link-
ed to the EC issue. Communist lead-
ers saw little advantage in serving
both pro-EC and pro-Kekkonen forces.

By December the SKP Politburo
had endorsed Prime Minister Sorsa' s
pr0posal to extend Kekkonen' s Presi-
dency by four years. The party re-
mained opposed to the economic

counterbalances to the EC set forth
by the Social Democrats because it
considered them inadequate to meet
what it termed the political and
economic dangers posed by Community
ties. .

That battle over economic"
legislation was just one of several
indices to the perennial dilemma of
Communist-Social Democratic cooper-
ation. SKP-SDP relations in Finland
continued to vacillate between pleas
for "worker solidarity" and recip-
rocal recriminations. .SKP offers to
the SDP to work out joint lines of
action were alternately made, re-
buffed, and retracted--as if in a
doomed mating rituala- The apparent
chaperon was the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, which itself con-
tinued to flash ambivalent or con-
tradictory signals to its Finnish
charges.

SKP international targets of
concern were comparable to those
preeminent elsewhere in Scandinavia.
With detente of prime interest, the
Communist promoted a Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). Whatever their role, the
multilateral preparatory talks for
the CSCE opened in Helsinki Novem-
ber 22. SKP efforts also may have
contributed to Finnish initiatives
toward the two Germanies--particu-
larly the agreement signed Decemr
ber 8 to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the German Democratic
Republic (GDR).

Undoubtedly, party pressure
helped in the December 28 decision
of the Finnish Government to recog~
nize North Vietnam, which ran count-
er to Finland's traditional policy
of equal treatment for divided
states. The party pressed, again
successfully, to have the government
launch negotiations with the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA)--either as a substitute or
counterweight to the free-trade
agreement initialed (but not signed)
with the EC.

Finally, in the interest of

81

82

detente, the SKP approved the
heightened rapport between washing-
ton and MOscow. It considered the
"summit” talks essential "since a
united front against the Soviet
union has already been in the making
between China and the USA.“ (Tiedo-
nantajd--July 6, 1972.)

Indeed, SKP loyalty to Moscow
in the Sine-Soviet rift continued to
characterize Finnish international

party contacts; With that in mind,
SKP officials (particularly the
Stalinists) scored Chinese foreign
policy in the subcontinent and with
the United States and made a point
of defending the prosecution of
participants in "the Czech spring"
of 1968 at the recent Prague trials
and proclaiming the intervention of
the warsaw Pact powers as "a day of

victory for proletarian internation-
alism."

background

APPENDIX I

DOES

Iceland

 

department of state * 0er 1974

 

GEOGRAPHY

Iceland is an island in the North
Atlantic Ocean east of Greenland and
immediately south of the Arctic Circle.
It is approximately 2,600 air miles from
New York and 520 miles from
Scotland.

Almost 75 percent of Iceland’s land
area, which is of recent volcanic origin,
consists of glaciers, lakes, a moun-

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Iceland

tainous lava desert (highest elevation
6,590 feet above sea level), and other
wasteland, with the remainder used for
cultivation or grazing. The inhabited
areas are on the coast, particularly in
the southwest.

Due to the moderating influence of
the Gulf Stream, the climate is
characterized by damp, cool summers
(Reykjavik:° July average 52° F.)
and relatively mild but extremely

w

PRO F I LE
Geography

AREA: 39,709 sq. mi. (about the size of
Kentucky). CAPITAL: Reykjavik (pop.
90,000). OTHER CITIES: Akureyri,
Hafnarfjordur.

People

POPULATION: 213,000 (1973 est.).
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.9%. DEN-
SITY: 4 per sq. mi. LANGUAGE: Ice-
landic. LITERACY: 99.9%. RELIGION:
Evangelical Lutheran. LIFE EXPECT-
ANCY: 73 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Constitutional republic. DATE
OF CONSTITUTION: 1874. INDEPEND-
ENCE: Home rule—1903; Independent
republic—1944.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 16 Prov-
inces.

BRANCHES: Executive— President
(Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of
Government), Cabinet (6 Ministers). Legis-
lative-bicameral parliament. Judicial—
Supreme Court, District Courts, Special
Courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Independence,
SOcial Democratic, Progressive, Organiza-

tion of Liberals and Leftists, People’s Al-
liance. '
SUFFRAGE: Universal adult (over 20).
FLAG: Red cross edged in white on a
field of blue.

ECONOMY

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP):
$997.6 million (1973 projected). GROWTH

RATE: 4-5%. PER CAPITA INCOME:
$4,697 (1973 projected).

AGRICULTURE: Labor—11%. Prod-
ucts— livestock, hay, fodder.

INDUSTRY: Labor— 14%. Products—
fishing. '

NATURAL RESOURCES: Diatomite,
fish, hydroelectric power.

TRADE: . Exports— $289.3 million

(1973): fish. Partners-us. 30%, U.K. and
F.R.G. 24%. Imports- $353.9 million
(1973): petroleum products, machinery,
transportation equipment, fishing vessels
and gear. Parmers— Norway, F.R.G., Den-
mark.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE:
landic kronur 83.60 = US$1.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: Nordic Council, Coun-
cil of Europe, U.N. and its specialized
agencies, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).

Ice-

[Weshington, Department of State, April 1974 .

windy winters (Reykjavik: January
average 30° F.) .

PEOPLE

Most Icelanders are descendants of
Norwegian settlers and Celts from the
British Isles. The population today is
remarkably homogeneous, and 85 per-
cent of Icelanders live in urban areas.
The Icelandic language is closest of the
Nordic languages to the Old Norse
language and has remained relatively
unchanged since the 12th century.
Iceland is the most literate nation in
the world with literacy estimated at
99.9 percent.

About 98 percent of the population
belongs to the state church, the
Evangelical Lutheran Church. How-
ever, there is complete religious liberty;
and other Protestant and Roman
Catholic congregations are present.

HISTORY

Iceland was settled in the late 9th
and early 10th centuries principally by
Norwegians. In 930 the ruling chiefs
of Iceland established a republican
constitution and an assembly called
the Althing-the oldest parliament in
the world. Iceland remained inde-
pendent until 1262 when the Norwe-
gian King succeeded in extending his
sovereignty to Iceland. It passed to
Denmark late in the 14th century when
Norway and Denmark were united
under the Danish crown.

Early in the 19th century national
consciousness revived in Iceland. The
Althing had been abolished in 1800,
but in 1843 it was reestablished as a

Publication 8227.]

 

Mmmwwm mymmmmMMflanwwa. m» 3,,

figs m
vfigggm:

FEW“ '
W”
K ,

m, A:
,M, v,

 

consultativc assembly.
Althing obtained limited legislative
authority, and a constitution was
granted to Iceland. The constitution
was revised in 1903 when home rule
was granted, and the Danish Minister
for Icelandic Affairs was made respon-
sible to the Althing. An agreement
was reached with Denmark in 1918
recognizing Iceland as a sovereign state

united with Denmark under a common .

king. Iceland was granted its oWn
flag, but Denmark retained control of
Iceland’s foreign affairs and defense.

The German occupation of Denmark
in 1940 severed communications be-
tween Iceland and Denmark. In May
1940 Iceland was occupied by British
military forces. In July 1941 respon-
sibility for the defense of Iceland passed
to the United States under the U.S.-
Icelandic Defense Agreement. Fol-
lowing a plebiscite, the country was
formally established as an independent
republic on June 17, 1944. II:

October 1946 the Icelandic and U.S. I

Governments agreed to terminate U.S.
responsibility for the defense of Ice-
land, but the United States retained
certain rights at Keflavi'k.’ In 1949
Iceland became a charter member of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO). After the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea in 1950 and pur-
suant to the request of NATO military
authorities, the United States and Ice-
land agreed that the United States
should be responsible for the defense
of Iceland. This agreement, signed on
May 5, 1951, is the authority for the
U.S. military presence in Iceland.
Iceland is the only NATO country with
no military forces of its own.

GOVERNMENT

The government is a constitutional
republic consisting of executive, legis-
lative, and judicial branches.

The President (Chief of State) is
elected to a 4-year term. His powers
are limited. The Prime Minister (Head
of Government) and the Cabinet exer-
cise most executive functions.

The Althing (parliament) is com-
posed of 60 members, normally elected
'every 4 years. After elections, the
Althing divides itself into Upper (20
members) and Lower (40 members)

In 1874 the

Houses, but the two houses often meet
together. Suffrage for presidential
and parliamentary elections is universal
(at age 20), and the electoral system
combines direct and proportional repre-
sentation.

The judiciary consists of the
Supreme Court, District Courts, and
various special courts. The Constitu-
tion protects the judiciary from in-
fringements by the other two branches.

Principal Government Officials

President—Kristjan Eldjarn

Prime Minister; Minister of Justice and
Ecclesiastical Affairs—Olafur Johan-
nesson (Progressive)

Foreign Minister—Einar
(Progressive)

Minister of Finance and Agriculture—
Halldor Sigurdsson (Progressive)

Minister of Education and Health and
Social Security—Magnus Kjartansson
(Labor Alliance)

Minister of Commerce and Fisheries—
Ludvik Josefsson (Labor Alliance)

Minister of Communications and Social

_ Affairs—Bjorn Jonsson (OLL)

Minister of Education and Statistical
Bureau—Magnus Torfi Olafsson
(OLL)

Agustsson

Ambassador to, the U.S.-H'araldur'

Kroyer
Ambassador to the U.N.—Ingvi Ingvars-
son

POLITICAL. CONDITIONS ‘

Parliamentary elections were held
on June 13, 1971'. A loss of four

seats caused the downfall of the

coalition government of the Independ-
ence (conservative) and Social Demo-
cratic (moderate Socialist) Parties
which had governed Iceland since 1959.

A new government (consisting of the
former opposition parties was formed
on. July 14, 1971, after difficult nego-
tiations. It is composed of the Progres-
sive Party (supported by farmer, labor,
and cooperative society groups), the
People’s Alliance (Communist-domi-
nated), and the Organization of Liberals
and Leftists (OLL), a non-Communist
leftist party established in 1969. The
election result- reflected a shift ‘of
Social Democratic voters to the OLL
and was a personal triumph for the
party’s founder, Hannibal Valdimars-
son. The relative strengths of the
other three political parties were
changed little. In the last presidential
election, June 1972, Dr. Kristjan
Eldjarn was reelected unopposed.

REPRESENTATION IN THE ALTHING

Elections
1 963 l 967 l 971

Progressive 1 9 18 17
People’s Alliance 9 IO 10
Organization of Liberals

and Leftists — — 5
Independence 24 23 22
Social Democratic 8 9 6

Icelanders depend heavily on fishing
for their economic survival and have
become ' increasingly alarmed by the
depletion of fish stocks, allegedly
caused by foreign vessels overfishing
in waters close to Iceland. The present
government, reflecting the will of the
vast majority of Icelanders, extended
the country’s fisheries jurisdiction from
12 to 50 nautical miles from the coast-
lines on September 1, 1972. ‘ The gov-
ernment has also committed itself to
improved wages and working conditions

 

READING LIST

Davis, Morris. Iceland Extends Its
Fisheries Limits. Oslo: Uni-
versitetsforlaget, l 963 .

Department of State. “NATO and
the Defense of Europe.” No. 2 in
the Issues in United ,States For-
eign Policy series. Pub. 8476.
Discussion Guide, Pub. 8487.
Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1969.

 

Gislason, Gylfi Th. The Problem
of Being an Icelander—Past, Pres-
ent, and Future. Translated by
P. K. Karlsson. Reykjavikz'
Almenna bokafelagio, 1973.

Griffiths, John C. Modern Iceland.
New York: Praeger, 1969. ,

Gro‘ndal, Benedikt. Iceland: From
Neutrality to NA T0 Member-
ship. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,
1971.

Johnson, Skuli, ed. Iceland’s Thou-
sand Years. Winnipeg, 1945.

 

 

85

86

and to more effective industrial devel-
opment planning.

ECONOMY

The fishing industry is Iceland’spri-
mary national resource and in most
years has made possible a high standard
of living. About 14 percent of the
population depend on fishing and fish
processing for a livelihood, 11 percent
on agriculture, and almost 30 percent
on manufacturing and construction.
Processed fish and fish products com-
prise more than 70 percent of Iceland’s
exports, and the United States is the
predominant overseas market.

In 1973, 27 percent of Iceland’s
exports went to the United States.
The United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany were the next
most important customers and to-
gether accounted for 24 percent of
Iceland’s exports. The other European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) and
European Economic Community
(EEC) countries and the Soviet Union
were smaller but significant purchasers
of Icelandic goods.

Principal imported items are pe-
troleum products, machinery, trans-
portation equipment, and fishing ,ves-
sels and gear. During the last few years
the U.S. share of Iceland’s imports has
ranged from 7 to 15 percent. The
principal products of U.S. origin sold
to Iceland ‘have been nonelectrical
machinery, tobacco, grains and cereals,
and transportation. equipment. Trade
with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe
in 1.973 accounted for 8.6 percent of
Iceland’s exports and 8.9 percent of its
imports.

Iceland has few proven mineral re-
sources, although deposits of diatomite
(skeletal algae) are being developed and
perlite (volcanic glass) explored. The
hydroelectric power potential is abun-
dant and is being harnessed gradually.
The Alusuisso aluminum smelter near
Reykjavik has an annual capacity of
77,000 tons. Extraction of chemicals
from seawater and the generation of
power from geothermal sources are be-

ing studied for possible development.
A ferro alloy plant is also under con-
sideration for completion in 1976.

“The Icelandic economy has under— .

gone a tremendous expansion and ex-
perienced far-reaching changes since
World War II. The gross national
product (GNP) rose by an annual
average of about 4.5 percent in real
terms during the decade 1961-70. Ice-
land’s per capita income is higher than
the average for all of Europe.

There are no railroads in Iceland.
Organized roadbuilding did not begin
until about 1900. The present national
road system connecting most' of the
population centers is largely in the
coastal areas and consists of about
6,000 miles of dirt and gravel roads,
and some 60 miles of hard surface
road. There are regular air and sea
services between Reykjavik and the
other main urban centers. In addition,
Iceland is connected with Europe and

. North America by regularly scheduled

airlines.

Iceland became a full EFTA mem-
ber on March 1, 1970 and entered into
a free-trade agreement with the BBC in
l 97 3 .

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Iceland wishes to maintain and
strengthen its economic and political
independence and a balanced foreign
trade without becoming unduly in-
volved in controversies among other
nations. While Iceland maintains diplo-
matic and commercial relations with
the. leading nations of the East and
West, its ties with the other Nordic

nations and with the United States are

especially close. Iceland plans to con-

tinue its active participation in NATO
under existing world conditions, al-
though the People’s Alliance Party
opposes NATO membership.

U.S.—ICELAND RELATIONS

U.S. policy is aimed at maintaining
the present cordial, cooperative rela-
tions with Iceland, both as a NATO
ally and as a friend interested in the
commonly shared objectives of estab-
lishing world peace and freedom and
encouraging worldwide economic and
social development.

In 1953 and 1956 the question of '
whether U.S. defense forces stationed
at Keflavik under NATO auspices
should be requested to withdraw from
Iceland was among the principal issues
in public debate. The present govern-
ment raised this matter again in 1973
and negotiations regarding the future
of the Defense Force were in progress
in March 1974.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Frederick Irving

Deputy Chief of Mission—Doyle V.
Martin

Political Officer-Joseph Becelia.

Economic Officer—Dennis C. Goodman

lAdministrative Officer—Stefan c.

Nadzo

Commander, Iceland Defense Force—
Rear Adm. Samuel M. Cooley, Jr.,
USN

The U.S. Embassy in Iceland is lo-
cated at Laufasvegur 21, Reykjavik.

 

Travel Notes

Clothing-The climate in Iceland is
similar to that on the northwest coast of

clothing is worn year-round.

Telecomnmnications-Telephone and
telegraph service is state-owned and is
available to all parts of Iceland and
principal points throughout the world.

 

the United States. Wool or other warm’

hansportation—Iceland has no rail-
roads or streetcars. Local taxi and bus
services are safe and efficient, but taxi
fares are higher than on the U.S. east
coast. Most roads outside the immediate
vicinity of Reykjavik are dirt or gravel
and are only poor to fair quality. One
can rent cars or four-wheeI-drive vehicles.

Community Health—There are no
endemic health problems in Iceland.'
Adequate medical facilities are found in
the major cities.

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8227

Revised April 1974

APPENDIX J
ICELAND—MI LITARY POWER

ICELAND
Lydveldid Island
Republic of Iceland

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 39,768 square miles

Population: 203,442

Total Active Armed Forces: None

Merchant Marine: 285 ships: l20,460 gross tons

Civil Air Fleet: 5 jet, 9 propjet, and I3 piston trans-
ports

POLITICO.MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

A member of NATO, Iceland maintains no military
forces, although there is an internal security police force of

.about 500 men, and a Coast Guard of 5 ships and 120 men.

Iceland provides its NATO allies with air and radar base
sites on its territory; there are approximately 4,000 US Air
Force and Navy personnel in Iceland, stationed at the
NATO air base of Keflavik. Elections in l97l brought a
new coalition government with leftist tendencies. which has
requested NATO and the US to evacuate the base, an act
which would have a serious adverse effect on NATO's
North Atlantic strategy. Iceland is also a member of the
UN and the Council of Europe.

[Excerpted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power,
by 031. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Anny, Ret. and Col. “budell Blanchard, U.S.

Army, Ret.
1972.]

Second Edition.

Dunn Loring, Va. , T.N. Durmy Associates,

87

88

APPENDIX K
ICELANDwSTRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

 

National Political Status: Date of
last election - June 13, 1971.
(See tabulation, over.)

Communist Party Membership: 2,000-
2,500 (estimate)

Leading Party Figures and Positions:
ARNALDS, Ragnar - Chairman

JOSEFSSON, Ludvik - Member of Polit-
ical Committee and Cabinet
Minister

KJARTANSSON, Magnus - Member of
Political Committee and Cabinet
Minister

Principal Publications:
Thjodviljinn - daily newspaper
Ny Utsyn - biweekly journal

[Excerpted from: World Strength of the Conmmist Party Organizations.

25th Annual Report, 1973 Edition.

Washington, Department of State,

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1973. Publication 8732.]

68

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With that consensus in mind,
Minister of Commerce and Fisheries
.Josefsson took a hard line in nego-
tiations with the United Kingdom and
the Federal Republic of Germany and
contributed, in part, to the new
"cod war" between Icelandic and
foreign trawlers. The PA Executive
Council pledged total loyalty to the
new 50—mi1e limit "until a complete
victory has been achieved." (Thjod-
viljinn, October 22, 1972.)

The PA continued to play upon
traditional Icelandic isOlationism
and xenophobia by espousing the
ouster of the U.S.-manned Icelandic
Defense Force (IDF) and Icelandic
withdrawal from the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. The Johannesson
government deferred action on its
announced aim to review the 1951
Defense Agreement with the United
States and seek the IDF's phased
withdrawal during the coalition's
four-year term of office, but the
People's Alliance repeatedly demand-
ed that Iceland rid itself of all
military bases.

Although memberShip in the

Eur0pean Community did not marshal
public attention in Iceland as else-

90

where in Scandinavia, the PA clearly
sided with Common Market opponents
throughout the Nordic area. It did
so out of genuine oppoSition to
Icelandic membership in the expanded
EC as well as out of the belief that
EC opponents in other nations would
be most likely to support PA posi-‘
tions on fishing rights and defense
questions.

-In 1972, party relations--in-
ternal and international--were of a
piece with the past. Factionalism,

a perennial plague for the PeOple's
Alliance, erupted with the founding
in early August of the Communist
Organization of Marxist-Leninists--a
radical Splinter stressing the teach-
ings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin,
and Chairman Mao. Except for some
contacts with the Romanian Communist
Party in June and with the Communist-
dominated World Peace Council in May,
the PA remained aloof from inter-
national party contacts. It contin-
ued its break from a previous pro-
Moscow line and spoke out against

wthe Prague trials as an "attack on

the struggle being waged by all
those who honor socialistic ideas in
word and deed." (Thjodviljinn--Au-
gust 17, 1972.)

APPENDIX L

 

KINGDOM OF NORWAY

 

Population: 3.9 million (1969 est.l
Capital: Oslo

Norway is located in northwestern Europe and
bounded by a 2,125-mile-long coastline along the
North and Norwegian Seas and the Arctic Ocean.
On the east it has common frontiers with Sweden,
Finland, and the Soviet Union. With an area of
about 125,000 square miles, Norway is slightly
larger than New Mexico.

Norway’s terrain is comprised mainly of high
plateaus and rugged mountains. The highlands are
broken by fertile valleys and dotted with lakes.
About 25 percent of the land is forested; only 3
percent is arable.

The climate is strongly influenced by the Gulf
Stream which results in relatively mild winters
for the latitude, particularly along the coast. How-
ever, interior winter temperatures are extremely
cold. Rainfall is generally at a maximum during
the fall-winter period. Spring and summer are
warm, with maximum temperature reaching only
the low 70’s.

The national flag consists of a white cross
and a blue inner cross on a red field. The white
cross and red field are derived from the Danish
flag; the blue cross was added to symbolize Nor-
way’s independence.

THE PEOPLE

Norway’s estimated 1969 population was 3.9
million, with an annual growth rate of slightly less
than 1 percent. Except for Iceland, Norway has
the lowest mean population density in Europe
averaging about 30 persons per square mile. Sixty-
five percent of the people live in the south and
along the coast. The major cities and their popu-
lations are: Oslo (487,000), Trondheim(126,000),
Bergen (116,000), and Stavanger (82,000).

Most Norwegians are of Germanic descent
whose ancestors mixed with the original inhabi-
tants. There also was mixture with the Finns and
Lapps. From 20,000 to 30,000 Lapps still live
in the north, some of whom followtheir traditional
reindeer culture.

The state church, the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, includes in its membership 96 percent
of the Norwegians although complete religious
freedom exists. Education is free through the
university level and is compulsory from ages 7
to 16. Literacy is virtually complete. The official
language is Norwegian, a Germanic language. In
addition, many Lapps still. speak their ancient
Lappish tongue.

HISTORY

The Viking period was one of national unifi-
cation and expansion. The Norwegian royal line
died out in 1319, and Norway entered a period of
“union” with Denmark and for a time also with
Sweden. By 1536 Norway had become part of the
Danish Kingdom. In 1814, as a result of the Napo-
leonic wars, Norway was separated from Denmark
and joined with Sweden under the SWedish crown.
An abortive movement for independence, which
included the adoption of the Constitution of 1814,
was put down by the Swedes, and the union per-
sisted, until 1905 when Norwegian independence
was recognized by Sweden.

The Norwegian Government offered the throne
of Norway to Danish Prince Carl in 1905. After a
plebiscite that approved the establishment of a
monarchy, the parliament unanimously elected
him King. He took the name of Haakon VII, hark-
ing back to the kings of independent Norway dur-
ing the Middle Ages and before union with Den-
mark. He reigned until his death in 1957, when
he was succeeded by his son, Olav V.

Norway remained a nonbelligerent during
World War I, but as a result of the German
invasion and occupation during World War II
Norwegians generally became skeptical of the con-
cept of neutrality and turned instead to collective
security. Norway was one of the original signers
of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

GOVERNMENT

Norway is a constitutional monarchy. The func-
tions of the King (Chief of State) are mainly cere-
monial, although he has influence as the symbol
of national unity. While the present Constitution
grants important executive powers to the King,
these are almost always exercised by the Council
of Ministers in the name of the King (King in
Council). The Council of Ministers (cabinet) con-
sists of the Prime Minister (Head of Government),
chosen by the political parties that enjoy the con-
fidence of parliament, and other Ministers.

The Storting (parliament) is neither unica-
meral nor bicameral in the usual sense of parlia-
mentary structures. Its 150 members are elected
from 20 electoral districts for 4-year terms ac-
cording to a complicated list system of propor-
tional representation. There is universal suffrage
for those more than 21 years of age. After the
Storting is elected, it divides into two chambers,

Washington, Department of State, January 1972. Publication 8228.]

91

Z6

 

the Odelsting and the Lagting, which meet sepa-
rately or jointly depending on the legislative cir-
cumstances.

The judicial structure is similar to that in the
United States, and, aside from the special High
Court of the Realm which hears impeachment
cases, the regular courts include a Supreme
Court (17 permanent judges and a president),
courts of appeal, city and county courts, and
conciliation councils. Judges attached to regular
courts are appointed by the King in Council after
nomination by the Ministry of Justice. The Nor-
wegian penal system places great emphasis on
rehabilitation of offenders.

Norway is divided into 20 Provinces, each
headed by a Governor appointed by the Central
Government.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

With the exception of a brief period in 1963
and from 1965 to 1971, Norway has had Labor
Party governments since 1935. However, it lost
its majority in the Storting in the 1961 elections
and since then has been obliged to rule as a
minority with the support of representatives from
one or more of the opposition parties.

Although the coalition of Center, Conservative,
Liberal, and Christian People’s Parties was re-
turned to power with a bare majority after the
September 1969 election, it split over the issue
of Norwegian membership in the European Eco-
nomic Community (Common Market) and was re-
placed by a Labor minority government under
Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli on March 17,
1971. The new Government is fully committed to
bringing Norway into the Common Market and
on that issue can count on support of the Con-
servative Party and elements in the Liberal and
Christian People’s Parties. The small Communist
Party has continued to lose support.

Party Representation in the Storting:

1961 1965 1969

Labor Party 74 68 74
Conservative Party 29 31 29
Center Party 16 18 20
Christian People’s Party 15 13 14
Liberal Party 14 18 13
Socialist People’s Party 2 2 0
Communist Party 0 O 0

With the exception of the issue of Norwegian
membership in the Common Market, on which
a national referendum is expected to be held in
late 1972, the Norwegians as a whole support the
main lines of the Labor Party’s foreign and do-
mestic policies. It is for this reason that the
Center-Conservative-Liberal-Christian People’s
coalition government made no radical changes in
national policy or programs during the little
more than 5 years that it held office.

ECONOMY

Despite Norway’s lack of major natural re-
sources (aside from its inexpensive hydroelectric
power), the determination and industry of the
Norwegians have developed a progressive, pros-
perous, and increasingly diversified economy.
Norway’s merchant fleet is the world’s third
largest and the country’s largestforeign exchange
earner. While fishing, forestry, and agriculture
have been Norway’s traditional economic activi-
ties, there has been a great movement into in-
dustrial production which now has surpassed these
activities in importance to the economy. Major
industries include metals, pulp and paper products,
chemicals, and shipbuilding.

Norway has enjoyed unprecedented economic
expansion since 1960. The real increase in gross
national product (GNP) was 4.4 percent in 1970.
The GNP, in current prices, was U.S. $11 billion
in 1970; per capita GNP was estimated at $2,880.
At the same time, the economy has expanded
under conditions of full resource utilization with
consequent pressure on prices. Despite a certain
tightening of economic policy, mainly through
monetary measures, inflation remains Norway’s
most difficult economic problem.

The problems connected with the split between
the Common Market and the declining European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) have been hard
on Norway. While the Common Market has been
taking a growing share of Norway’s exports in
recent years, tariffs and other Common Market
trade barriers have tended to harm such impor-
tant export industries as fisheries, aluminum,
pulp, and paper. The difficulties that Norwegian
agriculture and fisheries will face, especially in
the north, should Norway become a member of
the Common Market, have not been satisfactorily
resolved, although progress has been made in the
negotiations with the Common Market.

Since the total of Norway’s exportsand ser-
vices, including shipping, is equivalent to about
40 percent of its GNP, the economy is heavily
influenced by levels of world trade. Norway has
been a net capital importer in the postwar period
and as a result has been able to balance recur-
rent trade deficits in its GNP as well as increase
its foreign exchange holdings. In 1968 and 1969
Norway recorded a surplus($182 million) in its
balance of payments for the first time in several
years, but this was a temporary situation, mainly
the result of reduced net imports of ships. In
1970 Norway’s trade deficit amounted to $120
million. Norway is dedicated strongly to freedom
of international competition in the fields of trade
and transportation and reacts quickly to any
developments which it believes would threaten
this freedom.

The United States ranks fifth among Norway’s
trading partners (after Sweden, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark),
supplying in 1970 principally transportation equip-
ment (aircraft), machinery, alumina, coal andfuel
oils, and oil seeds. Principal imports to the United

93

94

States from Norway are aluminum, nickel, furs,
fish, and ships. In 1970 the United States pur-
chased 7 percent of Norway’s total $3.5 billion
in exports and supplied 8.2 percent of its total
$2.5 billion in imports.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The traditional cornerstones of Norwegian
foreign policy are support of the United Nations
and its specialized agencies, participation in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), co-
operation with the other Nordic countries, and
interest in European unity as exemplified by
Norway’s application for membership in the
European Communities.

In addition to strengthening traditional ties
with more developed countries, Norway seeks to
build friendly relations with less developed coun-
tries and has undertaken important aid efforts with
some countries in Africa and the Near East. The
Government has announced its intention to estab—
lish diplomatic relations with North Viet—Nam. It
has maintained diplomatic relations with the
People’s Republic of China since 1950.

U. S.-NORWAY RELATIONS

The United States and Norway enjoy a long
tradition of friendly association, bonded by com—
mon Western institutions and values and cemented
by the presence in the United States of millions of
Americans of Norwegian ancestry. U.S. policy
seeks to continue this close relationship and to
help maintain a free, friendly, and economically
stable Norway.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

King—Olav V

Prime Minister—Trygve Bratteli
Foreign Minister—Andreas Cappelen
Defense Minister—Alf Fostevoll
Commerce Minister—Per Kleppe
Ambassador to the U.S.—Arne Gunneng
Ambassador to the U.N.—Ole Algard

Norway maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 3401 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, DC. 20007.

PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—Philip K. Crowe

Counselor of Embassy—John Ausland

Economic Counselor—Lucian L. Rocke, Jr.

Chief, Political Section—Robert K. German

Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Robert C. Voth

Agricultural Attache—Harlan John Dirks (resident
at Copenhagen)

Labor Attache—Donald R. Niemi

Army Attache—Col. John D. Z. Kinsey

Air Attache—Col. Leslie H. Armen

Naval Attache—Capt. Robert Coulthard

Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group—Col.
William H. Cooper

The U.S. Embassy in Norway is located at
Drammensveien 18, Oslo.

READING LIST

Boardman, Philip. How to Feel at Home in Nor-
way. Oslo: Aschehous, 1960.

Con—nery, Donald S. The Scandinavians. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

Department of State. ”NATO and the Defense of
Europe.” No. 2 in the Issues in United States
Foreign Policy series. Pub. 8476. Discussion
Guide, pub. 8487. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, revised 1970.

Derry, T. K. A Short History of Norway. London:
Allen and Unwin, 1968.

Helvig, Magne, and Johannessen, Viggo. Norway:
Land-People-Industries. Oslo: Johan Grundt
Tanum Forlaget, 1966.

Jerman, Gunnar, and Nyquist, Finn P., eds. M
Norway: An Introduction to Norwegian Industry
on Entering the 1970’s. OslozGrondahl&Son,
1970.

Lauwerys, J. A., ed. Scandinavian Democracy.
Copenhagen: A/S J. H. Schultz, 1958.

Midgaard, John. A Brief History of Norway.
Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlaget, 1964.

Storing, James A. Norwegian Democracy. Bos—
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8228
Revised January 1972

APPENDIX 1‘1
NORWAY—MI LITARY POWER

 

NORWAY
Kongeriket Norge
Norwegian Kingdom
rowan POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 149,150 square miles

Population: 3,915,000

Total Active Armed Forces: 35,900 (0.92% popula-
tion)

Gross National Product: $12.46 billion ($3.183 per
capita)

Annual Military Expenditures: $410.64 million (3.3%
GNP)

Steel Production: 824,000 metric tons

Aluminum Production: 511,000 metric tons

Fuel Production: Coal: 391,000 metric tons

Electric Power Output: 57.2 billion kwh

Merchant Marine: 2,848 ships; 19.68 million gross
tons

Civil Air Fleet: 12 jet, 5 propjet, and 18 piston trans-
ports (exclusive of the Norwegian-owned portion of
SAS)

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

Norway is a constitutional monarchy; the King is the
nominal commander in chief of the armed forces. Control is
exercised, however, by the parliamentary Cabinet, with the
Minister of Defense being responsible for administering the
three independent military services. .

PO LlTICO-Ml LITA RY POLICY

Before World War 11 Norway adhered to the traditional
Scandinavian policy of neutrality. The experience of that
war convinced Norwegians that neutrality will not deter an
aggressor, and that Norwegian defense policy must be built
upon a mutual security alliance, since Norway cannot pos-
sibly muster the military strength to defend-itself against a
major aggressor. Thus Norway has been a wholehearted
participant in theNATO alliance but, to avoid offense to its
Soviet neighbor (Norway is the only NATO'country, except
Turkey, with a mgtual frontier with Russia) it has consis-
tently refused to allow allied troop units, or bases, or stored
nuclear weapons, on Norwegian soil.

NATO maintains a regional headquarters, that of

- Commander in Chief, North (CINCNORTH) at Kolsaas

near Oslo. Officers of various NATO nations are repre-
sented on the staff. NATO units visit Norway to participate
in maneuvers.

 

Norway has a battalion in the UN force on Cyprus, and
furnished a unit for the UN Emergency Force in the Gaza
Strip until evacuated in June 1967.

Norway's armed forces are maintained by conscription,
with an annual call-up of more than 20,000 young men.
Service is for 12 months in the Army, and 15 months in the
Navy and Air Force. Most of the Norwegian armed forces
are earmarked for AFNORTH (Allied Forces Northern
Europe).

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Norway's extreme length (its eastern boundary is over
1,600 miles long), the rugged nature of the interior of the

[Excerpted with permission from:
by Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army,
Army, Ret.
1972.]

country (particularly in the north). and the near total ab-
sence of a ground communications network in' the north.
pose almost insuperable defense problems, particularly
near the Soviet border.

Introduction of Soviet submarines into the numerous ice-
free fjords would facilitate interdiction of North Atlantic
sea lanes, and thus the loss of even northern Norway would
represent a severe setback to NATO. In addition to the
coastal invasion route from Kerkcnes near the Soviet-
Norwegian border, a serious threat is posed by the Finnish
“wedge," a salient of Finland with a good road which
stretches close to the coast in the strategic Bardufoss-
Tromso-Harstad area. A Soviet offensive on this axis could
quickly seize northern Norway.

The Almanac of hbrld Military Power,
Ret. and Col.

Second Edition. Dunn Loring, Va., T.N. Dupuy Associates,

Wendell Blanchard, U. S.

95

96

Problems of defense are compounded by the -‘\rct:c cii-
mate. and by a deeply indented. sparsely inhabited L‘ud‘dilllc
more than 2.000 miles long. very inimitable ti; airg'zrise
amphibious attack. The nature of litcr'c defense problems
was thoroughly demenstr ated during World \‘v'ar ll.

Near the Soviet Union on the strategic nolar route from
the US. Spitsbergen (Svalbard) was awarded to Nt-rw at; by
a l920 international treaty. which also prohibited the est.tb-~

lishment of naval or military base:.. There are a no lllltfl' of

active coal mines on the islands. worked by some 700
Norwegians and 2.000 Rossians. Beginning in 2914. Russia
sought revision of the treaty to include joint Soviet—Nor-
wegian defense measures. Norway has refused to consider
this without the concurrence of all treaty signatories. which
has not been forthcomin__.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Since I950 Norway has received $888.4 million in A meri-
ean military aid. The US Military Advisory Group in
Norway numbers about 30.

ALLIANCES

Norway is a member of the NATO alliance. Otherwise it
has maintained a strict neutrality in international relations
and, as noted above. has to some extent limited its involve-
ment in NATO. Norway is a member ofthe UN.

ARMY

Personnel: l8,000
Organization :
5 regional commands divided into ground-
defense districts
2 regimental combat tcamstone in north. one
in south)
4 tank companies
Major Equ i'pmenl In ven Jory .'
80 medium tztnksthl-48}
78 medium tanks(“lt.eopard”)
47 light tanks(i\-‘l-24)
armored cars ( M-bl
30 artillery pieces (including M-llll) SP howit-
zers)
APCs(l\f-l l3 and BV'-202)
34 light aircraft
l0 helicopters
Reserve: About 160.000 men who will be organized
into ll RCTS. supporting units. and territorial
defense forces.

NAVY

Personnel: 8.500 (including 800 coast artillerymen) _
Major Units:
5 destroyer escorts (Dli)
IS coastal submarines (55)

Coastal minclaycrslMMC.‘l
coastal llllllt.‘ sweepers (.‘i-lS‘l“)
- patrol escorts submarine chascrs t li’C'lslt
20 ganhoais fast patrol boats (PG li’Bl’: relia-
ting uith “Penguin" $8M)
lort'rc‘tltt boats ( P’} l
auxiliaries
coast defense artillery battalions
l9 utility aircraft
IO helicopters
.ljm'n Naval Bows: llaakonsvern. ilarstad. Tromso.
Trondheim. Bergen

_.
I
on

. J

2(

d

.
II'.

Reserves: lihfltltt trained reservists
/-'.i Fl FORCE

Personnel: 9.400
Organimu‘on:
l interceptor squadron (F- l 04G)
5 fighter-bomber squadrons (F-SA)
l reconnaissance squadron (RF-5A)
2 maritime patrol squadrons (P—3B and HU-
I68)
1 transport squadron (C-l30H)
2 helicopter squadrons
4 SAM battalions(“Nike/Hercules“)
Major A ircraft Types:
I30 combat aircraft
20 F-lO4G interceptors
80 F-SA fighter-bombers
l6 RF-SA reconnaissance aircraft
6 P-3B maritime patrol aircraft
8 HU-l6B maritime patrol aircraft
I79 other aircraft '
10 C-47 transports
6 C-l30H transports
4 “Twin Otter" light transports
22 miscellaneous transports
3 PBY-SA patrol/’fishing protection air-
craft
lOO miscellaneous trainer/support aircraft
34 helicopters (Ul’l~l B and Bell 4?)
Reserves: l9.000 trained reservists. Twelve light anti-
aircraft defense battalions.
Major Air Bases: Stavangcr.
Andoya ( Lofoten Islands)

PARAMILITARY

There is a highly organized Home Guard consisting of
75.000 individuals. Most of then are in Army units. linked
to the nation‘s territorial defense area commands There
are also a few Navy and .-‘.ir l‘orce Home Guard units. .-\!l
these are organi/ed in small groups and platoons with spe-
cific defense t‘nisisions in their home localities. \Veanons are
kept at home. and a relatively high state of readiness is
maintained by periodic drills and alerts.

Bodo. Bardufoss.

APPENDIX N
NORWAY-v—STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

 

National Political Status: Date of
last election - September 7-8, 1969.
(See tabulation, opposite.)

Communist Party Membership:
(estimate)

2,500

Leading Party Figures and Positions:
LARSEN, Reidar - Chairman

OVESEN, Georg - Leader of NKP youth
affiliate

grincipalggublications:
Friheten (Freedom) - organ of the

[Excerpted from: World Stren
25th Annual Report, 1973 Edition.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1973.

NKP (published weekly)
Kommunistisk Ungdom (Communist'
Youth) - bulletin issued by Commu-
nist Youth (KU)
Klassekampen (Class Struggle) -
Maoist publication

Areas of Communist Activity:
wayTs Communist Party (Norges
Kommunistiske Parti, NKP) continued
its nominal role in Norwegian affairs
in 1972. Formed in 1923 as a splint-
er from the Norwegian Labor Party,
the NKP has dwindled in strength

Nor-

gth of the Commist Party Organizations.

Washington, Department of State,
Publication 8732.]

97

 

% of No. % of

 

Votes
total of total
Name of Party cast votes seats seats
Communist
Norwegian Communist 22,520 1.0 0 0
Party (NKP)

Non-Communist Left

Socialist People's 75,505 3.5 0 0

 

 

 

 

 

 

Party
Labor 1,004,311 46.5 74 49.3
Center
Libera1 202,437 9.4 13 8.7
Christian Peop1e's 202,855 9.4 14 9.3
Center 227,468 10.5 20 13.3
Conservative
Conservative 422,456 19.6 29 19.3
Tota1 2.157.552 100.0 150 100.0

 

since its 1945 electoral peak. It 1

last won parliamentary representation

in 1957.

The party polled only 1% of the
votes in the 1969 election to the
Starting (Parliament) and is not ex-
pected to do much better in the
election scheduled for September
1973. Its approximately 2,500 mem-
bers, found primarily among indus-
trial workers in Oslo and low-income
groups in Finnmark and Hedmark, make
little impact on a total population
of about 4 million.

The party suffers from external
competition and internal division.
It has difficulty attracting new
members because of its political
stance between the Labor Party (Nor-
way's most powerful political organ—
ization) and the Socialist People's
Party (SF) on the one hand and an
assemblage of tiny Maoist factions
on the other. Reidar Larsen, NKP
Chairman, has~continued to try to
fend off intraparty factionalism.
However, his emphasis on a more
nationalist, left-Socialist strategy
has offended both Maoists and
Muscovites.

One of the main pending ques-
tions for the NKP is whether it can
resolve its internal conflict at its
next congress in 1973 and revitalize
its aging ranks (average age of mem-

98‘

hers is almost 60). Should the NKP
fail, young radicals will continue
to gravitate toward organizations
like the Socialist Youth League
(Sosialistisk Ungdomsforbund, Marxis-
tisk-Leninistisk--SUF, M-L). Chair-
ed by Sverre Knudsen,the SUF made

at its congress in early 1972 and in
debates throughout the year with
representatives of the Communist
Youth (Kommunistisk Ungdom, KU) that
it will not "relax in the struggle
against the harmful influence exert-
ed on young people and others by
modern revisionism, meaning the
ideas of the SF and NKP." (KZasse-
kampen, No. 1, 1972.)

Opposition to Norwegian member-
ship in the European Community (EC)
dominated the NKP program--domestic
and international--in 1972. An NKP
conference in Oslo on March 20
stressed the urgency of organizing
workers against being drawn into the.
Community and expressed full soli-
darity with the "POpular Movement
against the EC." Chairman Larsen
stated that EC membership would
threaten Norwegian sovereignty and
expose Norwegian industry to too
much competition from the Continent.

The NKP campaign, buoyed by a
raft of emotional and regional sent-
iments against the EC, succeeded.
Norway said "no" to the EC in a
nationwide advisory referendum,
September 24-25. Prime Minister
Trygve Bratteli, who had promised to
resign if Norwegians defeated the EC
issue, did just that and his minor-
ity Labor government was replaced by
Lars Korvald's mini-coalition of the
Christian People's, Center, and Lib-
eral parties. With the Korvald
government left negotiating a free-
trade agreement with the Community,
the NKP remained on guard against a
"development clause" which might,
over time, ease Norway into full EC
membership.

In other issues of foreign
policy, the NKP continued its strong
Opposition to NATO and its vehement
condemnation of U.S. policy in
Vietnam. '

The NKP also continued its
effort of emulating the Swedish
model of a national Communist move-
ment, independent of Moscow and neu—
tral in the Sino-Soviet conflict. An
NKP delegation, headed by Larsen,
visited the Soviet Union January 4-
14 and received a return visit from
the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) October 17-24. Primary
emphasis in both instances was on
affirming the implementation of de-
cisions made at the 24th CPSU Con-
gress. Talks with East German col-
leagues underscored the need to

normalize relations between the
German Democratic Republic and Nor-
way and to hold a Conference on Se—
curity and Cooperation in Europe.

The major discordant note in
the NKP's international party con-
tacts was the party's Opposition to
the Prague trials of summer 1972.
The NKP Central Committee sent a
letter to the Czechoslovak Communist
Party on August 20 which stressed
the need for a Socialist democracy
to assure freedom of thought and ex-
pression to its people.

99

100

APPENDIX 0

 

1.1”]. “kx .
Ml"

KINGDOM OF SW EDEN

Population: 8.| million (l97l est.)
Capital: Stockholm

Sweden, located in northern Europe and ex-
tending up into the Arctic Circle, has an area of
173,000 square miles (slightly larger than Wash-
ington and Oregon combined) and is the largest of
the Scandinavian countries. It shares common
borders with Norway on the west and Finland on
the northeast. Denmark lies to the southwest
across the Kattegatt (an arm of the North Sea).

The country has gently rolling hills in the
south and mountains in the north, especially along
the western border. Only 7 percent of Sweden’s
total area is arable. Half of the country is for-
ested, and lakes cover almost 9 percent of the
area. Much land is unsuitable for agriculture be-
cause it is too far north.

Although Sweden lies at approximately the
same latitude as Alaska, it has a more favorable
climate because of the warming influence of the
Gulf Stream. However, northern winters last 6
months or longer. Rainfall averages 24 inches a
year.

Sweden’s flag consists of a yellow cross laid
horizontally on a blue field.

THE PEOPLE

With about 8.1 million people, Sweden is the
most populous Scandinavian country. The annual
population growth rate is approximately 1.4 per-
cent, and there are an estimated 51 persons per
square mile. Stockholm has about 800,000 in-
habitants.

The population is homogeneous, with small
language minorities of about 110,000 Firms and
10,000 Lapps in the north. In recent years workers
have moved into Sweden, primarily from the other
Nordic countries but also from southern Europe.
It is estimated that more than 230,000 aliens are
now living in the country.

The state church is Lutheran, but about 400,000
Swedes are members of other denominations. The
national language is Swedish. Literacy is virtually
complete in Sweden.

HISTORY

Christianity began to gain adherents in Sweden
during the Viking era beginning about 800 A.D.,
and in 1003 the first Christian king was baptized.
The ensuing 700 years saw Sweden expand east-
ward and southward to become a major European
power. In the early 18th century Russia took away

(Washington, Department of State,

 

Sweden’s Baltic empire, and in 1809 Russia ac-
quired Finland, which had been under Swedish
control for almost 600 years. Sweden ruled Nor-
way from 1814 until 1005 when the unionwas dis-
solved.

The first Swedish Parliament met in 1435, but
it was not until 1917 that parliamentary govern-
ment was adopted. Universal adult suffrage fol-
lowed in 1921. The Swedish Constitution, the
oldest written one still in force in Europe, was
adopted in 1809.

Sweden remained neutral during World Wars
I and II. It became amember of the League of Na-
tions and joined the United Nations in 1946. Swed-
ish military contingents have served with the U.N.
forces in a number of world trouble spots.

GOVERNMENT.

Sweden is a limited constitutional monarchy.
The King is Chief of State, but his personal politi-
cal power is extremelylimited.

Executive authority is vested in the Cabinet,
consisting of the Prime Minister (Head of Govern-
ment) and 18 Ministers.

Previously, the Riksdag (parliament) was a
bicameral body of 384 members composed of an
Upper Chamber, elected indirectly, and a Lower
Chamber, directly elected every4years. However
in January 1971 the Riksdag became aunicameral
body with its 350 members elected for 3-year
terms.

The judicial branch of the Government includes
a Supreme Court, rural, municipal, and appellate
courts, and various special courts.

Administratively the country is divided into 24
Counties. In each County there is a government-
appointed County Administration Board, which is
the local branch of the Central Government, headed
by a County Governor.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Sweden has five political parties represented
in the Riksdag—the Social Democratic, Center,
Liberal, Moderate, and Left-Communist. All the
political parties, with varying degrees of flexibil-
ity, support an alliance-free foreign policy.

Sweden’s largest political party, the Social
Democratic Party, has been in office alone or
in coalition since 1932. It is a constitutional,
Socialist-labor party and is closely affiliated
with the Swedish Trade Union Confederation.

November 1972. Publication 8033.]

IOI

“ER" .
75..

" We ,
,u ‘u‘él'r
.M ‘

MI

 

102

Formed in 1913 the Center Party was origi..
nally supported almost exclusively by farming
and forestry interests, but in recent years it has
been successful in gaining urban voters and is
now the largest opposition party inthe parliament.
From 1936 to_ 1939 and from 1951 to 1957, the
Center Party collaborated in a coalition govern-
ment with the Social Democrats.

The second oldest political party in Sweden,
the Liberal Party, has in recent years received
between 15 and 20 percent of the vote in national
elections. The party" supports the welfare state
and free enterprise. '

Once the largest political party in Sweden,
the Moderate Party (formerly known as the Con-
servative Party) is now the smallest of the non-
Socialist Opposition parties. The Moderates sup-
port the free enterprise system, astrong national
defense, and closer ties with Western Europe.

The Swedish Left-Communist Party received
5.2 percent of the vote in 1964. In 1966 the
Communists received 6.4 percent and in the 1968
election, the Left-Communist suffered a huge
setback (down to 3 percent) following the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The most recent parliamentary election was
held in September 1970. The result of that elec-
tion was:

 

No. of % of

Seats th_e Votes
Social Democrats 163 45.3 2,256,581
Center 71 19.9 990,921
Liberals 58 16.2 806,893
Moderates 41 11.5 573,811
VPK (Left-

Communist Party) 17 4.8 236,653

Other 3.3 111,141

350 00.0 4,976,000

The next parliamentary elections are sched-
uled for September 1973.

ECONOMY

Since World War II Sweden has experienced a
general economic expansion with constantly in-
creasing production, productivity, and national
product. The economic growth rate slowed during
1971, but the gross national product (GNP) was
U.S. $36.5 billion. Per Capita GNP is approxi-

.. mately $4 , 400,and Sweden's high standard of living

is exemplified by the fact that one out of every four
Swedes owns an automobile. Per capita GNP is
second only to that of the United States.

Requirements for social welfare, defense, and
housing have led the Government to continue eco-
nomic and fiscal policies designed to prevent any
internal deve10pments which would result in con-
siderable unemployment, higher costs, or lower
productivity. Provision of adequate housing is a
major-goal.

The natural bases of the econom lie in the
extensive forest areas and the rich iron ore

deposits which have enabled Sweden to become
an impressive producing and exporting nation.
Sweden is one of the world’s largest producers of
timber products and, in addition to using large
quantities domestically, one of the largest ex-
porters of iron ore. With the exception of hydro-
electric power, Sweden is deficient in power and
fuels, and imports large quantities of petroleum.
This power deficit has caused a corresponding
interest in the use of nuclear power for civil
purposes. ,

Although barely one-tenth of the land area is
arable, Sweden is nearly self-sufficient in food-
stuffs. It imports large quantities of specialized
‘climatic items such as coffee, fruits, and vege-
tables, however.

Contrary to popular belief, about 93 percent of
Sweden’s total output is from private enterprise,
although the Government exercises a considerable
degree of influence and control over such sectors
as tranSportation, communications, tobacco and
liquor production, and iron ore mining.

Sweden is a low tariff country with relatively
few trade restrictions. Approximately 98 percent
of Swedish imports from the United States are
free-listed. Sweden exports about 40 percent of
its total industrial production. Aside from forest
products, the major export groups are machines
and instruments, transportation products, base
metals and steel mill products, and iron ore.
Total exports in 1971 were about $7.5 billion.

In°addition to being a major shipbuilding coun-
try, Sweden has a large merchant fleet whose
earnings help to offset the substantial customary
trade deficit. Sweden’s large import trade stems
from industry’s demand for raw materials and
fuel as well as the foodstuffs and consumer goods
required to maintain the high standard of living.
Imports in 1971 amounted to approximately $7.1
billion. '

While the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany are Sweden’s principal
trading partners, in 1971 Sweden received 8 per-
cent of its imports from the United States and sent
6.5 percent of its exports to this country.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The basic foreign policy objective of the Swed-
ish Government is to maintain an alliance-free
policy in peacetime in order to remain neutral in
the event of war. At the same time the Government
wishes to maintain the high Swedish standard of
living. These objectives require heavy expend-
itures for social welfare and for military secur-
ity (i. e. , 3. 5 percent of GNP in 1971).

Because foreign trade plays a key role in the
economic health of Sweden, European economic
integration developments are of considerable in-
terest to the Swedish Government. Sweden is a
member of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) and in July 1972 signed an industrial free
trade agreement with the European Economic
Community (EEC).

In recent years Swedish officials have been
extremely critical of U. S. foreign policy, espe-
cially in Southeast Asia. In 1969 Sweden recog-
nized the North Vietnamese Government, and in
1972 the Swedish charge! (1’ affaires in Hanoi was
raised to ambassadorial rank.

Sweden favors providing foreign aid through
multilateral frameworks, particularly if con-
nected with the United Nations, but also provides
substantial bilateralaid. Priority is given to tech-
nical assistance. The Government’s aim is to pro-
vide foreign assistance to the less developed
countries at the level of 1 percent of GNP by 1975‘.

U. S. POLICY

The United States seeks to encourage the con-
tinued independence of Sweden with which it enjoys
traditionally friendly relations, and to strengthen
U.S.-Swedish cooperation within the limits of the
Swedish neutrality policy.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

King—Gustav VI Adolf

Prime Minister—Clef Palme

Foreign Minister-Krister Wickman
Defense Minister—Sven M. Andersson
Commerce Minister—Kjell-Olof Feldt
Finance Minister—Gunnar Strang
Ambassador to the U.S.—Hubert de Besche
Ambassador to the U.N.—Olof Rydbeck

Sweden maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Wash-
_ ington, D.C. 20037.

PRINCIPAL U. S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador-

Counselor of Embassy—John C. Guthrie

Political Counselor—Arthur J. Olsen

Economic Counselor—William B. Dozier

Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Joann Lewinsohn
Agricultural Attache’—James 0. Howard

Labor Attache—Lester P. Slezak

Air Attache—pol. John R. Burman
Naval Attache—Capt. William N. Donnelly
Army Attache—Col. William L. Prout

The U. S. Embassy in Sweden is located
at Strandvagen 101, Stockholm.

READING LIST

These titles are proVIded as a general indication of the material
currently being published on this country: the Department of State does
not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications.as representing
the position of the US. GOVernment.

American-Scandinavian Review Quarterlymaga-
zine published by American-Scandinavian Foun-
dation, New York.

Andersson, Ingvar, A History of Sweden. New
York: Praeger, 1956.

Andrén, Nils. Modern Swedish Government, Stock-
holm: Almquist, 1961.

Board, Joseph B. The Government and Politics of
Sweden. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970.

Connery, Donald S. The Scandinavians. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1966.

Fleisher, Fredric. The New Sweden: The Chg;-
lflige of a Disciplined Democracy. New York:
McKay, 1967.

Huntford, Roland. The New Totalitarians. New
York: Stein & Day, 1972.

O’Dell, Andrew C. The Scandinavian World. Lon-
don: Longmans, Green, 1957.

Rustow, Dankuart. Sweden: The Politics of Com-
promise. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1955.

Scandinavia. New York: Life World Library, 1963.

Swedish Tourist Traffic Association. Sweden Past
and Present. Stockholm: Forlagg A7B Svenska
Samlingsverk.

Travel, Study and Research in Sweden. New York:

—Sweden-America Foundation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Additional material on Sweden may be obtained
from the Swedish Travel Information Bureau, Inc.,
630 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10020,
and the Swedish-America Foundation, 10027 East
73d Street, New York, New York 10021.

DEPARTMENT STATE PUBLICATION 8033
Revised November 1972

103

APPENDIX P
SWEDEN—MI LITARY POWER

 

, SWEDEN

KonungafiketSvefige
Swedish Kingdom

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: [73,648 square miles
Population: 8,125,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 87,300 (i.07% popula-

tion)
Gross National Product: $31.2 billion ($3.840 per
capita) '
Annual Military Expenditures: SL9 billion (3.82%
GNP)

Steel and Iron Production: 7.82 million metric tons
Iron Ore Production: 33.28 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 58 billion kwh

Merchant Marine: l,05| ships: 5.03 million gross tons

Civil Air Fleet: 74 jet. l0 propjet, and 35 piston trans~
ports (includes SAS)

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The King is the supreme military authority of Sweden,
but in a limited constitutional monarchy he exercises this
responsibility through the Minister of Defense, who is polit-
ically responsible to the Prime Minister. Recent adminis-
trative changes have strengthened centralized operational
and logistical control and surveillance by the Minister of
Defense over the three loosely integrated military services
(each of which has its own commander in chief). Overall
military planning and coordination are performed by an
integrated Defense Staff under a Supreme Commander who
is responsible to the King through the Minister of Defense.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

Since 1814, Sweden has avoided war through a policy of
armed neutrality. Although unequivocally aligned with the
Western powers in the bipolar world of post-World War I I,
Sweden has nonetheless adhered unswervingly to its policy
of neutrality, and has refused to join NATO or any other
form of military alliance. Sweden (unlike Switzerland)
came to the conclusion that membership in the United
Nations would not compromise this policy of neutrality.
Sweden has strongly supported the international police
activities of the United Nations, and has contributed indi-
viduals and units to most'of the UN observer teams or
peacecpreservation forces; Swedish diplomats and soldiers
have played leading roles in many of these activities.

Sweden relies upon a policy of deterrence as well as neu-
trality in the preservation of its national security. As a
result, for many years the Swedish armed forces have been
more powerful, more modern, and better prepared than
those of any other secondary power. To give credibility to
its avowed determination to resist any aggression as bitterly
and as effectively as possible, Sweden has been one of the
world leaders in all aspects of military research, develop~
ment, and production—with thenotable exception of offen-
sive nuclear weaponry. Sweden‘s armament industry is
among the largest and most sophisticated of the secondary
powers‘, producing heavy artillery. tanks, warships, high
performance jet aircraft, and all the lesser weapons of war.

Typical of Sweden’s defensive and deterrence posture has
been the development of nuclear bombproof facilities for
the military, for industry, for civil administration, and for
civil defense. If this display of determination does not deter
an aggressor, Sweden is probably capable of surviving ali
but a major nuclear assault, and of launching effective
counterblows. There is an operational underground war

[Excerpted with permission from: The Almanac of hbrld Military Power,
by Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret. and Col. Wendell Blanchard, U.S.

Army, Ret. Second Edition.

1972.]

104

Dun Loring, Va., T.N. Dupuy Associates,

headquarters; vast quantities of weapons and materiel are
stored underground; even the largest warships can take
refuge in deep harbors dug thousands of feet into coastal
mountainsides; there are similar air facilities cut into inland
mountainsides; a number of highways are especially
designed for use as runways. Sweden‘s defense expenditure
per capita is the highest in Europe.

Additional evidence of national defensive determination
is the policy of universal compulsory service in the armed
forces. Every physically fit male citizen between the ages of
[9 and 47 is required to serve in the armed forces. After a
period of 10 months‘ training most of the conscripts are
placed on “indefinite leave." Thus while theoretically ful'-
fledged members of the armed forces, they are virtually
reservists who are required to undergo periodic refresher
training on an elaborate schedule. Administration is on a
local, decentralized basis, and the total armed forces of
Sweden—approximately 700,000 strong—can be mobilized
into combat-ready units in a matter of hours.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Sweden’s long Baltic coastline makes it particularly
vulnerable to amphibious assault, or devastating bombard-
ment, by the forces of any nation controlling the Baltic. At
present the only possibly hostile Baltic nation is the USSR.
Because of this vulnerability, Sweden has strongly fortified
the island of Gotland, which dominates the Baltic and is an
important base for air and naval strike forces. It has a
strong coastal defense system.

Thinly-populated northern Sweden, with its long frontier
with Finland, is also vulnerable to possible Soviet overland
attack, which could quickly drive across the: intervening
Finnish territory. Sweden’s concerns regarding these two
vulnerabilities is reflected in its attitude in opposing fortifi-
cation and defense of Finland’s Aland Islands, which domi-
nate the Northern Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia, and
which are disturbingly close to Stockholm and Sweden’s
heartland. Presumably Sweden is prepared to seize these
islands rapidly in the event of war.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Sweden has been active in supporting UN peacekeeping
operations, furnishing battalion-size units for the UN
Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai and the Gaza Strip from
1956 to 1967, for the UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC)
from I960 to 1964, and for UN Forces in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) from 1964 to date. Truce observers have
served in Palestine since 1948, in Kashmir since l95l, in
Greece from I952 to 1954, in Egypt from 1956 to 1967, in
Lebanon in 1958, in New Guinea in l962, and in Yemen in
1963-1964. , '

While military assistance is not given on a grant basis,
training missions have been dispatched to developing
nations, notably Ethiopia.._Swedish artillery and aircraft are
sold widely throughout the world, and technical and train-
ing personnel are often provided to purchasers.

ALLIANCES

Sweden is a member of the UN, but is involved in no alli-
ances.

ARMY

Personnel:
[2,500 regulars (officers and non-commissioned
officers) '
36,500 conscript trainees

Organization:

6 military regions, each able to operate inde-
pendently with integrated forces of all serv-
ices

l6 infantry brigades (cadre onlyz'5,000-6,000
men each when mobilized)

8 Norrland brigades (trained and equipped for
arctic warfare)

8 armored brigades (cadre only: 5,000-6,000
men each when mobilized)

7 artillery-brigades (cadre)

l parachute training group (cadre)

6 AA regiments (cadre)

l SAM battalion (“Hawk”)

engineers, signal, and corps service units
Upon mobilization, these units would form
some 100 battalions and a number of inde-
pendent units (approximately l5 combat
divisions).

l battalion in Cyprus (UN Forces)

Major Equipment Inventory:
300 medium tanks (“Centurion")
medium tanks (Strv-S or “S-tank”)
tank destroyers (lKV-9 1)
light tanks (Strv-74)
83-11 and “Bantam” anti-tank missiles,
“Carl Gustav” and “Mini-man” antitank
weapons
APCs (va30 l / 302)
“Hawk” SAM (l battalion)
90mm recoillessguns (jeep-mounted)
“Redeye” troop-portable lightweight SAM
105mm and 155mm guns; 155mm self-pro-
pelled g'uns
105mm and 155mm self-propelled howitzers
90 light aircraft
50 helicopters
AA guns (20mm and 40mm guns; 57mm
self-propelled)
Reserves: There are about 600,000 reserves; high prior-
ity personnel mobilizable within 48 hours; most of the
balance, within two to three days.

NAVY

Personnel:
4,700 naval regulars (mostly otticers and petty '
officers)
14,000 coas‘t artillery regulars
. 7,400 conscripts (Navy and coast artillery)

105

Major Units:
1 light cruiser (CL)
8 destroyers (2 with SSM; 4 with SAM; DD,
DDG)
7 ASW escorts (DE)
26 diesel submarines (SS)
1 midget submarine
1 minelayer/ submarine depot ship
10 mining tenders
22 small minelayers(MMC)
18 coastal minesweepers (M SC)
17 inshore minesweepers (M SI)
54 torpedo boats (PT)
31 patrol boats/launches .
122 landing craft (LCU, LCM, and smaller
craft)
39 auxiliaries
5 coast defense ,artillery regiments (75mm,
105mm, 120mm, 152mm, and 210mm
guns, and Rb-08 and Rb-52 [SS—1 l] SSMs)
51 lightaircraft

25 helicopters (including Vertol 107 and
AB206A) '
Reserves: There are 50,000 reserves mobilizable within

48 hours
Naval Bases: Stockholm, Kariskrona, and Goteborg
are the bases in the conventional sense; ships and
support facilities are dispersed, however, in hardened
underground shelters in three base areas: Naval Base
East Coast, Naval Base South Coast, and Naval Base
West Coast.

AIR FORCE

Personnel:
5,800 regulars (mostly officers and NCOs)
6,400 active duty conscripts
Organization:
13 wings (2 to 3 squadrons each)

106

10 attack squadrons (A-32 “Lansen,” AJ-37
“Viggen”) .
22 all-weather fighter squadrons (J-35 “Drak-
en")
4 light attack squadrons (SK60B; 3 normally
used in training role) 1
5 reconnaissance/day-fighter squadrons (S-
32C, S-35E)
5 transport squadrons
6 SAM squadrons (“Bloodhound" 11; 120
missiles)
MajorAircraft Types:
515-610 combat aircraft
120-150 A—32A “Lansen” attack aircraft (being
replaced by 150 AJ-37 “Viggen”)
250-315 J-35 “Draken” fighters
45 S—32C “Lansen” reconnaissance aircraft
40 S-35E “Draken” reconnaissance aircraft
60 SK603 light attack aircraft
500 other aircraft
30 transports (C - 1 30E, 047, etc.)
410 trainer/support aircraft
60 helicopters(including Vertol 107)

Reserves: There are 50,000 reserves mobilizable within
48 hours

MajorAir Bases: Haslo, Ostersund, Ljunghyed, Karls-
borg, Satenas, Angelholm, Nykoping, Kalmar,
Norrkoping, Soderham, Uppsala, Kallinge, Tullinge,
Lulea, Halmstad, M almslatt

Air Defense Control System: Sophisticated computer-
ized control and air surveillance system “Stril” 60
(comparable to American SAGE)

PA RAMILITARY

There are about one million men and women in local
defense organizations. Civil defense service—general
defense and factory defense—is compulsory for men and
women not serving in the armed forces. Of the total cited
above, 90,000 are women with most of the remainder men
who are older than 47 years.

APPENDIX O
SWEDEN—STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

 

National Political Status: Date of
last election - September 20, 1970.

 

% of No. % of

 

Votes

t tal f total
Name of Party cast vgtes 52a ts seats
Communist
Left-Communist (VPK) 236,653 4.8 17 4.9
Communist League 21,232 0.4 0 0

Marxist-Leninist
(KFML)

Non-Communist Left
Sociai Democrat1c

Center

2,256,581 45.3 163 46.6

 

 

 

 

Center Party 990,921 19.9 71 20.3

Libera1s 806,893 16.2 58 16.6

Christian Democrats 88,770 1.8 0 0

Conservative

o erates 573,811 11.5 41 11.7

Other 1,139 .2 0 0
TotaI 4,976,000 100.0 350 100.0

 

 

Communist Party (VPK) Membership:
17,000 (estimate)

LeadingiParty Figures and Positions:
HERMANSSON, Carl—Henrik — Chairman
WERNER, Lars - Vice Chairman
FORSBERG, Tore - Secretary

Principal Publications:

Ny Dag (New Day)’- central organ of
the VPK issued in Stockholm
(called Arbetar-Tidningen
[Worker News] in Western Sweden)

Norrskenaflamman (Blaze of Northern

 

Lights) - daily VPK newspaper
from Norrbotten

Socialistisk Debatt (Socialist
Debate) - theoretical quarterly

Areas of Communist Activity} Swe—
den's Left Party-Communists (Van-
sterpartiet Kommunisterne, VPK), so
named since 1967, enjoyed an often—
pivotal role in Swedish politics
during 1972. Although still the

 

Carl—Henrik Hermansson, Chairman
Party of the Left—-the Communists (Sweden)

[Excerpted from: World Strength of the Conmunist Party Organizations.

25th Annual Report, 1973 Edition.
mreau of Intelligence and Research, July 1973.

Washington, Department of State,
Publication 8732.]

107

smallest of the five parties in
parliamentary representation, the
VPK continued to capitalize on the
17 places it won in the 1970 elec-
tions in the 350-seat, unicameral
Riksdag (Parliament).

That bloc tipped the scales when
the Social Democratic Party (SDP),‘
with 163 seats to the 170 held by
the three non-Socialist opposition
parties, had to turn to the VPK for
support on the year's two most crit-
ical votes, defense and tax reform.
Contrary to Swedish tradition which
had previously dictated compromise
on defense planning in order to gain
the support of the Center Party, the
SDP in May used Communist votes to
pass a controversial defense budget.
VPK support for a tax reform bill
also helped to save the Olof Palme
government and avert unscheduled
elections. ‘

Such disproportionate power forv
a party which-has an estimated mem-
bership of only 17,000 in a total
population of more than 8 million,
is relatively new for.the VPK. Form-
ed by SDP dissidents in 1921, the
VPK (formerly called the Swedish
Communist Party) had not enjoyed
much electoral success since WOrld
War II. It had slumped badly in the
1968 elections, held just after the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
As 1972 closed,the key question was
whether the VPK could sustain or
improve upon its new momentum in the
parliamentary elections in September
1973. . ' a

Central to that showing will be
the appeal of the party's new “Pro-
gram of Principles." The draft for
that program prOmpted fierce debate
within the VPK before its final
acceptance at the partyfs 23rd Con-
gress, October 26-29. _The Program
of Principles is more radical than
the "Socialist Alternative" ad0pted
at the 1967 Party Congress. It thus
drew sharp fire from VPK members in
Norrbotten, traditional stronghold
for old-line Muscovites and oppo-
nents of the Hermansson group and
prompted a paper war between Ny Dag,
the VPK's central organ, and
Norrskensflamman, the Communist
daily in Norrbotten.

108

The former condemned the latter
for being a "survival from the time
of directives" and urged a "revolu—
tionary alternative in the class
struggle against the Social Demo-
cratic class cooperation policy."
(Ny Dag--April 12-23, 1972). What
emerged was a more revolutionary
document proclaiming a "red wave“ to
reverse the nation's high prices and
unemployment. VPK rhetoric condemned
the Social Democrats for compromis-
ing with capitalism, at the same
time that VPK action served to pre-
serve a labor government in Sweden.

Although international issues
took a back seat to domestic econom-
ic concerns, the VPK did stake out
several predictable positions in
foreign affairs. The party blasted
Prime Minister Palme for subordinat—
ing national independence to the
Brussels bureaucracy when Sweden
signed a free-trade agreement with
the European Community (EC) on
July 22. Carl-Henrik Hermansson,
Party Chairman, called repeatedly
for a national referendum to stem
the tide toward closer EC-SWedish
cooperation.

In addition, the Communists,
like most Swedish political parties,
continued to condemn U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia and to support Swed-
ish recognition of the German Demo-
cratic Republic. They urged the
Swedish Government to move toward
recognition of North Korea and to
work through the United Nations for
the withdrawal of all foreign troOps
from Korea. Finally,,they scored

'"swediSh imperialism9‘for bolstering

“repressive" regimes in South Africa,
Greece, and Portugal.

The VPK remained aloof from
international party debate, except
for its condemnation of the politi-
cal trials held in Czechoslovakia
during the summer of 1972 and per-
sistent Maoistfactivity within its
own ranks. There were party visits
to or from the USSR, East Germany,
and Cuba, and a message from Moscow
to the VPK Congress which indicated
some improvement in relations be-
tween the VPK and the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX R

 

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(DPC) is composed of representatives
of the 14 countries which take part in
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SUBORDINATE SUBORDINA‘I’E

SUBORDINATE
"Committees COMMANDS: COMMANDS: COMMANDS:
The main committees of the Coun- m RTLRHTIO HORNE" EUROPE IORE mm
cil-DPC deal with the following sub- ~9er U-SA Kolms NW0! Rosyth we

gects: igfliticalEAfiairs; lingear ge-
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OER‘I’RM. EUROPE

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[Extracted from: NATO Handbook. Brussels, NATO Information Service,
February 1974. I

OII

APPENDIX 8

OUTLINE CHART 0F

ISCOM
GnngigAND

SUB-AREA

ISCOM

[CIT-AID

EASTERN

CANADIAN ATLANTIC

A _.
SUB-AREA

AREA 9 COMMAND
3’ o A!.LI.ED COMMAND

SUI-AREA JAY ova BISCAY EUROPE

SUB-AREA
UNITIDBTA‘I‘ES WESTERN .

 

CENJRAL

 

ATLANTIC

IAERIAN‘
AREA LEGEND.

mALlIED COMMAND ATLANTIC
REGION BOUNDARY “n“

_AREA BOUNDARY

OCEAN SUB-AREA

A r —'—SUB-AREA BOUNDARY

4/... 155.143

 

APPENDIXT
NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE

 

MILITARY COMMITTEE
MC

 

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
 
 
  
 

    
 
   
 

  

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Brussels
SUPREME ALLIED SUPREME ALLIED ALL'ED COMMANDER' CANADA u.s.
COMMANDER EUROPE COMMANDER ATLANTIC 'N'CH'E" IREGIONAL PLANNING GROUP
SACEUI-‘I SACLANT CHANNEL ' CUSRPG
CINCHAN .
Shape Belgium Norfolk USA Northwood . U.K. Washington DC
SACLANT
SHAPE TECHNICAL ANTI-suaMARINE NATO DEFENCE MILITARY AGENCY FOR ADVISORY GROUP F0
CENTRE WARFARE RESEARCH °°'-'-EGE STANDARDIZATION EROSPACE RESEARCH'
NDC a. DEVELOPMENT
31c CENTRE MAS AGARD
SACLANTCEN
The Hague La Spezia Italy Rome - Brusse'ls Paris

 

 

       

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

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APPENDIX N
NATO ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC

 

 

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
Norfolk USA

DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

 

 

       
 
  
       
 
 
 
  
    
 

  

 

   
 
  

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IILAND COMMANDER OOHRAIIDII manna ISLAND COMMANDER
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COM MAIDEN
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- (when assigned)

 

 

  
 

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-I- Operational Control

[Extracted from: NATO - Facts and Figures . Brussels , NATO Informt ion
Service, October 1971.] '

_ APPENDIX x
NATO NORTHERN REGION

 

l NORTHERN REGION I

ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS

 

I ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE I

  

COMMANDER [N CHIEF ALLIED FORCES
NORTHERN EUROPE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SII

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CINCNORTH
KOLSAAS NORWAY
l ' I
COMMANDER COMMANDER COMMANDER
ALLIED FORCES ALLIED AIR FORCES ' ALLIED FORCES
NORTH NORWAY II SOUTH NORWAY BALTIC APPROACHEs
COMNON COMAIRSONOR , '
COM DER COMMANDER CONBALTAP
BODD AREA NORWAY ALLIED AIR FORCES OSLO AREA NORWAY ALLIED AIR FORCES JUTLAND AREA DENMARK
#_
mm.“ NORWAY _ BALTIC APPROACHES
COMAIRNON COMMANDER . COMAIRBALTAP
BOD” AREA NORWAY ALLIED LAND FORCES JUTLAND AREA DENMARK
F SOUTH NORWAY
. COMLANDSONOR
COMMANDER COMMANDER
ALLIED LAND FORCES OSLO AREA NORWAY LAND FORCES
NORTH NORWAY HAHN"
COMLANDZEALAND
COMLANDNON COMMANDER
l-IARSTAD AREA NORWAY ‘ ALLIED NAVAL FORCES COPENHAGEN DENMARK
I _
I SOUTH NORWAY
COMMANDER CONVSPNOR COMMANDER
ALLIED NAVAL FORCE STAVENCER AREA NORWAY ALLIED LAND FORCES
NORTH NORWAY SCHLESWIMIOLSTEIN
COMNAVNON . I COMLANDJUT
BODD AREA NORWAY RENDSBURC GERMANY
COMMANDER
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES
BALTIC APPROACHES
COMNAVBALTAP
JUTLAND AREA ‘ DENMARK

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX Y
TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 0F NATO COUNTRIES

(current prices)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1949—1970
ACTUAL Forecast
Country Currency Unit 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
‘ i
(0) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7). (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)

Belgium Million Belgian Francs 7.653 8356133871996519.81519.92517,067 :7,O6518,35618,31218,686 19,161 19,561 21,‘11122,230 24,853 25,036 26,313 28,432 30,110 31,488 34,405
Canada Million Canadian Dollars 372 495 1.220 1.875 1.970 1.771 1.819 1,888 1,829 1,740 1,642 1,654 1,715 1,810 1,712 1,813 1,659 1,766 1,965 1,927 1,899 2,086.
Denmark Million Danish Kroners 360 359 475 676 889 885 920 936 1,012 988 986 1,113.1,180 1,551 1,651 1,764 1,974 2,080 2,249 2,591 2,640 2,757
France Million Francs 4.787 5.591 8.81112.53113,86511.71011.020 4,690 15,60016,56917,92619,162 20,395 22,184 22,849 24,280 25,300 26,732 28,912 30,200 31,700 33,200
Federal Republic
of Germany (a) Million DM .. , .. . 6,195 6,287 7,383 7,211 8,962 6,85311,08712,11513,17517,23319,92419,55319,915 20,254 21,408 19,310 21,577 22,647
Greece Million Drachmae 1,630 1,971 2,615 2,655 2,767 3,428 3,688 4,939 4,477 4,469 4,735 5,110 5,034 5,102 5,385 5,647 6,290 7,168 9,390 11,002 12,762 13,587
Italy Milliard Lire 301 353 457 521 480 543 551 584 611 647 667 710 749 861 1,031 1,118 1,212 1,342 1,359 1,403 1,412 1,446
Luxembourg Million Luxembourg Francs 112 170 264 436 488 566 614 395 439 429 402 263 290 355 348 462 477 497 413 374 391 414
Netherlands Million Guilders 680 901 1,060 1,253 1,330 1,583 1,699 1,854 1,845 1,656 1,505 1,728 2,013 2,186 2,307 2,661 2,714 2,790 3,200 3,280 3,682 4,002
Norway Million Norwegian Kroners 370 357 572 831 1,067.1,141 953 967 1,049 1,024 1,107 1,058 1,179 1,371 1,465 1,570 1,897 1,947 2,097 2,399 2,502 2,685
Portugal Million Escudos 1,419 1,516 1,553 1,691 1,975 2,100 2,224 2,297 2,391 2,485 2,820 3,023 4,922 5,744 5,724 6,451 6,680 7,393 9,575 10,692 10,661 11,444»
Turkey Million Liras 556 599 652 725 827 936 1,077 1,159 1,266 1,470 2,153 2,405 2,718 2,980 3,157 3,443 3,821 3,996 4,596 5,159 5,395 5,597
United Kingdom Million£sSterling 779 849 1,149 1,561 1,684 1,569 1,565 1,615 1,568 1,593 1,595 1,657 1,709 1,814 1,870 2,000 2,091 2,153 2,276 2,332 2,290 2,479
United States Million US Dollars 13,50314,307 33,059 47,598 49,377 42,786 40,371 1,513 44,159 45,096 45,833 45,380 47,808 52,38152,295 51,213 51,827 63,572 75,465 80,732 81.444 76,507
NATO Europe (b) Million US Dollars 4,825 5,445 7,627 10,23212,41111,74111,821 3,13713,79612,928 13,90414,63115,33917,40818,75619,7O6 20,574 21,475 22,994 22,296 23,216 24,447
NATO North .
America Million US Dollars 13,875 14,802 34,279 49,473 51,347 44,557 42,190 -3,40145,988 46,836 47,475 47,034 49,523 54,096 53,879 52,890 53,362 65,205 77,282 82,515 83,200 78,437
Total rmo (b) Million us Dollars 18,700 20,243 41,906 59,705 63,758 56,298 54,011 6,538 59,784 59,764 61,379 61,665 64,862 71,504 72.635 72,596 73.936 86,680 l00.27'«"1 l04,8|l 106,416 102,884

 

 

 

a. Before it acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (May 1955), the Federal Republic of Germany flfiributed to the defence budgets of certain NATO countries by the payment Of occupation costs; moreover, it
bore certain other costs which also fall within the NATO definition of defence expenditures. In addition to defence;exgenditures'(NATO definition), the German authorities are obliged to incur large annual expenditures for Berlin
owing to the exceptional situation of this city and the nwd, in the interests of the defence of the free world, to insure its'viability. These expenditures, which are not included in the figures given above since they do not come
within the NATO definition, are forecast to be 3,194 million BM in 1970.

b. The totals for Europe and for NATO do not include defence expenditures of the Federal Republic of Germany for .1949 and for this reason they are not directly comparable to the totals for the following years. Moreover, as
these totals have been established on the basis of the official exchange rates in force, comparisons made between two smssive years could be slightly distorted if one or more countries modified their exchange rates during
the course of one of these years.

[Extracted from: NATO Facts and Figures .
Service, October 1971.] -

Brussels , NATO Information

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By Order

Official:
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, United States Amny

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USASA (5)
USAREUR (5)
MDW (5)

ZI Armies

III Corps (8)
XVIII Abn Corps (8)
NWC (10)

ICAF (10)
AFSC (10)
USAWC‘ (10)
USACGSC (5)
USMA (5)
USIMA (5)

For explanation of abbreviations see AR 310—50.

31‘! U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 0—5‘

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g at Laeenwxcn

Longitude also

I Ozero Krasnoy?

, ANADYRSTZIY

Staroyo \layegi ‘

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SuppIement 1:" Na Ge'fi‘éPhic, er I975, I. . 356% Ai.‘ ninsk- :e Ald‘wr “ S ’ ara [AMT

Page 5I9A, VoI. I4
Copyright © 1971 Na
/ S E A O F

CEAN

nal Geographic 86y,

04m

I
ngvkandzhinskiy I z

a I: a II 5 k 0

CoHest town In the world. Here at ‘l m y

\\tl:e Pole of Cold"; temperature
of ~96 F. has en recorded
Mym k1;

n Nyumeyu
, » g

\L
V.YY. \U‘ '
Kheydzhan \ 75“
\21— ka‘" ,

Wii;'ii ;, , >
h. Ust'Charkyf

P ,’ duced in the Cartographic DiVI
National Geographic Society

MELVIN M AYNE, PRESIDENT

MELVILLE BELL GROSVENOR, EDITOR IN CHIEF
GILBERT M. GROSVENOR EDITOR

WILLIAM T. PEELE, CHIEF CARTOGRAPHER
DAVID W COOK, ASSISTANT CHIEF CARTOGRAPI‘IER
Text by Richard J. Darley

.\ i5. , Azimutha/ Fquidistant Prq’ection

SCALE I' IOOII,OOO OR |58 MILES TO THE INCH
I00 200 300

STATUTE MILES
200 300

KILOMETERS

Roads amt... _.

'o‘Seymchan*

N BalygigZSUkan‘

O

Oljm’rU-V

Railroads Airports * Canals . ...

Oil Fields II Oil Pipelines Glaciers Swamps :I ‘9“
Cold Currents Warm Currents Prevailing Winds

Elevations in Feet 20320 Depth Curves and Soundings in Fathoms .

. Karka
‘~,0moion '
, 'Labaznaya

($3 Kedon nm/

. 71

TurakhTas d
// M15“-
, V
o 'Shepetkovo
‘ga, 5e Lml
“i " “0 P'edrgou'n r‘l
‘fumfl

/

:60
"of

tude at which the Northern Hemillphere R“
experiences 24 hours of sun (about
June 2!) and 24 hours of
darknes (about Decgmber 22)

57I5 Gar ne nayaI‘

Medvezh I OstI::Iia\.;'

l Bear lslandf) |OS tmv K restovskiy

0 +
3593 6

the BeringSeaI I648 0U“ Ch“
is believed to have n the ’ \Bgdk
first to sail through Bering /,/
Strait named for Danish
6navigator Vitus Bering
91‘

77;»

Snezhnoyk;k
#06945 r' ‘x'

. Berezovo

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uyvzyeyEm
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‘ ell

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l
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LC \’ // \ Iga,ns.I(—~era

/Kystaty aggl

200/ / /l//

12%)" 135
I

.I\I ,.

W/iw/

Fortified fur—trading post built In I632,
during Russia s rapid expansion to the

,/ east. The penetration of Siberia began in

Menterefl \

ye

i‘ E [yet
Vwerkhoya.nsk

seKhjy
Ya
\A’ Iatagay .r

{I'Selebir

' CBur Khaybyt

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, Yanskiy
strov Yarok

ZaIiv:

()1
“9"“ akh

.a/ a
Os trov Bennett

I730 s and 40 5, Russia 5
Great Northern Expedition
explored and charted most

ofher Arct'c coast.

9 Attempting a voyage to the North Pole, the U. S.

vessel JEANNET TE was crushed by the ice and
abandoned near here in I881. Three years later
some of her wreckage was found near the
southernmost tip of Greenland, more than
-~ 3, 000 miles away, giving evidence of a steady
ft across the Polar sea ‘\

Earth '5 widest continental shelf,

400 miles, lies off the

coast of Arctic Siberia. The world
average; :42 miles.

' o. VRANGELYA
WRANGEL ISLAND)

{40,272 //
0v .
ROS/“y

9,109

O . ysSchmIét:
(North Cape]

fiwuzTenkzi-gynpflgyn

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Capt Henry K
,/

22
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Ensriielen
Nuniigran ~ .

KUrupka Io
Sireniki .

“Os trov Herald

,1
42 '

Firhgh ted by British

ellettgn I849.

lgh hekurovka

\e

3

During an all— out assault In the ‘Ostrov VII kitsko o 1:” ..

458I, when Cossack troops under Yermak
Timofeyevich

w
.06
ossed the Ural Mou tains. Nowy Ifi‘iyak

V2 ~: tip
Gora “133336-

DINO/3.91.... ”5°
°“ Ud

. h «309931! ,
z a 889 \

K”°Yk9’P£RMAFRosr . " \JE Saskylakh {imgfifipbno .
rmafrost, pqmanently frozen ground ' Doruokha £7ng \ '
aches‘Iepths ofabout 2 .000 feet 093' if" : _

on Waska 5 North Slope A record ‘IKha/ya Syn das >.

depth of more than 4, 900 feet has n, 7‘ o KOZhevn,k°V

been discovered In Siberia. ’ T ' F ‘ stuYa A.

‘Uryu

Gora Tsen tral ya; J
\A" . 12.1368
eta“)

Northernmost pain I
I lad As ,
, , ol Chelyusin-I

~O'Ostrov Stolbovoy
HovSK'YE

'“ Discovered in/I9l3 by Russian icebreakers‘
exploring the Northern Sea Route.

EBEI kovskiyA

yeng Urasa .

Fridtjof Nansen of Norway purposely put his ship
FRAM into the ice near the New Siberian Islands in
. September 1893, hoping to be carried across the Pole
by the winds and currents of the Arctic drift. In I895
Nansen and one companion left the ship at 84° N. and
'5 sledged toward the Pole, reaching 86°I4’N. They turned
« south to Franz Josef Land and were picked up in I896;
at the same time FRAM broke loose from the ice near
Spitsbergen. The ship's three—year drift made possible
the first detailed investigation of the Arctic Ocean.
" NORTH POLE T
Robert E Peary and Matthew Henson reached the North
Pole by dog sledge on April 6, I909; Richard E. Byrd by
.,airplane, I926; Lincoln Ellsworth, Roald Amundsen, and
Umberto Mobile in the dirigible NORGE. I926. A Russian
expedition, led by Otto Schmidt and Ivan Papanin, landed
by plane In I937. The nuclear submarine NAUTILUS, captained
by Comdr. William R Anderson USN crossed under the Pole,
August 3, I958. On March I7, I959, the nuclear sub SKATE,
\under Comdr. James F Calvert, USN, surfaced through the
ice precisely at the Pole. Minnesotan Ralph Plaisted and
three companions, traveling by snowmobile, made the first
surface journey to the Pole since Peary, arriving April I9,
I968. A four-man British expedition, under Wally Herbert,
reached the Pole by dog sledge on April 6, I969
Italian Guido Monzino attained the Pole by dog sledge,
May I9, I97I, r tracing/Peary’s I909 journey

Discovered by Ivan Lyakhov, I770,'
while prospecting for mammoth ivory.
Frozen mammoths and remains of deer,
musk oxen, rhinoceroses, and tigerlike
cats have been found here.

A )IERASIA

The “Pole of Relative lnaccessibility," considered the I
most difficult region to reach by surface travel, was ‘
passed within I5 miles by Wally Herbert and three 1840 N ,
companions on their epic dog- sledge journey from /+ [60° W
Point Barrow Alaska, to Spitsbergen This first 5.2 ‘,
\ surface crossing of the Arctic Ocean covered 3, 720 , /
miles In 476 days, February

Many areas of the’h’gh Arctic receive
less precipitation than a desert. Snow
blowing back and forth was often
responsible for the blizzards"
mentioned by explorers

'gibiryakova

”Hokey/eye“;

$5 trov

“at?“ 2

0‘1- 519;\-w6¥o9

0:tr 0
‘Os trov Sverdru

Ostrov Bel;

*Arkticheskogo
Institute

Os trova
lzvestiy Tsik

a Va sergeya Kirava
:thojll ’f) 90th ,.
’Sgl‘g

e}, , ,
a K"WW-a .Ostrov Uyedineniya

’ Englishman Stephen Borough, in I556,
was the first Western European to
sight Novaya Zemlya. In I596-7
Willem Barents, the Dutch explorer
for whom the neighboring sea is
. named, successfully wintered on the
northeast coast, but died on the

return voya e.
a Ostrov Vize' g

Ostrov Oktyabr‘skoy

C Payer In I873.
Ostrov Komsomolets
‘7: f Mys K uybysheva c ‘“
V Jitrov Schmidt

I Ieskiy '86

. Swedish engineer Salomon A. Andrée, the first to
attempt Arctic exploration by air, departed Danskoya
in a balloon in l897 and headed for the Pole. The fate

i of Andrée and his two companions was unknown until the
expedition's remains were discov red here in I930.

George Hubert Wilkins and Carl Ben Eielson

in I928, completing the first airplane \
crossing of the Arctic Ocean. 3200

 

Northern Green and was first

,. . / /
Discovered by an Austrian expedition "
under Karl Weyprecht and Julius

. flew from Paint Barrow Alaska, to Spitsbergen ”93 '

I‘I—‘R .VAK \

PLAI‘ITAI‘

75
. 2IE7
V5 4/ Q
. /

4‘ / i \ /,,

a 032/
/ ”Levk/ins‘icaya 44’

(Yertom/

T‘A monastery settlement here became Russia 5 +8

I7
:fi‘“;!le ding port in the late I6th century, trading

;with t e, English and Dutch Navigation at Archangel

omallygxtends from mid— May to mi

.Mezhdusharskiy
oliv Kostin/ Sluzr
-|ush ya Guba
ol. Gusmaya Zemlya

a;

n I553 Englishmen Hugh Willoughby and Richard
Chancellor led the first expedition to seek-a
Northeast Passage The entire route was first
traversed In I878- 9 by A. E. Nordenskiold In 3‘
the Swedish ship VEGA. The Soviet icebreaker
TSIBIRYAKOV completed the passage in one season
T in I932. Russian ships, convoyed by icebreakers .
and observation planes, new travel the passage
from mid— —July to the end of September.

The warm North Cape Current, a
continuation of the Gulf Stream,
., keeps Murmansk ice-free all year. I

, . . J , 7
According to the Icelandic Annals, Norse mariners discovered
Svalbard in II94. Embarking from Spitsbergen, William
Edward Parry made the first attempt to reach the Pole
y sledge, in l827. His advance was halted at 82°45 'N.,
when he found that the ice was drifting southward
‘ faster than he could cross it to the north

\Kong‘soyLYong Karla

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explored by Robert E. Peary, In
I892. Kaffeklubben Island, ,
‘ which he discovered in I900, /
was determined by I968-9..,, ,,
surveys to be the northernmost
/pointo \land in thegworld.
V d

\AURORA BOREALIS
The aurora borealis, or northern
lights, occurs when electrically
charged solar particles, deflected
Poleward by the earth's magnetic

 

 

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fussian M'ssion

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EW\/\ .33
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a, _ at , , .,
\o Highestpomtin North I.
7 ’ America, first climbed by- he , __
Archdeacon Hudson Stuck an S}
'Ophir three companionin I913. Allakake \Ffitfles 9
on 5:1Vaw1'le d\ , “V
a: "“25?

.Crooked Creek

“I00
)sa’rKuskokwl-m

« \Icusko kwizrb

McSraCfi

Nikolai: ‘

Phi I

Remnants of a once— —continuous landmass that
- Jinked Asia andWorth America At least8
two waves of peoplecrossed here to the I'
Americas: the ancestorso 9f the’American i
Indians and latepthose of the Eskimos /
The earliest migration probably occurred
20‘, 000 and possibly eyfn 40, 000 years ago

flfilcy Cape I

9) 223

FRANKLIN EXPEDITION \
Much of man '5 knowledge of the Arctic was gained iotherr
2) wake of tragedy. Probing for the elusive Nostliwest
p P ssage in l845- 8, an expedition under,S«Ir John Franklin
M reached Victoria Strait, where his ships EREBUS and
TERROR were frozen in foo—two years. Unknown to the
outside world, the entire party of I29 men perished.
Futile rescue efforts during the next decade led to the
charlttng of thousands of miles of shorelIne In the
Cauad' an archipelago Many of the region s geographical
I — 'names are these of men who attempted to find Franklin. g

V lover finds

n13);hBa;lI 7'10 Northernmost point of
the Uni ed States.
- Iuk Like
er! 2045 \2

In I968 a vast deposit of

\7\ oil— as much as ten billion“ .

barrels — was discovered here

8

NORTH WEST PASSAGE
This map shows the Northwest Passage as charted In
I955— 7. Norwegian Roald Amundsen In the GJOA first
navigated the entire passage in l903- 6, going north
and west of Somerset Island. The Royal Canadian
Mounted Police schooner ST. ROCH negotiated the

.. passage in a single year. The nuclear submarine
SEADRAGON made an underwater transit in I960. The
tanker SS. MANHATTAN completed the first passage
by a commerc\al vessel In I969.

‘ 6‘0

. U T O R T
Discovered by Robert McClure, I850, seeking Sir
John Franklin from the west. He sledged on over
the ice to Viscount Melville Sound, completing

the discovery of a Northwest Passage.
Village

,Christian

rt Yukon

‘ Circie Hot
Springs

7 n s Bay Company post found !
En lish— -speaking settlement In .
peratures of mo" n . ‘

I anacross

Eagl }
‘ ' r

Cordov

Montague l. >-
Hinohinbroo sland $2f:

The lowest official temperature
in North America, -8l° F ,was
recorded here February 3, I947.

Stewart
Erossing
y- yrrwash Landing i

ally Crossing
muzzle L. -

+
'6362
.’ armacks

ere recorded here.
t Klan

3570+ “31' British Lt. William E I
37‘” attempting a Nocth
from Lancaster
6 : 'byiceandwi
Storkerson. B .

II-

Tape Karo
Sachs Harlin
and the oldest 5,50
aska. In one yearfiil}
a55\

Mc COWS“; P” _

00
65
\%< Prctic Reid Rivdr

.\‘:\\ \ \ \ N Qck’e
be 2‘, \ f )a“
V8: g- ‘
Alexander Mackenzie, of the North West 5"
Company, canoed down the river now
bearing his name, reaching the Arctic

Ocea /n July I2 I789.

r Z We Lake
Fort GoodHUMEflaZB Belot ’

.490! s II

”hem tifiafrmg

jlquh oBay\\\

(Port R d m) Hudson: Bay 0

2! (”'38: toJuneII, I969;

route eastward, I940-2, then westward in I944 — first /

7C ‘ R'
\\koppermine III?)

Ice island T- 3 has been occupied almost continuously
by U. S. scientists since I952. It has made nearly
three clockwise circuits of the Amerasia Basin since
its discovery in I947, traveling about I5 000 miles
. . ,This and other Ice islands, breaking off from the Ice fl
shelves of northern Ellesmere Island, provide
excellent platforms for floating research stations.

/ /

Discovered by Vilhjalmur Stefansson In I9I6. ,
A year earlier his Canadian expedition ,..~/" 45

1-3
(Flet
July 197!

's Ice Islandl+

i259 .

>5 field, bombard the nitrogen and
oxygen of the upper atmosphere.

H76

Participating in the first
International Polar Year, Lt
/Adolphus W. Greely established a U. S

93 meteorological station her, 8I8I~3. V$\ LT?! 1'
.0 , ares an ~

 

discovered Brock and Borden Islands. 3 A 4’
/.

Kleybo/te Pe :jhzlli/ps
The earth acts as a giant magnet whose lines ofn ' Cape Sta/Ava 2,8 ‘Wa
force enter at the north magnetic pole and emerge , ”9%

at the south. In these areas the magnetic field

is vertical and compasses become useless. Both ,
poles move slowly in a northwesterly direction; the
north magnetic pole was on Boothia Peninsula when

James Clark Ross first located it In I83].
(:0 4»

Viscount Melville Sound

gnIrllJZL . 7
'cqllirls Kilianl..

gag

Charles Francis Hall, leader of a dissension-~
plagued U. S. expedition to the North

Pole, died mysteriously here November
8, I871. His body, preserved in the
permafrost, was exhumed August 7, I968.

by Chauncey Loomis, who found that
Hall had been pois ned with arsenic.

Two stone cairns
discovered here by Sir
T George Nares in I875
are believed to be of
Norse origin.

¢ +8400

+7500

‘- a
:2, - Ale
Siorppa I

l der

Haffner 7

T P B
Kapf’aPI-y 1 evn‘insula

Wolste \‘l

yTHuLEfiIR BA y
C1arence Head \

+9300

“.k \

a a - Dalton
A? "
Greenland resembles an ice—filled bowl «I
rimmed by coastal ranges. The icecap,
a great flat dome crevassed on the
edges, covers 700,000 square miles and
in places is more than II,OOO feet
thick. In the center its weight has
depressed the g. round surface I ,200 feet
below sea level. If melted, the Ice
woulrl raico u“, 1.6.] or u... wwu'.

oceans about twenty feet.

. p Vedel
K. p Ravn

Icebergs, nearly all of which are
' . calved from west Greenland glaciers,

find their way through Davis Strait 0.

A Ballistic Missile Early warning System radar .
station is located here. Another Is at Clear

' r Strazt
o Drg Island

er
9 ca?“ Parsks mm ., \.
Ph‘ ,0“ Island AI616 expedition led by \‘\

Robert Bylot explored the ., , ,
shoreline of this bay, named .., J “
for his pilot, William Baffin. [3‘ I I I \ \.
NORTHWEST PASSAGE

Cape Byam Martin

\

: eSherard
end} Harbour

‘ Named for English explorer
John Davis, leader of ,

mZ‘Llaf \ 820 (I
“006" awgs‘f‘k Win
0%
‘0‘“ ,“9

Cb_pman
Commitme

. drifting with the current along
' e shores of Baffin Island.

a;

The Distant Early Warning
Line, a 3,600-mile chain
of radar stations, stretches
from western Alaska to
Greenland. It would give
warning against any assault
by air across the Polar basinh50

‘7

e

V - rssuaq
f
//

(99 s,
(”0’
//O%//

// «I,

/ g/ Probable location. of ”Helluland, Leif
‘5 Ericson s first landfall In North America

' ,5?)

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$
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n

pisigdlit Remains of the home of Eric ’

the Red still visible here.
J.A.D. Jensens
55'2+Nunatakker I b ,
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Narss
ape IVan/glsmgham

yéngqaiél. 60°

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Toyma a

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fYarnETnvaf
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Named St. Petersburg .
mars} by founder Peter the
Greatin I7 3

\nQV
‘\

' leLs
PmISHOI I

58V

Toifi 6“

This celebrated whirlpool,
\‘\ once believed to suck In
every vessel within a wide
radius, gave the word
“maelstrom" to our language.
\

3

”69 Meridian of Greenwich.

O

NOR II E. GI
2072

\5
Pytheas of Massilia (Marseille) made
the first recorded voyage into the Arctic
region, about 330 BC, sailing north
until stopped by ice . d fog.

I355 l ,900

Discovered by Henry
Hudson in I607.

n
3: Fae 025
a

4 I
lrishirnonks settled Iceland in the eighth '/
century. Viking immigration began in the
870’s and ended about 930, by which time
the population totaled some 25,000.) [b
927 '7 Sat ‘

 

°o mm aPnJISW'I

I,
r ated by lava from a
volcanic eruption 4/
/beginning November I4, 0
I I963, this island grew to
an area of a square mile
in less than two years.

qogumaaxo to

eiwnl' aq g”
' b
ungmiut /
’9Kap, Dan
Angmagssalik

Greenland was inhabited for two to three
thousand years by Eskimos before Eric the
Red led Viking colonists here from Iceland
in AD. 986. They established the Eastern
Settlement near present—day Julianehab, and e\\
the Western Settlement near Godthab.
Another Eskimo migration, from Alaska through
Canada, occurred about this time. The Norsemen
mysteriously disappeared about AD. [500.
Permanent Danish colonization began in I 72/ ,
when Hans Egede began his missionary work.

,. ,I
v/
7a

/ 7a

29‘ ‘

I\f‘jordn

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a p Herluf Trolle

1450
‘ I

i460

Copies of this map may be purchased
rolled, suitable for framing, for
3/00 on heavy chart paper or $2.00 on .
plastic, plus 35 cents postage and handling
Order from the National Geographic
Society, Washington, D. 020036.

3733

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7-3 and Arlis II broke off from the ice
shelves of northern Ellesmere or
Greenland. Drifting clockwise around the Arctic

cean, these and similar ice islands provide
\ ideal floating laboratories for polar research .1

Robert E. Peary reached the North Pole by dog sledge April 6 [909
, My: ihE/agskiy\l6 RichardE Byrd by airplane I926; Lincoln Ellsworth Amundsen and

NobiIe by dirigible I926 Today commercial airlines fly
routes over or near the Pole The nuclear submarine
r\ the North Pole August 3, I958 pioneering an
05: I9 Bering Strait to Greenland Sea On
SKATE surfaced through

mWra2hgl IIsIandz7
+ (Ostroerange/ya) /

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NORWE

\A
eI
Q

Dan
Frederik VIII
Hochstetters
n u d K
resembles an ice—filled rimmed 03

by coastal ranges. In the center, the thick
ice overburden has depressed the ground

surface to I 200 feet below sea level.
m u\ S S e 11 8430+

King
Christian

Land

Site ofIOO man un er-Ice
town containing 2/ tunnels,

including a Main Street,
L a n LIOO feet/on . '°5°°+ /
\ d g 9630 + ce thickness 0

Cantu ”190th.Q Kin
E N L AomN 15 9
Denmark /
Greenland: greatest Ioszs+
known Ice thickness.

Christian IX

' Ice thickness
97/0
Mont Forel
”024 +

N 579
/ .760 II2o \
\

K4”

onti entat Th
f Sh f “ .ei
N O R<J T H 6S
\/

\ Devils Hole

64
Isles of

GDO
fig} An on Dohrn
1. .- eamount I.
\ Q 3.55

Rockall ' I260

//

Bank

Bank I500 '9‘ /

\ Q \@ o\\ Ponrcupme

I035 387 426

[467

c \\ gap oriinfQ WORLD)

935 ATLAS PLATE 3 NOVEMBER 1965
Compiled and Dra wn in the Cartographic Division of

the National

\ 0 THE NATIONAL

Geographic Society for ©
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE

“\Aaq Land
t “ /

/
/
/ /
Ice thickness/
f7g<yt

MELVILLE BELL CROSVENOR, EDITOR
WELLMAN CHAMBERLIN CHIEF CARTOGRAPHER
JAMES MDARLEY, CARTOGRAFHER EMERITUS
Azimuthal Equldlstant Prg'ection centered on tlIeNorth Pole

SCALE l:20,02|,760 OR 3l6 MILES TO THE INCH

ellowknife

A S K A T
North
Battlef

Glasgow

AH.

Borah Pk,+

+

W M
k
- Rock
Springs

Laramie Scottsbluff

///
/

Nunatakker
+6200 75“

BASIN/

Bow
53

I .

LOW Coa
62 lsla

Bib ylsla‘nd37
pat /

H ' s

80

awe“ 7° 05

0:1? e Port

fest:

/:5° King
N.

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ngz't Severn 47 Islands
abukP

J
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City.

A I

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/ figé‘é) _ 1,,
amo" 28410
/ 5e // B A s 1 N
/ 2595 /S/(K\9\ASSO‘S‘EJA
of ééswic‘hv , ,. / L

OR
a Longitude

STATUTE MILES

0 I00 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 IOOO
ELEIH l——1 I—I I—-—-—« I

_ 0 n
4499 0 a0 0 Principal Airports *
Q
€Seafiount O Gigiers E:

\ Group E evations in Feet 20320

I330 70 $0 001}
I] ($5
a e

O /

Intermittent Lake

(5 Altair

L/ 00

ll .0

/ In"
"ilnf‘f

€\ UNDLAN

2733 I 2200

W

5)

Depth Curves and Soundings in Fathomsssrr

Cold Currents

KILOMETERS

Early Warning Lines _ _ ._ _.

— Below Sea Level :1

Gulfweed E]

Warm Currents —>

i~546
Sao

do

AZORES
(ACORES)
Portugal
8

A T
Atlantis

65‘” /

l32 5

Marsala

I856 1699 .3

0/ H

\AlRLlNEDgISTANCES IN STATUTE MILES

3405
41519
5015

5670 5610 5115
5195 5315 5875
5165 6270 5045

4225 4710

New York 4505
4565
5865 5385 71955
San Francisco U.S.A
__ __ 5120 5145:
Thule 3115

I

U
’99

to

© 1965 The Society, Washington,

my co, LITHDGRAPHERS,

3§45.

3915

4180
6330:5199
4010

4315 5575
5135 5165
4330
3275' 2235
4175 4410
4190

4585 4115

SOVIET

x

D KL“
“NEETHERN

is the shortest

A great-circle

, a-‘re d9

9H“

RELATION OF NORTH AMERICA
T0 EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

between any two places on the globe. Aircraft

L3

leaving the United States for Europe head in a
northerly direction to fly the great-circle route.

Oblique Mercator Projection tangent on Great

San

Circle passing through Washington and London

STATUTE MILES

Transatlantic T

 

 
 
  
    
    
   
     
      
    
   
   
       

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GREENLAND

-—-— Territorial boundary
0 Territorial capital
0 Other town or settlement

1(|)0 290
Statute Miles
100 200 300

Kilometers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11342.1 10-49

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

 

 

 

 

   

INDIAN

OCEAN

 

 

IOUNDAIY IIFIIIINTATION II
NOT NICK‘IARILV AUTHORITATIVI

 

REPUBLIC

OF KOREA

TREATY

JAPANESE

TREATY

REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
TREATY

PHILIPPINE

TREATY

NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN

SOUTHEAST

ASIA

TREATY

ANZUS
TREATY

  

SOUTH

OCEAN

PACIFIC

\ Washington

  

 

NORTH ATLANTIC

 

NORTH

ATLANTIC --m.'

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U. s. and countries with which
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57001 9—67

NORTN ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)

A treaty signed April 4, 1949, by which
“the parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more 0! them in Europe
or North America shall be considered an
attaek against them all; and . . . each 0!
them . . . will assist the . . . attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties. such
action as It deems necessary including
the use of armed force . . A"

I IINITEO STATES 3 IIIKENBOIIIIC

2 CANAOA IO PORTIICAl

3 ICElANO II TRANCE

A NORWAY IZ ITAlY

5 IINITEO KINCOON I! GREECE

C NETIIERLANIIS H TIIIIKEY

T OENNARK IS TEOERAl REPOBIIC
I RElCIIIN OT-CERNANY

RIO TREATY
(22 NATIONS)

A treaty signed September 2.1947, which
provides that an armed attack against
any American State “shall be considered
as an attack against all the American
states and . . . each one . . . undertakes
to assist in meeting the attack . . ."

I INITEII STATES 22 El SAlYAOOR SO IIAZN

IS NTKICO 23 NICARAGUA SI IOIIYIA

IT CIIIIA 24 COSTA RICA 32 PARASOAY

II NAITI 25 PANANA 33 CNIIE

I! OONINICAN 25 COIONOIA 34 ARCENTINA
REPNOIIC 27 YENElIIElA 35 ORIICIIAY

2O NONOIIRAS 2O ECIIAIOI u TRINIIIIICANO

Z I COATENAIA 2! PE“ TOBAGO

ANZOS (Australia—New
ZeaIamI—IInited States)
TREATY

(3 NATIONS)

A treaty signed Septem-
ber l. 1951. whereby each
or the parties "recognizes
that an armed attack in
the Pacific Area on any of
the Parties would be dan-
gerous to its own peace
and safety and declares
that it would act to meet
the common danger In
accordance with its con-
stitutional processes."

I IINITEI STATES
36 NEW ZEAlANO
37 AIISTRAIIA

PNIIIPPINE TREATY
(OILATERAI)

A treaty signed August
30. 1951. by which the
parties recognize “that
an armed attack In the
Pacific Area on either of
the Parties would be dan-
gerous to its own peace
and satety" and each
party agrees that it will
act “to meet the common
dangers in accordance
with its constitutional
processes."

I OIIITIII STATES
38 PNllIPPINES

JAPANESE TREATY
(OILATERAL)

A treaty signed January 19,
1960, whereby each party “rec-
ognizes that an armed attack
against either Part in the terri-
tories under the a ministration
of Japan would be dangerous
to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in ac-
cordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes." The
treaty replaced the security
treaty signed September 8, 1951.

I IINITEO STATES
39 JAPAN

REPIIBtIC OF KOREA
(South Korea) TREATY
(BIIATERAI)

A treaty signed October
1. 1953. whereby each
party “recognizes that an
armed attack in the Pa-
cino area on either of the
Parties . . . would be can-
gerous to its own peace
and satety" and that each
Party “would act to meet
the common danger in
accordance with its con-
stitutional processes."

I IINITEO STATES
IO REPOOIIC OF KOREA

\ SOOTNEAST ASIA TREATY
(O NATIONS)

A treaty signed Septem-
ber 8. 1954. whereby each
Party “recognizes that
aggression by means or
armed attack in the
treaty area agaimt any of
the Parties . . . would en-
danger its own peace and
safety" and each will "in
that event act to meet
the common danger in
accordance with its con-
stitutional processes."

I IINITEO STATES
5 IINITEO KINCIION
TI TRANCE
36 NEYI ZEAlANO
SI AOSTRAlIA
3| PNIlIPPINES
IT TNAIIANII
42 PAKISTAN

REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Formosa) TREATY
(IIIlAIERAl)

A treaty signed Decem-
ber 2. 1954. whereby each
of the parties “recognizes
that an armed attack in
the West Pacific Area dl-
rected against the terri-
tories or either or the
Parties would be danger-
ous to its own peace and
safety." and that each
"would act to meet the
common danger in ac-
cordance with its consti-
tutional processes." The
territory of the Republic
of China Is defined as
“Taiwan (Formosa) and
the Pescadores."

I IINITEO STATES
43 REPOOIIC Of CNINA
(TORNOSA)