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CHAP. LXVII.]

I’ondicherry. Notwithstanding the strange-
ness of making a reference to the supreme
council for French affairs in India, concerning
a matter which was too mean for the French
commander, or his mercantile colleagues in
direction of French affairs at Myhie, the
English, still commonplace, in their own
common-sense way, proceeded to appeal to
the council for their property and redress of
injuries. The tone of these French commu-
nications was as devoid of true courtesy as of
justice and honour. Further correspondence
between the two factories of Myhie and Telli-
cherry ensued, but no person at either factory
understood the language spoken at the other
sufficiently well to carry on a clear correspon-
dence. and delays and mistakes resulted,
until it was mutually agreed to transact busi-
ness in Portuguese, as men of that nation, or
natives—half-caste Portuguese—resided at
both places.

The native chiefs were not slow in learning
the true state of feeling between the English
and French, and did their best to inflame their
jealousies and enmities, fearing that both
might unite for purposes of territorial aggran-
dizement. The Boyanore pretended to ally
himself with the English; a “ Nair,” named
Curringboda, ostensibly attached himself to
the French, and both European powers were
placed by their cunning native allies in an
attitude of anger and defiance. No English
were allowed to cross the French borders, nor
were the latter permitted to pass into British
territory; ifsuch a circumstance by chance oc-
curred, the intruders were chased like spies or
poachers. The vessels of either nation were
forbidden to enter the harbour of the other.
A French “muncha” persisted in approach-
ing the harbour of Tellicherry, and when
warned off, the crew used insulting language.
The offended council at Tellicherry demanded
from that at Myhie an apology for the tres-
pass and rudeness of their mariners, and also
demanded explanations as to the object of the
munchas voyage, which the English alleged
was to land ammunition and milita1y st01es
for the supply of the Rajah ofCotiote, in order
that he might have means of making war
upon the Boyanore, so as to prostlate 01
enfeeble the ally of the English. The object
of the F1ench was to make war upon the
B1itish indirectly, and without 1ncurring the

responsibility of appearing in arms. The
French commander apologised 111 most com-
plaisant tcr,ms which might have been 111-
tended ful‘ irony, for the rudeness of his
sailors, but took no notice of the serious im-
peachment of stirring 11p feuds to the damage
of the English, and supplying their known
enemies with munitions of war. Thus, step
VOL. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

 

189

by step, the French were accumulating an
amount of injuries to the English, which no
attempt was made to explain away, soften, or
compensate; and the irritated British were
nursing their pent-11p rage for the hour of
decisive action. The diary of the Tellicherry
factory from November 7 to December, 1725,
is ajournal of grievances against the French.

In 1726 the French and English were
very near coming into conflict. The Boyanore
was attacked by the French. The latter pre-
tended various grievances, but the real motive
was to weaken the relative power of the
English by the conquest of their most os-
tensible ally, and to produce a moral effect
among the native powers, by showing that
the English were not able to protect their
friends against France, and that to incur the
ill-will of the latter was destructive to all na-
tive powers, whatever their European alliances.
This was a bold motive, and the measure
was well calculated to carry it out. The
Boyanore claimed assistance, for which he
offered to pay, a condition upon which the
English insisted. They sent him one hundred
nairs, but the Boyanore had neither money
nor probity, and as he had already contracted
a large debt for military supplies, they were
unwilling to allow him to increase it. The
results were that the Boyanore demanded
a truce with the French, and came to terms.
The French accomplished their object, the
prestige of the English was lowered, and
their characteristic habit of adopting a costly
economy was once more brought prominently
out.

The French were emboldened, and joined
the natives that were hostile to the English
in every demonstration of ill-feeling. It was
at this juncture that the French united in a
pretended hunting expedition with certain
native chiefs, a circumstance incidently re-
ferred to in a former chapter to show the re-
lation of the English to the native powers
around them. The conduct of the French
on that occasion was palpably hostile, and
the English demanded satisfaction. The
reply was somewhat submissive, as if its
authors were conscious that they had gone
too far, and that they might incur the dis-
pleasure of the authorities of Pondicherry;
or else they were alarmed at the practical
manner in which the English had shown
their disapproval of “ the hunting party” of
native chiefs and French soldiers, by volleys
of grape-shot and musket balls. At all events,
the tone of the French was apologetic; they
declared they merely went a hunting, and
were surprised to find the English so unneigh-
bourly, and hoped, for the future, to “live in
peace and harmony with all,” especially their

c C

190 HISTORY OF THE

European neighbours, and chiefly their British
friends.’ Soon after, the French fired upon
an English hunting party—a bond fide party
of pleasure—and demands for redress were
of course made. The French pleaded un-
qualified innocence. The answer of the chief
of the English factory is one of the most
remarkable specimens of English diplomacy
ever disclosed. The plain-speaking Briton
was not to be soothed by heartless words, but
in direct terms informed his French corre—
spondents what he thought of them. It is so
unique, that the reader cannot fail to peruse
it with interest. It is signed by all the
members of the council, but the style identi-
fies it as the production of the chief, Robert
Adams. The “Cuny Nair” referred to, is
the native leader, previously termed “ Curr-
ingboda,” the English having been accus-
tomed to term him “Cunny,” or “Gunny
Nair,” in writing or speaking of him :—

To Elf. Trcnu'sot and his Council.
Tellic/zerry, October, 213$, 1736. 0.3.

GENTLEMEN,——We just now received yours of this date,
by which you acknowledge the receipt of ours of the thh
instant. By this we find, as we have always done,
commit what you will, are never at a loss for an evasion,
which treatment is grown so old, that it will hardly pass
for current at this time of day. It is with satisfaction
find you confess to have had some of your people out
those days we hunted, which we designed for our recrea~
tion, till obstructed by you and your accomplice, Cuny
Nair, who of himself would never have dared to have
broken the peace with us without your inciting and
assisting him, as he did in conjunction with your people,
by firing on us first, which was a good reason for us the
next day to go with more caution and preparation in our
own limits and conquest. It is very unaccountable you
of the French nation should not only with your money
and ammunition encourage the country against us, but
appear personally yourselves in an hostile manner, and
till you can deprive us of the evidence of our senses, we
shall not fail to continue to charge the French with the
breach of the good harmony between the two crowns in
Europe, as expressed in our officers’ and soldiers’ narrative
sent you of the actions of the 12th and 13th instant.

We did in 0an of the 16th, reply to all you wrote,
and did then signify that Cuny Nair to the 12th instant
was esteemed by us a friend, and might have continued
so, had you not beguiled him with vain promises of
protection and charges to disturb us. If this is your
meaning of loving tranquillity, we are strangers to it, and
shall be proud of being accounted so. As to the contents
of what you wrote, we are, and always have been, ob-
servers of the peace and good harmony between the two
crowns, and find with concern our patiently bearing all
your insults, both by sea and land, has not only given you
the opportunity to proceed as you have in this hostile
manner, but has encouraged you to do what you have lately
done with Cuny Nair; but your design not taking ett'cct,
are resolved to deny it. Otherwise, might have been as
open as Monsieur Boisron of the Lyme was, when he not
only seized and detained, but plundered the Dewy grab of
Mangalore.

These your treatments are so plain and obvious, that we
need not enlarge on them, and that now you should begin,
as did on the 12th and 13th instant, to give us new testi-

 

monies of your continuingr to disturb us, does not at all

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXVI I.

answer your expressions of this date, not to give us any
disturbance by land or sea. We should think ourselves
very happy, did your actions answer your writing; then
we could be able to say, as we have always made it our
study and endeavours to be in good harmony with you;
but while you agitate, assist, and excite the country
people in friendship with us, not only to take up arms, but
appear with them against us in an hostile manner as
above, you must pardon us if, in making the just and true
representation, we occasion you any uneasiness or con-
fusion, for we cannot but say, your usage, for these three
years last past, has been without regard to laws of nations
or nature; and as to Cuny Nair, who has broke his faith
with us, whenever we think convenient to call him to an
account for it, shall not, we hope, find any of your
people with him; which will induce us to be, gentlemen,

Your most humble and most obedient servants,
ROBERT ADAMS.
JOHN JOHNSON.
STEPHEN Law.
WM. FORBES.
Iluon Ilowaun.

Probably, under the circumstances in which
it was penned, no communication could have
been more pointed and prudent. The French
had all the advantage of style and dexterity;
the English, whatever their disadvantages in
those particulars, were so “downright straight-
forward,” as to cause confusion to their in-
triguing rivals, and leave them little power to
reply to any purpose.

Soon after the suave expressions of the
French in this correspondence, the English
received certain intelligence of the hostility
of Cuny Nair. It will be recollected by
the reader, from the perusal of previous
chapters, that there were several hills in the
immediate vicinage of Tellicherry. These,
if occupied strongly by the British, would
enable them to command the plains and the
land approaches: if occupied by an enemy,
Telliclierry would be untenable, and on this
account the situation was deemed ineligible
by military men, as requiring a larger gar-
rison than the amount of its commerce could
afford. Myhie, on the other hand, could not
be commanded, while its own position was
elevated and strong. One of the hills near
Tellicherry, the occupation of which by
an enemy might prove perilous, was called
Putinha, and this Cuny Nair intended to seize.
The English reasonably believed that this
movement was impelled by French instiga-
tion, which the subsequent conduct of the
authorities at Myhie proved. The ling-lish
anticipated Cuny, and occupied the hill them-
selves. There was another hill under the
guns of the English fort, called Caria Cuna,
and as soon as the French perceived the
movement of the British towards Putinha,
they seized the other eminence. Another
correspomlence ensued, which issued in a
conference. One Louet visited 'l‘ellichcrry,
and debated affairs with the British, but this

CHA P. LXVII.]

conference did not prove satisfactory. Stephen
Law and William Forbes proceeded as an
English deputation to Myhie. The hospi-
talities shown in each case to the delegates
softened the asperity of the contest, and the
affair ended in “ a drawn battle,” both parties
abandoning the military positions assumed,
and Cuny keeping himself out of the way.
On the whole, the dispute ended favourably
to the British, for, practically, they succeeded
in their object, although their demands for
apology were not satisfied.

The military expenses of both British and
French factories now so alarmed the directors
of each company, that orders were sent out
to cultivate a good understanding. The
French only intended to cultivate it so long
as necessity constrained, and hoped to recruit
the sinews of war for a better opportunity.
The English were in earnest, and orders were
issued to the council of Tellicherry to reduce
their armed forces, and to cultivate a kind
intercourse with their Gallic neighbours. As
the distance between the two settlements was
so short, it was easy to reciprocate courtesies
and hospitalities, which were for a while
abundant, and apparently cordial, but the
French continued to intrigue with the native
princes against the English, and to the dis-
turbance of the country, as far as their clever
but mischievous influence reached.

In 1728 a treaty of peace and alliance was
signed by the governors of Bombay and Pon-
dicherry, and the directors of the East India
Company in London, and the president and
council in Bombay believed that differences
were healed; but the Tellicherry people knew
better, and while carrying out the directions
of their superiors with frankness, did not relax
their vigilance, nor increase their confidence
in the political honesty of their new allies.

The English, who had been long enduring,
became at length testy, and rather disposed to
end harassing disputes, suspicions, and dis-
quietude by arms. They ceased to be anxious
for peace with French or natives, although
they did not then see on what a grand scale
of action the warlike powers of themselves
and their countrymen in India should be soon
tested. As the year 1740 approached, the
tone of feeling in Bombay and Madras, on the
coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, at Surat
and on the Hoogly, was that of a sullen
conviction that, some time or other, French
gasconadc and aggression would provoke war.
The English (lid not desire it, but, as the
French say, they “accepted the situation,"—
they gradually conformed their minds to the
Conviction that it was best to fight it out,
unless some decisive measure of peace in
Europe should harmonise elements which so

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

191

actively repelled one another. This state of
mind probably prevailed more at Tellicherry
than anywhere else in India, from the juxta-
position of the settlement and garrison of
Myhie. The pugnacious feeling created in
the minds of the English by the conduct of
the French found vent sometimes in a wrong
direction, and made them too hasty in entering
into native quarrels, which, in a calmer frame,
they would have avoided. The combativeness
thus called forth again reacted upon their
tone and bearing towards the French. Events

beyond their control, and the working of
which was hidden, were preparing them for

the development of the warlike genius, activity,

and daring, which so soon made them masters

of an empire. Probably the disturbances and

disorder within the factory at Myhie, in 1739,

prevented the occurrence then of the collision

to which circumstances were fast ripening.

The consciousness that the English were the

stronger also averted overt acts on the part of

the French, who were still further held in

check by the derangements of their com-

mercial and economical affairs.

In 1740 tidings arrived in India that
England had declared war against Spain, and
that it was believed in Europe France would,
as usual, espouse the cause of the enemies of
England. Previous to the arrival of this
news, a war of correspondence was waged;
but the advent of such information created an
excitement which could with difficulty be
repressed. The French, as usual when any
difference ensued, and they supposed them-
selves strong enough, made hostile demon-
strations. The British at Tellicherry had
fortified one of the neighbouring hills, called
Andolamala; the French formed intrench—
ments near it. The English, regarding this
as an aggression, did not, as formerly, write
blunt letters, or hold conferences, but directed
a small party of soldiers, under the command
of an ensign, to assault the trenches. This
was admirably executed. The attacking party
was small, and but one European officer with
it. The French opened a heavy fire upon the
advancing party when within range; but so
rapidly, boldly, and orderly did the British
charge, that they entered the trenches with
little loss, and drove out the enemy with so
much ease as to excite the contempt of the
natives and deeply to humiliate the vaunting
soldiers by whom the trenches were so inso-
lently opened and occupied. The humiliation
of the Gauls did not end with their defeat;
they did not dare to strike another blow; but
instead of gallantly seeking to retrieve their
disgrace, they endeavoured to bribe the native
chiefs to make war in their stead. The result.
of the action to the English was a great ins

192

crease of their moral influence and self reliance.
The event did not certainly dispose them to
put up with further insults, which the French
continued to offer in such way as to leave a
declaration of hostilities on the part of the
English on such ground impossible, while the
afl'ronts, nevertheless, irritated and annoyed.

Tellicherry was the focus, or, at all events,
the principal focus, when there were several
foci, of quarrel with the French. The factory
at Ajengo, the progress and general troubles
of which were .related in a former chapter,
was one of the points around which French
influence and menace gathered; but as the
Dutch preferred learned despatches to war,
so the French preferred gasconade and display
to any immediate appeal to arms, although
they made it evident enough they were willing
to strike but dared not. The English factors
at Ajengo were as invulnerable to French
satire as to Dutch casuistry : they pursued the
even tenor of their way, and carried on their
correspondence with the French with much
less respect for their adversaries than when
addressing the Dutch, notwithstanding the
overlaid courtesy and compliment of the
letters and despatches of the former.

At Carwar and Honawar, on the Malabar
coast, the English were annoyed by the pre-
sence of French agents in the neighbour-
hood, fomenting disputes between the native
chiefs, stimulating them against the English,
and sowing seeds of envy and anger among
the neighbouring Dutch and Portuguese,
which were as prolific as those who scattered
them could desire. Still it was at Tellicherry
not only so far as Western India was con-
cerned, but taking all India into account, that
intrigues and open acts of hostility on the
part of the French had the best opportunity
of development; and when all was compa-
ratively calm in the British settlements of
Malabar, disturbances between British and
French broke out again at Tellicherry and
Myhie. The French troubles appeared to
have been hushed to slumber at the other
stations—even St. David’s was comparatively
little tormented by Pondicherry—when at
Tellicherry there occurred new alarms and
discontents.

In 1741 the expectations of a general war
in Europe were yet more prevalent in India
than they were, as above noticed, in the be-
ginning of 1740. France and England,
although virtually at war from 1740, were
not actually in hostilities until 1741; accord—
ingly, authors date the commencement of this
var very variously, some considering that it
properly commenced in 1742, others before
that time, and another class of writers dating
its commencement from 1741.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LX V II.

It was natural that the Europeans in India
should in their own political relations be
keenly susceptible of any impression from
symptoms which portended a struggle be-
tween the two great maritime powers of
Europe, when it is remembered how frequently
their swords were drawn against one another.
The relations of the two great contiguous
European countries as to peace and war over
a long period of history may be thus stated.
There broke out wars between England and
France at the following dates, and which
lasted for the following periods :—“ 1100 for
two years; 1141, one year; 1161, twenty-
five years; 1211, fifteen years; 1224, nine-
teen years; 1294, five years; 1339, twenty-
one years; 1368, fifty - two years; 1442,
forty-nine years; 1192, one month; 1512,
two years; 1521, six years; 1515), one year;
1557, two years; 562, two years; 1627, two
years; 1666, one year; 1689, ten years; 1702,
eleven years; 1741, four years; 1756, seven
years; 1776, seven years; 1793, nine years;
and lastly, in 1803, twelve years: making in
all 265 years of war within a period of 727
years.”

The ideas of French power which prevailed
amongst Englishmen, and amongst the men of
other European nations in 17:11, were very
different from those which now prevail :-—-
“ During the early period of these wars, our
continental rival continued preponderant, and
the revenue and population considerably ex-
ceeded that of this country. The revenue of
Louis XIV. was computed at nearly three
times that of Charles II. The alliance against
France, cemented by the perseverance of
V‘Villiam, rendered victorious by the talents of
Marlborough, relieved us from the dreaded
overthrow of the political equilibrium; but
even after our splendid successes, it Continued
a common opinion among foreigners, as among
ourselves, that the resources of the French
were more solid, and that they would soon
equal or surpass us in those arts which form
the constituents of national wealth.

“ In the reign of George I., this country
bore to France in point of population the pro-
portion of only forty-five to one hundred.
“Vere we to continue the parallel, we should
find that as to population we shall probably
overtake our ancient rival before the lapse of
many years. Meantime, those who know that
the issue of a military struggle mainly de-
pends not so much on population as on dis-
posable revenue, will be satisfied that at
present we should have no cause to dread a
contest single-handed with that power, against
which our forefathers were obliged to seek
continental alliances.""“

* Colburn’s Uniled Service Magazine, January, 1857.

CRAP. LXVI 1.]

Between 1740 and 1744 the animosity be-
tween the two nations was intense, and their
resources were squandered in indirect war.
From the death of Charles VI., Emperor of
Germany, in 1741, the certainty of an open
and ostensible rupture between England and
France at no distant date was obvious to every
reflecting person in Europe and among Euro-
peans in Asia.

At Tellicherry and Myhie, the grand
struggle during this brief interval consisted of
efforts to prevent either factory from its usual
participation in the trade of pepper—a com-
mon source of quarrel between European
nations in the East, and one peculiarly em-
bittered. During that time, matters generally
went in favour of the English; they secured
by their more direct diplomacy the confidence
of the native chiefs, who admired the French
more, but trusted the English better. The Eng-
lish continued to receive lavish expressions of
French compliment, and replied by unpolished,
plain spoken, but on the whole civil letters,
the writers of which cared nothing for French
courtesy, and had no reliance on French ho-
nour. Meanwhile, the British had taken up the
French game of intriguing with the native chiefs
against their neighbours, and played it well;
so well, that for eight months the settlements
of France were blockaded by native powers
at English instigation. Among the French
no man, at least no public man, understood
the true policy to be pursued by a European
power in India, except the gallant and wise
Labourdonnais. In 1740 his Asiatic services
were so appreciated in France, that not only
was he welcomed to his country with accla-
mation, but the honour was conferred upon
him of returning to the East in command of
both afleet and army. He had previously,
as the reader has seen, shown his warlike
genius at Myhie in a. comparatively humbler
although honourable capacity; at the time
now under review, he equally displayed it as
a sagacious statesman and naval commander.
On the 13th of November, 1741, he arrived
at Myhie not only with naval and military
authority, but as supervisor of French trade.
Upon his arrival, he opened a correspondence
with the English factors at Tellicherry, pro-
posing accommodation and friendship. He
was sincere; and the language in which he
expressed himself showed the goodness of his
heart and the greatness of his nature. He of
course objected to those demonstrations of
force which the English so frequently made
against the French settlements in favour of
their native enemies; and requested that
in an attack contemplated by the French
upon the Boyanore and Namburis, who were
then blockading Myhie from the land, that

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

193

the English would not send succours of war
either by land or sea; and if English boats
came within a certain distance in spite of his
warning and request, he begged that he
might not be considered hostile if they were
searched, to ascertain whether munitions were
conveyed in them for his foes. His request
was reasonable, and it would have been im-
possible to convey what duty and necessity
dictated in language more manly, honest, just,
and conciliatory. The reply of the English
chief was civil and cold; he admitted the pro-
priety of searching English boats, but took
no notice of the other demands. The fact
was, the predecessors of Labourdonnais had
brought about a state of things which could
not be removed by the kind and sincere policy
of that great and good man. The French
had entered upon a certain game, into which
they had forced the English; and the latter
were not likely to allow them to draw the
stakes when there was a prospect of success
to English pertinacity and common sense.

Labourdonnais stormed the native in-
trenchments, defeated Boyanore in the open
field ; followed up his successes in a short but
brilliant campaign, and compelled the trouble-
some Indian to cede territory around the
factory at Myhie, within a circumference
swept by a radius of an English mile."“ The
French commander and supervisor then visited
the English, for whom he had a cordial re-
spect, which they appreciated, and received
him with distinguished honour. His object
was to conciliate and reconcile, as a Christian
obligation, and a sound policy in the Asiatic
interests of France, of the prospects of which
he alone, amongst all the French officers and
traders of the time, is known to have had fore-
sight.

He proposed a treaty, several articles of
which were characterized by justice, good
sense, and moderation. One of these articles
stipulated the mutual abandonment of all out-
lying forts, and military positions which only
served as demonstrations of hostility, and
created to both factories expenses destructive
of the profits of their trade. The English
freely accepted this point, for they had con-
fidence in Labourdonnais, although not in
his countrymen generally. Another article
was that all differences between the natives
and either the French or English, should be
arbitrated by that one of the two European
powers not mixed up in the dispute, and in
case the native chiefs refused the arbitration,
a combined force of French and English
should enforce what appeared just to both.
This was too complicated a proposal for the
English factors; they preferred ending their

* Diaries nfBoméag/ and Tel/ic/zeriy.

194: HISTORY OF THE
own quarrels without French assistance, and
they were not disposed to aid the French
against the natives in quarrels which did not
involve the interests of the East India Com-
pany. The proposal of Labourdonnais was
transmitted for decision to the council of Bom-
bay. After much deliberation the articles
were agreed to and ratified at Bombay and
Pondicherry.

The British, after the signature, became
more hopeful of peace, and redueed their
military forces; they also razed the forts of
Putinha, Andolamala, and Termala. Labour-
donnais being honest, and in earnest, the
French forts of Canamala, Peringaturc, Chim-
bera, and Poitera, were razed. Labourdon-
nais appeared no more upon the western
shores of India, but in other directions he
made his genius and warlike power felt while
the warbetween the two nations raged in the
East. According to Raynal he was the first
who suggested the desirableness of dispatch-
ing royal ships of war to the Indian seas.

On the withdrawal of Labourdonnais from
Myhie, a factor named Leyrit assumed the
government. He continued to maintain good
relations with the English as recommended by
Labourdonnais. The neighbouring native
chiefs were alarmed at seeing the amity of the
two European nations; and well understand-
ing how easy it was to disturb it, they agreed
among themselves to adopt whatever schemes
were most likely to bring to pass some inter-
ruption to the prevailing harmony. The
Boyanore, now an ally of the French, ob—
structed English trade, and the French, not-
withstanding the binding obligations of the
recent treaty, did not adopt any means to
persuade or deter him from doing so, as
they reaped a temporary profit by his pro-
ceedings. The King of Colestry defied and
irritated the French, assuming that he did so
as the champion of the English. A coolness
sprung up ; yet neither party was disposed to
break the peace. In 1744: the chief of Telli-

cherry informed the president at Myhie that .

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXVII.
been declared in Europe, but he proposed
that, nevertheless, they should remain good
neighbours; and to prevent any misinterpre-
tations of the good understanding, it was
agreed that their troops should not fire upon
one another within sight of the factory flags.
The Englislf went still farther in their peace—
ful dispositions, and having been very success-
ful in purchases of pepper, they sent eighty
candies of it to Myhie. The French returned
naval salutes, and restored English deserters.
The two companies encouraged these peaceful
manifestations, and the chief French authority
in Pondicherry ratified all that had been done
at Myhie. The president and council of
Bombay believed that such a compromise was
injurious to the interests of the English nation
generally, and more especially in the East,
and deemed it better that the two nations
should carry on the war at home and abroad
until victory decided the mastery. The Eng-
lish government was of the same opinion.
The chief at Tellicherry was censured by the
government of Bombay, pointing out to him
that the French were merely espousing a
truce to gain time, their Eastern forces being
inferior to those of England. At Myhie this
was more evidently the case, as the exchequer
of the factory was drained by pompous mili-
tary spectacles, and continuous military expe-
ditions, and once more, in the moment of
perplexity, the Boyanore invested the place.
Such were the positions of the two powers
in India, when the first bolts of war fell and
shook the realms over which the mighty
storm, long preparing, at last spent its force.
There was a eapriciousness and singularity
about French and English relations in \Yes-
tern India. When the parent powers were at
perfect peace, their factories were waging "' a
little war :” when there was open hostility in
the British Channel, the factories were ex-
changing salutes, making presents, offering
compliments, and vowing perpetual amity.
It is necessary now to turn to other depart-
ments of the field of struggle, and to relate

war between their respective countries had the progress of the war itself.

CHAP. LXVIII.] '

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN THE EAST—SURRENDER OF MADRAS—S‘IEGES
AND ASSAULTS OF FORT ST. DAVID BY THE FRENCH—SIEGE OF PONDICHERRY BY THE
BRITISH—PEACE IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE TREATY OF AIX-LA~CHAPELLE.

WAR between France and England having
been declared, and the efforts of the traders
of both nations in, some of the stations in
India to preserve neutrality having proved
unavailing, the conflict began at Madras in
17-16. On the 14th of September that year,
a French fleet, under the gallant Labour-
donnais, anchored between four and five
leagues to the south of Madras, and landed
six hundred soldiers, seamen, and marines.
The troops moved by land, while the fleet
coasted during the remainder of that day and

 

the morning of the ensuing. About mid-
day of the 15th, they arrived before the city.
Labourdonnais effected, without opposition,
the landing of the remaining French infantry.
The assailing force consisted of more than
one thousand French, four hundred sepoys,
drawn from the various French stations,
chiefly Pondicherry, and four hundred blacks
of Madagascar, called Caffres, who had been
employed as a garrison in the French settle-
ment of the Mauritius, and were well-disci-
plined by Labourdonnais himself. The troops
landed were little short of two thousand men,
and an equal number were on board the fleet
to act as occasion might require.

The garrison was by no means adequate to
cope with such a force, led by one of the best
commanders of the age. The soldiers were
two hundred, one hundred of whom were
English volunteers, and were utterly inex-
perienced in war. These were all that could
be relied upon. There were between three
and four thousand Portuguese Indians who
sympathized more with the French than with
the British, and were not armed. The Syrian
Christians and Jews were pretty numerous,
and would have proved faithful to the .
English, but they were not warlike, and the "
British did not place that confidence in them 1
which they deserved. Concerning the quality !
of the garrison, Professor \Vilson remarks :—
“,A letter to a proprietor of India stock,
published in 1750, by a person who was
evidently concerned in the government of’
Madras at the time, states, that the soldiersI
were not only few, but of a very indifferent;
description; that the town was ill provided
with ammunition stores, and that its fortifica-
tions were in a ruinous condition: the neces-
sity for rigid economy at home, having with-
held the means of maintaining the establish-
ment abroad in a state of efficiency.”

 

The governor was summoned to surrender,
and refused. A bombardment opened from
the whole fleet, and the artillery landed with
the invaders. Notwithstanding the weakness
of the defence, the bombardment was con-
tinued five days without any attempt to
storm. The troops of the garrison were worn
out, the native inhabitants filled with terror,
and the half-caste Portuguese disaffected; the
fortifications could no longer protect their de-
fenders, and as an assault must be successful,
the president offered a ransom. Labour-
donnais was too much of a politician to ac-
cept the like. He knew that if the French
flag was seen floating above Madras, it would
produce a moral effect not inferior to a similar
triumph at even Goa or Batavia, and he in-
sisted upon surrender. Mr. Mill describes
him as coveting “ the glory of displaying
French colours on the ramparts of St. George,”
which is not accordant with the temper,
character, or conduct of Labourdonnais: he
was solely actuated by a sense of duty and
honour, and a clear view of the policy that
suited his country.

“'hile he insisted upon capitulation, he
pledged his honour to restore the settlement
upon payment of a moderate ransom of
100,000 pagodas, or rather bonds for the
payment of that amount were given by the
president, and the city surrendered. The
conduct of Labourdonnais was as gentle
while a victor, as it was fearless in war. He
had not lost a man during the bombardment,
and as he did all in his power to avoid blood-
shed, only four or five English perished. His
care in directing the shells, so as to inflict as
little injury as possible upon private property,
enabled him to effect his conquest with only
the destruction of a few houses of the inhabi-
tants. Labourdonnais gained a complete
ascendancy over all with whom he came in
contact; he was beloved alike by English and
natives, his hearing was not that of a victor,
but of a friend: even of his private fortune, be
contributed to alleviate distresses, which, as a
French officer, he could not avoid inflicting.
History has not often recorded one so brave,
so good, so tender, and so just in victory as
this great and glorious man.

An English fleet had been dispatched from
England, but the admiral having died, the com-
mand devolved upon the senior captain, who
was deficient in skill and spirit, and evaded

196

a conflict with Labourdonnais, remaining in
the harbour of Trincomalee, so that the French
admiral was in effect not only masterof Madras,
but of the Indian seas.

Labourdonnais had a more formidable
enemy than the English—Dupleix, the go-
vernor of Pondicherry, and supreme chief of
all the French factories in India. He was a
man of superior, of even great, intellectual
parts, but of the lowest moral qualifications
for his post. His envy was mean, his osten—
tation childish, his desire of praise avaricious,
his ambition boundless and utterly unprin-
cipled. He could conceive the greatest un-
dertakings, and carry them out with a genius
corresponding to that which devised them.
No want of political intrigue was too intri-
cate for him to comprehend or disentangle;
but where the risk of personal safety was
concerned, he was without courage, even if
the completion of his dearest designs de-
pended upon its exercise. He had the great-
ness of mind which belongs to the purely
intellectual, but was without magnanimity,
for it was never shown towards foes or friends,
vanquished or victors, competitors in the same
career, or those who achieved success in any
other. He was implacable in his resentments,
and degraded his country by using her power
to gratify them. He was desirous of promot-
ing French glory, but chiefly that France
might be under obligation to him : he wished
her to be made conspicuous by a light shining
from himself. Such was Dupleix, and he
never displayed these evil qualities more than
in his conduct to Labourdonnais, and his
opposition to what that magnanimous man
proposed. “'hen Dupleix heard of the success
of Labourdonnais, his mind was filled with
strangely conflicting emotions. Hatred to
the English caused him to receive the in-
telligence with gi'atification—-envy of La-
bourdonnais, filled him with mortiflcation.
He conceived the idea of so thwarting his
own countryman, as to deprive him of his
honour, if not of his glory, and of so treating
the English, whom Labourdonnais respected,
as to humiliate their generous friend and con-
queror. Like the heroic Russian general who
conquered Kai‘s, Labourdonnais became the
friend and protector of the valiant and unfor-
tunate, whom nothing but fate could conquer;
but Dupleix determined to frustrate that
benevolence, and reverse that policy. Ac-
cordingly he refused to recognise the agree-
ment made by the captor of Madras to restore
it upon the payment of an indemnity. Labour-
donnais was not a man to be trifled with,
even by one so eminent and powerful as Du-
pleix, and he firmly insisted that the powers
with which he sailed from France were inde-

HISTORY O F THE

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [Guam LXVIII.
pendent of Duplcix, and that he had not
only acted in virtue of them, but under the
instructions which he received from the
French East India Company, which were
characterized by moderation and forbearance.
He had it in his power, Professor “'ilson
affirms, according to those instructions, to de-
stroy or to restore, but. not to occupy, Madras.
The second of the alternatives, where so
strong a nation as England was concerned,
was the more politic; but independent of that,
destruction and cruelty were revolting alike
to the principles and feelings of the great
Frenchman.

Unable to deter Labourdonnais, and afraid
to take any penal measures of a direct nature
against him, Dupleix sent instructions of such
a kind, as while not directly overruling the
admiral’s orders, rendered it difficult for the
French officers and agents to know which to
obey or what to do. By such means the re-
moval of goods and stores were impeded, and
the fleet was unable to leave Madras (the
worst point in a storm in all the Indian seas)
until the monsoons began. On the night of
the 13th of October a storm drove the fleet
out to sea. Two of the ships were lost, all
hands on board perishing except fourteen.
The other vessels were tossed about, dismasted,
and nearly wrecks. Dupleix refused all as-
sistance. He next insisted that the date of
the restoration of the city, which was to have
been two days after the storm, should be de-
ferred three months. Labourdonnais and the
English with reluctance consented. The ad-
miral could not remain on such a dangerous
coast during the stormy weather which had
set in, and on his departure the place was of
course surrendered to Dupleix. He imme-
diately violated the treaty in a manner as
void of shame as of honour.

“’hen Labourdonnais disappeared with his
fleet, the nabob, at the head of a native army,
attacked the French, resolving to possess
himself of the great city for which the Euro—
peans were contending among themselves.
When the French fleet sailed, twelve hundred
men were left behind, who had been disci-
plined by Labourdonnais himself after a pecu-
liar manner, to serve on land or sea. This
force encountered the numerous army of the
nabob, making dreadful havoc by the rapid
service of their artillery, and utterly discomn
fiting “the Moors.” Thus the example was
not set by Clive at Plassey, as is generally
supposed, of a small European force well dis-
ciplined defeating vast numbers of the natives ;
the little army of Labourdonnais at Madras
had that honour. This circumstance is no-

. ticed by Orme, but has been lost sight of by

English writers generally. Dupleix’s purpose

CHAP. LXVIII.]

of violating the treaty with the English pre-
sident at Madras, was supported by the public
voice at Pondicherry. Mill says (without
giving authority for the statement) that
Dupleix, by misrepresentation and power,
induced or constrained the French merchants
to present a petition against the fulfilment of
the treaty. “'ith or without such moral sup-
port as it was intended to be, Dupleix would
have carried out his purpose, and he accord-
ingly executed it withvigour. Madras was
plundered; English and natives were not
only deprived of their goods, but even of their
personal ornaments. The most remorseless
Mahratta robber was not less relentin g than the
French governor. Except some who effected
their escape, the English as well as the chief
native citizens were brought to Pondicherry
as captives, not for the purpose of better se-
curity, but to mock them by a public trium-
phal procession, in which they were made to
pass through every indignity that could be
heaped upon captives; the French governor
took part in the display with vain ostentation,
and gave way to malignant and despicable
exultation. He triumphed over his enemies
and his noble rival after the manner of the
most remote and barbarous times, such as had
long perished from the usages of all but the
weakest and most uncivilized peoples.
Among the captives who were led in that
inglorious procession—inglorious to France,
to Frenchmen, and above all to the execrable
anleix—was one youth whom Providence
had designed to avenge the indignity put
upon himself, his companions, his country,
and humanity. That youth was Robert Clive.
The present is a suitable moment in which
to state something of the early life of the
future conqueror, already passingly brought
before the reader. The family of young Clive
had been settled in Shropshire, near Market
Drayton, on a small estate, for five hundred
years, when he was born."“ His father was
bred to the bar, married a lady of Manchester
named Gaskil, and had a numerous family.
tobert was the eldest child, and was born
the 29th of September, 1725. Young Robert
was one of the many notable persons who
have confirmed the saying, “the child’s the
father of the man.” His early boyhood re-
vealed the characteristics of his future man-
hood. He was a lad of indomitable will,
obstinate, tyrannical, having the faculty of
attaching to him the enterprising and rest-
less, utterly fearless in danger, even loving it
for its own sake, so that the wild and reckless
adventures of his boyhood were the theme of
* 7716 Life ofRobert Clive; collecte/Ifrom firefzzmi/y
Impers cmmmmica/ed by the Earl (31" Pazcis. By Major—
Gcntrnl Sir John Malcolm, K.C.B.
um. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

197

conversation for many a mile around Drayton,
and for many a year after “naughty Bob”
had disappeared from the scenes of his early
exploits. Pugilistic encounters, in which he
displayed endurance and courage, and mimic
warfare among boys, in which he was always
a leader of one of the parties, afforded him
much delight. At school, boxing, skating,
cricket, racing, and all manner of manly
games, and of wild and daring adventures, en-
gaged his affections, to the disparagement of
literary progress and education. He was the
terror of ushers, his defiant spirit brooked no
indignity even when consciously in the wrong,
and when a mild discipline might prove suc-
cessful. One of his teachers, it is alleged,
predicted that “wild Bobby” would yet be
a great man. Lord Macaulay declares “the
general opinion seems to have been, that Ro-
bert was a dunce if not a reprobate.” His
lordship does not add, as he might have done,
that the opinion was in neither respect well-
founded. In all his wildness there was
character; he was deeply susceptible of the
friendships schoolboys form ; he was grateful,
and if not dutiful to his parents, he would yet
resent the slightest reflection upon them, and
speak of them with reverence, regretting his
own undutifulness. He was not addicted to
books, but he made more progress at school
than he got credit for, and possessed a quick
discernment, clear judgment, and comprehen-
siveness ofunderstanding. These intellectual
characteristics were, however, more displayed
in action than in preparing the lessons set by his
preceptors. The intuition with which school-
boys perceive the merits of their companions,
led them to invest young Clive with the attri-
butes of a lad of sense and of a. hero; their
confidence in his courage and capacity in
every boyish freak, equalled that with which
his soldiers afterwards surrounded him in the
broken battalions of Arcot, or followed him
upon the desperatefield of Plassey. Undoubt-
edly his chief excellences were, even in boy-
hood, prompt judgment in undertaking what
was practicable, perseverance in carrying out
what he undertook, a courage which no dan-
ger, however awful, could daunt, and a pre-
sence of mind which never forsook him in
peril or difficulty. These qualities were ex-
emplified when he climbed the steeple of
Drayton Church, to the terror of the quiet in-
habitants of that pretty village, as much as
they were when he escaped from Pondicherry,
captured, and afterwards defended Arcot,
surprised French expeditions, or routed na-
tive hosts with a few hundreds of men. His
chief fault was tyranny, and that he exhibited
when he bullied the shopkeepers of Market
Drayton, controlled his schoolfellows, and
D D

198 HISTORY OF THE
raised insurrections against unpopular pre-
ceptors, as much as when be arbitrarily dis-
missed Captain Armstrong of Bombay while
serving under him in Bengal, and when he
put down peculation and jobbery with a high
hand in the factories during the hey-day of
his power.

It is often the case in the families of men
of original genius, that the last to recognise
the peculiar parts of the eccentric, or supposed
eccentric, person are his own near relations.
This was the case with Clive. They did not
perceive the mighty strength of this English
Samson, and made no allowance for his
weaknesses. Yet, their conduct and feelings
towards him hardly justified the language of
Lord Macaulay. “ It is not strange that they
gladly accepted for him, when he was in his
eighteenth year, a writership in the East
India Company, and shipped him off to make
a fortune or die of fever in Madras.” There
is no material in the work of Sir John Mal-
colm which affords fair scope for placing the
conduct of the family in such a light in a
treatise professing to be a review of Sir
John’s biography. rThe elder Clive had so
small an estate, and that encumbered, he
made so little by his profession, and had so
large a family, that he reasonably accepted
the appointment for Robert. The ambition
of the young man was, however, to become a
Manchester merchant. He loved his mother’s
relatives, the Gaskils, in that city, and desired
to enter upon the active species of mercantile
pursuitswhich have always characterised the
trade of that great city. Long afterwards,
when far away from England, his thoughts
often turned to the happy days he had spent
in Manchester, whose scenes and associations
he longed to revisit. He seemed to entertain
the opinion expressed in a recent work, Young
America Abroad, by Mr. Train, of Boston,
United States, “I would rather be a clerk in
London or New York, than the head of a
large mercantile establishment in Madras.”
Thither, however, our young adventurer went,
reluctantly bidding adieu to the white cliffs
of his country. which he loved so well, and for
which he eventually dared and did so much.

Voyages round the Cape are still long, com-
pared with the overland route ; before steam
was known, the time consumed rid the Cape
was still greater; and a century ago, the
voyage was rendered very tedious indeed bV
the architecture of the ships employed in the
Indian trade, and the nautical habits of the
sailors and captains of that age. Clive, how-
ever, had a very long voyage, which consumed
a whole year. It is probable that it was, on
the whole, a welLspent year—one of thought
and reading, of meditation upon the future,

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXVIII.
and reflection upon the past. The ships made
a several months’ stay on the coast of the
Brazils, and there Clive studied the Portuguese
language, which was always an advantage to
him in his Indian career, the traces of the
Portuguese being then still fresh upon the
shores of the peninsula. Arrived in Madras,
he was filled with disgust. He neither liked
the place, the situation, nor the people. His
pay was inadequate, and he soon incurred
debts which harassed his mind. He was
haughty, and, like many other adventurers,
bold, competent, and self-relying; yet he was
shy, and consequently made few acquaint-
ances: he was miserably lodged, home—sick,
and unhappy. With all his intrepidity, like
Nelson, he was a delicate youth—at all events,
out of his own climate; and he suffered
greatly from the exhausting heats of all low
situations in Southern India. It was not, Sir
John Malcolm affirms, until he was several
months in Madras that he formed an ac-
quaintance with any family which a youth of
his early associations and respectability could
v131t.
for any one of the paths of honour and enter-
prise her industry and ambition provided
within her own shores. He thus wrote to
his relatives z—“ I have not enjoyed one happy
day since I left my native country. I must
confess, at intervals when I think of my dear
native England, it affects me in a very par-
ticular manner . . . . . . If I should be so
blest as to visit again my own country, but
more especially Manchester, the centre of all
my wishes, all that I could hope or desire for
would be presented in one View.” Lord
Macaulay, in his review of General Malcolm’s
memoir, says, of these passages, “ He ex-
pressed his feelings softer and more pensive
than we should have expected either from the
waywarduess of his boyhood or from the in-
flexible sternness of his later years.” It is
surprising that the great critic should not have
perceived, in Sir John Malcolm’s records of
the youth of his hero, sufficient evidence of-
a tender and even a plaintive spirit, which
lived within him in spite of all his rougher
attributes, as a mild bright star beaming
through the darkness and turbulence of a
storm. His lordship, in vindicating the nobler
attributes of Clive against his calumniators,
points out the benignant and afl'ectionate as-
pects of his disposition, which appear so touch-
ineg amidst even “the inflexible sternness of
his later years." \I‘liile neglected in Madras,
he met with some encouragement from the
president, who threw open to him his library,
which was well stdcked with the’best books
of the day. There Clive studied with assi-
duit)’, and, having had the foundation of a

He pined for his loved England, and'

CRAP. LXVIII.]

good education, he was able to make available
easily the information to be gathered amongst
the president’s books. He thus emerged into
public life neither ignorant of books nor men,
and having passed through long periods, in
proportion to his years, necessitating reflection
by the circumstances of retirement in which
he was placed. It does not appear that mili-
tary reading formed part of his studies: he
had, at that time, rather cultivated commercial
tastes and ambition; but, as almost every
English boy loves stories of military enter-

prise, he would be likely, from national taste

as well as from constitutional sympathy with
heroic adventure, to take 11p books recording
the valorous deeds of his loved ancestral
England. The singular intelligence on all
military subjects shown by him at once, when
emergency called for it, strengthens the pro~
bability that military history and tactics formed
part of his studies. While he lived as a
writer in Madras, his conduct was not very
dissimilar to that of his boyhood: he was
haughty to his superiors, and, without being
actually insubordinate, was so wilful as to en-
danger his situation. It would appear that
much of what was strange and wayward, and
even bold, in his behaviour arose from disease.
From his early youth or childhood, some
morbid affliction, perhaps an affection of the
brain, which influenced his emotions without
obscuring his fine intellect, attended him;
and, when lonely and apparently forsaken in
Madras, he twice attempted suicide. The
instrument used 011 each of these occasions
was a pistol, which both times missed fire
when the barrel was pointed to his head.
Having convinced himself, on the latter oc-
casion, that the pistol was well loaded, he
received the impression that Providence or
destiny had designed him for some important
purpose, as his life was so miraculously pre-
served. Such was the state of mind of this
young man when borne a prisoner by the per-
fidious Dupleix to Pondicherry, and there
paraded about for the sport of a people who
were little better than their then infamous
governor. It is easy to conceive how the
high spirit of Clive chafed under these indig—
nities; but his resolute will and fertile genius
soon found an opportunity to assert them-
selves: hc assumed the disguise of a Mussul-
man, left the town by night, and reached the
English fortress of St. David in safety. “Yell
had it been for Dupleix and for France that
the wanderer who so well affected the mien
and garb of Islam had been fettered in Pon-
dicherry, or that Labourdonnais' clemency
and honour had prevailed, and left the young
clerk in “\Vriters’ Buildings,” at Madras,
until commercial success, dismission, or suicide

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

-,‘,, .

199

had prevented him from interfering in the
field of war with the ambition of the governor
of Pondicherry, and the genius of French
conquest.

“'hen Clive arrived at St. David’s, he, of
course, found only occasional employment for
his pen; he was in distress, utterly penniless.
The indignation of the garrison against the
French was great, and every man thought of
the sword. Clive requested an appointment
as ensign in the company’s service, and his
desire was granted. Thus began his military
career, and, like another great hero, whose
deeds in India afterwards won for him im-
mortal renown—the Duke of VYellington—
Clive began the routine of his profession by
attention to the minutest things, acquiring the
detail of discipline, and the rules of war, and
forming his soldiers upon his own ideal model
of drill and duty. Before he entered the ser-
vice he gave proof of his audacious courage
by a protracted and desperate duel with a
military ruffian, whose insults had cowed the
civilians at the fort, but which were no sooner
directed to Clive than the vaunting desperado
was made to feel that he had provoked a man
of lofty and unconquerable spirit. When he
entered the company’s military service he
was twenty-one years of age. In this posi-
tion he must at present remain in our narra~
tive, until other events have passed, and new
transactions bring him once more upon the
stage of action.

Fort St. David was situated only twelve
miles south of Pondicherry, and was one of
the most important places held by the com-
pany in India. Beside the fort—a compre—
hensive phrase, which expressed, not only the
fortifications and barracks, but the English
town—there was a large native town called
Cuddalore, inhabited by native merchants and
bankers; there were also several large vil-
lages, and a country territory more extensive
than that owned by the company at Madras.
Cuddalorc was an imposing and important
place. Three sides of the town were towards
the land, and were defended by walls and
bastions; the fourth side was open to the see,
but a river flowed between it and a high
sand-bank, by which the river was separated
from the ocean. The agents at Fort St.
David took upon themselves the government
of English interests along the Coromandel
coast, performing the functions of the late
presidency of Madras.

Dupleix resolved to reduce Fort St. David,
and thereby conquer the whole coast of Coro-
mandel. Un the 19th of December,a force
consisting of about one thousand nine hundred
men, exclusive of officers, marched out from
Pondicherry against the English settlement,

200

About two hundred of this little army were
Caffres from Madagascar, trained by Labour-
donnais ; the rest were nearly all Europeans,
but a few were sepoys, and a troop of cavalry
was included in the full muster. Fortunately
many of the English and loyal natives of
Madras fled thence to St. David's, when they
perceived that Dupleix had resolved to violate
the treaty of Labourdonnais; these swelled
the numbers able to defend the fort to more
than three hundred men; one hundred, how-
ever, were topasses. The English hired two
tl ousand natives, a dismal looking brigade,
armed with spears and shields, swords and
matchlocks, bows and arrows; these men
were called “ peons.” To these peons muskets
were distributed, which, with the matchlocks
already possessed by them, changed the pro-
miscuous and comparatively harmless arma-
ment into one of some unity and efficiency.
These natives Were placed upon the walls and
bastions of Cuddalore; the English and to-
passes occupied Fort St. David. The Eng-
lish also applied for assistance to the nabob,
who, anxious to avenge his signal defeat by
the French at Madras, promised an “ army,”
if the English would bear half the expense.
This the British gladly accepted. The French
arrived, after a deliberate march, before the
fort, and took up an advantageous position,
which they had no sooner done, than the
nabob's army, numbering ten thousand men,
appeared in sight. The French retreated,
pursued by the combined forces, and losing
one hundred and thirty-two Frenchmen,killed
and wounded, of whom, however, only twelve
were slain. After that discomfiture, Dupleix,
persevering and sanguine, and relying much
upon his diplomatic address with the native
powers, made overtures of a friendly nature
to the nabob, and while thus amusing him,
without waiting for any formal arrangement
of friendship, he resolved to attack the Eng-
lish by sea. His plan involved a surprise
upon the Cuddalore portion of the defences.
The scheme was well laid. The flotilla set
out, every man confident of success; but a
storm arose, and compelled the boats to put
back. Having failed in conciliating the nabob,
Dupleix sent troops into his territory, hoping
thus to keep the army of his highness occupied
in defensive movements, while another French
force attacked Cuddalore. In accomplishing
the first part of this plan 'Dupleix’s tro'ops
committed scandalous excesses, which infu-
riated the nabob against the French nation,
towards which his previous resentment was
strong. At this juncture Dupleix received
a great accession of strength After the
storm which scattered the ships of Labour-
donnais, four of the finest of them made for

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXVIII.

Aeheen to refit; having accomplished that
object, they returned. The nabob was easily
persuaded that the reinforcements Were much
larger, and with that destitution of honour so
characteristic of the natives of India, he
changed sides and became the ally of the
French. This circumstance revived the
hopes of Dupleix, who described himself as
apprehensive of the nabob's army blockading
Pondicherry by land, and an English fleet
arriving in time to blockade it by sea. Ac-
cordingly, on the 13th cf March, 1747, a
French force approached St. David’s. The
English auxiliaries skirmished and fell back;
the French forced the passage of the river,
and took up the position it had occupied when,
on the previous occasion, the approach of the
nabob’s army compelled a retreat. At this
juncture the fugitive English fleet was descried
making for the roads. The French retreated,
and, according to Orme, the retreat was almost
a flight. Dupleix, fearing that his ships would
be captured, ordered them from Pondicherry
to Goa. Thence they continued their flight
to the Mauritius, where they found three
other royal ships, and the whole prepared to
strengthen themselves for operations against
the fleet which had arrived to the aid of the
English.

The English naval reinforcement consisted
of five men-of—war, under Admiral Gritlin,
and the squadron which had so ingloriously
evaded Labourdonnais. Admiral Griffin
having, as senior officer, superseded Captain
Peyton, who previously held command of
the squadron already in those seas, at once
urng a course of activity. Having raised
the siege of St. David's, he proposed carrying
the war into the ports of the enemy, and ex-
pressed his intention to organize an expedition
against I’ondicherry itself. The land forces
of the garrison of St. David’s were at the same
time augmented by reinforcements from Eng-
land, composed of a few soldiers who came
out with Admiral Griffin, a detachment of four
hundred sepoys, sent from ’I‘ellicherry, and
from Bombay onehundred European soldiers,
two hundred topasses, and one hundred se-
poys. Thus the sepoys trained in “'estern
India were coming into service, although no
hope was then entertained that they would
ever become so well disciplined, or so exten-
sively employed as was afterwards the case in
the company’s history. During the remainder
of the year one hundred and fifty English
soldiers arrived in different detachments, giv-
ing strength to the garrison such as it had
never before possessed. At the opening of
the year 17:98, Major Lawrence arrived with
the commission of commander-in-chief of the

l company’s forces in India.

CHAP. LXVIIIJ

Nothing was done by Admiral Griffin
against Pondicherry, notwithstanding his
demonstrations of activity. He remained in
the road of St. David’s and sent out his
lighter ships as scouts to watch the coast.
The French fleet at the Mauritius received
orders from Dupleix to convey reinforcements
and money to Madras, avoiding an action
with the English, but risking it in order to
accomplish the object.

In the month of June the French fleet
approached St. David’s, as if to attack Ad-
miral Griffin, but skilfully evaded doing so,
made for Madras, landed the reinforcements,
and again fled to Mauritius. Griffin set sail
in fruitless search of them. Professor Wilson,
in one ofhis notes to Mill, gives the following
account of the way in which the admiral’s
conduct was subsequently arraigned in Eng-
land, and his own explanation :——“ Admiral
Griffin, on his return to England, was brought
to a court-martial and suspended the service,
for negligence in not having stood out to sea
upon first receiving information of the enemy’s
approach ; by doing which, it was argued, he
might have frustrated the object of the French
squadron, if not have brought them to action.
He published an appeal against the sentence,
grounding his defence upon his having missed
the land-wind on the day before the squadron
was in sight, in necessary preparations to
strengthen his own ships for an encounter
with what his information represented as a
superior force, by which he expected to he
attacked.” “'hile Griffin was in pursuit of
the French fleet, Dupleix, ever active, vigilant,
and exploitful, resolved to attack St. David's
before the admiral could heat back through
the monsoon. He accordingly sent a fresh
expedition against Cuddalore. French writers
agree in awarding praise to the gallant and
skilful manner in which Major Lawrence
conducted the defence. He made a feint of
abandoning the garrison, and the French were
thus seduced to approach the walls rather
tumultuously; but while applying the scaling
ladders Lawrence opened a destructive fire of
cannon and musketry, which caused havoc
and dismay; the French throwing away
their arms in precipitate flight. Lawrence
was not in a condition to pursue them into
the plain; he contented himself by making
fresh dispositions against renewed attack.

The government of England resolved to
throw forth more power upon the eastern
theatre of the war. The means adopted to
retrieve the losses incurred in India are thus
described by an eminent historian :—“ Nine
ships of the public navy, one of seventy-four,
one of sixty-four, two of sixty, two of fifty,
one of twenty guns, a sloop of fourteen, 3

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

201

bomb-ketch with her tender, and an hospital-
ship, commanded by Admiral Boscawen; and
eleven ships of the company, carrying stores
and troops to the amount of 14:00 men, set
sail from England towards the‘end of the year
17-17. They had instructions to capture the
island of Mauritius in their way ; as a place
of great importance to the enterprises of the
French in India. But the leaders of the
expedition, after examining the coast, and
observing the means of defence, were de-
terred, by the loss of time which the enter-
prise would occasion. On the 9th of August
they arrived at Fort St. David, when the
squadron, joined to that under Griffin, formed
the largest European force that any one
power had yet possessed in India."

Dupleix had improved the interval with
his usual foresight and indefatigable zeal.
He had laid in stores of all kind in Pendi-
cherry and Madras; the fleet from Mauritius
had already landed there a large supply of .
silver when with the reinforcements it had
evaded Griffin. Dupleix, in his own account
of his feeling at the time, written years
afterwards, stated that he knew the nabob
would desert him as soon as he saw the
English armaments, and he resolved to make
the best use of an alliance which was certain
so soon to terminate."“ The English at Fort
St. David were urgent for active measures
against Pondicherry, and they mustered a
considerable body of troops which, with the
fleet under Admiral Boscawen, it was believed
must speedily reduce it.

Little more than two miles south-west of
Pondicherry there was a fortified town called
Ariancopang, to which the French of Pen-
dicherry could retire if hard pressed there.
It was deemed desirable to capture this sub-
sidiary place, and little opposition was
expected. The English had no means of
obtaining plans of the fortifications, and they
were wholly without information as to the
resources of the garrison. An assault was’
ordered, and was repulsed in such a manner
as was not flattering to the spirit of the sepoys
and topasses in the British service, and “ho
immediately formed a repugnance to the
expedition. Batteries were erected, but the
guns of the enemy were served with rapidity,
precision, and valour. The French, so justly
celebrated in war for their skilful defence of
fortified places, highly deserved such repu-
tation in this instance. Their sallies were
conducted with daring valour, superior enter-
prise, and military knowledge. On the occa-
sion of a desperate and successful sortie, the
English commander-in-chief was borne away
from the trenches in spite of the exertions of

* Jle’moir pour Dzzpleix.

202

his soldiers.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

At last, what the valour and l petty princes far and near, declaring that few

wisdom of this small body of Frenchmen had I victories were ever obtained where the dispio-

so well preserved Was lost by accident—the
powder magazine exploded. The garrison
immediatelyc blew up the defences, and 1e-
tired to Pondicherr y, strengthening the force
which Dupleix the1e possessed. Although
the approaching season, when the 1a1ns would
render all wa11ike operations impossible, de-
manded haste, the English with that fatal
want of promptitude by which they have so
often suffered in war, tarried five days re-
pairing the fortifications, instead of leaving
the task to the small garrison intended for its
occupation. They then advanced to Pendi-
cherry. VVhen before that renowned place
they continued their slow tactics, and their
measures were as timid as dilatory. The
trenches were opened at nearly twice the
usual distance, although there was nothing
in the position of the place to require such
a departure from the custom of sieges then
recognised. When the trenches were formed,
after much delay, it was found that they were
so far off, the batteries could make no impres-
sion on the town. The cannons and mortars
of the fleet were nearly useless, and in truth,
although Dupleix himself was frightened, the
besieged laughed their besiegers to scorn.
The intrenchments were carried slowly, cau-
tiously, and awkwardly, to within eight hun-
dred yards of the wall, and then it was found
that a morass obstructed the workmen. It
was at the same time discovered that at
another side of.the town from which no
approaches were made, the works might have
been carried to the foot of the glaeis. The
batteries erected on the edge of the morass
were silenced by the superior cannonade of
the enemy.

A whole month had now been wasted, and
nothing had occurred in the result of so much
labour but disgrace. A council of war was
called, which wisely determined to abandon
the siege, for the English were incapable of
conducting it; their gunners were no match
for the French, and the stormy season was at
hand, when the ships would be driven away,
wreck and loss of life occurring, as in the case
of the fleet of Labourdonnais.

When the English retired, Dupleix made
much noise about his exploits, writing to
France, to the Great Mogul, and to all the

 

portion of force was so great. All Pondieheny
was in transports; their joy was brilliant as
a Bengal light. Probably had the gallant
Lawrence not been captured, there would have
been cause for mourning. The result upon
the interests of Flance w is g1eatly to enhance
them , upon those of England they we1e de-
pressing. So speedily do Eastern peoples
forget the effects of achievements gone by,
that all the prestige of English valour passed
away, and they were once more looked upon by
the natives as essentially unwarlike, although
personally brave,—as having vast resources,
but not knowing how to make use of them.
Matters were in this condition when news
arrived, in November, 1748, of the peace of
Aix- la- Chapelle, which put an end to the Vs ar,
and placed the t .vo parties in India in statu
qua ante bellum. The English resto1ed their
late dearly-bought conquest, and received
possession of Madras. Dupleix did all in his
power to keep up the old spi1it of irritation:
he gave out that the I1 much gave the English
back Madras to show theirb charity and to
prove that the cause of quarrel did not lie with
him. This appeared to the natives as primti
facz’e true, and they wondered at the 111ag11a-

nimity and generosity of Dupleix. The
English he taunted with their imbecility,

reminding them that, but for events in
Europe, he would have driven them out of
India. Their operations by sea he derided as
much as those by land, and the natives were-
generally of his opinion. Still somehow, by
degrees. an 1mp1ess1on gained way among the
Indian chiefs that the English had an iriesist-
ible power somewhe1e, that, however inCom-
petent to carry on wars in India, yet their
proceedings elsewhere influenced Indian af—
fairs so signally that no other European power
made eventually successful war upon them.
These impressions were fluctuating, as events
raised one party or the other before the ob-
servers, whose keen eyes were ever directed
to any change in the relative power of the
different European interests on the peninsula.

Such were the facts and results of this
brief war, which, however, only proved to be
the preliminary of futu1e conflict, as the fnst
shoe t of the eaithquake 1s often but the 1101 tent
of a coming desolation.

 

[CHAR LXVIII.

CRAP. LXIX.]

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

203

CHAPTER LXIX.

ENGLISH CONQUEST OF THE CARNATIC—WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE RESUMED—a
CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE TO THE RETURN OF CLIVE TO ENGLAND.

THE treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle did not long 3
secure peace between the English and French
in India. From the first, it was felt to be a .
hollow truce. Mr. Mill, always severe upon
his countrymen, attributes to them the first
act of indirect hostility in their armed inter-
ference at Tanjore; but this is not just, for it
was notorious that Dupleix was enraged by
the peace, and made no secret of his intentions
to drive the English out of India, to possess
himself of the whole Carnatic,* and to found a
French dominion in Southern India. The re-
storation of Madras was made with the worst
possible grace, and the French seldom met the
English without predicting that the time was
at hand when the governor of Pondicherry
would rule the Deccan. The English were
prevented from settling down into peaceful
habits of trade by the menacing position and
vaunting language of Dupleix. It was im-
possible for the English, after the experience
of the late war, to disband their native forces
and send home their European troops, while
the French president retained his, sedulously
strengthened his positions, as if preparing for
war, and while yet surrendering Madras, and
conforming to the terms of the recent peace,
was opening new intrigues with the native
chiefs of the same character as those which
led to so much conflict during so many years.
The aim of this ambitious and mischievous
man was the same after the peace as during
the war: his thirst for conquest and glory
was not slaked; he still hoped, by the same
means as he had already used, to achieve the end
he had so long contemplated. The English
determined to foster alliances, and to strengthen
their own position.

The first event which broke the calm on
the eastern shores of the peninsula after peace
was proclaimed was an alliance with Syajee’f
or Sahujee, prince of Tanjore, on the part of
the English. This prince had been deposed
by his own brother, a common incident of
Indian history. He invoked the aid of the
English, and, in return, offered to them the
fortress and district of Devi-Cotah, well placed
on the banks of the Colaroone. As soon as it
was known at Colaroone that an English expe-

* The reader, by turning to the geographical portion
of this work, will find much assistance in tracing the
course of the contending armies, an assistance without
which any account of these conquests must be scarcely l
intelligible.

1" Mill, Murray, and others call him Suhajee.

 

dition was preparing at Tanjore, Dupleix af-
fected great horror of the ambitious projects
of the English. They took means indirectly
to inform him that the place they desired to
obtain was of value for trading purposes only,
and they were not about to wrest it from its
legitimate sovereign, but to conquer it, as his
ally. Dupleix pretended that it was necessary
for him to seek a counterpoise to English
power in another direction, in consequence of
this movement, whereas he had secretly been
planning the measures already, which he repre-
sented as forced upon him by English ambition.
In April, 174:9, the Rajah of Tanjore set
out from Fort St. David’s, accompanied by an
English force consisting of four hundred and
thirty Europeans and one thousand sepoys.
The late war had brought this latter descrip-
tion of force into use as an important arm of
Indo-European armies. The artillery attending
this brigade was only eight small pieces, four
of which Were mortars: there was, however,
a battering-train sent by sea. The land force
was under the command of Captain Cope.*
After a march of ten miles, the British
arrived before Devi-Cotah, meeting no re-
gular force, but annoyed by a guerilla warfare
throughout the march. This expedition was
managed still worse than the siege of Pondi—
cherry, in the war so lately concluded. N0
communications were kept up with the fleet,
on board of which was the heavy ordnance,
and although only four miles distant, the army
was ignorant of its position. Several shells
were thrown at the town from a distance which
rendered them harmless. The besiegers re—
treated, and returned to St. David’s after as boot-
less an expedition as ever an army undertook.
The shame of this affair so affected the
restored English government of Madras, that
they determined upon another expedition,
which was sent under Major Lawrence by
sea, Admiral Boscawen commanding the
flotilla. Mr. Mill thus noticed the motives
and feelings prevailing at Madras, in ordering
the new attempt upon the coveted prize :—
“ They exaggerated the value of Devi-Cotah;
situated in the most fertile spot on the coast
of Coromandel; and standing on the river
Colaroone, the channel of which, within the
bar, was capable of receiving ships of the
largest burden, while there was not a port
from Masnlipatam to Cape Comorin, which
could receive one of three hundred tons: it
* Mill erroneously assigns it to Major Lawrence.

204:

was true the mouth of the river was obstructed
by sand; but if that could be removed, the
possession would be invaluable."

The troops were conducted to the place of
debarkation, from whence the walls of the
fortifications were battered, until a breach
was made; but the river flowed between the
walls and the English, and the passage was
so commanded from the walls and woods,
that unless a large portion of the force could
be pushed over at once, the hope of success
was small. There were, however, no means for
the accomplishment of such an object, and the
second expedition was in danger of failing
like the first, when a ship-carpenter, named
Moore, devised a raft by which four hundred
soldiers were passed over at once. “hen
the raft was formed, a new difficulty pre-
sented itself, it could not be moved across.
Moore bravely volunteered to swim the river,
hearing a rope which, fastened to the opposite
side, would enable the raft to be pulled across.
To facilitate the accomplishment of this pro-
ject, a heavy fire was opened which cem-
pelled the enemy to retire some distance;
the brave fellow swam the flood, and exe-
cuted his task during the night. The troops
crossed, the trench was mounted, and the
place was stormed. This was, however, not
easily performed, and through the rash con-
duct of Olive, the future hero of India, many
valuable lives were lost. He led the storming
party. At the head of some Europeans, fol-
lowed by seven hundred sepoys, he showed
the most daring intrepidity, but advancing
too fiercely he was separated from his men,
who, being without orders, were thrown into
confusion, and nearly all cut to pieces. Clive
escaped unhurt, after passing through the
most imminent dangers. .

Major Lawrence, whom Lord Macaulay
describes simply as a sensible man, devoid of
the attributes of a great soldier, acted at Devi-
Cotah, as well as in his other enterprises, in
a manner worthy of higher Commendation
from the great reviewer. He led his whole
force across, and, with a skill in which Clive
was at that time deficient, he carried the
place, almost without loss. The reigning
rajah offered to concede to the English the
fort and the surrounding territory, if they
would abandon the cause of his brother, in
whose name they made war. To the dis-
grace ofthe British they accepted the over-
ture. Mill says that but for Admiral Bos-
cawen, they would have surrendered himiuto
the hands of the actual rajah. Orme, how-
ever, gives a totally different account of the
whole transaction. The only redeemingfeature
in the affair was, that a small allowance for the
deposed rajah was exactedgby the victors.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

 

[CHAR LXIX.

The conduct of the English was such that
while the French had no pretence to complain
of it, both the rajahs had. The English had
been the ally of the man against whom they
had made war for a bribe which they coveted,
and when they found him ready to bestow
as much, they basely deserted the cause of
the man on whose behalf they took up the
enterprise. The only apology for their con-
duct in that part of their policy was, that his

representation of the public feeling of the

people of his lost dominion was false, and
its subjugation would have involved much
cost and loss of men. The errors, politically
and morally, into which the English fell in
their conduct with the rival nabobs of Tan-
jore were not such as they had often incurred
previously, but were peculiar to the occasion.
They were so anxious to make a powerful
counterpoise to the French, that honour and
honesty were forgotten; “they stuck at no-
thing,” as a writer more expressive than
elegant remarked. The English at first
made mistakes in policy, chiefly from applying
the principles of international law known and
recognised in Europe, to people who were
ignorant of those principles, and who could
see no propriety or justice in their applica-
tion when those laws were pleaded or pro~
posed as bases of treaty, grounds of amity,
or reasons for redress. But in the short and
inglorious war with Tanjore, the conduct
of the English was truly oriental, and, on the
whole, suffered by comparison, morally, with
the policy of the reigning rajah. A time had
new arrived when it was very difficult for
any European nations to conduct relations
with the natives, on any principles regarded
as right and necessary in Europe, although
all made a show of doing so. “ The situation
of India was such that scarcely any aggres-
sion could be such without a pretext in old laws
or recent practice. All rights were in a state
of utter uncertainty; and the Europeans who
took part in the disputes of the natives con-
founded the confusion, by applying to Asiatic
politics the public law of the west, and analo-
gies drawn from the feudal system. If it
were convenient to treat a nabob as an inde—
pendent prince there was an excellent plea
for doing so,—he was independent, in fact.
If it were convenient to treat him as a mere
deputy of the court of Delhi, there was no
difficulty,-——for he was so in theory. If it was
convenient to treat his office as an hereditary
dignity, or as a dignity held during life only,
or as a dignity held during the pleasure of
the great Mogul, arguments and precedents
might be found for every one of these views.
The party who had the heir of Baber in their
hands, represented him as the undoubted,

CHAP. LXIX.]

legitimate, the absolute sovereign, whom all
subordinate authorities were bound to obey.
The party against whom his name was used
did not want plausible pretexts for maintain-
ing that the empire was in fact dissolved,
and that though it might be decent to treat
the Mogul with respect, as a venerable relic
of an order of things which had passed away,
it was absurd to regard him as the real master
of Hindostan.”*

The English had begun to understand
this state of things. “'hat Lord Macaulay
describes as the views of Dupleix may be said
of his rivals and enemies at this time, and
explains the readiness with which in Tanjore
the English espoused the cause of one brother
against another in pretension to the rajahlik.
“ The most easy and convenient way in which
an European adventurer could exercise sove-
reignty in India, was to govern the motions,
and to speak through the mouth, of some
glittering puppet, dignified by the title of
nabob or nizam.”1‘ “'hen once the English
adopted this view of Indian policy, they
practised it with a success of which their
Tanjore escapade gave no promise.

In the transactions thus recorded, Clive
was a very prominent actor. He had only
begun his military career when tidings of
peace between England and France having
arrived, the conflicts in India were for a time
stopped, and Madras being restored, Clive
retired from his temporary soldiering to
resume his duties in “VVriters’ Buildings.”
He could use both sword and pen, but the
sword best became him. Although historians
say little of him in connection with the siege
of Pondicherry—as indeed the records of
English historians are altogether meagre
concerning that event—yet Clive greatly
distinguished himself. His distinction ap-
pears, however, not to have been for skill, but
for courage. The same was the case in the
war with the Rajah of Tanjore, for which he
volunteered as lieutenant from his desk at
Madras. Both before Pondicherry and in
Tanjore, he was remarkable for the influence
he gained over the sepoys, the excellent dis-
cipline to which he brought them, and the
readiness with which they followed him into
danger, where he constantly and recklessly
placed himself. He understood the sepoys
better than any other man at that time in
India; he had a remarkable capacity for dis-
cerning their feelings, and aknack of winning
their confidence; as he said afterwards, “I
twined my laurels round the prejudices of

3’: Oil/[val aml Historical Essays ; calm-Mala] to Me
Lzluzlarg/z ievz'ew. By Thomas Babington Macaulav.
Essay on Clive.

1‘ Ibid.
VOL. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

205

the natives.” It does not appear that he had
analyzed the springs of those prejudices, or
penetrated the philosophy of the native re-
ligious; but as conscience did not prevent
him accommodating himself to their super-
stitions, there was no barrier between him and
them, such as usually exists where an officer
is scrupulous in religious matters. A friend
of his, named Hallyburton, who probably set
Clive the example of disciplining the natives,
and who possessed great talent as a regi-
mental officer, was shot dead by one of his
own sepoys, to whose prejudices he had given
unconscious offence. This produced a deep
impression on the sensitive heart of Olive, and
seems to have impressed him with the neces-
sity of going any and every length with the
peculiarities of the native mind. It was
Clive’s policy from the beginning to put
much confidence in such native officers as
appeared to him to possess military talents,
and through them he exercised more influence
over the natives than by direct intercourse
with them. All, however, whether officers
or soldiers, adored him for his heroism, and
they conceived at once a pride in following
a leader who always chose the path of peril,
and assumed the most imminently dangerous
position for himself. After the short war
with Tanjore, Clive again returned to his
desk, and probably would have remained in
pursuit of commerce, notwithstanding his
military taste and his recent daring exploits, if
new events had not called him again to arms.
Lord Macaulay at once describes the con-
dition at this time of the man, and the empire
whose fortunes he was destined to influence
so signally, in a single paragraph 1—“ VYhile
he was wavering between a military and a
commercial life, events took place which
decided his choice. The politics of England
attained a new aspect. There was peace
between the English and French crowns; but
there arose between the English and French
companies trading to the East a war most
eventful and important, a war in which the
prize was nothing less than the magnificent
inheritance of the house of Tamerlane."

It is true that the ensuing war was in its
ultimate results for the possession of all those
regions over which Tamerlanc once rode
upon the tide of conquest; but the immediate
conflict was for ascendancy only in a single
province of the many territories which made
up the mighty empire of the sovereigns of
Hindostan. His lordship is virtually correct
in describing the war as between the two
European companies, although in fact, Du-
pleix, in spite of his company, or by misre-
presentations designedly made, so far as he
had their consent, strode over the land in the

E E

206

‘love of conquest, with the morbid desire
for military glory peculiar to a Frenchman,
and with all the animosity prevalent in those
days in the minds of the French towards
England.

The unfortunate expedition of the English
to Tanjore strengthened the influence of
Dupleix with the native princes, and enabled
him, with some show of reason, to assure the
French company that the English were bent
upon aggrandizement, in order to counteract
which it was necessary for him to make
extensive native alliances, to weaken the
power and influence of native rulers friendly
to the English, and, should occasion arise, to
assert the supremacy of the French nation by
arms. The French company were appre-
hensive of the policy of Dupleix and the
power of England. They desired to enrich
themselves by trade, and by territorial re-
sources, acquired gradually and as peacefully
as possible. They wished by trick and treaty
to get hold of the lands which lay nearest to
their factories, but dreaded warlike expenses,
and protested that above all cares committed
to Dupleix, stood the responsibility of break-
ing peace with the powerful English. The
government of France sympathised with the
company, with which (as was shown in a pre-
vious chapter) it was identified in a manner
more closely than the English, or any other
European government, was with the Eastern
trading company which they respectively
supported. The French king knew that
however slow to arm the English were as a
nation, they were still slower in laying down
their arms when once taken up in war; and
his majesty, through the company, enforced a
policy of peace with the English, but gradual
and safe encroachment upon the natives.
Dupleix, however, continued in a subtle and
ingenious manner to turn all his instructions
from home to his own purposes, and while
affecting to be very amenable to his govern-
ment and the French company, to act- inde-
pendently, and carry on step by step his
projects for ousting the English, and becoming
lord of Southern India.

The time at length arrived for the new era
of conflict, and, for the English, of strangely
mingled reverses and victories, until their
chequered fortunes assumed the character of
a great and deeply interesting romance, made
actual by the interposition of all-powerful
destinies. Lord Macaulay describes the oc-
casion of the approaching struggles, and the
policy which availed itself of such occasion,
in the following manner :—-—“In the year 17-18
died one of the most powerful of the new

masters of India, Nizam-ool-Moolk, viceroy of‘

'the Deccan. His authority descended to his

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXIX.

son, Nazir Jung. Of the provinces subject to
this high functionary, the Carnatic was the
richest and the most extensive. It was go-
verned by an ancient nabob, whose name the
English corrupted into Anaverdy Khan.
But there were pretenders to the government
both of the viceroyalty and of the subordinate.
province. Mirzapha Jung, grandson of
Nizam-ool—Moolk, appeared as the competitor
of Nazir Jung; Chunda Sahib, son-in—law of a
former nabob of the Carnatic, disputed the
title of Anaverdy Khan. In the unsettled
state of law in India, it was easy for both
Mirzapha Jung and Chunda Sahib to make
out a claim of right. In a society altogether
disorganized, they had no difficulty in finding
greedy adventurers to follow their standards.
They united their interests, invaded the Car--
natic, and applied for assistance to the French,
whose fame had been raised by their success
against the English in their recent war on the
coast of Coromandel. Nothing could have
happened more pleasing to the subtle and
ambitious Dupleix. To make a nabob of the
Carnatic, to make a. Viceroy of the Deccan,
and to rule under their names the whole of
Southern India, this was indeed an attractive
prospect. He allied himself with the pre-
tenders, and sent four hundred French s01-
dicrs, and two thousand sepoysi‘ disciplined
after the European fashion, to the assistance
of the confederates. A battle was fought;
the French distinguished themselves greatly.
Anaverdy Khan was defeated and slain. His
son, Mohammed Ali, who was afterwards
well known in England as the nabob of Arcot,
and who owes to the eloquence of Burke a
most unenviable immortality, fled with a
scanty remnant of his army to Trichinopoly,
and the conquerors became at once masters
of almost every part of the Carnatic."

It is not necessary in this history to trace
the conflicts which followed. The fortunes
of the various native princes concerned
changed rapidly as the scenes in a diorama,
but amidst all these changes the genius of
Dupleix triumphed, and wherever the French
fought they maintained the reputation for
gallantry which their nation had acquired
throughout the world. In the various tests
to which their bravery was put, their officers
did not particularly distinguish themselves,
and their chief leaders were sometimes incom-
petent. Dupleix himself avoided all exposure
to danger, alleging that the smoke and noise
of battle were unfavourable to his political

* This is an exaggeration of the number of sepoys by
several hundreds, but there was a Catt‘re force which had
landed at Pondicherry attached to the expedition, which
brought the number of black troops up to one thousand
nine hundred.

CnAP. LXIX.]

speculations. He, however, provided scope
for the courage of his countrymen, if not
ambitions of displaying his own.

Nazir Jung was slain by a chief who had,
with his followers, betrayed their ruler. The
Deccan fell into the hands of Mirzapha Jung.
The conquerors entered Pondicherry in tri-
umph. They were received with demonstra-
tions of joy and honour unbounded. Not
only did the cannon thunder their welcome
as became such scenes and such victories, but
the sacred name of religion and of its Author
were invoked as sanctioning the intrigue and
cruelty by which the results were brought
about; public thanksgivings were observed
in the churches, and even the Portuguese
could not celebrate a Te Deum after some
sanguinary atrocity more heartily than the
French of Pondicherry did on this great oc-
casion. It was in the capital of French India
that the new nizam was installed in his grand
office of viceroy or soubahdar of the Deccan,
a circumstance not only flattering to the vanity
of Dupleix, but calculated to cement his power
and increase the prestige of France. In the
public procession, Dupleix sat in the same
palanquin with the sonbahdar, and took pre-
cedence of all the nabobs, rajahs, and petty
princes who came in the train of the great
viceroy. The French governor was declared
governor of southern India, from Cape Co-
morin to the Kistna river, and was appointed
to the command of seven thousand cavalry,
one oftthe highest honours conferred by a
native prince. The French mint was pro-
claimed as exclusively authorised to coin
money for circulation in the Carnatic. Du-
pleix amassed riches. The money and jewels
which he received as presents, were estimated
at more than a quarter of a million sterling
in value. The revenues be derived person-
ally could not be computed, as there were
few sources of revenue open to the viceroy in
which he had not some part.

The nizam’s death, which occurred soon
after his elevation, afforded an opportunity to
Dupleix still further to enhance his authority,
by nominating another prince to the viceregal
throne. The influence of the European ad-
venturer became boundless, and he used his
influence arbitrarily, arrogantly, and harshly.
Some of his acts were unnecessarily and wan-
tonly vain-glorious,others were politic although
boastful. Amongst the most signal displays
of his power and love of glory, was the erec-
tion of a pillar where he had effected the tri-
umph of Mirzapha over Nazir Jung. The
four sides of this column bore, in four different
languages, an inscription proclaiming his tri-
umph. Around the spot where this monument
of his achievements stood, a considerable town

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 207

was built, to which he gave the name of
Dupleix Fatehabad, which means “the town
of Dupleix’s victory."

The English sent a few troops under Major
Lawrence to thwart or check the progress of
the French, but ostensibly to resist the in-
vaders of the legitimate Viceroy and nabob,
whom they continued to recognise. It was
one of the chief modes of displaying hostility
on the part of the two rival European powers
to take opposite sides in all disputed succes-
sions, and as there was nearly always a dis-
puted succession somewhere in the neigh-
bourhood of their settlements, there was of
consequence a perpetual contravention by
intrigue, or military succour supplied to the
native parties in contention. Major Lawrence
was so disgusted with his allies that he aban-
doned them as impracticable; the French
more than once were obliged to leave their
friends on the same grounds, but the pertina-
cious and untiring policy of Dupleix, together
with his tact and finesse, enabled him to re-
store amity between his soldiers and their
allies. The retirement for atime from India of
the brave and indefatigable Major Lawrence
facilitated the designs of Dupleix, and ren-
dered his military ascendancy more complete ;
for Lawrence was the only man in India ca-
pable of assuming a large command, although
he was indifferently supported, and poorly re-
warded both by the authorities in Madras and
London. Clive had not gathered military
experience, but in him was genius adequate
to the great task of retrieving all that was
lost, and asserting for his country a power
and influence in India which the wildest
dreams of her most imaginative sons never
conceived.

The desperate affairs of Mohammed Ali at
last demanded some efforts on the part of the
English different from the feeble demonstra-
tions they had previously made. Although
nabob of the Carnatic, his own patrimonial
territory was small, and Trichinopoly, its chief
stronghold, was in daily danger of falling
before the siege of the rival nabob, and the
French. Upon the districts of Tanjore and
Trichinopoly both competitors had fixed their
attention as the centres of their respective
influences and claims of authority and power.
The accounts given by writers on Indian
affairs of the pretensions and rights of the
competing nabobs, are very contradictory.
Mill professes to rest his account upon Orme,
but his statements of Orme’s opinions do not
agree with that writers own representations
of the views he held; and it is scarcely of
sufficient importance to the general English
reader to analyze the evidence of the com-
parative claims of Mohammed Ali, and Chunda

208 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Sahib, and of the right of either to be inde-
pendent of the Mogul, even if it were prac-
ticable to unravel so intricate a skein of
treachery and intrigue. Dr. Wilson says :—
“ The Hindoo princes of Tanjore and Trichio
nopoly had never been subdued by the Mogul,
and although at times compelled to purchase
the forbearance of the Mohammedan states of
Bejapore or Golconda, they had preserved
their independence from a remote date. The
expulsion of their native princes was owing to
domestic dissensions, which transferred Tan-
jore to a Mahratta ruler, and gave Trichino-
poly to a Mohammedan. The latter was a
relic of the Hindoo kingdom of Madura, and
according to original authorities, Chunda Sahib
obtained possession of it, not under the cir-
cumstances described by the European writers,
who were avowedly ill-informed of the real
merits of the case, but by an act of treachery
to his ally Minakshi Amman, the reigning

queen, whose adopted son he had zealously

defended against a competitor for the princi-
pality—grateful for his support, and confiding
in his friendship, the queen gave him free
access to the citadel, and be abused her con—
fidence by making himself treacheronsly mas-
ter of the fortress.”*

To reduce Trichinopoly was now the work
of Chunda Sahib, and the prince offered to
resign on terms to the French. The English
interposed and .insisted that, instead of this
arrangement, Chunda Sahib should be recog-
nised as nabob of the Carnatic, Mohammed
Ali retaining Trichinopoly. The French
answered with insolent contempt; and the
tardy English, whose minds seemed full of
confusion at the magnitude of the events
passing around them, made some determina-
tion to resist. The allied army of Chunda
Sahib and the French advanced to Arcot,
contrary to the advice of Dupleix, who re-
commended the nabob to march upon Trichi-
nopoly itself, while yet the hesitating English
were dubious what course to pursue. An
English force, under Captain Gingens, left
Fort St. David to intercept, or at all events
harass, the enemy. The sahib had encamped
his forces on the great road between Trichi-
nopoly and Arcot, when the English came up
with him, and made dispositions for battle.
The chief force of the British was sepoys, and
there was also a body of Caffres, deserters
from the French, and from the Dutch, who
also had employed this description of soldiers.
Some of these were natives of Mauritius,
others of Madagascar, and various other blacks,
not natives of India, were comprised under
the general designation. The English com-

* “Historical Sketch of the Kingdom of Paudva: ”
Journal eff/1e Royal Asiatic Socially, vol. iii. 1). 199..

 

[CHAR LXIX.

mander called a council of war, in which an
action was opposed by some ; those who were
for attacking the enemy differed widely in
their opinions as to how the attack should be
carried out. The time consumed in dispute,
and the anxious manner of the English officers,
dispiritcd the troops, particularly their own
countrymen, who went into action without
that manifestation of daring spirit character-
istic of Englishmen. The battle being begun
the enemy replied with a spirited fire, and
advanced to meet their assailants boldly. The
native troops and Caffres in English pay fought
well ; but the English soldiers turned and fled,
leaving their native allies to do battle alone.
No attempts to rally the English were success-
ful, not even the derision of sepoys and Caffres
could move them to return to their duty, and
the battle was lost. The exultation of the
enemy was accompanied by tokens of supreme
contempt for the beaten English; their sable
comrades were equally prompt to upbraid
them with their cowardice. It is but just to
the English nation to say that only a few of
the Europeans in the detachment were British:
they consisted, for the most part, of Germans,
Swiss, and Dutch, French and Portuguese
deserters; all these, except, perhaps, the
Dutch, were in awe of the French, whose
reputation for discipline and military science,
together with the late splendid victories of
themselves and their allies, had spread an
impression amongst all nations in India, save
only a portion of the English, that they were
invincible. The British retreated, and took
post on the high road near Utatoa, but again
fled upon the approach of the enemy. Once
more the English drew up in order of battle
at Pechoonda, but a third time fled before the
foe, and, as from the previous encampment,
without firing a shot. The conduct of the
European portion of the British was thoroughly
dastardly, and the officers were without in-
fluence or authority who commanded that
portion of the troops. Most of the officers
newly arrived from England proved worthless.
The officers of the company’s forces were in-
ferior to those of the royal army as men of
intelligence; their manners entitled but few
of them to be received as gentlemen by their
companions in arms in the royal forces : but
they were more adventurous, and were better
fitted for Indian campaigning every way.
General intelligence,with Commanders at that
time, when opposed to native armies, was not
important; knowledge of native character,
especially in war, aptness to take advantage of
every turn on the field with rapidity, con-
tempt for more numerical superiority, and,
above all, promptitude in an enemy’s presence,
were the essential qualities, which the com-

CHAP. LXIX.]

pany‘s officers possessed in a much greater
degree than their comrades of the royal forces.

Having thus abandoned the country to their
pursuers, the fugitive British found themselves
in comparative safety under the walls of
Trichinopoly. Chunda Sahib and his Eu-
ropean eoadjutors pursued, but not with suf-
ficient rapidity. Chunda was too leisurely in
his military movements, being fonder of the
pomp of war than of its action. On his arrival,
he withdrew from the side of the town where
the company’s forces were encamped, and in
the opposite direction laid siege to the place.
There is no ascertaining the strength of this
army. Dupleix, after his return to France,
described the native army alone as thirty
thousand men. M. Law, by whom the French
were commanded, stated, in his work entitled
Plaz'ute de Chevalier Law, centre Sz'ezn‘
Duplez'x, that at no time did the entire force
before Trichinopoly exceed eleven thousand
eight hundred and sixty, of whom only six
hundred were Europeans, and that, when
afterwards a detachment was sent from that
army to relieve Arcot, only six thousand six
hundred and eighty men remained to conduct
the siege. Mill says he is much more inclined
to believe Law, as Dupleix was “one of the
most audacious contemners of truth that ever
engaged in crooked politics.” At all events,
the siege was so feebly conducted that, had
the English beneath its walls shown the least
enterprise and courage, the enemy could not
have maintained it for many days. M. Law,
in his vindication of himself, declared that he
had no means to conduct the siege, no batter-
ing guns, no heavy cannon fit for guns of
position,and that he had been three months be-
fore the place before any material of war suit-
able to his position reached him. If these
statements be correct, they add much lustre
to the honour, ability, and valour of the few
Frenchmen who kept the power of Mohammed
Ali at bay, and compelled the English to re-
main crouching under the city walls. M.
Law threw the blame of the delay in making
a capture of the place to the intrigues of
Dupleix, who had entered into correspondence
with Mohammed Ali, and secured his assent to
deliver 111) the city, so that he (M. Law) was
sent, not to besiege, but to receive it; Dupleix
relying rather upon the dexterity and pro-
foundness of his own schemes than upon the
chivalry and skill of his soldiers.

During the delay and incompetency of the
French, the English officers were actively en-
gaged in quarrelling with one another as to
the respectability of themselves personally, and
of the royal and the company's armies com-
paratively. As commanders ofmen they were
paltry and powerless; they had not even that

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

209

quality in which Englishmen are so seldom
deficient, and which soldiers express by the
the rough word “pluck.” It was not only in
that branch of the English army in India that
such a spirit prevailed: Major Lawrence had
found it an insuperable obstacle to his own
efficient command, and declared that the
British officers were objects of supreme con-
tempt to their native allies. At Madras, St.
David’s, and elsewhere, the state of things
was the same. The fighting qualities of the
English were dormant, because the officers
sent from home were not chosen for their
military qualities, but for reasons pertaining
to party, or to family interest. The necessity
of taking and of defending the besieged city
became, at last, obvious to both armies, for its
situation gave it a relative importance to the
war which could not be overlooked long even
by the incompetent persons then holding
power in the English interest in that part of
India. Mr. Mill describes it thus :—“ The
city of Trichinopoly, at the distance of about
ninety miles from the sea, is situated on the
south side of the great river Cavery, about
half a mile from its bank; and, for an Indian
city, was fortified with extraordinary strength.
About five miles higher up than Trichinopoly,
the Cavery divides itself into two branches,
which, after separating to the distance of
about two miles, again approached, and being
only prevented from uniting, about fifteen
miles below Trichinopoly, by a narrow mound,
they form a peninsula, which goes by the name
of Seringham; celebrated as containing one
of the most remarkable edifices, and one of the
most venerable pagodas, in India; and hence-
forward remarkable for the struggle, consti-
tuting an era in the history of India, of which
it was now to be the scene.”

During these events, Clive was once more
active, and in a manner calculated to give him
that experience which he required. “Vlien
the troops were sent out to intercept or annoy
the sahib, Clive, then twenty—five years of
age, was appointed to an office partaking both
of the civil and military: he was made com-
missary of the forces, with the rank of captain.
He was witness of the shameful flight of his
countrymen at Volcondal, but was not in a
position to do anything to retrieve that disaster.
He brought up, from time to time, the rein-
forcements, contributed something to their dis-
cipline, became thoroughly acquainted with
the country whence he drew supplies for the
forces, obtained useful information for the
authorities at St. David’s and Madras, was
brought more into connection with them, so
as to gain their confidence and learn their
peculiarities. He was thus made acquainted
with the arts of provisioning an army, and

210.

also with the mode of organizing resources,
which task, to a considerable extent, devolved
upon him. By his frequent and intimate con—
verse or correspondence with all the author-
ities, military as well as civil, concerned, he
was able to penetrate the weak points of
British policy and arrangement, and to discern
who were the weak men by whom vigorous
measures were impeded or marred. In a short
time, he gained such experience as enabled
him to request, to obtain, and, with reasonable
grounds of confidence, to undertake, the re-
sponsibility of a separate command, and to
verify the high opinion always expressed of him
by the noble-minded and valiant Lawrence.

According to Mill, the idea of relieving
Trinchinopoly by a diversion originated with
the authorities at Fort St. David or Madras.
Sir J. Malcolm, with more probability, attri-
butes the idea to Clive; and Lord Macaulay
endorses that view. Clive, according to these
authorities, pressed upon the attention of his
superiors the danger to which Trichinopoly
was exposed, and the consequences that would
ensue upon its fall, and requested to be allowed
the command of a detachment, by which,
threatening Areot, he might compel the allies
to raise the siege of the endangered city. This
request was complied with, and, from that
moment, the tide of fortune turned, and made
1751—2 years to be ever memorable in Indian
history.

The advance of Clive upon Areot, and its
capture, is one of those stories in history which
is related nearly in the same way by all his—
torians. Every writer, whether fragmentary
or voluminous, repeats the preceding narrator
of this transaction. The most condensed and,
at the same time, graphic account is that of
Dr. Taylor, although partly copying Mill
verbatim et literatim :—“ His force consisted
of two hundred Europeans and three hundred
sepoys, commanded under him by eight offi-
cers, six of whom had never been in action.
His artillery amounted only to three field
pieces, but two eighteen pounders were sent
after him. On the 31st of August, 1751, he
arrived within ten miles of Arcot; it was the
day ofa fearful storm ; thunder, lightning, and
rain more terrific than is usual, even in India,
seemed to render farther advance imprac-
ticable; but Clive, aware of the impression
such hardihood would produce on oriental
minds, pushed forward in spite of the elemental
strife. Daunted by his boldness, the garrison
abandoned both the town and citadel, the
latter of which Clive immediately occupied,
giving orders that private property should be
respected. As a siege was soon to be ex-
pected, he exerted his utmost diligence to
supply the fort, and made frequent sallies to

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXIX.

prevent the fugitive garrison, who hovered
round, from resuming their Courage.”

Mr. Mill describes the result in the following
words :—“ In the meantime Chunda Sahib
detached four thousand men from his army at
Trichinopoly, which were joined by his son
with one hundred and fifty Europeans from
Pondicherry; and, together with the troops
already collected in the neighbourhood, to the
number of three thousand, entered the city.
Clive immediately resolved upon a violent
attempt to dislodge them. Going out with
almost the whole of the garrison, he with his
artillery forced the enemy to leave the streets
in which they had posted themselves; but
filling the houses they fired upon his men, and
obliged him to withdraw to the fort. In
warring against the people of Hindostan, a
few men so often gain unaccountable victories
over a host, that on a disproportion of num-
bers solely no enterprise can be safely con-
demned as rash; in this, however, Clive ran
the greatest risk, with but a feeble prospect
of success. He lost fifteen of his Europeans,
and among them a lieutenant; and his only
artillery officer, with sixteen other men, was
disabled. Next day the enemy was reinforced
with two thousand men from Vellore. The
fort was more than a mile in circumference;
the walls in many places ruinous; the towers
inconvenient and decayed; and everything
unfavourable to defence; yet Clive found the
means of making an effectual resistance. When
the enemy attempted to storm at two breaches,
one of fifty and one of ninety feet, he repulsed
them with but eighty Europeans and one
hundred and twenty sepoys fit for duty; so
effectually did he avail himself of his feeble
resources, and to such a pitch of fortitude had
he exalted the spirit of those under his com-
mand; During the following night the enemy
abandoned the town with precipitation, after
they had maintained the siege for fifty days.
A reinforcement from Madras joined him on
the following day; and, leaving a small garrison
in Areot, he set out to pursue the enemy.
With the assistance of a small body of Mah-
rattas, who joined him in hopes of plunder, he
gave the enemy, now greatly reduced by the
dropping away of the auxiliaries, a defeat at
Arni, and 1'ecovered Congeveram, into which
the French had thrown a garrison, and where
they had behaved with barbarity to some
English prisoners; among the rest two wounded
officers, whom they seized returning from Arcot
to Madras, and threatened to expose on the
rampart, if the English should attack.”

Mill’s account of the force detached from
the sahib’s army at Trichinopoly does not
agree with the narrative of Monsieur Law, in
which he professed confidence. According to

CHAP. LXIX.]

the chevalier, five thousand two hundred and
eighty men were withdrawn from his army
for service at Arcot. Clive returned to Fort
St. David at the close of the year. As soon
as the enemy learned that he had left Arcot,
they collected their forces and marched into
the company’s territory, where they committed
great ravages. Both Madras and Fort St.
David had been nearly denuded of troops, to
enable Clive to take the field against Arcot.
Some troops afterwards arrived in these for-
tresses; but they were dispatched as rein-
forcements to Clive, so that when the enemy
began their raid into the company’s territory,
there were no means of making head against
them. In this emergency, Bengal supplied
some soldiers, native and European, and Clive
was not long in augmenting these by levies in
his own presidency, so that by February he
was able to go out against the invaders. The
principal portion of the troops at Arcot made
a junction with him, and he found himself at
the head of a small but, in his hands, formid-
able force. As soon as he approached the
enemy, they broke up their camp, but intended
to turn their retreat to account by making a
sudden assault upon Arcot, the residuary
garrison of which was not by any means suf-
ficient to man its defences.

At every period in Anglo-Indian history,
there has been a sufficient number of sepoys and
theirofficers in the English pay, corrupt or dis-
loyal, to endanger the garrisons or enterprises
of the British in most conjunctions of great
danger. It was so in this instance. Two native
officers had agreed to open the gates to the
enemy; the plot was discovered, and the traitors
seized. Accordingly, when the army ofthe sa-
hib came before Arcot, not finding their signals
answered, they concluded that theywere them-
selves betrayed by those whom they trusted.
Little confidence existing among natives, even
when religion, and native land, might be
supposed to bind them most together, it was
a natural inference, in a war of succession,
when the people were not much interested in
either side, to suppose that the officers had
made a double treason for a double profit.
The sahib’s army retired; but Clive was then
on his way to Arcot to prevent the step
which the sahib contemplated, and which his
keen mind had anticipated. The enemy, know-
ing of his approach, prepared a surprise.
Clive having heard of their retreat, naturally
concluded that they would elude him; and
was therefore astonished when the guns of
the sahib opened with a furious cannonade
upon his advanced guard, in a situation afford-
ing serious advantage to the assailants. A
battle began, and Clive soon found that his
Opponents had mustered all their forces, and

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

211

that the effort was one of a desperate nature,
the hope of altering the fortunes of the war to
the disadvantage of the English, being con-
centrated upon that action, which continued
all day with unremitting fury.

Clive felt that the artillery power of the
enemy was so great, that unless it could be
seized, he must next day be defeated. At
ten at night he detached a party for that pur-
pose. The night was unusually dark. By a
detour, the detachment came upon the rear
of the enemy’s park; silently approaching the
spot, no surprise being apprehended by the
enemy, the infantry and artillerymen at that
post were instantly overpowered, and either
slain or driven away. The army of the sahib
immediately dispersed, disheartened, and
holding the name of Clive in terror. The
boldness, suddenness, and judgment of the
enterprise had invested it in native apprehen-
sion with something of the mysterious; and
Clive was regarded by the lower orders as
endowed with supernatural power.

As soon as this event terminated, Clive was
ordered to Madras. This step was impru-
dent, as the enemy might have once more
gained heart by his absence. The French
troops were, however, recalled at the same
moment to Pondicherry, in ignorance of
Clive's withdrawal; and without such a
point d’appui as the French afforded, the
sahib could not have re-collected his de-
moralized men. The object of the recall of
Clive to the presidency, was to send him and
his troops to Trichinopoly, where, from what
had already transpired, there was really
nothing to fear.

The conduct of Clive was appreciated at
Madras, and the fame of his heroism spread
over all India. Still the remarks of Lord
Macaulay are undoubtedly an exaggeration,
when he says of the feeling at Fort St.
George, “ Clive was justly regarded as a man
equal to any command.” His lordship, however,
conveys what is obviously true, when be ex-
presses the opinion, “ Had the entire direc-
tion of the war been entrusted to Clive, it
would probably have been brought to a speedy
close. But the timidity and incapacity which
appeared in all the movements of the Eng-
lish, except when he was personally present,
protracted the struggle. The Mahrattas mut-
tered that his soldiers were of a different race
from the British whom they had met elsewhere.”
Their opinion was certainly reasonable, and
the circumstances which made it so were con-
nected with the system of favouritism which,
instead of ajust and patriotic recognition of
merit, influenced all royal military appoint-
ments; and the insolencc, contempt, and
neglect with which officers of superior merit

212 HISTORY OF THE
in the company’s service were treated by the
traders, amongst whom there existed an en-
vious and yet arrogant feeling towards all
professional men.

During these events, Olive showed not only
the audacity of courage for which he had
during several years received credit, but at-
tributes of a higher order of soldierhood were
conspicuously displayed. He proved himself
to be remarkably subordinate to authority.
Mr. Mill, and Lord Macaulay following Mr.
Mill, represent this as surprising, seeing that
his youth was so turbulent. Sir John Mal-
colm and Dr. Hayman Wilson affirm that the
subordination of his military conduct, not-
withstanding his frequent disagreement in
opinion with official superiors, was in harmony
with the habits of his earlier years. Sir John
Malcolm severely criticises the expression of
Mr. Mill; and the learned professor of San-
scrit at Oxford observes :~——“ There is nothing
in the history of his adolescence to warrant
the application (of the term turbulent); he
seems to have been stubborn and dogged
rather than turbulent.” His ambition was
animated by a passionate patriotism; and his
jealousy for the glory of his country was
united to a policy statesmanlike and wise.
This was exemplified in his destruction of the
pillarof Dupleix, when, in his career of victory,
he arrived at the place where that monument
was erected. He felt that it was an insult to
his country, and therefore razed it; but he
also judged that so long as it remained a me-
morial of French prowess and success, it
would influence the superstitious natives to
respect the power of France. Not satisfied
with destroying the proud column, he swept
the city itself from the face of the earth,
and by this deeisiveness, filled the imagination
of the Asiatic soldiers of both armies with
ideas of his boldness, comprehensiveness, and
invulnerability, as well as with a fatalistic no-
tion that victory sat upon the banners of the
English, while the day of French glory had set.

When Clive was ready to take the field
against the French and Chunda Sahib, who
still remained before Trichinopoly, Major
Lawrence arrived from England, and, as
senior officer, assumed the command. Law-
rence was probably not a politician, but he
was well acquainted with the politics of the
Carnatie and of the whole Deccan; he was a
man of shrewd sense, and great penetration of
character. As a soldier, he was fit for high com-
mand; and, had he served in any army where
promotion Went by merit, he would not have
ranked as a major, while he commanded, with
ability and good service to his country, armies
in the field. Clive was delighted at the arrival
of Lawrence, as so few of the English officers

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXIX.
were competent for any portion of responsi-
bility; he had also a high sense of the military
capacity and personal excellence of the major,
which feeling was reciprocated by the senior
of the two gallant friends. Both were in-
capable of jealousy, and exulted in each
other’s glory; so that it would have been
difficult to find two persons of great talent
more likely to co-operate efficiently.

W'hile Clive was preparing his forces at
Fort St. David’s for the relief of 'Jlricliiriopoly,
the rajah sought assistance from Mysore,
whence a large army was dispatched to his
aid, accompanied by a strong division of
Mahratta mercenaries, which had already
served with Clive in the neighbourhood of
Arcot. According to the Chevalier Law, the
French and allied army (lid not then amount
to more than fifteen thousand; this statement
was confirmed by the French Company, but
Dupleix informed the French public that it
was nearly twice the number. Whatever its
force, it held its position firmly in spite of
the Mysore and Mahratta auxiliaries of Mo-
hammed Ali. Such was the position of things
when the army under Lawrence marched
against the besiegers. Dupleix ordered Law
to intercept this force, which was impossible,

- as that gallant man, already embarrassed by

the impracticable orders of Dupleix, had ex-
tended his force to keep up an effectual
blockade, in the hope of starving the be-
sieged; so that his lines were, to use his own
language, “weak at all points,” and only by
his superior tactics could he deceive the My-
sore chicf as to his actual numbers and actual
weakness. He urged Dupleix to organize the
means at Pondicherry of intercepting Law-
rence, assuring him of the utter incapacity of
his exhausted force to deal with his numerous
foes. Dupleix, arrogant and deficient in mili-
tary science, renewed his orders, which were
of course not obeyed, because impossible.
The result was, that the little army of Law—
rence arrived to the relief of the beleaguered
city. The French removed their forces to
the island of Seringham, against the wishes of
Chunda Sahib, who believed whatever Du-
pleix said as to what ought to be done in the,
circumstances. The French burned alarge por-
tionoftheirbaggage and munitions. Orme says
that stores of provisions were also thus con-
sumed, to prevent their falling into the hands
of the Rajah of Mysore or the English. The
Chevalier, who knew best, and wrote like a
man of truth and honour, declares that he had
no stores of provisions—that his supplies were
small, and he was becoming apprehensive of
extremities.

Anxious to carry matters with his usual
rapidity, Clive suggested to Lawrence that it

CRAP. LXIXJ

would be desirable to place a division of his
army at the other side of the Colaroone, so
that supplies to the French might be effectu-
ally intercepted. Lawrence pointed out the
danger of dividing his army, lest each might
in turn be attacked and overpowered. N ever-
theless he believed that, if in Clive’s hands,
the measure would be carried through, and
he gave him command of a division of his
army to accomplish the proposed task. Clive
executed the commands imposed upon him,
or rather exercised efficiently the discretion
confided to him, for Lawrence allowed him to
take his own course. The measures of Olive
were soon proved to be necessary, for Dupleix
dispatched D'Auteuil with a powerful force
and large convoy for the relief of the gar-
rison at Seringham. Clive interposed on
D’Auteuil’s line of march, who, afraid to meet
the conqueror of Arcot, retired into a fort
whither Clive pursued him, capturing the fort,
garrison, and commander, with all the previ-
sions and munitions of war intended for Law.
Lawrence, meantime, cannonaded Seringham
with such judgment and effect, that the French
greatly suffered, and, in addition, hunger be-
gan to inflict its miseries. Chunda Sahib’s
soldiers deserted in large numbers. The
Mahratta legions did not like to fight against
Cl've, and went over to him in bodies.
Chunda Sahib at last threw himself upon the
mercy of the King of Tanjore, who had also
become an ally of Mohammed Ali. The Tan-
jore general gave his sacred promise of pro-
tection, but no sooner had the sahib entered
the camp than he was placedinirons. “illile he
was thus situated, the French surrendered,
prisoners of war, to Major Lawrence. There
then arose disputes among the Mysorean,
Mahratta, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly chiefs, as
to the custody of the sahib. Major Lawrence,
to deliver him out of their hands, proposed his
confinement in an English fort. The rajahs
retired to take this pr0p0s-ition into consider—
ation, but the cruel King of Tanjore ordered
the captive to be assassinated, and so settled
the debate. Dupleix charged Major Law-
rence with the murder, which the false-
hearted Frenchman knew Well was an act
impossible to the brave and good man upon
whom he sought to fix so infamous an impu-
tation. The French East India Company
charged Dupleix with the intention of im—
prisoning the unfortunate nabob, and making
himself, or causing himself to be made, by
his influence at the court of Delhi, soubahdar,
or Viceroy of the Deccan. Dupleix, how-
ever, was in possession of the fact, that the
nahob intended to break faith with him as
soon as his English and native enemies were
mastered. Thus cruelty and deceit prevailed
vor.. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

213

amongst all the authorities in the Deccan, and
prepared for that breaking up and recasting
of all the governments there, which eventually
ensued.

“'hile affairs were proving so disastrous
to the French throughout the Carnatic, the
industrious and crafty Dupleix was, never-
theless, carrying on vast intrigues in another
direction. In his plots with the various
claimants for the viceroyalty of the Deccan,
he acted through an agent named Bussy,
a man almost as cunning and unscrupulous as
himself. The Mogul refused to recognise the
French protégé for the vieeroyalty, and con-
ferred the title and authority on Gazee-ood—
Deen,eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and the
legitimate heir of the coveted post. The
competitor of Gazee was Salabat Jung,
who was in possession, and refused to sur-
render his honours. The incursions of the
Mahrattas so enfeebled and harassed the
Mogul empire, that the padishaw was un-
able to enforce what he had commanded,
and the intrigues of Bussy were so cunning
and so constant, that Salabat Jung held his
honours; while Dupleix, through his satrap
Bussy, virtually ruled the Deccan, and in-
directly exercised extensive influence over the
Mogul. This great influence might. have
contented his ambition, but as the Carnatie
was a part of the Deccan, he considered
nothing secure until the whole of the region
so designated was at his feet. Unfortunately
for the peace of India, and of the English,
the subtle genius of Dupleix found scope,
and out of the very materials of defeat, he
evoked renewed influence.

“'hen Major Lawrence had won Trichino-
poly, he was preparing to march through the
province, and subject all opposition before
Mohammed Ali. He urged that prince to
muster his forces and accompany him, but
was astounded to find that Mohammed had,
unknown to his English ally, gained the
alliance of Mysore by promising to give to
the rajali the city of Trichinopoly, when the
French were driven away. This promise,
Mohammed, of course, never intended to per-
form, but now the Mysore rajah, at the head
of twenty thousand men, demanded its ful-
filment. The Mahrattas, too, had been led to
entertain hopes that it should be given to
them, both by the possessor, and by the
promised possessor. They now demanded
that the Rajah of Mysore should surrender
his claim to them as a reward of their ser-
vices, indemnifying himself how he could;
and, at the same time, they intimated to the
actual sovereign, that the true construction of
his promises to them was that they should
have the city. Mohammed refust to fulfil any

F r

214: HISTORY OF THE
promise, pleading that extreme necessity jus-
tified promises which there was no intention
of performing—a plea, the force of which his
tormentors felt, because it accorded with their
own principles, but they were not therefore
the more ready to mitigate their demands.
The chief of Trichinopoly at last persuaded
the Mysorean chief to accept Madura, with
the promise of receiving Trichinopoly also
within two months. He pretended to accede,
but went away resolved upon revenge. Major
Lawrence advised the president of Madras to
deliver up the city to the chief of Mysore, or
else to seize him and the Mahratta leader
until security was taken that they would not
join the French. The company’s represen-
tatives (lid nothing, the only thing which
appears to have lain within the scope of their
talents.

Dupleix was at once made acquainted with
all these transactions, and from that hour
resolved to make another effort to regain
ascendancy in the Carnatic. He opened cor-
respondence with all the aggrieved parties,
and had the audacity to correspond secretly
with Mohammed Ali himself. His offers to
them all were most alluring, and so timed
and put in such form, as to make it their
obvious policy to keep his secrets and pre-
pare to betray one another when the oppor-
tune moment for so doing should arrive.

In consequence of his intrigues, as Well as
those set on foot directly by the disappointed
allies of Mohammed, the standard of revolt
was raised in various districts under the
government of the ill-starred prince, whose
victories were as disastrous as defeats, and
even more dishonourable. Gingee was con-
sidered a strong place, and the governor re-
fused to render allegiance to Mohammed Ali.
The English undertook to reduce it, and for—
tune once more forsook their standard. The
garrison consisted chiefly of French soldiers,
and the English considered its capture would
put an end to the war in 1Mohammcd Ali’s
dominions. This was the opinion of the
civilians by whom Major Lawrence and Cap-
tain Clive were overruled. Lawrence expos-
tulated in vain: he pointed out a really
feasible plan of procedure; but the heads of
the traders at Madras and Fort St. David
were turned with success, and they issued
orders with a self-confident air, as if by their
wisdom all had been accomplished, which
only the talents and experience of Lawrence,
and the genius of Clive, had achieved. The
repulse of the English at Gingee was so
signal, that the predictions of Major Law-
rence were fulfilled. The French gained
heart, and the feeble natives began once
more to believe that they could conquer.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXIX.
Dupleix, although badly sustained from home,
found means to reinforce the troops at (iingee,
so as to enable him to operate in the field.
He, in fact, organized another army, and sent
them under the walls of the astonished
English of Fort St. David. The approach
of the French to that place was anticipated
at Madras, and one hundred Swiss were sent
by sea to strengthen it. These men were
sent in open boats, contrary to the advice
of Lawrence, whose opinions were overruled
by the self-confident, pragmatical, and in-
competent council: the result was another
painful fulfilment of Lawrence’s predictions——
the boats and troops were captured by a
French man-of—war. Dupleix, cognizant of
the intention of his enemies, and calculating
upon their infatuated ignorance and conceit,
took his measures accordingly, and with suc-
cess. This was the first direct violation of
the treaty of peace between the two countries.
Hitherto the French and English only met in
hostility as the allies, and acting under the
ostensible orders, of contending native chiefs ;
in capturing English boats and troops, he
assumed to make war upon England without
the orders or acquiescence of his government,
which afterwards held him responsible for his
conduct.

Major Lawrence went forth against the new
army, by which English territory was entered
with hostile intent at a time of peace between
the two nations. His force was chiefly from
the nabob’s army, consisting of a division of
four thousand men. He had, in addition, a
brigade consisting of four hundred Europeans
and one thousand seven hundred trained
sepoys. The French were greatly inferior in
numbers, but superior in quality. They had
about the same number of regular infantry,
and consisting of the same proportions of Eu-
ropeans and sepoys; but the European force
in the English service was made up chiefly of
mercenaries. Dupleix’s European infantry were
not wholly French, but were chiefly recruits
lately sent. out, and were physically inferior to
the Europeans in English pay; but they felt
that they were fighting the battles of their
own nation, which gave. them an ardour such
as the mercenaries in the English ranks could
not feel. The French had a rabble of native
adherents; but only a few were enrolled as
soldiers. Making up for the disparity in this
respect, the French had a fine regiment of
cavalry, numbering five hundred men. The
nabob’s tr00ps with the English consisted
partly of cavalry, but of the worst class.
Major Lawrence offered battle, which was not
accepted; but. making a feint of retreating,
he lured on his vain-glorious enemies. The
battle was short and decisive: the French

can. LXIX.]

were signally defeated; but the nabob’s ca-

valry would not pursue, but, instead, plun- '

dered the French camp. The energy and
skill of Lawrence were displayed with striking
effect in this action, and he was seconded by
his friend and lieutenant, Clive, with his usual
splendid military ability.

As the Mysorean general hovered about
Trichinopoly, Lawrence could not follow up,
in the direction he wished, the victory he had
gained, nor could he spare troops from his
little army for separate services. The ever-
daring and inventive Clive undertook, with
two hundred undisciplined European recruits,
and such natives as he could muster, to capture
the fort of Covelong, defended by the French.
He collected some natives, and formed of them
two sepoy companies of one hundred men
each; and with this small detachment repaired
to Covelong. The European recruits were
morally and physically inferior: the sepoys were
wholly ignorant of the use of arms. A shot
fired from Covelong killed one of the Europeans,
when they all took to flight. Clive, with the
utmost difficulty, succeeded in inducing them
to return to their duty. Siege was laid to the

fort; but the sentinels being alarmed by a':

loud discharge of artillery, fled and hid them-
selves: one of them was found, after diligent
search, concealed in a well. Clive remon-
strated, persuaded, rallied them on their
timidity, appealed to their manhood, and, by

his own example, roused in them the sense of 1

manliuess, so that they became courageous,
well-disciplined, and ready to dare whatever
their leader's example pointed out as due to
honour and duty. Probably, no band oftimid,
unsoldierly men were ever made so much of
in so short a time, or made to perform so
much. During this time, he was ill from the
effects of fatigue, anxiety, and the climate.
The French garrison surrendered, and Clive oc-
cupied it with a portion of his small force, some-
what augmented by deserters from the French,
.and men of a similar stamp to those he com—
manded when they first came under his plastic
hand! Scarcely had he taken possession, when
a French force was sent from Chingleput, to
succour the garrison, ignorant of its capture.
Clive laid an ambush, and, by one volley,
placed hers-(Zc-combat one hundred French sol-
diers,he then charged them, killing and wound-
ing many and capturing three hundred. The

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

5

21
i rest fled panic-struck, hotly pursued by their
prompt assailant to the gates of Chingleput.
To this place, reputed at the time to be one
of the strongest fortifications in India, he laid
siege. Ilis artillery was very inadequate;
but he effected a breach, and was about to
storm it, when the French commander capi-
tulated, on being allowed to retire with his
men. After these events, Clive returned to
Madras, where the incapable men who had
thwarted him so often, regarded it as a great
honour for him to be made the object of their
commendations and attentions. His health
now obliged him to seek repose, for his late
achievements, inferior in ability and activity
to none of his previous ones, were performed
in weakness and suffering. He married a lady
named Maskelyne, sister to the astronomer
royal, of scientific notoriety. Macaulay de-
scribes her as “handsome and accomplished,”
and adds, “her husband’s letters, it is said,
contain proofs that he was devotedly attached
to her.” Very soon after they had received
the congratulations of their friends upon their
marriage, they embarked for England, where
Clive arrived after an absence of ten years,
, several of which were spent with renown to
ghis country and himself. He had redeemed
; her fallen military reputation in India,
l humbled the gifted Dupleix, repressed French
Epower in the Deccan, saved, with his eoad—
jutor and friend, Lawrence, the Carnatic, at
all events for the time, from becoming a French
province, and filled India and Europe with
the fame of his bravery and military resources.
His departure from India was an irreparable
loss to the English, as they were soon made
to feel. Indeed, both before he left India and
subsequently, wherever he or Lawrence was
not, defeat and shame attended the English
name from the arrival of Dupleix at Pendi-
cherry. It is customary for writers to give
all the glory to Clive, who knew the worth of
Lawrence too well to accept it. “'hen, on the
young hero’s return, the directors of the East
India Company offered him “a sword set with
diamonds,” he nobly refused to accept it unless
Lawrence received one of equal or superior
value. He regarded that fine officer as his
teacher and benefactor; and the latter was
, immoderately proud and fond of his pupil and
‘protégé.

 

 

MWNUMN’M’MW

216 HISTORY OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXX.

CHAPTER LXX.

BRITISH CONQUEST 017 THE CARNATIC—C’ontimml: FROM CLIVE’S RETURN TO ENGLAND TO
THE EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH.

“'mLE Clive was reducing forts, getting
married, receiving jewelled swords at the
India-house in London, and enjoying his
ofz'um cum dz'gnitate at Manchester and Mar-
ket Drayton, Lawrence was bravely battling
against all odds, ill-supported by the vacil-
lating English at forts St. David and St.
George. Dupleix had won over certain‘
Mahratta chiefs, who, with three thousand
men, marched to reinforce his army, which
was then about to encounter Lawrence at
Bahoor. On their way, the Mahrattas heard
that the French were defeated, and that
Lawrence and Clive were in the field; they
immediately marched into the British camp,
declaring that they would not fight against
these two heroes, whom the gods favoured,
but would serve under them against the dis-
turbers of the peace of Southern India. The
armies went into what is called in Europe
winter quarters; and Dupleix, who had no
competitor in diplomacy, succeeded in regain-
ing by that means all the influence of which
the British had deprived him in the field.
Mysoreans and Mahrattas declared open;
alliance with the French. The designs of.
Dupleix were penetrated by Major Lawrence,
and such advice given by him as met the
necessities of the occasion; but although it,
belonged to his profession to judge of the
practical bearing of Dupleix’s new alliances, =
and the company’s civil servants acknowJ
ledged his competency to pronounce an
opinion, they did not in any case follow it,:
so as to carry out any plan of contravention
to the schemes of the French director-general. ;
Even the advice and commands of Lawrence
to the officer in authority at 'l‘richinopoly
were not attended to, the civil officers of the
company overruling his orders. On one oc-
casion, Lawrence detected a plot to assassinate
Captain Dalton, the officer in command of the
garrison at Trichinopoly, by the Mysorean;
general Nunjeragh and the Mahratta chief
Marao, and upon assassinating the EnglishE
officer, to seize the city. Lawrence ordered
Dalton to seize them, as a conference proposed 1
by them for their own purposes would afford l

opportunity. The president and council of‘
Madras gave Dalton contrary orders; the"

captain was not assassinated, but the detected l
traitors were left free to carry on all their
treasons except the seizure of the city. Mill
blames the morality of Lawrence's orders, and ‘

admits the soundness of the policy; but it is
obvious that Mill had not made himself ac-
quainted with the whole case. Dr. Hayinan
“'ilson (lefcnds Lawrence in the following
terms :—“ In justice to Major Lawrence, it
must be remarked that this advice was given
only upon the detection of a plot, set on foot
by the Mysorean general, to assassinate Cap-
tain Dalton, and surprise Trichinopoly, there
being no open rupture yet even with Moham-
mcd Ali, much less with the English. ‘It
was on the discovery of this,’ says the Major,
‘that I proposed Dalton should seize on the
Maissorean and Morarow, which he might
easily have done by a surprise, as he often
had conferences with them; and I must own
I thought, in justice, it would have been right
to have done it, but the presidency were of
anotheropinion.” Never did man pursue a
policy with moreheroic obstinaey than Duplcix.
Mr. Mill places his conduct in this respect in a
correct light, when he thus describes his con-
dition, resources, and prospects in 1752:—
“Dupleix, though so eminently successful in
adding to the number of combatants on his
side, was reduced to the greatest extremity
for pecuniary supplies. The French East

‘ India Company were much poorer than even

the English; the resources which they fur-
nished from Europe were proportionally
feeble; and though perfectly willing to share

‘ with Dupleix in the hopes of conquest, when

enjoyment. was speedily promised, their im~
patience for gain made them soon tired of the
war; and they were now importunately urg-
ing Dupleix to find the means of concluding
a peace. Under these difficulties ‘rupleix
had employed his own fortune, and his own
credit, in answering the demands of the war ;
and, as a last resource, he now turned his

" thoughts to Mortiz Ali, the governor of Yel-

lore. He held up to him the. prospect of
even the nabobship itself, in hopes of drawing

‘ from him the riches which he was reputed to

possess. Mortiz Ali repaired to I’ondicherry,
and even advanced a considerable sum; but
finding that much more was expected, to
broke off the negotiation, and retired to his
fort. The. contending parties leolied forward
with altered prospects to the next campaign.
By the co-operation of the Mysoreans, and
the junction of the Mahrattas, the latter of
whom, from the abilities of their leader, and
* Lawrence’s Narrative, p. 39.

CHAP. LXX.]

their long experience of European warfare,
were no contemptible allies, the French had
greatly the advantage in numerical force. In
the capacity, however, of their officers, and in
the quality of their European troops, they
soon felt a remarkable inferiority. Lawrence,
without being a man of talents, was an active

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

and clear-headed soldier; and the troops’

whom he commanded, both officers and men,
appeared, by a happy contingency, to com-
bine in their little body all the virtues of a
British army.
enemy, on the other hand, were the very
refuse of the French population.” Lord
Macaulay, following Mill, and partly adopt-
ing Dupleix’s own account, which is little to
be relied on, gives a similar picture of the
helplessness of Dupleix, except as he relied
solely on his own genius. His lordship
quotes Dupleix’s own expression, that with
the exception of Bussy he had not an officer
on whom he could place the least reliance.
Most of these statements are greatly exag-
gerated, and some of them totally untrue. It
suited the circumstances in which Dupleix
was placed, when defending himself in France
against the French Company, to declaim
against that body for its neglect of his requi-
sitions; but the fact was, its supplies were
lavish until it became convinced that he was
squandering them in wars dangerous to
France, and contrary to the commercial inte-
rests of the French Company trading to the
east. It is astonishingly strange that such
writers as Mill and Macaulay should adopt
the assertion of Dupleix, that he had no good
officers! Did he not persecute the intrepid,
politic, and gifted Labonrdonnais? “'as it
not by his own unmilitary measures that the
Chevalier Law, a brilliant officer, was para-
lysed before 'I‘richinopoly. D’Anteuil, La-
touch, and other officers in his service, showed
superior parts, but were rendered powerless
by the complication of his own schemes, or
the genius ofLawrcnce and Clive. Lawrence,
in his own account of the transactions which
arose out of the fertility of Duplcix’s tricks,
describes the efforts of the French officers at
L’ahoor and rl‘richinopoly to keep their men
up under heavy fire, as most gallant, skilful,
and h<:>nourable. The men sent out to Du-
pleix were no doubt such as he described
them—children, thieves, and galley slaves;
but he had also fine French regiments, such
as met the armies of Europe with renown; and
he had large supplies of Madagascees, who
had been thoroughly trained in the Mauritius
on French principles of drill and discipline,
and well ofticered by gentlemen of the French
army and navy. He had also good engineer
officers, and artillery officers, such as the

The European troops of the,

 

 

217

French military schools produced. It was
not of their officers and French soldiers that
Chevalier Law and other French officers com-
plained during the discussions which occurred
in France after the return of Dupleix, but of the
want of military knowledge and courage of Du-
pleix himself; and of the impracticability, in a
military sense, of schemes which grew out of
Dupleix's political speculations and alliances.

As to his resources, he had enriched both
himselfand the company‘s Indian excheqner,
by his influence over the resources of Southern
India, and by the. great accessions of territory
he acquired. “'hen Mr. Mill says that the
French company was poorer than that of
England, he overlooks the fact,""‘ that the
govermnent of France itself favoured the
French East India Company, the resources
of the state having been applied to the
aggrandizement of the company, until the
exchequer of France was exhausted, the ex-
travagance of the company's agents in India,
and their love of incessant war, having been
one of the potential causes of that exhaustion.
The. whole history of these transactions shows
that the estimate formed of Lawrence in the
above passage by Mill, and copied by Macau-
lay, Taylor, Murray, and numerous others, place
his talents below the reality. As to the supe-
riority of the English officers to the French,
there is nothing related on Mr. Mill's own
pages to prove the assertion. There were no
men up to the period to which the history is
now brought, able to cope with the French
officers, when Lawrence or Clive were absent.
“'hether in the open field or in the defence
of fortified places, French military science
was in the ascendant in almost every in-
stance, exccpt when Lawrence or Clive, 01'
both, were present by their heroism and abi-
lity to turn the tide of battle. An accurate
and careful examination of the authentic
documents of the time, French and English,
will confirm the allegation that the general
current of modern historians, following Mill,
and more recently Macaulay, have exagge-
rated or misstated the disadvantages of the
French. Dupleix emerged from the temporary
cessation of‘arms in 17:32, consequent upon the
weather, in a condition to menace the English,
and sustain the prospect which his ambition
and hope presented, that with proper manage-
ment of his native allies he would humble
the English in the Carnatic, perhaps expel
them from Southern India, and himself reign
supreme in the vast and magnificent domi-
nions of the Deccan.

In the first week of the year 1753, the two
armies took the field. The French were

* See chapters on the French Company for trading in
the East.

218 IIIéTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

very superior in numbers, especially in ca-
valry. Five hundred European infantry,
sixty European cavalry; two thousand scpoys;
four thousand Mahrattas, nearly all cavalry,
commanded by Morari Rao, an able officer
well acquainted with European modes of
warfare, comprised the French movable
army, independent of the large forces before
Trichinopoly. The English army under
Major Lawrence was composed of seven hun-
dred European foot-soldiers, two thousand
sepoys, and fifteen hundred of the nabob’s
irregular cavalry, who would any time turn
aside to plunder, however urgent the require-
ments of honourable war.

The French showed good generalship, facts
again confuting Mr. Mills disparagement of
their officers. They avoided a general action,
employing their superiority of cavalry in
cutting off convoys, so that Lawrence and his
troops were exposed to great fatigue, and
sometimes he was obliged to march with his
whole army to ensure the safe arrival of a
large convoy at its destination. This desul-
tory war continued until the 20th of April,
when a letter from Captain Dalton informed
Lawrence that he had scarcely fifteen days’
provisions in the magazine of the city. He
had made a certain Mohammedan chief his
storekeeper, and, like the Turkish pashas
during the war with Russia, so this more
ancient specimen of Mohammedan officer and
ruler sold the provisions for his own profit.
Lawrence determined on marching at once to
the relief of the place. llis march was at-
tended by many casualties. The nabob’s
troops deserted in great numbers, so did some
of the sepoys, and even of the Europeans.
Dupleix’s agents were busy offering better
pay. Sickness had also made inroads upon
his force. “when he arrived at the place,
and Completed effective garrison arrangements,
he had so small a force remaining for field
operations, that the prospect of carrying on
the war with advantage, without considerable
reinforcements, seemed very gloomy. His
European detachment was reduced to five
hundred men, two thousand sepoys were at
his disposal, and the nabob attached to these
infantry forces a division of three thousand
ill-paid and insubordinate horse. Scarcely
had Lawrence arrived when French reinforce~
ments hastened to strengthen Nunjeragh.
These consisted of two hundred Europeans
and five hundred sepoys. The forces were
now relatively such that the French and
their allies could not capture the place, and
the English and the nabob could not raise
the siege. From 8th of May, 1753 to the
11th of October, 1754, the conflict was sus-
tained. Lawrence and his troops performing

 

prodigies of valour, for which he received
only praise, and that was scantily bestowed
by his own countrymen in the chief settlements-
of India.

The most condensed account, and at the
same time sufficient in detail, which has ap-
peared, of these transactions, amongst recent
publications, is that by Hugh Murray, Esq.,
F.R.S.E. He thus describes the defence of
Trichinopoly by Lawrence :—“ The major
was then able to open a communication with
the southern districts for a supply of neces-
sarics, and obtained some assistance from the
Rajah of Tanjorc, whose alliance, however,
like that of all Indian princes, wavered with
every variation of fortune. It became im-
possible in this scarcity to supply the inha-
bitants of so great a city as Trichinopoly, who,
to the number of four hundred thousand in-
habitants, were compelled to quit the place, and
seek temporary shelter elsewhere; and the
immense circuit of its walls was occupied only
by the two thousand men composing the gar-
rison. The provisioning of this important
fortress now became the principal object of
contest, the entire strength of both sides being
drawn around it; and the French, with an
immensely superior force, placed themselves
in such positions as enabled them to intercept
completely the entrance of convoys from the
south. The brave Lawrence twice attacked,
and, though with very inferior numbers, drove
them from their posts, and opened the way
for his supplies. 011 no former occasion,
indeed, had the valour of the English troops,
and their superiority to those of the enemy,
been more signally displayed. The garrison,
however, had nearly, by their own supine-
ness, forfeited the benefit of all these exertions.
One morning at three o’clock, the guard
having fallen asleep, the French advanced
to the assault, applied their scaling-ladders,
made themselves masters of a battery, and
were advancing into the city, when several
of the soldiers happening to fall into a deep
pit, their cries alarmed their companions,
some of whom fired their muskets. The
assailants thus conceiving themselves to be
discovered, made a general discharge, beat
their drums, and advanced with shouts of
Vice Ze Roi. Happily a considerable body
of British was quartered near the spot, who
were immediately led on by Lieutenant Har—
rison to such an advantageous position, and
directed with so much judgment, that the
foremost of the storming-party were soon cut
dowu, the ladders carried off or broken, and
all of the enemy who had entered, to the
number of three hundred and sixty, were-
made prisoners. Thus the enterprise, at
first so promising, caused to them a loss

[CHAR LXX-

i
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TV
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Cnar. LXXJ

greater than any sustained by their arms
during the course of this memorable siege.
Soon afterwards, however, an English detach-
ment, being sent out to escort a convoy of
provisions, was attacked by a corps of eigh—
teen thousand natives and four hundred Euro-
peans. An inexperienced officer, who had
the command, drew up his men in small
parties at wide intervals. Suddenly Morar'
Rao and Innis Khan, with twelve thousand
Mysorean horse, advanced with loud shouts
at full gallop, and charged this ill-constructed
line. Our countrymen had scarcely time to
fire one volley, when they found their ranks
broken by the enemy’s cavalry. Deserted
by the sepoys, they were left, only one hun-
dred and eighty in number, without any hope
of escape; upon which they determined to
sell their lives as dearly as possible. The
whole were either killed or taken, including
a company of grenadiers, who had acted a
prominent part in all the late victories.

“ Amid these gallant exploits, the siege of
Trichinopoly was protracted a year and a
half, during which neither the French nor
their numerous allies obtained any decisive
advantage. Mr. Mill considers the object as
very unworthy of such strenuous efforts ; yet
it ought to be remembered that the company
were deciding on that spot the destiny of the
Carnatic, and perhaps the very existence of
their establishment in India. To have yielded
in such circumstances might have realized
the views of Dupleix, whose boast it had been
that he would reduce Madras to a fishing-
village.” The same author thus notices other
transactions, by which the fate of the war
was more influenced :——“ Important events
were meantime taking place at the court of
the Deccan, where Bussy with his followers
were dictating or directing every movement.
This influence indeed he seemed entitled to
expect, both from the generosity and prudence
of Salabat Jung, who had been raised by the
French to his present lofty station, and by
them alone was maintained in it against the
Mahrattas, and Gazee—ood-Decn, whom the
Mogul had authorised to expel him. The
latter, however, as he was approaching with
a prodigious army, died suddenly, not with-
out suspicion, perhaps unjust, of having been
poisoned by the adherents of his rival. Sala-
bat being thus relieved from apprehension,
the great men around him, viewing with much
indignation the thraldom of their master to a
handful of strangers, urged him to adopt
measures for extricating himself from this
humiliating situation; and at their suggestion
he took certain steps, which were favoured
by a temporary absence of Bussy. The pay
of the troops was withheld, and on plausible

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

2l9

pretexts they were broken into detachments, and
sent into different quarters. The foreigner,
however, on his return immediately reassem-
bled them, and his own force aided by the
alarm of a Mahratta invasion, enabled him to
dictate terms to the soubahdar. He procured
the discharge of the hostile ministers; and
taking advantage of the accumulated arrears
demanded, and obtained as a security against
future deficiencies, the ccssion of an exten-
sive range of territory on the coasts of Coro-
mandel and Orissa, including the Northern
Circars. This, in addition to former acquisi-
tions, gave the French a territory six hun-
dred miles in extent, reaching from Medapilly
to the Pagoda of Juggernaut, and yielding a
revenue of £855,000.”

Thus, while a war in the Carnatic drained
the exchcquer of Pondicherry, Dupleix and
his accomplice, Bussy, took care by their
power at the court of the Deccan, to acquire
territory, and receive far more than sufficient
to compensate any such drain; while the Car-
natic itself was, in the prospective policy of
Dupleix, soon to belong to France, and Eng-
land, utterly vanquished, would be compelled
to withdraw from Madras and the shores of
Coromandel.

“'hatever might be the difficulties which
presented themselves around ’l‘richinopoly, or
elsewhere in the Carnatic, it. is obvious that
Dupleix had encouragement to persevere, and
found the means of doing so by his negotia-
tions in the capital of the Deccan itself. He
had there assumed a position which rendered
it incompatible with the continuance of French
power to allow a rival in the fairest province
of the government of the soubahdar, a go-
vernment which virtually belonged to France,
and to Dupleix as her representative. The
interference of the English at all in the Car—
natic was a proclamation that the influence of
Dupleix at the court of the soubahdar was an
usurpation. The displeasure of the French
East India Company with Dupleix was now
considerable, the French government hav-
ing been importuned by that of England to
put a stop to his career. The English go-
vernment could no longer be deaf to the re-
clamations of their own East India Company,
and intimated to the French ministry that
they could not any longer be burthened,
directly or indirectly, with the expenses of
war at a time of peace. A conference was
held in London, when all parties agreed to
place the blame of the bloodshed in India
upon Dupleix. He seems to have found no
advocate either in the French Company or the
French ministry. Mr. Mill, who can always.
see the errors and defects of his own country-»
men easier than those of their deadliest ene-

220 HISTORY OF THE
mies, has afforded him a posthumous defence
which inculpates more by its dubious extenu-
ations, than would a direct censure. The
opinion formed of Dupleix by his countrymen
was the correct one: he involved his country
in a sanguinary war to gratify her love of
glory and his own. Unwilling to take up the
quarrel in Europe, they gave up Dupleix, his
conquests, and his schemes, and conceded all
that England demanded. This spirit of con-
cession was no doubt greatly influenced by
the fact that, during the London conferences,
England sent out a powerful fleet to India——
an example which France was unable to
follow.

M. Godheu was appointed to supersede
Dupleix, and with special instructions to ter-
minate hostilities. He arrived in Pondicherry
on the 2nd of August, 175%, and conducted
negotiations in the spirit of his mission. The
siege of Trichinopoly was raised in virtue of
the treaty which followed, and all acts of war
were stopped on both sides. Godheu was no
doubt influenced by the fact which exercised
so much weight with the French ministry—
the transmission of a powerful. fleet and large
military reinforcements; otherwise it is diffi-
cult to suppose that he would surrender every-
thing for which the French had fought, and
concede all for which the English had appealed
to arms. Such, however, was the result of
his mission to Pondicherry. The French in
India were deeply mortified at two clauses in
the treaty, one of which recognised Mo-
hammed Ali as nabob of the Carnatic, thus
giving to the English an ostensible triumph ;
the other depriving the French of the vast
territory lately acquired, and thus inflicting
upon them in the eyes of the natives defeat
in the most obvious and substantial form.
But there was no use in murmuring, or resist-
ing Godheu, for Admiral VYatson had arrived
with three line-of—battle ships, and a sleep
of war, and nearly a thousand English sol-
diers. Godheu had brought with him fifteen
hundred French ; but the naval force of
Watson, and the material of war which he
took out, constituted a preponderarting power;
besides, it was known that the English had
determined, if necessary, greatly to augment
their forces, and France was not in a condition
at that time to maintain, either in Europe or
the East, a naval war with England.

When Godheu, and Saunders, the president
of Madras a very commonplace man when
compared with his French competitors—had
settled all matters thus satisfactorily to the Eng-
lish, they returned home, leaving their nations,
as they supposed, at perfect peace with one
another. But these appearances were illusory ;

 

 

the respective relations of the two nations to

BRITISH EMPIRE LCHAP. LXX.
the native powers were too complex not to
necessitate disputes by developing conflicting
interests. Both nations had maintained so
intricate a diplomacy that it was next to im-
possible to retrace their steps, and stand to
one another in static (11w ante bellum. The
policy of Dupleix was conceived with so much
genius, and worked out by him and Bussy
with so much foresight, and with the con—
templation of so many contingencies, and con-
secutive developments, that it irretrievably
committed the French. They had placed
themselves in such a position that they must
go on in a career of conquest and intrigue,
until the thrones of the Indian chiefs was at
their disposal, or sink into mere traders crav-
ing permission to traffic from petty chiefs, and
in continual danger of losing all chance of
mercantile success, in consequence of the
superior trading capacity which the English
and Dutch everywhere displayed. The roots
of French diplomacy had so spread and fas-
tened among the courts of Southern India,
that there they must remain, unless cut out by
the sword. The English eventually found
that solution of the difficulty the only one,
and did not shrink from undertaking the la-
borious task.

The English found their own treaties with
the natives so complicated that it was no easy
matter for them to carry out thoroughly and
heartily, as was their interest to do, their
treaty with the French. Thus, when the
treaty was signed, the general of the Mysorean
army before Trichinopoly, refused to recog-
nise it, and remained before the place until
events in Mysore compelled his return. One
of the causes of that return was the appear-
ance of a French force in aid of the soubahdar
of the Deccan to collect tribute, which the
Mysoreans refused to pay, and which the
soubahdar would never have demanded but
for French instigation, which was offered in
consequence of the English affording assist-
ance to Mohammed Ali, their old protégé, for
whom they warred so long and so well, in
order to enable him to collect the revenues of
Madura, an enterprise in which they con-
quered all opposition, but could raise no
revenue. The British entered into a money
bargain with Mohammed, which was at once
mean and impolitic. They agreed to enforce
the collection of his revenues in certain rebel-
lious districts, if he would give them half the
sum raised. This was a bargain intended by
the English to serve both parties; they could

‘not afford to pay and employ troops for the

rajah’s benefit. It eventually served neither
Mohammed Ali nor his patrons. After a fruit—
less attempt to collect the revenue, the British
retired from the task baffled and chagrined.

Ctnr. LXX.]

Salabat Jung and Bussy, the French agent
at the court of the Deccan, at the head of the
French troops marched against the Rajah of
Mysore, to collect tribute due by that prince,
or alleged to be due, to the soubahdar. At the
same time, the Mahrattas made one of their
raids upon the territory, so that the Mysorean
general withdrew from the neighbourhood of
Trichinopoly to defend his master's lands.
The rajah feared the Mahrattas, and therefore
pretended submission to the Viceroy. The
English now displayed their triumph by in-
vesting their protégé with the insignia of his
office as Kabob of the Carnatic, at his capital
of Arcot. The efforts made by the British to
gain the submission of the zemindars and
polygars, so that Mohammed might receive
his revenues, offended the French: they re-
presented that the employment of English
troops to interfere in the internal affairs of the
Carnatic was in violation of the recent treaty.
The real ground of annoyance with the French
was the prospect of the nabob having a re-
venue, and being thereby enabled to defend
himself. The governor of Vellore refused to
recognise the nabob's authority, at all events,
so far as revenue was concerned; and the de-
termination of the English to enforce that
authority was pleaded by the French as a
ground for military interference in the refrac-
tory governor’s behalf. The English, intimi-
dated by this demonstration and the strength
of Vellorc,withdrew their troops. Other chiefs
in his neighbourhood followed the example
of the ruler of Vellore, and the whole of that
part of the Carnatic became disturbed, and con-
tinued so for years. Madura itself was suddenly
seized by one of the boldest of the khans, and
held in defiance of the British. The French
were solicitous to interfere more decidedly by
arms, but the intrigues at the court of the
Deccan kept them busy : they, however, per-
petually incited the petty chiefs and district
governors to revolt, being as determined as
ever to prevent Mohammed Ali from obtaining
the rule of the C‘arnatic, while they con-
strued every attempt of the English to esta-
blish that rule (the treaty with the French
having fully recognised it) into covert war
against France. Nothing could be more evi-
dent at the close of 1755, than that the war
between the French and English must be
fought over again so far as the Carnatic was
concerned, and that nothing but the entire
prostration of the power of one or the other
could ensure quiet.

The French, for atime, lost influence at the
court of the Deccan, and negotiations were
opened with the English at Madras to send
troops to protect the capital, Bussy and his
French soldiers being at the same time dis-

VOL. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

221

missed. The English were at this juncture
occupied in Bengal in alife or death struggle,
and could not make the tempting offer avail-
able. The prime-minister of the soubahdar
caused the retiring forces of the French to be
treacherously waylaid and attacked; but Bussy
behaved with such intrepidity and skill, that
he resisted all assaults until succours ar-
rived. The soubahdar sued for peace, which
was granted at the still further expense of his
independence, and Bussy became more po-
tential than ever. The breaking out of war
in Bengal caused both parties to send troops
in that direction; but the English, still per-
sistently resolved to effect the complete sub-
jugation of Mohammed Ali’s dominions, and
war having broken out in Europe between
England and France, sent a large force to Ma-
dura, in the spring of 1 757. There Captain Cal-
liaud showed skill and heroism; but he had no
battering guns, the place was strong, and before
guns arrived, the French marched to Trichi-
nopoly once more, before which they encamped
on the lith of May. The garrison was small,
and, besides defending the place, had five
hundred French prisoners to guard. Calliaud,
active and intelligent, was soon apprised of
the danger, and, on the 25th, arrived within
nineteen miles of the beleaguered city. For
miles his force watched every movement, for
the French had denuded all their garrisons, even
Pondicherry, in the hope of surprising Tri-
chinopoly. The French had guarded every
approach to the city. A plain of seven miles
in extent, being an area of rice fields, was
deemed impassable, and not guarded. Calliaud
advanced towards the city, and made such de-
monstrations as an officer would have made
in order to force one of the strongly-guarded
posts; but at night he turned aside, ap-
proached the rice swamp, boldly entered it,
and brought his tired soldiers safely through,
effecting an entrance by daylight into the city.
So much was the French general dispirited by
this skilful and enterprising movement, that,
according to Ormc, he the next day retreated
to Pondicherry.

Other detachments of the French harassed
the country, and burned defenceless towns.
The English took reprisals, and sought every
opportunity to engage the French in the open
field, who, although far the more numerous,
declined battle, and maintained a sort of par-
tizan warfare. The English were well handled
in the field; but their officers were allowed
little discretion by the factors at Madras, and
the troops were harassed by orders and
counter orders, as the stupidity or fear of
the civilians at the presidency dictated.

The year 1757 was one of great activity
on the part of the Mahrattas, who demanded

c: G

222 HISTORY OF THE
“chout” (tribute) from the Carnatic, and
threatened Arcot, so that the nabob had to
send his family to Madras for safety. The
terrified nabob agreed to pay the chout, and
expected the English to find the money out of
the unpaid revenues of his own dominions, if
they could; but, at all events, he looked to
them for the means of redeeming himselffrom
a Mahratta invasion. The English, having
no adequate force to bring against the wild
horsemen, and unwilling to lose the Carnatie
—to the revenues of which, or their share of
them, they attributed great prospective value
—agreed to pay the stipulated rupees. The
brave Oalliaud, relieved from the presence of
the French at Trichinopoly, again sought to
reduce the refractory polygars of Madura and
Tinnevclly. He besieged Madura, but found
it easier to buy his way in, than force his way
through the breach. This seems, so far as
native spirit was concerned, to have quelled
revolt in these districts.

The French were now expecting a grand
fleet and vast resources of men and arms from
France. On the 8th of September, twelve
ships arrived at Pondicherry, landed one
thousand men, and returned to the Mauritius.
This was not the fleet to which the France-
Indians looked forward, as destined to sweep
away all opposition in the Eastern seas, and
to land such forces as would speedily subjugate
all Southern India. The reinforcements, which
were landed, immediately joined the army in
the field, and fort after fort fell to the French,
until eight strong places were subdued in the
neighbourhood of Chittapet, Trincomalee, and
Gingee. The French organized the collectorates
of these districts, and received the revenue as
ifthe territory was their own. The Mysoreans
invaded the dominions of the nabob, and
plundered the country up to the walls of
Madura. The English laid an ambush in a
narrow pass, and, although the detachment
consisted entirely of sepoys, they fell fiercely

upon the Mysoreans, inflicting appalling
slaughter. This event terminated their in-
cursion. In N OVember the French withdrew

their trOOps into the different forts; but the
natives attached to the rival claimants for the
nabobship ravaged the entire country—fire,
rapine, and blood everywhere indicated the
horrors of a war of disputed succession. The
year 1757 terminated leaving each party in
an expectant attitude; but the French had
undoubtedly gained during the struggle in the
Carnatic. On the 28th of April, the expected
French fleet arrived. It consisted of twelve
sail 0f the line, with a portion of the squadron
which had the previous year returned from
Pondieherry to Mauritius. This expedition
left Brest when afever raged in that port, and

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXX.
brought the infection on board, so that three
hundred men died on the voyage and many
arrived sick; a considerable number dying in
the roads of Pondicherry, or in the fort.

With this expedition, there was a body of
troops not less than thirteen hundred strong.
Most of them were Irish, in the French ser-
vice—the men who, at Fontenoy, snatched
victory from the English in the moment when
the beaten French were forsaking the field.
Probably no page of history records heroism
more gallant and romantic than that which
relates the courage displayed by the “Irish
Brigades” in the French service, when fight—
ing on the field of Fontenoy; and in the re-
cords of few battles is homage to the brave
so freely accorded by men of all parties as
to the gallant men who were the sole victors
of that sanguinary conflict. \Vith these trOOps
was the Count de Lally, an Irishman (or, as
some affirm,the son of an Irishman),who had on
the field of Fontenoy greatly distinguished him-
self—s0 much so, that he was promoted to
the rank of colonel by the French king at
the close of the battle. Dr. Taylor and Mr.
Murray describe him as a man of extra-
ordinary prowess. The former says :—“ Upon
the breaking out of the war betwen France
and England, in 1756, the French ministry
resolved to strike an important blow in India.
The Count de Lally was appointed to take
the chief command. He was descended from
one of the Irish families, which had been
compelled to emigrate at the revolution of
1688, in consequence of having adhered to
the cause of the Stuarts; and he was there-
fore animated by a bitter hatred of British
ascendancy, which had crushed both his
country and his creed. At the battle of
Fontenoy he took several English officers
prisoners with his own hand, and was raised
to the rank of colonel by King Louis himself
on the field of battle. He was accompanied
to India by his own Irish regiments, com-
posed of the best troops in the service of'
France, by fifty of the royal artillery, and by
several officers of great distinction.”

Dr. Taylor, however he may allow his own
national predilections to influence his tone in
the above paragraph, does not exaggerate the
surprising heroism of the count or of his
soldiers. The utmost confidence was placed
in both by France; and as Lally was en-
trusted with all the authority previously
allowed to Dupleix, it was supposed that the
English would be speedily driven out of their
long fostered possessions. Lally was not so
fortunate as at Fontenoy; and England, whom
in his remorseless bigotry he so bitterly hated,
was destined to triumph over him on a dis-
tant field, and cause the sun of his glory to

Cnar. LXXJ

set soon and for ever. Lally was not as
skilful as he was brave, although he pos-
sessed many of the finest intellectual qualities
of a good soldier. He was rash, vehement,
impatient, tyrannical; he chafed at obstacles,
which might have been patiently surmounted
had he preserved his temper. A furious reli-
gious animosity towards the English, as the
chief Protestant nation, blinded his judgment
as to present. means and probable results, and
threw him into acts of precipitancy from which
even his great valour and resources in danger
could not extricate him.

The Count de Lally was ordered to attack
Fort St. David as soon after his arrival as
possible. Before communicating with the land,
he caused his ships to take up positions
against that place, and at once make hostile
demonstrations, while he landed his troops
at Pondicherry. Then, with a dispatch
previously unknown in Indian warfare, ex-
cept under Clive, and sometimes under Law-
rence, he landed his Irish regiments, and an
equal number of sepoys, and sent them for-
ward at once against St. David’s. The
portion of the expedition furnished by the
garrison of Pondicherry was badly com-
manded and badly furnished with material.
Indeed, he found the garrison at Pondicherry
in a wretched condition. A salute was fired
with shotted guns, by which the hull and
rigging of one of his ships was damaged.
Lally complained bitterly of the ignorance
and incompetence of the governor and his
council, who could give him no information
either concerning the place he was about to
attack, or the strength of the English on the
coast; neither could they furnish his men with
good guides, or even suflicient provisions.

The forces arrived before Fort St. David
utterly exhausted, and must have famished of
hunger had they not laid the country under
contribution. Scarcely had the French ex-
pedition approached, when the English fleet
was descried from the ships in the road.
Mill, quoting Lally himself, and Orme, gives
the following account of the futile proceed-
ings of both fleets :——“ Mr. Poeocke, with the
ships of war from Bengal, had arrived at
Madras on the 21311 of February; 011 the
24th of the following month a squadron of
five ships from Bombay had arrived under
Admiral Stevens; and on the 17th of April,
the whole sailed to the southward, looking
out for the French. Having in ten days
worked as high to the windward as the head
of Ceylon, they stood in again for the coast,
which they made, off Negapatnam, on the
28th, and proceeding along shore, discovered
the French fleet, at nine the next morning,
riding near Cuddalore. The French imme- i

 

 

 

 

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

223

diately weighed, and bore down towards Pon-
dicherry, throwing out signals to recall the
two ships which had sailed with Lally; and
the English admiral gave the signal for chase.
The summons for the two ships not being-
answered, the French fleet stood out to sea,
and formed the line of battle. The French
consisted of nine sail, the English only of
seven. The battle was indecisive; the loss
of a few men, with some damage to the ships,
being the only result. Both fleets fell con-
siderably to leeward during the engagement;
and the French were six days in working up.
to the road of Pondicherry, where the troops-
were landed. Lally himself had some days
before proceeded to Fort St. David with the-
whole force of Pondicherry, and the troops
from the fleet were sent after him, as fast as
they came on shore.”

Meanwhile, matters on shore tried the skill
and energy of Lally to the utmost. In order
to procure attendants on his army, and as the
president and council could not give him a
sufficient number of men of low caste, he im-
pressed men of all castes indiscriminately, cans -~
ing consternation and rage everywhere; he
was from that hour hated and distrusted by
the natives. Lally became as much an object
of hatred to the French as to the natives.
He was instructed by the company to re—
gard them rather in the light of unprin-
cipled speculators, so that he arrived with a
prejudice against them :—“As the troubles.
in India have been the source of fortunes,
rapid and vast, to a great number of indi-
viduals, the same system always reigns at
Pondicherry, where those who have not yet
made their fortune hope to make it by the
same means; and those who have already
dissipated it, hope to make it a second time-
The Sieur dc Lally will have an arduous task
to eradicate that spirit of cupidity; but it.
would be one of the most important services.
which he could render to the company.”
Such were the terms of the instructions he
received. The want of means at Pondicherry
for any military enterprise, and the tardiness.
with which all material aid was afforded to
him for the reduction of Fort St. David, ex--
cited his anger to a vehement degree, so that
he abused the French civilians in terms which
were more appropriate to the lips of a mad-
man than to those of a governor and com--
mander.

Notwithstanding the impediments pre-
sented by the officials at Pondicherry, he
was able to bring a force before St. David’s.
superior to that of its defenders. The latter
consisted of sixteen hundred natives; three
hundred and sixty-nine European soldiers,
of whom eighty-three were invalids ; and two

224 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

hundred and fifty sailors unacquainted with
military discipline. Lally brought against
this garrison two thousand five hundred Euro—
pean soldiers, exclusive of officers, and an equal
force of sepoys.* The place was soon cap-
tured ; and the conqueror immediately sent
an expedition to Devi-Cotah, which the gar-
rison abandoned. 'On the 7th of June, he re-
entered Pondieherry, and celebrated a Te
Deum with great ecclesiastical pomp, for Lally
was as ardent in religion as in arms.

The English were astounded at so rapid a
series of disasters. They called in all their
troops from every department of the presi-
dency to strengthen Madras and Trichinopoly.
At this juncture, there is every reason to sup-
pose that the English would have lost Madras
itself had Lallybeen supported by the French;
but the poverty of the exchequer at Pondi-
cherry, the want of credit with the natives,
and the hatred excited among the latter by
the new general’s tyranny and bigotry, dried
up all sources of supply except what came
from France; in India the enterprising gene-
ral lost all hope of material aid, unless it could
be supplied by Bussy. Lord Clive, many
years after, thus described the condition of
affairs at this time :——“ M. Lally arrived with
a force as threatened not only the destruction
of all the settlements there, but of all the East
India Company’s possessions, and nothing
saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort
St. David, at that time, but their want of
money, which gave time for strengthening
and reinforcing the place.”

A letter written by Lally himself from
Fort St. David, after the capture, to the
president and council of Pondicherry, pre-
sents the poverty of French resources, and
the disunion between him and the French
civilians, in a light sufficiently clear to ex-
plain why Madras itself did not fall :—“ This
letter shall be an eternal secret between you.
sir, and me, if you afford me the means of
accomplishing my enterprise. I left you
100,0001ivres of my own money to aid you
in providing the funds which it requires. I
found not, upon my arrival, in your purse,
and in that of your whole council, the resource
of 100 pence. You, as well as they, have
refused me the support of your credit. Yet
I imagine you are all of you more indebted
to the company than I am. If you continue
to leave me in want of everything, and ex—
posed to contend with universal disafteetion,
not only shall I inform the king and the com-
pany of the warm zeal which their servants
here display for their interest, but I shall
take effectual measures for not depending,
during the short stay I wish to make in this

* Orme.

 

[CHA r. LXX.

country, on the party spirit and the personal
views with which I perceive that every mem-
ber appears occupied, to the total hazard of
the company.”

Bussy had in the meantime carried on a
series of intrigues in the metropolis of the
Deccan, worthy of his own reputation for
energy and ability, and of that of his preceptor,
Dupleix, for the like qualities. A series of
revolutions occurred at the court of the viceroy
as rapid as the shocks of an earthquake.
Again and again the interests of France and
the influence of Bussy were all but destroyed,
but from the ruins of each successive catas-
trophe, the genius of Bussy rescued his
country’s influence, and even increased it by
the very means adopted for its destruction.
Lally had the infatuation to order Bussy
away from the court of the soubahdar, and
treated his statements as to the' interests in—
volved as pretences. The mind ofLally could
not comprehend the subtle, complicated, and
extended schemes of Bussy. The latter, on
being treated as an impostor, joined the rest
of his countrymen in hatred against the hot-
headed innovator. Thus situated, the first
resolution of the victorious commander was
to attack Madras, carry it rapidly at any
sacrifice, and obtain therefrom the accumu-
lations of English industry,—those supplies
which he so much required. The naval
commander was, however, afraid of the Eu-
glish sailors, and would not even sail in the
direction of Madras, to observe the enemy.
lle sailed south, under the pretence of inter-
cepting English merchant vessels, but really
in the hope of keeping out of harm’s way.
A large body of troops placed on board were
thus kept idle, and drawn away from the
French army at St. David’s. Had these
soldiers been from the Irish instead of the
French portion of the force, they would pro-
bably, from their devotion to their general,
have mutinied against the admiral. The
latter succeeded in cruising about in such a
way as to avoid the English, and Lally, un-
able to secure his co-operation, was obliged
to adopt another project to gain supplies,
and extend French influence. The re-
jectcd claimant of the throne of Tanjore had
been held by the English as a prisoner at
Fort St. David, and Lally conCeivcd the
idea of using this personage for the purpose
ofgetting money from that country, the reign-
ing rajah of which had formerly given a.
bond of 5,600,000 rupees to the French, to
prevent their attacking his dominions. A
demand was made for the money; the rajah
did not possess the means of payment, and
the French proceeded to dethrone him in
favour of the prisoner at Fort tit. David,

is»

CHAP. LXX.]

who would levy it on the inhabitants, with
French assistance. On the 18th of June,
1758, Lally marched at the head of his dis-
posable forces against Tanjore. In seven days
the army arrived at Carical, the natives every-
where hiding their provisions, and showing
the utmost hatred to the general. His own
people rendered all support unwillingly; the
troops suffered from fatigue and hunger,
which the Irish bore even cheerfully, but
the French and scpoys were discontented and
murmured. A messenger from the Tanjore
monarch arrived to treat, but the general
would listen to no parley; either the bond
must be paid, or he would seize its equivalent,
and that of all further expenses incurred.
He proceeded to the wealthy town ofNagpore,
which he entered, no resistance being offered,
but the rich natives had fled, and there was
very little property left behind.

He next arrived at Kineloor, where a pa-
goda stood of great celebrity. He plun~
tiered it. Supposing the idols to be gold, he
carried them away; they proved to be brass,
but the effect upon the natives was the same
as if they had been of the precious metal.
He dug down to the foundations of the temple,
swept all the tanks, and treated the property
of the unoffending and defenceless with bar—
barity. Six Brahmins lingering about the
mum, in the hope of obtaining their gods,
be seized, denounced as spies, and blew them
away from guns.

llis track to the capital, where he arrived
on the 15th of July, was marked by devas-
tation. The king offered a treaty. Lally’s de-
mands, both in their nature and mode, were
itnprur‘lent, and violated the most obvious
religious scruples of the natives. Bigoted
himself to the last degree, ready to resent the
smallest indignity to his religion with fire and
sword, he had no respect or consideration for
the religious feelings of others. In civil and
religious matters he was alike a tyrant, but
he had the faculty, not only of ruling military
bodies, but of attaching them to him. This
was especially the case with his own Irish
soldiers, who followed him with a contempt of
danger, and a desperate courage which rivallcd
even his own, although he was reputed to be
the bravest man in France.

The bombardment of the rajah's strong-
hold promptly followed the failure of nego-
tiation which the king renewed under the
cannonade, but attempting to trick Lally,
as all oriental princes would at all risks, that
officer vowed he would send him and his
family as slaves to the Mauritius. The rajah,
determined to resist, every feeling of his
nature having been outraged by successive
insults the most galling to a Hindoo imagi-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

225

nation. He appealed to the English. Cap-
tain Calliaud had sent him a small detachment
of sepoys from Trichinopoly, being afraid if
he sent European troops, that the rajah might
regard them simply as means of effecting an
accommodation, and betray them into the
hands of the enemy. Calliaud sent another
and stronger detachment. The bombardment
continued until the 7th of August, when a
breach was effected. At that time, Lally had
only two days’ supply of food in his camp,
and hardly one day’s supply of ammunition.
In that conjuncture of affairs, the English
fleet arrived before Carical, the only place
from which Lally had obtained supplies.
During the siege, the two fleets had met,
and fought, the English gaining a victory:
this Lally also learned, and there now ap-
peared no hope for the French, unless in an
immediate assault. Lally called a council of
war, two officers were for the assault, of which
he was not one; the other thirteen counselled
him to raise the siege. They began their
retreat next day, but before putting that
movement into execution, the besieged gar-
rison sallied out, and partly effected a sur~
prise, placing the French army in imminent
danger. As it was necessary for the English
fleet to keep on the gui rice for the beaten
but not extinguished French squadrons,
Lally hoped to reach Carical before the Eu-
glish would venture to land a force there. In
this, he was successful, but when he saw the
powerful navy of England riding in the offing,
his hope failed, although his courage could
not fail, and his rage against the hated En-
glish broke forth in torrents of furious and
almost frenzied passion.

Lally soon saw that the entire evacuation
of Tanjore and its neighbourhood was essen-
tial to the safety of the French. Their fleets
were fugitive. The Mahrattas, at the insti-
gation of the English, threatened that they
would invade the French territory if Lally
and his forces (lid not retire from that of
Tanjore; and the civilians of l’ondicherry
urged his return, as twelve hundred English
menaced even the seat of the presidency.
Lally had not head for such sudden changes
and complicated transactions, and he was
bewildered and depressed, while the wants of
his brave and patient, but harassed army,
were as unprovidcd for as ever. The move-
ments of the two fleets were uncertain, and
their tactics at times unaccountable, both
were the victims of the weather. The French
had the best ships, the English the best
men, and the more nautical skill. Most of
the English ships were badly built, and in
action the French, knowing that the chances
were they would have to retreat, principally

.‘226 )IIISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

'fired into the English rigging to disable pur-
suit; while the English, firing at the hulls,
and sweeping the decks, inflicted more serious
and permanent damage, even when flight was
not prevented, and killed and disabled a far
greater number of men. The proceedings of
the different squadrons are differently related
by French and English authors, and the con-
tradictions occurring in their relations, render
it next to impossible to reconcile them. Mill’s
account is the clearest; he in the main gives
the relation of ()rme, with such modifications
as information subsequently coming to light
enabled him to supply. He thus describes
what took place at sea :—

“ After the first of the naval engagements,
the English fleet, before they could anchor,
were carried a league to the north of Sadras ;
the French, which had suffered less in the
rigging, and sailed better, anchored fifteen
miles to the windward. The English, as soon
as possible, Weighed again, and after a fruit-
less endeavour to reach Fort St. David, dis-
covered the French fleet on the 28th of
May in the road of Pondicherry. The next
day, the French, at the remonstrance of Lally,
who sent on board a considerable body of
troops, got under sail; but instead of bearing
down on the English, unable to advance
against the wind, proceeded to Fort St.
David, where they arrived on the evening
after the surrender. The English sailing
badly, fell to leeward as far as Alamparva,
where intelligence was received of the loss of
:the fort. The admiral, therefore, not having
water on board for the consumption of five
days, made sail, and anchored the next day
in the roads of Madras. The fleet had
numerous wants; l‘i’ladras had very scanty
means of supply; and nearly eight weeks
elapsed before it us again ready for sea.
On the 3rd of July, three of the company’s
ships arrived from Bengal, with money, mer-
chandise, and stores, but no troops. The
monsoon had obliged them to make the out-
ward passage towards the Acheen, and they
came in from the southward. The French
.admiral, after touching at Fort St. David,
had stood to the southward, to cruise off
Ceylon; in opposition to remonstrances of
Lally, who desired the fleet to co-operate in
the destined enterprise against Madras. Lally
hastened from Fort St. David to Pendi-
-cherry, and summoned a council by whose
authority he recalled the fleet. The injunc—
tion reached the admiral at Carical on the
16th of June, and be anchored the next day
in the road of Pondicherry. Had he con-
tinued his destined course to the southward,
he could not have missed the three English
East Indiamen from Bengal, and by their

 

[CHAR LXX.

capture would have obtained that treasure,
the want of which alone disconcertcd the
scheme of English destruction. 0n the 25th
of July, the English fleet were again under
sail; and on the 27th appeared before l‘on-
dicherry, where the French lay at anchor.
They put to sea without delay : but the diffi-
culties of the navigation, and the aims of the
commanders, made it the 2nd of August
before the fleets encountered off Carical. The
French line consisted of eight sail; the
English, as before, of seven. The fight lasted
scarcely an hour; when three of the French
ships, being driven out of the line, the whole
bore away, under all the sail they could
carry. The English admiral gave chase;
but in less than ten minutes the enemy were
beyond the distance of certain shot. Toward
night the English gave over the pursuit, and
came to anchor off Carical. The French
steered for Pondicherry, when the admiral
declared his intention of returning to Mau-
ritius. Lally sent forward the Count d’Estaign
to remonstratc with him on the disgrace of
quitting the sea before an inferior enemy,
and to urge him to renewed operations.
D’Estaign offered to accompany him on
board, with any proportion of the troops.
Lally himself moved with the army from
Carical on the 24th of August, and, having
passed the Colaroonc, hurried on with a small
detachment to Pondicherry, where he arrived
on the 28th. He immediately summoned a
mixed council of the administration and the
army, who joined in a fresh expostulation to
the admiral on the necessity of repairing to
Madras, where the success of an attack must
altogether depend upon the union of the
naval and military operations. That Com-
1nandcr, representing his ships as in a state of
the greatest disablcment, and his crews ex-
tremely enfeebled and diminished by disease,
would yield to no persuasion, and set sail
with his whole fleet for Mauritius on the 2nd
of September.

“ If we trust to the declaration of Lally, his
intention of besieging Madras, still more his
hopes of taking it, were abandoned from that
hour. Before the fleet departed, an expedi-
tion against Arcot, with a view to relieve the
cruel pressure of those pecuniary wants
which the disastrous result of the expeditions
to Tanjorc had only augmented, was pro-
jected and prepared.”

Disconcerted although Lally was, and ex-
hausted as were his means, his expedition
against Arcot was conducted with extraor-
dinary energy, dispatch, hardihood, and suc-
cess. His Irish legion performed prodigies of
valour, Lally himself ever foremost in the path
of danger. The native enemy melted away

CRAP. LXX.]

before their furious valour. Fort after fort
.fell. Every task was executed both by the
general and troops with masterly ability, yet
strategists affirm that the French commander
failed in not cutting off supplies from Madras,
which should have been a part of his scheme,
and was practicable, as these critics allege.
At all events, on the 4th of October, 1758,
Lally, “ on the terms of a pretended eapitu-
lation, amid the thunder of cannon, made his
entrance into Arcot."""‘

The grand error in Lally’s campaign was
the neglect. of Chingleput, which he might
have captured without resistance, so great was
the consternation into which the garrison
was thrown by his triumphant course. rI‘his
fortress covered the conveyance of supplies
to Madras, and as soon as the English re-
covered from the temporary panic inspired
by Lally’s rapid and brilliant career, they
strengthened the place in every way their
means allowed, and resolved to defend it, if
Lally’s eyes being opened as to its import-
ance, he should venture to assail it. \Yhile
the French, or Irish commander, as he may
with more strict propriety be called, sped as
a fiery meteor over the country, a naval rein-
forcement arrived from England, conveying
eight hundred and fifty royal troops, com-
manded by Colonel Draper. The brave and
wise Caillaud, with his European troops, were
recalled from Triehinopoly, and Chingleput
was powerfully reinforced.

Lally, who declared that he never lost sight
of Chingleput, but had comprised its capture
in his plans, wrote from Arcot to P011dicherry
for money to pay his troops and find means
for carrying them against that place; but the
council had no money, and the general was
obliged to put his troops into cantonments,
and hasten to Pondicherry himself, if pos-
sible to set things there in better order. The
celebrated Bussy would have been a far more
likely man to remove the disorder of that
capital; he had just joined his superior
as the latter entered Arcot in triumph.
Instead of harmonious action between these
two important men, crimination and re-
verimination occurred upon their meeting.
Lally, who was a man of honest and trans-
parent mind, accused the wily diplomatist of
a tortuous and fraudulent policy dishonouring
to France. Bussy, without being more frank
than wise, soon caused his master to under-
stand that the lesser magnate considered him
impolitic, precipitate, rash, and without a plan
which, by its comprehensiveness, consecutive-
ness, and harmony would bring all his power
to bear against the English. The sieur be-
lieved that by a bold, daring, onward warfare,

* Mill, lib. iv. cap. iv. p. 163.

IN INDIA'AND THE EAST.

 

227

t the peninsula might soon be cleared of them;

his men, he believed, could do it, if ammuni-
tion, food, and the sinews of war were pro-
vided. Bussy doubted if the English were a
people to be removed in a hurry, as Lally
might have known from the experience of his
ancestors in Ireland; and Bussy also thought
that money and power might both be had, if
the means taken to obtain them were well
chosen, and used with caution as Well as con—
rage. Another general of reputed ability,
who had been appointed by Lally governor
of Masulipatam, Morasin, also joined the con-
ference. Lally urged these officers to raise
money on their personal credit, which the
conduct of Lally himself had rendered impos-
sible. Bussy urged the consolidation of con-
quest, and the exercise of French power at
the court of the Deccan, as much more impor-
tant than the influence of the English with
the inferior and subsidiary court of the Car-
natic. It was to no purpose that reasons the
most convincing were urged for such a course ;
Lally could see no object but one—the re-
moval of the hated English from India, and
war against them everywhere; and there is
no doubt his views were popular with his
Irish soldiery. The French officers were in
favour of the plans of Bussy, and wished him
to supersede Lally in rank and authority.
The council at Pondicherry declared that
they had no means to support the army.
The officers urged an attempt to take Madras.
Lally had no means for a siege. Count
D’Estaign, one of the bravest soldiers in the
French army, exclaimed in a council of war:
“ Better to (lie under the \ ’alls of Madras, than
of hunger in Pondicherry.” Lally himself
hoped to pillage the black town, and thus
supported, shut up the English in Fort St.
George. He advanced his own money,
60,000 rupees, and prevailed upon various
Frenchmen in Pondieherry to advance more,
which barely exceeded half of his own contri-
butions. “'ith these means, be equipped a
little army of about seven thousand men, of
whom about two thousand seven hundred
were French and Irish, and proceeded against
Madras. He was ready to march by the first
week in November, but the weather detained
him six weeks, and his resources were being
rapidly consumed, and he was then reduced
to barely a week’s supply.

The English prepared themselves against
the danger which impended. Admiral Po-
eceke landed his marines at Madras. A body
of native cavalry, and the sepoys which had
been part of the garrison of Triehinopoly,
were posted so as to command the line of the
French convoys. Lawrence, who had before
been a victor so often, commanded the army,

I

228 HISTORY OF THE
which encamped on an elevated spot near the
city. Governor Pigot commanded the fort, a
man unsuitable for any military purpose,
although shrewd, sensible, and with much
capacity for business. The military in the
fort consisted of seventeen hundred and fifty-
cight Europeans, two thousand two hundred
and twenty sepoys, and two hundred of the
nabob’s horsemen, who were of little value.
There were one hundred and fifty Europeans,
who acted as civil auxiliaries.

On the 12th of December Lally attacked
Lawrence’s outposts, who fought and fell back.
Lally pressed upon him with impetuosity, and
Lawrence sought shelter in the fort. The
count reconnoitred all day on the 13th.
On the 14th, he realized his purpose of cap-
turing the black town, which was pillaged.
The Irish soldiery became intoxicated. The
English, acquainted with the fact, sallied out
to the number of six hundred men, who were
selected for their bravery and efficiency.
These troops fell upon the revellers, and slew
many; but although most were drunk, and
all in great disorder, they proved much more
formidable enemies than their French col-
leagues; they did not give way, but fought
in scattered groups with undaunted bravery
and determination, until two hundred of the
English, who also fought with obstinate va-
lour, lay dead in the streets. The remainder
retreated, before Lally’s soldiers could form.
Bussy, instead of intercepting the fugitives,
refused to act, or allow his officers to act, on
the ground that he was without orders and
without cannon,———an absurd pretext, for the
English were driven back without cannon
and without orders, and Bussy could have
intercepted them had he as much spirit as his
officers. Probably the want of cordiality
between him and Lally accounted for it, and
it may be that the feeling extended to Bussy’s
followers; for on Aughrim, Fontenoy, and
other fields, where they fought side by side,
the French evinced much jealousy of their
Irish auxiliaries.

Lally having obtained money from some
merchants who were resident in the black
town, opened his batteries, as he himself al-
leged afterwards, without hope of capture, but
with the intention to bombard. \Vhile the
count was thus proceeding a million of livres
arrived at Pondicherry, and with the funds thus
placed at his disposal, he made regular siege,
with the hope of subduing the fort before the
English fleet, expected back in January, should
arrive. “Vith disadvantages, such as would
have deterred any other man then living, unless
Olive, and with nothing to encourage him but
the heroism and noble devotion ofhis own Irish
soldiers, and a few of the common soldiers

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXX.
among the French and the sepoys, this daunt-
less man persevered. Mill did him and his
poor soldiers no more than justice when he
wrote the following account, which unites a
fulness and a brevity not to be met with in
any other record of these transactions :—~
“ With only two engineers, and three artillery
officers, excepting the few who belonged to
the company, all deficient both in knowledge
and enterprise; with officers in general dis—
satisfied and ill-disposed, with only the com-
mon men on whom he could depend, and of
whose alacrity he never had reason to com-
plain, he carried on the siege with a vigour
and activity which commanded the respect
even of the besieged, though they were little
acquainted with the difficulties under which
he toiled. By means of the supplies which
had plentifully arrived from Bengal, and the
time which the presidency had enjoyed to
make preparation for siege, the English were
supplied with an abundance both of money
and of stores. The resolution to defend them-
selves to the utmost extremity, which has
seldom been shared more universally and cor-
dially by any body of men, inspired them with
incessant vigilance and activity. The industry
of the enemy was perpetually counteracted by
a similar industry on the part of their oppo-
nents. No sooner had those without erected
a work, than the most active, and enterprising,
and often skilful exertions were made from
within to destroy it. “'hatever ingenuity
the enemy employed in devising measures of
attack, was speedily discovered by the keen
and watchful eyes of the defender". A breach,
in spite of all those exertions, was, however,
effected; and the mind of Lally was intensely
engaged with preparations for the assault;
when he found the officers of his army alto-
gether indisposcd to second his ardour. Mr.
Urine declares his opinion that their objec-
tions were founded on real and prudential
considerations, and that an attempt to storm
the place would have been attended with re—
pulse and disaster. Lally, however, says that
the most odious intrigues were carried on in
the army, and groundless apprehensions were
propagated, to shake the resolution of the
soldiers, and prevent the execution of the
plan: that the situation of the general was
thus rendered critical in the highest degree,
and the chance of success exceedingly dimi—
nishcd; yet he still adhered to his design, and
only waited for the setting of the moon, which
in India sheds a light not much feebler than
that of a winter sun, on the very day on
which an l'lnglish fleet of six sail arrived at
Madras. The fleet under Admiral Pocoeke,
which had left Madras on the 11th of October,
had arrived at Bombay on the 10th of Decem-

CRAP. LXX.]

her, where they found six of the company’s
ships, and two ships of the line, with six hun-
dred of the king’s troops on board. On the
31st of December the company’s ships, with
all the troops, sailed from Bombay, under the
convoy of two frigates, and arrived on the
16th of February, at a critical moment, at
Madras. ‘\\'ords,’ says Lally, ‘are inade-
quate to express the effect which the appear-
ance of them produced. The officer who
commanded in the trenches deemed it even
inexpedient to wait for the landing of the
enemy, and two hours before receiving orders
retired from his post.’ Lally was now con-
strained to abandon the siege. The officers
and soldiers had been on no more than half
pay during the first six weeks of the expedi-
tion, and entirely destitute of pay during the
remaining three. The expenses of the siege
and the half pay had consumed, during the
first month, the million livres which had ar-
rived from the islands. The officers were on
the allowance of the soldiers. The subsistence
of the army for the last fifteen days had de-
pended almost entirely upon some rice and
butter, captured in two small vessels from
Bengal. A very small quantity of gunpowder
remained in the camp; and not a larger at
Pondicherry. The bombs were wholly con-
sumed three weeks before. The sepoys de-
serted for want of pay, and the European
cavalry threatened every hour to go over to
the enemy.”

I t is probable that but for the personal
attachment of his own soldiers of the Irish
brigade the French would have seized Lally,
and given Bussy the command. On the night
of the 17th the army broke up from before
Madras, and made good their retreat. The
English seem to have been so awed by the
bravery and military capacity of Lally, and a
portion of his troops, that they instituted no
pursuit. Considering the superior force,
equipment, and resources of the English at
Madras, when the siege was raised, it was
much to their dishonour that a hot and unre-
lenting pursuit was not adopted. The tidings
of Lally’s misfortunes at Madras arrived in
l’ondicherry before him, and were hailed with
transports ofjoy, alike by French and natives,
so Completely had the bigotry and self‘will of
the governor counteracted the bravery, talent,
and glory of the soldier. “'hen he arrived at
l’i,.ntliclier1'y, if the joy at his ill success were
less openly expressed, it was not less hearty.

Mohammed Ali, the actual rabob of the
('arnz‘itic, the protégé of the English, had
proved himself a costly ally. He had, how-
ever, been true to English interests, and their
honour and policy was to support him. His
two brothers, who had been instigated by the

um. 11.

IN INDIA ANDz’THI; EAST.

 

229

French, and-:who had so often sought French
help, now, in tirehpur of adversity, betrayed
them. One of 'the‘vbrotlters actually assassi—
nated all the French’ iii-ibis service, except a
single officer, justifying the’.aapprehensions
entertained by Oalliaud, recorded’in ‘aiformer
page, when urged to send British tr’oopisa'to}
the assistance of the nabob himself. The ma.-
tive princes were entirely without faith, honour,
or principle, and no confidence could be re-
posed in them, however gratitude or oaths
might be expected to bind them to their en-
gagements, or even to the observance of hos-
pitality, justice, and mercy. The English
were most anxious to recover the province,
and prepared an expedition, but their funds
had been so heavily drawn upon, that they
were unable to take the field until the 6th of
March, when a force, consisting of 1156 E11-
ropeans, 1570 scpoys, 1120 collierees (regu-
lar troops), and 1956 horse, was fully equipped
for a campaign.

Besides this force, a native chief with a body
of sepoys was sent to the countries of Tinne-
velly and Madura. “'hen the troops had been
withdrawn for the defence of Madras, Madura
and Palam Cotah were attacked by the native
chiefs ; but the sepoys, who constituted the gar-
rison, remained faithful, and drove them off.

“hen the army of Lally retreated from
Madras, only a portion entered Pondicherry;
another division marched to Congeveram,
where the two armies remained in hostile
array for three weeks, neither feeling strong
enough to act upon the offensive. The English
drew off to VVandiwash, took the town, and
were preparing to open trenches against the
fort, when the French moved from Congeveram
to its relief. This was the expectation of the
English, and, acting boldly and promptly upon
the design previously formed, they turned,
by a forced march, reached Congeveram, as-
saulted and captured it. The two armies
watched one another, without giving battle,
until the 28th of May, when both went into
cantonments.

“'hile these events were passing, the fleets
were occupied by measures of usefulness. On
the 29th of April, Admiral Pococke arrived
from the western coast of India, and cruised
about, watching for French ships. About a
month after the armies went into canton-
ments, the company’s usual ships arrived at
Madras, and brought one hundred soldiers for
the service of the country, and announced that
royal troops, in considerable numbers, might
soon be expected. At the same time, it was
announced that no treasure would arrive until
1760, tidings which (lispirited the council,
but which they did not then permit to trans»
pire beyond the council chamber. In another

11 II

230

month, five ships airived at hevapatnam
with a portion of the expected troops, and,
having landed stores and infinitions, sailed f01
Mad1as.- . '

On the Zth of Aug ust the French squadron
sailed, fat: the neighbourhood of Trincomalee,
i211 filliesIsland of Ceylon, where the fleet was re-
infer ced by th1ee new ships from France. On
the 10th of September, the weather allowed
the two navies to operate, and the English,
having the wind, came down abreast, while
the French lay-to in line of battle. The s11-
periority of the French fleet was very great:
they had eleven sail of the line and three
frigates. The English had but nine sail of
the line, one frigate, a fire~ship, and two of
the company’s traders. The superiority in
guns 011 the part of the French was one
hundred and seventy-four. The battle lasted
but two hours, when the French line was
broken, and made all sail out of the engage-
ment. As usual, the English had suffe1ed
chiefly in the rigging, ando could not follow.
A pursuit of ten0 min1ites ploved that if the
English had the best of the battle, the French
were more skilful in making out of it. The
loss of men was about equal; but the French
ships were severely hulled, but suffered little
in the rigging. The English next day entered
the port of Negapatnam : the French, in four
days, reached Pondicherry. Great was the
distress of the people there, when a beaten
fleet sought shelter, which they 110ped would
bring them the means of victory and large
supplies. The disappointment and discontent
spread wherever the French troops were quar-
tered. The Irish brigade had received no
pay for a long time—they had “borne the
burning and heat of the day”—they had ac-
complished more in battle than the whole of
the French troops besides—they alone had
encountered with success the English ; yet the
limited funds of the presidency had been em-
ployed in recruiting and drilling sepoys, who
ran away, and in supporting the civilians,
French officers, and French troops, while
Lally’s own regiment was, like Lally himself,
treated with something like hostility. In the
hour of danger they were relied upon, and
French compliment was lavished, to stimulate
them, while, as at Madras, the toil of labour
and battle were borne by them, and they were
left to starve, unable to obtain either rations
01' their pay to piocu1e them. Their long-

emiuring patience at last(1 gave way : they 11111-
tinied, and the uhole Fiench army became
disorganized. This corps had been regarded
in India with the prestige it had acquired in
France, and looked up to not only as the most
chivalrous in battle, but the best disciplined;
now their disobedience shook the loyalty of

HISTORY OF T121} BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[Gnaru LXX.

every other corps.* But, although Lally's
regiment mutinied under the pressure of
hunger, and because they believed that their
general and themselves were the objects of an
invidious feeling, this did not hinder their
usual aptitude in arms, as they soon proved in
an action of great importance at VVandiwash.
Coote had not yet arrived, and the officer
who was next in command, was Major Brere-
ton. He was extremely solicitous to perform
some brilliant deed, while the chance of com-
manding in chief remained with him. He
accordingly induced the council of Madras
to consent to his leading a force against “'an-
diwash. The whole army accordingly marched
from Congeveram on the 26th of September.
The two forces now in front of one another
were very formidable, comprising the chief
strength of each, but the English were far s11-
perior in materiel and equipment, while they
were also well supplied with provisions. The
French were deficient in every requisite.
The English attacked the place 011 the night
of the 29th, they came on with great gal-
lantry, and they were received with equal spirit.
It does not appear that the native auxiliaries
011 either side were of much use. The En-
glish passed through a terrible fire, and with
the most audacious courage bore down all
opposition; it so happened that at VVandi-
wash, as at Madras, they were once more
brought into fierce conflict with their own
fellow-subjects, who constituted Lally’s corps,
a sanguinary conflict ensued, and the English
sustained a terrible defeat, leaving more than
two hundred men dead, or in the hands of
the victors. The repulse they experienced
seems to have much injured the morale of
the force, Mr. Mill relates the following anec-
dote, illustrative of the fact :——“ In this action
a detachment of grenadiers were very expe-
ditiously quitting the vicinity of danger;
when their officer, instead of calling after
them, an imprudence which would, in all pro-
bability, have converted their retreat into a
flight, ran till he got before them, and then,
turning suddenly round, said, ‘Halt,’ as
giving the ordinary word of command. The
habit of discipline prevailed. The men
stopped, formed according to orde1s and
marched back into the scene of action. But
this success of the French, however brilliant,

* The first troops of the brigade 1101c ge1-eially 1e-
garded in France as much better on the field of battle
than anywhere else, and soon after they gained for France
the far-famed field of Fontenoy, many complaints were
1u‘ged as to their free way of living in quarters and their
addictions to duels. The king pointed out the fact of
these complaints to their general, exclaiming, “ My Irish
troops give me more trouble than all the rest of my army.”
“ Sire,” was the gallant and witty reply, “your lnajcsty’s
enemies say the same thing.”

CRAP. LXX.]

neither clothed the men nor supplied them
with provisions."

The state of affairs which ensued upon the
French victory of VVandiwash, was, on the
whole, unfavourable to France. A signal
victory was gained without producing any
moral influence among natives in favour of
the French, for it was mainly to the valour of
Lally‘s corps that the triumph was attribu-
table, and the natives could not see any dif-
ference between Irishmen and Englishmen,
and supposed that Lally’s people were influ-
enced by no principle in serving the French,
but were mercenary soldiers who ought to
have been 011 the other side. The natives
did not fail to observe that, whenever the
French and English met, unless the soldiers
of Lally bore the brunt of the battle, the French
were beaten; so that the English got the moral
credit of the heroism of Lally’s soldiers, and
although they were defeated, still it was a
battle lost to their own countrymen, and in
the opinion of the natives redounded to En-
glish honour. The feeling became general
throughout the Carnatic, and in other portions
of the Deccan was rapidly making progress,
that the French, however invincible to na-
tives, were not as good soldiers as the British,
and must finally give place to them. In
various ways, such a feeling proved disadvan-
tageous to the French, depriving them of
native support. If the French lost a battle
the English of course got the glory; if the
French won one where the Irish brigade
formed part of their army, the victory was
attributed to the brigade, and the British had
the glory again, even although they expe-
rienced repulse. The French were in a'false
position, and lost moral power day by day.

The removal of Bussy from the court of
the Deccan left the French protégé, the vice-
roy, unable to cope with his ambitious rivals.
A revolution broke out, and French influence
then, deprived of the expert diplomacy of
Bussy, melted away.

The general state of affairs at this juncture,
as affected the French faxomablv and un-
favourably, is voluminously presented by the
great English historian of the time, Orme,
and by Lally attcr his 1eturn to F':1ancc

1'I1.1lill collated these accounts, and thus
011 ts the 1'esult.'——“ \eithcr the English nor
the l‘ rench had ever been able to thaw f1on1
th -e di tricts which they held in the country,
sufficient funds to defray the cxpens e of t11e
troops, employed 111 conqueiing and defend-
ing them. A consideiable portion of those
dist1.cts,1\liich the r1e1 ch had been able to
seize upon the arrival of Lallv, the English
had again rccove1ed. The government of
Iondicheiry, lelt ahnts tuholly destitute of

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 231

supplies from Europe, was utterly exhausted,
first, by the long and desperate struggle in
which they had been engaged; and secondly
(for the truth must not be disguised, though
the complaints of Lally have long been treated
with ridicule), by the misapplication of the
public funds: a calamity of which the vio-
lent passion of individuals for private wealth
was a copious and perennial fountain. Lally
had, from his first arrival, been struggling on
the borders of despair, with wants which it
was altogether out of his power to supply.
The English had received, or were about to
receive, the most important accession to their
power. And nothing but the fleet, which
had now arrived, and the supplies which it
might have brought, could enable him much
longer to contend with the difficulties which
environed him.

“ M. d’Aché had brought, for the use of the
colony, £16,000 in dollars, with a quantity of ‘
diamonds, valued at £17,000, which had been
taken in an English East Indiaman; and,
having landed these effects, together with
one hundred and eighty men, he declared his
resolution of sailing again immediately for
the islands. Nothing could exceed the sur-
prise and consternation of the colony, upon
this unexpected and alarming intelligence.
Even those who were the most indifl'erent to
the success of affairs, when the reputation of
Lally, and the interest of their country alone
were at stake, now began to tremble, when
the very existence of the colony, and their
interests along with it, were threatened with
inevitable destruction. All the principal in-
habitants, civil and military, assembled at
the governor’s house, and formed themselves
into a national council. A vehement protest
was signed against the departure of the fleet.
But the resolution of the admiral was in-
flexible; and he could only be induced to
leave four hundred Caffres, who served in the
fleet, and five hundred Europeans, partly
marines and partly sailors.

"' At the same time the departure of Bussy
had been attended, in the dominions of the
soubahdar, with a rapid succession of events,
ruinous to the interests of the French. A11
expedition from Bengal, fitted out by the
English against the northern Circars, those
important districts of which Bussy had ob-
tained the dominion from Salabat Jung, had
been attended with the most brilliant success;
had not only driven the French entirely out
of the country, but had compelled the soubah-
dar to solicit a connection with the English.”

Bussy, however, continued to open com-
munications with the revolutionists of the
Deccan; and, with a perfidy only to be sur-
passed by Dupleix, finding his former pro-

232 HISTORY OF THE
tégé the weaker, entreated the count to side
with the revolters. Lally was a straight-
forward, honest man, who detested Bussy and
his intrigues, and liked to adjust political
differences by honest treaty, or downright
hard fighting. He did not comprehend the
arguments of his lieutenant, admitted that he
had no knowledge of the politics of the
Deccan, but began to see the importance in
relation to the English of holding power with
the Viceroy, to whom the nabob of the Car-
natic, the protégé of the English, owed allegi—
ance. Lally permitted his minister to act as
he pleased, and his first act was to declare Sa-
labat Jung Nabob of the Carnatic. This pre-
tender had raised an army, and had the sup-
‘port of the revo ution ary power in the Deccan.
The sieur confided to Bussy a body of troops
to march to the assistance of the pretender,
then directing his course upon Vellore. Dussy
arrived at “'andiwash the day after the En—
glish suffered the reverse at that. place, to take
thence a portion of the troops upon his new en-
terprise. The French army, which was suffering
extreme privations, at once burst into general
mutiny. They believed that the admiral had
left plenty of money at Pondicherry, and
that the civilians had squandered it. The
civilians did squander from time to time very
much, and the chief cause of their hatred to
Lally was his incorruptibleness, and deter-
mination to check their corruption. On the
16th of October, the officers were deprived of
all authority. Bussy had by that time, through
his extraordinary address, led his division to
Arcot, when hearing of the still further pro-
ceedings of the mutinous army which he had
left behind, he halted. The French soldiers
were, however, pacified by six months’ pay,
and a general amnesty. But the pretender to
the nabobship had exhausted his resources,
was observed by an English corps, and was
solicited to give up his alliance with Bussy,
by Nizam Ali, the chief of the successful re-
volutionary party in the Deccan, and then
the ostensible viceroy. The negotiation be-
tween the pretender to the Carnatic and
Bussy was broken off. The latter continued
somehow to support his troops, and to increase
his division by four hundred superior horse-
men of the Deccan. Lally, no longer able to
feed his army, was obliged to separate it into
two divisions, and send each in a different
direction to collect the rents, and assert gene-
rally the sovereignty of those districts. This
was perilous in the presence of so great a force
as the English now possessed, but all parties
agreed that there was nothing else which could
be done, and preserve the soldiers alive.

0n the 20th of November, the division
which took the southern direction seized upon

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXX.
the island of Seringham, the garrison of Trich-
inopoly being too weak to offer resistance.
Unfortunately for Lally, Colonel Coote, with
the remainder of his force, had landed a few
weeks before, and, on the 21st of November,
reached Congeveram, where the English troops
were cantonned. He pretended to concentrate
his attention on Arcot, and deceived the
French, threw them off their guard at “'andi-
wash, and then, suddenly assaulting that place,
carried it on the 29th. This gallant coup of
Coote compelled Lally to abandon Seringham
for the defence of Arcot. He was joined by
Bussy, with the force at the head of which he
had been fruitlessly wandering about, for the
first time in his Indian experience. Bussy
recommended a cunning and effectual course
of strategy to his chief that of using his su-
periority of cavalry to act upon the English
communications. Lally found that the temper
of his Irish soldiers would not be satisfied with
expeditions which only harassed the enemy,
and that some bold exploit—some obvious and
tangible advantage, was necessary to satisfy
their daring enterprise and their protracted
disappointments. Bussy's plan was the best
in itself, but was unsuited to the condition of
the troops. The count, anxious to secure food
and ammunition, by clever strategem diverted
the attention of the English, and seized Con-
geveram, where he found nothing of im-
portance. The English were fed by paying
ready money daily at a high rate to the
country people, who, finding them to be good
customers, provided them with supplies ; but
Bussy’s Mahratta horsemen often interfered
with these operations, to the injury and em-
barrassment of the British. Lally next at-
tempted the recapture of “‘andiwash. Surprise
was impossible: he laid siege to the place:
but his genius was baffled by the professional
etiquette of the engineers, who insisted upon
carrying on the siege according to established
rules, instead of obeying the orders of their
chief, whose keen military eye saw that such
rules were unnecessary in the case. Before
he could do anything, a superior English army
came to raise the siege. Bussy advised his
superior officer to resort to the stratagem of
cutting off the English supplies; but Lally,
scorning to retreat, prepared to give battle to
the approaching foe. The English mameuvred
admirably, and formed their line with one.
wing in communication with the fort. and
resting upon it so as to be covered by its tire.
The European force of the French was su-
perior to that of the English, being 2250
against 1900. The native force of the British
was the stronger, being 23100 sepoys and
12-50 cavalry against 1300 sepays. The
Mahratta horse in the French service would

 

Chum. LXX.]

not approach the field within several miles.
The English had twenty—six field pieces, which
were admirably oflicered and manned. Lally’s
engineers and artillery were inferior: his sole
reliance was upon his Irish infantry; although
a portion of his French force were cavalry,
and from them he also expected some service.
These cavalry were the first troops tested, and
they behaved basely. The British advanced ;
and Lally, believing their left wing wavered
from the fire of his artillery, which there is
good reason for believing was an error, bravely
put himself at the head of his horsemen, and
ordered a charge ; but. neither men nor officers
would follow him. He suspended the com-
manding officer, and ordered the next in se-
niority to take the command: he refused to
obey. Lally addressed the men, appealing to
their patriotism and courage. A junior officer
cried out that it was shame to desert the ge-
neral in the midst of battle, and this produced
the effect. The general led them, however,
but a short distance when some artillery fire
beginning to take effect, the whole turned and
tied, and the intrepid soldier stood alone to
dare for France what Frenchmen were un-
willing to brave. Lally then brought up his
French infantry, who, wretchedly supported
by the artillery, and altogether deserted by
the cavalry, European and native, saw the
hopelessness of success, and fired at random.
The English, who perfectly obeyed their
orders, were commanded not to fire a shot, but
advance steadily, which they did, as if a mass
moved by a single will. The infantry on their
extreme right being Lally’s own, threw them-
selves into column, and rushed madly forward
to meet the English, who were ordered to re-
serve their fire until the enemy was close.
The English receiving the columns in line,
the battle assumed a form similar to that of so
many of the Duke of “'ellington’s in recent
years: as he said of “'aterloo, in his letter
to Marshal Beresford—“ They came on in the
old way, and were beaten off in the old way.”
The fire of the British line fell with deadly
certainty upon the front and flank of their op-
ponents, tearing open the column in a manner
the most sanguinary and terrible. Yet these
dauntless men, true to Lally when all else for-
swk him, broke through this terrific fire, and,
charging with the bayonet, in the same spirit
as the English afterwards became accustomed
to do, broke the British line, and, as Mill de-
scribes it, “bore down what was opposed to
it." Its victory, won so well—and never was vic—
tory won more bravely— was of short duration.
The l’rench cavalry had galloped off the field;
the native cavalry, their allies, had not appeared
upon it; the sepoys tired irregularly and at a
distance : the handful of heroes of Lally’s own

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

233

corps was left to do battle with the British army.
The English infantry, cavalry, and artillery
fell upon their unprotected flanks: yet still
they fought until the field was ensanguined
with their blood, and the tired remnant were
swept before the repeated charges of over-
whelming numbers, as the monsoon scatters
the surges of the sea. Bussy put himself at
the head of the French infantry, and led them
to a bayonet charge. His horse was pierced
by a British bayonet, and his soldiers forsook
him on the field, leaving him a prisoner in the
hands ofthe English. Lally ordered the sepoys
to charge: they would not, and soon turned
from the field. The Irish suffered dreadfully,
and were left alone to combat and to die,
winning for themselves an honour scarcely in-
ferior to that of Fontenoy, even in defeat.
The sieur acted the part of askilful generalin
bringing his beaten army off the field; and the
French cavalry, who behaved so cowardly, with
the brave remnant of Lally’s own regiment, so
gallantly covered the retreat, that the army,
demoralized although it was, was preserved
from annihilation. He even halted at a short
distance, the native cavalry in the English
service not daring to pursue ; and the British
infantry, having become exhausted in the cou-
fiict, were unequal to a task with which the
sepoys could not be entrusted. Lally awaited
the junction of his detachment at \Vandiwash,
and carried off his wounded and his light
baggage in the face of his enemy. He then
proceeded to Chittapet, and thence to Gingee.

Coote was a brave, cool, and active officer.
He did not allow the war to slumber, and
sent forward a detachment for the reduction
of Arcot. Hearing that the French fort of
Chittapet, was almost defenceless, Coote de-
termined to attempt its reduction before he»
sieging Arcot. Both forts were reduced with
trifling loss and labour, the enemy offering
but a feeble resistance.

Lally withdrew his troops from Gingee to
Vellore, lest the English should intercept his
communications with Pondicherry, and in
order to protect the districts from which he
had then any chance of obtaining provisions.
Finding that all his attempts to obtain any
pecuniary assistance from Pondicherry, or
supplies of any kind were unavailing, he pro-
ceeded to that place, and stormed with his
usual unrestrained passion against the delin-
quents whom he accused of embezzling the
property of the company, and betraying their
country. They in return accused him of folly,
rashness, incompetency, and to these charges,
which might have had some show of reason,
except as to any impeachment of incompe-
tency in the field, they added the absurd
taunt of cowardice. The result of these

234:

recriminations was to paralyse still further
all hope of conducting the war against the
English successfully.

The destitution and disorganization of the
French army was now fearfully increased, and
had the English marched at once boldly upon
Pondicherry, it must have fallen; but they
were deficient in information, and believing
that the resources of the French at Pendi-
cherry were ample, and that in other direc-
tions also they exceeded the reality, the
policy was adopted of attacking the various
minor places in detail, and then of gradually
closing upon Pondicherry, and reducing it
by blockade. This plan was acted upon
with slow, but ultimate success. It would be
tedious to recount the various actions which
took place, or to give an account of the rela-
tive consequence of the successes which the
English obtained. M. Auber* gives the fol-
lowing correct summary, which is, although
closely condensed, sufficiently ample for the
reader’s purpose, possessing the exactness which
that writer’s peculiar opportunities enabled
him to observe: “The army, after the sur-
render of Arcot, moved towards Pondicherry,
to cut off supplies, while Admiral Cornish
blockaded it by sea. The district of Trinco—
malee was reduced by Captain Smith. On
the 5th of March, Permacoil surrendered to
Colonel Coote, Carical to Colonel Monson
and Admiral Cornish on the 5th of April,
and Chellumbrum to Colonel Monson on the
12th. On the same day, Colonel Coote took
VValdour, where the camp was formed pre-
viously to operations against Pondicherry;
for which purpose, a large supply of gun-
powder had been sent from Bengal and Bom-
bay, accompanied by three companies of the
king’s artillery from the latter presidency.
The Mahrattas had gained a considerable
victory over Salabat Jung, who ceded to
them districts of the value of sixty lacs of
rupees, and the fort of Dowlatabad, at that
time the strongest in the country. M. Bussy
and other French prisoners on parole, at
Pondicherry, were ordered to Madras, as
several of them had borne arms by order of
M. Lally. Considerable apprehension being
entertained that the Mahrattas would enter
the province and demand the chant, and, if
joined by the Mysoreans and the French,
that they would impede the designs against
Pondicherry, a member of the council was
deputed, for the purpose of inducing them to
refrain from advancing towards the Carnatic.
In the month of September, the president,
Governor Pigot, accompanied by Colonel
Coote, visited Admiral Steevens, on board
the Norfolk, and, after much solicitation, ob-

* Brim]; Power in India, vol. i. chap. iii. 1). 1032.

 

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXX.

tained his consent to the marines of the squa-
dron being landed, to aid the troops in pre-
venting supplies being thrown into Pondi-
cherry. During the preparation for attack-
ing Ariancopang, orders were received from
Bengal for divesting Colonel Coote of the
command, and placing it in the hands of
Colonel Monson. The latter officer, in an
attack on the enemy’s outposts, having had
both the bones of his leg broken by a shot,
recommended that Colonel Coote should again
receive the command. It was some days,
however, before Coote would consent to re-
turn to the camp, having made preparations
to proceed to Bengal. The French blew up
Arianeopang, and retreated to Pondicherry.
The marines being re-embarked by the desire
of Admiral Steevens, he sailed in October
with the greater part of his fleet to Trinco-
malee, leaving five of his ships to prevent the
enemy affording aid by sea. The king (as
he was then styled) of Mysore having sup-
ported the French, a diversion was made into
his country, and the fort of Caroor taken by
Captain Smith. It was supposed to have
been the first instance of any European troops
having advanced so far inland westward.
The king subsequently addressed letters of
friendship to the president, and the nabob of
the Carnatic, stating that it was his prime-
minister, IIyder Naiguc, who had rebelled
against him, and sent his troops to assist the
French. This appears to have been the
first mention of Hyder, who became so formi-
dable an enemy to the company, both in his
own person and that of his adopted successor.”

By the 1st of May, 1760, the French had
lost all their possessions in the Carnatic, ex-
cept the strong fort of Gingee, and the fort
commanding an important pass called Jhiager,
and were shut up in Pondichcrry, blockaded
by land and sea.

Lally had, however, continued to negotiate
with the Mysoreans, and they consented to
afford him food, munitions of war, and a body
of three thousand horse, and five hundred
infantry. They falsified all his expectations.
They, indeed, advanced their troops, defeat-
ing an English detachment in their progress,
and encamped near Pondicherry, but finding
the affairs of the French desperate, they de-
camped in the night, after lingering about
the place for a month. They were probably
influenced by the arrival of six of the com-
pany’s ships at Madras, with royal troops to
the number of six hundred. This was the
2nd of August, Pondicherry having been
three months blockaded, and no impression
made upon the place. A month later (Sep-
tember 2), several other ships of the company
arrived, three ships of war, and a wing of a

CHA P. LXXJ

Highland regiment. The reinforcements of
troops had now been considerable, and the
fleet consisted of nineteen sail of the line,
with one or two frigates, and several lesser
ships, besides several heavily armed ships of
the company :-—“ Lally had now, and it is no
ordinary praise, during almost eight months
since the total discomfiture of his army at
“‘andiwash, imposed upon the English so
much respect, as deterred them from the
siege of Pondicherry; and, notwithstanding
the desperate state of his resources, found
means to supply the fort, which had been
totally destitute of provisions, with a stock
sufiicient to maintain the garrison for several
months. And he still resolved to strike a
blow which might impress them with an opi-
nion that he was capable of offensive opera-
tions of no inconsiderable magnitude. He
formed a plan, which has been allowed to
indicate both judgment and sagacity, for
attacking the English camp by surprise in
four places on the night of the 4th of Sep-
tember. But one of the four divisions, into
which his army was formed for the execu-
tion of the enterprise, fell behind its time,
and disconcerted the operations of the re-
mainder.” 5-:

Early in December, the English converted
the blockade into a close siege, erecting bat—
teries which fired upon the place, from the
end of the first week to the 30th; on that
day a tempest of extraordinary violence
stranded three of the English ships in the
road, and injured almost all the others. The
camp also suffered damage, the tents of the
soldiers being torn up and driven away, and
the ground flooded. It was a storm, which
in its intensity and the character of its effects,
bore a close resemblance to that which smote
the besieging fleets and armies before Sebas-
topol, on the memorable night of the 14th of
November, 1854:. As in the latter case, so
in the former, the storm and deluge only
delayed the siege, the English repaired the
damages, and pressed on the works through-
out the first days of January. About the
12th of the month, Lally, exhausted with
anxiety and fatigue, became ill, and the
management of affairs devolved upon the
council, which was torn with dissensions.
“'hatever Lally ordered was disobeyed. The
provisions which that general had, with so
much talent, energy and self-sacrifice, laid in,
were squandered. Lally, perceiving their
total want of competency and principle, or-
dered them to make terms with the besiegers ;
they deceived him, and went on squandering
the means of defence. In the evening of the

* Hist/J'y of Bribe/i India. By James Mill, Esq,
book iv. chap. iv. p. 182.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

235

14th, a commissioner from Lally, and a depu-
tation from the council, entered the English
camp. Lally claimed the benefit of a cartel
which had been concluded between the two
crowns, and which, the deputation from the
council urged, rendered it impossible to pro-
pose a capitulation. Coote, who commanded
the British, alleging that a dispute being still
open as to the meaning and extent of the
cartel, he could not recognise it, and would
accept nothing but an unconditional surrender.
There remained nothing for the French but.
immediate surrender ; they had only two days’
provision left, and no proper material of war
to resist a siege. The council of Madras
levelled the town and fort; all the French
were borne away prisoners. Dupleix had
boasted that he would serve Madras so, and
the council of the presidency determined to
make the King of France feel that the retri-
bution was as complete as it was deserved.
Theagar and Gingee surrendered almost
without resistance, completing the English
conquest of the Carnatic.

In the meantime important transactions
between the French and English had occurred
elsewhere, the result of which, taken with the
events in the Carnatic, was that the French
had lost all their possessions in India, when
Gingee surrendered.

The fate of Lally was sorrowful: when
liberated by the English and restored to
France, he was cast into the Bastile, thence
he was taken to a common prison, accused of
high treason, dragged through the streets of
Paris in a dung-cart, and then executed,—
forming one of the most disgraceful pages of
French history. Never was a man more true
to France, more loyal to her king, more zealous
or honest in the public service of any country.
His vices were a hasty temper, a despotic
will, religious bigotry, and a hatred t0 the
English, both national and religious, which
amounted almost to monomania. His services
to France were great; his requital murder, as
Orme, the English historian, designated his
execution—“a murder committed with the
sword of justice:” he might have more pro-
perly said, with the sword of law. The French
monarch and ministry, anxious to appease
the hostility which rose around them, sought
and found a noble victim. Lally was subse-
quently amply avenged. His son was the Lally
Tollendal whose eloquence in the constituent
assembly contributed so much to destroy the
bigoted, tyrannical, sanguinary, and treach—
erous monarchy of the Bourbons. Thus na-
tional, like individual retribution, forms a.
striking feature in the moral government of
the all-wise and just God, whose long suffer-
ing and patience hinder not, but illustrate and

236 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

enforce, the impartial and sure justice of His
administration.

The English were now masters of the
Carnatic, over which they ruled through
their nominee, Mohammed Ali, who had pro—
bably the most equitable claim to the title of
nabob. The soubahdar of the Deccan, whom
the English called Viceroy or nizam, pro-
fessed to be their ally; and although the
nabob of the Carnatic was tributary to him,
the latter was left wholly under the direction
and control of the English. This was the
first great war in which the English were en-
gaged in India, and was one so bloody,
protracted, and involving such lasting conse-
quences, as to deserve an extended narrative.

It required, however, a few years to con-
solidate the government of the Carnatic; and
during that process, fresh events tended to
alter its relations to surrounding territory,
and to give the English a still wider pre-
ponderance in Southern India, through the
necessary effects and sequences of the war in
the Carnatic, which they had so successfully
waged. The nabob was still disturbed by re-
fractory polygars, and at the same time by
intrigues conducted from Mysore by Hyder,
who, early in 1766, was in ostensible re-
volt against his sovereign}5 The English
were much occupied in negotiations with the
court of the Deccan, and with an expedition
to Manilla, which left Madras on the 29th of
July, 1762; but still they gave attention to
the nabob's affairs, mediated between him and
the Mysoreans, and aided in subduing the
polygars. At the end of the year 1761 Vel-
lore surrendered to the nabob, which was a
source to him of great satisfaction; and dur-
ing 1762, the most rebellious and powerful of
the polygars made submission.

The various parties contending in the Dec-
can, especially that of Salabat Jung, sought
English aid soon after the surrender of the
French, offering for it large territorial conces-
sions, which were refused, the council inform-
ing the directors, “we are not anxious to
grasp more than can be held,”—which showed
as much policy as moderation.

In 176$ tidings of peace in Europe be-
tween England and France arrived in Madras.
The council were as much averse to French
settlements in India as ever; alleging, in their
correspondence with the directors, that the
French could never support settlements by
trade; that in order to obtain means to keep
up troops and grand establishments, they
would be sure to seek territory by means
involving all around them in frequent rc-
course to arms. Governor Pigot had left

* Letter from 2716 001mm? of J[(((/)‘(’(3 (0 flee Court of
Directors, March, 1701.

 

[CHAR LXX.

for England at the latter end of the previous
year; these views he affirmed in London.
The successor of Mr. Pigot was of the same
mind. French settlements and peace were
regarded by the English as not likely to
exist long in India together.

In the early part of 1763, the fort of Na-
dura was invested by the British; in October
it surrendered to Major Campbell. By this
conquest, the nabob was enabled to occupy a
strong post in the midst of a large district
ruled by insurrectionary polygars. The most
important consequence of the conquest of the
Carnatic was the acquisition by the English of
the Northern Circars. This was, however,
not wholly the result of the expulsion of the
French from the Carnatic, although chiefly so :
the events in Bengal which were occurring at
the same time, contributed their quota to the
influences which enabled the English to be-
come masters of territory so desirable.

By the treaty of peace, Pondicherry was
restored to the French; and M. Law, who
had formerly distinguished himself as an op-
ponent of the English, had returned to Pondi-
cherry under that treaty. The English at
Madras became alarmed lest he should lay
claim to the Northern Circars, which had
been conceded to the French in 1657. The
territory was of great extent and importance,
commanding a vast range on the ()oroman—
del coast, fertile in a considerable portion
of its area, and occupied by an industrious
population. The French were no sooner
settled in Pondicherry, than disputes were
raised about the treaty between England and
France, and between France and the soubah-
dar in the Deccan, on the ground of which
the French might claim it. The English
having expelled the French during the late
war, were disposed to stretch to the utmost
the rights of their nominee, the Nabob of the
Carnatie. The French assumed a tone irritat-
ing, consequential, and assuming; they wrote
and talked as if they felt it to be their right
and duty to resume their old authority—to de-
prive them of which the war had been waged
so fiercely, and they were intent upon pursu-
ing their old courses as far as was possible in
their altered circumstances. The council of
Madras would have probably held the Circars
against their claims upon the nabob for ex-
penses incurred on his account, but the Mah—
rattas were now jealous of the rising dominion
of the English, and were too poxverful for the
English to provoke them. It was accord-
ingly proposed to rent the Circars from the
nizam (or Viceroy) of the Deccan, in order to
prevent the claims of the French. The nizam
was willing to cede the territory; but the
English, doubtful of his authority. preferred

rs ,

Cum. LXXI.]

paying a rent.
sincerity in his offers, either of friendship or
territory; and the English were obliged,
throughout the greater part of 1765, to main-
tain an armed observation of his movements.
The following account of the issue of these
transactions is brief and clear :—“ At this
period, however, events had laid the King or
Mogul under overwhelming obligations to
the English, whose power alone upheld him
on the ancient but decaying throne of Delhi.
He granted them, upon application, a firman,
by which they became, without conquest, law—
ful possessors of the Northern Circars.* Like
the rest of India, this tract had been held by
rajahs and polygars, who farmed the revenue,
and exercised a sort of independent authority
within the limits of their states. The impe-
rial firman released them from tribute to the
soubahdar of the Deccan, as well as to the
nawah (or nabob) 0f the Carnatic, and trans-
ferred their allegiance to the English. Since
the success of the company’s arms, indeed,
those powers had exercised little more than a
nominal influence in the Northern Circars,
and some new authority was called for to
rescue them from the anarchy by which they
were overwhelmed. The imperial grant, con-
ferring a legal right”L placed them at the

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

The nizam had, however, no ‘

!included in their

, 237
“ “'hen the English proceeded to take pos-
session of their new acquisition, the nizam, re-
belling openly against the imperial authority,
pretended to feel exasperated at their acts,$6
and prepared to make war upon them. Though
entitled to enforce their privilege by arms, they
preferred to negotiate peace, and agreed to
rent from the nizam, for an annual sum of
nine lacs of rupees, the Circars of Rajamun-
dry, Ellore, Mustephanegur, Chicacoole, and
Murtezanegur; while the Guntoo Circar was
allotted to Salabat Jung, the old soubahdar
of the Deccan, who had been dethroned by
his brother. It was, perhaps, an excess of
delicacy or timidity, which induced the com-
pany to offer such liberal terms; but it may
have been, at that juncture, wiser than the
policy of war. One stipulation in the treaty
was, however, imprudent. The English
agreed to assist the soubahdar with a military
force, whenever he should require it; thus
bringing on themselves the chance of dan-
gerous and destructive wars, which might be
equally profitless to themselves and ruinous
to their allies.‘l‘ This article of the treaty ex-
cited severe displeasure among the court of
directorsi However, the territory was now
’ growing empire, and the
‘. soubahdar, with shrunken dominions, was left

 

disposal of our countrymen; all that remained l to exercise his versatile talent for treachery
to confirm them in the territory, was annexa- by intriguing with the enemies of his allies.
tion. The advantage of acquisition was ap- { His power, indeed, had otherwise diminished.

parent. It would give them possession of all
the coast from the mouths of the Ganges to
the Coromandel settlements; excepting the

province of ()rissa, which, though included in |

the British dewanee, was held by the warlike
Mahrattas§

l‘The Nawab of the Carnatic, once his tribu-
l tary, was now, by an imperial firman, created
2 his equal.Ӥ

' The English were now virtually masters of
l the Northern Circars, the coast of Coromandel,
. and the whole Carnatic.

 

CHAPTER. LXXI.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN WESTERN INDIA AFTER THE BREAK-
ING OUT OF WAR BETWEENT THE TWO NATIONS IN 174é—CONQUEST OF THE PIRATE

ANGRIA.

Ar 'I‘ellicherry and Myhie, as has been shown
in former chapters, the English and French
were most frequently engaged in conflict on
the coast of \Vestern India. “'hen tidings
arrived in the former place, that Madras had
submitted to Labourdonnais in 1746, the
utmOst consternation was felt, and the chief
valuables of the settlement were removed

Mill’s British India, vol. iii. 1). 452.
I’enhoeu’s Empire Anylais, vol. ii. p. 456.
Mill’s British India, vol. iii. 1). 453.
Wilson’s Nola, ibitl.

VOL. II.

-o.++ «1- it

elsewhere. The council and garrison were
in daily expectation of a Visit from the fleet
of the conqueror, when their fears were re-
lieved by learning that a storm had wrecked
the proud ships whose thunder they expected
so soon to hear.

* Sntherland’s Hislorical Sketch of the Princes cf
India, 1). 8:3.

t Mill’s British India, vol. iii. p. 455.

j: Lei/(3r to Bengal, I768.
By

 

9' History of {/10 Brilis/L Conquests in India.
. Horace St. John, vol. i. p. 106.
I I.

238 HISTORY OF THE

On the 30th of March, 1748, the Exeter
and W'z'nchester, British men-of—war, attacked
the French ship St. Louis, as she lay in the
river of Myhie. She escaped by being hauled
into shoal water, but so damaged as to be
beyond repair.

When, in 1751, Dupleix was filling the
Deccan with his fame, the council at Bombay
was informed by certain spies of the King of
Travancore, that the French chief had formed
a comprehensive plan for the destruction of
the British settlements on the coast of Mala-
barfif' Throughout the year 1751 demon-
strations and minor conflicts took place be-
tween the French of Myhie and the English
of Tellicherry, without any decided advantage
on either side. The conflicts which each had
with the native chiefs, and the intrigues car-
ried on with these chiefs by the two hostile
European nations, have been noticed in pre-
vious chapters on the affairs of Western India.
The garrisons both of Myhie and Tellicherry
were after this time much reduced; the latter
garrison so much, that they were unable to
repress the insolence of Cuny Nair, a most
contemptible antagonist. As for the French,
they were in a still worse plight, fearing an
attack from the Canarese, distressed for want
of provisions, and unable to meet the expenses
of their forts to the northward. Officers and
men, tired of waiting for their arrears of pay,
deserted in large numbers, and in one day
a captain, ensign, engineer, mate of a man-
of-war, and five other Frenchmen sought
refuge in the English factoryxl‘

Up to the end of the year 1753 the English
had continued to incur great expenses for for-
tifications at Tellicherry and other places in
Malabar; nearly 100,000 rupees had been ex-
pended, and yet the forts were reported by
Sir J. Foulis to be in a ruinous condition.

In 1756 a sort of “armed neutrality" was
established between Tellicherry and Myhie,
both parties expecting that the war which had
slumbered in Europe for a season would burst
forth again with renewed fury. The French
chief visited the English factory for the pur-
pose of establishing neutrality, “a dodge”
which the chiefs of Myhie constantly prac-
tised when they felt themselves comparatively
weak. The English on some occasions fol-
lowed this example ; but although the French
had repeatedly profited by their generosity,
it was not reciprocated. “vhen Fort St.
David was captured, the guns of Myhie thun-
dered their salutes, and the offer of neutrality
then made by the alarmed English was scorn-
fully rejected; but when, in 1760, French
arms suffered in Tanjore, and the Oirears
* Bombay Diary, 14th of November, 1751.
1L Bombay Quarterly Review, October, 1857.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXI.
and their fleets were chased by the English, the
chief of Myhie was eager to represent the ad-
vantages of neutrality. Again, when Louet,
the French chief of the factory, supposed that
Admiral Cornish and Sir Eyre Ooote were
approaching the coast of Malabar, his earnest
importunities for neutrality, by one who had
refused it when it might have been accepted
with a good grace, were humiliating. The
English chief on that occasion made answer,
that he would refer to the president at Bom—
bay for instructions ; but he, meanwhile, pre-
pared for action should the British force be
strengthened on that coast.

From 1756 until the final subjugation of
the French on the Malabar coast, the opera-
tions of both nations were desultory, and on
the part of the French mainly offered through
their native alliances. The English were, how—
ever, strengthening such alliances, while the
French, by their arrogance, tyranny, and
above all, their bigotry, were rapidly losing
influence. Meanwhile, the English were
busy in supplying a petty prince and zealous
partizan of theirs, styled the third King of
Nelleasaroon, with stores and ammunition,
which he used so effectually as to capture in
September the French fort of Motally, mount-
ing twenty-two guns; although he afterwards
restored it, at the intercession of the Prince of
Cherical. War was not actually proclaimed.
until the 7th of October, when the Eng-
lish had the good fortune to find themselves
with several warm and lukewarm friends
amongst the native princes, but no avowed
enemy save the Boyanore. The French, on
the other hand, had many and bitter enemies;
the Prince of Cherical gave up their cause,
and concluded a treaty with the English; the
Cotiote was exceedingly incensed against
them, because they had compelled his prime-
minister, from fear of his life, to profess himself
a Christian; and the chief of Nelleasaroon,
equally hostile to them, offered to take their
forts with his own men, if the English would
only garrison them afterwards—an offer which
the English chief was compelled to decline,
so small were the number of European troops
at his disposal. Between the principals, how-
ever, of the two factories there was only an
exchange of courtesics. An E iglish picket
seized a French boat laden with pepper cap-
tured from the English, on which the chief
of Tellicherry, although of course detaining
the cargo, sent the boat with the letters found
on her, unopened, to Myhie. M. Louet, in
return, released English boats seized by a
captain of a French man-of—war, sent back
slaves that his men had lured away, and per-
mitted his surgeon to render medical aid at
the English factory. But when a native

CnAr. LXXI.]

oflicer of a French ship was detected in
raising recruits on British territory, and car-
ried before the chief in council, they behaved
to him more like brigands than generous
enemies. After a solemn consultation they
decided upon setting him at liberty, first con-
fiscating his silver-headed cane and picking
his pocket of 380 fanams.*

While these events transpired in the neigh-
bourhood of Tellicherry, others connected
with the war occupied the attention and
care of the factors of Ajengo. From the
breaking out of the war in 1744, to the
peace, and again after the short peace, until
the end of the resumed war, the traders
of this petty place were kept in alarm by
the appearance of French ships of war in the
offing. Their neighbour, the King of Tra-
vancore, assumed to be their protector, and
threatened very often the utter extermination
of all Frenchmen, should any land near
Ajengo, or offer molestation to its people.
His majesty, however, never did anything to
assure the factors, but very much to add to
their disquiet :—

“ For a series of years this warlike prince
was continually making application to the
British for supplies of ammunition, small
arms, and cannon, offering in payment cap-
tives taken in war, which the British accepted
with reluctance, although admitting that
they were cheaper than their slaves imported
from Madagascar. “’ith his other offers they
closed most cheerfully. He had compelled
his subjects to yield him a monopoly of all
pepper grown in the country, and the factors
were as glad to receive that as ready cash.
He ceded to them also for a term of years the
province of Tinnivelly, which they leased to
a merchant ; and it would have been of great
value to them, had not the neighbouring
polygars disturbed it, until reduced to order
by a force sent from Madras under Captain
Calliaudj‘ This liberality kept the victorious
monarch on excellent terms with the British,
and though a tyrannical oppressor of his
subjects, he seems never but on one occasion,
when his emissaries beat and plundered a
helpless woman within the company’s limits,
to have molested the factory of Ajengo.”i

The notice taken of Captain Calliaud's ser~
vices in a previous chapter, bore upon the

* Tel/ic/zerry Diary, 28th of April, 15th of Sep-
tember, 15th of October, 9th of November, 1756. Boul-
Zay Diary, 28th of April, 8th of May, 30th of August,
15th of December, 1757; 30th of November, 1758.
Ives’s Veg/aye. Bombay Quarter/y, October, 1857,
p. 221.

i As shown in previous chapters.

1: Bombay Qzlarler/y. zijenyo Diary. Diary qf fine
Select Committee. Orme’s History, vol. i. book v.
Forbes’s Orz'cnlal JIemoirs, vol. i.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

239

policy of the Madras council, the relations
of the English with the Nabob of the Car-
natic, of the French with the Nizam of the
Deccan, and of the issue of the policy initiated
by Dupleix; it is here only necessary to say
that the conduct of Calliaud ensured peace to
the little factory at Ajengo, and to a certain
extent along the coast of Malabar. The
Tanjore monarch, grateful for the subjuga~
tion of the polygars, and always apprehen-
sive of being subdued by the French, whom
he so often boasted he would annihilate,
offered no insults thenceforth to the com-
paratively helpless settlements of the English
upon that part of the coast to which his
power extended. Thus the effective opera-
tions in the war waged in the Carnatic, from
Madras and St. David’s, told upon Western
India, as in fact they also influenced the for-
tunes of Bengal. Whatever was done in the
Carnatic, affected the court of the Deccan and
the heart of French influence in Southern
India, so that along the whole shores of Mala-
bar and Coromandel, the wave of power was
felt as it ebbed and flowed from the impulses
within, as the waves that wash those shores
are agitated by the heaving of the ocean
upon the verge of which they rise or sink.

An event occurred with which the name
of Olive was connected, which much in-
fluenced the peace and prosperity of the
English settlements in “'estern India, and
strengthened them against the French, al-
though itself not connected with that enemy.
VYhen Clive had received the honours con-
ferred upon him in England, after the glories
he had won in India, he entered parliament,
was ejected on petition, distributed his re-
sources among his relatives to whom he was
much attached, lived in much style, and so
reduced his temporal means that he was
desirous to return again to India to recruit
them, just at the moment when it suited the
company to employ his services, which they
were anxious to do, because they expected a
renewed war with France after a brief and
hollow peace.

The directors appointed him to an im-
portant office in the government of Fort
St. David."'~" The king made him a lieutenant-
colonel in the royal army. He embarked
on board the Streatham in March, 1755, and
arrived in Bombay just as the pirate Angria
had received a severe chastisement from Com-
modore James, then commanding the com-
pany’s military marine in India.

* Lord Macaulay says he was appointed governor
M. Auber represents him as being nominated a member
of council at Fort St. David. The Bombay Quarter/y of
April, 1857, on the authority of the Bombay Diary, calls
him deputy-governor of that place.

2&0 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The council of Bombay were desirous of
following up the victory of James by a. more
decisive blow. A royal fleet, accompanied
by the company’s navy, under Commodore
James, the whole under orders of Admiral
Watson, set sail for Gheria. The troops on
board were commanded by Clive. In Feb-
ruary, 1756, the armament arrived in the
river, and at once attacked the stronghold of
piracy in “'estern India. “'atson succeeded
in burning the whole of the enemy’s ships.
Cliveattacked the fortress by land, which fell
before his skill and valour. Prize money to
the extent of £150,000 was divided among
the conquerors.

The consequences of this victory were very
great. The coast of Malabar was delivered
from the presence of a nest of pirates, who,
in resources and power, were more formid-
able than any piratical forces which had
ever troubled the Eastern seas, or, perhaps,
ever before or since ranged the ocean any-
where.

On the 12th of the October following, a
treaty was formed with the Mahrattas, by
which Gheria was given them by the English
in exchange for Bancote and various villages.
A clause was also inserted, that the Dutch
should never be permitted to settle in the
Mahratta dominions. The rajahs holding
territory along the Malabar coast were so
awed, that they made haste to sign treaties
conferring privileges of trade. The Mogul
himself was pleased with the subjugation of
the pirates, by whom his own ships were
frequently captured, and the event, joined
with other transactions of subsequent occur-
rence, conduced to the granting of a firman
by the Mogul in 1759, conceding to the com-
pany the government of Surat.

After Clive accomplished the reduction of
Gheria, Lord Macaulay represents him as
“having proceeded to his government of
Fort St. David.” This is an error: he re-
turned to Bombay, and remained there some
time, supposing that his services might be
again required in connection with that presi-
dency—a fact incompatible with the assertion
that. he had been designated to the supreme
government of Fort St. David.

That Lord Macaulay is wrong in the above
assertion is plain enough, for Clive became
involved in a dispute with the governor
and council at Bombay on a question as to
his own military position, after the destruc-
tion of the pirate keep of Gheria. He re-
turned to Bombay with the artillery, for the
purpose of joining an expedition against the
French, intended to be directed from that
presidency, but which had been abandoned
for another object. The Bombay council was

 

[Cuaxn LXXI.

peculiarly supercilious to military men, and
Clive, notwithstanding all his glory, was not
particularly beloved by them.

A Captain de Funck, a Swedish officer who
had experienced much tyranny and injustice
from the president and council, was tried by
court—martial, because he had refused to sub-
mit to a humiliation which the tyrannical
president sought to impose upon him. The
council appointed Sir James Foulis as pre-
sident, an officer of ability and fairness. Clive
was indignant that any officer but himself
should have presided over the court, and re-
monstrated in angry terms. He protested to
the council that he was “reduced to the ne-
cessity,” as he observed, of reminding the
president and council that he was commander-
in-chief of his majesty’s forces, that he bore
other distinguished titles, and had not been
treated by the Honourable Richard Bouchier,
Esquircn-who, indeed, was never remarkable
for civility—with proper courtesy. Ilis letter
was as follows :—

Bombay, 151/2 q/‘Jpril, 1756.

IIONOURABLL‘ Sin AND SIns,—It is with much con-
cern I find myself reduced to the necessity of delivering
this letter on the subject of the general court-martial
lately held on Captain De Funck.

Your honour and co. cannot be ignorant of the late
Articles of War, which empower none but the commander-
in-chief of his majesty’s forces for the time being to order
a general court-martial; and your honour and co. must
be sensible that, if I had interfered, no such court-mar-
tial could have sat. However, in this and indeed in
everything relating to the honour, reputation, and welfare
of the Honourable Company, I should gladly have ac-
quiesced, and if your honour and co. had thought me
worthy of the delegation given to Sir James Foulis, I
would with pleasure have acted in obedience thereto, whom
I apprehend had no right to be deemed commander-in-
chief of his majesty’s forces, without the king’s brcvet of
major can be proved superior to that of lieutenant-colonel.

Neither do I complain against your honour and co. for
ordering the general court-martial, but against the gover-
nor only, who never thonght proper to ask my advice or
opinion, or even to inform me himself, or by any other
person whatever, with one syllable relating thereto, and
considering the rank I hear of lieutenant-colonel in his
majesty’s service, of Deputy Governor of St. David’s, of a
member of the committee of this place, I do not think I
have been treated by the Honourable Richard Bouchier,
Esq, agreeably to the intention of the Honourable the
Court of Directors, who, I flatter myself, will do me jus-
tice herein, when they come to hear thereof.

I am, with respect, honourable sir and sirs,

Your most obedient, humble servant,
Ronrnr CLIVE.*

This letter of Lieutenant-colonel Clive was
answered by Daniel Draper, secretary to go-
vernment, who, in the name of his superiors,
tried to check the spoilt hero’s arrogance by a
little delicate satire. He could not, of course,

* The above letter does not appear in any of the
memoirs of Clive, and was first published in the BUIHIHQ/
(Jam‘lc’rly of April, l857.

011.111. LXXI.]

pretend to instruct such an officer in his mili-
tary duties, but he would venture to refresh
his memory on a few points which all knew,
save those who were wilfully ignorant. Offi~
cers did not always attain to command by
seniority, as the young colonel well knew.
That depended upon the pleasure of the su-
preme authority. The rank of such as had
been appointed for a particular service had no
eflicacy when that service was performed, and
they were without employment. The govern-
ment of Bombay fully acknowledged the
respect due to his majesty’s commission, but
they were at liberty to choose whether they
would engage Colonel Clive’s military services
or not. The lieutenant—colonel wrote as if he
was the only bearer of this commission in
Bombay; but many other officers bore it, and
all concurred in the propriety of the arrange-
ments made for this court-martial. In con-
clusion, the government assured him that they
had no wish to insult him, as he supposed,
and they would refer the question in dispute
to the court of directors. The ardent spirit
of Clive was pining for action. It would seem
as if from very ennui, he complained that he
could not enjoy the little excitement of sitting
011 a court martial. and relieved the monotony
of inactiv e life by opening a cont1 ov e1 sial c01-
respondence with the government. In a little
time worthier occupations were found for him,
and, quitting Bombay for ever, he entered a
new field of fame on the other side of the
continent. 7“

I11 a chapter on the rise of the navy and
almy of the company, it was 1emarked that
the t1oops of Bombay occasionally served in
the other presidencies, and that Captain Ar n1-
st1ong, serving undcri Major Lawr,ence had
been tyrannicalh and unjustly treated by Clive.

In ] I 34: Captain I or’bes s company of Eu-
ropeans, and some Swiss and native tloops,
seived under this Captain Aimstlong with
ability and 111m e1v. Both men and officers
Complained ofill tleatment. Immediately after
the tiagedy of the black hole of Calcutt

Captain Armstrong again served with the
Bombay a1tille1y and some otl1e1 tioops flom
that plesidency. He made many 1ep1esenta-
tions to his govelnment of the, injustice and
opp1ession ofD Clive Besides his lettels to his
own piesidency of Bombay, “he had blought
to the notice of the piesideht 111 Lengal 11 11 1t
he consideled an llnfz'lll distribution 0of plize
111oney, and his lettei had been tavoulablv re-
ee1\ ed Clive oftende at this, cidelcd him
to 1'~esi1n his connnand, although no chalges
ot mis conduct had been b1ou rht against him,
and to leal some aged and intiim topasses

’,.«BI11II//II/ JJI' ;I/, Aplil and Jul\21)f.h, 1.46. BIIIZ-
513/ QIgz .c1I/, .‘.\pxi11857

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 2M

back to Bombay. Armstrong remonstrated,
and was brought to a court-martial. As he
was honourably acquitted, we may suppose
that he had, as he said, been harshly and un-
justly treated. Clive added one more instance
of his malice and disregard of law, by refusing
to insert his acquittal in general orders. But
none of these acts, so discreditable to the
Indian hero, are recorded by his biographers,
who, with the exception of a bitter and libellous
foreigner, seem anxious to prove that modern
biography is little more than systematised
eulogy.”*

In 1760 a reinforcement was sent from
Bombay to Madras, consisting chiefly of a
company of European infantry and three
companies of royal artillery. Thus Bombay
lent considerable assistance to the other presi-
dencies, having so little territory of its own to
defend. After the destruction of the pirates,
the presidency were occupied with their affairs
at Gombroon in the Persian Gulf, through
Bussorah with Persia, and in Carnara. These
engagements were altogether commercial, al-
though some insubordination occurred among
the military at Gombroon, provoked by the
neglect and arrogance of the council.

In 1760 a report reached the presidency
that the Mahrattas were conspiring with the
F1ench, which was true; but it (lid not suit
Nannali, the Mahratta chief, to mow it when
the agents of the company arrived at Poonah ,
and whatever schemes he had in view were
soon extinguished by his death. The suc-
cessor of Hannah was his son Mhaderao ; and
a deputation was sent by the council of Bombay
to condole with him on his father’s death.
The chief turned the occasion to diplomatic
ends, and sought to draw the English into an
engagement to aid him against the viceroy of
the Deccan. This the council declined; but
they interposed by good offices, and ap-
peased the wrath of the nizam. “'hile this
peaceable intercourse proceeded between the
Bombay presidency and the Mahrattas of
Poonah, other bodies of that strange people
were harassing the borders of Bengal, so that
the English president there addressed his
brother of Bombay in 1761, proposing a ge-
neral attack upon the Mahratta nation. The
Bombay council wisely replied that the Mah-
rattas of Poonah regulated their affairs in such
a way as not to be compromised by the con-
duct of their brethren further cast; that it was
very desirable to humble the Mahratta power,
but the state of that nation and its relation
to Bombay rendered the time for any attack
upon it inopportune. This clear and decisive
opinion prevented the attempt projected in
Benga

* L’omaay szrlerfy, April, 1857, p. 299.

242 HISTORY OF THE

Subsequent events proved the wisdom of
this decision, for the Mahrattas and the nizam
became friends, although such friendship was
like the summer cloud, which the slightest
breeze bears away. Thus, while the affairs of
the French pressed heavily on Madras and
Bengal, Bombay felt little of this pressure, ex-
cept in the constant warfare which was main-
tained by asingle settlement of the presidency
of Tellicherry, with a single settlement of the
French, Myhie. That conflict, like every other
between the two nations in India, was destined
to be brought at last to a close in favour of
the English. After the fall of Pondicherry,
the English at Tellicherry resolved upon a
grand attack on Myhie. The French had
hopes of securing its neutrality, and, before
the fall of their capital, used renewed and sup--
pliant efforts with the factors of Tellieherry,
to secure to Myhie a neutral position. Their
object was to make it a storehouse for the
goods which they supposed were at Pendi-
eherry, and might be brought thence for safety.
After the fall of the capital it was hoped that
Myhie might be permitted to remain as a
gate to Southern India. The council at Telli-
cherry politely, but steadily, refused compli-
ance with the request, reminding the peti-
tioners that similar requests, under reasonable
and justifiable circumstances, when made by
the English, were insolently and haughtily
repulsed, and that France had sent out orders
with Lally to level all the fortified places, and
even open cities where the English had any
interest in India. It so happened that the
council of Tellicherry sent out an expedition
against N etture, which was unsuccessful,
through the treachery, bigotry, and inhu-
manity of native allies. A severe less in
killed and wounded was the result. The
French took occasion, before the troops re-
turned, to press for a final answer, whether
Myhie might calculate on neutrality. The
English governor, fearing an attack on the set-
tlement during the absence of the main body of
his troops, appeared to acquiesce, while to
confirm matters, as it were, he referred the
proposition to Bombay. The French go-
vernor was thus led to hope that his scheme
would at last succeed. The English chief
was cognizant of the fact that Admiral Po-
coeke was preparing a descent on Myhie, and
he preserved an attitude of negotiation until
his garrison returned from Netture, and fur-
ther, until the “pear was ripe” in the plans
and projects of the naval and military au-
thorities.

In the beginning of 1761, Major Piers,
and Major, afterwards Sir Hector Munro,
with detachments of royal infantry, arrived

with the purpose of reinforcing Coote, in the .:

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [Cunt LXXI
siege of I’ondicherry; but, discovering that
they were too late, they proposed to the presi-
dency of Bombay, the reduction of Myhie.
Their plan received the sanction of the coun-
cil. There was one, Captain Keir, who had
been a fellow passenger to India with the
wife of the French engineer on duty at the
fort of Myhie. This lady had given the cap-
tain an invitation to call and see them. It
was resolved that he should accept the invi-
tation, and act as a spy. He was received in
a friendly manner, and made such a report as
encouraged the intended assailants. Means
were taken to intercept any reliefs arriving to
the garrison. The native chiefs were all or
nearly all engaged in the affair, for, with the
exception of Boyanore, they avowedly hated
the French; and it was generally believed
that that fickle chief owed them no goodwill.
On the second of February English boats
closed around the fortress. Louet, the com-
mander-in-chief, pretending not to understand
their object, intimated, when the first came
within range of his fire, how painful the duty
imposed upon him was of sinking the boat,
unless it drew off, his orders being to allow
no boat to approach his batteries. The reply
was instantaneous and decisive, a summons to
surrender. For six days the French chief
refused to surrender; but, knowing that Pondi-
cherry had fallen, and that there was no hope
of succour, he offered to surrender, if but his
garrison were allowed the honours of war, and
that the liberty of Roman Catholic worship in
the place should not be interrupted, and the
churches remain the property of the clergy.
All these conditions were granted. The
garrison marched out with drums beating,
colours flying, and with their field artillery.
It was stipulated that they should not be de~
tained as prisoners of war, but sent to the Isle
of Bourbon, the Cape of Good Hope, or France,
as opportunity allowed, and that the private
personal property of military and civilians
should be respected. All these conditions
were conceded on condition that the other
French forts dependent upon Myhie should be
surrendered. The French factory at Calicut
it was agreed should remain neutral, as that
was not a place of arms, or one. that the French
could use for the subjugation of the natives.
All these stipulations were faithfully agreed to
by the English. \Yhen the garrisons marched
out, the officers surrendered their su‘ords.
which were instantly returned. The captives
were made the objects of the most generous
kindness and respect. \Ylieii Louet arrived
at Tellicherry he was saluted by fifteen guns.
One lady, whose husband had broken his
parole, was alone detained, for some time, in
imprisonment.

Can. LXXII.]

The fortifications of Myhie were destroyed,
and in a manner formally to show that it was
in consequence of the orders issued from

France, to level the cities and forts of thei

English. The work was not, however, heartily
set about, and was very imperfectly performed}
The subordinate fortresses of Motaly, Nellea-
saroon, and Veremala were faithfully evacu-
ated by the French, but immediately occupied
by some N airs, under a chief with the high-
sounding title of Kapoo, Prince of Cherical,
and nephew of Badenkalamkur, King Regent
of Colastry. “'ithout loss of time, Munro
marched against them, at the head of three
hundred and eighty Highlanders, some of the
company's regular and irregular troops, and
two guns a twelve and nine-pounder. Cap-
tain Nelson, late engineer of the French gar-
rison at Myhie, joined the expedition as a
volunteer, with other French ofiicers, “keen
for revenge against their black allies.” Thus
fell the last bulwarks of French power and in-
fluence in India. It was on the Malabar
coast that the first contentions began; and
when the rumble of warlike preparation was
hushed, and the tap of the French drum was
silent along the Coromandel shores, and in
the Deccan, the din of battle was heard, and
the mournful parade of vanquished and dis-
armed captives seen on the shores of Malabar.

 

IN INDIA AND TIIE EAST.

o

The incidents of the French war were not,
for a few years, folIOWed by any of a martial
nature in VYestern India. In 1765 another nest
of sea robbers, the Malwar pirates, was rooted
out, who had begun to show some activity. But
a new storm was soon portended. The famous
Hyder had gained ascendancy in Mysore, and
laid the foundation of a military dynasty.
Bombay regard ed with astonishmentand appre -
hension his growing power, which indicated
that a day must soon come when war with.
a fierce people, ably commanded, in a diffi-
cult territory, would ensue, or the presi-
dency of Bombay, and the Carnatic, be over-
run by perpetual predatory incursion, or a
5 permanent conquest, by a barbaric race. In
!future pages, the rise and fall of the new
! power in Mysore will be treated; but in the
interval of the wars which issued in such for-
tunate results, Bombay experienced much
3 alarm and trouble. The possession of supreme
i power at Surat—where first the English name
i became great in India, and where first English
i valour won victory from a European rival——
“gave great satisfaction to the presidency at
i Bombay and to the directors in London.
; Bombay was, for a time, the most tranquil of
.the English governments in India, and its
1 commercial prosperity was developed with

 

1
3 peace.
I

vax-v tVV/\'¢VV\1WVW’V\.W\IWWM

CHAPTER LXXII.

EVENTS IN BENGAL AFTER THE BREAKING

OUT OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE IN 1744—-

MASSACRE 0F ENGLISHMEN IN THE BLACK HOLE OF CALCUTTA—EXPULSION OF THE

FRENCH.

THE chief interest of the French lay in the
Carnatic. In Bengal their settlements were

i
of small importance, although at Chanderna- i

French in other directions, for they thus ad-
dressed them on the 16th of October :—
“Par. 3. Upon our strenuous application

this majesty hath been graciously pleased to
{ send a strong squadron of men-of-war, under
g the command of the honourable Rear-Admiral
f Boscawen, with these our ships whereon this

gore they made considerable efforts to estab-
lish a trade. During the short war which
broke out in 17H, no events of importance
between the French and English occurred in

their extreme eastern settlements; nor until a letter is sent.

in 1757 it became known that, after the short .
peace, war again raged in Europe between‘
the two great countries. The English were,
therefore, engaged in Bengal in the quiet
prosecution of their trade, as far as the in-
trigues and exactions of the nabobs and the
incursions of the )Iahrattas allowed.

In the year 1747, the directors hoped that
their agents in Bengal would be able to ren-
der assistance in weakening the power of the

* Bomb/y and Tellic/zeny/ Diaries.
{gr/72!.

Bomlaj/ Quar—

“ 7. In case Rear-Admiral Boscawen, or the
commander-in-chief of his majesty’s forces,
should require your assistance in attacking
the enemy anywhere near you, we hereby
order you to give it him to the utmost of your
power, and to put under his command what
military, marine, or other force, you can pos-
sibly procure or spare consistent with the
safety of your place.”

So far from being able. to render any assist-
ance to the company or to the crown, the
directors of affairs at Calcutta were crouching

 

 

 

24:4: HISTORY OF THE

in their factory under the influence of the
most abject cowardice. It is sorrowful to
relate to what a degree of tameness and timi-
dity Englishmen could have sunk in the per-
sons of the traders at Calcutta.

The directors at home became at last so
sensible of the poltroonery of their represen-
tatives in Bengal, that they wrote them a long
letter on June 17, 1748, which, in two para-
graphs, the second and sixth, reproaches their
want of courage, and stimulates their manli-
ness so as to do what in them lay for their
own defence. These paragraphs throw an
interesting light upon the character of the
Anglo-Bengalese, and the spirit of the times
in England relating to Indian affairs 2——

“Par. 2. It is plain from the apprehension
you was under on the loss of Madras, lest the
French should destroy you next, that you
neither thought your own strength, though
supported at that time by six of his majesty’s
ships, nor the neutrality of the country, a suf-
ficient security, and you at all times stand so
much in awe of the country government that
they easily and shamefully raise immense
contributions upon you at the company’s ex-
pense, though almost always under pretence
of abuses in carrying on private trade.

“ G. If you do not prevail upon the nabob to
acquiesce in your setting about the works and
fortifications without molestation, you are to
let him know in a proper manner. You have
our orders to make Calcutta as secure as you
can against the French, or any other Euro-
pean enemy; and that if he obstructs you in
following those orders you are forbid to issue
any money for trade, and must do the best
you can to fulfil them. Tell him that you
shall be sorry to be obliged to take such mea-
sures as may be ruinous to his revenues and
the trade of the country in general; and you
may add, the King of England having the
protection of the company greatly at heart,
as they may perceive by the strong force he
hath sent to the East Indies to meet the
French, his majesty will support the company
in whatever they think fit to do for their
future security; for though a peace is now
making with France, no one knows how long
it may last, and when war is broke out it is
always too late to make fortifications strong
enough to make defence against an enter-
prising enemy; as appears from what hap-
pened at Madras, where strong works were
erecting, but could not be half finished before
the French attacked and took the place.”

Events to the year 1756 were in harmony
with the state of things indicated by the let-
ters of the directors in 1747-8. Upon the
advent of the government of Suraj-ad-Dowla
as soubahdar or viccroy of Bengal, which

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXII.
began on the death of his grandfather, Ali
Verdi, the 9th of April, 1756, the English
experienced increased oppressions, and were
harassed by augmented fears. The soubahdar
was a wicked young prince, voluptuous,
avaricious, cruel, treacherous, and hated the
English, of whose growing power his grand-
father had conceived a jealousy which the
grandson inherited. On various pretexts of
too little interest to relate, he sought a quarrel
with the English at Calcutta. His chief ob-
ject was to rob the presidency, concerning the
riches of which he had formed absurdly exag-
gerated notions. I'Ie marched against Cal-
cutta, and on his way seized Cossimbazar,
to the garrison of which he offered the alter-
native of indiscriminate slaughter, or imme-
diate surrender.

On the 18th of June he attacked the out-
posts of Calcutta. The factors had neither
skill, courage, nor adequate means of defence.
They had, however, vast shipping accommo-
dation in the river, by which an orderly and
easy escape was practicable. Instead of sys-
tem and coolness, extreme disorder prevailed,
and a cowardice utterly shameless. On the
morning of the 19th, the women, children,
and effects were to be sent to the ships
by a decision of council formed the previous
night, while the male inhabitants were to de-
fend the place until succour might be obtained.
Such was the confusion during the embarka-
tion of the women and children, that a panic
ensued, which communicated itself to the
seamen, so that the ships began to move
down the river, increasing the panic on shore.
The chief persons in the place fled with the
women, abandoning their comrades in arms
and their duty, preferring dishonour to danger.
The governor, Drake, whose want of capacity
gave the soubahdar an excuse for the \ ‘ar, was
among the fugitives. He was accompanied
in his ignominy by Mr. Machet, Captain
Commandant Minchin, and Captain Grant.
Messrs. Manningham and F rankland, mem-
bers of council, were the persons who set the
example of cowardice, for they “dropped
down the river in the Dadally on the night
of the 18th.” The president followed with
his companions, in the morning. It ap-
pears that these infamous men were the
means of creating the panic in the fleet, and
so anxious were the council, president, com-
mandant, and other civil and military persons
of note, for their personal safety, to the dis-
regard of all other considerations, that they
ordered the company’s vessels, on board of
which they were, to paSS down the river,
abandoning their comrades to their fate.
\thn the flight of the government and com-
manders were ascertained by the rest of the

CRAP. LXXII.]

company’s servants, their alarm was only
exceeded by their anger. They, however,
determined to defend the place, and elected
Mr. Holwell to be their governor, who con-
ducted himself with much spirit and ability
in a situation for which he had no previous
preparation. He afterwards wrote an account
of the transactions in which he had taken so
prominent a part.

John Cooke was secretary to the governor
and council, and remained to share the fate
of his companions in the chances of war. He
was examined in 1772, by a committee of the
House of Commons appointed to “inquire
into the nature, state, and condition of the
East India Company,” and gave the following
evidence :—“ Signals were now thrown out,”
says Mr. Cooke, “ from every part of the fort,
for the ships to come up again to their sta-
tions, in hopes they would have reflected (after
the first impulse of their panic was over) how
cruel as well as shameful it was, to leave their
countrymen to the mercy of a barbarous
enemy, and for that reason we made no doubt
they would have attempted to cover the
retreat of those left behind, now they had
secured their own; but we deceived our-
selves; and there never was a single effort
made, in the two days the fort held out after
this desertion, to send a boat or vessel to
bring off any part of the garrison.” “ Never,
perhaps," says Mr. Orme, “referring to the
catastrophe which subsequently took place, was
such an opportunity of performing an heroic
action so ignominiously neglected; for a
single sloop, with fifteen brave men on board,
might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy,
have come up, and, anchoring under the
fort, have carried away all who suffered in
the dungeon."

Mr. Holwell endeavoured by throwing
letters over the walls to open negotiations
with the enemy for favourable terms of capi-
tulation; but those efforts were in vain, for
while waiting for an answer to one of these
communications, having suspended the fire of
the garrison until the reply should arrive, the
enemy treacherously approached the walls and
stormed the place. The garrison was not
given over, after Mohammedan fashion, to
indiscriminate slaughter. Most of those who
composed it were taken prisoners, among
whom were some ladies who were not able to
escape. Mr. Holwell was bound and brought
before the viceroy, who immediately ordered
him to be unbound. He assured him upon
the faith of a soldier that no harm should
happen to him or his people. “'hen evening
came, it was a question with the guards where
the prisoners should be disposed of for the
night, and it was resolved to place them in a

VOL. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

245

narrow chamber insufficient to hold them.
The result was the destruction of most of
their number before morning. This event
has been memorable in Indian and in English
history as the massacre of “the Black Hole
of Calcutta."

The space of this apartment was only twenty
feet square; it was not a den or hole, but a
comparatively airy prison suitable to a small
number of persons. Mill, who loses no oppor-
tunity to lower his own countrymen, from his
desire to blacken the reputation of the com-
pany, treats this horrid event as one of pro-
vidential retribution upon the English for
using so vile a dungeon for their common
prison; adducing the fact, with others, as
proof of their cruelty to prisoners. He par-
ticularly adduces the state of the prison of
Calcutta in 1782, as exemplifying the indif-
ference of the English to the sufferings of-
prisoners, and he refers to certain allegations
of cruel indifference to the lives of sepoys.
There can be no doubt that the prison of
Calcutta during the eighteenth century was
pestilential and filthy. It is not to be denied
that the English, as a nation, were apt to disre-
gard the sufferings of inferiors, but they were
never cruel to men of their own rank, when
prisoners, and to enemies they had always
borne the reputation of generous conquerors.
Such the French have always acknowledged
them to be, and no other nation has had an
equal experience of them in that capacity.
The whole treatment of this subject by Mill is
disingenuous and unjust. Professor Wilson,
always eager to do justice upon Mill him-
self, seizes this occasion of his unfair nar-
rative to reply with much severity and effect
as follows 2—“ The spirit in which this trans-
action is noticed, in this and the preceding
note, as well as in the text, is wholly unjus-
tifiable. It extenuates a deliberate act of
wanton cruelty by erroneous assumptions and
inapplicable analogies. The Black Hole was
no dungeon at all; it was a chamber above
ground—small and ill-aired only with refer-
ence to the number of persons forced into it,
but affording abundant light and air to many
more than it had ever lodged under the Engu
lish administration. According to Holwellfi‘ it
was a room eighteen feet square, with a door
on one side, and two windows on another. In
1808 a chamber was shown in the old fort at
Calcutta then standing, said to be the Black
Hole of 1756: its situation (lid not corre-
spond exactly with Mr. Holwell's description
of it, but if not the same, it was a room of
the same description and size, such as is very

* Letter to Dr. Davis, 28th February, 1757; published
in Holwell's India Zl'acls.
K K

246 HISTORY OF THE

common amongst the offices of both public
and private buildings in Calcutta, and no
doubt accurately represented the kind of
place which was the scene of this occurrence.
It bore by no means the character ofa prison.
It was much more light, airy, and spacious
than most of the rooms used formerly by the
London watch, or at present by the police,
for purposes of temporary durance. Had a
dozen or twenty people been immured within
such limits for a night, there would have
been no hardship whatever in their imprison-
ment, and in all probability no such number
of persons ever was confined in it. The
English, then, in the objectionable sense in
which the author chooses to understand the
‘Black IIolc,’ never had such a prison.
The state of the Calcutta jail, in 1782, like
that of the common jails in England or in
Europe, was, no doubt, bad enough; but it is
not said that its inmates had ever (lied of
want of air, or that one hundred and twenty
perished in a single night. Even if the ex-
cuse of inconsideratcness might be urged
for driving the prisoners into a space so
utterly inadequate to their numbers, there was
abundant opportunity to correct the mistake,
when it was seen what suffering it occasioned.
The whole transaction admits of no defence:
it was an exemplification of Mohammedan
insolence, intolerance, and cruelty; and in
contemplating the signal retribution by which
it has been punished, a mind susceptible of
reverence, though free from superstition, can
scarcely resist the impression, that the course
of events was guided by higher influences
than the passions and purposes of man.”

The horrors of the massacre itself mock
description. When the unfortunate victims
Were but a short time within the precincts of
their prison, their sufferings became intense,
and their cries for mercy were as vehement
as the agonies of despair could make them.
Their guards mocked them, some of their
keepers holding up lights to the gratings for
the others to have the satisfaction of witness-
ing the struggles and poignant sufferings of
those doomed to death. A general rush for
the neighbourhood of the windows added to
the horrors of the occasion, and the desperate
efforts to obtain a position near the apertures
for air, caused many of the weaker to be
trampled to death by the stronger. This also
afforded amusement to their callous hearted
keepers. Mr. Holwell, who obtained a place
near a window with some others, offered
none-y to the sentincls to procure water, some
received the bribe, and did not perform the
stipulated service, others were more merciful.
One benevolent soldier brought water re-
peatedly, and showed by the expression of

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXII.
his countenance as he held up his hand, a
kind and pitying disposition.

To the appeals which were made by Mr.
Holwell, for some one to convey to the viceroy
a knowledge of their condition, the reply was
that he slept, and no one dare awake him.
In the morning, when he did awake, and sent
for the prisoners, twenty-three men, and one
woman alone remained alive, and most of
these were found insensible among the already
putrifying dead. Such was the case with the
governor. The lady who was amongst the
living, the Viceroy took to his harem. The
poorer prisoners, from whom no money could
be extorted, were dismissed: the principal
persons among the survivors were kept stand-
ing in chains before the tyrant soubahdar, and
threatened with death, if they did not disclose
where treasure was hid. As no treasure was
obtained, they were sent, loaded with irons,
to Moorshedabad. No clemency was shoan
t0 the survivors, who were fed with rice and
water, in quantities insufficient. The tyrant
did everything short of murdering his victims.

Mr. Mill thinks that the tragedy of “the
Black Hole ” might have been averted, if the
persons incarcerated had offered a bribe to one
of the superior officers of the soubahdar, and
adds, “ to no one does it appear that this ex-
pedient occurred.” Of course, it was im—
possible for them to reach any “ officer of high
authority,” except through the medium of
their keepers, whom it is not at all likely the
imprisoned failed to urge by every persuasive,
money included, to take the steps most likely
to secure them a more lenient place of confine-
ment. Hugh Murray, Esq., in his III'story of
British India (p. 317), declares that what
Mr. Mill represents the English as too stupid
to think of, was actually tried, without success,
by Mr. Holwell. His language is, “ The je-
mautdars, or Indian guards, were walking
before the window, and Mr. Holwell, seeing
one who bore on his face a more than usual
expression of humanity, adjured him to pro-
cure for them a room in which they could
breathe, assuring him next morning of a re-
ward of 1000 rupees. The man went away
-——but returned, saying it was impoSsible.
Thinking the offer had been too low, the pri-
soners tendered 2000 rupees. The man again
went,—and returned, saying that the nabob
was asleep, and no one durst awake him ;-—~
the lives of one hundred and forty-six men
being nothing in comparison to disturbing for
a moment the slumbers of a tyrant.” Not
only the confinement in “ the Black Hole,” but
the whole of the siege and capture of Calcutta
is related by the historian Mill with the ani-
mus of one who desired to expose and incul-
pate his own countrymen as much as possible,

Cusp. LXXII.]

and extenuatc the conduct of Suraj-ad-
Dowlah, meriting the indignant protest which
was written by Horace St. John, in his work
on Indian history: “ The ingenuity, not to
say the eloquence, of a British historian has
been perverted to fabricate, or at least to sug-
gest, a defence of this celebrated crime. It
might appear to him heroic to defend what
all the rest of mankind declared infamous ; but
that act is justly condemned as susceptible of
no palliation. It was the cruelty of a Moham-
medan despoti‘ A hint is, indeed, insinuated
by another writer, on the authority of native
accounts, that Suraj -ad-Dowlah was innocent
of the deed, and that stupidity, not wicked-
ness, caused the misery which ensued to
the victimsxf The ferocious character of the
prince, however, renders this a weak plea
for his reputation. It appears certain that
by his will such vengeance was dealt on
the English, and the blood of a hundred
and forty—three unhappy men cried for pun~
ishment upon their murderers. This is no
illiberal interpretation of history, for, clear
Suraj-ad-Dowlah of this crime, and he is
still a monster. It was as notorious to the
Europeans as it was to his own people, and
his inhumanity was perseveringi If ever a
nation had cause of war, Great Britain then
had. That people would have been unworthy
of an empire which did not rise to punish the
author of such a crime.Ӥ

“'hen tidings of these events arrived in
Madras and Fort St. David, the feeling pro-
duced among the English was one of intense
indignation, and a determination, if possible,
to regain their lost position and avenge their
murdered countrymen. Colonel Clive had re-
mained at St. David's after he left Bombay.
Admiral “'atson was upon the coast with a
very considerable navy, so that there was no
want of able commanders, and there existed
tolerable resources to avenge the injury that
had been sustained. Meanwhile, Suraj-ad-
Dowlah made ostentatious triumph, tidings
of which reached the British, and still further
deepened their resentment. The brutal sou-
bahdar informed his master, upon the totter-
ing throne of Delhi, that he had expelled the
English from Bengal, forbid Englishmen for
ever to dwell within its precincts, purged
Calcutta of the infidels, and, to commemorate
the event, called it by a new name—Alina-
S’Ol‘e, the Port of God. It was in August
that the dreadful news of the fall of Calcutta,
and the murder of so many Englishmen,
reached Madras; and Lord Macaulay ex-

 

See Scrafton’s Jacomzl, p. 52.

Stewart’s [army If Bengal, p. 505.
Penhocn’s Euqu're Any/dis, vol. ii. p. 33.
Brit's/z Coup/wt; 5.: India, chap. ix. "p. 73.

~m++ -t- *-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

247

presses his admiration of the fact that so
inflamed was the military ardour of the gar-
rison, that in forty-eight hours they deter-
mined upon an expedition up the Bay ‘of
Bengal and the Hoogly. It was the universal
desire out of the council that Clive should have
the command of the army, which eventually
consisted of nine hundred English infantry
and fifteen hundred sepoys. These set forth,
as Lord Macaulay has written, “to punish a
prince who had more subjects than Louis the
Fifteenth or the Empress Maria Theresa."

The fitting out of the expedition was not
as prompt as the determination to accomplish
it. It was not until October that it set sail
against adverse winds, which kept it beating
about in the bay until December. The cause
of this delay was highly discreditable to the
English. The following account of it by
Mill, is too true for the honour of the presi-
dent and council of Madras :—-“ It was re-
solved, after some debate, that the re-esta-
blishment of the company’s affairs in Bengal
should be pursued at the expense of every
other enterprise. A dispute, however, of
two months ensued, to determine in what
manner prizes should be divided ; who should
command; and what should be the degree
of power entrusted with the commander. The
parties, of whom the pretensions were seve-
rally to be weighed, were Mr. Pigot, who
had been Governor of Madras since the de-
parture of Saunders, but was void of military
experience ; Colonel Aldercron, who claimed
as senior officer of the king, but was unac-
quainted with the irregular warfare of the
natives; Colonel Lawrence. whose experience
and merit Were unquestionable, but to whose
asthmatical complaints the close and sultry
climate of Bengal was injurious; and Clive,
to whom none of these exceptions applied.
It was at last determined that Clive should
be sent. It was also determined that he
should be sent with powers independent of
the presidency of Calcutta. Among his in-
structions, one of the most peremptory was,
that he should return, and be again at Madras
with the whole of the troops, in the month of
April; about which time it was expected that
in consequence of the war between France and
England, a French fleet would arrive upon
the coast. It was principally, indeed, with a
view to this return, that independence of the
Calcutta rulers, who might be tempted to re-
tain him, was bestowed upon Clive.”

The Viceroy was enjoying the pastime of
torturing flies and other animals, imprisoning
and executing human victims, and revelling
in every debauch at his capital of Moorshed-
abad. He revelled, too, in security as to
enemies domestic and foreign. He was not

248 HISTORY OF THE

much better or worse than many other Mo-
hammedan princes, to whom “the faithful"
rendered a conscientious and even contented
allegiance. His ideas of European powers
were the most unenlightened. He had, it is
true, been jealous of the English, but he sup-
posed that if their power in India were once
broken, they had no resources behind to press
forward again their beaten Indian forces. In
all his views he was flattered by his minions,
for none dare call in question the opinions of
the sanguinary voluptuary.

Before the tardy English had consumed the
many intervening months, there was time for
the tyrant to miss the revenues their com-
merce yielded. His ministers were compelled
to disclose the unwelcome intelligence that
the gains of his treasury were much diminished
since the traders were expelled, and as he
encouraged the expression of their views, he
was informed that the only remedy was to
allow them to return, to tax them heavily, so
as to obtain for himself a large portion of
their profits, but otherwise to allow them to
trade in peace and with security to their per-
sons and their property. He was convinced
by these arguments, and was in the frame of
mind which they were calculated to produce,
when he was astounded by the intelligence
that a force of armed Englishmen and a proud
war-fleet were in the Hoogly. He had not
heard of the preparations against him, and if
his ministers had, they did not deem it politic
to inform him. However vexed, he was not
alarmed. He expected to annihilate in a short
time the feeble force which landed, and gave
express orders to his generals to perform that
feat. He drew in his forces to Moorshedabad,
and marched at their head to Calcutta. But
before he had collected his troops for the ac-
complishment of his design, Clive, with his
usual rapidity of action, had inflicted defeat
and humiliation upon the soubahdar's garri-
sons. The fleet was moved up the river to the
vicinity of Moidaporc, the admiral intending
the next morning to attack the fort of Budge-
Budge, about ten miles below the town. Clive,
not aware that the enemy were encamped in
the vicinity, landed and ordered his men to
lie down to rest. In thus acting Clive com-
mitted a rashness, which might have. terminated
the war. Orme describes him as having
placed his men in a position which left a sur-
prise possible, and as having neglected the pre-
caution of outposts and sentinels. The result
was what might have been expected—a sud-
den attack of the enemy, who came on timidly,
and were led by a coward. Still the attack
was perilous, and it required all Clive’s cou-
rage and address to avert a catastrophe. The
cavalry of the enemy held back; had they

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXII.
charged, Clive would have found it impossible
to have presented a formation which would
have issued in arepulse. This was an exem-
plification of the rashness and fearlessness
of the man. Repeatedly, in the Carnatic,
when serving under Lawrence, and when in
chief command, he exposed himself and his
soldiers, and the cause for which they fought,
to imminent danger of destruction, by a fool-
hardy contempt of foes, and indifference to
death. The surprise effected by the enemy
enabled the garrison to penetrate the plan of
the commander, which was, to intercept its
flight when the cannonade of the fleet should
drive it from the fort. The native force,
however, abandoning the fort in the night,
stole away in a direction which Clive could
not have supposed probable, and baflled his
designs. His generalship was, and not for
the first time, at fault. Clive marched along
by land; “'atson sailed up the river. The
enemy retreated from the various positions
which they occupied, almost without firing
a shot. The valour and discipline displayed
by the Europeans in the surprise taught the
enemy a salutary lesson.

On the 2nd of January, 1757, the arma-
ment was before Calcutta. A few broadsides
from the fleet expelled the garrison. The
merchandise was found in the condition it
was left when the English council fled, as the
viceroy had ordered it to be reserved for him-
self. All the private dwellings had been
sacked.

Upon the capture of the place, jealousies
sprung up between the admiral and Colonel
Clive. The admiral desired to exclude the
company’s troops from the garrison. Clive
insisted that they were the proper portion of
the armament to assume that duty. They
also differed as to who should appoint a go-
vernor of the city. Clive vindicated his claims
with determination. The bickerings which
commenced between the admiral and colonel
continued throughout the whole time of their
co-operation in the service. Captain Coote
was ordered with a detachment to attack
Hoogly, which was captured, the enemy
offering a poor resistance. Prize-money, to
the extent of £15,000, fell to the forces by
this capture.

The viceroy, alarmed at these successes,
opened negotiations. According to most his-
torians, overtures were made by Clive, who,
whatever his boldness in actual battle, was
liable to be awed by the magnitude of
a great undertaking before actually entered
upon. He had now the whole army of the
viceroy of Bengal before him, and a handful
of troops to combat that great army. Lord
Macaulay maintains that the overtures were

CRAP. LXXIIJ

made by the soubahdar, and that he offered to
restore to the uglish their settlements, and
make compensation for the injuries which he
had inflicted. Admiral “'atson was opposed
to overtures for peace being either made or
accepted by the British. As to the places
previously in the possession of the English,
they had just captured them; as to compensa-
tion, they could take it. On the whole, the
admiral thought that until Suraj felt that his
viceroyalty itself was in danger, and was
obliged to sue for peace after severe losses
and defeats, he would remain a treacherous
although flexible foe, ever ready to make war
when an opportunity arose. By striking a
bold and decisive blow, the admiral belie 'ed
permanent peace might be secured.

Clive hesitated: in the language of Mr.
Murray, “He was not yet fully aware of
the weakness of Indian potentates, and was by
no means forward to rush into a contest with
the ruler of twenty millions of men.” It was
plain in these differences that “'atson had not
confidence in either the intelligence or sta-
bility of Clive, although placing the utmost
reliance upon his audacity and presence of
mind in the most appalling danger, and in his
fertility of invention in all sudden emergen-
cies. Lord Macaulay gives a view of Clive’s
relation to these transaction somewhat different
to this. He says, “ Clive’s profession was war,
and he felt that there was something discredit-
able in an accommodation with Suraj-ad-
Dowlah. But his power was limited. A
committee, chiefly composed of servants of
the company who had fled from Calcutta, had
the principal direction of affairs; and these
persons were eager to be restored to their
posts and be compensated for their losses.
The government of Madras, apprised that
war had commenced in Europe, and appre-
hensive of an attack from the French, became
impatient for the return of the armament.
The provinces of the nahob were large, the
chances of a contest doubtful; and Clive eon-
sented to treat, though he expressed his regret
that things should not be concluded in so
glorious a manner as he could have wished.”
His lordship adds, “\Vith this negotiation
commences a new chapter in the life of Clive.
Hitherto he had been merely a soldier, carrying
into cliect with eminent ability and valour the
plans of others. Henceforward, he is chiefly
to be regarded as a statesman; and his mili-
tary movements are to be considered subor-
dinate to his military designs."

Mill says that the anger of the Viceroy was
influenced by the capture of Hoogly, which
the English attacked solely for plunder, and
therefore he ordered his army to march against
Calcutta. These statements are not borne out

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

 

 

249

by the facts as related by Mr. Mill himself,
when received as a whole. The expedition
of Coote to Hoogly was a fair and lawful
operation of a war of reprisals, and the fact
that after the capture of Hoogly the soubah-
dar temporised and pretended to be desirous
of peace is indisputable.

Hugh Murray says, referring to the different
views of Clive and “'atson, that the former
prevailed so far that a mission was sent to the
soubahdar, who received it honourably, and
even proposed terms that were considered ad-
missible; but the writer adds, concerning the
prince, “ He did not, however, discontinue his
march, and by various evasions avoided bring-
ing the treaty to a conclusion.” Lord Macau-
lay takes the same view of the nabob’s conduct.
The French at Chandernagore, at this juncture,
according to Mill, proposed neutrality, even
although their respective nations were at war
in Europe. This, however, was a feint., for
the French at that station could not but know
the design of their countrymen to drive the
British out of India, and the policy of rejecting
proposals of neutrality whenever they were
strong enough to make war. Professor “'il-
son remarks upon this alleged offer, and the
time at which Mill represents it to have been
made :—“ There is some contradiction in the
statements of different authorities on this sub-
ject, which can be reconciled only by a con-
sideration of dates and circumstances. It
appears probable, that the French were not
informed of the war in Europe, until alter the
march of the nawab to Calcutta, and the nego-
tiations for peace with the English. They
could not, therefore, have joined him sooner,
and to prevent that junction taking place, was
one of Clive’s reasons for agreeing to the
treaty more readily than was thought advis-
able by Admiral VVatson. He writes to the
chairman, ‘ I know there are many who think
I have been too precipitate in the conclusion
of the treaty, but they never knew that the
delay of a day or two might have ruined the
company’s affairs, by the junction of the French
with the nawab, which was on the point of
being carried into execution.’7"' VYitll the conclu-
sion of the treaty, the French lost their oppor-
tunity of co-operatin g with the nawab. Their
negotiations for a neutrality were subsequent
to the nawab’s retreat; and if Clive's account
of the matter be correct, the English had not
much reason to be grateful for their forbear-
ance. ’

The soubahdar, after making many pretences
of negotiation, appeared on the 3rd of Feb-
ruary before Calcutta, immediately investing
it. Clive's resolve the next morning to attack
this camp have been severely criticised, and

* Max:179.

250 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

with justice. A thick mist also obscured his
operations. Nevertheless, he succeeded in
cutting through the camp, and returned, hav-
ing suffered as well as inflicted heavy loss.
The nabob was terrified at so audacious an
act of courage, and became earnest in his
overtures for peace, and on the 9th of Feb-
ruary a treaty was concluded. The terms
were the same as he at first offered, with an
additional article that the English might for-
tify Calcutta. Two days afterwards, he pro-
posed a treaty offensive and defensive, to which
the English acceded, and which was concluded
on the same day.

Clive was anxious to attack the French fac-
tory of Chandernagore; but the soubahdar,
willing to see the French in his dominions, as
a counter-poise to the too powerful English,
resisted, and made such a demonstration of
force as deterred the English from the
attempt. Clive maintained that either a treaty
of neutrality with that French station, or an
immediate attack upon it, was essential to the
security of English interests, and he proposed
one, which the French said they must refer to
the president at Pondicherry, but which Clive
signed definitively. Watson, who always
found scruples for refusing to do that upon
which Clive was bent, or reason for performing
what Clive hesitated to undertake, refused his
signature. “'hen Clive was for attacking
Chandernagore, Watson refused, without the
consent of the Viceroy, which he knew would
not be given. Large reinforcements arrived
at this time for the English, and they refused
to ratify the treaty with the French of Chan-
dernagore. While the English were uncertain
how to act in reference to Chandernagore, they
became apprised of the facts that the govern-
ment of Pondicherry was opposed to neutrality,
and merely desired, by negotiation, to gain
time, while they were instigating the Viceroy
to rely on them, and forming an alliance to
expel the English at last. The prince, how-
ever, was alarmed by the invasion and capture
of Delhi by Ahmed Shah, the Ahdallee, and
the rumour that the invader had determined to
march against Bengal. In his consternation, he
sent to the English, entreating their aid, and
showing his desire to gain it on almost any
terms. A council was called, at which the
feeble Mr. Drake, who had run away from
Calcutta, presided: Mr. Becher, Major Kil-
patrick, and Colonel Clive were the other
members. It was then debated whether an
attack should be made on Chandernagore.
Clive gives the following amusing account of
the way in which the council argued and
voted :——“ Mr. Becher gave his opinion for a
neutrality, Major Kilpatrick, for a neutrality;
he himself gave his opinion for the attack of

 

[CHAR LXXII.

the place; Mr. Drake gave an opinion that
nobody could make anything of. Major Kil-
patrick then asked him, whether he thought
the forces and squadron could attack Chan-
dernagore and the naboh's army at the same
time ?——he said, he thought they could; upon
which Major Kilpatrick desired to withdraw
his opinion, and to be of his. They voted
Mr. Drake’s no opinion at all; and Major
Kilpatrick and he being the majority, a letter
was written to Admiral Watson, desiring him
to co-operate in the attack on Chanderna-
gore.”

Drake was a man without patriotism or
honour. His sole object was to be allowed to
preside quietly in Calcutta, at the head of the
council, and turn the trading affairs of the
company to some account, and his own to re-
sults more profitable. He was jealous of Clive,
intrigued with the directors in London and
the council in Madras, to have Clive’s inde-
pendent command withdrawn, and for that
officer either to be placed under his orders, or
removed from Bengal. Incredible as it may
seem,that any man who had deserted his duty
and dishonoured his country, as Drake had
done, could desire to remove the only officer
capable of making head against the enemy,
such was the fact. He, therefore, opposed all
Clive’s movements; and Admiral \‘Catson,
seeing that the counsels on shore were so (ii-
vided, had the more scope for his perpetually re-
curring conscientious scruple against any mea-
sure either for negotiation or arms proposed by
that able and indomitable man. The following
statement of Clive’s instructions, and of ex-
tracts of Drake’s letters for the suppression of
Clive's independent authority, will account to
the reader for all the difficulties which arose
among the English themselves whenever Clive
proposed any new undertaking :——“ The orders
given to the admiral and Colonel Clive when
they left Madras were, to obtain full repara—
tion of all injuries, and eventually to attack
the tyrant in his capital. The council, on the
8th of January, advised the court of directors
of the recapture of Calcutta, and, on the 3lst,
of the success against lloogly. In the latter
despatch, they adverted to the instructions
from the president at Fort St. George, di-
recting that Colonel Clive, as commander of
all the forces, might be furnished with plans
for a treaty with the nabob, having placed
four Ines of rupees at his command, and em-
powered him to deviate from the whole or
part of such plans. should he consider them
to be inconsistent with the Company’s interests.
The council at Calcutta appeared to view with
strong feelings ofjealousy the position in which
Clive stood towards them‘ by virtue of those
instructions. They remarked, in their letter

Cua r. LXXII.]

to the directors, that ‘the authority the select
committee at Fort St. George have assumed,
in appointing Colonel Clive commander-in-
chief of the forces in Bengal, is so unaccount-
able, that we cannot avoid taking notice of it
as an encroachment of the rights and trusts
invested in us.’ Notwithstanding the im-
portant services Clive had already rendered,
and the probability of the nabob’s advancing
towards Calcutta, the council added, ‘We have
required of Colonel Clive to recede from the
independent powers given him by the select
committee, but he has refused to surrender
that authority; we must therefore leave it to
you, honourable sirs, to take notice of so in-
jurious a conduct in your servants on the
coast.”’ Adverting to the powers which he
possessed, he stated to the court of directors,
in a letter dated “the camp near Calcutta :”
“All propositions the council make will be
attended to; and, for my part, you may be
assured that, not withstanding my independent
command, I shall endeavour to maintain a
perfect harmony with them, and act through-
out with their participation. They thought
proper, some time ago, to demand a surrender
of my commission as commander-in-chief, and
that I would put myself under their orders.
“'hile I looked upon myself as obliged to re-
fuse, in justice to those who had entrusted me
with such powers, I represented that I had no
intention of making use of any independent
powers, unless they induced me to it by ne-
cessity, for we had but one common interest
to pursue, which was that of the company,
and as long as that was kept in view, they
would always find me ready to follow their
instructions.’ Colonel Clive's communication
appears to have been governed by a just sense
of the position in which he was placed, and to
have manifested every disposition to act in
harmony with the council, who felt aggrieved
at their power having been set aside. At
such a juncture, all personal feeling should
have been waived for the common good, es-
pecially in favour of an officer who had evinced
such qualifications."=‘-=

This correspondence, thus quoted and com-
mented upon, shows that from the firstmoment
of his success at Bengal, the old council
thwarted him, anxious for any compromise,
so that they might pursue their private
gains. The men who fled with the women
when Calcutta was besieged, leaving the su-
preme posts of government and military direc-
tion vacant, were not likely to consent to any
course of action of a bold and vigorous nature

* Auber’s Britt's/t Power in India, vol. i. chap. ii.;
pp. 56—59.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

251
to avenge the murder of their countrymen,
or vindicate the honour of their country.
They longed for a money compromise which
they should largely share, and of the division
of which they should have the patronage.
Patriotism and honour were words of no
meaning to them. Having from the begin-
ning of Clive’s expedition acted in that spirit,
they looked with much animosity upon the
projected attack at Chandernagore, that ex—
pedition and all other military undertakings
tending to keep Clive with his independent
commission in the province, and to increase
his renown, influence, and perhaps his direct
power, which was ultimately the case. Clive,
however, had made up his mind to drive the
French from Bengal, and he lost no time in
carrying his purpose into effect. The intri-
gues which followed the events just related,
and which surrounded the indomitable Clive,
who was the life and soul of English enter-
prise, were complicated, intricate, and un-
principled. The native powers, the French,
and the English, all endeavoured to deceive
one another, and all were unscrupulous in
the means which they employed. It has
become the fashion among English writers—
a fashion set by Mill—to traduce the cha-
racter of the British on all occasions of tempta-
tion during the trials which at that period beset
them. Much injustice is done to the Anglo-
Indians of that day, by their countrymen ofthe
present age. Impartial justice demands at
all events a verdict in their favour when they
are compared with either French or natives.
The French showed far less honour and poli-
tical morality than the English, and the con-
duct of natives of all ranks, sects, and classes
was profoundly corrupt, treacherous, venal,
and cruel. Princes, diplomatists, generals,
merchants, and people were utterly without
honour or principle, with rare exceptions.
The course of conduct generally pursued by
them was so perfnlious and wicked, that
where a simple and direct procedure would
have better served their purposes, they pre-
ferred chicane, meanness, cowardice and folly.
They exemplified the truth of the saying,
“ Quos Dells cult perdere prius demenfat.”
They reaped as they served, nabob, soubahdar
and people: a judicial vengeance politically
befel them. It would be an endless task to
unravel the many skeins of artifice which
were spun around the policy of natives,
French, and English at this time. Let it
suffice, to observe that Clive’s skilful ma-
noeuvres and bold schemes defeated the
coalesced French and natives, and that,
finally, the French were driven from Bengal.

HISTORY OF THE

[0
U!
N)

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXIII

CHAPTER LXXIII.

DETHRONEMENT 0F SURAJ-AD-DOWLAH—-BA’I‘TLE OF PLASSEY—TIIE ENGLISH MASTERS
OF BENGAL.

THE defeat and humiliation of the French left
the British no European rivalsin Bengal. There
Were still other European factories and settle-
ments, but there was no prospect, and scarcely
any possibility of their possessors rising to
great power, or of even attempting to dispute
the position and influence of the English. The
agreements entered into by the latter with the
soubahdar upon the expulsion of the French,
and in connection with that event, were not
fulfilled by the native government to the satis-
faction of the conquerors, and hence disputes
arose which led to war, and to the final con-
quest of Bengal by the British. Modern
writers, especially upon the continent of Eu-
rope, allege that these quarrels were fomented
by the English, in order to find a pretext for
pushing their conquests; and Clive is espe-
cially accused of having been the evil genius
of this policy. In support of this View, much
reliance is placed upon the statement of Olive,
which he made to the House of Commons,
that, “after Chandernagore was resolved to
be attacked, he repeatedly said to the com-
mittee, as well as to others, that they could
not stop there, but must go further; that,
having established themselves by force, and
not by consent of the nabob, he would endea-
vour to drive them out again; that they had
numberless proofs of his intentions, many upon
record; and that he did suggest to Admiral
Watson and Sir George Pococke, as well as

 

to the committee, the necessity of a revo-

lution; that Mr. Watson and the gentlemen

of the committee agreed upon the necessity,
of it; and that the management of that revo-
lution was, with consent of the committee, left
to Mr. “'atts, who was resident at the nabob’s
capital, and himself; that great dissatisfaction
arising among Suraj-ad-Dowlah's troops,Meer
Jaffier was pitched upon to be the person to
place in the room of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, in con-
sequence of which a treaty was formed." Clive
never intended to intimate, by what he thus
stated, that the idea of deposing the soubahdar
arose with the English: the fact was other-
wise. The English only took up a suggestion
made by certain of the soubahdar’s subjects;
and, as Lord Clive intimates in his statement
just quoted, and as he elsewhere declared, he
was actuated, in falling in with the plans of
the conspirators, by the necessity of the case.
The soubahdar never intended to fulfil any of

 

his agreements: he hated and feared the

English too much ever to be at case while they
held power and influence in Bengal. Lord
Macaulay describes his state of minds and
proceedings at this period in terms as correct
as expresslve :——

“ The French were now vanquished ; and
he began to regard the English with still
greater fear and still greater hatred. His
weak and unprincipled mind oscillated be-
tween servility and insolence. One day he sent
a large sum to Calcutta, as part of the compen-
sation due for the wrongs which he had com-
mitted. The next day, he senta present of
jewels to Bussy, exhorting that distinguished
officer to hasten to protect Bengal ‘against
Clive, the daring in war, on whom,’ says his
highness, ‘may all bad fortune attend.’ He
ordered his army to march against the Eng-
lish. He countermanded his orders. He tore
Clive's letters. He then sent answers in the
most florid language of compliment. He or-
dered Watts out of his presence, and threatened
to impale him. He again sent for Watts, and
begged pardon for the insult. In the meantime,
his maladministration, his folly, his dissolute
manners, and his love of the lowest company,
had disgusted all classes of his subjects—sol-
diers, traders, civil functionaries, the proud and
ostentatious Mohammedans, the timid, supple,
and parsimonious Hindoos. A formidable
conspiracy was formed against him, in which
were included Roydullub, the minister of
finance ; Meer Jafiier, the principal com-
mander of his troops; and Jugget Seit,* the
richest banker in India. The plot was con-

; fided to the English agents, and a communi-

cation was opened between the malcontents
at Moorshedabad, and the committee at Cal-
cutta. In the committee there was much
hesitation; but Clive’s voice was given for the
conspirators, and his vigour and firmness bore
down all opposition. It was determined that
the English should lend their powerful assist-
ance to depose Surai-ad-Dowlah, and to place
Meer Jaffier on the throne of Bengal. . . . The
odious vices of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, the wrongs
which the English had suffered at his hands,
the dangers to which our trade must have
been exposed had he continued to reign, ap-
pear to us fully to justify the resolution of
deposing him."

“ The odious vices of Suraj," in spite of Lord
Macaulay’s opinion to the contrary, afforded

* Properly, “ Set.”

CIIAP. LXXIIIJ

no justification whatever to the English for
the part they took, neither did they rest their
conduct on any such foolish ground. “The
wrongs which the English had suffered at his
hand," would have afforded as little justifica-
tion for their connection with the conspiracy as
his odious vices. Suraj had compensated
these wrongs, and placed himself not only on
terms of amity, but alliance with those whom
he had so foully injured. Neither did the
British rest their procedure upon any wrongs
endured by them in the previous war. “ The
dangers to which our trade must have been
exposed," is too vague an allegation to justify
an ally for entering into a conspiracy; but
there is no doubt a conviction that such
dangers impended, influenced the committee
at Calcutta. Clive, by whose advice the over-
tures of the conspirators were entertained,
based his policy upon the facts that the faith-
less tyrant had broken treaty with the British,
and intrigued for their overthrow with the
French in the Carnatic, and at the court of
the Deccan; and Clive also rested his policy
on the obvious truth that a man so vindictive,
foolish, and capricious as Suraj, could never
be a safe ally, and would always prove a
treacherous foes as he had already proved him-
self to be. The clear evidence afforded that
the infatuated prince was resolved to attempt
the expulsion of the English at the first fa-
vourable moment, and had already set on foot
traitorons designs, thereby violating all his
engagements, afforded better justification for
the desire and purpose to depose him than
that which Lord Macaulay urges in Clive’s
defence. The first ostensible cause of dispute
was the refusal of Suraj to deliver up cer-
tain French who had collected at Cossim-
bazar. The nabob furnished Mr. Law,* the
chief of the French factory there, with arms,
ammunition,and even money, and sent him and
his people to Bahar. Clive detached a part
of his army to intercept the fugitives, and in«
censed as well as alarmed the nabob by the
boldness of such a measure. From this in-
cident began open altercations between the
British and Suraj, of such a nature as plainly
portended not only a speedy breach of the
alliance, but open war.

The plot referred to in the quotation from
Lord Macaulay, was one of the fruits of this
state of things. It was not the first conspi-
racy formed against Suraj by his own sub-
jects and officers, nor were the proposals
which arose out of it the first made to the
English by the nabob’s subjects against him;
but the project of Meer Jaffier appeared to
the British the most feasible, or possibly “ the

* For an account of whom see chapter on the “ French
East India Company.”

VOL. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

253

pear was then ripe." Meer Jaffier was not
actually in the employment of Suraj, as the
quotation from Lord Macaulay would indicate,
when he first opened Communications with
the English. He had been deposed, and in
a manner likely to make him a rebel.
That chief was, however, a person of too
much consequence to remain long out of the
public service. for he had held high rank in
the army of Ali Verdi, to whose sister he had
been married. His rank was that of an inde-
pendent military chief, in which anomalous
position he raised and paid his army, which
nominally was in the service of the nabob,
but really regarded as its chief the general
who recruited and paid it.

“'hen negotiations were fully opened be-
tween the conspirators at Moorshedabad and
the English at Calcutta, co-operation was
agreed upon in manner and on terms which
have been much censured by historians.
The English senate resounded during many
sessions of the last century with denunciations
of the venality and treachery of the com-
mittee at Calcutta during these transactions ;
and the English press threw forth innumerable
sheets filled with reclamations and abuse of
the British chiefs. Lord Macaulay, who vin-
dicates the deposition of the nabob, and the
coalition of the English and the native party
in the revolt of the latter, condemns Clive for
writing soothing letters to the nabob and
keeping up the semblance of amity. It must
be obvious to every reflecting reader, that if
it were right for the English to co-operate in
the conspiracy at all, it was necessary to carry
out their project by preserving appearances
until the hour arrived for throwing off the
alliance openly. His lordship is obviously
inconsistent in excusing the one part taken
by the English and censuring the other.
VYhatever be the merits of the case, Clive did
no more than English diplomatists, and all
other diplomatists, European and Oriental,
have done ever since—conceal the purpose of
their governments to throw off an alliance
until opportune occasion. Governments with
which Lord Macaulay has been connected,
and which have had all the service of his
peculiar rhetoric, have shown as much laxity
in the ethics of their diplomacy.

Probably no part of the conduct of the
English has been so severely handled by
moral critics, as the pecuniary bargain made
with Meer Jaffier by the Calcutta committee.
Jafiier readily undertook to pay large demands
made by the English. In name of compen-
sation for losses by the capture of Calcutta,
10,000,000 rupees were promised to the Eng-
lish company, 5,000,000 rupees to English
inhabitants, 2,000,000 to the Indians, and

L L

254 HISTORY OF THE
700,000 to the Armenians. These sums were
specified in the formal treaty. Over and be-
side this, it was resolved by the committee of
the council—that is, the small number of indi-
viduals by whom the business was performed—
that a donation of 2,500,000 rupees should be
asked for the squadron; and another of equal
amount for the army. “When this was
settled,” says Lord Clive, “ Mr. Becher (a
member) suggested to the committee, that he
thought that committee, who managed the
great machine of government, was entitled to
some consideration, as well as the army and
navy.” Such a proposition, in such an as-
sembly, could not fail to appear eminently
reasonable. It met with general approba-
tion. Mr. Becher informs us, that the sums
received Were 280,000 rupees by Mr. Drake,
the governor; 280,000 by Colonel Olive; and
240,000 each, by himself, Mr. “‘Vatts, and
Major Kilpatrick, the inferior members of the
committee. The terms obtained in favour of
the company were, that all the French fac—
tories and effects should be given up; that
the French should be for ever excluded from
Bengal; that the territory surrounding Cal-
cutta to the distance of six hundred yards
beyond the Mahratta ditch, and all the land
lying south of Calcutta as far as Calpee, should
be granted them on zemindary tenure, the
company paying the rents in the same man-
ner as other zemindars.

Mr. Mill, with an impartiality and justice
of which he is too often very sparing where
the conduct of the company’s servants is con-
cerned, makes the following critique upon this
pecuniary arrangement, on account of which
Clive and the council have been so frequently
stigmatised as venal and corrupt :—-—“These
presents, which were afterwards made use of
by the personal enemies of Olive, to effect his
annoyance and attempt his ruin, detract much
from the splendour of his reputation, and re-
flect discredit upon all who were parties to
their acceptance. That general, admiral, and
members of the select committee, were alike
influenced by a grasping and mercenary spirit
is undeniable, and they seized, with an avidity
which denoted a lamentable absence of ele-
vated principles, upon an unexpected Oppor-
tunity of realizing princely fortunes. At the
same time, many considerations may be urged
in their excuse, and a more disinterested con-
duct would have exhibited in them, a very
extraordinary exception to the prevailing
practices and feelings of the times. The
servants of the company had never been for-
bidden to receive presents from the natives
of rank, and as they were very ill paid, it was
understood that they were at liberty to pay
themselves in any manner they could which

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXIII.
(lid not injure their employers. The making
of presents was an established practice
amongst the natives, and is one which they
even yet consider as a necessary part of
friendly or formal intercourse, and although,
agreeably to their notions, it is most incum-
bent on the inferior to approach his superior
with an offering, yet on great public occasions,
and especially upon any signal triumph, the
distribution of liberal donations to the army
and the chief officers of the court is a natural
result. There was nothing more than cus-
tomary, therefore, in the gift of large sums of
money by Meer Jaffier to those to whom he
was indebted for his accession ; and, as there
was neither law nor usage opposed to the ac-
ceptance of his donations by the servants of
the company, and as they were avowedly ex-
pected and openly received, there was nothing
dishonest in the transaction. That the amount
of the presents was excessive, may be attri-
buted, in some degree, to the erroneous opinion
entertained probably by Meer Jaflier, and-
certainly by the company’s servants, of the
great wealth in the treasury of Suraj-ad—Dow-
lah, which admitted of such deduction. With
a just regard to circumstances and seasons,
therefore, it is unjust to expect from the ser-
vants of the company a. lofty disregard of
personal advantage, although they would have
merited more unqualified admiration had they
disdained their private enrichment in the
noble aim of promoting the public good: much
unhappiness would have been avoided by
themselves, much misery would have been
spared to Bengal." That many of the per-
sons engaged in these arrangements were
actuated by motives the most selfish and
venal, the minor transactions connected with
them incidentally reveal. The discussion
which arose in the committee as to how much
its inferior members were to receive, is a case
in point, The distribution of 240,000 rupees
each to Becher, Watts, and Kilpatrick, led
to a dispute, which Clive thus accounted for
and described :——“ Upon this being known,
Mr. VYatson replied, that he was entitled to a
share in that money. He (Clive) agreed in
opinion with the gentlemen, when this appli-
cation was made, that Mr. VYatson was not
one of the committee, but at the same time
did justice to his services, and proposed to the
gentlemen to contribute as much as would
make his share equal to the governor's and
his own; that about three or four consented
to it, the rest would not.”

In order to carry out the compact, the
English were to make open war, and advan-
cing a small force, the General Meer Jaftier
would join it at Cutwa with his own troops,
and as many other detachments from the

CRAP. LXXIIIJ

nabob’s army, as he might be able to gain
over through the instrumentality of other
military malcontents. Clive put himself at
the head of a very small body of men, and
marched to Cutwa, but on arriving at the
rendezvous, he found no allies. This dis-
quieted him, for he had but little confidence
in the courage, capacity, or sincerity of the
conspirators. His disquietude was increased
by letters from Moorshedabad, in forming some
of the natives in his camp, that the conspiracy
had been revealed to the nabob, and that
Meer J affier had only saved his life, by pro-
mising to aid with his best endeavours the
prosecution of the war against the English.
These tidings were soon followed by a letter
from Meer Jaflier himself, informing Clive
that the nabob,suspecting some designs against
his throne, had compelled him to swear fidelity
upon the Koran. The general pleaded his
oath as a reason for not having fulfilled his
engagement so far, but declared that on the
day of battle he would go over to Clive with
his army. This epistle furnished an illus-
tration of Mohammedan casuistry. The oath
of fidelity upon the Koran preserved so far
the fealty of the rebel chief, that he would
not at once go over to his ally, but would,
nevertheless, hold friendly communications
with him; and propose new modes of de-
stroying his master's interests, which on the
day of battle he promised to betray. Clive no
longer trusted Meer Jaffier, who was playing a
double game. He had committed the English
to an undertaking which they would not have
ventured upon without his aid; yet his own
purpose was to observe neutrality, and play
off both the forces, that of the British and
that of the nabob, against one another, and
make his own terms with the ultimate con-
queror. Clive, with all his impetuous and
rash boldneSs, felt the desperate nature of his
position, and was depressed. He afterwards
admitted the depression he felt, and avowed
that he “thought it extremely hazardous to
pass a river which is only fordable in one
place, march a hundred and fifty miles up
the country, and risk a battle, when, if a
defeat ensued, not one man would have re-
turned to tell it."

Thus perplexed, he summoned a council of
war which decided against passing the river.
Clive declared that if he had followed its
advice, the result would have been the ruin
of the East India Company. It vould not.
however, have been reasonable on his part to
expect the council to come to any other opinion
than they did, which was in harmony with his
own, a fact which he took unusual pains to
let them know before they gave the decision.
It is the custom in councils of war for the

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

255

junior officer to give his opinion first, so that,
uninfluenced by the authority of his seniors,
he may express his own conviction. On this
occasion, Clive first declared his judgment
against crossing the river, and so great was
his influence that this decision was imme~
diately concurred in, so that in fact it was not
a council of war, but the opinion of Olive
himself, echoed by his junior officers.

Orme relates that “after the council dis-
persed, he retired alone into the adjoining
grove, where he continued an hour in deep
meditation: and gave orders, on his return to
his quarters, that the army should cross
the river in the morning.”* It is probable
that Orme had this account from the lips of
Olive himself. The next morning the army
crossed the river, and at midnight arrived at
Plassey. Before Clive had heard from Meer
Jaffier that the soubahdar‘l‘ had sworn him on
the Koran, the faithless general was thus
addressed by his English ally, through Mr.
Watts, the English resident at the court of
Suraj 2—“ Tell Meer Jaffier to fear nothing.
I will join him with five thousand men who
never turned their backs. Assure him I will
march night and day to his assistance, and
stand by him as long as I have a man left.”
Meer Jaffier was not brave, and the force of
the great English captain was so inferior,
that, notwithstanding, the mighty name already
gained by its commander, Meer Jaffier was
discouraged. Had the army of Clive been
twice as numerous, the wily Mohammedan
would have proved a more prompt ally.
Some historians accuse Meer Jaffier of having
himself awakened the suspicious of the sou-
bahdar against others of the confederates,
that he might, if necessary, for his own pur-
poses betray them also, but it. is not probable
that a politician so timid, would venture upon
so hold a procedure. The suspicions of the
Viceroy were actually aroused by M. Law, who
was led to suspect the plot, through informa-
tion connected with the French agents at the
court. He consequently urged the prince to
retain French troops about his person, but
his cowardice and vacillation prevented his
following such counsel, for he was afraid of
exasperating the English, yet more afraid of’
offending his own people who were jealous
of foreign troops, and he had not implicit con-
fidence in the French themselves.

Before the battle of Plassey was fought, or
the little English army had crossed their
rubicon, while yet everything depended upon

* Vol. ii. p. 170. .

'i' Suraj-ad-Dowlah is called soubahdar and nabob m-
discriminatcly by historians, although the names are not
synonymous; a nabob properly being deputy of the son.
bahdar, as the latter is Viceroy of the Mogul.

256 HISTORY OF THE
the privacy with which the conspirators
carried on affairs with their English allies, a
danger threatened the whole scheme, of the
most alarming nature. The secret negotia-
tions between Olive and Meer Jaffier, and the
ostensible diplomatic business between the
council at Calcutta and the soubahdar, were
carried on by Mr. Watts, the English resident
at his court, and one Omichund, a Bengalee.
He had been a merchant at Calcutta, and suf-
fered heavy loss when the place was captured
by Suraj, but, finding favour with the tyrant,
he was brought to Moorshedabad and com-
pensated for the losses he had sustained.
Notwithstanding this unusual generosity on
the part of Suraj, Omichund betrayed him.
It was convenient both to the soubahdar and
the English to have a person of Omichund’s
parts, experience, and knowledge of the Eng-
lish as a medium of transacting political busi-
ness, especially as politics and commerce were
so interwoven in the relations of the two
powers. Omichund was rich, but exceedingly
avaricious. He had no honour, no loyalty,
and was ready to sell either prince or stranger
to the other. He believed that the English
could pay the better price, and would in the
long run succeed, for he was far-sighted in
politics, and a shrewd judge of character.
He readily joined the conspirators; for, having
a talent for intrigue, he thus found scope for
it. Considering the English good paymasters,
and more worthy of trust than his master, he
was prepared to betray the latter for a price,
which was agreed upon amongst the conspi-
rators, and between him and them and the
English. He accordingly assisted Mr. “'atts
in all the plots carried on at the court of
Bengal, and was instrumental by his intimate
knowledge of Suraj’s mental habits and
character, and by his own plausible manner
and ingenious mind, in soothing the anger
of the soubahdar, and lulling his suspicions of
his own court, upon which the prince, utterly
faithless himself, placed scarcely any reliance.
Omichund appears to have gained more influ-
ence over him than any of his courtiers, and
he wielded it in the interest of the projected
revolution.

\Yhen all was ready for action, and Clive’s
little army was committed to the struggle, the
mercenary and faithless Bengalee informed
Mr. “'atts that unless the English consented
to pay him, as an additional bribe, the enor-
mous sum—especially in those days, and in
the circumstances of the English in Bengal—of
three hundred thousand pounds sterling, he
would disclose the Conspiracy. Clive was
appalled by the villainy of the wretch, for he
had from the first been one of the most zealous
advocates of a revolution, and was the person

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXIII.
through whom the proposals came to the
English to aid in effecting that revolution.
If the English refused, Mr. VYatts, Meer J af-
fier, and all concerned, natives or English, in
the power of Suraj would be seized and
Visited with the extreme of torture. It was
the opinion of Mr. VN‘atts, and of Meer Jaf-
fier, that Omichund would certainly fulfil his
threat, unless the English gave him such
security as satisfied him that he should receive
the vast treasure he demanded, which, with
his previous demands, would probably reach
half a million sterling. Although he had
been already compensated by the soubahdar
for his losses at Calcutta, he contrived to con-
ceal that fact from the English, and had
already obtained a pledge of compensation
from them. The committee at Calcutta were
paralyzed, but the ready courage and resources
of Clive never failed. He undertook the
management of this apparently unconquerablc
danger, and succeeded in satisfying Omichund,
so as to secure his silence, and yet of punish-
ing the traitor, so as to deprive him of all for
which he had dealt so greedy a bargain. All
that Omichund required was accordinglydonc,
without any dissatisfaction with his treachery
having been expressed to him, either through
the resident Mr. “'atts or by direct corre-
spondence. He was treated as if it were
natural and proper that he should make the
most of his secret, and be a chief sharer in the
spoil. This disarmed him of all suspicion that
the English had any plan for outwitting him.
Supposing that they regarded his conduct as
that which any individual among them would
himself pursue, in like circumstances, he had
no doubt that they would, on the score of his
treachery, refuse to pay, or promise to be
paidby the prospective nabob, all his demands.
The security which Omichund sought was an
article in a secret treaty between Meer Jaffier
and the English, eont'erring upon him all he
had required, and he demanded the perusal of
the treaty itself. Clive drew up two treaties,
one on white paper, the other on red. In the
former, which was the real one, no mention
was made of Omichund; in the latter, which
was fictitious, the payment of his demands
was made a stipulation. Lord Macaulay is
very severe upon Clive in this instance, in
which severity he is supported by nearly
every writer of the day who touches this
episode of Anglo-Indian conquest.

It is surprising that the conduct of Clive
should be denounced so sternly, especially by
politicians who uphold deeds far more ques-
tionable when a party object of modern times
is to be served by so doing. Clive had always
intended to act honestly by the pertidious
Hindoo, nor had the council at Calcutta ever

CRAP. LXXIII.]

for a moment contemplated an injustice to
him. He was too useful and powerful to be
the object of any meditated treachery by the
English ; but when they found him false, and
that. he was about to use the snares he had
placed in their hands to catch the nabob for
the purpose of their own destruction, they
might well throw the meshes over himself.
liven, after all, when the English had him at
their mercy, they treated him with indulgence.

Before Clive could accomplish his purpose
by means of the duplicate treaty, a difficulty
arose in consequence of Admiral “'atson’s
refusing to sign the fictitious one. For this
the admiral is praised by most writers to the
disparagcment of Clive, but the admiral had
always a point of conscience or of doubt when-
ever the bold and fertile spirit of Clive pre-
sented to him a grand conception or a manly
enterprise. \Yatson had little responsibility
beyond keeping his ships safe, driving off those
of the enemy, then an easy matter, or hearing
troops from one port to another. Upon the
presidents and commanders on shore the real
responsibility lay, and they often met with
embarrassment from the tardy views and want
of enterprise on the part of the royal naval
commanders. “'atson, although an able naval
officer, showed no competency beyond that;
and was a clog and impediment to the enter-
prise of Clive. Some of the panegyrists of
\Yatson, whose praise was expended in that
direction as indirect censure of Clive, doubt
if he ever concurred in the intrigue for the
deposition of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, but there is
incontestable evidence that he approved of it.
If the admiral felt no qualm of conscience in
carrying on an intrigue with Omichund to
dethrone his sovereign, thus countenancing,
on the part of the wily Hindoo, treachery
which admitted of no apology or palliation, it
is strange that his conscience should become
so tender when an expedient such as Clive
resorted to, as aprolectr’on against treachery,
was presented for his opinion. Probably if
any other member of the council but Clive
had contrived the subtle trick, “vatson might
have admired its ingenuity, and have con-
sidered it an appropriate mode, under the
circumstances, of snatching from the hands of
a double traitor the reward he had so in—
geniously determined to clutch. One may
fairly suppose this of the admiral when perus-
ing his Correspondence with Clive, expressing
his good wishes for the success of a conspiracy
which could only prosper by the English as-
senting to the treachery of Omichund against.
his own master. However influenced, “'atson
refused to sign the red treaty. Macaulay
says that Clive forged his signature. Mill
throws the imputation upon the whole com.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

257

mittee. At all events, the treaty was pre-
sented in such form as to deceive the Hindoo,
with all the sagacity for which Orme gives
him credit. After the battle of Plassey and
the triumphant progress of Clive through
Bengal, Omichund was undeceived, and he
found that his perfidy had overreached itself,
and that in Clive he had encountered an in-
tellect as subtle as his own. As this episode
in British Indian history has given rise to
much controversy, especially since the days of
Mill, it will interest the reader to place before
him the bitter animadversion of that writer,
and the calm and candid reply to it of Pro-
fessor VYilson. All the accusations against
Clive and the council, from the days of Mill
to Macaulay, are presented in brief in the
following note to Mill’s history :*—“ Among
the Hindoo merchants established at Calcutta.
was Omichund, ‘ a man,’ says Mr. Orme, ‘ of"
great sagacity and understanding,’ who had
traded to a vast amount, and acquired an
enormous fortune. ‘The extent of his habi-
tation,’ continues Mr. Orme, ‘ divided into
various departments, the number of his ser-
vants continually employed in various occu-
pations, and a retinue of armed men in con-
stant pay, resembled more the state of a prince
than the condition of a merchant. His com-
merce extended to all parts of Bengal and
Bahar, and by presents and services he had
acquired so much influence with the principal
officers of the Bengal government, that the
presidency, in times of difficulty, used to em-
ploy his mediation with the nabob. This
pre-eminence, however, did not fail to render
him the object of much envy.’1‘ “hen the
alarm, excited by the hostile designs of Su-
raj-ad-Dowlah, threw into consternation the
minds of Mr. Drake and his council, among
other weak ideas which occurred to them, one
was to secure the person of Omichund, lest,
peradventure, he should be in concert with
their enemies. He was seized and thrown
into confinement. His guards, believing that
violence, that is, dishonour, would next fall
upon his house, set fire to it, after the manner
of Hindoos, and slaughtered the inmates of
his harem. Notwithstanding this, when Mr.
Holwell endeavoured to parley with the
nabob, he employed Omichund to write letters
to his friends, importuning them to intercede,
in that extremity, with the prince. At the
capture, though his person was liberated, his
valuable effects and merchandise were plun-
dered. No less than four hundred thousand
rupees in cash were found in his treasury.
When an order was published that such of the
English as had escaped the Black Hole might
* Vol. iii. book iv. chap. iii. p. 135.
“'r Orme, vol. ii. p. 50.

fi~--r»W~.wWWsfi.

_. . ,, . =:=t'f—“”7.'“:'

258

return to their homes, they were supplied
with provisions by Omichund, ‘ whose inter-
cession,’ says Orme, ‘had probably procured
their return.’ Omichuud, upon the ruin of
Calcutta, followed the nabob’s army, and soon
acquired a high degree of confidence both with
the nabob’s favourite, and with himself. After
the recovery of Calcutta, when the nabob,
alarmed at the attack of his camp, entered
into negotiation, and concluded a treaty, Omi-
chund was one of the principal agents em-
ployed. And when Mr. “'atts was sent to
Moorshedabad as agent at the durbar (court)
of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, ‘he was accompanied,’
says Mr. Orme (ii. 137), ‘ by Omichund,
whose conduct in the late negotiation had
effaced the impression of former imputations,
insomuch that Mr. Watts was permitted to
consult and employ him without reserve on
all occasions.’ He was employed as a main
instrument in all the intrigues with Jaffier.
It was never surmised that he did not second,
with all his efforts, the projects of the Bug-
lish; it was never denied that his services
were of the utmost importance. Mr. Orme
says expressly (p. 182), that ‘his tales and
artifices prevented Suraj-ad-Dowlah from be-
lieving the representations of his most trusty
servants, who early suspected, and at length
were convinced, that the English were con-
federated with Jaffier.’ When the terms of
compensation for the losses sustained by the
capture of Calcutta were negotiated between
Mr. VVatts‘and Meer Jaffier, three millions of
rupees were set down to Omichund, which,
considering the extent of his property, and
that ‘ most of the best houses in Calcutta were
his,’*‘ was probably not more than his loss.
Looking forward to the rewards, which he
doubted not that Jaflier, if successful, would
bestow upon those of the English who were
the chief instruments of his exaltation; esti-
mating also the importance of his own ser-
vices, and the risk, both of life and of fortune,
which, in rendering those services, he had in-
curred, Omichund conceived that he too might
put in his claim for reward; and, according
to the example of his countrymen, resolved
not to injure himself by the modesty of his
demand. He asked a commission of five per
cent. on the money which should be received
from the nabob’s treasury, and a fourth part
of the jewels; but agreed, upon hearing the
objections of Mr. “'atts, to refer his claims
to the committee. “hen the aCCounts were
sent to Calcutta, the sum to be given to Omi-
chund, even as compensation for his losses,
seemed a very heavy grievance to men who
panted for more to themselves. To men
whose minds were in such a state, the great
* Orme, vol. ii. p. 128.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CIIA r. LXXIII

demands of Omichund appeared (the reader
will laugh~—but they did literally appear) a
crime. They were voted 0. crime; and so
great a crime, as to deserve to be punished—
to be punished, not only by depriving him of
all reward, but depriving him of his compen-
sation, that compensation which was stipulated
for to everybody : it was voted that Omichund
should have nothing. They were in his
power, however, therefore he was not to bc
irritated. It was necessary he should be de-
ceived. Clive, whom deception, when it suited
his purpose, never cost a pang, proposed that
two treaties with Meer Jaffier should be drawn
up, and signed, one, in which satisfaction to
Omichund should be provided for, which
Omichund should see; another, that which
should really be executed, in which he should
not be named. To his honour be it spoken,
Admiral Watson refused to be a party in this
treachery. He would not sign the false treaty;
and the committee forged his name. When
Omichund, upon the final adjustment, was told
that he was cheated, and found that he was a
ruined man, he fainted away, and lost his
reason. He was from that moment insane.
Not an Englishman, not even Mr. Orme, has
yet expressed a word of sympathy or regret.”

To this, Professor Wilson replies :-—“ In
this statement some very material circum-
stances are omitted, which palliatc, if they do
not justify the deception that was practised.
Before the attack upon Calcutta, Omichund
was in friendly correspondence with the min-
isters and servants of the nawab, and upon its
being taken, was treated with civility by Su-
raj -ad-Dowlah, whom he accompaniedto Moor-
shedabad, and there obtained from him repay-
ment of the money which in the plunder of
Calcutta had been carried off from his house.
Notwithstanding this, he was one of the first,
through his connection, no doubt, with the
Hindoo ministers, and Sets, the banker, to
engage in the plot against Suraj-ad—Dowlah.
The English had, therefore, no great reason
to look upon him as their friend; and as it is
evident that he was a stranger to every prin-
ciple except love of money, there is nothing
in his character to awaken any sympathy for
his fate. Still it is undeniable that thus far
he merited no treachery, and that his services
were entitled to consideration. It was intended
to reimburse his losses and remunerate his
assistance; but his want of principle instigated
him to enrich himself by the secret to which
he had been admitted, and when all was pre—
pared for action, he waited on Mr. “'atts, the
agent at Cossimbazar, and threatened to ac-
quaint the nawab with the conspiracy, unless
a donation was secured to him of thirty lacs
of rupees, about. £350.(>00. The demand was

CHAP. LXXIII.]

exorbitant, and infinitely beyond the amount
of any losses he could have sustained by the
plunder of Calcutta, for which losses also, it
is to be remembered, he had already received
compensation. Mr. Mill thinks it probably
not more than his loss, because the best houses
in Calcutta, according to Orme, were his.
But. admitting that they were of great value,
which is not very likely, they were still his.
Calcutta was not razed to the ground; the
buildings were still there, and on its recapture
had of course reverted to their owners. The
claim was wholly inadmissible, and its un-
rcasonableness was aggravated by the threat
of treachery with which it was enforced.
What was to be done ‘2‘ To have rejected it
at once would have been followed by the cer-
tain murder of the company's servants at
Cossimbazar, and of Meer Jaffier, with all his
family and adherents, and by the probable
defeat of the British projects and their de-
struction. The menaced treason of Omichund,
and its fatal consequences, are scarcely ad-
verted to in the preceding account, although
it was that, and not the mere demand of ex-
travagant compensation, which was naturally
enough denounced by the committee as a
crime, and determined to be worthy of punish-
ment. Clive, who had all along advocated
his cause, and defended his character, ‘ received
with equal surprise and indignation the in-
controvertible proofs offered of his guilt.
Viewing him as a public enemy, he con-
sidered, as he stated at the period, and pub-
licly avowed afterwards, every artifice that
could deceive him to be not only defensible,
but just and proper.’ There may be a differ—
ence of opinion on this subject, and it would
have been more for the credit of the European
character that, however treacherously ex-
torted, the promise should have been per-
formed, the money should have been paid;
but there can be no doubt, that, in order to
appreciate with justice the conduct of Clive
and the committee, the circumstance of Omi-
chund’s menaced treason should not be kept
out of sight. As to the reputed effects of his
disappointment upon his intellects and life,
there is good reason to doubt their occurrence,
for in the month of August following, Clive
recommends him to the secret committee of
the court of directors, as ‘ a person capable of
rendering great services, and, therefore, not
wholly to be discarded.’ ”"5

The opinion of Professor “’ilson is sub-
scribed . by many persons of eminence in
connection
this history has means of knowing. In the
esteem of others equally eminent, the learned

* See Lg'fe of Olive, vol. i. p. 289.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

with India, as the author of

 

259

Professor conceded too much as to the ethical
impropriety of refusing the demand of Omi-
ehund when victory crowned the English
arms. Such men as Elphinstone, Prinsep,
&c., among the most competent of living men
to pronounce an opinion on Indian affairs,
take this View. Upon some of the severer
attacks of Mill, Lord Macaulay himself, suffi-
ciently severe, has made the following stric-
tures 2—“ We can by no means agree with
Sir John Malcolm, who is obstinately resolved
to see nothing but honour and integrity in
the conduct of his hero. But we can as little
agree with Mr. Mill, who has gone so far as
to say that Clive was a man ‘to whom de-
ception, when it suited his purpose, never
cost a pang.’ Clive seems to us to have
been constitutionally the opposite of a knave,
bold even to temerity, sincere even to indis-
cretion, hearty in friendship, open in enmity.
Neither in his private life, nor in those parts
of his public life in which he had to do with
his countrymen, do we find signs of a propen-
sity to cunning. On the contrary, in all the
disputes in which he was engaged as an Eng-
lishman against Englishmen, from his boxing-
matches in school to those stormy altercations
in the India-house, and in parliament, amidst
which his later years were passed, his very faults
were those of a high and magnanimous spirit.
The truth seems to have been, that be con-
sidered oriental politics as a game in which
nothing was unfair. He knew that the
standard of morality among the natives of
India differed widely from that established in
England. He knew that he had to deal with
men destitute of what in Europe is called
honour, with men who would give any pro-
mise without hesitation, and break any pro—
mise without shame, with men who would un-
scrupulously employ corruption, perjury, for-
gery, to compass their ends. His letters Show
that the great difference between oriental and
European morality was constantly in his
thoughts. He seems to have imagined, most
erroneously, in our opinion, that he could
effect nothing against such adversaries, if he
was content to be bound by ties from which
they were free; if he went on telling the
truth, and hearing none; if he fulfilled, to
his own hurt, all his engagements with con—
federates who never kept an engagement
that was not to their advantage. Accord-
ingly, this man, in the other parts of his life
an honourable English gentleman and a
soldier, was no sooner matched against an
Indian intrigucr, than he became himself an
Indian intriguer, and descended, without
scruple, to falsehood, to hypocritical caresses.
to the substitution of documents. and to the
counterfeiting of hands.”

260

Lord Macaulay does justice to Clive in the

above quotation, so far as he complains of

Mill's unqualified denunciation; but, how-
ever plausibly expressed, the remainder of the
passage is a reply to the former portion. The
mode adopted to explain the contradictions in
the separate parts of Clive’s life is, like most
of his lordship’s casuistry, ingenious and im-
posing; but itis not founded upon facts. The
description given of Clive’s ideas of the ne-
cessity of descending into an arena of fraud,
and playing a part there appropriate to the
position, when in competition with native di—
plomatists, was never avowed, and, it may be
fearlessly said, was never entertained by Clive.
Lord Macaulay is indebted to his own dextrous
fancy for this mode of reconciling what be de-
scribes as the discrepant parts of Clive’s life.
There was no such discrepancy of character
in the man. He would outwit a thief, by
setting a trap for him, or pretending to con-
nive at ‘his villainy until the moment of arrest—
ing him arrived. He would countervail the
diabolical treachery of a man like Omichund,
in whose hands the fate of himself and of his
country’s interests were, by appearing to ac-
quiesce in his demands, and turning his own
tricks into pitfalls for himself; but he would
not substitute documents, forge names, or re-
sort to dishonourable averments, in order to
carry a point in diplomacy, deceive a con-
fiding and faithful ally, accomplish a scheme
of personal aggrandizement, or achieve any
object 111 its elf either corrupt or virtuous. He
did not hold the p1inciple of doing evil that
good might come, as applicable to oriental
politics; but he believed all means lawful to
escape the clutches of an assassin and robber.
He regarded Suraj-ad-Dowlah in no better
light, and, therefore, entered into alliance with
a revolutiona1y party in that sovereign’s do-
minions, which had plotted the deposition ot
their tyr rant He regarded Omichund as a
man who played the pa1t of a foul t1aitor, who
would have given up Clive’ s countrymen and
allies to massacre, if demands, which the Eng -
lish could not have complied with 1n justice to
themselves or thei1 allies, were not apparentlv
acquiesced 111. He considered the p1on1ise he

made like that which a man makes when the
knife of a highwayman is at his throat, and
he acted as most men would act when such a
danger must be eluded. IIad the1e been
other passages in Clive s Indian career bring-
ing out such principles and motives as Lord
Macaulay attiibutes to him, there would be
propriety in viewing the transactions with
Omichund as his lordship represents them, in
reference to the motives and p1iuciples by
which they were governed, but there IS no
evidence 1n the facts of Clive’ s Eastern career

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXIII.

to sustain the theory by which Lord Macaulay
accounts for his conduct. His lordship, at the
time he wrote his review of Malcolm’s Life
of Olive, had evidently not made himself
thoroughly acquainted with its contents, nor
had he, from other sources, placed before his
mind the Indian career of Lord Clive as a
whole—military, diplomatic, and administra-
tive. There is sufficient in each department
of Clive’s Indian history to prove that he never
regarded what was false and dishonourable in
Europe as otherwise in Asia. To deceive an
enemy in war or diplomacy, when that enemy
obviously intended treachery, he considered
fair; and the same course has been pursued
in European warfare and diplomacy so often
as to make it absurd to single Clive out for
indignation. He did wrong, as other generals
and statesmen do, from allowing the aims he
had in view—aims in themselves right—to
blind his judgment, and from the errors and
passions incidental to human judgment and
feeling, under circumstances of temptation and
peril; but he did not place himself on a level
with oriental politicians in matters of principle
and honour, and justify himselfin the adoption
of one standard of morality in India and an-
other in England.

Such were the intrigues which preceded
the battle of Plassey, an account of which is
indispensable in a correct narrative of the
conquest of Bengal by the British, for they
influenced all the results of that victory.

These events passed rapidly 011 while Clive
was preparing for his expedition, and after he
set out on his march. Before he reached
Plassey, he sent a message to the soubahdar,
setting forth the treasons in which his high-
ness had been detected, and the. wrongs in-
flicted on the British. Clive offered to refer
these disputes to the arbitration of Meer
Jaffier, and meantime he and his army would
wait upon his highness for an answer. Arrived
at Plassey, Clive took up his position 011 the
skirt of a grove of mango trees about two
miles square"—one of those groves of fruit—
trees so extensively planted by the natives in
India. Near to Plassey there had been an
intrenched camp of the soubahdar, and the
evening previous to the arrival of Clive, Su~
raj-ad-Dowlah himself, with the main body of
his army, arrived. These forces, united to the
troops in camp, constituted a large army. It
is difficult to state the precise number. Orme,
who was there, represents the infantry as
fifty thousand, the cavalry eighteen thousand,
and fifty pieces of cannon. Lord Macaulay
states the infantry to have been forty thousand
in number, the cavalry fifteen thousand, and

* This grove is still in existence, but greatly reduced
in dimensions.

CHAP. LXXIII._]

the artillery the same as in Orme’s computa-
tion, with the addition of a few field-pieces
belonging to the French, and worked by them.
Clive himself, in his letter to the directors,
estimated the forces of the enemy still lower,
representing the infantry as thirty-five thou-
sand, and the cavalry and artillery as of the
same force named by Lord Macaulay. “'ith
these forces were all the chief generals of
Bengal, and among them Meer J afiier, whose
heart failed him when the hour for forming a
junction with Clive arrived. The force which
Clive had to oppose to this huge army was
three thousand men ; of these about one thou-
sand were British, one hundred topasses, and
the rest sepoys. All were commanded by
British officers, some of them, such as Eyre
Cootc, men of distinguished ability; and the
whole of the troops were well disciplined.

Clive passed an anxious night, pacing to
and fro in the mango grove, or pondering in
his tent; for he knew that the morrow must
decide the destinies of Bengal, of its ruler, of
himself and his little army, and of the English
in Eastern India. All night he heard the
din and bustle of an oriental camp, and felt
the influence of the peculiar murmuring sound
which the voices and motions of a host on the
eve of battle were calculated to produce. His
opponent spent also a night of anxiety; he
had cast the issue of dominion upon the tide
of war, and the morning’s light would re-
veal whether his fortune would ebb or flow.
lie was naturally distrustful, and the ap-
prehensions attendant upon such a condition
of mind were heightened by the belief that
treason lurked within his lines. By some
misconduct, guards were not posted at his
tent during a portion of the night, and a
wandering camp follower, not knowing whither
he strayed, found himself in the monarch’s
tent, who, apprehensive of assassination, cried
aloud with fear, spreading alarm among his
chiefs.

The host of the despot was not eager for
battle—no loyalty kindled enthusiasm, and the
troops of Meer Jaffier were alienated, con-
sidering themselves bound only to the chief
whose salt they eat. The name of Clive was
itself a spell, which palsied the heart. of many
of the vaunting braves of the ostentatious
ranks of Suraj. Many of Clive’s ofiicers,
perhaps all, were more confident of success
than Clive himself. They had trust in his
genius and valour. He felt the tremendous
responsibility of his position—a bullet or an
arrow might lay him low, and the mere fact
of his fall would cause despair among his
epoys, and inspire the enemy with confidence.

The sepoys of Clive’s force felt no misgiv-
ings—they invested their leader with super-

vOL. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

. 261
human gifts, and expected to see some new
phase of his power, before which the great
host of the viceroy would disappear, as fallen
branches and foliage swept onward by the in-
undations of the Ganges. The European
soldiers were not confident of victory, but
were resolute to deserve it. They looked
wistfully forth for the eastern dawn to break.
That dawn at last arose upon the unslumber-
ing expectants of the conflict, and the battle
of Plassey began, June 23, 1757.

Few native armies have appeared to the
British so picturesque as that which advanced
against the mango grove and the sheltering
banks by which Clive’s little band stood wait-
ing for the onset. The infantry of Suraj
was variously armed—some in the style of-
ancient India, others carried the weapons of
European warfare. The bowmen formed
their lines, as those of Cressy or Poitiers; but
the turbaned heads and flowing drapery of
these Eastern archers were far more pictur-
esque. The musketeers carried their dusky
weapons withless propriety and graCe, and as
men less skilful with their weapons. Many
a line of swords and shields flashed in the
morning’s ray, and the sheen of lances (lis-
played the pomp and reality of war.

The most singular sight presented to the
British was the artillery. The guns were not
only numerous but of heavy metal; they
were all drawn by beautiful white oxen, whose.
movements were far more rapid than Euro-
pean nations would think likely with such ani-
mals yoked to field artillery. Behind every
gun an elephant, well trained for the purpose,
added to the celerity of the movement, by
pushing with his great strength. These
creatures were gaily caparisoned, and were
magnificent specimens of their kind. The
cavalry were mounted upon fine horses from
upper Hindostan, Affghanistan, and Central
Asia. The men of all the force, especially
of the cavalry, were fine specimens of the
well-formed, tall statured soldiers of Upper
Bengal.

Forth came the brilliant host. Firm and
undaunted the little band of British heroes
awaited their approach. The enemy, instead
of advancing to close combat, halted, and
opened a heavy fire of cannon; but so badly
were the guns worked, that scarcely a shot
told. The light French field-pieces were
skilfully directed, but were not brought into
sufficient play, the native leaders relying upon
the great execution they expected to be made
by their own ponderous ordnance.

The English artillery replied with con-
siderable effect, disabling the enemy's cannon
by killing or alarming the oxen and elephants,
and throwing the native gunners into conse-
M M

262

quent confusion. It was, however, to silence
the efficient French pieces, which were served
as gallantly as skilfully, that the English fire
was chiefly directed.

The army of Suraj wasted time upon a
fruitless cannonade, during which several of
the best officers fell by the well-directed aim
of the English gunners. At last Meer Mcden,
a general upon whom his highness placed the
utmost reliance, and whose fidelity deserved
the esteem in which he was held, received a.
mortal wound from a cannon-ball. He was
borne to the tent of his highness, who avoided
danger, and while the faithful officer explained
the arrangements by which he supposed vic-
tory might be gained, he expired. Suraj,
frantic with despair and grief, called for Meer
J affier, whose troops remained in a species of
armed neutrality on one flank of the soubah-
dar's line. Suraj tool: off his turban, and
placed it at Meer Jaffier’s feet—the most ab-
ject act of humiliation to which a Mussulman
can stoop; he implored him to avenge the
death of the faithful Meer Meden, and to
rescue from the perils that beset him the
grandson of Ali Verdi, by whose favour J af-
fier had grown great.

The conspirator, unmoved by Suraj’s
tears, or humiliation, turned the moment to
account, and advised him to retreat to the in-
trenchmcnts. Another general officer, Mohan
Lall, pointed out the certain destruction which
must ensue if such counsel were followed;
but the helpless Suraj gave the fatal order.
While one portion of the army consequently
made a retrograde movement, that commanded
by Meer Jafficr remained stationary. Clive
perceived the true state of the case, and or-
dered his whole force to advance, the 39th
British regiment of infantry leading, with im-
posing line and dauntless bearing. Suraj,
dull as he was, understood at a glance the in—
action of Meer J affier, and the well-timed ad-
vance of Clive. He fled. Mounting a swift
camel, attended by two thousand of his
choicest cavalry, he forsook the field. Meer
Jaffier drew off his troops from the line of
battle. The rest of the multitude took to
precipitate flight, casting away their arms.
The French, with a gallantry beyond praise,
endeavoured to rally the panic-stricken crowd
in vain, and alone faced the advancing Eng-
lish; but as the alarm, and rout of their allies
increased, the French were sweptfrom the field,
as the mountain rock borne downward by the
avalanche; and these brave men were merged
in the crowd, whose mad flight bore every—
thing before it. The battle was over; the
Bengalees fled without feeling the point of
British steel. The pursuit was short but
(lecisive ; five hundred of the enemy perished,

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXIII.

but they fell chiefly under the good artillery
practice of the English. Of the British, only
seventy-two were put hors dc conduct; and
of these only twenty-two were slain: scarcely
as many were mortally wounded.

The 39th regiment was the most con-
spicuous portion of Clive's troops—it still
bears the name of Plassey on its colours, and
is proud of the motto, “ I’rimus in Indis.”

Lord Macaulay says, “Meer Jaflicr had
given no assistance to the English during the
action, but when he saw the fate of the day was
decided, he drew off his division of the army,
and when the'battle was over sent his con-
gratulations to his ally.” This statement is
astonishingly inaccurate. It is true that
Meer Jaffier did not come over with his
troops, which would have been difficult, but
his treachery mainly conduced to the victory.
There is no knowing how the battle would
have issued, considering the disparity of forces,
and the skill and bravery shown by the
French, even with inactivity on the part
of Jaffier’s troops, if that officer had not given
the fatal advice to the soubahdar to order a
retreat to the trenches. “hen the retreat
commenced, he remained stationary, but in
such manner as betrayed his object so pal-
pably that the prince immediately fled in
despair, taking with him the élitc of his
army. Meer J aftier accomplished all that his
letter to Clive had promised. It was found
after the battle, that while the cannonade
was playing, he sent a letter to Clive advis-
ing the English chief to charge, and pro-
mising at that moment to withdraw his troops,
which was probably all he could entrust his
own soldiers to perform. The perfidy of
Jaflier was the real cause of success; but for
his assistance it is doubtful whether Clive
would have brought away his little force
from the field, far less was there a chance of
victory. No battle fought by Clive gained
him so much glory and emolument, in no
battle in which he ever engaged, did the
issue result less from any performance of
his. t was the only battle in the prelimi-
naries of which he showed hesitation, not
merely hesitation of judgn‘ient, but want of
confidence in his resources and his fortune,
and the only one in which his chief reliance
lay rather in the perfidy of a portion of the
army opposed to him than in his own genius
and the heroism of his troops. He doubtless
did all that man could do in his circumstances,
and everything he accomplished was per-
formed well. The explanations between the
two chiefs were mutually satisfactory. Clive
urged Jafiier to hasten to Moorshedabad
(then the capital of Bengal), and prevent the
possibility of Suraj rallying his forces, or

GnAP. LXXIII.]

raising fresh levies. The revolutionary nabob
followed this counsel and hastened forward.
Meanwhile, the fugitive prince continued his
flight to his capital. There, in a paroxysm of
fear, he consulted all his,courtiers, and fol-
lowed the advice of none. Some urged him
to surrender to the English, and throw him-
self on their mercy, as they were generous
and relenting, as well as daring in war.
Others appealed to his manhood and kingly
pride, advising that he should assemble all
that were faithful to him, place himself at.
their head, and fall upon the enemy, dying
sword in hand or reconquering dominion and
retrieving honour. His poltroon spirit shrunk
from the manly counsel. A few advised him
to place himself in the hands of the French
in the Deccan, and to await the return of
the tide of fortune to that nation, which they
perceived would soon flow again, when he
would be restored by their power, as they
would always be the foes of a nabob friendly
to the English. This counsel pleased him
most, but was least popular among his friends.
His indecision could resolve upon none of
these schemes, until no course remained for
his coward heart to choose, but ignominious
flight once more. Meer Jaflier followed fast
upon the fugitive, and when the besieging
nabob entered Moorshedabad, Suraj was let
down from a window of his palace. Ac-
companied, according to Orme, by one of his
favourite concubines, and two attendants, with
a casket of jewels in his hand, he entered a
boat and rowed for Patna. Native writers
describe his retreat as more leisurely, and
having a train of elephants to hear his family
and treasures. Clive arrived in a few days
afterwards with a large escort, leaving his
little army behind. He was received with
great deference by Heer Jafi‘ier and his con-
federates. A palace was assigned to the
English captain, surrounded by beautiful
grounds, and where there was camping ac-
commodation for five hundred men, the
number of his soldiers which accompanied
him. The installation of Meer Jafi‘ier as
nabob of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa was his
first care. He led the new ruler to the
throne or chair of state, made the customary
offerings, congratulated him on his exalta-
tion, and then, through his interpreter, ad-
dressed the people, calling upon them to
rejoice over the downfall of a tyrant, and the
accession to power of a virtuous ruler.

The next care of the British chief was to
demand from the regnant nabob the fulfil-
ment of the treaty made during the period
that the conspiracy was in progress. Up to this
period, Omichund was ignorant of the artifice
of the double treaty, and he presented himself

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

263

in high spirits, to obtain the sum, promise of
which he had exacted under the threat of
betraying the English to the Viceroy. Mr.
Scrafton was ordered by Clive to undeceive
him; the result has been related on a former
page.

Meer Jaffier did his best to carry out the
terms of the treaty, and disburse the sums
which he had contracted to pay; but the
treasury of Moorshedabad was far from full.
The desolating wars carried on with the Mah-
rattas by the predecessors of Suraj, the
military expenditure of that prince against
the English, and his profligate waste in the
excesses and extravagance to which he was
addicted, had, rich as Bengal was, reduced
the treasury to a low degree. By various ex-
pedients, such as the disposal of jewels and
making part payment in jewels, Meer J affier
made up a portion of the money, and engaged,
at certain intervals, to pay further instalments
until the debt was liquidated. More than
three quarters of a million sterling in coined
silver was sent down the river from Moor-shed-
abad to Calcutta. One hundred of the river
boats were employed to convey the precious
freight. The flotilla was conducted with
much display—flags flying, drums beating,
fireworks, brilliant as those of Bengal usually
are, testified the satisfaction of the English,
and the dissimulation of the courtiers of the
new nabob, who regarded with horror and
alarm the removal of so much treasure. It
was remarkable that much of the coinage was
European of an old date—such as the Vene-
tians used when that people conducted the
trade between Europe and India.

Clive was the object ofadulation and homage
such as can be rendered only by orientals.
Presents of the most costly nature were la-
vished upon him. His temptations were
great, and, although his share of the dis-
bursements connected with the treaty was
very large, his moderation was conspicuous :
he literally walked between heaps of gold and
silver, and piles of precious stones, in the
treasury of Moorshedabad. He might have
appropriated what he pleased: he was in-
vited—even urged, to do so, probably with
no sincerity, but it was the interest of the
party of the revolution to gratify him, for he
had been the only Englishman in Bengal
capable of bringing it to pass. Calcutta
witnessed a great accession of wealth: the
company profited by the political and terri-
torial advantages won by Clive’s genius; the
company’s officers were enriched by the gifts.
The craven creatures of the council of Cal-
cutta, who had fled before the name of Suraj
Dowlah, in the transactions which issued in
such stupendous results, were as grasping as

264 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. [CHAR LXXIV.
they were cowardly. They ruined English ' tragedy should incense his masters, which the
interests in Bengal; they impeded Olive in l English virtually were, and his protestations
his gigantic efforts to retrieve them; they and apologies were profuse. Clive was in-
envied, hated, and feared him, and, while jea- i dignant at this brutality ; but the council at
lous of his renown, and indifferent to the glory : Calcutta, while expressing their horror of the
of their country’s arms, they were ready to deed, had no pity for its victim, and would
take to themselves the credit of wisdom and , not trouble themselves to demand any inves-
statesmanship for what was effected, and con- i tigation into the matter. Thus perished Su-
sidered no amount of money which they could ; raj-ad-Dowlah,under circumstances ofstriking
appropriate sufficient for their services. f retribution. He had, by his oppressious and
. While the revolution bore Meer Jaffier to ' Wrongs, driven his chief general into rebellion,
a throne, sent the treasures of Moorshedabad . and suffered in turn the most cruel indignities

to Fort William, and spread terror of the name !
of Olive and of the English all over India, it
brought new and fatal calamities upon him
whose shameless cupidity and iron oppression
provoked it. The fugitive Suraj was be-
trayed by a Hindoo, whose family he had op-
pressed, and brought back to Moorshedabad
a few days after his flight, while yet his trea-
sures loaded the galleys on the river, and the
English were celebrating their success with fes-
tivity, music, and Bengal lights. The English
drums beat merrily, and the corruscations of
the fireworks rendered the shy lurid, as the
captive prince, shorn of his glory, no man so
mean as to do him homage, was borne to the
footstool of him who had once feared his
frown. Meer Jaffier resolved, or pretended
to resolve, upon consigning the unfortunate
prince to a humane and even luxurious cap-
tivity. But the new nabob had a son, a youth
of seventeen, as ferocious as Suraj himself,
and as despicable a coward. This aspirant
for the honours of an Indian Mohammedan
throne murdered the captive while under the
guardianship of his father’s honour. Such
were the Mohammedan princes and rulers of
India—semper eadem—changeless in their
sanguinary treachery and despotism to the
last. Meer Jaftier became uneasy lest this

and punishment from him. He had caused,
I; or at least occasioned, the murder of English-
} men, under circumstances the most inhuman
i and revolting, in a room at Calcutta; through
i himself a captive, and suffered a fate similar
to that he had permitted to go unpunished, if
he did not directly inflict.

The new nabob lived and moved under the
control of the English: the council at Cal—
cutta reigned—he administered. The vast
and rich regions of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa
lay at the feet of the company. Regions
more extensive, and aboundng in more na-
tural wealth than all western Europe, were
expanded before the power and enterprise of
the adventurous strangers. They began their
‘career of arms in a naval battle at Surat, in
which, against odds the most deterring, they
bore away victory, astonishing and filling the
native mind with admiration: they had now,
at Plassey, achieved a victory on land as sig-
nally, closing that portion of their career

 

the largest and richest provinces of India to
their dictation. Yet they were destined to
enter upon new phases in their Indian poli-
tical existence, and to tread new paths of
greatness and of glory.

 

.........

CHAPTER LXXIV.
OPPOSITION TO THE SOUBAIIDARSHIP OF MEER JAlt‘FIER—IN'I‘RIGCES OF THE NABOB 0F

OUDE, AND OTHER NATIVE PRINCES,

INSTIGATED BY THE FRENCH—INVASION 0F

BENGAL BY THE DUTCH, AND THEIR DEFEAT AND DESTRUCTION BY COLONEL FORD
-—INVASION OF BENGAL BY SHAH-ZADA—HIS REPULSE AND FLIGHT—DEFEAT OF THE
NAIB OF POORANIA BY CAPTAIN KNOX—DEATH OF THE HEIR 01“ THE SOUBAHDAR
BY LIGHTNING, AND CONSEQUENT TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

THE glorious issue of Clive’s short campaign,
and the rejoicings at Moorshedabad and Cal-
cutta, were the immediate preludes of further
troubles. M. Law had hastened to the suc-

cour of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, when that prince"
requested his presence for the defence of

Bengal. Having, however, received infor-

, mation of the battle of Plassey, he halted until
- further intelligence should reach him from
\ Sung." He soon learned from other sources

_ * “' Had he immediately proceeded twenty miles further ,
5 he would, the next day, have met and saved Snraj Dowlah,
‘ and an order of events very different from those which we
‘ have to relate would have ensued.”—-0rme, vol. ii. p. 185.

1- the instrumentality of the English, he became ‘

which they had fulfilled, in the subjugation of

Cuar. LXXIVJ

that all was lost, and that assistance from
him was impossible. A part of Clive's army,
under the gallant and skilful Coote, hung upon
the rear of the enemy, compelling them to
retire from Bengal. The French abandoned
all thought of directly interfering with Eng-
lish policy in that province, but still hoped
to thwart it through the government of Oude
and the court of the Mogul.

“"hile various intrigues were conducted
in that quarter, Meer J affier found his newly-
attained pmver rest heavily upon him. Ac-
cording to some writers he was unwilling,
when the moment for assuming regal state
arrived, to take upon him the dignity, and
Clive was obliged to use gentle force, and
something more, to cause his protégé to go
through the ceremony of installation. Other
writers aver that this was only a well-acted
scene between the two principal performers,
to which the other actors were accessories with-
out penetrating the motives of the chiefs.

Meer J affier was scarcely left to himself a
week after the withdrawal of Clive from
)[oorshedabad, before he discovered that
many of the zemindars were unwilling to re-
cognise his title, that portions of his army
were mutinous, that his chief civil function-
aries were disgusted by the large sums with-
drawn from the treasury by the English, and
that most of the chief persons in his province
were reluctant to acknowledge a soubahdar
who derived his appointment, not from the
grand Mogul, but a foreign conqueror.

Meer Jaffier made the exhaustion of his
treasury by the English a ground for levying
further taxes, and at the same time. for neither
paying his troops nor civil functionaries.
Most English writers maintain that his trea-
sury was really exhausted, and that those
who placed him on the “musnid” deprived
him of the means of government. Continental
writers, especially French, persist in alleging
that he outwitted the British, the latter never
suspecting there was an inner treasury within
the zenana, where eight crores of rupees,
equivalent to eight millions sterling, were
stowed away. They bring plausible proofs
for this assertion from documents possessed
by M. Law, the statements of natives of in-
fluence at the court of )Ioorshedabad, and the
fact that the widow of Meer Jaffier was ulti-
mately possessed of enormous wealth, to be
accounted for on no other supposition than
that of a reserved treasury, of which the
English had neither knowledge nor suspicion.
Clive knew so little of the habits of oriental
courts, that, notwithstanding his strong sense,
he might in such a matter be deceived.

The disaffection of Meer Jaflier’s army
rapidly increased ; the atrocities and tyranny

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

265

of Suraj-ad-Dowlah appeared to be forgotten
in the universal pity excited by his assas-
sination, and abhorrence of the perpetrator.
Besides, Surajah, in his better moments, was
capable of kindness, and he made politic
use of that parade and pomp so necessary in
an Eastern prince. His person was regal
and imposing, although his intellect was
weak. He was but twenty-five years of age
when assassinated, and, according to native
historians, his features were regular, and his
countenance expressed much sweetness. If
this last assertion be a fact, it controverts the
theories of physiognomists, who describe the
countenances of men as expressing the habi-
tual passions and emotions : there is evidence
enough to prove, that those of Suraj were
cruelty, avarice, and sensuality. The soldiery
and people of Moorshedabad, however, made
comparisons between the deposed prince and
the deposer, to the disadvantage of the latter
in many, if not in all respects; and the in-
crease of insubordination and disaffection soon
awakened Meer Jaflier to a sense of the inse-
curity of his newly acquired throne. Hence
arose a new source of uneasiness to the go-
vernor of Calcutta.

No plots of the French, of the Nabob of
Oude, of the Mogul emperor, or of any other
aspirant to power, did so much to weaken the
government of Meer Jaflier as the conduct
of himself and his son, Meeran. The former
sunk into contemptible sloth, disgracing the
“musnid” by incessant intoxication. His
son, Meeran, was full of youth and energy,
and his vigour was employed in every descrip-
tion of wickedness, which his father, and the
Begum (his mother), who were devotedly
attached to him, not only tolerated but en-
couraged. Assassinations as ruthless as that
of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, were frequently perpe-
trated by him. His father had been indebted
for everything to Ali Verdi Khan, yet the
princesses, the granddaughters of that monarch,
were murdered by him, on the pretence that
it was necessary to get rid of the disloyal, if
he would enjoy repose. The infant brother
and infant nephew of Suraj-ad-Dowlah were
also murdered by him in a manner as coarse
as it was cruel. The Mohammedan people
were not averse to the bloody deeds of Meeran,
so long as they were directed to supposed or
ostensible enemies. Sympathising in their
own minds with bloodshed, they were gratified
by the execution of rich Hindoos, especially
such as held any confidential communication
with the English, and many such suffered in
their persons or properties, and not a few
were slain. Meeran was the chief support
of Meer Jaffier. The whole family of Suraj
Dowlah was seized. His widow, mother,

266 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

daughter, aunt, and an adopted boy, were
seized at midnight, with seventy persons of

inferior note: all of the latter were drowned,

and some of the former; but it has never
been clearly ascertained which were destroyed
and which sent back to pi 1son.

The feeling between Meer Jaflie1’ and the
British was very bad, and that between his
son and them much more hostile. The Bri-
tish soon rega1ded the successor of Suraj- ad-
Dowlah as no better than that unto1tunate
p1i11ce. He governed his people badly
showed that he regarded the English alliance
as melely a convenience, and that as soon as
he could th1ow it off he would. Meelan
openly declared his hatred of it, and was in
constant fear of being seized by Clive as an
Open enemy. The young prince was ready
to join any enterprise, however hazardous,
not involving the exposure of his own person
to danger, that afforded the slightest hope of
driving the English out of Bengal. Of these
things the English were early apprised, and
directed their measures accordingly. Clive
soon regarded his protégé with distrust and
dislike, and young Meeran with aversion.
He began to vindicate the final assumption,
011 the part of the company, of the soubahdar-
ship of Bengal. Other enterprising English
officials entertained similar vie1 rs. Clive de-
clared that the Prince Meeran could not be
allowed to ascend the throne of the nabob, as
was 01iginallv stipulated with Meer Jatiier,
because of his hatred to the English. Bv
degrees Olive and all the British came to the
conclusion that the sooner the nabob himself
ceased to reign, the better for English secu-
rity and the good government of Bengal.

The relations of the English and the nabob
were complicated by the general supervision
which the former exercised in government
affairs. They considered themselves the real
masters of Bengal, and Meer Jaffier as vir-
tually a minister to carry out their wishes.
The nabob could with less difficulty be
brought to regard his position in that light,
thano his turbulent and ty1annical son Chis
soldiery, or his people. “ hen the British
remonstrated with Meeian for the murder of
the mother of Surai- ad- Dowlah, \1l1on1 many
writers believe to have been at the time alive,
the p1i11ce did not deny the deed, as these
writers allege he might have done, but in-
quired with astonishment, rage, and grief,
“What! can I not kill an old woman that
goes about in her dooly to excite the zemindars
against my father ?” He was indignant that
the English should assume the right to inter-
fere in such cases. They were without the
power to interfere efficiently. They might
denounce the atrocities and robberies perpe-

 

[Cl-HAP. LXXIV.

trated by the reigning nabob and his son, but
could not prevent them. The remonstrances
and even threats of the English only caused
them to be more hated without being obeyed.
The people and troops of the nabob, not con-
scious of the sources of British power, con-
sidered the perpetual interference of the
English agents as the result of the nabob's
weakness, whom they hated for allowing the
infidels to dictate to the followers of the true
faith. Such was the general state of the re-
lations of the parties whose alliance promised
so much and effected so little for the welfare
of Eastern India, the quietness of the English
settlements, and the prosperity of the English
trade. Individual Englishmen of influence
and authority realized vast riches, but the
company found that the increase of its wealth
by the alliance with Meer Jaffior, in one way
or another, increased its expenses. In con-
sequence of Clive’s representations of the
brilliant success achieved, and the vast ad-
vantages realized by the events of 1757, the
company resolved to send out no more money
for two years; but, in their correspondence,
stated that the treasures deposited at Calcutta.
should provide for the entire expenses of the
three presidencies, and also furnish the invest-
ments for the Chinese trade. The opinion of
the company that the results of the Bengal
conquest. should be sufficient for such purposes
was reasonable, although the mode in which
they attempted to carry out such a decision,
in the face of the state of things existing in
the Carnatic, the rapid revolutions and san-
guinary wars which prevailed at this time in
India among princes and Europeans, was
absurd.

I11 this condition of affaiis, Clive was the
overruling genius by which oruder was pre-
ser1 ed, while all aionnd was sinking into
chaos. He was considered by the English as
the only oflicer who could keep Meer Jaffier
to his engagements, and awe his son )[eeram
Meer Jafiier regarded him as his only reliance
amidst a mutinous army, seditious people, and
intriguing neighbours in Oude, Agra, and
Delhi; with any 01‘ all of whom the French
were ever ready to form an alliance. Meeran
considered him as the tyrant of himself and
his father, and the only man who stood be-
tween the family of the nabob and the exercise
of unlimited power to rob and kill all who
withheld what they demanded, or resisted
their tyranny and caprice. Lord Macaulay
describes Clive’s relations to all parties
thus 2—“ Mecr Jaffier could be upheld on the
throne only by the hand which placed him
011 it. . . . . The recent revolutions had un-
settled the minds of men. Many chiefs were
in open insurrection against the new nabob.

CHAP. LXXIV.]

The Viceroy of the rich and powerful province
of Oude, who, like the other viceroys of the
Mogul, was now in truth an independent

sovereign, menaced Bengal with invasion.‘

Nothing but the talents and authority of
Clive could support the tottering government.
While this state of things existed, a ship
arrived with despatches which had been
written at the India-house, before the news
of the battle of Plassey had reached London.
The directors had determined to place the
English settlements in Bengal under a go-
vernment constituted in the most cumbrous
and absurd manner; and, to make the matter
worse, no place in the arrangement was as-
signed to Clive. The persons who were
selected to form this new government, greatly
to their honour, took on themselves the autho-
rity of disobeying these preposterous orders,
and invited Clive to exercise the supreme
authority. He consented, and it soon ap-
peared that the servants of the company only
anticipated the wishes of their employers.
The directors, on receiving news of Clive’s
brilliant success, instantly appointed him go-
vernor of their settlements in Bengal, with
the highest marks of gratitude and esteem.
His power was now boundless, and far sur-
passed even that which Dupleix had attained
in the south of India. Meer J affier regarded
him with slavish awe ..... It is but justice
to say, that Clive used his power ably and
vigorously for the advantage of his country.
He sent forth an expedition to the track lying
to the north of the Carnatic. In this track
the French still had the ascendancy; and it.
was important to dislodge them. The con-
duct of the enterprise was entrusted to an
officer of the name of F orde, who was then
little known, but in whom the keen eye of the
governor had detected military talents of a
high order. The success of the expedition
was rapid and splendid.”"‘

Meer Jafi’ier’s dubious relation to the Eng-
lish, and the still more doubtful position of his
idolized son, were not his only, and scarcely
even his chief difficulties. He had scarcely
mounted the throne, and felt himself at once
in possession of the treasures, and surrounded
by the intrigues of French, ()udean, and Ben-
galee zeniiudars, as stated in the first pages of
this chapter, than he was obliged to prepare
against the invasion of his dominions by a
competitor for his throne. The shah-zada,
heir-apparent of the throne of Delhi, had ob-
tained from his father the appointment- of
Soubahdar of Bengal, a richer prize than even
the appointment of the Sonbahdar of the
Deccan. He immediately put forth a procla-

* (lilies! and Historiml Essays. By Thomas Babing‘
ton Macaulay, vol. ii. p. 108-9.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

2G7

mation, announcing himself as Viceroy of
Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and collected an
army to assert claims in a more substantial
manner.

The nabobs of Oude and Allahabad at once
tendered their support as an act of loyalty to
the Mogul, and Meer J affier utterly despaired
of encountering these nabobs, and the irre-
gular army collected from every quarter by
his competitor. His resource was Clive. He
could trust no one else. He was profuse in
his promise of future good behaviour and
large grants of money, although at the time
his own troops were defrauded of their pay,
while he and his dissipated son lived in
scandalous and foolish luxury and excesses.
While claiming the protection of the English,
and promising everything to them, he was,
after the fashion of Indian princes, opening
negotiations with his enemies unknown to
his allies, and resorting to the desperate, and
in his case foolish expedient, of bribing them
off. Clive soon discovered this, and remon-
strated; but the cowardly Jaffier could not
see the force of these protests. All his pre-
decessors had purchased immunity from in-
vasion in a similar manner. Clive became
more energetic in his tone, and wrote :-——-“ If-
you do this, you will have the Nabob of
Oude, the Mahrattas, and many more, come
from all parts of the confines of your country,
who will bully you out of money until you
have none left in your treasury. I beg
your excellency to rely on the fidelity of the
English and of the troops that are attached
to you.” Clive, concluding that his advice
would not be. followed by his protégé, unless
the chief officers of the latter showed some
determination, wrote to the governor of
Patna in a still more energetic tone :—
“ Come to no terms; defend your city to the
last. Rest assured that the English are
staunch and firm friends, and that is they
never desert a cause in which they have once
taken a part.”

The enemy advanced by forced marches to
the investiture of Patna, in order to anticipate
Clive, who, he had heard, was also advancing
with the utmost rapidity, to save that im-
portant city. Clive’s little army consisted of
less than three thousand fighting men, of
which less than five hundred were Europeans.
The enemy numbered forty thousand men,
besides large forces in support from Oude
and Allahabad. There was also a consider-
able number of French officers among them,
who were eager for battle with the English.
These assured the native prince that, if the
vast army would press the siege of Patna,
and attack the force of Clive, under their di-
rections, the British and their allies should be

268

scattered as the dust by the storm, and the
city, with its riches, fall into the hands of the
besiegers. In vain the gallant Frenchmen
urged battle upon the prince and his generals;
they fled before Cliv'e’s force came in sight.
Probably no Indian army ever so much dis-
graced itself. The flight of the army was
not, hovvever, as Lord Macaulay represents,
wholly caused by terror ofClive and his British.
The Nabob of Oude had proved treacherous:
he had seized the capital of his ally, the Nabob
of Allahabad, who withdrew his forces from
before Patna, to save his own territories.
M. Law and a detachment of French met
this nabob with his troops, and urged his
, return to the siege, offering his aid, and after-
wards effecting the restoration of the territory
seized by the nabob ofOude. The Allahabad
nabob was too much in earnest to save his
treasures and territory to think any more of
Patna and the alliance. M. Law, instead
of advancing and rallying the army of the
invader, as Clive would have done in like
circumstances, retired in despair, and the
heterogeneous masses of the shah-zada dis-
solved as snow flakes in the river. The vici-
nity of Patna was cleared of intruders, and
Clive returned to Moorshedabad in triumph
as complete as when he entered it after the
battle of Plassey. The Mogul, or, at all
events, the pretender to the soubahdarship of
Bengal acting in his name, negotiated for the
cession of his claims. A small grant of money
was given to him, on condition that he signed
a treaty conferring the nominal rank. of son-
bahdar of Bengal upon another son, and, by
patent, confirming Meer J aflier in the actual
vieeroyalty.

The Viceroy seemed now secure against all
enemies, having the sanction of the Mogul
himself for his government, and so great was
his gratitude that he conferred the jaghire of
Calcutta and the surrounding territory upon
Clive. Thus the East India Company be-
came his tenants, and the rent they paid to
the soubahdar was in future to be paid to him.
This amounted to £30,000 a year. He was
at the same time made “a lord” of the Mogul
empire, by the Mogul. The East India Com-
pany recognised the privileges conferred upon
Clive, and paid their rents to him. From
their subsequent conduct, it was evident they
were influenced in this by a View of their
own interests. This princely fortune ren-
dered it unnecessary that they should confer
upon him large pecuniary rewards fer the
great services he had rendered, and if at any
time they thought it expedient to become
rent free, it would be probably easier to make
themselves so if Clive or his successor was
landlord, than if the Mogul or his Viceroy

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXIV.

held the jaghireship. There was nothing in
the conduct of the company at the time that
was unfair to Clive, but afterwards efforts were
made to deprive him of his rights by some of
the very men who were forward in recognising
them when they were acquired. Lord Ma-
caulay, who questioned the propriety politi-
cally and ethically of Clive's reception of the
previous donations of Meer Jaffler, considered
his acceptance of this gift proper. His lord-
ship assigns no reason for this discrepancy of
opinion, except that this donation, from its
nature, could not be secret; yet he admits
that Clive made no secret, and never intended
to make any, of the previous acquisitions from
Meer Jaflier. If the reception of money in
the one case were right, it requires a casuistry
more subtle, and a logic more profound than
even his lordship’s, to make it appear wrong
in the other. The East India Company’s
recognition was equally extended to both.
Clive did not represent the British govern-
ment, but a trading company which favoured
any acquisitions made by its servants which
did not infringe its rights or emoluments.
This must be kept in view in all arguments
that are maintained upon the subject.

Scarcely had Meer Jaftier conferred ho-
nours and endowments upon Clive, than he
began a series of intrigues, of a daring nature,
against the English themselves. He knew
that he could obtain no absolute power in
Bengal while the English were there, and he
formed the design of allying himself to the
Dutch for the purpose of driving them out.
There was no other European state to which
he could apply. The Dutch were supreme
in the Archipelago, and their fame was still
great in India. The Viceroy did not know
that the power of Holland had much decayed
in Europe, the wars with the English having
issued in reducing the United Provinces from
the position of first naval power. By the
instrumentality of the Dutch, Meer Jaffier
determined to play this new game, and incur
the peril of losing all or driving the English
away. It does not seem to have occurred to
him that the Dutch would in turn have be-
come his masters, and that the only true
reliance for a prince or a people, where in-~
dependence is to be sought and won, should
be on

“ Native swords and native ranks.”

It is probable that this treacherous and
feeble prince would not have ventured upon
so during a scheme, had he not believed that
the recognition of his actual viceroyalty by
the Mogul, secured him against all danger of
insurrection in his own territories, or invasion
by his Mohammedan neighbours. Clive soon
discovered that some intrigue was proceeding,

Cnar. LXXIV.]

but does not appear to have had the least
suspicion that a European power was con-
cerned, or even contemplated by Meer J afiier.
He lost all confidence in his protégé, and
began to regard it as politic to prepare for
the assumption of English power in Bengal,
without the intervention of a nabob. In
January, 1759, he addressed a letter to Mr.
Pitt, requesting him to send a sufficient force
“to open a way for securing the soubahdarship
to ourselves.” His plan was to enter into a
treaty with the Mogul, and receive from him
the supreme authority in Bengal, subject to the
payment of fifty lacs of rupees yearly, which
could easily be spared out of the Bengal reve-
nues. Clive, who hated Mohammedanism, and
distrusted all Mohammedans of whatever rank,
assured Mr. Pitt that Meer J affier would break
with the English as soon as he found it his in-
terest, no matter under what obligations they
laid him; and as to his son and probable
successor Meeran, he represented him as “so
apparently the enemy of the English, that it
will be almost unsafe trusting him with the
succession.”

The intrigues of Meer Jafiier and his infa-
mous son were successful in gaining over the
Dutch. They determined on an expedition
to Bengal; a large fleet was fitted out at
Datavia, and a considerable body of troops
put on board. Their destination was Chin-
surah, where the Dutch had a factory, with
the chiefs of which Meer Jaffier had con-
ducted his intrigues. Suddenly the presidency
at Calcutta was alarmed by the arrival of seven
ofthe largest Dutch shipsin the Hoogly, having
on board fifteen hundred men,- seven hundred
of whom were Europeans, and the rest Malays.
Holland and England were at peace, and Clive
knew that no danger menaced the Dutch set-
tlements, requiring such military reinforce-
ments, and the presence of so powerful a fleet.
He therefore determined on intercepting them,
so as to prevent the arrival of the troops at
Chinsurah. He perhaps never found himself
in a more anxious situation. At that time,
it would have been a serious matter to
the English government to be at war with
Holland, added to its other European difli-
cultics; the ministry might disavow his acts,
notwithstamling the obvious justice and ne-
cessity of the course taken by him in such an
emergency. Should the English ministry
disavow him, and offer compensation to Hol-
land for any injury sustained by the Dutch
armament or settlement, it was probable that
Cli\'e’s great wealth would be seized to make
good the amount. The English government
had always been rapacious and unjust in its
conduct to the company, and seldom allowed
justice in the righteous claims of an individual

VOL. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

289

to stand in the way of its policy. Probably
no government in Europe had proved itself
so indifferent to individual losses and suffer-
ing as the English, when a political purpose
was to be served or the exchequer spared,
unless indeed the claimant had aristocratic
pretensions or influence. Clive doubted much
whether his influence or that of the company,
or his past services, or his popularity in
England, or all these sources of power to-
gether, would prove sufficient to deter the
English ministry from sacrificing him, if to
do so answered a party end, or relieved the
court from any embarrassment. A large
portion of his money having been sent to
EurOpe through the Dutch East India Com-
pany, that company would, in all proba-
bility confiscate his deposits, and thus an-
other consideration was added to those of a
political as well as personal nature to prevent
him from beginning the war, by intercepting
the Dutch armaments. On the other hand,
so large was the force, so faithless the son—
bahdar, and so few the English troops then
disposable for service in Bengal, that if the
Dutch once gained a footing, they could hold
their position until new and powerful rein-
forcements to their navy and army should
arrive from Batavia, and these, acting with
the native army of the soubahdar, might effect
the expulsion of the English from Bengal.
The soubahdar declared that he knew nothing
of the schemes of the Dutch, of which he had
received timely and accurate information,
and whose agents were actually recruiting in
Bahar, Patna, and even Moorshedabad. The
Dutch Company had always acted with an
ostensible independence ofits government, but
as constantly with its connivance, and Dutch
policy in India and the Eastern seas was
piratical. To force a commerce by destroy-
ing the ships and settlements of all compe-
titors was the simple policy of the Batavians.
It would have been impolitic in the extreme
to allow this great force to menace the inte-
rests of the English in Bengal. Clive ordered
as stronga detachment as he could spare,
under Colonel Forde, an officer in whom he
placed implicit confidence, to act as an army
of observation. Forde endeavoured to prevent
the advance of the Dutch troops by remon-
strance and expostulation, which were of no
avail. Hesitating to proceed to extremities,
he sent to Calcutta for positive orders, repre-
senting the persistence of the Dutch as only
to be overcome by force. Clive was playing
cards when the message arrived. He tore
off a piece of Forde’s letter, and wrote upon
it in pencil—“ Dear Forde,—Fight ’em im-
mediately, and I will send an order of council
to-morrow.” Forde did “fight ’em imme-
N N

270 HISTORY OF THE

diately,” although with forces much inferior
as to number, and so justified Clive’s confi-
dence that the Dutch were completely de-
feated, of the seven hundred Europeans, not
more than fourteen reached Chinsurah. An
attack upon the fleet was also successful, the
ships were all made prizes.

The results of these signal defeats were
satisfactory, the Dutch at Chinsurah submitted
to such terms as Clive thought proper to
impose, which were that no fortifications
should be erected, and no armed persons to
be retained in eonneetiOn with their factory,
except for police purposes; and, upon viola-
tion of either of these terms, expulsion from
Bengal was mutually recognised as a just
penalty. Clive restored the ships at the end
of December, 1759.

The fate of Meer Jafficr would have been
sealed by these events had policy allowed.
He made vehement protestations of fidelity,
and declared his entire ignorance of the pro-
ceedings of the Dutch; but while the English
did not deem it then discreet to act against
the soubahdar for what he said or did, they
had already resolved in their own minds to
allow matters to take their course as regarded
him, and await patiently the moment most
opportune for setting aside his authority.
It is probable from the subsequent conduct
of Meer Jaffier, that he penetrated the pur-
poses of' the English, and like a true Mussul-
man, resigned himself to the fate the future
might reveal, continued to enjoy his debauches,
and to accumulate precious stones, rich apparel
and coin, against the probable crisis which
awaited him.

Upon the fortunes of Clive these events
produced such effects as might be expected.
His name and presence awed his own coun-
trymen, and were a terror to every native
prince in India. The sepoys idolized him,
the native populations of India listened with
eagerness to the wandering story-tellers who
recounted his feats of arms, embellished by
additions of deeds more or less than human,
as suited the oriental fancy. The belief was
concurrent among the native populations, that
the devil‘s inspiration had much to do with
the military genius of the great commander.
In England his glory was the common sub-
ject of conversation, and the universal boast
of his countrymen, amongst whom, for so long
a time, so few eminent generals had been
raised up. Before the Dutch were humbled,
Pitt in one ofhis thrilling orations had passed
upon him the highesteulogies, calling him “the
heaven-born general, a man, who, bred to the
desk, had displayed a military genius which
might excite the admiration of the King of

 

Prussia.” Upon this Lord Macaulay remarks :—

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXIV.
“There were then no reporters in the gallery;
but these words, emphatically spoken by the
first statesman of the age, had passed from
mouth to mouth, had been transmitted to
Clive in Bengal, and had greatly delighted
and flattered him. Indeed, since the death
of VN'olfe, Clive was the only general of whom
his countrymen had much reason to be proud.”
The minds of the people of England were
thus prepared to hear of great exploits from
Clive, and to appreciate them, and as the
Dutch were unpopular, the humiliation which
he inflicted upon them filled his countrymen
with wild delight. It was Forde who really
accomplished the feats of battle, but he acted
under the inspiration of Clive, who carried
away the palm. Clive, however, did justice
to the gallant Forde; he was always liberal
in praise to the brave, although strict even to
tyranny upon all under his command who
dared to dispute his will. Forde’s previous
service in command of a detachment sent to
the Northern Circars by Clive, at the instiga-
tion of one of the leading polygars in that
district, and in Opposition to his own council,
had been brilliant. Forde met the rajah’s
troops, and in a pitched battle inflicted upon
them as signal defeat as he afterwards gave
the Dutch near Chinsurah. This was the
means of troubling the French much, and of
influencing, favourably to the British, the
war in the Carnatic, as already noticed in a
more appropriate place. It does not appear,
notwithstanding the high opinion of him
entertained by Clive, that either the company
or his country appreciated the military genius
and valour of Forde.

Clive having remitted large sums of money
to England, was anxious to see to their se-
curity. The Dutch Company held £180,000,
the English Company £4:0,000, and probably
£80,000 had been remitted through private
hands. He, therefore, in February, 1760,
returned to England. His departure was at
an unfortunate juncture for Bengal. Before
the Dutch invasion, a new invasion by the
Mogul prince was threatened, and scarcely
had the Dutch episode terminated by the
restoration of the captured ships and treasures
in December, 1759, than intrigues were dis-
covered among the nativc princes, and at the
court of Moorshedabad, likely to embroil
Bengal with surrounding nabobs, and to ex-
pose it to insurrectionary movements. Clive,
Forde, and other influential officers who were
in good health persisted in returning home, in
the face of a state of affairs which were
perilous, and have not escaped censure for
leaving Bengal to its fate. Colonel Calliaud,
however, was re-called from the Carnatic,
and as he was a man of superior military

 

can. LXXIVJ

parts, it was believed by Clive and the council,
that he would be able to maintain the interests
and honour of the company in military affairs.

Towards the end of November, 1759,
Colonel Calliaud arrived in Bengal with rein-
forcements, and he was at once engaged in
active operations to avert the threatened
dangers. Clive himself determined to support
him, and, if possible, settle matters at Moor-
shedabad before he departed from India.

The danger immediately impending was a
new invasion by the shah-zada. Clive was
determined that his highness should, if pos—
sible, be severely chastised for his breach of
the treaty made upon his former defeat, and
he therefore placed at Calliaud’s disposal
three hundred European infantry, six pieces
of cannon with fifty European artillerymen,
and one thousand sepoys, and sent him for-
ward at once to Moorshedabad; other forces
were to join him, and Clive himself was to
follow as soon as his attention to other affairs
allowed. Mr. Mill blames the determination
of the British to uphold Meer Jaffier against
the shah-zada as an encouragement of rebel-
lion, and a participation in it, and he de-
nounces both the morals and policy of Clive’s
course. Professor “'ilson gives the follow-
ing brief but complete reply to this 2—“ It
was not a question of policy, but one of good
faith. By the treaty with Meer Jafiier, as
well as by the nature of their connection with
him. the English were pledged to assist him
against all enemies whatever, and few of the
governors of the provinces would have scrupled
to consider the emperor as an enemy if he
had sought to dispossess them of their soubahs.
Even, however, if the theory of obedience
to a monarch, who at the very seat of empire
was no longer his own master, could be urged
with any show of reason, it would not be
applicable in the present instance, for the
shah—zada was not appointed by the emperor
to be his deputy in Bengal, and as Clive
pleaded to the prince himself, no communica-
tion of his movements or purposes had been
made from Delhi. On the contrary,‘ the
prince was there treated as a rebel to his
father. He could not plead, therefore, the
emperor's authority for his incursion, and no
other pretext could have afforded him the
semblance even of right.”

After the shah-zada set out upon his
second invasion, various events occurred
which complicated the state of affairs. Mr.
Mill describes them with so much beauty and
accuracy, that his description will admirably
convey the position and relation of parties,
as events rapidly presented new phases in the
general political condition :-“ The powerful
king of the Abdallees was again on his march

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

271

for the invasion of Hindostan. Excited by the
approach of formidable danger, the vizir, in
a fit of exasperation or despair, ordered the
murder of the emperor, the wretched Alum-
geer; and the news of this tragical event
reached the shah-zada, just as he had passed
the Caramnassa into the province of Bahar.
He was advised to assume immediately the
state and title of emperor; to confer the
office of vizir upon Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the
Nabob of Oude, and to confirm Nujeeb-ad-
Dowlah in the office of Ameer-ul-Omrah. The
majesty of the imperial throne, and his un-
doubted title, had an influence still upon the
minds of men. It was now clear and imme-
diate rebellion to resist him; and whatever
guilt could be involved in making war upon
their rightful sovereign, must be incurred by
those who carried arms against him. The
English had already familiarized themselves
with the idea of rebellion in India; and the
consideration oflegitimate sovereignty, though
the sovereign would have purchased their
protection by unlimited grants, appears not
to have excited a scruple in a single breast.
The new dignity, however, of vizir, called on
the Nabob of Oude for some exertions in
favour of his sovereign; and the fascination
of the imperial title was still of force to col-
lect around him a considerable army. The
march of the English was retarded by the
necessity of settling terms with the Nabob of
Poorania, who had encamped on the left
bank of the river between Moorshedabad and
Patna, and professed a desire of remaining
obedient to Jaffier, provided the English
would engage for his security. This nego-
tiation wasted seven days; and in the mean-
time the emperor advanced towards Patna.
Ramnarain, whom the sagacity of Ali Verdi
had selected to be deputy-governor of Bahar,
on account of his skill in matters of finance,
was destitute of military talents: and con—
sidering his situation, under the known
hatred of Jafiier, as exceedingly precarious,
he was unwilling to lay out any of the wealth
he had acquired, in providing for the defence
of the country. He was still enabled to draw
forth a respectable army, reinforced by seventy
Europeans and a batallion of English sepoys,
commanded by Lieutenant Cochrane; and he
encamped under the walls with a view to
cover the city.”

Colonel Calliaud had united his forces with
those of Meeran, who was at the head of
fifteen thousand men and twenty-five pieces
of cannon. The British colonel enjoined
upon Cochrane defensive measures, and to
avoid giving battle until he and Meeran
should come up. Cochrane was either nu.
:willing or unable to obey those commands,

 

273 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

and a battle was fought, in which a signal
defeat was sustained by Cochrane and his
native coadjutor, Ramnarain, the governor of
the province, who was a good financier and
a bad soldier. The chiefofficers of Ramnarain
behaved faithlessly,’ and endeavoured to
bring over the troops to the service of the
Mogul. The English never fought better,
and, few as they were, cut their way through
the enemy, or rather the enemy, awed by
their undaunted bearing, gave way before
them, not daring to interpose. Finally, the
detachment arrived safely at Patna.

The following curious account of this trans-
action was given by a Mogul nobleman, and
is interesting, as disclosing the light in which
the English appeared to men of his class :—
“ W'hat remained of their people [the English]
was rallied by Doctor “'illiam Fullerton, a
friend of mine, and possibly by some English
officers, whose names I know not, who ranged
them in order again; and as one of their guns
was to be left on the field of battle, they found
means to render it useless and of no avail, by
thrusting a large needle of iron into its eye.
The other being in good condition, they took
it with them, together with its ammunition;
and that handful of men had the courage to
retire in the face of a victorious enemy,
without once shrinking from their ranks.
During their journey, the cart of ammunition
chanced to receive some damage; the doctor
stopped unconcernedly, and, after having put
it in order, he bravely pursued his route
again; and it must be acknowledged, that
this nation’s presence of mind, firmness of
temper, and undaunted bravery, are past all
question. They join the most resolute courage
to the most cautious prudence; nor have they
their equals in the art of ranging themselves
in battle array, and fighting in order. If to
so many military qualifications they knew
how to join the arts of government; if they
showed a concern for the circumstances of the
husbandman and the gentleman, and exerted
as much ingenuity and solicitude in relieving
and easing the people of God, as they do in
whatever concerns their military affairs, no
nation in the world would be preferable to
them, or prove worthier of command. But
such is the little regard which they show to
the people of these kingdoms, and such their
apathy and indifference for their welfare, that
the people under their dominion groan every-
where, and are reduced to poverty and dis-
tress. Oh God! come to the assistance of
thine afflicted servants, and deliver them from
the oppressions they suffer.”

The people of God here referred to were
the Mohammedans: the privileges they de-
sired, the power to oppress the Hindoos.

 

[CHAR LXXIV.

Mill says, “ Had the troops of the emperor
pushed on with vigour, immediately after
this victory, when Ramnarain was severely
wounded, his army panic-struck and dispersed,
and the city without defenders, they might
have taken Patna with the greatest ease. But
they employed themselves in ravaging the
open country, and in receiving messengers
and overtures from Ramnarain, till the 19th
of February, when they learned that Meeran
and the English were distant from them but
twenty-eight miles. The resolution was taken
to march and engage them ; the next day the
two armies approached. Colonel Calliaud
urged immediate attack; but Meeran and his
astrologers found that the stars would not be

favourable before the 22nd. Early on the

morning of that day, Calliaud was in motion;
but before he could reach the enemy, the dayr
was so far spent ‘ by the insufferable delays,’
as he himself complains, of ‘ Meeran’s march,’
that, wishing to have time before him, he was
unwilling to engage till the following morning.
The enemy, however, advanced, and Calliaud
drew up his men between two villages which
covered both his flanks, advising Meeran to
form a second line, the whole of which, except
the two wings, would have been covered by
the English and the villages. But, though
this was agreed upon, ‘he crowded his army
upon the right, and, in spite of the most
pressing and repeated solicitations, presented
to battle a body of fifteen thousand men, with
a front of scarcely two hundred yards, in a
tumultuous unformed heap.’ With a feigned
appearance of directing the main attack upon
the English, the enemy advanced, with the
best part of their army, upon Meeran, who,
in about ten minutes, began to give way.
Colonel Calliaud, however, marched with a
battalion of sepoys to his aid, and immediately
decided the fate of the day.”

Calliaud in vain endeavoured to induce
Meeran to pursue the enemy, or place a body
of cavalry at his disposal, with which, in con-
junction with his sepoy infantry, he would
himself give chase. Meeran preferred enjoy-
ing himself at Patna, in his usual dissipations.
This he continued to do until the 29th of
January, 1760. Meanwhile, the emperor,
who had retreated to Bahar, gathered courage,
and resolved, if possible, to gain some days’
march between the allies and Moorshedabad.
and seize the Viceroy and the capitahbefore
the self-indulgences at Patna terminated.
\Ylien Meeran consented to move, the em-
peror was on his march to execute the stratagcm
hehad projected. Calliaud, by forced marches
and by sending swift boats with troops up the
river, was enabled so to menace the emperor’s
flank as to cause him to change his route,

a.-AWMM.¢M,u..~..._ a...“ ..

. 4.. u..." Age-“I

A - WNNMvmaAn; ._.

CRAP. LXXIV.]

still vigilantly followed by Calliand. The
Viceroy meantime became apprised of the
danger, mustered what forces he could, and
received two hundred men from Calcutta.
This army formed a junction with that under
Meeran and Calliaud, and, in the face of a
meditated attack, the emperor burned his
camp, and retreated. Calliaud was of opinion
that, by better concerted movements and
more eelerity, the imperial army might have
entered Moorshedabad. Once more Calliaud
proposed the pursuit of the retreating foe ; but
neither the Viceroy nor the hope of his house
had the courage to adopt his advice. He
again urged upon them the necessity of
placing some cavalry at his own disposal for
the purpose. It was refused. At this junc-
ture, M. Law, at the head of a French force,
passed near Patna, which had been left without
means of defence; but Law was ignorant of
the fact, and proceeded to Bahar, to await the
arrival of the emperor. Had the emperor’s
own army turned aside to Patna with celerity,
he would have entered it unopposed. That
city had a third piece of good fortune, in
escaping the Nabob of Poorania, who, at the
moment, declared for the emperor. Patna
was within an easy march of his forces; but
he neglected the 01:»portunity. Patna, through
the bad generalship of all parties, was saved
from a coup before which it must have fallen.
The emperor, however, when the opportune
moment had passed away, advanced against
it. The English factors and the native go-
vernor had thrown up defences and organized
a force. Calliaud, with his usual sagacity
and promptitude, had dispatched two hundred
European soldiers—the elite of his army—and
a battalion of sepoys. Before this force could
arrive, the emperor, joined by M. Law and
the French, pressed the siege, and, having
demolished part of the ramparts, assaulted the
place. Dr. Fullerton, the English surgeon,
with that courage which the medical men
attached both to the company’s and the royal
army have so frequently shown, at the head
of such force as he could collect, repulsed the
assailants. In two days, Law, with his
Frenchmen, renewed the assault, and suc-
ceeded in scaling the broken ramparts. Again
Dr. Fullerton, and one Rajah Shitabroy, suc-
ceeded in repelling the assailants. It. was,
however, expected that the whole French
force, supported by the emperor’s best native
troops, would the next night renew the assault,
and the citizens had no reliance upon them-
selves, and no hope of again repelling the
stormers. “'liile all was despair and confusion
in the city, Captain Knox, with the light
companies of his force, was seen from the
walls rapidly approaching. He had, by forced

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

273

marches, reached Patna in thirteen days, him-
self and his men having endured terrible hard-
ships from fatigue and heat. That evening
he reconnoitred the enemy, who were deterred
from offering an assault to the city. Next
day, at the usual hour of temporary repose in
India, Knox surprised the enemy while the
troops were asleep, entered their works, and
made havoc of those who occupied them.
The main army retired.

The N abob of Poorania, who still lingered in
the neighbourhood, at last began his march
to join the emperor. Knox proposed to the
governor of Patna to cross the river, and so
harass the nabob as to detain him until Calliaud
and Meeran should arrive. The governor
assented; but when the hour for action came,
none of the native troops or citizens would
venture upon an expedition which appeared
to them so full of peril. Rajah Shitabroy
had three hundred men in his pay, who had
caught the fire of their master’s spirit: these
joined Knox, and the little army crossed the
river. It was the captain’s plan to effect a
night surprise; but his guide deceived him,
and kept him and his troops uselessly wan-
dering about until morning, when, wearied,
he and his men lay down upon their arms.
At that moment, the advanced guard of the
enemy approached. Knox took up his position
with skill, and a battle ensued, which lasted
for six hours. The enemy’s troops numbered
twelve thousand men, and again and again
surrounded the little bands of Knox and the
rajah, but were repulsed with heavy slaughter.
At last disheartened, the enemy began to
show symptoms of disorder. The English
commander charged with his whole force.
The rajah’s troops were cavalry, and were
most efficient in the charge. The enemy
was pursued until dark.

During the terrible contest, the citizens
crowded the ramparts, their minds alternating
between hope and fear; but, on the whole,
their coward hearts yielded to the latter.
They saw the ebb and flow of battle, and
trembled with alarm, and were, no doubt,
ready to welcome any victor who might
approach from the contested field, if only they
could secure their goods.

The glorious conduct of Knox and his
brave native colleague, Rajah Shitabroy, was
thus oddly noticed by a native author already
quoted 1—“ When the day was far spent, a
note came to Mr. Amyatt from Captain Knox,
which mentioned that the enemy was de-
feated and flying. The intelligence was sent
to all the principal men of the city, and caused
a deal of joy. I went to the factory, to com-
pliment the gentlemen, when, in the dusk of
the evening, Captain Knox himself crossed

274 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

over, and came with Shitabroy and his party.
They were both covered with dust and sweat.
The captain then gave some detail of the
battle, and paid the greatest encomiums on
Shitabroy’s zeal, activity, and valour. He ex-
claimed several times, ‘This is a real nabob;
I never saw such a nabob in my life.’ A few
moments after, Ramnarain was introduced.
He had in his company both Mustapha
Koollee Khan, and the cutwal of the city,
with some other men of consequence, who,
on hearing of the arrival of these two men,
had flocked to the factory; and, on seeing
them alone, could not help believing that they
had escaped from the slaughter; so far were
they from conceiving that a few hundreds of
men could defeat a whole army. Nor could
they be made to believe (impressed as they
were with Hindoo notions) that a commander
could quit his army so unconcernedly, unless
he had indeed run away from it: nor would
listen to what Mr. Amyatt repeatedly said, to
convince Ramnarain and others of their
mistake.”"‘

The immediate consequence of the victory
was that the nabob gave up his idea of march-
ing to join the emperor, but turned his course
northward ; Calliaud and Meeran arriving,
they crossed the Ganges in pursuit, and soon
overtook him, because of the encumbrances of
baggage and heavy guns of position by which
his army was attended. The nabob drew up
in battle array, but with no disposition to
fight. He merely sought time to place his
treasures and women on camels and swift
elephants,'and then. calling in his skirmishers,
left his baggage and guns in the hands of the
English, and precipitately retreatedrl‘ The
conduct of Meeran was dastardly in the ex-
treme on this occasion. Calliaud: thus de-
scribes it :-—“ The young nabob and his troops
behaved in this skirmish in their usual manner,
halting above a mile in the rear, nor ever
once made a motion to sustain the English.
Had he but acted on this occasion with the
least appearance of spirit, and made even a
semblance of fighting, the affair must have
proved decisive ; nor could Cuddum Houssein
Khan or his treasure have escaped.” Calliaud
pursued the nabob, and the reluctant Meeran
joined in the pursuit.

Many months of 1760 had now been con-
sumed in repelling the invasion of the shah-
zada, and many defeats were inflicted upon
him and his coadjutors; yet adherents among
the native chiefs, of various ranks, still joined
his standard ; and his attainment to the throne
of empire rendered it very likely that this

* Seer .ifutzz/l/mreen, vol. ii. p. 123.
Scott’s History of Bengal, pp. 392—397.
Calliand’s Narrative, p. 34.

++ -+

 

[CHAR LXXIV.

would continue to be the case, unless blow
after blow were struck by the British and their
ally with rapidity and severity. It was the
month of July: the rains were falling; and
the nabob would soon be beyond reach of his
pursuers, unless rapid advance was made, in
spite of the tempests which now impeded the
march of bodies of men in northern Bengal.
Meeran reluctantly struggled forward, under
the pressure of remonstrance and cntreaty from
the vigorous and active Calliaud. 0n the
night of the 2nd of July, after four ‘days of
severe pursuit, an event occurred which ma-
terially altered the prospects of the war.
The night was one of fierce and uninterrupted
storm : thunder shook the allied camps, and
the forked lightnings played amid the tents
like incessant showers of fiery darts. Many
of the natives believed that the gods bent their
bows and discharged their arrows among the
helpless host, and the invisible world fought
against their cause. Meeran, always solicitous
for his own safety and harassed with super-
stitious fears, forsook his tent, which was a
rich and wide-spread pavilion of light texture,
for one of less demensions and superiorstrength.
He was attended by only two persons—a do-
mestic slave, a favourite, who chafed his limbs
to induce slumber, and a story-teller, to amuse
his wakeful hours, after the manner of the
East. The thunder—storm poured its successive
peals along for hours over the country, and the
fierce lightnings searched the camp. When,
at last, the fury of the elements abated, the
guards of Meeran, who crouched without, en-
tered his tent for orders, when they found
their master and his two attendants stiffened
in death, their bodies scathcd with lightning
and their costume singed or burned. Six
holes were numbered on the back part of the
commander’s head, and his body was streaked
as if with the marks of a whip. A scimitar,
which lay on the pillow above his head, was
also perforated, and the point melted. The
tent-pole was charred. A single stroke of
the electric fluid had blasted the life of the,
prince and his attendants. The French after-
wards raised a rumour in India that the
English had assassinated Meeran. Edmund
Burke alluded to this rumour in his celebrated
speech opening the charge against \Varren
Hastings. The imputation was not only un-
founded, but absurd. The English had no
interest in so acting at that moment, but
strong interest to the contrary, as the conduct
of Calliaud immediately showed. That officer
saw that further pursuit of the enemy was, by
the event, rendered impossible. Native armies
generally disperse when a chief falls; and,
should the like then happen, the peril of the
English troops would indeed be great. Calliaud

 

 

Emma . t

CHAP. LXXVJ IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 275

concealed the death, and had the prince placed Mohammedans entertained an opinion that
upon an elephant, as if alive. He then pro- 3 God had sent the stroke in consequence of
ceeded by forced marches to Patna, alleging the dying curse of the Widow of Suraj-ad-
that Meeran was ill, to account for his not Dowlah. The campaign with the emperor
appearing on the march. Calliaud placed his i had, however, terminated, not to be reneWed
troops in what the English in India called in favour of Meer Jaffier, and, at this juncture
“winter quarters.” Most of the Bengalces ' of affairs, Mr. Vansittart arrived in Calcutta
attributed the death of Meeran to the. retri- i from Madras, as the successor of Olive in the
bution of the gods upon his crimes. The l government of Bengal.

 

CHAPTER LXXV.

WARREN HASTINGS PROMINENT IN THE AFFAIRS OF BENGAL—GOVERNOR VANSITTART
OPPOSED BY THE COUNCIL—WAR WITH THE EMPEROR—DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL
ARMY, AND OF THE FRENCH, WITH, THE CAPTURE OF M. LAW, THE FRENCH CHIEF—
ESTABLISHM NT OF MEER COSSIM IN THE SOUBAHDARSHIP BY THE ENGLISH.

IN the events which had occurred in Bengal ancient but illustrious race. It is affirmed
up to the period of the arrival of Mr. Vansit- that the pedigree can be traced back to the
tart as governor, a young man took part who great Danish sea king, whose sails were long
was destined to play a prominent part in the the terror of both coasts of the British Channel,
history of India. That young man was and who, after many fierce and doubtful
“'arren Hastings. -struggles, yielded at last to the valour and

Miss Martineau, reviewing this period of i genius of Alfred. But the undoubted splen-
the history of Bengal, pithily observes :— I dour of the line of Hastings needs no illus-
“IYhere was young Hastings during these ‘tration from fable. One branch of that line
years? He had joined Clive’s expedition . wore, in the fourteenth century, the coronet
with enthusiasm when it came up from Madras of Pembroke. From another branch sprang
in December, 1756. But Clive soon disco— the renowned Chamberlain, the faithful adhe-
vered that Hastings had abilities which . rent of the white rose, whose fate has fur-
marked him out for political business; and nished so striking a theme both to poets and
he appointed him resident agent at the new historians. His family received from the
nabob’s court. Soon after C‘livc's departure Tudors the earldom of Huntingdon. . . .The
in 1760, Hastings was wanted at Calcutta, as lords of the manor of Daylesford, in VVorces-
a member of council. He was in full training tershire, claimed to be the heads of this dis-
for his future work.” To the influence of tinguished family. The main stock, indeed,
Clive much of the boldness and persistence of prospered less than some of the younger
the policy of Hastings may probably be attri- shoots. But the Daylesford family, although
buted. They admired one another, and the not ennobled, was wealthy and highly' con-
clder and more active man was likely to leave sidered, till, about two hundred years ago, it
the traces of his strong mind and will upon was overwhelmed by the great ruin of the civil
the versatile, susceptible, and impressible war. The Hastings of that time was a zealous
youth who watched the intrigues of the court cavalier. He raised money on his lands, sent
of Moorshedabad, and informed the governor his plate to the mint at Oxford, joined the
of Bengal of the policy pursued there. Clive royal army, and after spending half his pro—
depended much upon the genius of Hastings perty in the cause of King Charles, was glad
for correct information and useful suggestions, to ransom himself by making over the greater
for already the subtle and penetrating mind part of the remainder to Speaker Lentlial.
of the diplomatist gave proof of its fine edge The old seat at Daylesford still remained in
and. polished surface. the family, but it could no longer be kept up,

It will be appropriate in this place to take and in the following generation was sold to a
some notice of the life of “'arren Hastings London merchant. Before the transfer took
up to the time at which our history has ar- place, the last Hastings of Daylcsford pre-
rived. Lord Macaulay" thus writes of his sented his second son to the rectory of the
origin :—-“ “'arren Hastings sprang from an parish in which the ancient residence of the

* 0.,‘11’pflgfll1d [1,,{0,.;c,,.; 155,7,” Contributed to family stood. The living was of little value,
the Et’i/dmyil Emma, vol. ii. p. 152. and the situation of the poor clergyman after

I

 

27G HISTORY OF THE
the sale of the estate was deplorable. He
was constantly engaged in law-suits about
tithes with the new lord of the manor, and
was at last utterly ruined. His eldest son,
Howard, a well-conducted young man, ob-
tained a place in the Customs. The second
son, Pynaston, an idle, worthless boy, married
before he was sixteen, lost his wife before he
was two years married, and died in the West
Indies, leaving to the care of his unfortunate
father a little orphan destined to strange and
memorable vicissitudes of fortune.”

W'arren, the son of Pynaston, was born on
the 6th of December, 1732. His mother died
a few days later, and he was left dependant
on his distressed grandfather. Such was the
origin and early history of one of whom the
same writer also says, “ N0 cloud could over-
cast the dawn of so much genius and so much
ambition. The very ploughmen observed
and long remembered how very kindly little
“'arren took to his book.” It was while at
school in the rustic village at Daylesford, and
while the playmate of its rustic children, that
young Hastings pondered the idea of ulti-
mately becoming the lord of his ancestors’
estates. His uncle Howard took charge of him
in his ninth year, and he was sent to school in
London. In his eleventh year he was sent to
\Vestminster school, where he was the fellow
student of various youths who, like himself,
became men of note.

On the death of his uncle, Howard Hastings,
a distant relative or connection, to whose care
he had been consigned by his uncle, procured
him a writership in the company's service.
In October, 1750, when only in his seventeenth
year, hearrived in Bengal. He remained two
years in the secretary’s office at Calcutta, and
was then sent to Cossimbazar. In that place
he remained several years, making bargains for
stuffs with nativebrokers. He was thus oc-
cupied when the sanguinary Suraj-ad-Dowlah
seized upon the English there. The compas-
sion felt by some Dutch merchants for one so
young, delicate, and intelligent, induced them
to plead for him, and he was released from
confinement and was a sort of prisoner at
large at Moorshedabad. He thence secretly
corresponded with the English council when
they fled from Calcutta, and he displayed such
courage, capacity, and diligence in obtaining
information, and such judgment and talent in
the opinions he expressed, as to surprise the
council, and excite their admiration of his
abilities.

“'hen Clive arrived in the Hoogly with the
expedition from Madras, Hastings contrived
to join it as a volunteer, and by his heroism
and sagacity secured the high opinion and
confidence of Clive. Immediately after the

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXV.
battle of Plassey, Hastings was appointed
agent for the company at the court of the
new soubahdar; where he continued an in-
valuable servant, until the honour of member
of council at Calcutta was conferred upon
him. During the administration of Mr. Van-
sittart, Hastings was deprived of the influ-
ence to which his genius entitled him by the
corrupt council. The period between Clive’s
first government of Bengal, the history of
which has been recorded in foregoing pages,
and his second government of Bengal, the
history of which is yet to be related, was one
ofmaladministration on the part of the English,
and it is proper to anticipate somewhat our
narrative, by quoting what. Lord Macaulay,
in his criticism of Gleig’s Life ofIIash'ngs,
has said of our hero’s conduct during that
interyalz—“Ofthe conduct of Hastings at
this time little is known; but. the little that
is known, and the circumstance that little is
known, must be considered as honourable to
him. He could not protect the natives; all
that he could do, was to abstain from plun-
dering and oppressing them, and this he
appears to have done. It is certain, that at
this time he continued poor, and it is equally
certain that by cruelty and dishonesty he
might have become rich. It is certain that
he was never charged with having borne a
part in the worst abuses which then prevailed,
and it is almost equally certain that if he had
borne a part in these abuses, the able and
bitter enemies who afterwards persecuted
him would not have failed to discover and
to proclaim his guilt. The keen, severe, and
even malevolent scrutiny to which his whole.
public life was subjected, a scrutiny unpa-
ralleled, as we believe, in the history of man-
kind, is in one respect advantageous to his
reputation. It brought many blemishes to
light, but it entitles him to be considered
pure from every blemish which has not been
brought to light. The truth is that the temp-
tations to which so many English functionaries
yielded in the time of Mr. Vansittart were
not addressed to the ruling passion of \Varren
Hastings. He was not squeamish in pecu-
niary transactions, but he was neither sordid
nor rapaeious. He was far too enlightened a
man to look on a great empire, merely as a
buccaneer would look on a galleon. Had
his heart been much worse than it was, his
understanding would have preserved him
from that extremity of baseness. He was an
unscrupulous, perhaps an unprincipled states-
man; but still he was a statesman and not a
free-booter."

In 176% Hastings returned to England.
He had realized only a very moderate for-
tune, and that moderate fortune was soon

A mt .. ...A.. M...“ WW A...”

 

 

CH A P. LXXV.]

reduced to nothing, partly by his praiseworthy
liberality, and partly by his mismanagement.
“Towards his relations he appears to have
acted very generously. The greater part
of his savings he left in Bengal, hoping, pro-
bably, to obtain the high usury of India.
But high usury and bad security generally
go together, and Hastings lost both interest
and principal." During the four years Has-
tings remained at home, as well as the four
years he remained in India after Clive re-
signed the governorship of Bengal, many
momentous events occurred in India, which
prepared the way for the exalted position
Hastings ultimately held, and which were of
themselves of magnitude and deep import-
ance; to them it is necessary now to turn.
The departure of Olive threw the affairs of
Bengal into much confusion. It has been
already shown that under the heroes, Calliaud
and Knox, British valour was as triumphant
as if Clive himself led the soldiers; but the
civil concerns of the presidency were too
complicated to be set or kept in order by a
genius less commanding than Clive himself.
There existed much discontent on the part
of the English officials, even in high places,
with the neglect shown by the company to
men of parts, and the partialities evinced in
the promotions, civil and military. To such
an extent did the dissatisfaction with the com-
pany spread, that the following extraordinary
document was sent home before Clive took his
departure, who had himself, although the
company's chief officer in Bengal, taken an
active part in its production :—“ Having fully
spoken to every branch of your affairs at this
presidency, under their established heads, we
cannot, consistent with the real anxiety we
feel for the future welfare of that respectable
body from whom you and we are in trust,
close this address without expostulating with
freedom on the unprovoked and general as-
perity of your letterpcr Prince Henry packet.
()ur sentiments on this head, will, we doubt
not, acquire additional weight, from the con-
sideration of their being subscribed by a
majority of your council, who are, at this
very period, quitting your service, and con-
sequently independent and disinterested.
I’crmit us to say, that the diction of your
letters is most unworthy yourselves and us,
in whatever relation considered, either as
masters to servants, or gentlemen to gentle-
Incl). More inadvertencies, and casual neglects,
arising from an unaVoidable and most com-
plicated confusion in the state of your affairs,
have been treated in such language and sen-
timents, as nothing but the most glaring and
premeditated faults could warrant. Ground-
less informations have, without further scru-
voL. n.

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 277

tiny, borne with you the stamp of truth,
though proceeding from those who had therein
obviously their own purpose to serve, no
matter at whose expense. These have re-
ceived from you such countenance and en-
couragement, as must most assuredly tend to
cool the warmest zeal of your servants here
and everywhere else; as they will appear to
have been only the source of general reflec-
tions, thrown out at random against your
faithful servants of this presidency, in various
parts of your letter now before us,——faithful
to little purpose,-——-if the breath of scandal.
joined to private pique or private or personal
attachments, have power to blow away in one
hour the merits of many years‘ services, and
deprive them of that rank, and those rising
benefits, which are justly a spur to their
integrity and application. The little atten-
tion shown to these considerations in the in-
discriminate favours heaped on some indivi-
duals, and undeserved censures on others,
will, we apprehend, lessen that spirit of zeal
so very essential to the well-being of your
affairs, and, consequently, in the end, if con-
tinued, prove the destruction of them. Pri-
vate views may, it is much to be feared, take
the lead here, from examples at home; and
no gentlemen hold your service longer, nor
exert themselves further in it, than their own
exigencies require. This being the real pre-
sent state of your service, it becomes strictly
our duty to represent it in the strongest light,
or we should, with little truth, and less pro-
priety, subscribe ourselves.”

The company’s reply to this was resolute,
stern, and uncompromising. It was as fol-
lows, dated the 21st of January, 1761 :—
“ VYe have taken under our most serious
consideration the general letter from our
late president and council of Fort William,
dated the 29th of December, 1759, and many
paragraphs therein containing gross insults
upon and indignities offered to the court of
directors; tending to the subversion of our
authority over our servants, and a dissolution
of all order and good government in the com-
pany’s affairs : to put an immediate stop there-
fore to this evil, we do positively order and
direct, that, immediately upon receipt of this
letter, all those persons still remaining in the
company’s service, who signed the said letter,
viz., Messieurs John Zephaniah I'lolwell,
Charles Stafford Playdell, “'illiam Brightwell
Sumner, and “'illiam M‘Guire, be dismissed
from the company’s service; and you are to
take care that they be not permitted, on any
consideration, to continue in India, but that
they are to be sent to England by the first
ships which return home the same season you

receive this letter."

00

278 HISTORY OF THE

Mr. Vansittart had from the first been op-
posed by a faction in the council, ant “the
dismissal of which this letter was the signal,
not only gave a majority in the council to the
party by whom he was opposed, but sent Mr.
Ellis, the most intemperate and arbitrary of all
his opponents, to the chiefship of the factory
at Patna. He treated the nabob with the
most insulting airs of authority, and broke
through all respect for his government. So
early as the month of January he gave his
orders to the commander of the troops to seize
and keep prisoner one of the nabob’s collec-
tors, who had raised some difficulties in per—
mitting a quantity of opium, the private pro-
perty of one of the company’s servants to
pass duty free as the property of the company.
This outrage the discretion of the officer
avoided, by suspending obedience to the
order, and sending a letter to the nabob, to
redress by his own authority whatever might
appear to be wrong.”

This Mr. Ellis continued, with indomitable
energy and violence, to contravene the orders
of Mr. Vansittart; and his disobedience and
insults to the governor received such a mea—
sure of support from the opposition in the
council, as to render nugatory all attempts on
the part of the governor to enforce discipline
and order. The factions spirit of the council
was not without provocation, and, strangely,
that provocation was supplied mainly through
Clive’s instrumentality, in the very way against
which he and his brother officials so strongly
protested when the company, Without his in-
tervention, acted in a similar manner.

Vansittart was appointed governor of Ben-
gal at Clive’s suggestion. This offended Hol-
well, who had rendered more service in the
civil department than any of the company’s
officials, who bravely battled when the council
of Calcutta fled, who, during Clive’s govern-
ment, was the most efficient civilian in high
office, and upon whom the great dictator de-
volved important duties. When Clive left
India, the government rested upon Holwell
pro tempore, and he was undoubtedly better
fitted for the post than any other member of
the council. Mr. Amyatt, a man reckoned by
his fellow councillors of consequence, claimed
the office on the ground of seniority, and the
council and civilians generally regarded it as
unjust to place a gentleman from Madras over
his head. Clive, for reasons that appeared
weighty to himself, recommended Vansittart,
who, from the above-named causes, was ob—
structed, from the moment of his entering
office, by those who felt themselves aggrieved.
This was not the only cause of their opposi-
tion. A large number of the company’s sero
* Mill, book iv. chap. v.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXV.
vants were trading on private account in such
a manner as to be ruinous to the company.
They interfered with the native transit trade
in a manner, which, through the various
revolutions in the soubahdarship of Bengal
that ensued, drew forth the remonstrances of
each successive nominee of the British in the
native government, while the people of Bengal
in vain besought the intervention of their
soubahdar. Oppression and plunder were
rampant amongst the bullying and imperious
English officials everywhere. Mr. Vansittart
had not the requisite capacity and energy to
put a stop to these things; and when a decided
majority of the council was obtained against
him, he became almost powerless. Lord Ma-
caulay says of him and his position :-—-“ Mr.
Vansittart, the governor, was at the head of
a new and anomalous empire. On one side
was a band of English functionaries, daring,
intelligent, eager to be rich. 0n the other
side was a great native population, helpless,
timid, accustomed to crouch under oppression.
To keep the stronger race from preying on
the weaker, was an undertaking which tasked
to the utmost the talents and energy of Olive.
Vansittart, with fair intentions, was a feeble
and inefficient ruler. The monster caste, as
was natural, broke loose from all restraint, and
then was seen, what we believe to be the most
frightful of all spectacles—the strength of
civilization without its mercy. To all other
despotism there is a check—imperfect, indeed,
and liable to gross abuse, but still suflicient to
preserve society from the last extreme of'
misery. A time comes when the evils of sub-
mission are obviously greater than those of
resistance—when fear itself begets a sort of
courage, when a convulsive burst of popular
rage and despair warns tyrants not to presume
too far on the patience of mankind. But
against misgovernment, such as then afflicted
Bengal, it was impossible to struggle. The
superior intelligence of the dominant class
made their power irresistible. A war of
Bengalees against Englishmen was like a war
of sheep against wolves, of men against
demons. The only protection which the con-
quered could find, was in the moderation, the
clemency, the enlarged policy of the con-
queror. That protection at a later period
they found. But at first English power came
among them unaccompanied by English mo-
rality. There was an interval between the
time when they became our subjects, and the
time at which we began to reflect that we
were bound to discharge towards them the
duty of rulers. During that interval the
business of a servant of the company was
simply to wring out of the natives a hundred
or two hundred thousand pounds, as speedily

 

CnAr. LXXV.]

as possible, that he might return home before
his constitution had suffered from the heat, to
marry a peer’s daughter, buy rotten boroughs
in Cornwall, and to give balls in St. James’s
Square.”

This description is not so overdrawn as not
to describe generally the condition of things,
and show how helpless was the governor in
the transactions which took place under his
government, financial and military, among
the English themselves in their relations to
native princes and states, and to the unfor-
tunate Bengalees who groaned beneath their
rapacity and oppression. In the narrative of
Mr. \‘ansittart himself, published after his
resignation of the government of the presi-
dency, there is at once the clearest and most
concise account that has ever appeared of its
real condition, and of the English interest in
Bengal at the period of Mr. Vansittart’s ar-
rival. It is fortunate that the statements of
Mr. Vansittart himself are still in existence,
as they describe with truth and simplicity a
period amongst the most remarkable and
eventful epochs in the history of the British
empire in India. The events of that time, and
the part taken in them by our countrymen, are
amongst those most discussed by critics and
historians of the present day. The originality
and importance of the document excuse its
length. The condensation of its style, and
the authority of the writer, alike forbid abridg-
ment. Mr. Vansittart states 2—“ It is foreign
to my purpose to enter into any detail of the
transactions of Meer J afiier’s government, from
the time of his being raised to the soubah-
darship till the month of July, 1760, when I
came to Bengal, to succeed Colonel Clive. It
is enough if I give a plain and distinct view
of the situation in which I found his affairs,
and the company’s. The greatest part of the
nabob’s and the English forces was at Patna,
to oppose the shah-zada, who, for three years
successively, had invaded the province, and
at this time was more powerful than ever, by
the number of disaffected zemindars who had
joined him, or espoused his interest, in different
parts of the country. The nabob's army con-
sisted as usual of a great number of undisci-
plined people, who were never regularly paid,
but were kept together by the promises of
Saddoc Allec Cawnfi‘ the nabob’s son, who
commanded them, that he would be answer-
able for their arrears one time or other. Being
disappointed of these hopes by the death of
the nabob's son, who was killed by lightning,
the 3rd of July, their clamorous demands
could no longer be restrained, and a general
plunder and desertion was daily expected.
Colonel Calliaud, who commanded the English

* Commonly called the Chuta nabob.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

279

forces after Colonel Clive’s departure for
Europe, stOpped these clamours for a moment,
by his promises to secure the payment of their
arrears from the nabob; but the English
troops were in little better condition than the
nabob’s; they had two or three months’ arrears
due to them, the nabob having failed in the pay-
ment of the sum stipulated for their mainten-
ance, which was a lac of rupees a month, and
the low state of the treasury at Calcutta not
admitting ofthe deficiency being supplied from
thence. The effects of this were seen by the
desertion of many of our men; and the army,
thus situated, was within thirty miles of the
shah-zada’s whole force. The situation of
affairs at Moorshebadad, where the nabob re--
sided, was still more alarming. Far from
being in a condition to pay off the arrears of
his troops at Patna, he had a large number
of the same undisciplined rabble about his
person, and was no less in arrears to them;
these also losing their best dependence, by
the death of the nabob’s son, could no longer
be satisfied with promises, but insisted, in a
most tumultuous manner, on immediate pay-
ment. More than once they surrounded the
palace, abused the principal officers in the
most opprobrious language, and daily threat-
ened the nabob’s life ; through the weakness
of his government, and the general disaffection
of the people, the revenues of most parts of
the province were withheld by the zemindars,
and the nabob had so little attention to, or
capacity for business, that what little was col-
lected was, in a great measure, appropriated
by his favourites to their own profit. The
Beerboom rajah, whose country is situated
within a few miles of the capital, Moorshed-
abad, had declared for the shah-zadah, and
had raised a force, with which he threatened
to attack the city; and the nabob had so little
power of opposing him, that a body of troops,
which were ordered out against him in the
month of June, refused to march, and were
yet in the suburbs, when I arrived there in
the month of October. Upon the whole,
there was the greatest reason to apprehend,
that the disorderly troops would lay waste
and plunder the city, and put an end at once
to the nabob’s government and life. At
Calcutta, the treasury was so low, and our
resources so much drained, that we were
obliged to put an entire stop to the invest-
ment, and it was with the utmost difficulty
the current expenses of the settlement could
be provided for. The lac of rupees. which
the nabob was to pay monthly for the field-
expenses of our troops, remained, as I before
observed, two or three months in arrears;
and even supposing it to have been regularly
paid, was very insufficient for the intended

280

use; so that the company, upon this footing,
would have suffered a considerable loss by
their alliance with the nabob, as often as the
situation of affairs required their troops to be
in the field, of which the appearance of
troubles on every side afforded no prospect
of an end. The Burdwan and Nuddea
countries had been assigned to the company,
from April, 1758, to April, 1760, for the pay-
ment of the sums stipulated in the treaty, for
the restitution of the company’s and private
losses by the capture of Calcutta. Of that
amount about twenty lacs remained due, at
the time of my arrival, although the term of
the assignment had been expired some months:
and the nabob, at the same time that he could
find no means of discharging this balance, in-
sisted on the lands being restored to him, of-
fering a security ofjewels in their stead. He
sent the Royroyan, one of his principal offi-
cers, to Calcutta, to make this demand, and at
the same time to request the loan of a sum of
money to assist him in his distress. Thelast
was a proposal we had it not in our power to
comply with ; but the first could not in justice
be refused, as he was willing to give other
security, in lieu of the lands before assigned;
so that we were absolutely left without any
resources for money, and the company sent
out none from Europe. To add to our diffi-
culties, Madras and Bombay were told that
they must depend on supplies from Bengal;
and in the midst of this distress, not only the
dangerous state of the province obliged us to
keep all our forces in the field, at an immense
expense, but a still more interesting object
for the English nation in India, I mean the
success of the undertaking against Pendi-
cherry, which was then invested, depended,
in a great measure, on a supply of money.
The nabob, through an habitual indolence,
was quite incapable of managing his govern-
ment in such critical circumstances; and the
sudden and unfortunate death of his son had
thrown him into such a state of dejection that
he would not even try to exert the little
strength which his faculties had left. Unable
as the nabob was to help himself, it was the
universal opinion, founded on the experience
of his former conduct, that he would rather
have seen himself and the province involved
in one general ruin, than have given us the
means of saving him, by putting more power
and more resources of money in our hands.
The Dutch director’s letters to him, and his
behaviour at the time their forces came into
the country, are a public testimony of his
desire to reduce our power, instead of aug-
menting it: I asked a small favour of him
for the company, a little after my arrival, as
much with a view of sounding his disposition,

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXV.

as through a desire of obtaining it. It was
the grant of the Chittagong province, in farm
to the company, on the same terms as it was
held by the then fougedar, or if that was dis—
agreeable, the leavc only of establishing a
factory there for trade; but be positively re-
fused to admit of either. I determined not
to suffer the affairs of the nation and the com-
pany to fall under the ruin they were threat-
ened with, without making an attempt to save
them, and far from intending any injury to
the nabob, I considered the preservation of
his life and government as equally depending
with our own interests, 011 the immediate
prosecution of some methods for remedying
the difficulties with which we were sur-
rounded. One principal circumstance of the
impending evils suggested the first hopes of
a reformation. The death of the nabob’s son
had cut off the heir—apparent of the govern-
ment: he had two sons by concubines, and a.
grandson, the child of his deceased son, by a
concubine also; the eldest of his two sons
was little above ten years old, and his grand-
son an infant of a few months, so that they
were incapable of taking care of the business,
supposing the objection of their illegitimacy
to he of no weight. In these circumstances,
the whole province seemed to turn their eyes
on Meer Cossim, who was married to Meer
Jaftier's daughter, his only surviving legitimate
child; was esteemed a capable man ofbusiness,
and had been the means of preserving the
city from plunder, and the nabob from de-
struction, by an immediate payment of three
lacs of rupees to his troops, and becoming a
security for their arrears at the time of their
tumultously surrounding the palace ; and this
he did, upon promise of being appointed to
the vacant offices of his deceased son, and
declared his successor. I found Mr. Holwell
and the select committee had strongly recom-
mended to the nabob to perform this promise ;
on the other hand, Mr. Amyatt and Colonel
Calliaud had wrote to him in favour of his
infant grandson, representing that the troops
at Patna insisted on his being named to the
vacant offices, and that the ltaja ltajebullub,
late dewan to the nabob’s deceased son,
should have the management of them during
his minority. The nabob seemingly acqui-
esced in both recommendations, but con-
tinued wavering in his choice, in such a.
manner, as showed that the increase of the
English influence was the event that he most
dreaded in the appointment of either. This
is the only clue which can lead to the motives
of the many opposite resolutions which were
taken up by the nabob, upon this affair, in
the small space of time in which it was sus-
pended. His inclinations first led him to

. yuan“) .. c p

CRAP. LXX V.]

accept the advice offered him by Colonel
Calliaud, in favour of his grandson; but
when that advice was urged in more press-
ing and peremptory style, and Rajebnllub,
by his emissaries and friends at Durbar, too
solicitously laboured to bring about the
same design, the nabob became. jealous of
his growing power, and suddenly declared
his resolution to support Meer Cossim in his
pretensions, as will appear by the letter he
wrote Mr. Holwell and Colonel Calliaud upon
this subject. On the other hand, the nabob
perceiving that Meer Cossim was warmly
supported by Mr. Holwell, appears to have
formed the wild scheme of shaking off both,
by throwing all the chief offices of the go-
vernment into the hands of a stranger, named
Mirza Daood, who had for some years enjoyed
the protection of this court in the character
of a prince of the royal blood of Persia. Him
the nabob formally contracted to the natural
daughter of his deceased son, but a few days
after the declaration made in favour of Meer
Cossim, who, apprehensive of being disap-
pointed in his hopes, by the jealousy and
irresolution of the nabob, formed the pretence
of negotiating the restoration of Burdwan,
and the other assigned lands, to obtain his
leave to come down to Calcutta. He arrived
there about the middle of September. As he
came down with these fears and suspicions of
the nahob’s disinclination to him, for the fa-
vour already shown him by the English, 1t
naturally led him to fall in with any measures
which might be proposed by them, as a
means of securing the continuation of the
same interest in his behalf."

In the foregoing narrative, events are
referred to which were not recorded in
former pages of this history—those connected
with a new revolution in Bengal, and the
dethronement of Mecr Jaffier. This was
effected in the manner and temper recorded
in the narrative of Mr. Vansittart. Meer
Jaflier refused to hold any mere nominal pos-
session of the soubahdarship, and retired to
Calcutta, there to live under the protection of
the English. He declared that Meer Cossim
was a man of too ambitious a character to be
bound by treaty, or ties of affinity, and would
not trust himself within the limits of his
power. This estimate of his son-in-law’s
character proved ultimately too true.

Among the difficulties which beset the
new British governor was a jealousy among
the military commanders. Major Carnac
arrived to succeed Colonel Calliaud. The
army then chiefly lay at Patna, after the death
of Mee1 ran Mr. \ ansittart was unwilling to
disturb Colonel Calliaud 111 his command, at a
junctuic which still seemed c1itical, seeing

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

231

that)" ’ the colonel was well acquainted with
men» and with affai1s at Patna, of which the
major was necotsa1ily ignorant. That ofi‘icer,
how ever, burned to be in command. Ellis:
ever 1eady for violent tn’easuies and complaints,
made this a matter of discussion in the council,
and Vansittart was to1nivnted by his own
officeis, at a time which required the aexewise
of their united powers for the common, good

All these persons entered into tie1cer discus- .‘

sions with one anothei, and with the governor,
conce1ning the deposition of Mom Jaffit‘l ,
and the eligibility of his successor.

It is difficult to see what other course was
open to the governor than that which he took.
Professor VYilson thinks it was impolitic, and
thus expresses his views 2—“ Objections to
the removal of Meer Jaflier were made not
only by those whose personal feelings might
be suspected. The scheme was originally
Mr. Holwell’s, who communicated in April,
to Colonel Calliaud, his anticipation of the
necessity of deposing Meer Jaffier. The
colonel, in reply, observes, ‘ Bad as the man
may be whose cause we now support, I can-
not be of opinion that we can get rid of him
for a better, without running the risk of much
greater inconveniences attending on such a
change than those we now labour under. I
presume the establishing tranquillity in these.
provinces would restore to us all the advan-
tages of trade we can wish, for the profit and
honour of our employers, and I think we bid
fairer to bring that tranquillity about by our
present influence over the sonbahdar, and by
supporting him, than by any change that can
be made.’ * The removal of Jaffier was an
ill-advised measure; there was no absolute
impossibility in his performing his engage-
ments with the English, or paying his own
troops, for both objects were speedily accom-
plished by his successor, and he created no
new resources. The same means of acquitting
his obligations, were in Meer Jaffier’s reach.
There only wanted such support as should
enable him, and such control as should com-
pel him, to discharge those demands to which
he. had rendered himself liable, and the due
acquittance of which was essential to the
maintenance of that English force upon which
his own power, and even his existence de-
pended. Had Clive remained in Bengal, there
would probably have been no revolution.”

“'hatever might have been the policy of
Clive, that of Cossim was soon made intelli-
gible, “ For, aware that money was the pillar
by which alone he could stand, he made so great
exertions that, notwithstanding the treasury
of Meer Jaflier was found almost empty, he

‘3')Scrafton’s Observations 022 1"mzsiltart’s Alll'I'dffc'é’,
p. L.

282 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

paid in the course of a few months the arrears
of the English troops at Patna; so'ficar satis-
fied the troops of the soubahdayboth at Moor-
shedabad and Patna, that .they‘ were reduced
to order, and ready tojt‘a'kie“ the field; and
provided six ,or seven ' ‘lacs in discharge of
his engagements with the company, insomuch
that the presidency were enabled in November
to seneli‘two lacs and a half to Madras, whence

jlanlett‘er had been received, declaring that

without a supply the siege of Pondicherry
must be raised. In the month of January,
Major Carnac arrived at Patna, and took the
command of the troops. The province of
Bahar had sufi'ered so much from the repeated
incursions of the emperor; and the finances
both of the nabob and of the company were
so much exhausted by the expense of the
army required to oppose him, that the im-
portance was strongly felt of driving him
finally from that part of the country. The
rains were no sooner at an end than the
English commander, accompanied by the
troops of Ramnarain, and those which had
belonged to Meeran, advanced towards the
emperor, who was stationed at Gyah Maun-
pore. The unhappy monarch made what
exertions he could to increase his feeble army;
but Carnac reached his camp by three days’
march; forced him to an engagement, and
gained a victory.”*

This engagement redounded greatly to the
glory of the English. Law, the French corn-
mander, was made prisoner, and his forces
entirely dispersed. The following graphic
account of incidents connected with the cap-
ture of M. Law, is from the pen of a native
and a Mohammedan z—“VVhen the emperor
left the field of battle, the handful of troops
that followed M. Law, discouraged by his
flight, and tired of the wandering life which
they had hitherto led in his service, turned
about likewise, and followed the emperor.
M. Law, finding himself abandoned and alone,
resolved not to turn his back; he bestrode
one of his guns, and remained firm in that
posture, waiting for the moment of his death.
This being reported to Major Carnac, he de-
tached himself from his main body, with
Captain Knox and some other oflicers, and
he advanced to the man on the gun, without
taking with him eithera guard or any Talingas
(sepoys) at all.“ Being arrived near, this
troop alighted from their horses, and pulling
their caps from their heads, they swept the
air with them, as if to make him a saldm:
and this salute being returned by M. Law in
the same manner, some parley in their lan-
guage ensued. The major, after paying high
eneomiums to M. Law for his perseverance,

* Mill, vol. iii. book iv. chap. v.

 

conduct, and bravery, added these words :—
‘You have done everything which could be
expected from a brave man; and your name
shall be undoubtedly transmitted to posterity
by the pen of history : now loosen your sword
from your loins, come amongst us, and abandon
all thoughts of contending with the English.’
The other answered, ‘That if they wbuld‘
accept of his surrendering himself just as he
was, he had no objection; but that as to sur-
rendering himself with the disgrace of being
without his sword, it was a shame he would
never submit to; and that they might take
his life if they were not satisfied with that
condition.’ The English commanders, admir-
ing his firmness, consented to his surrendering
himselfin the manner he wished: after which
the major, with his officers, shook hands with
him, in their European manner, and every
sentiment of enmity was instantly dismissed
on both sides. At the same time the major
sent for his own palaukeen, made him sit in
it, and he was sent to camp. M. Law, un-
willing to see or be seen, shut up the curtains
of the palankeen for fear of being recognised
by any of his friends at camp,- but yet some
of his acquaintances, hearing of his being
arrived, went to him. The major, who had
excused him from appearing in public, in-
formed them that they could not see him for
some days, as he was too much vexed to
receive any company. Ahmed Khan Kotei-
shee, who was an impertinent talker, having
come to look at him, thought. to pay his court
to the English by joking at the man’s defeat;
a behaviour that has nothing strange, if we
consider the times in which we live, and the
company he was accustomed to frequent;
and it was in that notion of his, doubtless,
that with much pertness of voice and air, he
asked him this question; ‘ And Biby (Lady)
Law, where is she ?’ The major and officers
present, shocked at the impropriety of the
question, reprimanded him with a severe look,
and very severe expressions: ‘This man,’
they said, ‘has fought bravely, and deserves
the attention of all brave men; the imper-
tinenees which you have been offering him
may be customary amongst your friends and
your nation, but cannot he suffered in ours,
which has it for a standing rule, never to offer
an injury to a vanquished foe.’ Ahmed Khan,
checked by this reprimand, held his tongue,
and did not answer a word. He tarried about
one hour more in his visit, and then went
away much abashed; and although he was a.
commander of importance, and one to whom
much honour had been always paid, no
one did speak to him any more, or made a
show of standing up at his departure. This
reprimand did much honour to the English;

[CHAR LXXV,

 

 

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.‘ avatexbnhwmeawv. ....

 

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CHAD. LXXVI.]

and, it must be acknowledged, to the honour
of those strangers, that as their conduct in
war and in battle is worthy of admiration, so,
on the other hand, nothing is more modest
and more becoming than their behaviour to
an enemy, whether in the heat of action, or

in the pride of success and victory; these

people seem to act entirely according to the
rules observed by our ancient commanders,
and our men of genius.”*

After the battle, Major Carnac opened _
negotiations with the emperor, through Rajah L
Shitabroy, and subsequently visited the im-.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

283

perial camp. The emperor accompanied him
thence to Patna. Meer Cossim regarded the
good terms, upon which the emperor had
entered with the English, dangerous to his
own power. He arrived at Patna, but em-
barrassed the imperial alliance in every way
he could devise, and refused to pay his re-
spects to the emperor, until Major Carnac
effected a compromise. Finally, having re-
ceived an imperial investiture of the soubah-
darship, he agreed to pay as tribute to the
court of Delhi, twenty-four lacs of rupees
annually.

I WWW“ \ \WWVmN ’ z .

CHAPTER LXXVI.

AFFAIRS IN BENGAL—VIOLENT AND FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH—DISPUTES
BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF CALCUTTA—REVENUE CONTESTS BE-
TWEEN THE OFFICERS OF THE COUNCIL AND THOSE OF THE SOUBAHDAR—COM-
MENCEMENT OF WAR BY THE BRITISH-SERIES OF VIC’l‘ORIES—MASSACRE OF THE
ENGLISH AT PATNA—EXPULSION OF MEER COSSIM FROM BENGAL.

ON the return of the emperor towards his
capital, he was escorted by Major Carnac, to
the limits of Bahar, where he tendered to the
English the dewanee of Bengal, Bahar and
Orissa, and promised firmans, as soon as
“ petitions ” for them should be formally pre-
sented. Meer Cossim, offended by these
proceedings, soon showed that he was not
less hostile at heart to the English than any
of his predecessors. H is whole attention was
divided between disputes with the British
officials, and extortion of money from his own.
He was restrained by no sense of the injustice
of such deeds, and spared none who refused
to find money when he chose to demand it.
It would occupy many volumes to describe
the rapid passage of events during the govern-
ment of Mr. Vansittart. The deterioration
of the English was rapid. This, with the
intrigues and efforts made against British
influence by the nabobs, involved terrible
consequences.

One prominent incident in the history of
the times was the defiance of law, both Eng-
lish and native, which characterised the
British traders. The company’s servants
trading on their own account, and native
merchants buying the authority of the com-
pany’s officers, carried on a system of smug-
gling, of fraud, and of oppression, which no
pen could adequately describe. In order to
terminate, if possible, the disputes between
the sonbahdar and the English traders, Mr.
Vansittart, accompanied by Mr. Hastings,
sought an interview with the former : through-

"‘ Seer JIulal-lmreeu, vol. ii pp. 165, 166.

 

out these contentions Mr. Hastings had dis-
played a strong sense ofjustice. By his lucid
statements and arguments he convinced the
governor of the injustice offered to the sou-
bahdar by the English agents, supported by
the higher officials and members of council,
and he aided the governor in his efforts to
induce the council to put a stop to the law-
lessness of the company’s servants. On the
last day of November, 1762, these three im-
portant persons met at Mongheer. The son—
bahdar laid the long list of grievances inflicted
upon him by the company’s servants before
the governor, who soon satisfied the prince
that, so far as he and Mr. Hastings were
concerned, the insults, indignities, and pecu-
niary injuries of which the prince complained
were unequivocally condemned. It was
agreed that all memory of these transactions
should be obliterated, and that mutual efforts
should be made to put a stop to their recur-
rence. The soubabdar demanded that the
inland trade should be wholly given up by the
English. Mr. Vansittart proposed that the-
trade should be open to all upon a duty payable
alike by natives and English. To this the
soubabdar showed extreme aversion, but at
last gave his sanction. A treaty was accord-
ingly drawn up by Hastings, fixing the duty
at nine per cent. on all articles; and Mr..
Vansittart returned to Calcutta in January,
1763. On arriving at his seat of government,
he found the English in great commotion, de-
nouncing all that he and Hastings had per-
formed. The council passed a resolution that
the treaty was null, and that they Would pay;

284: HISTORY OF THE

no duties except 2% per cent. on salt, as
a compliment to the soubahdar. They also
resolved that their agents should no longer
be amenable to the native tribunals, but that
the native officers and traders should be
amenable to the English agents in the nearest
factory. The spirit and procedure of the
council was, in various respects, unjust and
fraudulent; but they complained that the go-
vernor had made concessions not demanded
by justice, and which were injurious to their
interests. They considered that the various
firmans of the Mogul entitled them to a free
trade in the provinces, although the soubah-
dars and nabobs, where the English forces
were weak, had withheld the privilege, and
imposed duties contrary to it. Neither Mr.
Vansittart nor Mr. Hastings gave, on that
occasion, satisfactory replies to these allega-
tions, which were supported by able argu-
ments on the part of several members, espe-
cially Mr. Hayes.*

Meer Jaffier, then resident at Calcutta,
authorized the governor's opponents in the
council to state that his interpretation of fir-
nians and treaties accorded with theirs. This
was said by him to inflame the dispute with
Meer Cossim, for his own purposes, for he had
never acted upon his own interpretation when
he had the opportunity; and when his in-
trigues issued in his being once more pro-
moted to the sumnid, he was as eager as
Meer Cossim had been to exclude the English
from the country trade, or to levy duties
when that could not be effected. The result
of the disapproval of the governor’s treaty
and correspondence with the soubahdar was
to render all accommodation impossible, and
to throw the whole of Bengal into a state of
alarm. The soubahdar’s servants were lying,
fraudulent, and tyrannical wherever the Eng-
lish were weak; the conduct of the English
was similar, and thus a sort of civil war be-
tween both was maintained, before any appeal
to arms was made by their governments.

A faithful historian can scarcely have a
more painful task than to wade through the
voluminous correspondence carried on be-
tween Mr. Vansittart and his officers, and
between him and the soubahdar, or, as Mr.
Vansittart, in his correspondence, always
called him, the nabob. Still more painful is
it to peruse the voluminous debates and
minutes of the council of Calcutta upon the
subjects of this correspondence, and the com-
plaints and recriminations of the officers of
the company, and those of the soubahdar. So
discreditable was the conduct of the English
in Bengal during the year 1763, that it leaves

* A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal, from
1760 to 1764-, vol. ii. By Mr. Henry Vansittart.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXVI.
a lasting stain upon the name of our country.
The soubahdar, by vigorous efforts, succeeded
at last in suppressing violent and fraudulent
conduct on the part of his own servants, as
far as, perhaps, any governor, British or na-
tive, has ever succeeded in doing in that
country. Notwithstanding his exactions on
coming to the throne, the firmness and equity
of his administration were soon felt every-
where among his own people, and, whatever
were his faults at first, he redeemed them by
the most sedulous care, to leave the dishonest
English no pretexts for plunder or war. All
his fidelity, activity, and intelligence, did not
avail him. Mr. Vansittart was well satisfied
with his conduct, but the governor obtained
no support in the council, except from Mr.
Hastings, whose conduct was humane, just,
and honourable in these transactions. The
English gradually threw off all disguise, re—
fused to pay the revenues sanctioned by the
treaty, plundered the native cultivators and
merchants, beat, and often murdered the na—
tive officers of justice, police, and revenue;
insulted, and defied the person of the soubah-
dar openly, and regulated their whole conduct
as if the council and its agents were a ban-
ditti organized under the pretence of trade.
The plunder thus accumulated was not passed
to the account of the company, whose zealous
servants the perpetrators professed to be, but
was grasped for their private advantage,
while the company’s afl'airs were wholly ne-
glected, and heavy expenses incurred in its
name. Mr. Vansittart being always in a mi-
nority, himself and Hastings being alone on
the side of treaty and integrity, he was
obliged to write letters to the nabob in the
name of the council, of which he and Hastings
totally disapproved. The following specimens
of the correspondence will enlighten the
reader as to the character of the English
at that period. They are written by the
nabob (properly soubahdar) to Mr. Vansittart,
as governor, containing extracts from the
correspondence of the latter to which they
were in reply. They disclose a dignity,
mingled with despair and indignation, on the
part of the soubahdar, which gave to his pro-
tests and complaints a tone and manner that
commanded the sympathy of the governor
and of Mr. Hastings.

Copy of a Letter from the A'abob to the
Governor. Dated flIarch 5, 1763.

I have had the pleasure duly to receive three of your
favours, dated the 7th and 8th of Shaaban, and under~
stand the particulars mentioned in them.

At a time when this government was loaded with a
balance of revenues due to the king, the arrears of the
troops, and debts owing to the English, I marched out of
Bengal, and repaired to the extremity of the province of

 

; L nw' 3 imam-albumin.” g4..u.;

Cum. LXXVIJ

Bahar, in order to settle these matters. That country
being thus left without a ruler, every village and district
became ruined by the oppressions of the English agents
and gomastahs, an entire stop was put to collecting the
revenues, and the merchants, and the poor, and all my
officers, and muttaseddees of the public and private re-
ceipts of custom, were distressed, and deprived of their
daily bread ; and I am a sufferer in the revenues due to my
administration, by near a crore of rupees. I have in the
meanwhile made continual complaints and representations
of this injustice, and informed you particularly and cir-
cnmstantially of all matters : nevertheless, you have been
pleased to observe that my officers are to blame.

When you favoured me with a visit at Mongheer, I
laid before you all my concerns. You were very earnest
in settling all disputes between my government, and the
English company and gentlemen, and their gomastahs:
and you in some measure comforted me, and persuaded
me that “ from that time business would he carried on in
a proper manner, and my government neither injured,
oppressed, or damaged.” Afterwards, on your return to
Calcutta, contrary to your agreement with me, you de-
tached forces, to carry on the business of the company
and English gentlemen by compulsion, and to beat and
chastise my officers, if they offered to speak a word. For
these three years I have not got a single rupee, nor a
thousand rupees ; nor one piece, nor ten pieces of cloth ;
nor a bundle of broad cloth, nor ten bundles ; nor a pair
of scissors, nor so much as a clasp-knife, from the English
gentlemen, or their gomastahs; at the same time, they
have by violence levied fines and penalties, and sums for
losses in their trade, on my officers, and still continue to
levy them; and if any of my officers refuses to submit to
this, they pour a storm of complaints on his head.

Lately you have repeatedly ordered me “to let the
business of the company, and the English gentlemen, and
their goinastahs, go on as was customary heretofore in the
different parts of the provinces of Bengal and Bahar; to
suffer the money and bullion of your factories to be coined
into siccas in my mints; and to have the wicket and in-
trenchments in the city of Patna opened.” I not having
it in my power to refuse, have given you the free use of
my mint, and directed the wicket to be opened, and a stop
to be put to collecting customs upon traffic in the commo-
dities of my country, from all merchants, pykars, and
dilolls, in the provinces of Bahar and Bengal; and I have
had all gauts and chokeys, both in the city and country
round about, entirely removed.

All these my losses are owing entirely to the favour
and indulgence ofthe council; because that my being like
the nabob Meer Jaffier indebted to his majesty, and em-
barrassed by my troops, and reduced to his situation, is
what they approve of. However, I can never approve of
my people and merchants being distressed, my country
oppressed, myself despised, and subjected to daily insults,
and my officers and servants ill-treated. I have therefore
chosen to give up all those points to you. Now I am in
expectation of your answer, to inform me if my life is
safe; or if there is anything else to be done?

From the A'abob to the Governor.
.March 5, 1763.

Your friendly letter, dated the 8th of Shaaban, is ar-
rived, and I am happy with the news of your welfare.

You write that the opinion of the council is as follows:
—-“ They are all very desirous of assisting and supporting
me in my government, but cannot bear with patience,
that my officers should impede or damage their commerce ;
that the report of your setting up another nabob is the
weak insinuatiou of designing men; that the resolution
of the board is, to make such an agreement in pursuance
of the royal firman, and the rules of equity, as may leave

VOL II.

Dated

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

285

no room for dispute in future, between my officers and
their gomastahs.” How can I bring myself firmly to
credit this, since Mr. Ellis is one of the council, who, for
these two years past, has been endeavouring all in his
power to hurt my affairs, and make me appear little in
the eyes of the world; nay, is at this time taking pains
daily to involve me in trouble, parading his companies of
sepoys to provoke me; and omitting no opportunity of
depreciating me both in this my own country, and to
Suraj-ad-Dowlah, and other great men at court, sending
all whatever he can devise to my discredit, by means of
Shitabroy, to Suraj-ad-Dowlah, &c., and saying also what-
ever comes uppermost in his mind to my prejudice in
public assemblies P

In regard to what you write concerning the royal
firman, and your having in view the preparation of another
treaty; when you favoured me with your company at
Mongheer, I told you frequently, that “ the power of your
people was great, but I had little to oppose it. I desired
you to consider, nor entertain the notion, that any agree-
ment would be binding with people accustomed to acts of
oppression.” Is not this an instance of oppression, that
the saltpetre farms, which I have allowed unto you gentle-
men, upon the produce of which you used to pay formerly
three, and three and half rupees per maund, you now
forcibly hold at one and three-fourth of a rupee, plundering
and injuring my people? In this manner my country is
to go to ruin, and I may not utter a word. Besides all
this, you write, that it is my own officers who create these
disturbances, exercise oppression, and injure the saltpetre
farm. This being the case, how can any treaty stand
good between us? And how can it take effect, if such
oppression continues? Besides, as you have dispatched
the company’s troops to chastise my officers, if they but
murmur at these evils, why need you trouble yourselves
to make any other treaty? In my service, there is not
one who can prejudice me against you in any affair.
Under you there is Mr. Ellis, who fails not to prejudice
you with evil insinuations against me, as you must see
and be sensible, though you connive at it, and say nothing
on the subject; but you are pleased to think (I do know
upon what grounds) that I have evil-minded people in
my servxce.

I am at a loss how to act under these censures, and
must own myself insufficient, if regulations of this nature
take place. Be pleased, therefore, to set me free from
the uneasiness of such an administration; and set up a
person for conducting it, whom the council may better
approve.

Full well I know, that they will both condemn me, and
injure your good name, and bring this about at last. Why
do they wait for a charge against me? It is not the part
of honest men, to bring an unjust charge against any one,
with a view to compass other designs; it is better that
you do it at this time.

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob t0 the
Governor. Dated JUG’I'CIL 14, 1763.

It has been owing solely to the friendship and regard
which I bear to you, that I have hitherto constantly
borne in my mind the marks of your favour; and, for
the friendship and kindness which you have shown to
me, I have put up with everything until now that my
patience is quite exhausted. Whatever is to be done, do
you, sir, do it yourself; why should you cause my au—
thority to be insulted, and my honour injured, by your
servants, and people of low character? One man may
easily continue in friendship to one man; but to be
dependent upon ten people, is beyond the power of
man.

I have, in no wise, been deficient in the observance of
the treaties which you made with me, but, from the be-

P]?

286 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

ginning, have scrupulously complied with all my agree-
ments.

At this time, that you have been pleased to write to
me to keep open the wicket, and intrenchment in the
city of Patna, and for trade to go on as usual, I paid all
due respect to your letter, and immediately complied with
its contents. I had sent for Mohammed Allee Beg from
Dacca, and I was on my way from Patna towards Raje-
mahl, and had reached Barr, when Mr. Ellis sent three
companies of sepoys, with two guns, in order to surround
my fortress of 'l‘aajepoor, besides other companies towards
Durbunga, Mow, ’I‘eegra, Sircar barum, Tekarry, and
other districts in different parts of the province, by which
my affairs have been so much hurt, that an entire stop is
put to the collection of my revenues.

I knew not in what light to consider all these dis-
turbances, plunderings, and ravages; so, upon information
of this news, I dispatched Mohammed Ameen Cawn, one
of my jemmatdars, towards ’I‘aajepoor, that he might in-
quire particularly, and bring me intelligence of the cause
of so much disorder. He had not reached the place,
before the companies above-mentioned had taken hold of
Acbur Allee, Naib of Sheer Zaman, my aumil at 'l‘aaje-
poor, and carried him away to Patna. My jemmatdar
wrote me these particulars; in answer to which, I sent
him orders to bring your gomastah, residing at the factory
of ’l‘aajepoor, to me, that I might inquire of him, why
my aumil had been seized and carried away.

When Mohammed Ameer Cawn drew nigh to the fac-
tory, your sepoys there, by order of the gomastah, fired
upon him without challenging him. My jemmatdar,
having no other resource, made use of.the force that he
had, seized your gomastah, and brought him to me. I
examined into this affair in the best manner, and then
dismissed your gomastah. I found from him, that my
aumil was by no means in fault; but Ellis, having fixed
the blame of all these tumults and disorders upon my
emails, under pretence of the saltpetre, merely from his
own hatred to me, and violence of temper, has created
these disturbances, and perseveres in them. You wrote
me heretofore, that by keeping the wicket in the city of
Patna shut, a report would in all probability prevail
amongst the people, that the company and I were at
variance. Ellis for two years past has been making all
these disturbances, in order to demean me, and injure my
affairs. Ought I not to be informed, how I am to con-
sider these proceedings, and what is the reason of them P
You are my friends, bound to free me from all these in-
sults, which I never can bear with. Since the said gentle-
man has proceeded to acts of violence against my officers,
should my officers, for the sake of their characters, stand
upon the defensive, you are not to reproach me with it;
but ifyou are inclined to allow of Mr. Ellis’s actions, you
will do well to give the country to him, that you and I
may be freed from the vexatious of it; for I am convinced,
that the council will not put an end to these disputes.

I have halted here at Barr two days, on account of this
affair ; to-morrow I shall march towards Mongheer.

The soubahdar, in order to deal justly with
his own people, and, as he hoped. remove all
complaints on the part of the British, ordered
the entire remission of duties upon the inland
trade to English and native merchants alike.
This threw the English into a state of panic
and rage. They declared it was ruinous to
their trade, and meant by the soubahdar to be
so. That he had no right, without permission
of the emperor, to remit the duties levied upon
the native merchants, and no right to levy
any duties upon the English. This amounted
to a demand for the exclusive trade of the

 

[CHAR LXXVI.

soubahdar’s dominions; and as the East India.
Company did not profit at all by the inland
trade, the demand was in favour of the com-
pany’s servants, by those servants to be en-
forced at the expense of the company. It is
diflicult to conceive a more entire blindness
to justice. Yet the council, without shame,
inveighed against the governor and Mr.
Hastings, because they pointed out the ab-
surdity of such claims, and the monstrous
oppression of enforcing a monopoly of trade-
against the soubahdar’s own subjects in his
own dominions.

Meantime, violence and outrage on the
part of the English increased, and nothing
was left for Meer Cossim and his servants but
to oppose violence by authority, and force by
force. Whatever the bad conduct of the
English, more especially of their chief officers,
and the majority by whom the governor was
opposed in council, the policy of many of the
soubahdar's chief officers was aggravating
and unjust. As illustrating this, a single
case may be named. At Luckypoor, one
Mohammed Crazy had been employed in the
service of the English factory. To punish
this person for his attachment to the English,
and probably also with the View of insulting
the English themselves, the soubahdar’s
officer, Syed Buddul Cawn, placed a guard
upon his house. Mr. Middleton, chief of the
factory, remonstrated upon the oppression
thus practised upon a person whose only
offence was his intimate service with the
English. The native officer refused to re-
lease thc person so flagrantly wronged, and
pleaded that his doing so would be against
superior orders—those of Mohammed Allee,
who had offered many provocations to the
English, and always managed badly his part
in those disputes when the English were the
aggressors. The council ordered Mr. Mid-
dleton to cause Syed Buddul Cawn to be
seized and sent a prisoner to Calcutta, where
he arrived the latter end of March, 1763.
He cxculpated himself when before the board,
by producing the orders on which he had
acted. Mohammed Allee’s letter was of such
a nature as left no doubt ofhis desire to bring
matters to an extremity. Whether this arose
from some interested speculation, or from the
vanity which led the native chiefs, notwith-
standing inuumerable defeats, to believe that

they could contend with the English, his

motives were sufficiently powerful to induce
him to defy the company and impose upon
the soubahdar by giving him false informa-
tion. That this was the true state of the
case, the orders issued by him to Syed
Buddul Oawn sufficiently prove. They were
in the following terms :—

 

 

. . .24A.._._4:-__msy_~.__»g~ w.

.4 , “Anni. -mnfi—m—- _...I_._... . I.“

CHAP. LXXVIJ

From fifohammed Allee to Syed Buddul
Calm.

Your agreeable letter is arrived. I fully understand
the particulars contained therein, and from the hircarra
likewise, I learned the account of the villanics of the
English in Luckypoor. I have written pressingly to Aga
Mohammed Nizam, and Samadan, and Aumur Sing, and
Jungul Sing, to repair all of them with their people unto
you. I have also sent perwannahs, with the utmost
dispatch, unto the zemindars of Bilwat, Baboopoor, &c.,
and I have taken engagements from every zemindar’s
vakeel, about Luckypoor, that their masters, the zemin-
dars, will attend upon you, and act as you shall direct
them. It behoves you, with the utmost dispatch, to re-
pair thither immediately, and blockade the passages for
going in and coming out on all sides of Luckypoor; and place
strong sentinels, that no person whatever may pass or re-
pass to and from Luckypoor, and that asoul does not escape.
Of those who claim the English protection, and make use
of their name, take two or three and crucify them, and
seize their houses and efi'ects. Lay hold of their wives
and children, and send them straightway to me. Be sure

’ not to fail in this respect, his excellent-y having honoured
me with his orders to this purpose, as you must be in-
formed from the copy of the governor’s engagement, and
of his excellency’s perwannah, in consequence, which I
heretofore sent you; and do not entertain the least dif<
fidence. Regard this my short letter in the light of a
thousand letters, and act accordingly. Moreover, let
guards be placed to keep a good look-out about Lucky-
poor, and the parts adjacent, until the nabob’s orders
arrive, when they will proceed to act as I shall write to
you. At present surround it on all sides, and keep a
constant watch.

You will take extraordinary good care of the Europeans
at Luckypoor, that they get no intelligence from any of
their dependents, either by land or water; and for se-
curity you will send two hundred men, with a commander
whom you can rely upon, and direct them, above all things,
to be ready for action both night and day.

The consequences of such proceedings were
thus noticed by Mr. Vansittart himself, in the
exposé of his motives and conduct in these
affairs, afterwards given by him :——“ Such a
declaration of his inveteracy to the English,
as was expressed in these letters of Mohammed
Allee's, and the many instances which he had
given of it throughout his whole conduct, from
his first appointment, justly excited the indig-
nation of the whole board. The most violent
readily seized this occasion, to infer a fixed
resolution in the nabob to break with us;
and that the appointment of such a man as
Mohammed Allee, with such extraordinary
powers, and his conduct in the execution of
them, were only in consequence of that reso-
lution. It was, therefore, warmly urged to
prevent the nabob's designs, by declaring im-
mediate war against him. This sentiment,
however, was opposed by a majority of the
board, who judged it most proper, in the pre-
sent circumstances, to regard the insults as
proceeding personally from Mohammed Allee,
and to chastise him for it ourselves ; since the
nabob, to whom we had repeatedly complained
against him, had hitherto afi'orded us no re-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

287

dress; and that the chief and council at Dacca
should he ordered to seize, and send him down
prisoner to Calcutta. In this alternative I
easily joined, as well in the hopes of yet pre-
venting a ruinous and unjustifiable war, as
from the conviction of the violent and incen-
diary spirit of Mohammed Allee ; who, if
suffered to act longer with impunity, I saw
would put it out of my power, or even of the
nabob’s, to preserve peace between us. It is
true, that the nabob, in answer to the demand
of the board for his dismission, declared that
he had removed him from his employment,
and summoned him to his presence ; but as he
still continued at Dacca, and the nabob had
always endeavoured to vindicate his conduct,
it was much to be feared that he would not
only escape the punishment he deserved, but
perhaps be continued in his authority, and
have his hands strengthened with such fresh
powers, as might make it dangerous to attempt
afterwards to call him to an account. The
nabob’s behaviour upon this occasion may be
easily accounted for, from the precarious situ-
ation in which he stood with the English.
“'hen I was with him at Mongheer, he assured
me that if the complaints which were then
alleged against Mohammed Allee, upon in-
quiry, proved true, he would both dismiss
him from his service, and severely punish him.
The same assurance he gave me with respect
to Sheer Allee, the fougedar of Poorneea, who
had been guilty of the like enmity and mis-
behaviour to the English dependents in that
district; and it is very probable that he was
sincere in this declaration at that time, since
his interest was most materially concerned in
removing every cause of disagreement from
between us. But when he perceived the
strong opposition, formed against him by the
general assembly of the council, and that the
design of his enemies was levelled openly
against his person and government, it is not
to be wondered at, that he should be cautious
of depriving himself of the assistance of per-
sons the most capable of serving him, and on
whose zeal he had so much reason to depend
in case of a rupture with the English. In a.
word, it appears from the nabob’s whole be—
haviour, from the time that the general council
was assembled, that he believed his own ruin
to be the object of that assembly; and every
step taken by the board served but to confirm
him the more strongly in that fatal persuasion.
Fatal I call it, since, with such a mutual dis«
trust, every accident, however trifling, was
easily construed into an intentional act of hos-
tility; and even the necessary precautions of
self-defence served but to make the breach
irreparable. I believe it will be needless to
point out instances of the effects of these pre-

288 HISTORY OF THE
possessions, amongst the many which occur
in the minutes of the council, and the nabob’s
letters which I have already inserted. To
the latter I shall add one, as it shows how
easily the nabob was led away by every
groundless report, and how naturally his
apprehensions disposed him to co-operate
with the very measures which tended to an
open rupture.“t

A deputation was sent by the council from
Calcutta to wait upon the soubahdar, and
come, if possible, to a mutual understanding.
His higlmess declined receiving the deputa-
tion, unless the council recalled the troops
which he alleged had been marching from
various directions towards his capital. At
that time, Mr. Vansittart declared not a
soldier had moved from his quarters. The
soubahdar had been inspired by his officers,
who vainly supposed that by a vigorous effort
the English authority might be shaken off.
This they were the more readily led to believe,
because it was supposed by them that the
sepoys in the English service were disloyal,
and that the people were so exasperated by
the bad conduct of the company’s servants,
that they were ripe for insurrection.

W’hile the soubahdar was giving implicit
credit to every story to the disparagemeut of
the English, the latter, Mr. Vansittart (le-
clared, were quite as credulous. Even the
council believed representations made to them
that the soubahdar had issued orders for all
the mulberry-trees to be cut down, in order
to destroy the silk trade; and for all the cot-
ton plants to be uprooted, in order to destroy
the trade in white cloths. This belief was
grounded upon the supposition, that as the
English refused to pay duties except on salt,
the trade with them was valueless to his
highness, and no motive for desiring their
presence in India any longer remained.
The governor treated those rumours as idle
and absurd, but the council resolved to act
upon them, and to adopt Violent measures,
which the governor could only restrain to a
certain degree by his authority. The whole
behaviour of the council in these matters
appears upon the evidence of the minutes in
council to be what the governor described it,
“scandalous and indecent.” In fact, the in-
terest of the company, national honour, the
faith of treaties, were all lost sight of in order
to accomplish what the grasping avarice of
the majority of the council desired. One
thing only may be alleged as plausible in
behalf of the majority of the council. The
president himself (Mr. Vansittart) traded on
his private account, and the council believed

* Mzrratirc of [11/3 Transactions in Bengal, from 1760
[01764. M " i

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [Guam LXXVI.
that in matters of revenue the soubahdar
favoured him, and therefore it was his private
interest that the company and individual
members of council should be subject to duties
from which he, by private management, was
able to have himself exempted. The president
solemnly denied the truth of these imputa-
tions. There were various circumstances
which, at all events, naturally led the Council
to suspect that the private interests of the
governor were adverse to those of the council.

Mainly, by the governor's influence, the
soubahdar consented to receive the deputa-
tion from the council, notwithstanding his
previous refusals. He, however, intimated
plainly his opinion that the interview could
result in no good, as it would be impossible
for him to exercise any authority as soubahdar
of Bengal while the company treated his
orders with contempt, and plundered and ill-
used his people as they pleased. “is high-
ness could see nothing to negotiate about,
for he declared that the English had not
left him anything worth the trouble. If they
wished to seize upon what belonged to some
one else, they had better do so without a
deputation to him; or, if the appearance of
negotiation was a formality necessary to
English measures, he thought they might
find somebody else with whom to go through
that form, and spare him the torment. Such
was the reasoning of his highness, and the
bitter irony it contained vexed the English
excessively. The nabob, however, met the
deputation; but, meanwhile, Ellis, the chief
of the English factory at Patna, and the other
agents of the company there, did everything
in their power to bring on a war for their
own private objects, so that the interview
began under most inauspicious circumstances.
The deputation conducted itself haughtily;
the soubahdar petulantly. His highness
equivocated and evaded, and it afterwards
appeared that he preferred the chances of'
war to compliance with the demands made
to him. The deputation effected nothing.
They showed no disposition to concede any-
thing to conciliate the nizam, as he liked to
call himself, and his exasperation was in-
creased by their visit. While they were yet
at the court of the soubahdar, Some boats
with arms arrived on their way to Patna for
the use of the English troops there. These
were seized, and his highness refused to re-
lease them, grounding his refusal on the
alleged belief that the arms and ammunition
were intended to enable the garrison near
Patna to attack that city. He also refused a
new demand, that an English agent should
reside permanently at his durbar, to prevent
disputes from arising for the future. The

Cur. LXXVIJ

grand point of difference was the demand of
the English that no native merchant. should
be exempted from heavy duties, while they
should be exempt from imposts of every kind
except such as they chose to grant.

It soon became evident that the soubahdar
had been quietly, but vigorously, making pre-
parations for war, but had resolved not to
begin the conflict; his purpose being to enter
upon hostilities as soon as he was attacked.
The council eagerly seized the occasion
presented by the irritated and ill-advised con-
duct of the soubahdar, to force matters to an
extreme pass. The governor disapproved of
these proceedings, but did not display either
the wisdom or decision requisite for coun-
teracting them. “'arren Hastings alone with-
stood the self—assertion, insolence, and aggran-
dizement of the council. At every meeting
he was eloquent on the side of moderation
and justice, and his protests against the folly
and tyranny of the council are masterpieces
of Indian policy and statesmanship. “'hile
yet the deputation remained at the court of
the soubahdar, he began to offer a series of
vindictive provocations which could not fail
to issue in war. His “chokies” insulted the
deputation of council. Bodies of horse were
thrown out for the purpose of intercepting
their departure, and finally the sepoys in the
English service were tampered with by the
soubahdar’s agents,until they deserted by hun-
dreds; and the native officers, so much relied
upon by the English of that day, were amongst
the first who yielded to seduction. This last
circumstance compelled the English at once to
take measures which the soubahdar considered
as nearly tantamount to a declaration of hosti-
lities. He demanded that the English troops
should be removed from Patna to Calcutta,
or to his own immediate neighbourhood, and
informed the deputation that peace or war
depended upon compliance with that demand.
It became obvious that he had never seriously
intended to negotiate on the subject of the
duties, and that his compliant policy was
merely to gain time to secure his military
position and ally to himself the talookdars
and zemindars of his own and contiguous ter-
ritories. His next step was to seize Mr. Hay,
as security for certain monies which he in-
sisted the English possessed, but which be-
longed to him. After this, he proposed in a
letter to the governor, that if Mr. Ellis were
removed from the chiefship of the factory at
Patna, he would negotiate. Before the g0-
vernor would introduce the subject to the
council, Mr. Ellis commenced hostilities, and
soon after the chiefs of other English fac-
tories adopted aggressive measures, on the
plea of necessity. It was new plain that

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

289

war had begun. Mr. Ellis, the chiefat Patna,
backed by the majority of the council at Cal-
cutta, had begun it. The next step was to de-
pose Meer Cossim by order of council, and pro-
claim another souhahdar in his room. The
choice of the council fell upon their old friend
and enemy, Meer Jaffier. The whole council
favoured this action, except the governor and
Mr. Hastings. Advices arrived from Mr.
Amyatt from Mongheer, where the soubahdar
was, that an Armenian general had marched
at the head of a strong reinforcement of
“ horse, foot, and cannon,” to Patna, and that
“ the Armenians solely managed the soubahdar,
and urged the disputes.” Mr. Amyatt left
the court of the soubahdar under passport,
and advised the council of his arrival at
Sootee en route for Calcutta, where he was
daily expected. Soon after a letter reached
the governor from Cossinibazar, informing
the council that as Mr. Amyatt was passing
the city of Moorshedabad, he was attacked by
the soubahdar’s forces and killed, with several
other gentlemen ; his escort having been made
prisoners. The day after this intelligence
was received, some servants and soldiers who
had escaped during the skirmish of Moor-
shedabad arrived at Calcutta. They brought
the information that; the English at Patna had
begun the war, and the attack on Mr. Amyatt
at Moorshehabad was in reprisal. The coun-
cil at once, July 7th, 1763, nominated Meer
Jafi'ier to the soubahdarship, declaring war
against Meer Cossim.

On the 8th of July, a letter from Meer
Cossim confirmed the rumours of active hosti-
lities at Patna. 0n the 24th of June, the
English suddenly attacked the city of Patna
at night, and took it by surprise. As soon
as the capture was made, a plunder of the
city commenced, and so great was the disorder
of the British, that a small body of the son-
bahdar’s troops entered the city at noon next
day and retook it, putting the plunderers to
the sword. The gentlemen of the factory,
with the scattered remains of the army, retired
across the river, and were all destroyed or
captured. The letter of the soubahdar was
one of sneering irony, in which he makes the
defeat of the violent gang of robbers who
managed the affairs of the company at Patna,
a ground for demanding the restitution of all
the lands of the soubahdarree surrendered by
him to the company on his accession to power.
His highness conceived himself to be strong
enough to make any demands, as the force at
Patna constituted the chief English garrison
of Bengal, and formed a considerable portion of
the whole of the English army in that presi-
dency.

The following extract from the letter of the

290 HISTORY OF THE

soubahdar showed how hopeless it would have
been to maintain any further relations With
him :—

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob Cossim
Allee Cawn to the Governor. Dated June
28, 1763.

In my heart I believed Mr. Ellis to be my inveterate
enemy, but from his actions, I now find he was inwardly
my friend, as appears by this step, which he has added to
the others. Like a night robber, he assaulted the Kella
of Patna; robbed and plundered the bazar, and all the
merchants and inhabitants of the city, ravaging and slay-
ing from the morning to the third pahr (afternoon).
When I requested of you two or three hundred muskets
laden in boats, you would not consent to it. This unhappy
.man, in consequence of his inward friendship,* favoured
me, in this fray and slaughter, with all the muskcts and
cannon of his army, and is himself relieved and eased
from his hurthen. Since it was never my desire to injure
the affairs of the company, whatever loss may have been
occasioned by this unhappy man to myself, in this tumult,
I pass over: but you, gentlemen, must answer for any
injury which the company’s affairs have suffered; and
since you have unjustly and cruelly ravaged the city, and
destroyed the people, and plundered effects to the value
of lacs of rupees; it becomes the justice of the com-
pany to make reparation to the poor, as formerly was
done for Calcutta. You, gentlemen, are wonderful friends;
having made a treaty, to which you pledged the name of
Jesus Christ, you took from me a country to pay the ex-
penses of your army, with the condition, that your troops
should always attend me, and promote my affairs. In
effect, you keep up a force for my destruction ; since
from their hand, such events have proceeded, I am en-
tirely of opinion, that the company should favour me in
causing to be delivered to me the rents for three years of my
country. Besides this, for the violences and oppressions
exercised by the English gomastahs for several years past,
in the territories of the Nizamut, and the large sums ex-
torted, and the losses occasioned by them, it is proper and
just that the company make restitution at this time. This
is all the trouble you need take; in the same manner as
you took Burdwan and the other lands, you must favour
me in resigning them.

Mr. Vansittart observes in his narrative,
that “ This was followed by a note from the
gentlemen at Cossimbazar, dated the night of
the 4th of July, informing us, that the factory
was surrounded by a numerous force, and
that they expected an attack the next morn-
ing.”

Mr. Hastings had been so disgusted with
the trickery, selfishness, and injustice of the
council, that he had resolved to resign his high
and honourable place as a member of council.
His patriotism, however, became influenced by
what he called “the unparalleled acts of bar-
barity and treachery” with which, on the part
of the nabob, the war had Opened; and he re-
solved to give his energies to carry the conflict
to a successful issue. It is surprising that Mr.
Hastings should consider the acts of Meer
Cossim, however barbarous and treacherous,

_ unparalleled in Indian warfare; they were

. * This language is used sarcastically, and betrays the
intense bitterness of the soubahdar.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXVI.
simply in character with Mohammedan usages
in war in India and everywhere else. Meer
Jaffier left Calcutta 011 the 11th of July,
1763, to join the army. The detachment he
accompanied was commanded by Major “'il-
liams. On the 19th, the soubahdar’s army
engaged the British, for the purpose of de-
fending the Fort of Kutwal, which, it was
supposed, might be best defended in the open
field. The troops of his highness were de-
feated, and Kutwal was abandoned. On the
26th the British stormed the lines of Moote-
gil, and captured Moorshedabad; about fifty
pieces of cannon were among the trophies.
On the 2nd of August a perilous exploit was
performed by the English. They crossed a.
dangerous ravine defended by strong outposts
of the enemy. These outposts were driven
back, and the British, advancing, found the
grand army of the soubahdar drawn up in
line of battle upon the plains of Geriah, near
Sootee. The British attacked with their
usual spirit, and the enemy resisted with un~
usual obstinacy. Fora time the battle ap-
peared to be equal. In a desperate charge
by the Bengalecs, the English line was
broken, and some of their cannon captured.
The Rajah Shitabroy distinguished himself
with his accustomed gallantry 011 the side of
the English, encouraging the native troops
in their service. The British having rc-
covered the temporary reverse, which had
nearly cost them the loss of the day, they re—
newed their assaults with persevering valour,
until at last the exhausted enemy fled, leav-
ing the field covered with their slain, and all
their cannon and baggage as prizes to the
victors. An immediate result of the victory
was the capture of a hundred and fifty boats
freighted with grain and rice.

The soubahdar’s forces continued their dis-
orderly flight to Ouhtanulla, a fort between
the river and a chain of hills. This place
was defended by an intrenchrnent, upon
which were mounted a hundred pieces of can-
non. The ditch was more than fifty feet wide,
of considerable depth, and full of water. In
front was a quagmire. The only ground
upon which an assaulting force Could ap-
proach was near the river, for the space of
one hundred yards. The English there
planted batteries and raised works, with the
most studied appearance of conducting a re—
gular system of approaches. The object of
these proceedings was to draw off the enemy’s
attention from the real plan of attack. On
the 5th of September a fire was opened from
the false attack, and such demonstrations made
as drew away a large body of the besieged to
that quarter; while the English in another
direction began the assault. There were

 

 

 

 

CHAP. LXXVIJ

troops enough in that quarter to make an
obstinate defence; and only after a furious
and sanguinary contest were the English
masters of the fort and all its appurtenances
of war.

The British have made few conquests in India
so creditable to their arms. Their entire force
scarcely exceeded three thousand; the enemy
were many times that number, and the Eng-
lish officers computed them at sixty thousand.
The English having secured the place, ad-
vanced to Mongheer. After every victory,
they obtained some native adherents to their
standard, as they professed to fight for the
restoration of a former sovereign, who,
although not popular, had adherents.

Meer Cossim fled, leaving a garrison to
defend his capital. Here he proved himself
to be as bloody-minded as his predecessors,
and as Mohammedan rulers generally are.
He put to death several of his own relations,
who, be supposed, might be made instruments
in the hands of the English in consolidating
a. rival authority. Ramnarain was drowned
with a bag of sand round his neck.

As the soubahdar fled to Patna, his thirst
for blood increased. The two bankers, Set
or Seit, the richest men in India, were both
murdered in a manner horribly vindictive.
His vengeance pursued their dead bodies,
which were given to wild beasts and birds
of prey, lest their friends should raise for
them a funeral pyre, after the manner of the
Hindoos. “'hen the English army advanced,
their bones were found in a retired apartment
of a house, where they had been secreted by
some of their co-religionists.

The English conquered Mongheer, but not
until a practicable breach was made. The war
under Adams had been conducted humanely.
After the victory at Oodwa Nulla, in which
the abettors of. the soubahdar were so sig-
nally defeated, one thousand prisoners were
made, among whom were many Mohammedan
gentlemen, officers in the army of his high-
ness. The whole of these Adams generously
released.

0n the 9th of September, as the major ad-
vanced to Patna, the soubahdar wrote to him
thence, threatening to kill all the English who
had fallen into his hands, if the major did not
abandon the war. That officer replied that
the war must be carried on whatever were
the consequences, and that it rested with his
highness whether it should be waged hu-
manely or become a war of sanguinary repri-
sals. The governor wrote to the same effect,
but neither the mild remonstrance of the latter
nor the threats of the commander had any
weight with Cossim. He ordered all the pri-
soners in his power to be massacred. Ellis,

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

291

by whom the war had been provoked, and
who signally merited retribution, with four-
teen of the company’s civil and military ser-
vants, various other gentlemen, and a bun-
dred private men, were murdered. On a
previous page the gallantry of Dr. Fullerton
was recorded. This officer was the only
person who escaped the massacre. He saw
Meer Cossim immediately afterwards, and he
wrote to the board a letter, from which the
following is an extract :—-“ Mr. Ellis, with
the rest of the gentlemen, were inhumanly
butchered by Shimroo,i6 who came that even-
ing to the place with two companies (he had
the day before sent for all the knives and
forks from the gentlemen); he surrounded the
house with his people, and went into a little
outer square, and sent for Messrs. Ellis, Hay,‘|‘
and Lushington, and with them came six
other gentlemen, who were all terribly mangled,
and cut to pieces, and their bodies thrown
into a well in the square, and it filled up;
then the sepoys were sent into the large
square, and fired on the gentlemen there, and,
rushing upon them, cut them into pieces, in
the most inhuman manner, and they were
thrown into another large well, which was
likewise filled up. On the 7th, the nabob
sent for me, and told me to get myself in
readiness to go to Calcutta, for that though
he had been unlucky in the war (which he
asserted with great warmth, had not been of ‘
his seeking, nor had he been the aggressor,
reproaching the English with want of fidelity,
and breach of treaty), yet he said, he had still
hopes of an accommodation; he asked me
what I thought of it. I told him, I made no
doubt of it. When some of his people, who
were present, mentioned the. affair of Mr.
Amyatt’s death; he declared that he had
never given any orders for killing Mr. Am-
yatt; but, after receiving advice of Mr. Ellis's
having attacked Patna, he had ordered all
his servants to take and imprison all the Eng-
lish in the provinces, wherever they could find
them; he likewise added, that if a treaty was
not set afoot, he would bring the king, the
Mahrattas, and Abdallees, against us, and so
ruin our trade, &c. He had finished his
letters, and ordered boats, and a guard to
conduct me; when, upon the advice of some
of his people, he stopped me, and said there
was no occasion for me to go. After his send-
ing for me at first, he ordered the sepoys, in

“ A Frenchman in Meer Cossim’s service. His
highness had engaged with the English to keep no French
in his service.

1' This gentleman had been one of the deputation from
the council; his detention and murder was an act of bar-
barous pertidy; which classes the name of Meer Cossim
with Suraj-ad-Dowlah, Meeran, and others of the most
bloody and barbarous Mohammedan rulers in India.

292 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXVII.

whose charge I was, to go to their quarters; broy, Mr. Ellis, and Major Carnac, without
two moguls, and twelve hircarras to attend 3 the knowledge of the governor, had carried on
me, but to let me go about the city where I secret correspondence with the emperor, and
pleased. I then applied for liberty to stay at his vizier, with the object of the soubahdar's
the Dutch factory, which was granted. I dethronement. For this purpose Ellis's com-
applied to Mehdee Allee Khan, for his interest plaints of fictitious grievances were made to
in behalf of the gentlemen in the Chelston, the council; and temptations were created by
who were seven in number, and were not him for the soubahdar, or his officers, to do
killed till the 11th of October; but when he some precipitate acts which would necessitate
was petitioned about them, he gave no answer; war. It is difficult not to believe that Ellis
but still sent orders to Shimroo, to cut them and others, his equals in rank, were bribed by
off. I likewise applied to Allee Ibrahim the Nabob of Oude, to bring about, if possible,
Cawn, who intereeded for them ; but he gave a rupture between the English and the son-
him no answer either, though I was present bahdar. that the latter might be committed to
when Ibrahim Cawn petitioned for them. On hostilities, and some members of the house of
the 14th of October, on the approach of our Delhi, or the vizier himself, be enabled,
army, Cossim Allee decamped with his troops through the turmoil, to reach the nmsnid.
in great confusion, and marched as far as He was, at all events, anxious for his own
Fulwarree, five coss to the Westward of the purposes, both to weaken the power of the
city. The hircarras that were with me, hav— English and keep the soubahdarree of Bengal
ing no orders about me, I gave them some disturbed. Mr. Ellis, and his Confederates in
money, which made them pretty easy. On intrigue, had known this well, but all con-
the 25th, after giving money to a jemautdar, siderations seemed to be 10st sight of by them,
that had the guard to the westward of the except the accumulation of money by what-
Dutch factory, by the river side, I set out in ever means.
a small pulwar, and got safe to the boats, under Patna was stormed on the 6th of November,
command of Captain “'edderburn, that were and the war against Mcer C’ossim was prose-
lying opposite to the city, on the other side of cuted with renewed ardour. The British,
the river, and at eleven o'clock that night under Major Adams, met with their usual suc-
arrived at the army, under the command of cess. In five months, after the formal com-
Major Adams, lying at Jonsy.” mencement of hostilities, Meer Cossim was
Of course nothing can be written in extenu- driven beyond the Caramnassa. The loss of
ation of this foul and wholesale murder, re- the British in accomplishing this success was
sembling so much the sanguinary horrors of very small, except at the massacre at Patna.
Cawnpore, when, in 1857, the Nana Sahib Several gallant officers, however, fell in diffe-
committed a similar massacre ; but the sou- rent places, and the senior member of council,
bahdar had much to provoke revenge. His Mr. Amyatt, perished at Moorshedabad, as
hoarded wrongs found an escape when the already related, with several other civilians of
very persons who were the chief instruments position. Meer Cossim, accompanied by the
in inflicting them were in his power. He well odious Shimroo, sought the protection of the
knew that through his enemy the Rajah Shita- Nabob of Oude.

 

CHAPTER LXXVII.

WAR WITH THE NABOB OF OUDE—llI'IN OF MEER COSSIM—DEATII 01“ )IEER J:\l"l"Il‘ll{~—'I‘HE
ENGLISH PLACE NUIUM-AD-DOWLAH UPON THE MI'SNID OF BENGAL—HUMILIATION
OF NI'NDCOOMAR, 'l‘IlE MINISTER OF JAFFIER—DlSORGANIZATION OF ENGLISH AFFAIRS
IN BENGAL—CORRI'PT PRACTICES OF THE COUNCIL—.~\PI’OINT.\1ENT OF CLIVE AS
GOVERNOR—NEW SETTLEMENT OF AFFAIRS IN BENGAL.

MEER JAFFIER was now once more upon the ' demands which had been previously made
musnid of the swbahdarree. It is important. _ upon Meer Cossim. At heart the former ap-
to review the terms upon which he was rein- ‘ proved the policy of the latter. Meer Jafiier
stated. Before he left Calcutta to join the ; regarded the conduct of the English through-
army, upon which devolved the task of ex- E out as unjust, and contrary to the treaty.
polling his son-in-law, and exalting him- i After all his intrigues with the council, he
self, considerable negotiations were necessary 5 betrayed no eagerness to reach the throne of
to induce him to comply with some of the ‘I which his relative was so soon to be deprived.

hen“ _.

Uiiar. LXXVIIJ

The council, pressed by the exigencies of the
crisis, gave way to his demands, and a treaty
was finally made. As this formed the basis of
the relations of the English to the soubahdar
of Bengal, so long as such an officer was per-
mitted to exist, it will throw light upon the
future proceedings of both parties on the part
of the company.

We engage to reinstate the nabob Meer Mohammed
Jaflier Cawn in the soubahdarree of the provinces of
Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, by the deposal of Meer Mo-
hammed Cossim Cawu; and the effects, treasure, jewels,
&c., belonging to Meet Mohammed Cossim Cawn, which
shall fall into our hands, shall be delivered up to the
nahob afore-named.

0n the part of the A'abob.

First, That the treaty which I formerly concluded with
the company, upon my accession to the nizamut, engaging
to regard the honotu‘ and reputation of the company, their
governor, and council, as my own, granting perwannahs
for the currency of the company’s trade, the same treaty
I now confirm and ratify.

Secondly, I do grant and confirm to the company, for
dcfraying the expenses of their troops, the chuclas of
Burdwan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong, which were before
coded for the same purpose.

Thirdly, I do ratify and confirm to the English the
privilege granted them by their firman, and several hus-
bulhookums, of carrying on their trade by means of their
own dustucks, free from all duties, taxes, and impositions,
in all parts of the country, excepting the article of salt,
on which a duty of two and a half per cent. is to be levied
on the Rowana or Hoogly market price.

Fourtlily, I give to the company half the saltpetre
which is produced in the country of 0oorneea, which
their gomastahs shall send to Calcutta, the other half
shall he collected by my fougedar, for the use of my
offices; and I will suffer no other person to make pur-
chases of this article in that country.

I‘f'ihly, In the chucla of Silhet, for the space of five
years, commencing with the Bengal year 1170, my fou-
gcdar, and the company’s gomastah, shall jointly prepare
chunam, of which each shall defray half the expenses;
and half the chunam so made shall be given to the com-
pany, and the other half shall be for my use.

Sixthly, I will maintain twelve thousand horse and
twelve thousand foot in the three provinces; and if there
should be occasion for more, the number shall be in-
crcased proportionably to the emergency. Besides these,
the force of the English company shall always attend me
when they are wanted.

Seventhly, Wherever I shall fix my court, either at
)loorshedabad or elsewhere, I will advise the governor
and council; and whatever number of English forces I
may have occasion for, in the management of my affairs,
1 will demand them, and they shall he allowed me; and
an English gentleman shall reside with me, to transact all
affairs between me and the company ; and a person shall
also reside on my part at Calcutta, to negotiate with the
Ef?‘~'[l‘llOl‘ and council.

Eighthly, The late perwannah issued by Cossim Allee
(fawn, granting to all merchants the exemption of all
duties, for the space of two years, shall be reversed and
called in, and the duties collected as before.

Ninthly, I will cause the rupees coined in Calcutta to
pass in every respect equal to the siccas of Moorshedabad,
without any deduction of batta; and whosoever shall de-
mand hatta shall be punished.

'I‘enthly, I will give thirty lacs of rupees to defray all
the expenses and loss accruing to the company from the

VOL. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

293

war and stoppage of their investment; and I will reim~
burse to all private persons the amount of all such losses,
proved before the governor and council, as they may sus-
tain in their trade in the country; if I should not be able
to discharge this in ready money, I will give assignments
of land for the amount.

Eleventhly, I will confirm and renew the treaty which
I formerly made with the Dutch.

'l‘welfthly, If the French come into the country, I will
not allow them to erect any fortifications, maintain forces,
or hold lands, zemindarrees, 850., but they shall pay tribute,
and carry on their trade as in former times.

Thirteenthly, Some regulations shall be hereafter settled
between us, for deciding all disputes which may arise
between the English agents and gomastahs in the different
parts of thc country, and my officers.

In testimony whereof, we the said governor and council
have set our hands, and affixed the seal of the company
to one part- hereof; and the nabob afore-named hath set
his hand and seal to another part hereof; which were
mutually done and interchanged at Fort William, the 10th
day of July, 1764.

HENRY VANSITTART,
JOHN CARNAC,
WILLIAM BILLERS,
J onx CARTIER,

Demands made on the part of the Aruba?)
JIIcer Jafier, to the Gorernor and Council,
at the time of signing the Treaty.

WARREN HASTINGS,
RANDOLPH Mannior,
HUGH WATTS.

First, I formerly acquainted the company with the
particulars of my own affairs, and received from them re-
peated letters of encouragement with presents. I now
make this request, that you will write in aproper manner
to the company, and also to the King of England, the
particulars of our friendship and union ; and procure for
me writings of encouragement, that my mind may be as-
sured from that quarter, that no breach may ever happen
between me and the English; and that every governor
and councillor, and chief, who are here, or may hereafter
come, may be well disposed and attached to me.

Secondly, Since all the English gentlemen, assured of
my friendly disposition to the company, confirm me in
the nizamut; I request, that to whatever I may at any
time write, they will give their credit and assent, nor
regard the stories of designing men to my prejudice, that
all my affairs may go on with success, and no occasion
may arise for jealousy or ill-will between us.

’l‘hirdly, Let no protection be given, by any of the
English gentlemen,to any of my dependents who may fly
for shelter to Calcutta, or other of your districts; but let
them be delivered up to me on demand. I shall strictly
enjoin all my fougedars and aumils, on all accounts to
afford assistance and countenance to such of the gomastahs
of the company as attend to the lawful trade of their fac-
tories ; and if any of the said gomastahs shall act other-
wise, let them be checked in such a manner as may be an
example to others.

Fourthly, From the neighbourhood of Calcutta to
Hoogly, and many of the perganahs, bordering upon
each other, it happens, that, on complaints being made,
people go against the talookdars, rciats, and tenants of’
my towns, to the prejudice of the business of the circar;
wherefore, let strict orders be given, that no peons be sent
from Calcutta on the complaint of any one, upon my
talookdars or tenants; but on such occasions, let appli-
cation bc made to me, or the naib of the fongedarree of
Hoogly, that the country may be subject to no loss or
devastation. And if any of the merchants and traders
which belonged to the buxbunder and azimgunge, and
have settled in Calcutta, should be desirous of returning
to Hoogly, and carrying on their business there as for-
merly, let no one molest them. Chandernagore, and the

Q Q

294: HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

French factory, was presented to me by Colonel Clive, and
given by me in charge to Ameer Beg Cawn. For this
reason, let strict orders be given, that no English gentle-
men exercise any authority therein, but that it remain as
formerly, under the jurisdiction of my people.

Fifthly, Whenever I may demand any forces from the
governor and council for my assistance, let them be im-
mediately sent to me, and no demand made on me for
their expenses.

The demands of the nabob Shujaaool Moolk Hissam,
o Dowla. Meer Mohammed Jaffier Cawn Behader
Mohabnt Jung, written in five articles. We the
president and council of the English company do
agree, and set our hands to, in Fort William, the
10th of July, 1763.

* Signed, &c.

Mr. Vansittart, as governor, carried out the
policy of the committee. That policy, although
successful, brought several members of their
own body to a miserable end, and involved
their chief partizans in similar destruction.
Mr. Vansittart resolved to leave Bengal, but
was detained by the dangerous intrigues of
Meer Cossim beyond its borders, and the
desire of the council that he should remain
until the province was settled down in orderly
government and external peace. VYhen Meer
Cossim crossed the Caramnassa, the emperor
and his vizier were encamped near Allahabad.
Thither the expelled Viceroy repaired, and
was ostentatiously received. He importuned
his majesty to make war upon the English,
but the vizier did not immediately act upon
such counsel. He then begged the vizier
himself, as Nabob of Oude, to make a grand
effort for the expulsion of the English. His
highness excused himself on the ground of
disturbances in Bundelcund. Meer Cossim
adroitly offered to put them down. His offer
was accepted, and he was more fortunate than
in his war with the English. So pleased was
the nabob with the courage and energy of the
exiled prince, that he agreed to march upon
Bahar, and endeavour to deprive the English
of that province. Meanwhile, the emperor
and vizier pretended to the English that Meer
Cossim should be formally stripped of his
power by an imperial decree, and his person
surrendered to the governor of Bengal. The
English, doubtful of the good faith of the
native princes, marched troops to the banks of
the Caramnassa. Several complications arose
of a serious nature to frustrate their military
plans. Major Adams resigned his command,
and soon after died. Major (late Captain)
Knox was compelled also to resign by ill
health. Major Carnac at last was placed in
charge of the army. The sepoys, who had
for some time shown a mutinous spirit on
occasions when their grievances were ima-
ginary, or if real, before there was time for
their investigation and redress, deserted in

* Majors Adams and Carnac absent.

 

[Gnarf LXXVII.

great numbers to the enemy, and had the
cause of the Nabob of Oude more at heart
than those whose salt they eat. Open dis-
obedience of orders was common on the part
of those who did not desert. This caused ex-
treme trepidation at Calcutta, and means were
taken to soothe the irritation of the hircling
soldicry. There were, however, a number of
French descrters in the English pay, and
these fomented the disturbance, so as almost
to destroy the British sepoy contingent. It
was found that Meer J affier was as much dis—
inclined to go to war for English purposes as
Mecr Cossim himself could have been, and
was in fact a less manageable instrument
against foreign aggression. Major Carnac
was ordered by the council to cross the Caram-
nassa and attack the enemy; but with his
disaffected French and scpoys, he could not
pursue a bold policy, and therefore acted only
upon the defensive, which tended to dis-
hearten such of the scpoys as remained obe-
dient, who had been accustomed to see the
English strike boldly for power. At length
Carnac retreated to Patna. The enemy fol—
lowed, and on the 13th of May, 1764, attacked
the British. A long conflict ensued, and at the
close of day the enemy was repulsed. The
emperor offered to negotiate on the basis of
Meer Jafficr’s surrender of Bahar. The
English not only refused, but demanded that
Meer Cossim should be given up, the French
(or Swiss as he was supposed by some to be)
murderer Shimroo, and the sepoy deserters.
Nothing came of these mutual demands.
Major Oarnac menacing the enemy’s flank, he
precipitately retired into Oudc.

The council at Calcutta, mischievous and
incompetent as ever, censured Major Carnac
because he did not lead the army, which had
fought so well on the 13th of May, into the
enemy’s territory. That experienced com-
mander declared that only by expedients and
extraordinary vigilance could disaffection in
his ranks be subdued, and had he led his army
into Oude it would have disbanded. The
fact was, the Mohammedan sepoys regarded
both the Emperor and Nabob of Oudc with
a religious reverence, which made them un-
willing to fight against them; yet, on the
day of battle, the esprit dc corps common to
soldiers kept them in action until victory was
obtained: many who fought well deserted
after. Major Carnac was unjustly and un-
wisely superseded, and the command given to
Major Munro. Happily this officer was com-
petent to the duty imposed upon him, but it
might have been otherwise, and the injustice
to Major Carnac, like other acts of the council,
might have been followed by a speedy retri—
bution. Major Munro found the whole of the

 

 

Cusp. LXXVII.]

native force at Patna mutinous. The major
adopted the policy of his predecessor, by first
endeavouring to subdue the mutinous state of
his own forces before attacking those of the
enemy. The day he assumed the command,
a battalion of sepoys with their arms and ac-
coutrements set out to join the enemy. One
hundred Europeans, a company of sepoys,
whose officers reported them trustworthy, and
two field-pieces were sent in pursuit of the
deserters. They were overtaken by night
while asleep, and not having placed sentinels,
were surprised, disarmed, and taken prisoners.
Fifty were selected for execution, and were
blown away from guns. This deprives them
of caste, and‘is regarded as a most severe
punishment. The native troops in garrison
refused to allow more than four of the men to
be executed, but Munro loaded his guns with
grape, drew up his Europeans in the intervals
between his ordnance, and commanded the
sepoys to ground their arms; the Whole party
originally sentenced were executed, and the
mutiny was completely quelled. Thus early
in the history of our occupation of India was
mutiny displayed, and thus early was it shown
by a. man of vigour how to suppress it.

On the 15th of September, active opera-
tions commenced. The enemy disputed the
passage of the Scam, but were dispersed in
a masterly manner by Major Champion, an
officer acting under Munro. At Buxar,
Major Munro came up with the enemy in
full force. A grand battle was fought, and a
glorious victory obtained by the British. As
the enemy retreated, a small river, the pas—
sage of which was covered by a bridge of
boats, lay in the line of march. Before the
rear of his army had crossed, the vizier de-
stroyed the bridge and sacrificed two thousand
of his men. Munro’s opinion of this act was
afterwards given in the following terms :—
“The best piece of generalship Sujah-ad-
Dowiah showed that day; because, if I had
crossed the rivulet with the army, I would
either have taken or drowned his whole army
in the Caramnassa, and come up with his
treasure and jewels and Cossim Ali Khan’s
jewels, which, I was informed, amounted to
between two and three millions.“é Besides
those lost in the river, the battle of Buxar
cost the imperial army two thousand men left
dead upon the field of battle, many wounded
prisoners, and one hundred and thirty-three
pieces of cannon. The strength of the army
was variously estimated from forty to sixty
thousand men. The British numbered 7772
men, of whom more than eight hundred were
placed 7107's (16 combat. The English acted
with compassion to the wounded. On the

* ISL-[deuce qf' Illajor JlImzro, First RCIIJOi't-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST:

 

295

day after the battle, the major received a
letter from the emperor congratulating him
on his victory, declaring that the vizier held
him in constraint, and imploring the major to
lend him his assistance. Great was the as—
tonishment of the British commander at the

receipt of such a communication. Munro
marched towards Benares; the emperor
marched in the same direction. He found

means to communicate with the English
commander, offering to depose the N abob of
Oude and confer his territory upon the Eng-
lish, if the latter would only assist him against
the nabob, who, as his vizier, had the real
direction of affairs. He craved an interview.
The major received from Calcutta directions
favourable to the emperor, and avoided any
molestation of his own personal guards. Meer
Cossim was also anxious to escape the vizier,
who demanded payment of subsidy, and also
the emperor’s tribute, neither of which the
ex-soubahdar could pay. To convince his
inexorable persecutor of this, he laid by his
state and assumed the garb and mode of life
of a Mohammedan devotee. As this was a
reflection upon the hospitality of a Moham-
medan prince, the vizier besought Meer Cossim
to re-assume his princely style. Meanwhile,
the troops which had followed the fortunes of
the latter became clamorous for pay, and his
highness parted with his hoarded gold for the
purpose, but resolved to get rid of an army
which could be of no use to him. Shimroo, the
French or Swiss mercenary, who had been
the executioner at the massacre at Patna,
headed the rioters. This general and the
troops went over to the vizier, taking their
arms and artillery with them. Thornton re—
presents this transfer as having taken place
before the battle of Buxar ; other writers de-
scribe it as one of the consequences of that
battle.

The vizier deliberately plundered the un-
fortunate Cossim of all his valuables, except
some jewels which he secreted, and sent by a
trusty servant into the Rohilla country. Thus
one Mohammedan prince was ever ready to
rob and oppress another, while perpetually
uniting in prayers and denunciations against
the infidel. The vizier refused to fulfil his
promise of giving up Meer Cossim to the Eng-
lish. When Major Munro reached Benares, an
agent of the virtual governor of the Delhi
empire waited upon the English officer, and
opened fresh negotiations. He refused, in
his employer’s name, to deliver up Meer
Cossim, Shimroo, or any of the fugitives, but
offered to make peace and indemnify the
English for the losses they had sustained,
and for the expenses of the war. Munro
refused. Subsequently, the vizier offered to

296 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

connive at Meer Cossim’s escape from his
own custody, in such a way as that the Eng-
lish might make sure of catching him. He
also offered to have Shimroo assassinated at
an entertainment; but would not surrender
him, it being contrary to the Koran. His
excellency had no objection to a foul and
sanguinary act of treachery, provided it was
not brought under any especial prohibition of
Mohammedan casuistry — exemplifying the
way in which Mohammedanism hardened the
heart, and prepared the hands for murder,
while it made hypocrites and fanatics of its
professors.

It was found impossible to make terms, and
active hostilities were again renewed. The
English laid unsuccessful siege to Chum-
nughur; but no battle of consequence oc-
curred, and Major Munro resigned his com-
mand, and quitted India. Meanwhile, the
occupation of the musnid of Bengal by Meer
Jaftier was not productive of satisfaction to
those who placed him there. He sent to
Calcutta complaints, similar to those with
which Meer Cossim had tormented the coun-
cil; and the same sort of contests between
the officers of the soubahdar and of the com-
pany continued. Meer Jaffier protested that
it was impossible to govern Bengal while the
English asserted rights and privileges sub-
versive of all native government. The (lis-
putes with his highness were terminated by
his death, which took place in February,
1765.

There were two competitors for the vacant
government; the second son of the deceased
prince, named Nujum-ad-Dowlah, and the
infant son of the deceased Meeran. The
English recognised Nujum-ad-Dowlah, al-
though they had very little confidence in
either his integrity or ability. They there-
fore took measures to insure their power,
and, if possible, secure peace, in connection
with the accession of the new sovereign.
One of their methods for accomplishing these
objects, was to take upon them the defence of
the three provinces, on condition of the new
soubahdar paying five lacs of rupees per
mensem for the support of the army thus
employed. Meer Jaffier had done this for
several months previous to his death; but
the English desired to have a public sanction
connected with its future performance. The
next care was to obtain proper persons for
the management of the chief offices of
state. This created difficulty. Meer Jaf-
fier had been singularly attached to a man
named Nundcoomar, a most treacherous
enemy to the English. To him, well know-
ing that fact, Meer Jaffier had confided the
chief management of his affairs. Mr. Van-

 

[Cnan LXXVII.

sittart opposed the elevation of this man by
Meer Jaffier, but the latter made it a sine
9201291071 to his own acceptance of power, at
a moment when the English were glad to
obtain some influential prince to set up in
opposition to Meer Cossim. The governor
and council deemed it expedient to yield;
but the governor’s misgivings were powerful
as to the probable result.

The remarks of Mr. Vansittart, when he
reluctantly gave his consent to the exaltation
of Nundcoomar, were as follow 1—“ As to
Nundcoomar, he had hitherto made himself
remarkable for nothing but a seditious and
treacherous disposition, which had led him
to perpetrate the most atrocious acts against
our government, having been detected and
convicted by the voice of the whole board, in
encouraging and assisting our enemies in
their designs against Bengal; taking the op—

portunity of the indulgence granted him, of'

living in Calcutta, under the company’s pro-
tection, to make himself the channel for
carrying on a correspondence between the
Governor of Pondicherry, and the shah-zada,
then at war with us. During the soubahdar-
ship of Jafficr Allce Cawn, he had dis-
tinguished himself by fomenting quarrels
between him and the presidency. After
the promotion of Cossim Allee Cawn, he
became as active, but with greater success,
in inventing plots, and raising jealousies
against him. This gave him an ascendancy
over some of the members of the board, and
made him a party object; by which, and an
unparalleled perseverance, he was enabled to
set the whole community in a flame. Such
was the man whom the nabob chose for the
administration of his affairs, and whose ex-
altation to this rank, he made a condition of
his acceptance of the souhahdarship.”

It was doubtless because Nundcoomar was
likely to work skilfully in undermining the
English that he was such a favourite with
Meer Jaffier, who, at heart, hated them, and
desired to have appropriate instruments at
hand should opportunity for their expulsion
ever arise.

During the second government of Mecr
Jaftier various circumstances occurred to in-
crease the suspicious which the English en-
tertained of his chief advice, and they resolved
that this man should not stand near the throne
of Nujumsad-Dowlah. They accordingly se-
lected Mahonied Iteza Khan for the post of
chief minister to the new soubahdar. Nund-
coomar’s talents for intrigue were immediately
set to work. He, unknown to the English,
opened, communications with the court of
Delhi, and obtained thence a sumnid for the
new soubahdar, before the English had com-

 

_‘ “Arm“ _ m

 

CHAD. LXXVII.]

pleted their arrangements; thus making it ap-
pear that his highuess ascended the throne not
by English power or influence, but through the
grace of the emperor; this was a means in the
eyes of the multitude of depriving the English
of the prestige they were so ambitions to
maintain. After various skilful and successful
manoeuvres, this gifted but vicious man was
unable to do more than thwart somewhat the
designs of the English, who ultimately carried
all their arrangements into effect. The coun-
cil succeeded in gaining considerable power
in the appointment of revenue oflicers, and
thus hoped to guard against the quarrels,
which during successive reigns had disturbed
the peace of Bengal. Concerning these ar-
rangements and others into which the English
afterwards entered, a distinguished historian"
of British empire in India thus writes :—“All
these arrangements may fairly be supposed
to have had their origin in an honest zeal
for the benefit of the company by whose ser-
vants they were made, and of the country to
which they belonged. The same favourable
view cannot be taken of their conduct in
another instance. They renewed with Nu-
jum-ad-Dowlah the agreement contained in
the last treaty made with his father for con—
tinuing to the English the privilege of carry-
ing 011 the inland trade free from duties,
excepting the two and a half per cent. paid
on salt. Not only was this unreasonable and
unjust in itself, but it was in direct contra-
vention of positive orders from the company
at home. The court of directors, by letters
dated 8th February, 1764, had required the
inland trade to be discontinued. The court of
proprietors shortly afterwards, recommended
a reconsideration of the subject, with a View
to its regulation in such a manner as should
‘prevent all further disputes between the
soubahdar and the company.’ The court of
_ directors accordingly, in a letter dated 1st
June, I 704:, desired the council ofFort‘Villiam
to form, with the approbation of the 11abob—-—
in the language of the despatch, ‘with his
free will and consent, and in such a manner
as not to afford anyjust grounds of complaint’
a proper and equitable plan for carrying
on the private trade: but it is to be re-
marked, in giving these directions, the court
took occasion to express their disapprobation
of those articles in the treaty with Meer
Jaflier which provided for the immunity of
the company‘s servants from custom duties
except 011 salt, while the general exemption
granted by )[eer Cossim was to be rev er: :.ed
The Court write, these a1e teims which
appear to be so very injurious to the nabob

* Edwa1d Thornton, Esq. Blitiolt .E/npiie 2,; India.
vol. i. chap. vi. p. 470, &c.

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

297

and to the natives, that they cannot, in the
very nature of them, tend to anything but the
producing general heart-burnings and dis-
affection; and consequently there can be
little reason to expect the tranquillity in the
country can be permanent: the orders there-
fore in our said letter of the 8th of February’
—the orders directing the entire abandon-
ment of the inland trade—‘are to remain in
force, until a more equitable and satisfactory
plan can be formed and adopted.’ In the
face of these orders, the council of Calcutta
inserted in their treaty with Nujum-ad-
Dowlah, an article reserving to the servants
of the company the privilege of continuing
to trade upon the same terms as had been
granted by Meer Jaffier—terms which the
directors declared injurious to both prince and
people, and incompatible with the tranquillity
of the country. “'ell might the authority
whose orders were thus set at nought, address
those by whom the new treaty was framed
and concluded, in language of severe and
indignant reproof. In expressing their opi-
nion upon the treaty, the court, after advert-
ing to this article and to their previous orders,
say, ‘ we must and do consider what you have
done as an express breach and violation of
our orders, and as a determined resolution
to sacrifice the interests of the company and
the peace of the country to lucrative and
selfish views. This unaccountable behaviour
puts an end to all confidence in those who
made this t1 eaty ”5

“ Vi hile the private trade was thus seemed
for the benefit of the company s servants in
general, those who had been instrumental in
placing the new nabob on the throne had the
usual opportunities of promoting their own
special interests. Presents of large amount
were tendered, and though for a time the
members of council displayed a decent coyness,
they were not unrelenting: as usual on such
occasions, their scruples gave way before the
arguments of their tempters. The nabob
dispensed his wealth with a liberality be-
coming his rank. The gratitude of Mahomed
Reza Khan was manifested by the earnestness
with which he pressed a participation in his
good f01tune upon those who had bestowed
it on him , and J11ggutSeit,T anxious for the
support of the British council in aiding his
influence with the nabob, was ready, in the
spirit of commercial speculation, to purchase
it. Mr. Vansittart had retired from the
government before the death of Meer Jafiier,
and the chair was occupied by Mr. Spencer,

* Leller lo Bengal, 19th of February, 1766.

t A banker, relative of the two unfortunate persons
murdered by Meer Cossim,and successor to their vast
trade and wealth.

298 HISTORY OF THE
a gentleman who, most opportunely for him-
self, had been brought from Bombay just in
time to improve his fortune to the extent of
two lacs of rupees."

The members of council obtained large
sums by these nefarious transactions. While
these things occurred in Bengal, the war with
the vizier, as Nabob of Oude, was still waged
to the advantage of English arms. The un-
principled members of the council having
obtained such treasures by the accession
of the new soubahdar, and feeling them-
selves secure against anything the deposed
soubahdar could do, offered to make peace
with the Nabob of Oude, if he would, as an
act of justice, execute Meer Cossim and
Shimroo. This proposal shocked all who
heard of it, except those most concerned in
the infamy. The court of directors in Lon-
don were aware of the proper conduct of
Major Munro in refusing to be a party to
any treacherous act on the part of the nabob
towards these culprits, and had approved of
his principles and policy. When they heard
of this proposal coming from the council,
they believed, or affected to believe, that the
council could not have been in earnest, and
observed, in reply, “ 1f the law of hospitality
forbad his delivering them up, surely it
forbad his murdering them.”

Nothing seems to have come of this vile
project, so worthy of the men who then ruled
Bengal. The war went on. Cliumnugur,
which had so long resisted the English, sur-
rendered in February. Allahabad fell before
their arms the same month. The emperor,
who professed to desire the success of the
British, took up his residence in that imperial
city. The Nabob of Oude fled to his capital,
but after a short time abandoned Lucknow,
and sought refuge in Rohilcund. Meer
Cossim made his escape, and went in quest of
his jewels. Shimroo abandoned the vizier
when his cause was no longer prosperous, nor
his service profitable. The ultimate fate of
the nabob trembled in the balance; but the
incompetent and unsteady council knew not
what course to take, and were so occupied
with their usual occupations of plunder and
oppression within the limits of Bengal, as to
have little leisure for great questions beyond
its confines, which only affected the company
in whose employment they were, the poor
pe0p1e of the country which they oppressed,
or the honour of their own country, which
they never consulted.

Bengal was nearly ruined. Repeated revo-
lutions had unsettled the minds of men. Trade
and industry fled affrighted from such a realm
of conflict. The council, and the native rulers,
* Letter 2’0 Bengal, l9th of February, 1760.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXVII.
together, had, by their unprincipled ambition,
turned it into avast Aceldama. The directors
in London knew all this, and sought and found
a remedy. Lord Macaulay thus depicts the
state of affairs at this juncture :—-“ A great and
sudden turn in affairs was at hand. Every
ship from Bengal had for some time brought
alarming tidings; the internal misgovernment
of the province had reached such a point that
it could go no further. What, indeed, was to
be expected from a body of public servants,
exposed to temptation such as that, as Clive
once said, flesh and blood could not bear it,
armed with irresistible power, and responsible
only to the corrupt, turbulent, distracted, and
ill-informed company, situated at such a. (lis-
tance, that the average interval of sending a
dispatch, and the receipt of an answer, was
above a year and a half? Accordingly,
during the five years which followed the de-
parture of Olive from Bengal, the misgovern-
ment of the English was carried to a point
such as seems hardly compatible with the very
existence of society. The Roman proconsul,
who, in a year or two, squeezed out of a
province the means of rearng marble palaces
and baths on the shores of Campania, of
drinking from amber, of feasting on singing
birds, of exhibiting armies of gladiators, and
flocks of camel-leopards,——the Spanish vice-
roy, who, leaving behind him the curses of
Mexico, or Lima, entered Madrid with along
train of gilded coaches, and of sumpter horses,
trapped and shod with silver, were now out-
done. Cruelty, indeed, properly so called,
was not among the vices of the servants of the
company. But cruelty itself could hardly
have produced greater evils than sprang from
their unprincipled eagerness to grow rich.
They pulled down their creature, Meer J afiier.
They set up in his place another nabob named
Meer Cossim. But Meer Cossim had parts,
and a will ; and though sufficiently inclined to
oppress his subjects himself, he could not bear
to see them ground to the dust by oppressions
which yielded him no profit; nay, which de-
stroyed his revenue in the very source. The
English accordineg pulled down Meer Cossim
and set up Meer Jaffier again; and Meer
Cossim, after revenging himself by a massacre
surpassing in atrocity that of the Black Hole,
fled to the dominions of the Nabob of Oude.
At every one of these revolutions the new
prince divided among his foreign masters
whatever could be scraped together in the
treasury of his fallen predecessor. The im-
mense population of his dominions was given
up as a prey to those who had made him a.
sovereign, and could unmake him. The ser-
vants of the company obtained, not for their
employers, but for themselves, a monopoly of

 

 

 

CHAP. LXXVII.]

almost the whole of the internal trade. They
forced the natives to buy dear and sell cheap.
They insulted with impunity the tribunals,
the police, and the fiscal authorities, of the
country. They covered with their protection
a set of native dependents who ranged through
the province spreading desolation and terror
wherever they appeared. Every servant of
a British factor was armed with all the power
of his master; and his master was armed with
all the power of the company. Enormous
fortunes were thus rapidly accumulated at
Calcutta, while thirty millions of human beings
were reduced to the extremity of wretched—
ness. They had been accustomed to live
under tyranny, but never under tyranny like
this. They found the little finger of the com-
pany thicker than the loins of Suraj—ad-Dow—
lah. Under their old masters they had, at
least, one resource—when the evil became
insupportable, the people rose and pulled
down the government. But the English go-
vernment was not to be so shaken off. That
government, oppressive as the most oppressive
form of barbarian despotism, was strong with
all the strength of civilization. It resembled
the government of evil genii, rather than the
government of human tyrants. Even despair
could not inspire the soft Bengalee with con-
rage to confront men of English breed, the
hereditary nobility of mankind, whose skill
and valour had so often triumphed in spite of
tenfold odds. The unhappy race never at—
tempted resistance. Sometimes they sub-
mitted in patient misery. Sometimes they
fled from the white man as their fathers had
been used to do from the Mahratta; and the
palanquin of the English traveller was often
carried through silent villages, which the re-
port of his approach had made desolate. The
foreign lords of Bengal were naturally objects
of hatred to all the neighbouring powers, and
to all the haughty race presented a dauntless
front. The English armies, everywhere out—
numbered, were everywhere victorious. A
succession of commanders formed in the school
of Clive, still maintained the fame of our
country. It was impossible, however, that
even the military establishments of the country
should long continue exempt from the vices
which prevailed in every other part of the
government. Rapacity, luxury, and the spirit
of insuhordination, spread from the civil ser-
vice to the officers of the army. The evil con-
tinued to grow till every mess-room became
the seat of conspiracy and cabal, and till the
sepoys could be kept in order only by whole-
sale executions. At length the state of things
in Bengal began to excite uneasiness at home.
The general cry was that Clive,and Clive alone,

could save the empire which he had founded.” E

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

239

As the result of the public feeling so strongly
expressed at home, Clive was appointed “g0-
vernor and commander-in-chief of the British
possessions in Bengal,” and he set sail the
third time for India, arriving at Calcutta in
May, 1765. Scarcely had he reached the
seat of his new government when he vigor-
ously set about the reform of abuses. He
met the council, and expressed his determina-
tion to carry out a thorough and searching
reform. A vague expectation existed among
them that he would fall in with their views,
yet rumours had reached them that Clive came
out for the specific purpose of putting down
their delinquencies. J ohnstone, who was as
bold as he was hypocritical and venal,
“bearded the lion ;” but while proceeding
with his oration, Clive suddenly stopped him,
and inquired, with his characteristic hauteur
and decision, if the council intended to ques-
tion the power of the new government. The
orator murmured apologies, and the awed and
baffled conclave of robbers, which were then
dignified by the name of the council of Bengal,
remained silent and submissive, each member
alarmed as to the consequences which might
ensue to himself if Clive were resisted, or his
opinion disputed.

The reader will probably inquire where,
during the period of the serious transactions
from the restoration of Meer Jaffier to the
arrival of Clive as governor, was Warren
Hastings ?—he who so eloquently and pertina-
ciously asserted the true interests of the
company, as compatible with the honour of
England and the rights of the Bengalee.
His manly protests, and the restraint of his
influence, were renewed in 1764, when, as
stated before, he returned to England, where
he resided during the whole of the transac-
tions which had occurred. His representations
in England had great weight with the com-
pany in showing them the true state of mat-
ters in Bengal, and the importance of a new
and vigorous government of that presidency.
Other and important events were destined to
transpire before “'arren Hastings trod again
the soil of India, and took up his abode once
more in the city of palaces.

Clive, having been made an Irish peer
while in England, entered upon his duties as
governor and commander-in-chief in Bengal
with increased dignity, his new rank greatly
promoting his influence both among his coun-
trymen and the natives. He had also the
advantage of being assisted by a body of men
called the select committee. The person
among them upon whom he had most reliance
was General Carnac, the same who, as Major
Carnac, had distinguished himself so well in
Indian warfare. The council regarded the

300

select committee with great jealousy, but
Clive overbore insubordination and held on
his course.

The first subject of reform was the private
trade, which he put down. Soon after, a
complaint from the new nabob against his
chief minister, that the latter had utterly ex-
hausted the treasury to bribe or satisfy the
demands of the council, led to an investigation
which was marked by many stormy scenes,
and issued in an exposure of the corruption
of the council greater than had ever been
alleged against them, or could have been
supposed. The total disobedience of the
company’s orders were proved by these in-
vestigations to have been as flagrant as the
corruption which prompted it.

Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude,
having formed an alliance with Mulhar, a
Mahratta chief, made preparations for re-
newed hostilities against Bengal. Brigadier-
general Carnac made such arrangements as
prevented the junction of the allied forces,
and by this means defeated the scheme of the
alliance. The general fell upon a division of
the Mahratta army unexpectedly, and cut it
to pieces. Intimidated by the boldness and
energy of the exploit, the whole Mahratta
force retired towards the Jumna, whither
Carnac proceeded, attacked, and routed them.
The Nabob of Oude losing all hope of con-
tending successfully with the English, threw
himself upon their generosity. He came over
for that purpose to the camp of Carnac.

Lord Clive quitted Calcutta on the Zith of
June, 1765, and proceeded to the north-west,
in order to negotiate in person with the nabob
and with the emperor. On the 16th of Au-
gust, at Allahabad, a treaty was signed?
This was the beginning of a connection with
Oude, which, to the present day, has been
fruitful of trouble to the English. This con-
nection was forced upon the English by the
aggressive policy of Sujah-ad-Dowlah. The
English then acted in the case of Oude with
moderation, and since then greater forbear-
ance has been shown to it than to any of the
tributary native states of India, so long as it
remained in that category. The nabob re-
sisted the insertion of any clause in the treaty
for the introduction of “factories” in his do-
minions, but a stipulation for a right to trade
was, nevertheless,insisted upon. The emperor
confirmed by treaty all previous privileges pos-
sessed by the English, granted the company a
reversionary interest in Lord Clive’s jaghire,
and conferred upon it also the dewanee of
Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. The company
henceforth held the provinces on a footing su-
perior to their previous occupancy. The com-

* Vide Printed Treaties.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[Cm r. LXXVI I.

pany became in fact- the soubahdar, while they
still upheld one nominally invested with the
office. Previously, the power of the English
was greater than that of the soubahdars, but
the latter still held great authority, and a
direct command over the resources of the
country, financial and military; henceforth all
real power rested with the English. The
opinions of the select committee on this
subject were thus expressed in a letter to
the court of directors :—“ The perpetual
struggles for superiority between the nabobs
and your agents, together with the recent
proofs before us of notorious and avowed
corruption, have rendered us unanimously of
opinion, after the most mature deliberation,
that no other method could be suggested of
laying the axe to the root of all these evils,
than that of obtaining the dewanee of Bengal,
Bahar, and Orissa for the company. By es-
tablishing the power of the Great Mogul, we
have likewise established his rights; and his
majesty, from principles of gratitude, equity,
and policy, has thought proper to bestow this
important employment on the company, the
nature of which is, the collecting of all the
revenues, and after defraying the expenses
of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund
for the support of the uizamut, to remit the
remainder to Delhi, or wherever the king
shall reside or direct.”

The directors adopted the views of the
select committee, and conveyed their ap-
proval, with instructions for future policy, in
the following terms :95—

“VYe come now to consider the great
and important affair of the dewanee. “Vhen
we consider that the barrier of the country
government was entirely broke down, and
every Englishman throughout the country
armed with an authority that owned no su-
perior, and exercising his power to the
oppression of the helpless native, who knew
not whom to obey, at such a crisis, we
cannot hesitate to approve your obtaining
the dewanee for the company.

“ “'e must now turn our attention to ren-
der our acquisitions as permanent as human
wisdom can make them. This permanency,
we apprehend, can be found only in the sim-
plieity of the execution. \Ye observe the
account you give of the office and power of
the king’s dewan in former times was—the
collecting of all the revenues, and after de-
fraying the expenses of the army, and allow-
ing a sufiicient fund for the support of the
nizamut, to remit the remainder to Delhi.
This description of it. is not the office we
wish to execute; the experience we have
already had, in the province of Burdwan,

* letter to Bengal, 17th of May, 1766.

 

 

 

 

 

CnAr. LXXVIIJ

convinces us how unfit an Englishman is to
' conduct the collection of the revenues, and
follow the subtle native through all his arts
to conceal the real value of his country, to
perplex and to elude the payments. VYe
therefore entirely approve of your preserving
the ancient form of government, in the up-
holding the dignity of the soubahdar.

“\Ve conceive the office of dewan should
be exercised only in superintending the col-
lection and disposal of the revenues, which
office, though vested in the company, should
officially be executed by our resident at the
durbar, under the control of the governor
and select committee, the ordinary bounds of
which control should extend to nothing be-
yond the super-intending the collection of the
revenues and the receiving the money from
the nabob’s treasury to that of the dewannah,
or the company.

“The resident at the durbar, being con-
stantly on the spot, cannot. be long a stranger
to any abuses in the government, and is
always armed with power to remedy them.
It will be his duty to stand between the ad~
ministration and the encroachments always
to bc apprehended from the agents of the
company’s servants, which must first be
known to him; and we rely on his fidelity
to the company to check all such encroach-
ments, and to prevent the oppression of the
natives. \Ye would have his correspondence
to be carried on with the select committee
through the channel of the president. He
should keep a diary of all his transactions.
His correspondence with the natives must be
publicly conducted; copies of all his letters
sent and received be transmitted monthly to
the presidency, with duplicates and tripli-
cates, to be transmitted home, in our general
packet, by every ship.”

Mr. Aubcr observes upon the last para—
graph :——"This was the introduction of the
system of recorded check, which has since
prevailed in conducting the home administra—
tion of the India government."

{ct'ormations were as much required in the
military as in the civil affairs of the presi-
dency. In attempting to carry out these,
Lord Ilive met with a more formidable 0p-
pusition than ever from the council. At the
instigation of a general officer, Sir Robert
Fletcher, all the officers of the company’s
army conspired to resign their commissions
on a single day; so that by depriving the
army of (,xfficcrs, the governor would be com-
pelled to submit to their terms. By amazing
vigour, ability, and resolution, Clive put
down this mutiny without bloodshed. Gene-
ral Fletcher, and some of the chief delin-
quents, were cashiered; and the rest were

voL. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

301

pardoned, on profession of repentance, and
permitted to return to their duty.

“'hile Clive was reducing the army to
discipline, an opportunity was aficrded to
him of showing his zeal for their welfare.
A large legacy was left to him by Meer
Jaflier, consisting of five lacs of rupees.
Clive made over this sum to the company,
for the formation of a military fund for in-
valided officers and soldiers, and their widows.
The company accepted the trusteeship, and
passed resolutions complimenting his lord-
ship’s generosity. This act has been cen-
sured, as contrary to the covenants insisted
upon by the company with their servants,
after the government of Mr. Vansittart, that
no presents were to be received from the na-
tive governments by any of the company’s
officers. The directors having been assured
by their legal advisers that the legacy would
be received by Clive without violating the
covenants, they passed resolutions of ap-
proval of his lordship’s conduct. Clive dis-
played all his former activity during his
government. He visited the upper parts of
Bengal personally, investigating all the com-
pany’s affairs.

The health of his lordship began to suffer
from his exposure to the climate, and this
made him desirous to return. Another mo-
tive for that wish he confessed to be, that
having a numerous family, he desired to su-
perintend the education and conduct of his
children. His great wealth, which he desired
to enjoy in England, was probably as influ-
ential as any other cause of his desire to re-
turn home. The company sent an express
overland, by way of Bussorah, to induce him
to remain another season. He reluctantly
consented, and devoted his vast energies to
the great work of consolidating the pOWer of
the company.

During Lord Clive’s stay in Bahar, while
investigating the company’s affairs there, a
congress was held at Chupra. His lordship,
General Carnac, Sujah—ad‘Dowlah, the em-
peror’s chief minister, and some Jaut and
Rohilla chiefs, assembled there. A treaty,
for mutual security against the Mahrattas,
was there formed, in case those marauders
should invade the dominions of any of the
states united in the alliance. Deputies from
the Mahratta chiefs also attended at Chupra.,
who made ardent protestations of peace, and
proved that what had been construed into
hostile demonstrations was the work of the
emperor himself, who had foolishly engaged
them to escort him to Delhi.

In May, 1766, the soubahdar died. It was
well that the native government had been re-
cently placed on a new footing, as already

R R

302

described, for otherwise the death of the
soubahdar would have caused new intrigues
and disturbances. Olive concerted with the
governments of Bombay and Madras such
operations against the Mahrattas, as would in
case of fresh invasions from them effectually
check their power. Clive’s health now seri—
ously gave way, and his anxiety to return
home greatly increased. He, however, be-
lieved that the object for which he had re-
turned to Bengal had been accomplished, and
that the consequences of his departure, appre-
hended by the company would in all proba-
bility not occur.

The private trade, which Lord Clive had
apparently suppressed, was soon after renewed,
and it is scarcely to his honour that he be-
came participator in it, realizing large profits,
which he divided among his relations and
friends. He justified himself on the ground
that he personally received no benefit; but if
it enabled him to provide for his brother-in-
law and other adherents, even to his valet,
the excuse is not valid.

He quitted Bengal on the 29th of January,
1767. The career of Olive as a soldier was
now ended. Even as a statesman he had
already numbered his days; for although in
England he took a large part in parliamentary
and~India-house concerns, and was put upon
his defence by bitter and powerful enemies,
so as to compel him to be very active in
public life, he never again saw India, and
could only influence affairs there by his
opinion, given to the directors or to the
public. Probably the best estimate of his
character as a soldier and statesman, and of
his general services in India, ever made, was
that expressed by Mr. Thornton in the fol-
lowing passages of his Indian history :—
“ The reader who looks back upon the scenes
through which he has been conducted, will
at once perceive that it is on his military
character that Clive’s reputation must rest.
All the qualities of a soldier were combined
in him, and each so admirably proportioned
to the rest, that none predominated to the

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[0mm LXXVII.

detriment of any other. His personal courage
enabled him to acquire a degree ofinfluencc over
his troops which has rarely been equalled, and
which in India was before his time unknown;
and this, united with the cool and consum-
mate judgment by which his daring energy was
controlled and regulated, enabled him to effect
conquests which, if they had taken place in
remote times, would be regarded as incredible.
Out of materials the most unpromising he had
to create the instruments for effecting these
conquests, and he achieved his object where
all men but himself might have despair-ed.
No one can dwell upon the more exciting
portions of his history without catching some
portion of the ardour which led him through
these stirring scenes; no one who loves the
country for which he fought can recall them
to memory without mentally breathing honour
to the name of Clive. In India his fame is
even greater than at home, and that fame is
not his merely, it is his country’s.

“ As a statesman, Clive’s vision was clear,
but not extensive. He could promptly and
adroitly adapt his policy to the state of things
which he found existing; but none of his acts
display any extraordinary political sagacity.
Turning from his claims in a field where his
talents command but a moderate degree of
respect, and where the means by which he
sometimes sought to serve the state and
sometimes to promote his own interests give
rise to a very different feeling, it is due to
one to whom his country is so deeply indebted,
to close the narrative of his career by recur—
ring once more to that part of his character
which may be contemplated with unmixed
satisfaction. As a soldier he was pre-emi-
nently great. With the name of Olive
commences the flood of glory which has
rolled on till it has covered the wide face of
India with memorials of British valour. By
Clive was formed the base of the column
which a succession of heroes, well worthy to
follow in his steps, have carried upward to a
towering height, and surrounded with trophies
of honour, rich, brilliant, and countless."

 

 

CRAP. LXXVIII.]

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

303

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

AFFAIRS IN BENGAL DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF MR. VERELST AND MR. CARTIER—-
ARRIVAL OF WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR.

Cmvn's last act before his departure from
Bengal was to continue the select committee,
the company having empowered him either
to abolish or continue it as he deemed the
wiser course. He nominated Mr. Verelst to
succeed him as governor, assisted by Mr.
Cartier, Colonel Smith, Mr. Sykes, and Mr.
Beecher. On the 17th of February, 1767,
Mr. Verelst took the oath as governor.
Scarcely had Clive departed when matters
again fell into the former train of corruption
and insubordination. Mr. Mill gives the fol-
lowing picture of the condition of the pro—
vince :-—“ For the benefit of certain false
pretexts which imposed upon nobody, the
government of the country, as far as regarded
the protection of the people, was dissolved.
Neither the nabob nor his officers dared to
exert any authority against the English, of
whatsoever injustice and oppression they
might be guilty. The gomastahs, or Indian
agents employed by the company’s servants,
not only practised unbounded tyranny, but,
overawing the nabob and his highest order,
converted the tribunals of justice themselves
into instruments of cruelty, making them
inflict punishment upon the very wretches
whom they oppressed, and whose only crime
was their not submitting with sufiicient wil—
lingness to the insolent rapacity of those
subordinate tyrants. “‘hile the ancient admi—
nistration of the country was rendered inefi‘i-
cient, this suspension of the powers of
government was supplied by nothing in the
regulations of the English. Beyond the
ancient limits of the presidency, the company
had no legal power over the natives : beyond
these limits, the English themselves were not
amenable to the British laws; and the com—
pany had no power of coercion except by
sending persons out of the country ; a remedy
always inconvenient, and, except for very
heinous offences, operating too severely upon
the individual to be willingly applied. The
natural consequence was, that the crimes of the
English and their agents were in a great
measure secured from punishment, and the
unhappy natives lay prostrate at their feet.
As the revenue of the government depended
upon the productive operations of the people;
and as a people are productive only in pro-

 

portion to the share of their own produce
which they are permitted to enjoy; thisi
wretched administration could not fail, in:

time, to make itself felt in the company’s
exchequer.”“

Mr. Verelst’s administration, and that of ‘
Mr. Cartier, by whom he was followed, were
chiefly occupied by internal arrangement-s,
revenue, and tradexl' The Mahrattas did not
perpetrate their usual raids, and the weak
soubahdar did not give himself up to political
intrigue after the fashion of his predecessors:
This period of peace did not bring commer-
cial prosperity to the company. Their ser-
vants invented new systems of cheating them,
and of harassing the people. The company’s
servants still returned rich from Bengal after
a few years’ service, and the poverty of the
province itself increased. The condition of
the company's interests in Bengal was de-
plorable and disheartening.§ While, how-
ever, Bengal was at peace within its own
borders, there were causes at work beyond
its limits, to engage the presidency in the
work of war. The “Goorkhas ” had invaded
the territory of the Rajah of Nepaul, who was
friendly, and between whose people and the
subjects of the soubahdar and the English
there was trade. He claimed the assistance
of the soubahdar, and the English united with
his highness in affording it. The council
and the select committee had the usual as-
sumption of those bodies, and the weakness
and incompetency for warlike undertakings
which had hitherto characterised the former
body. Their plans were expensive, yet in-
adequate; rash, yet not hold; time-serving,
but neither cautious nor prudent. The ex-
pedition against the Goorkhas was abortive.

Hyder Ali, of whom the reader will be in-
formed in another chapter, became formidable
at this time, and carried war and desolation

* Governor Verelst, in his letter to the directors, im-
mediately before his resignation, dated 16th of December,
l769, says: “ We insensibly broke down the barrier be-
twixt us and government, and the native grew uncertain
Where his obedience was due. Such a divided and com-
plicated authority gave rise to oppressions and intrigues,
unknown at any other period ; the officers of the govern-
ment caught the infection, and, being removed from any
immediate control, proceeded with still greater audacity.
In the meantime, we were repeatedly and peremptorily
forbid to avow any public authority over the ofiicers of
government in our own names,” &c.

'3‘ Englis/z Government in Bengal. By Harry Verelst,
London, 1772. Thong/Its on our Acquisitions in Bengal,
London, 1771.

i Stewart’s History quengal, 18l3.

§ History of fine East India Company, London, 1793.

304 HISTORY OF THE
into the Carnatic. The Madras government
applied for aid to Bengal. The urgency of
the case was greater than the invasion of
N epaul by the Goorkhas, and assistance was
sent to such an extent as to tie the hands of
the Bengal council from aggressive proceedings
elsewhere. The council was more troubled
from the scarcity of money than from any
other means. This they attributed to the
Chinese investments, which were generally
made from the Bengal revenues. Mr. Mill
accounts for it by the large sums drained from
the country in various ways by the company’s
servants. These they, to a great extent, sent
home through the Dutch and French Com-
panics?“

On the 23rd of October, 1768, the defi-
ciency reached 663,055 rupees. The corre-
spondence between Fort William and Fort St.
George at this period presents a pitiable pic-
ture of bad financiers, incapable administra-
tors, and traders ignorant of commercial philo-
sophy. Mr. Mill attributes the poverty of the
English exchequer in Bengal mainly to the
absorption of their revenues in the expenses
of governing their newly acquired territory.
Professor Wilson denies this in the following
terms :—“ This is not warranted by the facts:
a slight examination of the general accounts
of receipts and disbursements exhibited in
the accounts of the Bengal presidency pub-
lished by the select committee shows, that
the financial difficulties experienced there
arose not from the political, but the com-
mercial transactions of the company. From
1761 to 1772 there was a surplus on the
territorial account of about £5,475,000 (the
smaller figures are purposely omitted). The
whole produce of the import cargoes was
£1,437,000, the cost value of the goods re-
mitted to England, £5,291,000, of which, there-
fore, £3,854c,000 had been provided out of
the revenue. Besides this, large remittances
for commercial purposes had been made to
other settlements, and to China, exceeding
those received by £2,358,000, and conse-
quently, exceeding the whole territorial re-
ceipt by £737,000. It is not matter of sur-
prise, therefore, that the territorial treasury
was embarrassed, nor is it to be wondered
at that the resources of the country were in
progress of diminution; the constant abstrac-
tion of capital, whether in bullion or goods,
could not fail in time to impoverish any
country however rich, and was very soon felt
in India, in which no accumulation of capital
had ever taken place, from the unsettled state
of the government, and the insecurity of pro-
perty, and the constant tendency of the popu-
lation to press upon the means of subsistence.”

* Mill, book iv. chap. vii.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXVIII.

On the 21th of December, 1769, Mr.
Verelst left the three provinces in perfect
peace, and with a less amount of jealousy
between the soubahdar and the council than
had at any previous time existedfl‘

The greatest danger of Verelst’s government
was an event which passed harmlessly away,
but which, at the beginning of his presidential
career, seriously menaced the peace of Bengal.
Shah Abdallah—instigated, it was believed,
by Meer Cossim——advanced with a powerful
army towards Delhi. The council made de-
monstrations in favour of “the king,” as his
imperial majesty was then frequently styled.
The cause of his majesty was, in fact, the
cause of the soubahdar. His majesty was
unable to cope with the Shah Abdallah ; and
was on the point of submission, when English
interposition compelled a compromise. The
shah, however, did not return to his capital of
Lahore without exacting an indemnity from
his majesty of Delhi. The return of the
marauder was harassed by the Sikhs, who
were then rising into power, and were des-
tined to hold Lahore itself as their capital
at a period not remote.

The danger of a war beyond the frontier,
as the ally of the emperor, caused the council
to urge the company at home to complete the
military establishment recommended by Lord
Clive. Mr. Verelst exerted himself in treat—
ing with the Jauts, Mahrattas, and other
native powers ; the policy upon which he pro-
ceeded having been dictated from home, the
object being to form a complete chain of the
company’s influence and dominion, from the
banks of the Caramnassa to the extremity of
the coast of the Coromandelj The vizier
(Nabob of Outle) maintained a formidable
army; and notwithstzuiding the terrible de-
feats endured by him under the government
of Mr. Vansittart, and his humiliated position
to Lord Clive, he began a new system of in-
trigues almost as soon as Mr. Verelst was
called into power. He first endeavoured, by
intimidation, to compel the King of Delhi to
surrender to him the fortress, city, and dis-
trict of Allahabad. His majesty refused to
do so, rightly judging that any attempt on the
part of his rebellious vizier to seize the coveted
territory, would bring the English upon him.
The vizier apprehending the same result
should he seize the place, had the audacity
to attempt the corruption of a British otfieer.
Colonel Smith had remained with a British
brigade at Allahabad since the Lahore rajah

had made his incursion upon the King of
* Eng/[is]; Government in Bengal. By 11. Verelst,
London, 1772.

1' British Power in India, Auber, vol. i. chap. iv.
p. 182.

 

xuflbku’y ;-.. . -. -

 

can. LXXVIII]

Delhi's dominions. The vizier repaired to
the colonel, offering a large reward, and to
swear eternal fidelity upon the Koran, if that
otlicer would co—operate in delivering the
fortress into his hands. The colonel, of
course, communicated these facts to his go-
vernment ; and measures were taken to com-
pel the vizier to reduce the army which he
maintained as the Nabob of Oude. This
purpose was effected after troublesome nego-
tiations; and menaces which, if not executed,
would have exposed the British to contempt,
but the execution of which, had the nabob
resisted, would have involved much expense
and bloodshed, and probably new warlike
combinatiOns against the British.

There was a disposition to negotiate with
the native princes under menaces, which ex-
posed the council to alternatives similar to
those which depended upon their failure with
the Nabob of Oude, had they been so unfor-
tunate as not to engage him to their demands.
There was also a disposition on the part of
the council at Calcutta to mix in petty dis-
putes, in the hope by dispossessing one weak
rajah after another of his territory, to grasp
more for the company. Among minor in—
stances of this, there was one which concerned
the Rajah of Hindooput, which very unfa-
vourably impressed the company at home.

In view of the diplomatic meddling which
so much engaged the council and Mr. Verelst,
the directors wrote a despatch which was one
of the most enlightened ever directed to India.
It is probable that the opinions of Clive and
Hastings found expression in these documents.
One was written on May the 11th, 1769, the
other in June. The following are extracts:
—“ “'e have constantly enjoined you to
avoid every measure that might lead you
into further connections, and have recom-
mended you to use your utmost endeavour
to keep peace in Bengal and with the neigh-
bourin g powers; and you, on your part, have
not been wanting in assurances of your reso-
lution to conform to these our wishes. Yet,
in the very instructions which you have given
to the deputies sent up to Sujah Dowlah with
professions of friendship, you have inserted
an article, which will not only give fresh
cause of jealousy to Sujah Dowlah, but en-
gages you likewise in disputes with powers
still more distant. “’e mean the article
whereby they are directed to apply to the
king for a grant of two or three circars,
which belonged, you say, originally to the
Eliabad province, but were unlawfully pos-
sessed, some time since, by the Hindooput
rajah. Is it our business to inquire into the
rights of the Hindooput rajah, and the usurp-
ations he may have made upon others? And,

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

305

supposing the fact to have been proved, does
such an injustice on his part give us any
claim to the disputed districts ? If the districts
in question belong to the Eliabad province,
they are a part of Sujah Dowlah's undoubted
inheritance ; and, supposing him to waive his
right, you cannot send a man nor a gun for
the defence of these new acquisitions without
passing through his country, which will be a
perpetual source of dispute and complaint.
Nor does the mischief stop here. The Hin-
d00put rajah, who, by all accounts, is rich,
will naturally endeavour to form alliances, to
defend himself against this unexpected attack
of the English. Then you will say your
honour is engaged, and the army is to be led
against other powers still more distant. You
say nothing in your letters of this very es-
sential article of your instructions to the de-
puties. In several of our letters, since we
have been engaged as principals in the politics
of India, and particularly during the last two
or three years, we have given it as our opinion,
that the most prudent system we could pursue
and the most likely to be attended with a
permanent security to our possessions, would
be to incline to those few chiefs of Hindoostan
who yet preserve an independence of the
Mahratta power, and are in a condition to
struggle with them; for so long as they are
able to keep up that struggle, the acquisitions
of the company will run the less risk of dis-
turbance. The Rohillas, the Jauts, the Nabob
of the Deccan, the Nabob of Oude, and the
Mysore chief, have each in their turn kept
the Mahrattas in action, and we wish them
still to be able to do it; it is, therefore, with
great concern we see the war continuing with
Hyder Naigue, and a probability of a rupture
with Sujah Dowlah and Nizam Ally. In such
wars, we have everything to lose, and nothing
to gain: for, supposing our operations be at-
tended with the utmost success, and our ene-
mies reduced to our mercy, we can only wish
to see them restored to the condition from
which they set out; that is, to such a degree
of force and independence as may enable
them still to keep up the contest with the
Mahrattas and with each other. It would
give 11s, therefore, the greatest satisfaction to
hear that matters are accommodated, both at
Bengal and on the coast: and in case such a
happy event shall have taken place, you will
do your utmost. to preserve the tranquillity.”

In July, 1769, the bad faith of the French
involved the council in anxieties. The French
at Chandernagore opened a deep ditch around
the town, under the pretence of repairing a
drain. This work was followed by others,
which were intended to put the place in a
position of defence, in contravention of the

306 HISTORY OF THE
eleventh article of the treaty of peace. The
English government at Calcutta remonstrated
and protested. The French carried on the
works with greater energy. The council or-
dered their destruction. The French govern-
ment made representations to the court of
London, that the works were sanitary and
not warlike, and complained bitterly of the
unreasonable jealousy of the company’s ser-
vants. Either these representations were hy-
pocritical and false, or the French government
was imposed upon by the French East India
Company. The latter supposition is not pro-
bable. The French government pretended to
have causes for complaint, as it had determined,
upon the first favourable opportunity, to en dea-
vour to regain its lost ground in the East. In
the letter of the court of directors to the council
of Bengal, dated the 27th of June, 1770, the
result of the complaint of the French court to
that of St. James is thus stated 2—“ His ma-
jesty has constituted Sir John Lindsay his
plenipotentiary for examining into the supposed
infractions of the late treaty of peace: you
will afford him the necessary information and
assistance, whereby he may be enabled to an-
swer the complaints of the French plenipo-
tentiary, to justify your conduct, and to defend
those rights of the British crown which were
obtained by express stipulation in the treaty
of Paris, and which appear to have been in-
vaded by the proceedings of the French at
Chandernagore.”

Sir John Lindsay was not disposed to re-
gard matters in a light unfavourable to France,
and much unseemly discussion between the
servants of the company and the servants of
the crown arose out of the appointment of Sir
John. The council was undoubtedlyjustified
in complaining of an infraction of treaty, and
in enforcing the observance of it, results
proved that the opinion they formed of the
temper and intentions of the French from their
proceedings in the matter of dispute, was
well founded. The year 1770 opened with
important changes in connection with Bengal,
and with the surrounding states intimately
related to it. Mr. Cartier began his career as
president. Brigadier-general Smith resigned
his command in December, 1769, and Sir
Robert Barker took his place. Sujah-ad-
Dowlah, the Kabob of Uncle, who had lost the
king’s confidence, was, by a series of inge-
nious intrigues on his part, reinstated in
favour, and was again in full power as vizier
of the empire. One of the imperial princes
married the nabob’s daughter, still further
promoting the vizier’s power. These official
and political changes took place, not noise-
lessly, but without war. There were com-
motions at Allahabad, and mutinies of the

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXVIII.
troops of the empire and of Oude; yet these
important transactions were accomplished
without battle, and the collisions of thrones
and states. Amidst the rapid vicissitudes
thus brought about, Meer Cossim, so long
hidden from the observations of the different
governments, emerged from his obscurity.
The Ranee of Gohud invited him from the
Roliilla country to Gwalior. The vizier knew
his movements, and supported them. He
committed the foolish king to a correspond-
ence with him. Mahrattas, J auts, Sikhs, and
Rajpoots, were engaged in a confederacy to
support the part of the new actor upon the
great political stage. Motions of the various
parties were like the moves upon a chess-
board, where the players are equal and the
game is drawn. There were demonstrations
which portendcd the accomplishment of the
views of each of the various parties in turn,
but none obtained the advantages meditated.
The French were unostentatiously influencing
all parties against the English, but their posi-
tion was one of such commanding strength
that none dared to strike the first blow. The
English remained firm and unyielding. As
the rock, flinging back the rays of the torrid
sun, frowning upon the angry waves breaking
against it, and silent and settled while the
tempest sweeps around, so English power in
Bengal presented a sturdy, noiseless front
to the combination of distinct but blended, or
concussing, elements of political ambition and
power which were gathered around. Band
after band of Rohilla, Bajpoot, Mahratta,
Sikh, and J aut, moved about in concert, or
in conflict, as waves tossed upon waves in a
storm-smitten sea, to be confused and broken.

In March, 1769, the soubahdar of Bengal
died of small-pox, and a younger brother, ten
years of age, reigned in his stead. Later in
the year Rajah Bulwant Sing died at Benares.
and was succeeded by Cheyt Sing.

In 1770, the rapid and victorious move-
ments of the Mahrattas caused much uneasi-
ness in Bengal. The menacing attitude which
they assumed brought out circumstances
which afforded fresh proofs of the weakness
and folly of the king, and the pertidy of his
vizier. Partly through the good faith of some
of the Mahratta generals, and probably as
much from the fear which the English inspired
among the rest, no inroad was made upon
Bengal. The spirit displayed by the French
in fortifying Chandernagore in the early part
of the previous year pervaded their conduct
during that of which we write. They seemed
anxious to bring about a rupture between
France and England in the hope that,_if the
English were distracted by a European war,
the French in India might form such alliances

 

 

can. LXXVIII.]

with the native governments as would turn
the scale of power against the English.

The Mahrattas, however, unwilling to at-
tack the English, harassed their real and
pretended allies, and at last seized upon por-
tions of the King of Delhi’s territories and of
those of the Nabob of Oude. The council at
Calcutta resolved to interfere. The force at
Dinagepore was ordered to march to the
banks of the Caramnassa, and the garrison at
Allahabad was reinforced, while two of the
king’s battalions quartered there marched to
the points most in danger from the enemy.
The Mahrattas laid siege to Ferokabad, but
being deficient in material, they turned the
siege into a blockade. The arrangements of
the English caused the blockade to be raised
without a blow being struck. The Mahrattas,
however, departed in many separate bodies,
taking various routes, as if determined to fall
upon many different places at once, and, by
a series of masterly movements and rapid
marches, all these divisions converged upon
Delhi, which was captured by a coup de main.
The English afterwards received tidings which
proved to be true, that this feat was not quite
so brilliant as it appeared to be: the king
himself having conspired against his own
government, incredible as such a policy may
appear. His majesty, fearing that the vic—
torious marauders would proclaim shah-zada
in his room, adopted this strange course to
prevent such a catastrophe. He even hoped
that, when in the power of the Mahrattas,
they would find it their interest to act in
alliance with him, and that his intricate mea-
sures would issue in the fulfilment of his
long-cherished and romantic desire of reign-
ing in Delhi instead of Allahabad, and of
sitting upon the throne of his ancestors un-
molested. The vizier, opposed to this mea-
sure, deemed it politic to concur, and joined
his forces as Nabob of Oude to those of his
majesty. The king and his vizier having
come to terms with their enemies in a manner
so unprecedented even in the fickle policy of
Indian states, the company’s territory not
being attacked, and his majesty and the
vizier declaring not only peace but friend-
ship, the English had no pretence for war,
but endeavoured by negotiation to obtain
various strong posts, which they represented
to his majesty were rendered necessary to
their security by his majesty's own strange
proceedings.

In the month of April, 1772, Mr. Cartier
retired from the government of Bengal, and
“'arren Hastings, then a member of council
at Madras, was appointed to the government.
There was no other man in India so fit for the
important post, nor in England, except Clive.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

307

Before noticing the events of Mr. Hastings’
government, some notice of his career since
he had left Bengal is here appropriate. It
has been already shown that his conduct in
India had been most honourable and humane,
although his temptations were at least as nu-
merous and pressing as those before which
so many fell degraded. Lord Macaulay, in
his celebrated essay on Warren Hastings,
strangely asserts that little was heard of him
up to the period of his leaving India with
Mr. Vansittart. Had little been heard of
him during that time, he probably never
would have become governor of Bengal;
certainly he would never have been the
ruler of British India. During the whole
period of his residence in Bengal he had
been a noticeable person. In every meeting
of council, while Mr. Vansittart administered
the government, Mr. Hastings distinguished
himself by the purity of his motives, the
soundness of his policy, and a remarkable
foresight. He had read the native character
profoundly, had acquainted himself with the
literature of the East extensively, and had
studied political and administrative science
can amore. He was well known to the native
governments and the company’s servants in
India as a man of genius, and the directors
and proprietary at home considered him to
be a man of superior capacity before he had
left Bengal.

When he returned to England, his time
was chiefly occupied in retirement, medita-
tion, liberal studies, and in recruiting his
health. He did all in his power to encourage
the study of oriental literature in England;
and engaged the celebrated Dr. Johnson to
some extent in his views; at all events, he
left impressions of his own genius and learn-
ing upon the mind of that great man, to which
the latter afterwards referred with pleasure.

As Hastings had not enriched himself like
other “returned Indians,” his pecuniary re-
sources were small; and he became so em-
barrassed that he was compelled to solicit
employment from the East India Company.
They were very glad to make such valuable
services available; and having paid the
highest tribute to his talents and integrity
which language could convey, they appointed
him member of council in Madras. All his
little savings had been invested for the bene-
fit of his poor relatives, to whom, like Clive,
he manifested the most noble generosity and
ardent affection. He was from this circum-
stance compelled to borrow money to enable
him to depart in a manner sufficiently re-
spectable to the high post to which he was
designated.

In the spring of 1769 he embarked for

308

Madras. The voyage was replete with ro-
mantic incident, which left a lasting impres-
sion upon the mind and heart of Hastings.
It is doubtful whether the connexion of an
amatory kind—so much to his discredit——
formed on board the Duke of Grafton, did
not exercise an unfavourable influence over
his whole moral nature, and over his future
career. His character certainly never after-
wards appeared in so favourable a light
as it had before, although his talent shone
out more conspicuously. His moral de-
linquency could not obscure the brilliancy
of his genius—even the sun has spots upon
its disc. \Yhen Hastings arrived at Madras,
he found the company’s affairs in a seriously
disorganized condition.
scribes with perfect precision the state of
things, and the relation which Hastings bore
to them, when he wrote, “His own tastes
would have led him to political rather than

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

l

Lord Macaulay de-

[CHAR LXXIX.

’to commercial pursuits; but he knew that
' the favour of his employers chiefly depended
; upon their dividends, and that their dividends
Edepended chiefly on the investment. He
itherefore, with great judgment, determined
to employ his vigorous mind for a time to
this department of business, which had been

lmuch neglected since the servants of the

icompany had ceased to be clerks, and had

become warriors and negotiators. In a very
few months be effected an important reform.
The directors notified to him their high ap-
: probation, and were so much pleased with his
A conduct, that they determined to place him at
the head of the government of Bengal.”

; In this position matters must be left in the
chief presidency, while the reader’s attention
is turned once more to the Carnatic, and to
the regions of Mysore, whose prince then filled
so large a space and held so great a name in
7 Indian reputation.

,

vvva\ \. V \ vvvvvvx-VVWVVVW\ \'\.'\'\l\'\/V

CHAPTER LXXIX.
BOMBAY AND )IADRAS— EVENTS CONNECTED WlTH THOSE PRESIDENCIES TO 1775.

DURING the period the history of which in:

Bengal has been already related, Bombay was
the scene of comparatively few incidents of

importance, except those which were connected ,
with Hyder Ali, whose exploits will be the;

subject of a separate chapter. After the
destruction of the pirates of Gheria, by Com-
modore James and Colonel Clive, in 1756,
the presidency experienced comparatively
little trouble from marauders of that. descrip-
tion for some years. By degrees the Mal-
war pirates acquired strength and boldness,
causing alarm to the merchants, and injury to
their commerce. In January, 1765, it was
resolved to put an end to those apprehensions
and injuries by an attack upon the robbers in
their stronghold, which was successfully exe-
cuted; and the fort of Raree, in the southern
("oiican, was captured. By this conquest
security was obtained for mercantile ships,
and country boats for many years. The
vicinity of the Mahrattas, and the increasing
power of that confederacy, made them espe-
cially formidable to Bombay, although Madras

and Bengal were also much harassed by their ,

fitful and predatory movements against sur-
rounding native states. The Bengal govern-
ment was disposed to unite with those of the
other presidencies in a combined attack upon
the Mahratta power, but the Bombay council
wisely represented that the Mahrattas on the

Bengal frontier acted independently of the
: government of Poonah, that an attack upon
' any would constrain a combination of all the
Mahratta chiefs, and that such a combination
would prove far too formidable for the Eng-
‘lish to attack it with any hope of success,
especially as it was likely other native forces
would join the enemy. These arguments
prevailed, and the formidable Mahrattas were
allowed to develop their resources and power
unchecked by the English, except when ag-
gressions upon native governments in alliance
with the English brought the troops of the
latter into the field, or their political agents
into action.

In May, 1763, Hyder Ali, or Hyder Naigue,
as he was frequently then called, attracted the
very serious attention of the. Bombay govern-
ment. Previous to this date he had put forth
considerable power. He had taken Bednore,
Mangalore, and Onore, and his advance into
Concan, had struck the country with terror.
The obvious aim of Hyder was to bring the
3 sea forts into subjection, and in doing so he
‘ professed to act in conformity with the
.interests of the company, by putting down
‘ piracy, preventing its revival, and offering new

points for the conduct of legitimate trade. On
1the 27th of May, he made a treaty" with
l the council of Bombay, by which they were

1 * Printed Treaties, p. 513.

 

 

 

 

Cuar. LXXIX.]

allowed to erect a factory at Onore, a place
afterwards rendered famous by a siege. He
also afforded them various valuable commercial
privileges. In return he demanded seven
thousand stand of arms. This placed the
council in great difficulty, for the company
had issued strict orders against supplying the
country powers with arms; yet, if the council
had refused compliance, Hyder would have
inferred that they distrusted and feared him,
or that they had ultimate designs against his
territory or power. The council endeavoured
by half measures to avoid the difficulty ; they
supplied him with five hundred stand of arms,
and by so doing dissatisfied both him and the
company. The latter rebuked the council,
and renewed, in stern language, their previous
prohibitions against affording arms to native
princes on any grounds or pretexts, except
when allies in actual war. Hyder was dis-
gusted at receiving about one-fourteenth of
the number of muskets which he had re-
quested, and being vindictive and suspicious,
be cherished a bad feeling to the council,
which he deemed it politic to suppress, al-
though he took no trouble to conceal his dis-
appointment and his doubts of the friendliness
of the Bombay government. Hyder, how-
ever, still pressed for arms from the council,
and his demands were complied with. The
directors, in referring to their objections to
providing native powers with musketry that
might prove ultimately hostile, were very
particular and authoritative in ordering that
no cannon should be given or sold to them,
and that none of the coast powers should be
aided in obtaining ships of war. The council
of Bombay was nearly as prone as that of
Bengal to set the judgment of the company at
defiance, where vanity, interest, or ambition,
prompted a course opposed to the directors.
Notwithstanding the most distinct, and even
angry orders, from the directors to the con-
trary, the council permitted Hyder to pur-
chase ordnance, and to build a ship of war
at Bombay, to enable him to check the Mah-
rattas, and other freebooters. Hyder was
himself the greatest freebooter in India, and
soon made the council to understand that they
had armed him for their own injury. The
Mahrattas—who were as eager to rob Hyder,
as they were to rob every one else, and he
was to rolithem and allothcrs—werc intensely
indignant at the conduct of the council. Thus
this body, by its short-sighted policy, armed
actual enemies under the guise of friendship,
and in doing so raised up new enemies.
Their proceedings towards this powerful man
were full of contradiction. At one time they
encouraged the Mahrattas against him, and
at another supplied him with arms against
VOL. :1.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

 

309

them, notwithstanding renewed orders from
the directors, in the most specific terms, not to
do so. After all, they wrote to Madras in
1766, while professing friendship with Hyder,
requesting the council there to join them in
attacking hinii‘ The Madras government
was unwilling to incur such a risk, because of
the advantageous military position held by
Hyder, and from fear that N izam Ali would
form a junction with him. The Madras
cOuncil were also of opinion that Hyder acted
as a useful check to the Mahrattas. Upon
learning the opinions prevalent at Madras,
instead of an attack upon the bold adven—
turer, the Bombay government proposed a
treaty of peace. According to this treaty he
was to receive annually between three or four
thousand muskets, the council persisting in
its defiance of the company’s orders. The
council demanded payment of all monies due
to it by the rajahs which he had conquered,
and especial trading privileges, of course, to
the exclusion of all other European nations.
Hyder eagerly grasped at one of the pro-
posals—that he and the English should mu-
tually furnish troops when the territory of
either was menaced. It is probable that the
council never intended to fulfil all their part of
this stipulation, and supposed themselves to
be the ingenious fabricators of a very clever
trick. At all events, subsequent facts give
colour to this supposition.

In 1768, after war between Hyder and the
English in India had been for some time
waged,theyhad to renew the treaty under cer-
tain modifications,—Hyder still stipulating for
warlike stores, the council repeating its con-
cessions on this point, and the directors in
London disallowing and protesting against
all acts performed by their servants which
involved grants of arms and ammunition to
native powers. The ground of objection
taken by the honourable court in this par-
ticular case was, that by such a treaty stipu-
lation Hyder was enabled to add to his
military means, and thereby prepare for the
first moment favourable to himself to act
against the English, alone, or in alliance with
other native powers. The views of the di-
rectors at home were wise and far seeing;
generally they were so when opposed to their
servants at the presidencics. Except in cases
where men of great or extraordinary genius,
such as Clive and Hastings, represented the
company’s interests in India, the judgment of
the directors at home was far more sagacious
than that of their governors or councils.

On the 23rd of February, 1771,3112 Hodges,
the president of Bombay, died, and was suc-
ceeded by Mr. Hornby. On the 7th of March,

* Cbnsnltzzz‘z’ons, June 1766.
S S

I

310 HISTORY OF THE
Hyder was beaten in a sanguinary conflict with
the Mahrattas; and he applied to the council
for help. They were unable to afford it. He
felt that he was deceived, and cherished a
feeling of vengeance in his heart against
those whom he considered his betrayers. The
council declared that, although Without men
or money to spare, they would send him five
hundred muskets and four twenty-pound guns.
Subsequently, the council acknowledged itself
Willing to aid him with five hundred Euro-
peans and twelve hundred sepoys, if he paid
five lacs ofpagodas for them, thus exasperating
ibim yet more. Triumphing over his Mahratta
foes, so far as to make it their interest to
accept tribute and depart from his dominions,
be repeatedly declared that a day of reckon-
ing between him and the English, who had
so often deceived him, would yet come.

In July, 1771, the Nabob of Baroch, un-
sought, repaired to Bombay, and concluded a
treaty with the council, by which they were
entitled to have a factory at his capital. This
treaty was not signed until the last day in No—
vember, and it amounted to an alliance offen-
sive and defensive. The nabob had gone to
Bombay, for the purpose of engaging the coun-
cil in his interests; and with the intention, at
the same time, of betraying them whenever his
interests in so doing might appear. He soon
violated all the stipulations of the treaty, and the
council recalled their resident from his court.
This step was followed up by a military ex-
pedition against him, which was dispatched
from Bombay under Mr. Watson, “the su-
perintendent of marine,” and Brigadier-gene-
ral VVedderburu. The troops departed from
Bombay November the 2nd. On the 14th,
General Vi'edderburn reconnoitered the place,
and was killed while so doing. On the 16th,
batteries Were opened against it, and on the
18th it was taken by storm. The loss of the
English was considerable, especially in officers,
of whom five were killed, exclusive of the
general and a cadet, and six were wounded.

The council having concluded a treaty with
Futty Sing Guicowar, the spoils were divided
between that chief and the company. Besides
the prize of the city, the revenues amounted
to seven lacs ofrupees.

In the year 1772, special negotiations were
opened with the court of Poonah, for the ac-
quisition of Salsette, Bassein, and Caranga.
These were of extreme importance, as their
possession by an enemy endangered Bom-
bay itself. Mhade Rao, who then governed
the Mahrattas, knew the value of these places
as well as the English, and refused to cede
them at any price. That chief died in No-
vember, and was succeeded by his brother

Narrain Rao. In August, 1773, Narrain was .

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXIX.
murdered in his palace of Poonah, by the agents
of Ragoba, his uncle, who was at once pro-
claimed. This chief determined to make war
upon the Carnatic, not, it would seem, to make
a permanent conquest, but “to carry chout.”
Upon proceeding for this purpose with his
army, a revolution took place in his capital,
which he had to hurry back and suppress.
The council resorted to means which were at
least of questionable policy and justice, to
induce Ragoba to cede Salsette and Bassein,
but were again defeated. The feuds then
existing among the Mahratta chiefs caused
the negotiations of the English and their
apparent support of Ragoba in several of his
misdeeds, to be regarded with prejudice by
various powerful chiefs, and laid the founda-
tions of troubles to come. During the nego-
tiations with Ragoba, the council learned
that the Portuguese contemplated the con-
quest of Salsette. The council resolved to
seize the island, or, as they represented the
matter, to make available the disposition of
the inhabitants to surrender it to them. 011
the 12th of December, 1771, the forces left
Bombay. On the 28th, the fort of Tannat
was taken by storm, but not without great
loss, Commodore Watson being numbered
among the slain. The Mahrattas fought des-
perately, but British skill and valour con-
quered. A monument was erected at Bom-
bay to the memory of the gallant Watson.
The first matter of great concern to the
council of Madras, during the period which
has been already noticed in reference to
Bengal and Bombay, was the settlement of
the Northern Circars. The French having
resumed their possessions in India, in conse—
quence of the treaty of peace in Europe, the
president of Madras, in 1765, suggested to
Clive, then in Bengal, the desirableness of
"procuring from the Mogul sumnids for the
circars of Rajah, Mundry, Ellore, Musta-
phanagur, Ohicacole, and Condavir or Gun-
toor. On the 14th of October, the council of
Madras informed the directors, that at the
request of Mr. Palk, president of Fort St.
George, Lord Clive had obtained the sum-
nids from the Mogul. Differences arose
with the soubahdar of the Deccan as to the
occupation of the circars, and a treaty was
formed with his highness, by which he recog-
nised that occupation, on condition of military
aid in the defence of his own territory, or of
war occurring between him and any other
potentate. Clive appears to have acquiesced
in this arrangement, and even to have pro-
moted it, although it was contrary to the
policy the directors had ordered to be pursued.
The councils of the three presideucies had
now inVolved themselves in treaties with all

 

CHAP. LXXIX.]

the surrounding chiefs which Were incompa~
tible, and impracticable, involving the con-
stant peril of war, and of breach of faith. It
was next to impossible that the English could
either engage in any of the native disputes,
or refrain from doing so, without loss of
honour. By disobedience to the simple and
honest policy imposed by the court of direc-
tors, the agents in India had involved the
company in complications which were inex-
tricable. The letters from the directors on
receipt of the intelligence of the treaty with
the sonbahdar of the Deccan, are full of sense
and spirit, and lay down principles that are
indisputably just, for the conduct of their
servants in all dealings with the native
powers.

The council at Madras was exposed to
great anxiety during 1766 from the progress
and ambition of Hyder Ali. His troops
commanded all the passes from the upper
country into the Carnatic. His cavalry ho-
vered about like birds of prey, and it was
reported that he had obtained a sumnid
from the soubahdar of the Deccan for his
own possession of the Carnatic. Hyder’s
manoeuvres were as treacherous as those of
the soubahdar, and as cunning as those of
that ruler were weak. The Madras council
was now obliged to adopt vigorous measures
in regard to Hyder. They sent troops into
various refractory districts where his agents
had excited the polygars to revolt. They
formed a new covenant with the soubahdar
of the Deccan, in virtue of which he consented
to dismiss his army, called by the directors
“a useless rabble,” and to allow his places of
strength to be garrisoned by the British. It
is probable that his highness had no intention
of acting upon this covenant beyond a certain
show of doing so in the first instance, for the
stipulation was never properly carried into
effect. The soubahdar was without honour
or principle, and was ready to unite with
Hyder or the Mahrattas against the company,
as either might ofl'er him the higher pecuniary
inducement. Hyder, having settled for the
time his differences with the Mahrattas, found
means of inducing the soubahdar to join him
in hostilities against the English. A war
now broke out of a most formidable nature, in
which the Mysorean freebooter made able use
of the vast amount of arms and military stores
with which the Bombay council, probably in
view of their own profit, had supplied him, in
spite of the company’s orders to the contrary.
The war itself must be treated in a separate
chapter. The council of Madras opened a
correspondence with that of Bombay for con-
sultation as to mutual defence, as well as the
separate action of each presidency upon a

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

 

311

common plan. The policy of the Madras
government, and its opinion of the crisis, were
set forth in its despatches to the directors. It
urged upon the company the absolute neces-
sity of subduing Hyder, if the peace of the
Carnatic were to be secured. The chief ap-
prehension of the Madras government as to
Hyder was thus expressed :-——“ It is not only
his troublesome disposition and ambitious
views now that we have to apprehend, but
that he may at a favourable opportunity, or
in some future war, take the French by the
hand, to re-establish their afl'airs,—which
cannot fail to be of the worst consequence to
your possessions on the coast. He has money
to pay them, and they can spare and assemble
troops at the islands, and it is reported that
he has already made proposals by despatches
to the French king or company in Europe.”*‘

Meanwhile, the indefatigable Hyder threat-
ened Madras itself, when the council thus
wrote to the directors :—“ The continual re-
inforcements we had sent to camp had reduced
our garrison so low, we were obliged to con-
fine our attention entirely to the preservation
of the Fort and the Black Town, for which
purpose it was necessary to arm all the com-
pany’s civil servants, the European inha-
bitants, Armenians, and Portuguese.” On
the 29th September, when the enemy moved
on”, the council again wrote :—“ As it is un-
certain when the»troubles we are engaged in
will end, and as we must in the course of the
war expect to have many Europeans sick, we
must earnestly request you to send out as
large reinforcements as possible." This letter
reached the court by the Hector on the 22nd
April, 1768. The reply was one of the most
masterly despatches ever sent to India. The
principles and policy it expresses do honour
to the company, and refute many calnmnies
as to their territorial aggrandizement. The
company was not served by men able or
honest enough to carry out the views of the
directors, who thus wrote :—

“ The alarming state of our affairs under
your conduct, regarding the military Operations
against the soubahdar of the Deccan, joined
with Hyder Ali, and the measures in agita-
tion with the Mahrattas in consequence thereof,
requiring our most immediate consideration,
we have therefore determined on this over-
land conveyance by the way of Bussorah, as
the most expeditious way of giving our sen-
timents to you on those important. subjects.

“In our separate letter of the 25th March,
we gave you our sentiments very fully on
your treaty with the soubahdar of the Deccan.

“ After having for successive years given
it as your opinion, confirmed by our appro-

* Letter to Court, 2lst September, 1767.

'-

312

bation, that maintaining an army for the
support of the soubahdar of the Deccan was
endangering the Carnatic, and would tend to
involve us in wars, and distant and expensive
operations, and the grant of the circars was
not to be accepted on such terms, you at once
engage in that support, and send an army
superior to that which, in the year 1764, you
declared would endanger your own safety.

“ The quick succession of important events
in Indian wars puts it out of our power to
direct your measures. We can only give
you the outlines of that system which we
judge most conducive to give permanency
and tranquillity to our possessions.

“ We should have hoped that the experience
of what has passed in Bengal would have sug-
gested the proper conduct to you: we mean,
when our servants, after the battle of Buxarfi
projected the extirpation of Sujah Dowlah from
his dominions, and the giving them up to the
king. Lord Clive soon discerned, the king
would have been unable to maintain them,
and that it would have broken down the
strongest barriers against the Mahrattas and
the northern powers, and therefore wisely
restored Sujah Dowlah to his dominionsxt
Such, too, should be your conduct with re-
spect to the nizami and Hyder Ali, neither
of whom it is our interest should be totally
crushed.

“The dewannee of Bengal, Bahar, and
Orissa, with the possessions we hold in
those provinces, are the utmost limits of our
views on that side of India. On the coast,
the protection of the Carnatic and the posses-
sion of the circars, free from all engagements
to support the soubahdar of the Deccan, or even
without the circars, preserving only influence
enough over any country power who may
hold them, to keep the French from settling
in them; and, on the Bombay side, the de-
pendencies thereon, the possessions of Salsette,
Bassein, and the castle of Su‘at. The pro-
tection of these is easily within the reach of
our power, and may mutually support each
other, Without any country alliance whatever.
If we pass these bounds, we shall be led on
from one acquisition to another, till we shall
find no security but in the subjection of the
whole, which, by dividing your force, would
lose as the whole, and end in our extirpation
from Hindostan.

“Much has been wrote from you and from
our servants at Bengal, on the necessity of
checking the Mahrattas, which may in Some

* Recorded in a previous chapter.
1‘ An account of these transactions has been given in a
previous chapter.

1 The word nizam is used interchangeably with soubah
and soubahdar in Indian despatches and state papers.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXIX.

degree be proper; but it is not for the 00111-
pany to take the part of umpires of Hindostan.
If it had not been for the imprudent measures
you have taken, the country powers would
have formed a balance of power among them‘
selves, and their divisions would have left you
in peace; but if at any time the thirst for
plunder should urge the Mahrattas to invade
our possessions, they can be checked only by
carrying the war into their own country. It
is with this View that we last year sent out
field-officers to our presidency at Bombay,
and put their military force on a respectable
footing; and when once the Mahrattas under-
stand that to be our plan, we have reason to
think they will not wantonly attack us.

“ You will observe by the whole tenour of
these despatches, that our views are not to
enter into offensive wars in India, or to make
further acquisitions beyond our present pos-
sessions. W'e do not wish to enter into any
engagements which may be productive of
enormous expenses, and which are seldom
calculated to promote the company's essential
interests. 0n the contrary, we wishto see
the present Indian powers remain as a check
one upon another, without our interfering;
therefore, we recommend to you, so soon as
possible, to bring about a peace upon terms
of the most perfect moderation on the part of
the company, and when made, to adhere to it
upon all future occasions, except when the
company’s possessions are actually attacked;
and not to be provoked by fresh disturbances
of the country powers to enter into new
wars."*

The die was cast as to hostilities with
Hyder; both the Madras and Bombay go-
vernments were in collision with him, and
Bengal sent such assistance as was deemed
judicious and practicable.

When, at last, a treaty was made with
Hyder, the Circars, which had never been
fairly brought under the company’s manage-
ment, were placed by the council under its
sole control, the zemindars and other great
landholders offering violent opposition. In
1769, however, the subjugation of this refrac—
tory spirit was effected, and the Company
made such arrangements as to its lands as
suited its own interests. The introduction
of English law to Madras proved a source of
contest and confusion, the natives utterly de-
testing it, and the English using it against
the natives as a means of oppression. M.
Auber describes the folly displayed in working
English institutions, and the turmoil attending
it, in the following terms :——“ At a moment
when the company’s afi'airs on the coast. des
mantled the utmost attention of the council;

* Court’s Letter, dated the 13th of May, 1768.

'3
i
i
i

 

 

011A r. LXXIX.]

when the whole of the country from Tinne-
velly to the Kistna was involved in troubles,
and when the enemy were ravaging the Car-
natic. the council were harassed by the violent
and litigious proceedings of some members of
the grand jury, who obstinately persevered
in pressing matters and presentments, which
threw the settlement into contentions and
embarrassments; whilst, on other occasions,
they declined to make a return to any of the
bills of indictment brought before them. The
jurisdiction of the mayor’s court, under the
charter, became matter of doubt and dispute ;
the one party construing the word factory in
the most extensive latitude, the other taking
it in its literal and strict sense."

Suspicious began to be entertained that the
French were instigating Hyder and the nizam
against the English. As soon as the peace with
France restored to that nation its Indian pos-
sessions which had been conquered, symp-
toms of a preconceived determination to gain
power were evinced. These were slowly,
but surely, developed: still the company’s
servants felt no apprehensions, the French
being relatively weak; moreover, the rapid
passage of events between the English and
the native princes diverted the councils of
Bombay and Madras from noticing the pro-
cedure of their old competitors for power.

In 1769 the French made various (lemon-
strations of a nature to lead to the conclusion
that hostile movements against the English
were contemplated. Pondicherry was for-
tified, under the pretence of its being in
danger from the country powers. Pretexts
for fortifying the factories in Bengal were
also put forward, as noticed in a previous chap—
ter. These simultaneous efforts to strengthen
their positions, when there was really no
enemy, awakened the suspicious of the Eng-
lish. ’l‘wo French transports, of large capa—
city, had proceeded to the Cape of Good
Hope for provisions. Tidings came from
the Mauritius that French ships, full of men
and military stores, had been seen there. A
new settlement was made on the eastern
coast of Madagascar, which, from the accounts
forwarded of it to Madras, was intended as a
military depot, both for men and munitions of
war destined for employment in the East.
From the Archipelago, French ships of war
were reported as cruising about suspiciously,
and as having on board troops.

“'hile the council’s attention was drawn by
so many rumours to the French, the perpetual
conflicts among the native powers threatened
to involve the company in innumerable wars.
The Mahrattas desired the virtual conquest
of Mysore. Hyder resolved to resist their
demands for Client. The Nabob of Arcot

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

313

favoured the pretensions of the Mahrattas.
The nizam watched vigilantly for any oppor-
tunity which might arise for plunder, by those
powers exhausting one another. All these
royal robbers sought the aid of the company,
pleading the different treaties in which the
shallow policy of the councils of Bombay and
Madras had involved that body.

Hyderrefused the Mahrattas chout in 1770:
they made war upon him. He demanded
the aid of the company, on the ground of the
treaty made the previous year. The council
of Madras considered themselves absolved
from any obligations of alliance, as Hyder
was himself the aggressor. He well knew that
they were only eager to escape all obligations
on their part, and yet to secure all advantages
of the treaty from him. An incurable resent-
ment against the English name and race
seized possession of his mind.

Both the councils of Madras and Bombay
were entangled in fresh difficulties by the ar-
rival of Sir John Lindsay at the latter place.
That officer, besides his influence and rank. as
an admiral, had received extraordinary powers
from the English government, of which the
directors disapproved. He declared to both
the councils that he was minister plenipoten-
tiary from the royal government. In virtue
of this office, he inquired into the causes and
conduct of the late war with Hyder. He
brought a letter to the N abob of the Carnatic,
from the king, and demanded all the company’s
papers and documents as he might require
them. The council of Madras determined to
resist these demands, having no instructions
from “their constituents,” as they termed the
directors on that occasion. The English go-
vernment had acted without proper concert
with the company, and the result was dan-
gerous to the English interests in India.
Lindsay treated the council with contempt.
The latter body, strong in experience, know-
ledge of local relations, and sure of obedience
from all the company’s servants, was resolute in
resisting the alleged powers of Sir John. He
entered into private correspondence with the
nabob, who artfully treated him as a superior
authority, and faithlessly intrigued with him
against the company. The council was at
this time involved in so many disputes, that
it is surprising they could attend, in any
measure, to the company’s trade. Among
other quarrels, they had one of serious mag-
nitude with the celebrated Eyre Coote, at
this time major-general, and appointed com-
mander-in-chief of the company’s forces in
Madras by the directors. Sooner than submit
to the jealous dictation of the council, General
Coote returned to England, and the court of
directors censured the council. Examination

314: HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

of the folly and disobedience of the councils
of the three presidencies, and passing votes of
merited censure upon them, might have oc-
cupied the whole time of the honourable court.

The Nabob of Arcot raised claims upon the
Nabob of Tanjore, which during 1770 gave
the council of Madras much occupation. The
Tanjore nabob gave the English a reluctant
support during the Mysorean war, and re-
fused to contribute to the Nabob of Arcot’s
expenses in connection with that contest,
although Tanjore was a rich territory, and
the English, acting in the name of the govern-
ment of Arcot, preserved the peace of the
country. Hyder Ali fomented this dispute.
It was also discovered that he carried on
a correspondence with the French at Pondi-
cherry, while they carried 011 the new works
there.

Sir John Lindsay was succeeded, in 1770, by
Admiral Sir Robert Harland, with the same
powers. The fleet on the Indian station was
much strengthened under the command of
Sir Robert. The new admiral had received
instructions from the king to treat the com-
pany’s representatives with careful respect,
and to uphold their dignity before the native
rulers. When Admiral Harland arrived, he
found affairs in great confusion, the result
of his predecessor’s wrong-headedness. The
N abob of the Carnatic had, with the concur-
rence of Sir John Lindsay, invited the Mah-
rattas to join in a confederacy against Hyder,
contrary to treaty, and as the council be-
lieved, contrary to reason.

Major-general Coote had been prevailed
upon to return to India, and the crown con-
ferred upon him the honour of a Knight of
the Bath. This was before Sir John Lindsay
returned home, and at the same time the same
honour was conferred upon him also. The
royal government took a most extraordinary
course on this occasion, sending the insignia
to the nabob, with directions for the in-
vestiture. Whether this was the result of
some joint intrigue of Lindsay and Coote to
spite the council does not appear, but the
humiliation it inflicted upon the president
was very acceptable to those chiefs. Differ-
ences between the nabob and certain rajahs
having arisen, an appeal to arms was made,
and Brigadier Smith, at the head of a British
force, marched against them in April, 1771.
Operations were conducted until the 27th of
October, when peace was made without the
intervention of the council. It appeared as
if Lindsay, Coote, and the nabob had entered
into a confederacy to ignore the company :—
“Sir Robert Harland reached Madras, in
command of a squadron of his majesty’s ships,
on. the 2nd of September. He announced

 

[Cantu LXXIX.

his arrival to the council, whom he met as-
sembled on the 13th, and he informed them
that he possessed full powers, as the king’s
plenipotentiary, to inquire into the observance
of the eleventh article of the treaty of
Paris; and that he had a letter from his
majesty to the nabob. The letter was de—
livered to his highness by the admiral, the
troops in the garrison attending the cere-
monial. On the 1st of October, having inti-
mated to the council his readiness to be of
any use in the progress of their affairs, he
quitted the roads, in order to avoid the ap-
proaching monsoon, and retired to Trinco-
malee, dispatching a vessel to ascertain the
state of the French force at the Mauritius,
which was reported to be very considerable.“

Sir Robert Harland soon fell into the snares
of the nabob, who induced him to favour an
alliance with the Mahrattas against Hyder.
The council refused to obey the plenipoten—
tiary, declaring themselves ready to obey all
constitutional authorities, such as parliament
or the courts of law, but refusing to recognise
the admiral in any other capacity than as
commander of the king’s ships, in which
office they would 00- operate with him. They
persisted in refusing to violate the treaty
with Hyder. The alliance offered by the
Mahrattas was one which he sought to
force upon the nabob, as the admiral himself
admitted, by the threat of fire and sword.
They refused finally to accept the alliance,
and advised the admiral, by a diversion on
the Malabar coast, to distract the Mahrattas,
while the council would take such care of
the Carnatic as their experience suggested,
and their power allowed. The alliance pro-
posed by the Mahrattas, obliging the nabob
to send troops to their aid, had a significance
the admiral did not see. The nabob in ac-
cepting a forced alliance, and sending troops
into the field to avert the menace of the
power thus making itself an ally, accepted
conquest, and would be regarded in future
by the Mahrattas as dependant upon them.

Matters became worse between the admiral
and the council, until they issued in an open
rupture. The conduct of the admiral was in
violation of the company’s charter, and the
council resolutely maintained the rights of
their employers.

During the year 1772 various expeditions
were made, all of them successful, against
various polygars who refused to comply with
the requisitions of the nabob. Brigadier-
general Smith, having accomplished the
military enterprises referred to, returned to
Madras, and resigned his command. Sir
Robert Fletcher was nominated to take it.

* Auber, vol. i. p. 308.

 

A. “I.___-.RMMMWMWWM

cm». LXXX.]

Immediately, violent altercations arose be-
tween him and the council, discord between
commanding officers and councils seldom
ceasing in any of the presidencies. Sir Robert
was obliged to resign, and Brigadier Smith
resumed the command.

On the 31st of January, 1773, Mr. Dupré
resigned the office of president, which was
assumed by Mr. “’ynch. The Rajah of Tan-
jore refusing all allegiance to the Nabob of
the Carnatic, Brigadier—general Smith marched
to Tanjore, took it by storm, and made pri-
soners of the rajah’s family. It was soon dis-
covered that the Dutch were the chief insti-
gators of the rajah. He had, contrary to his
allegiance, as a tributary of the nabob, made
over various strong positions to the Dutch,
who were compelled by the British ships,
and troops acting in conjunction with the
forces of the nabob, to abandon them, under
circumstances of much humiliation. The con-
duct of the Dutch was marked by prevarica-
tion and bad faith.

Throughout the year 1774, the council
was troubled by the caprice of the nabob,
whose views were constantly changing ; who

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

n

015
regulated his policy towards others by his
relative pewer; the resources of whose coun-
try Were exhausted, while his avarice still
craved; whose ambition was as large as his
means were inadequate for even the feeblest
enterprise. It was scarcely possible for the
council not to perceive that the time was fast
approaching, when the English must assume
the entire control of the nabob’s dominions,
or see the Carnatic overrun by Hyder, the
Mahrattas, or the nizam.

During the period to which this chapter
refers, “’arren Hastings, for several years
held the high post of member of council.
It is probable that to him chiefly, if not ex-
clusively, the credit of every bold and firm
measure taken, was due. Yet less is known
of Hastings’ conduct during his membership
of council at Madras than of any other period
of his history. His novel career in the capital
of the presidency was much to his credit. His
duties to the company were discharged with
such ability, that he was nominated to the
most important office in India, the presidency
of the council of Bengal.

vwvvvv‘nn AWAIWWVVx/WWWW .

CHAPTER LXXX.
WAR WITH IIYDER ALI OF MYSORE.

Is previous chapters, especially the last,
reference has been made to Hyder Ali, the
Rajah, or, as he preferred being called, the
Nabob of Mysore. In the geographical por-
tion of this work descriptions will be found of
every part of Southern India, and very par-
ticular descriptions of the highlands, and the
whole region of the Deccan. A military
writer, who made various campaigns in the
Deccan during the last century, describes the
climate as very favourable for military opera-
tions :—“ Especially in the high country of
Mysore, it is temperate and healthy to a de-
gree unknown in any other tract of the like
extent within the tropics.
boisterous periodical rains, which, at two dif-
ferent periods, deluge the countries on the
coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, have their
force broken by the ghauts or mountains, and
from either side extend to the interior in fer-
tilizing showers, and preserve both the ver-
dure of the country and the temperature of
the climate almost throughout the year ; inso-

The monsoons, or a

In this country of Mysore there arose a
man of eminent daring and ability, already
repeatedly before the reader as Hyder Ali.
It is unnecessary to relate his history; no
number of volumes could comprise the story
of every able and daring Indian adventurer,
native and European, whose sword or whose
intrigues have been felt in India. It is suf-
ficient to tell that Hyder was of obscure
origin, and in one of the wars of which the
great table-land of the Deccan had been the
theatre time out of mind, he distinguished
himself as a volunteer. He was then twenty--
seven years of age. His daring courage made
him a conspicuous person, and he gradually
attached to himself a body of free-hooters. It
was not uncommon in India to begin a war-

; like career as leader of banditti, and end it as

 

‘a powerful rajah or nabob. Hyder was one

of the most remarkable instances of such a
gradation. By robbery he became enriched,
and he used his riches for the purpose of be-
coming a plunderer on a grander scale. While

much that the British army remained in tents yet he was no more than a great robber, he
and never went into cantonmcnts throughout ‘ fell in with a holy Brahmin, by whose cunning

the whole year."

he was much assisted, and who probably gave:

316

him the first notions of political intrigue.
Chiefs and monarchs in India honoured riches
more than high-born persons in any other
country. Hyder’s reputation for riches, no
matter how acquired, gained him much admi-
ration; and his well-known ability to defend
what he had acquired, added to that admira-
tion. He became recognised as a chief by
chiefs, and was known as the fougedar of
Dindigul. He soon put down all refractory
neighbours, either by artifice or the sword;
it was difficult to decide in which way he was
the greater. His friend the Brahmin obtained
access to the court of Mysore, and apprised
his colleague in former predatory adventures
of all political matters that might any how be
turned to their joint account.

A mutiny broke out in the army of Mysore.
Hyder bravely and promptly put it down,
earning and receiving royal gratitude. His
beloved Brahmin accused the richest chiefs of
Mysore as the instigators of the revolt. They
were seized, punished in person, and deprived
of their estates. Hyder and the Brahmin
profited largely by the forfeitures. He had
become a chief, high in royal favour, but.
he was still a robber. He had as little indis-
position to kill as to steal. Murder, as an
accessory to plunder, was simply regarded as
a necessary means towards a very unobjec-
tionable end. He gradually became a rebel,
as well as a robber. He took advantage of
certain mutinies of the troops for pay, to quiet
or quell the disturbances, and gain the un-
limited confidence of the monarch, that he
might ultimately the more securely dethrone
him. After a variety of ingenious and infa-
mous stratagems, in concert with the Brah-
min, he succeeded. He and the Brahmin
eventually betrayed one another, and this
cunning adversary nearly ruined Hyder more
than once. The courage of the bold bandit
never forsook him, and his competition with
his wily antagonist so sharpened his wits that
he at last excelled the Brahmin, and all other
Brahmins in Mysore, however wicked and
acute in the arts of cunning, dissimulation,
and far-sighted intrigue. Koonde Row (such
was the crafty Brahmin’s name) was at last
destroyed. The Rajah of Mysore himself he-
came a victim, and Hyder had no more rivals
in that country either as to craft or power.
Once established on the throne, he scented all
disaffection afar off, and soon tried the value
of his sabre in suppressing it. He became
rich exceedingly, little by little extended his
territory, and who could extend territory in
India, in his time, without coming into colli-
sion with the English? “'hen he became rich.
the Mahrattas invaded his country. He fought
them with great gallantry, but their cavalry

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXX.

came as the locusts and eat up every green
thing. Hyder purchased them off again and
again, when all the resistance of valour and
genius was useless against equal valour, per-
haps equal genius, and far superior numbers.

Mr. Thornton says the politics of the Dec-
can at this period (1763) presented “ an en-
tangled web, of which it is scarcely practicable
to render a clear account.” Probably Hyder
had a clearer view of them than any one else,
not even excepting Clive or Hastings. Pre-
vious to this time Hyder had intercourse with
the Bombay government, which was not
always complimentary, but not on the whole
unfriendly. The government of Madras had
however, formed a league with Nizam Ali
against him. The various events rapidly oc-
curred already related in previous chapters,
and Hyder had his part in them, or watched
them with the vigilance of a statesman. He
could neither read nor write, but his memory
was wonderful, and his agents were every-
where. His spies overran the country. The.
French possessed Hyder’s sympathy, and
to the designs of Lally he was especially
no stranger.

In 1766, the Mahrattas, Nizam Ali, and
the Madras government were allied against
Hyder. The Mahrattas were, of course, first
in the conflict. They overran half the My-
sore territory before their allies were ready.
He bought them off just in time to avert
their junction with the other allied forces.
The army of the nizam, supported by the
British, advanced to the northern limits of
Mysore. The English commander, Colonel
Joseph Smith, suspected both the nizam
and the Mahrattas. Hyder Ali bought off
the nizam, as he had already obtained the
neutrality of the Mahrattas. The stupid
council of Madras would not pay attention to
Colonel Smith’s information, nor adopt any
measures of defence. Their conceit and im-
pertinence disgusted the army, and nearly
brought ruin upon the presidency. The
nizam joined Hyder. Their combined forces
pressed upon the English. Colonel Smith
was intelligent and brave, but ignorant of the
country. He guarded passes which were not
likely to be penetrated; he left. unguarded
those, more especially one, by which the
troops of Hyder poured down like a torrent,
sweeping away the outposts, baggage, cattle,
and supplies of the English. Hosts of wild
horsemen thundered down with the violencte
and rapidity of a cataract upon the English.
Colonel “bed was dispatched from Trichi-
nopoly. Smith directed his energies to form
a junction with him, but was attacked by an
immensely superior force, which be defeated,
slaying two thousand men, himself losing but

 

 

CHAP. LXXX.]

one hundred and seventy in killed and
wounded. The Mysoreans came on with
their hosts of cavalry eddying like a flood,
and sweeping away rice~earts, bullocks, and
stragglers. Smith, after his men had fought,
and marched, and hungered for twenty-seven
hours, at last formed the desired junction
with \Vood. Smith and V‘Vood joined their
forces at Trincomalee, where they expected to
find adequate stores. The council had, how-
ever, thought of nothing but the grandeur of
their own policy; no preparations were made
for the support. of armies in the presence of
powerful invaders. Smith was obliged to
move away eastward in quest of provisions,
leaving his stores, sick, and wounded in Trin-
eomalee. The enemy prepared to assault
the place, but Smith, having found some
supplies, returned opportunely for its relief.
Alter a short time, another march to gather
provisions was necessary; the whole army
was occupied in foraging. Forty thousand
horsemen of the allies flew around the English,
crossing every rice-swamp or corn-field, oc—
cupying the tracts which served as roads,
desolating the villages, devouring hidden
stores of edibles, ravaging everywhere and
everything. As vultures gathered upon a
field of carrion, the Mysorean troopers found
nothing too mean for their prey.

Still the reputation of English valour awed
back the savage hordes, and Hyder hoped
only to conquer when the English, worn out
by fatigue and hunger, could no longer march
or fight. In the terrible emergency of the Eng-
lish, relief was found by the discovery of some
hidden hordes of grain. The English were
fed, and could therefore fight. Hyder knew
of their distress, but not of the discovered
supplies and the recruited strength which
they brought.

On the 26th of September, 1767, the foe
opened a distant cannonade against the left of
the English lines. Smith moved round a hill,
which arose between him and the main body
of the opposing forces. He hoped to take
them in flank upon their left. The enemy
perceived his movement, but did not under-
stand it. They made a movement to corre-
spond with their idea of that of Smith, which
they believed to be a retreat. At the same
moment both armies were moving from oppo-
site directions round the hill, but the collision
coming soon was unexpected by either. Both
armies saw the importance of gaining the hill.
Captain Cooke succeeded in obtaining it, but
not without a close competition. The enemy
ascended to a range of crags facing a strong
position. Taking them in flank, Cooke gal-
lantly and skilfully carried the post. A re-
gular battle then ensued. The English had

VoL. ii.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

317

fourteen hundred European infantry, and nine
thousand sepoys. Their cavalry consisted of
fifteen hundred wretchedly conditioned men,
miserably mounted, belonging to the nabob,
and a small troop of English dragoons. The
enemy numbered forty thousand cavalry, and
an infantry force a little. less numerous.
The enemy had a vast number of useless
guns, and about thirty pieces fit to bring
into action; the English had as many. The
allies formed a crescent, and manoeuvred to
enclose the small English force. The battle
opened by a cannonade, the enemy firing
with eagerness and rapidity, but no judgment.
The English fired slowly until they found
the range, and then served their guns with
great quickness as well as deadly aim. The
ordnance of the allies was soon silenced.
The English then suddenly opened their
whole cannonade upon the thick columns of
the cavalry, which were arranged in a manner
exposing them to such a casualty. The
troopers, eager to charge, bore for a few
minutes this galling fire, while great numbers
fell. No orders were given, the columns
broke, and the vast masses of ill-posted
horsemen dispersed upon the field. Hyder,
with the sagacity of his keen intellect, per-
ceived that the battle was lost, in time to
draw off his guns. He exhorted his ally to
retire, but the nizam became furious with
disappointment and rage, and refused to
leave the field. Smith ordered his whole
line to charge, the nizam became panic-struck,
and ordered a retreat. A curious incident
is recorded as having then occurred. The
nizam had posted a long line of elephants in
the rear of his army, bearing his harem and
other adjuncts to his pleasure. The ladies
were invited to view the destruction of the
English, as, long after, the Russian general,
Prince Menschikoff, with oriental taste and
similar fortune, invited the Russian ladies to
do at Alma. “'hen the nizam directed that
his elephants should be moved from the field,
a lady called out, “They have not been so
taught; they have been trained to follow the
standard of the emperor.” That standard was
soon in the advance, while English bullets
flew among the bearers of the palanquins, and
many fell for whom these missiles were not
designed. The nizam, on a swift horse, at-
tended by a chosen body of cavalry, fled
with the utmost precipitation, leaving Hyder
to draw off his army as best he could.
The wearied English rested on the field of
victory.

Next day, the army of Hyder was observed
in good formation and regular retreat. The
English pursued, and captured forty-one
pieces of cannon, in addition to nine which

'r T

318 HISTORY OF THE

were left upon the field; sixteen more were
abandoned on the march, and fell into the
hands of the English. Nearly five thousand
men were numbered among the dead upon
the field of battle or in the line of pursuit.
The English had one hundred and fifty put
hors de combat. The fugitives continued a
hasty flight far beyond the probability, or
even possibility, of pursuit. The English
withdrew into cantonments as the rainy season
approached.

Hyder Ali, ever indefatigable, even in de-
feat, continued in action, combating the mon-
soon and the skill of England, warring boldly
with nature and science. He captured several
small places belonging to the nabob, and then
proceeded to attack Amboah, a place peculiarly
situated, being built upon a mountain of
smooth granite. Hyder laid regular siege to
this place, and in five days rendered it no
longer tenable, except the citadel, to which
the garrison retired. The defenders were five
hundred sepoys and a few Europeans, under
the command of a brave and scientific officer
named Calvert. The native governor was,
What native governors usually were, faithless.
He was detected, and confined; his guards were
disarmed. Hyder’s previous success having
been through the information supplied by the
traitor, he now knew not- how to proceed. He
accordingly made a breach in an inaccessible
place, which was in vain attempted again and
again, his troops reeling back after every
attack discomfited, and leaving many of
their comrades slain. Hyder sent a flag of
truce, with eulogistic references to the bravery
of the commander, who replied that Hyder
had not yet come close enough to enable him
to deserve the compliment. Another flag
arrived with a large bribe, and the offer of
the highest military honours in Hyder’s ser-
vice, if Captain Calvert would surrender the
place. The reply was that the next mes-
senger proposing dishonour would be hanged
in the breach. From the 10th of November,
to the 7th of December, all the efforts of
Hyder were in vain. Colonel Smith left his
cantonments and hastened to the relief of his
brave brothers in arms. Great was his joy
when he saw the British flag flying as he
approached. Hyder perceiving the advance
of Colonel Smith, raised the siege. The
government directed that the sepoy regiment
which defended the place should bear the
rock of Amboah upon its colours.

Smith followed Hyder, but was compelled
to give up the pursuit from the deficiency
of his commissariat,—an impediment which
has since often obstructed British military
enterprise, when disgrace was still more re-
flected upon those in authority, to whom the

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXX.
real derangement or neglect was attributable.
Colonel Smith was joined by Colonel “'ood,
who advanced from ’I‘richinopoly. Hyder
was too much daunted by recent defeats to
make any bold attempt to prevent this junc-
tion. Not that he wanted courage personally,
but he knew that his troops were not of a
quality to face the English after such signal
and shameful defeats. Hyder was, however,
vigilant and active as ever. He attempted
various surprises upon convoys, but was de-
feated by the courage and constant watch—
fulness of the English officers.

At the close of the year 1767, he ascended
the ghauts, leaving strong detachments of
cavalry to watch and harass the English
army, which was in the deepest distress from
want of provisions, the government having
wholly left it to itself, and the officers dis-
playing but little talent in commissary affairs,
although by skill and bravery in breach and
battle, having won for themselves a glorious
renown. Hyder Ali now began to fear the
English power. Forces from Bengal threat-
ened Hyderabad. His ally, the nizam, now
prepared to betray him, as both had 'be-
trayed everybody else that trusted them.
Hyder was not to be deceived. He repre-
sented to the nizam that the latter had
adopted a wise course, and pretended to be-
lieve that it was done to deceive the English,
until affairs took a more favourable turn.
He, however, intimated that in future the
nizam’s army and his own had better ope-
rate separately. The nizam affected to agree
with all Hyder said, withdrew his army, and
the next day openly offered alliance to the
English against the man with whom he acted
in the field the day before. This was per-
fectly in keeping .with Mussulman faith on
the part of one prince to another throughout
Indian history. In the diplomatic game
which followed, the English played as foolishly
as was their custom. The nizam granted
everything, on the condition that the Eu-
glish should pay him tribute, which placed
matters pretty much as they were before:
the English gained nothing but glory. The
nizam also granted to the company the
dewannee of Mysore, on the condition that
when they conquered it, he should receive
a tribute. The nizam was beaten in battle,
but reaped, through the vain and dull council
of Madras, all the fruits of victory.

The chiefs on the Malabar Coast, who had
been reduced by Hyder, now revolted; and
the government of Bombay took the field
against him. Mangalore was captured at
once; the commander of Hyder’s fleet sur-
rendered it. Various other places on the
coast fell into the hands of the Bombay

 

 

CRAP. LXXX.]

officers.
British were repulsed even with slaughter.
Hyder hastened to the coast, with large forces.
He approached with such rapidity and skill,
and the English exercised so little vigilance,
that he was upon them suddenly. In May
he was before Mangalore. The English fled
in boats, and with such precipitation and
confusion that many were slain, and all their
artillery and stores were ingloriously captured.
Neither Smith nor Calvert were there.
Eighty Europeans, and one hundred and
eighty sepoys, sick and wounded, remained in
the conqueror’s hands. Hyder won the Whole
coast. He then proceeded to Bednore, whither
he had summoned the zemindars and other
holders of territorial possessions. He informed
them that he knew they were more favour-
able to the English than to him, and that he
would punish their disaffection by pecuniary
fines.

Mr. Thornton thus describes what then
took place 2—“ A list of the criminals was
then produced, and against the name of each
an enormous fine appeared. The conduct of
Hyder Ali’s affairs was marked by great pre-
cision; for every purpose there was a dis-
tinct provision. Among other establishments
nicely contrived so as to contribute to the
progress of the great machine of his govern-
ment, was a department of torture. To this
the offenders present were immediately con-
signed till their guilt should be expiated by
payment of the sums in which they were
respectively mulcted, and orders were issued
for taking similar proceedings with regard to
those whose fears had kept them away.”

Hearing that the government of Bombay
was making preparations to scour the coast
of Malabar with a naval and military force
which he could not resist, his genius suggested
an expedient by which he might retire with
some degree of military reputation, and with
pecuniary advantage. The author last quoted
thus describes his procedure, to this intent :—
“ With the Malabar chiefs Hyder Ali adopted
different means, but. not less characteristic,
nor less conducive to his interests. It was
intimated to them that their Mysorean lord
was tired of his conquests in Malabar, which
he had hitherto found a source of charge
rather than of profit; that if he were reim-
bursed the expenses incurred in their attain-
ment, he was ready to abandon them; and
that it was his intention that the territories
of those who refused to contribute to that
purpose should be transferred to those who
acceded to the proposal. Not one incurred
the threatened forfeiture, and Hyder Ali’s
officers retired from Malabar laden with the
offerings of its chiefs."

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

Canarese was attacked, but the,

 

319

The Madras government had organized no
efficient means of gaining intelligence, and,
therefore, were unable to apprise their officers
of the route taken by Hyder. Colonel Wood
reduced Baramahal, Salem, Coimbatore, and
lJindigul, but was unable to retain his con-
quests, from the fewness of his troops and
poverty of material. He attempted to guard
the passes, but the enemy eluded his vigilance
without difficulty, for he was wholly ignorant
of the country, as were all his officers. The
duty of providing guides—a task which the
nabob could have easily accomplished—oc-
curred to no one, or, at all events, was per-
formed by none. Hyder wrested from Colonel
“'ood all the conquests the latter had made.
Having at his command large bodies of
cavalry, Hyder was enabled to confuse the
English commander, so as to deprive him of‘
all benefit arising from a well-concerted plan
of action. The natives also constantly be-
trayed the English, surrendering strong places
without a blowf“ _

Colonel Smith was engaged in operations
to the north. On the 2nd of May, Kistna-
gherry capitulated to him. In June he laid
siege to Mulwagul, a strong place, from which
he apprehended a protracted resistance. It
was betrayed by the killadar. A brother of
Mohammed Ali had married the sister of this
person,and the formerbeing fougedar of Arcot,
had appointed his brother-in-law to exercise
under him the fiscal administration of Trinco-
malee. The principal was removed from office,
and the dependent, to avoid giving in his
accounts to Mohammed Ali, went over to.
Hyder Ali. He was now desirous of a change,
and offered to betray his trust, on condition
that his accounts should be considered closed.
Mohammed Ali consented; but there was
still a difficulty—the garrison were faithful,
though their commander was not. It hap-
pened, however, that the killadar had been
instructed to raise as large a number of‘
recruits for his master’s infantry as was prac-
ticable, and to give special encouragement to
men who had been disciplined by the English.
The killadar informed his officers that he had
succeeded in obtaining two hundred such
recruits, being two complete companies, and
that on an appointed night they were to arrive
with their native officers. At the specified
time, a party of English sepoys appeared as-
cending by a prescribed route. They were
led by a European officer, Captain Matthews,
not only dressed, but painted, so as to re-

* Of late years much has been written about the
fidelity of the native troops previous to 1857, except in
occasional defections. The truth is, the English in many
wars suffered from the treasons of native auxiliaries and
scpoys.

320

scmble a native. At daylight the mask was
thrown off, and the place was soon in the pos-
session of the Englisli.* Colonel Smith fol-
lowed up these successes by seve'al others.
An important accession to his strength was
obtained by an alliance with the Mahrattas
under Morari Rao. 0n the day when
Smith formed his junction with the Mah-
rattas, Hyder entered Bangalore with the
advanced guard of his grand army. He
heard of the junction of the Mahrattas with
Smith, and knew the locality of their encamp-
ment, for his spies were everywhere. He
formed the daring resolution of sending a few
hundred light cavalry that night into the
Mahratta camp, with orders to penetrate to
the tent of Morari Rao, and to return with
his head, when the infantry would at once
storm his camp, which, thrown into confusion
by the loss of its chief, would be routed with
slaughter. Moral-i Rao, like Hyder himself,
had organized a spy system, which was nearly
perfect. He became aware of the intended
attack, and, as so small a body of cavalry were
to conduct it, he gave strict orders that none
of his troops were to mount, but that his ca-
valry should remain each man stationed at his
horse’s head. The orders to the whole force
were, to be on the alert and attack all mounted
men, without accepting any pass-word or ex-
planation. This order was executed with pre-
cision, and had one unfortunate result in the
death of Captain Gee, Colonel Smith’s aid-
de-camp, who, riding into the Mahratta lines,
was mistaken for an enemy, and cut down.
Hyder’s cavalry were followed so close by his
infantry that the camp of Morari Rao would
have been attacked in force, but for a curious
incident. The state elephant of Morari re-
ceived an accidental wound : irritated by this
circumstance, and the alarm which raged
around him, he broke loose, and rushed
wildly through the camp, dragging the huge
chain by which he had been picketed.
Seizing this chain with his trunk, he hurled
it furiously at the advancing cavalry of
Hyder. They, supposing that the army of
the Mahrattas were charging, broke, and
rushed back over a column of infantry which
was marching in support. The infantry, be-
coming alarmed, took to flight, and, before
they could be rallied, morning dawned, re-
vealing the sheen of the English bayonets as
their lines of infantry were in motion.

The council of Madras sent civilian deputies
to the camps of Smith and Wood, in a manner
similar to that afterwards adopted in Europe
by the French Convention, and with similar
results. These delegates from the council

* Thornton’s Britt's/i Lidia, vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 557,
558.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

[CHAR LXXX.

were arrogant and self-sufficient, overruling
the conduct of the officers in matters beyond
the comprehension of the meddlcrs. The
English who occupied Mulwagul were removed
by these “ field deputies,” and some of Mo-
hammed Ali’s troops placed there. The MO-
hammedan commandant sold the place to
Hyder, as a previous Mohammedan com-
mandant in Hyder's service had sold it to the
nabob. Colonel \Nood’s strategy proved very
deficient, and b‘mith’s superior military talent
was by this means,-and the pompous in-
terference of the “field deputies,” rendered
nugatory. “'hen Mulwagul was betrayed,
\Vood made a movement for its recapture or
relief. He was too late for the latter, and
unable to accomplish the former. He at-
tempted to take the rock by an escalade,
which had nearly proved successful, through
the activity, presence of mind, and bravery
of an English officer named Brooke. The
next day, some light troops of Hyder ap-
peared in the distance. “bod proceeded to
reconnoitre, but soon perceived that an army
of three thousand horse, and at least an equal
number of infantry, with a powerful artillery,
were making dispositions to surround his
little band. \Yith great presence of mind,
more than his usual skill, and the most heroic
courage, he forced his way through one body
of the enemy after another, and united his
little army in a. regular retreat. Hyders
forces, increased by fresh accessions, hotly
pursued. Although his cavalry were nume-
rous, he used his well-appointed artillery,
which was moved rapidly in front. The
ground becoming less favourable for either
cavalry or artillery, the infantry of both ar-
mies skirmished, and so closely pressed were
the English, that a general action was inevi—
table, and as soon as the retreating force Could
find ground at all favou 'able, they took it, and
stood on the defensive. The positions of the
contending forces, and the mode of combat
which was necessitated by the peculiar cha-
racter of the ground, has been described with
military accuracy by Colonel \Vilks, in the
following passage :———“ The whole extent of the
ground which was the scene of the farther
operations of the day, consisted of a congeries
of granite rocks, or 'ather stones of unequal
heights and dimensions, and every varied
form, from six to sixteen feet diameter, scat-
tered ‘like the f‘agments of an earlier \Vorld.’
at irregular intervals over the whole surface
of the plain. Obliquely to the right, and in
the rear of the situation in which the ad-
vanced troops were engaged, was a small ob—
long hill, skirted at its two extremities with
an impenetrable mass of such stones, but flat
and covered with earth at the top to a suffi-

 

Ciur. LXXX.]

cient extent to admit of being occupied by
rather more than one battalion: the rocky
skirts of this hill extended in a ridge of about
three hundred yards towards the plain of stones,
and under its cover the Europeans had been
placed in reserve until the action should as-
sume a settled form. Hitherto, amid a mass
of cover and impediment, which bade defiance
to a regular formation, the intervals between
the rocks, and sometimes their summits, were
occupied by troops; the smaller openings were
converted into embrasures for guns ; and sup-
port successively arrived from each army to
those who were engaged. It was a series of
contests for the possession of rocks, or the
positions formed by their union, without any
possibility of the regular extension of a line
on either side, so that a rock was sometimes
seen possessed by Mysoreans within the ge-
neral scope of English defence. and by the
English among the Mysoreans.” The over-
whelming numbers of Hyder gave him the
advantage, in spite of the intrepidity of “'00d
and his soldiers. The English were giving
way, and there was danger of confusion among
the sepoys, who seldom behaved even toler-
ably well in retreat. The tide of victory which
set so strongly against the English was sud-
denly turned by Captain Brooke, the officer
who distinguished himself so much in the es-
calade on the previous day. Brooke had then
been wounded, but, notwithstanding his suf-
ferings, fought with a lion heart throughout
the conflict which it was now his fortune to
terminate. His position was with the baggage,
which, with the sick and wounded, he guarded.
His troops consisted of four companies and
two guns. He perceived a flat rock, which
was unoccupied, but which, strategetically,
afforded a good position. He ascended it,
as it was approached easily by a route cir-
cuitous and covered with crags and foliage.
His wounded men drew up, leaning on such
support as they could find. The guns were
dragged up and placed in position, and di-
rected upon the enemy with charges of grape,
making havoc in their ranks. The position
commanded the left flank of the enemy, upon
which, if any aid arrived from Smith, it would
have appeared. Hyder, perceiving suddenly
on his extreme left a body of men which he
supposed he had not seen before, believed
that some detachments from Smith’s division
had arrived upon the field. This impression
became a conviction, when suddenly, after
the first terrible discharge of grape, Brooke
and his whole force—even the sick and
Wounded all who eould raise their voice,
sin: «My shouted, "' Hurrahi hurrah! Smith:
Smith!” The British, not being aware of
the stratagem, were also imposed upon, and,

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

321
repeating the hurrahs and cries of “Smith I "
returned with such confidence to the battle
that Hyder, believing Smith’s whole army
was upon him, ordered a retreat. The trick
was soon discovered by the acute Hyder, and
he again returned to the attack; but his
troops were not convinced that new forces
had not joined the English, and they came on
cautiously. The British had, in the mean-
time, chosen strong ground, and made such
new dispositions of their force as greatly in-
creased their strength. Hyder forced his
legions upon the English lines ; but they were
found to be impregnable. Night. closed
around the combatants, the English remain-
ing possessors of the field. The rocks, be-
hind which the few British found repeated
refuge, saved them. There were not three
hundred men put hers de combat. Hyder’s
loss was two thousand.

A conflict of generalship began the next
day between the two commanders. Hyder
could handle large bodies of men with an in-
tuitive genius. He out-manoeuvred the British
commander, avoiding a battle, and sweeping
suddenly upon garrison after garrison, cap-
turing forts, and making prisoners. Among
other places he fell upon Bangalore, having,
by superior strategy, diverted “'ood’s atten-
tion in another direction. \Vood, leaving his
baggage and heavy guns in “ the Petat” of
that city, hastened to encounter Hyder, where
the wily Chieftain was not to be found, having
adroitly misled the British colonel. Hyder
seized the whole baggage of “'ood’s army,
the guns, stores of provisions, with merchan-
dise, and some treasure. The inhabitants
rushed to the fort for security. The garrison
closed the gates to prevent that confusion and
over—crowding which would have left the
citadel indefensible. The crowd strained for—
ward to save themselves, and their treasures,
from the ravages of Hyder’s army, until two
thousand men, women, and children, were
crushed or trampled to death. “Vood has-
tened from Oosoor just in time to find that
Hyder was gone, and had taken with him
everything of value in the place. The Eng-
lish were obliged to wander about for supplies,
the council of either Madras or Bombay ap~
pearing to be only concerned in keeping up
their dignity, and securing the chief cities of
their presidencies. Hyder intercepted “'ood’s
foraging expeditions, drove in his outposts,
cut off his stragglers, tore away his newly
acquired supplies, and day and night harassed
his Worn out troops. In one of these harass-
ing attacks, alter a running fight of several
days and nights, and when Hyder was making
the fiercest efforts to cut off the division of
Wood, the English were relieved by his

3:2 HISTORY OF THE

sudden and unaccountable retreat. Major
Fitzgerald and Smith’s division were at hand.
Hyder’s scouts brought the intelligence;
Wood was ignorant of it, until the roll of the
English drums came with welcome and cheer-
ing music to his ear. Smith had gone to
Madras, to bring the council to a proper
appreciation, if possible, of the crisis, and
Major Fitzgerald having assumed the com-
mand, with praiseworthy energy took mea-
sures to relieve Wood. Fitzgerald had very
imperfect information of the colonel’s condi-
tion, but he inferred, from a variety of minute
indications, and from what he could gather of
the movements of Hyder, that Wood, over-
powered, was gallantly struggling in an un-
equal contest. Fitzgerald might have long
wandered in quest of Wood, but for the heavy
and in part useless cannonade kept up by
Hyder, who, having captured the heavy guns
at Bangalore, seemed desirous of annoying, or
perhaps hoped to discourage the English by
perpetually firing them. Fitzgerald, follow-
ing the report, arrived in the nick of time to
save Wood and his truly gallant little army.
Warm were the congratulations of officers and
soldiers when they met, and high rose their
exultation as their enemy, although still many
times outnumbering them, dared not to give
them battle.

Fitzgerald found Wood in a state of great
depression, which, after the first burst of joy
upon their unexpected meeting, returned
again. Fitzgerald wrote to Smith, informing
him of this, who immediately presented the
letter to the council, and Wood was ordered
to be sent to them under arrest. This was
very cruel, for, however incompetent to con-
tend with such a soldier as Hyder, he was a
brave soldier and good officer. He was not
adapted to so important a command, but when
it devolved upon him, he did his utmost to
discharge its duties.

Fuzzul Oola Khan, one of the best of
Hyder’s generals, entered the province of
Coimbatore, and with facility captured one
fort after another, until he subjugated the
province. An English sergeant named Hos-
kin, was the only person in any command that
showed adequate courage or ability. He ’as
in command of an advanced post, with two
companies of native infantry, and one gun.
This little force occupied a mud fort, and de-
fended it heroically and cleverly. The fort
Was not taken, until it was thrown down and
lay in rubbish around its defenders. Even
then Hoskin disputed inch by inch of its
ruins with the aggressors. The contest was
sanguinary, and the greater part of the de-
fenders perished before superior numbers.
There are no records of Hoskin’s fate; his

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXX.
humble rank, in those days, would prohibit
any notice of his ability or heroism, except
such as the historian may gather from frag-
mentary references.

In other provinces the success of Hyder
was as swift, and as shameful to the army of
the nabob, and the arrangements of the Eng-
lish, as in Coimbatore. In several instances
the valour and talent of obscure English
officers delayed the progress of the conqueror
for a. little, but that was all that the English
and their allies were able to effect. As Hyder
himself marched upon Eroad, he encountered
suddenly Captain Nixon, with a force of fifty
Europeans and two hundred sepoys. Hyder
attacked them with two divisions of infantry
numbering probably ten thousand men, and a.
cavalry force still more numerous. Nixon
drew up his small band in good position, and
quietly awaited the approach of the enemy to
within twenty yards, when they delivered a.
volley with such Coolness that. every shot told.
The Europeans charged with the bayonet, an
instrument of which the Mysoreans were much
in dread. Hyder’s infantry reeling under the
well-directed volley, and charged with such
impetuosity at the point of the bayonet, broke
and turned from the field. Under another
commander, the native army would probably
have moved away; but Hyder knew what
could be effected; he ordered his cavalry to
charge the sepoys flank and rear, and they
were sabred to a man. Poor Nixon was among
the slain. An officer was the only man who
escaped, Lieutenant. Goreham. He was fortu-
nately able to speak the language, and claimed
the humanity of a native officer.

Hyder Ali made use of Goreham to trans-
late into English a summons to the garrison
of Eroad to surrender; and to write a letter
to its commander, Captain Orton, to come to
his camp, and negotiate terms, promising a
safe return if they could not agree. Orton
trusted to the honour of a man who had no
conception of it. He came. The officer next
in command to Orton, was one Robinson,
whom Hyder had released on parole, but who
broke his parole, and was permitted by the
council of Madras to break it. Hyder de-
clared that he was absolved from his obliga-
tion to Orton, by the knowledge that Robinson
was serving against him. Hyder offered to
spare the garrison, and permit them to march
out and proceed to Trichinopoly, if Orton
would order Robinson to surrender. Orton
gave the order, Robinson obeyed it; Hyder
walked into the place, triumphing alike over
the stupidity and dishonour of the English
ofiicers, who acted like men demented.
Robinson was clearly a man without personal
scruple or military pride. VVllkS explains the

 

cum-4.

 

CRAP. LXXXJ

conduct of Orton on the supposition that he
was a drunkard. Hyder, who kept no faith,
did not permit the garrison to go to Trichi-
nopoly, but sent them prisoners to Seringa-
patam, where he cast them into a loathsome
dungeon, and deprived them of adequate sub-
sistence. He hated the English with a keen
and unpitying animosity, and burned for every
opportunity of gratifying and displaying his
vindictiveness. The English had by tergiver-
sation, time serving, and unsteadiness of
policy merited his wrath and contempt. Had
the councils of Madras and Bombay followed
the honourable and wise policy pointed out
by the directors, had they obeyed orders
given repeatedly, and as often violated, the
humiliations inflicted by Hyder would never
have been visited upon them.

Hyder next proceeded to Caveriporam, and
summoned the garrison to surrender, offering
the release of the officer and garrison on
parole. The conditions were accepted; Hyder
seized the place, and violated as usual the
terms of capitulation. The garrison, with Cap-
tain F rassain, their commander, were sent to
the dungeons of Seringapatam, where already
several of the prisoners, among whom Captain
Robinson, as the first victim, had already
perished. The career of Hyder and his generals
was one of complete success, the country every-
where within the sphere of operations being
desolated or held by his forces. The council at
Madras was terrified, and having provoked
the war by their uncertain and arrogant
policy, after having armed the enemy they
thus provoked, they were glad to sue for
peace. Hyder requested that an English
officer should be sent to negotiate, and the
choice of the council fell upon the gallant
Captain Brooke, who had repeatedly distin-
guished himself by talent and valour in the
field. Mr. Thornton thus describes the diplo-
matic occurrences which ensued :—“Hyder
Ali requested that an English officer might
be sent to confer with him, and Captain
Brooke was dispatched thither in compliance
with his wish. Hyder Ali expatiated on
the aggressions of the English, and on his
own desire for peace; on the exertions he
had made to promote that object, and on the
unreasonable manner in which his overtures
had been rejected; on the wrongs which he
had received from Mohammed Ali, and on the
evil effects of that prince’s influence in the
councils of the English. He referred to the
advantage of maintaining Mysore as a barrier
to Arcot against the Mahrattas, and, advert-
ing to a threatened invasion by that power,
intimated that he could not oppose both them
and the English at the same time, and that it
remained for the latter power to determine

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

323

whether he should continue to shield them
from the former as heretofore, or whether he
should unite with the Mahrattas for the de-
struction of the English. Captain Brooke, in
reply, pointed out the superior advantages of
an alliance with the English to one with the
Mahrattas, to which Hyder Ali assented, and
expressed a wish that Colonel Smith should
come up to the army invested with full powers
of negotiation. Captain Brooke suggested
that Hyder Ali should send a vakeel to
Madras. This he refused, on the twofold
ground that it would give umbrage to the
Mahrattas, and that at Madras all his efforts
for peace would be frustrated by Mohammed
Ali. Before taking his leave, Captain Brooke
suggested to Hyder Ali that there was one
proof of his friendly and pacific disposition
which might readily and at once be afforded:
the discontinuance of the excesses by which
the country was devastated, and the defence-
less inhabitants reduced to the extremity of
wretchedness. The proposal met probably
with all the success which the proposer ex-
pected. Of friendly professions Hyder Ali
was profuse, but of nothing more. He an:-
swered that his treasury was not enriched by
the excesses complained of, but that he had
been compelled to accept the services of some
volunteers whose conduct he could not con-
trol. The report of this conversation was
forwarded to Madras, and Mr. Andrews, a
member of council, was deputed to negotiate.
He arrived in the camp of Hyder Ali on the
18th of February, 1769, and quitted it on the
21st, with proposals to be submitted to the
governor and council, having previously con-
cluded a truce for twelve days. The governor
of Madras had every reason to desire peace :
so great was their distress that the company’s
investments were entirely suspended, and it was
stated that their resources were insufficient
to carry on the war more than four months
longer.* Hyder Ali’s proposals were, how-
ever, rejected, and hostilities rccommenced.
Colonel Smith, who had returned to the field,
watched the movements of Hyder Ali with
unceasing vigilance, and frequently counter-
acted them with admirable skill. The ma-
noeuvres of the two armies had brought them
about one hundred and forty miles to the
southward of Madras, when suddenly dis-
missing nearly the whole of his infantry,-thc
greater part of his cavalry, together with his
guns and baggage of every description,
Hyder Ali, with six thousand horse, advanced
rapidly towards that place, and on the 29th
of March appeared before it. A small party
of infantry joined him on the following day.

* Separate Letter from Fort St. George, 8th March,
1769.

324 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

[CHAR LXXXI.

He immediately caused aletter to he addressed 5 dency of Mysore, which had been for some

to the governor expressing a desire to treat
for peace, and requesting that Mr. Dupré, a
member of council and next in succession to
the chair, might be deputed to attend him.
The character of the man who made this
demand, the place from which it. was made,
and the circun'istances under which he had
arrived there, all contributed to secure atten-
tion to the message. Mr. Dupré proceeded
to the camp of Hyder Ali on the morning of
the receipt of his letter, and, after a series
of conferences, the terms of a treaty were
agreed upon. The treaty was executed by
the governor and council on the 3rd of April,
and by Hyder Ali on the 4th. “'ith refer-
ence to the circumstances under which the
peace was concluded, Hyder Ali may be re-
garded as having displayed much moderation.
A mutual restoration of captured places was
provided for, and» Career, an ancient depen-

 

time retained by Mohammed Ali, was to be
rendered back. Alter the conclusion of the
treaty, difficulties arose from a demand of
Hyder Ali for the liberation of some persons
kept prisoners by Mohammed Ali, and of the
surrender of some stores at Colar. “'ith
much persuasion the nabob was induced to
comply with the former demand, and the
latter was yielded by the British government,
probably because it was felt to be vain to
refuse.”"“

Thus terminated the war with Hyder Ali
——a war which was needlessly and improvi-
dently commenced, and conducted, on the
part of the Madras government, with sin—
gular weakness and unskilfulness. Its con-
clusion was far more happy than that govern-
ment had any right to expect either from
their own measures, or from the character of
their enemy.

mmmmn vow/Mm... ‘ on“... on... v\‘\:\,

CHAPTER LXXXI.

HOME AFFAIRS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM 1750 TO 1775—IMPEACI1MEN'I‘ AND
ACQIIIT’I‘AL OF CLIVE—CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMPANY.

THE history of events in India. having been
brought down to a considerably later period
than that of the home incidents by which they

were influenced, it is necessary to relate what .
happened in the company’s proceedings as the '

tidings reached England of so many and great
vicissitudes in the East. In relating those
changes, such frequent reference has been
made to the directions received in India from
the company, and to the general policy of the
directors, that it will not be necessary to re-
count the minutia: of the company’s proceed-
ings, nor to go much into detail in describing
their fluctuating fortunes.

“Wren the second half of the eighteenth
century began, the company’s affairs were
much tried at home by the too great eager-
ness of the proprietary for large dividends.
So long as there was prosperity in that respect,
the proprietors of India stock did not much
trouble themselves as to how events went in
India. The successes of Clive, however, ex-

 

cited so much public attention, that from that ,
period a more enlarged interest in the affairs '

of India was felt by the ln‘oprietary. During
the year 175i he was “a lion” in England,
and popular opinion marked him out for fu-
ture achievement.

In March, 1755, when he was appelnted a
member of council for Madras, the d1rcctors
were nearly as much influenced by the general

feeling of the proprietors as by their own con-
victions that he was “the right man in the
right place." The French were at this period
the rivals most dreaded by the company and
the country, and all measures adopted by
them to curb French power in the East were
regarded by the people of England as patriotic.
This general sentiment strengthened the hands
of the directors, and enabled them to supply
men and material of war in a measure that
would otherwise have been impossible, while
the company was an object of such extensive
commercial jealousy.
the anxiety of the directors, and of a large
amount of the mal-administration and con-
fusion in India, was the complicated forms of
government contrived in London for the re-
gulation of the presidencies. Various attempts
to remove and to modify this evil were made
by the independent proprietors; Clive himself
pointed it out with his usual vigour and clear-
ness of expression, but no change found faVour
either with the directors or the councils in
India. The difficulties under which the di-
rectors laboured freni the slowness of com-
munication, and their imperfect maritime
arrangements, were then very great; while
the rapid occurrence of great events in India
baffled all their efforts to keep pace with them

* Ilia-[my of 1/18 Brz'tz's/z Empire 2'» India, Thornton,
vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 570—575.

 

One cause of much of

CHAP. LXXXIJ

in their arrangements. The councils at the
presidencies, not fully appreciating these dif-
ficulties, constantly complained of neglect.
They perpetually demanded men and stores,
which they often recklessly employed on en-
terprises not contemplated nor approved of
by the directors. The sense which the court
entertained of their arduous difficulties from
all these causes, is well expressed in their let-
ter to Bengal, 1760 :—“ The forces that went
abroad last year and are now destined for
India, will demonstrate that your employers
labour incessantly to strengthen and protect
their settlements, the glorious successes at
home having enabled the government to grant
us large succours, and we must gratefully
confess the ministry's care of this company.
The many remonstrances in almost every
letter would have been spared, if you had
reflected properly on our cruel and dangerous
situation; our mercantile concerns always
giving place to men and stores, when we
could possibly obtain them; ever distressed
for tonnage, as we carry abroad for the go-
vernment seldom less than one thousand tons
annually, exclusive of their men and baggage.
The heavy demorage incurred by ships de-
tained by accident or otherwise in India; the
immense expenses at Madras, with very scanty
returns; your own charges very great, those
of Bombay beyond all bounds; our settle-
ments in Sumatra, at the same time, requiring
large sums to put them in some state of secu-
rity against enemies and dangerous neigh-
bours; if these considerations had been duly
weighed, your injurious insinuations of being
neglected must have been turned into praise,
that your employers could do so much under
such untoward circumstances. “ve ourselves
look back with wonder at the difficulties we
have surmounted, and which, with our con-
tracted capital, must have been impossible, if
the proprietors, generously and without a
murmur, had not consented to reduce their
dividend twenty-five per cent; but with all
our economy and care, unless our servants
studiously attend to lessen their charges and
increase our advantages, the burthen will be
too great for us to bear much longer.”

The gratitude expressed towards the ini-
nistry in that letter was deserved, for upon
the increase of the company's military forces,
and especially when intelligence arrived that
the French and other European rivals held
out every temptation to the sepoys and other
mercenaries in the English service to desert,
measures were taken by the government to
extend and enforce the company’s military
authority. An act was passed which enabled
them to hold courts—martial for the punish-
ment of mutiny and desertion.

vOL. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

325

“'hcn Clive returned to England the se-
cond time, he received personally, July 16th,
1760, from the directors, their “unanimous
thanks for his many eminent and unparalleled
services.” It is a sad illustration of the cor-
ruption of human nature, that a few years
later, when no further advantages were ex—
pected from Clive’s military and administrative.
genius, these “many eminent and unparalleled
services" were so little regarded, that the
court of directors endeavoured to strip him
of his property and appropriate it to them-
selves.

In 1760, however, it was the policy of the
company to praise him; accordingly, in Sep-
tember of that year, the proprietors marked
their sense of Colonel Clive's services by a
public resolution of thanks to him, Admiral
Pococke, and Colonel Lawrence. They also
resolved unanimously, “ that the'chairman and
deputy chairman, when they wait upon Vice-
admiral Pococke, Colonel Clive, and Colonel
Lawrence, will desire those gentlemen to give
their consent that their portraits or statues be
taken, in order to be placed in some conspi-
cuous parts of this house, that their eminent
and signal services to this company may be
ever had in remembrance.” Thus the pro-
prietary at large rivalled the directors in
eulogising and conferring honours upon him :
a few years later, and their rivalry was as
signal in vituperating him, and endeavouring
to wrench from him property which he had
acquired with the sanction of the honourable
court. Clive was, however, destined to ren-
der further services to the company, and to
be still more an object of their panegyric be-
fore ingratitude and persecution marked him
for their victim. In 176%, alter the unfortu—
nate government of Mr. Vansittart in Bengal,
Clive, as has been already shown in the his-
tory of that presidency, was appointed gover-
nor and commander-in-chief. The circum-
stances atteuding his appointment were of
considerable home interest to the company,
and excited much attention from all classes
in the country.

There was a person in the direction of the
company named b’ulivan, by whose influence a
series of injuries and annoyances to Clive were
set on foot. Among other acts of hostility to
him, they refused to recognise his jaghire,
which had been conferred on him as already
related with the company's approval. As this
landed estate was worth £30,000 a year, and
the company was his tenant, it was deemed a
good prize, and of easy attainment. Clive
was compelled to take leading proceedings for
the recovery of his rights, the lawyers having
declared that his claims were legal and equit-
able. The company had no ground for re-

U U

326 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

sistin g them except that to appropriate to them-
selves Olive’s property would be an advan-
tage. Sulivan was perhaps actuated as much
byjealousy of Olive’s influence as by cupidity.
The latter motive Was that which chiefly pre-
vailed with the rest of the directors.

“hen the advices from Bengal, dated Sep-
tember 3rd, 1763, were received by the di-
rectors, great excitement was produced in
the honourable court, and among the public.
These advices were received on the 4th of
February, 1764, and informed the directors
of the war with Meer Cossim, and the death
of Mr. Amyatt in the conflict at Moorshed-
abad. On the 8th of February, an advertise-
ment appeared in all the London newspapers,
conveying the intelligence that had been re-
ceived. A special grand court was called on
the 27th of February, according to that pro-
vision in the constitution of the company,
under which nine proprietors might call such
a meeting. On the 29th of February, the 1st
of March, and the 12th of that month, the
court also assembled. All the revolutions
which had taken place in Bengal since the
first English acquisitions were made, became
subjects of discussion. Long and angry de-
bates ruffled the usually smooth surface of
the company’s meetings. The appointment
which the directors had made of making Mr.
Spencer governor of Bengal was “referred
back again to them,” and an outcry for the re-
appointment of Olive arose which could not be
stifled. He was then Lord Clive. His lord-
ship was present at the meeting on the 12th
of March, and expressed his willingness to
serve the company, if he were assured that
the court of directors were well disposed to-
wards him; but he declined coming to any
resolution at that moment.

It soon transpired that Clive believed the
deputy-chairman, Mr. Sulivan, was his enemy.
That gentleman almost Controlled the direc-
tion. He was a man of vast influence and
energy, and pertinacious in the extreme. He
and Olive were at constant variance; and
Clive resolved never to serve abroad if Suli-
van ruled at home. In a letter addressed
to the court of directors, March 28th, he
expressed his resolution in terms firm, but
modest and polite. He declared that he con-
sidered the measures of Mr. b‘ulivan utterly
destructive to the interests of the company;
but expressed himself as ready, if that gentle-
man u ere deprived of what was called “the
lead” in the company’s affairs, to accept the
appointment, even if the affairs of Bengal
should prove to be in a worse condition than
during the time of buraj-ad-Dowlah. To
this letter the directors made no reply. The
annual election for the directory took place

 

[Crush LXXXI.
on the 12th of April. On the 13th “new

chairs were chosen, and Mr. Sulivan returned
into the body of the court.”

On the 18th, the directors renewed their
correspondence with Lord Clive, who at-
tended there for the purpose of a conference,
at their invitation, the next day. He then
started new objections to his acceptance of the
honours proffered to him. These were the pre-
sence in Bengal of Mr. Spencer, with whom he
alleged many of the company’s agents would
no longer serve; and the disadvantage to

himself personally of proceeding to India,-

while a law-suit in reference to his jaghire
continued.

On the 27th, the court rescinded the
nomination of Mr. Spencer to the council of
Bengal, and re-appointed him to Bombay.
This appears to have conciliated Clive, who,
knowing of the intention of the directors as
to Spencer, prepared proposals of a concessive
nature Concerning his jaghire. Without wait-
ing for the company’s acquiescence in these,
he accepted their nomination, and was sworn
in, on the 30th of April, as president of Fort
William and commander-in-chief of the com-
pany’s forces there.

On the 5th of May, the general court
granted to his lordship the income of the
jaghire for ten years——that is to say, they
made him a present for ten years of an in-
come which was his own for ever; and this
was done with a show of magnanimity, and
consideration for his “eminent and unparal-
leled services." The results of these pro-
ceedings have been recorded in their proper
place in a previous chapter. The comments
of Mr. Mill upon the whole of these transac-
tions are inaccurate, and expressed in a spirit
unjust to the company and to Clive. \Vhat-
ever Mr. Mill has written, receives currency
to a greater extent among liberal persons not
well informed on Indian subjects, than the
statements of any other writer obtain; it is
therefore important to draw attention to in-
stances in which he allowed his peculiar
opinions to sway his mind, to the prejudice
not only of the East India Company, but
against the reputation of his own country.

In the history of the East India Company, ’

there were unhappily too many episodes dis-
creditable to that body and to Englishmen;
but it is unworthy of a great writer and able
man to subserve his peculiar commercial,
economical, or political opinions, by seizing
upon every apparent error, and twisting it into
a crime, and by perpetually turning aside from
the true line of fact to attribute motive, and
misconstrue the intention of those to whose
opinions and principles he is opposed.

On the proceedings between Clive and the

m. .4“ .

I.x.e,.~.._M « 4.2m

CHAP. LXXXIJ

company, related above, Mr. Mill thus anim-
adverts 2—“ During the military and political
transactions which so intensely engaged their
servants in India, the courts of directors and
proprietors remained for several years rather
quiet spectators and warm expectants, than
keen and troublesome controllers. When
they had been agitated for a while, however,
by the reports of mismanagement which were
mutually transmitted to them by Vansittart
and his opponents; and, at last, when they
were alarmed by the news of a war actually
kindled with the nabob, of the massacre of
so many of their servants, and the extensive
spirit of mutiny among the troops, their sense
of danger roused them to some acts of autho-
rity. Though Clive had quitted India with
an act of insult towards his employers, which
they had highly resented; though the direc-
tors had disputed and withheld payment of
the proceeds of his jaghire, for which he had
commenced a suit against them in the Court
of Chancery; he was now proposed for go—
vernor, as the only man capable of retrieving
their disordered and desperate affairs. Only
thirteen directors, however, were found, after
a violent contest, to vote for his appointment;
while it was still opposed by eleven. Yet
the high powers which he demanded, as in—
dispensable for the arduous services necessary
to be performed, though strongly opposed,
were also finally conferred. He was invested
with the powers of commander-in—chief,presi-
dent, and governor in Bengal ; and, together
with four gentlemen, named by the directors,
was to form a select committee, empowered to
act by their own authority, as often as they
deemed it expedient, without consulting the
council, or being subject to its control.” Al-
mOst every line of that passage makes a mis-
statement, or conveys by implication some
misrepresentation.

It is not true that the court of directors re-
mained quiet spectators rather than trouble-
some controllers. No impartial person can
read the correspondence between the councils
and the directors without coming to an
opposite conclusion. A very cursory inspec-
tion of documents and authorities at the
India-house must assure any honest mind
that the directors showed activity and vi-
gilance, answering all correspondence with
promptitude, and furnishing such means as
they Could against contingencies. So fre—
quently was the company deceived, by both
intentional and unintentional misstatements
from the councils, that the measures they took
did not correspond with cventualities. It is
not true that there was any indisposition to
control their servants, when clearly aware
that those servants were doing wrong. There

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

327

were instances in which some want of energy
was, in this particular, displayed, as has been
noticed in previous chapters. But the time
it required to receive intelligence and send
back orders was so great as frequently to para-
lyse the power of the directors, and enable the
councils to answer their masters with pro-
mises which they did not intend to perform.
As soon as the directors knew that Spencer,
Amyatt, and others, had perversely disobeyed
their orders and committed their honour,
these persons were either removed to other
spheres or dismissed. In the ease of several,
more especially Aymatt, the penal resolutions
of the directors failed to take effect, as these
persons had already paid the penalty of life,
for their impolicy or oppression, upon the
field of their errors. By the expression
“ warm expectants,” Mr. Mill evidently means
that the directors awaited eagerly for such
tidings of revolution and plunder as would
fill the treasury at home. If this be not the
meaning, the whole tone of the context is such
as to convey the impression. M. Auber" re-
marks upon this passage :—“ There is nothing
which authorizes the inference, that they were,
at that period, ‘ warm expectants,’ (it is pre-
sumed) either of new acquisitions or exor-
bitant gains. They desired the means of
meeting the heavy expenditure which the
operations in that country had entailed upon
the company. They advised and directed,
where advice and direction could be safely
given; and, although they wisely abstained
‘from controlling any measures which the exi-
gency of circumstances might have called for
on the part of the council, they communicated
their sentiments and Wishes thereon to their
servants.’ ” The course taken by the directors
in this last respect was the only rational one.
The sphere of operation was too remote for a
direct control; the only plan was to entrust
their servants with a large discretion, and
hold them personally responsible. M. Auber
meets the allegation of Mill, that the directors
were only at last roused to a sense of their
danger to resort to some acts of authority, by
the hostilities against the nabob, the massacres
of so many of their servants, and the extensive
spirit of mutiny among their troops, in the
following terms :—“ The directors had exer-
cised the acts of authority referred to before
any such news had reached England. The
death of Mr. Amyatt was not known to the
court until three weeks after he had been re-
moved from the service; the account of the
massacre did not arrive until three months,
and that of the mutiny until six months, after
the appointment of Lord Clive; and, instead

* British Power in India, vol. i. chap. iv. pp. 129,
130.

'328 HISTORY 01“ THE BRITISH EMPIRE

of its having been considered an extensive
mutiny, the court of directors, on the 11th of
October, 1764, caused the following notice to
be issued through the daily papers : ‘ We can,
with good authority, assure the public, that
although by the last advices from Bengal (7th
February), the East India Company were in—
formed there had been a mutiny among the
troops, instigated and encouraged by some
French soldiers, about one hundred and fifty
in number, who had enlisted in the company’s
service, yet the same, at the time of dispatch-
ing those advices, was quelled, without the
loss or desertion of a single European, ex-
cept those Frenchmen above-mentioned.’ "
M. Auber also remarks z—“Thc appointment
of Lord Clive was that of the court of pro-
prietors, and not of the court of directors.
'VVith regard to the high powers stated to
have been ‘demanded,’ it would be inferred
from the statement that they formed one of
the stipulations under which his lordship ac-
cepted the office of president; whereas he
was sworn in on the 30th of April, and it
was not until the 25th of May that the re—
commendation of the committee of corre-
spondence which was agreed to in personal
communication with, and not in consequence
of any demand from his lordship, was adopted
by the majority of the court. It was on that
occasion that the eleven directors dissented,
not from his appointment, but from the reso-
lution conferring such powers on the select
committee, which was to consist of four mem-
bers besides his lordship; and so far from the
act conferring such powers being unusual, the
principle had obtained of appointing a select
committee to act irrespective of the council,
since February, 1756. In the instance of the
expedition to Madras, under Colonel Forde,
in 1758, the select committee acted under such
powers, as appears by the consultations of
the 21st of August in that year. In the in-
stance of Mr. Vansittart, in February, 1761,
only three months preceding the proposition
for conferring the powers in question on Lord
Cliveand the committee, full powers had been
given by the court to Mr. Vansittart, ‘ with
authority to pursue whatever means he judged
most proper to attain the object. He was in
all cases, where it could be done conveniently,
to consult the council at large, or, at. least, the
select committee, though the power of deter-
mining was vested in him alone 1’”

While Clive was engaged in Bengal, the
company at home was much chagrined and
scandalized by the communications which he
made of the corruption of the court of Bengal.
It is much to be wished that the conduct of
the company to Clive himself in pecuniary
matters had been as honourable as it was

 

LUIIAP. LXXXI.

upon receipt of his communications, and as
they insisted the conduct of their councils
ought to be in their dealings with native
peoples and princes. The subject of presents
from native princes to the servants of the
East India Company, upon any revolution or
great political change, was a difficult subject
to adjust. Mr. Mill, in his history, places
the lists of recipients before his readers, and
shows the aggregate amount which in less
than ten years, as was proved before a com-
mittee of the [louse of Commons, was re-
ceived. This list, with the prefatory remarks
of Mr. Mill, will interest our readers :—

“ The practice which prevails in all rude
governments of accompanying an application
to a man in power with a gratification to some
of his ruling passions, most frequently to the
steadiest of all his passions, his avarice or ra—
pacity, has always remarkably distinguished
the governments in the East, and hardly any
to so extraordinary a degree as the govern-
ments of the very rude people of India.
“hen the English suddenly acquired their
extraordinary power in Bengal, the current. of
presents, so well accustomed to take its course
in the channel drawn by hope and fear, flowed
very naturally, and very copiously, into the lap
of the strangers. A person in India, who had
favours to ask, or evil to deprecate, could not
easily believe, till acceptance of his present,
that the great man to whom he addressed
himself was not his foe. Besides the sums,
which we may suppose it to have been in the
power of the receivers to conceal, and of the
amount of which it is not easy to form a con-
jecture, the following were detected and dis-
closed by the committee of the House of
Commons, in 177:: :—

“Account of Slllffi sums as loom? 6cm proral or (Iv/moni-
lmlf/ed elf/Em: [/18 commillee [01mm been, (lislributetl
fly 1/“? princes and ol/zer ”aliens of Bengal, from {/13
year 1757 lo l/w year 1766, l/ol/z inclusive; distin-
guis/{iizy t/m principal times of Me said (lislrz'blzlious,
med Specifying [lee SHIJIS received by eac/z. person re~
.rpectz'rely.

Revolution in favour of Mccr Jallier, in 173 2'

Rupees.

$0,000 ;

Rupees.

:2
CH '1'.
c,
G

Mr. Drake (Governor) .
Colonel Clive as second
in the select committee 280,000
Ditto as commander-in-
chief . . .
Ditto as a private dona-
tion . . . . . . 1600,0003
53,080,000

200,000

234,000

 

 

* It appears, by the extract in the appendix, No. 102,
from the evidence given on the trial of Ram Churn be-
fore the governor and council in 1761, by Roy Dulip,

who had the principal management in the distribution of

the treasures of the deceased nabob, Surajad-Dowlah, upon
the accession of Jafiier Ali Cawn———that Roy Dulop then

i
1

 

can. Lxxxr]

 

 

 

 

 

Mr. Watts as a member Rulms- Hul‘ees- 5
of the committee . 240,000
Ditto as a private dona-
tion . . 800,000
——1,010,000 117,000
Major Kilpalrick . . . . 210.000 27,000
Ditto as a private donation 300.000 33,750
Mr. Maningham . 240,000 27,000
Mr. Becher . . . 240,000 27,000
Six members of council onc lac
each . . 600,000 68,200
Mr. Walsh . 500,000 56,250
Mr. Sci-afton . 200,000 22,500
Mr. Lushington . . . 50,000 5,625
Stipulation to the navy and army 600,000
1,261,075
Jlemaraadmits—The sum of two ———————-
lacs to Lord Clive, as com-
mander-in-ehief, must be de-
ducted from this account, it
being included in the dona-
tion to the army . . . 22,500
Lord Clive’s jaghire was likewise
obtained at this period* . ——
1,238,575
ltevolution in favour of Cossim, 1760.
Mr. Sumner 28,000
Mr. Holwell 270,000 30,937
Mr. M’Guirc . 180,000 20,625
Mr. Smyth . 134,000 15,354
Major Yorke 134,000 15,354
General Calliaud . 200,000 22,016
Mr. Vausittart, 1762, received
seven lacs; but the two lacs to
General Calliaud are included;
so that only five lacs must be
counted for here . . . 500,000 58,333
Mr. M’Guirc 5000 gold mohrs 75,000 8,750
200,269
Revolution in favour of Jatlier, 1763.
Stipulation to the army . . 2,500,000 291,666
Ditto to the navy . . 1,250,000 145,833
137,499
Major Monro’r in 1761 received
from Bulwan Singh . . 10,000
Ditto from the nabob . 3,000
The oflicers belonging to Major
Monro’s family from ditto . 3,000
The army received from the mer-
chants at Benares . 100,000 416,666
62,666
Nujum-ad-Dowlah’s accession, 1765.
Mr. Spencer . . . . . . 200,000 23,333
Mcssieurs Pleydell, Burdett, and
Gray, one lac each 300,000 35,000 '

 

received, as a present from Colonel Clive, one lac, 25,000
rupees, being five per cent. on 25 lacs. It does not ap-
pear that this evidence was taken on oath.

* This, as noticed by Sir J. Malcolm, Life of Clive,
vol. ii. p. 187, is incorrect. The jaghire was not granted
till the end of 1759, two years after Meer Jaflier had been
seated on the throne.

1' It appears Colonel Monro accepted a jaghire from
the king. of £12,500 a-year, which he delivered to the
Kabob Meer J affier, the circumstances of which are stated
in the Journals of the year 1825.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

329
Rupees. 5:

Mr. Johnstone 237,000 27,650
Mr. Leycester . 112,500 13,125
Mr. Senior . . 172,500 20,125
Mr. Middleton 122,500 14,291
Mr. Gideon Johnstouc 50,000 5,833
$139,357

General Carnac received from Bul-
wan Sing in 1765 . 80,000 9,333
Ditto from the king . . . . 200,000 23,333

Lord Clive received from he Be~
gum in 1766 . . . . . . 500,000 58,333
90,999

Restitution—Jaffier, 1757.
East India Company . . . . 1,200,000
Europeans . 600,000
Natives . 250,000
Armenians . 100,000
2,150,000
Cossim, 1760.

East India Company . . 62,500

J atlier, 1763.
East India Company . . .

. . . 375,000
Europeans, Natives, &c. .

. . . 600,000
97 5,000
Peace with Sujah-ad-Dowlah.
East India Company . . . . . 5,000,000
Total of presents, £2,169,665.
Restitution, &c , £3,770,833.
Total amount, exclusive of Lord
Clive’s jaghirc .

583,333

. £5,910,408

JIenmramlmn.——The rupees are valued according to
the rate of exchange of the company’s bills at the difl’erent
periods”?

Mr. Mill wisely and eloquently remarked
upon these facts—“ That this was a practice
presenting the strongest demand for effectual
regulation, its obvious consequences render
manifest and indisputable. In the first place,
it laid the nabobs, rulers, and other leading
men of the country, under endless and un-
limited oppression; because, so long as they
on whom their whole power and influence
depended were pleased to desire presents,
nothing could be withheld which they either
possessed or had it in their power to ravage

* These sums appear by evidence to have been received

by the parties; but the committee think proper to state
that Mohammad Reza Cawn intended a present of one

' lac of rupees to each of the four deputies sent to treat

with Nujum-ad-Dowlah upon his father’s death ; viz.
Messrs. Johnstone, Leycestcr, Senior, and Middleton ; but
Mr. Middleton and Mr. Leycester affirm that they never
accepted theirs, and Mr. Johnstone appears to have ten-
dered his back to Mohammed Reza Cawn, who would
not accept them. These bills (except Mr. Senior’s for
50,000 rupees) appear to have been afterwards laid before
the select committee, and no further evidence has been
produced to your committee concerning them. Mr. Senior
received 50,000 rupees of his, and it is stated against him
in this account.

'1‘ T/iird Report on fire Nat/(re, Slate, and Candi/[0n
Ofl/Ie East [id/I'd Company, 1772, pp. 20—23.

830 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

and extort. That the temptations under
which the servants of the company were
placed, carried them to those heights of ex-
action which were within their reach, is far
from true. They showed, on the contrary, a
reserve and forbearance, which the education
received in no other country, probably in the
world, except their own, could have enabled
men, in their extraordinary circumstances to
maintain.”

0n the 17th of July, 1767, Lord Clive pre-
sented himself before the court of directors,
upon his return from Bengal, after his brief
but successful career there. The court con-
gratulated him in terms of energetic praise,
declaring that his conduct, “exceeded the
court’s most sanguine expectations, not only
in the very eminent services he had rendered
the company by his wise and judicious ad-
ministration of their affairs during his resi-
dence in Bengal, but also by that prudent
and well-formed plan which he had suggested
for the regulation of the plan of the select
committee; and that it was impossible by
force of words to represent to his lordship the
high sense of gratitude the court entertained
for the constant attention given by his lord-
ship to the company's interests."

“On the 23rd of September, the general
court, in consideration of the important ser-
vices rendered to the company by Lord Clive,
recommended to, and authorized, the court of
directors to make a grant, under the com-
pany’s seal, to his lordship, and his personal
representatives, of a further term of ten years
on his jaghire. The indenture granting the
same was approved and engrossed in October
following.”

The court of directors were probably well
pleased with their judgment. upon Clive’s ser-
vices, upon receiving a despatch from the
council of Bengal, conveying a good account
of the company's prospects, and attributing it
to the genius of Olive. The council must
have been much impressed with the over-
whelming ability of the great general and
statesman, when, in spite of his reforms, and
resolute and even haughty conduct to them-
selves, they could make up their minds to
lavish compliments upon him in this fashion :—

“ We should be wanting in the just praises
of superior merit, and in gratitude for the es-
sential services performed by Lord Clive, if
we failed to acknowledge that, to the prudence
and vigour of his administration, you are
chiefly to ascribe the present flourishing con-
dition of your affairs. Firm and indefatigable
in his pursuits, he joined, to the weight of
personal character, a zeal for your service, and
a knowledge of your interests, which could
not but insure success.

 

“We beheld a presidency divided, head-
strong and licentious; a government without
nerves ; a treasury without money, and a
service without subordination, discipline, or
public spirit. “'e may add that, amidst a
general stagnation of useful industry and of
licensed commerce, individuals were accumu-
lating immense riches, w hich they had ravished
from the insulted prince and his helpless
people, who groaned under the united pressure
of discontent, poverty, and oppression.

“ Such was the condition of this presidency
and of these provinces. Your present situa-
tion need not be described. The liberal sup-
plies to China; the state of your treasury, of
your investment, of the service, and of the
whole country, declare it to be the strongest
contrast to what it was.

“ We repeat,” added the committee, “ what.
we have already declared to Lord Clive, that
no motive, no consideration, shall ever induce
us to depart from that system of politics
which has been recommended to us by precept
and example, unless some very extraordinary
event and unforeseen change should occur in
the posture of your affairs.”

On the 6th of April, 1770, the committee
of the military fund carried into effect an
agreement between Lord Olive and the com-
pany, in respect to the legacy left to his lord-
ship by Meer Jaffier, referred to in a previous
chapter. This sum amounted to £62,833.
Meer Jaffier’s successor added to this sum
£37,700. There was also an additional sum
of £24,128, due by the company for interest.
at eight per cent. on these amounts. Mr. Mill
sneeringly observes that “to this ambiguous
transaction the institution at Poplar owes its
foundation." This is one of the many errors
into which that able man was betrayed by the
animus which he cherished towards the com-
pany. The institution at Poplar, under the
designation of “ Poplar Hospital,” was founded
for the relief of those who had belonged to the
company’s maritime service, or who might at
any future time have belonged to it. Lord
Clive’s fund was for the benefit of those who
had been in the military service, or who, in
after times, might have served in the com-
pany’s army. Poplar Hospital was instituted
nearly a century before Clive was born,
in 1627.

The conquests of Hyder Ali, which ocea-
sioned such tumults and alarms in the presi-
dencies of Bombay and Madras, excited great
concern in the court of directors. The follow-
ing despatch to the council of Madras sets the
affairs between Hyder, the Nabol) of the Car-
natic, and the Madras council, in their true
light, and proves that the directors clearly
understood how so many dangers and dis-

[CHAR LXXXI.

.. _.._,..»..‘.»:__-_:. a...“ “A- . . ».

Al
I
I
l

 

C n A I". LXXXI.]

tresses were brought about, notwithstanding
the advantageous light in which the council
placed their own conduct, and their petulant
accusations, against the nabob, and every one
else whoni their own ignorance, incapacity,
and apathy involved in their abortive projects
and disputes. The date of the despatch was
March, 1770 :—

“ In your letter to the nabob, dated the
16th July, 1767, you say that it has been
your intention, ever since 1761, to embrace
the first favourable opportunity of securing
the several passes into the Carnatic. That
you then had a favourable opportunity, be-
cause the Mahrattas had already struck a
terror into Hyder’s forces; therefore, you
urged the nabob to exert his utmost to get
this accomplished. You afterwards promised
him the government of the Mysore country.
Your field deputies pompously appointed him
fougedar thereof; and then you accuse him
of having an insatiable desire of extending his
dominions. He finds himself, by following
your advice, reduced, disappointed, and almost
despised; and then you blame him for want
of temper.

“ You have attempted to explain away the
value of almost everything for which you
have ventured to plunge us into a war with a
view to obtain. To such a degree of irreso-
lution and disability had your ill-conduct of
the war reduced you, that necessity obliged
you, at last, to give Mr. Andrews, in his in-
structions to treat with Hyder, a very extra-
ordinary carte blanche, nearly to this effect :
‘ If Hyder will not relinquish places taken, we
must relinquish pretensions thereto.’

“ You say the nabob has the Bengal trans-
actions always in his mind :—We wonder not
at it. You have, contrary to our express in-
junctions, afforded but too much reason for all
the country powers around you to suspect us
of encroaching designs against their posses-
sions and tranquillity, and gained no one ad-
vantage thereby.

“ In the first article of your treaty with
Hyder, you include, in general words, all the
friends and allies of the contracting parties,
‘provided they do not become aggressors ;’
but it they become aggressors, they lose the
benefit of such treaty.

“ Now, as by the treaty with the soubahdar,
Bazalet Jung is prohibited expressly, at any
time. from yielding Hyder the common formal
civilities necessarily practised by country
powers who are at peace with each other, we
cannot conceive how Bazalet Jung can fulfil
the condition by which he holds his circar,
and yet continue on good terms with Hyder,
as all our allies must do, if they act conform-
ably to the first article of your treaty with him.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

331

“ By your letter to the president and coun-
cil of Bengal, let March last, and their reply
thereto, of the 31st of the same month, we
find a plan has been concerted between you,
for establishing a fund for military resources,
by a reduction of the investments on which
we had so much reason to depend. However
salutary it might be to provide against future
exigencies, after your investments shall have
been carried to their full extent, yet it is with
the utmost astonishment we see that our ser-
vants (apprised, as they are, of the obligation
the company is under to pay £400,000 an-
nually to government, exclusive of the indem-
nity for tea, which may be estimated at near
£200,000) could entertain an idea of depriv-
ing us of the only means we could have to
discharge the same, together with such divi-
dends as the proprietors might reasonably ex-
pect from our late acquisitions, and at the
same time enable us to provide for the pay-
ment of bills of exchange, or our common and
necessary consignments, and the other impor-
tant occasions which must indispensably be
complied with.”

The reference made in the foregoing de-
spatch to the annual payment of £100,000 a
year to the British government arose from an
act passed to that effect in June, 1757, com-
pelling the company to pay that sum for
permission to hold the sovereignty of their
territorial possessions in India for two years.
This was another instance of the flagrant
manner in which the crown and parliament
were ever ready to rend from the company
money on any pretext. After the resources
of the company had been drained in formid-
able wars, and territory was conceded to
them, by the revenues of which they hoped
to cover the expenses incurred, the crown
and parliament were ready to seize as much
of these revenues as possible, leaving the
company to meet its onerous pecuniary obli-
gations as best it could. The government
and parliament found an opportunity for
enacting this piece of rapaeity, in conse-
quence of the turbulent proceedings of the
proprietors of Indian stock, who looked for
the most exorbitant dividends, under allega-
tions of the wealth of their newly-acquired
provinces, which raised the envy and cupidity
of the governing classes in England. They
at once proclaimed that subjects should not
become territorial lords, or make conquests,
except for the weal of the entire nation. The
company protested that some of these cessions
were in payment of expenses actually in-
curred, and that for most, if not all, of their
accessions of land they paid a rent, and, in
many cases, equal to that upon which zemin-
dars and polygars held their tenures, and fill

332 HISTORY OF THE

more surely paid. The legislature cared for
none of these arguments, nor for any repre-
sentations that might be made, the object
of its members being to relieve themselves
from taxation, and place money at the dis-
pOsal of government, for its own purposes,
however unjustly taken from the company.
The king of England and his ministers were
as ready as the Emperor of Delhi, his son-
bahdars, and their nabobs, to seize what
might, under their especial circumstances, be
taken. The Mahratta chiefs were not the
only royal personages who took "'chout”
from the Indian lands. The East India Com-
pany had to pay a “ chout” to the Mahrattas
of their own legislature upon the lands from
which they hoped to acquire a revenue. The
Act compelling the company to pay £400,000
a-year expired in 1769, but was then renewed*
for five years. The act in 1767, besides ex-
acting the tribute, compelled the company,
whether it suited their business or not, to ex-
port a given value in British produce.

Closely following the renewal of the tribute
act, government passed measures giving to
their admirals on the coasts of India extra-
ordinary powers, which were used stupidly
and obstinately, as the reader has seen in the
relation of the absurd interference of Admirals
Lindsey and Harland in affairs for which they
had neither intelligence, experience, nor capa-
city. Three commissioners sent out by the
company in 1769 never reached their desti-
nation. This was one cause of the assump-
tion of absolute supervision by the admirals,
whose powers would have been held in check
by the authority conferred on the commis-
sioners with the consent of the crown.

In 1772 the directors were obliged to re-
present to the ministers that, in consequence
of the imperfect power allowed to the com-
pany for the punishment of its servants, the
directors were unable to enforce their au-
thority; that the recent was, which they
neither desired nor occasioned, had absorbed
their revenue ; that the expenditure for troops
and stores had increased; and that the in-
vestment upon the “ out-tun,” upon which they
relied for means to meet their expenses, was
actually suspended, from the absorbtion of
their capital. It might have been expected
that the ruinous tribute of £100,000 a-year
would, under such circumstances, have been re»
mitted; but the minister of the day showed
no disposition to relax demands, or in any
way faVour the company. The directors
and proprietors did not themselves adopt
prudent Courses. They had not long before
declared a dividend of 621,- per cent, with the
full knowledge of their embarrassments; but

* 7 Geo. III. cap. 5?.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXI
the £100,000 demanded by government was
not paid. A public opinion was rapidly
created against the company and its servants.
Forgotten matters were sought out, refuted
accusations were revived, sins forgiven or
passed lightly over by the public, were
dragged to light again; “ returned Indians"
were ridiculed in the newspaper and comic
press, caricatures ofthose persons as “nabobs”
were exhibited in the printshops, while eager
crowds approvingly gazed upon them; and,
in fine, a widespread hostility existed to-
wards the directors and their agents. Had
the company paid its way and made good
dividends, had new accounts of glorious vic-
tories, instead of the intelligence concerning
the defeats and disgraces attending the war
with MySore arrived, the mob would have
cheered, the nation would have been proud
of its heroes, the company’s nabobs and the
holders of East India stock would have been
the most respectable of citizens. A cloud
came upon the face of the great luminary, and
every vulgar eye looked fearlessly upon it.
The very persons that had courted the pa-
tronage of the company only a short time be-
fore, when in the heyday of its power, were
amongst the pamphleteers and accusers who
detracted its fair and legitimate fame. Lord
Clive, instead of being a popular idol, became
a popular victim. The families of those whom
he had deprived of place and power, when in
1765 he uprooted so many maladministrators,
as well as so much maladministration, had
hated him from that time, and virulently ca-
lumniated him; but the public mind was notthen
prepared to listen to them : now it was ready
to believe as well as to hear every fiction, as
well as every fault which flowed from the
tongues of his vituperators. The circum-
stances under which his lordship had entered
upon that arduous trust were forgotten, whilst
the most distorted views were given of his
measures. Lord Clive was not a. recognised
servant of the state; he derived no authority
from law: he was placed over a presidency,
divided, headstrong, and licentious; the trea-
sury was without money, and the service
without subordination, discipline, or public
spirit: the subordinate functionaries being
aware that they were only amenable to punish-
ment within the precincts of the Mahratta
ditch. Such a state of things was alone to be
met and overcome by the firm and resolute
line of conduct which his lordship adopted.
The effect on the interests of the individuals
who suffered under the well-merited rebuke
their conduct had drawn upon them, led to
the strong opposition evinced at the time to-
wards his lordship,—-—a feeling which was
fomented by some of the leading members of

3.4.1. .muWA..m.. . n.

 

1 <1‘.;....;\ ~

 

CHAP. LXXXL]

the direction, who were personally indisposcd
ttwards him.*

A select and a secret committee were moved
for in parliament. The members were gene-
rally adverse to the company, and many were
envious of the reputations and fortunes which
had been made in India, by which persons
originally obscure, towered above “ old fami-
lies.” They were denounced in and out of
parliament as upstarts, as if it were criminal
of them to be either braver, wiser, or more
clever than the gentry at home. Those who
had grown rich by legitimate means, were the
objects of as much acrimonious jealousy as
those who brought home their stores of plun-
der; nor were the former free from calumny,
any more than the latter from just censure.
As many who had grown rich in India did so
by plundering their own employers as well as
vanquished princes and peoples—men who
had dared nothing, and done nothing for the
good of the company or the honour of their
country, and as these were a. vast majority of
all that had grown rich in India, the“ wealthy ;
Indians ” were as a class liable to suspicion :
and exposed to abuse. A perfect hurricane!
of obloquy and invective raged round the heads
of all connected with the East India Com—
pany. Hox‘ strange the fortunes of this ano-
malous society—one year the pride of an em-
pire, and conquering empires, its servants ,
statesmen and generals, whose names filledi
the world; in another year, not remote, none
so poor as to do it homage. Its fortunes
were like flashing meteors, attracting every
eye, and passing swiftly on into darkness.
I’itful and glorious were the episodes of its
progress. Every season of renown was fol-
lowed by one of obloquy. Now gorgeous
Eastern kings poured forth their treasures
before it, as offerings to its valour, wisdom,
and power. Anon, the street-rabble mock its
directors as they pass; and the most stupid
country gentlemen that ever slumbered and
voted upon the benches of the commons, deem
themselves of too much consequence to asso-
ciate with its returned ministers and soldiers,
men who had

“ Made the earth to tremble,
And did shake kingdoms.”

The general feeling against the company
and its servants was promoted by an event
in which they had no share, except as suf-
ferers. In the year 1770 the rains failed in
Bengal. Upon them depended the rice crops——
upon these the sustenance of thirty millions of
human beings. A famine ensued, such as often
ras- known in India, especially in the rice

* Auber’s Rise dill! Progress of Me East India Com-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

puny, vol. i. p. 338.
VOL. II.

districts. The loss of human life was terrible.
The Ganges rolled down day by day num-
bers of dead bodies—they had perished of
hunger. Nothing excites so much sympathy
in England as a famine. Englishmen hear of
desolating wars with an excitement, which, in
admiration of the results, and of the feats per-
formed, counteracts the disgust which blood-
shed would otherwise create. But in a famine
there is no room for any emotions but pity
and horror, unless where human instrument-
alities are engaged in producing the ruin,
and then the English character fires up in
rage against the oppressors. This was the
case at the period of which these pages treat.
The tidings of famine and death from India
exasperated the multitude. It was believed
that the company’s agents had boarded and
forestalled the rice, and in their eagerness for
gain, allowed multitudes of their fellow-crea-
tures to starve. Commensurate efforts to dis-
abuse the public mind were not made; and
perhaps no efforts would have been successful
in correcting the prejudice which was grecdily
received. As Macaulay wrote, “These un-
happy events greatly increased the unpopula-
rity of Lord Clive. None of his acts had the
smallest tendency to produce such a calamity.
If the servants of the company had traded in
rice, they had done so in direct contravention
of the rule which he had laid down, and while
in power had resolutely enforced. But in the
eyes of his countrymen he was the nabob—
the Anglo-Indian character personified; and
while he was building and planting in Surrey,
he was held responsible for the effects of a
dry season in Bengal.” Clive, as the writer
last quoted also remarked, “Had to bear the
double odium of his bad and his good actions,
of every Indian abuse, and of every Indian
reform.” Clive had himself a seat in parlia-
ment; his enemies desired to have a sentence
of expulsion passed upon him; they sought
the confiscation of his estates, and demanded
that he should be deprived of his rank in the
army. Clive’s conduct in the house was as
intrepid as in the field. He astonished even
the great Chatham by his clear statements,
lucid arrangements, sound argument, manly
eloquence, and bold, defiant declamation. He
bore himself as haughtily and bravely to the
senate of England, as to the corrupt council
of Calcutta, or before the throne of the Mogul.
As soon as his fortunes were on the wane.
nearly all his professed friends, and even those.
whom he had loaded with benefits, forsook
him. It was the common belief that all his
property would be seized, and his person in-
carcerated, after being stripped of all his well-
won honours. Men supposed that nothing
would remain to him but his genius and his
X x

334 HISTORY OF THE
glory; and with these his former parasites,
acquaintances, and colleagues had least sym-
pathy. They thought more of his palace in
Shropshire, his splendid mansion at Clare-
mont, his seat in parliament, and 'his title,
than of the renown of Areot and Plassey, the
conquest, salvation, and effective administra-
tion of an empire.

The committees examined and cross-ex-
amined him. Frank, manly, great in his
humiliation as when he gave law to India,
he met all inquiries with openness and truth.
He justified acts for which he has been since
generally condemned by writers who feared
to encounter public opinion in our own times
by defending him, but who were by no means
certain that his conduct deserved denuncia-
tion. Some of the worst acts attributed to
him, were performed under circumstances
which open up questions of the nicest ca-
suistry, and such as no man of honour and
virtue, who was enlightened and experienced,
would hastily decide. The committee did
not conclude its inquiries the first session,
but in the next having still further prose-
cuted them, it came to a conclusion. Before the
verdict was announced, it was made apparent
to all, and to the horror of those whom Lord
Macaulayjustly calls, “the low-minded and
rancorous pack who had run him down, and
were eager to worry him to death," that
Clive had found one faithful and sympathis-
ing friend—his king. George III., who, with
all his faults, had such signal virtues, deter-
mined to stand by his loyal and magnanimous,
even if erring, servant. “'hile yet they were
questioning and cross-questioning him, the
king had him installed in the Order of the
Bath, with great pomp, in the chapel of
Henry the Seventh. He had been before
elected to this dignity, but the king chose
the occasion of his persecution thus to honour
him. Shortly afterwards he made him lord-
lieutenant of Shropshire; and when, kissing
his majesty’s hand upon occasion of his ap-
pointment, he ventured to refer to his dangers
and services, and sufferings, the king betrayed
much emotion. His majesty gave him a pri-
vate audience, and took occasion to converse
intimately with him on Indian topics.

Notwithstanding the king’s favour, and the
transparent corruption of his accusers, Bur-
goyne, the chairman of the committee, became
his accuser before the house. Lord Macaulay
gives this man too much credit for both his
parts and his honour. Clive found another
friend; “'edderburu, the attorney-general,
eloquently and ably defended him. Clive
replied to Burgoyne and his other assailants
With courage and dignity, but there was a
tone of plaintiveness in his address never be-

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXI
fore known as he recounted his wrongs and
his sorrows: it was the first echo of a break-
ing heart. The concluding paragraph of his
address was striking, in which he reminded
them that not only his honour, but their own,
was to be decided. He then left the house.

The commons passed a series of resolutions,
several of which related to Clive personally.
The first declared that he had, when in com—
mand of the troops in India, received large
sums of money from Meer Jaflier. The house
would not aflirm Burgoyne’s eagerly—pressed
conclusion, that they were received corruptly.
A substantial motion was then made, that
Clive had abused the power he possessed,
and set a bad example to the public servants;
the “ previous question ” was put and carried,
the house thus refusing to entertain the ques-
tion at all. “'edderburn adroitly took ad-
vantage of the temper of the house, and
moved that Lord Clive had rendered great
and meritorious services to his country. This
was hotly debated. The truth of the propoo
sition was evident, but if carried, Clive would
go forth more triumphant than ever. It was
tantamount to a vote of thanks of the house.
His enemies struggled fiercely against it,
speaking against time, and endeavouring to
weaken the numbers on his side by exhaus-
tion. The night wore away, and when the
morning shone clear and bright upon St. Ste-
phen’s, Clive’s antagonists conceiving that there
was too much patriotism in the commons of
England to refuse a great man so just a tri-
bute, shrank from a decision, and the resolu-
tion was carried nemine contradicente. This
was a terrible blow for Clive's enemies out of
doors, and especially among the corrupt, cow-
ardly, and envious clique within the circle of
the directors themselves.

Clive’s success brought crowds of flatterers
around him, who had forsaken him when the
thunder-cloud was yet dark above his head,
and seemed ready to discharge its bolts upon
him. He was no longer deserted. He sought
the society ofa few attached friends, he basked
in royal favour, he surrounded himself by
luxury; but, amidst all, he pined—his heart
was broken. The king and the senate of his
country had stood by him, but the ignorant
masses were prejudiced, and regarded him
with superstitious horror; the venal among
the proprietary of India stock and their friends
kept. up an incessant attack upon him still.
The company, whose favour he had fought
and lived for, and for which he had conquered
kingdoms, looked coldly on him; and his sen-
sitive heart soon sank into a depression deeper
than death, and from which he sinfully sought
death as a relief. On the 22nd of Novem-
ber, 1774:, he committed suicide, having just

 

 

 

CHAP. LXXXII.]

arrived at the age of forty-nine. His enemies
trod upon his ashes, chased his memory
through every avenue of the past, vitupe-
rated the dead. His country slowly came to
a juster appreciation of his errors and of his
sins, of his greatness and of his glory.

The proceedings of the commons in con-
nection with the inquiry which secured Clive
from the power of his enemies, were harsh
and stern to the company. A resolution was
passed. that all territory won by the arms of
the state belonged to the state, and that the
East India Company had violated that prin-
ciple. The company had but little aid from
the state in its acquisitions, and paid for that
aid vastly more than its value. The principal
issue of the inquiry was “ the regulation act.”"‘“
This act increased the value of the qualifica-
tion demanded from a director, prescribed a
new oath, and made various regulations of a
purely administrative nature in connection
with the directory. It decreed that Bengal
should be governed by a governor-general
and four councillors, each to continue in office
for five years. The presidencies of Madras
and Bombay were to obey the government of
Bengal. The directors were to send to the
secretaries of state copies of all advices, but

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

335

Warren Hastings was nominated in the act
itself as the first governor-general of India.
Lieutenant-general Clavering, the Honourable
George Monson, Richard Barwell, and Philip
Francis, Esqrs., the first members of the su-
preme council. A supreme court cfjudicature
was to be established at Calcutta. The com-
pany‘s monopoly was made more stringent
than ever. Another act" granted the com-
pany £1,400,000 on loan for their relief. The
nation was to forego for a time all participa-
tion in territorial profits. The dividend to
proprietors was fixed at six per cent. The
amount of merchandise in English commo-
dities, to be annually exported by the com-
pany, should be to the value of £380,837.
The crown was to appoint officers to conduct
the civil and military affairs. The company
objected to most of these provisions, and the
court of proprietors refused to recognise the
appointment by the crown of General Cla-
vering to command their forces. Ultimately
they gave way. The members ofthe supreme
council, Sir Elijah Impey the new chief jus-
tice, and various other persons of distinction,
embarked at St. Helen’s on the 1st of April,
1774, and from this period commenced a new
phase of the existence of the East India Com-

no control was to be exercised by the ministry. pany.

 

CHAPTER LXXXII.

AFFAIRS IN BENGAL DURING

THE GOVERNMENT

OF WARREN HASTINGS—TERRITORY

WRESTED FROM THE MOGUL AND GIVEN TO THE NABOB OF OUDE—ALLIANCE WITH
THE NABOB FOR THE CONQUEST OF THE ROHILLAS—EXECUTION OF NUNDCOOMAR—
VAST SUMS OBTAINED BY HASTINGS FOR THE COMPANY FROM THE NATIVE PRINCES.

IT is important to glance at the relations of
the British to surrounding powers, and of
those powers to one another, at the period
when the government of Bengal, and by con—
sequence the government of India, devolved
upon “'arren Hastings.

The emperor’s government was in a very
feeble condition. He had been for a number
of years dependent by turns upon the Nabob
of Oude, the Mahrattas, and the English.
Even the nizam of the Deccan, and the sou-
bahdar of Bengal, were not too feeble to give
him uneasiness or offer affront to his authority.
The major part of the princes of India had
shaken off the imperial authority. Vassals,
or officials of the supreme power, took
advantage of the general decay of the Mogul
power to exalt themselves by force or fraud.
Mahrattas, Sikhs, Affghans, and the stronger
and richer of the nabobs constantly menaced

* 13 Geo. III. cap. 16.

 

the territories that‘ surrounded them, over
which they had themselves usurped the
authority which belonged legitimately to the
Delhi emperor. With such a state of affairs
around them, it required on the part of the
English a constant vigilance, and they were
as anxious to maintain the balance of power
in Hindostan, as the English at home were
solicitous to maintain it in Europe. It has
become the custom among politicians of a
certain school in recent times to deride this
principle, but it is founded in the nature of
things, for if any one state gains a prepon-
derance of power, by attacking weaker states
in detail, the independence of all will be in-
fallibly destroyed. It is therefore the inte-
rest of every other power, to limit that, which
to the desire of encroachment acids the power
of effecting it, unless checked by a combina-
tion of all or some of the governments,
* 13 Geo. III. cap. 94.

336 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

which believe themselves endangered. The
wars of the English in India had hitherto
arisen mainly from the necessity of preventing
any other power, native or European, from
becoming so strong that the existence of the
English in India would be at its mercy.
When in April, 1772, Hastings became the
successor of Mr. Cartier, as governor of
Bengal, and virtually the governor of India,
he saw around the British territory, and bor-
dering upon those states which were con-
tiguous to it, states and peoples who were
desirous of maintaining a constant warfare,
either to acquire territory or plunder. Some
of the chiefs of those countries were ambi-
tions of extended dominion, others only sought
tribute or temporary spoil, while another
class of chiefs were alike avaricious of innue-
diate plunder, and permanent occupation of
territory. The court of directors considered
Allahabad as the great central position from
which, as from a watch-tower, the English
could look around upon the greedy and rest-
less powers that prowled around. From
that position, support could be rendered to
the emperor, so long as it suited English
policy to pay respect to his nominal power,
and, under its prestige, themselves exercise the
reality. From Allahabad, the territories of
Sujah-ad—Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, and of
the Mahrattas, Rohillas, and Jauts, could be
observed. The directors had ordered the
council at Bengal, previous to the arrival of
Hastings, to maintain a strong brigade, at
what they deemed the key position of India.

The Nabob of Oude reigned on the north
of the Ganges. If an enemy, he, from his
position and resources, would prove a formi-
dable one; if an ally, and under the influ-
ence of the company, they could by his
means make themselves the umpires of 11m-
dostan. They had laid that chief under
great obligations, by restoring to him his
dominions, when the right of conquest, always
recognised in India, enabled them to deprive
him of princely dignity and power. The
"tohilla chiefs were numerous, but all held
their sway in detached lands in the vicinity
of the emperor, and Sujah-ad-Dowlah, so as to
be unable to make any movement. separately,
or combined without the knowledge of the
king and his vizier. These Rohillas were
wild chieftains, and when acting in unison
could pour an army of eighty thousand men
chiefly cavalry, upon any point in their vici-
nity. There was generally a good under-
standing betveen them and the Nabob of
Oude, to whom they looked up as having a
certain prescriptive authority even in Rohil-
cund. The ltohillas were among the best
soldiers in India. As mere horsemen they

 

[CHAR LXXXH.

were not superior to the Mahrattas, who were
probably the best light cavalry, for marching
and outpost duty in the world; but they were by
far their superiors in close combat, being among
the best swordsmen in India. The ltohillas
were also famous for their use of rockets in
war. The Jats, or Jauts, extended from Agra
to within a few coss of Delhi. Their revenue
was about two crores of rupees, and they held
three forts which were deemed by other na-
tive powers impregnable. They were also
reputed to have a splendidly-appointcd and
numerous artillery. The country of the
Mahrajah Madhu, lay south-west of Delhi.
He ruled over various tribes, but his people
were chiefly Ilajpoots. These were proud of
their lineage, as it was universally held that
they were descended from kings, as their name
of Rajpoots implied. They were considered
the proudest and b‘avest warriors in India.
They could not forage like the Mahrattas, they
were not gigantic in stature like the Oudeans,
they were not rocket-men like the ltohillas,
nor artillerymen like the Jats, but they own
surpassed the Itohillas as swordsmen, and
were by all warriors of IIindostan accounted
the bravest of the brave. It was reported
that they never retreated in battle. In a
war with the Jats, with whom they were
often at war, their cavalry charged through
the fire of ninety pieces ofcannon, were thrice
repulsed, each time only retiring to re-form.
and at the fourth charge gained the victory.
In stature, they were rather below the middle
size, but their persons were finely proportioned,
and their countenances handsome and ex-
pressive of dignity and courage.

The Sikhs then held the lands from Sirhind
to Attock, a country exceedingly fertile; they
were rapidly rising to political importanCe,
but the distance of their settlements caused
them to be placed out of the computations of
the English, when reckoning upon opposing
or allied forces. As, however, these Sikhs
soon rose to be a powerful power, their
position at this juncture is noticed. They
were brave, energetic, and industrious, in
the opinion of the peoples of Northern and
\N'estern India. The Mahrattas, their power,
position, and policy, have been so frequently
the subjects of remark in foregoing pages.
that it is only necessary to say here that of
all the tribes of India they were the most
likely to give the English trouble, excepting,
perhaps, the Mysoreans, whose importance
chiefly depended upon the skill and genius
of their chief. They were of kindred ‘acc
with the Mahrattas, inhabiting contiguous
territory, and of similar habits, military and
social. The policy reconnnended by the court
of directors was for their governors and coun.

 

 

CHAr. LXXXII.]

oils to be on friendly terms, and commercial
intercourse with all these nations, to avoid
the incumbrance of alliances with them,
either offensive or defensive, especially the
former, but not to allow any of them to
obtain so overwhelming a preponderance by
the conquest of the rest, as to become too
formidable to the English. This policy was
not. carried out intelligently and prudently
by the councils of presidencies 11p to the
time of Hastings. How far it was then ob-
served will be seen from future pages.

“ \Vhen “Varren Hastings took his seat at
the head of the council board, Bengal was
governed according to the system which
Clive had devised—a system which was per~
haps skilfully contrived for the purpose of
facilitating and concealing a great revolution,
but which, when that revolution was com-
plete and irrevocable, could produce nothing
but inconvenience. There were two govern-
ments, the real and the ostensible. The
supreme power belonged to the company,
and was in truth the most despotic power
that can be conceived. The only restraint
on the English masters of the country, was
that which their own justice and humanity
imposed on them. There was no constitu-
tional check on their will, and resistance to
them was utterly hopeless. But though thus
absolute in reality, the English had not yet
assumed the style of sovereignty. They held
their territory as vassals of the throne of
Delhi, they raised their revenue as collectors
appointed by the imperial commission; their
public seal was inscribed with the imperial
titles, and their mint struck only the imperial
coin. There was still a Nabob of Bengal,
who stood to the English rulers of his coun-
try in the same relation in which Augustus
stood to Odoacer, or the last Merovingians
to Charles Martel and Pepin. He lived at
Moorshedabad, surrounded by princely mag-
nificence. He was approached with outward
marks of reverence, and his name was used
in public instruments. But in the govern-
ment of the country he had less share than
the youngest writer or cadet in the company’s
service. The English council which repre-
sented the company at Calcutta, was consti-
tuted on a very different plan from that which
has since been adopted. At present, the
governor is, as to all executive measures,
absolute. He can declare war, conclude peace,
appoint public functionaries, or remove them,
in opposition to the unanimous wish of those
who sit with himin council. They are indeed
entitled to know all that is done, to discuss all
that is done, to advise, to remonstrate, to send
protests to England. But it is with the governor
that the supreme power resides, and on him

IN INDIA AND THE EAST

 

337

that the whole responsibility rests. This sys-
tem, which was introduced by Mr. Pitt and Mr.
Dundas, in spite of the strenuous opposition
of Mr. Burke, we conceive to be on the whole
the best that was ever devised for the govern-
ment of a country where no materials can be
found for a reproductive constitution. In
the time of Hastings, the governor had only
one vote in council, and in case of an equal
division, a casting vote. It therefore hap~
pened not unfrequently, that he was overruled
on the gravest questions, and it was possible
that he might be wholly excluded for years
together from the real direction of public
affairs. The English functionaries at Fort
“'illiam, had yet paid little or no attention
to the internal government of Bengal. The
only branch of politics about which they much
busied themselves was negotiation with the
native princes. The police, the administra-
tion of justice, the details of the collection of
revenue, were almost entirely neglected.
“'e may remark that the phraseology of the
civil servant still bears the traces of this state
of things. To this day they always use the
word ‘political’ as synonymous with ‘diplo—
matic.’ “’e could name a gentleman still
living who was described by the highest.
authority as an invaluable public servant,
eminently fit to be at the head of the internal
administration of a whole presidency, but
unfortunately quite ignorant of all political
business. The internal government ot'Bengal,
the English rulers delegated to a great native
minister who was stationed at Moorshedabad.
All military affairs, and with the exception
to what pertains to ceremonial, all foreign
affairs, Were withdrawn from his control;
but the other departments of the administra-
tion were entirely confided to him. His own
stipend amounted to near £100,000 sterling
a year. The personal allowance of the nabob
amounted to near £300,000 a year, passed
through the minister's hand, and was to a great.
extent at his disposal. The collection of the
revenue, the administration of justice, the
maintenance of order, were left to this high
functionary; and for the exercise of this im‘
mense power, he was responsible to none but
the British masters of the country.”*

The first business of importance which de-
volved upon Hastings, was in connection with
certain instructions of the court sent out
by them in August, 1771, and which ar-
rived only ten days after he succeeded to
the chair. These instructions referred to
Mohammed Beza Khan, who at that time ad-
ministered the revenue affairs ot'the soubahdar,
and in part of the British. “’hen the infant
brother of the former soubahdar came to the

Lord Macaulay’s Essay 022 Warren [{asling/s.

338 HISTORY OF THE
musnid, Nundcoomar, the infamous Brahmin
to whom reference was made when recording
the events of Mr. Vansittart's government,
was competitor for the post of chief minister
with Mohammed Reza. The latter was pre-
ferred. The writer last quoted thus describes
the result :-——“ Nundcoomar, stimulated at once
by cupidity and malice, had been constantly
attempting to hurt the reputation of his suc-
cessful rival. This was not difficult. The
revenues of Bengal under the administration
established by Clive, did not yield such a
surplus as had been anticipated by the com-
pany, for at that time the most absurd notions
were entertained in England respecting the
wealth of India. Palaces of porphyry, hung
with the richest brocade, heaps of pearls and
diamonds, vaults from which pagados and
gold mohurs were measured out by the bushel,
filled the imagination even of men of business.
Nobody seemed to be aware of what was
nevertheless the truth, that India was a poorer
country than countries which in Europe are
reckoned poor,——than Ireland, for example, or
than Portugal. It was confidently believed
by lords of the treasury and members for the
city, that Bengal would not only defray its
own charges, but would afford an increased
dividend to the proprietors of India stock, and
large relief to the English finances. These
absurd expectations were disappointed, and
the directors, naturally enough, chose to
attribute the disappointment rather to the
mismanagement of Mohammed Reza Khan,
than to their own ignorance of the country
entrusted to their care. They were confirmed
in this by the agents ofNundcoomar, for Nund-
coomar had agents even in Leadenhall Street.
Soon after Hastings reached Calcutta, he
received a letter addressed by the court of
directors, not to the council generally, but
to himself in particular. He was directed to re-
move Mohammed Reza Khan,to arrest him with
all his family, and all his partizans, and to insti-
tute a strict inquiry into the whole of the admi-
nistration of the province. It was added that
the governor would do well to avail himself
of the assistance of Nundcoomar in the investi-
gation. The vices ofNundcoomar were acknow-
ledged. But even from his vices, it was said,
much advantage might, at such a conjuncturc
be derived; and though he could not safely be
trusted, it. might still be proper to encourage
him by hopes of reward. The governor bore
no goodwill to Nundcoomar; many years
before they had known each other at Moor-
shedabad, and then a quarrel had arisen be-
tween them, which all the authority of their
superiors could hardly compose. Widely as
they differed in most points, they resembled
each other in this, that both were men of un-

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXII.
forgiving natures. To Mohammed Reza Khan,
on the other hand, Hastings had no feelings
of hostility. Nevertheless, he proceeded to
execute the instructions of the company with
an alacrity which he never showed, except
when instructions were in perfect conformity
with his own views. He had wisely, as we
think, determined to get rid of the system of
double government in Bengal. The orders
of the directors furnished him with the means
for effecting his purpose, and dispensed him
from the necessity of discussing the matter
with his council. He took his measures with
his usual vigour and dexterity. At midnight,
the palace of Mohammed Reza Khan at Moor-
shedabad was surrounded by a battalion of
sepoys. The minister was aroused from his
slumber, and informed he was a prisoner.
Vl'ith the Mussulman’s gravity he bent his
head, and submitted to the will of GO( .”
VYith Mohammed Reza another man of mark
was arrested, Shitabroy, or Schitab Roy.
His daring courage and skilful conduct at
the battle of Patna, under Captain Knox, in-
troduced him so favourably to the council of
Bengal, that he had been appointed minister
of revenue in Bahia, an office in reference to
that province similar in character to that
which was held by Mohammed Reza in refer—
ence to all the dominions of the soubahbar.
This heroic and honest man was another ob-
ject of hatred to the atrocious Nundcoomar, and
also fell, so far, a victim to his wiles. The
members of council knew nothing of these
proceedings until the prisoners arrived in
Calcutta, or, at all events, approached that
city. Hastings acted with a secrecy and
promptitude which by no means pleased the
council. “The inquiry into the conduct of
the minister was postponed on different pre-
tences. He was detained in an easy con—
finement during many months. In the mean-
time the great revolution which Hastings had
planned was carried into effect. The office of
minister was abolished. The internal admi-
nistration was transferred to the servants of
the company. A system, a \‘cry imperfect
system, it is true, of civil and criminal justice
under English superintemlence was esta—
blished. The nabob was no longer to have
even an ostensible share in the government,
at he was still to receive a considerable
annual allowance, and to be surrounded with
the state of sovereignty. As he was an infant,
it was necessary to provide guardians for his
person and property. His person was en-
trusted to a lady of his father’s harem, known
by the name ofthc Munny Begum. The” office
of treasurer of the household was bestowed
on a Son of Nundcoomarnamed Goordas. Nund-
coomar’s services were wanted, yet he could

I. 4.1 Amanda

 

 

 

 

CRAP. LXXXIIJ

not be safely trusted with power, and Hastings
thought it a master stroke of policy to re-
ward the able and unprincipled parent, by
promoting the inoffensive son.

“The revolution completed, the double go-
vernment dissdved, the company installed
in the full sovereignty of Bengal, Hastings
had no, motive to treat the late ministers with
rigour. Their trial had been put off on vari-
ous pleas, till the new organization was com-
plete. They were then brought before a
committee over which the governor presided.
Shitabroy was speedily acquitted with hon-
our. A formal apology was made to him for
the restraint to which he had been subjected.
All the Eastern marks of respect were he-
stowed on him. He was clothed in a robe of
state, presented with jewels, and with a richly
harnessed elephant, and sent back to his go-
vernment at Patna. But his health had suf-
fered by confinement; his high spirit had
been cruelly wounded ; and soon after his
liberation he died of a broken heart.

“ The innocence of Mohammed Reza Khan
was not so clearly established. But the go~
vernor was not disposed to deal harshly. After
along hearing, in which N undcoomar appeared
as the accuser, and displayed both the art and
the inveterate rancour which distinguished
him, Hastings pronounced that the charges
had not been made out, and ordered the fallen
minister to be set at liberty. Nundcoomar had
purposed to destroy the Mussulman adminis-
tration, and to rise on its ruin. Both his
malevolence and his cupidity had been dis-
appointed. Hastings had made him a tool;
had used him for the purpose of accomplish-
ing the transfer of the government from
Moorshedahad to Calcutta, from native to
European hands. The rival, the enemy, so
long envied, so implacably persecuted, had
been dismissed unhurt. The situation so long
and ardcntly desired had been abolished. It
was natural that the governor should be from
that time an object of the most intense hatred
to the vindictive Brahmin. As yet, however,
it was necessary to suppress such feelings.
The time was coming when that long animo-
sity was to end in a desperate and deadly
struggle."

As soon as the intrigues, falsehoods, for-
geries, hriberies, and other villaiuies of Nund-
coomar, had triumphed, and the company had
been so far imposed upon as to suspect, arrest,
and incarcerate two honest men, Nundcoomar
began a new series of infamous schemes. Al-
though a cruel and heartless villain, he had a
zeal for the Bralnninical religion, and was
desirous of uprooting the Mohammedan in-
fluence altogether in the Bengal provinces.

* Macalilay’s review of Gleig’s Lg'fe cf [lusting/vs.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

339

He accordingly sent to his son, then occupy-
ing the chief place of ministerial influence in
the court of the soubahdar, under the auspices
of the English, letters which he desired to be
copied by the Begum, the regent of the infant
soubahdar, which were to be addressed as if
from herself to the council of Bengal. These
letters were complaints of infractions of treaty
by the English, of encroachments upon the
rights of the soubahdar, and containing de-
mands for the removal of such encroachments,
and the restoration of such rights. The ob-
ject of N undcoomar was to create such a feud as
would rouse the English to destroy all the
privileges and influence of the Mohammedan
government. By this means he would hu-
miliate a rival creed, and, probably, in the
confusion which must ensue, he would ac-
quire fresh wealth or power. At all events,
he hoped for new modes of gratifying his
horrid malignity against both the Mohamme-
dans and the English. The governor discovered
his intrigues, but knowing how extensive the
influence which this rich and ingenious Brah-
min had gained at the India-house, Hast-
ings thought it prudent to take no step until
he had informed the directors. They, instead
of ordering the arrest of Nundcoomar, made no
reply for a long time, and then filled their
communication with unmeaning platitudes,
affecting to think Nundcoomaravery bad man,
but not worse than most other natives. It is
impossible to account for the way in which
the influence of this bad Brahmin prevailed in
London, except by supposing that he had
gained partizans in very high quarters by the
use of money in a way which disgraced the
recipients, nothing could sink Nundcoomar
himself into deeper infamy than he had already
reached. One of the objects contemplated by
Nundcoomar by hisintrigues, both in India and
in England, was the destruction of Mr. Hast-
ings, who had foiled his wiles on a previous
occasion. Hastings foresaw this, and warned
the directors in his despatch that he could
hope for no security, and Bengal for no quiet,
while any heed was given to the representa-
tions of Nundcoomar, either concerning the
council, the soubahdar, particular officers in
the service of either, the politics of the native
princes, or the condition of the country.
While the governor’s despatch was on its
way, other events transpired of much import-
ance in their influence upon the future.

The Mahrattas exercised a dangerous influ-
ence over the weak Mogul, and so active were
their raids that they became the tormentors of
all India. The vizier besought the aid of the
English. The king summoned the vizier to
Delhi; the latter, having no reliance upon the
monarch’s steadiness, and fearing that his

3l0

majesty would, perhaps, make over some of
the Oude territory to the marauders, refused
to go. The Mahrattas were preparing an in-
vasion of Rohilcund, which would bring them
upon the confines of the nabob’s own domi-
nions, and endanger their independence. He
also feared, or affected to fear, that the R0-
hillas, to save themselves, might unite with
the Mahrattas against him. He resolved to
open a negotiation with the Rohillas, and be-
sought the English general at Allahabad, Sir
Robert Barker, to accompany him. The
Council, hoping for peace through Barker's
intervention, gave their consent. The main
object of the nabob was, however, soon shown
to be to extort some portion of Rohilcund, and
he hoped the presence of the English general
would so alarm the chiefs as to cause them to
accede to his wishes. They consented on
condition that he would aid Zabita Khan, the
.Roliilla chief, then at Succurtaul, guarding the
fords 0f the Ganges against the approach of
the Mahrattas, who were assisted by the king,
as the Mogul emperor was at this time most
frequently called. \Vhile these negotiations
went forward Madajee Scindiah, the Mahratta
chief, forced the passage of the Ganges with
bravery equal, and skill superior, to that
displayed by the Rohillas. Zabita Khan
fled; Scindiah pursued the flying Itohillas
to the very heart of Itohilcund. The vizier
was obliged to open negotiations with the
conquerors, and such were his fears that
he would have submitted to the most abject
terms but for the presence of General Barker.
The mutinous disposition ofthe nabob’s troops,
partly from irregular pay, and partly from
sympathy with whatever cause the Mogul
espoused, unmanned the nabob. By the coun-
cils of the English general, the nabob put his
frontier in a good state of defence, while the
general ordered the first brigade of the Eng-
lish army, then at Patna, to cross the Caram—
nassa, passing the bounds of the company’s
territories. The council were displeased be-
cause they had not been consulted, for which
stop there was no time, as the Mahrattas were
quick of foot and hand. The council were
also angry at the expense incurred without
any agreement with the nabob to refund it.
The l\‘[ahrattas had no intention of waiting
upon the slow movements of the English.
They plundered Rohilcund, and retired, as
usual, laden with booty. The Rohilla chiefs
had, on the whole, behaved badly, either sur-
rendering to Scindiah, or seeking refuge in
the north. They then entered into a conven-
tion with the nabob that, upon paying to him
forty lacs of rupees, he would aid in defend-
ing their territory. The Mah‘attas charac-
teristically offered to him a portion of the

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

 

[Cm P. LXXXII.

Roliilla lands nearest to his own, if he would
only see that. the chout, or tribute, was regu-
larly paid to them. They announced, at the
same time, their intention to appmpriate
to themselves lands formerly conceded by
the Rohillas to the king. In fact, matters
assumed the aspect of a convention between
the vizier and the Mahrattas, to partition Ro-
hilennd, each seizing a portion. The Mah—
rattas had at this time broken all their agree-
ments with the king, and were rapidly de-
spoiling him, while professing to uphold the
dignity of his name. They had even forced
from him a sumnid for the district of Meerut.
The king endeavoured to betray them to
the vizier and the English, and while doing
so betrayed these to the very power from
which he besought his old allies to save
him. The Rohillas and the vizier made at
last a defensive league. The Mahrattas no
sooner heard of it than they marched against
the confederates, making ruinous demands
from Snjah-ad-Dowlah.

The vizier besought the company’s inter-
position, and Hastings wrote to the Mahratta
chiefs, showing them that they were making
aggressions upon an ally. The first brigade
of the British army advanced to the head-
quarters of the nabob. The king, who had
confederated himself with the Mahrattas, now
unaccountany opposed them, drew on a ge-
neral battle, and, as every one concerned fore-
saw, incurred a total defeat. He was at the
mercy of these banditti. The Mahrattas at-
tacked the Jats next, who, being betrayed by
an Englishman in their service, named Mad-
dox, were as unsuccessful as the Rohillas had
been. Colonel Champion and fresh forces
joined the vizier, who undertook to defray
their charges while employed in his defence.
The Mahrattas had obtained grants of Corah
and part of Allahabad from the vizier, under
the menaces they held out. The English
had conferred these districts upon him,
they reoccupied them. It was now evident
that the nabob’s territory alone stood between
the Mahrattas and the company’s provinces,
and that the time had arrived when some
definite and permanent means for his defence
against these marauders must be made. The
nabob sought for an interview with Hastings,
which he granted with the advice of the
council. The council placed no restraint
upon the liberty of the president as to his
negotiations, except that b‘ujahmd-Dowlah
must bear the expenses of troops sent to de-
fend him, and that as the king had committed
himself as an instrument in the hands of the
Mahrattas, their engagements with him should
terminate. The council, however, would re-
open with him fresh negotiations, upon new

 

can. LXXXII.]

conditions, one of which was that the tribute
of twenty-six lacs of rupees from Bengal and
Bahar should be surrendered.

Mr. Hastings, during his journey to Oude,
requested the king to send some person to
negotiate with him. He took no notice of
the president’s despatches, but sent menacing
demands for the payment of his tribute, and
subjection to his authority, which was nothing
less than subjection to the Mahrattas. “ Mr.
Hastings reached Benares on the 19th of
August, and, on the 7th of September, con-
cluded a final treaty with the vizier, by which
the districts of Corah and Allahabad were
ceded to him, on condition of his paying fifty
lacs of rupees to the company; twenty in
ready money, and the remaining thirty lacs
in two years, in two equal payments; and
defraying the charges on account of any of
the company’s forces which he might require,
the same being fixed at two lacs ten thousand
per month for a brigade. The vizier, at the
instance of Mr. Hastings, renewed with Cheyte
Sing the engagements made with his father
Bulwunt Sing, in 1764, excepting the addi-
tional tribute of two and a half lacs of rupees,
to which Cheyte Sing had agreed on his ac-
cession to the Raj, in 1770. Application was
again made to the vizier for the dismissal of
M. Gentil, although Mr. Hastings was of
opinion that ‘ the man ’ had acquired im-
portance from the notice taken of him, rather
than from his real power to effect our interests
It was arranged that a resident should be
appointed to the court of the vizier from the
presidency. The vizier left Benares the 10th
September, on which day Mr. Hastings de-

parted for Chunar, where he fixed the bound- .

ary of the lands appertaining to the fort. He
then proceeded to Patna, for the purpose of
acquiring information respecting the saltpetre
manufactories; and resumed his seat at the
board on the 4th of October, when he sub-
mitted a detailed report of his proceedings,
and adverted to what had passed between the
vizier and himself, as to the appointment of a
resident at the court of Oude, from the go-
vernor in council.”

The council were pleased with the arrange-
ments, and empowered Mr. Hastings to ap-
point a resident at the court of Onde, to hold
communications only with himself, and to be
dismissed at his pleasure.

The English general, Sir Robert Barker,
caused much trouble and anxiety to the go-
vernor and council, by making it a point of
honour to resist all directions given him by civil
servants. This conduct was unwarrantable,
for, although the civil officers gave him direc-
tions what to do, they left it entirely to his
own judgment as to the mode of performance.

v0L. II.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

311

When the Mahrattas were induced to with-
draw from Rohilcund, it was upon condition
that the Rohilla chiefs should pay by instal-
ments forty lacs of rupees, and that the nabob
guaranteed the payment. He did so upon
receiving the bond of the chief sirdar, who
was himself guaranteed by the confederated
sirdars. They never paid their quota. The
chief paid to the nabob five lacs instead of
forty, and he paid none at all to the Mah-
rattas.

0n the 18th of November, 1773, the
council received a letter from the vizier, in
which he complained of the non—payment by
the Rohillas of the money for which he had
given a guarantee to the Mahrattas, while the
chiefs of Rohilcund were themselvesinvading
the territories of the Mahrattas in the Doab,
which would, of course, bring these marauders
back again, to the danger of the nabob’s own
dominions, and with imperative demands for
the payment of the forty lacs. The nabob’s
proposal, under these circumstances, was brief
and pertinent :—“ On condition of the entire
expulsion of the Rohillas, I will pay to the
company the sum of forty lacs of rupees in
ready money, whenever I shall discharge the
English troops; and until the expulsion of
the Rohillas shall be effected, I will pay the
expenses of the English troops; that is to
say, I will pay them the sum of 210,000
monthly.” This demand excited protracted
discussions at Calcutta; but, at last, Colonel
Champion’s brigade was ordered to advance
and assist the vizier. The policy of the
council was, that it had become absolutely
necessary to strengthen Onde, as a barrier
against the Mahrattas, and that the Rohillas,
fearing the vizier more than they did those
more distant freebooters, would be more likely
to join them in plundering his territory, to
the danger of Bengal, and involving the
English in expensive operations of defence.

Champion's army and that of the nabob
encountered the Rohillas on the 22nd of April,
1774, when a sanguinary battle was fought.
In personal appearance the people of Oude
were then, as they are now, the fin est and most
soldier-like in India. Their average stature
is far superior to that of the English, as well
as of every other race in India to the frontier
hills of Affghanistan. Their courage, how-
ever, never bore any proportion to their gi-
gantic appearance—Roliillas, Rajpoots, Jats,
and other races, much lower in stature, having
always proved superior to them in the field.
Champion soon found that the Oudeans and
their ruler were cowards together; they fled
from the field, leaving the English to main-
tain unaided a conflict with desperate men in
overwhelming numbers. Victory decided for

Y Y

342 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

the English, chiefly through their artillery,
the Rohillas again and again charging the
guns with desperate valour, attacking the
English on both flanks, which their superior
numbers enabled them to do with prospect of
advantage, while such a fire was directed
upon the British front as might distract at-
tention from the attacks upon the flanks. The
chief sirdar, Hafiz Rhamet, was slain, also one
of his sons, after behaving with magnanimous
heroism. “'hen the battle was over, the
nabob and his cowardly followers appeared
on the field, to plunder the fallen and assas-
sinate the dying.

According to Mr. Mill, and Lord Macaulay,
who follows Mr. Mill slavishly in his reviews
of the memoirs of Olive and Hastings, the
utmost cruelty was perpetrated upon the
people of Rohilcund, and upon the family
of the fallen chief. The statements of Mill
appear to have been based upon the commu—
nications of Colonel Champion to the council.
That gallant soldier, scorning the cowardly
Oudeans, and admiring the chivalry of the
Rohillas, was ready, without sufficient evi-
dence, to make such representations as un-
authenticated reports brought him. The
council replied to his communications, dis
rectiug him to protect the conquered, and
calling for proofs of his allegations : these were
never given. The statements of Mill, and the
glowing pictures portrayed by Lord Macaulay,
representing British troops as partaking of
the cruelties perpetrated, or, at least, standing
by reluctant witnesses of burning villages,
plundered houses, and ravished women, are
denied by writers far better acquainted with
the history of the period than either Mr. Mill
or his lordship. The former quotes Colonel
Champion as stating in his despatehes in-
stances of cruelty and plunder witnessed by
the whole army. The colonel, no doubt, did
witness such acts, and would have witnessed
many more, and worse in their character, if
it were not for the moral pressure exercised by
him against the vizier’s misdeeds; but many
of the colonel’s statements were made upon
hearsay, and were false. Mr. Hastings was
denounced by Mill for justifying or palliating
such deeds by the custom of oriental war-
fare, and the admission that even English
armies in India had previously, in that very
country, misconducted themselves in a manner
similar to that of the vizier’s army : yet these
statements of Mr. Hastings were. true, and
the real explanation of what did occur, stripped
of the false representations which Mill too
readily credited, as did Colonel Champion
himself. Professor \1'ilson’s comment upon
Mill's statements is as follows :—" The words
‘extermination,‘ ‘extirpation,’ and the like,

 

[cum LXXXII.

although found in the correspondence, are
here [in Mill] put forward so as to convey
erroneous impressions. The only extirpation
proposed was that of the power of one or two
Rohilla chiefs. It was not a war against the
people, but against a few military adventurers
who had gained their possessions by the
sword, who were constantly at war with their
neighbours and with each other, and whose
forcible suppression was the legitimate object
of the King of Delhi, or the Nabob of Oude.
So far was the contest from being national,
that the mass of the population of Rohilcund
consisted of Hindoos, hostile both in religion
and policy to their Affghan rules, to whom
the name Rohillas is somewhat incorrectly
confined. Even amongst the Affghans, how-
ever, there was but a partial combination,
and several of the sirdars joined the vizier.
One of the many pamphlets put forth by the
virulent enemies of Hastings (Origin and
avutlzentz'c narrative of the present flIahratta
and late Rohz'lla ll'ar. Loud. 17:31), un-
blushingly aflirms that 500,000 families of
husbandmen and artists had been driven
across the J umna, and that the Rohilla pro-
vinces were a barren and uninhabited waste.
An equally false representation is cited from
the parliamentary register, 1781, by Hamilton,
according to whom, the numbers expelled
were about 17,000 or 18,000 men with their
families, none being included in the spirit of
the treaty, excepting such as were actually
fomzd in arms. The Hindoo inhabitants,
consisting of about 700,000, were no other-
wise affected by it than experiencing a change
of masters, to which they had been frequently
accustomed."é These statements all proceeded
from personal hostility to Hastings, and had
no foundation in genuine humanity. It is
evident that the son of Hafiz, although the
most grievous consequence of hostilities was
his father’s death, entertains no suspicion that
there was anything atrocious in the transac-
tion, and he expresses no personal resentment
towards the chief actors in the revolution.”i‘

M. Auberi notices the allegations put forth
by Mill, and repeated by Macaulay, in the
following terms :—

“Accounts of severity of conduct, on the
part of the vizier, towards the family of Hafiz
Rhamet, reaching the council, they intimated
to Colonel Champion that it had been an in-
variable maxim in the policy of the company's
governments, in the execution of any enter-

* Hamilton’s Hislozy/
p. 268.

“i- \\'ilson’s notes on Mill’s Brilislz India, book v.
chap. i. pp. 4023, 404.

i Auber’s Brim}; Power in India, vol. i. chap. vii.
pp. 407—409.

of tire ROILflfd Jilly/lam,

smug-um“ . ... .

‘ snags; -n

CHAP. LXXXII.]

prises undertaken in behalf of their allies, to
interpose their protection in favour of the
conquered princes, for the security of their
lives and honour: that it was the intention
of the council to adhere to a maxim which
had so greatly contributed to the reputation
of the British name, and to perform what
might be incumbent on them on the occasion
in question. They accordingly desired to be
informed of the nature and instances of the
ill-treatment alluded to, in order that they
might judge of the measures proper to be
adopted. In the interim, the commander-in-
chief was to urge such remonstrances to the
vizier as occasion might require ; and to point
out how entirely abhorrent the council were
to every species of inhumanity. No instances
were, however, adduced in proof of the alle-
gations of cruelty, which appeared to have
been made upon general rumour.”

M. Auber adds, in reference to these trans-
actions :—

“The vizier having intimated to Colonel
Champion, in the month of May, that he had
no further occasion for the services of the
troops in the field before the rains, prepara—
tions were made to canton them at Bareilly.
The whole of the country lately possessed by
Hafiz Rhamct, with Only and Bessouly, be-
longing to the son of Dudney Cawn, had been
acquired by the vizier."

The following was the letter of the council,
making known these events to the directors :

“Every circumstance that could pOssibly
favour this enterprise, by an uncommon combi-
nation of political considerations and fortuitous
events, operated in support of the measure.

“1st. Justice to the vizier for the aggra-
vated breach of treaty in the Rohilla chiefs.

“ End. The honour of the company, pledged
implicitly by General Barker’s attestation for
the accomplishment of this treaty, and which,
added to their alliance with the vizier, en-
gaged us to see redress obtained for the per-
fidy of the Rohillas.

“ 3rd, The completion of the line of defence
of the vizicr’s dominions, by extending his
boundary to the natural barrier formed by
the northern chain of hills and the Ganges
and their junction. ~

“ 4th. The acquisition of forty lacs of ru-
pees to the company, and of so much specie
added to the exhausted currency of these
provinces.

“ 5th. The subsidy of two lacs ten thousand
rupees per month, for defraying the charges
of one—third of our army employed with the
vizier.

“ 43th. The urgent and recent orders of the
company for reducing charges, and procuring
the means to discharge the heavy debt at

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

343

.interest, heightened by the advices of their

great distresses at home.

“ 7th. The absence of the il’lahrattas from
Hindostan, which left an open field for carry-
ing the proposed plan into execution.

“8th, and lastly. The intestine divisions
and dissensions in their state, which, by en-
gaging them fully at home, would prevent
interruptions from their incursions, and leave
a moral certainty of success to the enterprise.

“ These were the inducements which de-
termined us to adopt this new plan of conduct;
in opposition to which, one powerful objection,
and only one, occurred, namely, the personal
hazard we ran, in undertaking so uncommon
a measure without positive instructions, at
our own risk, with the eyes of the whole na-
tion on the affairs of the company, and the
passions and prejudices of almost every man
in England inflamed against the conduct of
the company, and the characters of their ser-
vants. Notwithstanding which, we yielded
to the strong necessity impressed upon us by
the inducements abovementioned, in spite of
the suggestions and the checks of self-interest,
which set continually before our eyes the
dread of forfeiting the favour of our employers
and becoming the objects of popular invective,
and made us involuntarily rejoice at every
change in the vizier’s advices, which pro—
tracted the execution of the measure. At
length, however, his resolution coinciding
with our opinions, the enterprise was under-
taken; and, if our intelligence be confirmed,
it is now finally closed, with that success
which we had foreseen from the beginning.
We shall then again return to the state of
peace from which we emerged, when we first
engaged in the Rohilla expedition, with the
actual possession or acknowledged right
(which the power of this government can
amply and effectually assert) of near seventy
lacs of rupees, acquired by the monthly sub-
sidy and the stipulation: and it rests with
you to pass the ultimate judgment on our
conduct.”"-"

M. Auber, referring to this communication,
sa 's :—

“ This letter had scarcely been dispatched,
when the troops were again called into the
field, in consequence of intelligence that
matters were accommodated between the
Mahratta Chieftains. The vizier was, there-
fore, anxious to complete the total reduction
of the Rohillas without delay, by which the
designs of the king and the Mahrattas, to be
executed after the rains, would be defeated.
The king had taken into his service Shimroo,
the notorious assassin of the unfortunate pri—
soners at Patna.”

* Letter to Court, 17th of October, 1774.

3H HISTORY OF THE

The vizier had been punctual in his pay-.
ments of the monthly subsidy for the brigade,
and had given an assignment on his treasury
for the fifteen lacs due by the treaty of
September, 1773,* for the second payment
on account of the cession of Corah and Allah-
abad.

Colonel Champion, under all the circum-
stances, consented to advance, and soon quelled
all disturbances, finally and completely esta-
blishing the authority of the nabob.

The king and the vizier entered into nego-
tiations, by which they satisfied or pretended
to satisfy one another. Colonel Champion
was directed by the council to be present, to
abstain from committing the British to any
new engagements, and to watch proceedings
generally. This he did with vigilance and
suspicion, having been disposed to attribute
too much importance to the petty intrigues
of Indian courts. The colonel considered the
ally of the company to be just as dangerous
as their enemies.

“'hen peace was established, Hastings
directed his attention to the revenue. He
abolished the office of supervisor, and estab-
lished that of collector, a name which has
ever since continued in the revenue system of
India. Means were taken to guard against
the trickery and frauds of the native occu—
piers of land, and at the same time to remove
all hardships and inequalities, as far as it was
possible to do so, without destroying those
customs of the country to which the natives
so tenaciously clung, even to their own disad-
vantage. The administration of justice next
claimed the care of the indefatigable governor,
whose keen and polished intellect penetrated
all subjects. The information given by him
to the directors on the laws, usages, and va-
rious offices and officers connected with the
administration of law, was more accurate and
complete than the court of directors had ever
before received. The suppression of Dacoittee
offered many difficulties, but the governor
persevered with such skill and energy to ac-
complish it, that a great effect was produced,
and a commensurate relief afforded to both
people and government.

011 the 11th of May, 177%, a measure abo«
lishing the right to buy or sell slaves who
had not previously been known as such, was
carried into effect. The Object was to prevent
child-stealing for the purposes of slavery, a
practice which the Dutch and French, more
especially the latter, had encouraged.

Mr. Hallied, of the civil service, made an
English translation of the Mohammedan and
Hindoo codes of laws. This book was pub-
lished in March, 1775, dedicated to Mr. Hast-
”‘ Vide printed Treaties.

 

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXII.
ings, to whom the translator attributed the
original plan, and the result of its execution.

Peace was not permitted to continue long in
India. The restlessness of the native chiefs
led them perpetually to make war upon one
another, and the English were mixed up with
so many of them by treaties, or agreements
which had all the effect of regular treaties,
that it was impossible to keep the sword
sheathed. Bhotan, a mountainous district on
the borders of Bengal (described in the geo-
graphical portion of this work), made war
upon Cooch Bahar. The Cooch rajah claimed
the protection of the English, offering to place
his territory under the dominion of the Bengal
government, and to pay to it half the reve-
nues, if he were preserved in the peaceful
enjoyment of the remainder, without being
exposed to the depredations of his neighbours.
As Cooch Bahar ranged along the British dis--
trict of Rungpore, the governor acceded to
the proposal. The “ Deb rajah," at the head
of the Bhotans, was ravaging the country of
Cooch Bahar with fire and sword, never sup-
posing that the English would interfere. The
operations of a few British troops threw his
highness into alarm, and the consternation
spread to the remotest recesses of Bhotan.
The sovereign implored the interposition of
Teshoo Lama}: who addressed to Mr. Hastings
the most remarkable communication probably
ever presented by any native power in India
to a representative of England. The docu—
ment is so curious, that it cannot fail to in—
terest the reader.

“ The affairs of this quarter in every respect
flourish, and I am night and day employed for
the increase of your happiness and prosperity.
Having been informed by travellers from your
quarter of your exalted fame and reputation,
my heart, like the blossom of spring, abounds
with gaiety, gladness, and joy. Praise! that
the star of your fortune is in its ascension—
praise! that happiness and case are the sur-
rounding attendants of myself and family.
Neither to molest or persecute is my aim: it
is even the characteristic of my sect to deprive
ourselves of the necessary refreshments of
sleep, should an injury be done to a single
individual. But in justice and humanity I
am informed you surpass us. May you ever
adorn the seat of justice and power, that man-
kind may, under the shadow of your bosom,
enjoy the blessings of happiness and case!
By your favour I am the rajah and lama of
this country, and rule over numbers of sub-
jects, a particular with which you have no

* Accounts of the Lamas, their religion, and the state
of Thibet will be found in the geographical portion of
this work, which the reader will do well to consult when

, perusing the historical chapters.

CHAP. LXXXIII.] IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 345

doubt been acquainted by travelleis f1om these I him to desist from his evil practices in future,
pa1ts.I have been repeatedly i11fo1med that and to be submissive to you in all matters.
you ha1e been engaged in hostilities against i I am persuaded that he 11111 confoim to the
the Dah Ter1ea to which it is said, the dah s advice which I have given him, and it will be
own c1iminal conduct in committing 1avages necessary that you treat him with compassion.
and othe1 outlages on your frontiers, has gi1 e11 As to my pa1t, I am but a fakeer, and it is
rise. As he is of a mule and ignorant 1‘,ace I the custom of my sect, with the 1osary in our
past times are not destitute of instances of the hands, to pray for the welfare of mankind and
like misconduct which his 011‘11 avarice tempted the peace and happiness of the inhabitants of
him to commit : it is not unlikely that he has this country; and I do now, with my head
now resumed those instances, and the ravages uncovered, entreat that you cease all hostilities
and plunder which he may have committed against the dab in future. It would he need-
on the skirts of the Bengal and Bahar pro- less to add to the length of this letter, as the
vinces have given you provocation to send bearer of it, who is a Goseign, will represent
your vindictive army against him; however, to you all particulars, and it is hoped that you
his party has been defeated; many of his will comply therewith. In this country wor-
people have been killed, three forts have been ship of the Almighty is the profession of all.
wrested from him, and he has met with the “‘e poor creatures are in nothing equal to
punishment he deserved, and it is as evident you. Having a few things in hand I send
as the sun, your army has been victorious; them to you by way of remembrance, and I
and that if you had been desirous of it, you i hope for your acceptance of them.”

might in the space of two days have entirely A treaty, consisting of ten articles, was
extirpated him, for he had not power to resist ,0 agieed to on the 25th of Ap1il. Some lands
your efforts. But I now take upon me to be 1' 11' e1e resto1ed to the Deb Rajah, who was to
his mediator, and to represent to you, that as pay to the company f01 the possession of the
the said Dah Terrea is dependant upon the _ Chitta Cotta province a tlibute of fi1e 'Iauzan
Dalee Lama, who rules this country with 1111- 2 horses: the Bhotan merchants were allowed
limited sway (but 011 account of his being in to send a caravan annually to Rnngpore.
his minority, the charge of the government Mr. Hastings saw that the communication
and administration for the present is com— I from the Teshoo Lama opened an opportu-
111itted to me), should you persist in offering nity for effecting regular intercourse between
further molestation to the dah’s country, it Thibet and Bengal, and he proposed that Mr.
will irritate both the Lama and all his subjects ! Bogle be sent by the council to the Lama, with
against you. Therefore, from a regard to our 3. letter and presents, accompanied by a
religion and customs, I request you will cease sample of goods, with the view of ascertaining
all hostilities against him, and in doing this which might be made objects of commelce.
you will confer the greatest favour and friend- ’Ihe council concurled in the views of the
ship upon me. I have reprimanded the (lab president. Mr. Hamilton accompanied M1.
for his past conduct, and I have admonished Bogle as assistant-surgeon.

 

 

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

TIIE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL UNDER WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF
INDIA, TO TIIE DEATH OF GENERAL CLAVERING~ARRIVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE
NEW COUNCIL—DISPUTES BETWEEN THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL AND THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL—A CONSPIRACY AGAINST HASTINGS, AND FALSE ACCESATIONS
CON’I‘RIVED BY NI'NDCOOMAR—THE BRAHMIN CONVICTED 0F FORGERY, AND HANGED
BY SENTENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT—MARRIAGE OI" HASTINGS—DEATH OF MON-
SON AND CLAVERING LEAVING HASTINGS IN A MAJORITY AT THE COUNCIL BOARD.

IN the last chapter on home events connected 1' India, that the other presidencies and pro—
with the company, it was related that in con- vinccs should, to a certain extent, be subjected
sequence of parliamentary interposition va- to the governor-generals superintendence;
1ions new regulations were made fo1 the and certain new councillors were nominated,
govelnment of India, and that among these who proceeded to Bengal. On the 19th of
)Ir. Hastings, piesident of the council of October, 177—}, the new council, with the ex-
Bengal, and governor of the Bengal p1o11nces ccption of )Ir. Barwel], who was in the coun-
was to be designated gover‘nm g-enelal of try, arrived at Calcutta, and were received

34:6 HISTORY OF THE
with public honours. Next day a council was
held. Proclamation was ordered, announcing
that the new government, under “ the regu-
lation act,” began that day. Various new and
useful regulations were made under the aus-
pices of the new council; among these one
was especially beneficial,—the establishment of
a board of trade, by which commercial affairs
should be exclusively the object of attention.
The decrees upon which the directors and
the royal government had agreed, were placed
before the governor-general and council,which
may be thus summed up :—A commission
was issued to the governor-general, constitut-
ing him governor and commander-in-chief of
the fortress and garrison of Fort William and
town of Calcuttafi“ Lieutenant-general Cla-
vering was granted a commission as com-
mander-in-chief of all the company’s forces
in India. If the governor-general and council
should at any time think proper to issue
orders, under their hands, or by their secre-
tary, to any officer in the army, thereby sus-
pending or superseding the specific commands
of the governor-general or military comman-
der-in-chief, such orders were to be implicitly
obeyed. The military commander-in-chief
was not to leave Bengal without the sanction
of the governor—general and council. VVhen-
ever the commander—in-ehief in India was at
either of the other presidencies, he was to
have a seat as second in council; but to vote
only on political and military affairs. His
allowances, as eommander-in-chief, were fixed
at £6,000 per annum, and his salary, as a
member of council, at £10,000 per annum.
Copies of the commission to Mr. Hastings and
to Lieutenant-general Clavering, and of the
court’s instructions, were to be forthwith pub-
lished in general orders at Fort William. In
addition to the foregoing instructions, a gene-
ral letter was addressed to the governor-
general and council. The measures of the
president regarding Cooch Bahar were ap-
proved, although the court by no means de-
parted from the rule laid down, of confining
their views to the possessions thus acquired.
Whenever General Clavering could be spared
from his duties in Bengal, he was to proceed
to Madras and Bombay, to review the troops,
and to make a strict examination into the state
of the company’s armies at each presidency,
and to assist the presidents and councils in
forming such regulations as might be neces-
sary for rendering the forces respectable. A
revision of the coinage was to be made in
Bengal, a treatise thereon, by Sir James
Stuart, Bart, being forwarded for the infor-

* The object of this was to prevent disputes about
authority with the eommauder-in-chief.

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXIII.
mation of the council.* At the instance of
Mr. Hastings, the council adjourned from
Thursday, the 20th October, until the Men-
day following, on which (lay, Mr. Barwell
having arrived at the presidency, the oaths of
office were administered, and the commissions
to the governor-general and the commander-
in-chief promulgated. In order to place the
leading branches of the public affairs before
the council, a minute was delivered in by Mr.
Hastings, reviewing the revenue system and
the political state of the provinces.
Discussions arose upon the minute of Mr.
Hastings, which threatened to assume impor-
tant consequences, so far did the views of the
new council and the governor-general diverge.
Upon discussion of the treaty of Benares,
and the Rohilla war, General Clavering called
for the original correspondence between the
resident at the vizier’s court and the presi-
dent. Mr. Hastings objected to produce
private correspondence, but was ready to lay
public documents before the council. A ma-
jority resolved that all ought to be produced.
He maintained that the usage of the Bengal
government was in harmony with his views,
that he was willing in future transactions to
be guided by the council, but would not sub-
mit to an ex post facto law, suddenly tbrmed.
The council ordered the agent down to Cal-
cutta, and to bring the whole correspondence
with him, Colonel Champion to act as political‘
agent in the meantime. General Clavering,
Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, were de-
termined to restrain the power of the go-
vernor, and to assume among themselves the
authority. Mr. Francis was much the most
intellectual person of the three new council-
lors; he was a man of keen discrimination, of
a critical habit, insubordinate, ambitious, per-
severing, tenacious, bitter, and unrelenting.
He was in some respects well fitted to cope
with Mr. Hastings in the intellectual arena
where they met. This will be readily be—
lieved by all readers, when they recognise
in Mr. Francis the celebrated “ Junius,”
whose political writings had previously made
such a noise in the world, and around the
authorship of which so much mystery and
interest has remained to the present day.
The light of recent investigations leaves no
possibility of doubt that Mr. Philip Francis,
the refractory colleague of Hastings in the
council of Bengal, was the “ Junius” whose

* This gentleman composed, for the use of the East
India Company, in 17 72, a work entitled, The Principles
qf Money applied to Me present Stale (f Bengal. It
was printed, and the court presented him with a ring, of
one hundred guineas value, with a suitable inscription, in
testimony of their sense of this service. M. Auber,
vol. i. p. 449.

 

t

uh... u._*v

.A‘m

C'nsr. LXXXIIIJ

political criticism, satire, and invective have
excited so large an amount of political and
literary interest.

C layering, Monson, and Francis perpetually
complained to the directors that their dignity
and consequence had not been considered suffi-
ciently by Mr. Hastings. Mr. Barwell sided
with the governor-general. Each party sent
home its own reports. Clavering, Monson,
and Francis sought to grasp the government,
and make the governor-general a mere puppet
in their hands. The replies of Hastings to
their complaints are admirable specimens of
logical and eloquent writing, and are per—
vaded by a manliness and dignity which
could not have failed to impress the directors.

“‘hile these painful discussions rent the
council, and this adverse correspondence con-
cerning the vizier and the policy which had
been pursued towards him was going on,
that remarkable person died, and his son,
under the title of AsoE—ul-Dowlah, succeeded
to Oude and its dependencies. Previous to
his death the vizier had paid fifteen out of the
forty lacs of rupees stipulated.

The council considered that the treaty with
Oude terminated with the nabob’s life, and
proposed another treaty with his successor, of
a purely defensive nature. The council eon-
trived to make the new treaty a means of fresh
acquisitions, and accordingly the zemindaree
of Benares was made over to them, without
being encumbered with any new engagements
or loading them with additional expenses.
The revenues amounted to rupees 1,23,72,656,
and were to be paid by the Rajah Cheyte
Sing in monthly payments, as a net tribute,
without rendering any accounts of his collec-
tions, or being allowed to enter any claim for
deductions. The nabob agreed to pay 2,60,000
rupees per month for a brigade of the com-
pany's troops, which was an addition of half a
lac to the former allowance. The important
point was gained of his consenting to dismiss
all foreigners from his service, and his engag-
ing to deliver up Cossim Ally Cawn, and
Shimroo, the assassin of the English at Patna,
should they ever fall into his hands. The
provinces of Corah and Allahabad were to
remain with the nabob."-‘ Instructions were
sent to Colonel Galliez to continue with the
brigade in the territories of Oude for their
defence, and for that of the provinces of Corah
and Allahabad, should the nabob require it.
llostilities had for some time been carried on
between Nudjiff Cawn, the Rajpoots, and
Jats, and they had alternately sought an
alliance with the nabob in support of their

* The treaty was concluded by Mr. Bristow, whose
conduct on the occasion was highly applauded by the
Silpl'eh’lt‘ gOVCl‘DIHCHt.

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 347

respective views. The latter, jealous of Nud-
jiffCawn, had evinced a disposition to join his
opponents. The grand object of the council
was to preserve a good understanding be-
tween the vizier and the other neighbouring
powers, for which purpose Mr. Bristow was
ordered to take the necessary measures, and
at the same time to urge the nabob to attend
to the good government and improvement of
his dominions.

Conflicts and treaties appeared now to have
been terminated so far as ()ude was concerned,
although the young nabob had manifested an
indisposition to concede much that the Eng-
lish required, but he chiefly showed dislike to
their insisting upon good government in
Oude as absolutely essential to the peace of
the English territory and the alliance. If
Oude were ill-governed, insurrections in
Oude proper, and in the Rohilla country,
would break out, and Jats, Rajpoots, Mah-
rattas, and Afl‘ghans, were all ready to swoop
down upon any country of Hindostan that
was torn by internal strife. The presence of
these inarauding hordes on the confines of
Bengal caused expense and alarm to the
English ; it was, therefore, vital to them that
Oude should be so governed as to leave no
apprehension of a border warfare. His ma-
jesty had a firm conviction that he might do
as he pleased with his own, without being
careful for the consequences to his neigh-
bours; and he submitted with a surly and
dubious acquiescence to the terms imposed
upon him.

When the affairs of Oude were brought to
what appeared to be a happy termination, the
opinion of the directors upon past events
reached Calcutta. They agreed in the main
with Mr. Hastings, and where they differed
gave him credit for doing what he did with
the best intentions. On some points they
agreed with his opponents, but not at all with
the spirit and temper of the opposition. Mr.
Barwell’s view, urged from the moment of
his arrival in India, that the new council had
nothing to do with past transactions, the re-
sponsibility of which rested with Mr. Hastings
and the former administration, was evidently
that which the directors espoused; but they
so framed their despatch as to induce, if pos-
sible, the two parties to coalesce for the com-
mon good. Had the directors known the
men of whom the council was composed, they
would never have expected compliance with
any such instructions. Hastings was a man
of undoubted genius ; he was conciliatory, and
had much self-control. All this the directors
knew, and hoped the best from that know-
ledge. During Mr. Vansittart’s government
he was in opposition, as has been shown, to

348 HISTORY OF THE
the majority of the Bengal council ; but While
discharging his duty faithfully and firmly,
he bore himself in a manner so gentlemanly
and urbane as to deprive the council of any
opportunity of showing ill-will personally to
him,—even the vehement and unabashed John -
stone, the worst of as bad a set of men as ever
administered the government of an English
dependency, treated Hastings with decorum.
During the time Mr. Hastings had served on
the Madras council, the follies of that body
were innumerable. Unable to control or in-
fluence them, he took little part in the active
politics of the period, and devoted himself to
the prosecution of the trade of the company,
and with such success as to ensure his pro-
motion to Bengal. But the directors did not
know that with the suavz'ler in mode, Hastings
united in so extraordinary a degree the for-
titer in re. They had no experience of his
indomitable will and strenuous persistence of
purpose in all dangers and against all odds.
It was their belief that the good manners,

graceful language, accomplished scholarship, ,
and gentle self—respect of the governor-genc- '

ral, added to the influence of his high posi-
tion, would gradually dissolve a hostile party,
and attach it to himself.

Mr. Barwell had long resided in India, and
was a valuable servant, of industrious habits,
and great experience in the company's busi-
ness. The company reposed confidence in
his integrity, propriety of conduct, and peace-
ful, co-operative disposition. Clavering they
did not know. He was a man of intense
prejudices, to which he was always ready to
sacrifice the public interests. A king’s officer,
he disdained the military service of the com-
pany, although more than once he was con-
strained to compliment the talent displayed
by its officers. He and Colonel Monson went
out to India determined to thwart the com-
pany’s civil servants, especially the governor-
general, believing that by so doing they
would be sustained by public prejudice in
England, and by the ill-will to the company
then prevailing in the House of Commons.
There was a large party of politicians in
England desirous of destroying the company,
and handing over to government their terri-
torial possessions. These were the leading
party men who sought the power and patron-
age which would accrue to their parties re-
spectively, if the dominions of the company
were governed under the immediate control of
the English ministry. Francis was turbu-
lent tyrant, haughty, arrogant, and malignant.
The directors had no knowledge of his pecu—
liar temperament, nor of his peculiar parts.
Lord Macaulay exhibits the disappointed and
bitter spirit of Francis at that time, and ex-

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXIII.
plains the circumstantial causes of the pecu-
liar intensity of the bitterness and disContent
he manifested, in a characteristic manner, and
with accurate statements, in the following
terms 2 “ It is not strange that the great anony-
mous writer should have been willing at that
time to leave the country, which had been so
powerfully stirred by his eloquence. Every-
thing had gone against him. That party
which he clearly preferred to every other,
the party of George Grenville, had been scat-
tered by the death of its chief; and Lord
Suffolk had led the greater part of it over
to the ministerial benches. The ferment pro-
duced by the Middlesex election had gone
down. ”Every faction must have been alike
an object of aversion to ‘Junius.’ His opi-
nions on domestic affairs separated him from
the ministry ; his opinions on colonial affairs
from the opposition. Under such circum-
stances he had thrown down his pen in mis-
anthropieal despair. His farewell letter to
\Voodfall bears date the 19th of January,
1773. In that letter he declared that he
must be an idiot to write again; that he had
meant well by the cause and the public;
that both were given up; that there were
not ten men who would act together on any
question. ‘But it is all alike,’ he added,
‘vile and contemptible. You have never
flinched that I know off; and I shall always
rejoice to hear of your prosperity.’ These
were the last words of Junius. In a year
from that time Philip Francis was on his
voyage to Bengal.”

The directors, although they did not know
the temper and talent of Francis, knew enough
of his antecedents to be aware that no post
would satisfy his ambition, no courtesy con-
ciliate his temper, and that his combative
spirit would eke out a cause of quarrel in
any affairs of which he had only in part the
management. He had served in various de-
partments of state, in all cleverly, and in
none with satisfaction to those who employed
him.

One of the first proofs afforded of how
little the advice of the directors prevailed
with the new members of council, was the mode
in which the latter interfered with the reve-
nues of Bengal. Hastings had with great
care and skill amended the fiscal system,
and reorganized the civil staff of the company.
The new council forming a majority of one,
undid much of what Hastings had done.
They were utterly ignorant of the laws, cus-
toms, and views of the people, but with rash
bands they pulled down, and with unskilful
hands they built up. They put new cloth
into old garments, and new wine into old
bottles, verifying the aptness of the scripture

CHAP. LXXXIII.]

illustration. They threw the minor presi-
dencies of Madras and Bombay into confusion
by ignorant meddling, for Francis (or “ J unius,”
if he may be so distinguished) considered
himself as having a natural title to rule every-
body, and a natural gift to govern everything.
His imperious commands, endorsed by Olav-
cring and Monson, were let loose as a curse
upon India. Lord Macaulay describes the
effects of this administration to have been
that “ all protection to life and property was
withdrawn, and that gangs of robbers,
slaughtered and plundered with impunity in
the very suburbs of Calcutta. Hastings con-
tinued to live in the government house, and
to draw the salary of governor-general. He
continued even to take the lead at the council
board in the transaction of ordinary business;
for his opponents could not but feel that he
knew much of which they were ignorant, and
that he decided both surely and speedily,
which to them would have been hopelessly
puzzling. But the higher powers of govern-
ment, and the most valuable patronage had
been taken from him." While affairs were
growing gradually into confusion, and three
members of council, Philip Francis and his
two military adherents, were destroying the
usefulness and the influence of Hastings,
Nundcoomar, so often upon the scene as an evil
spirit before, appeared again. He determined
to destroy Hastings by charges of corruption
sustained by perjury and forgery, and thus be
avenged personally for the defeat of previous
schemes of villainy discovered and denounced
by Hastings. He hoped also to raise him-
self on the ruins of the great Englishman,
and perhaps to enrich himself in any general
confusion that might arise out of his schemes.
He was destined once more, and for the last
time, and fatally, to find that Hastings, with
all his mildness of manner, was more than his
match in a grand conflict of intellectual
acumen; at all events, when there was also
scope for resolute and determined action.
Four men of master intellect were now about
to play a game upon which honour, reputa-
tion, and life itself might depend. These
men were “Varren Hastings, Philip Francis,
Sir Elijah Impey the chief-justice, and,
scarcely inferior to any of them in astuteness,
Nundcoomar, the great Brahmin. Nund-
coomar set on foot the mighty tournament of
intellectual strength and political chicane, in
which all were to suffer, but he most of all.

In the presence of a number of natives of‘

distinction, probably brought together for

the purpose, Nundcoomar placed in the hands

of Philip Francis, a sealed packet addressed

to the council, with the request that it might

be opened and read in their presence as it
VOL. II.

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 319

was for the good of the company and the
country, and of vital consequence. Francis
introduced it to the council and read it. It
was an impeachment of the governor-general,
for putting offices for sale, receiving bribes,
suffering offenders to escape, and other
crimes similar in kind. The morning the
paper was read by Francis before the council,
Lord Macaulay says “Hastings complained
in bitter terms of the way in which he was
treated.” It is astonishingly strange that
his lordship should so characterise the tone
or terms of the governor’s remarks. He
spoke with a calm and lofty dignity free from
all bitterness and passion. He did not even
betray emotion, but bore himself with amanly
self-possession, and expressed himself in words
free from contempt of others, except the oft
convicted and unprincipled Nundcoomar.
The language of Hastings was a noble illus-
tration of the sentiment “JVec tz'mco mo
sperno.” Hastings denied the right of the
council to sit in judgment upon him; and,
recording his protest, retired. At the next
assemblage of the council, another packet from
Nundcoomar was unsealed by Francis, who
admitted that although he had not seen the
first packet, he knew substantially what it
contained. There was in fact a conspiracy
suggested by Nundcoomar, patronised and
encouraged by Francis, worked out by the
crafty Brahmin, supported by the stupid mili-
tary adherents of Junius, now finding full
scope for his great talents and malignant
.passions. Nundcoomar petitioned for leave to
appear before the council, in order to sustain
his charges. Hastings protested against such
a course, alleging that the supreme court was
the proper place. The three opposing coun-
cillors thought otherwise. Nundcoomar was
heard, not indeed by the council, for ”the
president dissolved it, but by the three mem-
bers who were themselves conspirators, and
called themselves the council for the occasion.

The events in the council chamber have
been described with brevity by Lord Macaulay,
thus 2—“ N undcoomar not only adhered to the
original charges, but, after the fashion of the
East, produced a large supplement. He
stated that Hastings had received a large
sum for appointing Rajah Goordas, treasurer
of the nabob’s household, and for committing
the care of his highness’s person to the Munny
Begum. He put in a letter purporting to
bear the seal of the Munny Begum, for the
purpose of establishing the truth of his
story. The seal, whether forged, as Hastings
affirmed, or genuine, as we are inclined to
believe, proved nothing. Nundcoomar, as
everybody knOWS who knows India, had only
to tell the Mummy Begum, that such a letter

z z

8-50 HISTORY OF THE
would give pleasure to the majority of the
'council, in order to procure her attestation.
The majority, however, voted that the charge
was made out; that Hastings had corruptly
received between thirty and forty thousand
pounds; and that he ought to be compelled
to refund.”

There were important points brought out
in the investigation of these accusations which
proved that N undcoomar had either committed,
or suborned some one to commit, a forgery
for the purpose of ruining Hastings. The
letter alleged to be written by the hand of
the Munny Begum, which Nundcoomar de-
livered in, was compared with one received
from her by Sir John D‘Oyley, from the
Persian department. The seal was pro-
nounced to be the same on both letters, the
handwriting to be different. M. Auber, no-
ticing what followed, says :——“ The majority
observed that the letter to N undcoomar had
been written a year and a half before, and
the letter produced by Sir John D‘Oyley
within a few days. In either case there was
sufficient proof of the delinquency of Nund-
coomar. If its authenticity be admitted, its
contents established the fact of a conspiracy
on the part of the Begum and Nundcoomar.
If its authenticity be denied, the guilt of
forgery against Nundcoomar is placed beyond
doubt.”

On the 11th of April, Nundcoomar was
accused before thejudges ofthe supreme court,
of being party to a conspiracy against the
governor-general and others, by compelling
a man to write a petition injurious to their
characters, and sign a statement of bribes,
alleged to have been received by his excel-
lency and his servants. Next day an exa-
mination was instituted before the judges.
A charge on oath was exhibited against
N undcoomar, one ltadaehum, and an English-
man named Fowke. The accused were bound
over to take their trial at the following
assizes.

General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and
Mr. Francis, accompanied by Fowke, one of the
accused, went the next day to Nundcoomar's
house, to pay him a formal visit. They also,
both in Calcutta and in London, took means
to influence public opinion by publishing the
alleged vices of the governor. In Calcutta,
where circumstances and men were known and
understood, these efforts utterly failed, and a
strong tide of indignation set in against the
three members of council. In England their
efforts were more fortunate, and prejudice
was circulated in the court of directors and
in parliament, as well as in the country, against
Hastings. Hastings, aware of their exertions,
also struggled to maintain the justice of his

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXIII.
own cause. In a letter written to the di-
rectors at this juncture, the following passage
occurs, in which, in respectful, dignified, and
feeling terms, he appeals to the public opinion
of his countrymen in India, as to the recti-
tude of his conduct and the malevolence of
his persecutorsz—“There are many men in
England of unquestioned knowledge and in-
tegrity, who have been eye-witness of all the
transactions of this government in the short
interval in which I had the chief direction of
it. There are many hundreds in England
who have correspondents in Bengal, from
whom they have received successive advices
of those transactions, and opinions of the
authors of them. I solemnly make my ap-
peal to these concurring testimonies, and if,
in justice to your honourable court, by whom
I was chosen for the high station which I
lately filled, by whom my conduct has been
applauded, and through whom I have ob-
tained the distinguished honour assigned me
by the legislature itself, in my nominatiouto fill
the first place in the new administration of
India, I may be allowed the liberty of making
so uncommon a request, I do most earnestly
entreat that you will be pleased to call upon
those who, from their own knowledge or the
communications of others, can contribute such
information, to declare severally the opinions
which they have entertained of the measures
of my administration, the tenour of my con-
duct in every department of this government,
and the effects which it has produced, both
in eonciliating the minds of the natives to the
British government, in confirming your au—
thority over the country, and in advancing
your interest in it. From these, and from
the testimonies of your own records, let me
be judged, not from the malevolent declama-
tions of those who, having no services of their
own to plead, can only found their reputation
on the destruction of mine.”

Meanwhile N undcoomar and the majority
of the council were shamelessly and openly
identified in their efforts to annihilate the re-
putation and the power of Hastings. On the
6th of May, however, the Brahmin was ar-
rested upon a charge of forgery, by a merchant
of Calcutta. That this imputation was a
bond fidc one no one doubted, for all knew
that there was no villainy which the dishonest
and perjurious Brahmin would not perpetrate.
On the 9th of May, the majority of the council
displaced Munny Begum, the guardian of the
infant nabob, on the ground of peculation of
the revenues. This was the person on the
accusation of whose letter the majority of the
council had accused Hastings! Either they
never believed her, or discovered, after the

‘ accusation was made that her testimony was

I.“ ”.4. a..Mu.M._T.... A. . .

CnAP. LXXXIII.]

worthless, or they knew, from the first, that
the letter, alleged to be in her handwriting,
had not been written by her. The conduct
of the council in deposing her, after having
a short time before paraded her as a witness
against Hastings, scandalized all Calcutta;
but the scandal was far greater when, imme-
diately after, a son of N undcoomar, a person
of notorious incapacity, was placed virtually
in her stead. Thus the repeatedly convicted
perjurer, forger, and treason-monger was
publicly honoured, while yet under the im-
peachment of another added to his many
Well-known crimes. It is not credible that
Francis and his two military coadjutors Would
have dared to proceed to such lengths if not
encouraged by private correspondence with
the ministerial party in parliament anxious to
wrest the government of India from the com-
pany, for sake of the patronage, their eager-
ness to seize which was too great for them to
disguise. While Nundcoomar was in prison,
he petitioned the council that he could not
perform the ablntions necessary for him as a
Brahmin while in a state of such confinement.
The council addressed the judges on the sub-
ject, thinking to make the circumstance a
ground for N undcoomar’s release. The judges
replied that they had taken thought of the
matter, and appointed certain learned pundits
to report upon the case, whose report was to
the effect that the accommodation was suffi-
cient; that caste would not be lost by the pri-
soner. The judges, however, in spirited and
indignant terms, insisted that the council
should not again presume to interfere with
the course of British justice; that if the pri-
soner was aggrieved, the judges, not the
council, were the persons to whom to appeal;
that they understood their duty without any
monitions from a portion of the council; and
that as the natives sought everything from
power and nothing from justice, the judg-
ment—seat must be preserved from even
the appearance of government interference.
Nundcoomar remained in prison until the
assizes, and his trial came on in the routine
of its business. He was arraigned before an
English jury, and his trial was conducted
with the strictest impartiality and fairness; a
verdict was returned in the usual manner,
after the deliberation customary with British
juries, and that verdict was Guilty. Never
was a verdict more in accordance with truth
and justice. Sir Elijah Impey, the chief-
justice, sentenced the guilty man to death.
Great was the consternation of the council;

they protested, but no notice was taken of

their protest. Public opinion sustained that
of the jury: Englishmen and natives be-
lieved that he was guilty. Colonel Clavering

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

351

vowed that N undcoomar must be saved, even
from the foot of the gallows; but he knew
well that Hastings was determined that jus»
tice should have its course, and that Sir
Elijah Impey, the chief-justice, was also de-
termined to vindicate the law, and the inde-
pendence of the judges, at all costs. The
natives would not believe that any judge
would dare to sentence a Brahmin, or that
judges or governor would permit one so sa-
cred to be executed for any crime. They
knew he was as bad a man as ever fell by the
executioner; but he was a Brahmin, and the
priestly caste was sacred. On the day of his
execution, vast multitudes crowded to Cal-
cutta, still unbelieving as to the fate of the
chief Brahmin of Bengal. Whether from the
impression that, at the last moment, he would
be forcibly rescued by the council, or respited
by the administrative authorities, or from the
strange indifference to death which charac-
terises his caste, he approached his fate with-
out any sign of fear or reluctance. He
ascended the scaffold calmly, and, to all ap-
pearance, fearlessly, and was hanged. The
lamentations of the people were such as not
merely to astonish, but to awe the British.
They detested and yet revered Nundcoomar;
they lamented because their religion was out-
raged by the ignominious execution of a
Brahmin, a caste which sinned with impunity
so far as Hindoo law and custom were con-
cerned. Neither Nundcoomar nor the natives
had any idea that there was among the Eng-
lish a power greater than that of a governor-
general, or a council, or a general of an army,—
the power of law as seen and administered in
the courts and from the tribunals of law.
This was to them a new idea, and struck
universal terror into their hearts. The effect,
as it regarded Hastings, was immediate.
There were no more forgeries and perjuries
manufactured to please the more powerful
council: the dread of the mysterious tribunal
appalled a whole nation of liars and perjurers.
Nothing could prove more fully the turpitude
and cowardice of the native character than
these disgraceful transactions had done.
When to accuse the governor-general pleased
those more powerful than he, numbers were
ready to meet their wishes by accusations;
but when it was seen that there was an
authority higher than governor-general and
council combined—that of English law—their
hearts were stricken with fear, and none dared
to resort to the arts of knavery and treachery,
so much their practice and delight.

Much blame has been thrown upon the
judges, especially Chief-justice Impey. Lord
Macaulay doubts the legality of the proceed-
ing, and describes Sir Elijah Impey as the

352 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

tool of Hastings. There was nothing in the
conduct of Sir Elijah in trying Nundcoomar,
or in accepting the verdict of the jury, to jus-
tify this language. Whether Sir Elijah had
authority to pronounce the sentence which he
did pronounce, was open to discussion, was
discussed, and many men fit to determine such
a question have decided in his favour. The
Whole case has received a clear and impartial
statement from the pen of Professor Wilson.
He thus puts it :——“ It is true, that no circum-
stance in the administration of Hastings, has
been so injurious to his reputation as the exe-
cution of Nundcoomar—whether rightfully so
is a different question. From the moment
that Nundcoomar became the object of judicial
investigation, it would have ill become the
governor to have interfered—it was not for
him to interpose his personal or official influ-
ence to arrest the course of the law, nor would
it have availed. The supreme court was new
to its position, strongly impressed with a no-
tion of its dignity, and sensitively jealous of
its power. The judges would have at once
indignantly resisted any attempt to bias their
decision. For the fate of Nundcoomar, they
are alone responsible. It is presently admitted
that they decided according to law, and the
attempt to impeach the chief-justice, b‘ir Elijah
Impey on this ground, subsequently failed.
It is therefore to be concluded, that the sen-
tence was strictly according to law, and there
can be no doubt that the crime was proved.
The infliction of the sentence, however, upon
a native of India, for an offence of which his
countrymen knew not the penalty, and which
had been committed before the full introduc-
tion of those laws which made it a capital
crime, was the assertion of law at the expense
of reason and humanity: with this Hastings
has nothing to do—the fault, and a grievous
oneit was, rests with the judges. The ques-
tion, as it concerns the governor, regards only
the share he had in the prosecution. Did he
in any way instigate or encourage it? The
prosecutor was a party concerned, a native,
unconnected with the governor. He may
have thought he was doing a not unaccept-
able act in prosecuting a personal antagonist
of Hastings, but that was his feeling. There
is no necessity to suppose that he was urged
on by Hastings: he had wrongs of his own
to avenge, and needed no other instigation.
There is no positive proof that he acted in
concert with Hastings; we are therefore left
to circumstantial proof, and the only circum-
stance upon which the participation of Has-
tings in the persecution of Nundcoomar, is, its
following hard upon the latter's charges against
him. These were preferred on the 11th of
March, 1775. On the tith of May following,

 

[Guam LXXXIII.

Nundcoomar was arrested under a warrant of
the court at the suit of Mohun Pcrsaud.
Here is certainly a suspicious coincidence—-
but is there no other way of accounting for it
than by imputations fatal to the character of
W. Hastings ? In truth, it seems capable of
such explanation as acquits Hastings of hav—
ing exercised any influence over it. Proceed-
ings in the same cause did not then commence.
They had been instituted before in the De-
Wanny Adaulut, and Nundcoomar had been
confined by the judge, but released by order
of Hastings. The suit had therefore been
suspended, but it had not been discontinued.
The supreme court sat for the first time at
the end of October, 1774:. The forged in-
strument had been deposited in the mayor’s
court, and could not be recovered until all the
papers had been transferred to the supreme
court, and without it no suit could be pro-
ceeded with. At the very first Opportunity
afterwards, or in the commencement of 1775,
at the first effective court of Oyer and Ter-
miner and gaol delivery, held by the supreme
court, the indictment was preferred and tried.
It is not necessary to suspect Hastings of
having from vindictive motives suggested or
accelerated the prosecution. Ithad previously
been brought into another court, w here it was
asserted the influence of the governor— general
had screened the criminal, and it was again
brought into an independent court at the first
possible moment when it could be instituted.
The coincidence was unfortunate, but it seems
to have been unavoidable; and in the absence
of all possible proof, the conjectural evidence
is not unexeeptionable enough to justify the
imputation so recklessly advanced by Burke,
and seemingly implied in the observations of
the text, that Hastings had murdered Nund-
coomar by the hands of Sir E. Impey.”"‘

Upon the effect of this event on the for-
tunes of Hastings, and upon the government
of Bengal, Lord Macaulay remarks as follows :
“ The head of the combination which had
been formed against him, the richest, the most
powerful, the most artful of the Hindoos, dis-
tinguished by the favour of those who then

* The learned doctor deduced his opinion from the fol-
lowing sources of information :—-“ Forthe preceding charges
against Mr. Hastings, and the proceedings of the council,
see the Eleventh Report of the Select Cominittce,in 1781,
with its Appendix; Burke’s Charges against Hastings,
No. 8, and llastings’ Answer to the Eighth Charge, with
the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, pp. 953—1001;
and the Charges against Sir Elijah Impey, exhibited to
the House of Commons by Sir Gilbert Elliot, in 1787,
with the Speech of Impey in reply to the first charge,
printed, with an Appendix, by Stockdalc, in 1788. For
the execution and behaviour of Nnndcoomar, see a very
interesting account, written by the sheriff who superin-
tended, and printed in Dodsley’s Annual Rey/isle;- for
1788, Historical part, 1). 157.”

M. . A...‘.2<.._.M.5..M.a_.zfln .. ..

 

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CHM". LXXXIIIJ

held the government, fenced round by the
superstitious reverence of millions, was hanged
in broad day before many thousands of people.
Everything that could make the warning im-
pressive,-—-dignity in the sufferer, solemnity in
the proceeding—was found in this case. The
helpless rage and vain struggles of the council
made the triumph more signal. From that
moment the conviction of every native was,
that it was safer to take the part of Hastings
in a minority, than of Francis in a majority,
and that he who was so venturous to join in
running down the governor—general might
chance, in the phrase of the Eastern poet, to
find a tiger while beating the jungle for a
deer. The voices of a thousand informers
were silent in an instant. From that time,
whatever difficulties Hastings might have to
encounter, he was never molested by accusa-
tions from natives of India."

The calm resolution of Hastings, under the
most trying circumstances, was proved by his
conduct throughout those trying and harass-
ing affairs, especially in the episode of the
execution of Nundcoomar. Miss Martineau
draws from the calm resolve of the governor
of Bengal proof of his want of feeling, and of
an indurated heart. This opinion is undoubt-
edly severe, and probably unjust. The dis-
cussion, however, of such questions belongs
rather to the task of the biographer than the
historian. Lord Macaulay was struck with
the coolness of the English governor on this
occasion, and truly observes :——“ It is a re-
markable circumstance that one of the let-
ters of Hastings to Dr. Johnson bears date a
very few hours after the death of Nundcoomar.
“’hile the whole settlement was in commo-
tion, while a mighty and ancient priesthood
were weeping over the remains of their chief,
the conqueror in that deadly grapple sat down,
with characteristic self—possession, to write
about the Tour to the Hebrides, Jones’ Per-
sian Grammar, and the history, tradition, arts,
and natural productions of India.”

\Vhen tidings of all these events reached
England, there was commotion in the cabinet
and the court of directors. The majority in
the council of Bengal had powerful interest at
home. Lord North was adverse to Hastings,
and endeavoured to procure from the company
an address, upon which, by virtue of “the
regulation act,” under which Hastings was
appointed, the minister would be empowered
to remove him. Lord North was anxious to
put Clavering in the place of Hastings, as the
general was the minister’s nominee, and the
confederate of the other two members of coun-
cil constituting the factions majority, for a
majority may be factions as well as a minority.
This is not the appropriate place in which to

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

0ft“
UUU

depict the peculiar features of the contest
among the directors, the court of proprietary,
and the cabinet ministers; suffice it to say
that Lord North was defeated, and never did
a minister show less dignity under a political
defeat than did his lordship on that occasion.
Hastings, having foreseen this contest, had
provided against it. He had placed in the
hands of his agent, Colonel Macleane, his re-
signation, with directions to present it to the
court only when a moment of such emergency
should arise as imperatively to demand such
a course. Menaced on all hands as Hastings
was, notwithstanding his recent victory over
Lord North, and, the ministry, Macleane felt
that there was no means of saving his friend
from expulsion and degradation but by an
opportune use of the power entrusted to him,
and he accordingly presented the resignation.
The directors eagerly accepted it, and nomi-
nated one of their own body, a Mr. VYheler,
to the vacated post, at the same time writing
to General Clavering to assume the govern-
ment of Bengal pro tempore.

While these things were proceeding in
London, events were passing in rapid succes—
sion in Bengal, which had an equal, or even
greater influence upon the fortunes of Hast-
ings, and enabled the intrepid and self-col-
lected man to overbear all obstacles and all
hostilities. Monson died, and left Hastings
only two opponents in the council—Clavering
and Francis. His casting vote enabled him
to determine all matters in favour of his own
policy. Thus after two years of persecution,
and while bearing the insignia of office, hold-
ing only the semblance of power, he became
absolute, for Barwell, although a clever man,
and far better acquainted with the adminis-
tration of Indian business than Clavering or
Francis, was yet completely under the in-
fluence of Hastings. The governor now
seized upon the patronage of the province,
displacing the officials who were appointed
by the late majority, and reversing all their
partizan decrees. In order to mark more
signally that a new era had commenced,
Hastings ordered, in the name of the council
(by power of his casting vote), a valuation of
the lands of Bengal, in order to form a basis
for a new plan of revenue. All correspond-
ence was ordered to be under his sole con-
trol, and the whole inquiry to be directed by
him. He next laid down vast schemes for
the aggrandizement of the company’s inte-
rests, for which, and not for any venal pur-
poses, he thought and toiled. The plans he
projected were realized, and within his own
lifetime, although it was not reserved for his
own administration to carry them out. VYhilc
he was thus engaged the intelligence arrived

I
354

in England of the proceedings in the cabinet,
the court of di1',ectors and the court of pro-
prietary, in which he was so deeply inte-
rested.

Hastings had in the meantime, by the sheer
force of his genius, industry, and intelligence,
as well as by the concurrence of events, gained
such a personal ascendancy in India, that he
was unwilling to surrender his high functions,
especially, even for a season, to his rival—
Clavering. He refused to surrender the pre-
sidential chair. Clavering essayed to occupy
it by force, and a fierce struggle ensued.
Clavering, with much show of reason, ap-
pealed to the orders of the directors. Hast-
ings 1eplied that the orders we1e based
upon a mistake, which, when the directors
discovered, they would themselves of ne-
cessity abrogate. He declared that he had
not resigned his office. His own account
long afterwards of the transaction was, that
Macleane had exceeded and misapprehended
his powers; but that nevertheless he would
have resigned the government of Bengal had
not Clavering made offensive haste and in-
sulting demonstrations, in his eagerness to
grasp the office.

Clavering, immediately 011 the arrival of
intelligence, seized the keys of the fort, im-
portant papers, books, and documents, and
formed Francis and himself into a council.
Hastings sat in another apartment of the fort
with Barwell, and continued to issue the
orders of government, which none dared to
disobey, so completely had the master mind
of Hastings asserted itself. The English in
Bengal unanimously, or all but unanimously,
supported him; and the Bengalees had
trembled at his name ever since the rope
had put an end to the intrigues of Nund-
coomar. Either Hastings felt that his cause
was just, or that he had the formalities of
law 011 his side, for he offered to abide by
the decision of the supreme court of Calcutta.
This met the approbation of the English in
Bengal, who saw no other way of averting a

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

f

 

LCHAP. LXXXIII.

civil struggle, which might be attended V‘ ith
bloodshed, 23and 111inous to English intclests.
Clav ering was compelled to succumb to public
opinion, although he and Fr a1icis were an exse
to any albitration ot matte1s, legal or other-
Wise.

The decision of the court was that the re-
signation presented by Colonel Macleane was
invalid, and that Hastings, according to the
letter of the “Regulation Act,” was still
governor-general. After this, Clavering and
Francis lost all hope of offering an effectual,
resistance.

Immediately upon these transactions Hast-
ings married a foreign lady, the divorced
wife of a foreigner, with whom he had lived
on terms of illicit intimacy for years, and
under circumstances the most singular, ro-
mantic, and reprehensible, furnishing to his
biographers ample material for exciting nar-
rative, and ingenious speculations as to his
character. It does not speak well for the
morality of English society at Calcutta at the
time, that the wedding was celebrated with
great splendour by the whole community.
Hastings, elated with the success of all his
schemes, in love and politics, invited General
Clavering to the wedding. The general was
at the time broken in spirit and in health; he
was in fact dying. Making the state of his
health his only excuse for not affording his
p1esenee to the festivities, Hastings went
personally to him, and insisted upon the
oth 1011 of past differences being thus publicly
p10vcd.Clave1ing VV as brought captive, as
it were, to the b1illiant festivities, but he
drooped there, and retired to die. In a
few days he expired. Francis now alone
remained to oppose Hastings. His proud
and arrogant spirit could not be quelled.
He struggled for a time with dogged and
spiteful pertinacity, and then went home,
where he lived long enough to be a thorn
in the side of Hastings, when, at the greatest
crisis of his history, he stood impeached be-
fore the senate of England.

~Mmman.» ‘ ‘ “I

 

 

 

CHAP LXXXI V.]

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

GOVERNMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL (Continued)—ARRIVAL OF MR.
WHELER TO ASSUME THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL—REFUSAL OF HASTINGS
T0 SURRENDER IT—OPPRESSIVENESS OF LEGAL ADMINISTRATION IN BENGAL—DUEL
BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND PHILIP FRANCIS—FRANCIS LEAVES INDIA

—ANARCHY IN OUDE—WAR WITH THE

‘VVIIEN Mr. VVheler arrived at Calcutta, he
found Hastings in the full possession of au-
thority, and likely to retain it. The disap-
pointed governor was, however, a member of
council, and united with Francis in opposition
to the governor de facto. Their opposition
was of little avail. Hastings continued to rule,
and with such personal tact, administrative
capacity, and comprehensive genius, that the
directors at home veered round in his favour,
and Lord North dared not to displace him.
Events in Europe favoured the uninterrupted
possession by Hastings of the presidency of
Bengal. England had to maintain a fearful
struggle with foreign enemies, and her own
colonial fellow-citizens in America became dis-
affected. “’ars abroad, and bad government
at home, placed England in imminent danger.
The cabinet, instead of assailing Hastings,
were glad to have a governor who knew so
well how to govern. The English ministry
had no leisure to attend to India.

Although Hastings had undisputed autho-
rity, his difficulties were great, and scarcely
was one danger encountered, and conquered
by his genius, than another sprung up. War
in regions beyond the province of Bengal,
blunders by his own officers, civil and mili-
tary, and the harassing opposition of Francis
and “'heler, occupied his industry and vigi-
lance incessantly. Before noticing the war-
like events of his government, not already
related, it is desirable to glance at the civil
impediments to his sway with which he had
to contend. Sir Eyre Coote, who had dis-
tinguished himself so much in Indian warfare,
from the battle of Plassey, to that of VVandi-
wash and the capture of Pondicherry, and after
the warfare of the Carnatic, elsewhere, was ap-
pointed commander-in-chief of the company’s
armies. This appointment gave him a seat
at the council board, and being naturally ob-
stinate, haughty, and self-willed, he frequently
disputed the authority of Hastings, and sided
with Francis and \Vheler. When this was
the case, Hastings was in a minority, and
his views were overruled. The vigilance of
Francis never slept. His bitterness was as
lasting as his vigilance was wakeful. There
were, therefore, many occasions on which he

succeeded, with due management of Coote, in , of the other.”

MAHRATTAS.

putting Hastings into a minority. Hastings,
however, practised the arts of management
better than Francis, and by gratifying Coote’s
love of “allowances,” in a majority of in-
stances secured his vote. Besides, Coote
more generally agreed with Hastings than
with Francis. The latter was ignorant of
India, but the commander-in-chief, like the
governor-general, knew it well. Moreover,
the soldier was often in the field, and then

 

l

,pretensions of the judges.

the governor had his own way without any

,chance of being disturbed. These contin-

gencies in the constitution of the council,
gave uncertainty to their decisions, and frus-
trated some of the best administrative mea-
sures of the president.

A singular state of things arose under the
English law was
hated by all classes of the natives, and it was
administered proudly and oppressively. Its
slowness and expensiveness were ruinous to
the natives, who groaned under its oppressions.
Sir Elijah Impey, as chief of the supreme
court, had the highest possible notions of his
own official authority, and the respect due to
all the forms of law. .He was supported by
the other judges in a system of legal adminis-
tration which evoked the curses of the whole
community, English and natives. No man
felt safe from the tyranny of the courts. The
civil servants were constantly unable to carry
out the orders of the government from their
interference; and Hastings, who had himself .
done so much to recognise the power of the
courts, was almost driven to despair by the
way in which that power was wielded. VYords
could not describe the misery, conflict, and
disaffection which ensued, as far as the
supreme court extended its authority, and
probably no problem in the government of
Hastings presented itself as so hard of solu-
tion, as that of the true province of the
English courts. Lord Macaulay ascribes the
evil in this case to the indifference of the
legislature in forming “' the regulation act 1”—
“ The authors of the regulating act of 1773,

 

had established two independent powers, the

g onejudicial, and the other political; and, with

a carelessness scandalously connnon in English
legislation, had omitted to define the limits
The same author depicts the

356 HISTORY OF THE

results of the consequent efforts of the judges
to define the limits of their own authority in
the most extensive manner, and amongst
others gives the following descriptions :—
“ Many natives highly considered among their
countrymen, were seized, hurried up to Cal-
cutta, flung into the common gaol, not for
any crime imputed, not for any debt that had
been proved, but merely as a precaution till
their cause should come for trial.” “There
were instances in which men of the most
venerable dignity, persecuted without a cause
by extortioners, died of rage and shame in
the gripe of the vile alquazils of Impey.”
“ N o Mahratta invasion had ever spread
through the province such dismay as this
inroad of English lawyers. All the injustice
of former oppressors, Asiatic and European,
appeared as a blessing when compared with
the justice of the supreme court.”

It is not to be supposed that Sir Elijah
Impey acted illegally. Many of the acts of
the courts which spread terror and despair
through Bengal, were tamely submitted to in
England, and supposed to be a becoming
“part and parcel” of a most just code, the
pride of England and the envy of surrounding
nations. The laws and the courts were ter-
rible oppressions in England, to all but the
rich and powerful; but they were oppressions
to all alike in India, and probably rich natives
more than any other felt them. Some of the
most inequitable charges and decisions, de-
livered with party or personal feeling, and in
terms illogical as well as offensive, have been
delivered in England by English judges,
without exciting much indignation, so strong
has been the prejudice and pride of the Eng-
lish people in behalf of their laws, and those
who administer them,- but in India no such
feelings were entertained, and the whole
system of Englishjurisprudence, and its mode
of administration, was regarded as barbarous
and atrocious.

It was probably the intent of Hastings to
keep Sir Elijah Impey in his interest, but he re-
solutely resolved to oppose the system of legal
administration adopted by the learned judge.
The governor stood firmly on the side of the
people, and for once he received the unani-
mous support of his council. The judges
served the council with writs to answer in
court for their acts! Hastings ridiculed the
summons, forcibly dismissed various persons
wrongfully accused, and Opposed the sword
to the writs of the sheriff’s officers. Hastings,
however, contrived to avert a conflict be-
tween the crown and the company. Impey
had £8000 a year as chief of the supreme
court, Hastings offered him another £8000" a

* Lord Macaulay names this sum, Auber £6000.

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXIV.
year as ajudge in the service of the company,
dismissible at the governor’s pleasure; but
the office was conferred en the condition,
privately stipulated, that he would cease to
assert the disputed powers of the supreme
court. He accepted the bribe. Bengal was
freed from the turmoil which had been
created, and Hastings from the difficulty
which it presented to his government.

For a short time a sort of truce had been
formed between Hastings and Francis. Bar-
well promoted a peace between the two great
opponents, because he wanted to leave India,
and had pledged himself that he would not
do so, if the result would place the governor
in a minority. The truce did not last long;
Francis was opposed to Impey, and was
exasperated that his old enemy should
have a new honour and splendid emolument
conferred upon him, simply to prevent his
doing mischief. Lord Macaulay justifies
Hastings in buying off Impey's adverse power,
seeing that it inflicted so much evil upon the
inhabitants of Bengal, on the principle that
justifies a man in paying a ransom to a pirate
to obtain a release of captives. His lord-
ship’s reasoning and illustration are alike
unhappy in this case. The conduct of Has-
tings was censurable. “illere he believed pun-
ishment was deserved, he conferred honour.
He bribed the judge either to forego what
was due to law and justice, or to give up an
abuse of power. To induce a judge by any
means to forego what law and justice required
would be clearly wrong; to induce him by a
bribe to forego the improper use of his autho-
rity could hardly be less wrong. An appeal
to the crown and the company was the obvious
duty of Hastings, and if they refused to
redress the evil, he should have resigned his
government, on the ground that he could not
as an honourable man administer it under the
circumstances. Unhappily, it is too probable
that Hastings, having little confidence in the
wisdom of either crown or company, and no
confidence at all in the integrity of the
English cabinet, chose the way by which he
might best serve himself, and serve Impey also,
while he stopped the mischief. Francis found
a good opportunity for damaging Hastings in
this transaction, and it is difficult not to prefer
the logic of the malignant accuser of the go-
vernor in this case, than that of his eloquent
defender. It is probable that Francis merely
accepted the compromise effected by Barwell,
to induce the latter to leave India. Such
was the opinion of Hastings afterwards, and
he indignantly charged Francis with the im-
putation of faithlessness and dishonour in
this respect.

After various stormy meetings of council,

“Us“...

CHAP. LXXXIVJ

Hastings inflicted an insult on Francis which
was provoked, and probably deserved, but
which Francis was unable to endure. The
governor in a minute recorded on the con-
sultations of the government, inserted the fol-
lowing expressions: “I do not trust- to Mr.
Francis’s promises of candour, convinced that,
he is incapable of it. I judge of his public
conduct by his private, which I have found
to be void of truth and honour.” “'hen the
council rose, Francis placed a challenge in
the hands of the governor, who accepted it.
A duel took place, in which Francis was
severely wounded. Hastings was kind, in-
quired daily for him, and desired permission
to call and see him. Francis refused, acknow-
ledging the politeness of the offer, but declin-
ing to meet Hastings any where except in
council. When he did return to council, his
implacable hatred still raged. Lord Macaulay
gives Francis credit for patriotism; to what-
ever degree he cultivated that virtue, his
conduct in India did not display it. His
patriotism was never seen to less advantage
than after his recovery from the wound in-
flicted by Hastings. At that juncture Hyder
Ali, to whom reference has been repeatedly
made on former pages, swept all before him,
penetrating to Madras. The governor of
that presidency proved himself incapable, and
Hastings afforded many and fresh proofs of
his genius by the way in which he en-
countered this vast peril. During all those
efforts, so worthy of his great reputation, he
was impeded by Francis, whose sulky and
malevolent opposition never ceased, until at
last, finding all his animosity powerless,
and recoiling upon himself, he left India.
“'heler, his coadjutor in opposition, tamed
down into a quiet and acquiescent follower
of Hastings, who was thus left as a sovereign
whose sway was undisputed, to govern Ben-
gal, and direct the affairs of India generally.

“'hile suclgvere the distractions and vicis-
situdes in the council, events were taking place
in every direction requiring unanimity and
energy. No doubt the governor-general, if
not obstructed by either a majority in the
council or by an obstinate minority, who con-
sumed time uselessly, and impeded public
business, would have exercised an efi‘icient
control everywhere. As it was, he proved
equal to every emergency.

During 1775, Uude was in a state of per-
petual turmoil; the nabob squandered the re-
sources of the state in folly and debauchery,
and left public affairs to his chief minister—an
enemy of the English, without whose support
the nabob could not stand. The king of Delhi
constituted the nabob his vizier, as his pre-
decessor had been—this was supposed to have

VOL. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

357

been a spontaneous act of the Mogul. After
his appointment to the dignity of vizier, the
nabob became worse than before, both in his
personal conduct and his government. As-
sassinations of some of the most distinguished
persons in his dominions were laid to his ac~
count; murders were committed in his pre-
sence by courtiers, men of equal rank being
the victims. Nearly all the talented persons
at the head of the civil and military services
were treacherously slain or obliged to fly
beyond the territory of Oude. Revolts of
the troops and massacres repeatedly occurred.
British officers were appointed to discipline
the nabob’s soldiers, which led to a con-
spiracy and wide-spread mutiny: some of
the officers were slain by the mutineers, others
escaped, many with wounds, while a portion
of the officers succeeded in subduing their
soldiers and restoring order.

Apprehensions of the projects of the French
were very generally received at this period
among the English in India. French officers
were observed in various parts of the country
as if suspiciously engaged. A report of this
was made to the government. It was also
stated that the force at Pondicherry was con—
siderable, amounting to one thousand Euro-
peans, and a nearly equal number of black
soldiers.

The connection of the three presidencies
under a governor-general worked well, and
gave scope for the business talents and com-
prehensive plans of Hastings.

Ragoba and the Bombay government en-
tered into negotiations under the advice of
Hastings, which issued in his cession to the
company of Bassein, Salsette, Jamboosecr, and
Orphad, with the Islands of Caranga, Canary,
Elephanta, and Hog Island; thus affording to
Bombay Island a security never before pos-
sessed. The Bombay government, in virtue
of the treaty with Ragoba, received him
when a fugitive in their territory, and as-
sisted him with arms and men to regain his
ascendancy as chief of the Mahratta nation.
“'hile embarked in this undertaking, orders
arrived from the supreme council at Calcutta
revoking everything done at Bombay, and
in terms haughty and arrogant. This was
the work of the majority of the council
opposed to Hastings. The Calcutta council
even sent an officer to Poonah to treat with
the enemies of Ilagoba, thus humiliating
utterly the council of Bombay. Madras was
ordered not to assist the policy initiated at
Bombay. The measures of the Bengal coun-
cil failed, and, after all, that factions body
were compelled to commit the transaction of
a treaty to the council of Bombay, which
acted in conformity with the Opinion of Hast-

3 A

358 HISTORY OF THE
ings. Still, so unsteady and inconsistent were
the directions of the supreme council, that
confusion and dishonour ensued; and much
injury to the company’s interests would cer-
tainly have happened had not the directors
at home revoked the orders of the supreme
council, and censured the whole of its conduct
to that of Bombay.

In 1777 the French gained some ascen-
dancy over the government of Poonah, in
consequence of the continued feuds of the
Bombay and Bengal councils. The arrogant
spirits of Clavering and Francis wrought mis-
chief everywhere. The conclusion of these
diplomatic squabbles, and of the conflicts at
the Mahratta capital, is thus briefly recorded
by Amber :——“ In March, 1778, a revolution
broke out at Poonah in favour of Ragoba,
in whose name a proclamation was issued for
restoring peace and order. In July, the
Bombay council declared that the treaty con-
cluded by Colonel Upton had been violated
by the Durbar proceedings; and that they
were consequently freed from its obligations.
They also declared that measures had become
imperatively necessary to defeat the intrigues
of the French, who had been long exerting
themselves in schemes hostile to the English."6
They proposed to place Ragoba in the re-
gency at Poonah, and that he should conduct
the government in the name of the Peishwa.
This latter arrangement appeared to be in
consonance with the views of the court of
directorsT The necessary operations conse-
quent upon this determination could not be
commenced until the month of September.
In October a treaty was concluded with
Ragoba, by which the company were to as-
sist him with four thousand troops to conduct
him to Poonah.”i

The affairs of the Nabob of Arcot and the
Rajah of Tanjore still continued to give un-
easiness to the company. Lord Pigot having
assumed the government of Madras at the
close of 1775, set about adjusting the rela-
tions between the nabob, the rajah, and the
company; but jealousies between the civil
and military officers as to their respective
dignities, embroiled the presidency in dis-
putes, and delayed the execution of Lord Pi-
got’s plans. His lordship’s temper, however,
was the greatest of all impediments to his
projects. To such a length (lid he carry his
idea of his own authority, and so arbitrary
was he in his government, that at last the
majority of the council arrested him. The
admiral on the. station demanded his release,
in the king’s name; the council refused with-
* Secret Letter from Bengal, April, 1778.

1‘ Letter to Bombay, July, 1777.

 

72: Vide Printed Treaties. .

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXIV.
out the king’s order. The supreme govern-
ment at Calcutta supported the council of
Madras. The death of Lord Pigot terminated
the dispute. The English were unable to un-
dertake almost anything at that time without
violent discussions among themselves.

The conflicts between Hyder Ali and the
Mahrattas, and the feuds among the Mahratta
chiefs, in which the Bombay government was
to some extent involved, led the council of
Bengal to send troops overland to Bombay in
1778. Colonel Leslie, and this force, began
their march on May 4th, but it proceeded so
slowly, and with such little military judgment,
that it was necessary to supersede the com-
mander.

In November, Captain Stuart seized the
pass of Boru Ghaut, which opened the way to
Poonah; it was held and fortified. He was
followed from Bombay by a considerable force
in November, consisting of about four thou-
sand men, of whom six hundred and thirty-
nine were Europeans. On the 1st of January
this army, under Colonel Egcrton, began its
march upon Poonah, but had to retreat fight-
ing before a superior force. Fearful of a fresh
attack, the English opened negotiations, but
the Mahrattas refused unless Ragoba were
surrendered. A disastrous treaty, consenting
to everything the Mahrattas demanded, was
the result of the expedition. This treaty
the council of Bombay refused to ratify, and
that of Calcutta approved of their policy.
Brigadier Goddard, with a force from Bengal,
reached Surat, and, being joined by Bagoba
after the latter had made gallant and desperate
efforts to effect the junction, the combined
forces attacked the confederated Mahratta
chiefs, and gained various decisive Victories,
until the close of the year 1780, when they
went into quarters. S0 well did Hastings
provide the sinews of war, that he remitted 3.
crore of rupees to the governments of Madras
and Bombay.

Many transactions took placb in the inte-
rests of the company during the government
of Hastings, of which little notice has been
taken in history, but which had influence
upon the general condition of the English
territory. The treaty of the 2nd December,
1779, with the Rana of Gohud, is an in‘
stance. The Rana of Gohud, then described
as “ a chief south of Agra,” made overtures
for effecting a treaty with the company, to
secure himself against the Mahrattas. The
terms were agreed to and signed on the 2nd
of December. The Company were to furnish
a force for the defence of his country on pay-
ing 20,000 Muchildar rupees for each batta-
lion of sepoys; nine-sixteenths of any acqui-
sitions were to go to the company. The rana

 

 

 

 

 

CnAr. LXXXIV.]

was to furnish ten thousand horse, whose
combined operations might be determined on
against the Mahrattas. Whenever peace took
place between the company and the Mah-
rattas, the rana was to be included, and his
present possessions, with the fort of Gwalior,
were to be guaranteed to him.

As war was apprehended with France in
1778, Hastings made vast and skilful efforts to
prepare the territories he governed against
all contingencies, as he concluded that some
alliances with native powers would be effected
by the French. The declaration of war in
London was sent by the secret committee of
the court of directors, overland rid Cairo, and
orders were issued to the supreme council to
reduce Pondicherry.

MohammedReza Cawn now ceased to act as
regent in Bengal, and the young nabob took
upon himself the full responsibilities of his
government.

Mr. Auber bears the following testimony
to the labours of Hastings at this time :—
“ Mr. Hastings, in the midst of his other varied
and important avocations, did not lose sight
of the interests of science and literature. A
copy of the Mohammedan lavs had been
translated by Mr. Anderson, under the sanc-
tion and patronage of the government, and
sent home to the court, together with the
Bengal grammar prepared by Messrs. Halhed
and “'ilkins, five hundred copies being taken
by the government at thirty rupees a copy, as
an encouragement to their labours. Mr. VVil—
kins* was also supported in erecting and
Working a press for the purpose of printing
official papers, &c. The Madrissa, or Mo-
hammedan college, for the education of the
natives, was established by the government.
In order to open a communication by the Red
Sea with Europe, the government built a
vessel at Mocha, having been assured that
every endeavour would be made to secure the
privilege of despatches, with the company’s
seal, being forwarded with facility; the trade
with Suez having been prohibited to all Britislr
subjects, on a complaint to the king’s ministers
by the Ottoman l’orte.”

During the close of the year 1779, the
Carnatic was seriously disturbed, and the
cares of that province now fell upon the su-
preme council, although its immediate super-
intendence belonged to the Madras presidency.
In 1760 struggles took place in which the
existence of the company, in the Madras pre-
sidcncy, was seriously menaced. The great
war with Hyder must form the subject of a
separate chapter. It is here desirable to
follow the general events of the government

* Afterwards Sir Charles Wilkins, librarian to the
court of directors.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

359

of Mr. Hastings. The conflict ‘with the My-
sorean chief was too extensive and important
to be brought within the records of a chapter
so general in its subjects as the present. It
may here, however, be observed that almost
every occurrence connected with the manage-
ment of affairs in Madras itself at this period,
complicated the relations of that presidency to
the Carnatic, and those of the supreme go-
vernment to Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas.
Indeed, the government of Madras seemed
alike to set at defiance the directions of the
supreme council of Calcutta, and of the court
of directors in London. Sir Thomas Rum-
bold, Mr. VVhitehill, and Mr. Perring, the
three principal members of the Madras coun-
cil, set an example of insubordination. The
first-named was governor, but, finding that
his proceedings excited so much displeasure
in Calcutta, and in London, he resigned the
government in January, 1780, and was sue-
ceeded in the presidential chair by Mr. VVhite—
hill, the senior councillor. The party in the
council to which these gentlemen belonged
had, with other eccentric proceedings, abo-
lished “ the commission of circuit,” which had
been established by the express orders of. the
directors, to prevent the hardship incurred
by the rajahs and zcmindars, in being obliged
to have all their disputes adjudicated in the
chief city of the presidency, however great
the distance at which they resided.

M. Auber describes other freaks and ab-
surdities of this party in the following terms:
—“ They had also entered into an agreement
with Sitteram Rauze, for renting the havilly
lands for a term of ten years, and had ap-
pointed him dewan of the Vizianagram dis-
trict, a measure which the directors considered
to inflict a cruel and unnecessary degradation
on his brother. They had likewise disposed
of the Guntoor circar to the nabob for a term
of ten years. This circar had, by treaty,
been delivered to the company by Bazalet
Jung, in 1779, he receiving from them a per-
manent rent, equal to what his aumils had
paid to him.” As to the effect ofsuch conduct
at home and at Calcutta, M. Auber adds:—
“These proceedings were diametrically op-
posed to the orders of the directors. The
motives and principles by which the parties
had been governed in their adoption appeared
so very questionable, that Sir Thomas Rum-
bold, Mr. VVhitehill, and Mr. Perring were
dismissed the company’s service ;* and on the
17th of January, 1781, Lord Macartney was
appointed governor of Madras. His lord-
ship, as was then customary, expressed his
acknowledgment to the court of directors, and
to the company, in a general court of pro-

* Letter to Madras, 10th of January, 178].

3‘0 HISTORY OF THE
prietors. On the 18th of January, the pro- 3

prietors being met to consider the conduct of ‘
Mr. Paul Benfield, Mr. Burke, as proprietor,
delivered in a paper, entitled heads of ob-
jections to be inquired into before Mr. Ben- ‘

field should be allowed to return to India.*

Leave was ultimately granted for that purpose,
by a vote of 368 to 30‘). The supreme govern-
ment were equally opposed with the directors to
the conduct of Mr. VVhitehill. The government
were represented to have countenanced the
treaty concluded by that gentleman with Ba-
zalet Jung, whether to the extent alleged by

 

the Madras council was not apparent, but it
was clear that orders had been subsequently
sent from Bengal for relinquishing the circar.
The Madras government were accused of
pertinaciously refusing to obey such orders,
and of retaining the circar in defiance of the
peremptory instructions from Calcutta. On

 

a previous occasion, in a matter connected
with the nizam, the council at Fort St. George :
disputed the controlling power attempted to
be exercised by the supreme government, and
had expressed an opinion that the latter pos-
sessed only a negative power, and that con-
fined to two points, viz., orders for declaring
war, or for making treaties, and not a positive
and compelling power, extending to all poli-
tical affairs. Considerable jealousy had been
created in the minds of Hyder and the Nizam
by the treaty; both Bazalet Jung and Hyder
manifested decided intentions of hostility.”
Hyder made such demonstrations of hos-
tility, and had such means of making that
hostility formidable, that the supine council
might have been awakened from their apathy
in time to avert the terrible consequences
about to spread like a devouring flame over
the fair provinces of the presidency. The
nabob of the Carnatic was still more supine,
if possible, than the council : nothing was
either performed or attempted by him to
strengthen the hands of the Madras govern—
ment, or in any way prepare himself for an:
encounter with his formidable fee. The
nizam was able to afford to Hyder such a:
supply of French officers and troops ostensibly
in his own service that it ought to have been ;
an object of intense concern with the govern—
ment of Madras, by negotiation or money, to
prevent such a junction. No real efforts tol
accomplish so important an object was made, i
and when the moment arrived for action, the l

 

l
i

, trieved affairs so desperate.

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXIV.
Mysorean adventurer was able to add to the
elements of strength possessed by his vast
and well-organized armies, this new and most
dangerous one of French troops led by offi-
cers skilful in engineering and artillery, and
with all the prestige of being the best disci-
plined troops in Europe or in Asia. The
difficulties of Hastings at this juncture pass
description. The company’s funds in India
were exhausted ; the servants of every grade
were in arrears for pay ; the exigencies of the
war in the Carnatic were exorbitant; the
petty rajahs were everywhere displaying
symptoms of disaffection; the insubordinate
polygars of Tanjore had gone over to Hyder
Ali; the vizier and other powerful native
princes were murmuring and at heart dis-
loyal; the company was importunate for
money; the councils of the presidencics de-
spaired of finding means for the annual invest-
ment. Such was the condition of India in
1781-82. -

It seems to be one of the strange con-
ditions upon which providentially the Eng-
lish dominion in India has depended, that it
should, after the most signal seasons of pros-
perity and triumph, be suddenly brought to
the verge of ruin, and yet emerge from danger
and disaster more glorious than ever. This
has so often happened as to assume the ap-
pearance of a law, and challenge the investi-
gation of statesmen. At the period to which
reference is now made, such was the state of
the English power in India. After all its
prestige and glory, a wild and lawless man,
thrown up by the ever surging sea of Indian
life, put the empire founded by Clive and
consolidated by Hastings in the utmost peril ;
and when successive victories rolled back the
tide of his conquests, the pecuniary resources
of the company in India were exhausted, the
native chiefs were preparing to throw off the
yoke of England, and the English themselves
were weakened by dissensions in their presi-
dential councils. The genius of Hastings re-
IVhere his own
hand could not reach, and his own mind
direct, he nominated agents adapted to the
work he desired to see accomplished. Had
the appointment of the men, or the procuring
and management of the means, been left, at
this juncture, to either the councils in India
or the directors at home, all had been
lost.

WA \mvkuvvvvuvvvx m..- :- MAW” WI-

 

 

xm. mmhmxmwz. .

CHAP. LXXXVJ

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

GOVERNMENT OF HASTINGS (Coaliizued)—HIS EFFORTS TO RETRIEVE THE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
OF THE COMPANY IN INDIA—TRANSACTIONS WITH CHEYTE SING, THE VIZIER, THE
BEGUMS OF OUDE, E'I‘C.——CENSURES PRONOUNCED BY THE DIRECTORS AND THE

ENGLISH PUBLIC.

Fort a time, after the occurrence of the events
recorded in the last chapter, Hastings directed
his whole attention to finance, and made efforts
of the most ingenious but daring nature to
provide funds for the government.

Few of the transactions by which large
sums of money were brought to the coffers
of the company have been more canvassed
than the expulsion of Cheyte Sing, Rajah of
Benares. Lord Macaulay describes Hastings
as having deliberately meditated a robbery
(on behalf of the company) on this prince,
whom the same authority represents as hav-
ing paid regularly his tribute up to 1780-1.
His lordship is very severe upon Hastings for
treating a sovereign rajah in the manner he
did, and for demanding money for the com-
pany for which there was no legitimate claim
upon the rajah. His lordship in this case, as
in almost every other to which he refers in
his essays upon Clive and “'arren Hastings
( which are in fact essays upon Indian affairs
during their governments), follows Mill, and
he does so even when the means of correcting
Mill by more authentic sources of information
were abundantly open to him. The gist of
the affair is in the real relation held by the
rajah to the English government, and his own
actual rights, whether implied by the title of
rajah or the power or authority which he ex-
ercised. The truth was, the rajah perceived
with pleasure the difficulties by which the
company was surrounded, and hoped out of
the dismembcrment of its territories to derive
for himself a sovereignty to which he had no
claim. He had engaged to assist the English
during the struggles with the Mahrattas and
Hyder, by a body of cavalry, a force, of which
Lord Macartney declared in his correspon-
dence with the directors, that when he assumed
the government of Madras in 1781, the pre-
sidency was totally destitute. The English
were especially deficient in that military arm,
and relied generally for support in it upon their
native allies. The people of Benares being,
as compared with lower Bengal, warlike—but
by no means so warlike as Lord Macaulay
describes them, and as the inhabitants of
()ude, Rohilcund, Delhi, and the north and
north-west districts generally are—it was rea-
sonable for the English to expect that the
rajah would keep faith with them in furnishing

 

cavalry contingents. This he did not do. He
was also expected to aid the general govern-
ment in any extraordinary crisis, as the very
existence of his position as a prince depended
upon the protection of the English. Cheyte
Sing thought otherwise. He had no disposition
to lend them aid in their hour of peril, and
counted upon their necessity as his oppor-
tunity. Hastings was not a governor to be
so treated. He determined that Benares
should afford its full proportion of assistance
to the general want, and he resolved to make
his highness, the rajah, an example to other
rajahs of the reality of English power, and
the necessity of rendering a full, efficient, and
zealous support to the supreme government
——0f, in fact, sharing its dangers as well as
enjoying of its protection. The governor-
general accordingly proceeded to Benares, and
after undergoing desperate perils, expelled
the rajah and seized the revenue. The light
in which the transaction is placed by Auber
is sustained by the documents upon the au-
. thority of which a historical record must be
:based. It is with singular brevity recorded
; by him in the following terms :—~
’ “ Under the treaty concluded with Sujah-ad-
‘Dowlah in August, 1765, it was stipulated
that Bulwunt Sing, a tributary of the vizier,
and Rajah of Benares, should be continued in
, that province. On Sujah-ad-Dowlah’s death
i; in 1775, a treaty was concluded by Mr. Bris-
{ tow, with his successor, Asoff—ul-Dowlah, by
lwhich all the districts dependant on Rajah
Cheyte Sing, the successor of Bulwunt Sing,
gwere transferred in full sovereignty to the
fcompany, an arrangement which had appa-
l rently given great satisfaction to Cheyte Sing
and his family.
l “ “'hen intelligence reached India, in 1778,
§ of the war with France, Spain, and America,
i the supreme government were constrained to
% devise every means to augment the financial
:resources of the company, in order to meet
ithe unavoidable increase of charge. As the
f rajah's provinces derived the advantage of the
company’s protection, to whom he had, in point
of fact, become tributary, he was called upon
to aid in the general exigency. He very re-
luctantly assented to a contribution of five lacs.
This indisposition created an unfavourable
impression on the mind of the government.

 

 

 

362 HISTORY OF THE
“ Having been again applied to for aid
during the war in the Carnatic, in the prose-
cution of which the government of Bengal
had drained their treasury in supplies to
Madras, he evinced a decided disinclination
to come forward; and although he promised
to contribute some aid in cavalry, not one
man was forthcoming. These and other cir-
cumstances arising out of the deputation of a
party from the rajah to Calcutta, determined
Mr. Hastings to make known his mind to
Cheyte Sing, for which purpose he proceeded
to Benares on his route to meet the vizier,
where he arrived on the 14th of August, 1781.
It was the rajah’s wish to have paid the go-
vernor-general a visit that evening, but he
desired it might be postponed until a wish to
that effect was communicated to the rajah.

“In the interim, the governor-general
caused a paper to be forwarded to Cheyte
Sing, recapitulating the points upon which
he felt it necessary to animadvert. The re-
ply of the rajah was so unsatisfactory, that
orders were given to Mr. Markham, the resi—
dent, on the 15th, at ten at night, to place
him in arrest the following morning: should
opposition arise, he was to await the arrival
of two companies of sepoys. Mr. Markham,
with the troops, the following morning exe-
cuted his orders. The rajah addressed a
letter to Mr. Hastings, asking ‘what need
there was for guards ? He was the governor-
general’s slave.’ In consequence of the de-
sire of the rajah, Mr. Markham proceeded to
visit him; previous to his arrival, large bodies
of armed men had crossed the river from
Ramnagur. Unfortunately, the two compa-
nies who were with the resident had taken
no ammunition with them. They were sud-
denly attacked by the assembled body of
armed men and fired upon; at this moment
the raj-ah made his escape, letting himself
down the steep banks of the river, by turbans
tied together, into a boat which was waiting
for him. Those who effected his escape fol-
lowed him. Of the two companies oom-
manded by Lieutenant Stalker few remained
alive, and those were severely wounded;
Lieutenants Stalker, Scott, and Simes lying
within a short distance of each other. The
rajah fled from Ramnagur with his zenana to
Lateefgur, a strong fort ten miles from Chu—
nar, accompanied by every member of the
family who could claim any right of succes-
sion to the raj.

“In this state of affairs, Mr. Hastings se-
lected Baboo Assaum Sing, who had been
dewan under Bulwunt Sing, to take charge
of the revenues, in quality of nail), until it
should be legally determined to whom the
revenues belonged. The governor went to

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXV.
Chunar, from whence requisitions were issued
for succour from all quarters. Little aid
could be effectually given, as the whole of
the country was in arms, the provinces of
Benares, l'tamnagur, and Pateeta being in a
state of war. Troops ultimately arrived
under Major Popham from Cawnpore; the
exertions and gallantry of that officer rescued
the zemindary of Benares from the power and
influence of the disaffected rajah and his ad-
herents. His last strong fortress of Bejieghur,
from which he had escaped, was reduced and
brought under subjection to the company.
Baboo Narrain, a grandson of Bulwunt. Sing,
was proclaimed rajah in the room of Cheyte
Sing.”

This statement, supported by all existing
documents of the rajah’s position, preroga-
tives, and conduct, and the ground on which
the claims of the governor-general rested, do
not agree with the account given by Mill,
upon whose authority it is obvious Lord
Macaulay solely rests his estimate of the
conduct of Hastings. Mr. Mill, assuring his
readers of the sacred and indefensible rights of
the rajah, says :—“ “'hcthcr till the time at
which Benares became an appanage of the
Subah of Oude, it had ever been governed
through the medium of any of the neigh-
bouring vieeroys, or had always paid its re-
venue immediately to the imperial treasury,
does not certainly appear. VYith the excep-
tion of coining money in his own name—a.
prerogative of majesty, which, as long as theé
throne retained its vigour, was not enfeebled
by communication, and that of the adminis-
tration of criminal justice, which the nabob
had withdrawn, the Rajah of Benares had
always, it is probable, enjoyed and exercised
all the powers of government within his own
dominions.”

With views based upon such representa-
tions, Lord Macaulay would naturally de-
scribe any demands for assistance made by
Hastings, beyond the ordinary tribute, as a
robbery. Professor Wilson has, with his
usual research, examined the statements of
Mill, and gives the following confutation:——-
“This is an adoption of one of those errors
upon which the charge against Mr. Hastings
in regard to his relations with Cheyte Sing
was founded, and which commences with the
second report of the select committee, who
talk of ‘the expulsion of a rajah of the high-
est rank from his dominions.’ In point of
fact, however, no rajah had enjoyed and ex-
ercised the powers of government in the
province of Benares since the middle of the
eleventh century, at the latest. At the period
of the Mohammedan conquest, it was part of
the kingdom of Kanoj. It was annexed to

i . «A!

 

 

 

can». LXXXV.]

Delhi by the arms of Kutteh, early in the
thirteenth century, and in the fourteenth was
included in the Mohammedan kingdom of
J onpur. In the reign of Akbar, it was com-
prised in the subah of Allahabad, and in that
of Aurungzebe it was comprehended in that
of Oude. In all this time no mention is
made of a Rajah of Benares. The title ori-
ginated in the beginning of the eighteenth
century, or A.D. 1730, when Mensa Ram,
zemiudar of Gangapoor, having, in the dis-
tracted state of affairs, added largely to his
authority, obtained a sunnud of rajah, from
Mohammed Shah of Delhi—a mere honorary
title, conferred then, as is it now, by the
British government, without any suspicion of
its implying princely power or territorial do—
minion. Mansa Ram procured the title for
his son, Bulwunt Sing, who succeeded him in
‘I'HO; so that even the title was only forty
years old at the time of Cheyte Sing’s removal.
It had never conferred independence, for the
rajah had still remained a zemindar, holding
under the soubahdar of Oude. It is true,
that the minutes of council of various dates
speak of the rajah as a sort of king, tributary,
but reigning in his own right, and by the posi-
tion of his supposed kingdom, calculated to
be a valuable feudatory or ally of the British
government. Some of this was merely vague-
ness of expression, some of it ignorance. The
word rajah seems to have imposed even upon
Hastings ; certainly it did upon Clavering and
his party; and language was used in allusion
to Cheyte Sing, which exposed Hastings to
the charge of contradiction and inconsistency.
There is no vagueness or inconsistency, how-
ever, in the document upon which Cheyte Sing’s
Whole power and right depended. The sunnud
1776, granted to the rajah by the governor
and council, and which, it is to be observed,
‘ causes all former sunnuds to become null and
void;’ confers no royalties, acknowledges no
hereditary rights, fixes no perpetual limit to
the demands of the supreme government; but
appoints him zemindar, aumeen, and fougedar
ofBenares and other districts. All these terms
imply delegated and subordinate offices, and
recognise in him nothing more than receiver
of the rents, and civil and commercial judge.
In the kabooleat, or assent to this sunnud,
Cheyte Sing acknowledges the sovereignity of
the company, and promises to pay them a cer-
tain sum, the estimated net revenue, and to
preserve peace and order. “‘hatever, there-
fore, may be the fluctuating and contradictory
language of the minutes of council, there is not
the slightest pretext for treating the zemindar
of Benares as a sovereign, however subordi-
nate or tributary, to which he held whatever
power he enjoyed. It is true that the genu-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

363

ineness of this document was disputed by the
prosecutors; and they affirmed that the sun-
nud was altered in compliance with the repre-
sentation of Cheyte Sing, who objected to the
insertion of the term ‘ muchulka,’ and the
clause annulling all former sunnuds. They
could not prove, however, that any other
sunnud was ever executed; and whatever
might at one time have been the disposition
of the council to accede to the rajah’s wishes,
it does not appear that any actual measure
ensued. Even, however, if the omissions had
been made, of which there is no proof, it is
not pretended that any clause, exempting the
rajah for ever from all further demands, was
inserted; and this was the only material point
at issue.”"‘

It was obvious that, in the mode which
Hastings adopted in carrying out the punish.
ment inflicted upon Cheyte Sing, and in the
extent to which it was pushed, he was in-
fluenced by personal resentment. Cheyte
Sing had deserved resentment; but Hastings
carried it out vindictively. There can be no
doubt that his policy and sense of justice were
independent of his vengeful feeling, but that
gave a bitterness to all he did in the trans-
action.

“The spirit which Hastings manifested to-
wards Cheyte Sing was so intensely bitter, as
almost to force an inquiry whether the public
delinquency of this man could be the sole cause
of the governor-general’s hatred. This is a
question which could not have been satisfac-
torily answered had not Hastings himself
afforded the means. In enumerating the
crimes of the rajah, Hastings accuses him of
having entertained an intention to revolt.
‘ This design,’ says he, ‘had been greatly
favoured by the unhappy divisions of our go-
vernment, in which he presumed to take an
open part. It is a fact, that when these had
proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil
violence, by an attempt to wrest from me my
authority, in the month of June, 1777, he had
deputed a man named Sumboonaut, with an
express commission to my opponent, and the
man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad,
when, hearing of the change of affairs which
had taken place at the presidency, he stopped,
and the rajah recalled him.’1‘ Here, then, is
the key, furnished by Hastings himself, to the
feelings under which he carried on his pro-
ceedings against Cheyte Sing. While the
contest between himself and General Claver-

* Minutes of Evidence, p. 6’).

*i‘ Hastings’s Narrative, printed in the Appendix to
the Supplement to the Second Report of the Select Com-
mittee of the House of Commons on the Administration
of Justice in India, 1782; and also in the Minutes of
Evidence on the Trial of Hastings, vol. i.

364 HISTORY OF THE
ing was raging, the presumptuous rajah had
ventured to dispatch a messenger to the op-
ponent of the man who was eventually to be
master of his fortunes. For four years the
hatred engendered by this act had burned in
Hasting’s heart, when an opportunity oc-
curred for gratifying at once the claims of
public justice and of private revenge. Such
an opportunity Hastings was not the man to
pass by. It is not necessary to ascribe the
whole of his proceedings with regard to
Cheyte Sing to personal hatred. Indepen-
dently of this feeling, he would probably
have called upon the rajah for assistance to-
wards carrying on the war, and he would
have been justified; he would probably have
visited his numerous failures with some pun-
ishment; and in this, too, he would have
been justified: but in the absence of the
dark passion which had so long rankled in
his breast, he would have proceeded with
more calmness, more dignity, and more re-
gard to the courtesy which the rank and
position of the zemindar demanded. To
humble to the dust the man who had of-
fended him was a triumph which it was not
in the nature of Hastings to forego, when
circumstances threw in his way the oppor-
tunity of enjoying it. He set his foot on the
neck of his enemy, and was happy.

“ With the explanation afforded by himself,
the conduct of Hastings towards Cheyte Sing
appears perfectly in accordance with his gene—
ral character; but the indiscreet revelation of
his feelings is remarkable, as being in strik-
ing opposition to that character. Disguise
seemed to be natural to him. On all occa-
sions he surrounded himself and his motives
with mystery. Here is a striking exception.
A degree of frankness, which few men in
such a case would have manifested, for once
marks a communication from VYarren Hast-
ings. How is this to be accounted for ? By
the strength of the passion which had waited
years for gratification, and by the overwhelm-
ing sensation of triumph consequent on grati-
fication when attained. Powerful must these
feelings have been to overcome the caution of
a man with whom concealment was not so
much a habit as an instinct; which could in-
duce him for once to lift the veil which on no
other occasion was ever removed ; which could
lead him, unabashed and undismaycd, to ex—
pose to the public eye motives and feelings
of which the suggestions of the most ordinary
prudence would have dictated the conceal-
ment—and this, too, at a time when, under
the avowed consciousness that some parts of
his proceedings required explanation, and
under the humiliating sense of disappoint-
ment at the failure of his financial specula-

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXV.
tions, he was seeking to disarm hostility by
apology.“t

The conduct of Hastings throughout the
unfortunate events at Benares, was charac—
terised not only by his usual courage, but by
an amount of cool and dauntless fortitude,
such as the world has seldom witnessed.
VVheu the disaster occurred to the two com-
panies, Hastings, with about fifty soldiers,
was shut up in the residency, which the mob
surrounded, cutting off all communication.
The too forward valour of some English
officers with Hastings, nearly brought 011 a
conflict which would have probably issued in
the destruction of his little garrison and of
himself.
around was in arms, and the insurrectionary
spirit extended into Oude, the most turbulent
part of India. Volunteers from Oude, from
among the less warlike part of the population,
especially hastened to join the Benares insur-
gents. The ruling class of Oude, the Mo-
hammedans took little part in the disturbance,
but the Brahminical devotees considered it a
holy war, and nearly thirty thousand of them
crossed the borders into the Benares province.
Hastings, beleaguered in his little temporary
fortress, not only remained perfectly calm,
but acted with the cool assurance and auda-
city of one in a position to dictate. The
fugitive rajah sent to him, beseechiug, in
humiliating terms, pardon and friendship,
but in the meantime made no efforts to with-
draw the armed rabble that beset the go-
vernor. Hastings treated with haughty dis-
dain the rajah’s overtures. He contrived to
send letters, placed in the ears of certain of
the natives as ear-rings, to the nearest can-
tonments of the British army. The troops
idolized Hastings, as all the English did,
and officers and men made desperate and
enthusiastic efforts to hasten to his rescue.
Meanwhile, Hastings wrote with the greatest
coolness despatches to his agents in con-
nection with the negotiations then going on
with the Mahrattas. These despatches show
the most wonderful self-reliance and self-
possession. While a multitude thundered at
the gates of his residence, and bullets whistled
around, this indomitable man wrote with as
much collectedness as if sitting in his study
at govermnent house, or dictating a revenue
minute in the council chamber. The efforts
of the British troops soon turned the tide of
affairs, the vast mob of armed fanatics melted
away, and the liberated governor with wis-
dom, promptitude, and stern repression, re-
duced to a perfect calm the anarchical elements
that had raged so fiercely around him.

* Histmyqf flee British Empire in India. By Edward
Thornton.

The whole country for many miles"

CHAP. LXXXV.]

Cheyte Sing had placed himself beyond all
hope of mercy while these events were
passing. He was lifted up by the sight of
the whole population of the province of
Benares in arms, the thronging volunteers
from Oude, and the preparation for revolt in
Bahar, so that he threatened to “drive the
white faces out of Bengal,” and made high
and peremptory demands upon Hastings.
“'hen he saw the feeble resistance made by
multitudes of his co-religiouists to a few
English soldiers and sepoys commanded by
British officers, he became panic-struck, and
fled, abandoning for ever the regions he had
thrown into so sudden a convulsion. The
result to the company was an increase of its
revenue to the amount of £200,000 sterling
per annum, and a more complete dominance
in the regions that had so suddenly revolted.
A quarter of a million sterling was found in
the treasury of Cheyte Sing, which was dis-
tributed to the troops as prize money. VYhen
tidings of the occurrences at Benares reached
the directors, the court passed a resolution,
that the treaty of 1775, confirmed in per-
petuity to the company the zemindaree of
Benares, that Cheyte Sing was to have the
management of the province on paying a
certain tribute; that the governor—general
and council had recommended the rajah to
maintain two thousand horse, but that in the
opinion of the court, there was no obligations
resting upon Cheyte Sing to comply with that
recommendation; that the conduct of the
governor-general towards him, while at Be-
nares was improper, and that the imprison-
ment of his person was unwarrantable and
highly impolitic, and would probably tend to
weaken that confidence in the moderation
and justice of the English government, which
it was desirable the princes of India should
feel. These tidings reached the governor-
general just as he had concluded a glorious
peace with Hyder, and when flushed with the
success of all his enterprises, he was unlikely
to endure the language of censure with his
usual good temper and self-command. He
at once wrote a. respectful but indignant
despatch to the directors, a few extracts from
which will at once show the merits of the
whole question as they appeared to Hastings,
and the views which he took of the policy
and proceedings of the directors. He con-
sidered the judgment pronounced to have
issued from a party in the directory, under
the influence, no doubt of the cabinet, which,
anxious to grasp the patronage of India,
laboured incessantly to prejudice the minds
of the English public against the company’s
servants, believing that such prejudice would
ultimately be directed to the company itself.

VOL. 11.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

365

Hastings does not express so much in the
language he employed, but his allusions and
tone convey it :—“I understand that these
resolutions regarding Cheyte Sing were either
published or intended for publication; the
authority from whence they proceed leads to
the belief of the fact. “'ho are the readers ?
Not the proprietors alone, whose interest is
immediately concerned in them, and whose
approbation I am impelled, by every motive
of pride and gratitude, to solicit, but the
whole body of the people of England, whose
passions have been excited on the general
subject of the conduct of their servants in
India; and before them I am arraigned and
prejudged of a violation of the national faith
in acts of such complicated aggravation, that,
if they were true, no punishment short of
death could atone for the injury which the
interest and credit of the public has sustained
in them.”

M. Auberf" condensing the letter of Has-
tings, thus describes aud quotes its contents:
—“ “'ith respect to the two thousand horse,
it was not stipulated that Cheyte Sing should
furnish any given number, but that what
were maintained should be for the defence of
the general state. He denied that Cheyte
Sing was bound by no other tie than the
payment of his tribute, for he was bound by
the fealty of obedience to every order of the
government which he served, his own letters
being referred to as affording proofs. He
denied that Cheyte Sing was a native prince
of India, for he was the son of a collector of
the revenue of that province, which his acts,
and the misfortunes of his master, enabled
him to convert to his own permanent and
hereditary possession. ‘The man whom you
have just ranked among the princes of India
will be astonished when he hears it—at an
elevation so unlocked-for; nor less at the
independent rights which he will not know
how to assert, unless the example you have
thought it consistent with justice, however
opposite to policy, to show, of becoming his
advocate against your own interests, should
inspire any of your own servants to be his
advisers and instructors.’ Mr. Hastings re-
ferred to his narrative as explanatory of all
the circumstances, and then dwelt upon the
injury likely to arise from the support of a
native against the government; remarking,
‘it is now a complete period of eleven years
since I first received the nominal charge of your
affairs; in the course of that time I have had
invariably to contend, not only with ordinary
difliculties, but with such as most naturally
arose from the opposition of those very powers

* Rise and Proyrcss qf Britt's/z Power in India, vol. i.
chap. xi. pp. 642—644.

31;

366 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

from Whom I primarily derived my authority,
and which were required for the support of
it. My exertions, though applied to an un-
wearied and consistent line of action, have
been occasional and desultory; yet I please
m) self with the hope that in the annals of
your dominions which shall be written after
the extinction of recent prejudice, this term
of its administration will appear not the least
conducive to the interests of the company,
nor the least reflective of the honour of the
British name. Had sufficient support been
given, what good might have been done!
You, honourable sirs, can attest the patience
and temper with which I have submitted to
all the indignities heaped upon me in a long
service. It was the duty of fidelity which I
essentially owed to it; it was the return of
gratitude which I owed, even with the sacri-
fice of life, had that been exacted, to the com-
pany, my original masters and most indul-
gent patrons. There was an interval during
which my authority was wholly destroyed;
but another was substituted, and that, though
irregular, was armed with the public belief
of an influence invariably upholding it, which
gave it a vigour scarcely less effectual than
that of a constitutional power. Besides, your
government had no external danger to agi-
tate and discover the looseness of its compo~
sition.

“‘ The case is now widely different; while
your executive was threatened by wars with
the most formidable powers of Europe, added
to your Indian enemies, and while you con-
fessedly owed its preservation to the season-
able and vigorous exertions of this govern-
ment, you chose that season to annihilate its
constitutional powers. You annihilated the
influence of its executive members. You
proclaimed its annihilation—you have sub-
stituted no other, unless you suppose it may
exist, and can be effectually exercised in the
body of your council at large, possessing no
power of motion, but an inert submission to
your commands. It therefore remains for me
to perform the duty which I had assigned
myself, as the final purpose of this letter, to
declare, as I now most formally do, that it is
my desire that you will be pleased to obtain
the early nomination of a person to succeed
me in the government of Fort W'illiam; to
declare that it is my intention to resign your
service so soon as I can do it without pre-
judice to your affairs, after the allowance of a
competent time for your choice of a person to
succeed me; and to declare that if, in the
intermediate time, you shall proceed to order
the restoration of Rajah Cheyte Sing to the
zemindaree, from which he was dispossessed
for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your

 

[CHAR LXXXV.

council shall resolve to execute the order, I
will instantly give up my station and the ser-
vice. I am morally certain that my successor,
Whoever he may be, will be allowed to possess
and exercise the necessary power of his sta-
tion, with the confidence and support of those
who, by their choice of him, will be interested
in his success.””‘

The affairs of the Madras government led
to various differences between it and the su-
preme government; the directors supported
the Madras council against Hastings, object-
ing to the appointment of Mr. R. J. Sulivan
by the governor—general to Hyderabad, a
person whom he had nominated solely on
account of his abilities and qualifications.
Finally, the court supported Mr. Bristow at
Oude, in opposition to the governor-general.
These circumstances led Mr. Hastings to ad—
dress the court in the following terms, in a
letter written after that already quoted had
been dispatched :—“At whatever period your
decision may arrive, may the government fall
into the hands of a person invested with the
powers of the office, not disgraced, as I have
been, with an unsubstantial title, without au-
thority, and with a responsibility without the
means of discharging it. May he, at least,
possess such a portion of exclusive control as
may enable him to interpose with effect on
occasions which may tend to the sacrifice of
your political credit.”1‘

In reference to Mr. Sulivan, he, in a letter
of still later date, observed :——“ Among the
many mortifications to which I have been
continually subjected, there is none which I
so severely feel as my concern in the suffer-
ings of those whom my selection for the most
important trusts in your service has exposed
to persecution, and to censures, fines, depri-
vations, and dismission from home. It is hard
to be loaded with a weighty responsibility
without power, to be compelled to work with
instruments which I cannot trust, and to see
the terrors of high authority held over the
heads of such as I myself employ in the dis-
charge of my public duties”:

From the period when he heard of the dis-
approval of his conduct in reference to Cheyte
Sing, Hastings was discontented, and his let-
ters constantly breathe a sense of injury. He
felt that his great services were not appre-
ciated. Alluding, in the letter last quoted,
to the helplessness of the other presidencies,
and to the fact that he had saved India, he
remarked 2—“ “e have supported the other
presidencies, not by scanty and ineffectual
supplies, but by an anxious anticipation of all

* Letter to Court, 20th of March, 1783.
1‘ October, 1783.
: November, 1783.

 

 

CHAD. LXXXVJ

their wants, and by a most prompt and liberal
relief of them. “'e have assisted the China
trade, and have provided larger investments
from the presidency than it has ever furnished
in any given period of the same length, from
the first hour of its establishment to the pre-
sent, and ample returns of wealth have been
sent to England at a time when all the com-
pany’s possessions in India were bearing with
accumulated weight on Bengal for support
against native and European enemies.”

He complained bitterly of the miserable
state of affairs in Oude, which he attributed
to the impolicy of the company interfering
with his measures.

The nature of the differences between the
governor-general and the Madras govern-
ment, the way in which they proceeded, and
their influence upon the ultimate retirement
of Hastings, are thus summed up by Edward
Thornton :—“ Between the governor-general
and Lord Macartney there had never been
much cordiality of feeling, and the difficulties
in which the government of Madras was
placed, tended to multiply the points of dif-
ference. The governor-general had a plan
for surrendering to the nizam the Northern
Circars, in consideration of a body of cavalry
to be furnished by that prince. This was
opposed by Lord Macartney, and was never
carried into effect. Lord Macartney had,
with much difficulty, obtained from the Kabob
of Arcot an assignment of the revenues of the
Carnatic for the support of the war. This
was disapproved by the government of Ben-
gal, and the assignment ordered to be re-
scinded. Before these orders were received
at Madras, orders of a contrary character
arrived from the court of directors. The
government of Bengal, however. stubbornly
refused to yield, and Lord Macartney was
equally immovable. The treaty with Tippoo
Sultan afforded other grounds of difference.
It was disapproved by the government of
Bengal, among other reasons, because it did
not include the Kabob of Arcot; and a new
ratification, declaring it to extend to that
personage, was directed to take place. Lord
Macartney again resisted; and had the go—
vernor-general possessed confidence in the
stability of his own authority, some violent
measures might have resulted from these dis-
putes. But Hastings was now tottering in
his seat—heavy charges were in circulation
against him in England, and he had dispatched
an agent (Major Scott) thither for the defence
of his character and interests. The influence
of Lord Macartney at home appeared to be
rising as that of Hastings was declining; he
continued to exercise his authority without
impediment, until, in consequence chiefly of

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

367

the revocation of the orders of the court of
directors relating to the assignment from Mo-
hammed Ali, he voluntarily relinquished it,
and was ultimately appointed to succeed to the
office of governor-general.”

“’hen Hastings appointed Major Scott as
his agent, he intimated to the directors his
having done so, and at the same time declared
to them that he “ would suffer no person
whatever to perform any act in his name that
could be construed to imply a resignation of
his authority, protesting against it, as on
former occasions, as most unwarrantable.”

Out of the transactions at Benares arose
differences with Oude. The nabob vizier had
so badly governed his dominions, or so faith--
lessly fulfilled the duties of alliance, that the
insurrection in Benares derived great import-
ance, and caused great danger by the number
of his subjects that joined the masses of the
insurgents. Hastings was inflamed with
anger, and determined to make the nabob pay
dearly for any damage caused by his neglect.
Unfortunately for the nabob himself, he chose
this critical juncture to urge the withdrawal
of the British troops from Oude, which his
father and himself had engaged the English
to place there. His real object was not the
removal of the troops, but as it was policy on
the part of the English to keep a force in
Oude, he concluded that they would still do
so, even if he violated the treaty, and refused
to pay for them. Hastings saw through this,
and remonstrated, demanding the payment of
all arrears, and the regular disbursement of
the stipulated subsidy. The nabob declared
that he had no money, and that his kingdom
would not endure further taxation. Hastings
reminded him that if his revenues were ex-
hausted, the fault lay in the extravagance and
debauchery of which the nabob had set so
had an example to his people, and hinted that
if a native ruler could not make ends meet in
Oude, the English could; but that the latter
would never suffer Oude to be overrun by the
Mahrattas, as would be the case almost as
soon as the English troops disappeared,neither
would he impose the cost of preserving that
frontier of the British territory from foreign
enemies. Oude should bear the burden of its
own defences. The vizier nabob sought an
interview with Hastings. He proceeded to
Chunar to meet the governor-general, and
arrange with him as to the payment of the
troops, which, according to treaty, he was
bound to maintain. The governor-general
was not now satisfied, but increased his
demands, on the grounds of the nabob’s duty
to defend the empire, the protection of which
he enjoyed, and on the ground, also, that his
previous delinquencies deserved punishment.

368 IIISTO RY OF THE

This interview between the governor-general
and vizier took place on the 11th of Septem-
ber, 1781, and they remained for .a fortnight
in the picturesque fortress, discussing the
condition of India, and of Oude especially;
but still more especially debating the means
by which the British treasury at Calcutta
might be furnished with money. It was
finally arranged that the nabob should pay a
large sum to meet the present emergencies of
the English, and, on the other hand, he was
to be spared the stated expense of a large
portion of the British contingent, then sta-
tioned in his dominions. The infantry bri-
gade, and three regiments of cavalry, were to
be Withdrawn, a very large saving to the
annual expenditure of the nabob’s government.
One regiment of sepoys (infantry) was to be
stationed at Lucknow, but the charge to the
nabob was not to exceed 25,000 rupees per
mensem. The army at Cawnpore was to be
statedly kept up to the strength prescribed by
the treaty of 1773. All British officers, and
all English pensioners upon the state of Oude,
Whatever their claims, were to be withdrawn.
The nabob was also to resume certain jaghires,
of which the English had previously possessed
themselves, the united value of which was
very considerable. On his part the nabob
consented immediately, to supply fifty-five lacs
of rupees to the company, and subsequently
twenty lacs in entire liquidation of the debt
due by him to the company. On the 25th of
September, the vizier re-entered his capital,
gloomy and dissatisfied. Every trick of nego-
tiation to which he had resorted had been
turned against him. Hastings had foiled his
most cunning vakeels and subordinates with
their own weapons. The conduct of Hastings
in these negotiations has been much censured.
The English were bound by treaty to Fuzzul
Oola Khan, the Rohilla chief, who had some
years before protracted the war in that coun-
try. T he chief had stipulated to place at the
service of the English government two or
three thousand men “ aCcording to his ability.”
Hastings now demanded five thousand, but
reduced finally the mandate to three thousand
cavalry, which the khan pleaded that he did
not possess, but would send two thousand
cavalry, all he had, and one thousand infantry.
This offer was considered contumacious. It
is possible that Hastings believed it to be so,
but the grounds of suspicion are strong that
he was anxious for a quarrel, in order to hand
over the jaghires of the khan to the nabob, as
compensation for the ready money required
from the latter to meet the exigencies of the
Bengal treasury, then drained of its resources
by its supplies to the other presidencies in
their dangerous mismanagement and desperate

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [Guam LXXXV.
wars. At all events, the lands of Fuzzul Oola
were made over upon paper to the vizier, on
the ostensible ground that the khan had broken
the treaty. Fuzzul Oola had no doubt in various
ways departed from its strict letter, but the
pretext or reason announced for his deposition
was his refusal to supply the military force
agreed upon. Hastings had actually no wish
that this concession to the vizier should be of
use to him. He took means to impede the
execution of this clause of the treaty with the
nabob, while he was actually making it; and
ultimately be frustrated its fulfilment, accept-
ing from Fuzzul Oola a fine as a substitute for
confiscation.

The resumption of thejaghires by the nabob
involved the ruin of his mother and grand-
mother, called the begums. These princesses
were immensely rich, and Hastings believed
that the property they held had been impro-
perly conferred upon them by the previous
nabob—that, in fact, it belonged to the reign-
ing prince. However that might have been,
the English had, by treaty, recognised the
rights of the begum mother, both to her jag-
hires and her treasures. So ostensibly was
this recognition made, that when the nabob
had previously sought to plunder his relations,
the English government interfered for the
protection of the mother, on the ground of
treaty obligation, while only remonstrating
with the vizier for his treatment of the elder
lady. The nabob was very desirous of ob-
taining the wealth, but shrunk from the
odium of entirely dispossessing the royal
ladies. He suggested to Hastings the pro-
priety of leaving them in possession of their
jaghires, and of accepting their treasures in-

stead. Hastings decreed that they should
lose all. This stern, hard, and unpitying dc.

cree was executed, but not until after a
gallant resistance on the part of the retainers
of the royal ladies. Their affairs were in the
hands of two eunuchs : these, with other of the
begum adherents, were incarcerated, loaded
with irons. Lord Macaulay says that torture.
was also applied; but this is not borne out
by fact. He quotes a letter written by the
British resident to the officer in charge of
them, to allow the uabob’s agents to inflict
corporal punishment upon them. But this,
as Thornton shows, was never executed, and
probably never intended to be so. That
author, more severe on Hastings than most
historians who have animadverted upon his
misdeeds, conjectures that the order was in-
tended to act merely in terrorcm, so as to
induce the incarcerated men to comply with
the requisitions of their persecutors. Torture,
as the term is employed, was not applied; but
great severity was inflicted. Hastingsjustitied

“MM m4..u‘.._m.mm. ._ . . .

 

Cmr. LXXXV.] IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 369

his conduct throughout this last class of trans- the company's servants in India, and that he,
actions by the allegation that the begums probably, would be made the scape-goat, and
were enemies of British power in India, that he was anxious to secure this sum for his own
they abetted Cheyte Sing, and assisted the in- defence upon his return to England, if the
surreetion in Benares. When public discus- directors could be induced to concede it.
sion was raised in England concerning his Possibly this circumstance had some influence
conduct towards the princes of Oude, Sir in the delay which attended his communi-
l‘llijah Impey suggested to him the importance cation to the company, that this sum had been
of supporting the allegation of political in- paid to their account. He, at last, in a let-
trigue against the begums by affidavits. ter to the secret committee, asked permission
Hastings gladly availed himself of this sug- to keep it. This they refused. His morti-
gestion,and of the active services of Sir Elijah fication was intense, for he was not rich,
in taking the depositions. These were ren- and no governor had ever enriched his sove-
dered in a remarkable manner. The judge reign by his measures, in any age, as Warren
hurried off to the provinces which had been Hastings had enriched the Indian treasury of
the scenes of the alleged misconduct of the the company. Like Clive, he had saved
begums, and took the affidavits in the forms India for them, and they grudged him both
of Mohammedan, Brahminical, and Chris- the glory and what he considered equitable
tian attestation, according to the religion pecuniary reward. It was from Patna, in
of the witnesses. A vast pile of documents, January, 1782, that he addressed the court
most damnatory to the begums, was thus pro— on the subject of this donation, in the follow-
cured; nor would there have been any diffi- ing letter :——“I accepted it without hesitation,
culty in obtaining any number of sworn and gladly, being entirely destitute both of
testimonies which the governor deemed ne- means and credit, whether for your service
ecssary to his object. It does not appear, or the relief of my own necessities. It was
however, that Hastings countenanced any made, not in specie, but in bills. “hat I
methods to obtain false testimony, and it is have received has been laid out in the public
possible that he credited the evidence upon service, the rest shall be applied to the same
which he made the allegations originally. account. The nominal sum is ten lacs of
The facts contained in the affidavits were at rupees, Oude currency. As soon as the whole
the time notorious, although they were years is completed, I shall send you a faithful ac-
after denied in the British parliament by men count of it, resigning the disposal of it entirely
who were seeking to ruin Hastings, for the to the pleasure of your honourable court. If
means he employed to save the Indian empire. you shall adjudge the disposal to me, I shall
Public opinion in England treated the whole consider it as the most honourable apportion-
affair as an imposture—a corrupt contrivance ment and reward of my labours, and I wish
between thejudge and the governor to bolster to owe my fortune to your bounty. I am
up a case from first to last guilty and dis- now in myfiftieth year: I have passed thirty-
graceful. one years in your service. My conscience
Another circumstance connected with the allows me boldly to claim the merit of zeal
interview between the vizier and the governor- , and integrity, nor has fortune been unpropi-
general at Chunar has been made the occasion y tious to their exertions. To these qualities I
of severe reflections upon the latter. The ’ bound my pretensions. I shall not repine if
nabob offered his excellency a present of ten you shall deem otherwise of my services; nor
lacs of rupees; he accepted it, and passed the Ought your decision, however it may disap-
money to the company’s accountf’i' This, point my hope of a retreat adequate to the
however, he did not make known to the com- consequence and elevation of the oflice which
pany for some months after, which Lord 5 I now possess, to lessen my gratitude for
Macaulay considers as a ground for suspicion having been so long permitted to hold it,
as to the integrity of his motives. Mr. since it has, at last, permitted me to lay up a
Thornton attributes the concealment to the , provision with which I can be contented in a
love of mystery with which he thinks more humble station.”
Hastings invariably enveloped all his transac-l 0n the 22nd of May, from Calcutta, he
tions. Motives of policy probably induced the i again wrote, accounting for the money which
temporary concealment; but Hastings never be had received for the company, and applied
intended to apply it to his own use. He, to its use, from the month of October, 1780,
however, felt that the close of his power was 3 to August, 1781, amounting to nineteen lacs
approaching, that public prejudice in England I sixty-four thousand rupees (nearly £200,000).
was fast rising to a dangerous pitch against g Unfortunately, the ship Liz-61y, by which this
* He had previously acted in a similar manner in the 4‘ letter was intended to have been dispatched
case of Cheyte sing. i to Europe, was delayed, and necessarily the

 

370

letter also, which turned out to the subse-
quent disadvantage of the writer.

On the 15th of January, 1783, the directors
wrote to the governor-general, stating that
they were prevented, by a prohibitory act of
parliament, from applying the ten lacs in the
way he requested. The directors may have
so interpreted “the regulation act; ” but
there was no claim which hindered their
giving the money to Hastings : they chose to
accept it themselves. The answer of the di-
rectors was an evasion and a mean one. In
Gleig’s Life of Hastings, :1 letter is published
addressed by him to his agent, Major Scott,
in which the following passage sets forth fully
the views and feelings of the writer 011 this
matter :——“ I am neither a prude nor a hypo-
crite. Had I succeeded, as I had reason to I
expect, in the original objects of my expedi-

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

tion, I should have thought it, pe1haps, allow-

able to make some provision f01 myself when :
I had filled the companys tleasury , but I
am disappointed. I ha1c added, indeed, af

LCHAP. LXXXVI.

large income to the company’s revenue, and
if Mr. Middleton (resident at Lucknow) does
his duty, I have provided for the early pay-
ment of the debt due from the nabob vizier to
the company. But these are not acquisitions
of éclat. Their immediate influence is not
felt, and will not be known at all until long
after the receipt of these despatches. It will
be known that our receipts from Benares
were suspended for three months, and during
as long a time at Lucknow. It will be known
that the pay and charges of the temporary
brigade have been thrown upon the company,
and that all the nabob's pensioners have been
withdrawn ; but the effect of my more useful
arrangement, thanks to Mr. Middleton, yet
remains to be accomplished. I return to an
empty treasury, which I left empty. I will
not suffer it to be said, that I took more care
of my own interests than of the public, nor
that I made a sacrifice of the latter to the
former.”

wwvvvvv» \. \. \.\.\ \. v\.\‘v\/\/\JW\-\. \ 1.x». \r

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

GOVERNMENT OF HASTINGS (Co/‘zcludedj—TREA'I‘Y WITH THE MAHRATTAS—INSUBORDINATION
OF THE COUNCILS OI“ BOMBAY AND MADRAS~DISSENSIONS IN SUPREME COUNCIL—

HASTINGS RESIGNS THE GOVERNMENT-

SCHEMES OF THE MAIIRA’I‘TAS—PREPARA-

TIONS FOR THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL’S DEPARTURE—HASTINGS LEAVES INDIA.

IVHILE Hastings was at Chunar, communica- ‘
tions reached him from Madagee Scindiah,
which led to a better feeling with the Mah~
rattas. Colonel Muir was 01de1ed by Has-
tings to form a treaty with Scindiah, which
he effected on the basis of inst1ucti0ns sent
by Hastings 0n the 18th of October. That
chief acted as mediat01 between the English
and Ilyder Ali, but the time 11' as not lipe lo1
the full development of e1 ents between the
11011 ers of \Iysme and Calcutta. Peace, how-
ever 11 as concluded 11 ith the Mahlattas by the
treaty of Salbey, May 17th,1782,* Scindiah
having been the means of blinging to pass this
:lesilable event, Rag oba, concerning 11110111
the conflict arose, had an allowance of 25,000
rupees per month guaranteed to him. By the
treaty of Salbey, the Peishwa bound himself
on behalf of the whole of the Mahratta states
not to tolerate the e1ection of factmies by any
Emopean nations except the English. The
two men who held at that tune chief power
among the Mahr attas, was Scindiah, and Nana
Fuinavese, the p1ime ministcl of the Peishu a.
* Printed Treaties, p 518.

 

The treaty of Salbey did not give satisfac-
tion at Bombay; the council 1 'as jealous of that

1 of Bengal as supreme council, and pointed out

to the directors that the abridged power of
the Bombay presidency in deference to that
of Bengal, and the diminution of territory
caused by the treaty, would enfeeble and im-
poverish that presidency, and require remit-
tances from England or from Bengal annually.
They also intimated that as Bombay was conv
tiguous to the most powerful Mahratta tribes,
it was the most suitable 0f the three presi-
dencies in which to maintain a large 111ilitary
force.

The differences between the councils at
Madras and Bengal were still more promi-
nent than those between Bengal and Bombay.
From the arrival of Lord Macartney to the
retirement of Hastings, those feuds became
more and more bitter. It was intended by
the company to nominate his lordship gover-
nor-general, upon the retirement of Hastings.

'“."1[w110us of {/19 life of Ilanen Hedi/US [fist

Gooer'iem- Genmal (1)"szng Compiled from eliginal
Ipapeis b1 the Rev. GHVR Gleig,\ . .M., 1'01 ii. 11 433.38

 

a was”; .

x: A :J..Mm-Ifl4; Lummruuwm.‘ 4—9 . L21. .

 

CHAP. LXXXVI.]

This had been communicated to him, and had
the effect of making him insubordinate and
ambitious. He seemed to think it necessary
to prove his qualifications for his future post
by contravening all the acts of its present
possessor, which in any way came within the
scope of his resistance. As Hastings was not
a man to be trifled with, his modes of proce-
dure were energetic, prompt, and summary,
so that Madras and Bengal resembled two
independent European settlements, between
which a state of peace was barely maintained
by the authority of the country they repre-
sented.

The proceedings in England during the
parliamentary discussions of 1783 upon the
introduction of Fox’s India bill, re-aeted
upon the insubordinate presideneies of Bom-
bay and Madras, strengthening their disposi-
tion to defy or thwart the supreme council,
and more especially the governor-general,
who, although he had the faculty of attaching
strongly to himself the great mass of the civil
servants, military, and other European resi-
dents, was hated by the class of servants 0e-
eupying the highest posts. His fertile and
active mind was continually engaged upon
some expedient to correct their imperfect
transaction of public business, or to avert the
consequences of their want of political apti-
tude. This, of course, placed him in the
position of a censor perpetually, no matter
how graceful the courtesy with which he en-
deavoured to carry out his X's-arrangements
and counter orders. Hence this class of civil
servants, and sometimes the superior military
and naval officers, were constantly reminded
of their own mediocrity and of his statesman—
ship, intelligence, and marvellous acquaintance
with Indian affairs. However these men loved
their country and wished its success, and even
were ready to die for it on the field, they
were not disposed to see their ideas of their
own consequence and dignity so completely
ignored, as they were when Hastings quietly
undid performances of which they were proud,
01' listened with an indifference scarcely con-
cealed by politeness to opinions which he
knew to be worth no consideration. His
calm resolution to overrule all imperfect ad-
ministration and unwise political contracts
and decisions, and carry out government in a
way adapted to native prejudice, and deal
with surrounding states on broad principles
of policy, such as the existing state of things
required, was not comprehended by these men,
and they considered their rights infringed by
usurpation, and the councils set at nought by
the dominancy of a single will. Hastings was
always really solicitous to please and soothe
the mediocrities, and often succeeded won-

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

371

derfully : if he had not, he could not have con-
ducted the government of India at all. It
was impossible, however, to do so when these
men had all their own prejudices fostered and
encouraged by such able men as Francis, such
energetic men as Clavering, or such an ambi-
tions and influential person as Lord Macartney.
Such men were intellectually and by position
too powerful not to collect around them and
enlist under their banner all the nonentities
of the upper ranks of Indian civil and military
life, by flattering their prejudices and appear-
ing to espouse their cause against an autocrat
who, however eminent, was not always suc-
cessful, and, at all events, was not infallible.
“hen the news reached India of the com-
ments made upon the conduct of public affairs
in India by Hastings, every petty consequen-
tial member of the presidential councils affected
an air of wisdom, and made a point of moral-
izing upon those transactions in which the
equity of Hastings had been questioned before
the bar of public opinion in England. The
directors generally censured the policy of Has-
tings, without setting it aside. They Wished
to profit by its results, for it was obviously in
their interest, but at the same time they were
anxious to stand well with the public in
England, which took superficial views of the
events in which Hastings had been engaged.
The directors had also to study the wishes
and opinions of government, ever on the
watch to grasp if possible the patronage of
the government of India. Dreading the en-
croaclnnents of the crown and parliament, the
directors were constantly trimming between
their own direct interests in the East, and the
necessity of conciliating the ministry of the
crown. They were secretly pleased with
what Hastings had done to increase or ensure
their annual investments and enlarge their
sphere of territorial revenue, yet they af-
fected to condemn his measures, lest the g0-
vernment should make their approval a pretext
for depriving them of power. Some of the
directors were in the interest of the cabinet,
and hardly disguised the fact. Hastings, like
Clive, had a far better chance of fair play,
justice, and support from the proprietary of
the company, than from the directors. Many
of his opponents in India acted from what
they supposed to be the wish of the directors,
which they represented Hastings as controll-
ing, unlawfully, by his arrogant will and over-
bearing abilities. Under such circumstances,
it was no wonder if, upon receipt of the tidings
of attack upon Hastings in the English press
and parliament, the self-sufficient. and empty
men in India who had crept up to high office
by seniority, should take advantage of the
encouragement afforded them not only to

HISTORY OF THE

oppose but to revile the governor-general,
although the only man in India in‘ the Eng-
lish interest thoroughly acquainted with its
multifarious peculiarities, its governments,
languages, the modes of thinking of its peo-
ples, the policy of its princes, and the rela-
tions of the company to all the intricate and
complicated interests prevailing within and
around the Indian possessions.

During 1782-3 the council of Bengal some-
times assisted Hastings heartily; but at other
times they displayed a spirit of opposition, ac-
cording as tidings reached them from home
of the fluctuating influence of Hastings there.
It is difficult to account for the apparently
capricious opposition or support sometimes
displayed by this strangely composed group
of men. The senior was Mr. VVheler; next
to him was Mr. Macpherson, formerly agent
tothe Nabob of Arcot; then Mr. Stables,
who had been, like Mr. \Yheler, a director—
and who, like that gentleman, broughtjvith
him to the council exaggerated ideas of his
own importance from that circumstance. The
opinions entertained by Hastings concerning
this trio are upon record, and may well afford
instruction, as well as amusement, to the
curious in Anglo-Indian history. In aletter to
his English agent, MajorScott, he wrote: “ You
will wonder that all my council should oppose
me; so do I. But the fact is this; Macpherson
and Stables have intimidated VYheler, whom
they hate, and he them most cordially. Mac-
pherson, who is himself all sweetness, at-
taches himself everlastingly to Stables, blows
him up into a continual tremour, which he takes
care to prevent from subsiding: and Stables,
from no other cause that I know, Opposes me
with a rancour so uncommon, that it extends
even to his own friends, if my wishes chance
to precede his own in any proposal to serve
them. I11 council he sits sulky and silent,
waiting to declare his opinion when mine is
recorded, or if he speaks, it is to ask ques-
tions of cavil, or to contradict, in language
not very guarded, and with a tone of inso-
lence which I should ill bear from an equal,
and which often throws me off the guard of
my prudence; for, my dear Scott, I have not
that collected firmness of mind which I once
possessed, and which gave me such a supe-
riority in my contests with Glavcring and his
associates.” In the same letter, Hastings
writes :——"’I stay most reluctantly on every
account, for my hands are as effectually
bound as they were in the year 1775, but
with this difference, that there is no lead sub-
stituted to mine.”'l‘

That the minds of the council were influ-
* Gleig’s Memoirs of [fueling/s, vol. iii. pp. 121, 122.
1- Ibid.p.129.

 

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXVI.
cnccd by the attacks made upon Hastings at
home, he assured Major Scott, in his corre-
spondence, that he had unequivocal proof.
These men, instead of doing their duty to the
company and their country, as the governor
did according to his views of duty, merely
managed their own interests and prospects so
as to be compromised in no way by Hastings,
however just his views or conduct. A manly,
patriotic View of their obligations to stand by
their chief, when according to their conscience
he (lid right, does not seem to have actuated
them at all. VVhelcr confessed to the president
that he dared not. support him from fear of
the prejudice against him in England, which
was worked up by the ministry, and such as
hoped to profit by tearing the government of
India from the hands of the company. Hast—
ings, in one of his letters, tells Scott what
“Ilieler had admitted, and then atfds :~“ As
to the other two, they received an early hint
from their friends not to attach themselves to
a fallen interest, and they took the first occa—
sion to prove that if I was to be removed,
their removal was not to follow as a necessary
consequence of their connection with me, by
opposing me on every occasion, on the most
popular grounds, on the plea of economy and
obedience of orders, which they apply indis-
criminately to every measure which I recom—
mend, and Mr. Stables with a spirit of rancour
which nothing can equal but his ignorance.
His friend, with the most imposing talents and
an elegant and unceasing flow of words, knows
as little ofbusincss as he does, and Mr. “'licler
is really a man of business; yet I cannot con-
vince him of it, nor persuade him to trust to
his own superiority. He hates them, and is
implicitly guided by them, and so he always
will be by those who command him, and pos-
sess at the same time a majority of voices."*
Towards the close of 1783, Hastings pro-
posed the abolition of the British residency
in Uude, and the surrender of all interference
there with the government of the vizier. It
is not easy to see the motive of this. The
reasons assigned by Hastings are not con-
vincing. Probably there were motives of a
public nature beneath the surface which in-
fluenced him, but it was at the time generally
attributed to personal resentments against men
employed in the British agency at the court
of Dude. The council opposed his plan, but be
pre 'ailed and immediately adopted means to
carry out his purpose. The governor, for some
reason, was desirous of meeting the vizier,
and proposed to the council to go in person.
This proposal was resisted by them, but at
last conceded, and on the 17th of February,
1781-, he proceeded on his journey. The.
”1 Gleig’s anoz‘rs of Hastings, vol. iii. pp. 14:3, 1-10.

Uunr. LXXXVI.]

neCessity of coming to some arrangement
with the vizier for the payment of his obli-
gations to the company was urgent, for he
had incurred fresh debts by arrears, to the
amount of half a million sterling. His coun-
try was in danger of famine, and the financial
affairs of his government were utterly embar-
rassed. The governor gave him sound coun-
sel—formed plans for his extrication, and with-
drew all interference on the part of the com—
pany with the government of Oude. He caused
to be given back to the begums the jaghires
which had been wrested from them at his
own instigation; and it is a curious circum-
stance, that in a letter to Mrs. Hastings, pub-
lished in Gleig’s filemoz'rs, he describes the
begums as in his interest, yet they had ori-
ginally been denounced by him as enemies
and traitors, as a. ground for depriving them
of their property. This has been severely
commented upon by various writers, and al-
most bitterly by Edward Thornton; but so
rapid were the changes of policy among ori-
ental princes and politicians, that an enemy
in one year, or month, might be a fervent ally
in the next. Hastings may have been right
on both occasions in the contradictory ac-
counts given of them.

“'hile at Lucknow, he was met by Prince
)Iirza Jewar Lehander Shah, heir-apparent
of the )Iogul. The object of the prince in
seeking the interview, and the conduct of
Hastings towards him, are thus described by
M. Auber:"f—“ His object was to be enabled
to return to his father's court with suitable
attendants, and to have a jaghire equal to
the amount granted to him during the ad-
ministration ot' Meerza Nudjifl' Cawn, and to
be employed against the Sikhs. In order to
preclude the appearance of a distinction to
which the Mogul's known affection for his
younger son, Meerza Ackbar Shah, might
raise some objection, he requested his brother
might be employed in a similar service in
some other quarter. Mr. Hastings being con-
strained to quit Benares, left his body-guard
to support the prince. The vizier also agreed
to allow him four lacs per annum. It ap-
peared that the Mogul had received but one
lac and a half for his support in the preced—
ing year, and that it was the object of the
prince to obtain some increase of allowance
for his father. Mr. Hastings then explained
the feelings which had operated on his mind.
He was persuaded that the court would have
experienced the same.”

The letter of the governor-general to the
directors is beautiful and touching, display-

i‘ Rise and Progress Q)" 1.56 3751557: Power 232 India,
vol. i. pp. 682-3.
VOL. II.

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 373

ing the deep susceptibilities which lay be-
neath the cold surface of the astute politician.
The way in which he puts a transaction which
might be censured by the calculating direc-
tors is eloquent and persuasive, justifying the
opinion of his old enemy Francis, that there
was no resisting the pen of Hastings. Hav-
ing reasoned with his employers on the right-
eousness of acting as he had done to the heir
of the Mogul throne, he adds:—-“ Or let it
be, if it is such, the same weakness of com-
passion that I did when I first met the prince
on the plains of Mohawer, without state, with-
out attendance, with scarce a tent for his co-
vering, or a change of raiment, but that which
the recent effect of hospitality had furnished
him, and with the expression of a mind evi-
dently struggling between the pride of in-
herent dignity, and the conscious sense of
present indigence and dependence. Had his
subsequent conduct developed a character un-
worthy of his high birth, had he appeared
vain, haughty, mean, insolent, or debased by
the vices which almost invariably grow on
the minds of men born to great pretensions,
unpractised in the difficulties of common life,
and not only bred, but by necessity of political
caution familiarised to the habits of sloth and
dissipation, I could have contented myself by
bestowing on him the mere compliment of ex-
ternal respect, and consulted only the propriety
of my own conduct, nor yielded to the impulse
of a more generous sentiment. I saw him
almost daily for six months, in which we were
either participators of the same dues of hospi-
tality, or he of mine. I found him gentle,
lively, possessed of a high sense of honour, of
a sound judgment, an uncommon quick pene-
tration, and a well-cultivated understanding,
with aspirit of resignation, and an equanimity
of temper almost exceeding any within the
reach of knowledge or recollection.”

On the 22nd of November, 178i, Hastings,
worn out by opposition, his mind wearied, and
his body enfeebled, wrote, requesting to be
relieved from his cares of office. He alluded
to his letter of the 30th of March, 1783, when
he made a similar request. The court of pro-
prietary in London had overborne both the
court of directors and the house of commons,
in a firm determination to retain and support
him in his authority. This, however, neither
secured him from attack at home, nor opposi-
tion from his colleagues in government. He
accordingly addressed a letter to the direc-
tors, which throws a full light upon the state
of English interests in India at that time, his
own relation to them, and the causes by which
both were produced :—“ If the next regular
advices shall contain either the express ac-
ceptance of my resignation of the service, or

3 c

87$ HISTORY OF THE
your tacit acquiescence, I shall relinquish my
office to the gentleman who stands next to me
in the prescribed order of succession, and re-
turn to England as soon as the ship Barring-
ton can be made ready to sail. My constitu-
tion, though naturally not of the strongest
texture, yet for many years retained so uni-
form an exemption from positive disorder as
not to require one day of grace from my offi-
cial employment, is now so much enfeebled by
the severe illness with which I was attacked
in the year 1782, that it is no longer capable
in any degree of those exertions to which it
was formerly equal, and which were at no time
sufficient for the discharge of all the duties
which my place exacted of me. Nor am I
the only diseased part of it. It is itself dis—
tempered. “'itness the cruel necessity which
compelled me for nine months to abandon the
seat of government itself (referring to his visit
to Lucknow), and all the weighty occupations
of it, to attend to one portion of its charge,
which, under a sounder constitution, might
have been better conducted and with fuller
effect by orders known to proceed from com-
petent authority to enforce them. I do not
believe this government will ever be invested
with its proper powers till I am removed from
it, nor can it much longer subsist without
them. I am therefore a hurtful incumbrauce
on it, and my removal, whenever or however
effected, will be a relief to it.”

Before he could execute his determina-
tion to quit the country, various occur-
rences took place which exercised considerable
influence over the future. Madagee Scindiah,
the great Mahratta, obtained from the Mogul,
for the Peishwa, the high imperial office of
Vakeel-ul-Mulluck, which gave him a su-
preme control in the foreign administration of
the empire. This had long been an object of
ambition with the Mahrattas. Scindiah him-
self sought the appointment of grand naib or
deputy of the Vakeel-ul-Mulluck.

In consequence of the perpetual complaints
of the directors as to the charges for the
government of Bengal, the governor-general
organized efficient means of retrenchment.
One of the most interesting incidents connected
with the close of his government was his
review of the sepoy troops which had re-
turned from the war in the Oarnatic. Twice,
under circumstances which made the act ad-
venturous, Hastings sent sepoys from Bengal
to make war in South-western India. It has
been already shown how he dispatched to the
Bombay presidency a force of sepoys. That
wise and adventurous act was performed
against the Opinion of his council. Not less
than seven thousand men, attended by more
than thirty thousand camp followers, began

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXVI.
that memorable march, which they prosecuted
with persistence and fidelity. Hastings knew
that they would never consent to go by sea,
in consequence of their class prejudices, and
he determined to launch them forth upon the
sunburnt plains of Bengal, and to send them
through the rocky ravines of the Deccan, and
across the great southern rivers, until they
poured forth their force with effect upon the
shores of Malabar. On the second occasion,
when Madras was in imminent danger of
falling before Hyder Ali, he sent five regiments
eleven hundred miles along the coast of Coro-
mandel, and opposed them to the disciplined
troops of France with success. They returned
in four years, just before the governor—gene-
ral’s departure. They were called out for
review; and as the governor-general rode
down the lines, he was received with an en-
thusiasm such as European soldiers have not
surpassed when some great chief, who had
often led them to battle and to victory, pre-
sented himself to inspect their lines. Has-
tings, dressed as a civilian, rode along the
ranks, his head uncovered, while wild accla-
mations of attachment rose in the course of
his progress. The address of Hastings, on
that occasion, was characteristic, displaying
his capacity to adapt himself to all classes of
natives. It was received by his sable soldiers
with almost frantic delight, and its language
was transmitted, with astonishing accuracy,
from father to son among the Rajpoot sepoys,
for many years. Even yet the old sepoys of
Bengal talk of Hastings, and his address to the
native heroes who went forth to the wars in the
Oarnatic, with delight and pride; just as the
native women all over Bengal, from the re-
motest parts of the upper provinces to the
marshy shores of the Bay of Bengal, sing to
their children of the great sahib VYarren Has-
tings, the number of his horses and his ele-
phants, the richness of his trappings, and the
splendour of his train.

The success of the sepoy brigades which the
governor sent to “‘estern and Southern India
is often quoted as a proof that the Bengal
sepoys do not deserve the reprobation which
many modern writers pour upon them, and
the authority of Hastings is quoted as justi-
fying the unreasoning reliance placed upon
the sepoys who, in 1857, revolted in a mutiny
so extensive and determined. The cases have
no parallel. Hastings chose his black soldiers
from among the Rajpoots, the most gallant
and high-spirited race in India, a military
class, faithful to the military chief or govern-
ment they serve, so long as that government
preserves its compact with them. The Bengal
army which mutinied in 1857 was more Brah-
minical than military. It was an army of

CHAP. LXXXVI.]

religious fanatics, whether Brahmin or Mus-
sulman; and in India, the more religious the
man, the worse he is as a soldier or a servant.
The religions of the Brahmin and the high
Mussulman constrain to acts which unfit them
for faithful officials or constant soldiers. The
Bengal army of 1857 had been chosen mainly

from Oude and Agra, from certain Moham»

medan and certain Brahminical districts,
where the fanaticism of the people, from
various causes, is more intense than any-
where else in India. So far from these sol-
diers being like the sepoys of Hastings—the
gallant Rajpoots of 1780-85—there exists a
hatred to the latter among the Dude sepoys,
even marriage connection with them being
forbidden, except to the members of two small
Rajpoot tribes, who are contiguous to Oude.
A writer of some popularity, and who, at
the time he wrote, had no such comparison as
is here instituted before his mind, thus de-
scribes the sanguinary bigotry and fanaticism
0f the Oudeans in one particular aspect of it,
which exemplifies the assertion that the se-
poys of 1857 and those of 1781 were men of
different mould :——“ A respectable landowner-
of this place, a Sombunsie, tells me, that the
custom of destroying their female infants has
prevailed from the time of the first founder of
their race; that a rich man has to give food
to many Brahmins, to get rid of the stain, on
the twelfth or thirteenth day, but that a poor
man can get rid of it by presenting a little
food in due form to the village priest; that
they cannot give their daughters in marriage
to any llajpoot families save the rhatores
and chouhans; that the family of their clan
who gave a daughter to any other class of
Rajpoots would be excluded from caste imme-
diately and for ever; that those who have
property have to give all they have with
their daughters to the chouhans and rhatores,
and reduce themselves to nothing, and can
take nothing from them in return; as it is a
great stain to take ‘kuneea dan,’ 0r virgin
price, from any one; that a Sombunsie may,
however, when reduced to great poverty, take
the ‘kuneea dan’ from the chouhans and
rhatorcs for a virgin daughter, without being
excommunicated from the clan; but even he
could not give a daughter to any other clan
of llajpoots without being excluded for ever
from caste ; that it was a misfortune, no doubt,
but it was one that had descended among
them from the remotest antiquity, and could
not he got rid of; that mothers wept and
screamed a good deal when their first female
infants were torn from them, but after two or
three times giving birth to female infants, they
became quiet and r-ceonciled to the usage,
and said, " do as you like;’ that some poor

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

 

375

parents of their clan did certainly give their
daughters for large sums to wealthy people of
lower clans, but lost their caste for ever by
so doing; that it was the dread of sinking in
substance from the loss of property, and in
grade from the loss of caste, that alone led to
the murder of female infants; that the dread
prevailed more or less in every Rajpoot clan,
and led to the same things, but most in the
clan that restricted the giving of 'daughters in
marriage to the smallest number of clans.”*‘

These were not the men from whom the
sepoys of Hastings were enlisted. He knew
better than to put so high a confidence in
men of the stamp that committed, in 1857,
the atrocities of Delhi and Cawnpore.

On the 10th of January, 1785, Hastings
wrote to the directors, apprising them that
his advices from England rendered it essential
for him to retire from the government. In
this letter occurs the following remarkable, it
may perhaps be called extraordinary passage,
when all the antecedents of Hastings as go-
vernor-general are considered z—“ I conceive
it now to be impossible for your commands to
require my stay on the terms which I might
have had the presumption to suppose within
the line of possibility: were such to be your
pleasure, it is scarcely possible for your com-
mands, on any subject which could concern
my stay, to arrive before the season required
for my departure. I rather feel the wish to
avoid the receipt of them, than to await their
coming; and I consider myself in this act as
the fortunate instrument of dissolving the
frame of an inefficient government, pernicious
to your interests and disgraceful to the na-
tional character, and of leaving one in its
stead, such as my zeal for your service prompts
me to wish perpetual, in its construction to
every purpose efficient.”

Hastings now made energetic preparations
for departure. Hrs. Hastings had been sent
before, and it was reported that she retired from
the shores of India burdened with the most
costly presents: jewels, the rarest and most
brilliant, the most exquisite carvings in ivory,
the gold work of Benares, and even specie,
were said to have been lavished by rich na-
tives and the Indian princes upon one whose
influence over Hastings was so great. It
was generally believed that he knew but
little of these magnificent gifts, the reception
of which, it was believed by the English at
Calcutta, he would have prevented. “ilien
the period for his departure arrived, the con-
sternation of some of the native princes sur-
passed the joy of those who were enemies of
England, and even the astonishment of all.
The sepoys idolized the great sahib as they

* Sleeman’s Jam-Hey thong/z 014(k).

ni-
Q)‘

had previously adored Clive. The English
regarded Hastings with aprofound affection
and respect, and they now gave vent to these
feelings in the most demonstrative manner.
Mr. Hastings delivered up the keys of Fort
“'illiam and of the treasury to Mr. Mac-
pherson, in the council-chamber, on the 1st of
February. That gentleman succeeded as go-
vernor-general, under the provisions of the
acts of the 13 and 21 Geo. III., and took his
seat on the 3rd. From motives of respect to
Mr. Hastings, the council determined that the
ceremonial of succession should not take place
until the Berrington. had sailed. A letter
from Mr. Hastings, dated on board, the 8th
of February, announcing her departure, having
been received at Calcutta, the proclamation
of the new-government was made with the
usual formalities.

“'hen Hastings was about to retire, nume-
rous addresses were presented to him both by
English officials, military men, and residents;
the natives vied with the British in the mode of
marking their respect. “'hen he proceeded
to the place of embarkation, an immense
crowd lined the way which his carriage and
suite traversed. Numerous barges attended
his departure down the Hoogly, and it was
not until the pilot left. the ship, and the coasts
of Bengal were dim in the distance, that
some of the attached followers of Hast-
ings returned to the Hoogly. During the
voyage his active mind employed itself in
his favourite p11rsuit——literature. He read
much during the long voyage, and produced
several compositions, one of which obtained
much notoriety and some praise an imita-
tion of Horace‘s Otium Dims 'rogaf. This
was dedicated to Mr. Shore, afterwards Lord
’I‘eignmouth, one of the most useful and
gifted public men who had served the com-
pany in India, and who, after a most labo—
rious and skilful organization of the revenue
in Bengal, and long years of statesmanlike
labour, had returned to Europe only a month
before his friend. The ex-governor-general,
who landed in June, 1785, at Plymouth, pro-
ceeded at. once to London, where he was re-
ceived by crown and company with high
distinction. In another chapter his home
perils and vicissitudes, which were imminent
and extraordinary, will be recorded; it is
here only necessary to give a brief and gene-
ral view of the estimation in which his ser-
vices in India,and his character as developed
by those services, are held in the present day.
Probably, Miss Martineau has, with more
brevity, and in terms more expressive than
any other writer, conveyed the general esti-
mate of this great man, and of his fortunes,

 

in the foil wing passage :—“ He committed.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

I_CHAP. LXXXVI,

crimes, and inflicted misery, as unnecessarily
(according to modern opinion) as wickedly.
But, these crimes apart, he was a great belie--
factor to both countries by amalgamating
them to a greater extent than any other man
had done, or than any other could have done.
He was the first governor of India who could
and did converse with any natives in their
own tongue. He was the first who opened
the potent and mild resources of intellectual
sympathy, by cultivating and honouring
oriental literature, and interesting the best
minds of Europe in the history of our native
subjects in Hindostan. He made the way
easier for future governo 's, and finished with
his own strong hand the revolutionary period
which perhaps no other could have brought
to a close. It is impossible to esteem him,
and it is impossible not to admire him.
“'ithout any appearance of a conscience, and
with nearly as little indication of a heart, he
had a most efl'ective understanding, and de—
served whatever praise can be commanded
by vigorous and patient resolution, and a life of
strenuous purposes carried out in unfaltering
action. He could hardly have been a happy
man at any time; but he was strong and col-
lected enough to keep his foes at bay, and
win a final victory over them in the form of
an acquittal from charges for which he had
in fact undergone a protracted punishment of
disgrace and suspense. He won royal tavour,
and a good deal of popular admiration; was
made a. privy councillor and the idol of the
street; and he died, Hastings of Daylesford.
He would probably have confessed in some
soft hour of sunset, under the old oaks, that
he. did not enjoy them so much after the
heavy price he had paid for them as when,
in his childhood, he dreamed of possessing
them, without a thought of guilt to be risked
in the acquisition of them.”

However eloquently correct this expres-
sion of the views taken of Hastings generally
in the present day may be, there is just
ground for exception to many of the dicta
pronounced. It is not true that Hastings
committed crimes for which he saw no ne-
cessity. No necessity of state, or of the indi-
vidual, can, of course, justify a crime; but in
some of the instances in which Hastings
sinned, and sinned grievously, he was de-
ceived by his own casuistry; he believed that
a great necessity at least extenuated his
guilt. He did evil that good might come.
He supposed, in some cases, that the vast
benefits to be ensured by a policy which was
not equitable or moral, compensated for the
misdeeds. This unrighteous, and because
unrighteous impolitic, principle has been
avowed by many statesmen and divines who

Cum. LXXXVII.]

have been ready enough to censure the con-
duct of Warren Hastings. They have them-
selves, under far less temptation and less
pressure of difficulty and danger, pursued a
similar policy, and adopted a similar justifi-
cation with an effrontery of which Hastings
had set no example; for while it is evident
that his mind was beguiled by the idea that
the end sanctified the deed, he did not sup-
pose himself wholly under the influence of
such a principle. He always acted upon an
avowal of abstract justice, and where no prin-
ciple of equity was involved, he supported his
policy by its utility to the government, and
its beneficial influence upon the governed.
It is impossible to wade through the debates
and minutes in council, in which Hastings
participated, especially when he was the chief
support of Governor Vansittart, as the author
of this History has done, without perceiving
that the mind of Hastings was ever open to
an appeal founded upon justice. Miss Mar-
tineau deems it impossible to esteem him; yet
no Englishman in India ever excited an
esteem so universal. Nor is it true that he
was “ without any appearance of a conscience,
and with nearly as little indication of a heart,”
as his resistance to tyranny during the govern-
ment of Vansittart proves against the one
accusation, and his devoted friendships and
home attachments prove against the other.
One of the last acts of Hastings was an act of
touching friendship. His last letter, written
only a few hours before death, was worthy of
a man both of heart and conscience.

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

377

When at Daylesford, he enjoyed the otium
cum dignitate. There are no facts known con-
nected with the life of Hastings to prove the
probability of Miss Martineau’s supposition,
that he looked back with such pain upon his
public acts as disturbed the quietude of his re --
pose—a supposition in itself absurd 0n the part
of a writer who believed he had no conscience.
Miss Martineau follows too closely in the
train of Lord Macaulay, from whom her views,
favourable and unfavourable, of Hastings were
too implicitly drawn: just as his lordship ac-
cepted too easily the statements and opinions
of Mill, which—however softened and qualified
by him—he in the main followed. Hastings,
although a great man, was probably not quite
so great as he is generally supposed to have
been; and was certainly a better man than
it is now the fashion to depict him. It would
be impossible in a religious or even merely
ethical acceptation to call him a good man;
but posterity will doubtless mitigate the stern
judgment of the present generation upon him,
I while, to the latest times, his government of
1 India, his self-reliance, courage, energy, and
i talents will be an admiration and a wonder.
i It may be long before the moral portrait

of him, painted by one (Lord Macaulay)
’ whom Bulwer" calls “the Titian of English

 

prose,” shall cease to fill the mind of the
reading public; but a time will arrive, when
in spite of all that is reprehensible in him, a
more agreeable as well as just conception
will be formed.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

WAR \\‘l’l'll IlYDlilt

ALI OF )IYSORE—HIS INVASION

OF THE CARNATIC—HIS DEVASTA-

TIONS, VICTORIES, CRL'ELTY, AND DEATH.

Ox former pages the imbecility of the govern- ’
ments of Bombay and Madras, especially of;
the latter, during the time when “'arren‘

Hastings was governor-general of India, has
been depicted; and it was stated that in con-
sequence of the insubordination of the council
of Madras to the supreme council, Hyder and
the French were permitted without opposition,
and to a great extent without suspicion, to
form an intimate alliance—the former orga-
nizing a vast army, to a considerable extent

on French principles of tactics and discipline, ‘
He was '

and with the aid of French officers.
also allowed, without being impeded by any

countervailing address on the part of the

council, to negotiate alliance with the Mah-

rattas, and thus to engage on his side the most
powerful people among the natives of India.
The object of Hyder was not simply ambition ;
vengeance had also a place in his motives.
He had made various stipulations with the
, English, who had injured and insulted
him almost in every case with scandalous
breach of treaty. Notice has been taken on
5 previous pages of the bad faith of the English,
lwho were mainly influenced in deserting
{Hyder by fear of provoking the powerful
Mahrattas, and by a reluctance to incur the
censure of the directors at home, who were
constantly anxious lest their councils should

'4" ”Val! will ize (10 2021/: it? vol. i.p.9l. By Pisisll‘atus
‘ Caxton.

378

embroil them with the native potentates by
alliances and treaties, offensive and defensive.
In 1767 the council of Madras made a treaty
of this nature with Hyder, after he had passed
in swift conquest over the Carnatic, and
threatened Madras itself. When next he
was at war with the Mahrattas, the English
refused to fulfil their agreements, and he
from that hour hated them. In 1778, when
again menaced by the Mahrattas, Hyder ap-
pealed to the English to fulfil their treaty,
they again violated their honour, and inflamed
the hatred of the prince they had thus be-
trayed, to an almost intolerable degree. He
declared that no terms could be kept with a
a nation whose officers were perpetually
changed, each new council disclaiming the
acts of that which had preceded it.

When the English threatened the French
settlement of Myhie, Hyder remonstrated
with them, declaring that he considered that
place his own, and the French occupying it
under him. The English disregarded his
remonstrance, and drove the French out.
They could not have done otherwise. Myhie
could not have been permitted as a point.
d’appm‘ for the French in the close neigh-
bourhood of the English settlement of Telli-
cherry. The French never acknowledged
Hyder practically as the lord of Myhie; they
consulted no master but the French governor
at I’ondicherry. The remonstrance of Hyder
was, therefore, unreasonable; and it is ob-
vious that he merely claimed the sovereignty
of the place because he was anxious to keep
the British within bounds, and to use the
French as a counterpoise to the English on the
coasts of Western India. The English were
resolved to brave all dangers in expelling
rivals so dangerous and troublesome as the
French, and consequently alike disregarded
the threats and arguments of Hyder. From
the moment Myhie was seized by the English,
Hyder, already their relentless and aggrieved
enemy, prepared himself for war, and his pre-
parations were on a scale of stupendous mag-
nitude, such as in numbers of men and mili-
tary material might excite the envy and
admiration of some of the first military nations
in Europe. It consisted of 28,000 cavalry,
15,000 regular infantry, 40,000 peons, 2,000
rocket-men, 5,000 pioneers, 400 Europeans,
and a wild host of fanatical and half armed
followers. The council of Madras wrote to
the council of Calcutta that affairs were of a
warlike complexion, and then with an infatu-
ation only to be accounted for by the igno—
rance, pride, and obstinacy, which were so
generally displayed by the Madras govern-
ment, they neglected all precaution, and
even addressed the directors in London in

 

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXVII.

terms which only became men whose affairs,
political and commercial, were in a state of
perfect security. “hen the Madras govern-
ment was lulled in the torpidity which con-
ceit and stupidity are sure to beget in the
minds of public men, Hyder suddenly rushed
forth with the force and dash of a cataract
through the passes, precipitating a vast army
from the table-land of Mysore upon the sea-
girt plains of the Carnatic.

0n the 19th of J unc, the council was aware
that Hyder had left Seringapatam to join the
grand army assembled at Bangalore, mar—
shalled under the direction of officers of
France: his army having been consecrated
by the Mohammedan ecclesiastics, and the
Hindoos having performed the solemn cere~
mony of jebbum for its success. Ten days
later it was known at all the presidential capi-
tals that Hyder was marching upon the Car-
natic at the head of one hundred thousand
men, and that his army was such as never
before had been commanded by a. native
sovereign of India. Miss Martineau has as
beautifully as truly said—“ Then ensued that
invasion of the Carnatic which is as celebrated
an event as any in the history of India. The
mighty host poured down from the breezy
table-land of Mysore upon the hot plains of'
the Carnatic through the passes, and especially
through that one which Sir James Mackintosh
found so safe for the solitary traveller seven-
and-thirty years later—as wild with rock and
jungle in the one case as the other, but wit-
nessing within one generation the modes of
life which are usually seen five centuries
apart. Mysore was rising under Hyder to
the stage of improvement which a vigorous
Mohammedan ruler can induce upon an ex-
hausted Hindoo state; but, under British
superintendence, the best policy of Hyder had
been left far behind for many years, when the
recorder of Bombay made his philosophical
observations on the security of life, property,
and industry, on the very road by which
Hyder had descended to lay waste the Car-
natie.” Descending from Chamgana, he dealt
destruction with remorscless hand. Fire
and the sword spread a wide circle of desola-
tion; and the slightest hesitation on the part
of the miserable inhabitants, in obeying his
orders to withdraw from their homes, was
followed by horrible barbarities. He com—
mauded that cars should be cut off, noses
slit, and other mutilations practised upon
men and women, although it must be admitted
that the latter were frequently spared when
the former were savagely treated. Colonel
Willis confutes most modern writers as to the
extent of the desolation made by Hyder,
affirming that it only comprised such a circle

CHAP. LXXXVIIJ

around Madras as would, in Hyder’s opinion,
deprive it of supplies, while he found forage
and food in the Carnatic generally.

At last, arrangements for defence were
made by the feeble president and council of
Madras. Sir Hector Monro commanded in
chief, but he was detained in the capital by
the governor for the benefit in council of his
military knowledge and experience. Colonel
Macleod, a good officer, was appointed to
command in the Carnatic. Sir Hector was
of opinion that the English forces should
assemble near Congeveram. Colonel Macleod
declined carrying out that plan, on the ground
that, although at an earlier period it might
have been an effective defensive position, it
was now too late to make it the point of con-
vergence. Sir Hector, still relying upon his
own plan, determined on carrying it out him-
self, and on the 29th of August, 1780, took
the command at Congeveram of his little army
of five thousand men. This force was to
have been speedily augmented by troops then
under the command of Colonel Baillie, which
had been the previous year dispatched to
protect Bazalet Jung, who had been me-
naced by Hyder. Meanwhile, Hyder, with
extraordinary promptitude, surprised various
British posts of strength, and by bribery se-
cured the surrender of others. On the part
of the British, the first object was to secure
different strong places now held by the troops
of the nabob, who, it was not doubted, would
surrender them to the enemy on the first
attack. Several fell; but two were saved by
the exertions of very young British officers.
Lieutenant Flint, with a company of one hun-
dred men, having proceeded to “Endiwash,
was refused admittance by the killadar or
governor, who had already arranged the terms
on which the fortress was to be given up.
Flint, however, having with four of his men
procured access, seized the commandant, and,
aided by the well-disposed part of the garri-
son, made himself master of the stronghold.
Baillie, however, remained with his troops at
Guntoor. Hyder’s information was perfect;
the people, even those whom he dispossessed,
sympathised with him, if they were Moham-
medans ,2 and natives of the high caste heathen
were desirous to see the English driven out
by any native prince. Hyder determined on
preventing the junction of Baillie and Monro,
and in order to effect this purpose, placed a
large corps d'arméu under his son Tippoo,
whose hatred to the English, if possible, ex-
ceeded his own. Hydcr himself had laid
siege to Arcot, but leaving a corps sufficiently
numerous to invest it, he, with his main army,
took post within six miles of the encampment
of Sir Hector Monro. On the same day,

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

379

Tippoo attacked Colonel Baillie, and was re-
pulsed. This was the first real battle of the
campaign, and the English had the advantage
in arms. Tippoo, although defeated, was not
discomfited. He harassed Baillie’s little force
incessantly, hovering upon his flanks with
clouds of cavalry, and constantly menacing a
renewed attack. Baillie informed Monro that
he was unable to join him with his troops,
thus impeded by a superior force. Monro,
unable to take the offensive while his army
was thus separated, sent a detachment of one
thousand men, the pick of his troops, to form
a junction with Baillie, who might, by this
accession, be enabled to break his way through
the corps of Tippoo. Officers experienced in
Indian warfare‘ii have denounced the strategy
of Monro in this instance, as exposing not
only the detachment of Fletcher, but the main
army under his own command to the danger
of being attacked in detail and destroyed.
Monro, however, by a happy audacity, proved
his superior skill in the face of native armies.
These rules of warfare, applicable when Enro-
peans meet Europeans, are frequently of little
importance when Europeans contend with
native armies. More battles have been gained
by the British in India by a daring yet in-
telligent neglect of the rules of campaigning
received in Europe, than by adherence to the
laws of military science. Tippoo, who had
the English spies and agents in his pay, was
apprised of the expedition of Fletcher, but,
instead of attacking the head-quarters of the
British, with his main army, he manoeuvred
to intercept Colonel Fletcher, and was baffled
by the superior military skill of that officer.
Fletcher, deceiving his own guides, succeeded
in deceiving Hyder. On the 9th he joined
Baillie. The French officers on Hyder’s staff
did not penetrate the designs of Monro, but
supposed that he intended to effect a separa-
tion of the corps of Tippoo from the grand My-
sorean army, and then to fall upon the latter.
Tippoo had correct information, and acted
accordingly. His French advisers counselled
retirement. Hyder believed that the moral
and military effect of a retreat would be dis-
astrous, and be determined to maintain the
positions which he already occupied, and ob-
serve the movements of the English, until
chance should give his vigilance an advan-
tage. Baillie, strengthened by'Fletcher, began
his march. Hyder, by a series of masterly
movements, endeavoured to bring his army into
action in such way that his whole strength
might be directed against his opponents.
Baillie, by a series of blunders, the chief of
which was an intolerable self- confidence,played
into Hyder’s hands. An obstinate conflict en-
* Colonel Wilkes’ Hakim-y of Me .lM/n'alias.

880 HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

sued. The British soldiers fought with a heroism
that could not be surpassed ; the sepoys broke
and fled, and Baillie having displayed dauntless
courage, seeing all hope gone of saving his
European soldiers by battle, advanced, waving
his handkerchief as a flag of truce, and sur-
rendered. Scarcely had the English laid
down their arms than the soldiers of Hyder
fell upon the defenceless men, and perpetrated
one of the most cowardly andinfamous mas-
sacres recorded in the annals of even Indian
war. The sick and wounded, women, and
children, were hacked and hewn in pieces
with savage delight by the younger soldiers
of Hyder’s army especially.“ The barbarity
of the troops was, if possible, exceeded by the
barbarity of their chief. The heads of the
slain were heaped at his feet, as he sat within
his tent, and the prisoners were ”paraded
before him as they were made the objects of
every conceivable indignity, and the victims
of many atrocious cruelties. The efforts of
the French officers to mitigate the horrors to
which the captive English were exposed, were
honourable to their nation, but Hyder was
deaf to their persuasions and remonstrances.
Even after the fury of battle and exultation of
victory were long past, the prisoners were
subjected to a cruel incarceration. One of
the sufferers thus describes it :——“ We were
often told, and through other channels we
knew it to be the fact, that actual force had
been used on the persons of many of our
countrymen in‘ other prisons, with the expec-
tation that when they bore the indelible mark
of Mohammedanism they would apostatize
from God, and abjure their earthly sovereign.
The same abhorred expedient recurred to our
minds as intended for us whenever a stranger
of rank visited the prison, especially if he
seemed to cast a scrutinizing eye on our per-
sons. In such a state of complicated mental
distress nearly four years of the prime of life
were consumed; and during this sad period
our corporeal sufferings were not inferior in
their degree to those of our minds. Our
couch was the ground, spread with a scanty
allowance of straw ; the same wretched cover-
ing which shielded our limbs from nakedness
by day served to enwrap them also by night.
The sweepings of the granary were given us
in any dirty utensil or broken earthen pot.
Swarms of odious and tormenting vermin bred
in our wounds, and every abomination to the
sight and smell accumulated around us, till its
continuance became intolerable to our guards."]L

During the conflict of Baillie, Sir Hector
Monro exhibited as few qualities of a com-
mander as the colonel. llis efforts to relieve

* Colonel Wilks’ Ilz'sfm'j/ of tile JIa/u‘afz‘as.
1' Lieutenant Melville’s Narralérc.

 

[CHAR LXXX Vl I.

Baillie were not only inefficient but absurd,
and his conduct afterwards not less so. He
fell back to Chingleput, losing nearly all his
stores and baggage; there he was joined by
a reinforcement under Captain Cosley, but
there was no commissariat. By forced
marches he brought his army to Mount St.
Thomas, near Madras, on the 14th of Sep—
tember. In three weeks the army had been
nearly destroyed, and disgrace inflicted upon
British arms in spite of the most dauntless
courage on the part of officers and men, in
consequence of the inordinate self-esteem,
ohstinacy, and ignorance of the officers in
command. When the experience and ability
of Sir Hector Monro are considered,his incom-
petency throughout this brief and fatal cam—
paign is truly astonishing. On the 15th the
English army changed its position, taking
post at Mermalong, where a river flowed
along its front.

During this short period of shame and dis-
aster, the council of Madras were as disunited,
haughty, and incapable as ever. “hell they
saw their army driven back upon Madras
itself, and thick volumes of smoke by day and
columns of fire by night darkening or bright-
ening the horizon where the brands of Hyder’s
soldiery were busy, their hearts sunk within
them, and they gave vent to the language of
despair and dismay. Hastings, however, was
busy far away in Calcutta. His fertile mind
and busy industry took care of Madras when
its own council was paralysed with fear.

Hyder was as active on the theatre of war,
as was Hastings in the chamber of the chief
presidency. The Mysorean immediately laid
siege to Arcot, which he reduced in spite of
a gallant defence. It, however, held out until
the 3rd of November, seven weeks after the
fugitive English took up their position at
Mermalong. Arcot would hardly have been
captured before relief arrived, had it not been
for the usual treachery of the Bralnnins. The
governor was a distinguished person of that
caste, and was captured by Hyder’s troops in
an assault. Hyder bribed him, and invested
him with his previous office. The traitor
continued to sap the fidelity of the Brahmi-
nical sepoys. The Mohammedan sepoys
already sympathised with the invader, and
thus the town was lost. Whenever an op-
portunity occurred for influencing the fana-
ticism of the sepoys, no matter how loyal they
had previously proved themselves, they were.
ready to espouse the cause of the enemy who
shared their religious sympathies. The vie-
tory of Hyder also enabled him to lay siege
to VYandiwash, Vellore, Chingleput, and
other places of strength in the Carnatic,
where he inspired the garrisons with the

Can. LXXXVII.]

most gloomy apprehensions, and pressed them
with desperate pertinacity and boldness.

Hastings had sent Coote to take the place
of Homo, and the gallant old general ar-
rived a few days after the fall of Arcot.
Hastings sent with him five hundred and
sixty European troops. It was at this junc-
ture that he determined to dispatch his sepoy
army to march along the coast as soon as the
rainy season terminated. He suspended the
president of Madras, placing the senior mem-
ber of council in his place. Money was sent
with Coote, but its disposal remained in his
own hands.

The reinforcements brought by Coote raised
the shattered army of the presidency to the
number at which the force under Monro had
been computed, irrespective of that com-
manded by Baillie. About one thousand
seven hundred Europeans and more than five
thousand sepoys obeyed the orders of the new
general. The reputation of Coote inspired
confidence, and the fifteen lacs of rupees com-
mitted to him by Hastings gave him the
means of marching his army from the vicinity
of Madras, and, small as it was, of taking the
offensive. Hastings counselled such a course,
and prepared with all his available resources
to aid the general by further supplies of men
and money. It was at this juncture that
the Rajah of Berar excited apprehensions at
Calcutta by the dubious part he played, and
involved Hastings in intrigues which met
with subsequent censure in England, the real
merits of the case having been misunderstood
both by the company and the British parlia-
ment. The first care of Coote was to put
Madras in a state of defence, which the coun-
cil had neglected, each thinking only for his
own safety, maturing plans of flight to Bengal
or to England. Fortunately it was the rainy
season, so that the true cause of the inactivity
of the English army was concealed from Hyder.
At the end of the year 1780, Coote called a
council of war, and it was determined at once
to march against the hosts of Mysore. Mr.
Murray thus describes the views and pros-
pects of General Coote when setting out with
his little army against odds so great, and the
progress of affairs until Hyder was brought
to the first general action in which Coote en-
countered the )lysorean forces :—

“ What he dreaded was the harassing war-
fare carried on by Hyder in a country which
he had already converted almost into a desert.
The English army, when it left Madras, was
like a ship departing 011 a long voyage, or a
caravan preparing to cross the deserts of
Arabia. Everything by which life could be
supported must be carried along with it; and
.the soldiers, continuing to depend on the

vet. II.

 

IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 381

capital alone for supply, were in danger of
absolute famine. As they moved in a close
body through this desolated region, never
occupying more than the ground which they.
actually covered, clouds of the enemy’s ea-
valry hovered round them; who, finding that
they did not choose to waste their ammunition
on individual objects, even rode up to the line,
and held an occasional parley, uttering from
time to time a fierce defiance or an invitation
to single combat. Dallas, an officer of great
personal prowess, successfully encountered
several of the Indian chiefs, and his name
was called out by the most daring of the
champions. In this mode of fighting, how-
ever, the natives in general had the advantage.
Harassing as such a warfare was, and though
the Mysorean chief continued to refuse battle,
he was 'bbliged to raise the siege of every
place upon which the English directed their
march. In this manner the important for—
tresses of \Vandiwash and Permacoil were
relieved, and a stop was thereby put to the
career of the enemy. The British commander,
however, in following the rapid movements of
this indefatigable adversary, found his troops
so exhausted, and reduced to such destitution,
as left no prospect of relief except in a general
action, which he scarcely hoped to accomplish.
But Hyder at length, encouraged by the ap-
pearance of a French fleet on the coast, and
by a repulse sustained by our countrymen in
attacking the pagoda of Chillumbrum, in-
trenched his army in a strong post near
Cuddalore, where he at once maintained his
communication with the sea, and cut off the
supplies of his opponent.”

The same author, with well expressed
brevity, thus describes the battle which en—
sued when Coote was enabled to initiate an
attack :——“ This station was extremely for—
midable; but Sir Eyre Coote skilfully leading
his men through a passage formed by the
enemy for a different purpose, drew them up
in the face ofsevcral powerful batteries as well
as of a vast body of cavalry, and finally
carried all before him. The rajah, seated on
a portable stool upon an eminence in the rear
of the army, was struck with amazement at
the success of the attack, and burst into the
most furious passion; refusing for some time
to move from the spot, till a trusty old ser-
vant almost by force drew the slippers on his
legs, and placed him on a swift horse, which
bore him out of the reach of danger.”

Previous to the foregoing victory, the
English fleet gained a decided advantage at
sea. The French naval force referred to in
the foregoing summary of events, fearing the
approach of an English fleet, left the roads of
Pondichcrry, somewhat relieving Coote from

o
v) D

the distressing dangers, which at that time
cast a gloom over his hopes. Sir Edward
Hughes attacked the ships of Hyder in his
own ports of Calicut and Mangalore, and
utterly destroyed the hope of forming a
maritime power, which was one of the chief
objects of Hyder‘s ambition. On the 14th of
June the British admiral, having performed
this signal service, returned to Madras, bring-
ing with him a reinforcement from Bom-
bay. These circumstances greatly encouraged
Coote in the offensive operations which were
so bravely carried out. The consequences of
this action were most important, the English
were for the second time enabled to relieve
VVandiwash, then besieged by Tippoo. Both
armies retired to the neighbourhood of Arcot.
Hyder abandoned all hopes of conquering
the southern provinces.

The sepoy force which Hastings sent
by land did not arrive until August, and
when it formed a junction with the Madras
army, it was with greatly reduced numbers,
many of the sepoys having perished on the
line of march from physical incapacity to
endure its hardships, and many having de-
serted. In the last chapter, notice was taken
of the review of these troops upon occasion
of their return to Bengal by Hastings, and of
the lavish praise he bestowed upon them.
By many of these brave Rajpoots, the pane-
gyrics of the great governor-general was
deserved ; but that class of historians by whom
the sepoys are too lavishly commended, have
not only overlooked (as before stated) that
the returned victors were Rajpoots, not
Oudeans or Bengalees, but also the fact that
the march of the force was disgraced by de-
sertion, and at times when the temptations to
forsake their colours were few, and of no
extraordinary force. The project of sending
them was a bold one. Hastings knew that,
and made the most of his success. It was
politic in him to conceal any impressions of
an unfavourable nature which he might have
entertained, but a correct relation of the facts
demands the statements that more of the
soldiers sent by Hastings from Bengal to
Madras died from disease, or were lost by
desertion, than fell in battle. Too much was
made of the achievement by Hastings him-
self, who had a strong motive for acting as he
did, and by those who since have followed
him, in the excessive praise bestowed
upon the instruments of a scheme of which
he was so proud. The events which followed
the first'conflict, so fortunate for the British,
are thus summed up by Murray :—-“ After
sundry marches and countermarehes, Hydcr
once more took the field, and waited battle in a
position chosen by himself, being no other

 

 

HISTORY 01" THE BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXVH.

than the fortunate spot, as he deemed it, near
the village of Polilloor, Where he had gained
the triumph over the corps of Colonel Baillie.
Here General Coote led his troops to an
action which proved more bloody than deci-
sive; for though he placed them in various
positions, he found them everywhere severely
annoyed by a cross-fire from the enemy. Mr.
Mill’s authorities even assert, that his move-
ments were paralyzed by a dispute with Sir
Hector Monro, and that had the Mysorean
captain made a vigorous charge he would
have completely carried the day. But he at
length yielded the ground on which the
battle was fought, and the English reached
it over the dead bodies of their yet unburied
countrymen, who had fallen in the former
action. The natives, according to some
accounts, boasted of this encounter as a com-
plete victory; but Colonel “'ilks says they
represented it merely as a drawn battle,
which was not very far from the truth.”

This representation, so far as it is unfa-
vourable to the British, rests upon the autho—
rity of Mill alone. There was no occurrence
between Coote and his second in command,
Sir Hector Monro, which could be construed
into a dispute delaying the progress of the
battle. The conduct of Sir Hector was, as
usual, obstinate, self»sufl'icient, and he undoubt-
edly disobcyed orders, but the action went
on uninfluenced by the fact. There could be
no dispute, according to the laws of war, as to
which side had the victory. Hyder, notwith-
standing the amazing advantages of his posi-
tion, was driven off the field utterly discom-
fited. The account of the action given by
an officer afterwards distinguished as Sir
Thomas Munro, was as follows, and is at
variance with the picture of confusion and
disaster depicted by Mil1 :-—“ The position of
Hyder was such, that a stronger could not
have been imagined. Besides three villages,
which the enemy had occupied, the ground
along their front, and on their flanks, was
intersected in every direction by deep ditches
and water-courses; their artillery fired from
embrasures cut in mounds of earth, which
had been formed from the hollowing of the
ditches, and the main body of their army lay
behind them. The cannonade became gene-
ral about ten o’clock, and continued with little
intermission till sunset, for we found it almost
impossible to advance upon the enemy, as the
cannon could not be brought, without much
time and labour, over the broken ground in
front. The enemy retired as we advanced.
and always found cover in the ditches and
behind the banks. They were forced from
all before sunset, and after standing :1 short
time a cannonade on open ground, they fled 1n

CHAP. Lxxxvru

great hurry and confusion towards Conge-
verani.”

The English now suffered severely from
want of provisions. Sir Eyre Coote was in
continual alarm lest from this cause he should
lose his whole army. Hyder had so denuded
the country of provender, cattle, corn, and
rice, that the English army was reduced to
the greatest straits. Madras was itself in
danger of famine ; and Vellore, upon the sup-
port of which the preservation of the Carnatic
strategetically depended, was nearly in a starv-
ing state. Coote anxiously hoped for battle,
as affording him the only prospect of extri—
cating him from his difficulties.

The enemy took post at the pass of Shol-
ingar, on the Vellore road; and on the 27th
of September the advanced guard of Coote
approached their pickets. According to Mill,
Hyder occupied a favourable position, which
he had skilfully chosen to give battle to the
English once more : according to Colonel
\Vilks, the British surprised him, and the chief
object of Hyder was to withdraw his guns in
safety, to effect which he resolved upon the
sacrifice of his cavalry as the only alternative.
Sir Thomas Munro (not Sir Hector), then an
officer of inferior rank, supposed that Hyder
hoped by successive charges of cavalry, given
on different parts of the English line, to break
it. He accordingly thus gives the main fea-
tures of the battle :——“He divided his best
horse into three bodies, and sent them under
three chosen leaders to attack as many parts
of our army at the same time. They came
down at full gallop till they arrived within
reach of grape, when, being thrown into con-
fusion, the greater part either halted or fled,
and those that persevered in advancing, were
dispersed by a discharge of musketry, except
a few who thought it safer to push through
the intervals between the battalions and their
guns, than to ride back through the cross fire
of the artillery; but most of these were killed
by parties in the rear. This attack enabled
Hyder to save his guns. Except the escort.
with the artillery, every man in the Mysorean
army shifted for himself. The loss of the
enemy was estimated at five thousand, that
of the English fell short of a hundred.”

General Coote was unable to follov up his
victory. His chiefobject was to find supplies.
He obtained a large quantity of rice, sufficient
to afford a supply to his army, and to pro-
vision Vellore, so as to enable it, for a short
time, at all events, to maintain itself.

After the conquest of Myhie, the Madras
portion ofthe army employed against that place
was quartered at Tellicherry, but in May
it was ordered to join the army on active

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

service in the Carnatic, and its place was sup-

383

plied by Bombay troops, under the command
of Major Abingdon. One of Hyder’s best
generals, aided by the Nairs, besieged the
place. The major in vain sent to the Bom-
bay presidency for provisions, money, and
men; and he was at last ordered to give it
up. He refused to do so, and so effectually
remonstrated upon the impoliey and disgrace
of such a step, as well as upon the cruel-
ties to which the garrison would be subjected,
that he received counter orders, and reinforce-
ments were sent to him. The major was an
officer of great enterprise and courage: he
immediately determined upon a. sortie with
his whole force. So well were his plans
laid, that he surprised the enemy’s outposts,
stormed and captured them, and at dawn
drove them in panic from their camp. He
gave them no chance of re-collecting, so sud-
den was the attack, that they were scattered
in every direction, like the fragments of an
exploded shell. Abingdon reinstated the
native chiefs whom Hyder’s lieutenant had
deposed, and deposed those whom he had
appointed; and then, by forced marches, ad-
vanced upon Calicut. The place was pre-
pared for a powerful resistance; but by ac-
cident, the day after Abingdon’s arrival, the
chief powder magazine exploded, spreading
destruction throughout the garrison, and
opening a practicable breach in the walls,
which Abingdon instantly prepared to storm.
The terrified enemy surrendered at discretion.

The English were so hampered by want
of money and provisions, that they could
not accomplish anything against the enemy
during the autumn of 1781. Coote was
therefore obliged to withdraw his army to
cantonments in the month of November, ,
fixing his head-quarters in the immediate
vicinity of Madras.

Lord Macartney had now arrived as go-
vernor of Madras; and whatever his abilities,
they were lost to the cause by his ambition
to oppose Hastings in everything, and make
his government virtually independent of the
governor-general and the supreme council.
Mill thus describes the spirit with which his
lordship entered upon his government, his
general objects, and the projects which imme-
diately engaged his attention :—-“ He landed at
Madras on the 22nd of June, 1781, and then
first obtained intelligence that the country
was invaded. He came to his office, when
it undoubtedly was filled with difficulties of
an extraordinary kind. The presence of a
new governor, and of a governor of a new
description, as change itself under pain is
counted a good, raised in some degree the
spirits of the people, By advantage of the
hopes which were thus inspired, he was en-

384 HISTORY OF THE
abled to borrow considerable sums of money.
Having carried out intelligence of the war
with the Dutch, and particular instructions to
make acquisition of such of their settlements as
were placed within his reach, he was eager to
signalise his arrival by the performance of
conquests, which acquired an air of import-
ance, from the use, as seaports, of which they
might prove to Hyder or the French. Within
a week of his arrival, Sadras was summoned,
and yielded without resistance. Pulicat was
a place of greater strength, with a corps in
its neighbourhood of Hyder’s army. The
garrison of Fort St. George was so extremely
reduced, as to be ill-prepared to afford a de-
tachment. But Lord Maeartney placed him-
self at the head of the militia; and Pulicat,
on condition of security to private property,
was induced to surrender. Of the annuncia-
tion which was usually made to the princes
of India, on the arrival of a new governor,
Lord Macartney conceived that advantage
might be taken, aided by the recent battle of
Porto Novo, and the expectation of troops
from Europe, to obtain the attention of Hyder
to an offer of peace. “'ith the concurrence
of the general and admiral, an overture was
transmitted, to which the following answer
was returned, characteristic at once ofthe coun-
try and the man :—‘ The governors and sirdars
who enter into treaties, after one or two years,
return to Europe, and their acts and deeds
become of no effect; and fresh governors and
sirdars introduce new conversations. Prior to
your coming, when the governor and council of
Madras had departed from their treaty of alli-
ance and friendship, I sent my vakeel to con-
fer with them, and to ask the reason for such
a breach of faith ; the answer given was, that
they who made these conditions were gone to
Europe. You write that you have come with
the sanction of the king and company to settle
all matters; which gives me great happiness.
You, sir, are a man of wisdom, and compre-
hend all things. Whatever you mayjudge
proper and best, that you will do. You men-.
tion that troops have arrived, and are daily
arriving, from Europe: of this I have not a
doubt. I depend upon the favour of God for
my succour‘.’ Nor was it with Hyder alone,
that the new governor interposed his good
offices for the attainment of peace. A letter
signed by him, by Sir Edward Hughes, and
Sir Eyre Coote, the commanders of the sea
and land forces, and by Mr. Macpherson, a
member of the supreme council, was addressed
to the Mahrattas, in which they offered them-
selves as guarantees of any treaty of peace
which might be contracted between them and
the governor-general and council of Bengal:
and declared their willingness to accede to

 

BRITISH EMPIRE [Guam LXXXVII.
the restoration of Gujerat, Salsette, and Bas-
sein."

Lord Macartney followed up these proceed-
ings by other active measures, which do not
fall within the province of this chapter to re-
late. The governor and council of Bengal,
believing that the Nabob of the Carnatic had
the means of aiding the council in the war
with Hyder, and yet withheld them, intimated
that, as his highness’s territory was then over-
run by a powerful enemy, his authority was
virtually gone, and that it might be necessary
for the supreme council to collect and apply the
entire revenues of the state in the military
operations necessary to expel the foe. They
were, however, unwilling to resort to that ex-
treme measure, and expressed a willingness
to accept of several lacs of pagodas as a tem-
porary supply. The nabob would not, and
Mill maintains that he could not, grant this
sum. He, moreover, pleaded that limitations
had been set by the supreme council upon
his liability to contribute money. It was soon
discovered by the Madras council that the
nabob had secretly negotiated with Hastings,
and had entered into arrangements with him,
of which Lord Macartney and the Madras
council heartily disapproved. Thus the council
of Madras was not only at war with Mysore,
but was set at defiance by its ally, the nabob
——was overruled by the supreme council in
matters which involved both councils in dis-
putes,and, to complete the picture of confusion,
the members of council were divided amongst
themselves. To all these disorders another
was soon added: the commander-in-chief of
the army and the president became irrecon-
cileably at variance. The general had in-
dependent authority, which he was proud to
exercise, and was testy if the slightest remon-
strance was expressed by the council. He
would take offence even at the most polite re-
quest. The eouncil, in consequence of the
independent authority of the general, had no
control over the military expenditure, and
this, in the eyes of the natives, brought the
council into contempt. ltich natives refused
to make loans, although, in former periods of
trouble, they were prompt to do so, feeling
content with government security and a mo-
derate interest.

The claims of the creditors of the nabob
introduced a fresh source of trouble. “'hen
they—Europeans and natives—found that the
Bengal government insisted upon an assign-
ment of the nabob’s revenues, they naturally
urged that the private debts of his highness
should first be satisfied, or that the govern~
ment should secure their payment out of the
revenues of the Carnatic. Both the comicils
of Bengal and Madras, timid of the effects of

CHAP. LXXXVII.]

such a measure on the court of directors at
home, were reluctant to make such an under-
taking, yet felt the difficulty of seizing upon
his revenues, and neither liquidating his debts
nor leaving himself the means of even paying
the interest. Upon the settlement of the
financial questions connected with the nabob,
which afterwards created so much discussion
in England, Mill observes as follows :—“ On
the point, however, of the assignment, the
ituation of affairs, and the sanction of the
Bengal government, appeared to the president
and council sufficient authority for urging the
nabob forcibly to concur with their views.
\‘iith much negotiation it was at last arranged——
that the revenues of all the dominions of the
nabob should be transferred to the company
for a period of five years at least; that of the
proceeds one-sixth part should be reserved
for the private expenses of himself and his
family, the remainder being placed to his ac-
count; that the collectors should all be ap-
pointed by the president; and that the nabob
should not interfere. By this deed, which
bore date the 2nd of December, 1781, the in-
conveniences of a double government, which
by its very nature engendered discordance,
negligence, rapacity, and profusion, were so
far got rid of ; though yet the misery and
weakness to which they had contributed could
not immediately be removed.”

Upon this paragraph Dr. “'ilson thus com-
ments 2—“ This is evidently the main object
of the agreement projected, not executed,
with the nabob, by the government of Bengal.
In the reply of Hastings to the objections of
the government of Madras, he first apologises
for the interference by the character of Lord
Maeartuey’s predecessors. ‘Your lordship,’
he says, ‘will not ask why we thought our
intervention on this occasion necessary, and
why we did not rather refer the accommoda-
tion to the presidency of Fort St. George,
which was the regular instrument of the com-
pany’s participation in the government of the
Carnatic ; but I will suppose the question. I
might properly answer it by another. “'hy
did the company withdraw their confidence
from the same ministry, to bestow it on your
lordship ?’ He also declares that had be
known of Lord Macartney’s nomination, he
should have referred the nahob to his govern-
ment. He urges the enforcement of the
agreement as being the act ofthe government
of Bengal, and having been done by them;
but he lays stress only on the 8th, 10th, 11th,
and 12th articles; the two first insisting upon
the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic
and Tanjore, and their application to the pur-
poses of the war; and the two last proposing
the consolidation of the nabob’s debts, and

IN INDIA AND THE EAST.

 

 

385

arrangement with the creditors. The whole
matter was, however, left finally to the decision
of the Madras presidency.”

Such was the condition of affairs, in prospect
of a campaign against Hyder, in 1782. The
army had a short repose in cantonments.
Before the monsoon had spent its strength,
the fall of Chittore was made known at
Madras; and it was declared, by messages
sent from Vellore, that that place could not
hold out beyond the 11th of January. It
was absolutely necessary, at all costs, to save
Vellore. General Coote, whatever his ex-
cellent qualities in the field of battle, was a
bad purveyor, and his system of transport
was cumbrous, burthensome, and defective.
No other officer could, so encumbered, effect
such rapid marches; but he required such an
amount of baggage, and, consequently, car-
riage with his army, as to entail vast charges
upon the treasury, and to defy all resources
of commissary arrangement. The general
had no idea of economy in any direction; but
in the matters of cattle, carriages, servants,
and material, his extravagance was beyond all
bounds. The exorbitant demands for equip-
ment and conveyance were the principal
source of difficulty and alarm. “ To carry the
necessaries of thirty-five days for twelve or
fourteen thousand fighting men, the estimate
of the quarter-master was 35,000 bullocks.
Not to speak of the money wanted for the
purpose, so great a number could not be pro-
cured; nor was it easy to conceive how pro-
tection could be afforded from Hyder‘s force,
to a line of so many miles as the march of
thirty-five thousand bullocks would of neces-
sity form. The number of bullocks now in
store was eight. thousand. With these and
three thousand coolies, or porters, whom he
could press, it appeared to the president that
the army might convey what was absolutely
necessary. The urgency of the case made
the general waive his usual objections.“6

Coote at once proceeded to the relief of
Vellore, on the 2nd of January, 1782. The
events which followed, in the task which he
proposed to himself, displayed his genius as a
strategist, and the courage and perseverance
which characterised the gallant veteran. He
was ill when he joined the army; old age had
already laid its burthens on his head, and he
was exhausted by the fatigues which he had
undergone. To all these causes of depression
was added the anxiety resulting from the im-
poverished resources of the government, and
his perpetual differences with Lord Macartncy
and the council. Notwithstanding, be dis—
played an energy which he had never pre-
viously surpassed, and an indomitable deter-

* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

38G

mination to accomplish the undertaking upon
which he set out, which neither illness, enemies,
nor difficulties of any kind could conquer.
His proceedings in this expedition, and the
fortunes which bcfel him, have been related
with admirable brevity and correctness in the
following passage 2—“ Though with broken
health, he joined the army on the 2nd of
January; but on the 5th he suffered a violent
apoplectic attack, and the army halted at Tri-
passore. On the following day, he was so far
revived as to insist upon accompanying the
army, which he ordered to march. They were
within sight of Vellore on the 10th, and
dragging their guns through a morass, which
Hyder had suddenly formed by letting out
the waters of a tank, when his army was seen
advancing on the rear. Before the enemy
arrived, the English had crossed the morass;
when Hyder contented himself with a distant
cannonade, and next day the supply was con-
ducted safely to Vellore. As the army was
returning, Hyder, on the 13th, again presented
himself on the opposite side of the morass,
but withdrew after a distant cannonade. On
the evening of the 15th, the enemy’s camp
was seen at a distance ; and a variety of move-
ments took place on both sides on the following
day : after mutual challenges, however, and a
discharge of artillery, the contenders sepa-
rated, and the English pursued their march
to the Mount?"

While Coote was executing his gallant
task at Vellore, a detachment of reinforce—
ments, which arrived under General Meadows,
landed at Calicut. This body of troops was
under the command of Colonel Humberstone.
The troops under Major Abingdon, with that
officer himself, were now ranged under the
colonel, who at once marched against a
detachment of Hyder’s army. The dispro-
portion of numbers was such as to compel
Humberstone to make a speedy retreat, after
losing two-thirds of his men. Coote hearing
of this disaster, sent Colonel Macleod to take
the command, which he had scarcely done
when Tippoo Sultan made a night attack
which the colonel repulsed with much skill

* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE [CHAR LXXXVII.

and spirit. Admiral Sir Edward Hughes co-
operated with the colonel. A variety of skiL
ful movements took place on both sides, when
suddenly Tippoo withdrew his army. This
arose from tidings having reached him of
Hyder Ali’s death. Upon this event, Edward
Thornton observes :——“ He closed his ruffian
life at an age not falling short by many years
of that of Aurungzebe. To avert confusion,
it was important to conceal his death until
his successor was on the spot to maintain his
claim. The body was accordingly deposited
in a chest filled with aromatics, and sent from
the camp under an escort in a manner similar
to that in which valuable plunder was con-
veyed. All the business of the state went on
as usual, and inquirers after the health of the
chief were answered, that though extremely
weak, he was in a state of slow but progres-
sive amendment. Of the few persons entrusted
with the secret, one only, named Mohammed
Ameen, proved faithless. This person, who
commanded four thousand horse, formed a
project, with some others, to take off by as-
sassination those who provisionally adminis-
tered the government, and to assume their
power in the name of Hyder Ali’s second son,
a young man of weak intellect, in whose hands
empire would have been but an empty name.
The plot was detected, the conspirators seized
and sent off in irons; the belief that Hyder
Ali still lived being encouraged by these acts
being represented as the consequences of his
personal orders. 'The army marched in the
direction of Tippoo Sultan’s advance, and the
palanquin of Hyder Ali occupied its accus-
tomed place, care being taken to restrain too
close approach, lest the repose of the royal
patient should be disturbed and his recovery
impeded by noise or interruption. At length
the illusion was dispelled by the arrival of
Hyder Ali’s successor, who assumed the so-
vereignty which awaited him with an extra-
ordinary affectation of humility and grief.”

It was on the 7th of December, 1782, that
Hyder expired. On the 2nd of January,
1783, his son, Tippoo, privately entered the
capital, and was at once recognised as sove-
l reign of Mysore.

 

CnAP. LXXXVIIIJ IN INDIA AND THE EAST. 387

CHAPTER LXXXVIIL

“THE WAR WITH TIPPOO SAHIB—WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CARNATIC—CONQI‘ES’I‘S IN
WESTERN INDIA—SIEGES OF MANGALORE AND ONORE—VICTORIES OF COLONEL
FULLARTON AND GENERAL STUART—DEFEAT OF BUSSY AND THE FRENCH—~PEACE
WITH FRANCE—PEACE WITH TIPPOO.

THE death of Hyder Ali afforded the British powers of his predecessor, but undertook him-
a good opportunity for military enterprise, self to direct military affairs, leaving to the
which was lost chiefly through the supine- , general’s discretion the modus operandi.
ness or ignorance of General Stuart. That { The first plan of Macartney was one in which
officer succeeded Coote, whose health com- ! Stuart fully coneurred,—the destruction of
pelled him to retire for repose to the more lthe forts of Carangoly and “’andiwash.
peaceful and secure capital of Calcutta. He 3 Sir Eyre Coote having speedily recovered
had been, like Clive, the idol of the soldiery ; I his health in Bengal, was requested by Has-
his departure at such a crisis was unfortu- itings to return to Madras, which the daring
nate for the interests of the army and the 3 old soldier was most ready to do. On the
company. His age, and the infirmities attend- passage by sea, the vessel in which he sailed
ing upon age, rendered such a course impe- was pursued for two days and nights by a
rative. Probably no commander at his time a French line-of-battle ship. Coote was so
of life, and under such severe and repeated 3 excited that he remained on deck during the
visitations of illness, ever bore up so well, or so 5 whole of this time. The anxiety, fatigue,
pertinaciously persisted in the discharge of and exposure to climate brought on a renewal
such onerous military duties. General Stuart 3 of his disorders, and he merely arrived in
was not a man of equal purpose, although 1 Madras to die. This event was most dis-
capable of an obstinacy ruinous to his army . piriting to the English army, especially to
and his government. This general refused to §| the sepoys, who lamented his death in a
move his troops on the death of Hyder. He 3 manner that proved their strong attachment
even refused to believe that event, or as was :to him. This circumstance left General
suspected, pretended not to believe it, for 3 Stuart and Lord Maeartney in full oppor-
when at last it was impossible to affect , tunity to mismanage a struggle, for partici-
incredulity, he refused to march because his ' pation in which nature had not endowed them.
army was badly provided with material, and ‘; In the meantime, Tippoo Sahib used every
because he believed it incompetent to face i exertion to strengthen his army. He was
the enemy. i joined by a French force late in the year
Meanwhile, Tippoo Sultan placed himself 17822. This reinforcement consisted of nine
at the head of his army, which, after all his 5 hundred Europeans, two hundred and fifty
conflicts and losses, possessed a numerical { Candles and topasses, and two thousand
strength equal to that which it presented to ; sepoys. At the commencement of 1783, the
Hyder Ali, when he ledit forth from Seringa- 1 whole British force in the Carnatic was not
patam for the invasion of the Carnatic. The ' twelve thousand sepoys and topasses, and not
treasure left by Hyder exceeded three mil- ‘3 more than three thousand Europeans, if quite
lions sterling, besides great store of jewels, 3 so many.
and the magazines and arsenals of Mysore? General Stuart, after blowing up the for-
were filled with provisions and appurtenances l tifications of “Iandiwash and Carangoly, and
of war. The power of Tippoo Sultan was 5 having withdrawn the garrisons, felt himself
truly formidable, and he proceeded to make ' strong enough to offer battle, which he did
a formidable use of it. General Stuartjon the 13th of February; but the enemy,
could not.be induced to march until Hyder ‘ awed by the appearance of his army, retired
Ali had been two months dead, and Tippoo ' with precipitation and some confusion. The
had more than a month to mature his plans, ‘ English followed up their success, and the
and stimulate the enthusiasm of his soldier-y, 3 retreat of the enemy became almost a panic.
which he did by every possible means. Soon after the general receivedintelligence
General Stuart made one movement pre- '3 that Tippoo was retiring from the Carnatic.
vious to that time, which was for the purpose 3 Arcot was evacuated by the enemy, and two
of bringing provisions to the depot of Tre- {sides of the fort blown up. The object of
passore, situated at no great distance from the ; Tippoo’s withdrawal from the Carnatic was
cantonments. Lord Maeartney would not3not fear of General Stuart. He had heard
allow the general to assume the extraordinary ' of the enterprise and success of the Bombay

/

388

troops under Major Abingdon, Colonel Hum-
berstone, and afterwards General Mathews;
and, alarmed at the perils to which his do-
minions were exposed in that direction, he
determined to concentrate his strength there.
Stuart was bewildered by this movement,
and, after some marching without any defi-
nite object, he returned to the Mount.

The proceedings which took place on the
western side of the peninsula, while General
Stuart remained inactive, were interest-
ing and eventful. General Mathews was
ordered by the Bombay council to push for-
ward with energy against the important city
and fortress of Bednore. This command he
executed with an impetuosity the force and
audacity of which carried all before it.
He ascended some of the steepest of the
ghauts, where the enemy never for a moment
supposed that the British would venture.
He literally stormed some of the most for-
midable passes at the point of the bayonet,
and with a rash and daring valour threw his
force against vastly superior bodies of the
enemy, astounding them by the rapidity and
fearlessness of his attacks. Finally, he laid
siege to Bednore, which surrendered without
a blow. This city was reputed to be rich, and
a large amount of treasure was supposed by
the troops to have been seized by General
Mathews, and applied to his own use. Pro-
fessor “7ilson, in commenting upon the re-
marks of Mill, as to the disappointment
in the army upon the reports of General
Mathews appropriating money which they
expected to be prize, and upon the remarks
of Mill upon the sudden surrender of Bednore,
thus wrote :—“ As far as they originated with
the disappointment of the army, they were
unfounded. No such amount of treasure
could have been collected in Bednore. The
circumstances of the surrender of that plaCe
to the English, which General Mathews
thought little less than providential, consider-
ing the defective state of his equipments,
have been fully explained by Colonel \Vilks,
from original documents. Bednore was yielded
without resistance, from the treason of the
governor, Ayaz (Hyat) Khan, one of Hyder’s
military pupils or slaves, who had always
been in disfavour with Tippoo, who appre-
hended disgrace or death upon that prince's
accession; and who had intercepted orders
for his destruction. He therefore at once
ceded the province and capital to the Eng-
lish, and upon its investment by Tippoo, made
his escape to Bombay. He probably stipu-
lated for the preservation of what treasure
there was in the fort, and he claimed com-
pensation for what was lost, when the place

.HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

was recaptured. . His claim was but 1,40,0th ,

[Giana LXXXVI II.

pagodas, and the accounts of the finance minis
ter of Mysore state the embezzlement to have
been upwards of one lac, not eighty-one, as
particularized in the text. As usual, therefore,
the English were deceived by their own unrea-
sonable expectations, and as the negotiation
between Ayaz and the general was kept a pro-
found secret,——indeed Colonel VVilks supposes
it possible that General Mathews himself was
not aware of the motives of the governor,
which is by no means probable,-——they were
at a loss to understand why they were de-
prived of even so much of their booty as was
to be divided. The conduct of the general
after the occupation of Bednore, when the
withdrawal of the positive orders of the
Bombay governmentleft him free to fall back
on the coast, exhibits as great a want of mili~
tary judgment, as his disputes with his offi-
cers manifested irritability oftemper. Colonel
VVilks has given a very cepious and inte-
resting account of the whole of this calamitous
transaction, vol. ii. 4&8, et seq.”

Notwithstanding the fortunate issue of the
campaign, the strictures made upon the sub-
sequent generalship of Mathews by Colonel
“Elks and Dr. \Vilson were as just as severe.
His capacity appeared to consist in sudden
dash, in comprehending at once in the midst
of action the boldest measure practicable, and,
in defiance of all danger, executing it.

After the surrender of Bednore, nearly all
the forts and cities of the province surrendered.
A few held out, and one of these offered a
protracted, obstinate, and dishonourable resist-
ance. The town and fort of Anaporc fired twice
upon flags of truce; and when, after all, sur-
render was offered, and a party was sent to
take possession, it was attacked at disadvan~
tage in a mode which justified any retaliation
afterwards. The English commander ordered
all men found in arms when Anapore and
Onore were stormed to be put to the sword.
The order was to some extent carried out, and
a terrible slaughter resulted.

After these victories, contentions the most
fierce and disgraceful took place among the
superior officers of the English army. Mac-
leod, Humberstone, and Shaw proceeded to
Bombay, and complained of General Mathews
to the council. He was superseded, and the
command given to Colonel Macleod, with the
rank of brigadier-general. Macleod was a
rash man, with less ability for command than
Mathews. He had scarcely received his new
commission, when he disclosed his want of
prudence. Mill thus relates the circumstance
and its consequences:-——“Colonel Macleod,
new brigadier-general and Commanderin-
chief, returning to the army with the two
other officers, in the Ranger snow, fell in with

 

 

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