LAB DAILY Filmed & Processed by the Library Photographic Service University of California Berkeley 94720 | METRIC UN wrk 2 . 3 ITT O C Cc > O) £ £ LL Position THE MASTER NEGATIVE, FROM WHICH THIS REPRODUCTION WAS MADE, [IS STORED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE, ROOM 20, MAIN LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 9 4 7 2 0 FOR ADDITIONAL REPRODUCTION REQUEST MASTER NEGATIVE NUMBER 0 2 eZ = = Z, [2 b < OL > T CE VY ( 4 IR A I. N A TEE GE TCC er FT AP A ro HISTORY . THE AFGHANS. BY J. P. FERRIER, AUTHOR OF ‘ CARAVAN JOURNEYS AND WANDERINGS IN PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN, ETC.’; FORMERLY OF THE CHASSEURS D’AFRIQUE, AND LATE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE PERSIAN ARMY, Translated from the Original Unpublished Manuscript BY CAPTAIN WILLIAM JESSE. Th GT ry AA wo por ots LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1858. The right of Translation is reserved. AARPENTIER BY THE SAME AUTHOR, CARAVAN JOURNEYS AND WANDERINGS IN PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN, TURKISTAN, AND BELOOCHISTAN, AND THROUGH PARTS OF CENTRAL ASIA previously unvisited, THE HAZARAH COUNTRY, Gour, HELMUND, SEISTAN, &c. Translated from the original French Manuscript, by Captain JESSE. Second Edition, with Original Map, 8vo. 21s. This Work contains important information regarding the opening for British Manufactures through the Indus, into the heart of Central Asia. “ M. Ferrier’s conclusions are those of an intelligent observer, but they concern us more especially as coming from a foreigner, and from one whom we are entitled to regard as an unprejudiced witness. It is most welcome to find that such a critic of our Indian dominion is so satisfied of its secure tenure, that he is convinced it * will last for ages if it be not attacked by any European nation.’ ”— Times. LONDON: PRINTED BY W, CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARING-CROSS, Dedicated TO MY OLD COMRADES OF THE 2xp REGIMENT OF CARABINEERS THE 1st REGIMENT OF CHASSEURS D’AFRIQUE. J. P. FERRIER. rr —_—— LP IA Sl pens i Re 8 3 a WARD sag PREFACE. Tne Translator, having accomplished his very in- teresting, though laborious, task of rendering into English the manuscripts of General Ferrier, is anxious to avail himself of this opportunity to congratulate that officer on having added these instructive volumes to the Eastern literature of this country. They can be more thoroughly appreciated here than in France : and that they must prove of real value in England is evident when we consider how great are the interests involved in the development—commercial, social, and religious—of that vast continent which Providence has permitted to fall under our rule. As an old soldier also, the Translator wishes to mark his sense of the frank and generous manner in which General Ferrier has spoken of the arduous services of the Anglo-Indian army in Afghanistan ; more especially as at the period at which he gave expression to these sentiments—1845—the entente between his own nation and England was by no means so cordial as happily it is now. The Author's criticisms, when unfavour- able, are generally well-founded; and though, no doubt, inaccuracies are to be met with in some por- tions of the ¢ History of the Afghans, it is evident that they proceed from defective information, and not from any ignoble desire to write disparagingly of the British Empire or our gallant soldiers. As to his comments on the Indian policy of this country, or the manner in which that policy has been carried out, the Translator cannot, agreeing as he does with a 4 4 on A Ry og A 0 50 sin vi PREFACE. the greater number of them, feel at all surprised at their severity; indeed, he considers that we ought to accept these comments with gratitude, inasmuch as they present to us a more unprejudiced view of the subject than we have yet seen. At a very early period French travellers greatly distinguished themselves in the East, and the names of Tavernier, Bernier, and Thevenot justify the assertion ; but the travels of General Ferrier are even of a more interesting character than those of these pioneers in Asiatic adventure; moreover, his sufferings were great while wending his weary way over the deserts of Central Asia, in some districts where European foot had never before left its imprint on the burning sands. The cruelty and hardships he then endured entitle him to the commiseration of every feeling mind, and the industry and perseverance that enabled him to collect and to preserve the materials for his History and Travels, under circumstances so adverse, are worthy of all admiration. Important also are the opinions of one who is capable of giving us much sound advice, and critically examin- ing the conduct of Great Britain, in connection with the countries which join her Indian frontiers on the north and north-west. Our information regarding these countries, their inhabitants, and their policy, has hitherto come almost exclusively from officers or civilians in the East India Company’s service; it is profitable to see the same subjects treated by a foreigner and from another point of view, for reasons which must be apparent to many. General Ferrier has pointed out, in his chapter on the invasion of India, in ¢ Caravan Journeys, the probability of the Sepoys joining the Russian army, and the princes and rajahs throwing off their alle- PREFACE. vii giance ; opinions which, no doubt, elicited expressions of indignation from many of his readers, especially those who were the servants of the East India Com- pany—but how fearfully has his estimate of native fidelity been justified since the publication of that volume ! The reader will do well to consult the highly interesting notes and appendices of Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir John Login, and Mr. Danby Seymour, in ¢ Caravan Journeys, as they elucidate many points in the History of the Afghans. The style of the author is rather severe, and there are several portions of the present work in which there was an opening for much touching writing and for appeals to the highest and best feelings of our nature; even a few words only here and there would have considerably increased the interest of the subject, but the translator did not consider himself at liberty to do otherwise than adhere strictly to the text. When there was a duplication of thought, or want of arrange- ment, he has endeavoured to remedy these defects; but otherwise the reader is in possession of General Ferrier’s work in its integrity. WiLLiaM JESSE. Maisonette, Ingatestone, March 27, 1858. CONTENTS. CHAPTER 1. Bea Fak AN Origin of the Afghans — Opinion of Monsieur Ruffin, Eugene Boré, and others — Opinion of Afghan authors—Afghans mentioned by Tamerlane in his Institutes — The probability of their Jewish origin — Their conversion to Islamism — A Hebrew Bible presented to Nadir Shah by the Yoosoofzyes — Afghans of Indian and Khorassian origin — Warlike and independent under Sebek-Taghee — Aborigines of Afghanistan — Afchans in India known as Patans and Rohillas — First mentioned as Afghans in the reign of Aboo Seid — Classification of Afghan tribes — The author adopts that of Abdullah Khan — Persecution of the Afghans under Ghengis Khan — The Abdalees settle in the Suleiman mountains — Yoosoofzyes established in Cashmeer — Afghanistan inhabited almost exclusively by Abdalees and Ghildjzyes — List of Afghan tribes and their branches — Schism amongst them on this subject — Makoohees and Khaouganees — A singular reason for taking offence — Sub- division of the tribes and their branches .. oh “ vt Page 1 CHAPTER 11 Afghanistan conquered by Alexander — Reconquered by the aboriginal inha- bitants — Taken by the Tartars — Death of Mansoor — Success of Sebek- Taghee — Character of the Afghans at this period — Concession of territory to the Abdalee tribe — Ghildjzyes opposed to the Tartar dominion — The first sovereign of Afghanistan — His son Mahmood — Cruelty of the Tartar princes — Expulsion of Beiram — Khosroo Malek the last of the Ghaznevide dynasty — List of the monarchs of that race — Afghan princes of Gour — Mahmood Gouree —His conquests in India — Eldooz — Djellal Eddin — Afghanistan conquered by Ghengis Khan — Malek Kurt — Chems Eddin Gouree — Their suzerainty to the Tartars — Conquered by Tamerlane — Description of the Afghans by that invader — Afghan rule in India — Mahmood III. — Ibrahim Khan defeats Bellal and seizes Kabul and Kan- dahar — Mirza Baboor — Assisted by the Persians — Defeated by the Uzbeks, but successful in India — Fall of Ibrahim Khan — Death of Mirza Baboor — Succeeded by his son Humayoon — Protected by Shah Thamasp — Anecdote of the latter — Assists Humayoon with a Persian army — The Loods defeated — Their attempts to retake Delhi — The prophetess Kiemal Eddin — Shah Jehan drives out the Loods — Aurungzebe finally annihilates them — Kandahar ceded to Persia by Humayoon — Taken and retaken by the Persians and Moguls — Afghan deputation to Shah Abbas — Extract AT a_i ew ws CONTENTS. from Sir John Malcolm's ¢ History of Persia’ — Afghans quiet under Shah Abbas — Tyranny of his grandson Shah Seffee — Kandahar taken by Shah Abbas II. in 1642 — Success of the Ghildjzyes — Their revolt suppressed by the Shah Hoosein — Gourguin Khan — Deputation of the Afghans to the Persian Court in 1706. .. > or . “ Ww Page 13 CHAPTER III The Kelauter of Kandahar is sent prisoner to Ispahan — His intrigues against Gourguin Khan — He makes a pilgrimage to Mecca — Obtains a fefvo from the chief mollah of Islam — Returns to Ispahan, and finally to Kandahar — Indignation of Gourguin Khan — Events consequent upon this — Opinion of Abdullah Khan upon them — Death of Gourguin Khan — Mir Weis enters Kandahar — Statement of Mirza Mehdee — The Ghildjzyes declare their independence and exterminate the Persian troops — The tribe of the Abdalees establish themselves in Herat — The Persian generals attack the Kelauter and are beaten — Kaee Khosroo Khan besieges Kandahar — He is defeated and killed with 30,000 of his troops — Mohamed Roostem succeeds him, but is also beaten — The Afghans acknowledge Mir Weis as their sovereign chief — Death of the Mir in 1715 — His brother Mir Abdullah succeeds him — His negociations with Persia—1Is put to death by the eldest son of Mir Weis, who succeeds him — Alayar Khan, Governor of Herat — Zeman Khan appointed by the Persian monarch to succeed him — Heyat Sultan — He marches against Kandahar — Attacked by Assad Ullah and defeated — Enters Herat — Persian campaign against the Uzbeks — Sefi Kooli Khan — Is defeated by the Afghans — Independence of the Afghans established — Assad Ullah lays siege to Furrah — Is attacked by Mir Mahmood of Kan- dahar — A Belooch chief, Mir Mohamed, seizes Herat. . - 25 CHAPTER 1V. Intrigues of Persia in Afghanistan — Preparations of Mir Mahmood — He outwits the Persian Court — Is appointed Governor-General of Kandahar — His ambitious projects — Seizes the fortresses on the Helmund — State of the Persian army — Besieges Kerman — It surrenders to his troops — They are beaten by the Persian general Leuft Ali Khan — Mir Mahmood retreats to Kandahar — Leuft Ali is disgraced — Revolt against Mir Mahmood at Kandahar — The Mir marches with his army against the Persians-— Pro- visions the fortress of Bam — Kerman surrenders to him — He is repulsed before Yezd — Moves on Ispahan — State of Mir Mahmood’s troops — A singular recipe for courage — Pusillanimity of the Persians — Disunion amongst them — The consequences — Their army is routed by the Afghans — The Ethemad Dooulet and the Walee of Georgia — The chief command of the army is given to the latter — Proposition of Shah Hoosein to Mir Mahmood — The siege is pressed closer — The Persians endeavour to leave the city — Great scarcity prevails — The result — Dreadful sufferings of the inhabitants — Shah Hoosein proceeds to the Afghan camp — He abdicates the throne — Mahmood’s conduct after his victory. .. . “ 38 CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. The Prince Thamasp — Mahmood sends an army against him — Kasbeen sur- renders to the Afghans — Duplicity and cruelty of the victors — The inha- bitants take their revenge — Defeat of the Afghans — Mahmood is furious at this — Reconciliation with Aman Ullah Khan — Mahmood massacres the Persian nobles — Sanguinary scenes in Ispahan — State of the provinces — Prince Thamasp is proclaimed Shah — Assembles troops in the Azerbaidjan — The Turks and Russians seize upon Armenia and Georgia — State of the Afghan army — Desertions from Mir Mahmood’s ranks — Shiraz besieged — Tyranny of Mahmood — Mir Echreff appointed to the chief command — The Afghan army march upon Yezd — Mahmood becomes deranged — Losses in the Afghan ranks — the troops return to Ispahan — Mahmood in a paroxysm of madness puts to death the sons of Shah Hoosein — Death of Mahmood — Mir Echreff succeeds him — He puts the Serdar Ullah Khan to death — Policy of Russia at this period — Echreff marches against the Turks — Battle of Kiemereh — Defeat of the Turks — Treaty with the Afghans— Events in Afghanistan — The Russians take possession of Guilan — Echreff fortifies the Afghan quarter in Ispahan — Nadir joins the Shah Thamasp — He takes Nishapoor — Echreff seizes Yezd — Battle between Nadir and Echreff — Defeat of the Afghans — Battle of Bagh Mirane — The Afghans retire from Ispahan — Conflict at the Bend-emir — Retreat upon Shiraz — Destruction of the Afghan army — Death of Echreff — Reflections, Page 51 CHAPTER VI Nadir takes Herat and Furrah — Marches upon Kandahar in 1737 — Admirable defence by the Ghildjzyes -— Mir Hoosein capitulates — Nadir reduces Afghanistan — His policy in that country — Insurrection of the Afghans after the death of Nadir Shah — Expulsion of the Persians — Ahmed Khan Suddozye elected King — Hadji Djemal Khan — Revolt of the Serdars — Nasser Khan surrenders Kabul and Peshawur — Ahmed Shah marches against Lahore — Hayat Ullah Khan obtains the assistance of the Mogul Emperor — Admirable tactics of Ahmed Shah — Passage of the Tchenab — Ahmed Shah takes Lahore — Makes a treaty with the Mogul Emperor — Revolt at Kandahar — Execution of the conspirators — Ahmed Shah ad- vances into Khorassan — Siege of Herat — Defence of the citadel by Emir Khan — Timoor Mirza marches against Meshed — Defeat of the Khorassanee chiefs in that city — Meshed relieved by Shah Rokh — Defeat of Mir Alem — Ahmed Shah retires from Meshed — Besieges Nishapoor — Is obliged to retreat — Disasters of the Afghan army — Passage of the Heri-rood — The remainder of the army arrive at Herat — Ahmed Shah reaches Kandahar 65 CHAPTER VIL Second siege of Nishapoor by the Afghans — Clemency of the victor — He invests Meshed — Battle of Kakhak — Death of Ali Murad — Capture of Toon and Tubbus — An ambuscade — Treaty with Shah Rokh — Ahmed Xi1 CONTENTS. Shah retires to Herat — Campaign against the Uzbeks — Beghee Khan seizes Balk, Khulm, &c. — Assad Khan Ghildjzye — His successes in Persia — Defeat of Kerym Khan — Assad Khan is attacked in the mountains — Last attempt of the Afghans to annex Persia — Nasser Khan, Belooch, revolts — The combats of Pringuez and Mestook — Siege of Kelat — Favourable terms made by Nasser Khan — Ahmed Shah proceeds to India — Insurrection of the Mahrattas — Ahmed Shah Gourkanee deposed — Assassination of Alemguir — Ghazi Khan seizes the throne of the Moguls — Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, reaches Lahore — Marches on Delhi — Shooja ed Dooulet — Passage of the Bar — Desertion of Delaver Khan and Zal Beg — Shah Alem cedes his rights to the English — Revolt in Kandahar — Abdul Khalek Khan — Abdullah Khan suppresses the insurrection — Ahmed Shah marches on Peshawur — Arrives at Kandahar — Zal Beg is executed — Delaver Khan flies to Herat — Timoor Mirza is made viceroy — Ahmed Shah’s reasons for this — Death of Ahmed Shah — Yaghoot Khan — The Serdars declare for Suleiman Mirza — Character of Ahmed Shah - Page 79 CHAPTER VIII Kabul becomes the capital — Sons of Ahmed Shah — Dervish Ali Khan — Afghan principles — Walee Khan and his sons put to death — Flight of Suleiman Mirza — Timoor Mirza enters Kandahar — Resides at Kabul — Kuzzilbash cavalry organised — Timoor marches against Scinde — Conflicts between the Kaloras and Talpooras — Timoor Shah takes Bawalpoor — Establishes the Kaloras in Scinde — Fresh disturbances in Scinde — Medad Khan is beaten at Djioond — Fethi Khan Talpoora succeeds to power — Timoor takes the field against the Emir of Bokhara — Balkh and Akhcheh become independent — Timoor returns to Kabul — Events in Khorassan — Afghan army marches on Meshed — Mamech Khan — Capture of Tchinaran — Death of Medad Khan — Fresh insurrection in Khorassan — Afghan army advances into that province — Conspiracy to take Timoor Shah’s life — The plot fails — Arseleh Khan is put to death — Value of an oath in an Afghan sovereign — Death of Timoor Shah — Character of that monarch — Sons of Timoor .. .“ . .“ “ ot “ .t . 96 CHAPTER IX. Afghanistan at the death of Timoor — Intrigues for the succession — Payendeh Khan supports Zeman Mirza — Afghan tactics — Zeman is proclaimed Shah — He marches against his brother at Kandahar — Flight of Humayoon Mirza — Tyranny of Zeman Shah — His sanguinary acts — Gives up Balkh to Persia — Zeman marches against the Punjab — Humayoon seizes Kane dahar — Zeman takes the city by treachery — Humayoon is made prisoner — His brother puts out his eyes — Zeman advances upon Scinde — Mahmood Mirza endeavours to intercept him — Battle of Gourrek — Zeman advances on Herat — Takes the city — Mahmood Mirza retires to Persia — Advances on Furrah — Battle of Emaret — Mahmood invests Herat — Cunning of Zeman Shah — Mahmood quits his camp—His allies are beaten and dispersed CONTENTS. xiii — Zeman Shah arrives at Herat — Mahmood retires to Bokhara and Khiva — Revolt of the Sikhs — Zeman reduces Lahore — Disasters of his army — He reaches Kabul and Kandahar — Fatal tendencies of Shah Zeman — Discontent of the Afghans — The vizier Vefadar Khan — Conspiracy of the Serdars — Payendeh Khan and his accomplices executed — Flight of Fethi Khan — Revolts — Fethi Khan accompanied by Mahmood takes Furrah and Kandahar — The army deserts Zeman — Battle between the brothers — Zeman is beaten and his eyes put out — Vefadar Khan is executed — Zeman retires to Bokhara — Character of the Shah .. o oe Page 108 CHAPTER X. Mahmood ascends the throne — First acts of the Shah — Revolt, of the Ghildj- zyes — Kaissar Mirza is driven from Herat — Hadji Firooz Eddin made governor of that city — Kaissar Mirza attacks him, but is obliged to retire — Kamran, a son of Mahmood, and Kaissar alternately take possession of Kan- dahar — Disorders and conflict with the Kuzzilbashes — Peace is restored at Kabul — Conspiracy against Shah Mahmood — He is dethroned — His brother Shooja succeeds him — Mahmood remains a prisoner — Kamran is expelled from Kandahar by Kaissar Mirza — The latter, defeated by the Heratees, evacuates the city — The Persians besiege Herat — They are beaten and retire — Shah Shooja marches against the Talpooras — Returns to Kabul — English embassy to Kabul — Difficulties of the reign of Shah Shooja — The Serdar Fethi Khan intrigues and flies from Kabul — He is arrested by Kaissar Mirza — Dost Mohamed escapes and pillages Bakooa — Shere dil Khan assists Shah Mahmood to escape — The latter and the Mohamedzyes release Fethi Khan — Mahmood marches on Kabul — Seizes the city — Battle of Neemla — Shooja is put to flight — Endeavours to keep the field — Retires to Loodiana .. ‘ “ “ 1129 CHAPTER XI. Sir A. Burnes’ sketch of Shah Shooja — Fethi Khan is appointed Vizier — Shah Mahmood devoted to pleasure — Influence of the vizier — Kamran, the son of Shah Mahmood — His ferocious disposition — He kills his cousin Kaissar — Fethi Khan reduces the Belooches — Establishes order and security — Afghan alliance with the Sikhs — They unite and seize Cashmeer — Fethi Khan breaks his word to the Sikhs— The latter seize upon A ttok — Brilliant exploit of Dost Mohamed — Panic of the Afghans — Runjeet Sing pillages * Cashmeer — The pretensions of Persia on Herat — Hoosein Ali Mirza marches against that city — Fethi Khan marches to the relief of Herat — The vizier arrests Hadji Firooz Eddin — The prince’s harem is violated and plundered by Dost Mohamed — Flight of Mir Efzel Khan to Meshed — Battle of Kiaffir Kaleh — Retreat of both parties — The Afghans obtain the plunder — Kamran conspires against Fethi Khan — Shah Mahmood com- mands the vizier’s eyes to be put out — Kamran arrives at Herat and executes the order — The brothers of the vizier, Shere dil Khan and Kohendil Khan, escape — Poor dil Khan remains a prisoner .. “ .“ 143 ple, a TT eR, RR Ce PRR 3 oo SA 5 ig A CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. Shere dil Khan raises Kandahar — Kamran proceeds there — Poor dil Khan escapes — Cruelties of Kamran upon Fethi Khan — Brothers of the Vizier — Dost Mohamed Khan — Cause of his quarrel with Fethi Khan — He seizes Kabul — Flight of the Royal Family — Mahmood and Kamran meet at Ghuznee — Dost Mohamed puts them to flight — Murder of Fethi Khan — The Shah and his son are pursued and arrive at Herat — Misunderstanding between the princes — They acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia — Quarrels between Mahmood and Kamran — Hadji Firooz and Kalech Khan attack Kamran — The latter is killed and Hadji Firooz made prisoner — Kamran and the Persians at variance — Revolt of Furrah — Kamran proceeds to that place — Moustapha Khan and Mohamed Hoosein revolt at Herat — Cause of this — Djehanguir Mirza is proclaimed king, and afterwards deposed — Hadji Firooz succeeds him — Death of Meuhvali Khan — Hadji Firooz retires to Meshed — Moustapha Khan closes the gates of Herat against Kamran — He besieges the city, but retires on the approach of Shere dil Khan — The latter also retires — Cruelty of Moustapha Khan — Conspiracy of Syud Mir Sedik — Kamran enters Herat — Miserable end of Moustapha Khan — Vengeance of Kamran — Reflections on the Afghans Page 159 CHAPTER XIII. Death of Shah Mahmood — Kamran is suspected of murdering his father — He indulges in every kind of excess — Death of Attah Khan — Yar Mo- hamed Khan is made Vizier of Herat — Hostility of the Persians against this principality — Intrigues of Abbas Mirza — Yar Mohamed arrives at Meshed — He is put to the torture by the Persian prince — Is delivered by the Athar Bashi — Measures of Yar Mohamed — Revolt of the Syud Mohamed Sedik — He is betrayed by Kamran and executed — The Shah is closely watched by Yar Mohamed — His sons are disgraced — Project of Mohamed Shah on Herat — The Barukzyes consent to the restoration of Shah Shooja — He plays the despot, and is overthrown — Eyoob succeeds him — Mohamed Azim Khan marches against the Sikhs — Runjeet Sing successful against the Afghans — The battle of Noochero — The Afghans are beaten — Death of Azim Khan — The character of that serdar — His son Habib Ullah Khan succeeds him .. . o " 173 CHAPTER XIV. Proceedings of Habib Ullah Khan — Divisions between the sons of Payendeh Khan — Habib Ullah Khan at war with his uncles — Poor dil Khan inter- feres in Kabul — Union of Sultan Mohamed and Dost Mohamed Khang — Shere dil Khan and Poor dil Khan establish peace between their brothers — Dost Mohamed again at variance — His rivalry with Sultan Mohamed — That prince at Peshawur — Sir A. Burnes’s opinion of him— Kandahar — Poor dil Khan and Shere dil Khan-— Character of the latter — Sir A. Burnes’s opinion of the Kandahar chiefs — Character of Dost Mohamed — Sir A. Burnes’s opinion of him .. “ i ' .“ w 186 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XV. Shah Shooja takes up arms against the Barukzyes — Dost Mohamed Khan marches to the relief of Kandahar — Shah Shooja receives a check — That sovereign is completely defeated — He retires to Kelat — Sultan Mohamed arrives at Kabul — Machinations of that serdar against Dost Mohamed Khan — Resolution of the latter — The Dost, now elected Emir, marches against the Sikhs — Defeats them at Djamrood — Sir A. Burnes at Kabul — The English are hostile to Dost Mohamed — Sumner’s account of the Russians and the English in Asia — Mohamed Shah determines to invade Herat — He is supported by the Russians .. o ve .“" . Page 199 CHAPTER XVI. First diplomatic discussions relative to the siege of Herat— Mr. Ellis is succeeded by Mr. M‘Neil — The Persians invade the principality of Herat — The minister of the Shah plays a double game — Captain Eldred Pottinger at Herat — Russian officers in the Persian camp — Samsoun Khan — Colonel Blaremberg — General Boroffski — Colonel Semineau — Siege of Gorian — Recrimination against the French officer — Russian and English agents in the Persian camp — Their hostility against Colonel Semineau — Operations at the siege of Gorian — Fall of the place — Shere Mohamed Khan — Yar Mohamed’s reply to his brother — Duraticn of the siege .. ve 214 CHAPTER XVII. Herat — Appearance and position of the city — Its fortifications and environs — Attack of the Persians on the suburbs — Colonel Semineau’s plan of attack — Absurdities of the Persians — Underhand intrigues and eccentricities of Hadji Mirza Agassee — Means adopted by him to prevent success — Con- spiracy in Herat in favour of the Persians — The plot is discovered — Monster cannon — Treachery and death of Mirza Naghi — Distinguished conduct of Colonel Semineau — Cowardice of Meuhbalee Khan — Colonel Semineau declines to take part in the operations — The Afghans surprise Hadji Khan — Scarcity of provisions in the Afghan camp — Privations of the enemy in Herat — Difficulties of their position — Djellal Eddin Mirza and Chems Eddin desert to the Persians — Mr, M‘Neil arrives at the Persian camp — Proceedings of that minister — Diplomatic notes between the Russians and the English — Mr. M‘Neil breaks with the Persian government — His messengers are arrested — Mr. M‘Neil’s conduct in the Persian camp — He leaves for Tauris .. “ . .“ o .“ .. 227 CHAPTER XVIII. Mr. M‘Neil’s letter to the Muchteid of Ispahan — Lord Palmerston no longer continues his half measures — The English occupy the island of Karrack — Captain Vikovitch at Kandahar and Kabul — He returns to the Persian Xvi CONTENTS. camp with the envoys of these principalities — Treaty between Persia and Kandahar — Violent declaration of Lord Palmerston to the Persian govern- ment — General Simonitch arrives in the Persian camp — The Persians take courage — Hadji Mirza’s opposition to Count Simonitch — Colonel Semi- neau’s plan of attack adopted — Siege operations renewed — The assault — Treachery of the Persian chiefs — General Boroffski is killed and the Persians are repulsed — Colonel Semineau is wounded — He sends in his resignation, which is not accepted — Is promoted to the rank of General, and receives a Persian order — The English ultimatum arrives at the Persian camp ~-- Conduct of the Heratees during the assault .. ‘“ .“ Page 243 CHAPTER XIX. The Persians abandon the siege of Herat — The Serdars of Kandahar and Captain Vikovitch — Desolation of Herat — Yar Mohamed implores the assistance of the neighbouring principalities — Yar Mohamed sells the Heratees to the Turcomans — The English prepare to invade Afghanistan — Misunderstanding between Dost Mohamed and Runjeet Sing — Intervention of the English — Their want of good faith towards Dost Mohamed — Their partiality for Runjeet — Negociations between the English and the Dost — Battle of Djamrood — Burnes at Kabul — He meets with Vikovitch, who is coldly received by the Emir — The Dost makes frank explanations to the English — He is supported by Burnes at Calcutta — Burnes is triumphant over Vikovitch — Note of Lord Palmerston to M. de Nesselrode — Reply of the Russian cabinet — The last attempt of the Dost to secure the alliance of the English — Efforts to defeat this on the part of Sir W. MN aghten and Sir Claude Wade — Lord Auckland declares for Shah Shooja — Consterna- tion of the Dost at this intelligence — Reflections on the English policy 258 CHAPTER XX. Tord Auckland sends Sir W. M‘Naghten to Lahore — Treaty with the Sikhs — Manifesto of the Governor-General from Simla in justification of his policy — Reflections on this document — The possession of Scinde ad journed — The Emirs are opposed to the advance of the British army through their territory — Mir Roustem of Khyrpoor — Averse to lending the fortress of Bukkur to the English, but at length accedes to their request — The result of this to himself and his family — Conduct of the British authorities in Scinde — Strength of the army when concentrated at Shikapoor — Extract from Mr. Sumner’s work — Seizure of Kurrachee — English appliances to success in the invasion of Afghanistan — Proceedings of Shah Shooja 275 CHAPTER XXII. Introductory note to chapter — Character of the Afghans — Their physical de- velopment — Mental qualities — Indifferent Mussulmans — Their turbulent nature — Spirit of independence — Love of marauding — Their cupidity extreme — Insensible to good faith — The law a dead letter in their eyes — CONTENTS. Xvil The citizen and the nomade — Hospitality — Prandial habits of Yar Mohamed — The character of their food — Kooroot — Mode of eating — Ignorance of the Afghans — Their superstitions — Education — Costume — Dirty habits — Religious feeling — Administration of the laws — The lex talionis — Punishments — Diseases — Remedies — Public buildings — Roads — Pri- vate houses — The zoology of Afghanistan — Domestic animals — Nature of the soil — Productions of it — Aridity of the country — Minerals — Geo- graphical position — Climate — Difficulties of rapid communication — Popu- lation . . ve w . 3 ’" Page 283 CHAPTER XXII Government of the Afghan provinces — Power of the Emirs — Influence of the priests — Turbulence of the serdars — Ideas of government — Conduct of public affairs — Stability of power unlikely to last — Mode of obtaining it — Character of the serdars — The producing classes — They cannot leave Kandahar — Clannish feelings — Mercenary qualities of the serdars — Fidelity of the troops never certain — The result of their numerous wars — The sovereign and the serdars — Superiority of the Mohamedzyes — The power of the Barukzyes — Probabilities of their retaining it — English mar- riages in Afghanistan — The Afghan army — Manner in which it is composed — The contingents easily assembled — Ignorant of military discipline, and insensible to its advantages — War a necessity — Cavalry numerous — Mode of fighting — Rights of individuals unknown — Construction of their towns — Tribes of the south — Strength of the Afghan army in each principality — Yar Mohamed’s troops — Money — Prices of provisions — Wine — Weights and measures — The Parsivans — Mechanical arts — European manufactures — Taxation o ’ oh vo .. 302 CHAPTER XXIII English army leaves Shikapoor — March through the Bolan pass — Kohendil Khan advances to meet it— Defection of the Afghan chiefs — Kohendil retires into Persia — Kandahar capitulates — Assault and fall of Ghuznee — Dost Mohamed endeavours to negociate, but without success — The Emir leaves Kabul — The English enter the city — Restoration of Shah Shooja — First disagreement between him and the British — The latter interfere in the administration of the kingdom — Results of this — The priests are hostile to the invaders — Avaricious views of the English disappointed — Revenues of Afghanistan moderate in amount — Means employed to raise them — Shah Shooja demands the fulfilment of the treaty — Refusal of the English — Hatred against them augmented — Religious proselytism — English con- nexions with Afghan women — Revolts in the kingdom — The Dost at Bokhara — Persecutions to which he is subject — Combat at Karchy — Mohamed Shah threatens the Usbek Emir — The Dost is released — His perilous position near the Oxus — He flies to Cher Sebz and Khulm — Returns to the province of Kabul — Conflicts between the Dost and the English — Deserted by his countrymen — Surrenders to the English — He is sent to India .. : “ “ “ . . 327 b CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXIV. . . TT English — Thei : is country by the Eng oe ation of his cou ais Shooja ae invaders impose a vizier on Shah J iefs : the Afchan Chie ; : — Complaints of 3 he Unjustifiable acts of this functionary on against the English 7 spires with +f the English ja— The King conspires ors — Carelessness of the Eng Phone t the head of the conspirators art Sale Abdullal ) hon chiefs reduced — Revolt of the J i — Feeling of — Subsidies to . them — Is obliged to retire wt Revolt at Kabul . oa i * . * 3 '‘OV1 -_ “ha mis ti 4 English — Insurrection in the Dt of that officer — The scowrity in the Eng ’s house — Assassine : zen by them — 2 Burnes’s ho ive position taken by — Attack on Sir A. : Bad defensive pos Zeman Khan Inolish are driven from the city — ah Khan — Zeman Ynglish are rr pillaged — Death of Ahsan General Elphinstone Copgwns % Continual Azhting= Werione arms — Akbar Khan roclaimed King — " nsion BY roe £ ll proclaime A 44th Regiment — Suspe gin tl OIOVINCeS ) : i nts in 1e I — Conduct of the » English — Events in th Miton— Sng- returns to Kabul — Indecision of the E nent of Sir W. M‘Naghten we) returns b ndonsd — Embarrassmen a ut and Akbar Khan — Te ry or Meeting between the Be : aty with Akbar Khan LL the o ——— ta 1D ti ger — Tred ) : IRI ) picions o 2 — Major Potting ‘nolish deliver uy tvenis mer > "he English i 3 a Akbar Khan Sanat He Jellal- — The English retreat — R nnihilated — Akbar Khe The King im — English army a : man Khan — Th hostages to Ener betwen Shah Shooja and Zen Page 341 — Transac roel abad i Character of that Sovereign is assassinated — Shah Shooja demands the oy refusal — Forgery of letters — CHAPTER XXV. pir, a — Combat between that prince { and Akbar Khan returns to Roma 1] — The former becomes his ALE 1s S Shoo] i Diing Mirza suceeeds Shah Shoo] Veit) Duy ] The former is beaten — Zeman Khan — the citade “ Flight of the i Diin retire to the « Fethi Diing — Flig forces Fethi Djing 1 re Akbar plunders E oh bins in spite of the 1 $ 3 mm LNs ¥ . ad seogine Hany ih aster of Kabul — us Wm of Major Rawlin- : thar remains mas {andahar — Foresig : f Prince — Ak C . ves at Kanda 1al . Sa sian account 0 . seis aintain themse oity — Persist Ee insurrection mainte in the neighbourhood of that y Plan of the Afghans son — Occurrences Alizye, beaten by the Englis bv dition of the English Dh i a ate defeated — Second expe ize Kandahar — They ¢ to seize Kan istakes he i 0 — Mistakes of t i hat is false — 1 Z the / s true and wha Rr. I gh anistan this second expedition ul The English evacuate Alun yl , . - ilitary ma CI'S The Eng ish ai ) g : journalist in milite f Kabul — glis i hs i the throne o 0 ; a ms {abul and seizes ——— ue Da t Akbar Khan returns to Be i os sa >, of Dost Mohamed at Kabul —3 : pee r Restoration g : 8 ower — Res L Sh So i Kandahar by Kohendil Kh CHAPTER XXVL istic feeling —- Antagonistic feeling st. Mohamec Edt of Ui y return of Dos : itious projects of th State of Kabul after Oe son Alor Kin = Armin Reasons for this A wp Dost and the Walee of DL of Kandahar — hopes ~ a wishes to dispossess Kohendl ¢ re — Akbar Kha rupture Reaction ao — Conversation with the Khan — Kooli Khan accepts the English alli Abbott at Khiv Captain Abbott leaves for Russi Zadeh leaves Khiy — The Yuss Bashi and Hassan Bah Abbott reaches the liberation of the Russian slaves CONTENTS. Xix nce of the Shah of Persia — Favourable reply of that Sovereign — Akbar obliges his father to withdraw from the direction of affairs — Death of Akbar Khan — Revolt of Mohamed Shah Khan — Dost Mohamed forces him to return to his duty — Alliance between Persia and Kabul — The English are alarmed — Embarrassment of the Emir — Sultan Mohamed Khan returr 18 to Kabul — Reception by the Dost — The Emir appoints his son Haidar Khan, vizier — The Dost joing the Sikhs against the English — Antipathy of the Afghans to the Sikhs, and vice vers — Dost Mohamed takes Attock — His cavalry is defeated by the English — Owes his escape to the fleetness of hig horse Page 388 CHAPTER XXVIII. The English conquer the Punjab — Dost Mohamed loses Peshawur — He retires to Kabul — Policy of Kohendil Khan at ‘Kandah return from Persia — Retrospective view of affairs at Herat — Khan and the English — Major Pottinger and Colonel Stoddar leaves for Bokhara — Interview between Major Pottinger Khan—Serious consequences resulting from this — — Major Todd at Herat — Treat hamed all-powerful in the principality — A scene at Yar Mohamed’s dinner- table — Intrigues of that chief — His treatment of Shah Kamran — Misun- derstanding between Major Todd and the Vizier — Dine Mohamed Khan — Approbation of Major Todd’s conduct by the Directors of the East India Company — Official instructions to that officer — Bad faith of Yar Mohamed — Difficulties of Major Todd's position — Treachery of Yar Mohamed — Subsidy to Shah Kamran and hig Court stopped — The vizier makes fresh demands upon Major Todd — Counter propositions by the latter — He leaves Herat and is escorted out of the city ., . . " .« 401 and Attock ar after hig Yar Mohamed t — The latter and Shere Di] Conduct of Yar Mohamed y concluded with Shah Kamran — Yar Mo- CHAPTER XXVIII gainst the English at He to Major Todd — Death of th — General Peroffski J army — Aga Kh rat—Ingratitude of the East Indi at officer — Russi aves Orenburg — Dis an raises a revolt in a Company an expedition against Khiva asters and retreat of the Kerman — The Kazi of Herat Disgrace of Yacooba Mehter — Allah ance— Snare laid for the Kazi — Captain n there — Intrigues of Yacooba Mehter — a — The Usbeks take him prisoner— Akhood a in search of him — Meeting of Akhood adoor — Fresh complie Shakespear arrives and brings them to Russian at Khiva a— His missio and the captive ation — Captain - at Khiva — Obtains Astrakan — Lieut. Russia — Lieutenant aga SRLS XX CONTENTS. CONTENTS. xxi Shakespear’s reception at St. Petersburgh—Captain Abbott not recompensed | him to be put to death — Cha — Russia creates difficulties for Khiva— The Shah demands the Persian taken in England to ascertain th slaves — Captain Conolly arrives at Khiva— He fails in the object of his racter of Nasser Ullah Khan — Measures e fate of Stoddart and Conolly — Dr, Wolf mission — Requirements of the Khan .. “ “ .. Page 419 : uel os : - The Shah Kam- mran is imprisoned and plundered Mohamed Yoossoof — The diamond vest —Negocia- CHAPTER XXIX. tions regarding it — Mohamed Yoossoof Mirza the dupe of Yar Mines 2 He flies to Meshed — . Captain Conolly leaves for Kokan — Liberality of that officer — War between his sovereign - a Rpt set Ratunel tiberty — Yar Mohared Pte P=) . oe Bokhara and Kokan—Colonel Stoddart requests Conolly to come to Bokhara [| % . .- . . Page 461 — The Khan of Kokan is averse to his going — Nasser Ullah sends a firman to Captain Conolly insuring his safety—Conolly leaves Kokan for the Emir’s v a Colonel Stoddart — Bad auspices under which he arrives at Bokhara CHAPTER XXXII — First meeting between Colonel Stoddart and the Emir — Strange pro- Sons of Shah Kamran — Hadji Firooz ceedings of that officer when presented to Nasser Ullah — He treats him son Malek Kassem Mirza — Afghan with insolence — Stoddart is arrested — Barbarous treatment — The Mir and England in regard to Herat — Yar Mohamed, now sovereien pri f Cheb — Stoddart is confined in the Siah-tchah — He turns Mussulman — Herat, attends to the welfare of the Heratees —. Strengthens bi oe Russian intervention in his favour— Stoical courage of Stoddart — The Emir and prepares to attack Gour — Dine Mohamed Khan plunders the Ai changes his conduct towards him — Vicissitudes to which he is subjected — — Yar Mohamed takes possession of the province of Goup. Die The Sultan interferes in his favour — Also the Russian minister at Bokhara with Kandahar — Subjugates the Hazarah Zeidnats — Marches against the and the Khan of Khiva — Replies of the Emir to those who intercede for | Usbek Khanats — He js recalled to the south — Privations suffered b his him . . . . . . . . . 437 | army — Equilibrium between the states of Central Asia— Mohamed Shah of Persia supports Kohendil Khan in his quarrel with Yar Mohamed — The latter assists the Shah of Persia in his war with Khorassan — D atte : — Death of th CHAPTER XXX. Persian monarch — Alliance of Yar Mohamed with the Shah of Persia 418 Eddin — His sad end, and that of his princes in Persia — Conduct of Russia Character of Conolly — Full of hope as to the result of his negociations — Nasser Ullah returns to Bokhara— His interviews with the English officers — They are both imprisoned — Allah Dad Khan, the Afghan envoy, returns to Kabul — He is brought back to Bokhara — His in- famous intrigues — M. de Boutenieff leaves the city — Akhood Zadeh, the son of the Kazi of Herat, and his brother Mohamed Davood — Dangers to which the latter is exposed — Akhood Zadeh is arrested at the frontier of Bokhara — He is imprisoned by the Emir — Obstinate conduct of Stoddart — The servants of the English officers are released from prison — Akhood Zadeh and Allah Dad Khan are confined in the Siah-tchah — They are sub- sequently released — Joseph, a Greek, is executed — Paper and pens are found on Stoddart — He receives the bastinado — Execution of that officer and Conolly — A register of that event, and other circumstances connected with those officers .“ .- “ . “ ' .. 551 CHAPTER XXXII. Mohamed Shah of Persia threatens Khiva — Mr. Thompson, the British minister, arrives at that city — He fails in his negociations — Nasseli Flores, a Neapolitan, comes to Teheran — Travels to Bokhara, and is thrown into prison there — The Naib, Abdul Samut Khan — Nasseli is put to death — Abdul Samut experiences the same fate — Reasons that led to his execution — The watchmaker, Orlando Giovanni — The Emir orders — — ig Wil pod Kabool R Mithun Khote / oo Coch / AD »/ 1 AS - J | Sandy i ho Great a ¢ oBeekaneer | De s e r ¢ | ™ | | PJessulmezer Re r re p, { NORTH WESTERN ; INDIA accompany Ferriers History of the Afgha | Tr | ’ A VM el), *KABOOL yn " te 14, uf (10d 4 ) Wp ie, “A hl, “ b ) B No : Mel Y. 4; Ly 4 7 | f : Ting w i | 5 ° Tu | : amabad® ‘ny “ | ation q | 0 | 5 5 Bulamesnl Kalabagh BN 0 0 5 J : SHA 4 . 5 | Lunneeala ( Pend Daduri X Vazeerabac &. Kangn 1H = ~~ / a Q 5 $ Seltunpooro | 4 TY = af 5 & XK [4 i sy 18) | 2 = Mandi o™ | a ” Py © Amritsar Subic’ ! / 3% EI $ Sl fat 1 | % 7 | oS 3 by ~ : Q Q & <$ £ : SL : [ L o & SN Phillous : J i A era Vv! p¥ ZN >... . 3 | ) i ° 9 3 we 4 5 “8, L (l OQ 4. Yd HE 3 3 = 0 > > “on, 8 Loodiana "my - = el ~ © oO > Poy. rirditind © PD © Strhin Dera Been Punak o : & ! Unibad hb y tialah o | | ] © ara lo nd Fatiala Y | i = | Mooltan » al > |°Batinda oe SO ; 0 » T 4 _NXO Gougjeanuh | = roll — y M ON [) Bc cr —— + / i /] sof» hazee Khan®{ ( Yen | Huurnal J i I [ rr tukanuk | | / ns CSirsuh St | fl | d Bhutneer, vi] i | = > °Bhawlpoor / J) . A pr of oKishengurh / / 0 i d)meer _oVusseerabad ! Rajgurh l } | Aumont! Ulwar | i | “\ o . Hissar Han.si Rohtuke Dadrec Q 3 BE © ; { Laswaree J &C Walker > pr i ———— a ——— —— | | HISTORY OF THE AFGHANS. A, CHAPTER 1. Origin of the Afghans — Opinion of Monsieur Ruffin, Eugene Boré, and otheys — Opinion of Afghan authors — A fghang mentioned by Tamerlane in his Insti- tutes — The probability of theip Jewish origin —Their conversion to Islamism ~— A Hebrew Bible presented to Nadir Shah by the Yoosoofzyes — Afghans of Indian and Khorassian origin — Warlike and independent under Sebek-Taghee — Aborigines of Afghanistan — Afghans in India known as Patans and Rohillas — First mentioneq as Afghans in the reign of Ahoo Seid — Classification of Afghan tribes — The author adopts that of Abdullah Khan — Persecution of the Afghans under Ghengis Khan — The Abdalees settle in the Suleiman mountains — Yoosoofzyes established in Cashmeer — Afghanistan inhabited almost exclu- sively by Abdalees and Ghildjzyes — Iist of Afghan tribes and their branches — Schism amongst them on this gy bject — Makoohees and Kh aouganees — A singular reason for taking offence — Subdivision of t he tribes and their branches, Tur origin of the Afol given rise to ga variety of opinions, and it ig any one in particular. Some pretend tha the soldiers of Alexander the Gre after he had conquered them ; and from some under the kings that succeeded that emperor, subsequently Joined these descendants of his victorious legions. Others affirm that the Copts of Egypt, the Chaldans, and even the Armenians, were their ancestors ; but the majority of Eastern ‘iters consider them to be the descendants of one of the ten tribes of Isracl—and this is the opinion of the Afghans themselves, assure us that this nation jg not of Jewi who introduced the Mahometan rel verted Jews, The following is taken from the wor talist, M. Ruffin : “The from the Albanians of Ag; revolts, were 1ans, which is involved iy obscurity, has not easy to adopt t they are descended from at, whom he left ip these countries Greek colonists who, Finally, a few authors sh origin, but that those igion amongst them were cone k of that celebrated orien- Afghans,” he says, we “had their origin a, who, in consequence of theip numerous transported from one extremity of Persia to the other, and driven into Khorassan ; they were a very warlike people, B 2 ORIGIN OF THE AFGHANS. Cuar. I. known under the name of Aghvan or Avghan, and made them- selves fawgous in: ths history of Persia. Their Albanian origin is evident by the name itself, for agvan is the Greek word HA’AB.” This opinion, which has been contradicted by several authors, merits nevertheless some attention, because it is in accordance with the custom which the Persian monarchs are supposed to have fol- lowed, viz. that of removing from the shores of the Mediterranean or the Black Sea any population that gave them the least uneasi- ness or apprehension ; also that of bestowing upon the Greeks, a considerable number of whom were at all times in the Persian armies, a certain portion of territory, where they were allowed to establish themselves, as a reward for their services. 'T he historians of Alexander have made us acquainted with one of these colonies, and we learn from them that, when that monarch advanced into Bactria in pursuit of Bessus, he destroyed the town of the Brances, the inhabitants of which, descended from Milesian Greeks, he put to death, as a punishment for a crime committed by their ancestors —a most cruel and unjust act. The opinion of M. Ruffin is in opposition to that of another oriental scholar, M. Eugene Boré, who, in his Letters on the East, thus explains himself on the subject of these Albanians :— “The Aghovans,” he remarks, “were an ancient and distinct people, first brought to our notice by Pompey at the time of his expedition into the Caucasus. The Greeks and Latins, by an inac- curate transcription of their name, called them Albanians ; they inhabited the high mountains and the valleys bordering on the Caspian Sea, which now form the provinces of Daghestan and Shirvan. The Armenians were never able to subjugate this brave people, who were governed by feudal laws similar to those which existed in Europe during the middle ages ; they were Christians before they adopted the faith of Mahomet, and it is known that they preserved their liberty up to the period of the arrival of Bouzan, general of the Sultan Seljookide Malek Shah. The lan- guage of this nation differed entirely from that of the Armenians. ‘ . + In short, we may say that the people mentioned by the Greek authors under the denomination “of Albanians cannot, on account of their peculiar language, be considered as of ( ‘haldaean origin—an opinion which is in direct contradiction to that of their historian, Moses Galganderasti, who lived about the ninth century of the Christian era, and who, with Moses of Chorenus, affirms Cuar. I, MENTIONED BY TAMERLANE. 3 that they are descended from Sisag, of the Armenian race. We hope to clear up this point after having collected from the moun- tainous district in which these pretended sons of the Aghovans lived, the remains of the language they speak. Tt is with less reason still that some of the learned, led astray by a similarity of words, have confounded the Aghovans with the Afghans, feudal tribes dispersed over the south of Persia, and who, more than any other, recall to our minds the ancient Parthians. The language of the Afghans is analogous to that of the primitive Persian, and, in the opinion of Sir William Jones, they are neither of Jewish nor Chaldzean extraction. The supposition that they were identified with the Aghovans, once formed, has led to the conclusion that they were the descendants of Jews, because the province of Kir, to which the Assyrians transported the captive tribes of Israel, ap- peared to commentators to be the country watered by the Kour, the Cyrus of the Greeks.” Some persons have with reason affirmed that Tamerlane, exas- perated at the depredations committed by the people inhabiting Mazanderan, south of the Caspian, transported the whole of them into the mountains situated between India and Persia. But they erred in supposing that from this population are descended the Afghans of our own day, for the posterity of the unfortunate people who were removed to these mountains by the Tartar conqueror form at the present time a small tribe of Eimaks, known under the appel- lation of Firooz Kohis, after the city of that name (situated about sixty-three miles from Teheran), where they were defeated and taken captive by Tamerlane : this tribe now inhabit the country between Herat and Meinana. Besides, the Tartar warrior and legislator mentions the Afghans, in his Institutes, as a nation which had for many years inhabited the Suleiman mountains, and was much “given to pillage. The Afghan authors who admit the Jewish origin of their nation thus account for the removal of their ancestors to Central Asia some declare that Afghana, who gave his name to the Afghans, was lineally descended from Abraham and Hagar by Ishmael ; others affirm that he was the grandson of Saul ; and all think that Bakht ul Nasser * must have sent some Jewish prisoners into the mountains of Gour. These prisoners would soon have considerably * Nebuchadnezzar. — ee Tr 4 CONVERSION TO ISLAMISM. Cuar, 1. increased 3 and though far from their mother-country, without doubt they would - have preserved their faith, which was kept alive by the periodical reception of letters from their countrymen who, more fortunate than themselves, had returned to the Holy Land. Matters remained in this state until Mahomet announced himself as the messenger of God. = A Jew, by name Khaled, whom he converted, wrote at this time to his brethren in Gour to give notice of this happy event, and induce them to embrace the new faith 3 but they, before adopting Islamism, sent several of their chiefs to the Prophet. Amongst these was Keis, who pretended to be descended in a direct line from Saul through forty-seven generations, and Ab raham through sixty-five. Mahomet loaded him and his companions with favours, and gave him the title of Malek * Abd-ul-reshid, a rank to which he was entitled as the descendant of the Jewish king. These Afghan ambassadors, now Mussulmans, accompanied Ma- homet in several of his wars, and distinguished themselves by many remarkable deeds of valour ; nevertheless, with the sanction of the Prophet, and after having received his benediction, they returned to their own homes, accompanied by a few Arabs, and with their assistance succeeded, in the space of forty years, in completely con- verting their countrymen to Islamism. Some authors affirm that Afghana was the son of Khaled ; others say he was contemporary with Solomon, and assert that he was one of the principal officers of that monarch. These different versions, which do not rest upon any sufficient proof, are very difficult to admit ; the Afghans, however, think that they have evidence of their Jewish origin in the following tra- dition. When Nadir Shah, marching to the conquest of India, arrived at Peshawur, the chiefs of the tribe of the Yoosoofzyes pre- sented him with a Bible written in Hebrew, and several articles that had been used in their ancient worship which they had pre- served ; these articles were at once recognised by the Jews who followed the ramp. This fact, supposing it to be one, if affording evidence sufficiently convincing to some persons, can only be con- sidered as authority with respect to the Yoosoofzyes ; but it does not follow, therefore, that other Afghan tribes are branches from the same stem; on the contrary, everything leads to the conclusion that, although they all speak a common language, the Pushtoo, * Prince, Crap. I. ABORIGINES. the tribes are not all of the same origin,~—they are distinguished by marked characteristics, moral as well as physical. The Afghans of Kabul consider themselves as Indian Afghans, whereas those of Herat say they are Khorassani Afghans; one tribe repudiates another, and denies its Afghan origin, and there js not the least sympathy between them, We may believe that, being enemies in bygone ages, their union, such as it was, progressed only by degrees, with a view of delivering themselves from slavery, and repulsing the common enemy. The names of Patan, Rohilla, Afghan, which serve at the present time to designate the Afghan nation, are really those of so many distinct races now confounded in one. If we could admit, as they do, their Jewish origin, we must also suppose that they would, on the spot to which they were transferred, have developed all the characteristics of an enslaved people, humble and degenerate ; but such js not the ‘case, for we find the Afghans from the very first, that is to say from the reign of Sebek-Taghee, courageous, and animated by a love of inde- pendence —always warlike and energetic, retiring to their moun- tain fastnesses to escape from tyranny, and leavino them whenever the smallest hope presented itself of seizing lands which they con- sidered they had any right to—it is only a primitive race who could have remained so strongly attached to the soil. No one has thought of the aboriginal people, nevertheless they must not be lost sight of, for, according to Quintus Curtius and Arrian, the Arians, Arrachosians, and others, were both numerous and brave. The conquests of Alexander did not lead to their exter- mination ; and it is very natural to suppose that their race has descended to the present day through mntermarriages, though in small proportions, with the Greeks who remained amongst them, and after- wards with the Tartar and Persian conquerors who invaded them. However, under all circumstances, there is little affinity between them and these two nations ; it is not thus with the Beloochees, with whom they have many points of resemblance, moral as well as physical. In spite of the foreign domination which has weighed upon the Afghans for so many generations, we ought to believe them when they state that their race has never mixed with any other, for in our day they make no alliances except amongst themselves ; and the Afghan who should give his daughter in mar- riage to a stranger would dishonour himself; this, however, is a remark which in a strict sense applies only to those tribes that 6 ABDULLAH KHAN’S ACCOUNT. Cuar, I. inhabit Afghanistan properly so called, for those disseminated through India connect themselves without distinction with all Mahomedan nations. The natives of India have known the Afghans for centuries under ‘the name of Patans and Rohillas,* a designation which they now apply to them ; they also call them Pushtoonees, from the language they still speak ; and it is not till the reign of the Sultan Abou- seid, of the race of Ghengis Khan, that certain Eastern writers speak of them under the name of Afghan, which is only the plural of the Arab word Jeghan.t This was applied to them because they were always in a disunited state amongst themselves, and continually addressing their complaints to the sovereigns on whom they were dependent ; nevertheless the name was but little used till the reign of Shah Abbas the Great, who, tired with their in- cessant lamentations, ordered them henceforward to be called by that designation only. There are almost as many classifications of the Afohan tribes as there are Eastern authors who have written on the subject ; not only are they not agreed, but they have called each other very hard names to prove their accuracy. Being incompetent to decide which is right, we shall adopt the opinion of Abdullah Khan of Herat as the one most deserving of credit, and we will precede it by giving his view of the mammer in which the Afghans were brought to Afghanistan. The following is a translation of his manuscript :— “The word Afghan is derived from the Arab, that of aoughan from the Persian, and both one and the other are used in Hebrew. “Malek Thalut (Saul) king of the Jews had two sons, Afohan and Djalut—the first was the father of the Afghan nation and gave his name to it. After the reigns of David and Solomon, who suc- ceeded Saul, anarchy divided the Jewish tribes, and this continued to the period at which Bouktun Nasri took Jerusalem, massacred 70,000 Jews, and after destroying that city led the surviving inhabitants captives to Babylon. Subsequently to this disaster the Afghan tribe, struck with terror, fled from Judea and settled in Arabia: here they remained scme considerable time, but as pas- turage and water were scarce, and both man and beast suffered extreme privation, some of the tribe determined to emigrate to + Noise, tumult. i Nebuchadnezzar. * Rok in Pushtoo signifies mountain, and Rokilla an inhabitant of mountains. ——— a — I - Cuar. 1. CLASSIFICATION. 7 Hindostan. The branch of the Abdalees continued to reside in Arabia, and during the caliphat of Aboo Bekr their chiefs allied themselves to a powerful sheikh, by name Khaled ibn Velid, of the tribe of Korech. The position and condition of the Abdalees was sensibly ameliorated in consequence of the assistance which they obtained from Khaled, but at the period when the Arabs subju- gated Persia the Abdalees left Arabia and settled in this new con- quest, establishing themselves in the provinces of Fars and Kerman, and here they remained until Ghengis Khan invaded those districts, The tyrannical proceedings of this conqueror weighed with such terrible effect on the population, that the Abdalees quitted Persia and, passing by the Mekrane, Scinde, and Mooltan, arrived in India; but the results of this new migration were not more for- tunate, for they were scarcely settled here when their neighbours made war upon, and forced them to leave the plains and inhabit the rugged mountains of Suleiman, considered as the cradle of the tribe, and called by them Kooh-Khasseh.* The whole Afghan nation was brought together by the arrival of the Abdalees in the Suleiman mountains, and then consisted of twenty-four tribes, of which, as it has been already observed, Afghan, the son of Saul, was the father: this prince had three sons, named Tsera- Bend, Argoutch, and Kerlen, and each of them was the father of eight sons, who gave their names to the twenty-four tribes. “The following is the manner in which they are classed :— “Sons of Tsera-Bend. Names of the Tribes. Sons of Argoutch. Abdal .. .. .. Abdalees. Names of the Tribes. Ghildj oo .. Ghildjzyes. | Yoosoof -.. .. .. Yoosoofzyes. | Kauker .. .. .. Kaukerees, Baboor.. .. .. .. Baboorees. Djumourian ., .. Djumourianees. Wezir .. .. .. .. Wezirees. | Storian .. .. .. Storianees. Lohooan .. .. .. Lohooanees. | Pen ..... +. + Penees Beritch .. .. .. Beritchees. Kass .. ., .. .. Kassees. Khooguian ., .. Khooguianees. | Takan .. .. .. Takanees. Chiran .. .. ., ., Chiranees. | Nassar, Nassarees, “Sons of Kerlen. Names of the Tribes. | Sons of Kerlen. Names of the Tribes. Khattak .. .. .. Khattakees. | 20% ..' ii ivi Yazees, Soor .. .. .. ... Soorees | Bab .. .. .. .. Babees Afreed.. .. .. .. Afreedees. | Benguech.. . Benguechees. Toor .. .. .. .. Tooress Lendeh-poor .. Lendeh-poorees. * Aden and the surrounding country as an Afghan author has stated ? I do is at the present time inhabited byan not think we should: a similarity of Arab tribe, which, as well as the prin- name and the alliance of the Afghan cipal Afghan tribe, is known by the Abdalees with the Arab tribe of Korech name of Abdalee. Are we to conclude are not sufficient proofs in the affirma- that they have one and the same origin, tive.— Ferrier, TRIBES AND THEIR BRANCHES, Cuar, 1. “The greater number of these tribes were scattered over India; but there, instead of increasing, they so diminished that scarcely a trace of any of them is to be found in these days. The only exception to this remark is the tribe of Yoosoofzyes settled in Cashmeer. Nadir Shah, desirous of ascertaining their numbers, issued a de- cree that each family should bring a spear to his camp, and when these were counted they were found to amount to 600,000 : at the present time there would not be half that number. This tribe has for more than thirty years been under the dominion of the Sikhs. Afghanistan, properly so called, is inhabited almost exclu- sively by Abdalees and Ghildjzyes, and of these we shall speak more especially. The first, although inhabiting every part of Afghanistan, are principally resident in Herat and Kandahar ; the Ghildjzyes are established in the last-mentioned principality and Kabul ; the Kaukerees near the Bolan Pass ; the Baboorees, Nassarees, Lohooanees, and Babees, in Kandahar and Scinde, where they are profitably occupied in commercial pursuits ; the Beritchees are in the neighbourhood of Pisheen ; the Chiranees and the Moh- munds to the north-east of Kabul ; the Benguechees (Shiahs) between the last-mentioned town and the country of the Hazarahs,— these are divided into four branches, viz. the Bede-kheelee, Chaloozanee, Djajee, and Bertedjee ; finally, the Chiranees are to be found every- where, though in small numbers : the remaining tribes are in India, or have become extinct. “ Having only to consider Afghanistan Proper, T will now give more detailed information respecting the Abdalees and the Ghildjzyes, which form the bulk of the population of this country ; and as the offshoots in which they are subdivided are tolerably numerous, it will be useful to give here a tabular statement, which I have endeavoured to render as accurate as possible. “The powerful tribe of the Abdalees is known at the present time under the name of Dooranee, which was given to them by Ahmed Shah Suddozye on the occasion of his ascending the throne in 1747. When Nadir Shah ordered a census to be made of the Abdalee tribe, there were 195,000 families, and from these he raised 12,000 excellent cavalry ; but the Abdalees have decreased in number since Nadir’s time. “ Abdal, the son of Tsera-Bend, the founder of this tribe, had onl y one son, named Teryn, who had two sons, Zirek and Pindjpa : from the first originated three tribes, and from the second five. Char, I. TRIBES AND THEIR BRANCHES, “The tribes that descended from Zirek are,— “1st. Koofelzye, more generally known under the name of Popolzye, divided into five branches, namely,—1st, the Hussenzalee ; 2nd, Badoozye ; 3rd, Kalenderzye ; 4th, Ayoobzye ; 5th, Suddozye. The legitimate sovereigns who have reigned over the Afghans during the 17th and 18th centuries were of the branch of the Suddozyes. The tribe of the Koofelzyes numbered 20,000 families. : “2nd. Barukyze. This was in very ancient times one of the most distinguished offshoots of the Abdalees ; it is divided into six branches— 1st, the Mohamedzye ; 2nd, Kharzye ; 3rd, Sefretzye ; 4th, Inguizye; 5th, Gurjizye ; 6th, Etchekzye. The actual sovereigns of Kandahar and Kabul are of the branch of Mo- hamedzye. The Barukzyes numbered 40,000 families. “ard. Alikiouzye, which is divided into three branches—1st, the Djaloozye, to which belonged the chiefs of the Alikiouzye tribe ; 2nd, Melazye ; 3rd, Serkanee. Yar Mohamed Khan, of Herat, is of this tribe and the Djaloozye branch. The Alikiouzyes number 20,000 families. “The tribes descended from Pindjpa are— “1st. Isakzye, numbering 10,000 families and divided into four branches, viz., 1st, Ahmedzye ; 2nd, Avazye ; 3rd, Merdinzye ; 4th, Biroozye. “2nd. Alizye, numbering 10,000 families and divided into three branches—1st, Hassanzalee, to which the chiefs of the Alizye tribe belong ; 2nd, Alekzye ; 3rd, Guerazye. “3rd. Noorzye, numbering 30,000 families and divided into three branches—1st, Tchalakzye ; 2nd, Bahaderzye ; 3rd, Derzakee. “ 4th. Khaouganee, numbering 6000 families and divided into two branches—1st, Khaouganee Kelan ; 2nd, Khaouganee Kitchik. “ 5th. Makoohee, numbering 10,000 families and divided into three branches—1st, Bedelzye ; 2nd, Firoozye ; 3rd, Sebzalee. “The tribe of the Ghildjzyes, from which sprung Mir Weis, Mir Mahmood his son, and Mir Echreff his nephew, had Ghildj, the son of Argoutch, for its founder. Ghildj bad two sons, Ibrahim and Thooran, from whom sprung the six tribes that follow, viz., Ist, Suleiman-Kheilee ; 2nd, Outekee ; 3rd, Tookhee—from this came the branch of the Loods, which gave India its sovereigns ; 4th, Khaleelee; 5th, Toorkee ; 6th, Euderee. The three first descended from Ibrahim, and the three last from Thooran. TRIBES AND THEIR BRANCHES. A TABLE of the TRIBE of the ABDALEES. Founders, Stock. Tribes. Preetem— ee———— es Branches. Hussenzalee, Badoozye. | | Suddozye. Popolzye | Kalenderzye, Ayoobzye. | ( Mohamedzye. | | Kharzye, Sefretzye, Inguizye. Gurjizye. Etchekzye, Barukzye Djaloozye. Melazye, Serkanee. | | | | Alikiouzye .. Abdal and his son Teryn , founders of ( the Tribe. Isakzye | ( Ahmedzye, | } Avaazye, {| Merdinzye, ' | Biroozye, | ( Hassanzalee, Alizye Alekzye, | | Guerazye, Tchalakzye., Bahaderzye., Derzakee, ! Khaouganee Kelan. Khaouganee Kitchik. Pindjpa Noorzye Khaouganee Bedelzye, Makoohee .. | Firoozye, Sebzalee, \ TRIBE of the GHILDJZYE, | Suleiman-Kheilee. Outekee. Tookhee, | Khaleelee. Ibrahim. ' Thooran .. | Toorkee, | | Enderee.” The primitive tribe of the Afghans was called taifeh, a word which corresponds with that of nation : the first divisions of this primitive tribe are called Jerqueh, tribe ; the subdivisions of this, tirehs or branches. Thus the families which are descended from the first generation—T'sera- Bend, Argoutch, and Kerlen—as the Abdalees, the Ghildjzyes, the Kaukerees, form the Taifeh, nation ; those which descend from these last, such as the Popolzyes, Baruk- zyes, Ibrahim, Thooran, &ec., are called Ferqgueh, tribes; and the sub- divisions of these (see the above table) are called the T'ireh, branches, T he Abdalees and Ghildjzyes, by reason of their numerical superierity over the others, and also from the power they have | ( oy LoL, | | ( . en eee ———————————————— Cuar. 1. MAKOOHEES AND KHAOUGANEES, 11 exercised, and continue to exercise, in Afghanistan at the present day, have arrogated to themselves a certain kind of supremacy over the other tribes, and consider themselves of an origin more noble than theirs: they even refuse to acknowledge their right to the title of Afghan. It is more especially the Abdalee tribe that has put forth, and in the most positive manner, this pretension. Not only do they refuse the title of Afghans—and this even to the Ghildjzyes—but also there is a schism on the subject amongst themselves, and the Zireks affirm that they are of a more noble extraction than the Pindjpas. This scornful assumption has often given rise to sanguinary conflicts between them, and is based upon the fact that the mother of Abdal was a legitimate wife, whereas the mother of Ghildj was a concubine, which is, they say, proved by the name which was given him, for Ghildj in Pushtoo signifies - bastard. On the other hand, the tribes of Makoohee and Khaouganee, though of Afghan origin, were not at the outset of the Abdalee tribe, but, by reason of the perfect friendship which always existed between them, the Abdalees adopted them and classed them amongst the Pindjpas, and they have ever since been considered as belonging to that family. After the death of Nadir Shah an occurrence took place which will give some idea of the importance the Afghans attach to their belonging to the most noble tribe. Ahmed Shah had scarcely founded the dynasty of the Suddozyes when it was nearly overthrown by an intrigue fomented against him by the Serdar Noor Mohamed Khan. Obliged to employ severe measures to repress the evil-disposed, he ordered that ten persons of each tribe taken from amongst the most guilty should be put to death. It was the first time he had shed the blood of his subjects, and the experiment was not without danger, for the Afghans talked of avenging themselves and retaliating upon the Shah and his family ; but the sovereign authority triumphed, and from that moment it was admitted by the tribes that the king had the right of shedding blood without any one having the power to question it. The Makoohees and Khaouganees had not been included in these acts of severity, on the ground that, not being Abdalees by descent, their fault was of less magnitude, and therefore it was possible to pardon them ; but these tribes, affronted at the exception, withdrew from the Shah's camp. An explanation naturally followed, and Ahmed Shah, to satisfy them, ordered ten in LARD SEB IEE. fo 7: Bn SE XU Li Sp gtr iit bE SUBDIVISION OF TRIBES. Char. I, Makoohees and ten Khaouganees to be put to death, upon which they immediately returned to their duty, for they considered them- selves vilified by the exception that had been made in their favour. Independently of the tribes and branches that we have classified, those of the Abdalees and the Ghildjzyes are again subdivided into SO great a number of tiref, or families, and there js so much con- fusion in these subdivisions, that it would be impossible for an Afghan, even the best informed upon the subject, to give a perfect list of them. There would be No exaggeration in stating their numbers at more than three hundred. T hese have been formed from time to time when the surplus population of a tribe has been obliged to separate from it and seek a fresh district, or when an influential relative of the chief had some misunderstanding with him and withdrew from his authority, with those who were attached to his own person. At other times some successful conqueror broke up a tribe, to render it less powerful ; each subdivision then took the name of the new chief whose fortunes it followed, but they always looked upon themselves as members of the original tribe, though often separated by considerable distances from each other. T hese separations are also to be attributed to the fear entertained by the sovereigns of the numerical force of some of the tribes, Shah Abbas the Great was the last who adopted this measure on a large scale ; and to secure the permanent tranquillity and stability of the populations to which he had assigned a new territory, he carried a number of hostages with him to Ispahan. The Abdalees, besides having the name of Dooranees, which they received from Ahmed Shah, are still called Suleimanees, from the mountains whence they came ; the district they then inhabited bears the appellation of Tobeh-M aharoof. Car. II, CONQUESTS OF THE COUNTRY. CHAPTER 11. Afghanistan conquered by Alexander — Reconquered by the aboriginal inhabitants — Taken by the Tartars — Death of Mansoor — Success of Sebek-Taghee — Character of the Afghans at this period — Concession of territory to the Abdalee tribe — Ghildjzyes opposed to the Tartar dominion — The first sove- reign of Afghanistan — His son Mahmood — Cruelty of the Tartar princes — Expulsion of Beiram — Khosroo Malek the last of the Ghaznevide dynasty — List of the monarchs of that race — Afghan princes of Gour — Mahmood Gouree — His conquests in India — Eldooz — Djellal Eddin — Afghanistan conquered by Ghengis Khan — Malek Kurt — Chems Eddin Gouree — Their suzerainty to the Tartars — Conquered by Tamerlane — Description of the Afghans by that invader — Afghan rule in India — Mahmood III, — Ibrahim Khan defeats Bellal and seizes Kabul and Kandahar — Mirza Baboor — Assisted by the Persians — Defeated by the Uzbeks, but successful in India — Fall of Ibrahim Khan — Death of Mirza Baboor — Succeeded by his son Humayoon — Protected by Shah Thamasp — Anecdote of the latter — Assists Humayoon with a Persian army — The Loods defeated — Their attempts to retake Delhi — The prophetess Kiemal Eddin — Shah Jehan drives out the Loods — Aurungzebe finally anni- hilates them — Kandahar ceded to Persia by Humayoon — Taken and retaken by the Persians and Moguls — Afghan deputation to Shah Abbas — Extract from Sir John Malcolm's ¢ History of Persia’— Afghans quiet under Shah Abbas — Tyranny of his grandson Shah Seffee — Kandahar taken by Shah Abbas II. in 1642 — Success of the Ghildjzyes — Their revolt suppressed by the Shah Hoosein — Gourguin Khan — Deputation of the Afghans to the Persian Court in 1706, AMONGST the conquests of Alexander the Great was that of Af- ghanistan, and at the death of this invader his lieutenant, Seleucus, succeeded to the sovereignty of the greater portion of his dominions in Asia. It is presumed that his son and grandson followed him ; but history does not inform us how or why, under the reign of the last-mentioned monarch, Afchanistan was taken from the Seleukides by the aboriginal chiefs, and soon formed, with Bactria, an inde- pendent state, which existed with some degree of splendour during one hundred and fifty years. After the lapse of that period the Tartars made themselves masters of the country, and appear to have held possession of it up-to the tenth century. This blank remains in profound obscurity, and it is only from about the year A.D. Y97 that we have any information which can elucidate the history of the Afghans, At that time Mansoor reigned in Tartary, and when he died an officer of rank, named Sebek-Taghee, threw off the allegiance 14 SEBEK-TAGHEE. Cuar, II. he owed to his successor, established his dominion over all the southern part of Afghanistan, and made Ghuznee his capital. The Afghan tribes at this period were for the most part a nomade and barbarous people, living by plunder and rapine, and under a host of chiefs very careful of their independence, who were almost always at enmity with each other, and ready to sell their services to the highest bidder. Thence it often happened that a part of the nation was to be found in one camp, while another was opposed to it in that of the enemies, and, like true Condottieri, they fought against one another without the least scruple. The disunion existing amongst the Afghan tribes in the present day may be traced back to the most remote times, and it is not surprising that with this sentiment they have so long delayed to organize them- selves as a nation. Their migratory habits also contributed to this result, and they were for a long time a wild race dispersed over Persia, India, and the mountains of Afghanistan, but every- where and at all periods turbulent and difficult to govern, adapting themselves very little to the habits of those of a different origin within whose territory they established themselves. The consequence was, that on very many occasions quarrels arose in which many of the tribes were decimated without pity, while the remainder were obliged to seek refuge in the mountains where they are to be met with in the present day. The tribe of the Abdalees, the most powerful now existing, did not fix itself in the Suleiman range till it had received authority to do so from Sebek-Taghee, who was desirous of recompensing them by this concession of territory for the support they had afforded him in his Indian eampaigns. The Ghildjzyes, on the contrary, were always strongly opposed to the Tartar dominion over their country, which was so much the more dangerous for them, because their tribe was at that time exceedingly numerous. They carried their malpractices to such an extent, that Mahmood, son of Sebek-Taghee, who succeeded him on the throne of Ghuznee, was obliged almost entirely to exterminate them. But succeeding centuries have enabled the Ghildjzyes to recover from this disaster, and the tribe is now, next to that of the Abdalees, the most numerous and the most powerful in Afghanistan. Sebek-Taghee may be considered as the first sovereign who ruled over Afghanistan properly so called ; hit the Afghans, in conse- quence of his Tartar origin, looked upon him and his descendants Cuar. II. CRUELTY OF TARTARS, 15 as tyrants and usurpers, and thought little of his good deeds and the benefits he conferred upon them. Mahmood, after the death of his father, carried his arms into Persia and India, and with the spoils of war obtained in these countries enriched Afghanistan, and made Ghuznee, his capital, one of the most beautiful cities in Asia. His death took place in 1028. His de- scendants, little worthy of succeeding him, soon lost the territory which he had added to the kingdom founded by Sebek-Taghee ; their dominion was soon reduced to the Afghan provinces, in which their authority was not always respected ; and if they preserved these during two centuries, they owed this circumstance much more to the difficulties in which their neighbours were involved than to any fear they entertained of the Tartar dynasty. Beiram, one of these princes, seized upon an Afghan chief, of the name of Sooree, who about the year 1151 commanded in the province of Gour, and put him to a cruel death to punish him for the resolution with which he had opposed him. The barbarity of the Tartar prince on this occasion exceeded anything that can be imagined ; he made him suffer a thousand tortures, and insulted him by every species of outrage. Allah-Eddin, brother of this unfortunate Afghan and his successor in the sovereignty of Gour, determined to revenge himself by force of arms, and completely succeeded. He seized the town of Ghuznee, abandoned it during seven days to the fury and excesses of an army burning with vengeance and possessed with an inherent pas- sion for plunder, and who carried the spirit of a savage tempernment so far as to mix the blood of the vanquished with the mortar des- tined to repair the walls of the city. Beiram, thus vanquished, retired beyond the Indus, and con- tinued to reign in the Punjab, abandoning the western provinces of his kingdom to his victorious adversary. War was declared on several other occasions between these two princes, when Beiram was less unfortunate, and his son Khosroo Shah inherited the reduced territory he had preserved ; but the dynasty of the Ghaznevides was brought to a close during the lifetime of his grandson Khosroo Malek. Attacked in 1160 by Mahmood Gouree, cousin and successor of Allah Eddin, Khosroo Malek was overthrown, and his kingdom annexed to that of Afghanistan. The following is a list of the Ghaznevide princes who reigned over the last-mentioned country :— L Res a By is u A 16 AFGHAN PRINCES OF GOUR. Cuar, II. A.D. Hejira, | A.D, Hejira. Sebek-Taghee .. 976 .... 365 Al. inh oho F020 ad) Ysmbll 4... 907... B8y Abd-ul-Reschid ., 1052 “143 Mahmood or SOOT 000 00 Ferakh-zad .. .. 1053 .. . 444 Mohamed .. .. 2030 ..;. 421 Yorahim. .. .. .. 1059 .... 450 Massood .. .. .. 1031 .... 429 Massood .. .. ., 1098 .. .. 492 Madood .. ".. .. 1041 , . 433 Arselane Shah .. 1104 .. .. 508 Massood .. .. .. 1040... <4] Beiram Shah .., .. 1108 eras B12 The Afghan princes of Gour, from being simple chiefs of a small principality, were thus raised to the sovereign power in Afghanistan, to which they soon added divers principalities of India. Gour is a little province, well situated for defence, and in the heart of the most rugged mountains of the Paropamisus, but possessing none of those means of aggression which could enable the Afghans to hope for victory against one so powerful as that of Ghuznee. Tt may be supposed that Allah Eddin found a ready support in the other tribes of his nation, who submitted with regret to the dominion of the Tartars. The humiliation which the Afghans experienced in being treated as a conquered people, added to their feelings of nationality, must have excited heroic sentiments in their breasts, and made them triumph over the foreign race that oppressed them. Mahmood Gouree carried his arms into the interior of India and seized Benares, in which city he committed a thousand atrocities. This prince left no heirs, and died in 1205. His empire, in accordance with his desire, was divided between his favourites and his freedmen. Afghanistan proper fell to Eldooz, but he was soon despoiled of it by a prince of Kharism, whose successor, Djellal Eddin, was in like manner obliged to retire before the victorious armies of Ghengis Khan. Ferishteh informs us that the descendants of this conqueror were in possession of Afghanistan up to the year 1251—the period at which an Afghan or Patan King, which is synonymous, seized upon Ghuznee and Kabul, and annexed them to the Indian empire. Less than a century later a new dynasty, which western authors mention under the name of Malek Kurt,* established itself in the province of Gour and extended its dominion over Kandahar and Herat from a.p. 1336 (Hejira 736) to A.n. 1383 (Hejira 735). The first sovereign of this dynasty, Chems-Eddin Gouree, * The word Kwrt is a corruption of dynasty was of the Afghan race. — the word GGour, which, united with that Ferrier, of Malek, signifies Prince of Gour. This Cnar, 11, AFGHAN RULE IN INDIA. 17 nevertheless, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Tartar monarchs ; this was the case also with his sons and successors, Rookn-Eddin and Fakhr-Eddin, but the third, Ghyaz-Eddin, threw off the vassal- age which had been laid upon him by the descendants of Ghengis Khan. Chems-Eddin, Malek Hafez, Moez Eddin Hoosein, and Malek Bagher, who succeeded him, preserved their independence ; nevertheless the latter claimed the support of the Tartars to main- tain him in the position he had usurped ; but his reign was of brief duration, for his brother Moez-Eddin overthrew him, and left the reins of power to his son Ghyaz-Eddin, the ninth and last sove- reign of this dynasty. This prince was made prisoner by the Emir Tamerlane, who seized his territory as well as that of Ghuznee and Kabul. Tamerlane speaks of the Afghans in his Institutes as a barbarous people, devoted to pillage, and by no means so far advanced in civilization as the Tartars; but he limits the country they then occupied to the Suleiman mountains, from which we are left to conclude that he understood by the name Afghan or Aoughan only the tribe of the Abdalees, who, since the days of Sebek-Taghee, were in possession of the country mentioned in the Institutes. This circumstance is therefore confirmatory of the opinion we have already set forth on the uncertainty of the origin of the Afghans. From the conquest of Afghanistan by Tamerlane up to the com- mencement of the sixteenth century the information respecting them is exceedingly vague, and yet this epoch ought to have been one of the most honourable in the annals of Afghan history ; but a portion of the facts which relate to it occurred in India, and beyond the ter- ritory the history of which we are endeavouring to sketch : we shall therefore pass on very rapidly, and only have recourse to the manu- script from which we have already given some passages. The Afghan rule in India commenced at the death of Mahmood Gouree, which took place in 1205; thus, as we have already stated above, the dominions of this Mahmood were, for want of a direct heir, divided between his favourites and freedmen. The Indian provinces fell to Koutoob, one of his generals of the Afghan tribe of Lood. This tribe, seeing its chief the sovereign of a vast empire, with Delhi for its capital, left Afghanistan and settled themselves in India, where, protected and favoured by the monarch, they increased rapidly. Accustomed from their infancy to a life spent in camps, and of rude and simple habits, g Ah SAGE ER SSS — —p BERETA 18 AFGHAN RULE IN INDIA. Cuar, 11, they with little difficulty obtained an ascendancy over the natives of India, and the fear with which they inspired them resulted in their accepting with resignation the yoke of the Afghan dynasty. This dynasty still held possession of that country in 1398, when Tamerlane conquered it. Mahmood III. was then on the throne, and the invader allowed him to retain the supreme power as a recompense for the assistance which he gave him during those bloody massacres that obtained for him the title of the destroyer of humanity. Mahmood III. died in 1450, a period at which an Afghan lord, also of the tribe of Lood, named Bellal, overthrew the reigning family. This new sovereign made Agra his capital. During his reign the empire was a prey to continual agitation; the revolts amongst the Loods were incessant, and Bellal was at length driven out and succeeded by Ibrahim Khan, another Afghan chief of the same tribe, who subdued each of his competitors in turn; he in- vaded successively Kandahar and Kabul, meeting with scarcely any resistance, favoured as he was by the Afghan tribes. Suc- cesses so easily obtained increased his ambition, and he resolved to march upon the Tartar kingdom of Ferghana, already attacked in the rear by Chahee Beg, king of Bokhara, with whom he concluded a treaty offensive and defensive, stipulating that the conquered countries should be divided between them. Mirza Baboor, of the tribe of Gurkani, and fifth in descent from Tamerlane,* was at this time sovereign of Ferghana, who, already despoiled of some of the best parts of his territory by Chahee Beg, and menaced on the south by Ibrahim Khan, despaired of being able to resist this combination of his enemies, fled from his kingdom, and placed himself under the protection of the King of Persia. This took place in the year 1498 (Hejira 904). Shah Ismael Seffavye re- ceived him in the most gracious manner, and soon after gave him a force of 20,000 horsemen, commanded by Mir Nadjm, with which to recover his kingdom. Mirza Baboor also took the field, and commenced operations against the Uzbeks; but he had scarcely laid siege to Bokhara when the inhabitants, reinforced by the troops which Ibrahim Khan had sent to his support, attacked the Persians during the night, routed them, and killed their leader, Mir Nadjm. This occurred in 1505 (Hejira 911). * He was the son of Omar Sheikh, was the son of Miranshih, who was who was the son of Aboo Seid, who the son of Tamerlane.— Ferrier. Cuap. 11. ; MIRZA BABOOR. 19 After this disaster Mirza Baboor retreated by the way of Balkh, the road to which city remained open: he was fortunate enough to be able to take Kabul, and within a brief space he had made numerous partisans in that country, which he entirely sub- dued. In 1508 (Hejira 913) he seized upon Kandahar, and not long after the Punjab. The natives of India, seeing his suc- cess, wrote to him in 1511 (Hejira 916), and besought his assistance in throwing off the tyranny of Ibrahim Khan, promising to act with vigour the moment he should appear at the head of his army. This request consorted with the projects of vengeance that Mirza Baboor cherished against Ibrahim Khan, and he accepted it with readiness. He marched, therefore, against that monarch in 1525, defeated him, and took possession of the whole of the Indian territories of which Ibrahim had usurped the sovereignty. After this brief description of the transient power which the Afghans possessed in this part of India, the manuscript of Ab- dullah Khan of Herat proceeds thus. The natives of India had little reason to congratulate themselves in having requested another monarch to come and govern them, for Mirza Baboor oppressed and plundered, and made them almost regret Ibrahim Khan the Lood. At the death of Mirza Baboor, sovereign of India and Afghan- istan, which took place in 1530 (Hejira 937), his eldest son suc- ceeded to all his dominions, but his brother Kamran, and his vizier Shere Khan, an Afghan of the tribe of Lood, revolted against him, and, assisted by those devoted to their interests, obliged him to fly; the Persians, on the other hand, had some time before attacked Kandahar and taken it from the Moguls. Notwithstanding this act of hostility, Humayoon did as his father had done—he retired to the court of Persia and sought the pro- tection of the Shah Thamasp. This monarch, having been in- formed that the fugitive prince was approaching his territory, sent an order to the governor of Herat to receive him with every mark of respect, and to escort him to Kasbeen, the capital, in a manner worthy of his rank and with a splendour truly regal. After their meeting the two monarchs felt a lively interest in each other. The Shah Thamasp not only acceded to the wishes of his royal guest, but did everything in his power to anticipate them, as the follow- ing anecdote will show :— Humayoon, walking one day in the streets of Kasbeen, came to a c2 20 HUMAYOON. Cuar. IT. canal, the clear and limpid waters of which ran with a rapid course between banks covered with flowers and verdure ; the spot pleased him greatly, and turning to one of his officers he said, “If I had the means of doing so, I would here build a magnificent mosque.” A Persian nobleman who heard these words repeated them to the Shah Thamasp, who swore that the wish of Humayoon should not remain ungratified, and his architect, having been called into his presence, was ordered to construct a magnificent mosque, and within the space of six months, upon the site indicated by the exiled prince. He also forbade any of his servants from men- tioning the circumstance, and gave strict injunctions that Humayoon should never be permitted to walk near the spot until the edifice was completed. In six months the beautiful mosque was finished, and the name of the Shah’s guest inscribed over the portal in the facade as having been the founder. Humayoon, to whom no intimation on the subject had been given, was conducted to it. His astonishment on seeing it was great indeed, and his gratitude to the Shah Thamasp for this delicate mark of his friendship not less. Subsequently the Shah gave him further proofs of his attach- ment ; indeed he was prodigal of them. Humayoon, nevertheless, became at length sensible that the state of his affairs in India would never improve if he continued to pass his time amidst the festivities of the court at Kasbeen ; he therefore begged the Shah to give him some troops with which he might hope to regain his crown and punish the usurpers of his throne. The King of Persia received this new request as he had done every other, and placed 12,000 cavalry, commanded by Beyram Khan, at his disposal. This officer had resided many years in India, was well acquainted with the habits and feelings of the people of that country, and the Shah charged him to re-establish Humayoon in all his rights. The march of this army upon Delhi was soon known, and the Loods at once made every preparation for defence, but in vain. Humayoon had scarcely arrived at Kabul when his Indian subjects revolted against Shere Khan, and after having killed a large proportion of his Afghans obliged him to fly from the country. On hearing this Humayoon travelled night and day to reach his dominions, leaving Beyram Khan and his Persians, with a crowd of Tartars and Parsivans that soon joined him, to follow. This numerous and well-trained army was broken into divisions on its arrival in India, and Humayoon sent them in various directions Car. IL. A LOOD PROPHETESS. 21 with orders to massacre the Afghan Loods wherever they were met with and not leave one alive. These instructions were rigorously executed, and those who were fortunate enough to escape were reduced to a pitiable condition; but when they recovered from the terror into which they had been thrown, they showed themselves in arms at various points and again threatened the Emperor of the Moguls. Nevertheless they did not attempt any- thing in the lifetime of Humayoon, but after his death, which took place in 1535, and in the reign of his son Mohamed Akim Mirza, surnamed Djellal Eddin Akbar, Roouchen Bayazid, one of the chiefs of the Loods, who passed amongst them as inspired, in short almost a prophet, united the scattered warriors of the tribe, placed himself at their head, and declared his preten- sions to the throne of Delhi. Tor several years he kept up a desultory warfare against the Moguls, but without obtaining any positive result, for death surprised him in the midst of it. His son, Omar Sheikh Kiemal Eddin, continued the strife, and owed the success which he obtained, as his father had done, to the co-operation of the Prince Noor Eddin Jehanghir, second son of Humayoon, who had also raised the standard of revolt against Akbar. The Loods continued to carry on this party warfare for a considerable time, but without being able to grasp a second time the Indian sceptre, for the Moguls were too powerful. After the death of Omar Sheikh Kiemal Eddin, a young maiden of the tribe of Lood, named Kiemal Khatoon, endeavoured to create a schism in the Mahomedan religion as professed by the Afghans, the Moguls, and a few Indian tribes; her preaching and that of her disciples was the cause of great commotions in the empire : the Loods, who were always at the head of every disturbance, suffered new misfortunes, and fresh massacres considerably reduced their numbers. These troubles were rife up to the commencement of the reign of Shah Abedin Mohamed Shah, surnamed Shah Jehan, who again persecuted the Afghan Loods, and in 1632 (Hejira 1042) drove them out of India, but the revolts, which had been excited by this religious schism, were not thoroughly put down until the close of the reign of Aurungzebe, who succeeded him. From this period the Lood tribe ceased to have any influence in India ; they made no further attempts to obtain power ; and we shall in future become further acquainted with their history in that of Afghanistan Proper. Mirza Baboor, the founder of the dynasty-of the Moguls, was 2 fos il aaa x re ————— on Ee ———————————— i 2 22 EMBASSY TO SHAH ABBAS. Cuar. II. enabled to hold possession of Kabul, which he left to his successors ; but he lost Kandahar, and this as well as the principalities of Herat and Gour fell into the hands of the Persians. Subsequently, how- ever, he retook Kandahar, against which he sent his son Kamran Mirza, but soon after it was again in the power of the Shah Thamasp. Seffavye Humayoon, the successor to Baboor, seized upon it once more, but, to mark his gratitude for the services which he had received from the Shah of Persia, he ceded it to him by treaty in 1545; it continued in the possession of Persia during the lifetime of Humayoon, after which his son Akbar retook it. It fell, how- ever, in 1609 (Hejira 1018), into the hands of the great Shah Abbas Seffavye, but only to revert to the Emperor Jehangir, who carried Kandahar by assault. This was the last time but one that the Moguls were enabled to take this fortress, the advantageous position of which on the frontiers of the two states made them dispute its possession with so much tenacity against the Persians. The contest for it was again renewed in 1620 by Shah Abbas, and the efforts which Aurungzebe made to retake it at a later period completely failed. The officers appointed by the Persian monarch to govern Kandahar so oppressed the Afghans that they sent two of their principal Serdars to the Shah to obtain a relaxation of the rigorous measures to which they were subjected, and requested that the governor might henceforth be chosen from the chiefs of the Afghan tribes, promising that their fidelity should be proof against every tempta- tion. The following are the terms in which Sir John Malcolm, in his excellent work on Persia, speaks of this embassy ; the informa- tion is taken from the Persian manuscript of Mirza Syud Mohamed of Ispahan :— “In the time of the Saffavean kings of Persia the Affghans were often oppressed ; and on one occasion they were so discontented with their Persian governor, that they sent a secret deputation to Ispahan to solicit his removal and the appointment of one of their own tribe. Their request was granted ; and two of the tribe of Abdallee were raised to the office of Reish Saffeed, or Kutkhodah of the tribes, and their authority was confirmed by a royal patent. The name of one of these two persons was Seedoo, of the family of Bameeyehi, from whom Ahmed Shah, the founder of the present royal family of Cabul, is lineally descended. The name of the other was Ahmed, of the family of Bareekzehi, from whom the present Affghan chiefs, Serafray Khan and Futteh Khan, are Cuar. II. AFGHANS UNDER SHAH ABBAS. 23 descended. The Affghans were delighted with this arrangement, and granted their entire and respectful obedience to the chief appointed by the Persian Government. Time has confirmed this respect ; and the superiority of the chiefs so selected has become an inheritance to their family. The race of Seedoo obtained sovereignty, while that of Ahmed has only gained high station and command. The Seedoozehis (or descendants of Seedoo) are held in such venera- tion, that, if one of them was to attempt the murder of an ameer, or lord of another tribe, it would be considered wrong to obtain safety by assaulting the Seedoozehis. If an Affghan acted other- wise he would be deemed an outcast in his own class or tribe. There is, however, an exception to this rule in favour of the descendants of Ahmed, and the Ahmedzehis may without sacrilege slay a Seedoozehi ; but a great number of the Affghans deny this privilege, even to the Ahmedzehis. Seedoo and Ahmed (this author adds) were raised to rank by Shah Abbas the Great, and derived their fortunes from that fountain of dignity and splendour.” This respect for the Suddozyes amongst the Afghans has dis- appeared in our days; and since they have been dispossessed of the throne, not only those who belonged to this branch, but also all the members of the tribe of Popolzye, from which it was derived, are persecuted and often plundered by the Mohamedzyes actually in power. So long as Shah Abbas lived the Afghans settled in Herat and Kandahar remained perfectly tranquil under his dominion; but a Persian governor, appointed by his grandson and successor Shah Seffee, having maltreated them, they revolted. This sovereign managed to keep the Heratees in check, but his governor in Kan- dahar, a traitor to his duty, passed over to the camp of the Mogul Emperor with the Persian troops under his orders, and gave up the fortress to the Shah in 1634. Kandahar was taken from the Moguls by the Persians in 1642, during the reign of Shah Abbas the Second. The conquerors of Delhi subsequently made every effort, but in vain, to recapture the city, and were obliged te remain satisfied with the possession of Kabul, which had belonged to them from the time of Baber. The Persians retained Herat and Kandahar in spite of the adverse feeling of the Afghans, who were always more anxious to be under the dominion of the Great Mogul, which they considered less bur- densome than that of the Persians. 24 DEPUTATION TO PERSIAN COURT. Caar. II. The Afghans of the tribe of Ghildjzyes, dispersed over the pro- vince of Kandahar, were, however, the most restless and the most constant enemies of Persia, so that, towards the close of the seven- teenth century, they had pretty nearly rendered themselves masters of the principality. In 1698, a little before his accession to the throne, the Shah, Sultan Hoosein, felt that it was absolutely necessary that they should be put down, and with a view to effect this object he selected as their governor the Walee of Georgia, Gourguin Khan, sur- named Shah Nawaz Khan, a clever and energetic man, and sent with him a well-appointed and numerous army, and instructions to take severe measures with the Afghans. Shah Nawaz Khan arrived at Kandahar in 1702, and treated the Afghans without pity, as a conquered but rebellious people ; nothing could escape his inflexible and harsh proceedings—neither rank, age, nor sex was any protection ; his troops, surfeited with pte: and pillage, reduced the women and girls to a state of slavery, and made them the unhappy victims of their base violence. The Afghans, bewildered and alarmed at this state of things, sent a deputation to Ispahan, in 1706, to entreat the King to put a stop to the calamities which weighed upon them ; but this embassy did not succeed as a similar one had done in the reign of Shah Abbas, for their delegates were received with haughty and harsh indifference ; and the individuals who composed the deputation re- turned to their countrymen to share with them the despair they also fel . Disappointed in their hopes, the Afghans could not dream of emancipating themselves by force of arms from the heavy yoke of Gourguin Khan, for his vigilance was equal to his severity ; flight being impossible and complaint useless, and seeing no other mode by Which they could put a stop to the cruelties that were practised upon er they awaited in silence, and bowed down with grief, the moment when they should be able to take vengeance upon their oppressors for so many outrages; and this was not far distant, for an act on the part of Gourguin Khan soon presented them with an opportunity. Cuar. III. ARREST OF MIR WEIS. CHAPTER III The Kelauter of Kandahar is sent prisoner to Ispahan — His intrigues against Gourguin Khan — He makes a pilgrimage to Mecca — Obtains a fetvo from the chief mollah of Islam — Returns to Ispahan, and finally to Kandahar — Indig- nation of Gourguin Khan — Events consequent upon this — Opinion of Abdullah Khan upon them — Death of Gourguin Khan — Mir Weis enters Kandahar — Statement of Mirza Mehdee — The Ghildjzyes declare their independence, and exterminate the Persian troops — The tribe of the Abdalees establish them- selves in Herat — The Persian generals attack the Kelauter and are beaten — Kaee Khosroo Khan besieges Kandahar — He is defeated and killed with 30,000 of his troops — Mohamed Roostem succeeds him, but is also beaten — The Afghans acknowledge Mir Weis as their sovereign chief — Death of the Mir in 1715 — His brother Mir Abdullah succeeds him — His negotiations with Persia — Is put to death by the eldest son of Mir Weis, who succeeds him — Alayar Khan, Governor of Herat — Zeman Khan appointed by the Persian monarch to succeed him — Heyat Sultan — He marches against Kandahar — Attacked by Assad Ullah and defeated — Enters Herat — Persian campaign against the Uzbeks — Sefi Kooli Khan — Is defeated by the Afghans — Independence of the Afghans established — Assad Ullah lays siege to Furrah — Is attacked by Mir Mahmood of Kandahar — A Belooch chief, Mir Mohamed, seizes Herat. Amongst the Afghan nobles who had signed the petition to the Shah against Novi az Khan was Mir Weis, ie Kelauter * of Kan- dahar, and chief of a branch of the ile of Ghildjzyes. This Sore had, by his amiable manners, liberality, persuasive powers, and great intelligence, made himself much beloved by his countrymen. Gourguin Khan feared him, and knew that he was the principal instigator of the hatred which the Afghans bore him ; he therefore ordered the Kelauter to be arrested, under the pretext that he was conspiring against the government, and sent him, with several other rich Sefid t Afghans, to Ispahan, there to explain his conduct to the Shah. Mir Weis did not on this occasion belie his reputation for ability- On his arrival at the court of the Seffavyes, he at once perceived the corruption which reigned on all sides; and scattering a little gold about him, he endeavoured to turn his captivity to account. In a * The duties of kelauter in Persia are his other functions to superintend the not exactly defined. In different towns administration of the police, but with they are more or less important: but very extensive powers.— Ferrier. in the case of Mir Weis, at Kandahar, + Literally white beard, but in this the office must have been Governor in instance eminent,.— Ferrier. chief, And he had probably amongst ee ——— a —n 26 PILGRIMAGE OF MIR WEIS. Cuar. III. solemn audience granted him by the King he succeeded in obtain- ing from the sovereign an acknowledgment that he was innocent of the accusations which had been brought against him; and such was his tact, and the ductile character of his mind, that in the course of a few days he became one of the principal favourites of Shah Sultan Hoosein, and the friend of all the great nobles of his court. Assured of having for the future an influence over the degraded courtiers of the Persian King, the views of Mir Weis took a wider range than they had hitherto done, for he concluded that a country thus delivered up to men so worthless and corrupt might become an easy conquest if attacked by some brave men well led. Strong in the power of his own genius, he deeply reflected upon the mode in which he might carry out so gigantic an enterprise as an inva- sion of Persia; and, to give himself the best chance of success, he determined to work upon his countrymen by that most powerful of agents, fanaticism. Instead of evincing a desire to return to his country, he solicited and obtained the Shah’s permission to under- take a pilgrimage to Mecca, and also his consent that the rich sefids who had accompanied him should return to Kandahar; but before they left Ispahan he instructed them secretly to prepare the Afghans for revolt. A few days after their departure Mir Weis was on his way to the Holy City, where, having enlisted the sympathies of the chief mollahs of Islam, who, like the Afghans, were Soonees, he found no difficulty in obtaining from them a JSetvo, m which they declared that his countrymen were bound by every means in their power to throw off the thraldom of the Shiah heretics. Mir Weis returned to Ispahan as soon as he had performed his pilgrimage, and occupied himself in carrying out the intrigue which, with no little ingenuity, he had set on foot before his de- parture. Like all Persian nobles in high situations, Gourguin Khan had enemies at court anxious for his downfall, as much from jealousy as in the hope of succeeding to the government of Kandahar, or replacing him by one of their own creatures. Amongst these enemies was the vizier of Shah Sultan Hoosein, who could not forgive Gourguin Khan and his nephew, the Sipahee Salar Kaece Khosroo Khan, the estimation in which they were held by the Shah, and the influence which they had always employed against him. Mir Weis, with considerable penetration, saw that this = Cuavr, III, HIS RETURN TO KANDAHAR. 27 personage intended to compass the ruin of both uncle and nephew by prejudicing the mind of the Shah against them whenever an occasion should present itself; he made, therefore, secret advances to the Vizier with the hope of inducing him to associate himself in his design. The Vizier, well convinced of the bad feeling which the Afghan chief entertained against Shah Nawaz Khan, and believing him to be entirely devoted to the interests of the Shah, entered into his views, and became one of Mir Weis’s warmest protectors. In order the more rapidly to bring about the fall of Gourguin, the Vizier made every effort to support the Af- ghan chief against him, and solicited the Shah’s permission for Mir Weis to return to Kandahar. This feeble prince had been persuaded that Gourguin Khan and his nephew, secretly sup- ported by the Tzar of Russia, wished to raise the standard of revolt in Georgia, and declare themselves independent. This was sufficient to induce the Shah to give Mir Weis permission to return to his native city, with orders to resume the important func- tions of Kelauter, satisfied that his fidelity and vigilance would enable him to penetrate the real sentiments of Gourguin, and at the same time serve as a counterpoise to his power, which had con- siderably increased, and given rise to some apprehensions. Mir Weis, well assured that every one would be in his favour, returned to Kandahar by Kerman and the Seistan, observing attentively on his journey the state of things in each locality. On his arrival he saw that the power and tyranny of Gourguin Khan had attained their utmost limits, and thought that his adversary might refuse to recognise the firman which conferred on him the functions of Ke- lauter. But the Governor, though indignant at his return, con- formed to the orders of his sovereign, and reinstated the Mir in his post. Nevertheless, to humiliate him in the eyes of the people, and to prove that he himself was absolute in his own govern- ment, he ordered him to send one of his daughters, a girl of great personal beauty, to his harem without delay—his intention being not to make her his wife, but his concubine.* The Afghans, in- formed of the affront which had been put upon their chief, and eager * The manuscript of Abdullah Khan ~~ Mir, with whose talents and influence is here at variance with that of Mirza he was well acquainted, and that he Ali Mohamed, whose account of the wished by means of this marriage to transaction I have followed. Abdullah put an end to the differences that Khan states that Gourguin Khan was existed between himself and that chief. really desirous of an alliance with the — Ferrier, Es EE —_—_——.HH >bi]}J MURDER OF GOURGUIN KHAN. Cuar. 111. to avenge it, rushed immediately to arms; but Mir Weis, secretly assembling the principal chiefs, arrested their ardour, and they decided upon temporising in order that they might take measures which should better ensure the success of their plans. “The time which must prove our courage,” said he to them, «is arrived, but the prudence of the serpent that watches overcomes the strenoth of the lion who permits himself to slumber; we must conceal our swords in a bed of roses, and those who have sufficient faith in me to place their destiny in my hands may be convinced that the most profound secresy is the first condition of success.” After this conference Mir Weis affected to submit to the go- vernor’s wishes ; but instead of sending him his own daughter, he substituted one of his slaves, also a very beautiful girl, who, dressed _1n the richest attire, was conducted in great state to the harem of the Shah Nawaz Khan. Not less animated than Mir Weis against the oppressors of her country, his slave accepted, and with delight, the part she was called upon to perform. Gourguin Khan, not in the least suspecting the plot, believed the Afohan was really de- sirous of forgetting the past and being on friendly terms with him for the future ; he therefore trusted him implicitly. Mir Weis profited by the favour which he now enjoyed with the governor to bring about his fall with greater certainty ; at the same time he secured the co-operation of the officers of the palace, and excited the turbulent Abdalee and Kaukeree tribes to commence a revolt, which soon spread its ramifications over all the southern part of the province of Kandahar. This rising occasioned Gourguin so much anxiety, that he decided on sending his best Georgian troops to put it down, and retained only twelve or fifteen hundred men near him to defend the citadel. Mir Weis took advantage of the absence of these troops to put the projects he had so long meditated into execution, and sent Shah Nawaz an invitation to a feast which he had prepared at one of his country houses, situated about half an hours ride from the city. This he accepted, and without suspicion, and such was the security felt by Gourguin after he had arrived there, that he quaffed immoderate quantities of wine during the repast, and with his suite, who had indulged to an equal extent in their libations, even- tually fell asleep. Everything, in short, worked well for Mir Weis ; the conspirators slaughtered all the inebriated sleepers, after which the Kelauter dressed himself in the robes of Gourguin, Cuar. III. DESTRUCTION OF GEORGIAN TROOPS. 29 TSE bs and ordered the Afghans in his own service to put on those of the Georgians who had accompanied their Walee. Thus dis- guised, they returned to Kandahar in the middle of the night, put to death the Persian troops on guard at the gate, and entered the city without being recognised. The insurgents, at first but few in number, were soon reinforced by the Afghans from the environs, who had previously been prepared for the movement, and the Per- sian garrison was so completely exterminated, that not one soldier was left alive. Mirza Mehdee, a Persian, and author of the ¢ Life of Nadir Shah,” gives a different account of the death of Nawaz Khan. He states that the governor had quitted Kandahar to chastise some rebels of the Kaukeree tribe, when Mir Weis arrived, who fell upon the Georgian Walee at Dehchir, defeated and took him prisoner, and subsequently put him to death by the hands of Murad Khan, a low Afghan. This statement seems, however, to be inaccurate. The natives of different countries residing at Kandahar were at that time at variance with each other, and, after this tragedy was over, Mir Weis assembled them together with a view to their recon- ciliation. In his usual persuasive style of eloquence he showed them the advantages they might obtain from the liberty which had thus been given them, and invited them to form that bond of union which alone could emancipate them, and for ever, from the Persian yoke. He then drew forth the fetvo he had obtained from the chief mollahs at Mecca, which had an irresistible effect upon the feelings of this fanatical people, whose warlike instincts, having been power- fully excited, required only to be cleverly directed. They were not long in deciding what course to take, and swore that they would obey the Mir, inviolably attach themselves to his fortunes, and respect his person. Three days after this unlooked-for event, the Georgians who had been despatched against the rebels in the south, and succeeded in their mission, arrived under the walls of Kandahar. Here they were suddenly attacked by five thousand Afghan horse, com- manded by Mir Weis; and though they fought with a heroism worthy of a better cause, they were unable to stand the unexpected shock or make good their retreat: only eighteen escaped and re- turned with the disastrous intelligence to Persia. Such is the account given by Mirza Ali Mohamed, from whom Abdullah Khan again differs. The latter states “that Gourguin Khan himself 30 ABDALEES ESTABLISHED IN HERAT. Cuar. 111. marched at the head of his troops against the Abdalees and Kau- kerees, who had taken up a position about twenty leagues from Kandahar, and, refusing to pay the taxes, massacred without pity every Persian they came in contact with. Gourguin Khan was scarcely ten miles from the city, when Mir Weis, having quickly assembled the principal chiefs and all the fighting men of the Ab- dalee, Ghildjzye, and Kaukeree tribes then in Kandahar, followed rapidly in the rear of Gourguin Khan. It was the habit of the governor and his Georgians to get drunk regularly every day after sunset, and no precautions were ever taken to guard a camp in which every one was plunged in debauch. Mir Weis knew this, and fell upon them during the night : it was a massacre rather than a combat, for the Shah Nawaz and his troops were put to death almost without resistance. After this coup-de-main Mir Weis re- turned immediately with his men to Kandahar, to which he laid siege, and after a few days obtained an easy victory over the remaining half-starved Persians that defended the place. These he put to death, as well as those individuals who were not of Afghan origin, or who held an appointment under the late governor. Dis- cord ensued when the plunder was to be divided, and swords were drawn; but the Abdalees and Kaukerees were beaten by the Ghildjzyes, and finally obliged to submit, nor could they have remained in Kandahar without their permission. The Abdalees up to this time had always inhabited the country to the south of the Urghendab and the Helmund without having ever obtained the consent of the Mogul or Persian kings to pass those rivers; but now, by virtue of a fresh agreement with the Ghildjzyes, they were enabled to do so, and many of them settled amongst the mountains of the Siah-bend, situated between Kandahar and the principality of Gour. The emigration of the Abdalees into the principality of Herat dates from this period, and there in the course of a very few years they greatly increased in numbers and became very rich. Nevertheless the Afghans agree in stating that a branch of the Noorzyes had been established in the plains of Obeh and Chehrak for more than one hundred years before the bulk of that tribe came to reside in the principality.” Mir Weis, having driven out the oppressors of his country, turned his attention to the manner in which he might best consolidate his work : he restored union between the different tribes, established a kind of discipline amongst them, and released them from the heavy Cuar. IIT. SIEGE OF KANDAHAR. 31 imposts which had till then weighed heavily upon their exertions. Finally, in 1713, the principal families acknowledged him as the Sovereign Prince of Kandahar. The Court of Persia, instead of putting down this rebellion with vigour, adopted a system which exposed all its weakness. It commenced by negotiating ; but Mir Weis, having detained the ambassadors who were sent to advise him to return to his duty, the Shah at length determined to march an army upon Kandahar. With this view the chiefs who commanded in Khorassan were ordered to unite their forces and attack the rebels. This they did, and, though outnumbering the Afghan troops in the proportion of eight to one, they were, in consequence of the want of co-operation between the Persian chiefs, completely beaten by Mir Weisin three successive battles. These events took place in 1713. The Shah, on receiving information of this catastrophe, saw at once the imminence of the danger. The revolt might gain ground in other provinces of his empire, in which alarming indications had manifested themselves ; however, two years elapsed before he ordered his army of 30,000 men to take the field. It was com- posed of Persians, Arabs, and Abdalee Afghans, at enmity with the Ghildjzyes, and commanded by Sipahee Salar Kaee Khosroo Khan, Walee of Georgia, and nephew of the unfortunate Gourguin Khan. In this campaign Mir Weis was not successful. He lost all the territory he had taken from the chiefs of Khorassan, was completely defeated by Kaee Khosroo between the Helmund and the Urghendab, and, retiring from thence, was obliged to seek refuge within the walls of Kandahar, to which city his adversary soon laid siege. This the Sipahee Salar pushed forward with great activity and perseverance, and ravaged all the environs of the city, which, ere many days had passed, became a complete desert. As a reprisal for the acts which the Abdalees and Kaukerees had committed, he put to death all the Afghans who fell into his power, and did not even spare the women and children. The besieged were soon reduced to the greatest extremity, and, alarmed at the terrible consequences that might befall them if the city was taken by assault, they insisted that Mir Weis should offer terms of accommodation to the Persian general. But Kaee Khosroo Khan, thinking himself sure of success, and eager to avenge the death of his uncle by that of his murderers, demanded the uncon- ditional surrender of the place. The garrison saw by this reply that a A i ios 32 DEATH OF MIR "WEIS. Cuavr. ITT. they had nothing to hope for, and, gaining courage from despair, continued the defence with renewed energy, the abilities of their chief rising with the difficulties which he had to contend with. Mir Weis, having succeeded in baffling the vigilance of the be- siegers and escaped from Kandahar, assembled several thousand Afghan cavalry, ravaged the localities Khosroo had spared for the purpose of supplying his own camp, and harassed the Persians day and night. The result was obvious. The Sipahee Salar was obliged to raise the siege to obtain provisions, of which he stood greatly in need ; but constantly molested on his march, he found it impossible to secure a moment's repose for his troops, who, decimated and discouraged, began to disband. This new danger induced him to offer battle to the Afghans, who accepted it on the 26th of Ramazan 1714 (Hejira 1126), and they so completely annihilated the Persian army, that only one hundred out of thirty thousand men escaped with their lives. KHosroo Khan, borne down with despair, threw himself at the head of a few brave companions into the thickest of the fight, and there sought an honourable death, which defeat had made more welcome to him than life. This narrative is also from the text of Mirza Ali Mohamed. Abdullah Khan assures us that Khosroo did not attack the Afghans, but that they surprised and defeated him in a night attack. Mohamed Roostem, another Persian general of some repute, 1 a third army to subdue Mir Weis, was subsequently sent with but he was not more fortunate than his predecessor. Defeated owed his own safety by the Afghans in several encounters, he only to a rapid retreat, which left the Mir absolute master of the whole province of Kandahar. After this fresh success all the Afghan tribes gave in their adhesion to him, and acknowledged Mir Weis for their sovereign chief, as the inhabitants of the capital had done after the death of Gourguin Khan. Unfortunately, how- ever, this adroit and courageous man could not continue the great work which he had up to this time so cleverly conducted, for he died towards the close of 1715, in the eighth year of his rule over the Afghans, and in the succeeding one to that in which he obtained his last victory over the Persians. It was also the very moment at which the measures he had taken with a view of insuring the independence of his country and ameliorating the condition of the people afforded every hope that they would be realised; but, though checked for a time, these hopes were not extinguished, for ons ema : ‘ gap. IIT. MIR ABDULLAH—MIR MAHMOOD. 33 v those measur : es received a fresh i . sh impuls y his son Mahood. pulse under the government of Mir Wei is left two son i s, M : ‘ former, who was the or ht Mahmood and Mir Hoosein. The i ae : pny attained his eighteenth year Afghan chiefs declared that oo , and in consequence of this the Te 16 was not ¢ . Their u : competent to succeed h ncle, Mir Abdul a i ull: ras AI affairs, but the ua Tas foie placed at the head of ; which had been raised charactors : raised by the bold and his first oo conduct of his brother were not realised by him act wi : ‘ : hr as to open a conference with the Persian govern ) se suzerainty h es ‘ » inte, 3F the Shak i 2nd to ai and also to pay a : ive him t re hate mekei : g 1e government of Kand , make it hereditary in his : D antag. arnt tary in his family, and withdraw the Persi or sons from the principality. Sian wo years were consumed i and, Aid a these disgraceful negotiations 2 > projects of Mir Abdullah w ‘ ’ known t Af Abdullah were but imperf o the Afchans. they wer . : per ectl opneiitic fe 3 # they ei mistrustful of his intentions, oy as best they could ; but whe . be reveal : when these projects aled to the Fh ns ; jects came to a fon by the Persians, who in so doing hoped to sow 1 ds of dissension amongst them, they were in the bi egree indignant. 1 the highest Tl 1e eldest son of Mir Weis. w many of the qualiti re ise who was already distinguished by alities the Afohans had . one . . ans had admired in his fz who, tiough 50 v 2 admi in his father, and hough so young, had displayed dari 2 ’ ww. ; arig acts . : dering on rashness when engaged wi g acts of courage bor- taoaiob the &; gaged with the Persians, took advan H > discontent which the inter 4 Hin hod led! . e interested conduct of his é en rise He etels sartidet is uncle e to in the minds of Lis countrymen, and seized tl hh ereign power ofl which l wn V ’ ~ Ze t 1 The un lar; ! ie thought he had been unjustly deprived or : 5 on I of Mir Abdullah made his success ne : attacked his se wi gn S = ss easy; he hand, and m . pr only fifty men, killed him with hi ond = y ¢ ade the Afchan chiefs . ' gh iefs then andah: ; governor fn le tooth of bis murdered rol x Basia elect him Je: d relative “he selves demanded his electi . : ie people them- ; anded his election, which, however, was not op 2 {ow ambitious Serdare: 1 , Was not agreeable to “bated 4] ars; but when they saw the young chief had : 3 1e oeneral s ERY > J = 3 1a : le gen ral support of the nation, they adhered to tl : order of things. : ed to the new stor an, as less act J RD ’ : 0 : ~ 54 ALAYAR KHAN. Cuar. III. the latter several Ghildjzye chiefs talked openly of their intention to dictate to those in power ; the seeds of much discord had also been sown amongst the tribes, and Mir Abdullah was perfectly aware that he could not expect to retain the sovereign authority in any degree of tranquillity unless he could prevent new hostilities on the part of Persia. The negotiations therefore which he had entered into with the Shah had only that object in view, and there is no doubt that whenever he had found himself able to do so he would have thrown off a vassalage the light fetters of which he now consented to wear. The fiery Afghans could not understand the wisdom of this system, and the constant opposition of his nephew Mahmood finished by lowering his influence with the Serdars, several of whom hoped and were desirous of occupying his position themselves. The Mir’s death was as unjust as it was to be regretted, and the more to be deplored, as his successor displayed warlike qualities only, which led to the decimation of the tribes, and weakened them to such a degree that, under the reign of Nadir Shah, they again fell under the Persian yoke. The power also after Mahmood’s time passed into the hands of the Abdalee tribe—to the injury of the Ghildjzyes, who had been the first to proclaim and establish the independence of the Afghan nation. At about the period when Mir Weis died, the population of Herat tried also to withdraw from their allegiance to the Sef- faveans, The Khorassians, of whom it was for the most part composed, had obtained from Nadir Shah the privilege of being governed by their own chiefs. Alayar Khan, who was governor of the province at the time of Roostem Khan's defeat, though not declaring himself independent as Mir Weis had done, acknow- ledged only from that time a nominal submission to the Persian court ; but whether the Persian garrison of Herat, though very small, still inspired him with awe, or whether he hoped by cunning and temporising finally to become completely independent, he continued to keep up appearances, and observe a respectful bear- ing towards the Shah Hoosein ; and as anarchy reigned in several Persian provinces, he thought the monarch might possibly look upon these faint proofs of his obedience as submission. Alayar Khan, as well as Mir Weis, with whom he had sdcretly allied himself in a common determination to resist the Shah, died before he could put into execution the plans which he had con- ceived. The court of Persia appointed Zeman Khan, Koortchee Car, TTL ZEMAN KHAN—HEYAT SULTAN. 35 Bashee, his successor. This officer, who commanded the troops quartered in the province of Herat, was instructed to reinforce his division by enlisting all the volunteers in the locality and march against Mir Abdullah. If this chief had been as prudent as his predecessor, he might have hoped, if not to obtain a positive and complete success against the rebels in the south, at least some advantages which would, without doubt, have prevented Mir Mah- mood from undertaking the expedition which he made some time after in Persia ; but Zeman was a dull and dissipated man, and had not the tact to foment the elements of discord which existed amongst the Afghans. The Abdalee tribe, almost the whole of which was settled in his government, were the hereditary enemies of the Ghildjzyes, and might have been led against them with success ; but he had affronted them, and was obliged to take the field with a weak corps-d’armée composed almost entirely of Per- sians. Neither the importance of the undertaking he had to carry out, nor the burden of the responsibility which rested upon him, operated as any restraint upon his conduct, and his excesses were such that they effected his ruin even before he was in presence of the enemy. A short time before this a branch of the Suddozye tribe had established itself in the neighbourhood of Sukkur, and their chief, Heyat Sultan, anxious to obtain certain favours from Zeman Khan, committed a most fearful outrage against his own son. In- credible as it may appear, he sent Assad Ullah, a young and beau- tiful lad, to this wretch in human shape for an infamous purpose. The crime accomplished, the unfortunate youth took the first opportunity of making his escape from the Persian camp, and, re- turning to his tribe, which shared with him the feelings of fury that animated their young chief, they determined upon taking a deep revenge. Assad’s first step was to seize his vile and unnatural parent and imprison him in a fortress, after which, accompanied by a few thousand horsemen, he started in pursuit of Zeman Khan, and such was the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised the Persian commander at midnight in the district of Zemindavar, before he had received the slightest intimation of his being in arms, attacked with great bravery and impetuosity the weary and sleeping troops, and put them nearly all-to the sword. The villain who had so deeply injured him was the first that fell, and by the hand of Assad; after which the victorious youth marched on Herat, D 2 SEE eae Ee 36 PERSIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST UZBEKS. Caap. IIL. and, having obtained an entrance to the city, exterminated the few Persians he found there. After this he again took the field, and made himself, almost without opposition, master of the whole pro- vince, which, on the 26th of Ramazan, 1716, he constituted an in- dependent principality. As to the Persian troops which had succeeded in effecting their escape from the massacre at Zemindavar, finding themselves with- out a commander, they disbanded, and returned to Ispahan. All that the government could do to induce them to return to Afghan- istan under a new general was ineffectual ; they refused to march ; and the Shah Sultan Hoosein was under the necessity of relin- quishing his project for bringing that country again under his dominion. Assad Ullah Khan raised himself to power about a year before the period at which Mir Mahmood became by the murder of his uncle Prince of Kandahar. Persia, already so much weakened by the loss of two of her finest provinces and three armies, ravaged by the Uzbeks, menaced by Turkey and Russia, and governed by a degraded and super- stitious court who ruled the feeble Sultan Hoosein, had no little difficulty in making a stand against so many disasters. Neverthe- less, the Persian monarch made a last effort, and in 1719 raised an army of 35,000 men, well provided with artillery, which he placed under the orders of Sefi Kooli Khan, a general of re- pated talent, to whom he allotted the task of driving back in the first instance the Uzbeks, and then of reducing Herat and Kandahar. The Khan obtained an easy victory over the undisciplined hordes of Uzbeks, who, badly armed and badly led, having pillage only in prospect, and not the permanent occupation of Khorassan, took to flight at the first shock of the Persian army. Puffed up with pride at a success thus easily obtained, Sefi Kooli Khan pompously announced his intention to exterminate the rebel Af- ghans, to whom he sent an imperious order to come to his camp and implore his mercy. On the receipt of this message, Assad Ullah Khan moved forward to meet him at the head of 12,000 Afghans and Hazarahs, and, in spite of the disproportion of the two armies, attacked him directly. The Afghans were armed only with bad swords and worse matchlocks, but they did not hesitate to face the fire of the formidable Persian artillery, and maintained during a whole day a most obstinate combat, in which 3000 of their best Ft ¥ a i. . RoE rT Av 114 rs - ” - ro ppl pr lew ce Cuap, III. ASSAD ULLAH KHAN. i 37 troops lost their lives. The victory was still undecided at sunset, when by some accident never accounted for a dreadful explosion took place amongst the Persian artillery. This caused an instan- taneous panic in their army, and they took to flight, leaving on the field of battle all their baggage and the greater part of their guns. Sefi Kooli Khan and several members of his family, together with a large number of chiefs as well as 10,000 Persian soldiers, were slain in this battle fought near the village of Kariz. This victory decided the fortunes of the Afghans. Independence was henceforward theirs, and the power, but half-established, of Assad Ullah Khan was consolidated, not only in Herat, but _ also. through the greatest part of Khorassan, of which he took possession, with the exception of Meshed, its capital, and that re- sisted all his attacks. Seeing that his efforts to reduce it were ineffectual, he was satisfied with keeping a watch upon it, and marched to the south of his territories, in order to extend them in that direction. He seized, in the first instance, upon Subzawar, and afterwards moved on Furrah, to which place he laid siege, when he was attacked by Mir Mahmood of Kandahar, who thought these proceedings might be detrimental to his own interest, more particularly as Assad Ullah exhibited the courage and capacity of a good general, and belonged to the tribe of the Abdalees, the rival of his own. But Assad Ullah Khan was unfortunately killed at the commencement of the battle, a ball having struck him in the middle of the forehead; his troops, discouraged, retired to Herat, where anarchy reigned during several months, until a Belooch chief of the Seistan, one Mir Mohamed, seized the power and established order in the city. INTRIGUES OF PERSIA. CHar, 1V, CHAPTER 1V. Intrigues of Persia in Afghanistan — Preparations of Mir Mahmood — He outwits the Persian court — Is appointed Governor-General of Kandahar — His ambi- tious projects — Seizes the fortresses on the Helmund — State of the Persian army — Besieges Kerman — It surrenders to his troops — They are beaten by the Persian general Leuft Ali Khan — Mir Mahmood retreats to Kandahar — Leuft Ali is disgraced — Revolt against Mir Mahmood at Kandahar — The Mir marches with his army against the Persians — Provisions the fortress of Bam — Kerman surrenders to him — He is repulsed before Yezd — Moves on Ispahan — State of Mir Mahmood’s troops — A singular recipe for courage — Pusilla- nimity of the Persians — Disunion amongst them — The consequences — Their army is routed by the Afghans — The Ethemad Dooulet and the Walee of Georgia — The chief command of the army is given to the latter — Proposition of Shah Hoosein to Mir Mahmood — The siege is pressed closer — The Persians endeavour to leave the city — Great scarcity prevails — The result — Dreadful sufferings of the inhabitants — Shah Hoosein proceeds to the Afghan camp — He abdicates the throne — Mahmood’s conduct after his victory. Tue Persian Government, while sending armies to subdue Kandahar, also employed the arts of negotiation, and tried to deceive suc- cessively Mir Weis, his brother, and his son, with intrigues and promises of which Eastern nations are so prodigal. But these chiefs did not fall into the snare prepared for them: nevertheless Mir Mahmood, who put his uncle to death because he had received certain propositions from the Shah, found somewhat later that this plan was a good one, and adopted it himself; less, however, because he was afraid of the Shah of Persia, than because he re- quired a few years of repose to prepare himself for the invasion which he had projected against that kingdom. As the victory over Assad Ullah Khan might awaken the fears of the Persians, and induce them to march one of their everlasting armies upon him, he hastened, immediately he had relieved Furrah, to inform Shah Hoosein that he had attacked the Abdalees only to prevent them from taking the town from him, and that it was now entirely at the disposition of the Shah. The letter which Mir Mahmood sent to the Shah was placed in his hands by the same minister who had _ been the accomplice of Mir Weis, and on this occasion he did not give the lie to his own base antecedents. Instead of enlightening his master on the manifest ambition of the Afghan prince, he did all that lay in his power to convince him that the Ghildjzyes were Cuar. 1V. PROJECTS OF MIR MAHMOOD. 39 excellent vassals, who had rendered him a very great service, and furthermore that they had only exterminated Gourghin Khan, his nephew, and the Georgians, on account of the excesses they had committed, and to deliver themselves from a most odious tyranny. By such representations he sought not only to revenge himself on the Georgians, whose chiefs were his most dangerous antagonists, but also to endeavour to calm the resentment the Shah had always felt against him, in consequence of the efforts he had made to in- duce him to give Mir Weis permission to return to Kandahar. The poor feeble-minded sovereign, deceived once more, bestowed upon Mir Mahmood the surname of Hoosein Kooli Khan (the slave of Hoosein), and sent him a firman appointing him Governor- General of Kandahar, and making that high office hereditary in his family. Mir Mahmood accepted these honours with apparent gratitude and respect, and this good understanding between the Mir and the Court of Ispahan enabled him to augment in all security the force which he intended to employ in carrying out his ambitious projects. To clear away, however, all difficulties, he also wrote to the Shah and represented that the Abdalees recently established in Herat had been in revolt for the last two years and paid no taxes, and he solicited the Shah’s permission to subdue them. Sultan Hoosein was foolish enough to consent to this expedition, which Mir Mahmood at once undertook, but, in- stead of directing his steps to the north, he sent there a small flying detachment, while he himself marched with the mass of his army along the banks of the Helmund and seized all the fortresses on that river, for they commanded the principal roads of the Seistan leading into Persia. It is true he took possession in the name of the Shah, but his secret purpose was to fortify himself, and to collect provisions, in order that he might command an easy passage to the southern provinces, and at a future time with little difficulty invade the Persian territory. It will be remembered that his father had travelled through them on his return from Kandahar, and the invaluable information which he then collected was now to be utilized by his son, whose preparations for this invasion were pro- longed up to 1720. But even then his army numbered only 12,000 men ; however, they were all picked men, inured to war and hardships of every kind, and prepared for any eventuality that might arise. Persia, on the contrary, was at this time in a most deplor- able condition ; everything was in disorder; and the only emula- 40 MIR MAHMOOD TAKES KERMAN. Cuar. 1V. tion that could be said to exist at that court was who should ex- hibit the greatest weakness and degradation. The right of holding the appointments of the public service, instead of being a privilege belonging to high birth or a recompense for meritorious services, was sold to the highest bidder; the troops, without discipline, re- ceived neither instruction nor pay, and, frequently disbanding them- selves, pillaged the villages and the caravans. The towns were infested with thieves, who openly followed their villanous profession with the utmost assurance, knowing they could do so with impunity. In short, everything announced the complete decadence of this great monarchy, which, attacked on all its frontiers, by the Afghans, the Tartars, the Russians, and the Arabs, seemed likely to become an easy conquest to the first who should attempt to invade it. It was the young Mahmood, breathing vengeance for the miseries which his country had suffered under the Persian rule, who was the first that engaged in this difficult enterprise. In 1720, under the pretext of attacking Chedad Khan, a Belooch chief, who with his nomades was ravaging the province of Kerman, Mahmood placed himself at the head of his small army, and traversed amidst unheard of difficulties the arid and desert countries of the south of Persia. On this march his soldiers were soon decimated by privations and fatigue, and of the 12,000 men who set out with him only 7000 arrived under the walls of Kerman, to which he laid siege with a courage and determination utterly disproportioned to the means of aggression at his command. Simultaneously with these operations he again endeavoured to put the Shah IMoosein on the wrong scent and lull the vigilance of his government, to which he wrote stating that he had besieged Kerman merely to force the Governor to furnish his troops with provisions, and thus repay him the expense of moving his army in the interest and for the benefit of the Shah of Persia. Mahmood was joined by a great number of Persian malcon- tents, who soon filled up the casualties in his army. The town, hard pressed, Leld out only for a few days, and then surrendered at discretion ; nevertheless the victor thought it necessary to punish the inhabitants for the feeble resistance they had offered, and not only them but those of the whole district. During four months his soldiers, gorged with plunder, committed every imaginable excess, at the expiration of which time they were attacked and put to flight by the Persian General Leuft Ali Khan, who marched to the assistance of the invaded province with a very superior force. The ps ETT =n Char. 1V, REVOLT AT KANDAHAR. 41 defeat of Mir Mahmood was so complete that he was obliged to make a rapid retreat to Kandahar, taking with him only a miserable remnant of that army which had followed him with so much enthusiasm to the conquest of Persia! Not one man would perhaps have survived if the evil genius which presided over the destinies of that empire had not arrested the progress of her victo- rious commander. Leuft Ali Khan, the only good general the Shah then had, was, by way of recompense for the brilliant success which he had just obtained, deprived of his command and thrown into prison. A court intrigue, originating in the Vizier, brought about this unjustifiable result, for the letter of Mir Mahmood had been per- fidiously misinterpreted by him to the Shah Sultan Hoosein. But if Mir Mahmood had not been defeated, more important interests would have obliged him to abandon the province he had just conquered, for he received intelligence that his rear was seriously menaced. Beiram Sultan Lakzee, governor of Furrah, and Malek Djaffer Khan Sistanee, having formed an alliance, succeeded in exciting a portion of the province of Kandahar to revolt against his authority. Supported by a few thousand men, they had even seized upon the city in the name of Shah Hoosein, but were driven from it by Mir Hoosein, brother of Mir Mahmood. The latter therefore hastened his return, and his presence soon restored order. His resolu- tion had not been shaken for one instant, for he had reflected, and wisely, on all that had passed, and had seen his own faults. These had arisen rather from ignorance than want of courage— they appeared to him therefore easy of correction : and the bravery and intelligence which he had shown in his fatal expedition of 1720 secured for him the obedience and admiration of his soldiers, which enabled him with little trouble to raise another and a larger army, one not less enthusiastic than the first. The Afghans of every tribe, even those living in the provinces of Herat and Kabul as well as the Hazarahs, hastened with alacrity to the standard of a chief who promised to enrich them with the spoils of their ancient op- pressors. The Belooches settled to the south of the Helmund also furnished him with a contingent of several thousand men, and he determined to take an ample revenge for the disasters inflicted upon him by Leuft Ali Khan. After having installed his brother Mir Hoosein as Regent of Kandahar during his absence, he again entered Persia, in January, 1722, at the head of an army of 28,000 men, carrying with him 42 SECOND CAPTURE OF KERMAN. Cuar, 1V. immense stores of provisions in order to guard against the priva- tions his troops had suffered on his first expedition from the scarcity of food and forage. Mir Mahmood opened this campaign by rapidly crossing the | Seistan,. and without encountering any obstacle he reached the fortress of Bam, where he remained for a few days. This for- tress he repaired and strengthened with great care, and made it an immense depot of provisions and munitions of war. The gar- rison was ordered to collect within its walls all the corn which the inhabitants of the surrounding country could supply above what they required for their own use, and also to keep numerous beasts of burden ready to take the road whenever instructions were given to that effect. The command of this important place was confided by Mir Mahmood to his relative Noor Ullah Khan, a brave and energetic man, on whose fidelity he could rely; and having thus completed his preparations, he again advanced and arrived before Kerman, intending to besiege it once more, but the inhabitants opened the gates almost without offering any resistance : the garrison, however, in the citadel, composed of picked men, refused to sur- render. The commander wrote to the Afghan chief that, if his object was to amass great riches and become Shah of Persia, he would lose his time and uselessly exhaust his resources in under- taking the siege of a place that was provisioned for ten years, and the defenders of which were determined to bury themselves beneath its ashes rather than capitulate ; but he added that if the Mir chose to march on Ispahan he might accomplish his purpose, and he offered to give him 18,000 tomauns towards the expenses of the campaign, if he would raise the siege. Mahmood accepted these conditions, far less because, according to the custom of his country, it saved the honour of his arms, than because he had no heavy artillery to batter the place—the only guns at his disposal, those called in Persia zimboorek, being wholly inefficient for this purpose. Of these he had an hundred carrying a ball of from one to two pounds, each zimboorek being carried by a camel with the artillery- man who served it. Directly Mahmood had received the sum agreed upon he moved upon Ispahan by Yezd, the direct road, and made an attempt to take the latter town by assault as he passed ; but several attacks hav- ing, in spite of the brilliant courage of his soldiers, been vigorously repulsed, he abandoned this siege also. It was likely to prove Cuar, IV. MAHMOOD ADVANCES ON ISPAHAN., 43 a lingering affair and occasion him the loss of much precious time, so he continued his march upon Ispahan without troubling himself about his rear, for the country was too denuded of the enemy’s troops to give him any anxiety on that subject. As to his line of operations, that lay wherever provisions could be obtained, and he carried with him a pretty large supply, which was renewed from time to time in the villages on his road. In this manner he arrived at Guluabad, a village situated ten miles from Ispahan, without having met one Persian who attempted to oppose his passage. Here he entrenched his army, which had been somewhat reduced since its departure from Kandahar by privation and fatigue, as well as in the combats before Kerman and Yezd ; but these losses he had repaired by a few thousand Gheber recruits, who were not less desirous than the Afghans to revenge themselves on their common oppressors the Persians. Mahmood had still 23,000 com- Latants under his command when he arrived at Guluabad, but, in spite of their courage and the advantage they derived from the re- putation of their arms, they could have been easily exterminated if the Persians had possessed the least sentiment of national feeling, and been animated by the remembrance of the ancient grandeur of their country; but this debased people learnt from their weak monarch only how to lament their misfortunes, instead of warding them off by fighting manfully to prevent them, and it was not till the last moment, when money and arms were distri- buted amongst them, that they decided upon defending the capital of the empire. Mir Mahmood’s troops arrived at Guluabad in wretched condi- tion : the rags they wore scarcely covered them ; they were destitute of warlike stores ; with rare exception, their sabres were the only arm of which they could make any use, and their light artillery was unfit for siege purposes. Ispahan, on the contrary, besides its population, which was at this time estimated at more than 600,000 souls, had a garrison of 60,000 soldiers; the city walls were strong, and the besieged in possession of a formidable artillery. Unfortunately, however, the spirit of the army was cowardly and superstitious, and it was in those days more advantageous for a minister to deceive and betray the monarch, or flatter his pre- dilection for theological discussions, than to do his duty. One of his favourite generals, Fath Ali Khan Kadjar, assured Shah Hoosein he had heard from an old woman of Asterabad, who 44 DISUNION OF THE PERSIANS. Cuar, 1V. was said to be inspired, that two legs of a he goat, boiled with 325 peapods in water over which a young virgin had repeated 1200 times “ La illah, illah Ia,”* made a broth which would render invisible the men who drank it: the superstitious monarch therefore ordered that his troops should be daily supplied with goat-soup thus prepared. A thousand absurdities equally efficacious were decreed for a like purpose ; and there were only one or two high- minded men who, stimulated by the calamitous state of affairs, endeavoured to raise the drooping spirits of the garrison; but owing to the weakness of the monarch, they and the few followers who adhered to them soon fell victims to his imbecile conduct. Traitors alone were listened to and intrusted with the command of the troops ; there was no mutual understanding between them, and they daily accumulated acts of cowardice, treason, and folly, one upon the other. The Ethemad Dooulet, first minister of the Shah, and the Walee of Arabia, who was General in Chief, were always of opposite opinions. The first asserted that, as they had hitherto done nothing, but had allowed the Afghans to arrive under the walls of Tspahan, it would be better to remain on the defensive, and let them wear themselves out in useless efforts; but the Walee made light of the opinion of that eminent personage, and went out nearly every day skirmishing round the enemy’s camp, in a manner, moreover, that appeared to be much more in the interests of Mir Mahmood than in those of his sovereign. His subordinate officers committed similar faults ; sorties were made without judgment or discipline, and the Persian troops gave ground at the first onset, while the rivalry existing amongst the commanders produced daily collisions in their army, that frequently ended in bloodshed. A council of war having been summoned by the King, who presided in person, it was at length decided that a general attack should be made upon the Afghans. Mahmood had only twenty thousand fighting men to withstand the Persians, but, accustomed to conquer, the power of this force was increased three-fold by their own courage : they heeded not the numbers of the enemy, and blindly obeyed a prince who possessed all their sympathies, and who had the command entirely in his own hands; while the Persians, being formed into several divisions, all independent one of * God is God, and there i8 no God but him, Caar. IV. DEFEATED BY THE AFGHANS. 45 the other, and receiving different orders, were essentially deficient in combination and resolution, the chief elements of military success. At daybreak on the 8th of April, 1721, the Persians left the city in great confusion to attack the Afghan camp. The Ethemad Dooulet and the Walee of Arabia had not been able to come to an understanding as to the order of battle, and were no better agreed in opinion as to the attack ; thus each of them commenced with the corps-d’armée under his command, and in accordance with his own individual ideas, without dreaming of the mutual support they ought to afford to each other when required. At first the Ethemad Dooulet remained inactive, and, advantage- ously posted on the defensive, waited for the Afghans to advance, and this plan was approved by the majority of the other generals. But the Walee, aman of little reflection and of an ardent temper, looked upon this inaction as disgraceful, and, without listening to the advice of his colleagues, exclaimed, “ We are not here to deliberate, but to fight.” With these words he galloped forward to his men, who poured down upon the left flank, which gave way at the first onset. It now required a slight effort only to turn the Afghans and put them to a complete rout ; but the Arabs, far more anxious for plunder than for glory, rushed into the camp of Mir Mahmood and began the work of pillage. The Ethemad Dooulet, observing the Walee thus engaged, fell upon the Afghan right, which was moving up to attack the Arabs ; but Aman Ullah Khan, the most talented of Mir Mahmood’s lieute- nants, who commanded this wing, perceiving his intention, faced about, and for some time retired before the Persians ; then suddenly halting, he opened his squadrons and unmasked his one hundred zimbooreks, which instant'y sent forth a hail of balls into their ranks. The enemy, instead of rushing at once upon the guns, which could not have been reloaded in time for another discharge, suddenly halted, and finally decamped. Aman Ullah, seizing the propitious moment without hesitation, fell upon the fugitives with his cavalry, and made a terrific carnage ; their artillery, consisting of twenty- four pieces of large calibre, which they had placed in their rear, were also captured, and turned against the royal army. From that moment the rout of the Persians was complete, and the soldiers, instead of entering Ispahan, regained each his own province, and there waited the issue of events. The Afghans obtained an im- mense booty in this battle, in which 25,000 Persians remained upon the field : amongst them was Roostem Khan Gooulaye Agassee, rr a 46 PROPOSITIONS OF THE SHAH TO MAHMOOD. Cnar. IV. chief of the slaves, and Ahmed Khan, General in Chief of the Artillery, two of the most important officers in the army. This event spread the greatest consternation in Ispahan, and the Shah held another council of war, at which the Ethemad Dooulet proposed that the King should leave the capital without delay, and retire to Kasbeen, from whence he could make an appeal to his faithful subjects, raise a powerful army, and, returning, rescue Ispahan from the Afghan invaders. The Walee of Arabia, whose troops had behaved so ill in the last battle, and had been the cause of the defeat, again held a different opinion, which obtained with the feeble monarch, who, influenced by traitors and cowards, blindly consented to his own ruin. He gave the Walee the supreme command of his army ; but in thus concentrating the power into one hand he did not succeed in imparting greater unity to the sub- sequent operations. The successive reverses which overwhelmed the Persians, instead of opening the eyes of the Shah to the inca- pacity of his general, served only to increase his absurd caprices, which always ended in partial defeats, and eventually so decimated and discouraged his army, that the troops were afraid to expose themselves beyond the walls of the city. While the Shah Hoosein confided the destinies of his empire to a man so little worthy of this trust, Mir Mahmood, though a con- queror, was a prey to the most cruel anxiety, for the number of his troops diminished without his having the power to recruit them; a turn of fortune in favour of the Persians might place him in a most critical position; and at one moment such was his indecision that he ceased to give any orders to his gene- rals. Finding that Ispahan did not surrender after the victory he had gained, he was on the point of retiring to Kerman to reorganize his army; but having been informed of the alarm which reigned in the city, and that provisions were running short, his hopes again revived, and another motive arose to dis- suade him from fulfilling his intention of retreating. Instead of preserving that firmness of demeanour, which will frequently sus- tain a drooping cause, instead of energetically battling with his enemy, the Shah Sultan Hoosein was seen to drag the imperial purple through the mire, and, following the example of his go- vernor of Kerman, beseech his enemy to accept immense sums of money to evacuate the Persian territory. It was evident that his proposition originated in fear and discouragement; and Cuar. IV. SIEGE OF ISPAHAN. 47 Mir Mahmood was convinced that he should soon be master of the city if he persevered in the investment of the place. He hourly saw the Persian generals committing the grossest faults, and neglecting to take the most simple measures for their pre- servation. He knew that imprudent and ignorant counsellors gave the Shah advice which must infallibly lead to his destruction ; and all these circumstances determined him to abandon his project of retreat and press the Persians with additional vigour, The errors, or rather the treachery, of the Persian nobles, enabled Mahmood to surround the city by a line of circumvallation, which it would have been impossible to defend with his small army if the Walee had made the least effort to dislodge him ; but he sent a succession of feeble detachments against the Afghans, which, badly directed, failed in every attack. Ferahabad and Djulfa, abandoned by the Walee, were now taken by assault, and, regard- less of the heroic resistance of their inhabitants, the general in chief made not the least demonstration in their favour ; it was supposed that the fanaticism of this barbarian was gratified by the ruin of Djulfa, for it was inhabited by Armenian Christians. In short, the Walee and his troops always moved in the direction where the enemy was not ; and if he did meet the Afghans, he was sure to retreat under some frivolous pretext or other; he boasted in loud terms, when in presence of the Shah, but always remained in a state of inaction when he ought to have shown energy and determination. Feeling that he was victorious on all points, Mahmood drew closer the line of circumvallation in which he held the Persians, who made not the least attempt to check his operations: debased by the tyranny and superstitious bigotry of the court, they became utterly helpless ; while the Afghans, elated by their success, and possessing all the élan of a people who had recovered their liberty, fought with the greatest enthusiasm. They carefully guarded the roads, intercepted the convoys of provisions that endeavoured to enter the capital, and laid waste the environs with fire and sword, preserving only what was necessary for themselves; until this country, hitherto so fertile, became an arid desert on which nothing could be seen but the bleached skeletons of men and horses, and the charred ruins of forsaken villages. At the commencement of the war the rural population, harassed and plundered, flocked to the capital, where they were of no use in 48 SUFFERINGS OF THE PEOPLE OF ISPAHAN. Cuar. IV. the defence, and their presence only increased the scarcity, which soon became extreme, and many thousands of the famished citizens of Ispahan let themselves down from the ramparts and fled from the city, hoping to reach some other province where food was in abundance. But the Afghans, who closely watched their move- ments, slaughtered them without remorse, and but a very few succeeded in effecting their escape; nevertheless the bare possi- bility of doing so induced crowds of them daily to make the hazardous attempt. Heaps of human bodies were seen here and there wanting the common rights of sepulture, while many more floated on the surface of the Zendehrood, the tainted waters of which were no longer fit for the ordinary purposes of life ; and at length even these did not reach the capital, for the Afghans cut off the canals which supplied the city ; the tanks were insufficient to meet the general consumption, and thirst was superadded to the pangs of hunger. Provisions of all kinds were soon exhausted ; the few camels and other beasts of burden which remained were sold at so high a price that the great men about the court could alone purchase any animal food ; and the people were reduced to such extremities that they were compelled to give chase to the most unclean animals, which by their religion they were forbidden not only to eat, but even to touch. At night the inhabitants of one quarter made incursions into other parts of the city to search for provisions supposed to be concealed, and frequent scenes of vio- lence and bloodshed were the result; for here the father was often found armed against his son, and brother against brother ; all affection was banished amongst the members of the same family ; they looked upon each other as deadly enemies, and fought for the wretched scraps of food they had perchance procured, At length meat of every kind disappeared, and the trees were stripped of their leaves and bark to satisfy the cravings of these miserable beings, who, searching the very dunghills and com- mon sewers, lived upon any soft substance, whatever it might happen to be, which they found there. Old pieces of leather were soaked, boiled, and eaten with avidity; the plaster from the walls, mixed with sawdust, also offered them another spe- cies of food which was sometimes the object of angry dispute even to the death. The population of Ispahan, so healthy, light- hearted, and rich a few months before, now presented the spectacle of a mob of attenuated creatures, wan and of a sinister aspect, Char, 1V, ABDICATION OF SHAH HOOSEIN. 49 scarcely able to drag themselves along the streets places, that were covered with the corpses of their countrymen, and which, horrible to relate, were sometimes eaten to alleviate the terrible pangs of hunger. Many put an end to their own existence to avoid these sufferings. Amidst all this appalling misery the people evinced to the last their devotion to their King, who assured them of the speedy arrival of his son Thamasp. This prince had succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Afghans, and gone to the north of the empire, where he expected to raise an army and march to the relief of Ispahan ; but five months having elapsed without any tidings of him reaching the capital, its inhabitants despaired of his return, and besought the Shah to bring their calamities to a close. This prince, more weak than ill-inten- tioned, afflicted with the fearful condition of his subjects, determined to put an end to it ; besides, it was utterly impossible that he could prolong the defence. All his armies had been destroyed, the few soldiers that remained in Persia were in distant provinces, and many of them in the interest of ambitious chiefs, who, profiting by the miserable state of their country, united with each other to create an independent power. Eight months had elapsed from the commencement of the siege, when, on the 14th of Sefer, 1135 of the Hejira, and 23rd October, 1722, the Shah Sultan Hoosein left the city, escorted by the great officers of his court, and arrived at the camp of Mir Mahmood, in whose favour he publicly abdicated the throne, and with all solemnity delivered to him the sword and crown of the Seffa- veans, the attributes of his power as monarch of the Persian empire. The same day the invader took military possession of the arsenals and other public establishments, but it was not till five days after that he made his triumphant entry into Ispahan. His first act was to assign a place of residence to the fallen Shah, and a sufficient pension to meet his requirements ; his second, to order a general massacre of the troops remaining within the city, not so much with a view of taking revenge upon them for the resistance they had made, as to strike terror into those who, under the command of the Prince Thamasp, might be tempted to renew the contest. This massacre continued during three days, after which Mir Mah- mood ordered it should cease, and occupied himself in restoring tranquillity and security in the capital. Having very little confi- dence in the administrative powers of the Afghans, who, up to this E and public rn A Se: 50 CONDUCT OF MIR MAHMOOD. Cuar. TV. v period, had never taken part in public affairs, and not daring to place any faith in the Persians so recently subjected to his rule, the Mir appointed two officers at the head of each department of the administration—an Afghan and a Persian ; the former to watch the latter, and at the same time acquire from him all that it was useful for him to know. The measures taken by Mir Mahmood to protect the vanquished from insult, the severe discipline he observed in his army, and the even-handed justice he dealt out to every one, soon acquired for him the esteem of the Persians. The Persian chiefs, who, traitors to their king, had furnished him with information during the siege, he treated with the greatest severity; he, nevertheless, made an exception in favour of the Walee of Arabia, whose life he spared in conformity with a vow that he had made so to do if he should come victorious out of the contest; and in order not to give any opportunity for a false interpretation to the motives which dictated this, he loaded with favours those who had remained faithful to the fortunes of the Shah Hoosein. Up to the day on which Mir Mahmood attained a position so elevated, his conduct was that of a man animated by magnanimous sentiments ; but, from the time he felt securely seated on the throne of the Seffaveans, he adopted a line of conduct which tar- nished the glory of his previous career; the innate ferocity of the Afghan, suppressed for a time, soon reassumed its empire over his mind ; he became suspicious and even cruel towards those who had served him with the greatest fidelity. But, in spite of his tyranny, he endeavoured to tranquillise Persia by his judicious administra- tion, and to extend his dominion over those provinces which had not recognised his authority. He would, perhaps, have succeeded, but for the change which had taken place in his character, and which became every day more and more cruel. Cuar. V. SURRENDER OF KASBEEN., CHAPTER V. The Prince Thamasp — Mahmood sends an army against him — Kasbeen sur- renders to the Afghans — Duplicity and cruelty of the victors — The inhabitants take their revenge — Defeat of the Afghans — Mahmood is furious at this — Reconciliation with Aman Ullah Khan — Mahmood massacres the Persian nobles — Sanguinary scenes in Ispahan — State of the provinces — Prince Thamasp is proclaimed Shah — Assembles troops in the Azerbaidjan — The Turks and Russians seize upon Armenia and Georgia — State of the Afghan army — Desertions from Mir Mahmood’s ranks — Shiraz besieged — Tyranny of Mahmood — Mir Echreff appointed to the chief command — The Afghan army march upon Yezd — Mahmood becomes deranged — Losses in the Afghan ranks — The troops return to Ispahan — Mahmood in a paroxysm of madness puts to death the sons of Shah Hoosein — Death of Mahmood — Mir Echreff succeeds him — He puts the Serdar Ullah Khan to death — Policy of Russia at this period — Echreff marches against the Turks — Battle of Kiemereh — Defeat of the Turks — Treaty with the Afghans — Events in Afghanistan — The Russians take possession of Guilan — Echreff fortifies the Afghan quarter in Ispahan — Nadir joins the Shah Thamasp — He takes Nishapoor — Echreff seizes Yezd — Battle between Nadir and Echreff — Defeat of the Afghans— Battle of Bagh Mirane — The Afghans retire from Ispahan — Conflict at the Bend-emir — Retreat upon Shiraz — Destruction of the Afghan army — Death of Echreff — Reflections. AFTER the abdication of his father in 1722, the Prince Thamasp Mirza assumed the title of Shah at Kasbeen ; but when Mir Mah- mood despatched an army against him, the prince fled at its approach, and retired into the Azerbaidjan. The inhabitants of Kasbeen, seeing themselves thus abandoned, immediately made their submission to the Afghans, to whom they gave a most friendly reception. The invaders reciprocated this feeling, and appeared desirous of being on the best terms with them ; but, after they had been some time in the town, renewed the scenes of car- nage which took place at Ispahan, and during three days gave the reins to their passion for murder and pillage. The Kasbeenians, finding that submission had not disarmed the vengeance of their conquerors, assembled in arms after the first moment of sur- prise, massacred in their turn nearly half the Afghans, and drove the remainder from the city. The survivors at once dispersed ; some of them regaining Ispahan, while others followed the Serdar Aman Ullah Khan, and Mir Echreff, the cousin of Mahmood. These two Afghan chiefs had, more than any others, contributed to E 2 Ba MAHMOOD'S ATROCITIES. Cae. V. Cuar. V, STATE OF THE AFGHAN ARMY. 53 the victories and elevation of the son of Mir Weis ; but Mahmood, extended itself to the provinces, and murder, pillage, and desola- Jealous of their popularity, instead of recompensing them for their | tion reigned on all sides. services, basely accused them of treachery and threatened them At length the cruelties of Mir Mahmood became a species of with death, from which they escaped to Kandahar. madness, but the Persians, utterly debased, did not attempt to Mir Mahmood was highly incensed at the defeat his troops sus- ~ deliver themselves from his frightful tyranny. In the midst of tained at Kasbeen, and not less so at the defection of the two these sanguinary scenes they lay prostrate at the feet of him who serdars ; he was also apprehensive that the Persian nobles whom had but yesterday deprived them of a father, a brother, a son, or a he had retained at his court might attempt to overthrow him or friend, and, while waiting till they received the same fate at his take his life, and thought, therefore, that, having merely a small hands, were vile and degraded enough to submit to be used as the body of troops to make a stand against a general revolt, terror instruments of his ferocious nature. But the torrents of blood thus alone could retain the Persians in obedience. Well convinced of shed brought no sense of security to Mir Mahmood, and his posi- this, he determined upon adopting the most barbarous measures, and, tion was certainly well calculated to inspire him with uneasiness. having succeeded in reconciling himself with Aman Ullah Khan, Thamasp Mirza had recently been acknowledged Shah by the turned that circumstance to account by making it the opportu- population of Azerbaidjan, and a party which began to be powerful nity for holding a great festival. To this he invited all the Persian in that province had pronounced in his favour, and threatened to dignitaries of rank and other persons of note in Ispahan, who, march, at no distant date, upon Ispahan. On the other hand, the anxious to please their new sovereign, and entertaining no suspicion Turks and the Russians, taking advantage of the distracted state of his villanous design, accepted his invitation, and arrived at the of Persia, had seized upon Armenia, Georgia, Guilan, Kurdistan, palace to the number of one hundred and fourteen, but, instead of and a part of Irak, and made further dispositions for advancing the banquet which they had expected, they found Afghan troops towards the south. The army of Mahmood numbered only at this posted in the royal gardens, who, in conformity with the orders they time a few thousand Afchans; it is true, their name alone was in had received, put them all to death. This horrible butchery accom- siself sufficient to make the conquered tremble ; but the ranks plished, the soldiers spread themselves over the city, and slaughtered, to the number of several thousands, the near relatives of the victims, as well as a great number of syuds and ulemas of the capital. Tt was only when this bloody tragedy had been played out that Mahmood’s fury was temporarily appeased. Two days after, five hundred youths, of the first families in the kingdom, and who within the walls of their colleges had escaped this massacre, were taken from thence into the country, and hunted down like deer, the Afghans piercing them through with their jereeds as they fled terror-stricken across the plain. Not long after, three thousand Persians, who had taken service in the tyrant’s army, experienced a similar fate; they were suddenly attacked at a banquet which he gave them, and, being unarmed, were exterminated to a man. Finally, he put to death every Persian who had held any em- ployment or received any favours from the Shah’s government. These horrible proceedings, which lasted during a month, plunged all the first families of the country into the depths of despair, and denuded Ispahan of half its population ; the carnage subsequently of these hardy and ferocious soldiers were daily thinned, and every- thing indicated that they would not be able to resist the storm which was gathering against them in the north. All these considerations, and the retirement of Mir Echreff, a chief beloved by the troops, led to much desertion amongst the Afghans ; the most devoted servants and the nearest relatives of Mir Mahmood fled from the effects of his tyranny, and he soon found himself isolated in the midst of his court. In this extremity he recruited his army with Kurds, who, as well as the Afghans, were Soonees, thinking that he could rely more upon them than upon the Persians, who were of the hostile sect of Shiahs. He thus raised a new army, with which, in 1724, he took possession of several districts in Irak and Fars, though Shiraz, the capital of the latter province, did not surrender until it had stood a siege of eight months and suffered all the horrors of famine. But the Afghan nation were not dazzled by these successes. Mahmood never regained their confidence, and such was the im- pression his actions had produced that the reinforcements he had incre RET. Sins ER A 5 pn SEES any. ee I m—_ == Br Sa ———— ATEEIIPT IO a PR OA e iw a — Dita 1 tt 2 ING 5 HO. Pls Sgr bo 1 gS v1 > Tn a ts . " - ioc A . PA — Ba y ’ By BT I agen omo or INT w Apr — EE i i v A K 54 MADNESS AND DEATH OF MAHMOOD. Cuar. V. Cuar. V. ACCESSION OF MIR ECHREFF. 5 haughtily demanded from Kandahar arrived but tardily, and amounted only to the tenth part of what he anticipated, for no one would serve a prince who had delivered them from the Persian yoke only to impose a more cruel and despotic tyranny of his own. The Serdar Mir Echreff was at the head of these troops, and they tunate father, hearing their cries, broke through the guards, and, rushing to the scene of carnage, endeavoured to protect them at the risk of his own life ; a blow from Mahmood’s dagger wounded him in the arm, and the sight of his blood alone recalled the Mir to himself, and induced him to spare two of the princes, still very 1 | insisted that he should be confirmed in his command as the abso- young, the only ones that escaped from this fearful massacre. His | lute condition of their services. Mir Mahmood the more readily insania was at length complete: to this were added an attack of \ complied with this request, because, having been abandoned by paralysis, a painful disease of the intestines, and want of sleep, and i his principal officers, the co-operation of his cousin had become an in this condition he sometimes tore pieces of flesh from his body, i i absolute necessity for him, not only to direct the military opera- and devoured them. His mother, as some say, in despair at his i tions, which, by reason of his bad state of health, he was unable to sufferings—or Mir Echreff, as others affirm, to obtain the power to } conduct, but also to retain in Persia, through his influence, many which he was called by the general wish of the Afghans—ordered by i Afghans who would otherwise have left the country. Ou the him to be smothered under the cushions of his own divan ; his re- | arrival of this reinforcement Mir Mahmood marched upon Yezd, mains were thrown to the jackals. But whoever gave the anion for / which he attempted to seize, but he was not fortunate in this the death of Mahmood, it is certain that this prince was still alive | enterprise. He issued orders to his troops which it was impos- when the Afghans acknowledged Mir Echreff as their sovereign. | { sible to execute, and derangement of his intellectual faculties The antecedents of this young soldier and his brilliant qualities, 5 was clearly manifested upon this occasion; his eccentricities were in no way inferior to those of his predecessor during the first years ! very nearly causing a revolt in his army, which, indignant at of his reign, raised great hopes of him in the minds of his subjects. the losses it had sustained without obtaining any corresponding } Accordingly, he applied himself earnestly to the task of mitigating success, obliged him to raise the siege and return to Ispahan. the misery inflicted by his relative, and expressed publicly the : This check soured and excited him, and his irascible nature horror he felt at the merciless deeds which had rendered the very was still more aggravated by the unreasonable demands of his name of Afghan odious; he paid the greatest honours to the re- officers, who were supported by the troops. Alarmed also at the mains of the sons of the Shah Sultan Hoosein by magnificent progress of Thamasp Mirza, the Russians, and the Turks, and a funeral rites, at the close of which he declared to the assembled prey to remorse, his mind was filled with visions of his victims Afghan and Persian nobles that he devoted the memory of Mah- ready to torment him, so that he abandoned himself to super- mood to the execration of future ages. In short, he did everything | stitious devotion in the most exaggerated form; he shut him- in his power to attach the Persians to his interests, and bestowed self up in a subterraneous cell, observing the strictest fast, and favours upon them, even to the detriment of the Afghans. The when, at the end of two months, he left this retreat, he was in such latter were not long in perceiving that they had chosen a master a state that he could scarcely be recognised. Livid, emaciated, who was quite determined to take every advantage of the power and his features contracted, he seemed to dread the light of day, they had just placed in his hands, for his first act was to put the and reappeared more fearful and more cruel than ever ; haunted by Serdar Aman Ullah Khan to death. This brave but ambitious the darkest suspicions, gloomy and taciturn, he shuddered at the ap- general of Mir Mahmood, as well as several other chiefs, had done proach of his best friends, dre: ading to find in every one an assassin. everything to prevent his election, and he was also suspected of During one of the paroxysms of his disease he was informed holding a secret correspondence with Shah Thamasp. No real A iii ————— at ma Sa | { that the sons of the Shah Sultan Hoosein had made an attempt to crime could be imputed to them, but Mir Echreff thought their deaths b.& i} escape, when, trembling with rage at this intelligence, he ordered necessary to his security. Ie confiscated to his own profit the hE f { | them all to be brought into his presence, and, drawing his poignard, wealth which they had accumulated during the conquest of Persia, i —EE RT 5 put thirty-one of them to death with his own hand. Their unfor- and this enabled him to meet the rtiredinie necessities consequent ee me my: Mua Re HEI TI, I Ji ya i mei RR PAE SSG EE Se 2 3 ma I Seman EO earl rp - = a SE ~~ ——— Ey ee ————— A Wan. Ae _ A meg 56 THE RUSSIANS AND TURKS. Cuar. V. upon his succession and the embarrassments that met him on all sides. Echreff entertained no delusions on the difficulty of his position. It was evident that he must put an end to the divisions amongst his own people, and obtain the confidence of the Persians; he had also to repel the invasion of the Russians, who had seized upon the Guilan ; that of the Turks, already masters of Georgia, the Azer- baidjan, Kurdistan, and part of Irak; and finally to subdue the party of Thamasp Mirza, which had been organised in the south of the Azerbaidjan and the Mazanderan. This prince was the only one of the three surviving sons of the Shah Hoosein, who was then in possession of his liberty : by the abdication of his father he con- sidered himself King of Persia, and had, as Shah, treated with the Russian and Turkish governments. To the first he had promised the cession of the provinces bordering on the Caspian; and to the second, the countries they had already seized, on condition that they assisted him in regaining the throne of his fathers. Agreeably to the terms of this treaty, which accorded so well with the views of territorial aggrandizement projected by the remarkable sovereign who then reigned in Russia, the army of Peter the Great disem- barked in the Guilan, and there established itself; and as every- thing denoted that the Russian generals did not intend to leave the positions they had taken up, Echreff’ turned his first efforts against the Turks. In his endeavours to establish peace he at first tried what he could effect by negotiation, offering to make great sacrifices to obtain that result. But the Sultan, Ahmed Khan, seeing the state of anarchy that reigned in Persia, determined to retain the provinces already mentioned ; the negotiations, therefore, were broken off, and he ordered Ahmed Pasha, the Walee of Bagdad, and Hoosein Pasha, the Walee of Mosul, with the troops under their command, to converge first on Kermanshah, and afterwards to concentrate them on Hamadan. These two towns were already occupied by detachments of the Turkish army under the orders of Abdul Rahman Pasha. The Walee of Bagdad, who had the com- mand in chief, was instructed to send a flag of truce to Mir Echreff directly his army had assembled at Iamadan, and impera- tively demand that the Shah Hoosein and his sons, at this time imprisoned in the fort of Teberruk, at Ispahan, should be set at liberty. He was also to insist upon the immediate evacuation of the Persian territory by the Afghans, as well as the restitution of — rm “ ” lit wt Cuar. V. ECHREFF DEFEATS THE TURKS. 7 (=) ] all the treasure they had laid their hands on during their occupation. The rejection of any one of these conditions was to be followed by a declaration of war.* And in this manner the matter terminated, for the Turkish envoy was unable to come to any understanding with Mir Echreff. Ahmed Pasha took the field with an army of 60,000 men and 70 pieces of artillery, and marched direct upon Ispahan. Echreff met him about four days’ march from the capital, his army not being half as numerous as that of the Turks, and very ill provided with artillery. A battle was fought at Kiemereh, a town situated between Ispahan and Boroodjird, and the victory was for a long time undecided, but at length the Turks were routed, leaving 12,000 men upon the field, and 50 pieces of cannon ; the baggage also fell into the hands of the Afghans. Echreff showed himself as great after the victory as he had been reasonable and moderate during the negotiations, and, retaining only the arms, returned all the booty his soldiers had made to the Turks. To Ahmed Pasha he wrote that he could not consider as legitimate spoils of war the plunder he had taken from misguided Mussulmans ; that his greatest desire was to live in peace with his brethren ; that he trusted the Sultan would not again disturb him in the possession of a throne which he had taken from heretics, and to which he had an incontestable right by every law, human and divine. This generous conduct, and the cession to the Turks of the districts of Tauris, Zinguian, Sultanieh, Tefrich, Ferahane, Kezaz, Kurdistan, Loo- ristan, and Koozistan, as well as admitting the religious supremacy of the Sultan, which Mir Echreff engaged to acknowledge in future, induced the Turks to make peace. This he ardently desired, for he had to contend with immeasurable difficulties ; and in these negotiations with the Turks, as well as his conduct in the field, Echreff displayed the talents of a consummate diplomatist and a first-rate general. He obtained from Turkey the formal recognition of his right to the throne of Persia : and the year following, the Sultan Ahmed Khan sent Reshid Pasha to congratulate the Afghan chief on his acces- sion to the throne. Echreff afterwards sent Mohamed Khan, a * Abdullah Khan, the historian of Herat, remarks in his manuscript, that is the only eastern authority which records the death of the Shah Sultan Echreff was so thoroughly indignant at the insolence of this message, that im- mediately after the receipt of it he ordered the Shah Hoosein and his sons to be beheaded in the presence of the Turkish envoy; but as Abdullah Khan Hoosein as having taken place at this epoch, I thought it right to mention the circumstance in a note, adopting myself the opinion more generally ac- credited.— Ferrier, & A SE a a RE UU II, Fs 3 Ps oy pn ps 58 EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. Cuar, V, Beloochee, to acknowledge the compliment, and he was received at Constantinople with great honours. In consequence of the treaty thus concluded between Echreff and the Sultan, the Prince Thamasp was left to his own resources ; and when the Turks entered the Azerbaidjan he evacuated that pro- vince, followed by a few devoted adherents. Subsequently to this he again took possession of Kasbeen and Teheran, and in these cities he resided alternately ; but no sooner had Echreff got rid of the Turks than he marched against and completely defeated the Prince, forcing him to retire into the Mazanderan. Nevertheless the troops of Thamasp refused to surrender Kasbeen and Teheran to the victor, who, called to Ispahan by the urgency of his affairs, left an army to prosecute the sieges under the command of the Serdar Seidel Khan Nassaree, who soon reduced these cities. While Echreft was courageously fighting in Persia to establish his power, he lost his hold upon Kandahar, which remained defini- tively in the hands of Mir Hoosein, a brother of Mir Mahmood, whom he had endeavoured to overthrow by an intrigue. In the Seistan, the governor Malek Mahmood, a descendant of the ancient Persian sovereigns, had taken the title of king, and subsequently seized upon the greater part of Khorassan. Herat had acknow- ledged his authority for many years past, so that the Afghans were driven out in this direction. These changes were the cause of further complications amongst the chiefs, between whom there was already anything but a good understanding. It was, therefore, evident to Echreff that there was no hope of his being assisted by his own nation, and that for the future he could reckon only upon those who had, up to this time, followed his fortunes. He now saw, without much regret, the Russians masters of the Guilan ; and when he was convinced that the posses- sion of that province would satisfy their ambition, and that they had no intention of disturbing him in Irak, he determined to act with the utmost energy in the East, where his affairs were much em- barrassed ; but before leaving Ispahan he ordered the quarter in which the Afghans resided to be enclosed with high and thiek walls, within which they would be secure against all the vicissitudes of war. Shah Thamasp, on the other hand, made every effort to recover the throne of the Seffavyes, and had the good fortune to secure the services of one of those extraordinary men that Nature produces only at long intervals. Nadir, subsequently Nadir Shah, Cuare. V, ECHREFF MARCHES AGAINST NADIR. 59 a powerful robber-chieftain, offered his services to the son of the Shah Sultan Hoosein, who accepted them with eagerness. The military reputation of Nadir, to which was now added the autho- rity derived from his position as commander-in-chief of the troops of the legitimate king, attracted numerous partisans to his camp, and he soon saw himself at the head of a large and well-disciplined army inspired by his own peculiar and energetic impulses. During the years 1726 and 1727 Nadir employed himself in reconquering that part of Khorassan which Malek Mahmood, the Prince of Seistan, had seized, and also in taking Herat ; after which he marched towards Mazanderan, that he might, in concert with his sovereign, adopt some plan for driving the Afghans from the kingdom. The capture of the city of Nishapoor, and the slaughter of 3000 Afghans, was the prelude to this enterprise. After this he dislodged successively all the Afghan garrisons in Khorassan, and drove them from post to post, until they had entirely evacuated this province, which soon acknowledged, and to the fullest extent, the authority of the Shah Thamasp. While Nadir was thus occupied, Mir Echreff seized upon Yezd, which had resisted the arms of Mir Mahmood: but the conquest was dearly bought, for he there lost his tried and veteran soldiers, the élite of his army. This was indeed a great misfortune, and, aggravated by the fact that, Mir Hoosein having declared himself independent in Kandahar, he was unable to fill up the casualties in his army with Afghans, who were no longer anxious to take service under him. Mir Echreff was, therefore, constrained to recruit his army with Persians, and march without further delay against Nadir, whose victorious battalions were daily augmented by men eager to deliver their country, and take a deep revenge for the odious tyranny under which they had groaned for six years. Mir Echreff had never been in such a critical position, and the measures of precaution which he took to protect his rear plainly showed the disquietude he felt; his soldiers participated in this feeling, they had lost all confidence in themselves, and it was under such apprehensions that they moved forward to meet the enemy. Shah Thamasp, impatient to recover his capital, was desirous that Nadir should march in all haste on Ispahan; but the prudent general respectfully but firmly declined to comply with his wishes, convinced that such a movement would be inopportune. Nadir felt confident that, if he kept his troops fresh, it would be easy for him 60 BATTLE BETWEEN NADIR AND ECHREFI. Cuar.V. to beat the Afghans, if they attacked him after a long forced march, exhausted by privations and fatigue. In acting thus he also had the advantage of choosing the ato on which To intended to give battle with removing Rom Mazanderan. The population of this province was entirely devoted to Shah T hamasp, and he could there- fore, in case of a reverse, effect his retreat in all security across the mountains, which offered at every step admirable positions for defence. The army of Echreff numbered 30,000 men, scarcely the half of which, at the utmost, were Afghans, and on coming up with the forces of the enemy he found them i in a well-chosen position on some small “hills selected by Nadir. The Afghans, never having seen the Persians hold their ground, were anxious to attack at once ; but Echreff, who had a higher opinion of his adversaries, repre essed, perhaps inopportunely, di impulse, which might have given hire the victory, and remained several days in a state of inaction. Tt was only when it became impossible for him to obtain supplies that he decided upon giving his adversary battle, and on the 23rd of Reby-i-ul akher, 6th of November, 1728, he took up a position in front of his army échelloned from Moomineabad to Boordj-meyoos, or Meimandoos. The latter place is situated about seven miles east of the town of Damghan, having the village of Naimabad on the west, and at the same distance from the village of Deh Mollah. The attack commenced along the whole line ; but the Persians received it with great steadiness, and, perfectly cool, waited till the enemy had advanced within half musket-shot before they poured in their fire. The Afghans fought with the courage and savage energy that was natural to them and the confidence of men accustomed to conquer ; but they were unable to make any impression upon their adversaries. Echreff, surprised at a resistance to which his troops were not accustomed, attempted to destroy Nadir’s order of battle by turning his left flank ; but the Persian commander, perceiving his intention, formed his infantry into squares, and routed in detail with his cavalry Echreff’s detachments, after which, leading the mass of his forces against the Afghan reserves, he put them to flight. * * Abdullah Khan states there were that this sovereign held them in great ten French officers, for the most part consideration, gave them the absolute belonging to the artillery, serving in authority over his troops, and that he the Persian army, and that his father, owed the greater portion of his success who was placed by Nadir under their to the faithful support which they gave special orders, had frequently told him him,— Ferrier, CHar, V, DEFEAT OF AFGHANS, 61 The Mir’s troops performed, indeed, prodigies of valour ; but they were unable to rally, and left 12,000 of their comrades on the field of battle. The Persians, who lost only 3000 men, followed the retreating enemy and came up with them at the defile of Khar, called also by the Persians Tingui-serdaree.* Here the Afghans allied and renewed the fight; but they were again defeated, and abandoned all their Pom to the victors—Nadir himself was wounded in this I engagement. The distance from the defile of Khar to Teheran is forty-five miles, and the remnants of the Afghan army reached that city in one day; they subse- quently pressed on to Ipsahan with all speed, spreading alarm, desolation, and death on their route. On their arrival there they hastened, with their families and their treasure, into the fortress which Echreff had constructed in the centre of the city ; but after having confided its defence to a garrison of picked men, the Afghan commander again took the field with his remaining troops, con- sisting of Afghans, Tartars, Kurds, and Ghebers, in all 20,000 men, marched to the north of Ispahan, and at a spot twenty-four miles from thence took up a position on a table-land in advance, and to the north-east of the village of Moortchekhor. There he waited for the Persians, over whom he still hoped to prove his superiority in arms. The Afghans were posted between the village and a trench which they had thrown up in front of their camp in the form of a demi-lune, their right resting on a watercourse and their left on a caravanserai difficult to take. Seeing them in so good a position, Nadir did not think it advisable to attack imme- diately : he wished to refresh his troops, and for this purpose pitched his camp about two miles west of the high road and round the village of Bagh-mirane. The reconnaissances which he ordered to be made on the Afghan camp having satisfied him that it could not be carried in front, he determined to turn the position, and taking advantage of a dark night, which occurred three days after his arrival, he found himself at the near approach of day in the rear of the Afghans, separated from them only by the village. Fortune, which favoured him at all points, again declared for him, for a violent wind arose and drove clouds of dust in the faces of * This spot is cited by several travellers, and with reason, as being the Caspian Pyles — Ferrier, 62 DESTRUCTION OF AFGHAN ARMY. Cuar. V. the Afghans, and, favoured by this circumstance, Nadir fell upon them with the same intrepidity and vigour which he had already displayed. The enemy, in despair, maintained an obstinate re- sistance ; but they had to do with men flushed with recent victories, which gave them the solidity of old soldiers. If the Afghans fought to preserve their conquest and their lives, the Persians were ani- mated by the remembrance of the injuries they had suffered, and were burning to avenge. The village was at length carried, and afterwards the entrenchments, in defending which 4000 Afghans found a soldier’s death. The survivors retreated in disorder to Ispahan, where each of them collected in the course of the night his most valuable effects, and at daybreak, accompanied by their wives and children, mounted on mules and camels, fled southward. Mir Echreff, furious at his reverses, put the Shah Sultan Hoosein and his two sons to death, and in a gloomy and savage mood was the last Afghan that left the walls of Ispahan. He carried with him all his treasures and jewels, and, with 12,000 horsemen still under his command, directed his course on Shiraz, from which city he hoped again to reassume the offensive against the Persians; but Nadir did not allow Echreff time to reorganise his army, and after a few days’ repose he was once more on foot, intending, if possible, to force him to evacuate the province of Fars. The Afghans ad- vanced to meet the enemy as far as Peulee Khan, a bridge over the Bendemir, ten miles south of Persepolis, and disputed with tenacity and fury the passage of that river; but they were again defeated and retired to Shiraz in the greatest confusion. Nadir doggedly pursued them step by step, invested the city, and informed the beleaguered host that, if Echreff was not delivered up to him within forty-eight hours, he would put every soldier to death, and with torture. The Afghans agreed to his conditions, on ascer- taining’ which the Mir prepared for flight, and, accompanied by two hundred brave men who remained faithful to his fallen fortunes, cut his way sword in hand through the investing army, taking in hot haste the road to Afghanistan—a portion of his army fell under the swords of the Persians, who gave their adversaries no quarter, and the remainder dispersed. As to Echreff, he was so rapidly pursued that he was obliged to abandon his baggage and treasure to avoid being made prisoner: his followers, seeing that they could no longer be of the least service, left him. When he reached the Seistan, rn IT Cuar. V, DEATH OF ECHREFF — REFLECTIONS. 63 he had only two servants with him, and they, as well as the Mir, fell by the hand of Abdullah Khan, a Belooch chief, who sent his head and two large brilliants which were found on him to the Shah Thamasp.* Thus terminated the dominion of the Afghans in Persia. If any individual was capable of maintaining it for a longer period, it was certainly Mir Echreff, who to extraordinary courage united great talents of every kind ; but the elements on which his power rested were too unstable for it to be possible that he could eventually come forth victorious from the conflict which arose between himself and the robber chieftain. This extraordinary invasion of Persia ended in the extermination of all those who had taken part in it— a just retribution for the crimes and atrocities with which they had sullied their cause. During the seven years that the Afghans held Persia, that empire lost more than a third of its population ; the soil remained without cultivation, the canals and watercourses for irrigation were dried up, and the greater portion of the public buildings completely destroyed. The invaders had to contend against a people enervated, effeminate, and devoid of every senti- ment of honour and national feeling; they triumphed, there- fore, by an obstinate determination to succeed, and, in spite of their inferiority in numbers, they did so. Such examples are, it is true, rare in history ; but the Afghans were better qualified to fight than to govern. To appropriate, wherever they went, and without any reason or pretext whatsoever, money or money’s worth, was their practice ; revolts and disturbances naturally ensued, and necessitated the employment of a large army. They were in the end weak- ened by twenty combats, and found it impossible to recruit in Afghanistan, except in the small and scarcely organised state of Kan- dahar, which ceased to provide them with further reinforcements ; they were, therefore, obliged to admit foreign soldiers within their ranks, whose fidelity was at least doubtful, and who rarely acted with vigour ; but they maintained themselves seven years in Persia, much more by the terror which their first victories and their cruelty inspired, than by the material means at their disposal. If Echreff vanquished the Turks, it was because he had the support of the * Several Eastern authors contradict this account, and assert that Echreff died of disease.— Ferrier. Pw i ld ie i TR SR M3 nF ES RNC te i Ba Rs te a i eas” 5 he 4 5 64 Persians, who detested them much more than they did the Afghans 3 and served voluntarily against the this unreal and unstable dominion four successive battles. Shunned turbulence and barbarity, tl m; but directly Nadir appeared, was dissolved and overthrown in and dreaded everywhere for their 1ey were repulsed on all sides, and found, Iter in those desert acked like wild beasts, ery and hunger, and it d Afghans ever returned with great difficulty, an asylum or even a she wastes ; the greater number of them were ia and killed like them, or perished from mis is doubtful whether more than a few hundre to their own country. REFLECTIONS. Cuar. V Car. VI. NADIR TAKES HERAT AND FURRAH., CHAPTER VIL Nadir takes Herat and Furrah — Marches upon Kandahar in 1737 — Admirable defence by the Ghildjzyes — Mir Hoosein capitulates — Nadir reduces Afghanistan — His policy in that country — Insurrection of the Afghans after the death of Nadir Shah — Expulsion of the Persians — Ahmed Khan Suddozye elected King — Hadji Djemal Khan — Revolt of the Serdars — Nasser Khan surrenders Kabul and Peshawur — Ahmed Shah marches against Lahore — Hayat Ullah Khan obtains the assistance of the Mogul Emperor — Admirable tactics of Ahmed Shah — Passage of the Tchenab — Ahmed Shah takes Lahore — Makes a treaty with the Mogul Emperor — Revolt at Kandahar — Execution of the conspirators — Ahmed Shah advances into Khorassan — Siege of Herat — Defence of the citadel by Emir Khan — Timoor Mirza marches against Meshed — Defeat of the Khorassian chiefs in that city — Meshed relieved by Shah Rokh — Defeat of Mir Alem — Ahmed Shah retires from Meshed — Besieges Nishapoor — Is obliged to retreat — Disasters of the Afghan army — Passage of the Heri-rood — The remainder of the army arrive at Herat — Ahmed Shah reaches Kandahar. IT not having been our intention to write a history of Persia, we shall not follow Nadir Shah in his wars with the Turks and other nationalities under the Persian rule, but proceed at once to speak of his campaigns in Afghanistan. After the victory at Shiraz Nadir reconquered in succession all the Persian provinces which had become detached from the empire. In the year 1730 he seized upon Herat, that city having revolted from his authority ; he also took Iurrah, a strong and very im- portant fortress, situated about one hundred and forty miles south of the first-mentioned place ; but he did not extend his conquests on that side, and it was only after having obtained several fresh vic- tories over the Turkss and imprisoned Thamasp, that he placed the crown of the Seffavyes on his brow. In 1737 he marched on Kan- dahar at the head of 100,000 men without meeting any resistance on his road, for the inhabitants submitted to his authority or fled at his approach. Nevertheless the population of the city, which had been considerably augmented by the influx of persons whom his victorious march had driven into it, prepared to resist the Persian invader. Mir Hoosein Khan, who was still in command there, reminded the Ghildjzyes of the struggle they had made for their indepen- dence, their victories over the Persians, and their conquest of that g Spied ea 66 SIEGE OF KANDAHAR. Cuar. VI. country ; and, being eloquent as well as brave, he easily succeeded in exciting them to make a spirited defence. The position of Kan- dahar was at this time very strong, the city being situated at the foot of a rocky mountain which flanked it on the north and east: innumerable stone towers, connected by curtains, surrounded it, and followed the sinuosities of the mountain, the summit of which was occupied by a fort, believed to be impregnable, and commanding the citadel, placed half way between it and the city. Nadir Shah, against whom no resistance had as yet been offered, was obliged to halt before these obstacles, to which art bad also added all that could render the defence effectual. Despairing of being able to take the city by assault, he established a strict blockade, hoping to reduce the garrison by famine; but it was in vain that he enclosed Kandahar within a double wall, between which his soldiers were sleltered from attacks both from within and without; a year and a half elapsed without his having obtained the least advantage against the city—however, he was more successful towards the country, for his detachments brought the whole of the environs under submission. When, therefore, he was master of the province, he resolved to carry the place, and ordered a general assault. The preparations for this had been most formidable, the bravery and devo- tion of the troops admirable, but, after a furious and desperate conflict of two days’ duration, Kandahar was not only not taken, but not one of the advanced works was carried, though several attacks against them had been made. A feeling of discourage- ment began to pervade the Persian army, when a newly-raised corps, of the tribe of the Bakhtyarees, which had already distinguished itself on several occasions by its firm and courageous bearing, ob- tained an advantage which raised the hopes of the rest of the troops, and induced them to redouble their efforts. dhough received with a storm of bullets, this gallant band had succeeded, by climbing the almost perpendicular rocks and clinging to their projections, in reaching a little plateau, from whence they were enabled to carry several towers on the north side of the mountain. Into these they managed, simply with ropes and their own strong arms, to raise some pieces of artillery, which opening their fire upon all the other towers, a breach was made, and in six hours the Bakhty- arees were in possession of them; the town and citadel were therefore obliged to surrender at discretion. Mir Hoosein Khan retreated into the fort on the summit of the mountain, where Am at rat Cuar. VI. NADIR’S POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN, 67 he successfully resisted every attack, and might still have made a protracted defence had it not been for the generosity of Nadir, who promised to spare his life, and give him high rank in his own army. This noble offer led to a capitulation, and Mir Hoosein afterwards became sincerely attached to the Persian invader, and one of his favourite generals. Once master of Kandahar, the Persian monarch took measures to consolidate his power, and, with a view of preventing the in- habitants from again offering a similar resistance, which their bravery, their means of defence, and the strength of the place might tempt them to do, he dismantled the fortifications, and trans- ferred the population to a new town which he built during the blockade at about a gunshot from the old city. But the new one was scarcely inhabited fifteen years, for immediately Ahmed Shah Suddozye came to the throne he built a third city, about one mile and a half further east, when the city of Nadir was deserted. To the conquests of Herat and Kandahar Nadir was not long in joining that of Kabul, and thus became master of the whole of Afghanistan. By great political ability, and more especially by the generous manner in which he treated the people and their chiefs, he completely secured their good will, and raised a contin- gent of 16,000 horse in that country. They were recruited amongst those who could claim descent from the Abdalees and the Ghildjzyes, twelve thousand being taken from the former tribe, and four from the latter: the chiefs of these tribes, to the number of ten, namely, eight Abdalees and two Ghildjzyes, had the command of these troops, the command in chief being given to Noor Mohamed Khan Alizye, one of them. This body of men accompanied Nadir Shah in all his expeditions, and participated powerfully in the successes and glory of that conqueror. They rendered him more especially a signal service, and certainly saved his army from complete destruction, when, on his return from India, he was engaged with the enemy in the mountains beyond Peshawur, and harassed on all sides by the Khyberrees. The Persian con- queror was in a most critical position on that occasion, and extri- ated himself only by paying a large sum of money by way of toll to the mountaineers who closed the defiles against him. In short, this contingent of the Abdalees and Ghildjzyes showed so much devotion to Nadir, and rendered him such important services, that he at length preferred them to his own troops, which led to great FZ €8 INSURRECTION OF THE AFGHANS. Caar. VI. jealousies on the part of the Persians ; and when Nadir was assas- sinated in 1747, they gave vent to their resentment, and attacked this favoured corps with fury. Being very inferior in numbers, the Afghans were obliged to consult thle own safety by a prompt retreat, and returned to their country under their own commander Noor Mohamed Khan, but they immediately took measures to deli- ver themselves from the Persian yoke, by no means a difficult task, for, after Nadir’s death, anarchy reigned in every part of the empire. The serdars who had served in the Persian army were, as we have already remarked, ten in number. Ahmed Khan Suddozye, descended in a direct line from Sudoo, who had been ambassador Shah Abbas the Great, was the most noble amongst them ; and Hadji Djemal Khan Mohamedzye, lineally descended from Mohamed, a companion of Sudoo in that embassy, was the most influential. Experience had clearly demonstrated to all these chiefs that the divisions amongst themselves, much more than the power of their enemies, had, up to that period, brought them under the subjection of the various invaders of their country ; and they swore therefore to remain strictly united, and adjourned for one month the completion of the code of laws which they had deter- mined to give to their nation. After the return of the Afghan contingent to Kandahar, they remained some days in the enjoyment of those social and family ties to which they had been for so long a time strangers, and their tur- bulent spirits took some repose ; but whether from a discontented feeling towards their chief, or intrigues which led them to rebel against him, they withdrew the chief command from Noor Mohamed Khan, giving as a reason that his origin was not sufficiently noble, After the fall of this personage the princ ipal serdars of the Abdalee and Ghildjzye tribes assembled in the tomb of Sheik Seurk, situated in the village of Nadir-abad, now Kichk-nookhood, thirty- five miles from Kandahar, to decide upon the best method of organising a regular government in Afghanistan. At this meet- ing it was agreed that a fusion of their nation with the Persians was henceforward impossible—that they ought to elect a chief taken from amongst themselves, who should be obeyed in all things, and assisted in giving that unity of purpose to all military opera- tions, and the civil administration, without which there was no chance for them to preserve their independence. This proposition was not agreed to without delay, and more especially without great Char. VI. AHMED KHAN SUDDOZYE ELECTED KING. 69 difficulty ; each tribe was anxious to advance the claims of its own candidate for the throne, and the good understanding between the chiefs who represented the tribes was far from being impressed with sentiments of a conciliatory or unselfish character. Almed Khan Suddozye, whose family lived at Herat, where he enjoyed great consideration, was present at eight of these tumultuous assemblies, and had listened attentively to all that had been said without offer- ing one word on the important questions which had been discussed. The dervish who had the care of the tomb of Sheik Seurk, and whose opinion was always received with respect, had remarked the reserved manner of Ahmed Khan, and the holy man, wearied with the interminable discussions and repetitions which had taken place during several days at these meetings, advised their breaking up the conference at once. “Why all this verbose talk ? 7 said he to the serdars; “God has created Ahmed Khan a much greater man than any of you; he is of the most noble of all the Afghan families. Maintain, therefore, God’s work, for his wrath will weigh heavily upon you if you destroy it.” After having pronounced these words in a most energetic manner, he took a handful of barley from an adjoining field, and, having formed it into a wreath, placed it on the head of Ahmed Khan, adding, “and may this serve as your diadem.” Hadji Djemal Khan, the most powerful of the serdars present at this meeting, and who appeared to have the greatest number of votes, immediately withdrew his pretensions in favour of Ahmed Khan, and supported his election with all the weight of his persuasive eloquence—conduct that obtained for him the general respect of the Afghans. The serdars, seeing that he who would certainly have been chosen their sovereign was so disinterested, followed the example thus given them ; but they separated well convinced that Ahmed Khan, who had been the most silent of them all, had also been the most clever in not allowing his claim to be advanced till the last moment, when the diversity of opinions had wearied the meeting, and, above all, in having these qualifications brought forward by a third person, which made him appear modest and disinterested, when they well knew he was neither the one nor the other. Ahmed Khan, who took the title of Shah, was crowned in the mosque at Kandahar towards the close of the year 1747, when there were great rejoicings, which were prolonged during several weeks. The ceremony of his coronation was of the most simple 70 AHMED MARCHES ON KABUL. Cuar. VL kind : the Mollah of the highest rank poured a measure of wheat on the head of the new monarch, announcing to the assembled Afohans that he was the chosen of God and the nation. This emblematical investiture of the regal power is followed at the present day amongst the Afghan tribes each time that they elect a chief; the signification which is attached to this ceremonial is that abundance and prosperity will result from the acts of Hira whom they make the depository of power. The Afohans were still in the midst of their coronation festivals when there arrived at Kandahar Eaghee Khan Chirazee, chief of the customs to Nadir Shah in Scinde and the Punjab, having in his custody two kooroors, 1,360,000L, in money, diamonds, and shawls. This Ahmed Shah seized and immediately distributed amongst the officers and men of his army and the employés of the government ; and this great liberality on his part did more for his future career than all his private virtues and his noble origin. Several tribes who had not as yet positively recognised his ceelion but the chiefs of which were on this occasion the recipients of Hs generosity, now attached themselves to his person, and he profited by this feeling of unanimity to consolidate his power, and during the first years of his reign to raise a large army, with which he subsequently marched on Kabul with a view to its capture. This was not so easy as an offensive operation, for Nadir Shah had settled twelve thousand Persian families in the Bala Hissar, the citadel of that capital ; but Ahmed Shah having, through his parti- zans, entered into a secret understanding with them, they made common cause with the Afghans on their arrival, under a promise 1 o} . . . . py . . . . > . . i that their chiefs should participate in the official appointments and advantages in the gift of the sovereign, and be treated in all things on a footing of equality. * : re Abinitonn No so §2 y 3s spite of this defection, Nasser Khan, the governor of Kabul, obstinately refused to recognise the authority of Ahmed Shah, and did everything in his power to recruit the garrison amongst the * The Persians inhabiting K: are > " 2 'S known by the name aa as Me 2 the hes ave ‘shen 4 3 iilbashes, kind of red cap; hence their name of because they form part of one or more ‘“ Red head,” Kezzel bash. The of the seven Turkish tribes that em- seven tribes were Oustadjaloo Chat ny braced the party of the Shah Ismail, Nikaloo, Baharloo Zoolkadder K 1008 the founder of the tribe of the Seffa- and Afchar.— Ferrier, hein Ran vyes. This sovereign, to distinguish Cuar. VL HAYAT ULLAH KHAN. 71 Hazarahs and Usbeks, but all in vain ; and despairing at length of being able to make head against the Afghans, he fled, after a feeble conflict, to Peshawur. Ahmed Shah then took possession of Kabul without meeting with the slightest opposition ; appointed as governor of the province a clever man devoted to his person and interests ; and left the city in pursuit of Nasser Khan, who, abandoned by the greater part of his followers and seeing clearly that a longer resistance could only end fatally for himself, surrendered Peshawur to the Afghans and submitted to their king. Ahmed Shah was aware that war was a necessity to the people over whom he reigned ; their turbulent nature, and the rivalry which oxisted between the various tribes, would certainly have led to grave disorders against the prosperity of the state and been dangerous to his rising power, if they had remained inactive. Besides, the king- dom of the Afghans was to be constituted, the limits and boundary of which had not up to this time been defined by any one. Ahmed Shah resolved to extend these limits wherever an Afghan tribe was to be found, and, in order to carry his views into effect, he remained no longer at Peshawur than was necessary to subdue and organize the tribes which inhabited the mountainous districts of that province ; and when he was convinced that there was nothing more to appre- hend from their opposition, he crossed the Indus and marched against Lahore. Hayat Ullah Khan, son of Zekeria Khan, honoured by Nadir Shah with the surname of Shah Nawaz Khan, who had succeeded his father in the government of this city, hearing the intentions of Ahmed Shah, assembled an army and took up a position at a little distance north of Lahore. He also wrote a letter to the Great Mogul at Delhi, Ahmed Shah Gourkanee,* informing him of the advance of Ahmed Shah Suddozye; the capture he had recently made of Kabul and Peshawur ; of his projects on Lahore, and those which he presumed he might have on India; and for these reasons claimed his assistance. The Mogul Emperor conceded all that he desired, and placed himself at the head of the troops destined to co-operate with Hayat Ullah. Immediately the Lahore chieftain felt certain of this he did not wait for their arrival, for, thinking that Ahmed Shah Suddozye, when he saw him so well supported, would * Gourkanee is the name of the tribe to which Tamerlane belonged, also Mirza Baboor and his descendants.— Ferrier. AHMED MARCHES AGAINST LAHORE. Cuar. VI. not dare to tempt fortune against him, he made a bold demonstra- tion in the hope of arresting his march, and moved his camp to the left bank of the Tchenab. The Afghans, however, neither halted nor delayed their onward movement as he had expected, and soon arrived in his front; but as the river was conside rably swollen, the two armies were obliged to wait till it had fallen before they could attack. The impatience of the Afghan monarch in particular was great, for he was anxious to engage his adversary before the Moguls, of whose expected arrival he was aware, had joined, but the want of pontoons obliged him to remain passive during several days. Directly his cavalry could attempt the passage of the river with any security he put the whole of that arm in motion at mid- night and in profound silence, and crossed at a spot a few parasangs above the enemy’s encampment. Ahmed Shah had conceived the idea of marching straight to Lahore, carrying the place by a coup- de-main, and baffling the vigilance of his opponent by leaving his infantry behind him on the right bank and in sight of the enemy. His anticipations were well founded, for the army of Shah Nawaz Khan, thinking they had still before them the whole of the Afghan forces, slept in fancied security. On the following day, however, the Governor of the Punjab learnt that Ahmed Shah was marching on the capital with his cavalry. Leaving therefore his infantry face to face with that of his opponent, he hastened in pursuit of their horse with his own, and came up with them on the following day half-way between the Tchenab and the city ; but having reconnoitred and found the enemy much superior in numbers, he did not dare to attack, and filed along his flank, protected by a chain of hills, south of which he expected to fall in with Gourkanee, who was marching to his assistance. The Afghan King saw clearly the movement of his adversary and divined his object, and, a fresh project having suddenly sug- gested itself to his mind, he permitted Shah Nawaz to make this retro- grade movement without offering any opposition to it; but when he supposed him to be at a good distance Ahmed returned by the road by which he had advanced, and fell upon the Sikh infantry on the left of the T'chenab, routed them completely, captured their artillery and a considerable booty. He then passed his own infantry over to the right bank of the river, and moved rapidly on Lahore, ‘which he seized without difficulty. Shah Nawaz Khan, ashamed of a flight which must be explained Cuar. VI. REVOLT AT KANDAHAR. : 73 to his ally by some reason or another, attempted to justify it by exalting to the highest degree the numbers, courage, and clever- ness of the Afghans ; this imprudent speech brought discouragement into the Mogul ranks, and their inclinations, which up to that period had been unanimous in favour of fighting, were transformed into an ardent desire for peace. After having fortified Lahore and confided it to the care of a picked garrison, Ahmed Shah Suddozye marched to meet Ahmed Shah Gourkanee, but he had scarcely traversed half the distance which separated him from the Mogul Emperor, when he was met by his envoy, who was the bearer of pacific proposals from his master. After long hesitation Ahmed Shah Suddozye decided for peace, for the chances of the war in which he was engaged were oreat ; his power was as yet in the bud; he was also not without uneasiness as to his rear, and even regarding the state of his own country ; he thought therefore that it would be imprudent on his part to risk his fortune on the uncertain issues of a battle, and therefore agreed that all the provinces in the Punjab which had been under the rule of Nadir Shah should remain in the hands of the Afghans, and should form the dower of a Mogul prin- © cess, who was some little time afterwards married to the prince Timoor Mirza IL, son of Ahmed Shah Suddozye. All the countries situated beyond the Sutlej on the left bank of the Indus remained in the hands of the Moguls, and the rivers before mentioned were to form the line of demarcation between the two empires. A treaty based upon this convention was sioned by the two parties in 1750; and the Suddozye prince, after having nominated governors in his new conquests, returned to Kandahar, where several Afghan serdars, jealous of the power of their sovereign and of the glory which he had recently acquired, secretly endeavoured to excite the masses against him. No sooner, therefore, had he arrived in his capital than they resolved to assassinate him, but the king, informed of this conspiracy a few moments only before the time at which they had fixed to carry it out, frustrated it entirely by his firmness and presence of mind. I'he leader in this plot was the same Noor Mohamed Khan, Alizye, who was removed from the command of the army when the Afghans returned from Persia, and upon whom Ahmed Shah had conferred the title of Mir or Prince of the Afohans ; his accomplices were Meuheubet Khan, Kedoo Khan, and several other Afghans of less note, who 74 SIEGE OF HERAT. (nar. VI. with him perished by the hands of the executioner, as well as ten men from each of the tribes most deeply compromised. These executions were the first which had taken place by order of Ahmed Shah, and many of the chiefs, being apprehensive that he might on some other occasion adopt the same severe measures against them- selves, disputed his right to inflict the punishment of death. After the executions were over they agitated the question whether or not the lex talionis should be applied to the Shah and his family ; they also wished to limit his power, or rather to subject it their approbation ; but Ahmed Shah suppressed with energy this feeling on the part of the chiefs, and his determination and justice goon produced tranquillity in the countries subject to his dominion. Reassured by this favourable result, he meditated the conquest of Khorassan, a project which he had conceived immediately he ascended the throne. At that period Shah Rokh, grandson of Nadir Shah, reigned in this province, where he had with difficulty established himself after great opposition on the part of the chiefs. His principal antagonist was Moomeen Khan, governor of Tchina- ran, who had even succeeded in taking possession of Meshed and induced the army to proclaim him Shah of Persia; but after having exercised the sovereign power for a few days only, he gave umbrage to the troops, who mutinied and put him to death. This event enabled Shah Rokh to reassume his rights; his satisfaction, however, was not without alloy, for several other chiefs who had the same object in view as Moomeen Khan spread anarchy and confusion in all parts of Khorassan. Ahmed Shah thought, ‘there- fore, that this was a most propitious opportunity for his purpose ; and in 1750 he marched into that province with an army of 70,000 men. Herat was then governed by the Arab Serdar Emir Khan an old commander-in-chief of artillery under Nadir Shah, who held the city in the name of Shah Rokh Mirza ; this chief, feeling that he was not strong enough to meet the Afghans in the field, placed the citadel in a good state of defence, and with a garrison of picked men retired within its walls. To the townspeople who were ready to defend the city he ordered that money, provisions, and arms should be distributed, and despatched a messenger to Shah Rokh Mirza requesting his prompt assistance. The inhabitants of Herat now sustained a siege for fourteen months in the most heroic manner, trusting always that this assist- ance, twenty times demanded, and as often promised by the prince, Bt or Sart - pa od Craze, V9. SHAH ROKH—MIR ALEM. 75 would at length reach them ; finding themselves, however, deceived in their hopes, and being reduced to the greatest distress, they sur- rendered at discretion and opened the gates. Emir Khan, who, from the citadel, witnessed the fall of the city, determined to make one last effort in its defence, and descended into the suburbs with his little band ; but being assailed in front by the Afghans and in the rear by some Heratees who were of their party, his soldiers were soon exterminated, and the Emir hacked to pieces on the spot. Fifty men whom he left in the citadel were the only troops that surrendered to the Afghans, and their lives were spared. Shah Rokh Mirza had been prevented from going to the relief of Emir Khan by circumstances which he could not control, for he was hardly able to maintain his own ground in Meshed, the pos- cession of which was disputed by a score of competitors. The general-in-chief, Yoosoof Khan, had at the outset beaten them all, but this chief, as brave as he was faithful, fell in a combat which took place between his troops and those of two princes of Khorassan. One of them, by name Mir Alem, belonged to an Arab tribe of the Seistan; the other, Djaffer Khan, was chief of the Kurdish colonies of Boodjnoord. These Khans, after the death of the brave Yoosoof Khan, seized Meshed and imprisoned Shah Rokh ; but when the moment arrived for dividing the authority and the plunder they could not agree, and, assisted by their respective parti- sans, came to blows. In this conflict Mir Alem proved the victor, and remained sole master of the city. After having obtained this ad- vantage he made every preparation to resist Ahmed Shah Suddozye, repaired the fortifications, provisioned the place, and after having confided its defence to the inhabitants, whom he believed he could trust, he left Meshed, determined if possible to pounce upon Herat. In this attempt he was disappointed, for, on arriving at Toorbut- Sheik-Jam, he was himself surprised by the prince Timoor Mirza, who, with the advanced guard of the Afghan army, was marching on Meshed. Recovering from the first feeling of astonishment at this untoward incident, Mir Alem attacked his adversary with the greatest intrepidity and made him give ground; but a charge of 3000 Belooch cavalry commanded by Nasser Khan, chief of Kelat in Beloochistan, carried disorder into the Emir’s ranks, and his army was cut to pieces. Mir Alem immediately gave up all idea of keeping Meshed, and retired in the direction of Ghain to his tribe. 76 SIEGE OF MESHED. Char. VI, Nasser Ullah Khan, the son of Shah Rokh, who was in the field with a small party of horse when he heard this good news, entered ji, delivered his father, and placed him at the head of affairs. nxious to terminate the object of his expedition sd Sh: now appointed Dervish Ali Ba, Hh to the a Herat, and, rejoining his advanced-guard with the rest of his troops, a few days afterwards arrived under the walls of Meshed, which he invested on all sides, and vigorously besieged. is attacks were, however, repulsed with energy, and he suffered during several months considerable losses that were not compensated by any cor- responding success. In spite of the vigilance and the discipline which Ahmed Shah maintained, a night rarely passed without his being surprised by Nadir ‘Mirza or Nasser Ullah Khan, who, at the head of a few select horsemen, came down upon the Afohan camp when they were least expected, and did not retire until they had placed a good number of their adversaries ors de combat. Asiatic armies have no conception how to protect themselves from night attacks by placing main guards, pickets, or videttes; so that Alined Shah’s forces were always surprised by these onsets, which, being cleverly conducted, annoyed them much. Mamech Khan Zider ranloo, governor of Tchinaran, who had attached himself to the fortunes of the grandson of Nadir, gave him also very useful support ; he supplied the town with provisions, his cavalry made daily attacks upon the rear of the Afghans or pillaged and laid waste the environs of the city and their camp. Although the besieg- ing army amounted to an effective force of 60,000 men, they wow never able to overpower, or even seriously to check, this handful of cavalry, who dealt such heavy blows and numbered not more than a thousand men. Matters remained in this state during four months, after which Ahmed Shah, who had not expected iy meet with so obstinate a resistance, finished by listening to the proposi- tions that were made with a view to an amicable arrangement, and consented to raise the siege of Meshed on condition that his son Sindjar Mirza, who had remained a prisoner with the Persians after the death of Nadir Shah, should be restored to him. Several of Ahmed Shah’s relations, whom Emir Khan had carried away from Herat where his family resided, were also to be given up, and on the receipt of a large sum of money the Afghan king agreed to retire from before the place. Re These conditions having been duly fulfilled, Ahmed Shah, with- CHar. V1. DISASTERS OF THE AFGHAN ARMY. mT out troubling himself about his rear, proceeded at once to lay siege to the fortified city of Nishapoor, situated in a plain exceedingly fertile, where his army could easily find subsistence. This town was then governed by two persons of equal authority—one, Abbas Kooli Khan, of the tribe of Beyat, which numbered 10,000 families, residing around Nishapoor, and on which he relied for support ; the other, Hadji Seif Eddin, a native of the city; and both determined to offer a stout resistance. ‘Ahmed Shah was satisfied by simply investing the place, deferring the siege to a later period, when, according to a promise made him by the latter, he hoped to be able to obtain possession of the city. For himself, said this personage in his letter to the Afghan monarch, he laid down his arms the very day of Ahmed Shah’s arrival ; but he added that it would require some time before he could overcome the obstinacy of Abbas Kooli Khan, who had decided upon fight- ing. In thus acting the cunning Hadji was only desirous of gaining time, and the Afghan sovereign was his dupe, for he negotiated and temporised so long, that the winter set in before he had opened his trenches ; the snow fell heavily, the army were soon in want of provisions, and cold and hunger cruelly decimated the troops. At length the severity of the season was such that the beasts of burden perished, and the Afghans were compelled to abandon their tents, baggage, ammunition, and artillery. After having destroyed the former and spiked the guns, they threw them into the kariz, or subterranean aqueducts, communicating with the surface by shafts, and then retreated, leaving a long line of corpses and baggage-animals on their track. Another division of their army, which had been detached against Ali Murad Khan, the chief of Tubbus, was also nearly exterminated ; those who escaped the sword succumbed in their flight to the severity of the weather ; and such was the intensity of the cold that at the halt made at Kiaffer Kaleh 18,000 of Ahmed’s soldiers died in one night, and on the following day very nearly the same number perished in attempting the passage of the Heri-rood, near the town of Kussan. The river was frozen, but it gave way under the crowd of fugitives, who were swallowed up in the icy waters ; those who had retreated by other roads were scarcely more fortunate. The Serdar Djummeh Khan, who held a command in this expedition, left a short sketch of it, and one of the incidents that he relates is worthy of mention, as it appears to us unique in history. He assures us that, in order ———————— —— > ————— — ne 78 THE AFGHANS REACH HERAT. Cuar. VI. to preserve himself from the excessive cold, and therefore from death, which was the certain consequence, only one way suggested itself, which he adopted; this was, to disembowel some of his camels, in the inside of which, enveloped in a blanket, he each night took up his quarters, and in this way he passed from one to an- other as they got cold, killing seventeen between sunset and sunrise. The disasters of this retreat continued until the wretched remnants of the Afghan force reached Herat, at which time all that remained of Ahmed Shah’s brilliant array of troops were a few miserable beings more resembling skeletons than soldiers. A few days after his arrival in the city, Ahmed Shah perceived that the governor, Dervish Ali Khan, profiting by his distressed position, was in- triguing to seize his person and raise himself to power upon his ars Wp ; but Ahmed, anticipating his intention, ordered him 0 be arrested and thrown into prison inting his son Ti Mirza governor in his stead ; on left a — er 0) ) lew of recruiting his army. Cuar. VIL SECOND SIEGE OF NISHAPOOR. CHAPTER VIL Second siege of Nishapoor by the Afghans — Clemency of the victor — He invests Meshed — Battle of Kakhak — Death of Ali Murad — Capture of Toon and Tubbus — An ambuscade — Treaty with Shah Rokh — Ahmed Shah retires to Herat — Campaign against the Usbeks—Beghee Khan seizes Balk, Khulm, &c.— Assad Khan Ghildjzye — His successes in Persia — Defeat of Kerym Khan — Assad Khan is attacked in the mountains — Last attempt of the Afghans to annex Persia — Nasser Khan, Belooch, revolts — The combats of Pringuez and Mestook — Siege of Kelat — Favourable terms made by Nasser Khan — Ahmed Shah proceeds to India — Insurrection of the Mahrattas — Ahmed Shah Gour- kanee deposed — Assassination of Alemguir — Ghazi Khan seizes the throne of the Moguls — Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, reaches Lahore — Marches on Delhi — Shooja ed Dooulet — Passage of the Bar — Desertion of Delaver Khan and Zal Beg — Shah Alem cedes his rights to the English — Revolt in Kandahar — Abdul Khalek Khan — Abdullah Khan suppresses the insurrection — Ahmed Shah marches on Peshawur — Arrives at Kandahar —Zal Beg is executed — Delaver Khan flies to Herat — Timoor Mirza is made viceroy — Ahmed Shah’s reasons for this — Death of Ahmed Shah — Yaghoot Khan — The Serdars declare for Suleiman Mirza — Character of Ahmed Shah. In the following year, namely, in 1751, having completely repaired his disasters, Ahmed made a second inroad upon Kho- rassan. Every cavalry soldier carried with him two battements* of iron for casting shot, which were placed in store directly he arrived with his army under the walls of Nishapoor. The siege of this city was now pressed with great energy ; the Afghan monarch cast a gun upon the spot, which threw a projectile weighing 472 1bs. English, and one month was employed in casting, boring, and placing this monster gun on its carriage. When fired it produced a most terrible effect, the walls and houses being pierced through and through, but it burst the very first time it was used. The citizens of Nishapoor, ignorant of that fact, were so terrified by the destruction which this single bullet occasioned, that they despatched several of their chiefs to Ahmed Shah to inform him that they surrendered at discretion. Abbas Kooli Khan, who held the citadel, refused however to acknowledge this surrender, and attacked the Afghans at the moment they were on the point of entering the city ; but he was repulsed in an instant, and reduced to the alternative of soliciting in person the clemency * A battement of Herat is equal to 6 1bs. English.— Ferrier. bE —————— A ——— RO 80 BATTLE OF KAKHAK. Crap. VII. of the conqueror. Ahmed Shah detained him as a prisoner in his camp, and he subsequently accompanied him to Kabul : the Afghan conqueror, having perceived in this chief very considerable talents, and a frankness of disposition in which he thought he could confide, gave him his sister in marriage; he also bestowed one of his daughters on Abbas Kooli’s son, after which he sent him back to Nishapoor, as governor of that city. Having thus satisfactorily established his power there, Ahmed Shah, thinking he had cause of complaint against Shah Rokh Mirza and his sons, who had been hostile to him in his second campaign in Khorassan, again laid siege to Meshed. Contemporaneously with this movement he detached a corps of cavalry under the orders of the Serdars Jehan Khan and Nasser Khan of Kelat, to subdue the districts of Toon and Tubbus, and take revenge for the defeat which the Afghans had sustained during the preceding year at the hands of Ali Murad Khan. These Serdars commenced operations by devas- tating the country, after which they marched against the governor of Tubbus, whom they met at Kakhak, a small village situated near Gourmabad, and there fought one of the most obstinate and bloody battles that is to be found in the annals of Persian history : such was the tenacity and fury of the combatants, that, when ammunition failed on both sides, they dismounted from their horses, and, drawing their sabres, did not cease to strike till the death of Ali Murad, who arrived at the close of the conflict ; this determined the issue of the battle, and the remainder of his men, for the most part of Arab tribes, took to flicht. Much of the credit of this victory was more especially due to the bravery of Nasser Khan and his Beloochees, who behaved like heroes, After this the Afghans took possession of Toon and Tubbus, and committed every kind of excess upon the inhabitants of those towns: fire and sword did their work, and to these were added viola- tion, murder, pillage, and devastation; in which having indulged sufficiently, they again joined the royal camp, carrying with them a considerable booty. While the serdars of Ahmed Shah were obtaining these successes, that sovereign pressed on the siege of Meshed with vigour, but he had, up to this period, been scarcely more fortunate than in the preceding year. The inhabitants, animated by religious fanaticism, defended themselves with intre- pidity, and the Afghans suffered heavy losses in their encounters with the enemy ; their resources also diminished daily, and provi- Cnar. VII. AHMED’S TREATY WITH SHAH ROKH. 81 sions became very scarce, which obliged Ahmed to detach 2000 of his cil y in the direction of Subzawar and Shah Rood Bostam, to procure supplies. In this enterprise they perfectly succeeded, and were returning to camp with 2500 beasts of burden laden with plunder, which had greatly encumbered and delayed them, when on reaching the halt of Abbasabad the foragers fell into an ambus- cade, in which were po-ted 1500 Kadjar horse from the environs of Asterabad, who fell upon and completely routed them. A great number of Afghans were killed or made prisoners in this affair ; the plunder fell into the hands of the Kadjars, and the survivors, numbering scarcely a thousand, regained the Afghan camp. Ahmed Shah, seeing that his efforts to take Meshed would prove ineffectual, and fearing that the winter, vhich was now approach- ing, might cause a repetition of the disasters of the preceding one, accepted the terms offered him by Shah Rokh Mirza. These were, that Ahmed should leave him in quiet possession of Khorassan and support him against the ambitious chiefs of the province, on con- dition that Shah Rokh should acknowledge his suzerainty, that money should be coined in his name, firmans and other official documents bear his seal, and the districts of Toorbut Sheikh Jam, Bakharz, Toorbut-hai-dariech, and Khaff, be made over to him. A treaty, drawn up on this basis, was signed by the two contracting parties, after which Ahmed Shah, thinking that the power which he had thus consolidated was a sufficient guarantee against the ambitious projects of Assad Khan, an Afghan chief, of whom we shall have occasion to speak hereafter, returned to Herat, where he occupied himself in carrying out numerous reforms in the army and administration. It was from hence that he sent Beghee Khan, one of his viziers, with an army to subdue the countries beyond the Oxus, inhabited by Uzbeks, Hazarahs, and a few Afghan families, who had not yet acknow- ledged his dominion. After having engaged in several combats, but not very serious ores, Beghee Khan seized upon Meimana, Andekhooye, Akhcheh, Shibbergan, Serpeul, Balkh, Khulm, Badakshan, and Bamian: he organized the various districts he had conquered ; and having appointed governors, with whom he left troops to keep the inhabitants in awe, he returned to Kandahar, where Ahmed Shah had previously arrived, and this sovereign, to recompense Beghee Khan for the services he had rendered him, added to his title of vizier that of Sedre-azem. G | | TS Tm DEFEAT OF KERYM KHAN. Cuar. VIL It has been mentioned that in isolating Khorassan Be Ly and placing the former under the authority of Shah okh : i his vassal, Ahmed Shah acted with a view of in in against the projects of Assad Khan, an Afghan Ser os 0 oe : : of the Ghildjzyes. After the death of Nadir this Ser RN : ee : fortunate enough to maintain his authority in the Azer an, g ; which province he was governor. He was a man of Te : : To 4 brave, and more enlightened than are ordinarily the Ha ih % his nation ; and his justice, his equitable views, and the per a 1 y which he manifested in favour of the sect of Shiahs, drew SR him a ereat number of partisans. Seeing his power and pou 7 y thus increased, he declared openly his pretensions to a of Irak, Khorassan, and even proposed to push on to as s and dethrone Ahmed Shah, whom he considered pani per oe in his opinion the throne belonged by right to 3 $ he! : ; i of Ghildjzyes: but he was arrested in his march ust a 3 recalled to Irak, by serious events that occurred in 17 3 ry 3 Khan, of the tribe of the Zends, after having made His Sule acknowledged in Fars and the other southern provinces a big “a took advantage of the hatred which their pas elt ir everything that bore the name of Afchan, to aise a oe 20 : and with this he marched against Assad Khan, Ww ith Som o forcing him beyond the Persian border. Plhis chief, w 0 i) already advanced as far as Damghan, retraced his steps, net antagonist at Kasbeen, attacked him immediately, and with Se effect, that Kerym Khan was completely beaten, and im 3 pursued, that he was obliged to abandon Ispahan and S oh without being able to offer even the slightest redsipniee. » subsequently retired to the mountams im the south of Pon " chelter himself from further pursuit 3 and discouraged y t 1e reverse he had just experienced, was on the pomt of seeking refogs in India to enjoy the repose he so ardently desired, when he was dissuaded from taking this step by Roostem Sultan, the chiet of the district of Khecht. This chieftain informed Kerym Khan that Assad Khan had committed the imprudence of entangling himself healt in the defiles which led to his place of retreat; that this ill-judged movement would infallibly lead to his destruction, because the country people, who were on the side of the Zend chief* and i 1 : i » SM ry ph a ) hy # Of the army of Assad Khan one-third were Afghans, and the other two Geor gians, Kurds, and Turks of Azerbaidjan, —Ferrier. Cuar. VIL ATTACK ON ASSAD KHAN. 83 detested the Afghans, were acquainted with all the advantages and difficulties of the ground, and, profiting by such knowledge, would make the narrow gorges and defiles through which the latter were marching a last resting-place for his enemies. Convinced by this reasoning, Kerym Khan decided upon renew- ing hostilities, and placed his troops under the orders of Roostem Sultan, giving him full power to act as he thought fit; accord- ingly this chieftain halted for Assad Khan at the defile of Kooma, which extends about a mile and a half along the summit of a high mountain, and through this the Afghans could only advance in single file. The Persians placed themselves behind the fragments of rocks which lay scattered along the pass, and waited till the enemy occupied it from one extremity to the other before they attacked, when, with a perfect unity of action and inconceivable energy, they fell upon the whole line. Every shot from the long match- locks of these expert marksmen carried death into the Afghan ranks, while their bullets fell harmlessly against the rocks, behind which their adversaries had ensconced themselves. All those who could escape from this hornet’s nest endeavoured to make good their retreat and regain the plain, but here they found fresh opponents, who had turned the position and attacked them with fury. It was in vain that Assad Khan tried to rally his troops and renew the fight ; his efforts were unavailing, and he was obliged once more to retire. A few days after, while continuing this re- trograde movement, he was overtaken by Mohamed Hoosein Khan, Kadjar, another aspirant to the Persian throne, when the remainder of his army was destroyed, and Assad Khan only escaped with his life by seeking refuge in Bagdad. Not meeting here with the sup- port he expected, he passed on to Georgia, where the Prince Hera- clius gave him no better reception; and worn out and dispirited by his many disappointments and personal sufferings, and being without a hope of success, he finished by making his submission to Kerym Khan, who gave him high rank at his court and treated him with every consideration. Assad Khan remained to the end faithfully attached to Kerym Khan, and this was the last attempt made by the Afohans to seize the throne of Persia. Ahmed Shah experienced some disquictude in seeing Assad Khan thus submit to the Persian monarch, but Kerym Khan, having plenty to do in maintaining the tranquillity of his own kingdom, never again made the slightest hostile attempt to annex Afghan- \ ) a 4 a Rm SEE a fs al Ce d——"r- Br —— A — AA Ai 84 REVOLT OF NASSER KHAN. Crap. VII. istan to Persia: it was however believed at Kandahar that he was no stranger to the revolt of Nasser Khan, chief of Kelat and Belosdkinan, of which we shall have occasion to speak. Subsequently to his return from Khorassan Ahmed Shah had been under the necessity of proceeding three times to India, as well to establish his authority in the Punjab, where great agita- tion, fomented by the Mahrattas, was almost permanent, as to curb the turbulent spirit of that people, who were not less un- manageable than the Afohans. Nasser Khan had taken part in all these expeditions, and distinguis hed himself in each of them: he had recognised the suzerai mty of Ahmed! Shah from the time he ascended the throne, and had alw ays been well treated and gener- ously recompense »d by that sovereign; but nevertheless the Belooch chief revolted against him and proclaimed his own independence in 1758. Ahmed Shah exhausted every means of ? onciliation towards Nasser Khan, whom he esteemed, without being able to bring him back to his allegiance, and at length sent a division of his army against him, but the chief, who had been for some time prepared for this crisis, was not intimidated, and directly he was informed of the arrival of Ahmed’s troops ho marched to meet them. A battle was fought near the village of Pringuez, situated about seventy miles from Kelat, in which the Afghans were completely beaten, and obliced to retire to a distance of thirty miles from thence. The Serdar in command immediately despatched a messenger to the king to demand re inforcements, and Ahme d, fear- ful lest axech a check, thoug! 1 of little consequence in itself, hill acquire importance from the exaggerated manner in which the circumstances might be detailed to the tribes recently subdued, put himself at the head of this second division, and hastened to the support of his d'scomfited troops. Nasser Khan, assailed by him near the camp of Mestook, situat ed three miles and a half from Pringuez, was defeate d, and obliged to retire in all haste to Kelat: this town he had previously plac «d in a good state of defence, and within its walls he now took refuge. Ahmed Shah followed him close and invested the place; the position of the citadel on an eminence was exceedingly strong, and this circumstance, and the want of unanimity that existed amongst the Afcohan serdars, were the causes that le d to a protracte .d siege, and eventually to no advantageous result. It was in vain that assaults were made on five different ®casions ; they all failed, because the various chiefs Cuar, VIL THE MAHRATTAS. 85 W ould not, and did not, support each other ; and at length the Shah perceiving he could gain nothing by prolonging the conflict pote sented to a treaty which replaced Nasser Khan under his pri rainty, and obliged him to furnish a contingent of troops on every occasion that the Afghan monarch made war beyond the boundaries of his kingdom. In this case the chief of Kelat was to receive a sum of money and munitions of war every time he took the field. Nasser Khan also stipulated that he should not be compelled to furnish such contingent for the sake of supporting this or that Suddozye chief, or their successors of that or any other tribe, or ; ll car th a : . be obliged to take part in the internal quarrels that might arise amongst the Afghans themselves. This was the only condition bearing the charactor of vassalage imposed upon the Belooch chief, who was now exempted from the tribute which he had previously paid to Ahmed Shah ; and in order to make the treaty more binding the king married a cousin of Nasser Khan's, after which he retur ned to Kandahar, and he was shortly obliged to leave for India to put down the troubles which had again broken out owing to the intrigues of the Mahrattas. This people incited the population to revolt, and seized the country, which was the appanage of the Mogul Princess, the wife of Timoor Mirza. : i “The Mahrattas,” remarks Sir John Malcolm, “ became formid- able in the reign of Shah Jehan, and during thirty years that Arungzebe passed in the southern provinces of his empire his chief occupation was to subdue the Mahrattas ; but this he found impos- sible, for they never awaited his attack. The country was laid waste and his troops continually harassed by men who, from the lightness of their frames, were no burden to their horses, and who from habits of hardihood and abstemiousness, required little dither for shelter or support. It seemed in vain to war with a foe who was intangible, and whose glory lay in the rapidity of his retreat ; for the Mahratta soldier, though brave, boasts more of his power to elude than to attack his enemy. When the empire of India fell to pieces at the death of Arungzebe, and Mahomedan princes and nobles were all ranged against each other, the Mahrattas, by con- tinuing united, made a rapid and surprising progress. Besides the great possessions which they actually occupied, they had compelled not only the paramount sovereign of India, but almost every ruler of a province, to pay them a considerable part of their annual col- TPE rms rh se NCP STC ETT ae a TE er AT 86 AHMED SHAH REACHES LAHORE. Cuar. VIL lections,* that their habitations and fields might remain in safety. At the period when Nadir threatened invasion, the city of Delhi itself was subject to this disgraceful tribute.” + The disgraceful tribute of which Sir John Malcolm here speaks was agreed to by the Indian princes at the period when Ahmed Shah marched against the confederation of the Mahrattas, and the latter used all the influence they possessed in the various princi- palities of India to force those princes to send their contingent of troops to take part in the war in which they were about to engage against the Afghans. : Ahmed Shah Gourkanee, the sovereign of Delhi, had been de- posed in 1753 by his vizier Ghazee Khan, and that functionary placed his nephew Alemguir on the throne in his stead. This prince, utterly destitute of ability, was assassinated by Ghazee in 1760, when the usurper seized upon the sovereign power himself ; and Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, heard of this event a few days before he arrived at Mooitan, as well as of the junction of the Mogul troops with those of the Mahrattas. : The various populations of India had been in an unsettled state ever since Nadir Shah seized upon Delhi; but at the death of Shah Mahmood, emperor of the Moguls, anarchy was rampant. The princes of India, tributaries of the Mahrattas, ardently desired to deliver themselves from the yoke imposed upon them by this confederation of plunderers, and Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, sent secret emissaries to their courts in order to work upon and strengthen this feeling. With a view of giving them time to do this he advanced but slowly, and occupied himself in organising the territory which he had recently conquered in Scinde and Mooltan. He then entered the Punjab, which the Mahrattas evacuated at his approach without fighting, so that he arrived at Lahore unopposed, and there he encamped. The Indian princes obeyed the injunctions of the Mah- rattas, and, in spite of the intrigues of Ahmed Shah, sent their several contingents, which, when united, formed an army of 200,000 men, of which 70,000 were cavalry, supported by twenty pieces of artillery of large calibre and 200 zimbooreks. : : Ahmed did not take the field until the whole of this formidable * This was levied under the various + Sier Musakhereen. names of Choute, Desmokee, &c. Cuar. VIL SATTLE OF PANIPUT. 87 army was assembled in the environs of Delhi. He then advanced to meet it, and came up with the enemy on the banks of the river Bar ; but in consequence of the depth of that stream and the want of pontoons, he was obliged to wait a few days until the water had subsided. This was all the more disadvantageous to him, inasmuch as he could only obtain provisions for his troops on the side occupied by the enemy ; and as the Mahrattas were vigilant in watching the fords which they fortified, the Afghans soon felt the effects of a scarcity in their camp ; some of them murmured loudly, and others prepared to desert, when a fortunate occurrence, the result of the clever policy of their sovereign, took place, which, producing abundance at once, revived their hopes. Shooja-ed-Dooulet, the Prince of Lucknow, had submitted to the Mahrattas only because he could not avoid it, and, suddenly leaving them, proceeded to the Afghan camp, followed by several other Indian rajahs and 25,000 men, which made the effective force of Ahmed Shal’s army 85,000 men—45,000 being cavalry and the remainder infantry—with seven- teen pieces of cannon and eighty zimbooreks. There were about 10,000 non-combatants in the Afghan army, whereas in that of the Mahratta confederacy one-third might be set down as belonging to that class, such, for instance, as servants, sutlers, drivers in charge of oxen, ponies, camels, &c., and thus not more than from 100,000 to 110,000 troops could be brought into position. ; Shooja-ed-Dooulet, having provisioned the Afghan army, and overcome the hesitation of the Serdars, who considered the passage of the river as a thing impossible, it was resolved to give battle. On the 7th of January, 171, therefore, Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, ordered the Serdar Samut Khan, Yoosoofzye, to cross the river with 5000 ca- valry and attack the Moguls—which order he promptly obeyed ; but the greater portion of his horsemen were carried away by the rapidity of the current, and the fire of the enemy’s artillery made such havoc amongst them, that the survivors remained in a state of indecision. Ahmed Shah, perceiving this corps required support, sent two others to its assistance ; but the Serdars Delaver Khan, Isakzye, and Zal Beg, Popolzye, who commanded them, and who were at variance with Samut Khan, did not heartily execute the order they had re- ceived, and allowed Samut’s troops to be cut up. The king saw the state of affairs at a glance, and, alive to the least thing that might compromise him as to the issue of the conflict, mounted his horse FF A ES a ER pr. a HS RE 88 DEFECTION OF SERDARS. Cuar. VII. and plunged into the river, followed only by his guards. The Serdars commanding the divisions which had remained immovable were now obliged to advance, for the troops were ashamed to see their sovereign braving death while they remained passive spectators of the combat. The Mahrattas redoubled the fire of their artillery to repulse this attack, and this was so terrible that the surface of the river was covered by the corpses of men and the carcases of horses, and its waters became crimsoned with their life-blood. But the Afghans gained at length, though with heavy loss, the opposite shore, and with hearts burning for revenge fell upon the enemy, whom they finally put to the rout; 20,000 of them remained on the field of battle, also their artillery and baggage, and the victors obtained a rich booty. This memorable and bloody battle was fought on the plains of. Paniput, a few parasangs north of Delhi. Shooja-ed-Dooulet had up to this time formed but an icor- rect estimate of the bravery of the Afghans; but after having been an eye-witness of it, and remembering that they were not very conspicuous for their notions of gratitude, and might perhaps be wanting in that which they owed to him, he regretted that he had assisted them—nevertheless he remained faithful to his new ally ; as to Delaver Khan and Zal Beg, who had not obeyed the order of Ahmed Shah to march to the assistance of Samut Khan, and feared his anger, left the camp by stealth, taking with them their men, even before the issue of the day was known. The king, without making himself very uncasy at this defection, continued rapidly to advance, and seized upon the Mahratta country, after which he passed into the Mogul territory, when the usurper Ghazee Khan, seeing his kingdom invaded, determined to obtain, if possible, the mediation of Shooja-ed-Dooulet, and thus make his peace with Ahmed Shah. The Prince of Lucknow was not averse to under- taking this negotiation ; but on condition that GGhazee Khan, as in duty bound, should surrender the crown to the legitimate sovereign, and further pay an enormous contribution to the expenses of the war. These severe terms having been accepted, Ahmed was desirous of placing Shah Alem, the son of Alemguir, on the throne, and, upon his refusal to be reinstated in his rights, his son Jehan-booglt, as yet only a child, was raised to the musnud. Matters at Delhi having been thus settled, Ahmed Shah pro- ceeded in the direction of the Punjab to maintain order there, and Cuar. VIL REVOLT IN KANDAHAR. 89 was preparing to march to the southern provinces of India when he learnt that the Mahrattas had moved upon Delhi. He returned, therefore, in haste to the support of his new ally, whom he had the good fortune to save from the danger that menaced him, for the Mabhrattas retired at his approach. Whether Shooja-ed-Dooulet had really intrigued with them to bring about the fall of Jehan- booght, or whether the serdars, jealous of his influence with the Shah, deceived Ahmed in order to effect his ruin, the result was that the Afghan monareh, who ought to have shut his eyes, at least for the moment, to the accusations brought against the Prince of Lucknow, demanded from him a large sum of money ; but Shooja, indignant at the request, determined not to comply with it, and, clandestinely leaving the camp with his troops, retired to his own country. This desertion, added to that of Delaver Khan and Zal Beg, with their 10,000 horse, seriously reduced the strength of the Afghan army, so that Ahmed Shah was no longer in a position to prolong the campaign, but, satisfied with the immense treasures he had collected during the war, he returned towards his own terri- tory, to which he was, as it happened, recalled by an event of some importance. Some ambitious, and consequently discontented serdars, had, after their flight from the royal camp, joined Delaver Khan and Zal Beg, who, supporting the revolt of a nephew of Ahmed Shah’s, by name Abdul Khalek Khan, proclaimed him king at the fortress of Girishk, and subsequently moved in triumph towards Kandahar. Previously to this Hadji Djemal Khan, of the branch of the Zer- gueranees, had likewise proclaimed himself king at Kandahar after the departure of Ahmed Shah for India, and had even coined money in his own name ; but having heard of Ahmed’s victories, he thought it would be more prudent to renounce the royal position he had assumed and stand on one side. Abdul Khalek, less judi- cious, made incredible efforts to secure his object. When Ahmed Shah became thoroughly aware of what was passing in his capital, he considered the circumstances of so little importance, that he did not think it necessary to return there in person, but sent the Isakzye Serdar, and Abdullah Khan, surnamed Shah Pecend Khan, with a strong division of cavalry, to put down the rebellious proceedings of his nephew and the serdars who had joined him, recommending the Khan, above all things, to use the utmost despatch and endea- 1 $ x 2 a 1 i 7 Bt pC ui a a TR 90 EXECUTION OF ZAL BEG. Cnar. VIL vour to arrive at Kandahar before they could reach it from Girishk ; he was not, however, in spite of his exertions, able to do so until after the revolt had taken root there, and Suleiman Mirza, the eldest son of Ahmed Shah, who governed in the absence of his father, had been expelled from the capital. ~The greater number of the revolted ser- dars had only supported the usurper because they believed the report which had been circulated by Delaver Khan and Zal Beg that Ahmed had lost the battle of Paniput, and met with great reverses and disasters in India; but they deeply regretted their folly in this unlucky business when they were made acquainted with his success and saw Abdullah Khan and his cavalry make their appearance. Thinking, therefore, that the only way to obtain the Shah’s pardon was to make a prompt submission, they, with few exceptions, went to the camp of the latter, to whom they delivered up the city, and also Abdul Khalek himself. When he left Delhi, Ahmed Shah had gone to the Punjab, and thence to Peshawur, to re-establish his authority, which had been somewhat questioned ; and it was during this journey that he received a letter from Abdullah Khan, announcing the manner in which he had terminated his mission-— the king, in his reply, desired him to strangle his nephew secretly, a command which he immediately put into execution. The disorder at Peshawur was great when Ahmed arrived there, as well in the town as in the neighbourhood ; and several months elapsed before tranquillity was restored, and matters resumed their ordinary course. At this period snow covered the ground to the depth of three feet, and the Shah was obliged to wait for the spring until he could return to his capital ; he wrote, therefore, to his son Suleiman Mirza, desiring him to take every possible means in his power to capture the serdars Delaver Khan and Zal Beg, who had so treacherously deserted him, and to put them to death. The prince wrote therefore to the latter, feigning a friendship and pro- mising perfect oblivion of the past—and this in the name of his father—if he would pay him a visit at Kandahar. Zal Beg ac- cepted the invitation, and, with perjury truly Eastern, Suleiman Mirza put him to death directly he entered the town. Delaver Khan was less inclined to confide in the prince’s word than his unfortunate friend, and instead of proceeding to Kandahar, as he had previously promised to do, he fled to Herat, and placed himself under the protection of the prince Timoor Mirza, second Ee a ait Cuap, VII. TIMOOR MIRZA VICEROY. 91 son of Ahmed Shah, and governor of that city. From a spirit of opposition to his brother Suleiman, with whom he was on bad terms, Timoor received the fugitive in a somewhat eager manner, and showered honours and benefits upon him, which were increased, even to prodigality, each time that the reiterated orders arrived at Herat to put him to death. Ahmed Shah left Peshawur at the commencement of spring,* and remained the whole summer at Kabul, arriving at Kandahar about the middle of autumn, at which period he experienced an attack, and with more intensity than ever, of that terrible malady which had forced him long before to substitute an artificial nose of silver for his own, which had sloughed away. This malady, called by Abdullah Khan Djuzam (which in Persian signifies leprous, and a small ulcer) arrived towards the close of this year at such a fearful height, that the Shah determined to proclaim his second son, Timoor Mirza, his viceroy and successor to the throne of Afghanistan. The serdars, astonished at this decision, which appeared to them unjust, inasmuch as it was to the prejudice of his eldest son Suleiman Mirza, assembled, and, having come to a resolution, presented a respectful request to the Shah Ahmed in favour of that prince. In this document they allowed a feeling of something like discontent to appear, that they had not been con- sulted in a matter of so grave a nature. The Shah replied, that in acting thus he had not consulted his own particular bias, and that in making his selection he had been guided entirely for the public good. “ Timoor,” said he, “it is true, is younger than Suleiman, but he is infinitely more capable of governing you than his brother.” The serdars wished for a proof; the Shah simply replied that Suleiman had never been able to conciliate the esteem and affection of the tribes; that he was violent without clemency ; that he had never been able to foresee or put down a revolt ; and, in short, that he hastily put to death the Serdar Zal Beg. “But,” said the serdars, “it was by your order.” “Did I not also order Timoor to put Delaver Khan to death?” replied Ahmed ; “and what did he do? Political reasons might induce me to order two culprits to be put to death, but other secret reasons, which were known to the * The manuscript of Abdullah is entirely without dates, the author is therefore unable to give any,— Ferrier, RR Ah SER Fire 02 DEATH OF AHMED SHAH. Cuar. VII. prince Suleiman, ought to have led him to disobey me, as his brother did.” The serdars appeared satisfied with these replies, which seemed to embody, as it were, his opinions for the future guidance of the princes of the blood. When Ahmed Shah had induced the serdars to acknowledge his son Timoor Mirza as his successor, he retired to a palace he had built at Tobeh-Maharoof, situated in the midst of the Suleiman mountains, the cradle of his tribe. From hence he watched over the government; but after four or five years had elapsed, his disease having rendered him incapable of any further continuous labour, he entirely abandoned public affairs to the governors of the various provinces of his empire, and expired shortly after, namely, in 1773. Yaghoot IXhan, the chief of his eunuchs, and a person in whom he had great confidence, kept his death a profound secret, and wrote immediately to Timoor Mirza, who was still governor of Herat, to come with all speed to Kandahar and take possession of the throne. At the same time that he transmitted this information he set out himself, taking the royal corpse with him j this was placed in a litter, and the curtains being arefully drawn was completely concealed from every one. The adroit eunuch approached the litter from time to time, as if to receive some order from his sovereign, or give him some refresh- ment, remarking to those of his escort who wished to make any request or an inquiry about his health, that, being extremely unwell, the Shah had ordered that no one should be allowed to disturb him. Yaghoot Khan also took with him the Shali’s jewels and treasure, which were carried by mules, and always preceded the royal litter, so that he might be able to have his eye con- stantly upon them. No one discovered the deception during the greater part of the journey; and it was only about a day’s march from Kandahar, when the prince Suleiman Mirza came out to receive his father, that it was necessary to make the Shah’s death public. The serdars, who were frosnt on this occasion, were nearly all attached to the party of this prince, from whom they had received brilliant promises, and they immediately returned with him to the city, and proclaimed him Shah of the Afghans. Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, reigned twenty-five years and a few months : he was free from most of the crimes commonly found in individuals of Eastern nations; such as drunkenness, whether from Crap, VII. HIS CHARACTER. 93 wine or opium, duplicity, avarice, cruelty, and one which need not be mentioned ; he was always a most firm supporter of religion. On his accession to the throne he changed the name of his file, which was Abdalee, to that of Doran, which signifies a person of noble and ancient birth ; and he took the title ot; Doorveranee, 7. e. he around whom converges the noble and ancient tribe. In order to increase the numbers of the Afohan nation Ahmed connected with it all the tribes of doubtful origin, Eimak or Belooch, speaking the Pushtoo language, who were settled in the various provinces, particularly in the dis strict of I'urrah and on the banks of the Helmund. There was a clause in his will forbidding his successors to cut off the nose or ears of any one, no matter whom ; and this was based upon his own sufferings, for the leprous disease having destroyed his nose, and Nadir Shah, to punish him for an act of insubordination, having cut off one of his ears, he had deeply felt the deprivation of these organs. He also desired the Doora- nees to ally themselves one with another, and not to give their girls in marriage to strangers; that for the future the succession should go entirely to the son and to the exclusion of the daughters, who up to that time had participated in the property left by their father ; that at the death of an Afghan his nearest relative, the father and son excepted, should marry his widow ; and if there was no relative, the widow should reside in the house of her deceased husband, and live on the proceeds of his property till her death ; that when a married woman died without having a child, her father, brother, or other relative could not demand her dower from the husband ; he also abolished divorce, and withdrew from the master his right to kill his slave. Ie abrogated the custom of bending the body and kissing the earth before “the sovereign, whom he commanded henceforth to be saluted by carrying the hand straight to the forehead ; he granted permission to sit in the pre- sence of the monarch nl to the syuds and priests, to whom he conceded the privilege of dining every Thursday evening with the sovereign, in order that he might be able to converse with them on the sciences and religion. The laws he made during his reign he caused to be rigorously executed, and commanded that his descendants and successors should do the same after him. He accumulated great riches, but they consisted of the plunder which he had taken from his enemies; the revenues of A 3? : or a rR SR BARE, BE RL i i Red RSPB RR S : 04 CHARACTER OF AHMED SHAH. Cuar. VII. Afghanistan, properly so termed, never found their way into his private coffers : he gave his troops their pay in person. The name of Ahmed Shah became glorious throughout Asia after the battle of Paniput, which was one of the causes that led to the rapid decay of the Mogul empire. The petty chiefs of Khorassan, who all acknowledged his suzerainty, and offered but a timid opposition, he would have brought into complete subordination, had it not been for the six campaigns which he made in the Punjab, India, and Beloochistan, which absorbed all his time. He saw that repose demoralized his troops, and he kept them always in a high state of discipline. It was by this system that he was enabled to maintain himself securely upon the throne, as much as to the great clemency that he constantly manifested, and which induced him so continually to pardon the rebellious chiefs who could not bring them- selves to bow under the yoke of obedience, and between whom he was obliged to be the peacemaker. His reign was remarkable for the good which he spread around him, and his generosity and simple and modest demeanour in the midst of courtly pomp made him loved by all'who approached his person ; he was of easy access, and administered justice upon the most equitable principles, without a harsh word even to those who deserved it ; he was conciliating, per- suasive, and no one ever complained of the judgments that he gave. He greatly extended the limits of his empire, which, at the moment of his decease, were as follows: the frontier to the north was defined by the Oxus and the mountains of Kiafferistan ; to the south, by the sea of Oman ; to the east, by the mountains of Thibet, the Sutlej, and the Indus; and to the west, by Khorasan, Persia, and Kerman. But Ahmed Shah is much more deserving of eulogy for the talent with which he subjected the various Afghan tribes to his laws, than for having given such a vast extension to his kingdom, or for the victories he won. The princes who prior to him governed the Afghans exercised but a nominal authority over the nomade tribes, for they listened only to the orders of their own chiefs. Ahmed Shah conciliated the majority of these, and reduced to obedience the few who were hostile to him. The nine Serdars who had served with him in the army of Nadir formed a Council which he always consulted in questions of state: he adopted no measure of importance without their approbation, and never BA a a I OS i in Cuap, VIL CHARACTER OF AHMED SHAH. 95 failed in any promise that he made them. His government in short resembled much more a federative republic of which he was the Lead, than an absolute monarchy. After a victory he always gave up a large part of the spoils of the enemy to his soldiers ; he never adopted an arrogant tone of superiority with their dicks which could hurt the feelings of those with whom he had once been on equal terms, and who had elevated him to the sovereign power, I “ , A SN SRA RSHOP EEr, er ———— FORMATION OF AFGHAN CHARACTER. Cuar. VIIL CHAPTER VIIL Kabul becomes the capital — Sons of Ahmed Shah — Dervish Ali Khan — Afghan principles — Walee Khan and his sons put to death — Flight of Suleiman Mirza — Timoor Mirza enters Kandahar — Resides at Kabul — Kuzzilbash cavalry oor marches against Scinde — Conflicts between the Kaloras takes Bawalpoor — Establishes the Kaloras in _ Medad Khan is beaten at Djioond — Fethi Khan Talpoora succeeds to power — Timoor takes the field against the Emir of Bokhara — Balkh and Akhcheh become independent — Timoor returns to Kabul — Events in Khorassan — Afghan army marches on Meshed — Mamech Khan — Capture of Techinaran — Death of Medad Khan — Fresh insurrection in Khorassan — Afghan army advances into that province — Conspiracy to take Timoor Shah’s life — The plot fails — Arseleh Khan is put to death — Value of an oath in an Afghan sovereign — Death of Timoor Shah — Character of that , — Sons of Timoor. organised — Tim and Talpooras — Timoor Shah Scinde — Fresh disturbances in Scinde monarch ally enjoyed their independence till the the national disposition was probably The liberty of speech and action in which tributed without doubt power- and rustic pride which Tue Afghans never T€ reign of Ahmed Shah, and modified at this epoch. they were permitted to indulge con fully to develop that independent manner still characterize them in our own day—a conquered nation for generations, they became all at once conquerors. This sudden tran- sition took place it is true under Mir Mahmood, but was only thoroughly developed under Ahmed Shah, Suddozye ; it inspired them with confidence in themselves and roused a superiority which had up to that period been dormant; in a word, the national mind had been formed. The city of Kandahar was considere during the reign of Ahmed Shah, but he only resided there during the autumn and winter; he went to Kabul in the spring and cummer, alternately changing his place of abode from one city to the other, that he m y enjoy an agreeable and ight constant] His son Timoor Shah altered this state of things ; for he withdrew the title of capital from Kandahar and transferred it to Kabul, which was subsequently the royal resi- dence during the whole period that the dynasty of the Suddozyes ed the throne of Afghanistan. d the capital of Afghanistan temperate climate. occupi Crap, VI II. AFGHAN PRINCIPLES ‘ 97 Ahmed Shah left eioht Mirza, Ch Sites Jos namely, Suleiman Mi ¢ Sihondor bal ts Sindjar Mirza, Yezdan po Cy Pons War : Don Mirza, and Perviz Mirza. The Pd noc heir oF Lis rn named by his father as his ii fe oem Yack . Ian received the letter written to hi : h fiat his Drath oy 1an, but he learnt before he left H, Ratdaing pe a Mirza had been proclaimed Xin , Woke Kine. drs erdars, at the head of whom was the $i o § hich took plies Ber ire dousosed Buck: Ths delay : or proceede : on pana occasioned oe Wy og coy escaped ho gn ans pm traitor, who Ly ad i . : geons o erat, 1 ‘hi : ¢ ln bn Mn return Pas 2 on a se rallied round this Khan ; i him to come WY I of pardon, was clever enough to ind e to Afghan usage, whi : precinets of his palace ; where, ace dine a ae oh oy ich consists generally in a perfect - ing A most solemn oaths, he put him Fy Morand tr 3 oe command of the Hazarahs to the S ee appointed his ow: an a member of the same tribe. After To i as he was a a Motard Mirza, Governor of Herat hy A nm accompany him to Kondabior, us his son i L fe, Jus vizier, as the Zo , taarched i) Tins oe, after which he assembled HR Sones of — iy hav oe shoan Mirza. On his arrival at SE a “ime number of partizans who had alr - deserted Sue ie of his brother, but amongst all those Rory ES i 5 i most important accession to his cause Wao H's Boras phen) who had great influence over the Afol was Dea ns Min, 4 his two sons and two of the an Siah-ab ; but the RT — which was no by this old serv y Jeariig to be 1ampered in the g oS Je it father, and desirous ar tiki ht Le § ns : y a severe example, ordered hole oi of Silchar Mins ec y they appeared before him. The re ei a, terrified by these executions, was 3 i , and the usurper finding himself thus deserted a 0 India, ac : , accompanied by f ] . our ers W : to him. y followers who alone remained faithful H 03 PROMOTIONS BY TIMOOR. Cuar. VIII. Timoor, surrounded by all the great and powerful families in the kingdom, and accompanied by a numerous army, now made his public entry into Kandahar with much pomp and circumstance, and was at once acknowledged king by the assembled Serdars ; but he made only a short stay in this city, the population of which had become odious to him from having taken his brother’s part: as a punishment he deprived it of its title of capital, which as we have already said he transferred to Kabul, to which place he at once proceeded with his army, leaving his son Mahmood provisional Governor of Kandahar. = The reign of Timoor con- tinued for twenty years, and during this period he almost always passed the winter at Peshawur, and the remaining seasons of the year at Kabul. On ascending the throne he augmented the pay of the Afghan chiefs, and gave the tribes a great extension of territory ; several of the serdars received appointments of great trust and high command and titles much esteemed at the court of an Asiatic sovereign. The Serdar Payendeh Khan, son of that Hadji Djemal who had renounced his pretensions to the throne in favour of Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, was confirmed in the command of the powerful tribe of the Barukzyes, and honoured with the title of Sera-fraz Khan. Delaver Khan, the Serdar who deserted at the battle of Paniput, received the title of Medad Khan, and the grade of Serdaree Serdarane, * General of Generals.” Kazee Feiz Ullah, Pich-nawaz of the king, received the title of Kelane Kelauter, ¢ Greatest of the Great.” Timoor Shah had such an implicit confidence in this Serdar that he never did anything without consulting him. Abdul Latif Khan, one of the descendants of Sheik Ahmed Zindeh Pir, was appointed lieutenant of the kingdom and receiver-general of the taxes. Noor Mohamed Khan, Baberee, was made president of the court of accounts; and lastly, 1ltifat Khan, chief of the eunuchs, was appointed chief treasurer and custodian of the crown jewels. All these personages had the rank of ministers, and Timoor ordered as a general rule that the principles of justice, equity, and a mild course of conduct should be observed towards every one ; but he re- commended them to employ the chiefs of tribes as little as possible as public functionaries, for up to this period they had generally held the appointments, and almost always abused their authority. The Shah’s guards were selected from the tribe of Isakzye, and to this the Serdarec Serdarane belonged. A division of 12,000 Cup. VIII. TIMOOR MARCHES AGAINST SCINDE. 99 Kuzzilbash horsemen was also organized under the command of the Serdar Mohamed Khan Beyat, the pay of their officers was augmented, and Timoor chose from amongst these the companions of his debauched habits, for he had a great predilection for wine and other pleasures. Ie paid with great punctuality every half- year the salaries of the officers of his court, and the army every ear. Timoor Shah was only twice at the head of his troops to meet his enemies; all the other wars in which he was engaged were con- ducted by the Serdaree Serdarane, Medad Khan, Isakzye. The first occasion on which Timoor took the field was in 1779 in the campaign against Scinde, which had revolted. The governor of this province, a vassal of the Afghan sovereigns, and admitting their suzerainty, had endeavoured to throw it off at the time the Mahrattas rose in his father’s reign, and Ahmed Shah had subdued him even before the battle of Paniput, making him pay a very large sum of money as arrears of tribute, and as an indemnity for the expenses of the war; after which Ahmed forgave him, and maintained him in his government. This chief belonged to the tribe of the Kalora, and had the title of Emir of Scinde. Mir Fethi Khan, chief of the Talpoora tribe, a rival of his, attacked him in June, 1779, massacred a great number of his people, and dispos- cessed him of his government. The Kalora chieftain fled to Kandahar, from whence he addressed a petition to Timoor Shah, who at once took the field with his army to reinstate him in his rights. The king began by seizing Bawalpoor, in which place he found immense riches, and upon these he laid his hands. The in- surgents alter this success did not hold their ground anywhere, and their chiefs fled from the province, which the Shah placed under the control of the Kalora Emir, and then returned to Kabul ; but he had scarcely left Scinde when the chief of the Talpooras again entered that territory and once more drove out the K aloras. The embarrassments under which Timoor laboured at that time prevented him from promptly repressing this fresh outbreak : and it was only in 1786 that the Serdaree Serdarane Medad Khan could march there with a small corps d’armée, with which, on its entering Scinde, the contingent of the Khan of Kelat was to form a junction ; this chief, however, was bound to the Talpooras by family ties, and on various pretences did not bring the reinforcement which by treaty he was obliged to furnish. In spite of this conirstemps HZ 100 WAR WITH THE EMIR OF BOKHARA. Cuar, VIII, Medad Khan marched upon the insurgents with his small force, but, being attacked by very superior numbers near the village of Djioond, he was beaten and obliged to retire and fortify himself in that locality. Mir Fethi Khan then entered into negotiations with the Serdaree Serdarane, demanded to be invested with the same rights that the Shah of Afghanistan had formerly acknowledged, and which had been held by the chief of the Kaloras, promising for the future an exact payment of the tribute as well as the sum then due for arrears. Medad Khan accepted this arrangement, which was confirmed by his sovereign, but Mir Fethi Khan, who only wished to gain time to collect his treasure and his forces, in order that he might defy his suzerain with the greater chance of success, refused to pay the tribute the third year after his installation as Governor of Scinde, and proclaimed his independence. Timoor Shah being unable to send troops and thus oblige him to return to his duty, Scinde remained independent of Afghanistan up to the time of the Shah’s death. The second occasion on which this sovereign took the field in person was in his conquest of Sarmacand and Bokhara, to punish the inhabitants of Balkh and Akhcheh, who had driven out their Afghan governor and revolted against him at the instigation of Sultan Murad Khan, Emir of Bokhara, and of Mavar-ul-nahar. When the Shah approached Balkh, those who had raised the standard of rebellion, and in whose support Sultan Murad Khan had sent a contingent of troops, left the town to oppose the Shah, and encamped at a short distance from him. If Timoor Shah had at once attacked the Uzbeks he would most certainly have crushed them, for his army was much superior to theirs, not only in numbers but in the spirit of the troops ; but the rivalry which existed between the serdars, and the vexation felt by those who commanded the tribes at being obliged to leave their lucrative appointments, caused them to temporize and thus compromise the success of the Afghan arms; and his attempts to conciliate these chiefs were so prolonged that the army was at last completely without provisions. The fall of Timoor Shah was the object of the serdars, and this they hoped to accomplish without its appearing to be their fault, trusting that his successor would grant them the advantages which they had hoped, but in vain, to receive from him. The king pene- trated their design, and to avoid an irreparable disaster came to an et Ll anim t———— ET ——- ' ' . > . * ’ Crap, VIII, EVENTS IN KHORASSAN. + + :oo.e, 2, y, 101 understanding with the rebels, withdrew from the conquest of Navar-ul-nahar, and retired to Kabul, preserving a feeble appearance of authority on Balkh and Akhcheh, which from this day became pretty nearly independent. They accepted, it is true, a governor named by Timoor Shah, but they took care previously to point out cer- tain persons from amongst whom that officer should be taken. The authority of the governor thus chosen was very limited ; the people he governed merely furnished him with the means of subsistence for himself and a very small number of personal servants; but they paid him neither taxes nor salary and subjected him to every kind of annoyance. The consequence of this was that Timoor Shah was at length unable to find any person who would accept the appointment of governor of these turbulent cities, which led to a hundred jokes and witticisms more or less wounding to the feelings of the sovereign, particularly from those who were hostile to him. The Loutis, who wandered from town to town with monkeys and other animals, taught them to cast earth upon their heads (a sign of the deepest grief amongst Asiatics) when they were asked whether they would be governors of Balkh or Akhcheh. From the period at which Timoor Shah succeeded to the throne Khorassan had been in a permanent state of revolt. Shah Rokh Mirza, who recognised the suzerainty of this sovereign as he had done that of his father, claimed his assistance against his old friend Mamech Khan of Techinaran, who had five years before seized and continued to hold possession of Meshed, in which city he exercised a most fearful tyranny. Timoor Shah sent 30,000 men, under the orders of the Serdarce Serdarane, to overthrow the usurper, On his arrival at Meshed Mamech Khan left the city and shut himself up in his fortress of Tehinaran, in which place Medad Khan thought it would be as well not to disturb him ; he contented himself therefore by ordering his villages to be pillaged, his territory ravaged, and, replacing Shah Rokh at the head of the government of Meshed, he returned to Kabul ; but he had scarcely reached the capital when news was brought to him that Mamech Khan had been enabled to collect a few thousand horsemen, and once more devastate the province, and that his position became every dav more menacing. Timoor Shah was obliged to send Medad Khan to put down this fresh revolt, and on his arrival Mamech Khan again retired within the walls of his fortress, but this time the Afghans laid siege to the place, and soon forced him - sis om AN I -“ 102 . PLOT AGAINST TIMOOR’S LIFE. Cuar, VIII to surrender at discretion. The Serdaree Serdarane, however, treated Mamech with generosity, left him in possession of his Khanat, and was satisfied with accepting a light contribution in money towards the expenses of the war and a thousand beasts of burden loaded with provisions : after which he set out on his return to Kabul ; but the simoom blew with such intensity when he arrived in the plains of Furrah that he died, and with him a great number of his soldiers. A few days subsequently to this circumstance the Khorassanees were informed of it and immediately rose against the Afghans and their protégé Shah Rokh Mirza, which obliged Timoor Shah to send a third army the following year to reduce them to obedience. He placed these troops under the command of Ahmed Khan Noorzye, son of Nasser Ullah Khan, who, although with great difficulty, suc- ceeded in putting down the revolt. From this moment up to the end of the reign of Timoor, the Afghans were never engaged in any conflict; nevertheless the year preceding the death of that prince was remarkable for an event in which the Shah was nearly coming to a violent end. In accordance with his usual custom Timoor went to pass a few months at Peshawur, but this year he remained at that city a longer period than usual, detained there by an insurrectional movement which threatened to develop itself further and extend as far as Lahore. Arseleh Khan, of the Mohmund tribe, and Yaghoot Khan, chief of the eunuchs of the late king, who with several other Afghan chiefs were dissatisfied with Timoor, determined upon his ruin. It was agreed amongst them that Yaghoot Khan, who commanded the guard of the royal harem, should connive at the entrance of Arseleh Khan and his people when the king retired there, and put him to death, after which they were to proclaim his nephew, Iskander Khan, a son of Suleiman Mirza, king in his stead. On the day agreed upon for the execution of this conspiracy, 9500 hill-riflemen, and as many resolute inhabitants of Peshawur, well armed, suddenly assembled in a large open space covered with ruins, habitually deserted and situated on the side of the grand square opposite to the citadel, on which a few thousand Kuzzilbash horse, forming the king's guard, were always en- camped. It was about two hours after noon, the time at which eastern nations take their siesta ; the palace guard were therefore all Cuar, VILL ITS FAILURE. 103 asleep, or very nearly so, and the conspirators made choice of this moment to penetrate into the citadel by a sally-port, of which Yaghoot Khan had given them the key. By a rare chance Timoor Shah had not yet fallen asleep, and, hearing the tumult and a distant hubbub of voices, he perceived at once that he was threatened by some impending danger, and quickly retired to the The most powerful and influential of all the serdars was Pay- endeh Khan, a son of that Hadji Djemal who withdrew his pre- tensions to the crown in favour of Ahmed Shah. Like his father he was the head of the family of the Mohamedzy 5, and commanding- in-chief the tribe of the Barukzyes. This position gave him great influence amongst the people, who, after the descendants of Sudoo had been raised to the throne, had withdrawn from them a portion of their regard, which, replaced by fear, had been bestowed upon the descendants of Mohamed, whom they considered as alone capable of maintaining their privileges against the excessive power which they had given to their kings. Payendeh Khan gave his adhesion to Zeman Mirza, the fifth son of Timoor, and succeeded in abr taching to his party the most influential of the Afghan My and the chiefs of the Kuzzilbashes at Kabul. i Amongst the former were Ahmed Khan, Noorzye ; Fath-Ullah Khan, Suddozye ; Noor Mohamed Khan ; Emin-ool-Moolk ; Emir Islam Khan, Djevanchir; Djaffer Khan, Djevanchir ; Mohamed Khan, Ropu Emir Ullah Khan, Logheree; and many others of as hig 1 rp and equal power. With their assistance he was enabled in Hie f ot instance to calm the general excitement, and subsequently to ele- tect ea ee ri — ——— rE — 110 ZEMAN PROCLAIMED SHAH. Cua, IX. vate the Prince Zeman to the sovereign power in the following manner :— On the proposition of Payendeh Khan, the princes agreed to assemble with the chiefs of tribes in order that the latter might proceed in all liberty to the election of a sovereign taken from amongst the former. Each of the sons of Timoor, accompanied by the serdars, came to this meeting ; and in conformity with an under- standing which had been already agreed to, no one had any arms, either concealed or otherwise, about his person. The place selected for this gathering belonged to Payendeh Khan; he had previously, and with great secrecy, strengthened all the doors and windows, and arranged the apartments in such a manner that no prison could have been more secure. When the princes were assembled, and some time had been occupied in discussion, Zeman, whose par- tisans had purposely abstained from appearing there, suddenly, under some slight pretence, left the assembly. Payendeh Khan, who, to prevent any suspicion, had not uttered a word in favour of his candidate, followed him out of the room, after which all those who remained in the house were placed under lock and key, and troops stationed round it. The various factions, deprived of their chiefs thus retained pri- soners and receiving no instructions, allowed themselves to be per- suaded by Payendeh Khan, and acknowledged Zeman Mirza as their king. The new sovereign kept his brothers in confine- ment during five days without giving them anything to eat save two or three ounces of bread daily, the only way in which he could bring them to recognise his election. When they and the chiefs who had shared their captivity were released, they resembled so many skeletons, and left the inhospitable and treacherous roof under which they had passed these five days of suffering, only to be transferred to the citadel of the Bala Hissar, within the walls of which Zeman thought it would be prudent to place them. The new sovereign commenced his reign by settling a pension upon the old and devoted servants of his father, and by various concessions attached to his person those serdars who had been opposed to him ; but some few others, for the sake of example, he put to death ; and as, after all, the Afghans were obliged to have a king, they contented themselves with the one that ed thus been elected, who met with no further opposition in Kabul. Humayoon Mirza, informed of the blow thus levelled at his tid akan sas a HOP od saan sq cid iy Cuar. IX. HIS TYRANNY. 111 rights as the eldest son of Timoor, protested against the usurp- ation of Zeman, and accelerated his preparations for war; his brother, Mahmood Mirza, did the same ; and a good many par- tisans came forward at their appeal to overthrow the usurper. But Zeman Shah, who could dispose of the greater and the richest portions of the kingdom, who was in possession of the royal trea- sure and the most warlike of the troops, did not remain inactive ; in a very short space of time he had assembled a sufficient force to put down his two antagonists, and, directly he was in a position to take the field, he marched on Kandahar. Though Mahmood had not yet come to his assistance, Humayoon Mirza advanced boldly to meet Zeman, and came up with him at the little town of Kelat-i- Ghildjzye ; a battle ensued between the rival brothers ; Humayoon was completely beaten, and obliged to fly into Beloochistan, where he found an asylum at Kelat with the Emir Nasser Khan. Mahmood Mirza, retained at Herat by the necessity of calming the excitement that reigned there, was mot able to act up to the promise he had made his brother Humayoon to come to his support ; and Zeman, after the defeat of the latter, made prepara- tions to subdueMahmood, when several revolts which broke out at Kabul forced him to return there. At this period evil council- lors obtained a power over the mind of the Shah: they persuaded him that the weakness and condescension of his father to the serdars had alone checked the increasing impulse given to the prosperity of Afghanistan by his ancestor Ahmed Shah, and they recommended him to alter this system, and concentrate the absolute power in his own hands. To effect this object Zeman Shah commenced by taking the great appointments of the state from those who had inherited them as sinecures since the reign of that monarch. Even Payendeh Khan himself, to whom he was indebted for his throne, was not made an exception by the instigators of this violent change, for his influence considerably diminished, and these diatnlssats did not long suffice to appease the fears that his ambitious advisers suggested to Zeman Shah. Individuals of consideration were attracted to court on the faith of solemn oatns, arrested, im- prisoned, or put to death, and these sanguinary executions spread consternation in Kabul, the citizens of which were soon brought under a yoke of iron. Such useless cruelties alienated the a - mp i a — - mete THE I i FF ' -— SE a EE ot — —— bt UNE 0 WP. ———————————— ——— 112 ZEMAN MARCHES AGAINST THE PUNJAB. Cuar. IX. i ‘on: and his brothers, who were A iy oe a So ay after they had eon om sf dispersed over the different provinces, and oy Te a radio to his authority. Obliged to i i oh oS of the troops that were sent to suppress the i De, themselves were the instigators, they nevert Gent on $ pr intrigues to endeavour to hs ibs 2 Se 1 ancerous to his power. h: buh a oY OA be manifested Airy Zoran, faa to put toe who were in his power to death, as it Yes pe ow — his intention to do ; but these quarrels betw eer th Bie corr Shah were the prelude to scenes . a in 2 i mas * the Suddozyes was : My i De or founder of the Yo i in Poon, sent Mohamed Hoosein Khan, Srp sn to Shah Zeman, requesting the cession i id 0 " uired in order that he might be able ” 2 i i pe a the expedition which he proposed to make undertake in all se » © ’ . me n = o . | . c cession to the Kadjar, who oo Iv to his demand, but promised eofore t only he consented, Dero) m Ho Subsequently Agha Mo- sist him with his Ow 8. = also to assist hi we the menaced 1 d Khan having been called to the west by I ame . . ple t was never carrie( ) . Send; ‘the Russians, this treaty ‘ls vag invasion of fe Ru Sia we have related above the fire Pn ring the events the To i » midst of the i Ang which was so soon to burst forth in he ae > \ ) Smo cee The Punjab, annexed to the kingdom by £ Afghan nation. I'he ye y lependence, and the Shah Zeman ~ a eocalll 118 11( ™~3 p cel ah, attempted to reg : walle » had scarcely Bi DE : the field to chastise the rebels ; bate in Seay mr 4 the Indus when he learnt that, assisted by t ey Q 70 ’ eu his brother Humayoon had seized upon : Beloochistan, his brother iu t off his expedition to Lahore, This intelligence obliged him to put o Lh d he set off by forced marches, and by the direc | Jf] is brother e se ‘ y "0s 118 brother, an tiins.t0 attack the former city. On the APR a C ® i . y nshe a betrayed by his Afghan partisans, w | umayoon was aaah ' the Beloochees, Y he deliver him up to Zeman ; but, tasisted : anaes seize ee ym. and again fled to Be stan. he succeeded in escaping from them, and again fic I The hah sent a thousand cavalry in pursit of him, The Shah sent a St ean Gr ts PA 0 ro Gh ir Cuar. IX. BATTLE OF GOURREK. 113 clutches he escaped for several days ; but having, unfortunately for him, returned on his road to gain Herat, they came up with and arrested him in the district of Zemindavar, after which, and in _obedience to the orders they had received from Shah Zeman, they put out his eyes. The Shah, delighted with this fresh act of cruelty, which, he fancied, ought to strengthen the power he had usurped, thought of marching against the Emirs of Scinde, as much with the desire of punishing them for the support they had given to Huma- yoon, as to force them to pay the arrears of tribute which they owed, and which they had ceased to pay several years before the death of Timoor Shah. Shah Zeman had reached the Bolan Pass when he heard that Mahmood Mirza, after having established his power at Herat, had just taken the field with an excellent army, and in- tended to advance upon his rear while he was engaged with his enemies in Scinde. Forced therefore by necessity, he came to terms with Fathi Ullah Khan Talpoora, and for the sum of 300,000. gave up the remainder of the arrears, which amounted to three times that sum, and confirmed him in the government of Scinde, after which he moved by forced marches to meet his brother. Mahmood Mirza, quite as well informed of the movements of Zeman as the Shah was of his, halted when he heard of the king’s return to Kandahar, and having taken up a position in the mountains of the Siah-bend, across which he had advanced, only moved forward when he learnt that Zeman was two or three marches from his encampment. The two armies came in sight, and attacked at Gourrek, a large village situated between Girishk and Zemindavar, and fought with fury during fifteen successive hours. At length fortune declared itself against Mahmood Mirza, who, beaten, turned, and cut off from his communications, was obliged to fly and retire within the walls of Furrah, followed only by a hundred of his dependants. After this Shah Zeman, without giving himself any further trouble about his antagonist, marched straight upon Herat, and encamped under: its walls, but several assaults which he made were repulsed with energy, and he was on the point of retreating when the mother of Mahmood Mirza arrived in his camp to make proposals in the name of her son, who she assured Zeman had uno desire for the throne, and would be quite satisfied simply with the 1 114 ZEMAN TAKES HERAT. Cnar. IX. government of Herat. The Shah, who was anxious to carry his arms to other points that were seriously menaced, was delighted with the. proposition, and accepted it immediatetly. Kamran Mirza, the son of Mahmood, and Hadji Firooz Eddin, his brother, who had been appointed governor of the city in Mahmood’s absence, had remained within the citadel, and were afraid to go into the town lest the fortress should be taken from them by some treacherous act on the part of the garrison. Not having received any information respecting the transaction which had just taken place between the two brothers, their joy was not greater than their astonishment when they saw Zeman Shah in full retreat, which they attributed to the arrival of Mahmood Mirza at the head of fresh forces. Desirous, therefore, of making a diver- sion in his favour, they assembled in haste the troops that were at hand, and pursued the Shah; but they had scarcely reached the royal residence of Roouz-bagh, situated seven miles south of Herat, when the Parsivan, Kalech Khan (a serdar of the Taymoonis, suze- rain lord of Khaff, a man of great influence in the principality, and reputation in warlike affairs), who had been intrusted by Kamran and Firooz Eddin with the command of the citadel daring their absence, despatched a messenger to Zeman Shah to inform him that he held the fortress at his disposal, and that he ought to come immediately and occupy it with his own troops. The princes, informed of this unfortunate circumstance, returned instantly to Herat, which still held out for them, and attacked the citadel on all sides; but it was in vain that they cannonaded it. Kalech Khan, whom they summoned, and ordered to return to his duty, answered only by redoubling his fire. The place was strong, well provisioned, and capable of resisting any assault for several months, while it required only two days for Zeman Shah to come and occupy it. Directly he appeared, the princes, see- ing themselves abandoned by their partizans, fled in the direction of Khorassan; and Zeman, meeting with no further opposition, took possession of Herat, where he remained four months. Ie appointed his son Kaissar Mirza governor of the province, and gave the command of the Heratee troops, as well as 1000 Afghan horse, to the Serdar Kalech Khan, who had delivered up the place to him. Zeman Khan, Popolzye, was appointed Vizier to Kaissar Mirza, and received the title in partibus of governor of Persian Khorassan, which Zeman Shah had the intention of uniting with Caar. IX. MAHM"™OD ADVANCES ON FURRAH, 115 Afghanistan. With this view he left a corps of troops with the Popolzye Serdar, independently of those commanded by Kalech Khan, in order that he might be enabled to invade that province the conquest of which was resolved upon. After having taken those measures the king returned to Kandahar, where he remained but a short time, and a few days after arrived at Kabul. But Mahmood Mirza, without either money or an army, could do but little, and came to the determination of going to Teheran and demanding assistance from Feth Ali, the Shah of Persia who had for some years been seated on the throne of the Kad- jars; and this sovereign promised him support and his reinstalla- tion in the government of Herat, on condition that he admitted his suzerainty. This occurrence took place in the year 1798 during which the revolt of Sedik Khan obliged Feth Ali to pro ceed to the Azerbaidjan ; but before his departure he recommended Mahmood Mirza to the care of the Emir Assad Ullah Khan governor of Kachan, and son of the Ethemad Dooulet, Huds Ibrahim of Shiraz. Mahmood Mirza followed the Emir Assad Ullah Khan to Kachan, but, observing that Feth Ali Shah prolonged his stay in the north of his kingdom, the prince got weary of wait- ing for the support that had been promised him, and wrote to the Shah, requesting that he might be permitted to leave the residence which he had assigned him. The King of Persia having consented to this request, Mahmood proceeded to Khorassan, where he hoped to be able to raise some recruits ; nor was he deceived in this hope, for Mir Ali Khan, an Arab, the governor of the district of Ghain, espoused his cause, and they took the field with 3000 infantry, marching in the first instance in the direction of Furrah. The inhabitants of this city were favourable to the cause of Mah- mood, and directly they heard of his approach they came out several days’ march to meet him, when a great number of them enrolled themselves in his army. The news of the arrival of Mahmood Mirza had spread rapidly in Herat, much exaggerating his success, and he was described as having arrived at Furrah with 50,000 men, subduing every- thing on his road. These reports carried consternation into the minds of the citizens; all those who had deserted the Prince Mahmood, dreading his anger, made their preparations for de- parture ; and the Prince Kaissar, himself believing in the accu- 1 2 3 116 BATTLE OF EMARET. Cuar. IX racy of the intelligence, repaired and provisioned the citadel in great haste ; but more truthful accounts followed and modified the alarm of the prince and the scared inhabitants. The report of this triumphant march brought to Mahmood Mirza’s standard a reinforcement of several thousand men ; amongst these was the Noorzye Serdar, Djabber Khan, who brought with him a contingent of a thousand horsemen ; but when he saw what a small army Mahmood’s was, he repented of the step he had taken, and under cover of a dark night quitted the camp, and proceeded in great haste to Herat, where he made the real state of things known. Reassured by this information, Kaissar Mirza assembled the troops of Kalech Khan, and, uniting them to those of Zeman Khan, Popolzye (who, on learning the news, had returned promptly from Khorassan, in the direction of which he had moved), marched with these two divisions against his uncle. Mahmood, seeing that Furrah was favourable to his cause, left that town on his right, advanced at once to meet his opponent, came up with and at- tacked him near the village of Emaret, and routed him completely. The vanquished army retired in haste to Herat, and closed the gates. Mahmood Mirza followed, but, being unable to invest the place entirely by reason of the smallness of his force, he determined to encamp at a spot on the banks of the Heri-rood about three miles from the walls. The Vizier Zeman Khan, having discovered that the sympathies of the Heratees were in favour of Mahmood, conceived that a temporizing line of conduct could not but be advantageous to the latter: he resolved therefore, as force was not on the side of Kaissar, to obtain the victory by cun- ning. After having obtained the permission of that prince, he wrote a letter to Mir Ali Khan, the Arab, as if it was the reply to some terms of arrangement which the latter had made to Kaissar Mirza, and which consisted in his obtaining some favour of that prince, in exchange for which Mir Ali promised to deliver Mah- mood Mirza into his hands. The adroit Vizier confided this letter to an intelligent man, and advised him to manage in such a way that he should be suspected and arrested by some of the prince’s troops, and then pretend great anxiety that the letter in question should not be seen. The scheme was carried out as he wished ; the camp guard seized the messenger and conducted their prisoner to Mahmood Mirza, to whom they presented the letter Cuar, IX. ZEMAN ARRIVES AT HERAT. 117 which they had taken. Mahmood, alarmed at the snare thus revealed to him, asked the advice of an Afghan noble, Mo- hamed Akrem Khan, as to what steps should be taken, and he advised him to avoid by flight the trap that had been laid for them. Nevertheless, the contents of this letter did not remain so entirely a secret from Mir Ali Khan, but that he received some information respecting it. He hastened, therefore, immediately to Mahmood, and swore and protested in the most energetic terms to the truth of his devotion to his person and his cause. The prince feigned to believe him ; but, when night came, he fled from the camp, ac- companied by his son Kamran, his brother Hadji Firooz Eddin, the Serdar Akrem Khan, and a few devoted servants ; and when he thought himself in safety he sent his son and his brother to Teheran to claim the promised assistance of Feth Ali Shah, proceeding himself to Bokhara to endeavour to interest the Emir in his favour. Mahmood Mirza had scarcely left the camp and his ally Mir Ali Khan, than Kaissar Mirza was informed of the fact, and he profited by the confusion and astonishment into which this event had thrown the Ghainians, to fall upon and rout them thoroughly— a great many were made prisoners and brought to Herat. As for Mir Ali Khan, he had great difficulty in effecting his escape, and reached Ghain with only a few horse, having met much privation and danger on the road. Shah Zeman, then at Kabul, was soon informed that his brother Mahmood had returned to Afghanistan, and some false reports induced him to believe that Kaissar Mirza, after having been beaten at Emaret, had also evacuated the city of Herat on the approach of Mahmood, who had taken possession. He therefore assembled his army without loss of time, and took the field with a view to its recapture, for the country and the roads were so thoroughly scoured by the partisans of Mahmood, that no messenger had been able to reach him with true intelligence of the actual state of things: it was only on his arrival at Herat itself that he knew positively what was passing. Delighted to find that the evil was not so great as he had anticipated, he encamped his army on the banks of the Heri-rood, and, followed by his court, subsequently entered the city. When he learnt that his brother had gone to Bokhara he immediately despatched the Kazee, Abdul Irak, to the Emir ——— TR ISN 118 REVOLT OF THE SIKHS. Cuar. 1X. of that country, to represent that by the terms of the treaty concluded between Timoor Shah and the Emir he was bound to deliver up Mahmood Mirza to him as a disturber of the tran- quillity of the Afghan kingdom; but that, nevertheless, if he found himself bound by the duties of hospitality, he should remain satisfied if he would order the prince to be watched at Bokhara in such a manner that he could not escape and again foment discord in his dominions. Sultan Ali Murad detained the Afghan envoy for some time at his court without giving him a categorical answer: he finished, nevertheless, by promising that Mahmood Mirza should be detained in his capital, and that he would answer for it with his head that he should not leave it. The Kazee left Bokhara without having comprehended the meaning of these words of the Emir, who had dwelt especially upon the last part of his reply, the real and secret intention of which was to gratify upon the fugitive prince the mortal hatred which he felt for the family of the Suddozyes; his death was indeed only deferred at the earnest request of a great and influential Uzbek nobleman, by name Fezl Ahmed, who interested himself in his behalf. Mah- mood, informed by Fezl Ahmed of the plot which was in prepara- tion against his life, managed to deceive the vigilance of his guards and fled to Khiva, when Mohamed Rahim Khan, the sovereign of that Khanat, for some time treated him with great hospitality ; but as in the end he was unable to render him the assistance which he required to renew the war, Mahmood Mirza left Khiva and rejoined his son and his brother at Teheran, to which city he had sent them subsequently to his flight from the camp of the Emir of Ghain. After a residence of four months at Herat, Zeman Shah received letters from the governor of Peshawur informing him that on his departure from Kabul the Sikh mountaineers of Yambou had made a descent upon Lahore, and plundered and sacked the city. The Serdar Ahmed Khan, at the time governor of Lahore, did his best to frustrate their intention; he went out and attacked them, but his soldiers fled at the first onset, and the Khan was killed in endeavouring to cover their retreat. On the receipt of this dis- astrous intelligence, Shah Zeman appointed Mir Efzel Khan, son of the Serdaree Serdarane, Medad Khan, vizier to his son Kais- sar, after which, taking with him Zeman Khan, Popolzye, in whose military talents he had the greatest confidence, he left immediately for Kabul by the difficult and mountainous road which traverses Cuar. 1X. DISASTERS OF ZEMAN’S ARMY. 119 the country of the Hazarahs, Poocht Kooh, accompanied only by one hundred and fifty horse. As to the mass of his army, artillery, and baggage, he sent them by Kandahar, under the conduct of his minister Vefadar Khan and the Serdar Ahmed Khan Noorzye. Zeman Shah, who arrived in the capital in twelve days, took a large sum from his treasury to make formidable prepara- tions for carrying on the war with activity ; and directly the troops which arrived by way of Kandahar had joined those he had just raised he left for the Punjab. The Sikh mountaineers abandoned Lahore at his approach and retired into their fastnesses ; he there- fore took peaceable possession of the city. As the inhabitants had taken no part in the last revolt, in which they had been maltreated by the mountaineers, he thought he could place confidence in them, and consented to the request which they made, namely, that in future the governor of Lahore should be selected by the Shah from amongst the principal Sikh chiefs, to the exclusion of the Afohans. He chose, therefore, for this post one of them, by name Runjeet Sing, who had even then acquired a great reputation for talent and courage ; and after having duly installed him, Zeman Shah departed on his return to Kabul. This march was for him and his army one long series of misfortunes; his artillery and a great part of his baggage were lost at the passage of the Jelum ; the rain, which fell in torrents and almost daily, had so broken up the roads that they were impassable; the soldiers, worn out by their sufferings, either dropped to the rear or deserted, and the plundering tribes took advantage of the distressed condition of the army to pillage the baggage and strip the stragglers, who were incapable of defending themselves. In fact, it was the débris of an army of attenuated men, which, harassed by a thousand miseries and privations, that Zeman succeeded in bringing into Peshawur. Here he remained a month to rest and refresh his troops, after which, having installed his brother, Shooja-ool-Moolk, as governor of the city, he proceeded to Kabul, where he made but a very short stay, for he was under the necessity of going on to Kandahar in spite of the severity of the winter to suppress the disposition to revolt in that city. Such revolts originated more especially in the discontent which the powerful tribe of the Barukzyes felt at seeing their chiefs, the Mohamedzyes, set aside and debarred from holding any public appointment, and meeting with no consideration at court. The 120 THE VIZIER VEFADAR KHAN. Cuar. IX. reader should remember that, from the day on which Sudoo and Mohamed had been raised to a superior rank by Shah Abbas the Great, the descendants of the first had enjoyed under the Seffavean dynasty an almost regal power in Afghanistan. The descendants of the second, without having so great an influence, held nevertheless the highest appointments in the state, and were not less venerated than the Suddozyes. When Ahmed Shah ascended the throne, he, out of gratitude to Hadji Djemal, a chief of the Mohamedzyes, respected the privileges of that family, the chiefs of which constantly held the most important commands in his army and the great offices at his court. Timoor Shah, who followed the example of his father, had the tact always to attach them to his party, and Zeman Shah was the first who dared to alter this state of things, which, sanctioned by time, had all the force of law. Payendeh Khan, chief of the Mohamedzyes, was, as we have already remarked, stripped of all the appointments that he held, and this was the first grievance of the Barukzyes against royalty. The prime minister of Zeman Shah, Vefadar Khan, although be- longing to the royal tribe of Popolzye, was of low extraction. The Shah did nothing without having first taken his advice, and this personage was the instigator of all the harsh measures which the Shah had adopted against the great families of the kingdom ; Vefadar Khan found his own interest in the confiscations which habitually followed, and they also delivered him from dan- oerous rivals. Zeman remained deaf to the milder counsels which were given him, and a fatality seemed to urge him for- ward from day to day in this impolitic and unjust path. The prime minister, having sprung from the lower ranks of the no- bility, was despised by the higher, and he revenged himself by oppressing them and elevating unknown persons in their place, who became so many tools in his own hands. The system thus adopted by Zeman of governing in the most absolute manner, without the concurrence and support of the serdars, had nevertheless, up to this time, produced only irritation in the public mind, and some partial revolts; but the discontent was general, particularly amongst the most influential and powerful chiefs, who had all of them been more or less despoiled. Although Vefadar Khan was not ignorant of the extent to which he was detested by these persons, he played nevertheless a double game, and nourished in their minds sentiments of hostility to the king. The Khan en- Cuar. IX. CONSPIRACY OF SERDARS. deavoured to compromise his sovereign in their eyes, by making them believe that, in whatever he did, he simply executed the wishes of the Shah, and that his intervention with the king was the means of saving them from much greater disasters. His friendly pro- testations were always accompanied by hypocritical marks of inte- rest in their behalf, such as the remission of a tax or the conces- sion of some land, and led them to believe that he had great difficulty in procuring these favours from the Shah, regretting that it was not in his power to render them a greater service, thus lead- ing them to hope that they would be in a much better position in future. In this way he by turns flattered and caressed all par- ties, boasting everywhere the favours he had granted, and seeking every opportunity of laying upon the king all the odium of his tyranny and the bloody executions of which he himself was the sole originator, hoping by such conduct to overthrow his sovereign, and by these intrigues attain himself the regal power. He fancied he should obtain his end by exciting, when the propitious moment arrived, a tumult amongst the people, and expected to receive the support of the new serdars of his own creation, who were devoted to him. His numerous emissaries glided amongst the populace, and, though apparently perfectly disinterested, worked upon them for the vizier's own purposes. The brothers of the king also were under his influence, and he made use of them and led each in his turn to believe that he was endeavouring to raise him to the throne. The intrigues and underhand practices of this ambitious man proved that he had as much craft and subtlety as he had talent for go- verning ; the steps he took were always well considered, and to the point, and his plan was so well conducted that it might have succeeded if he had had the boldness to bring it more rapidly to an issue; but the heads of a few more serdars, who had taken umbrage at him, were wanting : he temporized, therefore, and this delay was fatal. The Afghan serdars, for the most part discontented, formed a secret league, in order that they might come to some un- derstanding as to the measures that must be taken to free them- selves from the iron yoke and sanguinary persecutions which weighed upon them; but to give a greater chance of success to their enterprise, they delegated five of the most powerful amongst them, who alone were to decide upon the means to be employed— the others binding themselves to be ready on the day appointed, mss sg wo onm e - -_ F— I AR — A —— = — Tn Es 122 CONSPIRACY OF SERDARS. Cuar. 1X, and to execute without hesitation whatever should be determined upon. As the police of Vefadar Khan was perfectly organized, and nothing escaped their Argus eyes, the five delegates fied upon the house of a dervish, in high repute for his sanctity, as their place of meeting, for his residence had been always fr equented by the most considerable of the Afghan nobility, who went by t the appella- tion of his murids. He never received more than six persons at a time, and his door was shut against every one until these six de- parted to make way for others. Payendeh Khan had the clever- ness to induce this holy man to join the conspirators, and he trusted that, by meeting at his house and taking advantage of the custom so long established there, he and the other delegates would es ape the inquiries which might arise. After a lively discussion at one of these meetings, in which cach of them stated the griev- ances of his tribe, it was admitted that their nation had suffered beyond what any men of spirit could tolerate—that Zeman Shah and his minister ought to be overthrown, and the first replaced by the prince Shooja-ool-Moolk, his half-brother, at that time governor of Peshawur. The chiefs present at this meeting were Payendeh Khan, Mo- hamed Sherif Khan, Moonshee Bashee (cashier-in-chief ), Yoosoof Ali Khan, chief of the eunuchs, Sultan Khan, Noorzye, and Rahim Khan, Alizye. Before separating they fixed upon a day for the execution of their project, and also drew up several articles, forming a kind of constitution, which they were to give to their countrymen. The principal clauses in this document were, that henceforth the crown should be elective ; that the Serdars alone had the right to vote at such election, and also to depose those sovereigns who proved themselves unworthy of the trust which had been reposed in them. But unfortunately the conspirators procrastinated, and their plans were betrayed to the prime minister by the Moonshee Bashee. Vefadar Khan, thinking this an admirable opportunity of getting rid of his principal opponents at one fell swoop, im- mediately informed the Shab of the conspiracy which had been revealed, who recommended that the greatest secrecy should be observed, and at once relieved his guards, of whose fidelity he was doubtful, replacing them by others on whom he thought he could rely. The following day he made considerable presents to his servants and officers, and also to the people, to dispose them in his favour, and on the succeeding one sent for all the Crap. 1X, FLIGHT OF FETHI KHAN. 123 chiefs who were concerned in the plot ; but separately, and under the pretext that he was desirous of conversing with them upon public affairs, so that they should not have the least suspicion of his motive. However, on their arrival at the palace, they were seized and imprisoned in the citadel. A few hours after the Shah ascended the throne in great state, and, ordering them to be brought into his presence, demanded why they had conspired against him? to which they replied, that they had sworn to de- throne him, but not to put him to death; that they never could have had an idea of attacking his royal person if they had not been firmly convinced that all their representations to induce him to dismiss his vizier would be fruitless ; it was his ruin alone they were bent upon, and it was the hope of putting an end to this wretch that had led them to conspire against their king. After having listened to this avowal, Zeman Shah ordered them to be exe- cuted in his presence, their bodies to be left on the public square outside the citadel, and remain there for three days exposed to the public gaze. As he now feared some movement on the part of the Barukzyes, the chief of which tribe he had just put to death, he ordered that all the Mohamedzye serdars should be arrested, but the greater part of them, having been warned in time, were enabled to save themselves by flight, or take refuge in the mosque of Ahmed Shah,—a sanctuary never violated. Fethi Khan, the eldest son of Payendeh Khan, who was more particularly sought after by the express orders of the Shah, with a view of putting him to death, also escaped the vigilance of the soldiers that were sent in pursuit of him. Having received notice of their intentions, he got over the walls, and, having excellent horses awaiting him in a garden adjacent to the city, he reached Girishk, seventy-three miles distant, in eight hours. From thence he took the road over the mountains and across country, in order that no trace should be found of him, and directed his course to Persia, where he rejoined Mahmood Mirza, who, as we have already remarked, had, for the second time, taken up his residence at the court of the Kadjars. On this occa- sion, as on the former one, he had been very well received by Feth Ali Shah, who had placed himself at the head of an army, with a view of reinstating him in his government of Herat; but on his arrival at Nishapoor he or that fresh disturbances had broken out in the Azerbaidjan, which obliged him to return to Irak re — Cr SES Ao A AA SR + ln SN TRS " 124 MAHMOOD TAKES FURRAH, Cuar. IX. with his troops, and dismiss Mahmood Mirza, to whom he gave a subsidy and assigned Turchiz as his place of residence, promising that he would send him troops when order was restored in the north of the empire, so that the prince might proceed against Herat. It was at Turchiz that the Serdar Fethi Khan joined Mahmood Mirza, and the greater part of his brothers soon arrived at the same place, who, like him, had also their father’s death to avenge. After the sanguinary executions of the chiefs at Kandahar, the Afghans in all parts of the kingdom rose against Zeman Shah. The Punjab and Peshawur in particular openly raised the standard of revolt. There were also some attempts at insurrection in Kabul, which obliged the King to proceed there in great haste ; but fearing also for the tranquillity of Kandahar, he left there a part of his army, and the Serdar Mir Ali Khan, a devoted, energetic, and intelligent man, as governor. While Zeman Shah was in a state of complete uncertainty as to what step he should take to pacify his kingdom, Fethi Khan, who had, as well as his brothers, devoted himself to the cause of Mahmood Mirza, urged that prince to enter Afghan- istan once more, and overthrow his brother. Their pressing soli- citations at length prevailed, and he marched on Ghain, but, on his arrival in that district, he saw that the inhabitants did not feel disposed to pardon him for the check they had sus- tained, owing to his flight when they formed part of his army before Herat, and that in consequence they were very little inclined to assist him. Mahmood almost regretted having left Turchiz, and thought of returning ; but Fethi Khan somewhat restored his courage, and induced him to renounce this intention. At the same time he sent two of his brothers to the fortress of I'urrah, to endeavour to keep matters quiet and obtain intelligence ; this was easy enough, for the inhabitants of that town were entirely devoted to Mahmood Mirza, to whom they opened their gates when he presented himself before them, accompanied ouly by eighteen horsemen, which formed all his army. This success obtained for him the support of some chiefs of Khorassan, and he soon found himself at the head of a small force. Ile then made an appeal to the Afghan nation, and in the manifesto which he issued he drew a vivid picture of the cruelties and vices of Zeman Shah and his minister Vefadar Khan, and announced his design of marching on Kabul, to deliver the people from their oppres- pur SAA » iL » " gut sR gr Cuar. IX. AND KANDAHAR. 125 sion. The tribe of the Barukzyes, who recognised Fethi Khan as their chief, hastened en masse to place themselves under the orders of their young general, and this example was soon fol- lowed by the greater number of the Dooranee tribes, when Mah- mood marched on Kandahar. The governor, Mir Ali Khan, in- formed of his approach, went out to meet him at the head of four thousand cavalry, but, completely routed and forced to fly, he had scarcely time to retire within the citadel. Mahmood Mirza followed him step by step, and invested the city, which he be- sieged without success during forty-two days. At length, on the forty-third the assault was given, and Fethi Khan, who conducted it, was the first man that scaled the walls, and his soldiers followed rapidly. They were treacherously aided by Bakheh Khan and Hassan Khan, two Afghan chiefs, who, osten- sibly of the Shah Zeman’s party, were secretly doing all they could to make that of Mahmood Mirza triumph, and but for their help the place would not have been taken without great difficulty. When Mir Ali Khan saw that the affair was desperate, he ordered these two traitors to be brought into his presence, and, feeling sure of their perfidy, put them to death on the spot, after which he mounted his horse and escaped by a secret door, accompanied only by a few horsemen. Directly Mahmood Mirza was in possession of Kandahar he was obliged to levy a large sum upon the inhabitants for the maintenance of his army ; but the persuasive manners and talents of Fethi Khan induced them to support this contribution with- out murmuring, and they remained devoted to the prince. On hearing what was passing at Kandahar, Zeman Shah sent an army of 15,000 horse, under the command of the Serdar Ahmed Khan, against Mahmood, for he was averse to leaving the capital himself for fear he should lose it in his absence. This officer was but little satisfied with the Shah, and still less so with his minister Vefadar Khan, and, in the hope that he would be better treated by Mahmood, he went over to him, with all his army, at Mookpoor. In anticipation of ulterior events, Shah Zeman had, after the departure of Ahmed Khan, assembled fresh troops, but when they heard of the defection of the corps under that serdar they at once disbanded and retired to their homes. An outbreak occurring at the same time in Kabul, Zeman Shah was under the necessity of evacuating the city and retiring in the direction of A A 3 VI A 1 vy ———— Tn, —— 126 BATTLE BETWEEN ZEMAN AND MAHMOOD. Cuar. IX. Jellalabad. On leaving the gates of the capital Le had with him only two hundred cavalry and four hundred artillerymen, with their uns, stores, and ammunition ; his minister, Vefadar Khan, and the Serdar Zeman Khan, Popolzye, were the only chiefs who re- mained faithful, and they retired with him and his party within the fortified village of Kaleh Acheg, the name of its owner, and im- mediately set to work to repair the walls and provision it. From hence a fresh appeal was made to the partizans of the Shah, and, as the royal treasure was still in his hands, he was joined by a pretty good number of recruits, but much more in the hope of receiving high pay than from any devotion to his person. How- ever that might be, Zeman again found himself in a position to give battle to his brother. After the 15,000 cavalry of Ahmed Khan had joined the army of Mahmood Mirza, the prince marched rapidly upon and seized Kabul, without meeting with the slightest resistance. The Emir Islam Khan and Djaffer Khan, two Kuzzilbash chiefs, who only could have defended the city, were allied by marriage to the Mohamedzyes, and went over to their side the moment they appeared. Mahmood, thus successful, decided upon dislodging Zeman Shah from the fortified position he had taken up. The task was a difficult one, for the latter had saved all his artillery, while the prince had not one single piece to oppose to him. Never- theless, he hesitated not, and again took the field. The armies of the two brothers met at the halt of Ouchpane, when that of the Shah was completely beaten and dispersed, and he had the greatest difficulty in regaining Kaleh Acheg. Mahmood fol- lowed him, and immediately assaulted his adversary’s stronghold, but, defended by both nature and art, and garrisoned by brave men determined to die for their king, it resisted for eleven days the continuous efforts of the besiegers. However, the time had arrived when they could hold out no longer, and the Shah, accom- panied by the serdars who were with him, escaped during the night, and retired into another small fortress near Jugdulluk, also belong- ing to Acheg Khan. This chief, alarmed at the probability that disastrous consequences might result to him for the hospi- tality he had shown to his sovereign, sent a messenger to Mahmood to inform him of the Shah’s retreat. The prince immediately sent a serdar, with a strong escort and a surgeon, to the spot PRISE —_ Cuap, IX. DOWNFALL AND MISFORTUNES OF ZEMAN. 127 which the Khan had designated, when Zeman was taken prisoner, and, in conformity with the orders of Mahmood, his eyes were immediately put out — a punishment he richly merited for the same cruelty which he had practised upon Humayoon Mirza, his elder brother. Vefadar Khan, Zeman Khan, Popolzye, and Mohamed Khan, the brother of the Vizier, also taken prisoners with Shah Zeman, were sent to Kabul, and there publicly exe- cuted. Thus terminated the career of this ambitious minister, who could only govern by intrigue and murder, and this in order that he might supplant his master, which he would have done, had not his courage failed him at the moment his plan was on the eve of execution. Ie perished by a death to which he had condemned hundreds, and which he so thoroughly deserved himself. Though blind, Shah Zeman, with the assistance of a few devoted friends, subsequently managed to deceive the vigilance of his guards, and fled to Bokhara, where fresh misfortunes awaited him. His daughter, who followed him in his exile, and who was remarkable for her great beauty, was torn with violence from him by the Emir Haidar Turreh, who had inherited from his father a hatred of the Suddozye family. After this abduction he was on the point of putting Zeman to death, which would infallibly have happened, if he had not again succeeded in making his escape. From Bokhara this king, hitherto so powerful, but now so unfor- tunate, went to IHerat, which was then governed by the Prince Hadji Firooz Eddin, half-brother of the Shah Mahmood, who respected his misfortunes and gave him a generous reception ; and after having treated him in the most hospitable manner during several months, he gave him an escort which secured his safe retreat to India. Zeman retired to Loodiana, where he lived on a pension from the East India Company, devoted to the observances of his faith, and did not at any subsequent period mix himself up with the revolutions of which his country was so frequently the theatre after his fall. He was still living in 1846. This prince, like all the Afghans, was cruel ; but this arose much more from the fact that he was influenced by a bad minister, in whom he placed too much confidence, and who knew how to inspire him with chimerical fears, than because he was of a na- turally cruel disposition, and wished to gratify it. His greatest crime was, that he was absolute, and would reign on that principle. This wounded the pride of the serdars, and was in opposition to a go Yd ——— wr amir, Rr — 128 CHARACTER OF ZEMAN. Cuar. IX, the received opinions amongst them as to the extent of the sove- reign power. With a different vizier, he might have hoped that his reign would be as long, and possibly more glorious, than that of his father, for he was personally very brave, very active, always on horseback, bringing one war to a conclusion only to commence another ; nor was he wanting in intelligence: but he lost all his future chances by making the Mohamedzye chiefs discontented, for their rights to the great offices of the state were quite as sacred mm the eyes of the Afghans as those of the Suddozyes to the throne. The moment he endeavoured to abrogate those rights his fall be- came certain; but, in spite of the sanguinary executions he was guilty of at the instigation of his minister, the Afghans. have ¢ greater respect for his memory than that of any of the other sons of Timoor Shah. Caapr. X. ACCESSION OF MAHMOOD SHAH. : 129 CHAPTER X. Mahmood ascends the throne — First acts of the Shah — Revolt of the Ghildj- zyes — Kaissar Mirza is driven from Herat — Hadji Firooz Eddin made governor of that city — Kaissar Mirza attacks him, but is obliged to retire — Kamran, a son of Mahmood, and Kaissar alternately take possession of Kan- dahar — Disorders and conflict with the Kuzzilbashes — Peace is restored at Kabul — Conspiracy against Shah Mahmood — He is dethroned — His brother Shooja succeeds him — Mahmood remains a prisoner — Kamran is expelled from Kandahar by Kaissar Mirza — The latter, defeated by the Heratees, evacuates the city — The Persians besiege Herat — They are beaten and retire — Shah Shooja marches against the Talpooras — Returns to Kabul — English embassy to Kabul — Difficulties of the reign of Shah Shoonja — The Serdar Fethi Khan intrigues and flies from Kabul — He is arrested by Kaissar Mirza — Dost Mohamed escapes and pillages Bakooa — Shere dil Khan assists Shah Mahmood to escape — The latter and the Mobamedzyes release Fethi Khan — Mahmood marches on Kabul — Seizes the city — Battle of Neemla — Shooja is put to flight — Endeavours to keep the field — Retires to Loodiana. AFTER seven years of conflict and misfortunes Mahmood Mirza ascended the throne of his fathers in the year 1800, and when Zeman Shah was overthrown he took the title of Shah, and made his solemn entry into Kabul. He behaved with the ut- most generosity to his troops, even to such an extent that he exhausted the greater part of the treasure accumulated in the coffers of the state by his father and grandfather. He also enriched thes chiefs who had assisted him, and gave them the highest appointments at his court : the Serdar Fethi Khan received the title of Shah Doort Khan; * Shere Mohamed Khan, son of the Vizier Shah Velee Khan, was named Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, and to him was delegated the government of the kingdom ; the Serdar Abdullah Khan, Ali Kioozye, father of Yar Mohamed Khan, who had been confined in the Bala Hissar by Shah Zeman, was released from that fortress, and made Governor of Cashmeer ; and, finally, he sent his son Kamran Mirza, with several brothers of the Serdar Fethi Khan, against Shooja-ool-Moolk, who commanded at Peshawur, to take the city and seize that prince. Shooja did not wait for them, but fled at their approach; so Kamran took possession of Peshawur without any fighting. * Friend of the king.— Ferrier, Bi patie 3 Hi Bonn w A — LN AA A oo 4 i ” i i 130 KAISSAR MIRZA DRIVEN FROM HERAT. Cuar. X. A few capital punishments, which Mahmood ordered after his installation to power, excited a little irritation amongst the nomade tribes, the chiefs of which had more especially felt the effects of his anger ; but as these rigorous measures affected his adversaries only, the Shah’s party felt no uneasiness, and considered that he had a right to chastise those who had been opposed to him. Nevertheless the Ghildjzyes, the born enemies of every Abdalee sovereign, revolted at the outset against his authority, and were desirous of placing one of their own tribe upon the throne; Mahmood was obliged to send the Serdars Fethi Khan and Ahmed Khan against the rebels, who beat them in four or five makng them conform encounters, and terminated the revolt by to the existing state of things. On the other hand, fortune came to the aid of the Shah Mahmood ; for Kaissar Mirza, the son of Shah Zeman, lost the government of Herat, and this without any attempt on the part of Mahmood to dispossess him of it. The circumstances were as follows :— Mir Efzel Khan, the Vizier of Kaissar Mirza, conceived the idea of overthrowing the prince immediately after the fall of his father, and at this intrigue he worked ardently, and formed with great ease a powerful party on which he could entirely rely. When he thought he was sufficiently powerful, he resolved on Kaissar to death, but the prince, informed of the plot in d from Herat, and sought refuge at Kaff-rooge, a town nd children under the protec- ss influential than e apprehen- putting time, escape of Khorassan, leaving his wives a tion of the Serdar Kalech Khan, who, though le Mir Efzel Khan, was still sufficiently powerful not to b sive on account of the support and protection he gave to this unfortunate family. After the flight of Kaiss Shah Mahmood, occupied not by any possibility come anc blish his authority in Herat. to him, would not agree to this except with a certain reserva- tion; but, on the other hand, they rejected and repelled the secret intrigues of Kalech Khan, the antagonist of the usurper, who wished to assassinate him. The Heratees demanded that Efzel Khan, though retaining the appointment of vizier, which they guaranteed him, should receive as governor, in the place of Kaissar Mirza, one of the blood royal, unless he preferred the ar Mirza, Mir Efzel, well convinced that at this time with the Ghildjzyes, could 1 disturb him, endeavoured to esta- 1h» ‘nhabitants, who were attached Cm . Ee —_—— Ebadi kai Chaar. X ‘ HADJI FIROOZ EDDIN ~N. 131 ” . on of that prince himself; but Mir Efzel. fear] tent of the latter, hastened to find a suc s oding 8) pon wishes of the people. i Hadji Fi ddi irooz Eddin, who, Ta rae » who, as we have already remarked, retired n, had on leaving that capital tre a to Mecca. On his return Moti 1 pa LL : ; : anistan was i ( : . g TO sanguinary executions of Shah Zeman, and A WR 1, and the war was then going m and Mahmood Mirza ; the Hadji, wl bots not to be a witness of these sad sec rl Ars in Khorassan, which the Shah of Poon he fenirais Tune : ersia h: i i i residence, and here he occupied hi a. _. So Sash imself in th 1 ane e purchase an g ” camels, and other beasts of burden De en i ir Efzel Khan came to him there d a acceptance the government of Herat b go i - » - 3 ut 1 ambition, and caring little for the ; de I declined the offer, preferri a of Sek Spent dec , preferring to continue his com its, I'his refusal was WR fusal was not at all to the taste of Mir Efzel, w ! by the intrigues of Kalech Khan, w : 5 10, presses I hh han, was more earnestly solicited from \ y to recall Kaissar Mirza. To allay impatience of the people, 1 | at ei HALion of 10 people, he pretended that he had received rom Hadji Firooz Eddin accepting the : city ; this, however, he had himself f ara 4 se ge a ; orged, and, contemporane- SUNY 2 2 ow public, despatched in haste a few 8 rchiz, who, under the pretex ishi i pretext 18 y some horses, induced the prince to Prt t jo Hg bo is et them in a retired s when they carr i i Wa ey carried him off by main force, and brought hi ps Herat, nolens volens, where he was obliged t uy Jeni g o accept the title of Kiseor. Mi . Sai Mirza, seeing that his uncle had carried the da o0¢ 7 S i " ony iim, would not submit to the decision of the Herat , lif, would ratees anc marched against Ierat at the head of a small a v . i, » « / Afghans and Khorassanees, which he had succeeded i i g Go — hon 8 ded in raising. Hadji I irooz allowed him to advance as far as Shekivar 4 village situated twenty-one miles west of Herat ir ee attack ie adoarentc. we zo By Nuce Susenl his adversary, when Kaissar was completely worsted anc oi to take to flight. In accordance with a plan 207T00 ov] SV 1 : Speak upon previously, and of which the troops had been in a the prince after his defeat directed his course south ” ; ’ 8 ~ ~ —_—- arc un the plain of Bakooa, where the fugitives went to Ve) . y 0 r 3 1 rejoin him ; when they all arrived he marched against Kandahan Mu C « & p ’ RK 2 I A 7 i Ras oss a Biel Je 7 Ae, BPN eT TY - : RT a vim - i“ ea TA — pa oR YAN \ dtl | (EL |) ARs HEE | , | 4 |) be 3 : He 132 CONFLICTS WITH THE KUZZILBASHES. Cmar. X. Ciav. X. PEACE RESTORED. ” | | hoping to surprise Kamran Mirza, who commanded there, and IE capture that city. In this attempt, as it turned out, he was | successful, but a few days after the inhabitants revolted, and drove 1 1 He him out of Kandahar. Kamran Mirza, who had retired to Kelat known that this fetvo had been issued, the Afghans assembled in arms, and in great numbers, around the mosque, and afterwards went, full of excitement, to exterminate the Kuzzilbashes. The first place to which they proceeded was the quarter of the Khaffis, | | } i Ghildjzye, was recalled by them, so that these two princes succeeded each other three times during the space of two months, according as the party which supported either had the upper band ; nevertheless Kamran Mirza finished by remaining master of the position, and Kaissar fled once more. Mahmood Mirza had been the sovereign ruler of Afghanistan during two years and six months, when the city of Kabul became the scene of sanguinary disorders, originating in a religious schism between the Afghans, who are Soonees, and the Kuzzilbashes of the sect of Shiahs; these riots seriously compromised the power of Shah Mahmood, nevertheless he surmounted the diffi- culty, but the support he gave to the heretical Shiahs alienated the Afghans from him, and contributed greatly to his fall, which took place some short time after. These disorders were occasioned by a circumstance arising out of the horrible inclination the Persians have for a vice which it would sully these pages to mention. Some of the Kuzzilbashes secreted for several days a young Afghan lad of great beauty in their house, during which time he was treated in the most infamous manner, and this not only from their depraved passions, but from their hatred to Soonees. Restored to liberty, the youth informed his parents of what had taken place, when they immediately complained to Shah Mahmood ; but the king, not wishing to alienate the Kuzzil- bashes, whose adhesion had been, and might be again, of great service to him, refused to legislate upon the matter, and forwarded it to the religious tribunal from which it came. The injured parties, although dissatisfied in that the Shah eluded their com- plaint, nevertheless conformed to his orders, and proceeded to the mosque to consult the Syud Mir Vaéz, a man highly venerated by the Afghans, and whose hostility to the Shah Mahmood was no secret to any one. When the complainants appeared, the Syud was preaching to an immense crowd of persons, and they inter- rupted him to make known their business with loud cries and rending their clothes. On learning the nature of it, Mir Vaez at once gave them a fetvo authorising the extermination of all the Shiahs in Kabul, whom he held in detestation. When it was a people originally from Khaff, massacred all those whom they met, and pillaged and burnt their houses. Recovered in some degree from the first movement of surprise which this sudden attack had caused them, the Kuzzilbashes assembled, fully determined to defend their property and their lives to the last extremity. Nevertheless, their situation became every moment more critical, for, after a stout de- fence of two days, they saw, on the morning of the third, all the heights that commanded their position occupied by the Afghans from the neighbouring villages, who had come to the assistance of the citizens. The Shah Mahmood had sent Mooktar ed Dooulet and Ahmed Khan several times to the assailants, to endeavour to prevail upon them to desist from their sanguinary intentions, but this step, instead of appeasing, only irritated them the more, excited as they were by the mollahs and some serdars, who were jealous of the favour shown to the Kuzzilbash chiefs by the Shah. After four days’ fighting, during which four hundred persons at least, and on either side, had lost their lives, the Serdar Fethi Khan, who, by reason of the alliances which existed between his family and the Kuzzilbashes, had, up to this time, refrained from taking any part in the affair, became alarmed, and, apprehensive that things might take a still more serious turn, was anxious to put some bounds to the furious harangues of Mir Vaéz, who spared not even royalty itself. Fethi Khan therefore stepped forward, and, with his brother, declaring in favour of the Kuzzilbashes, rushed at the head of their partisans upon the disturbers of public order, and dispersed them with matchlock and sabre, to the great regret of the serdars opposed to Mahmood, who were also envious of the favour in which he was held by his sovereign. From this moment they conspired against them, and swore to overthrow them both. An occasion for doing this did not present itself for two years, when Fethi Khan was obliged to march with an army to Bamian to put down some disorders amongst the IHazarahs. Immediately after his departure, Mir Vaiz, the Serdar Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar ed Dooulet, the principal chiefs of the conspiracy, sent an express to the prince Shooja-ool-Moolk, the younger brother of Shah Mah- mood, requesting him to come immediately to Kabul, and overthrow or 134 MAHMOOD DETHRONED. Cuar. X. the latter, promising to give him their support and that of the Afghans in general. This prince, who had received information of this plot long before, was not very far distant from Peshawur, which he had secretly approached, and, on the receipt of the letter written him by the conspirators, advanced rapidly towards Kabul with all the men he could collect. Shah Mahmood was one of the last persons who heard of his arrival, for no one had revealed the fact to him, and he only ascertained it by remarking the excitement which everywhere prevailed. He was not a person who could suggest to himself the energetic measures which the exigencies of the moment required, and the man of action who had placed him on the throne, and through whom he governed, namely, Fethi Khan, was at a distance, and wholly ignorant of what was passing at Kabul— all the warriors who had been despatched to him by Shah Mah- mood had also been detained, and could not join him in person, for he was closely watched in his palace. Feeling the imminence of his danger, Mahmood took refuge in the Bala Ilissar, and the inhabitants, satisfied by keeping an eye upon him from the outside of the citadel, went in crowds to meet Shooja-oo0l-Moolk, whom they brought into the city in triumph, and placed on the throne amidst the loudest acclamations, I have, up to this point, followed the manuscripts of two Eastern authors, whose works I have frequently quoted in the course of my narrative : that of Mirza Ali Mohamed has led me only to the close of the Afghan dominion in Persia ; from that period, up to the arrival of Shah Shooja at Kabul, I have drawn my materials from the writings of Abdullah Khan Heratee, pich- Khetmet, gentleman of the chamber, or equerry, to the Shah Kamran of Herat: but I must add that his narrative is very summary and destitute of dates; and I have been obliged to make researches elsewhere to find those I have recorded. I have also joined to the information taken from his manuscript many other particulars which T collected myself during my travels in Afghanistan, from the mouths of cone temporaries of Shah Timoor and of his sons, who themselves took part in the events of those times. The reign of Shah Shooja-ool- Moolk is the one upon which I am not so well informed, and, having no European library to refer to, it will be impossible for me to fill up the very important omissions which, without doubt, exist in the history of this reign. The first act of Shah Shooja, as king, was to seize Shah Cuar. X. THE PERSIANS BESIEGE HERAT. 135 Mahmood, delivered up to him by his own guards, and to order the lex talionis to be enforced by putting out his eyes, as Mahmood had done those of the Shah Zeman ; Mooktar ed Dooulet having interceded for him, Shooja revoked this order out of consideration to his supporter; but he detained the ex-king a prisoner, and confined him in a dungeon of the Bala Hissar, After having taken this precautionary measure, the king confided a division of his army to his nephew Kaissar Mirza, the son of Shah Zeman, in order that he might turn Kamran Mirza, a son of Mahmood Shah, out of Kandahar, where he commanded ; but, meeting half-way Alem Khan, nephew of the Serdar Ahmed Khan, he learnt, greatly to his satisfaction we may presume, that this had already been done. The inhabitants had risen at the instigation of Alem Khan, and driven Kamran from the city ; no opposition, therefore, was offered to the prince on entering Kandahar, of which, in virtue of new orders from his uncle, he became governor. On leaving the city, Kamran Mirza took the road towards Herat, where his uncle Hadji Firooz Eddin gave him a kind reception, and confided to him the government of the district of Furrah, adjacent to Kandahar, where he was in a position to observe the events that were passing in that city, and to lay hands upon it by surprise, or otherwise, as occasion might present itself. Some time after Hadji Firooz Eddin, influenced by his mother, who was also the mother of Shah Mahmood, consented to march an army against Kabul, and make an attempt to release his brother ; he gave the command of these troops to his son Malek Kassem Mirza and his nephew Kamran Mirza. The prince Kaissar, tardily in- formed of their march, came out nevertheless from Kandahar and attacked the Heratees near Kaleh d’Azim Khan, but he was beaten and forced to fly once more, leaving the victors masters of Kandahar. Hadji Firooz Eddin had scarcely obtained this success when he learnt that Mohamed Velee Mirza, Governor-General of Khorassan, had marched an army commanded by the Naib Mohamed Khan Kadjar to take Herat. He therefore recalled his nephew and his son, who abandoned in their turn Kandahar to Kaissar Mirza, While awaiting their arrival, Hadji Firooz Eddin assembled in haste a few thousand horse of the Eimak tribes, and moved out of Herat to meet the Persians; the encounter took place near Chekivan, but he was beaten and obliged to make a speedy retreat into Herat, which was soon besieged by the victors. The Persians 136 SHAH SHOOJA MARCHES ON SCINDE. Cuar. X. had good artillery, and their troops had received for some time past a certain amount of instruction and organization on the European system ; they might therefore hope to make themselves masters of the place in a short space of time. But this hope was not realized, owing to their want of vigilance, for the Afghan princes, returning from Kandahar, fell upon their rear, which they put to the rout, while Hadji Firooz sallied from the city and attacked them in front, so that, taken between two fires, they must have thought them- selves fortunate in being able to effect their retreat with the loss of a few hundred men killed and three or four guns taken. They repaid themselves however for this check by ravaging the country through which they retreated, and bringing with them to Meshed more than one hundred thousand cattle. This was the first time after the death of Nadir Shah that the Persians put forward their claims to Herat ; since then they have made very many attempts to take it, without more success than in this instance: nevertheless they have exercised from this period a certain influence upon its governor, who, for the sake of being at peace with them, acknowledged, although evasively, the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia after this attack ; and agreed to pay a tribute, the terms of which were left altogether undetermined : neither the amount nor the time it was to be paid was stated ; it was much or little according to circumstances and the means which the Persians might have of enforcing payment. Shah Shooja had enough trouble to consolidate his power in Kabul, for a thousand factions were in a state of agitation around him; he punished some and compro- mised matters with others, and had at length succeeded in establish- ing some order. The Serdar Fethi Khan, after his return from Bamian, attached himself to his party and became one of his minis- ters; it was this chief who advised him to give up his life of repose and make war, which alone could conciliate and obtain for him the respect of the Afghans. As the Shah had a predilection for a military life, this advice was adopted, the invasion of Scinde re- solved upon, and, after having assembled an army of 30,000 men, the king marched on that country. The chief of the Talpooras endeavoured to avoid the storm, and sent his minister Walee Mohamed Khan to the Shah, offering to pay him 320,0007. which he was indebted to him for arrears of tribute ; but the Serdar Fethi Khan, who saw the king was inclined to accept this offer, opposed it in every way that he could. His advice would most probably have Char. X. ENGLISH EMBASSY TO KABUL. 137 been listened to if disastrous intelligence had not been received from Kabul : the northern tribes were in a state of agitation, and the capital itself was not tranquil ; which reasons induced the Shah to terminate his misunderstanding with the Emirs of Scinde and accept the 320,0007., which having done he returned in great haste to Kabul. Having restored tranquillity there, he made an expe- dition eastward, with a view of retaking possession of Cashmeer, and reducing the Serdar Runjeet Sing, Governor of Lahore, to obedience ; but he failed in this enterprise also, and returned to Kabul, having suffered considerable losses. ; Though Shah Shooja’s reign was so short, it was nevertheless one of those which had the greatest chance of being prosperous. The Afghans seemed tired of the demon of discord, but unfortunately there was nothing of a conciliatory character about the Shah; be alienated those whom he had the greatest interest in attaching to his cause, and an unforeseen occurrence, by which he ought to have obtained strength, served only to excite in him the love of absolute authority, and in the end turned to his prejudice. The British government, after having subdued in succession all the sovereigns of India one after the other, saw itself menaced in the middle of its triumphs by a danger against which it sought to protect itself by all the means in its power. The Emperors Napoleon and Alexander had just agreed to undertake an hostile ex- pedition against India, passing through Persia. Feth Ali Shah, who then reigned in the latter country, was not so stanch an ally that England could trust him; she thought therefore of establishing her first line of defence beyond the Persian frontier, and sought the friendship of the Afghans to form her advanced guard. With this policy in view, the G overnor-General of India sent Mr. Elphinstone as ambassador to Kabul, where he made a treaty Of alliance offen- sive and defensive with Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk ; the ambassador was exceedingly well received, and each day the Shah gave him a frosh entertainment in the royal palace.” The siege of Herat, which Mohamed Velee Mirza had just undertaken, and the result of which had been so unfortunate, was the counterpart to this embassy. It is well known how the rupture which took place between France and Russia, and the ascendancy obtained by England at the court of ‘Teheran by scattering her gold on all sides, led to the failure of Napoleon's plans, which might otherwise have been completely successful, and overthrown the then political state of India. 38 CHARACTER OF SHAH SHOOJA. Cuar. X. Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk had the reputation, and with reason, of being the most talented of the sons of Timoor Shah. With great firmness of character and tried courage, it was plainly to be seen by more than one circumstance that he was not a man to support intrigues, or serve as an instrument to a party. It was, therefore, a little against the grain that the serdars had submitted to the coercion of Mir Vaéz, Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar-ed- Dooulet, the result of which was the elevation of Shah Shooja to the throne ; for they clearly saw that under such a sovereign they must take a straight course and obey without making those representa- tions which the Afghans love so much to present to their superiors. Pressed by circumstances, they could not do otherwise than accept the candidate for the throne without conditions, for his usurpation was the only means by which they could withdraw themselves from the vengeance of Shah Mahmood, and that of the Serdar Fethi Khan, in the eyes of whom they had become ostensibly compromised since the unfortunate day when the Soonees and Shiahs had massacred one another in the city of Kabul. Never- theless, they still hoped that in accepting Shah Shooja as king he would keep his authority within just limits ; but they were mistaken, for the Shah, who at once penetrated their intentions, cut short all their demands from the very day he ascended the throne, by an act of sovereign power of the most absolute character. This tyrannical feeling soon became habitual to him, and it increased by degrees with all those who displeased him, however powerful or influential they might be. The Mohamedzyes themselves were deprived of their appointments, and their chief, Fethi Khan, dis- oraced by the king. The serdars, who vegetated in obscurity and were the least to be feared, were taken from their retreats and placed in positions of importance—in a word, Shooja shook himself free from the yoke, and transformed everything, and he never after- wards gave any proofs of that independent spirit which had led others to have such an high opinion of him when he was only a prince of the blood. But it must be admitted, and to his praise, that he was always grateful to those who had raised him to power: Mir Vaéz, Ahmed Khan, and Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, were much more his friends than his dependents ; but this friendship could not preserve them from the sad fate that awaited them ; and they fell all three from the elevated rank in which fortune had placed them by the revolutions which the Barukzyes and their numerous adherents een A i ——————— —- Cuar. X. HIS DIFFICULTIES. 139 stirred up amongst the Afghans. Mooktar-ed-Dooulet, obliged to give up the post of vizier in favour of the Serdar Akrem Khan, was in prison, and it was without doubt from the day that he retired from affairs that the decadence in the reign of Shah Shooja may be dated. The Serdar Ahmed Khan, less unfortunate than Mooktar, died sword in hand, while putting down a revolt in which the most faithful of the Shah’s friends lost their lives. The sons of these two chiefs, who exercised so great an influence over the Afghans, took from that time part in the revolt, and from this moment the reign of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk was nothing more than a succession of dangers, sufferings, and bitter anxiety. If he had been content to remove with some show of reason those who impeded the march of government by their intrigues, or if, while repressing them with more severity, he had acted with justice on the flagrant proofs of their crimes, the restless disposition of the Afghans would not have been alarmed, and he might have aspired to a reign not Jess glorious than that of his grandfather Ahmed Shah, with whom he had more than one point of resemblance. But he was capricious and singular like his brother Zeman, whose cruelty was necessary to consolidate the power in his own hands. Discontent soon became general amongst all classes of Shah Shooja’s subjects, even amongst his most devoted adherents, who also murmured loudly ; but without taking into consideration their irritation and remonstrances, he continued to give vent to his haughty and absolute disposition. The Afohans, who saw in him the most talented of the Suddozyes, resisted for a long time the wishes of their serdars, who, hab tuated to raise and depose their kings, were anxious to be rid of him; and the want of agreement on the choice of a successor which they must give the nation was the reason why they delayed his fall indefinitely. There 1s even some probability that this prince would have been able to maintain bis hold upon the throne if the Serdar Fethi Khan had hot been amongst the number of his adversaries ; Shooja imagined he could despise him, and, instead of conciliating him, which would have been the wisest course, he did everything to crease his dis- catisfaction. This false policy cost him dear. ; After his diserace Fethi Khan, disliking Kabul as a residence, proceeded to Kandahar, his native city, and In the environs of which the greater part of the tribe of the Barukzyes resided. When he arrived Kaissar Mirza was governor, and he promised that he rr G ORR SA 140 IMPRISONMENT OF FETHI KHAN. Cuar. X. should be respected and protected by him as long as he did not interfere in the affairs of government. Fethi Khan was not then in a position to make conditions, and was obliged to accept those which were offered him; but he prepared everything in secret for the restoration of Shah Mahmood. Whether Kaissar was informed of this, or whether he thought the step necessary to his uncle’s safety, he ordered the serdar to be seized on his leaving an audience which had been accorded him; and the officers who were commis- sioned to arrest him precipitated themselves upon him with such violence that he fell with his face to the ground, and knocked out several of his teeth. Profiting by this circumstance, they gagged him to stop his cries, bound his feet and his hands, and made him a close prisoner ; his young brother, Dost Mohamed Khan, who was near him, assisted by a few servants, attempted his rescue, but, overpowered by numbers, he was obliged to take to flight to escape the same treatment. Ie succeeded, however, in collecting a few hundred Barukzyes in the city, and with these attacked the citadel, but, received by a volley from the garrison, he was obliged to retire, and, hastily leaving the town, retreated to the fortress of Girishk, the governor of which was devoted to his family. After this he scoured the plain of Bakooa with the Barukzyes who had followed him, plundered the caravans, and soon found himself in possession of 6007, which he spent in obtaining recruits and adherents to his cause. The Serdar Fethi Khan had previously to his arrest despatched his brother Shere dil Khan to Kabul, with the view of facilitating the escape of Shah Mahmood from prison, and recommended him, above all things, not to permit any Afghan to take part in this enterprise, but to employ Kuzzilbashes exclusively. This Persian tribe, as we have already stated, consisted of 12,000 families when they were brought to Kabul by Nadir Shah, but subsequently to the death of that conqueror their numbers had considerably augmented. Up to the reign of Shah Mahmood the Afghans treated them upon a footing of equality, but after the sanguinary conflict which arose between them on the occasion of the horrible crime committed by these Persian colonists they were oppressed in every kind of way, though Fethi Khan had always remained on good terms with them, which led them very naturally to assist him in delivering Shah Mahmood. The undertaking was a difficult one, for Shah Shooja kept him closely guarded ; but whatever might have Cuar. X. ESCAPE OF SHAII MAHMOOD. 141 been the vigilance of his gaolers, the Kuzzilbashes finished by evading it. Tools were sceretly conveyed to the prisoner, and such was the energy with which he used them, that in eight hours he had dug down to the conduit by which he was to escape beyond the city walls. It was night when he gained the outside, and the Kuzzilbashes, who were on the watch, conducted him to a tomb in a churchyard situated near the walls of the Bala Hissar, and, having covered the place of his retreat with branches and earth, they retired, recommending him to have patience for a few days until the pursuit which it was certain would take place began to slacken. The next morning a hundred emissaries were de- spatched on every side, with orders to put him to death directly he fell into their hands, but the majority of them soon returned to inform the Shah that their endeavours to find him had been unavailing. After having passed several days in this subterranean abode, Mahmood learnt that his brother had made useless search for him : he therefore left his retreat in the middle of the night, and, accompanied by Shere dil Khan and a few devoted adherents, galloped southward, when they were soon joined by Dost Mohamed Khan, in whose company they plundered three rich caravans. With the proceeds of these robberies they were enabled to raise a small force, after which they acted upon a larger scale ; the villages were in their turn put under contribution, and they then laid siege to Kandahar. : During three months Kaissar Mirza repulsed all the attacks of the besiegers, but after this, being without either provisions or munitions of war, he came to a compromise with them, setting the Serdar Fethi Khan at liberty, on condition that they raised the siege and retired from Kandahar. When the serdar was released, Mahmood Shah was strongly inclined to break his promise, and constrain his nephew to give up the city, but Fethi Khan prevented him; he represented to him that the throne was at Kabul, and not at Kandahar, and this determined Mahmood to march on the capital ; they left, nevertheless, two thousand Barukzye horse encamped within a short distance from the former city. When Shah Shooja heard that Kandahar was besieged by Mahmood, he collected his troops and left Kabul with 25,000 picked men to relieve it, but after a few days’ march more than half deserted ; the Kuzzilbashes especially all left his court and returned to Kabul, which obliged the Shah to fall back on his 142 SHAH MAHMOOD RESTORED. Cnar. X. capital, but he had scarcely arrived there when a revolt forced him to evacuate it, and he retired and took up a position in a vast plain surrounding the gardens of Neemla, near Gundamuck. Shah Mahmood and Fethi Khan, who followed him close, remained In Kabul only long enough to take possession of it ; they then confided ‘+ to the care of the Kuzzilbashes, and hastened against Shah Shooja, whose army was advantageously posted and numbered 20,000 combatants. Though mustering only 3000 horse, Fethi Khan charged them with impetuosity at a moment when they least expected it, and before they had even time to form up in order of battle: the result was a complete rout, for it threw the mass into utter confusion; fear took possession of them, and they fled from the field. Akrem Khan, the vizier of Shah Shooja, was killed, and the king escaped to the mountains of the Khyber, abandoning on the field of battle all his baggage and the royal treasure, which, independent of a sum of 2,000,0001., contained precious stones of immense value. Shah Mahmood secured an enormous booty, and entered Kabul amidst the acclamations of the inconstant people of that city, mounted on an elephant which Shah Shooja had ordered to be richly caparisoned for his own triumphant entry into the capital. Shah Shooja remained only a short time in the Khyber, and retired soon after towards the south, where he hoped, by joining his nephew, Kaissar Mirza, to take the offensive and regain his crown. Directing his course towards Kandahar by the mountains bordering the Indus, he obtained some recruits on the road ; but in spite of the secrecy with which he endeavoured to conduct his march, it became known, and, to add to his disgrace, his nephew was driven from Kandahar by the Serdar Poor dil Khan, a brother of Fethi Khan. After this Poor dil Khan attacked Shooja with superior forces, who was fortunate in being able to es ape by a rapid flight; this was in 1809, four months having elapsed between his first and second defeat. Powerless rather than dis- couraged, he retired shortly after to Loodiana, where he resided near his brother the Shah Zeman, living from that time, like that prince, on the bounty of the East India Company, but not before he had gone through many severe trials. Sir A. Burnes’ sketch of Shah Shooja — F Cuap. XL. SKETCH OF SHAH SHOOJA. CHAPTER XL ethi Khan is appointed Vizier — Shah Influence of the vizier — Kamran, the son of isposition — He kills his cousin Kaissar — Fethi Khan reduces the Belooches — Establishes order and security — Afghan alliance with the Sikhs — They unite and seize Cashmeer — Fethi Khan breaks his word to the Sikhs — The latter seize upon Attok — Brilliant exploit of Dost Mohamed — Panic of the Afghans — Runjeet Sing pillages Cashmeer — orsin on Herat — Hoosein Ali Mirza marches against The pretensions of Pe that city — Fethi Khan marches to the relief of Herat — The vizier arrests Hadji Firooz Eddin — The prince’s harem is violated and plundered by Dost Mohamed — Flight of Mir Efzel Khan to Meshed — Battle of Kiaffir Kaleh — Retreat of both parties — The Afghans obtain the plunder — Kamran conspires against Fethi Khan — Shah Mahmood commands the vizier's eyes to be put the order — The brothers of the Mahmood devoted to pleasure — Shah Mahmood — His ferocious d out — Kamran arrives at Herat and executes vizier, Shere dil Khan and Kohendil Khan, escape — Poor dil Khau remains a prisoner. Sir ALEXANDER BURNES, an enlightened and conscientious traveller in Afghanistan, gives a Co oe pms 196 SIR A. BURNES'S OPINION Cnar. XIV, mountainous ; it contains a large proportion of arable land which is most productive. It lies along the base of hills, and derives a richness from the soil washed from them. The revenues of Kabul amount to eighteen lacs of rupees. Its military force is greater than any among the Afghans, since the chief retains a body of good horse, who are well mounted and accoutred. Ie has also 2000 infantry, with other auxiliaries, village troops, and a park of fourteen guns which are well served for a native state. This country is by nature strong and mountainous, though it has good roads through it. “The reputation of Dost Mohamed Khan is made known to a traveller long before he enters his country, and no one better merits the high character which he has obtained. He is unremitting in his attention to business, and attends daily at the Court-house with the Kazee-o-Mollahs to decide every cause according to the law. The Koran and its commentaries may not be the standard of legis- lative excellence ; but this sort of decision is exceedingly popular with the people, since it fixes a line, and relieves them from the jus vagum aut incognitum of a despot. Trade has received the greatest encouragement from him, and he has derived his own reward, since the receipts of the Custom-house of the city have increased 50,000 rupees, and now furnish him with a not revenue of two lacs per annum. One in forty, 2.e. 2} per cent., is the only duty levied in his territory ; and the merchant may travel without guard or protection from one froatier to another, an unheard of circum- stance in the time of the kings. The chief of Kabul, in his zeal for orthodox government, has deprived his subjects of the luxury of wine and spirits as being prohibited by his creed. The enactment has driven the Jews and Armenians from his country, since they had no other means to procure a subsistence. A good Mahom- medan ought not to regret the loss of such luxuries ; but with this single exception I heard of no complaint against the rule of Dost Mohamed Khan. That chief, in common with many of the Afghan nation, was addicted in early life to wine and its concomitant vices. His prohibition of them may be, therefore, capricious ; but he as well as his court hold out a bright example to the community. The Justice of this chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes : the peasant rejoices at the absence of tyranny ; the citizen at the safety of his home and the strict municipal regulations regarding weights and measures ; the merchant at the equity of the decisions and the protection of his property ; and the soldiers at the regular EE ————— i Cuap. XIV, OF DOST MOHAMED KHAN. 197 manner in which their arrears are discharged. A man in power can have no higher praise. Dost Mohamed Khan has not attained his fortieth year ; his mother was a Persian, and he has been trained up with people of that nation, which has sharpened his understanding, and given him advantages over all his brothers, One is struck with the intelligence, knowledge, and curiosity which he displays, as well as his accomplished manners and address. He is doubtless the most powerful chief in Afghanistan, and may yet raise himself by his abilities to a much greater rank in his native country. ““ The differences which exist between Dost Mohamed and his brothers lessen the influence of all parties, and would lay open the state to intrigue and faction if invaded. The family of Barukzye * have nothing to fear from any other Afghan tribe, since they surpass all in numbers as much as in power. The chiefs of Peshawur and Kandahar do not want the wish to injure their brother of Kabul, but they cannot accomplish their purpose. Both of them have had a footing in Kabul, and look with envy on the prosperity of Dost Mohamed Khan. Both have emissaries at his court, who excite disturbance; and both cherish hopes of rooting out one whom they consider a usurper. The task will be found difficult, for the chief of Kabul, besides the moderation and justice which secure him so many friends, enjoys an advantage in his Persian descent which will prove of material service to him in adversity. He holds the warlike clan of Juwanshire in his interests, and takes every occasion to conciliate this tribe, which has so often turned the scale in favour of different pretenders to the throne. He has acquired their language (the Turkish), and promoted their interests and wellbeing. “The Persians of Kabul amount to 12,000 families ; they reside In a separate quarter of the city, which keeps up an esprit de corps among them; it also gives them a knowledge of their power which may prove salutary or prejudicial to the factions that divide the country according to circumstances. The state of fear which an enemy on both sides must inspire. has had a bad effect on Dost Mohamed Khan's administration. With his own house as an * Mohamedzye.— Ferrier, consists of only four or five thousand t This is an error into which Burnes families. If it is the tribe of Barukzye has fallen; if it is the family or branch to to which he alludes, it is probable that which the sons of Payendeh Khan belongs it contains 45,000 or 55,000 familes,~— that he refers to, he shouid have men- Ferrier, tioned them as Mohamedzyes, and that > —————" i (To Wy ar wo, 198 DOST MOHAMED KHAN. . CHar. X1V, object of care, he is not likely to pursue conquests abroad, or retrieve the fallen state of Kabul. This alone deters him from taking Herat, the only province of the kingdom of Afghanistan now held by a descendant of the royal family, and the Prince Kamran rules more from tolerance in his enemies than his own power. He receives no aid from his countrymen, since the whole of the chiefs of Afghanistan are his enemies, and desire his destrue- tion, in revenge for the assassination of their brother Futteh Khan. Herat has, therefore, become a dependency of Persia. The town itself has of late been several times entered by the troops of that nation, and only spared by the ready tender of money on the part of its governor.* It was threatened in September, 1832, by the Prince Royal in person, who made a pecuniary demand, and also required that the coinage of the city should be struck in the name of the King of Persia. It is probable that both these requests will be granted, since Kamran would gladly hold his power on any terms. The Persians do not appear to contemplate any permanent settlement in Herat, since it would incur the expense of retaining a force that would diminish the tribute now gained from it, Kamran is said to be in possession of some of the crown jewels of Kabul, and derives a large revenue from Herat, which is situated in one of the most fertile countries of the world. By this wealth he is yet able to retain about his person some of the Afghan chiefs, and can raise a body of 4000 or 5000 horse. He has no political conuexions in any quarter; but still clings to the hope of being able to re-establish the monarchy of his father. He has the character of a cruel and tyrannical man, is destitute of friends, and odious to his countrymen, “The same causes which prevented Dost Mohamed from marching against Herat prevented him also from making some endeavours to wrest Mooltan and Dera Ghazee Khan from the Sikhs. He last year made a demonstration against Jellalabad, a district between Kabul and Peshawur, worth about seven lacs of rupees a year. He will probably annex it to his power, but until able to coerce or subdue either Peshawur or Kandahar, Dost Mohamed Khan cannot rise above a chief, or be aught than one among many in Afghanistan. In the present state of politics in that country he is nevertheless the most rising man in the Kabul dominions.” * This is an error; the territory has t I have witnessed the contrary, — been entered, but the city not.— Ferrier. Ferrier, Cuar, XV, KOHENDIL AND SULTAN MOHAMED. CHAPTER XV. Shah Shooja takes up arms against the Barukzyes — Dost Mohamed Khan marches to the relief of Kandahar — Shah Shooja receives a check — That sovereign is completely defeated — He retires to Kelat — Sultan Mohamed arrives at Kabul — Machinations of that serdar against Dost Mohamed Khan — Resolution of the latter — The Dost, now elected Emir, marches against the Sikhs — Defeats them at Djamrood — Sir A. Burnes at Kabul - The English are hostile to Dost Mohamed — Sumner’s account of the Russians and the English in Asia — Mohamed Shah determines to invade Herat — He is supported by the Russians, Such was the state of things when Burnes visited Kabul in 1832. The result of his opinion, as of my own, which is also that of the Afghans in general, is that Kohendil Khan, the sovereign of Kandahar, had not the same superiority of mind as his brother, and was far from following in the same steps. The people were discontented with him, and he might have been reproached, as well as Sultan Mohamed Khan, who did not govern at Peshawur a whit better than he did, with sentiments of jealousy and hostility to Dost Mohamed, whose enlightened and loyal govern- ment they sought to impede and ridicule in a manner little honourable to themselves. Ambition is an unfaithful mirror, which reflects things much less in their natural aspect than that in which mankind is pleased to colour characters and personal interests. With these perverted feelings, Kohendil Khan and -Sultan Mohamed Khan constantly pursued a hostile line of con- duct towards their brother, who was desirous of being on the best terms with them; and they accused him, but without the least reason, of wishing to seize their territories—there was danger for them it is true, but this danger was in another quarter. Sultan Mohamed Khan, already subdued by Runjeet Sing, was on the eve of being totally overthrown by the Maharadja, and, if Kohendil Khan did not succumb to him first, it was because he owed his preservation entirely to the generous support which he received from his brother Dost Mohamed Khan, as we shall now see. Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, although often beaten, had not re- 200 PROCEEDINGS OF SHAH SHOOJA. Cuar. XV, nounced his right to the throne. From the period at which he was, for the first time, overthrown by Fethi Khan, he had made eight attempts to regain it by force of arms; he failed—but his courage remained unshaken, and he had succeeded in interesting the Anglo-Indian government in his fate. They required a sovereign in Afghanistan devoted to their views, but, afraid to assist him openly, the Governor-General supported his cause with some Sikh regiments, with which, through his intervention and proniises of concession of territory on the part of Shah Shooja, Runjeet Sing agreed to furnish the Suddozye prince. This fact has been proved by the letters of Sir Claude Wade, at that time political agent at Loodiana, which letters were found amongst the baggage of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk after his defeat; a good many amongst them were addressed to some of the Afghan serdars. The British agent excited these chiefs to revolt, and assured them that his government would know how to appreciate the support that they might give to their legitimate sovereign. In January, 1834, Shah Shooja quitted Loodiana ; in the month of May he crossed the Indus, and, in the first instance, seized upon Shikapoor, belonging to the Emirs of Scinde, but to which he laid claim. He then marched towards Kandahar at the head of an army of 22,000 Afghans and Hindostanees, the latter drilled and manceuvring on the European system, and observing its discipline, some of them being deserters from the Company's service. Kohendil Khan, having assembled in haste what troops he could collect, marched to meet the king as far as the valley of Pisheen to close the passage, but he was defeated and obliged to make a rapid retreat on Kandahar, whence he despatched messenger after messenger to inform Dost Mohamed of the storm which had burst upon him. On the reception of this news the chief of Kabul made the following reply : “ Whenever you are menaced let me know, and, as I am your enemy now, so I will be your friend then.” After which, forgetting the just complaints which he had against this ungrateful brother, he remembered only the ties of kindred and blood which united them, and hurried to his assistance with his army. But, before setting out, he despatched an officer to Sir Claude Wade to ascertain from him if it was true that the Shah was openly supported by his government? that if his reply was in the affirmative, he should think about it; if, on Cuar. XV. DOST MOHAMED RELIEVES KANDAHAR. 201 the contrary, it was in the negative, he should fight. The political agent of the Company replied that the Indian government had taken no part in the expedition, but that Shah Shooja had its best wishes for his success. The best wishes” of the English government did not stop Dost Mohamed ; his march, which he had delayed in order that he might receive the reply of Sir Claude Wade, he now hastened ; and it was indeed high time that he should arrive at Kandahar, for Shah Shooja had taken up a position between the old and the new city, and pressed the siege closely. The ground from which he opened his attack was intersected by numerous watercourses and covered with large gardens, enclosed with mud walls, in which the soldiers made many gaps to pass through; and these obstacles were far from favourable to the manceuvres of cavalry, of which arm the greater part of both armies was composed ; nevertheless, conflicts took place daily on both sides in these labyrinths. The encounters were the more murderous, inasmuch as the combatants, surrounded by walls, preferred being killed on the spot to yielding one inch of ground, and such close fighting soon weakened both parties. Shah Shooja had great difficulty in repairing his losses, though the advantage on the whole was on his side, and on the 29th of June, 1834, he made a general assault upon the place. His troops displayed great bravery; four times repulsed, four times they returned to the assault, but at last they were obliged to retreat, leaving the ditches of the town filled with their dead and wounded. The Dost’s army arrived at this juncture, and from that day Shah Shooja was under a double disadvantage, for he was obliged to divide his forces to repel the sorties of the besieged commanded by Kohendil Khan, and the attack of the Dost in his rear. This war, or rather this butchery, lasted during fifty-four days, and the Afghans affirm that 16,000 men were killed before the place. After having lost a pitched battle against Dost Mohamed Khan, Shah Shooja fought only to clear a passage for himself and his troops, and make good his retreat to Shikapoor ; but hotly pursued by the Mohamedzyes, he was cut off from his communications, and thrown back upon the interior of the kingdom. Soon after he was abandoned by his soldiers, and had only fifty horsemen with him when be arrived at Herat, and demanded a refuge and hospitality of the Shah Kamran; but his nephew, who never loved him, and TR TTT TO (SET ARE NEw mp a - 202 PROCEEDINGS OF SULTAN MOHAMED. Cuap. XV, was afraid that he might intrigue with a view of supplanting him, refused him permission to enter the city. The defeated Shah was therefore obliged to retire upon Furrah, through the arid deserts of Beloochistan. What he suffered in traversing its parched and burning sands, under the scorching rays of the sun, without food or water, wanting in short everything, is incredible, and the Mohamedzyes, who pursued him, were on the point of taking him prisoner at the moment he entered Kelat Nassir and was safe from further molestation. The Emir of this town had freed himself from the Afghan dominion during his reign, but he received him hospitably, and furnished his guest with the means of gaining Loodiana in a manner suitable to his rank. Here he again resided, pensioned by the English, who reserved him for a new invasion in which he subsequently lost his life, and England met with the greatest disaster that she was ever called upon to register in the military annals of her Indian empire. Mohamed Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohamed Khan, distinguished himself, in the campaign that had just terminated, by a courage which might almost be termed fool- hardy, and military talents which even then gave indications of what his future career might be. : This victory definitively confirmed the Mohamedzyes in the possession of eastern Afghanistan ; but, instead of profiting by it to strengthen their position, it became the signal for fresh dissensions amongst them, the result of which was the recall of Shah Shooja a few years later, supported by an English army. W hile Dost Mohamed Khan was gone to assist his brother against this expa- triated sovereign, Sultan Mohamed Khan had been removed from his government of Peshawur by Runjeet Sing ; forced, therefore, to retire to Jellalabad, he, with a view of remedying this re- verse, thought he might profit by the absence of Dost Mohamed Khan to seize Kabul. His two brothers, Pir Mohamed Khan and Syud Mohamed Khan, joined him in this enterprise, which they had already commenced when they heard of the victory the Dost had gained at Kandahar and at the same time his return to Kabul. They therefore remained some days undecided as to what line they should adopt; but the success of their plan being, to say the least, doubtful, and they not as yet committed to it, they gave up the project, pretended to feel an ardent desire to be on the most friendly terms with their victorious brother, and Caar. XV. DOST MOHAMED ELECTED EMIR. 203 4 went boldly to meet the Dost to congratulate him on a success which, as it annihilated all their hopes, they cursed from the bottom of their hearts. Although informed of their faithless proceedings, Dost Mohamed thought it would be better to leave them to think that he was ignorant of their schemes, imagining that in acting thus he might bring their dissensions to a close. He received his brothers, therefore, with courtesy and all the appearance of sincere friendship, and spared nothing to attach them to his cause. Moreover, directly he returned to Kabul he deter- mined to revenge the affront which had just been put upon them by Runjeet, and proclaimed a holy war against the Sikhs; neverthe- less, before undertaking it, he was desirous of exalting himself in the eyes of the Afghans, and received from a council, composed of the serdars of the principality, the title of Sovereign Prince. Mir Vaez, the grand Mollah of Kabul, proclaimed him Emir ool Moamerime,* and on this occasion repeated the same form of ceremonial that had been used at the coronation of Ahmed Shah and his successors. When the festivities of his enthronement were over he sent 9000 horse against the Sikhs commanded by one of his brothers, but, as they obtained only a doubtful success, he left Kabul and placed himself at their head ; the Afghans were encouraged by his arrival, but the result was not more fortunate than before. This was owing to the intrigues of Sultan Mohamed Khan and his brothers, who were negotiating secretly with Runjeet Sing; and the Emir Dost Mohamed, having convinced himself of this fact, abandoned the war, which could only be disastrous to him, and returned to Kabul. There he occupied himself in rein- forcing his army, intending to enter at some future time upon an- other campaign, with greater chances of success, which were not to be hoped for so long as Sultan Mohamed Khan was ready to play the traitor. All the public functionaries of whose fidelity the Dost was not perfectly sure were now dismissed; he made his sons governors of the various provinces and districts, and further intrigues failed in consequence of the wise measures which he adopted. Sultan Mohamed Khan and his two brothers, seeing that they were wholly powerless in Kabul, threw themselves completely into the hands of Runjeet Sing, who appointed the former governor of Rota, a * Commander of the Faithful.— Ferrier. 204 DOST MOHAMED DEFEATS THE SIKHS. Cuap. XV. fortress in the north of the Punjab, the inhabitants of which were for the most part Mohamedans. The Sikhs, finding that Dost Mohamed hesitated to renew the attack, mistook his discretion for fear, and Haree Sing, governor of the Maharadja at Peshawur, threatened some villages depend- ant on Kabul, and was guilty of numerous exactions against the Afghans of that country. The Emir, wearied with all these annoyances, declared war against Runjeet, and gave the command of his army to his sons Mohamed Efzel Khan and Mohamed Akbar Khan, with orders to advance immediately against the Sikhs. This time fortune declared in favour of the Afghans. They attacked their enemies at Djamrood, near the entrance of the Khyber Pass, to which they had advanced, and defeated them completely ; their general, Haree Sing, being killed in this battle. The Emir, who evinced great moderation after his victory, respected the territory of his enemy, and claimed the intervention of Lord Auckland, Governor-General of the British possessions in India. He demanded that the Indus should for the future be the line of demarcation between the two states, and consented on this con- dition to abandon Cashmeer to the Sikhs for ever, though it was an Afghan province, and the majority of the population were his countrymen. Lord Auckland rejected these reasonable proposi- tions; and, in his reply, left Dost Mohamed only a Zope that Runjeet Sing would be requested by him to restore the govern- ment of Peshawur to his brother, Sultan Mohamed Khan ; adding, that he could not, consistently with the friendly relations existing between the Maharadja and the East India Company, force him to make a restitution, the legitimacy of which was, in his eyes, a questionable point. Burnes was sent to Kabul to make known this decision of his Excellency to Dost Mohamed ; and the Emir naturally preferred leaving Peshawur to Runjeet, to seeing it again in the hands of his mortal enemy, Sultan Mohamed Khan. It was about this time that the army of Mohamed. Shah, king of Persia, marched against Herat, and the Emir was far from desirous of forming a treaty with that sovereign, for all his sym- pathies were with the English, and he had done everything in his power to enter into a sincere alliance with the East India Com- pany ; but Messieurs the Directors would listen to nothing ; they had admitted as a principle, that the consolidation and extension of Runjeet Sing’s power, under their immediate protection, was Caar. XV, THE ENGLISH HOSTILE TO HIM. 205 a counterpoise against every evil that could happen to them, and every advantage the Russians could gain arising from the Treaty of Turkomantchai signed between the latter power and Persia in 1827. Hence arose the tenacity with which the East India Com- pany supported the invasions of the Maharadja and rejected the loyal concessions of the Emir Dost Mohamed, who from that moment had no other hope of safety than by allying himself with Russia and Persia. Let us not, however, anticipate, but come to that famous siege of Herat, which was nearly altering the status of every country in Central Asia. Almost all those persons who have written on the changes which it occasioned during the last few years in Afghan- istan have allowed a party spirit more or less strong, with which, God be praised, the author has nothing to do, to influence their opinions. Merely a traveller in the country, my constant aim was to search for truth, and to speak it with impartiality ; having no political interest to defend, nor dignity or diplomatic pride to maintain, free from constraint, and having been able to mix with all classes of the population, information came to me from all sides, and many fresh circumstances were revealed to me. In adding them to those already known, I have given a sketch of the whole, and endeavoured to make it as accurate as possible with respect to the events that have recently taken place in Central Asia. To attain this object with the greater certainty, I have selected from amongst the narratives, which have hitherto appeared, those which seemed to me to contain the most exact detail of facts, borrowed from them whatever appeared to be true, and rejected all that seemed open to the suspicion of a single doubt. The extracts are from the text of these authorities, which could not gain by a transformation of style, and the information that I have collected is added. I shall begin by giving the reader an idea of what were the respective positions of the English and the Russians in Asia at the time the siege of Herat was undertaken, but a reservation is necessary on my part. Though assenting to the mode in which the writers whose works I am about to make use of, and who have examined matters to the core, have appreciated them, I do not intend to be responsible for any remarks that can wound the susceptibility of any nation which is the subject of them. My object is to make known facts without malice or prejudice, to give these facts impartially, 206 SUMNER’S ACCOUNT OT THE Cuar. XV. with simply their historical interest attached to them, and not to recriminate against any individual whatever. The first quotation is taken from a work by Mr. George Sumner of Boston, who seems to me to have treated what relates to the English in a manner which is tolerably satisfactory. The following is his opinion :— “It has been generally thought that the war made on the Afghans by the English was to be attributed to a fear of the encroachments of, and invasion by, Russia, but it has since been acknowledged that this fear was only a chimera. Let us examine this question. First, to make the subject more clear, we will speak of the position of England in the East: there we see an immense empire, with more than 100,000,000 of subjects, a large army, large revenues, and towns containing a million of inhabitants, entirely ander the control and government of a company of merchants and capitalists, who, franauily seated behind their counters, give their instructions and orders to their agents, and in less than eighty years have succeeded in raising a power which seems almost to equal that of Alexander or Tamerlane. “The condition in which they found the various states of India was no doubt exceedingly favourable to the increase of this empire ; but another cause, tending almost equally to that increase, was the vast field that it opened to talent of every description, and the facility that every able officer, however low his rank or _position, there found of attaining wealth and distinction, by courageously devoting himself to the interests of those whom he served. “It one to be remarked, in speaking of the facility with which India was subjugated, that the plan of conquest adopted at the com- mencement by Clive, and since constantly followed by the English, did not originate with them. It was conceived by the French General Dupleix, when that talented officer commanded at Madras. His proposition to the French government was imme- diately rejected, and drew upon its author reproaches that the most recent biographers have not endeavoured to remove—indeed they have continued them. It was to employ only a small number of European troops in the conquest of India, and to take advantage of the dissensions amongst the princes and rajahs of the country, to foment discord in their different states, and, finally, to assist any one of them who, after his success, showed a disposition to become a docile instrument in the hands of the nation that had v - EE A I P om orl Cuar. XV. RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH IN ASIA. 207 supported him. Divide et impera. By adopting this plan the East India Company has worked by degrees to the north and north-west, invading, one after the other, princes, rajahs, and emirs, and even the Great Mogul himself had to accept their alliance and submit to their rule. The Company has occupied Delhi, the capital of the empire of Aurungzebe, crossed the Sutlej, rendered tributary the sovereign of Lahore, and has travelled thus far without knowing when or where it ought to stop, until it found itself face to face with another power, of which the mind was as active and the resources as great, of which the interest and capability of adv ancing southwards were just as unlimited as those of England acting in the opposite direction—that power is Russia. “ When the expedition of the Shah of Persia against Herat, in 1835 and 1836, was determined upon, the northern limit of the states belonging to the English, and paying taxes to them, was the river Sutlej, which flows south-west, and joins the Indus at a distance about 200 miles north of Delhi. “ Beyond, and in the delta formed by the Sutlej and the Indus, is the Punjab, the kingdom of the Sikhs, with their remarkable sovereign, Runjeet Sing of Lahore. He had hastened to treat with the Beth government in 1832; Burnes said of him that he might be regarded as one of the most faithful allies of the English, and the Maharadjah proved this by joining with them against the Afghans. “ Crossing the kingdom of Runjeet, we come to the unhappy country of Afchanistan, which witnessed the recent disasters of the British army. To the north of Kabul, the capital of that province, extends a portion of the Himalaya range of mountains, across which, in summer, there are at least two passes open to caravans, leading direct to the Khanats of Badakshane, Balkh, and Bokhara. With these Russia has formed great commercial interests, but the government of that country pretends that she has not yet any well- established political relations there. “ From Kandahar, another city in Afghanistan, the road is open towards Herat, on the Persian frontier s, and, passing through Persia, we reach the Caspian Sea and the southern boundary of Russia. Between Afghanistan and Russia then there is on one side, besides the three Khanats that we have mentioned, a vast extent of deserts, and on the other side is Persia, which, like Turkey, seems scarcely to have forgotten its past splendour and ancient renown. This 208 tUSSIANS AND ENGLISH IN ASIA. Cuar. XV, nation, enfeebled within and powerless without, has become more and more tottering, and seems ready to fall before the first enemy who shall attack her with vigour. “ Thus it is evident that the country of Afghanistan, of which Europe thought very little fifty years ago, is without doubt destined to be the theatre of important events, on which the powers of Central Asia will be tested, and their destiny decided. “It was in Afghanistan, that Alexander the Great, on his march towards the Indus, stopped to rest his soldiers, who ate with delight the refreshing fruits of the villages in which we now find Kabul. Through it also passed Ghengiz Khan and Tamerlane, when they undertook their expeditions to India. On this distant point is now fixed the attention of the two great countries, who look upon it as the pivot on which, in some degree, must turn their respective interests in India. Count Nesselrode, in a despatch of October 20th, 1838, recommended England to respect Afghanistan. ¢ Great Britain and Russia,’ said he, ¢ can have but one desire, that of maintaining peace in Central Asia, and supporting the independence of the peoples who are the legitimate possessors and the ancient inhabitants.’ “ The friend of England, Runjeet Sing, was not arrested in his progress by this manifestation on the part of one of the greatest powers of Asia. He had already committed depredations in Afghan- istan, reduced Peshawur to a state of vassalage, and prepared other more hostile movements towards the south-east. When the Shah of Persia, remembering that his dominions had in former times ex- tended to Delhi, determined to recover or reduce Herat (which had been part of his legitimate possessions, and which is the capital of that province of Afchanistan situated farthest to the north-west), he was probably instigated to attempt this reassumption of his ancient rights by Count Simonich, then Russian minister at Teheran; at least it was supposed so.” The position of the English in India, and the tendency of their future policy, are clearly set forth in this ext ract ; but it would not be of much interest if it were not followed by a sketch of the Russian policy in Central Asia. This question was considered in 1843, in a monthly review, by «. A, Chodsko,” who has proved himself as well informed as the philologist of Boston. After having rapidly traced the efforts which had been made by the cabinet of St. Petersburgh to render its policy Cuar. XV, RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 209 dominant in Europe, and, above all, in Turkey, the writer turns his attention to Asia, and unfolds, with startling truth, the suc- cessive invasions of the Colossus of the North on that continent. The reviewer commences by citing the opinion of a contemporary historian : « Vainly,” say Lesur, “ were the dangers pointed out of permitting this intrusion of an enslaved and barbarous people into the system of European politics ; Russia has been elevated as much by the errors of others as by her own genius. The last treaties with Turkey, Persia, and the powers assembled at Vienna, have established her dominion on the right bank of the Danube, at the extremity of the Gulf of Bothnia, and from the Vistula to Kam- tchatka. She commands the Black Sea, she suffers none but her own armed flag to float over the Caspian, and the shrine of the Kadjars is placed under her protection.” After this quotation the reviewer continues: Subsequently to the year 1819 Russian agents left Tiflis, envoys to the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. Their instructions were to obtain the abrogation of the trade in slaves, and to announce their mission as the accomplishment of a great duty on the part of the head of the Russian empire. Russia, who had generally imposed slavery upon civilized nations, pretended to restore liberty to slaves, and she knew not how to proceed otherwise than by the sword: she threatened to conquer. The Autocrat expected the refusal that his envoys returned with, but he wished to give a colour to the war for which he was prepar- ing, and his battalions were already marching from Tiflis upon Orenburg. Their reports also informed the Emperor Alexander that his projects against Turkestan were premature ; he could not ensure his object until he had deprived Persia of the states she possessed on the borders of the Caspian Sea, and that conquest could not be attempted without further success against Turkey. But the patient constancy with which Russia carries on her schemes is well known ; aggression against Turkey would dissipate any sus- picions that might arise, while an invasion of Persia would only confirm them. The disposition of the Greeks to revolt was therefore encouraged, and Alexander showed himself again in the character of defender of an oppressed people. But he contented himself with pleading their cause with the Sultan; and several influential personages of his court having endeavoured to turn to their ad- rantage the discussions that arose in 1823 with the Porte. to provoke a rupture, the Emperor sent them into exile. p 210 RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. Crap. XV, “The long looked for epoch for the achievement of the project to the accomplishment of which all his intrigues had been directed, arrived in 1824. In the spring of that year he saw the ambassadors of the Khirghizes arrive at his court to render him homage as the supreme chief of the Tartars. In virtue of this title he granted them a code of civil laws, drawn up in the Russian language and in the language of their country ; this he bestowed upon them in consequence of their having acknowledged themselves vassals of his empire ; the Emperor also promised to visit them, and did in fact very soon after set out for Orenburg. “ Such was the rash and inconsiderate contempt of the nations of the west for the people whom they called the barbarians of Asia, that this step on the part of Alexander occasioned no suspicion. The country of the Khirghizes attracted no attention, though it was the very same kingdom of Kharism, formerly so powerful, and which once entirely ruled Central Asia. “ A brilliant reception awaited the Tzar at Orenburg. The khans of the most distant tribes came there to acknowledge their prince, and proclaim aloud his sovereignty. The Russian journals were filled with accounts of the homage which the numberless hordes scattered over Asia came to offer to their new chief. They had bestowed upon him, as formerly on their celebrated Temondjine, the Tartar surname which signifies Z%he Greatest — Djenghis. “ The Emperor soon quitted Orenburg to visit some of the Khirghiz hordes, and was satisfied that he should find in them all the submission that he could expect from their nomadic habits. “ Alexander went again to Orenburg in 1825, and took the empress, then an invalid, with him, intending to leave her at Tangarsk, the climate of which place, the mildest in Russia, would, it was hoped, re-establish her health : but as, on the contrary, she grew worse, he would not quit her. It was then that he was attacked by the mysterious malady which had already carried to the grave his father, the Emperor Paul, and which also terminated his own life, for he had drawn upon himself the same enemies. “ Everything was in readiness for the Persian war, and the com- mencement of it was in the following year the first act of his suc- cessor ; it might therefore from that moment be concluded that Nicholas was worthy to continue the policy of Alexander. The rupture of the treaty of Gulistan appeared to be the work of Crap, XV, RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 2% Persia, and the conjecture might be read in the papers that she was emboldened to that step by the secret intervention and pro- mises of England. “The treaty of Turkomantchai, of which the preliminaries were signed November 3rd, 1827, was the result of this clever comedy. Russia acquired two khanats which in a military point of view com- manded the Persian provinces, occupied the countries south-west of the Caspian Sea, and sueceeded to the rights which Persia had preserved over that Turkomania which had been the ancient kingdom of Samarcand. These rights were of the same nature as those recognised by the Khirghizes, and became much stronger, being thenceforth exercised by the acknowledged chief of the Tartar nation. “ Nevertheless, whatever dangers were revealed, the blindness of England continued and manifested itself by the impolitic battle of Navarino, in which the Turkish navy was almost entirely de- stroyed. The result of it was the treaty of Adrianople, and after- wards that of Uukiar Skelessi, which confirmed to the Emperor Nicholas his preponderating influence in Turkey. “ The successor of Alexander then a ppeared sure of the expected triumph of the policy so long followed in Asia. His numerous army was concentrated upon Orenburg, and orders were given for the opening of the campaign in the first fine weather of 1831, when the insurrection in Poland suddenly obliged him to mareh his troops to the Vistula. “The British ministry was the first that opened its eyes, as is proved by its intrigues to cause, though prematurely, the breaking out of the rebellion; and it sacrificed that unfortunate people to its own safety, by hurrying them into action to avoid being taken at a disadvantage itself. “Taking immediate measures for the protection of the Indian Empire, of which the chiefs, absorbed in commercial calculations, had too much neglected the political interests, the ministry ad- dressed to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, fresh instrue- tions ; and it was at this time that Captain Conolly and Lieute- nant Burnes were sent on their respective journeys. The first started from St. Petersburg to pass through the countries of the Khirghizes, Turkestan, and Persia, while the second left Delhi to explore Afghanistan, Bokhara, and Persia. Burnes had already shown great capability in other expeditions, but the object of his P J J RS 212 RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. Cuar. XV. travels was not dissembled. It was evident that his purpose was to investigate the intrigues of the Russians, and the extent to which their efforts to lay the foundations of political power in Turkestan, under the appearance of commercial intercourse, had succeeded. Burnes allowed it to be seen that he was convinced the project of marching an army across so much arid and unculti- vated steppe was impracticable ; but the passage of his narrative in which he insists with the greatest force upon this assertion suffices to prove that he had presented Lord Auckland with notes and information to the contrary. Here follows the passage : * When one has met with and felt such a horrible scarcity of water, and found pasture for the horses so difficult to obtain, oph- thalmia so prevalent, and so many other impediments, it will be understood that this desert can with difficulty be crossed even by a few squadrons of light cavalry. But who would think of crossing it? If the descendants of the Scythians and the Parthians have the pretension to enter upon this conflict, they can do so without exciting much attention from Englishmen. If the traveller thus deluded himself, one may be allowed to think that his Bri- tish pride had strangely blinded him. What “difficulty could there be in procuring water in a country from which the river had only been turned aside? What obstacles could hinder the raising of forage in a country lately so fertile and of which the sterility* was so recent ?”+ This sketch gives a very accurate idea of the object the Tzar had in extending his dominion towards the south ; it is astonishing therefore that the English Government should have been alarmed at the project formed by the Shah of Persia, under the advice of Russia, to sieze Herat. We will admit, like many other persons, and as several newspapers have done, that the possibility of a Russian expedition to India is a chimera if we had based our opinion, as there is everything to lead us to suppose these writers did, on the authority of Burnes; but as the Government at Cal- cutta knew very well that the obstacles were not so serious as this * The district of Merv here spoken of was ravaged by the Tartars and Usbeks in 1786. t+ The critic is perfectly correct in his remarks upon Burnes, and, had he possessed more information, he might have added, that in the winter and in the spring grass and water are to be found everywhere in the deserts of Khiva and Bokhara. The facility with which a Russian expedition could thus reach India has been shown in ‘Caravan Journeys.'— Ferrier, RR i ah ~~ TT —— PE ———— a a RT —— Cuar, XV, PROGRESS OF ENGLISH CONQUEST. 213 officer wished them to believe, the Governor-General in Council was right to take precautions against any invasion which could be made from the north of Europe into Central Asia. He ought indeed to have done this with more energy at the outset, and with less delay, by which means he would have avoided many diploma- tic embarrassments, and many important disasters, the wounds from which will not be healed for a long space of time, though, without doubt, England gained her object. Herat has remained independent, and Russia has retired within the limits stipulated in the treaty” of Turkomantchai, while England has brought her frontier up to the west bank of the Indus, and passed that river at two points; Peshawur in the north, and Shikapoor in the south, are two tétes-de-pont which cover the principal approaches to the river, and menace the Afghans. But let us not anticipate. . a RR Re Si FIRST DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS Cuar. XVI. CHAPTER XVI First diplomatic discussions relative to the siege of Herat — Mr. Ellis is succeeded by Mr. M‘Neil — The Persians invade the principality of Herat — The 1winister of the Shah plays a double game — Captain Eldred Pottinger at Herat — Russian officers in the Persian camp — Samsoun Khan — Colonel Blaremberg — General Boroffski — Colonel Semineau — Siege of Gorian — Recrimination against the latter officer — Russian and English agents in the Persian camp — Their hostility against Colonel Semineau — Operations at the siege of Gorian— Fall of the place — Shere Mohamed Khan — Yar Mohamed’s reply to his brother — Duration of the siege. IT has been already remarked that the idea of laying siege to Herat for the purpose of effectually putting a stop to the incur- sions of the Ileratees on the Persian territory, and forcing Kamran to pay tribute, originated with Mohamed Shah, but it should be said that immediately the subject was made known to the Russian Go- vernment it met with its eager support and encouragement ; not because the views of Russia extended at that period so far as to undertake an invasion of British India, for she was not then in the least prepared for so great an enterprise, but because she ever obeys that spirit of forecast, evoked by Peter the Great, which always leads her, whenever an opportunity presents itself, to extend her influence in the direction of the Indus, as she did not long ago to the banks of the Bosphorus at Constantinople. At that time the Russians were contented with the possessions which they held in Asia, but they could not, as clever politicians, see without Jealousy the successive invasions of England ; they therefore forced her to extend her frontiers out of all 1 2ason, exciting her fears by demonstrations of an ambitious character, hoping by that means to make her consume with greater rapidity the immense resources at her command, and to irritate the numerous peoples she has subjected, who serve her much more from a sentiment of fear than because they are habituated to, or love, her rule. The projects of Mohamed Shah on Herat began to see the light about the commencement of 1835. Mr. Ellis, then British minister at the court of Teheran, at once informed his government of the fact by pointing out the active part which the Russian minister in Persia, General Simonitch, had taken in connexion Cuar. XVI. RELATIVE TO THE SIEGE OF HE XAT. with the ‘resolution which had been formed by the Persian monarch. The British Ambassador danced atttendance in the diplomatic antechamber eighteen months to persuade Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Minister of Her Majesty, of the com- plicity manifested by Russia in this war, which was evidently undertaken with views hostile to England. It was in vain Mr. Ellis informed his Lordship that, after having offered his mediation to smooth the misunderstanding existing between the Shah of Persia and the sovereign Prince of Ierat, the Persian Government had refused to allow Major Todd, the officer attached to his mis- sion, to be the bearer of his letter to Shah Kamran; and that he was obliged to place it in the hands of the Persian authorities in order that it might reach its destination ; in other words, to be submitted to the supervision and control of Russian agents. The British minister further stated that Count Simonitch openly encouraged the war against Herat, that each day he hastened forward the preparations as well as the concentration of troops at Teheran, promising, in the name of his government, subsidies of all kinds and even the support of some Russian regiments. It was equally useless that, under the profound impression that he foresaw a very serious misfortune impending over his country, Mr. Ellis wrote to his superior thus :—¢ 1 have the complete conviction that the English Goyernment cannot permit the extension of the Persian Empire, in the direction of Afohanistan, without placing the interior tranquillity of British India in danger. This extension will bring Russian influence to the very threshold of our Indian Empire ; and as Persia will not, or dare not, enter into a sincere alliance with England, our policy for the future should be to consider her not as a barrier which covers India, but as the first parallel from whence the assault will be given.” Lord Palmerstou* was not much moved or affected by this infor- mation: his policy at that time was not anti-Russian, and he persisted in seeing in the reports of his subordinate at Teheran, ‘only, and perhaps unreasonably, timid anticipations which nothing could justify. Left without instructions, obliged very frequently to have recourse to his recollection as to what the English policy had * An article from the pen of Mons, able information on facts relating to A. Thomas, in the ‘ Revue des Deux these negotiations. Ferrier, Mondes,” has furnished me with valu- 216 DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS. Cuar. XVI. been during his service in India, to enable himself to make a few feeble remonstrances to Mohamed Shah, and almost always cen- sured by his chief for the fears which he expressed, the unfortunate Mr. Ellis did not know what part he was to play at Teheran. The minister of Russia, on the contrary, always advanced boldly in the warlike policy which he counselled, and had driven the Shah fo carry on: supported by his government he dared everything, and his most trifling wishes were accepted as orders by the Court of Teheran, If Lord Palmerston, pressed by Mr. Ellis, was hardy enough to make a few weak remonstrances to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, Monsieur de Nesselrode denied facts as clear as the sun, and it was almost by menaces that he replied to the constant demands of the English minister that a good understanding should exist between the two governments upon the affairs of Persia. The noble Lord, deceived by Russian duplicity, considered it a crime in his minister at Teheran to have seen too well and appreciated too clearly the state of things there. The Prime Minister had been disturbed at a moment when the Russian alliance was without doubt necessary to him, as a balance, and he could not make up his mind to open his eyes tq an event and give his attention to a subject which took him by surprise and deranged his plans. © The correspondence of the Foreign Office relative to this affair is nothing more than a series of reproaches upon what Lord Palmerston then denominated chimerical ideas, which his subor- dinate had conceived respecting General Simonitch ; his Lordship requests Mr. Ellis to act in concert with that diplomatist, respecting whose intentions, so far as he is concerned, he is quite satisfied, and to make confidential representations to the Shah’s Government on the embarrassment which his inconsiderate aggression against Shah Kamran must expose him to. In short, he has nothing to transmit to Mr. Ellis but timid counsel to assist him in meeting an evil, the cause of which his Lordship obstinately refuses to comprehend ; he will sce nothing because he is determined to avoid a conflict with Russia, and he keeps on such good terms with that power as to embolden Ler to redouble her exertions in encouraging the Shah to seize upon Herat. However, this cautious policy could not save Lord Palmerston from the consequences of the entanglements which it created for him, and he finished by being completely the dupe of his own acts. He believes the word of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and yet he doubts more and more the accuracy of the Cuar, XVI. MR. ELLIS SUCCEELED EY MR. M‘NEIL. 217 reports of his own minister at Teheran. The far-sighted Mr. Ellis then has to endure all the ill-humour of Lord Palmerston, and he is recalled without mercy for not having been able to stop events the development of which was owing to the too great confidence of his chief in the assertions of the Russian Government. The noble Lord still endeavoured to disguise to himself the check which his policy had inflicted upon English influence in Persia ; nevertheless he subsequently made choice of an energetic man, well known for his hostility to Russia, to fill the post of British minister at the court of Teheran. Mr. M*Neil belonged to that school of diplomatists who are perfectly happy in the midst of agitation, and for whom European principles disappear before the necessities of the tortuous diplomacy of Asia. After having passed twenty-five years in India or Persia, he had returned to England towards the end of the year 1834, and, not approving of the policy that had been followed by his government in Persia since the accession of Mohamed Shah to the throne, he had, through the press, fought the question with all the obstinacy inherent in the English cha- racter, stating that there was no necessity for drawing the sword from the scabbard to baffle the Russian intrigues at Teheran, that it was only requisite for England to declare distinctly to the Shah her opposition to the war with Herat for that monarch to ab- stain from carrying on any further the preparations for the expe- dition. This view of the subject, one so simple, which Lord Palmerston ought to have adopted from the first, at length broke in upon his Lox dship’s mind, but nevertheless he preserved it as a last resource in case he should find th: Shah intractable in every other way ; and as he was aware that Mr. M‘Neil was active even to restlessness, resolute even to temerity, his instructions were similar to those which had been given to Mr. Ellis. The new Envoy was desired to discourage the ambitious projects of the Shah, and to offer his mediation in arranging the misunderstanding which had arisen between Persia and Herat ; in short, he was to continue a spectator of Russian intrigues without being able to offer one energetic word in opposition to them. Mr. M‘Neil was not more successful than his predecessor, and complained to his government with as much force as perspicuity, demanding that his instructions should be extended in order that he might have the power of acting with some hope of success. But Lord Palmerston appeared to send him duplicates of all the replies that ea. RTA La I T—_———_— wil I dl a ae I I AL To DP re i “ ———3 oo | J Vv 4 ‘Har. XVI. CAPTAIN POTTINGER AT HERAT. 219 i iy | 218 THE PERSIANS INVADE HERAT. Car. XVI, Cuar. XVI JAPT ’ Li he had fi lv oi to Mr. Ellis. His Lordship could not vet stipulations which their diplomatist had made with him, and, as i : ly iver Mr. Ellis. wordshi : | | | a a Xr initiative ; : D lion these engagements were never carried out, the city was not taken. hE make up his mind to take the initiative in a vigorous opposition to 3 dst hatin ol) Lo ig | _ > ; y This resolution of the Vizier is the solution of the enigma which so ig | Russia, and he endeavoured to maintain a peace which that power nn Sen) No El Lord Palmers ‘as not ver many persons have attempted, but in vain, to discover. wenty | | seemed little anxious to preserve. ord Palmerston was not very ae Tr ar on V3) Bet tie, 4 . . . - . . » . r ¢ > S Eo fortunate in his appreciation of diplomatic affairs, for, when he Yedays ath . ght : va. tothe | ; to id : at Teher nevertheless it sustained a siege of more than nine months, to the ] E | certified in his letters to the sincerity of the part played at Teheran i tof bk Who, SOO ORG re | | bv C Qi itch. the bleman admitted his bad faith in his great displeasure of Mohamed Sha 1, who, deceived by his A | yy Count Simonitc 1, that nobleman admittec IS bad 1: g - RE Ome drasnailithe rn : [i Ww respondence. The noble Lord waited with imperturbable ters and generals, was Ignorant that there were some among pe jd own correspondence. 1e noble Lord waite ] : : ] or Bagh pire a ! | tre lity till reparation should be made by the Persian Govern- who had been gained over to the unglish party ¢ it | rangi nyu Teparati i gs aa. retreat without havino accomplished the projected conquest. But 4 i | ment for conduct with which he was offended, and this at the very etre: MOVING a ques, " i 1K To: : surance that the Shal the folly and incapacity of the Persian officers in directing the | i moment when Mr, M‘Neil received the assurance that the Shah Apo, Pepe potions midi wy { ; os erations he siege, as well as > > mes ) | | declined to make any ; and as Lord Palmerston had purposely op rations OI the siege, ¢ ¢ or | Wi : . hie. ‘ . : , hi Jf sed by the prime minister, were more than sufficient to cause the failure I | | deferred sending his instructions, his envoy found himsc opposed, I ey Th Eh A 4 | i i : 1 res ssla. ¢ > enterprise without the ¢ ain. i | | with his hands tied, to the ever active manceuvres of Russia, and 0 the enterp $ i antinil a1 } the determination of the Shah to seize Herat The newspapers assured us at the time, anc many pers st | | C ) ) VO 4 . . . ‘ - a So. wt ¥ mm ‘ . : M*Neil had foreseen at le woth think so, that the Persian army was accompanied by many Russians, I Phat which Messrs. Ellis and M‘Nej iad foreseen at leng | : ) ae H Dane, 1 in 188 1 in the l officers and men, when it marched against Herat, and that the a | occurred ; the Persians took the field in 1837, and in the month oY. EME AN 1 : ‘ WR ace was defended by several Enolis 8 3 - of October entered the province of Herat; but it is necessary to piace w os ¢ oe g - : ; hich T will clear away ii I . . . . ago gy assertions w . ‘ : ; add that the energetic representations which My. M : hs bef, ] the English Government should remain neutral, but it might never- realization of the promises made eighteen months before y > Eng : ; 4 p TP | G \ ral Gy mitch also yowerfull r contributed to develop The theless become a mediator if requested to 0 SO )Y otn pal es. reneral Sunor Jediiso UY Wi WE a | We have seen that Enoland up to this time had not failed on her Persians had waited, but in vain, up to this time for the material ; : £ CT | 1S r Russi: 1 the Russian diplomatist. wl ) part with respect to that clause ; but the eagerness with which the | itervention promised by ussia, and the Russian diplomatist, whe D WSCA I RT | 1 1 141 y 8 1¢ < ¢ 18 Sldlls J S162 « had been urged to give a guarantee mm writing to the effect that wussians had ¢ ; Y wa | i 1 had of] lo so. Mohamed ened the dearest interests of England, without doubt inc uced the | it would be forthcoming, had Just refused to do so. Mohame rl fo Oe ror Daa WH A nO 2 Shah had conceived some Just apprehensions upon this subject, overno i aiiso pay Ja The Ind: : iE | hic ited. : f renouncing his projec Captain Eldred Pottinger to defend Herat. 1 Indian news- which led him for a moment to think o renouncing his project, ! HL fbi Ores Ec dm wd Xp ‘as afraid that his lam ally would al don him in the papers pretended that “this o cer, travelling neigh for he was afraid that his quondam ally would abandon him in the pa : aE | i : ’ 1 ar with Hers ioht | enn of that city, entered it by chance at the moment the siege com- height of the conflict which the war with erat might cause A ; Y ; ? oe Sr > : ; 3 FOTNIOS ! menced, and that it was with his assistance and advice as well as between himself and England. But the cleverness of Count need, : WS | i QQ . : qn ; ls 1 ] S| al k ] the encouragement qieen by the English xovernment, 1a | Simonitch surmounted this difficulty also, and the Shah took the ; : i / : io Dheidiee | i 12 he fi inhabitants were enabled to hold out for nine months. 1e firs field without an afterthought, determined to seize upon the for- A Hh Capioln Pottinger, som by is | k 5; but his prime ministe Hadi part of this assertion is not accurate. aptain Pottinger, sent by hi. ; tress which he was going to attack ; but his prime minis er, Hadj ; ; ENE I I Mi see, an old and obstinate man, directing as he pleased Government with a secret mission, : ¢ at disg Mirza Agassee, an old and obstinate n an, ting: pleasec G1 0g ite Oliv 0 Hoe tr ivin & ar fi : senti Hindoo physician, and was known there only to ree merchants ¢ | | ions of the King, was far from sharino these sentiments Indoo phy ’ ) 3 CL No ’ p I ol ad ne t H ‘ Herat, who were devoted to Enolish interests—Shah Kamran and Ie readily consented that the -ersian army should invest Herat era, ; fe 10 none : i | adily X te ie or oe. to allow the sie : his vizier did not hear of his arrival until the army invested the | but he had secretly decided in his own mind to a ow the siege ia hose, by the Brot ice | i is il the Russians had fulfilled the erbal place. * This was the moment chosen y the Englis operations to languish until the Russians had fulfillec 1e verba - a ce oe 220 - SAMSOUN KHAN, Cuar. XVI, offer the support of his professional services, as well as subsidies of all kinds on the part of his Government, to assist the Shah Kamran in making a stand against the Persians. This offer was accepted with joy, but such was still the discretion of the chiefs of Herat that the inhabitants were actually not aware that the pretended Hindoo physician was an English officer, until Mr. M—than Zeman or Mah- mood, for instance, who had been kings before him, and had done nothing to disinherit their children or deprive them of their rights to the throne? Shah Kamran and Shah Eyoob had always protested against the pretensions of Shooja to the throne. Why, then, should the English be so regardless of their remonstrances and cpposition, and the opinions of the generality of the Afghans? "This policy 262 LETTER OF DOST MOHAMED. Cuar. XIX, concealed an ambitious project; the Anglo-Indian Government was possessed with a passion for territorial extension, and in no way sensitive as to the justice of the cause of Dost Mohamed from the moment they found that he would not bend to their wishes ; and not being in a condition to depose him themselves, they weakened his power as much as possible by means of their ally Runjeet, who annually sent an army to ravage some part of the Afghan kingdom. Although the Government of Calcutta showed a marked predi- lection for that ruler, it did not fail still to maintain its relations with and show some consideration for Dost Mohamed, who had on his part been guilty of very great duplicity, if he had really written to the Emperor Nicholas the letter which they accused him of sending, for very nearly at the same time, viz. on the 31st May, 1836, following, he addressed Lord Auckland, who had recently arrived in India, in the most humble terms, as follows :— “It may be known to your Lordship that, relying on the prin- ciples of benevolence and philanthropy which distinguish the British Government, I look upon myself and country as bound to it; and the letters I have received from that quarter have all been replete with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the effect that, in the time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and mis- guided Sikhs and their breach of treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest itself to your wisdom for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance. “T hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own, and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly.” Lord Auckland replied to this communication on the 22nd of August, 1836, with the greatest kindness, very highly praised his discreet policy, and promised his impartial intervention to effect a reconciliation between the Afghan prince and the Sikhs. During the time that this correspondence was passing, the Per- sian expedition against Herat was prepared and openly encouraged by General Simonitch; but it was November, 1837, before the army of Mohamed Shah arrived under the walls of that city. Early in the same year, however, Dost Mohamed, grown weary of Cuar. XIX. SIR A. BURNES AT KABUL. 263 the provocations of the Sikhs, and finding that he derived no benefit, but rather the contrary, from the intervention of Lord Auckland, determined upon avenging his own cause, and seized upon the opportunity offered him in the month of May by the indis- cretion of the Maharadjah (who recalled his troops from the Afghan frontier in order to celebrate, with the greater pomp, the marriage of his grandson Nahal Sing), to march 15,000 men into the province of Peshawur. They were commanded by the Dost’s two sons, Mohamed Efzel Khan ane Mohamed Akbar Khan, who attacked the Sikhs at Djamrood on the 1st of May, 1837. The combat was obstinate and the carnage dreadful, but victory crowned the banner of the brothers at the heavy cost of 7000 men. The Government of Calcutta, already sufficiently alarmed by the Persian expedition against Herat, became still more so on hearing of the defeat of their faithful ally Runjeet, and despatched with all speed Sir A. Burnes to Kabul, to endeavour to arrest the progress of the victorious Afghans. The Dritish Envoy arrived in that city in September, and was received with great honours by Dost Mohamed, who greatly esteemed him. The instructions of Lord Auckland were, that he was simply to enter into commercial relations and pacific interven- tion between the Emir and the Maharadjah ; he added also that he was authorized to do this in the interest of the Afg_.an chief and to avert his ruin. It was sufficiently surprising that his Lordship should use such language respecting a prince who had hitherto so well known how to defend himself, who had set forth no demands but what were perfectly reasonable, and in accordance with which he would, if admitted, have laid down his arms. The task of Burnes was difficult ; but he was fortunate enough to obtain from the Emir a temporary suspension of hostilities, and it was while he was occupied in this negotiation that Captain Vikovitch arrived at Kabul, namely, in December, 1837. The English have asserted that he brought the reply of the Emperor N icholas to the letter the Emir had written his Imperial Majesty in the commence- ment of 1836. Whatever might have been the real object of his presence there, Vikovitch met with a cold reception, and Dost Mohamed made his arrival the pretext for paying a visit to Sir A. Burnes, and requesting his advice as to what he ought to do under the circum- stances. The Emir declared from the first that he had determined 264 COLD RECEPTION OF VIKOVITCH. Cuar. XIX. not to adopt an alliance or political relations with any other foreign power than England, that he would receive no foreign agent so long as he had the hope of conciliating the sympathy of the Anglo-Indian Government, and that for all he cared he was willing to dismiss the Russian officer, or arrest him on his journey ; indeed, to treat him as Burnes might wish. It must be admitted that this was very extraordinary language for a man to use who had been recently accused of having written to the Emperor of Russia in the most respectful and submissive terms. Nevertheless Vikovitch was allowed to enter Kabul, but only at the request of Burnes, who took copies of all the letters brought by the latter to the Emir, and the conduct of Dost Mohamed was in every way calculated to inspire the English Government with confidence. The following letter from the Envoy to Lord Auckland proves this to have been the case :— “ January 15,1838.—Since I have been here I have learnt that a Persian agent, bearing presents for Dost Mohamed, has pene- trated the country as far as Kandahar,* and he has announced himself as the bearer of most seductive promises; but he was nevertheless obliged to leave Afghanistan almost immediately, because no one invited him to come on to Kabul. After him a Russian agent came, by name Vikovitch; he brought flattering compliments and offers of lasting engagements, but he was received with only the respect due to any stranger and the regular forms of hospitality. The Emir has said that his interest was in the English alliance, and that he would not abandon that while he had a hope of obtaining it.” The reasons which Burnes gave to his Government seemed to him so conclusive, that he did not for a moment think that the authorities at Calcutta would reject the alliance of a chief so de- voted to the English as Dost Mohamed; and to smooth every species of difficulty, he exerted himself to establish a friendly un- derstanding between the Dost and the Sikhs. The Emir, a witness of his efforts, testified his gratitude for them ; but his confidence in the equity of the Directors of the East India Company towards him was not so great as that of the English officer. Knowing how strong was their predilection for Runjeet Sing, and * This agent arrived with Vikovitch in October, 1837, and remained there when the latter went on to Kabul.-— Ferrier. Cuar. XIX. FRANK DECLARATIONS OF DOST MOHAMED. 265 having a vague suspicion that the Court would come to a partial determination, the Dost neglected no means of persuading them of his entire devotion. “In return,” said the Emir to Burnes, “1 ask but little, but that little is just and reasonable. I ask the English to protect me from the spoliations of the Sikhs and the resent- ment of the Persians, who will never forgive me for having made common cause with your countrymen; they must also force the former to give me back Peshawur, which is the only point that protects my frontier on this side of the Indus, and oppose any attempt of the latter to reduce Herat and Kandahar to a state of vassalage : then I am theirs, body and soul. I shall never have recourse to others till I have lost all hope in you, and even in acting thus it would be with regret to save only Afghanistan and my own honour, not from ill-will towards England. On the contrary, I should be happy to be advised and protected by her, and in return should make every effort to second her views, political and com.- mercial.” This frank and explicit declaration of the Dost’s could not leave Lord Auckland in any doubt of his loyalty or sincerity. It was quite sufficient to induce him to fall back upon the natural course of British policy in India, and to maintain the Afghan in- dependence against every other state, instead of joining with the Sikhs to attack it on the one hand, while the Russians, in alli- ance with the Persians and the Serdars of Kandahar, ruined it on the other, The arrival of Vikovitch at Kabul, and the copies of the letters presented by him to the Emir, produced a lively sensation at Calcutta, and formed the subject of a note sent by Lord Clan- ricarde to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, which plainly allowed the determination of the British Government to act vigorously to be perceived. The following is an extract from that document :— “ The undersigned is further instructed to state that the British Government possess a copy of a Treaty which has been concluded between Persia and the Afghan ruler of Kandahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count Simonich, and has given to this Treaty, which tends to afford Russia, if she adopts the guarantee, a pretence to compel the Shah of Persia not only to make himself master of Herat, but to deliver over that city afterwards to the rulers of Kandahar, to be held by them, to- gether with their other possessions, in the capacity, which those TTR 266 PALMERSTON'S NOTE TO NESSELRODE. Cuap. XIX. rulers engage by the Treaty to acknowledge, of tributaries to Persia. “The guarantee, moreover, contains a promise to compel Persia to defend the rulers of Kandahar against attack from any quarter whatever. It is true that in this stipulation no specific allusion is made to England ; but the intention of the parties may be inferred from the original draft of this treaty, of which also Her Majesty’s Government have a copy, and which was less cautiously worded, and in which specific allusion was made to England as one of the powers against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the rulers of Kandahar. “The undersigned is further instructed to state that a Russian agent of the name of Vicovitch, but sometimes calling himself Omar Beg, and said to be attached to the staff of the general commanding at Orenburg, was the bearer of letters from the Emperor and Count Simonich to the ruler of Kabul, copies of which are in the possession of the British Government, and that Count Simonich observed the most perfect silence towards the British minister at Teheran with respect to the mission of this agent ; a reserve which might seem unnecessary if this agent was merely to deliver the letters of which he was the bearer, and if his mission was to have no tendency prejudicial to the British interests. “ But the British Government have learned that Count Simonich announced to the Shah of Persia that this Russian agent would counsel the ruler of Kabul to seek assistance of the Persian Government to support him in his hostilities with the ruler of the Punjab; and the further reports which the British Government have received of the language held by this Russian agent at Kandahar and at Kabul can lead to no other conclusion than that he strenuously exerted himself to detach the rulers of those Afghan states from all connexion with England, and to induce them to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and ultimately upon Russia. “If the British Government could entertain a doubt of the correctness of the foregoing information, that doubt would, in a great measure, be removed by the unfriendly language with respect to the British Government which Count Simonich held some time ago to the agent of Kabul at the court of Persia, and of which the British Government possess proof in the report made by that agent to the ruler of Kabul.” 3 Sai SEs i ARNE CHar. XIX, THE REPLY. 267 Lord Clanricarde concludes by declaring “ that Russia is free to pursue with respect to the matters in question whatever course may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the interests of Russia. But the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia and Great Britain are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nessel- rode and Mr. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vikovitch in Asia.” The Russian Government was not much disturbed by this note, nevertheless it did vouchsafe to give a few explanations, but in a most ironical manner. It denied facts as clear as the sun, with an audacity so sustained and so calm that any minister less experi- enced than Lord Palmerston would have allowed himself to be deceived by the language of Count Nesselrode. The following are some extracts from the despatch which that diplomatist addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, to be communicated to the Foreign Office, October 20th, 1838 :— “ You state that on this occasion Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary-of-State for Foreign Affairs did not conceal from you, Monsieur le Comte, that public opinion in England ascribes to Russian influence a decisive part in the events now passing in Persia, and attributes to our Cabinet intentions danger- ous to the security of the Dritish possessions in Asia. “ This consideration 1s so serious, it is calculated to have so pernicious an influence on all our relations with Great Britain, that we do not hesitate a single instant to meet the English Cabinet with a frank and spontaneous explanation. The policy, M. I’ Ambassadeur, which the Emperor pursues in that quarter is guided by the same principles which direct it in Europe. Far from any idea of encroachment, that policy has only for its object the maintenance of the rights of Russia, and respect for those legitimately acquired by all other powers. “The idea of assailing the security and tranquillity of the pos- sessions of Great Britain in India has consequently never pre- sented itself, and will never present itself, to the mind of our august master. He desires only what is just and what is possible. “ If the British Government places in those principles the con- filence which they are calculated to inspire, it will be easy for you, M. I’ Ambassadeur, to clear up the doubts which it has con- ma —— es ———— rr eS — = pe me. — ea TS wr | MN 268 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE Cuar. XIX. ceived as to the conduct which we have adopted in the midst of the recent events in Persia, and specifically with regard to the expedi- tion of Mohamed Shah against Herat. “ If we adduce these facts, if we point out the restless activity of certain unaccredited and unrecognised individuals, it is cer- tainly not our wish to impute to the Government to which they belong the blame of which they are deserving. On the contrary, we consider the British Cabinet to be altogether a stranger to the tendency which we have just alluded to. But in like manner as we place a just reliance on the rectitude of the intentions of the English Government, so also are we entitled to expect that it will not raise a doubt as to our own. « These remarks, M. le Comte, which the Emperor commands you to communicate with the most perfect frankness to the English Ministry, will serve, I hope, to satisfy it, above all, as to the inten- tions of our Cabinet, and to place in its true light the conservative and disinterested policy of our august master. Our attitude, M. le Comte, will necessarily be regulated according to the definitive determination which the British Government shall think fit to adopt.” After this display of principle M. de Nesselrode gives his explanations. He declares that the siege of Herat appears to him a thing just in itself, but defends himself from the charge of having instigated the Shah to undertake it. Nevertheless, he adds, that if Herat were joined to Kandahar all contests would cease, and that country would then become accessible to every nation interested in the commerce of Central Asia. The Emperor could not have any reason to injure England, and the natural obstacles which separate the two empires render a collision between them impossible. ~M. Thomas continues his narrative, and states that “ According to Count Nesselrode it was England who had made the first attack, and he finished by no longer concealing that Russia well knew, when necessary, how to manceuvre up to the Indus. It was therefore for England to refrain and be careful ; as to the Russians, they had nothing to reproach themselves with; they denied the existence of any grievances that could be brought against them ; they had wished to prevent the attack upon Herat ; Simonitch and Vikovitch were pacificators ; the latter had been charged simply to fix the extent of security that Afghanistan would grant to Russian merchants, Cuapr. XIX. CABINETS OF LONDON AND PETERSBURG. 269 and not to establish a treaty, or any other political combina- tion, Russia having no other object than to secure a market for her manufactures in Central Asia. If by accident the agents had slightly deviated from their instructions, England could not com- plain. Where is the government that is always served as it wishes to be? Had England herself the power to control those turbulent travellers who continually excited disturbances in Asia ? ¢ Further, Count Nesselrode announced the recall of General Simonitch, and that Colonel Duhamel, who was appointed to succeed him, was on his way to Teheran—terminating his despatch as follows :— “ «If we recall these facts—if we notice the activity of certain individuals who put themselves forward without having been accredited, or even recognised, by their government—it is not because we wish to impute to the Dritish Government itself the blame which belongs to them; on the contrary, we consider the British Cabinet as being entirely above such actions as we point out; but as we place confidence in the rectitude of her intentions, we consider that we have a right to expect she should not throw any doubt over ours. “ ¢ These remarks, which the Emperor commands your Excel- lency to communicate in full to the British Cabinet, will, I hope, serve to satisfy it, and place in its proper light the conservative and disinterested policy of our august master. Our attitude must necessarily be regulated by the definitive determination that the British Government will think fit to adopt.” ” But Lord Palmerston, who, to the last, strove to preserve the illusion that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was sincere, wrote to Count Pozzo di Borgo in the following terms on December 20, 1838 : — “1 can assure your Excellency that her Majesty’s Government have given to this important communication all the attention which it so justly demands; and I have great pleasure in being able to state to your Excellency that this communication has in its general result been highly satisfactory to her Majesty’s Government. The leading principle which invariably directs the British Government in the management of its relations with foreign powers is an anxious desire to preserve for the British nation the blessings of peace. But as regards Russia this wish is peculiarly strong; because an alliance of long standing between Great Britain an dal - y Sein. — A —— i —— _— — ——— —— — e—X 270 CONDUCT OF RUSSIA, Cnar, XIX, Russia, commercial intercourse v aluable to both countries, and common interests of the higl 1est order, must necessarily lead her Majesty's Government to deprecate as a great misfortune any event which might tend to interrupt the good understanding which so happily subsists between the Cabinets of Petersburg and London.” Count Nesselrode, delighted to have succeeded in calming Lord Palmerston’s fears, wished probably to make him fecl that from the explanations he had given it did not follow that the Russian Cabinet was determined henceforth to concede to him on all points, for after having received his reply he addressed the following dry answer to his Lordship on January 29, 1839, a reply which reads far more like a threat than an approach towards the good under- standing upon which the N oble Lord seemed so self-satisfied ;— “ Those explanations,” remarks Count N esselrode, « have afforded to the two Cabinets the opportunity of receiving and of offering on either side assurances which bear the character of just reciprocity, and which are inseparable from one another, Our Cabinet, in taking note of that assurance, expects to receive the proof of its entire fulfilment. Is it possible to show more ability, more subtlety, more than Russia did ip these negotiations, years’ duration ? Nothing in her conduct can seriously give offence to the English, They reproach her with treaties m agents ; she disavows them. acuteness, or rather deceptions, of four ade by her They are offended at the siege of Herat, which they attribute to her ; she immediately abandons the Shah to his own resources and withdraws from him the Russian deserters. She has extended her influence to the frontier of the British empire in India, without its costing her the smallest sacri fice ; she fails, it is true, but she retires without shame ang without loss, and in her retreat she shot a Parthian arrow at her rival, who ouly triumphed for the moment, subsequently to meet with the most dreadful catastrophe, Though Russia and Persia had appeared to give way on all points, and Lord Palmerston had shown himself satisfied with the explanations of M. de Nesselrode, the British never] continued their preparations in India for the the Emir Dost Mohamed and Kohendil cipalities of Kabul and Kandahar. ships of war also entered the P 1eless purpose of driving Khan from the prin- Live of the Company’s ersian Gulf in the spring of 1838, Cuar. XIX. DOST MOHAMED’S PROPOSITIONS. 271 and the troops they had on board took futon. of ie hn o Karrack, where they ow me mes 08 them into the heart of Persia by the river Ka i hey Caer Herat was raised, this expedition was given up ; but th te was carried 9 with a fms So 71 all risks, to become the ) nd, a concessions she, in her blind policy, constantly i was thought to possess commons im trative ability, and a courage not common even bina Shas ghans. These qualities did not constitute any Fam lah the eyes of the Directors of the East India pn heme Emir, who by inclination and Soni pv fot retaining his position could on y be derive ) ; un thing but their concurrence could enable him to in : oe a monarchy, ed ny to by rsndyy bry ander Burnes to make one last a emp fle oo of England, by intrusting him with a letter to Lord Auck- os 10 his Lordship,” said he, “give oe hy a 2 i CONS : mir abul, oe lt ha fe ay and 1 will rush to his support with wd hoy sop to defend him from the Shah of Persia, on the Spies cy Bon receiving a subsidy for the troops that I shall ou opis bis ones of the Company.” He even added, “ that for t 9 Presa 1e not say another word about the restitution of Peshawur. in There was so much disinterestedness and so Bi goo In we in these propositions, that Sir A. Burnes Smee ANE 2 in promising the Dost that he could Indus s { ome accept them ; but what did that avail Koi 2 pr 4 i ie 4 ie 5 was in vain that he wrote to Calcutta, 1 et is Sm making Afghanistan a barrier against the Russians, x isan form a strics alliance with Dost Mohamed, to on i) i ih rity, which has been compromised by family ves 2 iy on one be thoroughly convinced that’ the i a ver allow any attempts to be made to injure or i fh "8 t the Court of Directors was far from entertaining the same SR and in its insatiable avidity had long lab es dis i> establishment of Shah Shooja in the government of A ghanistan, 272 DECISION OF LORD AUCKLAND. Crap. XIX, order to have the finances of that country entirely at its own dis- posal. Lord Auckland laid the conflicting opinions of Burnes and of the Court of Directors before the English Cabinet, who decided in favour of that of the British officer, as being the only rational and practicable one; but the contrary opinion, supported by Sir W. M‘Naghten, Sir Claude Wade, and Sir John M‘Neil, which favoured the secret views of the Directors, prevailed. Sir Claude Wade, the resident at Loodiana, who was the warmest parti- san of Shah Shodja, encouraged the warlike propensities of the East India Company by leading them into the error in which he had himself been held many years by his protégé, namely, that the Barukzye tribe did not contain 60,000 families, as Burnes had stated, and that their numbers did not amount to more than 6000 ; also that their chiefs were generally hated by the serdars of the other Afghan tribes. Opinions so different held by two officers, both of whom enjoyed in a high degree the confidence of their Government, arose from one common source, ignorance : like the greater part of those authors who have hitherto written on Afghanistan, they confused the tribes with their subdivisions or branches. Thus: — Ahmed Shah and his descendants (Shah Shooja, &c.) were of the tribe of Popolzye, and the branch or family of the Suddozyes. Hadji Djemal Khan and his posterity (Dost Mohamed, &c.) were of the tribe of Barukzye, and the branch or family of the Mohamed- zyes; and it is probably of this latter branch, which does consist of four or five thousand families, that Sir C. Wade intended to speak ; for in Afghanistan, when a descendant of Hadji Djemal is spoken of, he is not called a ¢ Barukzye chief,” but a *“ Mohamed- zye chief.” In the same manner Ahmed Shah is not called Ahmed Shah Popolzye, but Ahmed Shah Suddozye. The advice of Burnes was rejected and his acts completely dis- avowed. Lord Auckland also took upon himself to offer to the Emir of Kabul the most merciless ultimatum, first demanding, but in the most polite manner possible, that he should immediately dismiss Captain Vikovitch ; and next, that he should renounce all his rights to the Afghan provinces conquered by the Sikhs, because the noble Lord had determined not to interfere in his favour, from a fear of displeasing his faithful ally, the Maharadjah of the Punjab. Burnes exerted all his powers of persuasion and argument, which marked the intense interest he took in the cause of the Emir, to induce him to accept these hard conditions. The Dost, though Cuar. XIX, CONSTERNATION OF DOST MOHAMED. 273 indignant at this unworthy treatment, had not actually given his definitive reply, affirmative or negative, when he received informa- tion from his agents in India, which left him no doubt of the fact of the concentration of a British army at Ferozepore with the well- determined purpose of replacing Shah Shooja on the throne of Kabul. Simultaneously with this information the Dost received letters from Captain Vikovitch, written from Kandahar, in which the fairest promises were made to him. These letters decided him in his course of action, and he broke off his negotiations with Burnes, who, having failed in his mission, retired, leaving Dost Mohamed in a state of great consternation. Mons. Thomas then proceeds with his remarks :—“ The Dost could not, he said, hold out a month against England, and the thoughts of displeasing her filled him with terror. He was not ignorant that Runjeet was the friend of the English, and that it would not be wise to attack him. They could at any moment support Peshawur, if not with troops at least with simple remon- strances, which would have restrained the Maharadjah of Lahore ; but, on the contrary, they were now more than ever Runjeet’s declared friends, and preferred him to the Afghans, who were ready to place themselves at their disposal. Certainly that was not the provocation of a very determined enemy. Burnes himself, when he left, did not think that the Afghans would ever throw themselves into the arms of the Russians, and unite with the Per- sians. The fatal policy of England, however, constrained the Dost to do s0, and left him no alternative but ip or war. “ After having been four years at pe: having forced the Shah of Persia to retire from Her en Tortie ascertained with certainty the devotion of Dost Mohamed—w hat could excite the Government of India to such a violent determination? Why make war on the Afghans? Had all Asia risen in arms? Had the Persians taken Herat and Kandahar, the Russians Bokhara and Khiva? No; but, as Burnes said, it was only because a Cossack captain, without state or suite, had galloped up to Kabul. Lord Palmerston, who had hesitated so long before he interfered officially in Persia, adopted in less than six mouths a vigorous intervention in Afghanistan. He required a war with Kabul, because he had not known how to ask in proper time for explana- tions at St. Petersburg, which would certainly have been given him if he had procrastinated, temporised, and tergiversated less. Afraid T re ——— mt et 274 REFLECTIONS ON ENGLISH POLICY. Cuar. XIX. of losing the alliance of Russia in Europe, because he had the misfortune to place faith in it, and the still greater one of preserving it as a balance of power—necessitated to defer to her, though the Foreign Office had been obliged during four years to pass over in silence the Muscovite intrigues, he had not warned the princes of the East that England considered herself affronted, but endea- voured to detach them from these intrigues out of regard for their interests. He never spoke in the name of his Government, and they had therefore never listened to him; however, seeing India seriously threatened, he at length took a side, but which? Lord Palmerston let loose the demon of war all over the East; he created perils without end for the British empire; he raised up against it resentment and vengeance; he mixed England up more and more with the internal quarrels of a country in which her do- minion could only be maintained by neutrality ; he hurried her purposely into the path of conquest, and struck wherever the Russian had set a foot or intended to set one, hoping these grand strokes of his genius would astonish and lead to reflection, without remembering that such flagrant injustice is never pardoned.” Caar. XX, LORD AUCKLAND'S MANIFESTO. CHAPTER XX. Lord Auckland sends Sir W. M‘Naghten to Lahore — Treaty with the Sikhs — Manifesto of the Governor-General from Simla in justification of his policy — Reflections on this document — The possession of Scinde adjourned — The Emirs are opposed to the advance of the British ermy through their territory — Mir Roustem of Khyrpoor — Averse to lending the fortress of Bukkur to the English, but at length accedes to their request — The result of this to himself and his family — Conduct of the British authorities in Scinde — Strength of the army when concentrated at Shikapoor — Extract from Mr. Sumner’s work — Seizure of Kurrachee — English appliances to success in the invasion of Afghanistan — Proceedings of Shah Shooja, As soon as war had been determined upon, Lord Auckland sent the Secretary of the Government of India, Sir William M‘Naghten, to negotiate a treaty with Runjeet Sing and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, which he concluded without difficulty; the Shah agreeing to cede to the Maharadjah all the Afghan provinces he had con- quered, including even Peshawur, which Dost Mohamed had refused to give up. This point settled, Lord Auckland published the following manifesto, in which he set forth his reasons for making war upon the Afghans: — ¢ Simla, October 1st, 1838. “The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Gouncil, directed the assem- blage of a British force for service across the Indus, his Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure. “It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the British Government in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sinde, the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facili- tate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in Central Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce. With a view to invite the aid of the de facto rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mohamed Khan, the chief of Kabul. The original objects of that officer’s T 2 I mew RL 276 LORD AUCKLAND’S MANIFESTO Cuar. XX. mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Kabul, information was received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost Mohamed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally, the Maharajah Runjeet Sing.* It was naturally to be apprehended that his Highness the Maharajah would not be slow to avenge this aggression, and it was to be feared that, the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor-General resolved on authorizing Captain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mo- hamed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, his Lordship would exert his good offices with his Highness, for the Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that in the mean time hostilities on his part should be suspended.t “It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor- General that a Persian army was besieging Herat ; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her Majesty’s mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain. } “ After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless nego- tiation at Kabul, it appeared that Dost Mohamed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assist- ance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, § such as the Governor- General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the * What then of the spoliation of the on both parties, and which England Afghan prcvinces by Runjeet.— Ferrier, + I have no doubt that the English, foreseeing that the Punjab would ere long be theirs, supported Runjeet in his spoliations.— Ferrier. 1 An alliance which was obligatory had been the first to break by refusing to pay the subsidy she had promised to Persia.— Ferrier, § The restitution of Peshawur, the bulwark of his country, extorted by Runjeet,— Ferrier, Cuap. XX. IN JUSTIFICATION OF HIS POLICY. 277 friendship of the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, be the channel of sub- mitting to the consideration of his Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India ; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and inju- rious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprized, and, by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to leave Kabul without having effected any of the objects of his mis- sion. It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good under- standing between the Sihk ruler and Dost Mohamed Khan; and the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that, so long as Kabul remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved inviolate. “ The Governor-General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months.* The attack upon it was a most unjusti- fiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwith- standing the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British envoy at the court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach them from British India. In the mean time the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have heen, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has recently ascertained, by an official despatch from Mr. M 1 : Hien a ursts forth only a very small portion of the population for the > ih 1e oa] the country, and this supplies all the wants army, which is an ele ment of order and i ny, : security—the government, in short, is tl i short, 1e guardian and watch ps : ches over the : Ores of the nation for the general good. But in Afghanistan 1e 1deas : x be eet of the government and the governed are holly different ; there each man thi s : ; 3 an thinks only of destruct BLA en : y of destruction and Ju Jaron ; 1t 1s who shall labour least, or who shall enrich self the mos Sn : ¢ most, and by the most culpable means. ~ The deposi $ of power, instead of leadi ‘ steac eading those unde \ g thos er them in the righ path, instead of giving th oo giving them, by their own conduc P living ) uct, a good Ses and ameliorating the condition of the peo) le 1 d a . . or 2 jon with exactions and enrich themselves at their cost pe 1s syste 1ati : nl of spoliation and embezzlement is practised by Ss naries of svar class, and has a sad effect upon the minds e masses, who follow tl : " thei : 1e example of their super 9 iho samen, Wha ; ler superiors : seein i he gh instead of occupying themselves with their ei 7 think joyi 3 $ y 2 3 of enjoying themselves at their expense, they become otistical : avaricious i for. 300 8 fy ; od rd m their turn, and prefer idleness to 1 industry, which sery oe 3 serves only to benefit their son ah, 50 only 1eir oppressors, and > upon themselves additional persecution. To seize w thous remony : ' i Sok upon the property of other people is an example which £ ot 9 "0 . « y v . : : Gen ghans receive daily from their chiefs, and it appears to a ‘eni X fe A both convenient and Just ; the effect of this ; ‘manent state of disqui : £ tisquietude and trouble, Ins mon ] : uble. They are, as I dy remarked, the mos Lo 103t P > ¢ i i SL quo mens 2 9:3 turbulent nation in Asia, Wa to govern: they always welcome, and with S1a8Y ATI Ve * r : s1asm, the arrival of a new sovereign, but a reign too 1 ; ( ; ong or a peace too prolonged with their neighbours 1 Dy 18 to them insup- » Ww Nn I 0 0 D ortunit / i 1 of their over-exci : : Gir over-excitement on their foes without, thev make w upon one another. s they make war and If cour: is . rage 18 to them the first of virtues, it may be said also ¢ NC Cl = tl t or ta Oo t 3 fi rst AODQS t ry o th ~ ~ re C agi ation 18 for he m a I'S nec € SSI \ us SCE ne » f 1 1 s C pv ————— eI LTE TE RE I TL 304 INSTABILITY OF POWER. Cur. XXII. violence arise which produce a change of government, and with it a change of sovereigns, with inconceivable rapidity. He who possesses a little money and can scatter it amongst the crowd will soon have a sufficient number of partizans to assist in raising him to power; and though this power is hereditary in Afghanistan, the regular succession to the throne is by no means liked and is the most uncertain thing possible. The legitimate heir is always obliged to submit the question of sovereignty to an election and the chances of war ; the result is rarely doubtful, and has always favoured the candidate who paid the soldiers best that adhered to his fortunes ; hence it is that one sees so many obscure adventurers, enriched by razzias, suddenly elevated to the supreme authority. These have, for the most part, been little better than avaricious and sanguinary tyrants, who are overthrown almost as soon as they are set up. In Afghanistan everything that succeeds is legitimate, and in this way success favours the greatest rascal ; his crimes or his virtues are of little importance to the people ; if he pays well he is their idol ; but let his purse get empty, let a reverse of fortune overtake him, he at once becomes an object of contempt and aversion, and is obliged either to expatriate himself or retire into a greater obscurity than that from which he sprung. Afghanistan is of all countries in the world that in which a man’s position is the most uncertain ; a serdar to-day wealthy and powerful will to-morrow be despoiled of everything he is possessed of, and be reduced to serve, and in a subordinate rank, those who, till then, had obeyed his smallest wish. The members of his family will be dispersed and reduced to the greatest privations, and hence it is that in this country are seen so many nobles in rags, There are hundreds of khans who take service as private soldiers, and even servants of the lowest grade; but no matter what may be the misery, degradation, or adversity to which they are reduced, they are always wonderfully vain of their birth, and their aristo- cratic pride is sure to pierce through their plebeian garb. The sovereigns of Afghanistan bestow every kind of title with a prodigal hand, and that of khan so much so, and upon such perfect nobodics, that it” has completely lost the consideration properly due to it. The chance which every energetic man has of rising to power, even the highest, and the facility with which he attains it, has established between the people, the Cuap. XXII, THE SERDARS—THE PRODUCING CLASSES, 305 serdars, and the sovereign, a species of familiarity which is seen m no other country. Individuals of the lowest birth and class clad mM rags and covered with vermin, take whatever complaints they may have in person to the king ; they approach and seat themselves before him without ceremony, enter at once and with- out preamble into their story, and with that easy nonchalant air which is $0 characteristic of Afghan human nature, The sovereign Sees, receives, and discusses every petition even on the most insignificant subjects, and his minister, when he has 0 SC : io generally speaking, merely gives effect to the decisions of his master, As the Af. ghan chiefs are never sure of holding ened period any great appointment in the state their 1s always how they can fill their own coffers and ruin however great and politic, and of future advant may appear, they will always sacrifice present benefit, no matter how small. Another mode of enriching themselves Is putting up the public offices for sale to the highest bidder, and the purchasers then consider that they are justified In committing every kind of fraud tg reimburse themselves the sums they have paid. Individual liberty exists nowhere ia the East so perfect as in Afghanistan ; every Afghan can go where he thinks fit; he can leave the kingdom with his family if he . . . : wishes, neither authority nor passport is required to enable him to do so, no one has a right to interfere with or restrain him : the sovereign certainly would not, for ductive article, which consumes much and produces nothing : but this is not the case either with the Parsivans or the Hinds: settled in the country, who form the industrial and producing dass, They, especially those in Kandahar, are retained in the princi ality against their wishes, and are severely punished when they to : to leave it. It cannot be said that there is, as we ierstand 2 mn Europe, any national spirit amongst the Afghans ; fey fight much more for their own interests than for thats independence : there is, nevertheless, something which resembles it, though 08 commonly felt: this is a sentiment of affection for or a Seal i pride in, his own tribé, which makes a man detest the ” a one, though of the same race: it may be affirmed th every tribe of Afghans has its own clannish feeling which protects the nation ; interest alone effects : for a length- first thought the country; age, any measure it to the most trifling an Afghan is a very unpro- eighbouring erefore, that » and it is that a passing unity X 3 EE AE Oa a —— year RE "a oes ro — A TT — 306 THE SERDARS—THE TROOTS. (nap. XXII. of purpose, and when that is satisfied the rivalries of different castes and clans re-assume their sway. The serdars are at one and the same time the strength and the curse of the monarch ; prompt to take arms and defend him when a good understanding exists between them, they are as ready to revolt against him when they find, or think, they have the smallest interest in doing so ; in anything, however, to which they are disinclined, they would not obey even the sovereign of their choice but with reluctance ; moreover, they are always impatient to see him replaced by another, from whom they hope to obtain greater advantages. Each subdivision of a tribe is, according to its numerical force and extent of territory, commanded by one or more serdars. These chiefs, though of a-different country and religion, may be compared to the dukes and barons of the middle ages in France—the more powerful to the knights bannerets, and those having authority over only a few families to the esquires—who in time of war enrol themselves and their men under the orders of the chief that inspires them with the greatest confidence, and can pay them the best. They have also the characteristic which was common to the old Italian condottieri, namely, that they will sell their services to the highest bidder. In war, as in peace, they are ready to pass from the ranks of the Emir of Kabul into the service of the Vizier of Herat, the chief of Kandahar, the English, the Persians, Sikhs, Tartars, or Belooches, and vice versa, without the slightest scruple ; it is indifferent to them whether their friend of to-day is their enemy to-morrow, or whether they have even to take arms against their relations or not ; the love of money enables them to overlook all these considerations. The soldiers imitate on a small scale that which their chiefs do on a large one, that is to say, they will desert one party and attach themselves to another, without feeling any compunction or incurring the least disgrace ; the question is simply one of speculation, an admitted custom, and there is no shame in conforming to it. The consequence of this is that a sovereign is never sure of his troops, and, if any one else will give them higher pay or treat them better than he can, théy will pass over to his camp.7 The authority of the chiefs of tribes is much more effectual over their subordinates, whom they sometimes rule with a rod of iron; these consider the chief as their father, and are accustomed to obey and respect him from their infancy ; he is of the same clan as them- Cuap. XXII, RESULT OF THEIR WARS, 307 selves, he has received his power and authorit of ancestors ; but these reasons nevertheless him from ruin ; it requires very little to e A 1s attacked, followed, and driven forth such as it is, passes to a brother branch, to any one, in short : the family. T . os we od ht have reddened the soil of Afghanistan for the last I's have so completely decimated th ites e old families mans u fam have become extinct, and several tribes Py 2 * lout a head. On some occasions, when the sovereion has gs Shen a chief of his choice, instead of one of their , readful and bloody conflict h oh 1 always ended in the tri a im, Aas alw 0 umph of the chief elected b i a his ae 18 natural enough. To accept a A: ~ ry : | v apse; upon them would be to abdicate their riohts. to deltas fas Serves op to the tender mercies of the pringes wihorons ho s the command by right of election defends his position and privileges with : . Ce greater tenacit ; mdividual who attacks him. ¥» To matter who may be the : i visits of the serdars at the court of th or oT i a buy ae generally apprehensive of fa] ich is o aid fi isli ii fo ik for them, and they dislike the prolonged stay i y obliged to make when once they are there They p fer residing amongst their tribe, i ir f : rey gs ribe, in their fortif : | ified viljages pain | ges, generall ge py Ti eminence, where in case of attack an tl : r . . . : 2 e readily and continuously resist the efforts of their encmi . 2 i Dove amongst them are caressed by the iy 0 attaches them to his i — 0 his interests mucl Yagu! Stes res 1 more by the concessions Wh than by the fear which he inspires ; ordinarily, and with W- to preserve a nomi I : : serve mal authority over tl i iy ove a | y over them, he remits the ae hpunsst ip imposes in their stead the obligation to contingent of troops in tl j y ! 1e event of war being fea a of ; eng declared Agni st him by his neighbours, This wretched on ui 0 r . yl : 3 4 80 Jy P wer to the serdars ; the sovereign 1s at their mercy, and ; : the ambition of these men that gives bir Ee Civil wars in Afghanistan, for they are t h i ¥ It has been shown in the cour extent they carried their excesses dozyes ; if they h y through a long line Ss cannot always save xcite discontent ; then he and his right to govern, an uncle, or some collateral so that the feudal rights remain in € sovereign are rare, ling into some trap sovereign, th to the numerous constantly in revolt, se of their history to what an under the dynasty of the Sud. ave mot as often deposed and recalled the x2 I TE i | kL =a SI Cute. subs Crar. XXII q JRZYES. 308 THE MOHAMEDZYES AND BARUKZYE ily 1 it w n exception it is » that family is as it were a Mohamedzyes, it is because oy gy Sl En - to the Afghans in general, an SAL superior intelligence and energy of ol : A : ief; now how t Y : y other chiefs, an got ascendancy over the , Rt: by the Kn which they so adroitly excite and a 5 : Lo and by settling or encamping the tribe o Tae 4 al v 's that, to hich the Mohamedzyes belong, n ws an iy Ih ] far as Ghuznee. entra lying south of Kandahar, By AL OE position enables them to move t eir fore gi Wa spot, and suppress all revolts with alacrity and vig 2 I : * tribe var £ el stronger they control the other tribes. ; a y Tee n strong Bey = yo they have broken up into sections or dispersed, in ” der oe Ty al assis 1 Ye impossible that they should render mutual ass ey a i k wi ater facility. ach other, and they thus hold them in check a greate io i» ; ; ion i mber always enjoy i SOV s a member alway The clan of which the sovereign 1s LR greatest privileges and advantages over the rest, Reiss . . . 8 the reasons why each tribe is continually agitating an i aise its chief to power. ; i a a in Afghanistan have up to this The princes ac ning 1 Drlitehre time ha with as much good fortune as Super 3 that have taken place in their states; but though this has : Sled the \ to hold the reins of government for many Jean we 4 ? oh he M re stifle spirit 0 imacine that the Mohamedzyes have stifled the spi ; whos i essity in the Afghan character as rebellion, which is as much a necessity : ie TL ici 1 oanization ; rukzyes mz the effect of a vicious social or mens the b a | 7 liv ay to daym a p § m-to- w, they live on from day : overthrown to-morrow, they Se iti i » is dependent on the caprices o and their fate is depen : ev ge i jes. Burnes has affirmed that Dos asure of their enemies. Bur the good pleasure Pal i 1 / wind that he 1s | is he reneration by the Afghans, Mohamed is held in vene gain f nderste 1e sweets of peace, irs ereign w ade them understand t first sovereign who n ! bis, ge, and introduced abundance and security Jo them ; buys By i » arrived for them to show their when the hour arrived : i 2 yd sl was abandoned for Shah Shooja, for whom oratitude r this chic & : ) IT im Hey had still less consideration. The English took po 2 Cl 5 . 1 i i ; serious resistance on their march ; 9 o with any serious resista Kabul without meeting 3 Rane al might still be said, in spi y has been said, and what mg : i pe 7 igs : Troy were then received with acclamations I affirm and assert tha y wi 0a) ! i and protestations of friendship and devotion Wan i a i ] } al J 1 Ss > ec solicitation on their part, and this from chiefs who oo eq gy . . ry s S Sr . declared them to be their enemies. Then, as now, the se Cuar. XXII, THE ARMY. 309 were men of bad faith: they expected and hoped for gold ; as long as they were given any they accepted it and said nothing ; their consciences were dead within them, even the bigoted feeling of fanaticism was hushed in their breasts; the husband sold the honour of his wife, the father that of his daughter, the brother that of his sister, and one saw a circumstance till then unheard of, a number of Englishmen, Christians, become the legitimate husbands of Afghan women who professed the faith of Islam, Money had made these savage Afghans as tame and submissive as sheep, but directly the order was given by the East India Company to reduce the subsidies which had been paid ‘to them, turbulence and fanaticism returned at once ; the salaries and donations which they received after this reduction were even then much higher than those they obtained from their own sovereigns, but in this, as in all other circumstances, their avarice, their unstable, restless, and fickle character, brought about the insurrection which re-established the power of the Emir Dost Mohamed in Kabul and that of Kohendil Khan in Kandahar. Their return was celebrated with every circumstance of pomp by their subjects, and yet how often since that period have they not revolted against these chiefs ! They will, as they have already done before, turn their backs on them on the first occasion ; and if these princes have the good fortune to terminate their troubled lives in power, it is all that in common reason they can expect. It will be impossible either for them, or Yar Mohamed Khan of Herat to establish a dynasty, the foundations of which shall be sufficiently solid to enable them to transmit it with any degree of certainty to their legitimate heirs ; the sovereignty in this country exists only on considerations purely individual,—it is frequently brought to a close with the life of the possessor, and becomes afterwards the appanage of some bold adventurer or soldier of fortune. The Afghan army might in case of necesssity consist of the whole male population, for every man is born a soldier, and attaches himself to some chief as soon as he can hold a musket. As the troops have no regular pay, and during their period of service generally speaking live on plunder, it is difficult to say which is the most disastrous to the people, its own army or that of a foreign enemy, for both one and the other abandon themselves to all kinds of excesses, devastate the country, and leave behind the most fearful traces of their passage ; ordinarily speaking, a i ER ST Geen mg ea a 0 AT pp CRS tr PT ge 310 . THE ARMY. Cuar. XXII. the strength of the army of each principality is dependent ii probabilities that exist of maintaining it in the district to whic § ” : ’ a ah fit news of war the serdars hasten with their fa contingents to the camp of the sovereign, each bringing with fe the number of men in proportion to the nature and importance o his command. These contingents united form the army, properly so called ; but in addition to it is another class of wi which, though not the best, are often the most numerous ; such, for instance, as the inhabitants of towns, who are not attached to any chief, individuals who make war on their own account and at their own expense, solely for the pleasure of making it, and in the hope of obtaining large booty. It sometimes happens that these irregulars unite in parties, or all together, and elect a chief, or chiefs, under whose command they place themselves ; but more often they are broken up into small detachments of Boas or acquaintances coming from the same locality, associated toget os and intending to share in the profits of the enterprise; they mare after their own fashion, and without order, regulating their pro- ceedings according to the movements of the army, or leaving it when it suits their views and convenience. These elements united, or sometimes disunited, form an Afghan army, if one can give such a name to a collection of men, animals, and followers marching pell-mell, and in the greatest confusion. It ga only a few days for the serdars to assemble their contingents, every man of the tribe is always ready to mount his ‘horse, an each of them carries his provisions with him in a kind of havresac, which is slung behind the saddle. The Afghans, such parasites and sponges when at home, are exceedingly frugal and temperate when they are on a journey; their powers of abstinence and en- durance are great, and they can live almost upon anything and for a long time; the chiefs, and those whose means enable them to do so, are accompanied by so many servants for their personal requirements, or to look after the baggage, that during the whole of the operations they generally exceed in number those of the fighting men. All these form a mixed and noisy rabble, wis. ciplined and impracticable, badly equipped, and taking no pre- cautions necessary to their own security, whether on the march or in camp, even when in presence of the enemy. Nevertheless, though in this miserable and confused state, the army moves with ” 2 Cuar, XXII. THE ARMY. 311 great rapidity and over immense distances: the inhabitants of the villages fly at their approach, for they destroy and pillage every- thing that lies on their road. Sometimes dearth of provisions is felt in the camp, when the majority of the volunteers quit the army and return to their homes; the serdars, who carry with them only food enough for their personal wants, are also obliged to disband successive portions of their contingents to obtain sup- plies, so that it often happens that only a fourth, and even a less number, are all that remain with their colours. When war takes place between the Afghans themselves, it generally ends in a combat in which a very small force is engaged on either side, In the field, the Afghans never think of ascertaining what is going on in their front on the line of march ; they form neither advanced nor rear guards, but move straight on without the least uneasiness or apprehension until they meet the enemy ; it matters little to them whether or not their communications are left open; the spot on which they find their subsistence is for them the line of operations ; they pitch their camp by hap-hazard, with- out system or order, at the first place they come to, but by pre- ference near villages, which they can plunder, and where they are also sure to find water. As this is in some parts very scarce, and to be found only at certain points well known to all, it often occurs that the various contingents marching in several columns, finding the springs or wells near which they intended to encamp exhausted, retire upon the adjoining ones, but the ground is often occupied,/and a bloody conflict is the result, when the strongest party remains in possession of the springs, and the other has to continue its search elsewhere. In the camp each contingent forms an irregular circle, the baggage and the chief's tent being in the centre. The mass of the Afghan army is composed of cavalry, and the national character, and the nature of the climate and soil, are the principal reasons that lead them to prefer this arm to infantry, which, excepting in the mountains north of Kabul, is held in little estimation amongst them: there the country is difficult and the climate temperate, but in the other parts of Afghanistan the people do not fancy traversing on foot miles and miles of desert plains, under a burning sun, and where water is scarce. With a little forethought and arrangement these obstacles would readily and promptly be overcome, but this is not the 312 MODE OF FIGHTING. Cnae. XXII. | country in which people care to overcome difficulties: anything | that is easy of execution and can be effected in a brief space of : time is much more to their taste. The love of war is felt much more amongst Afghans than all * other Eastern nations; nevertheless, in no one instance has so J little desire been shown to augment the means of resistance and | aggression. War to them is a trade, for it would be impossible i | to give the name of science to the thousand absurd proceedings { which they employ, and which prove that their chiefs are completely ignorant of the first elements of the art. The reason of their success pg against the other Asiatic hordes up to this day has been their élan & in the attack, their courage, but not any clever dispositions or | A a knowledge of military operations; their neighbours the Sikhs, previously subject to them, defeated the Afghans and seized some of the most valuable provinces in their territory, directly they had obtained even a partial knowledge of European tactics. It cannot be denied that the Afghans are excellent skirmishers and experienced foragers, for they possess the necessary qualifications in a much greater degree than Europeans. They are perfectly independent in their manceuvres, each detachment fighting after its own devices, unrestrained by any subordination and discipline, those who command them not being any wiser than themselves. Their instinct tells them what movement will ensure their safety under defeat, or will tend to their advantage in victory. European : soldiers would certainly effect as much as they could under the { same circumstances ; but then they are subject to regular discipline, 8 directed by one impulse, the majority of them confiding in the If talents of their chiefs, so that their courage is limited within | proper bounds, out of which they cannot step without compromis- If ing their discipline, or sometimes endangering the lives of their comrades. For the theatre of combat between their armies the Afghans hil always select large plains, in order that their numerous cavalry, on which they place a blind reliance, may be able to deploy J freely; if they could charge regularly and in line it would be perhaps the finest cavalry in the world. The sword is their favourite arm, and when they say of any one “chemchiri adam est” (that man is a swordsman) they have paid him the most flattering compliment. They have no idea of the advantages of position, or estimating in a military sense the features of the a a A aT Tr Io pli pc - —~ i al ~ Caar. XXII. MODE OF FIGHTING. 313 ground ; in their eyes the shortest road is the best ; they never seek to turn a position or to make a diversion ; they always attack - in line parallel to that of the enemy and on all points at once taking, in the words of the proverb, «the bull by the horns,” Before they encounter their adversary, however, they endeavpur to weaken him by ruining the country in his front, so that he cannot maintain himself ; they burn the villages, expel the inha- bitants, destroy the aqueducts ; and after he has wandered for days iu the desert they have made, panting with thirst and extenuated by hunger, they pounce upon their enemy like a tiger and make a horrible massacre. Strategy and tactics are unknown to them, and not even by compulsion could they be initiated in these power- ful agents in obtaining victory. They will have independence of action, opportunities of displaying their address and their physical strength ; they place the triumph of individual courage far above that of science, and reject every idea of combination and unity in their movements. But this impulsive ardour, this daring bravery of which they were so proud, slackened when they had to meet he British, whose artillery cleverly served, and infantry squares solid as walls, made fearful havoe in their squadrons. The artillery especially, that terrible arm in the hands of Europeans, inspires them with no less aversion than it did formerly Montluc or the Chevalier Bayard, the first of whom looked upon it as an invention of the devil, and the second said it was a shame that a brave man should be exposed to die by such a miserable device. Against cannon the Afghans feel that they cannot trust to the prowess which they value so highly. Their valour is incontestable but their presumption is greater ; they never cease to boast, and are constantly repeating that, if other nations were, like them- selves, armed only with the sword, they could give laws to the world. When they attack they utter loud cries, and the most courageous place themselves in front ; the rest form a second or third line, more or less distant from the first, according to the degree of ardour they may possess. These’ are ready to rush forward and plunder if their comrades in advance are victorious, or to run away if they are beaten. The chiefs are far more intent upon signalizing their personal courage than upon directing their troops, who are not under any control when they have been a short time in action. The Afghans never disband until they have failed in three charges successively, but after that it becomes impossible to rally them, because they believe that talleh, A a lc wii a —— ERs Rh he BS 314 Cuar. XXII. THE TOWNS. fate, is against them, and that they would offend God by longer opposing his decrees. But if they gain the day, woe indeed to the conquered! for an Afghan ceases not from slaughter till his arm is wearied with striking ; till then there is no quarter from him, and a hundred times better is it to die on the field than survive to be his slave, certain of the hardest possible toil and the most inhuman treat- ment : a large ransom is the only chance of liberty. In time of war the Afghans carry on their communications by signal fires on the mountains, the information they are to afford being intimated by their numbers and position, and the length of time they burn. They have no idea of the rights of individuals, nor any regard for public opinion, or fear of reprisals. To express any humane - or generous sentiments after a victory is in their eyes the greatest weakness ; and if they have lost the ideas they first formed of the power of the British, it is not because they evacuated the country, but because they did not, before they left it, convert it into a vast desert, deluged with the blood of the inhabitants. In the Afghans enthusiasm and impulse are not the result of noble sentiments, and but rarely of fanaticism ; they are excited by the hope of pillage, or even, like the tiger, for the plain and simple purpose of satisfying their ferocious instincts. Nothing is more natural, in their eyes, than to seize upon a neighbouring state, even upon that of an ally, without having received the slightest provocation ; force, the last argument of a nation who respects itself, is with them the first and only one, and justifies all their actions. Though they are entirely ignorant of the art of attack and de- fence of towns and fortresses, the Afghans are remarkable for the obstinacy of their resistance and the correctness of their aim when they are behind walls. When they are the assailants they always attack, suddenly, by escalade, surprise, or stratagem, but very seldom succeed. It is by long blockade or treachery, or more often by lying and false oaths, that they possess themselves of a fortified place. The majority of their towns are square, but more or less perfect in their form, enclosed by one very thick and high wall of earth, embattled and loopholed, and having a banquette within, on which two men, at most, can walk side by side : at intervals are placed small hollow towers ; those at the angles being larger, solid, and constructed for artillery. The ditch which surrounds the enceinte ’ ’ Cnar. XXII. SOUTHERN TRIBES—ARMS. 315 is flooded in time of war whenever water can be obtained. The gates are strengthened with large nails and bands of iron, and to give them greater security there is a portcullis with loopholes above it to defend the approach. A great proportion of the villages in Kandahar and Herat are. like the towns, enclosed with mud walls of about 12 or 15 feet in height, and 4 in thickness at the base, but narrower at the top; they are seldom protected by a ditch, and in some instances there are no turrets except at the angles. These defences would be inefficient against artillery well served, but they are all that is required to sustain the mode of attack customary in the country ; however, the climate being so very hot and rain so very infrequent, the walls are of considerable solidity, and are difficult to destroy with artillery only,—the mine 1s indispensable for effecting a practicable breach. These remarks apply to the towns and villages situated in the plains of Kabul, but not to those in the mountains, which are con- structed in positions defended by nature. The inaptitude of this nation for discipline and military organi- sation arises from their spirit of impatience under the slightest idea of restraint ; and to this feeling their religion contributes, for they are taught to believe that, having proclaimed Djehad, Holy War, the numerous battalions of the Infidels are powerless against a handful of the Ghazees, or soldiers of the Faith. The climate and nature of the soil have also a great influence on the warlike habits of the Afghans. The tribes of the south are less quarrel- some and less able to support the fatigues of warfare than those of the north ; and those who inhabit the southern banks of the Helmund are considered by all the others as an effeminate race. There is more than one instance of this pernicious influence of climate upon the human character, and not the least remarkable one 1s, that the Roman legions gradually lost their manly -courage as they carried their conquests eastward. The arms of the Afghans are the firelock, the carbine, the swivel-gun, or a pair of bad pistols ; sometimes a bow, or a lance with a bamboo handle. The fire-arms are coarse and heavy, the hammers of the locks being very defective ; most of the barrels are Turkish, and rifled. They also carry a shield, a foot and a half in diameter, covered with copper, or the hide of either the elephant or the horse, which is very hard. The whole Afghan army consists of the three divisions of ar —— ein {I LT Ee 316 STRENGTH OF THE ARMY. Cnap. XXII. Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat ; of these, the troops called Defteris,* present the following effective force :— KABUL 15,000 Afghan Horse. : 6,000 Parsivan or Kuzzilbash Horse. 6,000 Afghan Mountaineers, i oy 4,000 Parsivans, Hazarahs, or Usbeks, Infantry. Total 31,000 Mohamed Akbar Khan, son of the Emir, Dost Mohamed, per- ceived the great advantages which order and discipline gave ii itish d, as soon as he had in some degree establishe the British army, and, as s rh i A air rhan cave his power, he attempted to train the / ghan cavalry dt squadrons—but all his efforts failed against the power of habit. He was more successful with two battalions of Parsivans, ie Ww 2 1 as the Afghan or the discipline that he not so intractable as the Afgha S unde : p Ae introduced. These battalions, as it is said, manceuvred be y enough; they were drilled by an Englishman of the name o > , " oh mn Kervel who, having been wounded and made prisoner at the i 4 1 X NE y © | ‘ - of the disasters in Kabul in 1841, became a Mussulman, an entered the service of Dost Mohamed. In KANDAHAR there are 12,000 Afchan Horse. 3,000 Afghan Infantry. 3,000 Belooch Infantry. Total 18,000 In 1833 Kohendil Khan, sovereign of this principality, ohipinad the assistance of a few “uropeans to Instruct and a army, and after five years of continued exertion = Sense o in bringing into some slight degree of discipline, i ny ns about 2000 Afghan infantry. In 1838, when Mo ame oa Khan advanced to Subzawar with the intention of taking Herat, these battalions met the enemy for the first time, but er ond volley was given their natural instinct of sSkdependonce was 2 once in the ascendant; every man left the ranks, forgetting a he had learnt, and fought independently, the orders of the officers being drowned in tumult and confusion. fitout Kabul and Kandahar have also a few pieces of arti ry, Tove: by Afghans, who learned, to a certain iii ow to serve them during the occupation of Afghanistan by the British. * Which receive pay.— Ferrier. 2 Cnar. XXII. YAR MOHAMED’S TROOPS. 317 In HERAT the army consists of 8,000 Afghan Horse, 4,000 Hazarah Horse. 10,000 Parsivan Infantry. Total 22,000 —————— Of the three Afghan princes the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan is the one who has placed the most confidence in his infantry, and he persists in keeping up this arm; notwithstanding the little favour with which it is viewed by the people, he has succeeded in forming eight battalions of 1000 men each. He accomplished this with the assistance of a Hindoo Mussulman, who had been a sergeant in the East India Company's service ; this man arrived at Herat in 1829, and was killed in the last campaign which the Vizier undertook against the Hazarahs in 1847. In the organization and drill of these battalions there was much room for improvement, but they have done pretty good service. The Vizier, finding the Afghans ill adapted for making disciplined soldiers, recruited these corps from the Parsivans exclusively, and this released him from the exactions of the serdars of his principality, whom he managed with so much tact that he made it impossible for them to injure or even to disobey him. But if this plan’had its advan- tages it had also its evils, for by it Yar Mohamed committed the same fault that Marius did when he received slaves and freedmen into the Roman army, and he prepared the way for much future embarrassment in Herat. The Parsivans are the conquered race, and their number is double that of the Afghans; by putting arms in their hands, which they know how to use, Yar Mohamed Khan has restored to them their prestige and power. Any other chief but him would have already paid dearly for this imprudence, but his policy has been so clever that he attached to himself by the ties of gratitude a race that ti]] then had never borne, but with impatience, the yoke of their cruel oppressors. It is probable that 80 long as he lives these battalions of Parsivan infantry will always be faithful to him, and give him their staunch support ; but his vigilance is unequalled, and he always foresees, and with rare talent provides against, eventualities that might be fatal to him. The ordnance of the Vizier is composed of sixteen pieces of artillery, 6, 8, and 12-pounders, which are served by the infantry, who make but poor artillerymen, In the three Afghan principalities the chiefs are too numerous in proportion to the number of the troops they command, and that EE REA h ae” ———— en a SI SERS ke ER ne PMS at ae 318 PAY OF TROOPS—MOX EY. Cuar., XXII. is particularly the case in Herat. The Vizier is aware of this, but could not avoid recompensing the brave soldiers who so valiantly fought the army of Mohamed Shah, and afterwards supported him against Shah Kamran. Hence the superabundance of officers, even then but poorly rewarded, and having no permanent command. The pay of the contingents is given to the serdars by the sove- reign and is never fixed : it varies according to the influence these chiefs possess, and the number of men they can bring into the field. The tax due to the state is deducted from the pay when the serdar receives it, but it is rarely they distribute the whole to their soldiers—more than half remains in their own hands, and they indemnify the men by small grants of land, right of pasturage, permission to work at a trade, ef cefera, and no notice is taken. Each Afghan is obliged to furnish his arms and horse at his own expense, for which reason they always take great care of them. The princes of Afghanistan have not coined gold pieces ; those which are current in that country are the ducat of Russia and the tellah of Bokhara. The gold tomaun and the silver kran of Persia are also in circulation, but at a depreciation of a tenth of their value, whereas that of the ducat and tellah is augmented in the same proportion. Small silver coins called djindek are struck at Herat, in value about fourpence; and at Kandahar rupees, also of silver, and of the value of a shilling. At Kabul the rupee is worth two shillings. There are two fictitious light coins current in the three principal cities, called chakee and abbasee; two chahees make one abbasee, and two abbasees a djindek or fourpence ; there are three Herat djindeks in the Kandahar rupee, and two rupees of Kandahar to one of Kabul. Fractions of the chahee and abbasee are represented by a copper coin called poul or paiseh : its value is never fixed, and varies according to the abundance or scarcity that exists in the market -at the time. This value is determined every three months by the sovereign on the report made to him by the chief agent of police and the five principal merchants, who previous to the audi- ence consult their fellow merchants of the locality on the subject. There are from three to five pouls in a chahee according to circum- stances, but this copper coin has no currency except in the towns, where it is compulsory to receive it. The country-people will not take it, or sell their provisions to the caravans and travellers, unless they obtain in exchange a piece of coarse cotton cloth manufactured ( uh Cuar. XXII. PRICES—WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. 319 in the country, called kerbas, with which they make their clothes, They will’ not even receive silver money ; and if the purchaser has no cloth he must present them with some article that will be useful to them ; in the way of food there are only two things which they inquire for, viz. tea and sugar. In a country where the inhabitants are so idle and poor, every article naturally sells at a very low price ; a man may live for two pence a day. The following is the current value of the under- mentioned articles of first necessity in Afghanistan in the year 1845, Bread .. the men of Herat * 0 1) | Salt «+ .. the men 0 0a Mutton en 0 47 | Tobacco 1 0 Butter and fat ” 1 1 Wheat ., -.. 200 Tbs 21 Milk of various kinds ,, 0 1 | Barley 1°83 Fruit -” 0 1 [Indian corn 2 1 0 Rice ‘5 0 28|{Wine .. .. ubattemen 0 3 J It is strictly forbidden to make or drink wine at Kabul and Kandahar ; at Herat the contrary is the case, where Yar Mohamed has monopolized the right to make it, and this has brought him in a considerable profit by farming that right at a ve " others. As to the consumption of it, he is one of the greatest wine- bibbers in that city or the principality. 2 Everything, whether solid or liquid, is sold by weight in Afghanistan ; the one which is generally used is the men or battemen of Herat, which, as I have just stated, is of the weight of seven pounds. This is divided into 40 sirs, the sir into 20 mis- cales, and the miscale into 24 nookoods. Cloth and manufactured articles are measured by the guez which is 3ft. 32in. It is divided into 16 guireh or knots, and one of these is subdivided into 4 nokteh or points. Though this is the only measure sanctioned by the government It is rare that an Afghan will purchase cloth in the bazaar unless it 1s measured from the hand to the elbow, and more especially by his own, that is to say, from the elbow to the very extremity of the middle finger. The Afghans who take any part in commercial affairs are very few in number ; they are principally the Babees, who live to the south of Kandahar ; the rest never occupy themselves in this way * The men of rat i 7 3 i ri Praia Tn f Home is seven pounds of Afghanistan ; but the sir is less, and Fo ersia 1s only six, and weighs only sixteen nookoods,— Ferrier. vided In the same manner as the m:n ry high price to__ 320 PARSIVANS AND HINDOOS, Crap, XXII. or in any branch of industry ; they have in fact the greatest répugnance to every kind of occupation, and are only qualified either to make war or to plunder. - Those who inhabit the towns are habitually in the employ of their wealthy countrymen, and: the nomades op country people who have pasture or arable Ind never farm this themselves. Directly an Afghan receives a concession of land from his chief, he places it and a few oxen in the charge of a Parsivan, who tills, sows, and reaps it for him, and when the crops are housed he has a third of the produce for his trouble ; if they have flocks, the Parsivan is in like manner the shepherd ; and if the Afghan is overtaken by poverty, he procures as best he can a horse and arms, and sets out to plunder his neighbours, The Parsivans in the towns as well as in the villages are, as we have already stated, the industrial class; all commercial affairs are in their hands, all manufactures ; in a word, it is their activity and intelligence that support the country and those who govern it. The Afchans are incapable of imitating them ; they know only how to fight, and live from hand to mouth, rarely making a competency when they have no public appointment ; but once invested with the least power, they enrich themselves by every species of exaction. To the Parsivans must be added some few Hindoos, as forming part of the commercial and industrious class, who are attracted to the Afghan towns by the hope of gain ; they are here what the Jews are elsewhere, always ready to enter into commercial transac- tions, and evincing like the Israelites the same intelligence and activity in all their operations, displaying the same poverty-stricken appearance, and affecting great simplicity in their dress. Every- thing about them denotes the greatest humility, which docs not however protect them from the contempt of the Afghans, theless, that does not give them much concern, and they console themselves if it does by filling their strong box with Russian ducats or Bokhara tellahs. and some of them are immensely rich. They are considered extremely honest in all business transactions, exact in fulfilling their engagements, and devoted to those to whom they have once attached themselves, The very few Afghan merchants that are met with are, generally speaking, Syuds or descendants of the Prophet, who will not profane their holy origin by serving any master. These are especially employed in the, somewhat unsaintly occupation of horse-dealing with the Hazarahs and Never- Crap. XXII. MECHANICAL ARTS—TRADE, 221 Turkomans, They take these horses to Shikapoor, and return from that town with English goods to Afghanistan. Their title of Syud smooths all the difficulties of their Journeys, for they are venerated by the tribes, even those most addicted to pillage. It would be hazardous for Parsivans and Hindoos to undertake similar expedtiions and embark in an port and export trade, for they would be stripped before they had traversed half the road between Kandahar and the Indus, they employ therefore these Syuds as their agents. The mechanical arts of indispensable utility are but imperfectly known in Afghanistan : they manufacture inferior sabres, glass, delf, coarse cloths of goats’ hair, called kourk, and others of camels’ hair, called barek, of which they make their robes and cloaks, and export a pretty large quantity to Turkestan and Persia. The kerbas, or coarse cotton cloth, is their principal article of manu- facture, and with it they make their shirts and trousers. At Herat, and there only, they raise and weave a little silk of a light texture, and dye it of a red colour: the women’s chemises are made of this. A thick cloth, manufactured from the long coarse hair of the camel and goat, is used by the nomades for their tents, Masonry, and carpenters’ or joiners’ work are pretty generally understood in this country ; they also work tolerably well in leather ; and sheep-skins, with the wool on, are beautifully dressed at Kabul. This is done with considerable art, and the cloaks made with these skins, which are very handsome, have a great reputation all over Central Asia. It appears that their superior quality is to be attributed to the fact of their being prepared with the rind of the pomegranate, a fruit which grows with peculiar luxuriance near that city : workmen, who have established them- selves at Kandahar, and at Herat, have not been able to obtain the same results with the pomegranates grown in those provinces as they did with the fruit of their native city. The Afghans purchase in Persia, Turkestan, and more especially in India, a number of articles of European manufacture, which they cannot do without, and which are not produced even in small quantities in their own country. Amongst these the following may be mentioned—metals, silk goods, cloth, muslins, woollen and cotton goods, particularly the latter, which they purchase in very large quantities, the lower and middle classes wearing scarcely anything else. Fowling-pieces and watches would find a ready v OTE AF a a a a a Ee — eT — TT - 322 FOREIGN TRADE—REVENUE. Cnap. XXII. sale in Afghanistan ; those that I saw there were Geto ee of French manufacture, and more in demand than t 1e oe a hes of English make. Delf, cutlery, spectacles, ue wi - goods, woollen or cotton, for turbans and sas > or st, paper, and sugar might be imparted with CL note Afghanistan, Turkestan, and Persia are exce oi Hh Ho England and Russia, who have nearly monopo oe hs Y of those countries; if France had a commercia i y a Persia, she might hope to introduce several millions o pes merchandize into Central Asia annually. The Emir % fii hamed and Yar Mohamed have endeavoured by ooty means i their power to encourage their subjects in Th oe of the articles which they require from European oe an 1 avoid the high prices at which they are obliged to fe 1% er : but on such subjects to speak to an Afghan or a dea a a in lutely the same thing ; the Parsivans responded more Wi i appeal, but they were very soon disgusted with ae fig e ge ey acquired, for it was only a source of misery to them, Se one pretence or another the wealthy and powerful classes made Le work for their benefit and without sufficient ran 2 best gunmaker in Kandahar was incarcerated mm the : 01 9 cn Girishk by the Serdar Mohamed Sedik han, on the Be pretext that he was born at a village within his Jedi ; ¢ khan gave this unfortunate artizan scarcely bread enetig 1 out and the man eventually expired under the harsh ronment received for having attempted to souks a visit to en children, who were living only ten hours journey from wg 4 Foreign merchandize arrives in Afghanistan by ki ier routes : the first is that from the west, which EE by Teheran, and Meshed to Herat; the second is free 1 “ ih on the north, by Bokhara, Merv, Moorghab to Herat ; By ; iird, also from Turkestan, by Bokhara, Karchy, Bali, and 3 iy to Kabul ; the fourth is the eastern one, from the I unjab | y Sen and Peshawur to Kabul ; and the fifth is that of i south from India by the Indus, Shikapoor, and Bolan, to Kanda or, ni Vi The revenue in Afghanistan varies according to the a pumas of water which irrigates a locality, or the race of persons by w al it is inhabited. An Afghan, who thinks that any de fo es his country is repaid by the fact of his arm be at as pe always finds some way of avoiding the payment of a portion of th Cnap, XXII. TAXES. 323 tax he owes his sovereign : but the Eimak are regarded as a conquered people, tl the collector takes only double of w although Mussulmansg (the greater p Shiahs) they are obliged to pay th called also ser khaneh, or house t are exempt. The following is a statement of the tax, not as it is collected, but as it is fixed in the principalities of Herat and Kandahar, Though the Afghans are exempt from the humiliating tribute of the ser khaneh, they pay under another name a contribution of two shillings for each tent or house. The Eimaks, or the nom the ser khaneh, which am shillings and eightpence fo free of this impost. The ser khanéh is not paid under this name by the Parsivans and Hindoos living in towns, who are exempt by placing them- selves under the protection of some Afghan chief; but the sove- reign repays himself by the tax levied on their shops. At Herat Afghans and Parsivans, &e., pay an annual tax for the horses or other animals which they keep. For a camel and a mare, sixteen djindeks (five shillings and fourpence) ; for a cow, three djindeks and a half (one shilling) ; for an ewe or a she-goat, twenty abassees (or two pence) ; a he-goat or a sheep is free of tax. For all animals without distinction, whether male or female, a tenth of their value is paid when they are sold in the public market, In Kandahar the tax upon animals is only paid upon sheep at sixpence a head ; the tax of meidane* is levied on all the other animals at the rate of five per cent, In Kandahar and in Herat it is taxes are levied; the sovere there was seed sown, and al $ and Parsivans, who ink themselves fortunate if hat they should legally pay ; art it is true are of the sect of e kharadj, or capitation tax, ax, from which the Afghans ade Beloochees, pay the contribution of ounts to forty-four djindeks, or fourteen r each family : orphans and widows are only on cultivated land that ign fakes as much of the crop as so eight djindeks (two shillings and eight pence) on the produce of ten battemens of seed sown. Fruit gardens are taxed by the tenef, or cord, at ten shillings each ; this measure comprises a space sixty paces long on every side. Kitchen gardens pay twelve shillings and sixpence per cord. When an Afghan proprietor or farmer lets his land to ———————————————— * The duty upon sales,— Ferrier, ti CT - — - LL a ww, — o_o. 324 TAXES. Cuar. XXII. a Parsivan, and furnishes seed, and oxen to work it, the former claims four-fifths of the produce, and leaves one-fifth for his tenant. But when the Parsivan takes the land only, he takes three-fifths, and gives two-fifths to the landlord. Having merely passed through the principality of Kabul, it was impossible for me to know positively how the taxes are levied there, but the information I obtained by careful inquiry justifies me in supposing that it is nearly in the same manner as in Kandahar. In the eyes of an European these taxes appear trifling, but it must be remembered that the smallest payment seems onerous to an Afghan; they work so little, and are therefore so poor, that they feel the want of the least thing that is taken from them, and every time they pay a tax they exclaim against what they call violence and tyranny. They might perhaps become reconciled to the impost if, after they had paid it, they were left in peace and idleness to enjoy the fruits of their speculations or their misdeeds, but they are subject to the exactions of subordinate agents, and that provokes them, though they pay less than the Parsivans and others. The inhabitants of the country pay also another indirect tax, which, in proportion to their resources, is rather heavy, but it does not seem oppressive to them, because it is engrafted on the manners of the nation: it is the hospitality they are bound to exercise towards travellers, of whom a great number are servants of the government. When the travellers are men of rank they have a long train of attendants, all of whom the villages are obliged to feed, and also their horses; it is true they sometimes avoid extortion by concealing themselves if they have timely notice, but they cannot often elude the vigilance of the head of the village, who almost always extracts something from them; this is violence and not hospitality as they like to practise it. A sa general rule, if an Afghan is obliged to work one month in twelve he considers himself most unfortunate. The re- pression of crime and levying a tax he designates as zalm, tyranny. To live in perfect licence and never to be asked for anything is what he would call the proofs of a paternal govern- ment. Nevertheless, the heaviest demands are not made upon him ; the Parsivans, who are attached to the soil, obtain for their labour in cultivating it, only just so much as is necessary for the maintenance of themselves and their families. There is no Tailor. CHar. XXII. TAXES 25 security for them unless t of an Afghan, and this live in the towns as they are the w bey put themselves under the protection protection costs them dear. Those who are less oppressed than those in the country, but on orking part of the population, they are subject to a [taxes direct and indirect which they have much difficulty ai the Piney of, even when they are always in work. —— PY pounds twelve shillings per annum, for a open their shops. Those who expose their goods in ot 0 J teir houses, such as altar, bakal, halva-furouch,* pay Soom : a a sum fixed by the tax-gatherer, which varies To 0 the presumed profits of the merchant, Artificers kiefe ~dooz, 2ine-dooz, zerquer, or khayat,t are obliged when they sell an article, and before they deliver it to the urchaser, t submit 1t to one of the inspectors, who perambulate a rer ;: receive the mark of the dagh,t for which they pay a duty e i : one third of the value of the article sold. Workmen " o benna, nahal-bend, or nadjar§ are obliged to give to the ; i i B10 g government days’ work out of seven. Ip fact, every professio every species of trade or commerce, is subject to ok 5 ~ Herat in particular, the meat-markets, soap-manufactories 0 hper- ware, and ironmongery trade, carpentry, the repairing of old for 1 ture and even shoes, and the carriage of water, are all mono re At Kabul, previously to 1839, the Parsivans were much De treated ; they did not pay more than two per cent. on their fo 4 and four per cent. on the harvest, like the Afghans ; but sine ry Poker of the Emir, Dost Mohamed Khan, has been a be e conduc Is sons, avaricious Jos es avaricious demands have greatly increased In Kandahar extortion is yet more rampant than in Kabul Herat. The people live in utter misery, aud within the last ten y Wd wore than 100,000 of Kohendil Khan’s subjects have emi ; od All merchandise entering Afghanistan pays duty as under ig ; At Herat o per cent., but with other exactions it may be At Kandahar 21 ui AtKabul 23) ? calculated at 9 per cent 2 bX] 10 2) 2) 4 J - « » > > : Goods are exported from the three principalities free of customs duties, but they are subject to the badj,| viz. :— 1 4 » 4 9» » 2» * Druggis srocer. Spi S + a, at Do os Pek : aker. Daddler. Goldsmith, $ as Jlacksmi § 3 mason. Blacksmith. Carpenter, | Tax on transport.— Ferrier, we Asp Sens re - Ei “ nt it, TO re RI, rE A = Tm me ero Ba aad a moms Co En <= ——— i a — ms — — — EE I tg me a 326 REVENUE—MINERALS. Cuar. XXII. 8d, A camel load, whether entering or leaving the country, pays .. . 2 a A horse or mule load . ‘“ ve . i . 8 ) An ass load .. v “r . “ .“ “i “ vei 2 Every horse sent to India for sale pays 17. 4s. 4d. to the chief of Kandahar when he leaves his territory. The revenues of Afghanistan are :— In Herat £56,000 and £24,000 in corn. In Kandahar 48,000 5 32,000 wT In Kabul 140,000 ,, 60,000 ” Whoever looks only at the amount of this revenue will never be able to form a correct opinion of its importance ; he must also understand the price of labour, of materials, of cereal and other products, of the requirements of the people, et cetera, he will then have an idea of the real value of sums which appear so small. Under the system followed by the Afghan chiefs, these revenues covered all their expenses, and left them a very pretty profit. The English, instead of following the same system, paying the officials regularly and on the same footing, and thus have satisfied every one, thought it necessary to increase the expenses which such a revenue was not able to meet ; this was one of the principal reasons that led to their disasters in that country, because every one had enjoyed the augmentation, and revolted when the time came for retrenchment. We have said that the minerals in the mountainous parts of Kabul and Kandahar are not worked. Yar Mohamed, of Herat, saw better than either of his neighbours, the advantages which he possessed in this source of wealth, and has for some years past worked an iron and a lead mine near his capital. The results, however, have been but moderate as to profit, owing to the ignorance of the workmen, who are unacquainted with metallur- gical operations ; the silver is not properly extracted from the lead ; the iron can be broken, and is as brittle as glass even when hot. The Vizier is most anxious to increase his revenue by these mines ; he would like to establish cotton and woollen factories, also spinning machinery for cotton, silk, and wool ; to erect cannon foundries and small-arm manufactories, but in the Afghan style. Yar Mohamed would like to have all this without spending any money, and with the assistance of one man, who must be ac- quainted with every department, and who would find by enchant- ment, in a country devoid of everything, all. the machinery and tools requisite to carry out such projects, EO, 8.8 PE Chap, XXIII, BRITISH LEAVE SHIKAPOOR. 32% CHAPTER XXIII English army leaves Shikapoor — March thro Khan advances to meet it — Defection of the Afghan chiefs — Kohendil retires into Persia — Kandahar capitulates — Assault and fall of Ghuznee — Dost Mohamed endeavours to negotiate, but without success — The Emir leaves Kabul — The English enter the city — Restoration of Shah Shooja — First disagreement between him and the British — The latter interfere in the administration of the kingdom — Results of this — The priests are hostile to the invaders — Avaricious views of the English disappointed — Revenues of Afghanistan moderate in amount — Means employed to raise them — Shah Shooja demands the fulfilment of the treaty — Refusal of the English — Hatred against them augmented — Religious proselytism — English connexions with Afghan women — Revolts in the kingdom — The Dost at Bokhara — Persecu- tions to which he is subject — Combat at Karchy — Mohamed Shah threatens the Usbek Emir — The Dost is released — His perilous position near the Oxus — He flies to Cher Sebz and Khulm — Returns to the province of Kabul — Con- flicts between the Dost and the English — Deserted by his countrymen — Sur- renders to the English — He is sent to India. ugh the Bolan pass — Kohendil WE must now return to the History which was interrupted at the close of the 20th chapter, the last incident mentioned being the concentration of a British force at Shikapoor. This army left that place early in March, and after passing Dadur, entered the mountains through which the road winds as far as Bolan, a distance of fifty-two miles, and thence leads to the great table- land of Central Asia, more than 5000 feet above the level of the sea. Notwithstanding the advantages which this defile afforded the Afghans scarcely defended it. The English advanced without serious opposition, though two hundred men well posted might have annihilated them, distressed as they were by a painful march amidst the natural obstacles with which the pass is thickly beset at every step. At Dadur, on this side the mountains, the thermometer stood at 102° of Fahrenheit, while violent snowstorms fell heavily on the way-worn soldiers as they advanced along the Bolan Pass, On the 24th of March, after eight days of a most harassing march from Shikapoor, the army having cleared the mountains, moved on towards Kandahar. Kohendil Khan had ceased to intrigue against Dost Mohamed, and became on friendly terms with him, as he always did when threatened by serious danger. He had deter- mined upon shutting himself up in his capital till his brother of I. cr TP ) ‘as if conscious that his claim to the throne w 328 MARCH THROUGH THE BOLAN PASS. Cuar. XXIII. Kabul should arrive with reinforcements to his assistance, but the dost having been detained by a movement which the Sikhs had made in favour of the English on this side of Peshawur, Kohendil Khan decided upon assembling all his contingents and marching to meet the enemy. However, he had scarcely reached the valley of Pisheen when the ranks of his army were thinned by numerous desertions. The Serdar Hadji Khan, Kaukeree, was the first to pass over to Shah Shooja with five hundred picked horsemen ; this was the signal for the disorganisation of the Kandaharian army, and Kohendil Khan, and his brothers, despairing of then defending themselves and their families with success, determined upon flight. They gained the Helmund, followed its course to lake Roustem, and entered Persia, where the Shah received them most kindly ; he bestowed upon them as a fief the little town of Sher-babek, situated between the provinces of Fars and Kerman, and gave them the reve- nues of the whole of that district, amounting to 12,000 tomauns annually. The flight of the Prince of Kandahar was followed by the immediate submission of the Serdars Hadji Dost Mohamed Khan, Isakzye, Habib Ullah Khan, Surkanee, Peistalub Khan, Noorzye, Ramazan Khan, Ghildjzye, Akhter Khan Alizye, Ser Firaz Khan Isakzye, &e. &e., who brought with them a detach- ment of horse to Shah Shooja, and his cause might from that hour be looked upon as triumphant in Afghanistan. The British Army thus took possession of Kandahar without opposition, and the King and General Sir John Keane made their public entry into that city on the 20th of April. Shah Shooja, as not very legitimate, was crowned in the mosque of Ahmed Shah on the 8th of May, 1839, hoping by that ceremony to render his claim more important in the eyes of the Afghans, After naming his son Timoor Mirza governor of the city, the King and the Army marched on the 27th of June, in the direction of Ghuznee. “This town,” says Mr. Sumner, “is about one hundred and sixty miles from Kandahar, and sixty-eight from Kabul : although ten days ought to have been sufficient to reach Ghuznee it was not till the 21st of July that Sir John Keane arrived before that fortress, The march of the troops had been muchJimpeded by the difficulties of the road, the great number of camels, and the crowd of camp followers, more numerous even than the soldiers, but no resistance worthy of remark opposed the progress of the army. ————— EE —— my a tiie ea | i HE N-a Cusp. XXIII. DEFECTION OF AFGHAN CHIEFS, 329 “It had been supposed that the town of Ghuznee was not fortified, it is, however, surrounded by a wall and a ditch. To attack it with the few light field-guns that the Anglo-Indian army had with it was impossible, but one of the gates was destroyed with gunpowder in the course of the second night, and on the 23rd of July a fierce combat took place in the streets of the town, in which the English lost two hundred men. The Afghan garrison, numbering 2500, fought with unexpected energy,—it is stated that almost all the dead were pierced by the bayonet, and very few received gun-shot wounds. Nevertheless, the Afghans were vanquished, and Gholam Haidar Khan, one of the sons of Dost Mohamed, who commanded, was taken prisoner; Shah Shooja wished to put him to death, and the English had the greatest difficulty in making him renounce his intention.” Notwithstanding the defection which had so seriously weakened the army of Kabul, Dost Mohamed would not abandon his kingdom without trying the fortune of war, and he marched at the head of the few followers who remained faithful to him, about 6000 men, with his artillery, to meet the British Army ; but having at the second halt heard of the fall of Ghuznee, he sent his brother the Nawab Djabbar Khan, as ambassador to Sir William M‘Naghten, the British Commissioner, to negotiate with Shah Shooja. The Afghans reproached the Nawab with being too warm a partizan of the English, with whom he had for some time kept up a continuous intercourse ; but as he was of a conciliatory disposition and generally appealed to as peace-maker in the quarrels between his brothers well as those between the serdars of the different tribes, this partiality was overlooked. The Dost could not have made a better choice of a negotiator with his adversaries, to whom he proposed that he should accept a post under Shah Shooja, analogous to that which his brother Fethi Khan had held under the Shah Mahmood, that is to say Prime Minister. He also demanded the restoration of his third son Haidar Khan and his wives, who had been made prisoners at Ghuz- nee, and consented to submit on these two conditions ; but they were rejected. The Nawab met with an icy reception in the ‘nglish camp, almost insulting, and returned full of hatred for those who, but a’ few days before, held the first place in his esteem. The Emir retraced his steps when he heard the result of his last conciliatory offer, and gave up the idea of making head against the invading army with so small a force as his own, tl , 48 ie greater I IT sr TB ee % 330 RESTORATION OF SHAH SHOOJA. Cuar. XXIII part of which were demoralized,—morcover, he could only expect fresh defections. He made, therefore, but a short stay in Kabul, and abandoning that city retired beyond the Hindoo Koosh into the dominions of the Emir of Bokhara, accompanied by his family and three hundred and fifty devoted adherents. As soon as he was gone, Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye, Aziz Khan, Ghildjzye, “min Ullah Khan, Logheree, and Khan Shireen Khan, Kuzzil- bash, who might still have created fresh difficulties for the English, and caused them considerable loss in their attack upon Kabul, now openly espoused the party of the invaders and made their submission, The Anglo-Indian army entered that city without opposition on the 7th of August, 1839, and proclaimed the definitive re-establish- ment in power of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk. The General-in-Chief had hoped to take Dost Mohamed prisoner, but finding that he had escaped he sent Colonel Outram with one hundred and filty British cavalry, and seven hundred Afghan horse, commanded by Hadji Khan, Kaukeree, in pursuit. On the 21st of August they had nearly attained their object, for they were but fourteen miles from the fugitive Emir, but having received secret intelligence of this by a messenger from Hadji Khan, he made a forced march, and escaped the danger that threatened him. Before he could reach Khulm he had to repulse several attacks of the Hazarah Deh Zinguis, who had already felt the power of English influence, and his little escort was reduced to half its number by the time he arrived at Balkh. His first intention had been to gain Persia, but the Emir Nasser Ullah Khan Bahadoor having despatched a mes- senger to offer him shelter in his dominions, he delayed his journey to Teheran, and went direct to the court of the Ushek Emir. Shah Shooja, replaced on the throne of his fathers, was soon surrounded by the greater part of the Afghan serdars, and with the exception of some partial eutbreaks of little importance, had reason to consider himself firmly seated on the musnud. This result was due to. the conciliatory conduct that he at first manifested, and his good understanding with the English; but he only acted thus from an apprehension that Dost Mohamed might be near at hand, for’ as soon as he knew that that chief had arrived at Bokhara, he wished to exercise the sovereign authority to the exclusion of his protectors. They, on the contrary, had determined to leave him nothing but the semblance of it—and Sir W. M‘Naghten directed everything. He gave all his orders through Cizap. XXIII, BRITISH INTERFERENCE, 331 the Shah, who every morning repeated, at his durbar, the lesson he had received on the previous evening from the British Commissioner. The serdars were too clear-sighted not to perceive this, and they expressed their disgust in strong terms at all times, and in all places. The English, though affronted at this freedom of speech, dared not openly repress it, lest their own interference in the Government should become too manifest, but they revenged them- selves by noting the chiefs that were rebellious in their eyes, and in this way created a great deal of discontent. Notwithstanding the smothered displeasure that prevailed, the English fancied themselves firmly established in the country, and sent back part of their army to India. They determined also at once, and without the least consideration for the Afghans, to introduce those administrative reforms which they had established in their Indian possessions, where all had been done progres- sively and without wounding the prejudices of a population, far more timid and nore easy to manage than the Afghans. It is true that in Afghanistan they put native officers at the head of the different departments, but they were there like puppets, having no liberty of action and only following blindly the directions of a British officer, who was associated with them. In doing this, Sir W. M‘Naghten appeared to be guided by the remembrance of what Mir Mahmood the Ghildjzye had done when he established his government in Persia; but Sir William forgot, or overlooked, the point that the Mir in placing with his officials others more enlightened than themselves, selected the former from among the Persians, a servile people always accustomed to bend to a conqueror, while the English officers on the contrary thrust their own will upon the Afghan functionaries, which was a very different condition of affairs. The plan failed and brought into general contempt with their country- men those natives who accepted office under such circumstances, This system gradually disturbed the good understanding existing between Shah Shooja and the English ; they wished to be masters, but wanted the courage to act openly, and yet they would not leave the King to his own ideas of Government : they were apparently neutral, and still had the presumption to mix themselves up in everything. This bastard system alienated from them both the people and the court; the Shah testified his great displeasure at it, and at last counteracted every measure that originated with the ‘nglish. * For’ example, Sir Alexander Burnes, who had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the city of Kabul, had established RR a conti Co 332 RESULTS OF BRITISH INTERFERENCE. Cuap. XXIII. a new and reduced tariff for the merchandize imported into Afghan- istan, but Shah Shooja seeing that this was done simply with a view of encouraging the interests of British commerce, secretly authorised his agents to levy higher duties than those which had been deter- mined on. The injured merchants complained to the English, by whom they were referred to the Minister of the Shah, and this officer gave them the bastinado for appealing for justice to strangers before they had applied to the Royal Government. At length an almost open rupture took place between Mollah Chekkar, the Shah’s Prime Minister, and Sir W. M‘Naghten. A party had been formed by the Vizier with the hope of withdrawing the Shah from the influence of the British, and this party cared not in the least to conceal or dissimulate its intentions. Sir W. M‘Naghten and Sir A. Burnes were made aware of its existence, but they despised the information they received on all sides, antl"when their partisans endeavoured to make them see the extremities to which impunity would encourage the Afghans, they answered in the famous words of the Duc de Guise, “they dare not.” The result proved that these gentlemen were no nearer right than was the Duc de Guise. : The Afghans, little initiated in the intricacies of politics, and not as yet completely experienced in the duplicity of the government of Calcutta, remembered the article in the treaty that Lord Auckland had concluded with their king, which stipulated that as soon as Shah Shooja was firmly established on his throne, the Anglo-Indian army should repass the Indus. This word “ firmly gave him, it is true, a great latitude, but it was not thus that the Afghans had interpreted it ; and they were impatient for the hour that should rid them of their protectors. : The uneasiness at length became general, and confidence existed amongst the English only. The Afghans anticipated a catastrophe, and the agitation, at first confined to the towns, soon spread into the A country. The Mollahs would no longer recite the * Khoutbe” (or prayer for the King) in the Mosques, alleging that they could only do so for an independent sovereign, and that Shah Shooja was not independent. On the other hand, the maintenance of the British army had nearly exhausted, the provinces, all the necessaries of life had quadrupled in price, and a cry of distress was raised every- where. In vain did the Vizier publish an order placing the sale of provisions on the old footing and forbid monopoly ; no one paid any attention to his injunctions. The Shah therefore found himself ” Cuar. XXIIT. RESULTS OF BRITISH INTERFERENCE. 333 obliged to arrest the monopolists, whose corn was re-sold at the tariff price, and by public auction, The English were ill-judged enough to interfere in their favor, which increased the irritation amongst the people, and they were accused of wishing to create a famine. It was in vain that they distributed food gratis to the necessitous, the populace valued not this concession as proceeding from charity ; that virtue is practised in a different manner by the Afghans, and the English lost more than they gained by granting benefits to one class only, and with an appearance of such method and calculation so totally foreign to Afghan habits. The deplorable mania which the English have for scattering gold by handfuls in Asiatic countries, without any reason for doing so other than to gratify an useless pride, and for valuing things only because they are expensive, created for them in this instance one of the most formidable difficulties they have ever had to encounter. The officers were prodigal in their personal expenditure, and that depre- ciated the value of money ; the British Commissioner had obliged the King to give his officers, civil and military, as much pay for a month as they had hitherto received for a year ; and that without having previously ascertained that the revenues of the country would admit of his so doing. It is true the English had calculated on an excess of receipts consequent upon the regularity of their administration, and an amount of revenue founded upon the informa- tion given by Shah Shooja when he was at Loodiana. But in that as on many other occasions they were wrong in not remembering the maxim of Machiavelli, * that it is dangerous and imprudent to undertake an expedition upon the representations and hopes of exiles.” The English also paid for every species of labour, tenfold what the Afghans had ever received before, so that all the workmen were glad to be employed on the fortifications, or other- wise occupied by the English, and hands were therefore soon wanting to till the ground. Shah Shooja, even, could not obtain the men that he required, because he could not pay them on this footing, and he was therefore obliged to overwork the labourers who were engaged in the repairs of his own palace,-and to pay them the ordinary wages of the country. But here the English meddled again, and signified to the Vizier, that if those who com- plained were not satisfied, and paid according to the English tariff, they should pay them themselves, and place the sum to the Shal’s account. This new and insulting injunction irritated the Shah to 33 RELIGIOUS PROSELYTISM. Car. XXIII. the last degree, and from that moment he seemed to be indifferent whether or not he was on good terms with his protectors ; he even earnestly required of them the promised evacuation of his do- minions, But Sir W. M‘Naghten refused to comply with this demand, objecting, that he could not be “firmly ” seated on his throne while Dost Mohamed remained at liberty, and that the English could not leave him without support as long as there was a chance of the return of that chief. Shah Shooja, forced rather than convinced, resigned himself to their tutelage ; but his reite- rated complaints created in his subjects the most hostile feelings against the English, and their exasperation broke through all bounds when the people saw that the invaders considered the Afghans incapable of serving them, and found themselves super- seded by Hazarahs and Parsivans who up to that time had been looked upon as a conquered people. Perhaps the English were not wrong in having a better opinion of these descendants of the Persian colonists, but such a step should only have been taken with the greatest prudence, gradually, and after they had become perfectly established in the country. Another error was their constant habit of threatening to send some of the restless chiefs to India, and not carrying out the menace. This might possibly have prevented the development of the revolt in which they were overwhelmed at a later period. The Afghans have little or none of that feeling which we understand by the word patriotism, for they are quite indifferent as to which or how many of their tribes may be subdued, provided their own is in the enjoyment of personal freedom ; but this indifference as to who governs them, is accompanied in each individual by a deep attachment to his own tribe. The repeated threats, therefore, of separation from them created serious alarm, and these fears being worked upon by the partisans of Dost Mohamed, inspired a still greater distrust and hatred of the English : who never looked with the least anxiety at these various indications of approaching trouble, but slept on in perfect tranquillity. While they were reforming the administration, their missionaries attempted to meddle in religion also, and distributed everywhere the Bible translated into Persian—a proselytism that was more injurious than profitable to them. Previously to the time at which the English entered Afghanistan, the inhabitants might have been considered as the least fanatical of any people professing Islamism ARR " 3 —— Crap. XXIIT. REVOLTS, 335 —but as a set-off, they are the most covetous upon earth, and the result was that the women soon gave themselves up to the English for money, even with the knowledge of their husbands; fathers and brothers sold their daughters and sisters, and it was a novel spectacle to see Christians become the legitimate husbands of Ma- homedan wives, for many officers were legally married to Afghan women. The Mollahs did not omit to rouse the anger of the faithful, against this tendency to encroach upon their religion, and they excited on all sides a fanaticism which manifested itself in the provinces by assassination and partial revolt. Colonel Herring was murdered at Ghuznee, and it was only with great difficulty that Colonel Orchard and Major Mac Gregor quelled a seditious move- ment excited by a certain Syud Kassem. The fortress of Kelat-i- Ghildjzye also rose against the authority of Shah Shooja, or rather the English, and the circumstance that led to this was one of the unnecessary acts of rigour, of which they are so often guilty in Asia. : Lieutenant Lynch, one of the political agents in Afghanistan, made a military reconnaissance on the side of Kelat-i-Ghildjzye and summoned the inhabitants to open the gates of their fort to him. The commandant was one of those men who were tired of the ascend- ancy so arrogantly maintained over their sovereign by his foreign ally, and replied that he should do as Lieutenant Lynch demanded as soon as he showed him an order from Shah Shooja, or his son Timoor Mirza, and that in the mean time he would visit him the next morning as a friend. Lieutenant Lynch was not satisfied with this answer, and without further negotiation demolished his fortress with his artillery, and the chief and many of the garrison lost their lives. The survivors, who were of the Ghildjzye tribe, bent for a time to the storm, but as soon as the opportunity presented itself, they took their revenge by massacring all the English that fell to their hands. A detachment under Major Clibborne was cut up in the south, and that officer lost his life. The Serdar Akter Khan, Alizye, who had raised a small body of troops of his tribe in the district of Zemindavar, held the English in check in that quarter, and Yar Mohamed Khan secretly sent him reinforcements, for though the English paid him large sums of money the discontented Afghans always found help and shelter in his dominions. In the midst of these serious difficulties the British were surprised by fresh troubles, the Emir Dost Mohamed re-appeared in arms BE i RR RI ER ERE, PIV ER sory 336 THE DOST AT BOKHARA. Cuar. XXIII. on the northern frontier, and there was not a moment to be lost in preparing to meet the storm. The Emir of Bokhara had received the fugitive Prince and his family in a suitable manner when he arrived in his capital, and allotted a daily sum for their maintenance, but from that conduct five or six days after, it became evident that his offer of an asylum was intended to draw them into a snare, for their allowance was stopped and the Dost was left to his own resources. This indiffcr- ence to misfortune, so foreign to the Mussulman ideas of hospitality, was followed by aggravated insults. The greater number of Dost Mohamed’s sons accompanied him to Bokhara, and the youngest, Sultan Djan, who was remarkable for his personal beauty and graceful and distinguished manners, attracted the attention of the Emir Nasser Ullah. This monster was addicted to the most horrible of Eastern propensities, and one day sent an officer to the Dost’s house to bring Sultan Djan to the palace. His father, however, well acquainted with the Uzbek Emir’s character, refused to let him go, and immediately ordered the lad, accompanied by his second son Akbar Khan and one hundred Afghan horse, to leave Bokhara. They did so, but were soon pur- sued, and after a desperate encounter near Larchy, in which the Afghans lost two-thirds of their party, the remainder were obliged to lay down their arms. The two brothers were then brought back prisoners to Bokhara, and it is unnecessary to say what was the fate of the youngest at the hands of Nasser Ullah. The position of the Emir Dost Mohamed had now become most distressing ; he had every day to repulse some new demand from his tyrant ; his life even was in danger, for Nasser Ullah Khan, besides his hereditary hatred to the Afghans, wished to make himself popular in the eyes of the English by showing hostility to the Emir of Kabul, as they might some day enter his own dominions. His messengers were frequently crossing those of Shah Shooja, and the two monarchs had concerted together one of those vile plots by means of which Asiatics so frequently endeavour to effect their objects, when the Shah of Persia wrote to Nasser Ullah Khan and informed him that he should hold him responsible for any evil that might befall the Dost, whom he declared he had taken under his own special protection. The Shah also enjoined him to set that chief and his family at liberty, in order that he might make a pilgrimage to Mecca, as he had expressed his Cuap. XXIII. ESCAPE OF THE DOST. 337 intention of doing, and concluded by signifying to the Emir of Bokhara his royal determination of making war upon him if he did not comply with his injunctions. Nasser Ullah, afraid openly to manifest his indignation against the Shah of Persia, allowed the Dost to leave Bokhara; but he was even then actually planning the death of this unfortunate chief, and taking measures to make it appear the result of acci- dent. Before the departure of the Dost he sent a man to the banks of the Oxus who, in concert with the ferryman, was ordered to upset the boat, and take care that the Emir should never reach the shore alive. Happily, an indiscreet remark of the wretch intrusted with this detestable. commission made the Dost, when he reached the banks of the river, suspicious of some lurking danger; and a caravan from the south travelling to Samarcand coming up at the time, he succeeded in escaping with it, disguised and in a litter, and thus eluded the vigilance of the authorities of Bokhara. His wives had left’ that city after him, and, having sent a messenger to desire them to alter their route, they rejoined him seven miles from Samarcand, which place he did not think it prudent to enter. Here, however, he took off the female attire in which he had escaped, mounted a horse, and proceeded to ask hospitality of the Khan of Cher Sebz, who generously granted it, but for a brief space only, for, though this Khan detested the Emir of Bokhara, he dreaded his power. Alarmed therefore at his threats, and command to put Dost Mohamed and his sons to death, on pain of being deprived of his Khanat, he secretly sent away his guest, furnishing him with the means of reaching Khulm. Mir Walee, the chief of this province, was by no means easy at the approach of the English, who had already reached Bamian, and he had made warlike preparations to receive them. The moment of the Dost’s arrival could not have been more propitious, for the partisans of the Emir had suc- ceeded in agitating Kohistan, of which the population refused to obey the orders, emanating in appearance from Shah Shooja, but really from the English. Discontent was general in the other Afghan provinces, and if the orders of the latter were still acted upon it was feebly and with repugnance on the part of the offi- cials, though they were active enough when they saw a chance of committing some extortion that might prove a benefit to themselves. Sir W. M‘Naghten knew not what to do, nor whom to trust—for Z 338 RETIREMENT OF THE USBEKS. Cnap, XXIII, those Afghans who did not betray him were indifferent to the disaffection that existed and the progress of revolt: he gave orders, and revoked them almost as soon as given; and at last determined on rigorous measures, hoping thereby to eradicate the evil. In doing this he made several arrests of very doubtful legality, and missed the real culprits, who were most of them about the person of Shah Shooja. Hadji Khan, Kaukeree, the first of the Afghan chiefs who joined the English, was arrested and sent to India, for showing too much independence, and being suspected of having pursued the Dost too leisurely in order to give him time to escape. Two other Ghildjzye serdars, Abd el Rahman Khan and Mahme, who had taken refuge with the Sikhs, were, contrary to all the laws of hospitality, given up to the English, and also sent to India. In Kandahar severity was pushed to its utmost limits; Akrem Khan, Noorzye, convicted of having taken up arms against the invaders of his country, was arrested, and blown from a gun. Hadji Dost Mohamed Khan, Izakzye, died almost at the same time in the prison of Kandahar, and the people, ever suspicious, believed, though it was never proved, that he had been poisoned. Such was the position of affairs when the Walee of Khulm and Dost Mohamed took the field. On the 30th of August, Mir Efzel Khan, eldest son of the Emir and commander of the advanced guard of Ushek Afghans, attacked the British post at Badjguiabh, but did not succeed, and he fell back upon the main body of the army. Dost Mohamed waited a few days longer, and on the 18th of September accepted the offer of battle given him by Colonel Denny, and he likewise was unsuccessful ; after which the Usbeks retired alto- gether. This check, however, did not daunt the Emir, who withdrew into Kohistan, where the majority of the chiefs declared for him, and their men, added to those who joined him at Khulm, still presented an effective force of 6000 troops ; other reinforcements from various districts also came and ranged themselves under his standard, but Sir W. M‘Naghten cooled their ardour for the cause of their ancient chief by lavishly distributing gold amongst the hostile tribes. The Dost and his companions, who well knew the power of this touch- stone of honesty over the mind of an Afghan, were alarmed at the probable result of such prodigality, and it was almost with hesita- tion that on November 2nd, 1339, he engaged General Sale and Prince Fethi Djing, second son of Shah Shooja, at Pervarieh Derreh, Cuap, XXIII. SURRENDER OF THE DOST. 339 The Dost’s soldiers performed prodigies of valour, and the 2nd Regiment of Bengal Regular Cavalry wavered and fled before a charge of eighty Afghans, led by the Emir himself, who broke them at the onset, and then engaged the infantry, upon whom he inflicted considerable loss, especially in officers. The advantage of the day remained with the Dost, and the Anglo-Indian army would have been completely beaten had they renewed the combat on the morrow, but success being doubtful they determined to conquer with gold ; their agents entered the camp of the Emir, and manceuvred so well and so quickly, that he only escaped death at the hands of his own mutinous troops by a rapid flight, in which he was accompanied by a few brave men who remained faithful to him. Dost Mohamed now retired to the mountains, and wandered amongst them for some time; his partisans, who were gradually detached from his falling fortunes by English bribes, and being also little inclined to face the hard winter in the hills, returned to their homes. Their noble chief was at length utterly abandoned, and had much to suffer from privation and the rigour of the season ; but this was not all,—he found himself hunted by parties of Afghans, who hoped to receive a large recompence for betraying him to his enemies, and this led to the resolution which he finally took of placing himself in their hands. On the 4th of November, 1840, he went almost alone under the walls of Kabul, and, taking advantage of an accidental meeting with Sir W. M‘Naghten to make his submission, he gave up his sword to the envoy, declaring at the same time who he was. The English diplomatist immediately returned it, which mark of respect gratified the Emir exceedingly, and they rode into Kabul together. Dost Mohamed was honourably treated while he remained in his own capital, and was afterwards sent to India with his wives, where he was pensioned, and carefully guarded by the political agents of the East India Company ; his sons, whom he had left in Afghanistan, soon joined him in his exile, with the exception of Akbar Khan. We have seen that this chief was taken prisoner by the Bokha- rians after having sustained a bloody combat with them at Karchy. On his return to Bokhara he was imprisoned by order of Nasser Ullah Khan, and was consequently prevented from leaving it with his father. But a short time after the flight of the latter the surveillance to which he was subjected was relaxed, and z 2 340 THE DOST SETTLES IN THE MOUNTAINS. Crap. XXIII. having succeeded in making his escape he reached Cher Sebz: but the Khan of that place, afraid to grant him an asylum for the same reasons that prevented him from sheltering his father, gave him an escort of two horsemen as far as Khulm, where the Walee received the fugitive, and several of his dependents who joined him there. Notwithstanding the strict watch that was kept over him, Dost Mohamed was treated with great consideration and respect by Lord Auckland, who, wishing to give him a clear idea of the British power in India, took him over all the arsenals, magazines, dockyards, &c., at Calcutta. The Emir was completely amazed at all he saw, and expressed the conviction that afterwards he often repeated to his sons when they wished him to make war with the English, that they were «invincible, and would some day be the masters of the world.” After several months’ residence at Calcutta the Dost fell ill from the effects of the climate of Bengal, when he sought and obtained permission to join his family at Loodiana.—Subsequently he was allowed to settle in the moun- tains, the air of which was more favourable to his health. Crap, XXIV, DEMANDS OF SHAH SHOOJA. CHAPTER XXIV. Shah Shooja demands the evacuation of his country by the English — Their refusal — Forgery of letters — The invaders impose a vizier on Shah Shooja — Unjustifiable acts of this functionary — Complaints of the Afghan chiefs to Shah Shooja — The King conspires with them against the English — Abdullah Khan at the head of the conspirators — Carelessness of the English — Subsidies to chiefs reduced — Revolt of the Ghildjzyes — General Sale marches against them — Is obliged to retire into Jellalabad —Feeling of Security in the English — Insurrection in the provinces — Revolt at Kabul — Attack on Sir A. Burnes’s house — Assassination of that officer — The English are driven from the city — Bad defensive position taken by them — Commissariat stores pillaged — Death of Abdullah Khan — Zeman Khan proclaimed King — Continual . fighting — Weakness of General Elphinstone — Conduct of the 44th Regiment — Suspension of arms — Akbar Khan returns to Kabul — Indecision of the English — Events in the provinces — Plan of retreat abandoned — Embarass- ment of Sir W. M‘Naghten — Suspicions of the Afghans — Meeting between the resident and Akbar Khan — Assassination of the former — Major Pottinger — Treaty with Akbar Khan — The English retreat — Akbar Khan unmasked — The English deliver up hostages to him — English army annihilated — Akbar Khan besieges Jellalabad — Transactions between Shah Shooja and Zeman Khan — The King is assassinated — Character of that sovereign. AFTER the submission of the Emir, Shah Shooja, thinking the English had no further plausible motive for refusing to evacuate Afghanistan, inasmuch as the tranquillity of the country could not be disturbed by any pretender to the throne, demanded for the second time the fulfilment of the treaty; but, on various pre- tences, they again rejected this demand, and continued to carry out those injudicious reforms which had already alienated so many from their party. It might have been supposed that they were striving to destroy their own influence by adopting measures so false and ill adapted to the objects they had in view; every day they in some manner wounded the self-love and disappointed the avarice of the Afghans, and expected them to change abruptly the habits, customs, and ideas that had existed amongst them for ages past—indeed, they endeavoured to make them do so. In a country so recently conquered, and on which a new sovereign had been forced, the opposition must, of necessity, be r 342 FORGERY OF LETTERS. Cuar. XXIV, obstinate ; the wisest policy would, therefore, have been to attach the people to them by kindness, to throw, if possible, a veil over the past, and, above all, to be indulgent to minor offences. The British did just the reverse in Afghanistan. After his flight to Bokhara, Dost Mohamed continued to cor- respond with the Afghan serdars that surrounded Shah Shooja, and he kept all their letters; these were found in a little bag on the field after the battle of Pervaneh and given to the English, who talked of this discovery, and threatened to make use of them against the chiefs whom they compromised and who were far from docile under their rule. But this indiscreet conduct brought about a result very different from what they intended, for the serdars who were hostile to them, and who were afraid of being sent to join Hadji Khan, Kaukeree, in India, held aloof, and, to prevent any surprise on the part of their conquerors, surrounded themselves with their followers, always appearing in public attended by an escort ready to fight ; this warlike attitude was almost a challenge to their adver- saries, who scarcely dared to accept it. The English, moreover, drew upon themselves the resentment of those who up to that time had been devoted to their cause, by recompensing the indi- viduals that delivered this packet of pretended letters, the con- tents of which were, in truth, the fabrications of some artful and avaricious intriguers—a fact that was proved in the sequel. Shah Shooja profited by the errors of the English to alienate the minds of the Afghans from them, and to strengthen his own party ; his vizier, Mollah Chekker, was the soul of all his intrigues, and cared so little to spare the protectors of his sovereign, that in several instances they were able to prove his hostile intentions, and eventually demanded his dismissal. The king resisted to the utmost of his power, but was at last obliged to accept a vizier of their choice ; and the Nizam ed Dooulet, the new minister, who consulted his master simply as a matter of form, entirely followed the instructions he received from the English. This miserable wretch, finding himself supported by them, committed spoliations and exactions of every kind, and was guilty of many acts of tyranny; those whom he plundered sometimes found the means of bringing their complaints before the king ; but Shah Shooja informed them that he could do nothing, being him- self a slave. Sir W. M‘Naghten was far from approving of the vizier’s conduct ; but having himself made him minister, he could Cuar, XXIV. COMPLAINTS OF AFGHAN CHIEFS. 343 not immediately degrade him. To these causes of discontent and anxiety was soon added a still greater one. The Directors of the East India Company, who have a habit of judging of the value of a conquest only by the revenue it produces, were more disappointed than can be described at the deficit which the expedition of Afghanistan had occasioned in their treasury. They, therefore, ordered a rigid economy to be practised in the Shah’s army, and these instructions were carried out by the British officers with more or less intelligence. Chiefs, whom it would have been wise in the government to conciliate, found themselves deprived of their subsidies; those of others were considerably reduced, and, at the same time that the pecuniary interests of the Afghans were attacked, several Hazarah and Kuzzilbash chiefs received fresh proofs of favour, which irritated the Afghans to the highest degree. Towards the end of September the serdars met in Kabul and laid their grievances before Shah Shooja, who could only reply that his power as a king was a fiction, that it.was impossible for him to do them justice, and added—¢TIt is your own fault that I have fallen thus low ; you have abandoned me to the good pleasure of the English ; had there been one man of spirit amongst you, he would soon Lave delivered me from this shameful state of depen- dence.” These words were not uttered in vain. Amongst the serdars present at the durbar was Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye (branch of the Barukzyes), a chief of energy and resolution, who stood forward and offered to be that man. In the afternoon of the same day Ite met the Shah in secret conference in the garden of his palace, and there a revolt, which was to be post- poned till a favourable opportunity should render success certain, was planned. However, it was resolved that the death of Sir A” Burnes should take place immediately ; for the king, who well knew the infinite trouble that officer had taken to support Dost Mohamed, detested him, and was very anxious to prevent his being made the Resident at his court, if Sir W. M‘Naghten, whose departure had been talked of for some time, should be removed. On leaving the Shah, Abdullah Khan called together at his own house the serdars Mohamed Attah Khan, Sikander Khan, Mir Efzel Khan, Abdul Samut Khan, and Abdul Selam Khan, all of the royal tribe of Popolzye ; also Seidal Khan, Alikioozye, Emin 344 CARELESSNESS OF THE ENGLISH. Cuar. XXIV, Ullah Khan, Logheree, and Mohamed Hoosein Khan, Erz Beghi,* and communicated to them the intentions of Shah Shooja : to which they agreed to conform in every particular, and swore to over- throw the British power in Afghanistan. This oath was written on the leaves of a Koran, and the seal of each of the serdars pre- sent was affixed to it. The secret was ill kept, and soon came to the knowledge of Sir W. M‘Naghten, who was not in the least alarmed by it, being fully impressed with the idea that it was impossible the chiefs should undertake any serious measures. He would not even allow the Koran to be seized for the purpose of learning the names of the conspirators, lest that act should be construed into evidence of timidity on his part: an appearance of perfect indif- ference was, in his opinion, the best mode of proving to the discon- tented that the British were not afraid of them; but Burnes took quite an opposite view of the case. Thus the two officers, invested with special power, were never agreed upon the most judicious plan to be adopted for the general interests, and this want of good understanding between the Resident and the political Envoy was, perhaps, of all the causes that contributed to the British fall in Afghanistan, the one that hastened it the most. It is impossible to doubt that, if three or four of the conspirators had been arrested and sent to India, it would have been sufficient to put a stop to these intrigues; but instead of adopting this vigorous course, Sir W. M‘Naghten gave them ample time to bring them to maturity, and exasperated the serdars by the most ill-timed measures of economy. Though he did not see that the storm was so close at hand, he was fully aware of the difficulties that were to be surmounted, and modified in a degree the reduction in the pay of the Afghan soldiers ordered by Lord Auckland ; but from the moment he received notice of his nomination to the post of Governor of Bombay, he made no further objection to the instructions that the Directors had given, and unhesitatingly reduced all the subsidies which had been pointed out as super- fluous. The Ghildjzye serdars, who occupied the defiles of the Khyber * This serdar was the brother of that day has influence in Afghanistan. The wife of Dost Mohamed who had been chiefs of Kabul and Kandahar are both previously married to Mohamed Azim equally anxious to attach him to their Khan. By this marriage she had a son cause. Ferrier, called Sultan Djan Khan, who to this tt ie atria Avital Cuar. XXIV, REVOLT OF THE GHILDJZYES. 345 mountains between Kabul and Jellalabad, and held them open or shut at their pleasure, were informed at the commencement of October, 1841, that they must submit to a reduction of 40,000 rupees = 4000/., when they at once hastened to Kabul to ascer- tain the motive for this alteration. They made their represen- tations in the first instance to Sir W. M‘Naghten, and he referred them to Shah Shooja, by whom they were haughtily dismissed, which greatly wounded their self-love and disappointed their cupi- dity ; but a few amongst them he secretly received, initiated them into the conspiracy against his protectors, and assured them that for the future their interests would be cared for. Sir Alexander Burnes, without actually foreseeing the conse- quences that would result from these retrenchments, nevertheless opposed them with all his power, though he did not succeed in pre- venting them; the consequence was, that when the Ghildjzye serdars returned to their homes, they raised their countrymen and cut off the communications in the mountains. On the other hand, the conspirators at Kabul had sent emis- saries to all the Afghan provinces to prepare the tribes for revolt ; already discontented, they alarmed them still more by persuading them that their chiefs were to be banished to India, that Shah Shooja was a mere puppet who would soon be upset, and that the British yoke, so heavy only in a protective character, would be far more so when it became absolute. The nomades responded imme- diately to this appeal, rushed to arms, and the communications between Kabul and Kandahar were closed without delay, as those had already been between Kabul and Jellalabad. General Sale was sent with a brigade to reopen the latter and force the passage of the Hindoo Koosh ; this small force quitted Kabul on the 11th of October, entered the mountains the same day, and was very far from expecting to meet with the terrible resistance it found there. Once in this infernal region, however, the Indo-British troops could not retrace their steps, and during eighteen days they were, if the expression may be used, choked in these defiles, where every step of their way was disputed foot by foot. On the first day General Sale was wounded and obliged to abandon his command, and a fourth part of his brigade was exterminated. From the 12th of October the troops could advance only three miles and a half a-day, and arrived exhausted on the 2nd November at Gundamuck, on the other side of the gorge of the Khoord Kabul; here they rested a few days, 4 SSE ena SEA oo FN aga Hn bE mle inhi opinion 346 REVOLT AT KABUL. Cuar. XXIV. and then left for Jellalabad, still harassed by the tribes in revolt, and after having reached that town took refuge within its walls with only three days’ provisions. Never were troops in such a precarious position ; but a most happy incident came to their assist- ance, for caravans brought them supplies for three months from Peshawur, which enabled them resolutely to oppose an energetic resistance to the insurrection in which the rest of the army perished. The news of these conflicts of the mountaineers with General Sale’s brigade arrived at Kabul on the 1st of November, and was the signal for a serious disturbance which broke out in that city. The unconquered tribes of Afghanistan waited only for the signal to be given them by the Khyberees to rise simultaneously and commence a war for their faith—a religious war, the most bloody of all wars. ‘They watched attentively the Indo-British troops, who were imprudently dispersed in the several garrisons of Kabul, Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghildjzye, Charikar, Kandahar, Jellalabad, and other places; they knew that these detachments could easily be cut off, and also that it was impossible that reinforcements should reach them from India until the month of April, the mountain passes being obstructed by the snow. Of the thirty-two political agents scattered over the country, not one perceived the least symptom of the excited state of the public mind ; the unfortunate Burnes himself, blinded by his excessive confidence in the natives, was the first to report to the Indian Government that the Afghan chiefs were sincerely attached to Shah Shooja, and that the British army might be withdrawn from their garrisons. Sir W. M‘Naghten wrote more confidently in the same strain: all had fallen into a fatal slumber, from which they were aroused only by surrounding massacre. The British Commissioner had, in the first instance, attempted to parley with the Ghildjzyes and induce them to return to their duty, offering as one of the most persuasive arguments 100,000 rupees = 10,0007 ; but they rejected every species of temptation, and continued to make war upon the invaders, their attacks being generally made at night. As soon as the signal of revolt had been given in the-country, Abdullah Khan, the head of the conspiracy in Kabul, took no further trouble to conceal his intentions, and said openly that he would kill Burnes before eight days were over. This officer, though warned, paid no attention to these threats, considering them as simple boasting, but, seeing that the serdar’s insolence Cuar. XXIV. ATTACK ON SIR A. BURNES HOUSE. 347 increased daily, he at last became very uneasy, and obtained information which left no doubt as to the serious position they were in; moreover, he saw that the conduct of Abdullah Khan was connected with the revolt in the hills. This enlightened him as to the snare which had been woven round them, and he exclaimed, “There is nothing for it now but to quit this country.” The next day, November 2, 1841, early in the morning, he sent one of his servants to the house of Abdullah Khan to request that chief to come to him; but the serdar, suspecting that Burnes intended to seize him and send him to India, conceived that the moment had arrived to execute the project of open revolt, for which he was so well prepared ; his first act was therefore to kill Burnes’s messenger, and, without loss of time, he proceeded to his residence, accompanied by Seidal Khan, Sikander Khan, Mohamed Attah Khan, Abdul Selam Khan, Emin Ullah Khan, &e. &c., and their followers and servants, in all nearly one hundred and thirty persons, the nucleus of the insurrection. On the way there they killed the British officers and soldiers whom they met in the streets; the delay this occasioned enabled Burnes, who had been informed of these massacres, to barricade the large outer gate of his house, and the insurgents were therefore a long time before they could force a passage. He had thought of retiring to the cantonments situated three miles from the city, but while putting on an Afghan dress to effect his retreat undiscovered, he changed his mind, and said, “ No, I cannot play the coward, and, for the life of one man, com- promise the honour of the British name. Were I to escape thus, the Afghans would believe that I was frightened ; no, a hundred times worse than death, the prestige of my authority would be lost.” With these words he put on his uniform again and remained at his post, but sent messenger after messenger to Sir W. M Seo 3 IS Si 350 WEAKNESS OF GENERAL ELPHINSTONE. Cuar. XXIV. and he surrounded himself with all the pomp of royalty. This chief, at the head of his partizans, daily exchanged a few shots with the English, who were shut up in their cantonments; but though he captured and murdered a few officers and soldiers who imprudently risked their lives outside the camp, the Mohamedzye chief experienced only reverses in his repeated attacks. In ome of these Abdullah Khan, Etchekzye, the originator and promoter of the conspiracy, received a ball in the forehead and died within two days. After each defeat Zeman Khan retired into the city without being disturbed, for the English never followed him, which they could have done without difficulty ; and as they had committed the serious fault of establishing their magazines of provisions at a considerable distance from the cantonments, they should at the outset have displayed a little more energy in endeavouring to dis- lodge the Afghans from the houses in which they were regaling themselves upon them. At the sight of one battalion and two or three pieces of cannon, they would have fled : they admit it now, and it was the step they most dreaded the enemy would take. Many times did the officers suggest it, but General Elphinstone would not give his consent, and the army saw itself reduced to procure provisions with gold and presents from the insurgents —the conduct of the general was indeed incomprehensible. After Shah Shooja had concerted with Abdullah Khan the revolt against the English, he fell into a far more dependent con- dition than that from which the latter had intended to withdraw him. - The Etchekzye serdar and other conspirators had shown themselves exceedingly overbearing towards him, sharp discus- sions took place, and there was very nearly a rupture; never- theless Shah Shooja was not sufficiently clearsighted to discover that they only looked upon him as a tool to be set aside as soon as the annihilation of his protectors was accomplished, and the rising of the Khyberees induced the king to throw himself into the arms of the national party, and conspire actively himself. He first permitted the unhappy Burnes to be murdered, though he could have saved him with the greatest ease, for he occupied the citadel with a devoted garrison of a thousand men ; but it seems that he lost confidence in his accomplices while that act was being per- petrated, the cause of which was probably secret information that he received from the Serdar Mohamed Attah Khan. He then Cuar. XX1V. CONDUCT OF 44rs REGIMENT. 351 thought it prudent to close the gates of the Bala Hissar before the mob could reach it, and, in his blindness, believed that when order was restored the Afghans would hail him again as their king without the concurrence of the British being necessary ; he therefore abstained from helping them, hoping by this means to secure the support of his own subjects. He even thought it very wrong when some of the English troops, shut up in the fortress with him, fired upon the townspeople, and turned their artillery upon the city ; but it was quite a different matter when the insurgents cut down * the trees in his garden under the guns of the place, or when the partizans of Zeman Khan came within range: then the Shah entreated that the sharpest and best sustained fire possible might be kept up. Several British officers, to whom the treachery of Shah Shooja was now evident, proposed that the army should occupy the citadel in which he still resided, as they would then have the town in their power, and could, by threatening its destruction, obtain supplies and provisions. This plan was warmly supported by Sir W. M<‘Naghten, but rejected by General Elphinstone, who gave as his reason that the discouragement amongst the troops rendered the execution of it impossible ; indeed he acted in direct opposition to this sound advice by ordering a regiment, that had been sent to the Bala Hissar when the rebellion broke out, to return to camp. After this, though thus reinforced, the General lost all confidence in himself for any useful purpose ; he had despaired of success from the commencement, and waited to the last with the inertness and cold apathy that are the result of a fixed opinion, the annihilation of the doomed army under his command : the troops themselves, cast down by the example of their chief, lost all energy. The British soldier has proved in all times that in bravery he is second to none in Europe; but this is under certain conditions : he must have full rations, his arrack, his beer, and a thousand other stimulants, the privation of which induces discouragement and indecision. There is no doubt such was the condition of the force at Kabul, and to this must be attributed the feeble and pusillanimous conduct of H.M.’s 44th and the 37th N.I. when attacked by the insurgents in a small entrenched camp on an eminence which protected the © citadel ; they scarcely made any resistance, the efforts of Brigadier Shelton to animate them were useless, and cavalry and infantry gave ~ way and fled in great disorder to the cantonments, hotly pursued a ea 352 AKBAR KHAN RETURNS TO KABUL. Crap. XXIV. by the Afghans, who would perhaps have forced their enemy’s position that day, but for the intervention of the insurgent Serdar Osman Khan, Isakzye, who made a special treaty with Sir W. M a — al a OR TE Te Se er en. SS oi . : a TEER as at ——— Di ow ga ant 2 ps Eu ge ” E Aa el whe oo di = 3 em > [i . | 474 THE DIAMOND VEST. Crap. XXXI Se Kamran. He therefore sent for Mohamed Yoossoof and, after Janne we him his liberty, informed him that it had ona been ey i usurp wi oH power; that he always intended to a prince of the blood-royal in pl place of the Shah, tl bs fee Wipes turned upon him, Mohamed Ya J» that his determination was to of i i daughter in marriage, and d py Sia eclare him sovereign of the principal: The only condition, h i rN: : » he said, that he should att foams; was that the Brice should endeay a Wisi Tan ° dvs Vi he had hidden his gold and jewels all always had a great affection for hj i Possessed his entire confidence a 10 nd he, therefore, not ili entrusted him with part of th ry oy e desired informati i 1 mation. Mohamed asa Pe a wary man, took one-half of the money which had a Yes fe in his way by his confiding sovereign, and carried by Mento nae who did not conceal his gratification at this y at he most coveted, however, was not Seas et forth- Sigs by _ Ws s vest, decorated With en stones | which was 0007. Before K i : citadel he thought this I: Hy I aenndinA g ady’s waistcoat would be no Jo i Zh nger safe wit him, and gave it into the care of one of his wives, who Mi ’ the responsibility thus thrown upon her, handed it over to hep steward, named Nasser Ullah Beg. This trustworthy man had, in ’ tl inst: ois Hanes Iola to the country ; but, three days after the red to the citadel he went to M 1 ; : eshed, carrying tl precious waistcoat with him, M a , ohamed Yoossoof Mj 1gnorant of the latter circumsta na nce, though he knew th ment had been given to Ye wike ar the Shah’s wife, and h zi of this, who put the : re aa Ft poor creature to the torture, to fore ; e he jee 1t up; but she bore the agonising trial rather than woh fe eel 5 then tried the effect of domestic influences i No ed to her that her only daughter by Shah Kaman Sag t 1 om day be married to his son, the Serdar 8 ot ¥ fans es om J when the unhappy girl heard who oe to sband, she poisoned herself to ese a escape the detested nup- 8 ohamed discovered that t] j i search was at Meshed, and En ui : made every effort to cet j without success ; he th im er ad : success ; en revenged himself on the miser i Soe rever > miserable wife of fis sovchi, whom he imprisoned in the citadel, and a ally torture, and it was not til] 1846 that she was wha, on ) Cuar. XXXI. NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING IT. 475 the reiterated demands of the Shah of Persia. She then fled to Teheran, and joined her brother, the Serdar Chems Eddin Khan, who had long since been driven to take service in the Persian army by the tyranny of the vizier. As for the valuable vest, it never fell into the possession of those who had a right to it. In December, 1845, when I was at Meshed, the faithful depositary of the trea- sure, Nasser Ullah Beg, died of cholera; he had been ill some time previously, and Assaf Dooulet, seeing his end approaching, appointed him his steward, giving him at the same time one thou- sand tomauns with which to purchase camels. Nasser Ullah, laid up by sickness, was unable to execute the commission; and when he died, the governor of Khorassan, under the pretence that the deceased had funds of his in his hands, seized everything in his house, and the royal vest thus became his property. It is true that the claims of the Serdar Chems Eddin were supported by the Shah of Persia, and that he ordered his uncle to restore it to him ; but Assaf Dooulet settled the question of its restoration by the payment of several thousand tomauns. Since that period he has been deprived of his command in Khorassan, and with the wealth that he accumulated during the thirteen years that he governed that province, his son the Sipahi Salar, created a powerful party, with whose support he raised the standard of revolt against the Shah of Persia, and kept his army in check from 1847 to 1850. At the same time that Yar Mohamed tortured the faithful wife of Kamran, he disposed of the other wives of that sovereign—and in the Shah’s lifetime—to his own friends and partisans; and as they were, for the most part, young and rich, their new husbands were well satisfied with this arrangement, though it is reprobated by the laws of Islam. I was informed of one action of the vizier’s of which I should scarcely have believed him guilty, had it not been mentioned to me by his most intimate friends, namely, that he sold three or four of the daughters of Shah Kamran, as well as the eldest of his wives, to the Turcomans, who disposed of them again in the markets of Khiva and Bokhara. But to return to the Prince Mohamed Yoossoof : after having exe- cuted, so far as he had the power, the behests of the vizier, he claimed the performance of the promises which he had made him. Yar Mo- hamed declared himself ready to fulfil them, but objected that Mo- hamed Yoossoof had only partly carried out his engagement, and that much of the treasure had yet to be recovered ; he did not, he 476 YOOSSOOF MIRZA FLIES TO MESHED. Cuar. XXXI. said, intend to alter his determination on account of that disappoint- ment, if the prince would give him a decisive proof of his devotion by having his cousin, the Shah Kamran, put to death. Mohamed Yoossoof now saw clearly the snare into which the vizier wished to draw him, and subsequently throw upon him all the odium of the murder of his relative, for it was in this manner that Yar Mohamed intended to clear for himself, and at the prince’s expense, the road to the sovereign power, and thus avoid the disgrace of the crime of regicide. Mohamed Yoossoof at once perceived the danger of reject- ing the proposals of a man like Yar Mohamed, hardened in every crime, and, to lull his vigilance, consented to all that he demanded ; in the evening, however, under the pretence of enjoying the fresh air, he went out for a ride, escorted by a few servants, and escaped to Meshed, where the Persians received him in the kindest and most generous manner. Before leaving Herat he took the precau- tion to write letters to several of his friends, in which he warned them of the vile deed meditated by the vizier; but the Heratees had long been accustomed to submit to his tyranny, and were indifferent to, or, at any rate, took no interest in any schemes that he might have against the Shah Kamran, whose - conduct had made them callous to his fate. Some few chiefs, who were in favour of a legitimate monarch, endeavoured to revive in the people the prestige which attached to their ancient line of kings ; but they could only excite a partial movement, which Yar Mohamed speedily suppressed. This manifestation, however, baffled him in his treasonable plans, and he waited till he should so perfect his combinations that a failure in them would be jm- possible. His first preparatory measure was to remove Shah Kamran to the citadel of Kussan, thirty-six miles west of Herat, confiding his safe keeping to his cousin, the Serdar Dad Khan, and for some months after this the miserable existence of the de- throned monarch was passed in this fortress in the midst of continual ergies ; the vigier commanded that he should be freely supplied with wine and spirits and exciting drugs, in the hope that they would conduct him more quickly to the grave, and also that, in his fits of intoxication he would say or write something that would lead to the discovery of the famous Jewelled vest. But his hopes were disappointed, for, however intoxicated the Shah might be, he always recovered the most perfect self-possession when- ever his hidden wealth was alluded to. At last Yar Mohamed Cuapr. XXXI. SHAH KAMRAN PUT TO DEATH. 477 commanded that torture should be resorted to to vanquish iy obstinacy ; but this also was fruitless. 3 Let wih a a p : grimage to Mecca,” said the old man, } and I wi a Jou 2 rich ransom when I reach Meshed.” The vizier ii 00 ! versed in the value of Afghan promises to trust to this or 0 finding that his prisoner was utterly useless for his privipe P : pose, and might even create trouble for him, he at lengt os go to put the Shah out of his way. The moment st oie his project; the defiles of Kabul had witnessed ie fos ) of one British force, the division in Kandahar cou t ie y of its own safety, Shah Ss a bot his fsa Sin runner of that of his nep ew, the : ae HAR attempt made by the inhabitants of Hoan to deliver him in the spring of 1842, this unhappy Pies oe again tortured and cruelly beaten, and at the close of Na os Mohamed commanded that he should be suffocated. The : dar Dad Khan was the executioner, and when he placed the cushion on the poor old man’s face, he made no resistance ; on the ange: he testified a certain degree of satisfaction that the moment whic was to terminate his sufferings had arrived. > —— SONS OF SHAH KAMRAN. Crap. XXXII, CHAPTER XXXII Sons of Shah Kamran — Hadji Firooz Eddin — His sad end, and that of his son Malek Kassem Mirza — Afghan princes in Persia — Conduct of Russia and Eng- land with regard to Herat — Yar Mohamed, now sovereign Prince of Herat, attends to the welfare of the Heratees — Strengthens his power, and prepares to attack Gour — Dine Mohamed Khan plunders some caravans — Yar Mohamed takes possession of the province of Gour — Differences with Kandahar — Sub- Jjugates the Hazarah Zeidnats — Marches against the Usbek Khanats — He is recalled to the south — Privations suffered by his army — Equilibrium between the states of Central Asia— Mohamed Shah of Persia supports Kohendil Khan in his quarrel with Yar Mohamed — The latter assists the Shah of Persia in his war with Khorassan — Death of the Persian monarch — Alliance of Yar Mo- hamed with the Shah of Persia. THE assassination of the Shah Kamran is the vilest of the many atrocious crimes that stain the character of Yar Mohamed Khan. Cuap. XXXII. HADJI FIROOZ EDDIN. 479 the blood of the Suddozyes flowed in his veins, for, like all that family, he was brave, though restless and debauched. Some time after the siege of Herat by the Persians, he declared himself inde- pendent in the district of Furrah, of which he was governor, and Yar Mohamed was obliged to send troops to subdue him ; which having been accomplished, he was brought to Herat, where he had only half his liberty. When, however, Shah Kamran was removed to Kussan, the Mirza succeeded in escaping, and took refuge in Persia. At Teheran he lived utterly lost to all sense of his own dignity ; and at the time he was residing in the low quarter of the Niguaristan, inhabited by the Berbers, he thought only of drinking arrack and smoking opium, where, completely brutalised, he still lives on a small pension granted him by the Shah of Persia. The other sons of Kamran are effeminate men, ‘more or less polluted by the same vices as their elder brother. Seif ool | Moolk and Saadet Mulook, after the ruin of their house, retired first into the district of Gour, and then into that of Zemin- davar, in the principality of Kandahar. Nadir Mirza established EE eS ET _— _—- a - oi Rl - . EE x - ; aR x - 3 = ~~ 3 » . - — ome - Rh RS oe - ie lo = a ay Ta : o 3 Toots a f - - — — “ WA, EBERT i te ced I Had he waited but a short time longer, the death of his aged sovereign, whose constitution was broken up by excesses and tor- tures, must have taken place naturally. To Europeans the cowardly deed appears in the most odious colours : not so to the Afghans. In their eyes it was simply the exercise of a right—the right of the —— himself at Bagdad. Alemguir and Ahmed Ali took refuge in India, and are the most intelligent princes of this family. The remaining brothers, Djehanguir, Djellal Eddin, Iskander, Chahab, and Zeman went to Teheran, where the three who de a NE i v i 1 — strongest ; it was perfectly reasonable that the vizier should kill his enemy, if he could ; and the tone in which they would say to each other, “the vizier has killed the Shah Kamran,” seemed to express an opinion that he deserved commendation for his conduct, and had by this act added to the glory of his career rather than that he had done anything worthy of reproach. ; At his death the Shah left ten sons: their names were as follows :— Djehanguir Mirza. Djellal Eddin Mirza. Seif ool Moolk Mirza. Iskander Mirza. Saadet Mulook Mirza. Chahab Mirza. Alemguir Mirza. Zeman Mirza, Ahmed Ali Mirza. Nadir Mirza, Iskander and Zeman died of cholera at Teheran in 1846. The eldest son, Djehanguir Mirza, who ought to have succeeded Shah Kamran, will be remembered by his revolt against his father at the time that the latter went to quell disturbances in the pro- vince of Furrah, and by the cruel sentence that he pronounced against his envoy, Meuvalee Khan. He showed, however, that survive owe their daily bread to the generosity of their cousin, the Shah of Persia. Mohamed Yoossoof Mirza, also their cousin, though much inclined to drunkenness, is superior to them in capacity, and is distinguished by the same qualities that won for his grandfather, Hadji Firooz Eddin, the esteem and affection of the Heratees. That prince, it will be remembered, reigned sixteen years in Herat, to the general satisfaction of the population, whom he treated in the most paternal manner. After having been vanquished by Moustapha Khan, he went to Meshed, and resided there in great retirement upon the bounty of the Persian Govern- ment. One morning a party of serbaz broke into his garden, and were proceeding to pillage it, when he went to remonstrate with them ; but the simplicity of his attire so completely deceived the villains as to his identity, that they supposed him to be a servant ; and to prevent him from returning to the house to give the alarm, one of them killed him on the spot with a stroke of his kandjar. The fate of his son, Malek Kassem Mirza, was not less sad. This prince was attached to the expeditionary corps which, under SE —— a ET SE - = ak RT 480 YAR MOHAMED SOVEREIGN OF HERAT. Cnar. XXXII. the command of Abbas Mirza, marched against Herat in 1833. Being detained by business at Meshed, he followed the army a few days after it had left, accompanied by only ten servants, and was attacked half-way between Meshed and Herat, by a party of Turcomans ; in this murderous conflict he had the misery of seeing one of his sons fall beside him mortally wounded, and the next moment he was seized, bound, and dragged off to Khiva, where he was sold in the public market-place for a slave. Information of this fact having reached the Khan of Khiva, he purchased him immediately, and gave him the revenues of a vil- lage for his support, though he would never allow him to leave his dominions ; and he died there in 1840. Mohamed Y oossoof, the son of Malek Kassem Mirza, obtained a grant of land from Assaf Dooulet, and, accompanied by some Heratees, who had attached themselves to his fortunes, he raised the little village of Singbest from the ruins in which it had lain for more than two hundred years. Mohamed Ali, Shah of Persia, sheltered and protected all the members of the Suddozye family in the hope of one day making use of them against Herat, the possession of which he had not ceased to covet, but his successor, Nasser Eddin Shah, harassed by the intes- tine divisions of his kingdom, was far less taken up with the idea of extending it towards the east : but the Suddozye princes and a few Afghan chiefs still remain on the list of state pensioners; though it may now be affirmed that not one amongst them has the capacity necessary to induce the Afghans to place him on the throne of his ancestors. The influence that Russia or England may one day exercise in this part of Asia, renders anticipations of this kind very unimportant, for those powers will respectively attach to their own interests such of the Afghan chiefs as will bend with the greatest docility to their views of dominion, without con- sidering the qualifications of the individuals whom they place at the head of the principalities. The cruelty of Yar Mohamed Khan was great ; great, also, were his ambition and his avarice, which had been the source of a thousand evils to the Heratees ; nevertheless they joyfully beheld him attain the sovereign power, hoping that when they were relieved of Shah Kamran, for whom contempt was- the only feeling they entertained, the vizier would give them tranquillity and security; and they were not dis- appointed. As soon as he had proclaimed himself master of the ce ei is Cuar. XXXII. YAR MOHAMED, SOVEREIGN OF HERAT. 481 principality, under the simple title of Vizier Saheb Kebir,* he exercised his authority with a firm hand, and introduced a great many reforms, which in his intercourse with the English he had found would be profitable to his treasury, as well as to the people ; the taxes, police, customs, and all that related to them, were placed upon a fresh basis, and every one gained by these reforms. When he was firmly established he ceased to be cruel, even to those who were opposed to him, but he showed thieves and assassins no mercy. Ie had the tact to procure the recognition of his usurped power by his neighbours, with the greater number of whom he lived on good terms. The serdars of Herat, who up to that time had sold him their support, were reduced to complete obedience : some of the most turbulent he put down, replacing them by others from the tribe of Ali Kioozye, to which he belongs, and he eventually became absolute over the great vassals, and the nomade population under his jurisdiction. It was more by address than by severity that he obtained this result, and as no one dared to dispute with him the sovereignty he had usurped, his power was soon limited only by his will. The town of Herat, destroyed by the siege of 1838, rose by degrees from its ruins, thanks to the gold that the English had so profusely scattered around them; Yar Mohamed continued the improve- ments they had so happily commenced, and applied prompt re- medies to the evils under which the population still suffered. He especially encouraged agriculture and commerce, placed a very light duty upon the sale of corn and the necessaries of life, and further relieved the poorer classes by setting them to work at the fortifications of the town, which were rebuilt in accordance with the plans of the English engineers. Finally, he completely checked the pillage that had been carried on, not only in the principality, but even up to the gates of Herat. The means that he employed to attain this end were so terrible that to this day, when any article is by accident dropped on the roads, or even in the fields, no one dares to take it up; the first person who finds it informs, with the utmost speed, the nearest officer of police of the fact, whose duty it is to seek out the owner, and return it to him, without putting the careless proprietor to any expense. Yar Mohamed Khan had become wealthy at this period—excessively wealthy ; his rapacity, * Grand Vizier, 482 YAR MOHAMED STRENGTHENS HIS POWER. Cnar. XXXII. without being extinguished, was a little abated, and he wished that the people, who now felt the advantages of his beneficial administration, should give him all the honour and gratitude due for it; while by throwing the blame of the previous anarchy on the weakness of Shah Kamran, in whose reign he pretended he could never realise the improvements he proposed, he contrived to render odious the memory of that unworthy though unfortunate monarch. Yar Mohamed was thus occupied in consolidating his power in Herat, when the chiefs of some distant districts, who had only nominally recognised the sovereignty of Shah Kamran, raised the standard of revolt, and he therefore resolved to strike vigorously, in order to annihilate any disposition of the kind for the future. After having confided the city to his son, the Serdar Seif Mohamed Khan, and a picked garrison, he proceeded to the district of Kaleh- noon, inhabited by the Hazarah Zeidnats; but the Serdar Kerim Dad Khan, their chief, feeling that he was not strong enough to confront the approaching danger, went to offer his submission to the Vizier, engaged to recognise his suzerainty, also to pay him a tribute in barek and horses, and gave him one of his brothers and several Hazarah chiefs as hostages for his fidelity. This happy settlement of the disturbances in Kaleh-noon enabled Yar Mohamed to turn his arms against Gour, the state of which province caused him considerable uneasiness. This district was governed by two independent chiefs, the Serdars Moustapha and Ibrahim Khan, who, being open to more than one influence adverse to the interests of the new sovereign of Herat, now and then made a raid upon his dominions at the instigation of Kohendil Khan, Prince of Kandahar. They might have been acting in support of some discontented serdars, but on the present occasion the danger to the vizier was more imminent, for he had to unravel the plots of Seif ool Moolk and Saadet Mulook, sons of Shah Kamran, who, when driven from the citadel of Herat, had taken refuge with Ibrahim Khan. This chief warmly embraced their cause, an alliance the more vexatious for the vizier as the country of Gour presents at every step admirable positions for an army on the defensive and is intersected by high and rugged mountains, very precipitous, and covered with forests ; lying between them are beautiful valleys, inhabited by the nomade population, and in the villages which are also scattered on the steep sides of these mountains, a few men in ambuscade might easily hold Cuar. XXXII. YAR MOHAMED PLUNDERS THE CARAVANS. 483 a very considerable army in check. To these advantages, which enabled the fugitive princes to harass the usurper of their rights, and, in case of discomfiture, retire to a formidable position, there was added another, scarcely less important ; the intrepid cousin of the vizier, Dine Mohamed Khan (who, as we have already said, married the daughter of Moustapha Khan, the other Taymooni Serdar), also consented to join their party. And we must here digress for a moment to give a brief account of his subsequent career. After his flight from Herat, Dine Mohamed Khan soon wearied of the life that he led in the mountains of Gour, where he had been found by the messenger of Major Rawlinson when he brought him the proposal that he should march to the relief of Shah Kamran, then besieged in the citadel of Herat. He afterwards took advan- tage of the return of the Mohamedzyes to Kandahar to resume his active life ; and when the English left that city, and Kohen- dil Khan proceeded there to take it from Seif der Djing, Dine Mohamed appeared at Kandahar to offer his services to the son of Shah Shooja, who was under the protection of the British. The prince accepted them with gratitude; and in the battle which took place at Haooz Singsar, in which Seif der Djing was de- feated, Dine Mohamed distinguished himself by his accustomed bravery. With two hundred chosen men he for two hours sustained the attack of the entire army of Kohendil Khan, amount- ing to six thousand men ; but in the end, finding himself obliged to yield, he retired to the mountains, where no one thought of disturbing him. His little band being soon destitute of every- thing, he proceeded to the plain of Bakooa, near the Kach- rood, and placed himself in ambush on the side of the Koohi Duzd (Robber’s Mountain), where he waited for a caravan of several thousand camels and mules, which was expected to pass that way ; When it arrived he captured the whole, and upon this plunder maintained his troop during the winter. In the course of the two following months he completely restored his finances by pillaging other caravans, after which he returned to the mountains of Gour, where he found the sons of Kamran, with whom he made common cause. When Yar Mohamed marched against Gour he with his usual tact began his operations by sowing dissension among his enemies, and Moustapha Khan, who supported Dine Mohamed, and Ibrahim, 212 484 YAR MOHAMED TAKES POSSESSION OF GOUR. Cuar. XXXII. who took the part of the princes, quarrelled—nay, fought. In this conflict Ibrahim Khan was worsted, which led to the subjugation of the country ; and the princes having lost the support of Moustapha Khan, and Ibrahim having fled to the mountains, they were obliged to retire to the district of the Serdar Akter Khan at Zemidavar, in the territory of Kandahar, where they were soon surrounded. As to Dine Mohamed Khan, he grew tired of the harassing life he had passed for two years, and willingly gave his sanction to a reconciliation which several chiefs wished to bring about between him and the Vizier ; but remarking, as he thought, a coldness in his reception by Yar Mohamed, he feared that he might be be- trayed, and fled from his camp the same night. On arriving at Meshed he was kindly welcomed by Assaf Dooulet, who imme- diately availed himself of his acknowledged bravery by sending him with his Afghans to pacify the southern part of Khorassan, then in revolt, and the chief has since remained in the service of Persia. Yar Mohamed had afterwards little trouble in reducing the disunited serdars of Gour. Ibrahim Khan, driven from one posi- tion to another, retired to a fortified rock in the mountain of Tchalap Dalan, which had the reputation of being impregnable ; there, reduced by famine, he surrendered at discretion and swore obedience to the Vizier; but a few days after, however, he contrived to escape, and returned to the hills, where he lived for some time by pillage. This chief had about 7000 families of Taymoonis under his rule, and Yar Mohamed, after having completely devastated the country they occupied, removed them to Herat, where he established some in the city and the remainder in the suburbs; they were afterwards organized into several bat- talions of serbaz, and, being very brave, are now the best troops in his army. Moustapha Khan having assisted Yar Mohamed against Ibrahim Khan, the vizier spared his life, but this was not the only reason that dictated his generosity; the district inhabited by the former chieftain is the most impracticable in the country, and the difficulties that Yar Mohamed would have had to surmount in any attempt to reduce it, spoke far more in Mous- tapha’s favour than the gratitude of the Vizier of Herat. Having obtained these satisfactory results from his expedition, the Vizier returned to his capital and occupied himself in ex- Cuar. XXXII. DIFFERENCES WITH KANDAHAR. 485 tending his frontier towards the north. In the commencement of 1846 he marched with his army in the direction of the Moorgab, on the banks of which river were encamped some Hazarah Zeidnats, commanded by one of the brothers of Kerim Dad Khan, of Kaleh-noon, the chief of the whole of that tribe, but these nomades decamped at the approach of the vizier, and retiring into the Persian territory, put themselves under the protection of Assaf Dooulet, who gave them the village of Kariz on the frontier of Herat. This act was not of a nature to allay the hatred felt by Yar Mohamed for the Governor of Khorassan: he did not forget it, and at a later period made him pay dearly for the vexatious opposition. The Vizier allowed his cavalry to graze their horses in the fine pastures watered by the Moorgab, and afterwards returned to Herat to be present at the departure of his daughter Bobojane for Kabul, whose marriage with Mohamed Akbar Khan ‘was, it will be remembered, very nearly causing a serious conflict between the Vizier and the Prince of Kandahar. The latter desired nothing better than to seize this pretext for extending his territory at the expense of Yar Mohamed, but each time that he sent his troops towards the frontier of Herat, Mohamed Akbar as a devoted son- in-law, immediately made a corresponding movement towards that of Kandahar, with the army placed in observation at Ghuznee, which at once checked the ambitious aspirations of his uncle, Kohendil Khan. Nevertheless Yar Mohamed was anxious to take revenge for the depredations that had been committed by the Kandaharians, in the south of his principality, and ravaged the border villages of Kandahar. After this, and towards the middle of 1846, he marched into the Gour country, where disaffection had again manifested itself, and did not leave it till order was perfectly re- stored in the province. It was about this time that the Serdar Akter Khan, Alizye, attacked and beaten by Kohendil Khan, who feared his influence and his power, took refuge with Yar Mohamed, who gave him the government of the district of Gour, where he was rejoined by his tribe which had been dispersed, and it is still established there. Since that period Kohendil Khan has not dared to renew his incursions upon the Heratian territory. Towards the close of the year 1846, the intrigues of the prime minister of the Shah of Persia, having induced his royal master to deprive Assaf Dooulet of the government of Khorassan, and the Roc p——— — Rr qd HE 2 era? FY din sm j 486 SUBJUGATION OF THE HAZARAH ZEIDNATS. Crap. XXXII. consequence of that measure having been the entire ruin of his family, one of his sons, as I have said before, raised the standard of revolt, and all Khorassan responded to his appeal. The fall of Assaf Dooulet greatly assisted the cause of Yar Mohamed, whose power increased considerably. For thirteen years the Vizier had been held in check by him ; he had never permitted him to extend his rule over the small Usbek Khanats situated to the north of his dominions, and he went even so far as to counteract openly that which he more legitimately exercised over the Hazarah Zeid- nats. As soon as Yar Mohamed heard that Assaf Dooulet had left for Teheran, and that he had therefore nothing to fear from him he marched once more against Kerim Dad Khan, whose submission had hitherto been only nominal. This time the Hazarah chief deter- mined jupon making open war with his suzerain; he assembled a chosen band of 12,000 of his best cavalry, and Yar Mohamed led to the attack in the open country of Kaleh-noon 8000 horse, 6000 foot, and a battery of six guns. The combat, a most sanguinary one, lasted nine hours ; but the Hazarahs were at length crushed, and many chiefs lost their lives on both sides: the gallant Kerim Dad Khan, weakened by the loss of blood that streamed from many wounds, escaped with great difficulty, and was accom- panied only by one single horseman of the brave men he had commanded, when he reached the Persian territory at Toorbut Sheikh Djam. Yar Mohamed encamped upon the field of battle, and in the space of eight days collected ten thousand families of the Hazarah Zeidnats whom he removed from their native soil to that part of the district of Herat, reaching from Obeh to Gorian, where he settled them on the banks of the Herirood. By these forced immigrations of the Taymoonis and Hazarahs, the principality became more populous than it had been previously to the siege of Herat in 1838, and Yar Mohamed obtained the further advantage of keeping under his eye the most turbulent inhabitants of his dominions. He made excellent soldiers of these Eimaks and by their amalgamation with the Afghans it became almost impossible for the former to betray him. After having installed them in their new abode, and fixed the tax they should pay at three tomaums for each tent, Yar Mohamed again took the field, and marched upon Meimana, a small indepen- dent Khanat lying north of Kaleh-noon, of which there were two Cusp. XXXII. MARCH AGAINST THE USBEK KHANATS. 487 chiefs, brothers, Eukmet Khan and Shere Khan, who admitted his suzerainty without hesitation. The Vizier then pushed on to the rich Khanats of Serpeul, Chibberghane, Andekhooye, and Akhtche, and their respective khans, who up to that period had nominally been vassals of the Emir of Bokhara, also submitted. From Akhtche Yar Mohamed sent an ambassador to that sovereign, and also to the Caliph of Merv, to inform them that they must with the least possible delay give up all the Heratee slaves then in their territories ; he also warned them that if there was the slightest armed demonstration on their part, or on that of the Khanats which he had subjugated, he would march straight upon their capitals. Although Yar Mohamed had nothing to fear from the Shah of Persia in thus extending his dominions, he considered it politic to inform him of his march into the Usbek country, and assure him that these conquests could not but contribute to augment his power and renown, inasmuch as they were made in his name by the most humble of his vassals. Mohamed Shah having the revolt in Khorassan on his hands, and being unable to repress it, was obliged to put up with these lying protestations, and he endured what he could not prevent. Yar Mohamed subsequently marched upon Balkh, when a courier brought him information that the gallant Kerim Dad Khan, having placed himself at the head of some fugitives of his tribe who had joined him in Khorassan, was ravaging the district of Gorian from one end to the other—his letters also brought him other news not less vexatious. Shah Pecend Khan, an independent Afghan chieftain and lord of Laush-jowaine (a fortress on the north of Lake Roustem), who was allied to the serdars of Kan- dahar, had at their instigation, and with the aid of some nomade Beloochees, pillaged the camps and villages in the district of Furrah and Bakooa. This untoward intelligence obliged the Vizier rapidly to retrace his steps, and move with the mass of his forces towards the quarter threatened. But, after the first five days’ march, the Usbeks that he had incorporated into his army deserted, and the Khanats, which had so recently submitted, proclaimed their independence, at the same time massacring the garrisons that had been left in them. To complete his misfortunes, the cold set in with such intensity, that before he could reach Koochk a large pro- portion of his soldiers and four-fifths of his horses had perished ; provisions suddenly failed, and hunger was added to the other - A Rw 488 BALANCE OF POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA. Cuar. XXXII. miseries his army had to suffer. These difficulties, which occurred simultaneously, were certainly great, but Yar Mohamed was only three days’ march from his capital ; he had obtained a large sum of money in the countries through which he had passed, so that it was easy for him to repair these disasters, and from the moment of his return to Herat his activity and vigilance triumphed over them. This success against the Usbeks naturally excited the jealousy of Persia and all the independent chiefs, his neighbours, who, dreading lest his influence and power should trench upon their own, formed a league against him; and Kandahar, obeying the impulse given by Persia, allied itself to the chiefs of Bokhara, Khulm, and Balkh, to oppose his projects and those of his ally, the Emir of Kabul. The mutual hostility of these states is the impe- rative result of their respective positions, and that circumstance is the cause which has for so many years prevented the union of the Afghan principalities in one kingdom. If Kabul or Herat attacks Kandahar, a diversion is made on the north by Balkh and Khulm in support of that principality ; if it is on Khulm or Balkh that the central states direct an attack, then Kandahar and Persia will make a diversion in favour of the established equi- librium — the balance of power in Central Asia. Herat and Kabul have for some time reciprocally assisted each other; but it must be added that these alliances are modified and vary ac- cording to the interests that are engaged on either side. A short time before Yar Mohamed’s expedition to the north, he was alarmed lest his friendly connexion with Kabul should be broken off by the death of his son-in-law Mohamed Akbar Khan; but as his widow Bobojane then became the wife of Goulam Haidar Khan, another son of Dost Mohamed’s, and who also succeeded Mohamed Akbar in the post of vizier of Kabul, these fears were gradually dissipated, and, when he marched towards the south to put down the revolt of the chief of Laush-jowaine, his new son- in-law so completely overawed Kandahar that it gave him confi- dence in his intentions. The Vizier, however, knew by long experience that family ties are of little value in the eyes of Afghans, and that the smallest conflicting interest neutralises them completely ; he therefore endeavoured, while preserving the friend- ship of the chiefs of Kabul, to secure the support of Persia, her sovereign having till that period been hostile to him. To attain Crap, XXXII. KOHENDIL KHAN. 489 his object he in the first instance assisted the Shah’s troops that were engaged in repressing the revolt in Khorassan at the head of which were the sons of Assaf Dooulet ; and in thus acting he also indulged the hatred that he felt for all the members of his family. This alliance with Persia was a fresh proof of the far-sighted cha- racter of the vizier’s policy, but the friendly manifestation had very little effect upon Mohamed Shah, who detested him from his heart’s core, and an opportunity of showing this feeling having presented itself, the Persian monarch did not allow it to escape him. On the 6th of August, 1848, a messenger from the Prince Hamzeh Mirza, commander-in-chief of the Persian forces in Kho- rassan, brought two letters to the Shah. One of these missives came from Kohendil Khan, who declared himself the very humble vassal of the Shah of Persia, and as such requested the permission of the King of Kings to march against Herat with 15,000 men, and take it. “ For a long time,” said the Serdar, “ the great men of that city have been constantly asking me to assist them in putting an end to the tyranny of the Vizier Yar Mohamed Khan ; but I will not undertake the expedition without the authority of your majesty.” The other letter was from Yar Mohamed, who expressed himself in equally devoted terms, and requested the assistance of the Shah against the hostile demonstra- tions of his neighbour of Kandahar. He represented, judiciously enough, that the position taken by the English near the right bank of the Indus at Dadur, near the Bolan Pass, was at so short a distance from the former city that they necessarily possessed, and could exercise whenever they pleased, a most powerful influence over the political conduct of Kohendil Khan, who had no means of releasing himself from it; also, that in furthering the designs of the Prince of Kandahar upon Herat, the Shah of Persia would be acting in direct opposition to his own interests, for the English would then be able by his means to enter Persia at any moment they imperatively intimated a wish to that effect. Mohamed Shah knew that the Vizier told the truth, for experience had long since proved that in maintaining the three princi- palities in Afghanistan, and upholding the independence of some of the smaller chiefs, his government could exercise a much greater ascendency over them than by uniting them under one sovereign ; he could thus enter into their quarrels, and control them alter- 2 K PT — — a - - Te ne a mi J - hE 3 REE f gi In £4 ig tk gl of ! | NE | & ] {MH | TH Le 4 1 HE {ROE | (feds gs Rk ER i 1 | ib al | # fa GRE Re | 3 Gof el 4 f at A } i v : EAL | & $1 11% R } ol 1 ¢ id \ is ! iE ii ] Fla 10) { Lo | i a oY \ MN } t 490 ALLIANCE OF YAR MOHAMED Crap. XXXII, nately through each other. But his antipathy to Yar Mohamed overpowered every other consideration, and he had decided on supporting Kohendil Khan when death put an end to his earthly career on the 4th of the following September, and arrested the execution of the orders he had sent to his army in favour of the Prince of Kandahar. At the time the Shah of Persia came to this unwise decision the Vizier was at Meshed, assisting Prince Hamzeh Mirza, who was besieging it. The Afghan army per- formed prodigies of valour in many successive assaults, but what could 8000 men do against a city the inhabitants of which had, a century before, and for two years consecutively, resisted the efforts of 60,000 Afghans, under Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, and finally obliged him to raise the siege. When the news of the death of Mohamed Shah reached Meshed, the Persian troops became demo- ralised, and two battalions which occupied the citadel evacuated it, and rejoined the besieging army, which, subject to daily attacks from the enemy, and starving, had very soon no other resource left than to retire into the territory of Herat, where Yar Mohamed received Prince Hamzeh Mirza most hospitably, maintaining his soldiers for many months ; and when, in consequence of the recall of their commander to Teheran at the commencement of 1849, they quitted the principality, the prince presented four pieces of cannon to the Vizier in testimony of his gratitude for the treatment that he and his troops had received. Nasser Eddin, the successor of Mohamed Shah, adopted a policy entirely different from that of his father. Towards the middle of 1849 he sent to Yar Mohamed a sword richly set with jewels, and his highest decoration, accompanied by a letter in which he stated that he considered the Vizier as his most faithful ally. The latter was not tardy in returning these professions of friendship, and in the spring of 1850 a colossal elephant, that had been pre- sented by Yar Mohamed to his suzerain, was frequently seen prome- nading the streets of Teheran : in fact, the best understanding existed between Nasser Eddin and Yar Mohamed. Those who know the Vizier see in these demonstrative sympathies for Persia nothing more than an additional instance of his ability, but they remain still convinced that he will never give her his support so completely as to enable the Persians effectually to subdue the revolution in Khorassan under the Salar, That revolt is a great piece of good fortune for Yar Mohamed ; he now gives the law to all the TT I ar Cuar. XXXII. WITH THE SHAH OF PERSIA. 491 smaller chiefs around his dominions, and he is too clever not to see that the pacification of Khorassan would be a disadvantageous event for him—he therefore secretly feeds the fire, though he pre- tends he is endeavouring to quench it—but it is with a cupful of water. As to Kandahar, there is less chance than ever of its receiving support from Persia; and at this time, 1850, the attention of Kohendil Khan, as well as that of the Emir of Kabul, is chiefly directed to the results that have followed the extension of terri- tory acquired by the English at the expense of the Sikhs, and consequently their nearer approach to Afghanistan. Their present north-west frontier is the Indus, along the whole of its navigable course ; and they have crossed it at two points—Peshawur on the north, and Shikapoor on the south. These are tétes-de-pont which command the passage of that river, and give to the Anglo-Indian government the power of exercising the greatest influence over the policy of the chiefs of Kandahar and Kabul—may Europe never have cause to repent that she has permitted those conquests which will render Great Britain and Russia all-powerful over this planet. THE END. LONDON : PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARING-CROSS, - e——— a - s or ~ - re ¢ - 5 - - aa 3 as Binge a mp —— S —— hula 3 Bi Tl a os » Rn - EE me one 1] ME AFR ee a Ey 490 ALLIANCE OF YAR MOHAMED Crap. XXXII, nately through each other. But his antipathy to Yar Mohamed overpowered every other consideration, and he had decided on supporting Kohendil Khan when death put an end to his earthly career on the 4th of the following September, and arrested the execution of the orders he had sent to his army in favour of the Prince of Kandahar. At the time the Shah of Persia came to this unwise decision the Vizier was at Meshed, assisting Prince Hamzeh Mirza, who was besieging it. The Afghan army per- formed prodigies of valour in many successive assaults, but what could 8000 men do against a city the inhabitants of which had, a century before, and for two years consecutively, resisted the efforts of 60,000 Afghans, under Ahmed Shah, Suddozye, and finally obliged him to raise the siege. When the news of the death of Mohamed Shah reached Meshed, the Persian troops became demo- ralised, and two battalions which occupied the citadel evacuated it, and rejoined the besieging army, which, subject to daily attacks from the enemy, and starving, had very soon no other resource left than to retire into the territory of Herat, where Yar Mohamed received Prince Hamzeh Mirza most hospitably, maintaining his soldiers for many months ; and when, in consequence of the recall of their commander to Teheran at the commencement of 1849, they quitted the principality, the prince presented four pieces of cannon to the Vizier in testimony of his gratitude for the treatment that he and his troops had received. Nasser Eddin, the successor of Mohamed Shah, adopted a policy entirely different from that of his father. Towards the middle of 1849 he sent to Yar Mohamed a sword richly set with jewels, and his highest decoration, accompanied by a letter in which he stated that he considered the Vizier as his most faithful ally. The latter was not tardy in returning these professions of friendship, and in the spring of 1850 a colossal elephant, that had been pre- sented by Yar Mohamed to his suzerain, was frequently seen prome- nading the streets of Teheran : in fact, the best understanding existed between Nasser Eddin and Yar Mohamed. Those who know the Vizier see in these demonstrative sympathies for Persia nothing more than an additional instance of his ability, but they remain still convinced that he will never give her his support so completely as to enable the Persians effectually to subdue the revolution in Khorassan under the Salar, That revolt is a great piece of good fortune for Yar Mohamed ; he now gives the law to all the a Mm Tr abet gas it Cuar. XXXII. WITH THE SHAH OF PERSIA. 491 smaller chiefs around his dominions, and he is too clever not to see that the pacification of Khorassan would be a disadvantageous event for him—he therefore secretly feeds the fire, though he pre- tends he is endeavouring to quench it—but it is ‘with a cupful of water. As to Kandahar, there is less chance than ever of its receiving support from Persia; and at this time, 1850, the attention of Kohendil Khan, as well as that of the Emir of Kabul, is chiefly directed to the results that have followed the extension of terri- tory acquired by the English at the expense of the Sikhs, and consequently their nearer approach to Afghanistan. Their present north-west frontier is the Indus, along the whole of its navigable course ; and they have crossed it at two points—Peshawur on the north, and Shikapoor on the south. These are tétes-de-pont which command the passage of that river, and give to the Anglo-Indian government the power of exercising the greatest influence over the policy of the chiefs of Kandahar and Kabul—may Europe never have cause to repent that she has permitted those conquests which will render Great Britain and Russia all-powerful over this planet. THE END. LONDON : PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARING-CROSS, ————— —— — ———————— 5/5 for) Qo eee ME TIE YY MAP TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL FERRIER'S HISTORY OF AFGHANIS TAN. | { Sr” il | [ = i ar— i > I \ Wt Course o - Yo\ if -— pr = Bumposed AS | 2\ ¥ hon Z _ ~— y; re i = \ | = \ / A Clan Mohamed 3 Abin ard kos han = ahuwhrieila .- (Astrabad "Jah Jam. ) © 4 { i , | o Hostam Sunibia 8 Meanabad —— f rr a) N Me Fomeed Mevane -Daifht ; Toos / rit | AN Shah od Buduusit) 4 4 bby ggabad > " 008 Mooxdaran i‘ t « ed : hy = WET A ur o aS a. \ - fag J y D phan pre Ley, Molin, 7% Tar Miyeen nr Hoe i Shs awar TNR Ghooskun : \ 7 “ollhanaboody net N aay, d ~ t 0! osha apo / ) “life Zaffour ¥ 9 me? Teg tN \ Shereetabad QHedireh / IN ig pd abad, n “1, ~ “ewon I a ™ Ce sf “ln i y vo st oon Kalui Kyzrerbeg o | | . ol / | “ Toobut . Hydree ? ol Shehere No Toorbut Sheikh Jumee ° Aliabjad Oonshy | K © Sangal A H | 0 R A ” » 3 \ T ir _____Toorsheez — Kaui: ® A 'N 1720 | hr KX 6 a | | / N © Ruhi 4 dl Pom. 0 Hach “ g [ z To \ | Xa 8 rl, rs } i Khaff 5 . or 0 d . Sadaru Sr Buschrewgah ps ° Tubbus | / | / 7 \ Vain . . \ Tabbas Beerjoon o. ° ol 1 Lp KRezab - rc Ghayn o / i in” ~ I A ne" listan 7 Muhammedia / | ° z | Mahan o Salem l ~~ INE I~Tr IIIT TTT TIITITIe TIT ITTY ~ I J : | en - I TTI TUINTITTTITT, TUTTI TRIN JUICY \ 3 L ; Br. Kaskn)y/~ ; | | Haramaya Da ed |= | oo Harald A Ay faa Cass LT \ id Kara Bughaz T rl ~~ Kyzyl Hala o” Gulf | F Dirin ) . / / oki Lf 1819 / | po Tuer-of Tt Tongra Mus py TTT Fdkh Nabad | : ~ Yasale Jen ~~ Prarie J | [SE a & t — 4 | rel i | \ el | Lr Dorma Jem / \ / Sf \ | 7 | \ - | H or “ T jo | Wg T \ A | QO x08 A \ Kurjookoolgn o / Shurukhs td ar Serukhs - ~~. Yedagee ~~. \ \ \ See Malanoodabad Q y \ a y i aX v : Se / Diumin KH a ! Ghorian),, = 7 — Mahabad N 7 \ Yo Gutchleoo Neybundan \ IA / LL rpmpmr——— of . ~ Laroo 011 S— 1) —— 101) — TOMA 6\5 7\0 Tivo wi Drie To N Lr \ sl Orgran] ‘Waftkend, | \Zshk robat / 4 & Td & Hf Shooshe yguro | & $ | ro | Seerab oF | 7 o Nexushaks Te — — — — * ™ \ Ph ——— < WY ~~—— \ J Kaleha . / “wm ® Der gor ¥ =) “ \~ , Merve ag ( Char Bahar ow Castle of Merve \Noollataun § Charbaugh \? Imand \WBilkcleaush 5 vSahvee Yalave Punj Deeri o ‘Hooch Turchilch g * Chingoorde © Kooshk-ass tb Ei ne . ho Kussan Woosh robat & S - de Emit. Rosai pn ake Ven Qs. at § Purwana RY ”~ ERAT A ) Roxeh Bagh ? Q MirDavood R Shabith 5 ¢ wt \detreslcan ’ A Kash jabaran Subzawar NN. Sakhiro Yo Shale Jehan Jedge fo § & Ab -liourmah wr v Ww 2 Gira gkhoch- -ava, \ ir” a wo yo neh L s 5 Guzeri Khash Uy, Kiser Surig “thi 3 qh ih-quz Khan Fn don \ 0 york IE B11. LLL GR 1 a Im 7 S Wardandji 0 Ki The & Robat Sede: 3 \f | \Dehi No wp = Xx \ | | § ws \ \Sajidabad | o ; 3 Irakbittas, ” > 3 o G8 o Aldpom Alghoor Is i J fio wc Jed / , a: ier - ere trermef Tv Hissar “A i m Tv Tis 2 Ro opti’ / um Iiohistan baba ¥ Crm | ¢ Nc ok Loge a | pore a pe 9 [yamena 5 Q "Seb z [ \ TRRCCEIRIR, THC / “oe n 4 . em F. . . a” . * 2 2 3s done, 03 ey / . fl / N\ 3 $n * a) 2? . > i LA © Mamarscharvit™_ + = TE Schawloat d “iy, rt st oe PANE Him, 1, A No nn Sms MET TTg HR TE A Tg ty X RY \Gurbenit or Kaluga ol \ : ~ ! { SY. } / Syaniy ly hu 4a oh ° FB Todt or R. 7 Hes, Which, il rohan U Deragit’ 8 . Sirpool Barian { of pAhar ar »y - KABOO 5 of HE pe A Aq Babojos d 1 Sielierele J bj ly ew pi 5 MI meTRic 3 4 FATT TTT : ALLL LU INCHES x 1l v I Y 2l 1 I v 3 V I Ce Ra) 1 11 12 13 14 1 TTT TTI TTT FT fi LLL TTR, TTA ww ot . C Walker, - T 5 5 » a Tm ho i Tr Pym" 60 65 a er Sn — LL — 1 Tm, a 0 erred BR 11]1} I Ji) TIL, TITIIITIT TORII 7 Br: Kasha gf ~ fret oe ~ ; (vv - \ / Atbulak § \ Wn E ’ | f . M A P ‘ o | { = \Fomal: Ata J AN ba | TO ILLUSTRATE \ Ne 3 AT Ys r 35 Ng 7 \\ \ Derria wa . om ma (l ., oy wi 7 . Ml Seats “oe ae . Wile, Re IL aL) 1 | H y a { E . hl 9 . RV / \g ’ GENERAL FERRIER'S HISTORY Wit, § 7 q 2} Davdcara | ~ / ~N OF ; Se hahtenuz, > & / “~ Near: A \* / ) AFGHANIS TAN rhe 8 > S 1 AN X Y Bulan \ . \ \ ( i \ / js ~ ( ( \ = \ Gaza o \ \ | { ! Tangax - = / ) ot q STUN &y N \ ccaaddan | Almaz | N\ asco! ERS / p Khoj wii f "%% / O | H \ : ~~ agate A Noe \U roveni \ f ) | 4 \ Trang re or <_[ “SNewNrgen) AN / | f — jp - . / Schawtoat 9 JN ~ oo L . | / 2 \ [ J \ Fair . | a \ — . wns”, Ha — > \ | Dnguppa3. “HORAN Narghildy H Kara Bughaz . TT ~~ No ” jak \ / N / \ Macha 0 — ~ ar \ gl 5 VT | Jo ~ Hyryl Hula \ pig i» \ | “T™ dv fe \ | ( A \ i / Gulf § o Dirin : | Zo \ / C NEL < - » \ { \ \ : g| \), / 7 he - { [ ster y \ r / Tuer = | Ziman Tul \ o [/ X N pit = Tong ru — 9 dlch Nabad % Ba xergan. i \ | NN oN \ \ We x Fer | | / man JYasale Jem o = “, de, eer TT | N -— \ ok Y | L/ gs SAT Cone ml nai ~~ Bf I 7 J , — Al Tai Moy, 0 bl Wn Ho i ! ) Doras Jem / E shurneh | \ Dtsch Tuba] “Cains a Ba 4 TT ® NEN 5 > J # / Liiry, 7 a lTh Pa ¢ f A J / v Wardand)i, | A Stes, Dizzikch | t 7 K , v | Hix Feadeh \ | es 4 i 40 | ~ I vo A / 1 Ee < JL: 4 Lie we | } Waf’ nt 42 b= “ 2 a - eRe TT _ | rf 1 Tg, AA No 7 aa — 1 A : ho 7 Composed ALE 2 [posatara ) Nee LA] - 2 . vd | ot oo oo x \ va | & (ian Mohamed —\ Farakool A Old Byleun ~ ~~ w / Ho / y 4 2) akir ) g § J — = Khoosh e. 0 { | H \ A Robat { = f / \ word | gE, \J__ oe Schaweh \ — | y ~ Charjooee N SDengis L. r Adji Bou" 7 / \ ar) / ) \ v dj Be Jermab | J IDerberjd or Kakuga J \ + f [ | / y ™ ! Va Rafiarisan te, : | | $/ . \ | Lshk robaty / ) J / / . E | 5 Y Kirkinjud: o l( fo. J 8 { J \ S$ { SY * ! J Shu ib 5 J & i | { \ 0 3) y N | | A % , . Hpurbad 7 Ey Hissar or Y 4 { { \ / / .~ ’ {| 5 Shooshcygure Earahindes [| fDehi 2 Nou &7 Shadman " 5 | \ / / et A oY . : Ve 2 ~~ { . 7h dtr) | Seaab Kirke CA 3 & € Nadu - Td | fo [= of a \ o Nexushada \S; i : N > ) av 8 | \ / ~~ Abi ward 0 Nexushak Saidabad | ( - 3 & Savad po g | / — ~~ ACTON “ oN S ; f : Jan Jil ah \ | \ poy RN ~ ~~ g. NF 3 7 an Toil a i / 5, a Y% - — ™/ Aaleha o { 3 =~ $b Hawadia | \ / tlt, RS © Deregor “ Alghoor 3 J Rj #, Ast. " 2 fess el Bdoinoom { \ : Na) § | 5 “aby, fF Ly NL Aer Char Bahar 3X A - ts | ; 4 ; : aliaba me { ar Bahar or Cy of Merve . WW) o | fF < —_ Lissuruc = Shecrwan NS Kurijool volgn o Noollataun | oS " Ten \ ¢ 5 | w tr | odabyhirteda Koochan™ TN Kooi WK Charbaugh a WSR ay I Andakh,, fs \ | Astrabad Jah Jerm Radlan \ ) Robat Ab, re ™ or oe) | © dshral \ ° Mearcabad { ~~ A © , Imaumnd Aullay, 4, . Yep " Ashrat oo | Hostamn Sunldias © LT y /Shurukhs Pikleaush Khair-qp, ad _ hay - lite h ‘ ) | — z Uerfonied gp Vivane Dafht J Fé or Serukhis Lh Salivee Yaluve Ao hil, raha l eC bv og. id 3 . § / ° { \ chan | Drak AE dus) f dbbsabad J \ 3 loos Moodptin | Tedage ET “Kati Katoh \ rat { 2 3 rib | ; Damighan o-+ 7 } ow lliard / Vi TAT Mehr f Shh \, MySay D Ac T= / Lp “ Heim, \ | EN §. Dera; \ [| WL / Norn / 7 Migeen 7 \ Sh sanivar \ ¢.Ghoosku VE t Sirpool Narin | | \ lah f{ quveti’® \ ) 1 cdr ah $ Serbagh 3 4 \ plihanakoody\ J ne * Nesha . opr oF ¥ OT eh | | CF n = a i ( MH ) @ i # - i “der abad. / ) \ ” tain Pe - “dda ody Sdnut } Dehas yen [gore ” - Jnderaast *1, / ~ 3 TT Shere. Y; \ Turchilch ¢ Kartcuwo | a - Ko RTSumi “CLvoy \ ) “Tin Quifedireh \ rei r i » Vi t 4 " : “N pr Weidan AN \ A E, | 4 5, ~~ " 1 | — Boodhi 7 “Noo gh | ! , “ oon Kalui Ayres bein o Se Mali deh ad Chingoord 1. = Toobut 0 . o [ 35 &naci : Ive oe J Shéherc Noh - 5 . Cooshle assarth © I Toorsheez an. { Re - os Fo TDi Tisai , pi © dliabyd Kaleh nook TIN = Bamian ~~ y R | = Qonshy: ¥ Hoi: 4 Wooshi jrobut NES . ’ | v ’ Sangal nd take fo 3 : : , 8 OLA] abo 5 K H ~ : wait An wh Koh i pay Aharzar RABO ON a ow a 8 AN lr fo | Divernine if o Grinabad Ghorian), 4 oR, \ po. Jaght’ : 4 Lom & fach L Ruhi Roweh Bay 3 hn i E oon. o- ) Air Davood | 8 o Khaff Shabith ? H a o Sadaru Buschrewgah X = | ya ° Tubbus ( yd Jean 2 3 pe - ) dclresl § : 5 / . { Pv? | 8 ( A fash _Jabaran NU Abirevdn o Pa % Denia -derreh _ i i - / / \ ° o ¢ - 1 Vor | wi Subzowar™ Sakhir o \ aN 0 1 rR ~ = | Nain / , . Tabbas \ \ y x | / Beerjoon 0 > o Shale Jehan \ Tv’ 4 PG / Sedge ’ ) ~~ Reval ' & Ab Jourmah Lerra ¢ » bn | by exab } : . { | 5 o Grtchloo o llahabad Nevbundan Pp / \ [A vereh { Ng. 5 ee Ghayn o Licroo f phhoch-aly) \ / 1 Fe oo - ~O a J (iran os / 1 - Listan 5 hts Wh caurm ab & § [ = oF gah FY wast > A | P \. / ee 5 / ght «Ne | B - x D WY = Khoormaleke od WN > 2 \ pigbanak | q / / Lesh, 7s Bw osyq Hasso ab od & $F Sine | \ ] / tr fonfine 2 As oy > JG Wo ge ne | 1 Muhammedia / YN 1). ’ a 4 Kar? NA r y 3! 5 ndaropn'y Je Doorroozabads ~ - (oy of rah vr okhhash Mahmood! > ~ g | SS Khubhes Homo gio w ¥ Guz er hash \ Kaley “a. " —. 2 ] | Tehey, hé HE 52. po Kh Kms Y : § | | \ / ry U.,; user wig gpguari vr ao | a v ! Tukhtapol X po g | | \ / % t 3 - a “abd ohh aziz Khan Ae MRalatch : Jat * & — \ P J or Shindeh (cHzar Juft pe Ny | | \ / Shemal™ § Derveshane § Nn ON HH Bos, \ / ‘ | bei \ / oT whah aboo Thaleb Sr fom WX . & ~~ { | Hormu radu, Jie o Salem La a pr eis - J g { | ) 3 Ny aderreis “ ~ = { |B 1 \ / \ Pe RE tA Lemar Ketan rT 4 { f J \ / ph y R NY 2, “in, Yona Siler Latif \/ \ ) "iy | 2, nti Lose sin . K | 3 \ / +, lela Trak, Sy ¥ § F 2 us at Ho HE a sUnena 30 a0) \ ; S Kia ye $ % Lob / & ry "$y vn « 2 I 2 - RO \ . EH Try —— / — | a. _ 4 ‘ — / Jo - mE — — : ~ 09D YKIRMAN a m—L TH PLL TALS ~~ ) I . QOL TI il NIE = | — : ; TE EN pr, i ee — CELLET LRH LH ULL MY 3.8 C Walker, [INCHE 1 T | l iii 1 2 3 LL 3 6, fm LTT YTD bree reer Sr der do T 1 HT TITTTATTTTTTITITT Tht IM TT TTT TTT TTITTAITAe wo ALBEMARLE STREET, January, 1858, MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF WORKS IN PREPARATION. a THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS. 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