AN Impartial Account OF THE LATE EXPEDITION AGAINST ST. AUGUSTINE UNDER AN Impartial Account OF THE LATE EXPEDITION AGAINST ST. AUGUSTINE UNDEP, AN Impartial Account OF THE LATE EXPEDITION AGAINST ST. AUGUSTINE UNDER General Oglethorpe. General Oglethorpe. General Oglethorpe. A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE 1742 EDITION, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND INDEXES BY Aileen Moore Topping. BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES. A University of Florida Book. University Presses of Florida. Gainesville 1978. A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE 1742 EDITION, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND INDEXES BY Aileen Moore Topping. BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES. A University of Florida Book. University Presses of Florida. Gainesville 1978. A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE 1742 EDITION, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND INDEXES BY Aileen Moore Topping. BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES. A University of Florida Book. University Presses of Florida. Gainesville 1978.  THE BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES published under the sponsorship of the BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION OF FLORIDA, SAMUEL PROCTOR, General Editor. A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE 1742 EDITION WITH PREFATORY MATERIAL, INTRODUCTION, AND INDEXEs ADDED. NEW MATERIAL COPYRIGHT @ 1978 BY THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA. All rights reserved. PRINTED IN FLORIDA. Library of Congress Cataloging in PublicatiOn Data Main entry under title: An Impartial account of the late expedition against St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe. (Bicentennial Floridiana facsimile series) Includes bibliographical references. 1. St. Augustine Expedition, 1740. 2. Oglethorpe, James Edward, 1696-1785. I. Topping, Aileen Moore. II. Series. F314.134 1978 973.2'6 78-21956 ISBN 0-8130-0420-9 THE BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES published under the sponsorship of the BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION OF FLORIDA, SAMUEL PROCTOR, General Editor. A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE 1742 EDITION WITH PREFATORY MATERIAL, INTRODUCTION, AND INDExEs ADDED. NEW MATERIAL COPYRIGHT @ 1978 BY THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA. All rights reserved. PRINTED IN FLORIDA. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: An Impartial account of the late expedition against St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe. (Bicentennial Floridiana facsimile series) Includes bibliographical references. 1. St. Augustine Expedition, 1740. 2. Oglethorpe, James Edward, 1696-1785. 1. Topping, Aileen Moore. II. Series. F314.134 1978 973.2'6 78L21956 ISBN 0-8130-0420-9 THE BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES published under the sponsorship of the BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION OF FLORIDA, SAMUEL PROCTOR, General Editor. A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE 1742 EDITION WITH PREFATORY MATERIAL, INTRODUCTION, AND INDEXEs ADDED. NEW MATERIAL COPYRIGHT © 1978 BY THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA. All rights reserved. PRINTED IN FLORIDA. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: An Impartial account of the late expedition against St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe. (Bicentennial Floridiana facsimile series) Includes bibliographical references. 1. St. Augustine Expedition, 1740. 2. Oglethorpe, James Edward, 1696-1785. 1. Topping, Aileen Moore. II. Series. F314.I34 1978 973.2'6 78-21956 ISBN 0-8130-0420-9  BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION OF FLORIDA. Governor Reubin O'D. Askew, Honorary Chairman Lieutenant Governor J. H. Williams, Chairman Harold W. Stayman, Jr., Vice Chairman William R. Adams, Executive Director Dick J. Batchelor, Orlando Johnnie Ruth Clarke, St. Petersburg A. H. "Gus" Craig, St. Augustine James J. Gardener, Fort Lauderdale Jim Glisson, Tavares Mattox Hair, Jacksonville Thomas L. Hazouri, Jacksonville Ney C. Landrum, Tallahassee Mrs. Raymond Mason, Jacksonville Carl C. Mertins, Jr., Pensacola Charles E. Perry, Miami W. E. Potter, Orlando F. Blair Reeves, Gainesville Richard R. Renick, Coral Gables Jane W. Robinson, Cocoa Mrs. Robert L. Shevin, Tallahassee Don Shoemaker, Miami Mary L. Singleton, Jacksonville Bruce A. Smathers, Tallahassee Alan Trask, Fort Meade Edward J. Trombetta, Tallahassee Ralph D. Turlington, Tallahassee William S. Turnbull, Orlando Robert Williams, Tallahassee Lori Wilson, Merritt Island BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION OF FLORIDA. Governor Reubin O'D. Askew, Honorary Chairman Lieutenant Governor J. H. Williams, Chairman Harold W. Stayman, Jr., Vice Chairman William R. Adams, Executive Director Dick J. Batchelor, Orlando Johnnie Ruth Clarke, St. Petersburg A. H. "Gus" Craig, St. Augustine James J. Gardener, Fort Lauderdale Jim Glisson, Tavares Mattox Hair, Jacksonville Thomas L. Hazouri, Jacksonville Ney C. Landrum, Tallahassee Mrs. Raymond Mason, Jacksonville Carl C. Mertins, Jr., Pensacola Charles E. Perry, Miamd W. E. Potter, Orlando F. Blair Reeves, Gainesville Richard R. Renick, Coral Gables Jane W. Robinson, Cocoa Mrs. Robert L. Shevin, Tallahassee Don Shoemaker, Miami Mary L. Singleton, Jacksonville Bruce A. Smathers, Tallahassee Alan Trask, Fort Meade Edward J. Trombetta, Tallahassee Ralph D. Turlington, Tallahassee William S. Turnbull, Orlando Robert Williams, Tallahassee Lori Wilson, Merritt Island 6 BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION OF FLORIDA. Governor Reubin O'D. Askew, Honorary Chairman Lieutenant Governor J. H. Williams, Chairman Harold W. Stayman, Jr., Vice Chairman William R. Adams, Executive Director Dick J. Batchelor, Orlando Johnnie Ruth Clarke, St. Petersburg A. H. "Gus" Craig, St. Augustine James J. Gardener, Fort Lauderdale Jim Glisson, Tavares Mattox Hair, Jacksonville Thomas L. Hazouri, Jacksonville Ney C. Landrum, Tallahassee Mrs. Raymond Mason, Jacksonville Carl C. Mertins, Jr., Pensacola Charles E. Perry, Miami W. E. Potter, Orlando F. Blair Reeves, Gainesville Richard R. Renick, Coral Gables Jane W. Robinson, Cocoa Mrs. Robert L. Shevin, Tallahassee Don Shoemaker, Miami Mary L. Singleton, Jacksonville Bruce A. Smathers, Tallahassee Alan Trask, Fort Meade Edward J. Trombetta, Tallahassee Ralph D. Turlington, Tallahassee William S. Turnbull, Orlando Robert Williams, Tallahassee Lori Wilson, Merritt Island   GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE. HE war of words, threats, and ultimatums between Spain and England which finally erupted into bloody conflict in 1739 was fought not only on the great battlefields of Europe but also in the pine forests and the swamps and along the salt marshes and on the white sand beaches of South Georgia and Northeast Florida. Spain's la Florida had once extended from the Keys north to the Chesapeake Bay. The explora- tions and discoveries of the sixteenth-century con- quistadores provided the basis for Spain's claim to this vast territory. Then in 1607 England threw down a daring gauntlet when a group of her col- onists under the leadership of Captain John Smith established a settlement at Jamestown. England claimed this territory as her own and named it Virginia in honor of her queen. Spain postured and threatened, but took no decisive action, and the die was cast. Her royal banners began their slow but inexorable retreat southward. In 1629 Charles I granted part of what is now North Carolina to Sir Robert Heath, and Charles II named the area in 1663. Charleston was settled soon after, and in v GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE. HE war of words, threats, and ultimatums between Spain and England which finally erupted into bloody conflict in 1739 was fought not only on the great battlefields of Europe but also in the pine forests and the swamps and along the salt marshes and on the white sand beaches of South Georgia and Northeast Florida. Spain's la Florida had once extended from the Keys north to the Chesapeake Bay. The explora- tions and discoveries of the sixteenth-century con- quistadores provided the basis for Spain's claim to this vast territory. Then in 1607 England threw down a daring gauntlet when a group of her col- onists under the leadership of Captain John Smith established a settlement at Jamestown. England claimed this territory as her own and named it Virginia in honor of her queen. Spain postured and threatened, but took no decisive action, and the die was cast. Her royal banners began their slow but inexorable retreat southward. In 1629 Charles I granted part of what is now North Carolina to Sir Robert Heath, and Charles II named the area in 1663. Charleston was settled soon after, and in v GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE. HE war of words, threats, and ultimatums between Spain and England which finally erupted into bloody conflict in 1739 was fought not only on the great battlefields of Europe but also in the pine forests and the swamps and along the salt marshes and on the white sand beaches of South Georgia and Northeast Florida. Spain's la Florida had once extended from the Keys north to the Chesapeake Bay. The explora- tions and discoveries of the sixteenth-century con- quistadores provided the basis for Spain's claim to this vast territory. Then in 1607 England threw down a daring gauntlet when a group of her col- onists under the leadership of Captain John Smith established a settlement at Jamestown. England claimed this territory as her own and named it Virginia in honor of her queen. Spain postured and threatened, but took no decisive action, and the die was cast. Her royal banners began their slow but inexorable retreat southward. In 1629 Charles I granted part of what is now North Carolina to Sir Robert Heath, and Charles II named the area in 1663. Charleston was settled soon after, and in v  vi vi vi 1733 James Edward Oglethorpe arrived with thirty-five families aboard the galley Anne off the Atlantic coast. He selected a townsite on a high bluff overlooking the Savannah River, increasing the threat to the Spanish in St. Augustine and along the St. Johns River. The situation became even more perilous when a settlement was estab- lished at Darien, Georgia, to guard the mouth of the Altamaha River, and a number of forts and outposts were erected along the coast. Frederica on St. Simons Island was to become the main bas- tion on the water route leading from St. Augustine to Savannah. Then there were Fort St. Andrews on Cumberland Island and Fort St. George at the mouth of the St. Johns River itself, just a few miles from the gates of St. Augustine. It did not matter to Oglethorpe that these forti- fications were not on Georgia soil, and Spain's anxieties multiplied. Tension was building, and the relationship between England and Spain was becoming more tenuous, more dangerous with each passing incident. Spain's power was declining, but she was still a force to be reckoned with, and this threat to her Florida borderlands would have to be met. The English forts along the Georgia coast were undermanned and undergunned; they could not resist a Spanish attack. Oglethorpe re- turned to England in the fall of 1736 to raise a regiment. He was named general of all the British military forces in South Carolina and Georgia, and 1733 James Edward Oglethorpe arrived with thirty-five families aboard the galley Anne off the Atlantic coast. He selected a townsite on a high bluff overlooking the Savannah River, increasing the threat to the Spanish in St. Augustine and along the St. Johns River. The situation became even more perilous when a settlement was estab- lished at Darien, Georgia, to guard the mouth of the Altamaha River, and a number of forts and outposts were erected along the coast. Frederica on St. Simons Island was to become the main bas- tion on the water route leading from St. Augustine to Savannah. Then there were Fort St. Andrews on Cumberland Island and Fort St. George at the mouth of the St. Johns River itself, just a few miles from the gates of St. Augustine. It did not matter to Oglethorpe that these forti- fications were not on Georgia soil, and Spain's anxieties multiplied. Tension was building, and the relationship between England and Spain was becoming more tenuous, more dangerous with each passing incident. Spain's power was declining, but she was still a force to be reckoned with, and this threat to her Florida borderlands would have to be met. The English forts along the Georgia coast were undermanned and undergunned; they could not resist a Spanish attack. Oglethorpe re- turned to England in the fall of 1736 to raise a regiment. He was named general of all the British military forces in South Carolina and Georgia, and 1733 James Edward Oglethorpe arrived with thirty-five families aboard the galley Anne off the Atlantic coast. He selected a townsite on a high bluff overlooking the Savannah River, increasing the threat to the Spanish in St. Augustine and along the St. Johns River. The situation became even more perilous when a settlement was estab- lished at Darien, Georgia, to guard the mouth of the Altamaha River, and a number of forts and outposts were erected along the coast. Frederica on St. Simons Island was to become the main bas- tion on the water route leading from St. Augustine to Savannah. Then there were Fort St. Andrews on Cumberland Island and Fort St. George at the mouth of the St. Johns River itself, just a few miles from the gates of St. Augustine. It did not matter to Oglethorpe that these forti- fications were not on Georgia soil, and Spain's anxieties multiplied. Tension was building, and the relationship between England and Spain was becoming more tenuous, more dangerous with each passing incident. Spain's power was declining, but she was still a force to be reckoned with, and this threat to her Florida borderlands would have to be met. The English forts along the Georgia coast were undermanned and undergunned; they could not resist a Spanish attack. Oglethorpe re- turned to England in the fall of 1736 to raise a regiment. He was named general of all the British military forces in South Carolina and Georgia, and  vii vii vii he was given 600 men, some of whom were sta- tioned on Cumberland Island. Robert Jenkins, an English seaman and smug- gler, was responsible for the name of the conflict, the War of Jenkins' Ear, which began in 1739 be- tween Britain and Spain. The year before, Jenkins had displayed his ear to the members of Parlia- ment, claiming that it had been cut off by his Spanish captors. England's good citizens were outraged at this shameless atrocity and demanded vengeance against the Spanish barbarians. Actually the war was the outgrowth of bitter commercial rivalry, a contest for world dominion, for com- mand of the seas, and for international trade. Ogle- thorpe had seen it coming for some time and had sought desperately for an alliance with the Creek Indians. In the summer of 1739 he made the long journey to their town, Coweta, on the Chatta- hoochee River, and secured the pledge of a thou- sand warriors. Afterwards, Oglethorpe begged South Carolina for money, men, and supplies, but for many reasons, including a dislike of the peti- tioner, the South Carolinians were slow to respond. The South Carolina General Assembly finally au- thorized 600 men to come south on a four-month enlistment. Supported by some 900 regulars and militia, and nearly 1,000 Indians, Oglethorpe moved against Florida in the late spring of 1740. His long siege of St. Augustine failed. The ill-fated expedition he was given 600 men, some of whom were sta- tioned on Cumberland Island. Robert Jenkins, an English seaman and smug- gler, was responsible for the name of the conflict, the War of Jenkins' Ear, which began in 1739 be- tween Britain and Spain. The year before, Jenkins had displayed his ear to the members of Parlia- ment, claiming that it had been cut off by his Spanish captors. England's good citizens were outraged at this shameless atrocity and demanded vengeance against the Spanish barbarians. Actually the war was the outgrowth of bitter commercial rivalry, a contest for world dominion, for com- mand of the seas, and for international trade. Ogle- thorpe had seen it coming for some time and had sought desperately for an alliance with the Creek Indians. In the summer of 1739 he made the long journey to their town, Coweta, on the Chatta- hoochee River, and secured the pledge of a thou- sand warriors. Afterwards, Oglethorpe begged South Carolina for money, men, and supplies, but for many reasons, including a dislike of the peti- tioner, the South Carolinians were slow to respond. The South Carolina General Assembly finally au- thorized 600 men to come south on a four-month enlistment. Supported by some 900 regulars and militia, and nearly 1,000 Indians, Oglethorpe moved against Florida in the late spring of 1740. His long siege of St. Augustine failed. The ill-fated expedition he was given 600 men, some of whom were sta- tioned on Cumberland Island. Robert Jenkins, an English seaman and smug- gler, was responsible for the name of the conflict, the War of Jenkins' Ear, which began in 1739 be- tween Britain and Spain. The year before, Jenkins had displayed his ear to the members of Parlia- ment, claiming that it had been cut off by his Spanish captors. England's good citizens were outraged at this shameless atrocity and demanded vengeance against the Spanish barbarians. Actually the war was the outgrowth of bitter commercial rivalry, a contest for world dominion, for com- mand of the seas, and for international trade. Ogle- thorpe had seen it coming for some time and had sought desperately for an alliance with the Creek Indians. In the summer of 1739 he made the long journey to their town, Coweta, on the Chatta- hoochee River, and secured the pledge of a thou- sand warriors. Afterwards, Oglethorpe begged South Carolina for money, men, and supplies, but for many reasons, including a dislike of the peti- tioner, the South Carolinians were slow to respond. The South Carolina General Assembly finally au- thorized 600 men to come south on a four-month enlistment. Supported by some 900 regulars and militia, and nearly 1,000 Indians, Oglethorpe moved against Florida in the late spring of 1740. His long siege of St. Augustine failed. The ill-fated expedition  viii viii viii further inflamed the enmity which Georgians and Carolinians held for each other, and there were innumerable charges and countercharges. Ogle- thorpe held that if Charleston support had come earlier, his venture would have been successful. Citizens of Charleston and the South Carolina General Assembly argued otherwise, and they prepared a report which set forth the degree of their support of Oglethorpe. When this document was suppressed for political reasons, it generated still another report, An Impartial Account of the Late Expedition against St. Augustine under Gen- eral Oglethorpe, which was published in 1742. It is this important document, long out of print, that Aileen Moore Topping has edited for publication in the Bicentennial Floridiana Facsimile Series. Al- though the Impartial A ccount was published anon- ymously in London in 1742, Mrs. Topping's pains- taking research shows that its author was James Killpatrick, a former resident of Charleston, who also paid the printing bill. This volume comple- ments the Relation, or Journal, of a Late Expedi- tion to the Gates of St. Augustine, on Florida which was earlier edited for publication by John Jay TePaske for the same series, published by Uni- versity Presses of Florida for the American Revo- lution Bicentennial Commission of Florida. Aileen Moore Topping is a graduate of Agnes Scott College and Middlebury College and has taught at the University of Miami. She has worked further inflamed the enmity which Georgians and Carolinians held for each other, and there were innumerable charges and countercharges. Ogle- thorpe held that if Charleston support had come earlier, his venture would have been successful. Citizens of Charleston and the South Carolina General Assembly argued otherwise, and they prepared a report which set forth the degree of their support of Oglethorpe. When this document was suppressed for political reasons, it generated still another report, An Impartial Account of the Late Expedition against St. Augustine under Gen- eral Oglethorpe, which was published in 1742. It is this important document, long out of print, that Aileen Moore Topping has edited for publication in the Bicentennial Floridiana Facsimile Series. Al- though the Impartial Account was published anon- ymously in London in 1742, Mrs. Topping's pains- taking research shows that its author was James Killpatrick, a former resident of Charleston, who also paid the printing bill. This volume comple- ments the Relation, or Journal, of a Late Expedi- tion to the Gates of St. Augustine, on Florida which was earlier edited for publication by John Jay TePaske for the same series, published by Uni- versity Presses of Florida for the American Revo- lution Bicentennial Commission of Florida. Aileen Moore Topping is a graduate of Agnes Scott College and Middlebury College and has taught at the University of Miami. She has worked further inflamed the enmity which Georgians and Carolinians held for each other, and there were innumerable charges and countercharges. Ogle- thorpe held that if Charleston support had come earlier, his venture would have been successful. Citizens of Charleston and the South Carolina General Assembly argued otherwise, and they prepared a report which set forth the degree of their support of Oglethorpe. When this document was suppressed for political reasons, it generated still another report, An Impartial Account of the Late Expedition against St. Augustine under Gen- eral Oglethorpe, which was published in 1742. It is this important document, long out of print, that Aileen Moore Topping has edited for publication in the Bicentennial Floridiana Facsimile Series. Al- though the Impartial Account was published anon- ymously in London in 1742, Mrs. Topping's pains- taking research shows that its author was James Killpatrick, a former resident of Charleston, who also paid the printing bill. This volume comple- ments the Relation, or Journal, of a Late Expedi- tion to the Gates of St. Augustine, on Florida which was earlier edited for publication by John Jay TePaske for the same series, published by Uni- versity Presses of Florida for the American Revo- lution Bicentennial Commission of Florida. Aileen Moore Topping is a graduate of Agnes Scott College and Middlebury College and has taught at the University of Miami. She has worked  ix ix ix extensively in the Spanish archives at the Archivo General de Simancas, the Archivo Historico Na- cional, and the Archivo General de Indias. Mrs. Topping is continuing her research and writing of Florida colonial history at her residence in Orange Park, Florida. SAMUEL PROCTOR. General Editor of the BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES. extensively in the Spanish archives at the Archivo, General de Simancas, the Archivo Historico Na- cional, and the Archivo General de Indias. Mrs. Topping is continuing her research and writing of Florida colonial history at her residence in Orange Park, Florida. SAMUEL PROCTOR. General Editor of the BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES. extensively in the Spanish archives at the Archivo General de Simancas, the Archivo Historico Na- cional, and the Archivo General de Indias. Mrs. Topping is continuing her research and writing of Florida colonial history at her residence in Orange Park, Florida. SAMUEL PROCTOR. General Editor of the BICENTENNIAL FLORIDIANA FACSIMILE SERIES.   INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. HROUGHOUT the year 1737 reports reached London of an expeditionary force being prepared in Havana for a descent upon Georgia to expel that new colony from Spanish territory. Those reports had important effects. For several years the British Crown had ignored Spanish protests against the encroachment on Florida by English colonists and Spanish de- mands that the territorial boundary between Florida and the English colonies be fixed. In Sep- tember 1737 the government of Prime Minister Robert Walpole answered the latest demand by proposing that the question of boundaries and other disputes which had arisen between the two nations be settled in a conference of commission- ers to be named by the two sovereigns. Thomis Geraldino, Spanish minister plenipo- tentiary, was no match for the Duke of New- castle, British foreign secretary. Geraldino was later reprimanded for having accepted on behalf of his Court the proposal conveyed to him, with- out at the same time insisting upon certain condi- tions stipulated by his sovereign-that the forts xi HROUGHOUT the year 1737 reports reached London of an expeditionary force being prepared in Havana for a descent upon Georgia to expel that new colony from Spanish territory. Those reports had important effects. For several years the British Crown had ignored Spanish protests against the encroachment on Florida by English colonists and Spanish de- mands that the territorial boundary between Florida and the English colonies be fixed. In Sep- tember 1737 the government of Prime Minister Robert Walpole answered the latest demand by proposing that the question of boundaries and other disputes which had arisen between the two nations be settled in a conference of commission- ers to be named by the two sovereigns. Thomis Geraldino, Spanish minister plenipo- tentiary, was no match for the Duke of New- castle, British foreign secretary. Geraldino was later reprimanded for having accepted on behalf of his Court the proposal conveyed to him, with- out at the same time insisting upon certain condi- tions stipulated by his sovereign-that the forts Xi HROUGHOUT the year 1737 reports reached London of an expeditionary force being prepared in Havana for a descent upon Georgia to expel that new colony from Spanish territory. Those reports had important effects. For several years the British Crown had ignored Spanish protests against the encroachment on Florida by English colonists and Spanish de- mands that the territorial boundary between Florida and the English colonies be fixed. In Sep- tember 1737 the government of Prime Minister Robert Walpole answered the latest demand by proposing that the question of boundaries and other disputes which had arisen between the two nations be settled in a conference of commission- ers to be named by the two sovereigns. Thomis Geraldino, Spanish minister plenipo- tentiary, was no match for the Duke of New- castle, British foreign secretary. Geraldino was later reprimanded for having accepted on behalf of his Court the proposal conveyed to him, with- out at the same time insisting upon certain condi- tions stipulated by his sovereign-that the forts xi  xii xii xii built in Spanish territory by Mr. James Edward Oglethorpe be demolished, that the disputed ter- ritory be evacuated, and that the conference of commissioners be limited to a period of not more than six months.' King Philip V immediately canceled the expedi- tion against Georgia. Although his order to that effect was issued on 28 November 1737, it was not received in Havana until 21 March 1738, a few hours before the main body of the expeditionary force was to set sail.' Commissioners met at El Pardo in January 1739, only to suspend their deliberations in October of that year when En- gland declared war on Spain. The conflict was called the War of Jenkins' Ear, because in 1738 Captain Robert Jenkins, a British seaman, exhibited to the House of Commons his ear, which he said had been slit off seven years earlier by a Spanish guardacostas captain who had arrested him for smuggling in the West Indies. Another effect of the rumors of imminent dan- ger to Georgia was an increase in the influence of the twenty-four members of Parliament who were Trustees of Georgia. Together with powerful mercantile interests, they were able to contravene Walpole's pacific policy toward Spain. In a meet- ing of the Privy Council on 24 April 1737, the Georgia Trustees were denied permission to form an infantry regiment with the command and a commission as colonel to be given to Oglethorpe. built in Spanish territory by Mr. James Edward Oglethorpe be demolished, that the disputed ter- ritory be evacuated, and that the conference of commissioners be limited to a period of not more than six months.' King Philip V immediately canceled the expedi- tion against Georgia. Although his order to that effect was issued on 28 November 17 37, it was not received in Havana until 21 March 1738, a few hours before the main body of the expeditionary force was to set sail.' Commissioners met at El Pardo in January 1739, only to suspend their deliberations in October of that year when En- gland declared war on Spain. The conflict was called the War of Jenkins' Ear, because in 1738 Captain Robert Jenkins, a British seaman, exhibited to the House of Commons his ear, which he said had been slit off seven years earlier by a Spanish guardacostas captain who had arrested him for smuggling in the West Indies. Another effect of the rumors of imminent dan- ger to Georgia was an increase in the influence of the twenty-four members of Parliament who were Trustees of Georgia. Together with powerful mercantile interests, they were able to contravene Walpole's pacific policy toward Spain. In a meet- ing of the Privy Council on 24 April 1737, the Georgia Trustees were denied permission to form an infantry regiment with the command and a commission as colonel to be given to Oglethorpe. built in Spanish territory by Mr. James Edward Oglethorpe be demolished, that the disputed ter- ritory be evacuated, and that the conference of commissioners be limited to a period of not more than six months.' King Philip V immediately canceled the expedi- tion against Georgia. Although his order to that effect was issued on 28 November 1737, it was not received in Havana until 21 March 1738, a few hours before the main body of the expeditionary force was to set sail.' Commissioners met at El Pardo in January 1739, only to suspend their deliberations in October of that year when En- gland declared war on Spain. The conflict was called the War of Jenkins' Ear, because in 1738 Captain Robert Jenkins, a British seaman, exhibited to the House of Commons his ear, which he said had been slit off seven years earlier by a Spanish guardacostas captain who had arrested him for smuggling in the West Indies. Another effect of the rumors of imminent dan- ger to Georgia was an increase in the influence of the twenty-four members of Parliament who were Trustees of Georgia. Together with powerful mercantile interests, they were able to contravene Walpole's pacific policy toward Spain. In a meet- ing of the Privy Council on 24 April 1737, the Georgia Trustees were denied permission to form an infantry regiment with the command and a commission as colonel to be given to Oglethorpe.  xiii xiii xiii That decision was soon reversed, so that when Oglethorpe returned to Georgia it was as a major general with a regiment of 700 men and the com- mand of British forces in South Carolina and Georgia. During Oglethorpe's previous sojourns in America, from January 1733 to May 1734 and from February to November 1736, he had built a line of forts southward: Forts Frederica and St. Simons on St. Simons Island, Forts William and St. Andrews on Cumberland Island, and Fort St. George on the north shore at the mouth of the St. Johns River. The Trustees for the Establish- ment of the Colony of Georgia had been author- ized on 9 June 1732 to settle the territory between the Savannah and Altamaha rivers. Only the two forts on St. Simons Island were within the Georgia grant. All of the forts were on islands which for more than a century had been the sites of flourish- ing Spanish missions until, in the last years of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth, the depredations of hostile Indians, corsairs, and Carolina traders forced the governors of St. Augus- tine to withdraw the missions from Guale. Oglethorpe's fort at the mouth of the St. Johns was intolerable to Spain. In July 17 36 Juan Fran- cisco de Gniemes y Horcasitas, governor of Ha- vana, sent the engineer Antonio de Arredondo to convey to Oglethorpe a demand that Fort St. George be demolished. Arredondo also had orders That decision was soon reversed, so that when Oglethorpe returned to Georgia it was as a major general with a regiment of 700 men and the com- mand of British forces in South Carolina and Georgia. During Oglethorpe's previous sojourns in America, from January 1733 to May 1734 and from February to November 1736, he had built a line of forts southward: Forts Frederica and St. Simons on St. Simons Island, Forts William and St. Andrews on Cumberland Island, and Fort St. George on the north shore at the mouth of the St. Johns River. The Trustees for the Establish- ment of the Colony of Georgia had been author- ized on 9 June 1732 to settle the territory between the Savannah and Altamaha rivers. Only the two forts on St. Simons Island were within the Georgia grant. All of the forts were on islands which for more than a century had been the sites of flourish- ing Spanish missions until, in the last years of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth, the depredations of hostile Indians, corsairs, and Carolina traders forced the governors of St. Augus- tine to withdraw the missions from Guale. Oglethorpe's fort at the mouth of the St. Johns was intolerable to Spain. In July 1736 Juan Fran- cisco de Gdemes y Horcasitas, governor of Ha- vana, sent the engineer Antonio de Arredondo to convey to Oglethorpe a demand that Fort St. George be demolished. Arredondo also had orders That decision was soon reversed, so that when Oglethorpe returned to Georgia it was as a major general with a regiment of 700 men and the com- mand of British forces in South Carolina and Georgia. During Oglethorpe's previous sojourns in America, from January 1733 to May 1734 and from February to November 1736, he had built a line of forts southward: Forts Frederica and St. Simons on St. Simons Island, Forts William and St. Andrews on Cumberland Island, and Fort St. George on the north shore at the mouth of the St. Johns River. The Trustees for the Establish- ment of the Colony of Georgia had been author- ized on 9 June 1732 to settle the territory between the Savannah and Altamaha rivers. Only the two forts on St. Simons Island were within the Georgia grant. All of the forts were on islands which for more than a century had been the sites of flourish- ing Spanish missions until, in the last years of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth, the depredations of hostile Indians, corsairs, and Carolina traders forced the governors of St. Augus- tine to withdraw the missions from Guale. Oglethorpe's fort at the mouth of the St. Johns was intolerable to Spain. In July 1736 Juan Fran- cisco de Giiemes y Horcasitas, governor of Ha- vana, sent the engineer Antonio de Arredondo to convey to Oglethorpe a demand that Fort St. George be demolished. Arredondo also had orders  xiv xiv xiv to examine the colony of Georgia and to deter- mine what reinforcements and new fortifications were needed in Florida. Gnemes sent Oglethorpe copies of Article VII of the Treaty of Madrid, which in 1670 recognized England's possession of lands in America which she held at that time, and of Article VIII of the Anglo-Spanish treaty, which was part of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. In the Treaty of Utretcht, Queen Anne of Great Britain promised to aid the Spaniards in order that the former boundaries of their dominions in America be restored and established as they were in the time of the Spanish king Charles 11 (1661-1700), if it were found that they had suffered any infraction after his death. Guemes asked that English en- croachment on Spanish lands be stopped and that usurped territory be evacuated. In reply, Oglethorpe cited King Charles II's charter to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, which in 1665 granted to them territory south- ward to 29 degrees of latitude, and included St. Augustine, then one hundred years old. Ogle- thorpe insisted that he had not enlarged the do- minions of his sovereign but had only regulated them, and that without further orders he could not change his policy. He agreed to demolish Fort St. George, but said that the question of boundar- ies could be settled only by the two Crowns! Later Oglethorpe sent his aide, Charles Dempsey, to St. Augustine. Dempsey was able to arrange on to examine the colony of Georgia and to deter- mine what reinforcements and new fortifications were needed in Florida. Gnemes sent Oglethorpe copies of Article VII of the Treaty of Madrid, which in 1670 recognized England's possession of lands in America which she held at that time, and of Article VIII of the Anglo-Spanish treaty, which was part of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. In the Treaty of Utretcht, Queen Anne of Great Britain promised to aid the Spaniards in order that the former boundaries of their dominions in America be restored and established as they were in the time of the Spanish king Charles 11 (1661-1700), if it were found that they had suffered any infraction after his death. Gnemes asked that English en- croachment on Spanish lands be stopped and that usurped territory be evacuated. In reply, Oglethorpe cited King Charles II's charter to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, which in 1665 granted to them territory south- ward to 29 degrees of latitude, and included St. Augustine, then one hundred years old. Ogle- thorpe insisted that he had not enlarged the do- minions of his sovereign but had only regulated them, and that without further orders he could not change his policy. He agreed to demolish Fort St. George, but said that the question of boundar- ies could be settled only by the two Crowns.' Later Oglethorpe sent his aide, Charles Dempsey, to St. Augustine. Dempsey was able to arrange on to examine the colony of Georgia and to deter- mine what reinforcements and new fortifications were needed in Florida. Gnemes sent Oglethorpe copies of Article VII of the Treaty of Madrid, which in 1670 recognized England's possession of lands in America which she held at that time, and of Article VIII of the Anglo-Spanish treaty, which was part of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. In the Treaty of Utretcht, Queen Anne of Great Britain promised to aid the Spaniards in order that the former boundaries of their dominions in America be restored and established as they were in the time of the Spanish king Charles 11 (1661-1700), if it were found that they had suffered any infraction after his death. Guemes asked that English en- croachment on Spanish lands be stopped and that usurped territory be evacuated. In reply, Oglethorpe cited King Charles II's charter to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, which in 1665 granted to them territory south- ward to 29 degrees of latitude, and included St. Augustine, then one hundred years old. Ogle- thorpe insisted that he had not enlarged the do- minions of his sovereign but had only regulated them, and that without further orders he could not change his policy. He agreed to demolish Fort St. George, but said that the question of boundar- ies could be settled only by the two Crowns.' Later Oglethorpe sent his aide, Charles Dempsey, to St. Augustine. Dempsey was able to arrange on  Xv xv Xv 18 October 1736 a so-called treaty with the gov- ernor of Florida, Francisco del Moral Sinchez Villegas, which temporarily accepted the status quo. Ginemes considered the "treaty" a breach of faith on the part of Oglethorpe and a ploy de- signed only to gain time. The Spanish king im- mediately declared the agreement void because neither party had authority to make a treaty, and Moral Sinchez was removed from office forth- with.' Colonel Manuel de Montiano, late of the in- fantry of Arag6n, was appointed governor of Florida by the same royal cedula of 12 April 1737 which dismissed Moral Sinchez." From the time of his arrival at St. Augustine, Montiano sought in- telligence about the English colonies to the north. In July 1738 he sent Juan Ignazio de los Reyes, an astute Iguaja Indian who lived at Pocotalaca near St. Augustine, to reconnoiter the Georgia coast. The scout went in a small canoe from Picolata to Cumberland Island, where he asked for asylum, saying that he had killed another Indian in St. Augustine and was fleeing from Spanish authori- ties. He was taken to Fort St. Andrews and then to St. Simons, where the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Cochran, asked him many questions about the Spanish expedition which had been canceled in March of that year, and about the defenses of St. Augustine. Cochran wanted to know if the castillo could be mined, if there was 18 October 1736 a so-called treaty with the gov- ernor of Florida, Francisco del Moral Sinchez Villegas, which temporarily accepted the status quo. Giiemes considered the "treaty" a breach of faith on the part of Oglethorpe and a ploy de- signed only to gain time. The Spanish king im- mediately declared the agreement void because neither party had authority to make a treaty, and Moral Ssnchez was removed from office forth- with.' Colonel Manuel de Montiano, late of the in- fantry of Arag6n, was appointed governor of Florida by the same royal c6dula of 12 April 1737 which dismissed Moral Sinchez." From the time of his arrival at St. Augustine, Montiano sought in- telligence about the English colonies to the north. In July 1738 he sent Juan Ignazio de los Reyes, an astute Iguaja Indian who lived at Pocotalaca near St. Augustine, to reconnoiter the Georgia coast. The scout went in a small canoe from Picolata to Cumberland Island, where he asked for asylum, saying that he had killed another Indian in St. Augustine and was fleeing from Spanish authori- ties. He was taken to Fort St. Andrews and then to St. Simons, where the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Cochran, asked him many questions about the Spanish expedition which had been canceled in March of that year, and about the defenses of St. Augustine. Cochran wanted to know if the castillo could be mined, if there was 18 October 1736 a so-called treaty with the gov- ernor of Florida, Francisco del Moral Sinchez Villegas, which temporarily accepted the status quo. Gnemes considered the "treaty" a breach of faith on the part of Oglethorpe and a ploy de- signed only to gain time. The Spanish king im- mediately declared the agreement void because neither party had authority to make a treaty, and Moral Sinchez was removed from office forth- with.' Colonel Manuel de Montiano, late of the in- fantry of Arag6n, was appointed governor of Florida by the same royal cedula of 12 April 1737 which dismissed Moral Sinchez." From the time of his arrival at St. Augustine, Montiano sought in- telligence about the English colonies to the north. In July 1738 he sent Juan Ignazio de los Reyes, an astute Iguaja Indian who lived at Pocotalaca near St. Augustine, to reconnoiter the Georgia coast. The scout went in a small canoe from Picolata to Cumberland Island, where he asked for asylum, saying that he had killed another Indian in St. Augustine and was fleeing from Spanish authori- ties. He was taken to Fort St. Andrews and then to St. Simons, where the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Cochran, asked him many questions about the Spanish expedition which had been canceled in March of that year, and about the defenses of St. Augustine. Cochran wanted to know if the castillo could be mined, if there was  xvi xvi xvi water inside the fort, if there was much money in the town, and so on, saying that soon all would belong to the king of Great Britain. Cochran had just returned from England. He told the Indian scout that as soon as General Ogle- thorpe arrived with his 700 men, they and the 900 divided between St. Simons, St. Andrews, and Savannah and the 5,000 to 6,000 Indians who could be called up within two months would lay siege to St. Augustine. They would begin the operation by capturing a small fort on the St. Johns River seven leagues from the presidio. Cochran said that the soldiers then in Georgia had been brought there to capture St. Augustine, but when news of the Spanish expeditionary force in Havana reached Georgia, Oglethorpe changed his plan and went to England to procure more men. The Indian's re- port was corroborated by sworn depositions taken from three deserters from St. Simons, who had come to the village of Nombre de Dios de Atacaris. At about the same time the quartermaster, Cap- tain Sebastiin Sdnchez, went up the coast as far as Port Royal with 16 men in a piragua in search of 8 forced laborers who had escaped from a lime kiln where they were working. He reported to Mon- tiano that he had seen no new fortifications on the coast but that there were many soldiers in Georgia. At Frederica he was told that 400 sol- diers and 200 laborers had just arrived there." water inside the fort, if there was much money in the town, and so on, saying that soon all would belong to the king of Great Britain. Cochran had just returned from England. He told the Indian scout that as soon as General Ogle- thorpe arrived with his 700 men, they and the 900 divided between St. Simons, St. Andrews, and Savannah and the 5,000 to 6,000 Indians who could be called up within two months would lay siege to St. Augustine. They would begin the operation by capturing a small fort on the St. Johns River seven leagues from the presidio. Cochran said that the soldiers then in Georgia had been brought there to capture St. Augustine, but when news of the Spanish expeditionary force in Havana reached Georgia, Oglethorpe changed his plan and went to England to procure more men. The Indian's re- port was corroborated by sworn depositions taken from three deserters from St. Simons, who had come to the village of Nombre de Dios de Atacaris. At about the same time the quartermaster, Cap- tain Sebastiin Sinchez, went up the coast as far as Port Royal with 16 men in a piragua in search of 8 forced laborers who had escaped from a lime kiln where they were working. He reported to Mon- tiano that he had seen no new fortifications on the coast but that there were many soldiers in Georgia. At Frederica he was told that 400 sol- diers and 200 laborers had just arrived there.' water inside the fort, if there was much money in the town, and so on, saying that soon all would belong to the king of Great Britain. Cochran had just returned from England. He told the Indian scout that as soon as General Ogle- thorpe arrived with his 700 men, they and the 900 divided between St. Simons, St. Andrews, and Savannah and the 5,000 to 6,000 Indians who could be called up within two months would lay siege to St. Augustine. They would begin the operation by capturing a small fort on the St. Johns River seven leagues from the presidio. Cochran said that the soldiers then in Georgia had been brought there to capture St. Augustine, but when news of the Spanish expeditionary force in Havana reached Georgia, Oglethorpe changed his plan and went to England to procure more men. The Indian's re- port was corroborated by sworn depositions taken from three deserters from St. Simons, who had come to the village of Nombre de Dios de Atacaris. At about the same time the quartermaster, Cap- tain Sebastiin Sinchez, went up the coast as far as Port Royal with 16 men in a piragua in search of 8 forced laborers who had escaped from a lime kiln where they were working. He reported to Mon- tiano that he had seen no new fortifications on the coast but that there were many soldiers in Georgia. At Frederica he was told that 400 sol- diers and 200 laborers had just arrived there."  xvii xvii xvii Meanwhile Governor Gnemes had sent to St. Augustine the 8 pickets of 50 men each who had come from Spain to Havana for the Georgia expe- dition, and with them 12 cannon. He had also sent from Havana the engineers Arredondo and Ruiz de Olano, a master mason, a master ironworker, 2 carpenters, 6 stonecutters, and 82 forced laborers to improve the fortifications at St. Augustine and Apalache.' Early in 1739 Captain Pedro Lamberto went from Florida to Charleston, ostensibly to consult a physician. There he learned that there was friction between Oglethorpe and the South Caro- linians, who refused to recognize him as their commander-in-chief.8 In July of that year Juan Castelnau, assistant paymaster at Pensacola, gave information about Georgia to the governor of Havana. While traveling with permission from St. Augustine to Charleston, Castelnau had been arrested in Georgia. During the eighteen months that he spent in prison there, he learned that in July 1738 Colonel Cochran had brought to St. Simons 300 men whom he had taken out of Gibral- tar, and that two months later Oglethorpe had ar- rived with three transports, one warship, and a packet, all loaded with men and munitions. Castel- nau had heard officers of General Oglethorpe's regiment say that they had come to America to take St. Augustine." Meanwhile Governor Giiemes had sent to St. Augustine the 8 pickets of 50 men each who had come from Spain to Havana for the Georgia expe- dition, and with them 12 cannon. He had also sent from Havana the engineers Arredondo and Ruiz de Olano, a master mason, a master ironworker, 2 carpenters, 6 stonecutters, and 82 forced laborers to improve the fortifications at St. Augustine and Apalache.' Early in 1739 Captain Pedro Lamberto went from Florida to Charleston, ostensibly to consult a physician. There he learned that there was friction between Oglethorpe and the South Caro- linians, who refused to recognize him as their commander-in-chief.* In July of that year Juan Castelnau, assistant paymaster at Pensacola, gave information about Georgia to the governor of Havana. While traveling with permission from St. Augustine to Charleston, Castelnau had been arrested in Georgia. During the eighteen months that he spent in prison there, he learned that in July 1738 Colonel Cochran had brought to St. Simons 300 men whom he had taken out of Gibral- tar, and that two months later Oglethorpe had ar- rived with three transports, one warship, and a packet, all loaded with men and munitions. Castel- nau had heard officers of General Oglethorpe's regiment say that they had come to America to take St. Augustine." Meanwhile Governor Gdemes had sent to St. Augustine the 8 pickets of 50 men each who had come from Spain to Havana for the Georgia expe- dition, and with them 12 cannon. He had also sent from Havana the engineers Arredondo and Ruiz de Olano, a master mason, a master ironworker, 2 carpenters, 6 stonecutters, and 82 forced laborers to improve the fortifications at St. Augustine and Apalache.' Early in 1739 Captain Pedro Lamberto went from Florida to Charleston, ostensibly to consult a physician. There he learned that there was friction between Oglethorpe and the South Caro- linians, who refused to recognize him as their commander-in-chief. In July of that year Juan Castelnau, assistant paymaster at Pensacola, gave information about Georgia to the governor of Havana. While traveling with permission from St. Augustine to Charleston, Castelnau had been arrested in Georgia. During the eighteen months that he spent in prison there, he learned that in July 1738 Colonel Cochran had brought to St. Simons 300 men whom he had taken out of Gibral- tar, and that two months later Oglethorpe had ar- rived with three transports, one warship, and a packet, all loaded with men and munitions. Castel- nau had heard officers of General Oglethorpe's regiment say that they had come to America to take St. Augustine.'  xviii xviii xviii Throughout 1739 Oglethorpe reinforced his gar- risons with militia and Indians who were sent with increasing frequency on border raids into Florida. In March, when a committee from the South Car- olina General Assembly stopped at St. Simons en route to St. Augustine to demand the return of runaway slaves, Oglethorpe took advantage of the opportunity to send with them Lieutenant Ray- mond Dem6r6 "to present his compliments to the governor." Dem6r6's efforts to obtain intelligence for his superior were frustrated by Montiano's in- sistence upon entertaining all the Englishmen as his houseguests." Later that year the general himself traveled to Coweta, deep in the interior of the country, to enlist the assistance of the Creek and Cherokee nations in an attack on St. Augustine. On 5 Octo- ber he informed the Trustees of Georgia that he had sent Toonahowi against the Spaniards with 200 men. Toonahowi was one of the Indians who had been entertained by the Trustees in London when he was taken there by Oglethorpe in 1734. Oglethorpe told the Trustees that the Cherokees were raising 600 men and the Creeks 400, "who will act with me."" On 27 September 1739 Oglethorpe informed Lieutenant Governor William Bull of South Caro- lina that he had orders "to annoy the Subjects of the King of Spain." He asked that the province of South Carolina join him in an expedition against Throughout 1739 Oglethorpe reinforced his gar- risons with militia and Indians who were sent with increasing frequency on border raids into Florida. In March, when a committee from the South Car- olina General Assembly stopped at St. Simons en route to St. Augustine to demand the return of runaway slaves, Oglethorpe took advantage of the opportunity to send with them Lieutenant Ray- mond Dem6r6 "to present his compliments to the governor." Dem6r6's efforts to obtain intelligence for his superior were frustrated by Montiano's in- sistence upon entertaining all the Englishmen as his houseguests.4 Later that year the general himself traveled to Coweta, deep in the interior of the country, to enlist the assistance of the Creek and Cherokee nations in an attack on St. Augustine. On 5 Octo- ber he informed the Trustees of Georgia that he had sent Toonahowi against the Spaniards with 200 men. Toonahowi was one of the Indians who had been entertained by the Trustees in London when he was taken there by Oglethorpe in 1734. Oglethorpe told the Trustees that the Cherokees were raising 600 men and the Creeks 400, "who will act with me."" On 27 September 1739 Oglethorpe informed Lieutenant Governor William Bull of South Caro- lina that he had orders "to annoy the Subjects of the King of Spain." He asked that the province of South Carolina join him in an expedition against Throughout 1739 Oglethorpe reinforced his gar- risons with militia and Indians who were sent with increasing frequency on border raids into Florida. In March, when a committee from the South Car- olina General Assembly stopped at St. Simons en route to St. Augustine to demand the return of runaway slaves, Oglethorpe took advantage of the opportunity to send with them Lieutenant Ray- mond Dem6r6 "to present his compliments to the governor." Dem6r6's efforts to obtain intelligence for his superior were frustrated by Montiano's in- sistence upon entertaining all the Englishmen as his houseguests.4 Later that year the general himself traveled to Coweta, deep in the interior of the country, to enlist the assistance of the Creek and Cherokee nations in an attack on St. Augustine. On 5 Octo- ber he informed the Trustees of Georgia that he had sent Toonahowi against the Spaniards with 200 men. Toonahowi was one of the Indians who had been entertained by the Trustees in London when he was taken there by Oglethorpe in 1734. Oglethorpe told the Trustees that the Cherokees were raising 600 men and the Creeks 400, "who will act with me."" On 27 September 1739 Oglethorpe informed Lieutenant Governor William Bull of South Caro- lina that he had orders "to annoy the Subjects of the King of Spain." He asked that the province of South Carolina join him in an expedition against  xix xiX xix St. Augustine, warning, "If we do not attack, we shall be attacked."" South Carolina had no reason to fear an attack from Florida. In a letter dated 27 March 1738, the day before the scheduled launch- ing of the expedition against Georgia, Governor Ginemes had assured the governor of South Caro- lina, quoting the pertinent articles of the treaties of Madrid and Utrecht, that the operation was to be directed only against usurped territory, not against lands legally held by Great Britain as was the case with Carolina.'" But the people of South Carolina had another reason to desire the destruction of St. Augustine. Since 1727 there had been in effect in Florida royal orders which protected fugitive Negro slaves. The provisions of those orders were changed sev- eral times. At first the royal officials of St. Augus- tine were authorized to pay the owners for fugitive slaves who had been converted to the Roman Catholic faith, and the slaves became the property of the Crown. By a royal c6dula of 22 October 1733, Philip V granted freedom to runaway slaves who adopted the Catholic faith and served a term of four years of labor for the state. Later this labor requirement was removed. St. Augustine was par- ticularly attractive to Negroes who had been brought to South Carolina from Portuguese An- gola, where they had learned something of the Portuguese language and of the Roman church. The slaves who were responsible for several deaths St. Augustine, warning, "If we do not attack, we shall be attacked."" South Carolina had no reason to fear an attack from Florida. In a letter dated 27 March 1738, the day before the scheduled launch- ing of the expedition against Georgia, Governor GUemes had assured the governor of South Caro- lina, quoting the pertinent articles of the treaties of Madrid and Utrecht, that the operation was to be directed only against usurped territory, not against lands legally held by Great Britain as was the case with Carolina.1" But the people of South Carolina had another reason to desire the destruction of St. Augustine. Since 1727 there had been in effect in Florida royal orders which protected fugitive Negro slaves. The provisions of those orders were changed sev- eral times. At first the royal officials of St. Augus- tine were authorized to pay the owners for fugitive slaves who had been converted to the Roman Catholic faith, and the slaves became the property of the Crown. By a royal c6dula of 22 October 173 3, Philip V granted freedom to runaway slaves who adopted the Catholic faith and served a term of four years of labor for the state. Later this labor requirement was removed. St. Augustine was par- ticularly attractive to Negroes who had been brought to South Carolina from Portuguese An- gola, where they had learned something of the Portuguese language and of the Roman church. The slaves who were responsible for several deaths St. Augustine, warning, "If we do not attack, we shall be attacked."" South Carolina had no reason to fear an attack from Florida. In a letter dated 27 March 1738, the day before the scheduled launch- ing of the expedition against Georgia, Governor Gtiemes had assured the governor of South Caro- lina, quoting the pertinent articles of the treaties of Madrid and Utrecht, that the operation was to be directed only against usurped territory, not against lands legally held by Great Britain as was the case with Carolina." But the people of South Carolina had another reason to desire the destruction of St. Augustine. Since 1727 there had been in effect in Florida royal orders which protected fugitive Negro slaves. The provisions of those orders were changed sev- eral times. At first the royal officials of St. Augus- tine were authorized to pay the owners for fugitive slaves who had been converted to the Roman Catholic faith, and the slaves became the property of the Crown. By a royal c6dula of 22 October 1733, Philip V granted freedom to runaway slaves who adopted the Catholic faith and served a term of four years of labor for the state. Later this labor requirement was removed. St. Augustine was par- ticularly attractive to Negroes who had been brought to South Carolina from Portuguese An- gola, where they had learned something of the Portuguese language and of the Roman church. The slaves who were responsible for several deaths  X xx XX in an insurrection at Stono in South Carolina in September 1739 were identified by General Ogle- thorpe as natives of Angola." Spanish agents and missionary priests were accused of inciting them to rebellion and desertion. Eager as they may have been to destroy St. Augustine, the members of the South Carolina General Assembly were obliged to consider very carefully the question of joining Oglethorpe in the enterprise he proposed. Funds in the provincial treasury were low, Charleston had suffered an epidemic of smallpox, and the danger of insurrec- tion made it unwise to send many men away from the province. After studying the matter, the Com- mons House resolved on 12 December, the coun- cil concurring, "In case General Oglethorpe should think it proper to form a Design of besieging St. Augustine and should communicate his Scheme to the General Assembly, and should make it appear that the same was probable of being attended with the Success of taking or demolishing that Garri- son, that then the Public of this Province would engage to give General Oglethorpe the best As- sistance they reasonably could to put his Scheme into Execution." Oglethorpe's reply, dated 29 December 1739 and received on 30 January 1740, contained a list of the things he thought reasonable and necessary for South Carolina to provide. He did not men- tion the number of men to be supplied by the in an insurrection at Stono in South Carolina in September 1739 were identified by General Ogle- thorpe as natives of Angola." Spanish agents and missionary priests were accused of inciting them to rebellion and desertion. Eager as they may have been to destroy St. Augustine, the members of the South Carolina General Assembly were obliged to consider very carefully the question of joining Oglethorpe in the enterprise he proposed. Funds in the provincial treasury were low, Charleston had suffered an epidemic of smallpox, and the danger of insurrec- tion made it unwise to send many men away from the province. After studying the matter, the Com- mons House resolved on 12 December, the coun- cil concurring, "In case General Oglethorpe should think it proper to form a Design of besieging St. Augustine and should communicate his Scheme to the General Assembly, and should make it appear that the same was probable of being attended with the Success of taking or demolishing that Garri- son, that then the Public of this Province would engage to give General Oglethorpe the best As- sistance they reasonably could to put his Scheme into Execution." Oglethorpe's reply, dated 29 December 1739 and received on 30 January 1740, contained a list of the things he thought reasonable and necessary for South Carolina to provide. He did not men- tion the number of men to be supplied by the in an insurrection at Stono in South Carolina in September 1739 were identified by General Ogle- thorpe as natives of Angola." Spanish agents and missionary priests were accused of inciting them to rebellion and desertion. Eager as they may have been to destroy St. Augustine, the members of the South Carolina General Assembly were obliged to consider very carefully the question of joining Oglethorpe in the enterprise he proposed. Funds in the provincial treasury were low, Charleston had suffered an epidemic of smallpox, and the danger of insurrec- tion made it unwise to send many men away from the province. After studying the matter, the Com- mons House resolved on 12 December, the coun- cil concurring, "In case General Oglethorpe should think it proper to form a Design of besieging St. Augustine and should communicate his Scheme to the General Assembly, and should make it appear that the same was probable of being attended with the Success of taking or demolishing that Garri- son, that then the Public of this Province would engage to give General Oglethorpe the best As- sistance they reasonably could to put his Scheme into Execution." Oglethorpe's reply, dated 29 December 1739 and received on 30 January 1740, contained a list of the things he thought reasonable and necessary for South Carolina to provide. He did not men- tion the number of men to be supplied by the  xxi xxi xxi province. The general promised to "spare no per- sonal Labour or Danger towards freeing Carolina of a Place from whence their Negroes were en- couraged to massacre their Masters, and were openly harboured after such Attempts." Because two men had been killed on Amelia Island by Yamasee Indians who were allies of the Spaniards, Oglethorpe had already made a raid into Florida. On 4 February the assembly received two let- ters from Oglethorpe, written on 23 January. He reported that a detachment of British soldiers and Indians had captured the two small Spanish forts called Picolata and San Francisco de Pupo, on op- posite shores of the St. Johns River, and he sent a list of the assistance he would require for an ex- pedition against St. Augustine. The assembly de- cided that the province could not afford the esti- mated cost of the supplies, 209,492 pounds, 10 shillings (Carolina currency), but that, "If the General would certify . . . that the same [expedi- tion] was probable of being attended with the Success of taking that Garrison with an assistance from this Government of an Expence amounting to the sum of 120,000 pounds . . . that then the Publick of this Province would be willing to be at that Expence." General Oglethorpe replied with the promise that he would come to Charleston. In Charleston on 26 March, Oglethorpe wrote to Bull: "It would be best immediately to make a sudden Attempt which might be done with an province. The general promised to "spare no per- sonal Labour or Danger towards freeing Carolina of a Place from whence their Negroes were en- couraged to massacre their Masters, and were openly harboured after such Attempts." Because two men had been killed on Amelia Island by Yamasee Indians who were allies of the Spaniards, Oglethorpe had already made a raid into Florida. On 4 February the assembly received two let- ters from Oglethorpe, written on 23 January. He reported that a detachment of British soldiers and Indians had captured the two small Spanish forts called Picolata and San Francisco de Pupo, on op- posite shores of the St. Johns River, and he sent a list of the assistance he would require for an ex- pedition against St. Augustine. The assembly de- cided that the province could not afford the esti- mated cost of the supplies, 209,492 pounds, 10 shillings (Carolina currency), but that, "If the General would certify . . . that the same [expedi- tion] was probable of being attended with the Success of taking that Garrison with an assistance from this Government of an Expence amounting to the sum of 120,000 pounds . . . that then the Publick of this Province would be willing to be at that Expence." General Oglethorpe replied with the promise that he would come to Charleston. In Charleston on 26 March, Oglethorpe wrote to Bull: "It would be best immediately to make a sudden Attempt which might be done with an province. The general promised to "spare no per- sonal Labour or Danger towards freeing Carolina of a Place from whence their Negroes were en- couraged to massacre their Masters, and were openly harboured after such Attempts." Because two men had been killed on Amelia Island by Yamasee Indians who were allies of the Spaniards, Oglethorpe had already made a raid into Florida. On 4 February the assembly received two let- ters from Oglethorpe, written on 23 January. He reported that a detachment of British soldiers and Indians had captured the two small Spanish forts called Picolata and San Francisco de Pupo, on op- posite shores of the St. Johns River, and he sent a list of the assistance he would require for an ex- pedition against St. Augustine. The assembly de- cided that the province could not afford the esti- mated cost of the supplies, 209,492 pounds, 10 shillings (Carolina currency), but that, "If the General would certify . . . that the same [expedi- tion] was probable of being attended with the Success of taking that Garrison with an assistance from this Government of an Expence amounting to the sum of 120,000 pounds . . . that then the Publick of this Province would be willing to be at that Expence." General Oglethorpe replied with the promise that he would come to Charleston. In Charleston on 26 March, Oglethorpe wrote to Bull: "It would be best immediately to make a sudden Attempt which might be done with an  xxii xxii xxii Expence of only Part of the Sum intended. If this Attempt could not be immediately made, that the only Measure would be the giving him at present such Part of the Assistance proposed as might keep the War on the other Side of St. John's or St. Mattheo's River until the Fall, during which Time Preparations might be made for the Siege at an Expence within the Sum voted by the Assembly." He added that if neither course could be followed, the two provinces must prepare to defend them- selves, and that the Spaniards would regain control of the St. Johns River and the lines of communica- tion with Apalache and the French at Mobile. When the Commons House asked for an esti- mate of what would be needed for a sudden attempt, Oglethorpe gave a list of the men and mat6riel he would expect. He added, "If these Preparations could not be made within fourteen Days so as to set out from Charlestown within that Time, the Enterprize would hardly succeed." Having found that the supplies could not be ready that quickly, the house wanted to know from the general, "What Supplies he thought necessary to keep the War on the other Side of St. John's River." Oglethorpe then offered to wait longer for supplies in order to make the sudden attempt that he preferred. In a conference with members of both houses, Oglethorpe assured them that he did not doubt his being able to capture St. Augustine quickly. Expence of only Part of the Sum intended. If this Attempt could not be immediately made, that the only Measure would be the giving him at present such Part of the Assistance proposed as might keep the War on the other Side of St. John's or St. Mattheo's River until the Fall, during which Time Preparations might be made for the Siege at an Expence within the Sum voted by the Assembly." He added that if neither course could be followed, the two provinces must prepare to defend them- selves, and that the Spaniards would regain control of the St. Johns River and the lines of communica- tion with Apalache and the French at Mobile. When the Commons House asked for an esti- mate of what would be needed for a sudden attempt, Oglethorpe gave a list of the men and mat6riel he would expect. He added, "If these Preparations could not be made within fourteen Days so as to set out from Charlestown within that Time, the Enterprize would hardly succeed." Having found that the supplies could not be ready that quickly, the house wanted to know from the general, "What Supplies he thought necessary to keep the War on the other Side of St. John's River." Oglethorpe then offered to wait longer for supplies in order to make the sudden attempt that he preferred. In a conference with members of both houses, Oglethorpe assured them that he did not doubt his being able to capture St. Augustine quickly. Expence of only Part of the Sum intended. If this Attempt could not be immediately made, that the only Measure would be the giving him at present such Part of the Assistance proposed as might keep the War on the other Side of St. John's or St. Mattheo's River until the Fall, during which Time Preparations might be made for the Siege at an Expence within the Sum voted by the Assembly." He added that if neither course could be followed, the two provinces must prepare to defend them- selves, and that the Spaniards would regain control of the St. Johns River and the lines of communica- tion with Apalache and the French at Mobile. When the Commons House asked for an esti- mate of what would be needed for a sudden attempt, Oglethorpe gave a list of the men and mat6riel he would expect. He added, "If these Preparations could not be made within fourteen Days so as to set out from Charlestown within that Time, the Enterprize would hardly succeed." Having found that the supplies could not be ready that quickly, the house wanted to know from the general, "What Supplies he thought necessary to keep the War on the other Side of St. John's River." Oglethorpe then offered to wait longer for supplies in order to make the sudden attempt that he preferred. In a conference with members of both houses, Oglethorpe assured them that he did not doubt his being able to capture St. Augustine quickly.  xxiii xxiii xxiii Aware of the longstanding enmity between the Carolina traders and the French at Mobile, he warned that "in Case the Havanna was taken, the Spaniards would in all Probability, rather call in the French to Augustine, than let it fall into our Hands." Captain Vincent Pearse, commodore of British naval forces in the area, who was present at the conference, promised that "he would answer for it the Place would have no relief by Sea, and that they all ought to be hanged if they did not take it in a very short time." On 5 April both houses accepted the general's plan, and prepara- tions for the expedition were begun immediately." It appears that misunderstandings as to the pur- pose of the enterprise, the plan of campaign, the conduct of operations, and the division of au- thority and command existed from the inception of the undertaking. When the expedition failed, recriminations were inevitable. Members of the South Carolina General Assembly and the local citizens were incensed to learn that Oglethorpe had claimed that the contributions of South Caro- lina were tardy and insufficient and that certain Carolina officers were guilty of insubordination, among them the experienced Indian fighter Col- onel John Palmer and Colonel Alexander Vander- dussen, commanding officer of the South Carolina regiment. On 18 July, two weeks after Oglethorpe had ordered withdrawal of the expeditionary forces Aware of the longstanding enmity between the Carolina traders and the French at Mobile, he warned that "in Case the Havanna was taken, the Spaniards would in all Probability, rather call in the French to Augustine, than let it fall into our Hands." Captain Vincent Pearse, commodore of British naval forces in the area, who was present at the conference, promised that "he would answer for it the Place would have no relief by Sea, and that they all ought to be hanged if they did not take it in a very short time." On 5 April both houses accepted the general's plan, and prepara- tions for the expedition were begun immediately." It appears that misunderstandings as to the pur- pose of the enterprise, the plan of campaign, the conduct of operations, and the division of au- thority and command existed from the inception of the undertaking. When the expedition failed, recriminations were inevitable. Members of the South Carolina General Assembly and the local citizens were incensed to learn that Oglethorpe had claimed that the contributions of South Caro- lina were tardy and insufficient and that certain Carolina officers were guilty of insubordination, among them the experienced Indian fighter Col- onel John Palmer and Colonel Alexander Vander- dussen, commanding officer of the South Carolina regiment. On 18 July, two weeks after Oglethorpe had ordered withdrawal of the expeditionary forces Aware of the longstanding enmity between the Carolina traders and the French at Mobile, he warned that "in Case the Havanna was taken, the Spaniards would in all Probability, rather call in the French to Augustine, than let it fall into our Hands." Captain Vincent Pearse, commodore of British naval forces in the area, who was present at the conference, promised that "he would answer for it the Place would have no relief by Sea, and that they all ought to be hanged if they did not take it in a very short time." On 5 April both houses accepted the general's plan, and prepara- tions for the expedition were begun immediately." It appears that misunderstandings as to the pur- pose of the enterprise, the plan of campaign, the conduct of operations, and the division of au- thority and command existed from the inception of the undertaking. When the expedition failed, recriminations were inevitable. Members of the South Carolina General Assembly and the local citizens were incensed to learn that Oglethorpe had claimed that the contributions of South Caro- lina were tardy and insufficient and that certain Carolina officers were guilty of insubordination, among them the experienced Indian fighter Col- onel John Palmer and Colonel Alexander Vander- dussen, commanding officer of the South Carolina regiment. On 18 July, two weeks after Oglethorpe had ordered withdrawal of the expeditionary forces  xxiv xxiv xxiv from Florida, the Commons House resolved "That a Representation should be immediately prepared, and laid before His Majesty, in which should be set forth, in a particular Manner, what Measures have been taken lately by this Province for the Reduction of St. Augustine, in which we have exerted ourselves to the Utmost, and brought a greater Debt on the Public than our present Cir- cumstances are well able to bear." The house appointed Attorney General James Abercromby, Captain Robert Austin, Colonel Robert Brewton, John Dart, Thomas Drayton, William Elliot, Captain Henry Hyrne, Isaac Mazyck, Captain Samuel Morris, Jacob Motte, and Major William Pinckney as a committee "to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus- tine under the Command of General Oglethorpe." That committee conscientiously based its findings solely upon "Extracts of Journals ... Examina- tions on Oath, and original Letters." The report submitted almost one year after the appointment of the committee was accompanied by an appendix of 139 corroborating documents. After consider- ing the "principal and most apparent Causes of the ill Success that attended this most extraordinary Expedition," the committee had found that "neither the General nor the Commodore have taken any proper or vigorous Steps toward the Re- duction of St. Augustine or done what they en- from Florida, the Commons House resolved "That a Representation should be immediately prepared, and laid before His Majesty, in which should be set forth, in a particular Manner, what Measures have been taken lately by this Province for the Reduction of St. Augustine, in which we have exerted ourselves to the Utmost, and brought a greater Debt on the Public than our present Cir- cumstances are well able to bear." The house appointed Attorney General James Abercromby, Captain Robert Austin, Colonel Robert Brewton, John Dart, Thomas Drayton, William Elliot, Captain Henry Hyrne, Isaac Mazyck, Captain Samuel Morris, Jacob Motte, and Major William Pinckney as a committee "to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus- tine under the Command of General Oglethorpe." That committee conscientiously based its findings solely upon "Extracts of Journals . . . Examina- tions on Oath, and original Letters." The report submitted almost one year after the appointment of the committee was accompanied by an appendix of 139 corroborating documents. After consider- ing the "principal and most apparent Causes of the ill Success that attended this most extraordinary Expedition," the committee had found that "neither the General nor the Commodore have taken any proper or vigorous Steps toward the Re- duction of St. Augustine or done what they en- from Florida, the Commons House resolved "That a Representation should be immediately prepared, and laid before His Majesty, in which should be set forth, in a particular Manner, what Measures have been taken lately by this Province for the Reduction of St. Augustine, in which we have exerted ourselves to the Utmost, and brought a greater Debt on the Public than our present Cir- cumstances are well able to bear." The house appointed Attorney General James Abercromby, Captain Robert Austin, Colonel Robert Brewton, John Dart, Thomas Drayton, William Elliot, Captain Henry Hyrne, Isaac Mazyck, Captain Samuel Morris, Jacob Motte, and Major William Pinckney as a committee "to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus- tine under the Command of General Oglethorpe." That committee conscientiously based its findings solely upon "Extracts of Journals ... Examina- tions on Oath, and original Letters." The report submitted almost one year after the appointment of the committee was accompanied by an appendix of 139 corroborating documents. After consider- ing the "principal and most apparent Causes of the ill Success that attended this most extraordinary Expedition," the committee had found that "neither the General nor the Commodore have taken any proper or vigorous Steps toward the Re- duction of St. Augustine or done what they en-  xxv xxv xxv gaged to do, and therefore they are of Opinion that this Government hath been greatly misled by both." After approving the report, the General Assem- bly engaged the local printer Peter Timothy to publish it. Some three months later, impatient with the slow progress of the printer, the assembly sent the documents to Peregrine Fury, London agent of the province, with orders to have both report and appendix published in England. By that time the bitter dispute between General Oglethorpe and South Carolina had spread to London, where both adversaries had their advocates. More delay ensued. James Glen, the newly appointed governor of South Carolina, had not yet left England for America. Peregrine Fury turned to Glen for guid- ance and when he found that in Glen's opinion the report was "not calculated for the meridian of London," Fury further delayed the printing. On 18 May 1742 Lieutenant Governor Bull sent the commons a letter dated 29 January from Fury in which the agent promised that "His Excellency Governor Glen would acquaint the Committee with the particular Reasons that had prevailed with the Agent to desist from printing and pub- lishing the Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus- tine, etc." gaged to do, and therefore they are of Opinion that this Government hath been greatly misled by both." After approving the report, the General Assem- bly engaged the local printer Peter Timothy to publish it. Some three months later, impatient with the slow progress of the printer, the assembly sent the documents to Peregrine Fury, London agent of the province, with orders to have both report and appendix published in England. By that time the bitter dispute between General Oglethorpe and South Carolina had spread to London, where both adversaries had their advocates. More delay ensued. James Glen, the newly appointed governor of South Carolina, had not yet left England for America. Peregrine Fury turned to Glen for guid- ance and when he found that in Glen's opinion the report was "not calculated for the meridian of London," Fury further delayed the printing. On 18 May 1742 Lieutenant Governor Bull sent the commons a letter dated 29 January from Fury in which the agent promised that "His Excellency Governor Glen would acquaint the Committee with the particular Reasons that had prevailed with the Agent to desist from printing and pub- lishing the Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus- tine, etc." gaged to do, and therefore they are of Opinion that this Government hath been greatly misled by both." After approving the report, the General Assem- bly engaged the local printer Peter Timothy to publish it. Some three months later, impatient with the slow progress of the printer, the assembly sent the documents to Peregrine Fury, London agent of the province, with orders to have both report and appendix published in England. By that time the bitter dispute between General Oglethorpe and South Carolina had spread to London, where both adversaries had their advocates. More delay ensued. James Glen, the newly appointed governor of South Carolina, had not yet left England for America. Peregrine Fury turned to Glen for guid- ance and when he found that in Glen's opinion the report was "not calculated for the meridian of London," Fury further delayed the printing. On 18 May 1742 Lieutenant Governor Bull sent the commons a letter dated 29 January from Fury in which the agent promised that "His Excellency Governor Glen would acquaint the Committee with the particular Reasons that had prevailed with the Agent to desist from printing and pub- lishing the Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus- tine, etc."  xxvi xxvi xxvi The Commons House immediately ordered the documents to be printed in Charleston and ap- pointed a committee "to enquire into the Reasons given by Mr. Fury . . . and [his] conduct . . . in the Dispute between this Province and the Colony of Georgia." On 1 June 1742 the house was told, "Your Committee are apprehensive that our Agent has private Reasons to dissuade him from publishing any printed Papers, wherein the least Imputation of Blame can any way be laid on Gen- eral Oglethorpe, who, your Committee are in- formed, employs Mr. Fury as Agent for his Regi- ment of Foot at Georgia." Consideration of the committee's report was postponed, and it was not until May 1744 that the house reprimanded the agent for ignoring its instructions." The surgeon James Killpatrick, a former resi- dent of Charleston, was living in London in the summer of 1742. Little is known of Killpatrick's early life; it has been conjectured that he was edu- cated at Edinburgh, as a student of that name was enrolled there in 1708-9. Killpatrick made an ocean crossing in 1717 or 1718, which may have been his emigration to America. In South Carolina his name appears in the will books: in 1724, as ex- ecutor of the will of David Kilpatrick [sic]; in 1727, as executor of the will of Thomas Hep- worth, secretary of the province and Killpatrick's father-in-law; in 1732, in the will of Thomas Cooper, Gentleman, who bequeathed to him a The Commons House immediately ordered the documents to be printed in Charleston and ap- pointed a committee "to enquire into the Reasons given by Mr. Fury . . . and [his] conduct . .. in the Dispute between this Province and the Colony of Georgia." On 1 June 1742 the house was told, "Your Committee are apprehensive that our Agent has private Reasons to dissuade him from publishing any printed Papers, wherein the least Imputation of Blame can any way be laid on Gen- eral Oglethorpe, who, your Committee are in- formed, employs Mr. Fury as Agent for his Regi- ment of Foot at Georgia." Consideration of the committee's report was postponed, and it was not until May 1744 that the house reprimanded the agent for ignoring its instructions." The surgeon James Killpatrick, a former resi- dent of Charleston, was living in London in the summer of 1742. Little is known of Killpatrick's early life; it has been conjectured that he was edu- cated at Edinburgh, as a student of that name was enrolled there in 1708-9. Killpatrick made an ocean crossing in 1717 or 1718, which may have been his emigration to America. In South Carolina his name appears in the will books: in 1724, as ex- ecutor of the will of David Kilpatrick [sic]; in 1727, as executor of the will of Thomas Hep- worth, secretary of the province and Killpatrick's father-in-law; in 1732, in the will of Thomas Cooper, Gentleman, who bequeathed to him a The Commons House immediately ordered the documents to be printed in Charleston and ap- pointed a committee "to enquire into the Reasons given by Mr. Fury . . . and [his] conduct . .. in the Dispute between this Province and the Colony of Georgia." On 1 June 1742 the house was told, "Your Committee are apprehensive that our Agent has private Reasons to dissuade him from publishing any printed Papers, wherein the least Imputation of Blame can any way be laid on Gen- eral Oglethorpe, who, your Committee are in- formed, employs Mr. Fury as Agent for his Regi- ment of Foot at Georgia." Consideration of the committee's report was postponed, and it was not until May 1744 that the house reprimanded the agent for ignoring its instructions." The surgeon James Killpatrick, a former resi- dent of Charleston, was living in London in the summer of 1742. Little is known of Killpatrick's early life; it has been conjectured that he was edu- cated at Edinburgh, as a student of that name was enrolled there in 1708-9. Killpatrick made an ocean crossing in 1717 or 1718, which may have been his emigration to America. In South Carolina his name appears in the will books: in 1724, as ex- ecutor of the will of David Kilpatrick [sic]; in 1727, as executor of the will of Thomas Hep- worth, secretary of the province and Killpatrick's father-in-law; in 1732, in the will of Thomas Cooper, Gentleman, who bequeathed to him a  xxvii xxvii xxvii gift of Greek, Latin, and English books; and in 1734, in the will of Benjamin Godfrey, Berkeley County planter, which mentions a parcel of land sold to Dr. David Kilpatrick [sic], executors to convey said land to James Kilpatrick [sic], son of said David Kilpatrick [sic]. His purchases and sales of land are recorded in Charleston. His name is mentioned in the South Carolina Gazette several times after 1734 in connection with the practice of medicine. The death of Killpatrick's son Thomas in the smallpox epidemic of 1738 may have caused him to persist in the use of inoculation against the disease in spite of widespread criticism. The prac- tice of inoculation was denounced by the South Carolina Gazette and by Dr. Thomas Dale, a prominent physician, and was finally prohibited by the General Assembly. In 1739 Killpatrick published in Charleston a pamphlet, A Full and Clear Reply to Doctor T. Dale, which he later developed into a longer paper, The Analysis of Inoculation, published in London in 1754, and later translated into several European languages. Having changed his name and acquired the degree, he signed the name Dr. J. Kirkpatrick to the es- says, translations, and Latin and English poetry he published from 1749 to 1772." It is thought that Killpatrick was established in London by July 1742, several weeks after the as- sembly had received the letter in which Fury gave gift of Greek, Latin, and English books; and in 1734, in the will of Benjamin Godfrey, Berkeley County planter, which mentions a parcel of land sold to Dr. David Kilpatrick [sic], executors to convey said land to James Kilpatrick [sic], son of said David Kilpatrick [sic]. His purchases and sales of land are recorded in Charleston. His name is mentioned in the South Carolina Gazette several times after 1734 in connection with the practice of medicine. The death of Killpatrick's son Thomas in the smallpox epidemic of 1738 may have caused him to persist in the use of inoculation against the disease in spite of widespread criticism. The prac- tice of inoculation was denounced by the South Carolina Gazette and by Dr. Thomas Dale, a prominent physician, and was finally prohibited by the General Assembly. In 1739 Killpatrick published in Charleston a pamphlet, A Full and Clear Reply to Doctor T. Dale, which he later developed into a longer paper, The Analysis of Inoculation, published in London in 1754, and later translated into several European languages. Having changed his name and acquired the degree, he signed the name Dr. J. Kirkpatrick to the es- says, translations, and Latin and English poetry he published from 1749 to 1772." It is thought that Killpatrick was established in London by July 1742, several weeks after the as- sembly had received the letter in which Fury gave gift of Greek, Latin, and English books; and in 1734, in the will of Benjamin Godfrey, Berkeley County planter, which mentions a parcel of land sold to Dr. David Kilpatrick [sic], executors to convey said land to James Kilpatrick [sic], son of said David Kilpatrick [sic]. His purchases and sales of land are recorded in Charleston. His name is mentioned in the South Carolina Gazette several times after 1734 in connection with the practice of medicine. The death of Killpatrick's son Thomas in the smallpox epidemic of 1738 may have caused him to persist in the use of inoculation against the disease in spite of widespread criticism. The prac- tice of inoculation was denounced by the South Carolina Gazette and by Dr. Thomas Dale, a prominent physician, and was finally prohibited by the General Assembly. In 1739 Killpatrick published in Charleston a pamphlet, A Full and Clear Reply to Doctor T. Dale, which he later developed into a longer paper, The Analysis of Inoculation, published in London in 1754, and later translated into several European languages. Having changed his name and acquired the degree, he signed the name Dr. J. Kirkpatrick to the es- says, translations, and Latin and English poetry he published from 1749 to 1772." It is thought that Killpatrick was established in London by July 1742, several weeks after the as- sembly had received the letter in which Fury gave  xxviii xxviii xxviii his reasons for not publishing the report of the committee "appointed to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Ex- pedition against St. Augustine under the Com- mand of General Oglethorpe." In a letter dated 7 September 1742 the South Carolina Committee of Correspondence instructed Fury to deliver the copy of the report which was in his possession to Colonel Alexander Vanderdussen who was going to London, "in order to make what Use of it he should find in his Power for the Service of this Province." Whether Killpatrick first read the re- port and the appendix in Charleston or in London, he certainly had access to a copy of the report when he took it upon himself to write and publish a faithful abstract of it. Killpatrick did not prepare an abstract of the appendix, which was at that time "in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury," but in his preface he wrote, "No Proof or Paper is cited in this, of which the Relator has not, by the Favour of Friends, seen the Original, or authentic Copies." Killpatrick's Impartial Account ... Occasioned by The Suppression of the Report, made by a Committee of the General Assembly in South- Carolina was published anonymously and at the author's expense. It is a skillful pr6cis of the report which omits no important circumstance, and it is the work of an accomplished polemicist. The few discrepancies either are minor or are readily dis- his reasons for not publishing the report of the committee "appointed to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Ex- pedition against St. Augustine under the Com- mand of General Oglethorpe." In a letter dated 7 September 1742 the South Carolina Committee of Correspondence instructed Fury to deliver the copy of the report which was in his possession to Colonel Alexander Vanderdussen who was going to London, "in order to make what Use of it he should find in his Power for the Service of this Province." Whether Killpatrick first read the re- port and the appendix in Charleston or in London, he certainly had access to a copy of the report when he took it upon himself to write and publish a faithful abstract of it. Killpatrick did not prepare an abstract of the appendix, which was at that time "in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury," but in his preface he wrote, "No Proof or Paper is cited in this, of which the Relator has not, by the Favour of Friends, seen the Original, or authentic Copies." Killpatrick's Impartial Account . .. Occasioned by The Suppression of the Report, made by a Committee of the General Assembly in South- Carolina was published anonymously and at the author's expense. It is a skillful precis of the report which omits no important circumstance, and it is the work of an accomplished polemicist. The few discrepancies either are minor or are readily dis- his reasons for not publishing the report of the committee "appointed to enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of Success in the late Ex- pedition against St. Augustine under the Com- mand of General Oglethorpe." In a letter dated 7 September 1742 the South Carolina Committee of Correspondence instructed Fury to deliver the copy of the report which was in his possession to Colonel Alexander Vanderdussen who was going to London, "in order to make what Use of it he should find in his Power for the Service of this Province." Whether Killpatrick first read the re- port and the appendix in Charleston or in London, he certainly had access to a copy of the report when he took it upon himself to write and publish a faithful abstract of it. Killpatrick did not prepare an abstract of the appendix, which was at that time "in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury," but in his preface he wrote, "No Proof or Paper is cited in this, of which the Relator has not, by the Favour of Friends, seen the Original, or authentic Copies." Killpatrick's Impartial Account . . . Occasioned by The Suppression of the Report, made by a Committee of the General Assembly in South- Carolina was published anonymously and at the author's expense. It is a skillful pr6cis of the report which omits no important circumstance, and it is the work of an accomplished polemicist. The few discrepancies either are minor or are readily dis-  xxix xxix xxix cernible, as for example the substitution of the name "Pupa" for "Picolata" on page 32 of the Impartial Account. Where new facts are intro- duced, the Impartial Account makes more vivid the sense of the report. An example of this intensi- fication of meaning is the paragraph on pages 27-28 concerning General Oglethorpe's offer to show his orders to Colonel Vanderdussen and "another Gentleman then present," after the colonel had expressed his "great Dissatisfaction at this mortify- ing Retreat," when Oglethorpe said that "he had done all that was expected from his Orders . . . intimating that the Design was only to draw the Spaniards Attention from Cuba." Killpatrick regretted that the two gentlemen had not examined those orders, and he suggested that perusal of them was still desirable. It was un- reasonable to think that they were the orders of 15 June 1739 "to annoy" the Spaniards and that Oglethorpe had received no further directions, particularly after the declaration of war. Kill- patrick suggested that from the beginning Ogle- thorpe had not taken the government and the of- ficers of South Carolina into his confidence, "Nor indeed can it be supposed at all improbable from the whole Conduct of this Affair, that it was in- fluenced by such Orders [to draw attention from Cuba].... And if this Siege were in Truth but a Feint, might not that have been effected without such an Expence . . .?" cernible, as for example the substitution of the name "Pupa" for "Picolata" on page 32 of the Impartial Account. Where new facts are intro- duced, the Impartial Account makes more vivid the sense of the report. An example of this intensi- fication of meaning is the paragraph on pages 27-28 concerning General Oglethorpe's offer to show his orders to Colonel Vanderdussen and "another Gentleman then present," after the colonel had expressed his "great Dissatisfaction at this mortify- ing Retreat," when Oglethorpe said that "he had done all that was expected from his Orders . . . intimating that the Design was only to draw the Spaniards Attention from Cuba." Killpatrick regretted that the two gentlemen had not examined those orders, and he suggested that perusal of them was still desirable. It was un- reasonable to think that they were the orders of 15 June 1739 "to annoy" the Spaniards and that Oglethorpe had received no further directions, particularly after the declaration of war. Kill- patrick suggested that from the beginning Ogle- thorpe had not taken the government and the of- ficers of South Carolina into his confidence, "Nor indeed can it be supposed at all improbable from the whole Conduct of this Affair, that it was in- fluenced by such Orders [to draw attention from Cuba].... And if this Siege were in Truth but a Feint, might not that have been effected without such an Expence ... ?" cernible, as for example the substitution of the name "Pupa" for "Picolata" on page 32 of the Impartial Account. Where new facts are intro- duced, the Impartial Account makes more vivid the sense of the report. An example of this intensi- fication of meaning is the paragraph on pages 27-28 concerning General Oglethorpe's offer to show his orders to Colonel Vanderdussen and "another Gentleman then present," after the colonel had expressed his "great Dissatisfaction at this mortify- ing Retreat," when Oglethorpe said that "he had done all that was expected from his Orders . . . intimating that the Design was only to draw the Spaniards Attention from Cuba." Killpatrick regretted that the two gentlemen had not examined those orders, and he suggested that perusal of them was still desirable. It was un- reasonable to think that they were the orders of 15 June 1739 "to annoy" the Spaniards and that Oglethorpe had received no further directions, particularly after the declaration of war. Kill- patrick suggested that from the beginning Ogle- thorpe had not taken the government and the of- ficers of South Carolina into his confidence, "Nor indeed can it be supposed at all improbable from the whole Conduct of this Affair, that it was in- fluenced by such Orders [to draw attention from Cuba]. . . . And if this Siege were in Truth but a Feint, might not that have been effected without such an Expence . . .?"  XXX xxx XXX Killpatrick's Impartial Account was attacked by George Cadogan, a lieutenant in Oglethorpe's regiment, in a pamphlet entitled The Spanish Hireling Detected: Being a Refutation of the Sev- eral Calumnies and Falsehoods in a late Pamphlet, etc. (London, 1743). Still writing anonymously, in A Full Reply to Lieut., Cadogan's Spanish Hire- ling, etc. (London, 1743), and in articles pub- lished in the Champion and the London Magazine, Killpatrick answered Cadogan and other critics.'" General Oglethorpe gave his explanation for the failure of the expedition in a letter to William Bull: "Sir, To satisfy our Friends, though I have but little Time, I shall trouble you with a long Letter which I believe will clear up all Objections concerning the Management of the present Ex- pedition. Augustine cannot be closely shut up without dividing the Troops that besiege it. There must be one Party on the Main, one on St. Anasta- tia, and one on Quartell; which I could not do un- til the Seas spared the 200 from the Island. You must remember that I mentioned that Augustine was scarce of Food, the Entrenchment around the Town weak, and the Garrison not compleated. I therefore insisted to attack it immediately since all Hope of Success lay in Speed, and that, as I appre- hended, if we delayed, Succours would come from Cuba. . . . After I left Charles Town and before the Troops got to the Rendezvous, six Half Gal- Killpatrick's Impartial Account was attacked by George Cadogan, a lieutenant in Oglethorpe's regiment, in a pamphlet entitled The Spanish Hireling Detected: Being a Refutation of the Sev- eral Calumnies and Falsehoods in a late Pamphlet, etc. (London, 1743). Still writing anonymously, in A Full Reply to Lieut., Cadogan's Spanish Hire- ling, etc. (London, 1743), and in articles pub- lished in the Champion and the London Magazine, Killpatrick answered Cadogan and other critics." General Oglethorpe gave his explanation for the failure of the expedition in a letter to William Bull: "Sir, To satisfy our Friends, though I have but little Time, I shall trouble you with a long Letter which I believe will clear up all Objections concerning the Management of the present Ex- pedition. Augustine cannot be closely shut up without dividing the Troops that besiege it. There must be one Party on the Main, one on St. Anasta- tia, and one on Quartell; which I could not do un- til the Seas spared the 200 from the Island. You must remember that I mentioned that Augustine was scarce of Food, the Entrenchment around the Town weak, and the Garrison not compleated. I therefore insisted to attack it immediately since all Hope of Success lay in Speed, and that, as I appre- hended, if we delayed, Succours would come from Cuba. . . . After I left Charles Town and before the Troops got to the Rendezvous, six Half Gal- Killpatrick's Impartial Account was attacked by George Cadogan, a lieutenant in Oglethorpe's regiment, in a pamphlet entitled The Spanish Hireling Detected: Being a Refutation of the Sev- eral Calumnies and Falsehoods in a late Pamphlet, etc. (London, 1743). Still writing anonymously, in A Full Reply to Lieut. Cadogan's Spanish Hire- ling, etc. (London, 1743), and in articles pub- lished in the Champion and the London Magazine, Killpatrick answered Cadogan and other critics." General Oglethorpe gave his explanation for the failure of the expedition in a letter to William Bull: "Sir, To satisfy our Friends, though I have but little Time, I shall trouble you with a long Letter which I believe will clear up all Objections concerning the Management of the present Ex- pedition. Augustine cannot be closely shut up without dividing the Troops that besiege it. There must be one Party on the Main, one on St. Anasta- tia, and one on Quartell; which I could not do un- til the Seas spared the 200 from the Island. You must remember that I mentioned that Augustine was scarce of Food, the Entrenchment around the Town weak, and the Garrison not compleated. I therefore insisted to attack it immediately since all Hope of Success lay in Speed, and that, as I appre- hended, if we delayed, Succours would come from Cuba. . . . After I left Charles Town and before the Troops got to the Rendezvous, six Half Gal-  xxxi xxxi xxxi leys with long brass Nine-Pounders got into Augustine with two Sloops loaded with Provisions. ... It was impossible to carry heavy Cannon, and mount them, and make Trenches without Pio- neers. And you know when I proposed 400 of them, Whites or Negroes, it was an Expence the Province could not afford. . . . The Commodore and the Sea Officers agreed with me that they would attack the Galleys, which, if taken, was to be followed by Colonel Vander Dussen attacking the Town on the Water-side at the same Time as I was to attack it on the Land. I accordingly went on the Main. . .. The Commodore acquainted me that the Council of War found it impracticable to attack the Half Galleys, and that they were obliged to leave the Coast on the 5th Day of July, and that several Vessels loaded with Provisions were got into the Metanzas for the Spaniards. . . . With respect to the Affair at Moosa . . . the Occasion of losing that Party was the disobeying my Orders."" In Spanish accounts Oglethorpe's attempt to capture St. Augustine is called a siege. One report was written by Captain Domingo de la Cruz, naval commandant and chief pilot of St. Augustine, who in May 1740 was captured by an English war frig- ate when he went out from the presidio bound for Guarico, carrying 6,000 pesos with which to buy food for the garrison of St. Augustine. The Spanish money was confiscated, and captain and leys with long brass Nine-Pounders got into Augustine with two Sloops loaded with Provisions. ... It was impossible to carry heavy Cannon, and mount them, and make Trenches without Pio- neers. And you know when I proposed 400 of them, Whites or Negroes, it was an Expence the Province could not afford. . . . The Commodore and the Sea Officers agreed with me that they would attack the Galleys, which, if taken, was to be followed by Colonel Vander Dussen attacking the Town on the Water-side at the same Time as I was to attack it on the Land. I accordingly went on the Main.. .. The Commodore acquainted me that the Council of War found it impracticable to attack the Half Galleys, and that they were obliged to leave the Coast on the 5th Day of July, and that several Vessels loaded with Provisions were got into the Metanzas for the Spaniards. . . . With respect to the Affair at Moosa . . . the Occasion of losing that Party was the disobeying my Orders."" In Spanish accounts Oglethorpe's attempt to capture St. Augustine is called a siege. One report was written by Captain Domingo de la Cruz, naval commandant and chief pilot of St. Augustine, who in May 1740 was captured by an English war frig- ate when he went out from the presidio bound for Guarico, carrying 6,000 pesos with which to buy food for the garrison of St. Augustine. The Spanish money was confiscated, and captain and leys with long brass Nine-Pounders got into Augustine with two Sloops loaded with Provisions. ... It was impossible to carry heavy Cannon, and mount them, and make Trenches without Pio- neers. And you know when I proposed 400 of them, Whites or Negroes, it was an Expence the Province could not afford. . . . The Commodore and the Sea Officers agreed with me that they would attack the Galleys, which, if taken, was to be followed by Colonel Vander Dussen attacking the Town on the Water-side at the same Time as I was to attack it on the Land. I accordingly went on the Main.... The Commodore acquainted me that the Council of War found it impracticable to attack the Half Galleys, and that they were obliged to leave the Coast on the 5th Day of July, and that several Vessels loaded with Provisions were got into the Metanzas for the Spaniards. . . . With respect to the Affair at Moosa . . . the Occasion of losing that Party was the disobeying my Orders."" In Spanish accounts Oglethorpe's attempt to capture St. Augustine is called a siege. One report was written by Captain Domingo de la Cruz, naval commandant and chief pilot of St. Augustine, who in May 1740 was captured by an English war frig- ate when he went out from the presidio bound for Guarico, carrying 6,000 pesos with which to buy food for the garrison of St. Augustine. The Spanish money was confiscated, and captain and  xxxii xxxii xxxii crew were taken to Charleston as prisoners. Cruz was released on 13 August with license to take ship for England. He disembarked at Bayonne and went overland to Madrid, where on 9 October he presented to the king a journal of what he had observed in South Carolina. He began his report with the departure from Charleston on 25 May of six 20-gun frigates and two packets with 1,400 men, and concluded it with the return of the Carolinians on 2 August. "Because this enterprise did not have the effect they had confidently ex- pected, the whole province has been thrown into a state of great consternation. After six days of meetings they have decided to represent to their king the great effort they had made for the con- quest of St. Augustine . . . and to beg for assistance so that they can again lay siege to that plaza."" The engineer Pedro Ruiz de Olano sent to the king on 8 August a report of the siege in which he said that in twenty-seven days of continuous fire only the parapets of the castillo had been dam- aged badly, recommending that they be made thicker at once, because it was logical that if Gen- eral Oglethorpe again lay siege to St. Augustine, he would place his batteries on the mainland to give him more effective firepower." Franciscan Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada, auxiliary bishop of Santiago de Cuba, was in St. Augustine at the time of the siege. After crew were taken to Charleston as prisoners. Cruz was released on 13 August with license to take ship for England. He disembarked at Bayonne and went overland to Madrid, where on 9 October he presented to the king a journal of what he had observed in South Carolina. He began his report with the departure from Charleston on 25 May of six 20-gun frigates and two packets with 1,400 men, and concluded it with the return of the Carolinians on 2 August. "Because this enterprise did not have the effect they had confidently ex- pected, the whole province has been thrown into a state of great consternation. After six days of meetings they have decided to represent to their king the great effort they had made for the con- quest of St. Augustine . . . and to beg for assistance so that they can again lay siege to that plaza."" The engineer Pedro Ruiz de Olano sent to the king on 8 August a report of the siege in which he said that in twenty-seven days of continuous fire only the parapets of the castillo had been dam- aged badly, recommending that they be made thicker at once, because it was logical that if Gen- eral Oglethorpe again lay siege to St. Augustine, he would place his batteries on the mainland to give him more effective firepower." Franciscan Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada, auxiliary bishop of Santiago de Cuba, was in St. Augustine at the time of the siege. After crew were taken to Charleston as prisoners. Cruz was released on 13 August with license to take ship for England. He disembarked at Bayonne and went overland to Madrid, where on 9 October he presented to the king a journal of what he had observed in South Carolina. He began his report with the departure from Charleston on 25 May of six 20-gun frigates and two packets with 1,400 men, and concluded it with the return of the Carolinians on 2 August. "Because this enterprise did not have the effect they had confidently ex- pected, the whole province has been thrown into a state of great consternation. After six days of meetings they have decided to represent to their king the great effort they had made for the con- quest of St. Augustine . .. and to beg for assistance so that they can again lay siege to that plaza."" The engineer Pedro Ruiz de Olano sent to the king on 8 August a report of the siege in which he said that in twenty-seven days of continuous fire only the parapets of the castillo had been dam- aged badly, recommending that they be made thicker at once, because it was logical that if Gen- eral Oglethorpe again lay siege to St. Augustine, he would place his batteries on the mainland to give him more effective firepower." Franciscan Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada, auxiliary bishop of Santiago de Cuba, was in St. Augustine at the time of the siege. After  xxxiii xxxiii xxxiii the departure of the English, he sent a day-by-day account of the ordeal to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza of Seville, Spain, who had the letter published in that city. The bishop stated that when the attack began, the people of St. Augustine took as their protector the Most Holy Mary of the Rosary and decided that at every shot, whether fired by the enemy or by the defenders, no sound should be heard in the city except the Hail Mary. He claimed that the miraculous protection enjoyed by the people was demonstrated in several ways: the camp at Moze was recovered with minimal losses, valuable infor- mation about the English encampment was given by a deserter who came into the plaza, cannonballs fired from Anastasia Island by the enemy fell harmlessly into the bay, and although the convoy of provisions which came from Havana was ob- served by the enemy, he made no effort to capture it, which could have been done with ease." Governor Montiano reported to Havana and Madrid in a series of letters. As early as November 1739 he feared that a siege was imminent, because the previous month a 24-gun English frigate had captured an advice boat that he had dispatched for Havana: Later the same frigate had been sighted off Matanzas Inlet. Montiano urgently requested that provisions be sent from Cuba and Mexico, because the English merchants of New York who had been purveying food to the presidio the departure of the English, he sent a day-by-day account of the ordeal to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza of Seville, Spain, who had the letter published in that city. The bishop stated that when the attack began, the people of St. Augustine took as their protector the Most Holy Mary of the Rosary and decided that at every shot, whether fired by the enemy or by the defenders, no sound should be heard in the city except the Hail Mary. He claimed that the miraculous protection enjoyed by the people was demonstrated in several ways: the camp at Moze was recovered with minimal losses, valuable infor- mation about the English encampment was given by a deserter who came into the plaza, cannonballs fired from Anastasia Island by the enemy fell harmlessly into the bay, and although the convoy of provisions which came from Havana was ob- served by the enemy, he made no effort to capture it, which could have been done with ease.22 Governor Montiano reported to Havana and Madrid in a series of letters. As early as November 1739 he feared that a siege was imminent, because the previous month a 24-gun English frigate had captured an advice boat that he had dispatched for Havana: Later the same frigate had been sighted off Matanzas Inlet. Montiano urgently requested that provisions be sent from Cuba and Mexico, because the English merchants of New York who had been purveying food to the presidio the departure of the English, he sent a day-by-day account of the ordeal to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza of Seville, Spain, who had the letter published in that city. The bishop stated that when the attack began, the people of St. Augustine took as their protector the Most Holy Mary of the Rosary and decided that at every shot, whether fired by the enemy or by the defenders, no sound should be heard in the city except the Hail Mary. He claimed that the miraculous protection enjoyed by the people was demonstrated in several ways: the camp at Moze was recovered with minimal losses, valuable infor- mation about the English encampment was given by a deserter who came into the plaza, cannonballs fired from Anastasia Island by the enemy fell harmlessly into the bay, and although the convoy of provisions which came from Havana was ob- served by the enemy, he made no effort to capture it, which could have been done with ease." Governor Montiano reported to Havana and Madrid in a series of letters. As early as November 1739 he feared that a siege was imminent, because the previous month a 24-gun English frigate had captured an advice boat that he had dispatched for Havana: Later the same frigate had been sighted off Matanzas Inlet. Montiano urgently requested that provisions be sent from Cuba and Mexico, because the English merchants of New York who had been purveying food to the presidio  xxxiv xxxiv xxxiv would undoubtedly be ordered to stop their ship- ments to Florida. Work on the castillo, he noted, was progressing, but it still lacked a covered way which could serve as a refuge for the civilians of the town." On 31 January 1740 Montiano reported that in the previous month two outriders of Captain Lam- berto's dragoons had been killed while returning from Apalache, the garrison at Picolata had re- pulsed an attack led by a British officer, and parties of white men and Indians had been sighted in the grasslands south of the St. Johns River. He had decided to reinforce the small fort on Diego de Espinosa's ranch and had sent men out to round up cattle and move them to Santa Anastasia Island and to bring horses into the plaza. On 18 January, Juan Ignazio de los Reyes had reported seeing 12 vessels and about 700 men at San Nicolis, and on 21 January he had brought news that Fort Picolata had been burned to the ground and Fort Francisco de Pupo captured. Diego de Espinosa and six soldiers had been sent to examine all harbors near the mouth of the St. Johns; at San Nicolis they saw three campaign tents on the north shore. Montiano described the great river as "an arm of the sea three-quarters of a league wide." With- out naval power, he pointed out, he could do ab- solutely nothing: the English had control of the St. Johns River; they had vessels large enough to would undoubtedly be ordered to stop their ship- ments to Florida. Work on the castillo, he noted, was progressing, but it still lacked a covered way which could serve as a refuge for the civilians of the town.23 On 31 January 1740 Montiano reported that in the previous month two outriders of Captain Lam- berto's dragoons had been killed while returning from Apalache, the garrison at Picolata had re- pulsed an attack led by a British officer, and parties of white men and Indians had been sighted in the grasslands south of the St. Johns River. He had decided to reinforce the small fort on Diego de Espinosa's ranch and had sent men out to round up cattle and move them to Santa Anastasia Island and to bring horses into the plaza. On 18 January, Juan Ignazio de los Reyes had reported seeing 12 vessels and about 700 men at San Nicolis, and on 21 January he had brought news that Fort Picolata had been burned to the ground and Fort Francisco de Pupo captured. Diego de Espinosa and six soldiers had been sent to examine all harbors near the mouth of the St. Johns; at San Nicolds they saw three campaign tents on the north shore. Montiano described the great river as "an arm of the sea three-quarters of a league wide." With- out naval power, he pointed out, he could do ab- solutely nothing: the English had control of the St. Johns River; they had vessels large enough to would undoubtedly be ordered to stop their ship- ments to Florida. Work on the castillo, he noted, was progressing, but it still lacked a covered way which could serve as a refuge for the civilians of the town.23 On 31 January 1740 Montiano reported that in the previous month two outriders of Captain Lam- berto's dragoons had been killed while returning from Apalache, the garrison at Picolata had re- pulsed an attack led by a British officer, and parties of white men and Indians had been sighted in the grasslands south of the St. Johns River. He had decided to reinforce the small fort on Diego de Espinosa's ranch and had sent men out to round up cattle and move them to Santa Anastasia Island and to bring horses into the plaza. On 18 January, Juan Ignazio de los Reyes had reported seeing 12 vessels and about 700 men at San Nicolis, and on 21 January he had brought news that Fort Picolata had been burned to the ground and Fort Francisco de Pupo captured. Diego de Espinosa and six soldiers had been sent to examine all harbors near the mouth of the St. Johns; at San Nicolis they saw three campaign tents on the north shore. Montiano described the great river as "an arm of the sea three-quarters of a league wide." With- out naval power, he pointed out, he could do ab- solutely nothing: the English had control of the St. Johns River; they had vessels large enough to  XXXv xxxv XXXv transport artillery of moderate size; and they could be reinforced at any time by way of the channels which stretched from port to port as far north as Port Royal. No attempt against them without sea power would be effective." Montiano informed GUemes on 23 February that on the St. Johns was a place called Mojoloa where the channel was very close to the shore; there all boats attempting to go south to Pupo would be exposed to gunfire. He had decided to build a small fort there with six or seven 8-pound guns and 50 men under a captain. To enable him to do that, he required three or four of the galliots which had been built in the Havana shipyards for the aborted 1738 expedition. He hoped that with the galliots he could recover Pupo and re-establish communication with Apalache. Later Ruiz de Olano and Pedro Lamberto chose the narrows at San Nicolds as a more advantageous place, but the scarcity of food at St. Augustine was so extreme that Montiano had to abandon the idea of sending a detachment to build and man a fort there." On 25 March, Montiano dispatched to Havana a list of the men he had available for the defense of the presidio: 462 soldiers, 61 militia, 50 Indians, and 40 free Negroes." On 27 April he reported the safe arrival on 14 April of 6 galliots with a complement of 122 men under the command of Captain Juan de Le6n Fandino and Captain Fran- transport artillery of moderate size; and they could be reinforced at any time by way of the channels which stretched from port to port as far north as Port Royal. No attempt against them without sea power would be effective." Montiano informed Guemes on 23 February that on the St. Johns was a place called Mojoloa where the channel was very close to the shore; there all boats attempting to go south to Pupo would be exposed to gunfire. He had decided to build a small fort there with six or seven 8-pound guns and 50 men under a captain. To enable him to do that, he required three or four of the galliots which had been built in the Havana shipyards for the aborted 1738 expedition. He hoped that with the galliots he could recover Pupo and re-establish communication with Apalache. Later Ruiz de Olano and Pedro Lamberto chose the narrows at San Nicolas as a more advantageous place, but the scarcity of food at St. Augustine was so extreme that Montiano had to abandon the idea of sending a detachment to build and man a fort there." On 25 March, Montiano dispatched to Havana a list of the men he had available for the defense of the presidio: 462 soldiers, 61 militia, 50 Indians, and 40 free Negroes." On 27 April he reported the safe arrival on 14 April of 6 galliots with a complement of 122 men under the command of Captain Juan de Le6n Fandino and Captain Fran- transport artillery of moderate size; and they could be reinforced at any time by way of the channels which stretched from port to port as far north as Port Royal. No attempt against them without sea power would be effective.24 Montiano informed Gtiemes on 23 February that on the St. Johns was a place called Mojoloa where the channel was very close to the shore; there all boats attempting to go south to Pupo would be exposed to gunfire. He had decided to build a small fort there with six or seven 8-pound guns and 50 men under a captain. To enable him to do that, he required three or four of the galliots which had been built in the Havana shipyards for the aborted 1738 expedition. He hoped that with the galliots he could recover Pupo and re-establish communication with Apalache. Later Ruiz de Olano and Pedro Lamberto chose the narrows at San Nicolis as a more advantageous place, but the scarcity of food at St. Augustine was so extreme that Montiano had to abandon the idea of sending a detachment to build and man a fort there." On 25 March, Montiano dispatched to Havana a list of the men he had available for the defense of the presidio: 462 soldiers, 61 militia, 50 Indians, and 40 free Negroes." On 27 April he reported the safe arrival on 14 April of 6 galliots with a complement of 122 men under the command of Captain Juan de Le6n Fandino and Captain Fran-  xxxvi xxxvi xxxvi cisco del Castillo, and of two launches laden with food and ammunition brought from Havana by Captain Domingo de la Cruz." By late June, Montiano had reported that the port was blockaded, although Matanzas Inlet was still open, and that the English had occupied Fort San Diego, Santa Anastasia Island, the settlement of Gracia Real (also called Moze), and San Matheo Point. Families of the town had taken refuge under the protection of the guns of the fort. Despite the gravity of the situation, Montiano wrote, "Noth- ing causes me anxiety except the want of provi- sions . . . if we get no more supplies we shall die of hunger."" When Montiano reported that he had recovered the camp at Moze, he sent the king a paper found earlier near there: "To whom it may concern, greetings: You are informed that as the King of Great Britain has declared war on Philip of Bor- b6n, King of Spain, because of cruelties committed against English traders, . . . and because many Spanish subjects, especially Catalonians, have given reason to believe that they will not obey a bad government if their ancient privileges are not re- stored, if there is any Catalonian, or other Span- iard, Indian, or Negro, who wishes to pass from the garrison of St. Augustine to this camp, the Spaniard will be treated as such, the Negro or Indian will be freed.... And if they wish to join us they will be accepted."" cisco del Castillo, and of two launches laden with food and ammunition brought from Havana by Captain Domingo de la Cruz." By late June, Montiano had reported that the port was blockaded, although Matanzas Inlet was still open, and that the English had occupied Fort San Diego, Santa Anastasia Island, the settlement of Gracia Real (also called Moze), and San Matheo Point. Families of the town had taken refuge under the protection of the guns of the fort. Despite the gravity of the situation, Montiano wrote, "Noth- ing causes me anxiety except the want of provi- sions . . . if we get no more supplies we shall die of hunger."" When Montiano reported that he had recovered the camp at Moze, he sent the king a paper found earlier near there: "To whom it may concern, greetings: You are informed that as the King of Great Britain has declared war on Philip of Bor- b6n, King of Spain, because of cruelties committed against English traders, . . . and because many Spanish subjects, especially Catalonians, have given reason to believe that they will not obey a bad government if their ancient privileges are not re- stored, if there is any Catalonian, or other Span- iard, Indian, or Negro, who wishes to pass from the garrison of St. Augustine to this camp, the Spaniard will be treated as such, the Negro or Indian will be freed.... And if they wish to join us they will be accepted."" cisco del Castillo, and of two launches laden with food and ammunition brought from Havana by Captain Domingo de la Cruz." By late June, Montiano had reported that the port was blockaded, although Matanzas Inlet was still open, and that the English had occupied Fort San Diego, Santa Anastasia Island, the settlement of Gracia Real (also called Moze), and San Matheo Point. Families of the town had taken refuge under the protection of the guns of the fort. Despite the gravity of the situation, Montiano wrote, "Noth- ing causes me anxiety except the want of provi- sions . . . if we get no more supplies we shall die of hunger."" When Montiano reported that he had recovered the camp at Moze, he sent the king a paper found earlier near there: "To whom it may concern, greetings: You are informed that as the King of Great Britain has declared war on Philip of Bor- b6n, King of Spain, because of cruelties committed against English traders, . . . and because many Spanish subjects, especially Catalonians, have given reason to believe that they will not obey a bad government if their ancient privileges are not re- stored, if there is any Catalonian, or other Span- iard, Indian, or Negro, who wishes to pass from the garrison of St. Augustine to this camp, the Spaniard will be treated as such, the Negro or Indian will be freed.... And if they wish to join us they will be accepted.""  xxxvii xxxvii Montiano's report to the king dated 9 August was a review of the siege: Sire: I bring to Your Majesty's attention that several English frigates and other vessels of different classes having stood offshore before this port from 31 March until a few days ago, it happened that on 13 June this plaza was be- sieged by the generals James Oglethorpe, com- mandant of the land forces, and Vincent Pierse [sic], commodore of the maritime forces. The former brought 500 men and many banners to the village of Gracia Real where I had placed the free Negroes, 300 men to the shore at San Matheo, and an equal number to the island of Santa Anastasia. The latter came with seven warships of different burdens, one of them a 50-gun ship, one with 40 guns, another with 28, and four with 20; three sloops, twelve schooners, twenty-three launches and boats, a few piraguas, and three packets. The besieging force comprised 450 soldiers of General Ogle- thorpe's regiment, 40 horse, 600 militia from Carolina and Georgia, 130 Indians of various nations, 200 armed sailors encamped on Santa Anastasia Island and 200 who manned the schooners and sloops, and the piraguas which were used to transport food and ammunition from one place to another within the bar. They set up three batteries against us, one opposite the fort in the place called the Loza on Santa Anastasia Island with four 18-pound Montiano's report to the king dated 9 August was a review of the siege: Sire: I bring to Your Majesty's attention that several English frigates and other vessels of different classes having stood offshore before this port from 31 March until a few days ago, it happened that on 13 June this plaza was be- sieged by the generals James Oglethorpe, com- mandant of the land forces, and Vincent Pierse [sic], commodore of the maritime forces. The former brought 500 men and many banners to the village of Gracia Real where I had placed the free Negroes, 300 men to the shore at San Matheo, and an equal number to the island of Santa Anastasia. The latter came with seven warships of different burdens, one of them a 50-gun ship, one with 40 guns, another with 28, and four with 20; three sloops, twelve schooners, twenty-three launches and boats, a few piraguas, and three packets. The besieging force comprised 450 soldiers of General Ogle- thorpe's regiment, 40 horse, 600 militia from Carolina and Georgia, 130 Indians of various nations, 200 armed sailors encamped on Santa Anastasia Island and 200 who manned the schooners and sloops, and the piraguas which were used to transport food and ammunition from one place to another within the bar. They set up three batteries against us, one opposite the fort in the place called the Loza on Santa Anastasia Island with four 18-pound xxxvii Montiano's report to the king dated 9 August was a review of the siege: Sire: I bring to Your Majesty's attention that several English frigates and other vessels of different classes having stood offshore before this port from 31 March until a few days ago, it happened that on 13 June this plaza was be- sieged by the generals James Oglethorpe, com- mandant of the land forces, and Vincent Pierse [sic], commodore of the maritime forces. The former brought 500 men and many banners to the village of Gracia Real where I had placed the free Negroes, 300 men to the shore at San Matheo, and an equal number to the island of Santa Anastasia. The latter came with seven warships of different burdens, one of them a 50-gun ship, one with 40 guns, another with 28, and four with 20; three sloops, twelve schooners, twenty-three launches and boats, a few piraguas, and three packets. The besieging force comprised 450 soldiers of General Ogle- thorpe's regiment, 40 horse, 600 militia from Carolina and Georgia, 130 Indians of various nations, 200 armed sailors encamped on Santa Anastasia Island and 200 who manned the schooners and sloops, and the piraguas which were used to transport food and ammunition from one place to another within the bar. They set up three batteries against us, one opposite the fort in the place called the Loza on Santa Anastasia Island with four 18-pound  xxxviii xxxviii xxxviii guns and one 9-pounder with which they fired on the galliots; a second on the wooded point of the same island with two 18-pounders; and another on San Matheo Point with seven 6- pounders, five of them made of iron, the others of bronze. In those three batteries they placed four mortars for firing grenades weighing half a hundred-weight and about one hundred- weight, and three small mortars for firing hand grenades and grenades weighing 6, 8, 10, and 12 pounds. Bombardment and firing from the batteries continued for twenty-seven consecutive days, from 24 June until 20 July, whereupon the besiegers set out in precipitate ignominious flight. They left behind four 6-pound guns, one schooner, several rifles and muskets, a quan- tity of cannon balls and grenades, two barrels of powder, and some gun carriages for use on sea and land. They set fire to several barrels of meat, cheese and butter, dried meat, rice, and beans, and to a schooner, and a beautiful mor- tar carriage. Our people salvaged some barrels of flour, butter, rice, biscuits, and bacon. We experienced some damage in the fortress which must be repaired at once. One artilleryman and one convict were killed by cannon balls. One soldier and one Negro slave were wounded by grenades; the latter has recovered completely; the former has a good chance of surviving, but with the loss of one leg. I must tell Your Majesty without delay that the right hand of the Omnipotent has miracu- guns and one 9-pounder with which they fired on the galliots; a second on the wooded point of the same island with two 18-pounders; and another on San Matheo Point with seven 6- pounders, five of them made of iron, the others of bronze. In those three batteries they placed four mortars for firing grenades weighing half a hundred-weight and about one hundred- weight, and three small mortars for firing hand grenades and grenades weighing 6, 8, 10, and 12 pounds. Bombardment and firing from the batteries continued for twenty-seven consecutive days, from 24 June until 20 July, whereupon the besiegers set out in precipitate ignominious flight. They left behind four 6-pound guns, one schooner, several rifles and muskets, a quan- tity of cannon balls and grenades, two barrels of powder, and some gun carriages for use on sea and land. They set fire to several barrels of meat, cheese and butter, dried meat, rice, and beans, and to a schooner, and a beautiful mor- tar carriage. Our people salvaged some barrels of flour, butter, rice, biscuits, and bacon. We experienced some damage in the fortress which must be repaired at once. One artilleryman and one convict were killed by cannon balls. One soldier and one Negro slave were wounded by grenades; the latter has recovered completely; the former has a good chance of surviving, but with the loss of one leg. I must tell Your Majesty without delay that the right hand of the Omnipotent has miracu- guns and one 9-pounder with which they fired on the galliots; a second on the wooded point of the same island with two 18-pounders; and another on San Matheo Point with seven 6- pounders, five of them made of iron, the others of bronze. In those three batteries they placed four mortars for firing grenades weighing half a hundred-weight and about one hundred- weight, and three small mortars for firing hand grenades and grenades weighing 6, 8, 10, and 12 pounds. Bombardment and firing from the batteries continued for twenty-seven consecutive days, from 24 June until 20 July, whereupon the besiegers set out in precipitate ignominious flight. They left behind four 6-pound guns, one schooner, several rifles and muskets, a quan- tity of cannon balls and grenades, two barrels of powder, and some gun carriages for use on sea and land. They set fire to several barrels of meat, cheese and butter, dried meat, rice, and beans, and to a schooner, and a beautiful mor- tar carriage. Our people salvaged some barrels of flour, butter, rice, biscuits, and bacon. We experienced some damage in the fortress which must be repaired at once. One artilleryman and one convict were killed by cannon balls. One soldier and one Negro slave were wounded by grenades; the latter has recovered completely; the former has a good chance of surviving, but with the loss of one leg. I must tell Your Majesty without delay that the right hand of the Omnipotent has miracu-  xxxix xxxix xxxix lously inspired in this garrison and civilian pop- ulation such spirit, zeal, and valor, that besides having persevered tirelessly with weapons in their hands day and night throughout the siege, even the Negro slaves, whom I had also armed with rifles and bayonets, longed to rush out to meet the enemy's attacks. These ardent Spaniards distinguished them- selves on the following occasion. Having been assured by my spies that in the quarters at the village of Gracia Real, also called Moze, there was a detachment of little more than 100 men, I sent out of the plaza at midnight on 25 June a party of about 300 men, dragoons, convicts, Indians, and free Negroes, under the command of Captain Antonio Salgado. Moving slowly and cautiously they were able by two o'clock in the morning to lie in ambush near the camp. At three o'clock the Scots called out the watchword, and our men, who were ready for action, realized that they had already been per- ceived. They showed themselves all at once, and met a heavy fire from the enemy. Taking advantage of this juncture, they advanced with such impetus that in less than three quarters of an hour, the duration of the skirmish, there sur- rendered at bayonet point a company of 72 Scots, chosen men who were General Ogle- thorpe's guards, 15 infantrymen and a sergeant from General Oglethorpe's regiment, 40 horse, and 35 Indians, Yuchis and Uchises. That detachment or garrison, which was commanded by Colonel Palma [sic], the man lously inspired in this garrison and civilian pop- ulation such spirit, zeal, and valor, that besides having persevered tirelessly with weapons in their hands day and night throughout the siege, even the Negro slaves, whom I had also armed with rifles and bayonets, longed to rush out to meet the enemy's attacks. These ardent Spaniards distinguished them- selves on the following occasion. Having been assured by my spies that in the quarters at the village of Gracia Real, also called Moze, there was a detachment of little more than 100 men, I sent out of the plaza at midnight on 25 June a party of about 300 men, dragoons, convicts, Indians, and free Negroes, under the command of Captain Antonio Salgado. Moving slowly and cautiously they were able by two o'clock in the morning to lie in ambush near the camp. At three o'clock the Scots called out the watchword, and our men, who were ready for action, realized that they had already been per- ceived. They showed themselves all at once, and met a heavy fire from the enemy. Taking advantage of this juncture, they advanced with such impetus that in less than three quarters of an hour, the duration of the skirmish, there sur- rendered at bayonet point a company of 72 Scots, chosen men who were General Ogle- thorpe's guards, 15 infantrymen and a sergeant from General Oglethorpe's regiment, 40 horse, and 35 Indians, Yuchis and Uchises. That detachment or garrison, which was commanded by Colonel Palma [sic], the man lously inspired in this garrison and civilian pop- ulation such spirit, zeal, and valor, that besides having persevered tirelessly with weapons in their hands day and night throughout the siege, even the Negro slaves, whom I had also armed with rifles and bayonets, longed to rush out to meet the enemy's attacks. These ardent Spaniards distinguished them- selves on the following occasion. Having been assured by my spies that in the quarters at the village of Gracia Real, also called Moze, there was a detachment of little more than 100 men, I sent out of the plaza at midnight on 25 June a party of about 300 men, dragoons, convicts, Indians, and free Negroes, under the command of Captain Antonio Salgado. Moving slowly and cautiously they were able by two o'clock in the morning to lie in ambush near the camp. At three o'clock the Scots called out the watchword, and our men, who were ready for action, realized that they had already been per- ceived. They showed themselves all at once, and met a heavy fire from the enemy. Taking advantage of this juncture, they advanced with such impetus that in less than three quarters of an hour, the duration of the skirmish, there sur- rendered at bayonet point a company of 72 Scots, chosen men who were General Ogle- thorpe's guards, 15 infantrymen and a sergeant from General Oglethorpe's regiment, 40 horse, and 35 Indians, Yuchis and Uchises. That detachment or garrison, which was commanded by Colonel Palma [sic], the man  xl xl X1 who in the year '28 dared to approach within the distance of two rifle shots of this fortress to make certain demands of Field Marshal Don Antonio de Benavides, was entirely undone and destroyed. Our men left 75 dead and took out 35 prisoners and their flag, among the prisoners a captain and three subalterns, all Scots; among the dead, Colonel Palma and his son, a cavalry captain. I think that many others went out to die in the thickets of the forests, as afterwards several bodies were found there, and on the river bank we have found the cloth- ing of others who threw themselves into the stream. I have learned of the escape of only 11 Indians and 7 horse who were out on patrol and did not meet our party, perhaps by special providence. The six galliots with 122 crewmen sent to me by the governor of Havana for the purpose of recovering Pupo have prevented schooners and other smaller vessels from entering the bay which lies before this city. In summary, Sire, I can report to Your Majesty that amid the in- tense stubborn persistence of the fire of cannon and mortars and the anxiety naturally aroused by the multitude of vessels of every burden which were in our sight, that not only did no Spaniard desert in all the time of the siege, but no one complained, although all these faithful soldiers and subjects were supplied only one pound of bread, half rations for the infantry, and everyone knew that from the 15th day of who in the year '28 dared to approach within the distance of two rifle shots of this fortress to make certain demands of Field Marshal Don Antonio de Benavides, was entirely undone and destroyed. Our men left 75 dead and took out 35 prisoners and their flag, among the prisoners a captain and three subalterns, all Scots; among the dead, Colonel Palma and his son, a cavalry captain. I think that many others went out to die in the thickets of the forests, as afterwards several bodies were found there, and on the river bank we have found the cloth- ing of others who threw themselves into the stream. I have learned of the escape of only 11 Indians and 7 horse who were out on patrol and did not meet our party, perhaps by special providence. The six galliots with 122 crewmen sent to me by the governor of Havana for the purpose of recovering Pupo have prevented schooners and other smaller vessels from entering the bay which lies before this city. In summary, Sire, I can report to Your Majesty that amid the in- tense stubborn persistence of the fire of cannon and mortars and the anxiety naturally aroused by the multitude of vessels of every burden which were in our sight, that not only did no Spaniard desert in all the time of the siege, but no one complained, although all these faithful soldiers and subjects were supplied only one pound of bread, half rations for the infantry, and everyone knew that from the 15th day of who in the year '28 dared to approach within the distance of two rifle shots of this fortress to make certain demands of Field Marshal Don Antonio de Benavides, was entirely undone and destroyed. Our men left 75 dead and took out 35 prisoners and their flag, among the prisoners a captain and three subalterns, all Scots; among the dead, Colonel Palma and his son, a cavalry captain. I think that many others went out to die in the thickets of the forests, as afterwards several bodies were found there, and on the river bank we have found the cloth- ing of others who threw themselves into the stream. I have learned of the escape of only 11 Indians and 7 horse who were out on patrol and did not meet our party, perhaps by special providence. The six galliots with 122 crewmen sent to me by the governor of Havana for the purpose of recovering Pupo have prevented schooners and other smaller vessels from entering the bay which lies before this city. In summary, Sire, I can report to Your Majesty that amid the in- tense stubborn persistence of the fire of cannon and mortars and the anxiety naturally aroused by the multitude of vessels of every burden which were in our sight, that not only did no Spaniard desert in all the time of the siege, but no one complained, although all these faithful soldiers and subjects were supplied only one pound of bread, half rations for the infantry, and everyone knew that from the 15th day of  xli xli xli July there were rations for no more than an- other fortnight. On 27 July there came into this port by way of Matanzas Inlet three sloops and two schoon- ers laden with food sent to me by the governor of Havana, and with casava, corn, rice, and 700-weight of flour sent by the viceroy of New Spain and the governor and royal officials of Vera Cruz. Because of my repeated requests made in view of Your Majesty's royal orders and the needs of this plaza, I expect more suc- cor. Those ships could not come into this port earlier because of the danger posed by the enemy warships which except for a few inter- vals have stood off this port since 2 October of last year. I received a message from Mosquito Inlet on the night of 7 July that those vessels had put in there on the previous day, but I took no steps toward transporting those provisions for important reasons, especially because of in- telligence given me by a deserter that the enemy intended to advance on the city by sea and land with one of the spring tides. As soon as the spring tides had ended, I sent Ensign Don Antonio Nieto de Carvajal with two launches, one boat, and a piragua to fetch the victuals. On the lee shore of Matanzas Inlet he encountered a frigate and a packet which fired on him persistently and put out two launches and two boats to pursue him. He de- fended himself bravely, and returned here with almost 800-weight of flour. This method of July there were rations for no more than an- other fortnight. On 27 July there came into this port by way of Matanzas Inlet three sloops and two schoon- ers laden with food sent to me by the governor of Havana, and with casava, corn, rice, and 700-weight of flour sent by the viceroy of New Spain and the governor and royal officials of Vera Cruz. Because of my repeated requests made in view of Your Majesty's royal orders and the needs of this plaza, I expect more suc- cor. Those ships could not come into this port earlier because of the danger posed by the enemy warships which except for a few inter- vals have stood off this port since 2 October of last year. I received a message from Mosquito Inlet on the night of 7 July that those vessels had put in there on the previous day, but I took no steps toward transporting those provisions for important reasons, especially because of in- telligence given me by a deserter that the enemy intended to advance on the city by sea and land with one of the spring tides. As soon as the spring tides had ended, I sent Ensign Don Antonio Nieto de Carvajal with two launches, one boat, and a piragua to fetch the victuals. On the lee shore of Matanzas Inlet he encountered a frigate and a packet which fired on him persistently and put out two launches and two boats to pursue him. He de- fended himself bravely, and returned here with almost 800-weight of flour. This method of July there were rations for no more than an- other fortnight. On 27 July there came into this port by way of Matanzas Inlet three sloops and two schoon- ers laden with food sent to me by the governor of Havana, and with casava, corn, rice, and 700-weight of flour sent by the viceroy of New Spain and the governor and royal officials of Vera Cruz. Because of my repeated requests made in view of Your Majesty's royal orders and the needs of this plaza, I expect more suc- cor. Those ships could not come into this port earlier because of the danger posed by the enemy warships which except for a few inter- vals have stood off this port since 2 October of last year. I received a message from Mosquito Inlet on the night of 7 July that those vessels had put in there on the previous day, but I took no steps toward transporting those provisions for important reasons, especially because of in- telligence given me by a deserter that the enemy intended to advance on the city by sea and land with one of the spring tides. As soon as the spring tides had ended, I sent Ensign Don Antonio Nieto de Carvajal with two launches, one boat, and a piragua to fetch the victuals. On the lee shore of Matanzas Inlet he encountered a frigate and a packet which fired on him persistently and put out two launches and two boats to pursue him. He de- fended himself bravely, and returned here with almost 800-weight of flour. This method of  xlii xlii xlii transporting the food was continued safely until the ships mentioned above could put in here, after the retreat of the enemies and the departure of the frigate and packet which re- mained on this coast for four days after the siege was lifted. All the nineteen English deserters who are here have assured me that General Oglethorpe is now at the mouth of the St. Johns River with his troops, militia, and marine forces. They say that at times he states that he intends to attack this plaza again soon, at other times that he will continue the retreat to his colony, and again that he will lay siege to this plaza next spring. Some of the deserters say that he will have 2,000 men for the second siege; others say that he will conduct the operation with 2 regiments which are to come from London. Although I am persuaded that the re- buff he has suffered and his disgraceful flight can afford him nothing but universal disrespect, nonetheless, because of the influence that gen- eral can exert over personalities consonant with his restless and captious nature, I humbly beg Your Majesty to send me a reinforcement of men, ordnance, and warlike stores. In the present war the English have dimin- ished my garrison as follows: in the capture of Pupo, one sergeant, ten soldiers, and one In- dian; in the sloop which belonged to this plaza they captured forty-eight men, among them gunners, sailors, and the naval officers of this transporting the food was continued safely until the ships mentioned above could put in here, after the retreat of the enemies and the departure of the frigate and packet which re- mained on this coast for four days after the siege was lifted. All the nineteen English deserters who are here have assured me that General Oglethorpe is now at the mouth of the St. Johns River with his troops, militia, and marine forces. They say that at times he states that he intends to attack this plaza again soon, at other times that he will continue the retreat to his colony, and again that he will lay siege to this plaza next spring. Some of the deserters say that he will have 2,000 men for the second siege; others say that he will conduct the operation with 2 regiments which are to come from London. Although I am persuaded that the re- buff he has suffered and his disgraceful flight can afford him nothing but universal disrespect, nonetheless, because of the influence that gen- eral can exert over personalities consonant with his restless and captious nature, I humbly beg Your Majesty to send me a reinforcement of men, ordnance, and warlike stores. In the present war the English have dimin- ished my garrison as follows: in the capture of Pupo, one sergeant, ten soldiers, and one In- dian; in the sloop which belonged to this plaza they captured forty-eight men, among them gunners, sailors, and the naval officers of this transporting the food was continued safely until the ships mentioned above could put in here, after the retreat of the enemies and the departure of the frigate and packet which re- mained on this coast for four days after the siege was lifted. All the nineteen English deserters who are here have assured me that General Oglethorpe is now at the mouth of the St. Johns River with his troops, militia, and marine forces. They say that at times he states that he intends to attack this plaza again soon, at other times that he will continue the retreat to his colony, and again that he will lay siege to this plaza next spring. Some of the deserters say that he will have 2,000 men for the second siege; others say that he will conduct the operation with 2 regiments which are to come from London. Although I am persuaded that the re- buff he has suffered and his disgraceful flight can afford him nothing but universal disrespect, nonetheless, because of the influence that gen- eral can exert over personalities consonant with his restless and captious nature, I humbly beg Your Majesty to send me a reinforcement of men, ordnance, and warlike stores. In the present war the English have dimin- ished my garrison as follows: in the capture of Pupo, one sergeant, ten soldiers, and one In- dian; in the sloop which belonged to this plaza they captured forty-eight men, among them gunners, sailors, and the naval officers of this  xliii xliii xliii presidio, and six thousand pesos; at Fort San Diego twenty-four soldiers, two sergeants, nine horse, and three Indians, at the moment when one watch was about to relieve the other; at Matanzas three soldiers who were carrying messages; another courier dispatched to me from Apalache; in the sally to Moze one ensign and eleven soldiers killed, two wounded; two men killed outside the plaza; and in the siege one gunner killed and one soldier wounded. I again assure Your Majesty that in the meantime, until Your Majesty orders to be sent here the assistance which this plaza needs for its defense, I shall defend the plaza dili- gently as is my duty, even to giving my life in its defense. The enclosed instruments are word for word copies of a summons from the generals Ogle- thorpe and Pierse and of the response made to it: To His Excellency Don Manuel de Mon- tiano, Governor and Captain General of Flor- ida and the garrison of St. Augustine, the Very Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop and Father in God, the Honourable War Council, officers, soldiers, and citizens of this Plaza: We the undersigned James Oglethorpe, General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vin- cent Pierse, Commodore of the warships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at present are before the city of St. Augustine, presidio, and six thousand pesos; at Fort San Diego twenty-four soldiers, two sergeants, nine horse, and three Indians, at the moment when one watch was about to relieve the other; at Matanzas three soldiers who were carrying messages; another courier dispatched to me from Apalache; in the sally to Moze one ensign and eleven soldiers killed, two wounded; two men killed outside the plaza; and in the siege one gunner killed and one soldier wounded. I again assure Your Majesty that in the meantime, until Your Majesty orders to be sent here the assistance which this plaza needs for its defense, I shall defend the plaza dili- gently as is my duty, even to giving my life in its defense. The enclosed instruments are word for word copies of a summons from the generals Ogle- thorpe and Pierse and of the response made to it: To His Excellency Don Manuel de Mon- tiano, Governor and Captain General of Flor- ida and the garrison of St. Augustine, the Very Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop and Father in God, the Honourable War Council, officers, soldiers, and citizens of this Plaza: We the undersigned James Oglethorpe, General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vin- cent Pierse, Commodore of the warships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at present are before the city of St. Augustine, presidio, and six thousand pesos; at Fort San Diego twenty-four soldiers, two sergeants, nine horse, and three Indians, at the moment when one watch was about to relieve the other; at Matanzas three soldiers who were carrying messages; another courier dispatched to me from Apalache; in the sally to Moze one ensign and eleven soldiers killed, two wounded; two men killed outside the plaza; and in the siege one gunner killed and one soldier wounded. I again assure Your Majesty that in the meantime, until Your Majesty orders to be sent here the assistance which this plaza needs for its defense, I shall defend the plaza dili- gently as is my duty, even to giving my life in its defense. The enclosed instruments are word for word copies of a summons from the generals Ogle- thorpe and Pierse and of the response made to it: To His Excellency Don Manuel de Mon- tiano, Governor and Captain General of Flor- ida and the garrison of St. Augustine, the Very Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop and Father in God, the Honourable War Council, officers, soldiers, and citizens of this Plaza: We the undersigned James Oglethorpe, General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vin- cent Pierse, Commodore of the warships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at present are before the city of St. Augustine,  xliv xliv xliv summon you to surrender to His Most Excel- lent Majesty George II, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, etc., the fortress of St. Augustine with everything which pertains to Florida, in order to prevent the shedding of Christian blood and the evil consequences which may result from the unrestrained fury of the several nations when they capture a plaza by force of arms. The British Camp in Florida. 20 June 1740 OS. James Oglethorpe- Vincent Pierse. To Their Excellencies James Oglethorpe, General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vincent Pierse, Commodore of the war- ships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at present are before the city of St. Augustine: We the undersigned Colonel Man- uel de Montiano, Governor and Captain Gen- eral of this city of St. Augustine and its prov- inces, Very Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop of 'Tricale and Auxiliary Bishop of Cuba, officers and captains of the garrison of this plaza, in reply to the letter of summons of 20 June OS calling upon us to surrender this royal fortress and all that pertains to Florida to His Majesty George II, King of Great Britain, in order to prevent the shedding of Christian blood, we respond that we are entirely pre- pared and resolved to shed Christian blood in defense of this fort and this plaza to the glory of the sacred name of God and the honour of summon you to surrender to His Most Excel- lent Majesty George II, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, etc., the fortress of St. Augustine with everything which pertains to Florida, in order to prevent the shedding of Christian blood and the evil consequences which may result from the unrestrained fury of the several nations when they capture a plaza by force of arms. The British Camp in Florida. 20 June 1740 OS. James Oglethorpe- Vincent Pierse. To Their Excellencies James Oglethorpe, General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vincent Pierse, Commodore of the war- ships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at present are before the city of St. Augustine: We the undersigned Colonel Man- uel de Montiano, Governor and Captain Gen- eral of this city of St. Augustine and its prov- inces, Very Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop of Tricale and Auxiliary Bishop of Cuba, officers and captains of the garrison of this plaza, in reply to the letter of summons of 20 June OS calling upon us to surrender this royal fortress and all that pertains to Florida to His Majesty George II, King of Great Britain, in order to prevent the shedding of Christian blood, we respond that we are entirely pre- pared and resolved to shed Christian blood in defense of this fort and this plaza to the glory of the sacred name of God and the honour of summon you to surrender to His Most Excel- lent Majesty George II, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, etc., the fortress of St. Augustine with everything which pertains to Florida, in order to prevent the shedding of Christian blood and the evil consequences which may result from the unrestrained fury of the several nations when they capture a plaza by force of arms. The British Camp in Florida. 20 June 1740 OS. James Oglethorpe- Vincent Pierse. To Their Excellencies James Oglethorpe, General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vincent Pierse, Commodore of the war- ships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at present are before the city of St. Augustine: We the undersigned Colonel Man- uel de Montiano, Governor and Captain Gen- eral of this city of St. Augustine and its prov- inces, Very Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop of 'Tricale and Auxiliary Bishop of Cuba, officers and captains of the garrison of this plaza, in reply to the letter of summons of 20 June OS calling upon us to surrender this royal fortress and all that pertains to Florida to His Majesty George II, King of Great Britain, in order to prevent the shedding of Christian blood, we respond that we are entirely pre- pared and resolved to shed Christian blood in defense of this fort and this plaza to the glory of the sacred name of God and the honour of  xlv xlv xlv the armed forces of the King of all Spains, so that the dominion of His Majesty King Philip V our natural Lord may always prevail in them. St. Augustine, 2 July 1740 [NS]. Don Manuel de Montiano-Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura, Bishop of Tricale-Don Fran- cisco Men6ndez Marquez-Don Sebastiin Sinchez-Don Ludovico Rodriguez Rozo- Don Miguel de Ribas-Don Fulgencio de Al- faros-Don Juan Durana-Don Isidro de Le6n -Don Antonio Salgado-Don F6liz de Uriza Alonso-Don Alonso Izquierdo-Don Pedro Ram6n Barrera-Don Pedro Lamberto Benedit Horruitiner-Don Sebastiin L6pez de Toledo -for my captain his lieutenant Don Antonio Izquierdo- or my captain Don Domingo Jacinto Rodriguez." In his letters to Gnemes after the withdrawal of the English forces, Montiano thanked the gover- nor of Havana particularly for having sent the six galliots which had been so useful to him. Montiano said that he had not yet been able to comprehend General Oglethorpe's conduct or his methods, and he marveled that with so strong a force the general should have ordered a retreat so precipitate as to abandon a wealth of provisions." Montiano had resisted a temptation to pursue the English rear guard because his men were few and were very tired, and he did not wish to risk the ruin of the presidio after having saved it from disaster.2 the armed forces of the King of all Spains, so that the dominion of His Majesty King Philip V our natural Lord may always prevail in them. St. Augustine, 2 July 1740 [NS]. Don Manuel de Montiano-Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura, Bishop of Tricale-Don Fran- cisco Menendez Marquez-Don Sebastiin Sinchez-Don Ludovico Rodriguez Rozo- Don Miguel de Ribas-Don Fulgencio de Al- faros-Don Juan Durana-Don Isidro de Le6n -Don Antonio Salgado-Don Feliz de Uriza Alonso-Don Alonso Izquierdo-Don Pedro Ram6n Barrera-Don Pedro Lamberto Benedit Horruitiner-Don Sebastiin L6pez de Toledo -for my captain his lieutenant Don Antonio Izquierdo-for my captain Don Domingo Jacinto Rodriguez." In his letters to Giiemes after the withdrawal of the English forces, Montiano thanked the gover- nor of Havana particularly for having sent the six galliots which had been so useful to him. Montiano said that he had not yet been able to comprehend General Oglethorpe's conduct or his methods, and he marveled that with so strong a force the general should have ordered a retreat so precipitate as to abandon a wealth of provisions." Montiano had resisted a temptation to pursue the English rear guard because his men were few and were very tired, and he did not wish to risk the ruin of the presidio after having saved it from disaster.2 the armed forces of the King of all Spains, so that the dominion of His Majesty King Philip V our natural Lord may always prevail in them. St. Augustine, 2 July 1740 [NS]. Don Manuel de Montiano-Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura, Bishop of Tricale-Don Fran- cisco Men6ndez Marquez-Don Sebastiin Sdnchez-Don Ludovico Rodriguez Rozo- Don Miguel de Ribas-Don Fulgencio de Al- faros-Don Juan Durana-Don Isidro de Le6n -Don Antonio Salgado-Don F6liz de Uriza Alonso-Don Alonso Izquierdo-Don Pedro Ramon Barrera-Don Pedro Lamberto Benedit Horruitiner-Don Sebastiin L6pez de Toledo -for my captain his lieutenant Don Antonio Izquierdo-for my captain Don Domingo Jacinto Rodriguez." In his letters to Gdemes after the withdrawal of the English forces, Montiano thanked the gover- nor of Havana particularly for having sent the six galliots which had been so useful to him. Montiano said that he had not yet been able to comprehend General Oglethorpe's conduct or his methods, and he marveled that with so strong a force the general should have ordered a retreat so precipitate as to abandon a wealth of provisions.? Montiano had resisted a temptation to pursue the English rear guard because his men were few and were very tired, and he did not wish to risk the ruin of the presidio after having saved it from disaster.2  xlvi xlvi xlvi Montiano thought that Oglethorpe's talk about a second siege might have been calculated to pla- cate the Carolinians. He thought it unlikely that they would follow Oglethorpe a second time, and that any assistance the general might get from South Carolina would be slow. However, all the schemes of the citizenry of South Carolina and Georgia seemed to proceed from their desire to capture St. Augustine, since it was the obstacle which prevented them from exterminating the Indians of Apalache in order to occupy all of Florida unopposed. If their intense distrust of Oglethorpe continued, the Carolinians might peti- tion their king to give the command to another soldier. On the other hand, Oglethorpe might be clever enough to bewitch them again. In any case, it was necessary that the St. Augustine garrison be strongly reinforced, because if there was another attack, it would be with at least twice the number of men. Montiano added, "I must immediately send a messenger to the Uchizes so that in view of all this intelligence they will release themselves from friendship and obedience to the English, and I shall promise to reward them well if they care to come to visit us." As a reward for his defense of St. Augustine, Montiano was praised by King Philip V and made a brigadier. Before the end of the War of Jenkins' Ear, however, the governor would be reprimanded by his superiors for the failure of his expedition Montiano thought that Oglethorpe's talk about a second siege might have been calculated to pla- cate the Carolinians. He thought it unlikely that they would follow Oglethorpe a second time, and that any assistance the general might get from South Carolina would be slow. However, all the schemes of the citizenry of South Carolina and Georgia seemed to proceed from their desire to capture St. Augustine, since it was the obstacle which prevented them from exterminating the Indians of Apalache in order to occupy all of Florida unopposed. If their intense distrust of Oglethorpe continued, the Carolinians might peti- tion their king to give the command to another soldier. On the other hand, Oglethorpe might be clever enough to bewitch them again. In any case, it was necessary that the St. Augustine garrison be strongly reinforced, because if there was another attack, it would be with at least twice the number of men. Montiano added, "I must immediately send a messenger to the Uchizes so that in view of all this intelligence they will release themselves from friendship and obedience to the English, and I shall promise to reward them well if they care to come to visit us."83 As a reward for his defense of St. Augustine, Montiano was praised by King Philip V and made a brigadier. Before the end of the War of Jenkins' Ear, however, the governor would be reprimanded by his superiors for the failure of his expedition Montiano thought that Oglethorpe's talk about a second siege might have been calculated to pla- cate the Carolinians. He thought it unlikely that they would follow Oglethorpe a second time, and that any assistance the general might get from South Carolina would be slow. However, all the schemes of the citizenry of South Carolina and Georgia seemed to proceed from their desire to capture St. Augustine, since it was the obstacle which prevented them from exterminating the Indians of Apalache in order to occupy all of Florida unopposed. If their intense distrust of Oglethorpe continued, the Carolinians might peti- tion their king to give the command to another soldier. On the other hand, Oglethorpe might be clever enough to bewitch them again. In any case, it was necessary that the St. Augustine garrison be strongly reinforced, because if there was another attack, it would be with at least twice the number of men. Montiano added, "I must immediately send a messenger to the Uchizes so that in view of all this intelligence they will release themselves from friendship and obedience to the English, and I shall promise to reward them well if they care to come to visit us."3 As a reward for his defense of St. Augustine, Montiano was praised by King Philip V and made a brigadier. Before the end of the War of Jenkins' Ear, however, the governor would be reprimanded by his superiors for the failure of his expedition  xlvii xlvii xlvii against Georgia in 1742, and for not having taken action against Oglethorpe when he made his final ineffectual invasion of Florida in March 1743. By the end of Montiano's term of office in 1749, he had greatly improved the fortifications of St. Augustine and Apalache, had built a stone fort at Matanzas Inlet, and had made an alliance with the Uchize Indians which persisted until 1763, when Great Britain took possession of the province by treaty. AILEEN MOORE TOPPING. NOT ES. 1. Dispatch to Don Thomis Geraldino, Madrid, 27 November 1737, Archivo General de Indias: Audi- encia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 2592, Document 96 (hereafter cited as AGI:SD, followed by legajo and document numbers). Dates in the Spanish documents used in the introduction are from the Gregorian cal- endar (NS); those in the English documents are from the Julian (OS); the discrepancy between the two cal- endars at the time the documents were written was ten or eleven days. 2. Juan Francisco de Ginemes y Horcasitas to the Marques de Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI: SD 2593/43. 3. Giemes to Don Joseph Patifino, Havana, 12 Decem- ber 1736, AGI:SD 2591/58. 4. Geraldino to Torrenueva, London, 31 January 1737, AGI:SD 2592/5. Oglethorpe told Geraldino that he had left Georgia "in a perfect understanding with the against Georgia in 1742, and for not having taken action against Oglethorpe when he made his final ineffectual invasion of Florida in March 1743. By the end of Montiano's term of office in 1749, he had greatly improved the fortifications of St. Augustine and Apalache, had built a stone fort at Matanzas Inlet, and had made an alliance with the Uchize Indians which persisted until 1763, when Great Britain took possession of the province by treaty. AILEEN MOORE TOPPING. NOT ES. 1. Dispatch to Don Thomis Geraldino, Madrid, 27 November 1737, Archivo General de Indias: Audi- encia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 2592, Document 96 (hereafter cited as AGI:SD, followed by legajo and document numbers). Dates in the Spanish documents used in the introduction are from the Gregorian cal- endar (NS); those in the English documents are from the Julian (OS); the discrepancy between the two cal- endars at the time the documents were written was ten or eleven days. 2. Juan Francisco de Ginemes y Horcasitas to the Marqu6s de Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI: SD 2593/43. 3. Guemes to Don Joseph Patiino, Havana, 12 Decem- ber 1736, AGI:SD 2591/58. 4. Geraldino to Torrenueva, London, 31 January 1737, AGI:SD 2592/5. Oglethorpe told Geraldino that he had left Georgia "in a perfect understanding with the against Georgia in 1742, and for not having taken action against Oglethorpe when he made his final ineffectual invasion of Florida in March 1743. By the end of Montiano's term of office in 1749, he had greatly improved the fortifications of St. Augustine and Apalache, had built a stone fort at Matanzas Inlet, and had made an alliance with the Uchize Indians which persisted until 1763, when Great Britain took possession of the province by treaty. AILEEN MOORE TOPPING. NOT ES. 1. Dispatch to Don Thomis Geraldino, Madrid, 27 November 1737, Archivo General de Indias: Audi- encia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 2592, Document 96 (hereafter cited as AGI:SD, followed by legajo and document numbers). Dates in the Spanish documents used in the introduction are from the Gregorian cal- endar (NS); those in the English documents are from the Julian (OS); the discrepancy between the two cal- endars at the time the documents were written was ten or eleven days. 2. Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas to the Marques de Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI: SD 2593/43. 3. GUemes to Don Joseph Patifno, Havana, 12 Decem- ber 1736, AGI:SD 2591/58. 4. Geraldino to Torrenueva, London, 31 January 1737, AGI:SD 2592/5. Oglethorpe told Geraldino that he had left Georgia "in a perfect understanding with the  xlviii xlviii xlviii commandant of Florida." For useful studies of the Flor- ida-Georgia territorial question one should consult Verne E. Chatelaine, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565- 1763 (Washington, 1941); Verner W. Crane, The South- ern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929); John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763 (Durham, N.C., 1964); J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America (Athens, Ga., 1971). A Spanish document recommended in the report of the Conde de Montijo to the Marqu6s de Torrenueva relative to Florida and Georgia affairs, San Lorenzo, 9 November 1737, AGI:SD 2592/92, 165 pp. 5. Real c6dula, Madrid, 12 April 1737, AGI:SD 851/77. 6. Manuel de Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 August 1738, AGI:SD 2541/47; Consejo de Indias to the king, Madrid, 14 February 1739, AGI:SD 838/44. 7. Gnemes to Montiano, Havana, 24 March 1738 AGI:SD 2593/32. 8. Montiano to Giemes, St. Augustine, 14 August 1739, Library of Congress, East Florida Papers, Bundle no. 37, Letters of Montiano to the Captain General of Cuba, no. 156 (hereafter cited as EFP, 37, followed by letter number). 9. Gnemes to Don Joseph de la Quintana, Havana, 18, 24 July 1739, AGI:SD 2593/59; enclosure: deposi- tion of Juan Castelnau. 10. Montiano to Gbemes, St. Augustine, 3 April 1739, EFP, 37, no. 133. 11. James Edward Oglethorpe to the Trustees of Georgia, Savannah, 5 October 1739, in The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, ed. Allen D. Candler et al. (Atlanta, 1913), vol. 22, pt. 2, p. 217 (hereafter cited as CRG). 12. Oglethorpe to William Bull, Georgia, 27 Septem- ber 1739, The St. Augustine Expedition of 1740, A Re- commandant of Florida." For useful studies of the Flor- ida-Georgia territorial question one should consult Verne E. Chatelaine, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565- 1763 (Washington, 1941); Verner W. Crane, The South- ern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929); John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763 (Durham, N.C., 1964); J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America (Athens, Ga., 1971). A Spanish document recommended in the report of the Conde de Montijo to the Marques de Torrenueva relative to Florida and Georgia affairs, San Lorenzo, 9 November 1737, AGI:SD 2592/92, 165 pp. 5. Real cedula, Madrid, 12 April 1737, AGI:SD 851/77. 6. Manuel de Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 August 1738, AGI:SD 2541/47; Consejo de Indias to the king, Madrid, 14 February 1739, AGI:SD 838/44. 7. Guemes to Montiano, Havana, 24 March 1738 AGI:SD 2593/32. 8. Montiano to Giemes, St. Augustine, 14 August 1739, Library of Congress, East Florida Papers, Bundle no. 37, Letters of Montiano to the Captain General of Cuba, no. 156 (hereafter cited as EFP, 37, followed by letter number). 9. Gnemes to Don Joseph de la Quintana, Havana, 18, 24 July 1739, AGI:SD 2593/59; enclosure: deposi- tion of Juan Castelnau. 10. Montiano to Guemes, St. Augustine, 3 April 1739, EFP, 37, no. 133. 11. James Edward Oglethorpe to the Trustees of Georgia, Savannah, 5 October 1739, in The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, ed. Allen D. Candler et al. (Atlanta, 1913), vol. 22, pt. 2, p. 217 (hereafter cited as CRG). 12. Oglethorpe to William Bull, Georgia, 27 Septem- ber 1739, The St. Augustine Expedition of 1740, A Re- commandant of Florida." For useful studies of the Flor- ida-Georgia territorial question one should consult Verne E. Chatelaine, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565- 1763 (Washington, 1941); Verner W. Crane, The South- ern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929); John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763 (Durham, N.C., 1964); J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America (Athens, Ga., 1971). A Spanish document recommended in the report of the Conde de Montijo to the Marques de Torrenueva relative to Florida and Georgia affairs, San Lorenzo, 9 November 1737, AGI:SD 2592/92, 165 pp. 5. Real c6dula, Madrid, 12 April 1737, AGI:SD 851/77. 6. Manuel de Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 August 1738, AGI:SD 2541/47; Consejo de Indias to the king, Madrid, 14 February 1739, AGI:SD 838/44. 7. Giiemes to Montiano, Havana, 24 March 1738 AGI:SD 2593/32. 8. Montiano to GUemes, St. Augustine, 14 August 1739, Library of Congress, East Florida Papers, Bundle no. 37, Letters of Montiano to the Captain General of Cuba, no. 156 (hereafter cited as EFP, 37, followed by letter number). 9. Guemes to Don Joseph de la Quintana, Havana, 18, 24 July 1739, AGI:SD 2593/59; enclosure: deposi- tion of Juan Castelnau. 10. Montiano to GUemes, St. Augustine, 3 April 1739, EFP, 37, no. 133. 11. James Edward Oglethorpe to the Trustees of Georgia, Savannah, 5 October 1739, in The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, ed. Allen D. Candler et al. (Atlanta, 1913), vol. 22, pt. 2, p. 217 (hereafter cited as CRG). 12. Oglethorpe to William Bull, Georgia, 27 Septem- ber 1739, The St. Augustine Expedition of 1740, A Re-  xlix xlix xlix port to the South Carolina General Assembly, Reprinted from the Colonial Records of South Carolina, with an Introduction by John Tate Lanning (Columbia, South Carolina Archives Department, 1954), appendix no. 1, p. 91 (hereafter cited as Report). 13. Ginemes to the governor of South Carolina, Ha- vana, 28 March 1738, a copy enclosed in Gnlemes to Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI:SD 2593/34. 14. Oglethorpe to the Accountant Harman Verelst, Savannah, 9 October 1739, CRG, p. 231. 15. Report, pp. 10-18. 16. Ibid., introduction, pp. xii-xiv. 17. Joseph loor Waring, M.D., James Killpatrick and Smallpox Inoculation in Charlestown, Annals of Medical History, New-Series X (1938); Carolyn T. Moore, Ab- stract of the Wills of the State of South Carolina 1670- 1740, vol. 2 (Charlotte, 1960), pp. 133, 143, 201-2, 229. 18. Report, introduction, p. xxvii. 19. Oglethorpe to Bull, British Camp in Florida, 19 July 1740, Report, appendix 129, pp. 169-70. For a useful analysis of the campaign see Phinizy Spalding, Ogle- thorpe in America (Chicago, 1977), pp. 110-26. 20. Journal of Don Domingo de la Cruz, 1740, AGI: SD 2584/28. 21. Pedro Ruiz de Olano to the king, St. Augustine, 8 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20. 22. Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza, St. Augustine, 1740 (Seville, Spain, 1740). 23. Montiano to Quintana, St. Augustine, 21 Novem- ber 1739, AGI:SD 2584/18. 24. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 January 1740, AGI:SD 2658/8. 25. Montiano to Giemes, St. Augustine, 23 February 1740, EFP, 37, no. 190, no. 191, port to the South Carolina General Assembly, Reprinted from the Colonial Records of South Carolina, with an Introduction by John Tate Lanning (Columbia, South Carolina Archives Department, 1954), appendix no. 1, p. 91 (hereafter cited as Report). 13. Giemes to the governor of South Carolina, Ha- vana, 28 March 1738, a copy enclosed in Gibemes to Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI:SD 2593/34. 14. Oglethorpe to the Accountant Harman Verelst, Savannah, 9 October 1739, CRG, p. 231. 15. Report, pp. 10-18. 16. Ibid., introduction, pp. xii-xiv. 17. Joseph loor Waring, M.D., James Killpatrick and Smallpox Inoculation in Charlestown, Annals of Medical History, New-Series X (1938); Carolyn T. Moore, Ab- stract of the Wills of the State of South Carolina 1670- 1740, vol. 2 (Charlotte, 1960), pp. 133, 143, 201-2, 229. 18. Report, introduction, p. xxvii. 19. Oglethorpe to Bull, British Camp in Florida, 19 July 1740, Report, appendix 129, pp. 169-70. For a useful analysis of the campaign see Phinizy Spalding, Ogle- thorpe in America (Chicago, 1977), pp. 110-26. 20. Journal of Don Domingo de la Cruz, 1740, AGI: SD 2584/28. 21. Pedro Ruiz de Olano to the king, St. Augustine, 8 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20. 22. Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza, St. Augustine, 1740 (Seville, Spain, 1740). 23. Montiano to Quintana, St. Augustine, 21 Novem- ber 1739, AGI:SD 2584/18. 24. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 January 1740, AGI:SD 2658/8. 25. Montiano to Gnemes, St. Augustine, 23 February 1740, EFP, 37, no. 190, no. 191. port to the South Carolina General Assembly, Reprinted from the Colonial Records of South Carolina, with an Introduction by John Tate Lanning (Columbia, South Carolina Archives Department, 1954), appendix no. 1, p. 91 (hereafter cited as Report). 13. Gbemes to the governor of South Carolina, Ha- vana, 28 March 1738, a copy enclosed in Gdemes to Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI:SD 2593/34. 14. Oglethorpe to the Accountant Harman Verelst, Savannah, 9 October 1739, CRG, p. 231. 15. Report, pp. 10-18. 16. Ibid., introduction, pp. xii-xiv. 17. Joseph loor Waring, M.D., James Killpatrick and Smallpox Inoculation in Charlestown, Annals of Medical History, New-Series X (1938); Carolyn T. Moore, Ab- stract of the Wills of the State of South Carolina 1670- 1740, vol. 2 (Charlotte, 1960), pp. 133, 143, 201-2, 229. 18. Report, introduction, p. xxvii. 19. Oglethorpe to Bull, British Camp in Florida, 19 July 1740, Report, appendix 129, pp. 169-70. For a useful analysis of the campaign see Phinizy Spalding, Ogle- thorpe in America (Chicago, 1977), pp. 110-26. 20. Journal of Don Domingo de la Cruz, 1740, AGI: SD 2584/28. 21. Pedro Ruiz de Olano to the king, St. Augustine, 8 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20. 22. Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza, St. Augustine, 1740 (Seville, Spain, 1740). 23. Montiano to Quintana, St. Augustine, 21 Novem- ber 1739, AGI:SD 2584/18. 24. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 January 1740, AGI:SD 2658/8. 25. Montiano to Gnemes, St. Augustine, 23 February 1740, EFP, 37, no. 190, no. 191.  I I I 26. Montiano to Gilemes, St. Augustine, 25 March 1740, ibid., no. 192. 27. Montiano to Giemes, St. Augustine, 27 April 1740, AGI:SD 2658/11; EFP, 37, no. 193. 28. Montiano to Glemes, St. Augustine, 24 June 1740, EFP, 37, no. 200. 29. Copy of a paper found near Moze, 14 June 1740, AGI:SD 2658/23. 30. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 9 August 1740, AGI:SD 845/8; AGI:SD 2658/12; enclosures. At Moze, Colonel John Palmer was killed, but his son, Cap- tain William Palmer, was not. 31. Montiano to Guemes, St. Augustine, 28 July 1740, AGI:SD 2541/55; EFP, 37, no. 205. 32. Montiano to Gilemes, St. Augustine, 3 August 1740, EFP, 37, no. 207. 33. Montiano to Guemes, St. Augustine, 7 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20; EFP, 37, no. 210. 26. Montiano to Gijemes, St. Augustine, 25 March 1740, ibid., no. 192. 27. Montiano to Guemes, St. Augustine, 27 April 1740, AGI:SD 2658/11; EFP, 37, no. 193. 28. Montiano to Gaemes, St. Augustine, 24 June 1740, EFP, 37, no. 200. 29. Copy of a paper found near Moze, 14 June 1740, AGI:SD 2658/23. 30. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 9 August 1740, AGI:SD 845/8; AGI:SD 2658/12; enclosures. At Moze, Colonel John Palmer was killed, but his son, Cap- tain William Palmer, was not. 31. Montiano to Guemes, St. Augustine, 28 July 1740, AGI:SD 2541/55; EFP, 37, no. 205. 32. Montiano to Ginemes, St. Augustine, 3 August 1740, EFP, 37, no. 207. 33. Montiano to Giemes, St. Augustine, 7 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20; EFP, 37, no. 210. 26. Montiano to Giuemes, St. Augustine, 25 March 1740, ibid., no. 192. 27. Montiano to Gilemes, St. Augustine, 27 April 1740, AGI:SD 2658/11; EFP, 37, no. 193. 28. Montiano to Gilemes, St. Augustine, 24 June 1740, EFP, 37, no. 200. 29. Copy of a paper found near Moze, 14 June 1740, AGISD 2658/23. 30. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 9 August 1740, AGI:SD 845/8; AGI:SD 2658/12; enclosures. At Moze, Colonel John Palmer was killed, but his son, Cap- tain William Palmer, was not. 31. Montiano to Guemes, St. Augustine, 28 July 1740, AGI:SD 2541/55; EFP, 37, no. 205. 32. Montiano to GUemes, St. Augustine, 3 August 1740, EFP, 37, no. 207. 33. Montiano to Gilemes, St. Augustine, 7 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20; EFP, 37, no. 210.  A N Impartial Account OF' THE LATE EXPEDITION AGA INST ST., AUGUSTINE UN DBER A N Impartial Account OF THE LATE EXPEDITION A GAI NS T ST. AUGUSTINE UNDEK A N Impartial Account OF THE LATE EXPEDITION AGAINST ST. AU GUSTINE UNDE5R General Oglethorpe. General Oglethorpe. General Oglethorpe. OccafloIIed by The Supprefio of the REPORT, made by a Committee of the General .Afflrnhl in SOUTH -CAROLINA, tranfmitted, under the Great Seal of that P'rovince, to their Agent in E N G L A N D, in order to be printed. WITH ANl Exaa P L A N of the Town, Cafile and Harbour of St. Augufline, and the adjacent Coafh of Florida; fhewing the Difpofition of our Forces on that E N T E ,R RI Z E. Thbe Suppr]Tion of Evidence is the firong e/2 Evidence of Guilt. TERE N C H A R D. L 0 N D 0 N: Printed for J. H v 000, N s oN, in Sword- and-Buckl Vt- Court, over-againft the Crown-Tavern an Ludgate- Hill, 1742. (Price One Shilling) Occafioned by The Suppre]Jion of the RE PO0R T, made by a Committee of the General Y7mbhl in SOUTH - CAROLINA, tranlinitted, tinder the Great Seal of that P'rovince, to their Agent in E N 0 L AN 0, in order to he printed. WITH AN Exa& P L A N of the Town, Caflie and Harbour of St. Aug ufire, and the adjacent Coaft of Florida; fhewing the Diipofition of our Forces on that E N TE FEP I Z E. The Sut rejion of Evidence is the flrongefl Evidence of Guilt. TERE N C H A R 0). LO0N DO0N: Prin ted for J. H UT 0 00 N SO0N, in Sword- and-Buckler- Court, over-againft the Crown-Tavern on Ludgate. Bill, I 74z. (Price One Shilling) Occafloned by The Suppreffiot; of the REPORT, made by a Committee of the General Ajfibly in SOUTH -CAROLINA, trantinitted, under the Great Seal of that P'rovince, to their Agent in E NOGL AN D, in order to be printed. WITH AN Exa& P L A N of the Town, Caftle and Harbour of St. Augufline, and the adjacent Coaft of Florida ; fisewing the Doipofition of our Forces on that E N T E R F R I ZE . Thbe SuttriLfo of Evidence is the flrongell Evidence of Guilt. TERE N c H A E. 0. L 0 N D 0 N: Printed for J. H L, 0 00 N SO0N, in Sword- and-Buckler- Court, over-againft the Crown-Tavern on Ldae -Hill, 1742. (Price One Shilling)   7he P R E FA C E. T H E Reafon of publiping thefe Sheets being manifefl from the Title Page, I Ihall not pretend to a Knowledge of thofe fecret and extraordinary Motives, that could induce the Agent of a Province to difpenfe with the Dire~lions of that Province, by fupprel/ing their Senfe of a public Afair, a very important one to them, and perhaps not without fome Signifcance to the Kingdom itfelf. I have read it, and am convinc'd by common Senfe, that it contains no 7reafon, nor affrms any thing without clear and fufficient Proof. And without doubt, the Legigfature of that Ptovince did not conceive the Publication of it to be a very indifferent Tbing, either for their own Yufification, or the Information of Great-Britain, when the Enquiries they en- ter'd upon in order to it, and the Dige/lion of the Report afterwards employ'd fo much time there, and the ImprelIrn of it here mufl ne- cefarily expofe them to a farther Expence,when A z they The P R E FA C E. T H E Reafon of publilbing thefe Sheets being manifefl from the Title Page, I jhall not pretend to a Knowledge of thofe fecret and extraordinary Motives, that could induce the Agent of a Province to dfrpenfe with the Direffions of that Province, by jupprel/ing their Senfe of a public Afair, a very important one to them, and perhaps not ,without fome Significance to the Kingdom itfelf. I have read it, and am convinc'd by common Senfe, that it contains no 7reafon, nor affirms any thing without clear and fufficient Proof. And without doubt, the Legilature of that Ptovince did not conceive the Publication of it to be a very indifferent Thing, either for their own jufpification, or the Information of Great-Britain, when the Enquiries they en- ter'd upon in order to it, and the Digeflion of the Report afterwards employ'd fo much time there, and the Imprellmn of it here mufl ne- celfarily expofe them to a farther Expence,when A z they The P R E FA C E. T HE Reafon of publihing thefe Sheets being manifefl from the Ttle Page, I fiall not pretend to a Knowledge of thofe fecret and extraordinary Motives, that could induce the Agent of a Province to dfrpenfe with the Direffions of that Province, by fupprefing their Senfe of a public Afair, avery important one to them, and perhaps not witbout fome Significance to the Kingdom itfelf I have read it, and am convinc'd by common Senfe, that it contains no Treafon, nor affirms any thing without clear and fufficient Proof. And without doubt, the Legijfature of that Province did not conceive the Publication of it to he a very indiferent Thing, either for their own fufpification, or the Information of Great-Britain, when the Enquiries they en- ter'd upon in order to it, and the Digeflion of the Report afterwards employ'd fo much time there, and the ImprelJt'n of it here muf ne- cefarily expofe them to a farther Expence,when A z they  iv The PREFACE. they had but little inclination to add to that extraordinary one, fo fruitlejly advanced to- wardc the Expedition. But whatever Motives may have deter- mined the Conduff of another in this Afair, a fincere Love of 7ruth, and a hearty Attach- meot to the general Interefi of that Govern- ment that Jecures my juji and natural Freedom, are the real Caufes of my endeavouring to ob- viate any Evils that might arife from the Sup- prefion of fo feafonable an Information as that Report might have furnihed our Superiors uith. If any Errors fall appear in the ConduH of this Siege, the Reprefentation of them is the furef Way to prevent their Repetition, if a ft- cond Attack ftould be enterpriz'd : And 'what- ever Steps of it may be approv'd, willnaturally recommend themfelves to thofe fuch Enterprize hall be committed to. Befides, as a Spirit of Enquiry into public Affairs Jeems to prevail now, and will, no doubt, he attended with proper and fpeedy Meapures for reffifying what- ever needs it; it was imagin'd that no func- ture could ever prove more feafonable and cri- tical than the prefent, for tendering this Nar- rative to the Public. This iv The PREFACE. they had but little inclination to add to that extraordinary one, fo fruitlejy advanced to- wards the Expedition. But whatever Motives may have deter- mined the Condui of another in this Affnr, a Jincere Love of Truth, and a hearty Attach- medt to the general Interefi of that Govern- ment that fecures my jujI and natural Freedom, are the real Canufes of my endeavouring to ob- viate any Evils that might arife from the Sup- prejion of fo feafonable an Information as that Report might have furniped our Superiors with. If any Errors fiall appear in the Conduil of this Siege, the Reprefentation of them is the fure Way to prevent their Repetition, if a fe- cond Attack Aould be enterpriz'd : And what- ever Steps of it may be approv'd, will naturally recommend rhemfelves to thofe fiech Enterprize phall be committed to. Befides, as a Spirit of Enquiry into public Affairs Jeems to prevail now, and will, no doubt, he attended with proper and fpeedy Meafpures for regifying what- ever needf it; it was imagin'd that no 7unc- ture could ever prove more feafonable and cri- tical than the prefent, for tendering this Nar- rative to the Public. This iv The PREFACE. they had but little Inclination to add to that extraordinary one, fo fruitlejy advanced to- 'wards the Expedition. But whatever Motives may have deter- mined the Conduff of another in this Affair, a fincere Love of Truth, and a hearty Attach- meat to the general Interefi of that Govern - ment that fecures my jufi and natural Freedom, are the real Caufes of my endeavouring to ob- viate any Evils that might arife from the Sup- prejion of fo feafonable an Information as that Report might have furniped our Superiors with. If any Errors fiall appear in the Condug of ibis Siege, the Reprefentation of them is the furel Way to prevent their Repetition, if afe- cond Attack Ipould be enterpriz'd : And what- ever Steps of it may be approv'd, will naturally recommend rhemfelves to thofe puch Enterprize hall be committed to. Befides, as a Spirit of Enquiry into public Afairs Jeems to prevail now, and will, no doubt, be attended with proper and fpeedy Meafures for regifying what- ever needs it; it was imagin'd that no 7unc- ture could ever prove more feafonable and cri- tical than the prefent, for tendering this Nar- rative to the Public. This  The PREFACE. v 2ibis Pamphlet may jujly be conftder'd as a 'very fair AbJlraff of that full and authentic Report, whofe Supprejion has produc'd it. The chief Diference is, that the Report contains much more, feveralExaminations, Depofitions, and Proofs being annexed to it, which this has not. Ho-wever to give a right Idea of this, the Author is fatisfied it contains the greateft Part of the material Fags mentioned in the Report; the Narrative of the Expedition is nearly in the fame 7erms; and the Refexions on the fame Meafures, frequently jmilar, as they naturally mufl. No Proof or Paper is cited in this, of which the Relator has not, by the Favour of Friends, feen the Original, or authentic Copies. And if he has ever fet down any thing upon other Information or Rumour, he has fpecifedfuch Information or Rumour as the Foundation of it. It is not expefed that a Thing of this Na- ture can efcape the Cenjure of thoje who will imagine themfelves or their Friends aff ed by it: Neverthelefs the Relator thinks he is not without Reafon in calling it, An impartial Narrative, fince he has flriily related fuch Fags as he had a regular Information of and his The PREFACE. v 7bis Pamphlet may jufy be confider'd as a very fair Abflrag of that full and authentic Report, whofe Supprelfion has produc'd it. The chief Diference is, that the Report contains much more, feveral Examinations, Depofitions, and Proofs being annexed to it, which this has not. Ho-wever to give a right Idea of this, the Author is fatisfied it contains the greateji Part of the material Fags mentioned in the Report; the Narrative of the Expedition is nearly in the fame 7erms; and the Reflexions on the fame Meafures, frequently fimilar, as they naturally mu]). No Proof or Paper is cited in this, of which the Relator has not, by the Favour of Friends, feen the Original, or authentic Copies. And if he has ever fet down any thing upon other Information or Rumour, he has fpecifedfuch Information or Rumour as the Foundation of it. It is not expefed that a Thing of this Na- ture can efcape the Cenfure of thoje who will imagine themfelves or their Friends affeffed by it: Neverthelefs the Relator thinks he is not 'without Reafon in calling it, An impartial Narrative, fince he has flrigly related fuch Fags as he had a regular Information ofj and his The PREFACE. v 7his Pamphlet may jufily be conJider'd as a very fair Abflrag of that full and authentic Report, whofe Suprej~ion has produc'd it. The chief Difference is, that the Report contains much more, feveralExaminations, Depofitions, and Proofs being annexed to it, which this has not. However to give a right Idea of this, the Author is fatisfed it contains the greateft Part of the material Fags mentioned in the Report; the Narrative of the Expedition is nearly in the fame 7erms; and the Reflexions on the fame Meafures, frequently fimilar, as they naturally mu]). No Proof or Paper is cited in this, of which the Relator has not, by the Favour of Friends, feen the Original, or authentic Copies. And if he has ever fet down any thing upon other Information or Rumour, he has fpecifedfuch Information or Rumour as the Foundation of it. It is not expeled that a Thing of this Na- ture can efcape the Cenjure of thoje who will imagine themfelves or their Friends affeded by it: Neverthelefs the Relator thinks he is not without Reafon in calling it, An impartial Narrative, fince he has flrigly related fuch Fags as he had a regular Information ofj and his  vi The PREFACE. his Reflexions on them appear to bimfeif fo obvious and unfirained, that be muj) have made the fame on the fame Fags, if every Perfon concerned in them had been unknown to him. That others of equal Impartiality and bet- ter fudgment, may jufly diffet from him in many of them may be owing to his Incapacity, but not to any finif/er Intention. He has at leaf) the good Fortune of having a little Intimacy with his abundant DefeEls, he has not the lea]) Enmity again) any Perron men- tioned in the Affair, and is at this time as little interejied about that Expedition as mo]) of his Readers. In brief, whoever is offended with this Narrative, mug be at Enmity with Truth: Tho' when Fags are extravagant and unac- countable, the mofi impartial Relator of them contrags an Air of Prejudice with fuperficial Readers, and even People of Difcernment, who are affed by it, will at lea]) confider him as offcious, and tell him, that ahen he had con- ]erfdffo little Intereji in the Affair, be might have left it to thole who had more. To this the Anfwer is obvious, that in all difputed Ca- fes it is the real Duty of every Alan, to contri- bute vi The PREFACE. his Reflexions on them appear to bimfef fo obvious and unfirained, that he mu]) have made the fame on the Jame Fags, if every Perfon concerned in them had been unknown to him. That others of equal lmpartiality and bet- ter 7udgment, may jufly difer from him in many of them may be owing to his Incapacity, but not to any finifer Intention. He has at lea]) the good Fortune of having a little Intimacy with his abundant Defeis, he has not the lea]) Enmity again) any Peron men- tioned in the Affair, and is at this time as little interejied about that Expedition as mo]) of his Readers. In brief, whoever is offended with this Narrative, mu!1 be at Enmity with Truth: Tho' when Fags are extravagant and unac- countable, the mofi impartial Relator of them contrags an Air of Prejudice with fuperficial Readers, and even People of Difcernment, who are aff'eged by it, will at lea]) confider him as offcious, and tell him, that a hen he had con- jeffp dfo little Intere f in the Affair, he might have left it to t hole who had more. To this the Anfter is obvious, that in all difputed Ca- fes it is the real Duty of every Alan, to contri- bute vi The PREFACE. his Reflexions on them appear to himfeif fo obvious and unf]rained, that he mu) have made the fame on the fame Fagfs, if every Perfon concerned in them had been unknown to him. That others of equal lmpartiality and bet- ter ?fudgment, may jufly difer from him in many of them may be owing to his Incapacity, but not to any finifler Intention. He has at lea]) the good Fortune of having a little Intimacy with his abundant Defes, he has not the lea]) Enmity again) any Per fon men- tioned in the Affair, and is at this time as little interejied about that Expedition as mo]) of his Readers. In brief, whoever is offended with this Narrative, mull be at Enmity with Truth: Tho' when Fags are extravagant and unac- countable, the mofi impartial Relator of them contrags an Air of Prejudice with fuperficial Readers, and even People of Difcernment, who are affegled by it, will at lea]) confider him as ofcious, and tell him, that vhen he had con- Jeflrdfo little Interefi in the Affair, he might have left it to thole who had more. To this the Anfwer is obvious, that in all difputed Ca- fes it is the real Duty of every Man, to contri- bute  The PREFACE. vii bute whatever he knows towards the Attain- nent and Difcovery of Truth, efpecially where he has been a Witnefs to any ungenerous En- deavour to fupprefs it, whether he is called upon or not, or whether he has any Intereji or no in the Difcovery : Nay, the lefs he is af- feffed by the Ifue, he is the better qualifed for an impartial Evidence. Whatever the Sen- timents of fuch may be, who make SELF the invariable Rule of Conduff, a Promptitude to this cannot be impertinent in any Man, and it were well for every Community if a greater Majority were of fuch an honeji, generous Dif- pofition. If Ifiould be inadvertently guilty of mif. reprefenting any thing, I know there is the au- thentic Senfe of a large Committee of no incon- fiderable Province, properly exemplify'd in the Hands of their Agent, who may conviO me of fuch Difagreement by printing it. And if the Fags herein aferted lhall be fairly difprov'd, the Relator will think himfelf obliged by Truth and Honefly to acknowledge his Mijlakes, and to de- clare the Reafons that enforced him to receive them for Truths. This indeed he has not the leafi Appehenfion he fhall be reduced to but if ever The PREFACE. vii bute whatever he knows towards the Attain- ment and Difcovery of Truth, efpecially where he has been a Witnefs to any ungenerous En. deavour to fupprefs it, whether he is called upon or not, or whether he has any Interefi or no in the Difcovery : Nay, the left he is af- fe ed by the Iffue, he is the better qualified for an impartial Evidence. Whatever the Sen- timents of fuch may be, who make SELF the invariable Rule of Conduff, a Promptitude to this cannot be impertinent in any Man, and it were well for every Community if a greater Majority were of Juch an honeft, generous Dif pofition. If Ifiould be inadvertently guilty of mq{- reprefenting any thing, I know there is the au- thentic Senfe of a large Committee of no incon- fiderable Province, properly exemplify'd in the Hands of their Agent, who may convi& me of fuch Difagreement by printing it. Andif the Fa~is herein aferted /hall be fairly difprov'd, the Relator will think himfelf obliged by Truth and Honefly to acknowledge his Miflakes, and to de- clare the Reafons that enforced him to receive them for Truths. This indeed he has not the leaf Apprehenfion he f/all be reduced to but if ever he PREFACE. vii bute whatever he knows towards the Attain- ment and Difcovery of Truth, efpecially where he has been a Witnefs to any ungenerous En. deavour to fupprefs it, whether he is called upon or not, or whether he has any Interejl or no in the Difcovery : Nay, the lefs he is af- feged by the Ifue, he is the better qualifed for an impartial Evidence. Whatever the Sen- timents of fuch may be, who make SELF the invariable Rule of Condug, a Promptitude to this cannot be impertinent in any Man, and it were well for every Community if a greater Majority were of fuch an honej), generous Df- pofition. If Ifiould he inadvertently guilty of mif. reprefenting any thing, I know there is the au- thentic Senfe of a large Committee of no incon- fiderable Province, properly exemplify'd in the Hands of their Agent, who may convig me of fuch Difagreement by printing it. Andif the Fa Us herein afferted lhall be fairly difprov'd, the Relator will think himfelf obliged by Truth and Honefly to acknowledge his Miflakes, and to de- clare the Reafons that enforced him to receive them for Truths. This indeed he has not the leafj Appehenfion he fiall be reduced to j but if ever  viii The PREFACE. ever he is, he will obferve his Engagement with afenfible Satisfailion. For notwithflanding the Multitude of Contentions in the World, no- thing but Truth and Liberty can be worth the Contention of a confiderate Man, and Liberty indeed, as it is Truth. And wherever the Ambition of others attempts to invade and ef. face that natural, popular Truth, they fiould he confidered as the wanton and wicked Enemies of Human Nature it feif, and he entitled to as little §uarter from the Species, as thofe Beafis who are fometimes fo by Necefty. I need not inform any military Reader who may perufe this 7ifle, that the Re- lator is not of that honourable Profefion. My want of proper Terms, and perhaps of' proper Obfer'vations, will make it but too evi- dent. I hope it may appear intelligible ; and if the Performance can pretend to any Excellence, it is owing to its 7ruth, a Circumfiance very favourable to the Author's many Defefis ; as it needs very little Capacity to illuflrate, very little Elegance to adorn it. Ipfa fuis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nofnri. viii The PREFACE. ever he is, be will obferve his Engagement 'with a fenfible Satisfaflion. For not'withflanding the Multitude of Contentions in the World, no- thing but Truth and Liberty can be worth the Contention of a confiderate Man, and Liberty indeed, as it is Truth. And wherever the Ambition of others attempt-s to invade and ef- face that natural, popular Truth, they fiould be confidered as the wanton and wicked Enemies of Human Nature it felf, and be entitled to as little guarter from the Species, as thofe Beajfs who are fometimes fo by Necepty. I need not inform any military Reader 'who may perufe this 7rifle, that the Re- lator is not of that honourable Profefion. My want of proper Terms, and perhaps of proper Obfer'vations, 'will make it but too evi- dent. I hope it may appear intelligible ; and if the Performance can pretend to any Excellence, it is owing to its Truth, a Circumfiance very favourable to the Author's many Defeifs ; as it needs very little Capacity to illufirate, very little Elegance to adorn it. Ipfa fuis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nofnri. viii The PREFACE. ever he is, he will obferve his Engagement with a fenfible Satisfaglion. For not'withjlanding the Multitude of Contentions in the World, no- thing but Truth and Liberty can be worth the Contention of a confiderate Man, and Liberty indeed, as it is Truth. And wherever the Ambition of others attempts to invade and ef. face that natural, popular Truth, they #ould he confidered as the wanton and wicked Enemies of Human Nature it felf, and be entitled to as little guarter from the Species, as thofe Beafis who are fometimes fo by Necefty. I need not inform any military Reader 'who may perufe this 7rifle, that the Re- lator is not of that honourable ProfeJion. My want of proper Terms, and perhaps of proper Obfervations, 'will make it but too evi- dent. I hope it may appear intelligible ; and if the Performance can pretend to any Excellence, it is owing to its Tuth, a Circumfiance very favourable to the Author's many Defeils ; as it needs very little Capacity to illuflrate, very little Elegance to adorn it. Ipfa fuis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nofnri. A N A R- -4 N A R-, -4 N A R-  ZINARRATIVE of the CON- DU C T of the Forces on the Expedition againfi St. Au- GUSTINE. IN order to conceive the clearefI Idea of this unfortunate Affair, and to evince the real Importance of it, it feems requi~ite to attend a little to the Motives that induced the Province of South- Carolina to engage in an Expedition againft the Town and Cafile of St. Augufline. The Refolutions and Meafures they entered on in Confequence of fuch Motives, will, next be related. To which a juft and fuc- cind Enumeration of the Steps this Enter- prize was conduqed with in the Field will neceflarily fucceed: And fome fair un- 11rained Refexions on the moft evident Caufes of this unhappy Difippointment, will naturally conclude this Impartial En- quiry on the Subje-. it feems no ways neceffary here to de- fcend to every minute Inconvenience, the Province received 6rom the Neighbour- IA hood, SNARRATIVE of the CON- DU C T of the Forces on the Expedition againfj St. Au- GUSTINE. N order to conceive the cleareQ Idea of this unfortunate Affair, and to evince the real Importance of it, it feems requirite to attend a little to the Motives that induced the Province of South- Carolina to engage in an Expedition againft the Town and Caale of St. Augufine. The Refolutions and Meafures they entered on in Confequence of fuch Motives, will, next be related. To which a juft and fuc- cinar Enumeration of the Steps this Enter- prize was conduded with in the Field will necefarily fucceed: And fome fair un- firained Reflexions on the moft evident Caufes of this unhappy Dilappointment, will naturally conclude this Impartial En- quiry on the Subje-a. It feems no ways neceflary here to de- fcend to every minute Inconvenience, the Province received from the Neighbour- B hood, ANARRATIVE of the CON- DU C T of the Forces on the Expedition againfj St. Au- GUSTINE. N order to conceive the cleareQ Idea of this unfortunate Affair, and to evince the real Importance of it, it feems requifite to attend a little to the Motives that induced the Province of South- Carolina to engage in an Expedition againf the Town and Caale of St. Auguine. The Refolutions and Meafures they entered on in Confequence of fuch Motives, will, next be related. To which a juft and fuc- cin& Enumeration of the Steps this Enter- prize was condufted with in the Field will neceflarily fucceed: And fome fair un- 11rained Reflexions on the mont evident Caufes of this unhappy Difappointmcnt, will naturally conclude this Impartial En- quiry on the Subjea&. It feems no ways neceflhry here to de- fcend to every minute Inconvenience, the Province received from the Neighbour- B hood,  ( Io ] hood of that Garrifon in its early Sende- ment, nor to fpecify what particular Per- fons were fenibly injured by it. The Expedition of Colonel Yames Moore again' it in 1701, is fuffcient to convince us, that the Carolinians were very knfble then of their Infecurity from it ; when the Set- tlement, lcfs extended and populous than at prefent, undertook the Siege of it with a (maller Number of Troops than were on this Expedition, and without any Bombs or Veffels of Force to prevent the arrival of Supplies, which two Defefts fcem to have been the fole Reafons of their Dif- appointment then, as they entirely derftoyed the Town, and drove all the Inhabitants into the Caffle, with little or no Lofs on their Parr. Indeed, on this Occafon they entrenched on the Main, and clofe about the Town, having their little Force toge- ther, and not being feperated by Water, a Mile or two from the Garrifon they beiLeged. And about twelve or thirteen Years ago, after Come Mifehief done by thofe Indians, they corrupted and proteded, Colonel Palmer, with about 3oo Men, to the bef of [ io ] hood of that Garrifon in its early Settle- ment, nor to fpecify what particular Per- fons were fenfibly injured by it. The Expedition of Colonel James Moore againft it in 1701, is fufficient to cOnvince us, that the Carolinians were very Enble then of their Infecurity from it ; when the Set- tlement, lefs extended and populous than at prefent, undertook the Siege of it with a (maller Number of Troops than were on this Expedition, and without any Bombs or Veffels of Force to prevent the arrival of Supplies, which two Defeats feem to have been the fole Reafons of their Dif- appointment then, as they entirecly deflroyed the Town, and drove all the Inhabitants into the Caftle, with little or no Lofs on their Part. Indeed, on this Occaion they entrenched on the Main, and clofe about the Town, having their little Force toge- ther, and not being feperated by Water, a Mile or two from the Garrifon they befieged. And about twelve or thirteen Years ago, after Come Mifchief done by thofe Indians, they corrupted and proteated, Colonel Palmer, with about 3 00 Men, to the beft of [ Io ] hood of that Garrifon in its early Settle. ment, nor to fpecify what particular Per- fons were fenfibly injured by it. The Expedition of Colonel James Moore againft it in 1702, is fufficient to convince us, that the Carolinians were very enfble then of their Infecurity from it ; when the Set- tlement, lefs extended and populous than at prefent, undertook the Siege of it with a finaller Number of Troops than were on this Expedition, and without any Bombs or Veffels of Force to prevent the arrival of Supplies, which two Defects feem to have been the fole Reafons of their Dif- appointment then, as they entirely derftoyed ihe Town, arid drove all the Inhabitants into the Cafle, with little or no Lofs on their Part. Indeed, on this Occarion they entrenched on the Main, and clofe about the Town, having their little Force toge- ther, and not being feperated by Water, a Mile or two from the Garrifon they befieged. And about twelve or thirteen Years ago, after fome Mifehief done by thofe Indians, they corrupted and protec6ed, Colonel Palmer, with about 300 Men, to the bell of  [ II ] of my Recolleafon, a great part of whom were Indians, dellroyed and plundered the Town ; driving all the Inhabitants into the Canfle, killing ten or twelve rarnafees, and returning without Lofs to Charles Tbwn. Indeed their Booty was never confiderable enough to prove a Motive for fuch At- tempts ; but as that Garrifon, even in Times of Peace, was a continual Recep- tacle of criminal and fugitive Slaves, who might prove very injurious to Carolina, as Guides and Pilots to the Spaniards in Times of Hoility ; and as they were conti- nually doing their utmoll to corrupt the Indians, and encourage the Slaves to defert with the Hopes of Freedom, &c. it be- came necllfry for that Province to fecure themfelves by the rarlicf Precautions from fuch evil Confequences, as the dilioneft Condua of flch a Neighbour might pro- ducE7 There was formerly a Stipulation between them, by which the Garrifon ob- liged themfelves to give up every fugitive Slave that 1hould run there ; but this was foon evaded, as they faid they were made Chrifians, and become the King of Spain's 13 z Subjes; [ II ] of my Recolleafon, a great part of whom were Indians, dellroyed and plundered the Town ; driving all the Inhabitants into the Caftle, killing ten or twelve ramafees, and returning without Lofs to Charles Town. Indeed their Booty was never confiderablie enough to prove a Motive for fuch At- tempts ; but as that Garrifon, even in Times of Peace, was a continualRecep- tacle of criminal and fugitive Slaves, who might prove -very injurious to Carolina, as Guides and Pilots to the Spaniards in Times of Hoffility ; and as they were conti- nually doing their utmoft to corrupt the Indians, and encourage the Slaves to defert with the Hopes of Freedom, &c. it be- camie neceflary for that Province to fecure themfelves by the carlieft Precautions from fuch evil Confequences, as the diflioneft Conduat of fuch a Neighbour might pro- duce There was formerly a Stipulation. between them, by which the Garrifon ob- liged themfelves to give up every fugitive Slave that thould run there ; but this was foon evaded, as they faid they were made Chrifians, and become the King of Spain's B 2 Subje6ls; [ if ] of my Recolle6lion, a great part of whom were Indians, detroyed and plundered the Town ; driving all the Inhabitants into the Caftle, killing ten or twelve Taraafees, and returning without Lofs to Charles Twn. Indeed their Booty was never confiderable enough to prove a Motive for fuch At- tempts ; but as that Garrifon, even in Times of Peace, was a continualRecep- tacle of criminal and fugitive Slaves, who might prove very injurious to Carolina, as Guides and Pilots to the Spaniards in Times of Hoffi!ity ; and as they were conti- nually doing their utmolt to corrupt the Indians, and encourage the Slaves to defert with the Hopes of Freedom, &c. it be- came neceflary for that Province to fecure themfelves by the earlieft Precautions from fuch evil Confequences, as the dilioneft Conduat of fuch a Neighbour might pro- duce-- There was formerly a Stipulation between them, by which the Garrifon ob- liged themfelves to give up every fugitive Slave that fhould run there ; but this was foon evaded, as they faid they were made Chrifians, and become the King of Spain's B 2 Subjeas;  [ 12 ] Subje&s ; and thofe who could obtain any Confideration for their Slaves, were ob- liged to accept a pecuniary one, and they were but a few who ever had that. When we reflea that Rice, the chief Staple of Carolina, is manufaaured by Negroes, (European Conifitutions being really unequal to the Culture of it in that Climate, or indeed to the general Culture of the Climate) it muaf be evident, that a great Number of Slaves are neceflary to produce the yearly Quantities of that and other Commodities exported from that Province; and, without entering into a firiat Calculation, it is certain they greatly out-number the white People there. Now, if, even in Times of Peace with Spain, they have been harraffed with Infurreaions and Maffacres from them, what can they expect in cafe of an Invafion, when their Enemies would certainly encourage their Revolt; and what Refiffance could a thin, yetValuable Colony make to a Foe with- out, when they had fuch numerous and cruel ones within, at whofe Mercies the Lives of their Families mull lie, upon their [ 12 ] Subje6as; and thofe who could obtain any Confideration for their Slaves, were ob- liged to accept a pecuniary one, and they were but a few who ever had that. When we reflec that Rice, the chief Staple of Carolina, is manufactured by Negroes, (European Conifitutions being really unequal to the Culture of it in that Climate, or indeed to the general Culture of the Climate) it muff be evident, that a great Number of Slaves are neceflary to produce the yearly Quantities of that and other Commodities exported from that Province; and, without entering into a firica Calculation, it is certain they greatly out-number the white People there. Now, if, even in Times of Peace with Spain, they have been harraffed with Infurredions and Mafflacres from them, what can they exped in cafe of an Invalion, when their Enemies would certainly encourage their Revolt; and what Refiftance could a thin, yetialuable Colony make to a Foe with- out, when they had fuch numerous and cruel ones within, at whole Mercies the Lives of their Families muff lie, upon their [ 12 ] Subjels; and thofe who could obtain any Confideration for their Slaves, were ob- liged to accept a pecuniary one, and they were but a few who ever had that. When we reflect that Rice, the chief Staple of Carolina, is manufactured by Negroes, (European Conrfitutions being really unequal to the Culture of it in that Climate, or indeed to the general Culture of the Climate) it muft be evident, that a great Number of Slaves are neceffary to produce the yearly Quantities of that and other Commodities exported from that Province; and, without entering into a firia Calculation, it is certain they greatly out-number the white People there. Now, if, even in Times of Peace with Spain, they have been harraffed with Infurredions and Maflacres from them, what can they expea in cafe of an Invalion, when their Enemies would certainly encourage their Revolt; and what Refiffance could a thin, yelialuable Colony make to a Foe with- out, when they had fuch numerous and cruel ones within, at whoe Mercies the Lives of their Families muf lie, upon their  [ 13 1 their exerting any rigorous Oppofition againif the publick Enemy. In fhort, if it be confidered, that the late Expedition was undertaken immediately after the great Mortality of the Years i7 3 8 and 39, by the Small Pox and bilious Fevers, and how much a thin Colony, and not in its moil flourilaing Circumafances, contributed, by their Perfons and Fortunes, in hopes of re- ducing that Fortrefs, their Senfe of the Neccfity of reducing it mull have been very ftrongly expreffed in the Meafures they entered on for that Purpofe. It cannot furprize us, that a People fo peculiarly circumftanced fhould linlen very favourably to every Propofal, and fhould be inclined to hope the bell from every Argument that was ufed as a further Incite- ment to fuch an Undertaking: For, how- ever heartily they mull defire the Removal of fo inconvenient a Neighbour, fo unge- nerous an Enemy, they were convinced their fingle Power was infuficient to dif. lodge him. But what firil engaged their publick Deliberations on this Subjel, was a Letter from his Excellency General Ogle- thorpe, [ 13 1 their exerting any rigorous Oppofition againll the publick Enemy. In fhorr, if it be confidered, that the late Expedition was undertaken immediately after the great Mortality of the Years 17 38 and 39, by the Small Pox and bilious Fevers, and how much a thin Colony, and not in its mioft flouriflhing Circumiaances, contributed, by their Perfons and Fortunes, in hopes of re. ducing that Fortrefs, their Senfe of the Neccfty of reducing it muft have been very llrongly expreffed in the Meafures they entered on for that Purpofe. It cannot furprize us, that a People fo peculiarly circumaranced fhould lillen very favourably to every Propofal, and fliould be inclined to hope the bell from every Argument that was ufed as a further Incite- ment to fuch an Undertaking : For, how- ever heartily they mull defire the Removal of fo inconvenient a Neighbour, fo unge- nerous an Enemy, they were convinced their fingle Power was infuflicient to dif. lodge him. But what firil engaged their publick Deliberations on this Subjeu, was a Letter from his Excellency General Ogle- thorpe, [ 13 1 their exerting any rigorous Oppofirion againll the publick Enemy. In fhort, if it be confidered, that the late Expedition was undertaken immediately after the great Mortality of the Years 1738 and 3 9, by the Small Pox and bilious Fevers, and how much a thin Colony, and not in its motl flourifliing Circum tiances, contributed, by their Perfons and Fortunes, in hopes of re- ducing that Fortrefs, their Senfe of the Necelity of reducing it mul have been very llrongly expreffed in the Meafures they entered on for that Purpofe. It cannot furprize us, that a People fo peculiarly circumafanced mhould lilen very favourably to every Propofal, and fhould be inclined to hope the bell from every Argument that was ufed as a further Incite- ment to fuch an Undertaking: For, how- ever heartily they mull defire the Removal of fo inconvenient a Neighbour, fo unge- nerous an Enemy, they were convinced their fingle Power was infufhcient to dif. lodge him. But what firal engaged their publick Deliberations on this Subjeal, was a Letter from his Excellency General Ogle- thorpe,  E 14 1 thorpe, dated September 2 r, 1 73 9, to the Honourable William Bull, E((q; Lieute- nant-Governor of that Province, where- in he acquaints him, " That he had re- " ceived Orders from his Majefly to an- noy the Subjeas of the King of Spain " in the be& Manner he was able ; and that he hoped the People of Carolina would give th: neceffary Affiftance, " that they might begin with the Siege of " Augufine, before more Troops arrived " from Cuba." The Contents of which being communicated to the Commons Houfe of Afembly, by the Lieutenant- Governor, in a Meffagc on the 8th of November following, a Committee was appointed to take the fame under Coni- deration, who, in their Report thereon recommended, " That, in cafe General " Oglethorpe fiould think proper to form " a Defgn of befieging Augufine, and " fihould communicate his Scheme to the " General Affembly, and fiould make it Cc appear, that the fame might probably c be attended with succefs, that then the " Publick of this Province wou'd en- " gage E '4 I thorpe, dated September 21, 1739, to the Honourable Wiliam Bull, Efq; Lieute- nant-Governor of that Province, where- in he acquaints him, "1 That he had re- " ceived Orders from his Majelly to an- " noy the Subjeas of the King of Spain " in the beft Manner he was able ; and " that he hoped the People of Carolina " would give the neceffary Affiftance, " that they might begin with the Siege of " Augufline, before more Troops arrived "1 from Cuba." The Contents of which being communicated to the Commons Houfe of Aflembly, by the Lieutenant- Governor, in a Mefage on the 8th of November following, a Committee was appointed to take the iame under Confi- deration, who, in their Report thereon recommended, " That, in cafe General " Ogletborpe fhould think proper to form a Deign of befieging Augufline, and " ihould communicate his Scheme to the General Affembly, and fhould make it appear, that the fame might probably be attended with Succefs, that then the Publick of this Province wou'd en- C' gage E 14] thorpe, dated September 2z i, 173 9, to the Honourable William Bull, Elq; Lieute- nant-Governor of that Province, where- in he acquaints him, " That he had re- ceived Orders from his Majelly to an- noy the Subjeas of the King of Spain " in the be Manner he was able ; and " that he hoped the People of Carolina " would give the neceffiry Affiftance, " that they might begin with the Siege of " Augufine, before more Troops arrived a from Cuba." The Contents of which being communicated to the Commons Houfe of Aflembly, by the Lieutenant- Governor, in a Meflage on the 8th of November following, a Committee was appointed to take the fame under ConG- deration, who, in their Report thereon recommended, " That, in cafe General " Oglethorpe thould think proper to form a Defmgn of befieging Augufline, and ifhould communicate his Scheme to the General Aflembly, and ihould make it " appear, that the fame might be attended with Succefs, that then the Publick of this Province wou'd en- cc gage  [15 1 gage to give General Oglethorpe the beft " Afliaance they reafonably could, to put " his Scheme in Execution." To this the Houfe agreed, and, in Confequence thereof, fent a Meffage to the Upper Houfe, "C to defire their Concurrence, and that they would apply to the Governor to communicate the fame to General Ogle. a thorpe". On the 4th of February following, the Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the Lower Houfe an Account of the Affiffance the General expeaed from this Province, confilling of fuch Forces, Prefents for In- dians, Ammunition, Provifions for fuch Forces, and for 400 Men of his own Re- giment for three Months, and fich other Stores as he thought reafonable and necef- fary for this Province to furnifli towards the Siege. Which Propofal having been confidered by a Committee of both Hou- fes, they reported, " That the Eme would " exceed the Sum of 2oo,oo Pounds a Carolina Currency, which they were of " Opinion was too large an Expence for Cc the Province to bear ; but recommend- " ed [15 1 "gage to give General Oglethorpe the beft Afliaance they reafonably could, to put " his Scheme in Execution." To this the Houfe agreed, and, in Confequence thereof, fent a Meffage to the Upper Houfe, " to defire their Concurrence, and that they would apply to the Governor to " communicate the fame to General Ogle. a thorpe". On the ith of February following, the Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the Lower Houfe an Account of the Affifance the General expected from this Province, confifting of fuch Forces, Prcfents for In- dians, Ammunition, Provifions for fuch Forces, and for 400 Men of his own Re- giment for three Months, and Grch other Stores as he thought reafonable and necef- fary for this Province to furnifh towards the Siege. Which Propofil having been confidered by a Committee of both Hou- fes, they reported, " That the fame would o exceed the Sum of zoo,ooo Pounds CC Carolina Currency, which they were of CC Opinion was too large an Expence for CC the Province to bear ; but recommend- " ed [15 ] " gage to give General Oglethorpe the beft C Aflifance they reafonably could, to put " his Scheme in Execution." To this the Houfe agreed, and, in Confequence thereof, fent a Meffage to the Upper Houfe, CC to defire their Concurrence, and that " they would apply to the Governor to communicate the fame to General Ogle- " thorpe". On the 4th of February following, the Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the Lower Houfe an Account of the Affiflance the General expected from this Province, conffing of fuch Forces, Prefents for In- dians, Ammunition, Provifions for fuch Forces, and for 400 Men of his own Re- giment for three Months, and frch other Stores as he thought reafonable and necef- fary for this Province to furnifi towards the Siege. Which PropoWl having been confidered by a Committee of both Hou- fes, they reported, "C That the Cime would C exceed the Sum of zoo,ooo Pounds " Carolina Currency, which they were of Opinion was too large an Expence for '' the Province to bear ; but recommend- " ed  [ 16 ] " ed that, if the General would under- take the Expedition againfi St. Augufline, " and would certify to the General Affem- " bly of the Province, that the fame was likely to be attended with the Succefs of taking that Garrifon, with fuch an 4 Aflifance from this Province, as fliould not exceed 1 zo,ooo Pounds; that the Publick of this Province were willing " to be at that Expence, and would pro. " vide for the fame;" which was agreed to by the Houfe. And that Committee being direaed to calculate, what Number of Forces, what Prefents for Indians, what Provifions, &c. might be tranfported to Augufline for that Sum, reported, " That " the fame was fufficient for a Regiment of Foot, containing eight Companies of 60 Men each; for 300 Pioneers, " Prefents for x oo Indians, and Provifi- ons for the Whole for fix Months." This was alto communicated to the Ge- neral by the Lieutenant Governor, at the Requci of both Houfs's, together with certain Articles propofed to be flipulated with the General, for conduCing the Ex- pedition. T he [ 16 ] ed that, if the General would under- " take the Expedition againrf St. 4ugufline, and would certify to the General Affem- " bly of the Province, that the fame was likely to be attended with the Succefs C, of taking that Garrifon, with fuch an Affiflance from this Province, as fhould not exceed i zo,ooo Pounds; that the " Publick of this Province were willing " to be at that Expence, and would pro. < vide for the fame;" which was agreed to by the Houfe. And that Committee being dire6ed to calculate, what Number of Forces, what Prefents for Indians, what Provifions, &c. might be tranfported to Augufline for that Sum, reported, " That " the fame was fufficient for a Regiment of Foot, containing eight Companies of 60 Men each; for 300 Pioneers, " Prefents for i 0o Indians, and Provifi- ons for the Whole for fix Months." This was alto communicated to the Ge- neral by the Lieutenant Governor, at the Requct of both Houfcs, together with certain Articles propofed to be flipulated with the General, for conduiing the Ex- pedition. T he [ 16 ) " ed that, if the General would under- " take the Expedition again fl St. Augufline, and would certify to the General Affem- bly of the Province, that the fame was likely to be attended with the Succefs of taking that Garrifon, with fuch an Afliftance from this Province, as fhould " not exceed 1 2o,ooo Pounds; that the Publick of this Province were willing " to be at that Expence, and would pro. " vide for the fame;" which was agreed to by the Houfe. And that Committee being direfted to calculate, what Number of Forces, what Prefents for Indians, what Provifons, &c. might be tranfported to Augufline for that Sum, reported, " That " the fame was fuifcient for a Regiment " of Foot, containing eight Companies of 60 Men each; for 30o Pioneers, " Prefents for ooo Indians, and Provifi- " ons for the Whole for fix Months." This was alfo communicated to the Ge- neral by the Lieutenant Governor, at the Requeft of both Houfes, together with certain Articles propofed to be flipulated with the General, for conduCing the Ex- pedition. T he  [ 17 ] The General coming foon after to Charles 27rwn, defired the Lieutcnant-Governor, in a Letter of March 26, 174t, to ac- quaint the Aflembly, " That he had re- ceiv'd their Plan, propofing the Af- fance of I0,ooo Pounds towards the Siege of Augufline, and that he was " come to confult Meafures with them, " for bringing that Enterprize to a happy " Conclufion, with the fmallell Expence of Men and Money. For which Pur- pofe it would be beft immediately, " with what Men could be had, to make a SUDDEN ATTEMPT." And on the z9th of the fame Month, the Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the Commons Houfe of Affembly, the Ge- neral's Plan of Aflifiance, for a fudden Attack upon Augufline ; propofing, " That one Regiment of 400 Men fhould be raifed, a Troop of Rangers or Cattle " Hunters, Prefents for 5 o o Indians, Pro- " vifions for the Whole for three Months, " and Arms, Ammunition, Tools and " Utenfis, adding, that unlefs the fame could be furnifhed fo as to fet out from C "1 Charles- [ 17 ] The General coming foon after to Charles 7own, defired the Lieutenant- Governor, in a Letter of March 26, 174r, to ac- quaint the Affembly, " That he had re- ceiv'd their Plan, propofing the Affi- iance of 20,ooo Pounds towards the " Siege of Augufline, and that he was C come to confult Meafures with them, for bringing that Enterprize to a happy Conclufion, with the fmallefi Expence " of Men and Money. For which Pur- " pofe it would be beft immediately, with what Men could be had, to make a SUDDEN ATTEMPT." And on the 29th of the fame Month, the Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the Commons Houfe of Affembly, the Ge- neral's Plan of Affifiance, for a fudden Attack upon Augujline ; propofing, " That one Regiment of 400 Men hould be raifed, a Troop of Rangers or Cattle Hunters, Prefents for 5 o o Indians, Pro- " viflons for the Whole for three Months, and Arms, Ammunition, Tools and Utenfils, adding, that unlefs the fame could be furnifhed fo as to fer out from C " Charles- ( 17 ] The General coming foon afier to Charles Y2Own, dered the Lieutenant-Governor, in a Letter of March 26, 1741, to ac- quaint the Aflembly, " That he had re- " ceiv'd their Plan, propofing the Affi- " fance of 2o,ooo Pounds towards the " Siege of Augufline, and that he was " come to confult Meafures with them, " for bringing that Enterprize to a happy " Conclufion, with the fmalleft Expene of Men and Money. For which Pur- " pofe it would be beff immediately, with what Men could be had, to make " a SUDDEN ATTEMPT." And on the 29th of the fame Month, the Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the Commons Houfe of Affembly, the Ge- neral's Plan of Afliftance, for a fudden Attack upon Augufjine ; propoting, " That one Regiment of 400 Men fhould be raifed, a Troop of Rangers or Cattle " Hunters, Prefents for 5o o Indians, Pro- " vifions for the Whole for three Months, and Arms, Ammunition, Tools and " Utenfils, adding, that unlefs the fame could be furnifhed fo as to fet out from C " Charles-  [ I8 ] " Charles-Town in fourteen Days, the En- terprize would not be likely to fac- ceed." It was the unanimous Opinion of the Houfe, upon confidering thefe Pro- pofals, " That the Particulars therein fpe- cifed could not pofiEbly be provided 4 by this Government in fo fliort aTerm." And as they had then the greateft Reafon to think the Enterprize would be declined, they direaed their Committee to join a Committee of the Upper Houe, and de- fired the General might be asked, " What Supplies he thought would be neceffary to keep the War on the other Side of " St. 7ohn's River. There was accordingly a Conference of a large Committee of both Houfes the fame Day, at which the General and Capt. Vincent Pearfe, Commodore of his Ma- jefty's Ships of War in thofe Parts, and moft of the Members of both Houfes were prefent. When the General propofing to the Committee to ray a longer Time for the Supplies, and reprefenting to them, " That he had private Intelligence from " Augufline, that they were in the greateft "Want [ 8 ] Charles-Town in fourteen Days, the En- " terprize would not be likly to fuc- ceed." It was the unanimous Opinion of the Houfe, upon confidering thefe Pro- pofals, " That the Particulars therein fpe- a cifed could not pofibly be provided " by this Government info fhort aTerm." And as they had then the greateR Reafon to think the Enterprize would be declined, they direded their Committee to join a Committee of the Upper Houfe, and de- fited the General might be asked, " What Supplies he thought would be neceffary c to keep the War on the other Side of " St. 7ohn's River. There was accordingly a Conference of a large Committee of both Houfes the fame Day, at which the General and Capt. Vincent Pearfe, Commodore of his Ma- jelly's Ships of War in thofe Parts, and moft of the Members of both Houfes were prefent. When the General propofing to the Committee to ray a longer Time for the Supplies, and reprefenting to them, " That he had private Intelligence from " Augufline, that they were in the greateft "Want [ I8 ] Charles-To-un in fourteen Days, the En- terprize would not be likely to fac- ceed." It was the unanimous Opinion of the Houfe, upon confidering thefe Pro- pofals, " That the Particulars therein fpe- cified could not pofibly be provided " by this Government in fifhort aTerm." And as they had then the greateft Reafon to think the Enterprize would be declined, they direaed their Committee to join a Committee of the Upper Houfe, and de- fired the General might be asked, " What Supplies he thought would be neceffary to keep the War on the other Side of " St. 7ohn's River. There was accordingly a Conference of a large Committee of both Houfes the fame Day, at which the General and Capt. Vincent Pearfe, Commodore of his Ma- jetty's Ships of War in thofe Parts, and moft of the Members of both Houfes were prefent. When the General propofing to the Committee to ray a longer Time for the Supplies, and reprefenting to them, " That he had private Intelligence from " Augufline, that they were in the greateft "Want  [ 19 J Want of Provirions; that he was cer- " tain many of the Garrifon would de- " fert, and that he did not doubt making " himfelf Mafter of the Town the FIRST N I G H T : That the Multitude of Wo- men and Children who would be forced " from thence into the Cafile, muft ne- ceffarily diftrefs it ; which, being fol- lowed with the throwing in of feveral " Bombs, would undoubtedly produce a " fpcedy Surrender: That in cafe the Ha- cc vanna was taken, the Spaniards would " in all Probability, rather call in the " French to Augufline, than let it fall in- " to our Hands." In brief, both he and the Commodore giving the greateff En- couragement to the Committee to report in Favour of the Enterprize, the latter of whom fiid, " they ought all to be hang'd " if they did not take it in a very fhort " Time and the General further repre- fenting, " that he had font for feveral In- " dians who were daily expeaed down " to the Expedition," the Committee in- duced by fuch Reafons, recommended it in their Report, C" to affill him with fuch C z "1 Forces [ 19 1 " Want of Provifions; that he was cer. tain many of the Garrifon would de- " fert, and that he did not doubt making C himfelf Mafler of the Town the FIRST N I G H T : That the Multitude of Wo- men and Children who would be forced " from thence into the Caale, muff ne- " ceffarily diffrefs it ; which, being fol- " lowed with the throwing in of feveral " Bombs, would undoubtedly produce a " fpcedy Surrender : That in cafe the Ha- "wanna was taken, the Spaniards would in all Probability, rather call in the " French to Augufline, than let it fall in- to our Hands." In brief, both he and the Commodore giving the greateft En- couragement to the Committee to report in Favour of the Enterprize, the latter of whom faid, C" they ought all to be hang'd " if they did not take it in a very [hort " Time ; and the General further repre- fenting, CC that he had font for feveral In- " dians who were daily expeaed down " to the Expedition," the Committee in- duced by fach Reafons, recommended it in their Report, " to affift him with fuch C 2 "1 Forces [ 19 1 " Want of Provifions; that he was cer- tain many of the Garrifon would de- " fert, and that he did not doubt making " himfelf Manler of the Town the FIRST " N I G H T : That the Multitude of Wo- C men and Children who would be forced from thence into the Cafle, muff ne- " ceIarily diffrefs it ; which, being fol- " lowed with the throwing in of feveral " Bombs, would undoubtedly produce a " fpeedy Surrender : That in cafe the Ha- C wanna was taken, the Spaniards would " in all Probability, rather call in the " French to Augufline, than let it fall in- " to our Hands." In brief, both he and the Commodore giving the greatelt En- couragement to the Committee to report in Favour of the Enterprize, the latter of whom fiid, "1 they ought all to be hang'd " if they did not take it in a very fhort " Time ; and the General further repre- fenting, CC that he had fent for feveral In- " dians who were daily expefted down " to the Expedition," the Committee in- duced by fuch Reafons, recommended it in their Report, C" to affift him with fuch C 2 "C Forces  [ 20 ] " Forces and Neceflaries as were thought fuficient to the Enterprize, according " to his own Plan laff mentioned, and " to continue the fame for one Month longer than he had propofed ;" being only prevented from continuing them for fix Months in the Whole, by the Captains of his Majefty's Ships declaring, " they could not venture to flay fo long, c as they apprehended the Hurricane Sea- fon would approach before the Expi- " ration of that Term." All which be- ing approved by both Houfes, an Aft was paffed, Aprit 5, 1741, for carrying the fame into Execution. Thefe Engagements were not only punc- tually fulfilled by that Province, except the Article of Rangers, who could not be procured, and indeed could have been of no important Service, but leaft they fhould not prove fuffcient for the End propofed, the Affembly afterwards voted an Addition of z oo Men more for it. Befides which, the Lieutenant-Governor purchafed by their Allowance, a large Schooner with ten Carriage and 16 Swivel Guns, in which they [ 20 ] " Forces and Neceffaries as were thought " fufficient to the Enterprize, according to his own Plan laft mentioned, and " to continue the fame for one Month " longer than he had propofed ;" being only prevented from continuing them for fix Months in the Whole, by the Captains of his Majefty's Ships declaring, " they could not venture to flay fo long, as they apprehended the Hurricane Sea- fon would approach before the Expi- " ration of that Term." All which be- ing approved by both Houfes, an A6t was paffed, April 5, 1741, for carrying the fame into Execution. Thefe Engagements were not only punc- tually fulfilled by that Province, except the Article of Rangers, who could not be procured, and indeed could have been of no important Service, but leafi they fiould not prove fufEcient for the End propofed, the Affembly afterwards voted an Addition of 2 co Men more for it. Befldes which, the Lieutenant-Governor purchaed by their Allowance, a large Schooner with ten Carriage and 16 Swivel Guns, in which they [ 20 ] C Forces and Neceflaries as were thought fufficient to the Enterprize, according " to his own Plan laft mentioned, and " to continue the fame for one Month longer than he had propofed;" being only prevented from continuing them for fix Months in the Whole, by the Captains of his Majefry's Ships declaring, they could not venture to flay fo long, as they apprehended the Hurricane Sea- fon would approach before the Expi- " ration of that Term." All which be- ing approved by both Houfes, an Adt was paffed, April 5, 1741, for carrying the fame into Execution. Thefe Engagements were not only punc- tually fulfilled by that Province, except the Article of Rangers, who could not be procured, and indeed could have been of no important Service, but leaft they fliould not prove fufEcient for the End propofed, the Afembly afterwards voted an Addition of 2 oo Men more for it. BeFides which, the Lieutenant-Governor purchafed by their Allowance, a large Schooner with ten Carriage and 16 Swivel Guns, in which they  [ 21 ] they put 5 o Men under the Command of Capt.72yrrell, and having thus even exceeded the General's la& Demands, they pleafed themfelves with the agreeable Profped of Succefs, no ways doubting his Excellency's Zeal and Capacity for his Majefty's Ser- vice, and the Security and Happinefs of his Fellow Subjects in Georgia and Carolina. The Contributions of South Carolina towards this Enterprize, being thus fpe- cify'd, the Meafures purfued at the Siege, or in the Field, demand our next Confi- deration. It appears then by the feveral Letters and Papers fent by the General and Col. Vanderdufen, who commanded the Carolina Regiment, and by the Examina- tions of the Colonel, the Lieutenant-Co- lonel and Major of the faid Regiment, and feveral other Gentlemen employed in that Expedition, (the proper Extradls of which and all other neceffary Proofs, are con- tained in the Appendix of the Report, un- der the Sancion of the publick Seal of the Province, now in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury,) that the Place of Ren- dezvous was at the Mouth of St. John's River, E 21 ] they put 5 o Men under the Command of Capt. 7yrrell, and having thus even exceeded the General's laft Demands, they pleafed themfelves with the agreeable Profped of Succefs, no ways doubting his Excellency's Zeal and Capacity for his Majefty's Ser- vice, and the Security and Happinefs of his Fellow Subjecls in Georgia and Carolina. The Contributions of South Carolina towards this Enterprize, being thus fpe- cify'd, the Meafures purfued at the Siege, or in the Field, demand our next Confi- deration. It appears then by the feveral Letters and Papers fent by the General and Col. Vavderduf/en, who commanded the Carolina Regiment, and by the Examina- tions of the Colonel, the Lieutenant-Co- lonel and Major of the faid Regiment, and feveral other Gentlemen employed in that Expedition, (the proper Extrads of which and all other neceflary Proofs, are con- tained in the Appendix of the Report, un- der the Sanalion of the publick Seal of the Province, now in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury,) that the Place of Ren- dezvous was at the Mouth of St. 7ohn's River, E 21 ] they put 5 o Men under the Command of Capt. 7yrrell, and having thus even exceeded the General's laft Demands, they pleafed themfelves with the agreeable Profped of Succefs, no ways doubting his Excellency's Zeal and Capacity for his Majefty's Ser- vice, and the Security and Happinefs of his Fellow Subjeffs in Georgia and Carolina. The Contributions of South Carolina towards this Enterprize, being thus fpe- cify'd, the Meafures purfued at the Siege, or in the Field, demand our next Confi- deration. It appears then by the feveral Letters and Papers fent by the General and Col. Vavderduei/n, who commanded the Carolina Regiment, and by the Examina- tions of the Colonel, the Lieutenant-Co- lonel and Major of the faid Regiment, and feveral other Gentlemen employed in that Expedition, (the proper Extrads of which and all other neceflary Proofs, are con- tained in the Appendix of the Report, un- der the Sanffion of the publick Seal of the Province, now in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury,) that the Place of Ren- dezvous was at the Mouth of St. J7ohn's River,  [ 22 ] River, on the Florida Shore, where the Ge- neral arrived with his Forces, a Detach- ment of the Carolina Regiment, and the Cherokee Indians on the 9th of May ; from whence they marched on the I oth, to at- tack Fort Diego, about zo Miles diffant, whichFort had 9 Swivel, i Carriage Guns of two Pound Shot, and 5 o Men. And having furrounded it on the 1 2th, they tent in a Spa- nifj Prifoner with a Drum, to fummon the Garrifon, who immediately capitulated on the following Conditions. The Garrifon to furrender Prifoners of War, and deliver up the Fort with the Guns and Stores to the King of Great-Britain. 2dly, That they fhould have Liberty to keep their Baggage, and not be plundered. 3 dly, That Seignior Diego Spinofa, to whom the Fort belonged, being built at his Expence, and on his Lands, fhould hold his Lands, Slaves, and fuch other Effeas, as were not already plundered in the Field. 4thly, That no Deferters or Runaways from Carolina,fhould have the Benefit of this Capitulation, but be furrendered at Difcretion. This Fort was garrifoned by 6 0 of the General's Forces, and [ 22 ] River, on the Florida Shore, where the Ge- neral arrived with his Forces, a Detach- ment of the Carolina Regiment, and the Cherokee Indians on the 9:h of May ; from whence they marched on the 1oth, to at- tack Fort Diego, about zo Miles diaant, whichFort had9 Swivel, 2 Carriage Guns of two Pound Shot, and 5 o Men. And having furrounded it on the 1 ith, they tent in a Spa- ni Prifoner with a Drum, to fummon the Garrif6n, who immediately capitulated on the following Conditions. The Garrifon to furrender Prifoners of War, and deliver up the Fort with the Guns and Stores to the King of Great-Britain. zdly, That they fhould have Liberty to keep their Baggage, and not be plundered. 3dly, That Seignior Diego Spinofa, to whom the Fort belonged, being built at his Expence, and on his Lands, fhould hold his Lands, Slaves, and fuch other Effects, as were not already plundered in the Field. 4thly, That no Deferters or Runaways from Carolina,fhould have the Benefit of this Capitulation, but be furrendered at Di(cretion. This Fort was garrifoned by 60 of the General's Forces, and [ 22 ] River, on the Florida Shore, where the Ge- neral arrived with his Forces, a Detach- ment of the Carolina Regiment, and the Cherokee Indians on the 9th of May ; from whence they marched on the 1 oth, to at- tack Fort Diego, about zo Miles diffant, whichFort had9 Swivel, 2 Carriage Guns of two Pound Shot, and 5 o Men. And having furrounded it on the 1 ich, they tent in a Spa- nui Prifoner with a Drum, to fummon the Garrif6n, who immediately capitulated on the following Conditions. The Garrifon to furrender Prifoners of War, and deliver up the Fort with the Guns and Stores to the King of Great-Britain. 2dly, That they fhould have Liberty to keep their Baggage, and not be plundered- 3dly, That Seignior Diego Spinofa, to whom the Fort belonged, being built at his Expence, and on his Lands, fhould hold his Lands, Slaves, and fuch other Effeaqs, as were not already plundered in the Field. 4thly, That no Defercers or Runaways from Carolina, fhould have the Benefit of this Capitulation, but be furrendered at Difcretion. This Fort was garrifoned by 6o of the General's Forces, and  [ 23 ] and from thence they returned to the Place of Rendezvous, where they were joined by Colonel Panderdufen with the reif of the Carolina Regiment on the 19th of May, whence they marched again to Diego the 3 it, and from thence in two Days to Fort Moofa, in View of, and near two Miles diftant from Augufine, and 2.3 from Diego. The Spaniards having deferted Moofa, the General ordered the Gates to be burnt, and three Breaches to be made in the Walls. They then proceeded with the whole Army to reconnoitre the Town and Cattle, after which they returned back to Diego. From thence the General ordered Colonel Vanderduffen to march with his Regimenr, and take Poffeflion of Point §?jartell, ly- ing to the North of the Bar, and feparated from Fort Moofa by a Creek ; while the General with about 260 Men of his Regi- ment, and the greateft part of the Indians embarked on Board the Men of War, and arrived at the Ifland of Anaflatia, oppofite to the Cattle; leaving behind him on the Main, but between 90 and 100 white Men, Highlanders and others in his Pay, with [ 23 ) and from thence they returned to the Place of Rendezvous, where they were joined by Colonel Vanderduifen with the reif of the Carolina Regiment on the Ith of May, whence they marched again to Diego the 3 if , and from thence in two Days to Fort Moofa, in View of, and near two Miles diftant from Augufline, and 2.3 from Diego. The Spaniards having deferted Moofa, the General ordered the Gates to be burnt, and three Breaches to be made in the Walls. They then proceeded with the whole Army to reconnoitre the Town and Cattle, after which they returned back to Diego. From thence the General ordered Colonel anderdufen to march with his Regiment, and take Poffeflion of Point §artell, ly- ing to the North of the Bar, and feparated from Fort Moofa by a Creek; while the General with about 260 Men of his Regi- ment, and the greateft part of the Indians embarked on Board the Men of War, and arrived at the Ifland of Anaflatia, oppofite to the Cattle ; leaving behind him on the Main, but between 9o and 1oo white Men, Highlanders and others in his Pay, with [ 23 ) and from thence they returned to the Place of Rendezvous, where they were joined by Colonel Vanderdufen with the reif of the Carolina Regiment on the 9th of May, whence they marched again to Diego the 3 1 f, and from thence in two Days to Fort Moofa, in View of, and near two Miles diftant from Augufine, and 2 3 from Diego. The Spaniards having deferred Moofa, the General ordered the Gates to be burnt, and three Breaches to be made in the Walls. They then proceeded with the whole Army to reconnoitre the Town and Cattle, after which they returned back to Diego. From thence the General ordered Colonel fanderduffen to march with his Regiment, and take Poffeflion of Point §guartell, ly- ing to the North of the Bar, and feparated from Fort Moofa by a Creek ; while the General with about 260 Men of his Regi- ment, and the greareft part of the Indians embarked on Board the Men of War, and arrived at the Ifland of Anaftatia, oppofire to the Cattle ; leaving behind him on the Main, but between 90 and ioo white Men, Highianders and others in his Pay, with  [ 24 ] with 42 Indians and two commiflioned Officers, to alarm the Spaniards on that Side, as he faid ; but gave a verbal Con- mand of the Whole to Colonel Palmer, a Volunteer from that Province. About the fame Time zoo Sailors from the Ships were landed upon that lfland, which the Spaniards dire6ly abandoned, under the Command of Captain Warren, Captain Laws, and the Honourable Captain 7ozwn- fiend, who were all very infrumental, by their exemplary Courage and Diligence in inciting their Men to eredr Batteries, and do fuch other Services as prefented. While the Troops were thus difpofed, a firong Detachment iffued from the Cattle of Augufline, 7une 15, between three and four in the Morning; and attacking the Party under the Command of Colo- nel Palmer, then at Fort Moofa, defeated them, killing the Colonel, with feveral others, and raking many Prifoners, after which the Carolina Regiment was ordered over to Anafatia. Two Batteries were thrown up on the Iflanid of Anaflatia, one a Mile and Quarter, the [ 24 ] with 42 Indians and two commiffioned Officers, to alarm the Spaniards on that Side, as he faid ; but gave a verbal Com- mand of the Whole to Colonel Palmer, a Volunteer from that Province. About the fame Time z oo Sailors from the Ships were landed upon that Ifland, which the Spaniards dire6tly abandoned, under the Command of Captain Warren, Captain Laws, and the Honourable Captain 7oun- fiend, who were all very infirumental, by their exemplary Courage and Diligence in inciting their Men to erect Batteries, and do fuch other Services as prefented. While the Troops were thus difpofcd, a firong Detachment iffued from the Cattle of Augmfine, June 15, between three and four in the Morning ; and attacking the Party under the Command of Colo- nel Palmer, then at Fort Moofa, defeated them, killing the Colonel, with feveral others, and taking many Prifoners, after which the Carolina Regiment was ordered over to Anaflatia. Two Batteries were thrown up on the Ifland of inafatia, one a Mile and Quarter, the [ 24 ] with 42 Indians and two commiflioned Officers, to alarm the Spaniards on that Side, as he faid ; but gave a verbal Com- mand of the Whole to Colonel Palmer, a Volunteer from that Province. About the fame Time 20o Sailors from the Ships were landed upon that Ifland, which the Spaniards direcaly abandoned, under the Command of Captain Warren, Captain Laws, and the Honourable Captain 7oun- jpend, who were all very inifruinental, by their exemplary Courage and Diligence in inciting their Men to erect Batteries, and do fuch other Services as prefented. While the Troops were thus difpofed, a firong Detachment iffued from the Cattle of Augmfine, June 15, between three and four in the Morning ; and attacking the Party under the Command of Colo- nel Palmer, then at Fort Moofa, defeated them, killing the Colonel, with feveral others, and taking many Prifoners, after which the Carolina Regiment was ordered over to Anafjatia. Two Batteries were thrown up on the Ifland of Anaflatia, one a Mile and Quarter, the  [ 25 ] the other a Mile and Half, and a Third at Point Luartel, a Mile and Quarter from the Cafnle of Augufline. From thefe Bat- teries they fired at the Cafile and Town, and threw off a great Number of Shells. The Fire was returned from the Cafile, and from fix Spanilh Half Gallies in the Far- bour that chiefly annoyed our Forces: Upon which it was propofed to attack the Gallies, and was agreed to by the 3 Sea Commanders afhore, and fuch of the Land- Officers as confulted with them, and a Time was appointed to put it in Execution. But the final Omiffion of this important Service will be more properly mentioned, when we come to relate the Condua of the Maritime Forces afiembled on this Ex- pedition. Soon after this, the Garrifon received a Supply of Provifions, &c. from Cuba, which was difcovered by Capt. Fanfaw, of his Majefty's Ship Phenix, after they were got within the Mofquito's ; from whence they were conveyed up the Met- tanfas, and landed to the Southward of the Town, where there was no Battery to D annoy, [ 25 ] the other a Mile and Half, and a Third at Point §uartel, a Mile and Quarter from the Caffle of Augufline. From thefe Bat- teries they fired at the Caftle and Town, and threw off a great Number of Shells. The Fire was returned from the Cafile, and from fix Spanilh Half Gallies in the Har- bour that chiefly annoyed our Forces: Upon which it was propofed to attack the Gallies, and was agreed to by the 3 Sea Commanders afhore, and fuch of the Land- Officers as confulted with them, and a Time was appointed to put it in Execution. But the final Omiflion of this important Service will be more properly mentioned, when we come to relate the Condua of the Maritime Forces afembled on this Ex- pedition. Soon after this, the Garrifon received a Supply of Provifions, &c. from Cuba, which was difcovered by Capt. Fanfhaw, of his Majeffy's Ship Phenix, after they were got within the Mofquito's ; from whence they were conveyed up the Met- tanfas, and landed to the Southward of the Town, where there was no Battery to D annoy, [ 25 the other a Mile and Half, and a Third at Point guartel, a Mile and Quarter from the Caffle of Augufline. From thefe Bat- teries they fired at the Cafile and Town, and threw off a great Number of Shells. The Fire was returned from the Cafile, and from fix Spani/h Half Gallies in the Har- bour that chiefly annoyed our Forces: Upon which it was propofed to attack the Gallies, and was agreed to by the 3 Sea Commanders afhore, and fuch of the Land- Officers as confulted with them, and a Time was appointed to put it in Execution. But the final Omiflion of this important Service will be more properly mentioned, when we come to relate the Condua of the Maritime Forces affembled on this Ex- pedition. Soon after this, the Garrifon received a Supply of Provifions, &c. from Cuba, which was difcovered by Capt. Fanfaw, of his Majeffy's Ship Phenix, after they were got within the Mofquito's ; from whence they were conveyed up the Met- tanjas, and landed to the Southward of the Town, where there was no Battery to D annoy,  [ 26 ] annoy, or Force to intercept them. And now the Seafon of the Year approaching, in which the Captains of the King's Ships fuppofed it might be dangerous to con- tinue on the Coaft, they refolved to fail on the 5th of July, and in order thereto, commanded their Men from Anaflatia on Board. Whereupon the General, July 4. fent Orders to Col. VanderdufJen, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke,to raire the Block- ade, and bring off the Train and Troops, with the leaff Lofs they could ; and to fpoil the Artillery if they could not fetch it off. Accordingly the Colonels made a Retreat, carrying off every thing entire, but one Cannon which was fplit, tho' the General burnt a great Quantity of Provi- frons, Arms, &c. on his Retreat, not- withifanding there were two empty Boats at hand, which might have carry'd them off. After this Col. Vanderdu/fen joined the General's Regiment on the Main, from whence they retreated to St. John's; feve- ral of the General's Regiment having de- ferred. And thus ended this moal difgrace- ful and unfortunate Expedition. Upon [ 26 ] annoy, or Force to intercept them. And now the Seafon of the Year approaching, in which the Captains of the King's Ships fuppofed it might be dangerous to con- tinue on the Coaff, they refolved to fail on the 5 th of July, and in order thereto, commanded their Men from Anaflatia on Board. Whereupon the General, July 4. fent Orders to Col. Vanderdufen, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke,to raife the Block- ade, and bring off the Train and Troops, with the leaft Lofs they could ; and to fpoil the Artillery if they could not fetch it off. Accordingly the Colonels made a Retreat, carrying off every thing entire, but one Cannon which was fplit, tho' the General burnt a great Quantity of Provi- fions, Arms, &c. on his Retreat, not- wirhflanding there were two empty Boats at hand, which might have carry'd them off. After this Col. Vanderdujen joined the General's Regiment on the Main, from whence they retreated to St. John's; feve- ral of the General's Regiment having de- ferred. And thus ended this moi difgrace- ful and unfortunate Expedition. Upon [ 26 ] annoy, or Force to intercept them. And now the Seafon of the Year approaching, in which the Captains of the King's Ships fuppofed it might be dangerous to con- tinue on the Coaff, they refolved to fail on the 5th of July, and in order thereto, commanded their Men from Anaflatia on Board. Whereupon the General, July 4. fent Orders to Col. Vanderdufen, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke,to raife the Block- ade, and bring off the Train and Troops, with the leaft Lofi they could ; and to fpoil the Artillery if they could not fetch it off. Accordingly the Colonels made a Retreat, carrying off every thing entire, but one Cannon which was fplit, tho' the General burnt a great Quantity of Provi- fions, Arms, &c. on his Retreat, not- withfanding there were two empty Boats at hand, which might have carry'd them off. After this Col. Vanderdufen joined the General's Regiment on the Main, from whence they retreated to St. John's; feve- ral of the General's Regiment having de- ferred. And thus ended this moil difgrace- ful and unfortunate Expedition. Upon  [ 27 ] Upon the Colonel's expreffing his great Diflatisfaclion at this mortifying Retreat, the General told him and another Gentle- man then prefent, that he had done all that was expe'led from his Orders, and offered to fliew them; intimating, that the Defign was only to draw the Spaniards Attention from Cuba. But as well as I can remem- her, they told me, they did not give them- felves the Trouble to fee them. I con- fefs I fhould have had the Curiofiry, and pofmbly fuch extraordinary Orders may even be worth the Infpeaion of our Superiors. Nor indeed can it be fup- pofed at all improbable from the whole Conduc of this Affair, that it was influ- enced by fuch Orders, for as I remember, the Committee very juftly obferve, "1 That from the Day the General left Charles- 7"rum, to that memorable Day of his appearing with his Forces before Au- ' gufline, every Step he took had a ma- nifeft Tendency to alarm the Place be- forehand, and to prevent that Surprize, that was the profeffed Defign, and on which, they greatly depended for Succefs. D z This E 27 ] Upon the Colonel's expreffing his great Diffatisfadion at this mortifying Retreat, the General told him and another Gentle- man then prefene, that he had done all that: was expeded from his Orders, and offered to fhew them; intimating, that the Defign was only to draw the Spaniards Attention from Cuba. But as well as I can remem- ber, they told me, they did not give them- felves the Trouble to fee them. I con- fefs I fhould have had the Curioiry, and poffibly fuch extraordinary Orders may even be worth the Infpeaion of our Superiors. Nor indeed can it be fup- pofed at all improbable from the whole Condud of this Affair, that it was influ- enced by fuch Orders, for as I remember, the Committee very jufily obferve, " That " from the Day the General left Charles- " 7wn, to that memorable Day of his " appearing with his Forces before Au- '' guffine, every Step he took had a ma- nifeft Tendency to alarm the Place be- forehand, and to prevent that Surprize, that was the profeffed Defign, and on which, they greatly depended for Succefs. D 2 This E 27 3 Upon the Colonel's expreffing his great DifTatisfadion at this mortifying Retreat, the General told him and another Gentle- man then prefent, that he had done all that was expeced from his Orders, and offered to fhew them; intimating, that the Defga was only to draw the Spaniards Attention from Cuba. But as well as I can remem- ber, they told me, they did not give them- felves the Trouble to fee them. I con- fefs I fhould have had the Curiofity, and poflibly fuch extraordinary Orders may even be worth the Infpecion of our Superiors. Nor indeed can it be Cup- pofed at all improbable from the whole Conduat of this Affair, that it was influ- enced by fuch Orders, for as I remember, the Committee very jufily obferve, " That from the Day the General left Charles- 7" wn, to that memorable Day of his appearing with his Forces before Au- '' gufline, every Step he took had a ma- nifeft Tendency to alarm the Place be- forehand, and to prevent that Surprize, that was the profeffed Defign, and on which, they greatly depended for Succefs. D 2 This  [ 28 ] This I had from both thefe Gentlemen. And if this Siege were in Truth but a Feint, might not that have been effe&ed without fuch an Expence to a Colony, who had appropriated her Rum Duty, and made other confderable Contributions to the Benefit of Georgia, on its firit Settle- ment? Tho' it may be fuppofed this brief De- tail of the Enterprize will prefent many obvious Errors to an intelligent Perfon, without any particular Animadverflons, yet is it difficult for the moff indifferent Relator to fupprefs the Refleaions which occur fpontaneoufly on this Occafion. Our Minds are conifituted in fuch a Man- ner, that it feems fcarcely in our Eleaion, whether we will reflea or not, on Sub- jeds important in themfelves, or their Con- fequences, when we have once enter'd on them. But in fuch Cafes, we are to have the fame inviolable Regard to jufice in our Obfervations, that we muff to Truth in our Narrative. And ifill there will be this material Difference, that Faas, upon due Proof, mutt be admitted by every Perfon i [ 28 ] This I had from both thefe Gentlemen. And if this Siege were in Truth but a Feint, might not that have been effeaed without fuch an Expence to a Colony, who had appropriated her Rum Duty, and made other confiderable Contributions to the Benefit of Georgia, on its firiL Settle- ment? Tho' it may be fuppofed this brief De- tail of the Enterprize will prefent many obvious Errors to an intelligent Perfon, without any particular Animadverfions, yet is it difficult for the moft indifferent Relator to fupprefs the Refleaions which occur fpontaneoufly on this Occafion. Our Minds are conifituted in fuch a Man- ner, that it feems fcarcely in our Eleaion, whether we will reflea or not, on Sub- jeas important in themfelves, or their Con- fequences, when we have once enrter'd on them. But in fuch Cafes, we are to have the fame inviolable Regard tojuffice in our Obfervations, that we muff to Truth in our Narrative. And itill there will be this material Difference, that Faas, upon due Proof, muff be admitted by every Perfon ; [ 28 ] This I had from both thefe Gentlemen. And if this Siege were in Truth but a Feint, might not that have been effeaed without fuch an Expence to a Colony, who had appropriated her Rum Duty, and made other confiderable Contributions to the Benefit of Georgia, on its firit Settle- ment? Tho' it may be fuppofed this brief De- tail of the Enterprize will prefent many obvious Errors to an intelligent Perfon, without any particular Animadverfions, yet is it difficult for the moff indifferent Relator to fupprefs the Refleaions which occur fpontaneoufly on this Occafion. Our Minds are conifituted in fuch a Man- ner, that it feems fcarcely in our Eleaion, whether we will refleal or not, on Sub- jeds important in themfelves, or their Con- fequences, when we have once enter'd on them. But in fuch Cafes, we are to have the fame inviolable Regard tojuffice in our Obfervations, that we muff to Truth in our Narrative. And ifill there will be this material Difference, that Faas, upon due Proof, muff be admitted by every Perfon ;  E 29 3 Perfon; tho' the Refledions of different Minds upon the fame Fads, will frequent- ly vary. Norwithaanding which, he may be confider'd, methinks, as a fair Animad- verter, who utters no Remarks but fuch as appear to himfelf to refult neceffarily from fuch Faas, in the very Nature and Reafon of Things; who can diveft him- felf of every partial Prepoffefflon and Pre- judice, and confiders the Adions rather than the Ators. 'Tis poffible, I may very partially Miflake this to be my own Cafe, but I am certain and confcious it is my Defire and Endeavour that it fhould. No Man can well be fuppofed willing to deceive himfelf, where he can acquire no- thing but Difcredit by it ; and I fhould judge it a real Immorality to intend the Deception of another. Some Readers who might not confider the Subjed as in- terefting enough for their Reflexions, may yet be willing to hear another's; and thok who fhall judicioufly difapprove mine, will make fuch as appear jufter to themfelves. 'Tis too certain indeed, that the beft Reflexions in the prefent Cafe, are but a kind E 29 ] Perfon ; tho' the Refleaions of different Minds upon the fame Fads, will frequent- ly vary. Notwithflanding which, he may be confider'd, methinks, as a fair Animad- verter, who utters no Remarks but fuch as appear to himfelf to refult neceffarily from fuch Fads, in the very Nature and Reafon of Things; who can diveft him- felf of every partial Prepoffeflion and Pre- judice, and confiders the Adions rather than the Aftors. 'Tis poffible, I may very partially Miflake this to be my own Cafe, but I am certain and confcious it is my Defire and Endeavour that it fihould. No Man can well be fuppofed willing to deceive himfelf, where he can acquire no- thing but Difcredit by it ; and I fhould judge it a real Immorality to intend the Deception of another. Some Readers who might not confider the Subjet as in- terefling enough for their Reflexions, may yet be willing to hear another's; and thofe who fhall judicioufly difapprove mine, will make fuch as appear jufter to themfelves. 'Tis too certain indeed, that the bell Reflexions in the prefent Cafe, are but a kind E 29 3 Perfon ; tho' the Refletions of different Minds upon the fame Fads, will frequent- ly vary. Notwithftanding which, he may be confider'd, methinks, as a fair Aninad- verter, who utters no Remarks but fuch as appear to himfelf to refult neceffarily from fuch Fads, in the very Nature and Reafon of Things; who can diveft him- felf of every partial Prepoffeflion and Pre- judice, and confiders the Adions rather than the Aftors. 'Tis polfible, I may very partially Miflake this to be my own Cafe, but I am certain and confcious it is my Defire and Endeavour that it fhould. No Man can well be fuppofed willing to deceive himfelf, where he can acquire no- thing but Difcredit by it ; and I fhould judge it a real Immorality to intend the Deception of another. Some Readers who might not confider the Subjet as in- terefting enough for their Reflexions, may yet be willing to hear another's; and thofk who fhall judicioufly difapprove mine, will make fuch as appear jufter to themfelves. 'Tis too certain indeed, that the bell Reflexions in the prefent Cafe, are but a kind  [ 30 ] kind of Phrygian Wifdom, and incapable of preventing the Evils the adjacent Co- lonies may be expofed to from this Dif- appointment. For as the Vicinity of Au- guftine can be no bad Reafon for difallow- ing Negroes in Georgia, fo any Perfon, generally acquainted with thofe Climates, may venture to affrm, that Georgia can fcarcely make a Figure, as a Colony, with- out them. And the Defertion of the Ca- rolina Slaves, may not improbably be fur- ther increafed by this impotent Attempt upon that Fortrefs, whereby our Arms are certainly become contemptible both to them and the neighbouring Indians. Yet if it fhall appear, upon a fair Difquifi- tion, that this Enterprize was not defeat- ed by any fuch Events as were fortuitous, and could not eafily be forefeen or pre- vented ; but that it evidently refulted from our own Overfight or Mifcondua, a plain Eviaion of the particular Errors muaf effe6aually prevent a Repetition of them upon any future Revival of the like Attempr. Other Errors may occur, for who is infallible ? The fame karcely can, and [ 30 ] kind of Phrygian Wifdom, and incapable of preventing the Evils the adjacent Co- lonies may be expofed to from this Dif- appointment. For as the Vicinity of Au- gufine can be no bad Reafon for difallow- ing Negroes in Georgia, fo any Perfon, generally acquainted with thofe Climates, may venture to aflirm, that Georgia can fcarcely make a Figure, as a Colony, with- out them. And the Defertion of the Ca- rolina Slaves, may not improbably be fur- ther increafed by this impotent Attempt upon that Fortrefs, whereby our Arms are certainly become contemptible both to them and the neighbouring Indians. Yet if it fliall appear, upon a fair Difquifi- tion, that this Enterprize was not defeat- ed by any fuch Events as were fortuitous, and could not eafily be forefeen or pre- vented ; but that it evidently refulted from our own Overfight or Mifcondua, a plain Eviaion of the particular Errors muff effe6aually prevent a Repetition of them upon any future Revival of the like Attempt. Other Errors may occur, for who is infallible ? The fame fearcely can, and [ 30 ] kind of Phrygian Wifdom, and incapable of preventing the Evils the adjacent Co- lonies may be expofed to from this Dif- appointment. For as the Vicinity of Au- gufline can be no bad Reafon for difallow- ing Negroes in Georgia, fo any Perfon, generally acquainted with thofe Climates, may venture to affirm, that Georgia can fcarcely make a Figure, as a Colony, with- out them. And the Defertion of the Ca- rolina Slaves, may not improbably be fur- ther increafed by this impotent Attempt upon that Fortrefs, whereby our Arms are certainly become contemptible both to them and the neighbouring Indians. Yet if it fliall appear, upon a fair Difquifi- tion, that this Enterprize was not defeat- ed by any fuch Events as were fortuitous, and could not eafily be forefeen or pre- vented ; but that it evidently refulted from our own Overfight or Mifcondua, a plain Evition of the particular Errors muff effeually prevent a Repetition of them upon any future Revival of the like Attempt. Other Errors may occur, for who is infallible ? The fame fearcely can, and  [ 31 1 and many Perfons who have carefully con- fidered thefe, have conceived it difficult to devife others, that could in any wire refemble a Siege, and operate fo direatly to the Difappointment of it. Firif then it appears, that the taking Fort St. Francis de Pupa, wherein were z Soldiers and a Serjeant, before any Mea, fures were concerted with the Province of South-Carolina, for the Siege of Auguffine, was a very unfeafonable Step, which ferved only to Alarm the Spaniards, and put them on the fpeedief Methods of con- fulting their future Security. This was proved beyond all Difpute by the Letters found on Board a Spanip Veffel bound from St. Augujine to Cuba, taken by Capt. Warren ; in one of which, the Spanijh Go- vernor relates the taking this very Fort, and his daily Expefation of a Siege; prelt fing for an immediate Supply of Provif- on, Ammunition, &c. to enable him to maintain the Place. And in Confequence of this early Alarm, thofe Supplies finally arrived, which determined the Befiegers to abandon the Enterprize. Yet this Over- fighr, [ 31 1 and many Perfons who have carefully con- fidered thefe, have conceived it difficult to devife others, that could in any wife refemble a Siege, and operate fo direaly to the Difappointment of it. Firft then it appears, that the taking Fort St. Francis de Pupa, wherein were i z. Soldiers and a Serjeant, before any Mea, fures were concerted with the Province of South-Carolina, for the Siege of Augulline, was a very unfeafonable Step, which ferved only to Alarm the Spaniards, and put them on the fpeedieft Methods of con- fulting their future Security. This was proved beyond all Difpute by the Letters found on Board a Spanij Veffel bound from St. Augufine to Cuba, taken by Capt. Warren ; in one of which, the Spanih Go- vernor relates the taking this very Fort, and his daily Expeaation of a Siege; prefll fing for an immediate Supply of Provifi- on, Ammunition, &c. to enable him to maintain the Place. And in Confequence of this early Alarm, thofe Supplies finally arrived, which determined the Beficgers to abandon the Enterprize. Yet this Over- fighr, [ 31 1 and many Perfons who have carefully con- fidered thefe, have conceived it difficult to devife others, that could in any wife refemble a Siege, and operate fo direatly to the Difappointment of it. Firflt then it appears, that the taking Fort St. Francis de Pupa, wherein were 1 z Soldiers and a Serjeant, before any Mea, fures were concerted with the Province of South-Carolina, for the Siege of Augulline, was a very unfeafonable Step, which ferved only to Alarm the Spaniards, and put them on the fpeedieft Methods of con- fulting their future Security. This was proved beyond all Difpute by the Letters found on Board a Spanij Veffel bound from St. Augufine to Cuba, taken by Capt. Warren ; in one of which, the Spani Go- vernor relates the taking this very Fort, and his daily Expeatation of a Siege; prefl fing for an immediate Supply of Provifi- on, Ammunition, &c. to enable him to maintain the Place. And in Confequence of this early Alarm, thofe Supplies finally arrived, which determined the Befiegers to abandon the Enterprize. Yet this Over- fight,  [ 32 ] fght, however material, might probably have been redeemed by a proper Vigour in the Field afterwards, as it appeared by fome intercepted Letters from the Gover- nor of Augufine to the Commander of St. Marks, about i oo Miles beyond St. Au- guflive, that they had not above three Days Bread at the Arrival of thofe Supplies, which they confidered as a miraculous De- liverance effeced by St. Rofana, or the Virgin of the Apalaches. It may well be fuppofed, that landing the Forces at the Mouth of St. John's River, and marching them thence to Augufline by Fort Diego, which was about 45 Miles very bad Way, where they were obliged to leave a 4 Pounder behind them, was very in- judicious, in Comparifon to landing them at Pupa, which is about 15, and a very good Road. Undoubtedly at fuch a hot Seafon of the Year, and in a Climate fo generally intemperate and fickly during that Seafon, good Conduft and Humanity muft have fuggefted the Neceflity of eafing the Army, as far as might be, without Detriment to the Service. And indeed it appears by Colonel [ 32 ] rght, however material, might probably have been redeemed by a proper Vigour in the Field afterwards, as it appeared by fame intercepted Letters from the Gover- nor of Augufline to the Commander of St. Markr, about oo Miles beyond St. Au- guflive, that they had not above three Days Bread at the Arrival of thofe Supplies, which they confidered as a miraculous De- liverance effected by St. Rofana, or the Virgin of the Apalaches. It may well be fuppofed, that landing the Forces at the Mouth of St. John's River, and marching them thence to Augufine by Fort Diego, which was about 45 Miles very bad Way, where they were obliged to leave a 4 Pounder behind them, was very in- judicious, in Comparifon to landing them at Pupa, which is about 15, and a very good Road. Undoubtedly at fuch a hot Seafon of the Year, and in a Climate fo generally intemperate and fickly during that Seafon, good Condud and Humanity mutt have fuggefted the Neceflity of eating the Army, as far as might be, without Detriment to the Service. And indeed it appears by Colonel [ 32 ] ight, however material, might probably have been redeemed by a proper Vigour in the Field afterwards, as it appeared by fome intercepted Letters from the Gover- nor of Augufine to the Commander of St. Marksr, about i oo Miles beyond St. Au- guflive, that they had not above three Days Bread at the Arrival of thofe Supplies, which they confidered as a miraculous De- liverance effected by St. Rofana, or the Virgin of the Apalaches. It may well be fuppofed, that landing the Forces at the Mouth of St. John's River, and marching them thence to Augufine by Fort Diego, which was about 45 Miles very bad Way, where they were obliged to leave a 4 Pounder behind them, was very in- judicious, in Comparifon to landing them at Pupa, which is about 15, and a very good Road. Undoubtedly at fuch a hot Seafon of the Year, and in a Climate fo generally intemperate and fickly during that Seafon, good Condud and Humanity mut have fuggefted the Neceflity of eating the Army, as far as might be, without Detriment to the Service. And indeed it appears by Colonel  [ 33 J Colonel Barnwells Examination, that the General acknowleged to him, " he was " advifed in Carolina to rendezvous them " there, as the properefl Place. " And this was the Advice of fuch Gentlemen there, as were bed acquainted with the Situation of AugufJive, and the adjacent Country. The Reafon affigned in Juflification of this March of 3 o Miles extraordinary, is really frivolous, viz. " Left the Forces ihould be difcouraged for want of feeing the Men of War" It is difficult to con- ceive that a Body of Veterans, or of any Soldiers, fhould be dejedted by a (hort Se- paration from Veflels, which they mutt be tatisfied, were engaged in, and adually had proceeded on the Expedition ;efpeci- ally as no Weather intervened to endanger or delay their Arrival. But it is unde- niably clear, that many fuch hally, unpro- fitable Marches (to give them the mildefE Name) had greatly enfeebled and difpirited the Soldiery,when fome of them dy'd under the Fatigue, and others were utterly unable to proceed; efpecially as there were con- tinual Complaints of miferable Occonomy, E and E 33 ] Colonel Barnwels Examination, that the General acknowleged to him, " he was " advifed in Carolina to rendezvous them " there, as the propereff Place. " And this was the Advice of fuch Gentlemen there, as were bed acquainted with the Situation of Auguflixe, and the adjacent Country. The Reafon afligned in Juftification of this March of 3 o Miles extraordinary, is really frivolous, viz. " Left the Forces fliould " be difcouraged for want of feing the " Men of War" It is difficult to con- ceive that a Body of Veterans, or of any Soldiers, (hould be dejeCled by a fhort Se- paration from Veffels, which they muff be fatisfied, were engaged in, and atually had proceeded on the Expedition ; efpeci- ally as no Weather intervened to endanger or delay their Arrival. But it is unde- niably clear, that many fach hafty, unpro- fitable Marches (to give them the mildeft Name) had greatly enfeebled and difpirited the Soldiery, when fome of them dy'd under the Fatigue, and others were utterly unable to proceed; e(pecially as there were con- tinual Complaints of miferable Occonomy, E and [ 33 J Colonel Barnwells Examination, that the General acknowleged to him, " he was c advifed in Carolina to rendezvous them CC there, as the properetl Place. " And this was the Advice of fuch Gendemen there, as were bed acquainted with the Situation of Auguflive, and the adjacent Country. The Reafon affigned in Juftification of this March of 3 o Miles extraordinary, is really frivolous, viz. " Left the Forces fhould " be difcouraged for want of fecing the Men of War" It is difficult to con- ceive that a Body of Veterans, or of any Soldiers, fhould be dejeaed by a fhort Se- paration from Vefiels, which they muff be fatisfied, were engaged in, and atually had proceeded on the Expedition ; efpeci- ally as no Weather intervened to endanger or delay their Arrival. But it is unde- niably clear, that many Cnch hafty, unpro- fitable Marches (to give them the mildeft Name) had greatly enfeebled and difpirited the Soldiery, when fome of them dy'd under the Fatigue, and others were utterly unable to proceed; efpecially as there were con- tinual Complaints of miferable Occonomy, E and  E 34]1 and a mofn fcanty Difaribution of Provi- fions to them. Humanity to our Fellow Creatures and Fellow Subjeds might be thought a fufficient Motive for a generous Mind to allow no Ground for DiffatiG faffion and Complaints of this Nature ; or a very Zeal for the Service fliould pre- vent fuch fevere Hardibips, in time of A61ion, as muft be defiruative of it. Yet is it in Truth notorious, that there were continual Complaints on this Occafion in the General's Regiment ; and in Fadt, it appeared that thefe unneceffary Marches and unjuft Reifraint of Food was attended with a very early Defertion from the Ge- neral's Regiment, whereby the Garrifon was fully apprized of our Force and DiC- pofition. During this Campagne they had no Leifure to regale at their Viatualling Office, as the Oyffer Banks (very com- mon in thofe Countries, and very unwhole- fome in Summer) were familiarly called by the Soldiers of Frederica. As his Ex- cellency propofed this for a S U D EN A T T E M PT, and was undoubtedly fen- fible, that Difpatch and Secrecy are ne- ceffary E 34 1 and a moff fcanty Diftribution of Provi. fions to them. Humanity to our Fellow Creatures and Fellow Subjeats might be thought a fufficient Motive for a generous Mind to allow no Ground for DiffatifG fadion and Complaints of this Nature ; or a very Zeal for the Service fhould pre- vent fuch fevere Hardfhips, in time of Adion, as mull be deftructiveof it. Yet is it in Truth notorious, that there were continual Complaints on this Occa~ion in the General's Regiment ; and in Faat, it appeared that thefe unnecefhry Marches and unjufi Reifraint of Food was attended with a very early Defertion from the Ge- neral's Regiment, whereby the Garrifon was fully apprized of our Force and Dif- pofition. During this Campagne they had no Leifure to regale at their Viatualling Office, as the Oyfier Banks (very com- mon in thofe Countries, and very unwhole- fome in Summer) were familiarly called by the Soldiers of Frederica. As his Ex- cellency propofed this for a S U D D EN A T T E M P T, and was undoubtedly fen- fible, that Difpatch and Secrecy are ne. ceffary [ 34]1 and a moft fcanty Diftribution of Provi- fions to them. Humanity to our Fellow Creatures and Fellow Subjeats might be thought a fufficient Motive for a generous Mind to allow no Ground for Diffatif- fadtion and Complaints of this Nature ; or a very Zeal for the Service fhould pre- vent fuch fevere Hardbips, in time of A6tion, as muff be deftrudive of it. Yet is it in Truth notorious, that there were continual Complaints on this Occafion in the General's Regiment ; and in Fadt, it appeared that thefe unneceffary Marches and unjutf Reftraint of Food was attended with a very early Defertion from the Ge- neral's Regiment, whereby the Garrifon was fully apprized of our Force and Dif- pofition. During this Campagne they had no Leifure to regale at their Viaualling Office, as the Oyfter Banks (very com- mon in thofe Countries, and very unwhole- fome in Summer) were familiarly called by the Soldiers of Frederica. As his Ex- cellency propofed this for a S U D D E N A T T E M P T, and was undoubtedly fen- fible, that Difpatch and Secrecy are ne- ceffary  [ 35] ceffary to a Surprize, it is very diffcult to reconcile fuch feeming Hurry, and fuch effeaual Delay and impolitic Rigour with martial Skill and Forefight, People who think they are very hardly dealt with, will often Hazard the Lofs of a very mi- ferable Life, for the meer Chance of bet- tering it. As on the other hand, thofe who might have yielded to the firif Im- preffions of their Fear and Panic, recolle6 their Judgment, and their Courage too, when they have a regular Apprehenfion of the Dangers that threaten them. We have already obferved GeneralOglethorpe told the Committee ofConference, it was very likely he might carry the Town the FIR ST N I G H T ; and indeed by all Appear- ances it is probable he might, if he had then attempted it, when the whole Army, with which he reconnoitred it, expefled that Service, and exprefs'd an Ardor for it. But inftead of that we are told, " that himfelf and fome other Officers went up to the Walls, with feveral Drums, and after alarming the Garri- fon, marched back to Diego with Bying E 2 " Colours." [ 35] ceffary to a Surprize, it is very difficult to reconcile fuch feeming Hurry, and fuch effelual Delay and impolitic Rigour with martial Skill and Forefight, People who think they are very hardly dealt with, will often Hazard the Lofs of a very mi- ferable Life, for the meer Chance of bet- tering it. As on the other hand, thofe who might have yielded to the firif Im- preflions of their Fear and Panic, recolle6t their Judgment, and their Courage too, when they have a regular Apprehenfion of the Dangers that threaten them. We have already obferved Generaloglethorpe told the Committee ofConference, it was very likely he might carry the Town the FIRST N I G H T ; and indeed by all Appear- ances it is probable he might, if he had then attempted it, when the whole Army, with which he reconnoitred it, expedted that Service, and exprefs'd an Ardor for it. But inflead of that we are told, CC that himfelf and fome other Officers " went tip to the Walls, with feveral Drums, and after alarming the Garri- fon, marched back to Diego with flying E 2. " Colours." [ 35 ] cefTary to a Surprize, it is very diffcult to reconcile fuch feeming Hurry, and fuch effeaual Delay and impolitic Rigour with martial Skill and Forefight, People who think they are very hardly dealt with, will often Hazard the Lofs of a very mi- ferable Life, for the meer Chance of bet- tering it. As on the other hand, thofe who might have yielded to the firft Im- preflions of their Fear and Panic, recolle6t their Judgment, and their Courage too, when they have a regular Apprehenfion of the Dangers that threaten them. We have already obferved Genera loglethorpe told the Committee ofConference, it was very likely he might carry the Town the FIRST N I G H T ; and indeed by all Appear- ances it is probable he might, if he had then attempted it, when the whole Army, with which he reconnoitred it, expeded that Service, and exprefs'd an Ardor for it. But inflead of that we are told, that himfelf and fome other Officers " went up to the Walls, with feveral Drums, and after alarming the Garri- " fon, marched back to Diego with flying E 2 " Colours."  ( 36 ] " Colours." 'Tis ferioufly difficult to be grave on fuch an extraordinary Incident, fuch a fgnificant Parade! Were the Forces marched back to Diego, 2 5 Miles off, purely that they might meafCure the fime Diftance thence again, to air and refreta them at this fultry Seafon ? For ought that appears here, they might have pro- ceeded direcly to entrench themfelves, to the real Inveffment of the Place, and Di- ftrefs of the Befieged. If fuch Meafures had a ferious Tendency to reduce this For- tref, it muff be acknowledged they were profound beyond Example; but People, who are unacquainted with the Depths of martial Policy, muff confider this loud Alarm, and fudden Retreat innfead of Attempt, as a Contrivance more likely to put the Garrifon on their Guard, than to furprize them. A March of 5 o Miles muff have allowed them a convenient Lei- fure to recover from their Panic, and make them better prepared for a fecond Alarm. In fhort, to charaa1crize fuch ex- traordinary Condut with the ftriftel Pro- priety, we muff admit, it has more the Air of a Farce than of a Siege. The [ 36 ] C Colours." 'Tis ferioufly difficult to be grave on fuch an extraordinary Incident, fuch a fignificant Parade ! Were the Forces marched back to Diego, 25 Miles off, purely that they might meafure the fame Diffance thence again, to air and refrefli them at this fulaty Seafon ? For ought that appears here, they might have pro- ceeded directly to entrench themfelves, to the real Invefiment of the Place, and Di- ftrefs of the Befieged. If fuch Meafures had a ferious Tendency to reduce this For- tref, it muff be acknowledged they were profound beyond Example; but People, who are unacquainted with the Depths of martial Policy, muff confider this loud Alarm, and fudden Retreat inffead of Attempt, as a Contrivance more likely to put the Garrifon on their Guard, than to firprize them. A March of y o Miles muff have allowed them a convenient Lei- fure to recover from their Panic, and make them better prepared for a fecond Alarm. In fhort, to charaderize fuch ex,- traordinary Condua with the ftricte11 Pro- priety, we muff admit, it has more the Air of a Farce than of a Siege. The [ 36 ] "1 Colours." 'Tis ferioufly difficult to be grave on fuch an extraordinary Incident, fuch a fignificant Parade ! Were the Forces marched back to Diego, 2 5 Miles off, purely that they might meafure the fame Diffance thence again, to air and refreli them at this fultry Seafon ? For ought that appears here, they might have pro- ceeded direatly to entrench themfelves, to the real Invefiment of the Place, and Di- ftrefs of the Befieged. If fuch Meafures had a ferious Tendency to reduce this For- trefq, it mua be acknowledged they were profound beyond Example; but People, who are unacquainted with the Depths of martial Policy, muff confider this loud Alarm, and idden Retreat inffead of Attempt, as a Contrivance more likely to put the Garrifon on their Guard, than to forprize them. A March of 5 o Miles muff have allowed them a convenient Lei- fire to recover from their Panic, and make them better prepared for a fecond Alarm. In fhort, to characterize fuch e- traordinary Conduct with the flrictefn Pro- priety, we muff admit, it has more the Air of a Farce than of a Siege. The  E 37 1 The Garrifoning and Guarding every infignificant Hut and Sandhill, and the frequent unnecedary Marches and Coun- termarches were nearly of the fame Strain, being compar'd by an experienced and wor- thy Officer on the Spot, " to Squirrel " Hunting rather than War." As the Forces then under the General's Com- mand were fhort of what he firat propo- fed as neceffary to the Enterprize, was it very confiftent to weaken his little Army, by fuch frequent Detachments, however fmal ? And as this was to be a SUDDEN A T T E M P T, how were fuch reiterated Motions and Counter-motions reconcilea- ble with fuch an Intention ? As they did make a circuitous March to Augufline by Fort Diego, it might very probably be pru- dent to take it in ; if it were only, by the Capture of fo many Prifoners, to deprive the Garrifon of a Reinforcement of 5 o Men, whenever they fhould incline to draw them thence. But it may be doubt- ed, whether leaving a Detachment of 6o of our Men to Garnfon it, was altogether prudent in our Circumfances. We find this [ 37 1 The Garrifoning and Guarding every infignificant Hut and Sandhill, and the frequent unneceffary Marches and Coun- termarches were nearly of the fame Strain, being compar'd by an experienced and wor- thy Officer on the Spot, " to Squirrel " Hunting rather than War." As the Forces then under the General's Com- mand were fhort of what he firif propo- fed as neceffary to the Enterprize, was it very confiftent to weaken his little Army, by fuch frequent Detachments, however fmall And as this was to be a SUDDEN A T TE M P T, how were fuch reiterated Motions and Counter-motions reconcilea- ble with fuch an Intenton ? As they did make a circuitous March to Augufine by Fort Diego, it might very probably be pru- dent to take it in ; if it were only, by the Capture of fo many Prifoners, to deprive the Garrifon of a Reinforcement of S o Men, whenever they fhould incline to draw them thence. But it may be doubt- ed, whether leaving a Detachment of 6o of our Men to Garrifon it, was altogether prudent in our Circumnances. We find this E 37 1 The Garrifoning and Guarding every infignificant Hut and Sandhill, and the frequent unneceffary Marches and Coun- termarches were nearly of the fame Strain, being compar'd by an experienced and wor- thy Officer on the Spot, " to Squirrel " Hunting rather than War." As the Forces then under the General's Com- mand were fhort of what he firif propo- fed as neceffary to the Enterprize, was it very confiftent to weaken his little Army, by fuch frequent Detachments, however fmall ? And as this was to be a SUDDEN A T T E M P T, how were fuch reiterated Motions and Counter-motions reconcilea- ble with fuch an Intention ? As they did make a circuitous March to Augufine by Fort Diego, it might very probably be pru- dent to take it in ; if it were only, by the Capture of fo many Prifoners, to deprive the Garrifon of a Reinforcement of 5o Men, whenever they fhould incline to draw them thence. But it may be doubt- ed, whether leaving a Detachment of 60 of our Men to Garnfon it, was altogether prudent in our Circumnances. We find this  [ 38 ] this Fort 25 Miles from Augufine gar- rifoned, and further flrengthned by a Ditch; but Fort Moofa, within two Miles of the Caftle, difinantled. Now certainly we had lefs to apprehend at the former than the latter: The Spaniards would undoubt- edly be more cautious of hazarding their Men at fuch a Diflance, where Parties might interpofe to cut them off, than where they had a continual View of the Place, and could receive an hourly Intel- ligence of our Force and Difpofition. But it has been fugge fed, that garrifoning Diego was very commodious as a Place of Retreat; and we mutr acknowledge, that as Matters were afterwards conduded, it looked like a timely Precaution and Fore- fight. Having already obferved the Impru- dence of retreating from the Town, which gave the Spaniards an Opportunity of en- trenching round it, which we ought and negleced to do ; the employing the main Body of the Troops on Anaflatia and Point Puartel, may juRly be confidered rather as a neceffiry Confequence of that Negled, [ 38 ] this Fort 25 Miles from Augufline gar- rifoned, and further flrengthned by a Ditch; but Fort Moofa, within two Miles of the Caftle, difmantled. Now certainly we had lefs to apprehend at the former than the latter : The Spaniards would undoubt- edly be more cautious of hazarding their Men at fuch a Diftance, where Parties might interpofe to cut them off, than where they had a continual View of the Place, and could receive an hourly Intel- ligence of our Force and Difpofition. But it has been fuggefted, that garriloning Diego was very commodious as a Place of Retreat; and we muft acknowledge, that as Matters were afterwards condudted, it looked like a timely Precaution and Fore- fight. Having already obferved the Impru- dence of retreating from the Town, which gave the Spaniards an Opportunity of en- trenching round it, which we ought and negleced to do; the employing the main Body of the Troops on Anafatia and Point 9uartel, may juffly be confidered rather as a neceffiry Confequence of that Negledl, [ 38 J this Fort 25 Miles from Augufine gar- rifoned, and further flrengthned by a Ditch; but Fort Moofa, within two Miles of the Caftle, difinantled. Now certainly we had lefs to apprehend at the former than the latter : The Spaniards would undoubt- edly be more cautious of hazarding their Men at fuch a Diftance, where Parties might interpofe to cut them off, than where they had a continual View of the Place, and could receive an hourly Intel- ligence of our Force and Difpofition. But it has been fuggefted, that garrifoning Diego was very commodious as a Place of Retreat; and we mutt acknowledge, that as Matters were afterwards conduded, it looked like a timely Precaution and Fore- fight. Having already obferved the Impru- dence of retreating from the Town, which gave the Spaniards an Opportunity of en- trenching round it, which we ought and neglected to do ; the employing the main Body of the Troops on Anaftatia and Point §uartel, may juflly be confidered rather as a neceffiry Confequence of that Negle&,  E 39 1 Neglea, than an original Blunder. The Cattle could not readily be formed from fuch a Difpoficion of the Troops, and as Lieutenant- Colonel Cook, an experienced Engineer and Officer, declared our Batteries too diftant for any effeaual Service, it was very unlikely they ihould ever be reduced to capitulate from thence. The Spanmf Shot, which feemed generally well direca- ed, fell frequently very near our Forces, but dead, and never killed or wounded one Man from the Cattle. It was not then to be imagined that ours, from a like Diftance, fhould batter heavy Walls to any Purpofe. By this Diftance of the Forces from the Cattle, and their Sepa- ration from it, and from each other by Water, the whole Main was left open to the Befieged, if they might truly be called fo, for themfelves and their Cattle. Was this diftrefling them, or likely to produce the fpeedy Surrender fo valiantly talked of? Did not this leave a free Paaage to the Cattle for any Supplies that fhould be landed on the Main ? Whereas, if the Town had been carried, or even clofely inveaed, and a Bat- [ 39 3 Neglea, than an original Blunder. The Caftle could not readily be formed from fuch a Difpoftion of the Troops, and as Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, an experienced Engineer and Officer, declared our Batteries too ditlant for any effeaual Service, it was very unlikely they fIould ever be reduced to capitulate from thence. The Spani/jZ Shot, which feemed generally well direct- ed, fell frequently very near our Forces, but dead, and never killed or wounded one Man from the Catle. It was not then to be imagined that ours, from a like Diflance, fhould batter heavy Walls to any Purpofe. By this Diftance of the Forces from the Catle, and their Sepa- ration from it, and from each other by Water, the whole Main was left open to the Befieged, if they might truly be called fo, for themfelves and their Cattle. Was this diftrefling them, or likely to produce the fpeedy Surrender fo valiantly talked of? Did not this leave a free Paflage to the Cattle for any Supplies that Ihould be landed on the Main ? Whereas, if the Town had been carried, or even clofely invefed, and a Bat- E 39 1 Neglect, than an original Blunder. The Cattle could not readily be formed from fuch a Difpofition of the Troops, and as Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, an experienced Engineer and Officer, declared our Batteries too diftant for any effeatual Service, it was very unlikely they fhould ever be reduced to capitulate from thence. The Spanijb Shot, which feemed generally well direct- ed, fell frequently very near our Forces, but dead, and never killed or wounded one Man from the Cattle. It was not then to be imagined that ours, from a like Diftance, fhould batter heavy Walls to any Purpofe. By this Difance of the Forces from the Cattle, and their Sepa- ration from it, and from each other by Water, the whole Main was left open to the Befieged, if they might truly be called fo, for themfelves and their Cattle. Was this difrefling them, or likely to produce the fpeedy Surrender fo valiantly talked of? Did not this leave a free Paflage to the Cattle for any Supplies that thould be landed on the Main ? Whereas, if the Town had been carried, or even clofely inveaed, and a Bat-  [ 40 ] a Battery erected to the Southward of it, to command the River there, which Co. lonel Vanderduffen propofed, and Lieute- nant-Colonel Cook approved to no Pur- pofe, the Supplies that arrived, in fpight of fo many Men of War, muff, with the greateft Probability, have been either driven back, funk, or taken by the Be- fiegers, as they were attended with no fuf- ficient Strength to force thro' them into the Place ; in which Cafe it feens paff doubt, that the Garrifon muff be fpeedily reduced to capitulate. But if it were thought unadvifed or improper to hazard the Body of the Forces on the Main, 'tis hard to conceive the Prudence of fending Colonel Palmer there, with lefs than oo Whites, and but 42. Indians, within two Miles of the Cat- tle, when the fironger Corps upon Ana- flatia and Point 9partel, were as fecure from the Enemy as they were incapable of an- noying them. Colonel Barnwell declared on his Examination, he heard Colonel Palmer, who was a good Judge of the Situation, tell the General, " the Party he " fent [ 40 ] a Battery ereated to the Southward of it, to command the River there, which Co. lonel VanderdufJen propofed, and Lieute- nant-Colonel Gook approved to no Pur- pofe, the Supplies that arrived, in fpight of fo many Men of War, muff, with the greatef Probability, have been either driven back, funk, or taken by the Be- fiegers, as they were attended with no fuf- licient Strength to force thro' them into the Place; in which Cafe it feems paff doubt, that the Garrifon muff be fpeedily reduced to capitulate. But if it were thought unadvifed or improper to hazard the Body of the Forces on the Main, 'tis hard to conceive the Prudence of fending Colonel Palmer there, with lefs than t oo Whites, and but 42 Indians, within two Miles of the Cat- tle, when the ifronger Corps upon Ana- flatia and Point §artel, were as fecure from the Enemy as they were incapable of an- noying them. Colonel Barnwell declared on his Examination, he heard Colonel Palmer, who was a good Judge of the Situation, tell the General, " the Party he a1 ent ( 40 ] a Battery ereSed to the Southward of it, to command the River there, which Co- lonel Vanderdufen propofed, and Lieute- nant-Colonel Cook approved to no Pur- pofe, the Supplies that arrived, in fpight of fo many Men of War, muff, with the greateft Probability, have been either driven back, funk, or taken by the Be- fiegers, as they were attended with no fuf- ficient Strength to force thro' them into the Place; in which Cafe it feems paff doubt, that the Garrifon muff be fpeedily reduced to capitulate. But if it were thought unadvifed or improper to hazard the Body of the Forces on the Main, 'tis hard to conceive the Prudence of fending Colonel Palmer there, with lefs than x00 Whites, and but 42 Indians, within two Miles of the Caf- tle, when the ifronger Corps upon Ana- flatia and Point Q artel, were as fecure from the Enemy as they were incapable of an- noying them. Colonel Barnwell declared on his Examination, he heard Colonel Palmer, who was a good Judge of the Situation, tell the General, " the Party he a fent  [ +1 1 Cent him over on the Main with, was " took weak ; " but upon the General's telling him " One of his Officers would " undertake it with the fame Number, " and that he would fend him over a " Reinforcement when he had taken "Anaflatia (which he never did ) the gallant Colonel accepted it, and proved the Truth of his AfFertion by the Defeat of his Party, dying bravely himfelf, as he had lived, in the Service of his Coun- try. It has never been even fuggeaed, that any Meafures were ever taken to have fupported this fmall Number in Cafe of an Attack, tho' they were feparated by Water, both from the General's and Co- lonel's Regiments, and the few who efcaped being flain or taken Prifoners, owed their Prefervation to a Biat that was acci- dentally paffing by, which they hail'd to fetch them over. Was it to be fup- pofed they could continue to alarm the Catle frequently, for which it feems they were Cent there, without having their Num- bers difcovered And was it to be thought the Spaniards would not determine, as they F did, [ +1 1 " fent him over on the Main with, was took weak;" but upon the General's telling him " One of his Officers would c undertake it with the fame Number, " and that he would fend him over a Reinforcement when he had taken " Anaflatia (which he never did) the gallant Colonel accepted it, and proved the Truth of his Affertion by the Defeat of his Party, dying bravely himfelf, as he had lived, in the Service of his Coun- try. It has never been even fuggefled, that any Meafures were ever taken to have fupported this fmall Number in Cafe of an Attack, tho' they were feparated by Water, both from the General's and Co- lonel's Regiments, and the few who efcaped being flain or taken Prifoners, owed their Prefervation to a Boat that was acci- dentally paffing by, which they hail'd to fetch them over. Was it to be fup- pofed they could continue to alarm the Cafle frequently, for which it feems they were ent there, without having their Num- bers difcovered And was it to be thought the Spaniards would not determine, as they F did, [ 41 " ent him over on the Main with, was " took weak ;" but upon the General's telling him " One of his Officers would " undertake it with the fame Number, " and that he would fend him over a " Reinforcement when he had taken "Anaflatia (which he never did) the gallant Colonel accepted it, and proved the Truth of his Affertion by the Defeat of his Party, dying bravely himfelf, as he had lived, in the Service of his Coun- try. It has never been even fuggeffed, that any Meafures were ever taken to have fupported this fmall Number in Cafe of an Attack, tho' they were feparated by Water, both from the General's and Co- lonel's Regiments, and the few who efcaped being flain or taken Prifoners, owed their Prefervation to a Boat that was acci- dentally paffing by, which they hail'd to fetch them over. Was it to be fup- pofed they could continue to alarm the Caftle frequently, for which it feems they were Cent there, without having their Num- bers difcovered And was it to be thought the Spaniards would not determine, as they F did,  [ 42 1 did, to cut them off by a fuperior Detach- ment, when they found them fo effealu- ally divided from the main Body? But we are told in the General's Letter, " That this Misfortune happened thro' a Neg- led of thofe Orders by which they were enjoined to encamp every Night in a different Place." Was a Compliance with fuch Orders truly likely to have pre- vented this ill Event ? Can it reafonably be (uppofed the Enemy was without Spa- niA or Indian Scouts, to difcover their Force and Situation at fo fmall a Difnance ? And thefe being once difcovered, what availed it where a handful of Men en- camped, that were daily employed to catch Horfes at fo much per Head, and had then caught about a Hundred? Muf not their Fatigue enervate them for Adion, compel them to fleep, and expofe them to Surprize, as it adually happened ? If the Cafle was once taken, would not thefe precious Horfes, and all the Stock have fallen of Courfe; and could it be prudent to har. rafs the Forces by an Employment that embarafs'd the main Defign ? Were not this [ 42 ] did, to cut them off by a fuperior Detach- ment, when they found them fo effeau- ally divided from the main Body? But we are told in the General's Letter, "1 That CC this Misfortune happened thro' a Neg- " led of thofe Orders by which they were " enjoined to encamp every Night in a " different Place." Was a Compliance with fuch Orders truly likely to have pre- vented this ill Event ? Can it reafonably be fuppofed the Enemy was without Spa- nib or Indian Scouts, to difcover their Force and Situation at fo fmall a Diflance ? And thefe being once difcovered, what availed it where a handful of Men en- camped, that were daily employed to catch Horfes at fo much per Head, and had then caught about a Hundred? Muff not their Fatigue enervate them for Adion, compel them to fleep, and expofe them to Surprize, as it aaually happened ? If the Caff I was once taken, would not thefe precious Horfes, and all the Stock have fallen of Courfe; and could it be prudent to har- rafs the Forces by an Employment that embarafs'd the main Defign ? Were not this [ 42 1 did, to cut them off by a fuperior Detach- ment, when they found them fo effeatu- ally divided from the main Body? But we are told in the General's Letter, " That " this Misfortune happened thro' a Neg- " ledb of thofe Orders by which they were " enjoined to encamp every Night in a " different Place." Was a Compliance with fuch Orders truly likely to have pre- vented this ill Event ? Can it reafonably be fuppofed the Enemy was without Spa- ni# or Indian Scouts, to difcover their Force and Situation at fo fmall a Diftance ? And thefe being once difcovered, what availed it where a handful of Men en- camped, that were daily employed to catch Horfes at fo much per Head, and had then caught about a Hundred? Muf not their Fatigue enervate them for Adtion, compel them to fleep, and expofe them to Surprize, as it a6tually happened ? If the Cafile was once taken, would not thefe precious Hores, and all the Stock have fallen of Courfe; and could it be prudent to har- rafs the Forces by an Employment that embarafs'd the main Defign ? Were not this  [ 43 1 this fmall Party capable of making the fme Defence at Moofa as elfewhere? Nay, pofibly if this Fort had not been un- feafonably difmantled, they might have been able to repulfe the Enemy. Ten Creek Indians who came to affift at the Siege, the Day before this Defeat, flop- ping at Moofa, asked Colonel Palmer where the General was ; and when he told them he was upon Anaflatia, they asked him, " If the General fent them few Men " with their little Guns to fight againft fo many Men, and fuch a trong Fort," faying, " They looked like fomething put into a great Mouth, that was to be de- voured as foon as the Mouth was fhut." Common Reafon made thefe untaught impolitick Savages true Prophets on this Occafion, which indeed required no Con- jurer to foretel. Much might be added very pertinently, on the Madnefs or Bar- barity of expofing fuch a fmall unfupport- ed Party to fuch a fuperior Enemy ; but in brief, if it were intended to have facrifi- ced them, nothing lefs than a prefent Maffa- cre could have done it more effeaually. F 2 Tho' [ 43 1 this fmall Party capable of making the fame Defence at Moofa as elfewhere? Nay, pomfibly if this Fort had not been un- feafonably difmnantled, they might have been able to repulfe the Enemy. Ten Creek Indians who came to affift at the Siege, the Day before this Defeat, flop- ping at Moofa, asked Colonel Palmer where the General was ; and when he told them he was upon Anaflatia, they asked him, 4 If the General fent them few Men with their little Guns to fight againfL fo many Men, and fuch a ftrong Fort," faying, " They looked like fomething put into a great Mouth, that was to be de- voured as foon as the Mouth was fhut." Common Reafon made thefe untaught impolitick Savages true Prophets on this Occafion, which indeed required no Con- jurer to foretel. Much might be added very pertinently, on the Madnefs or Bar- barity of expofing fuch a fmall unfupport- ed Party to fuch a fuperior Enemy ; but in brief, if it were intended to have facrifi- ced them, nothing lefs than a prefent Maffa- crc could have done it more effectually. F 2 Tho' [ 43 ] this fmall Party capable of making the fime Defence at Moofa as elfewhere ? Nay, poffibly if this Fort had not been un- feafonably difmantled, they might have been able to repulfe the Enemy. Ten Creek Indians who came to affif at the Siege, the Day before this Defeat, flop- ping at Moofa, asked Colonel Palmer where the General was; and when he told them he was upon Anaflatia, they asked him, " If the General fent them few Men " with their little Guns to fight againft " fo many Men, and fuch a firong Fort," faying, " They looked like fomething put C into a great Mouth, that was to be de- " voured as foon as the Mouth was fhut." Common Reafon made thefe untaught impolitick Savages true Prophets on this Occafion, which indeed required no Con- jurer to foretel. Much might be added very pertinently, on the Madnefs or Bar- barity of expofing fuch a fmall unfupport- ed Party to fuch a fuperior Enemy ; but in brief, if it were intended to have facrifi- ced them, nothing lefs than a prefent Maffa- cre could have done it more effeaually. F 2 Tho'  E 44 Tho' nothing can appear furprizing af- ter fuch Condu&, I cannot avoid men- tioning the Injuftice and Imprudence of difguAing the Indians in Amity with the Englif, who had travelled fo far to aflift at the Siege. Some of the Chickefaws meeting with a Spanmfl Indian in one of their Excurfions, killed him, and bring- ing his Head in Triumph to the Camp af- ter their Manner, prefented it to the Ge- neral, who rejeaed it with Indignation, calling them "1 barbarous Dogs, and bid- " ding them be gone:" Upon which they faid, " If they had carried the Head of an Englifman to the French, they fhould not be treated in that Manner." And Squirrel, their King, faid, " If he had " carried one of our Heads to the Go- " vernor of Augufline, he fhould have " been ufed by him like a Man, as he " had been now ufed by the General like a Dog." Thefe very brave People, dreaded by the French and Spaniards, and our conffant Friends, came to fight and affift in good Earneft at the Siege; nor could they be juftly blamed, if it had been all E 44 Tho' nothing can appear furprizing af- ter fuch Condua, I cannot avoid men- tioning the Injuftice and Imprudence of difgufting the Indians in Amity with the Englif, who had travelled fo far to aflift at the Siege. Some of the Chickefaus meeting with a Spanifl Indian in one of their Excurfions, killed him, and bring- ing his Head in Triumph to the Camp af- ter their Manner, prefented it to the Ge- neral, who rejeaed it with Indignation, calling them "1 barbarous Dogs, and bid- " ding them be gone:" Upon which they faid, " If they had carried the Head of an Englifnman to the French, they fhould not be treated in that Manner." And Squirrel, their King, faid, " If he had " carried one of our Heads to the Go- " vernor of Augufline, he fhould have " been ufed by him like a Man, as he " had been now ufed by the General like a Dog." Thefe very brave People, dreaded by the French and Spaniards, and our conifant Friends, came to fight and aflift in good Earneft at the Siege; nor could they be juffly blamed, if it had been all [ 44] Tho' nothing can appear furprizing af- ter fuch Condu&, I cannot avoid men- tioning the Injuffice and Imprudence of difguffing the Indians in Amity with the EngliA, who had travelled fo far to aflift at the Siege. Some of the Chickefaws meeting with a Spanif] Indian in one of their Excurflons, killed him, and bring- ing his Head in Triumph to the Camp af- ter their Manner, prefented it to the Ge- neral, who rejeded it with Indignation, calling them " barbarous Dogs, and bid- " ding them be gone:" Upon which they faid, " If they had carried the Head of an Englifman to the French, they fhould not be treated in that Manner." And Squirrel, their King, faid, " If he had " carried one of our Heads to the Go- " vernor of Augufline, he fhould have " been ufed by him like a Man, as he " had been now ufed by the General like Cc a Dog." Thefe very brave People, dreaded by the French and Spaniards, and our conflant Friends, came to fight and aflift in good Earneft at the Siege ; nor could they be juftly blamed, if it had been all  [ 45 1 all a Joke, for having never been let into it, they could never have dreamt of fuch a warlike Refinement. This Step fo con- trary to Juffice and Policy, made them refolve to return Home; and it was at the earneft Intreaty and Infrance of the Carolina Officers, they were prevailed on to flay. And this will appear the more unaccountable, when we recollea, that upon the Arrival of fome Indians in the General's Camp, he wrote to Colonel Vanderdufen to fend him fome Prefents for them, with a Power to difaribute them, becaufe (to ufe his own Words) " much " depends on the Nations." Certainly then fome Indulgence to them was at leaff necefary ; and this extreme, romantic Ten- dernefs, upon a due Confideration of all Circumifances, muff have been truly in- judicious and unfeafonable. What can be thought of the Capitula- tion of Diego, a Palifade Fort, whereby the Garrifon were to be Ptifoners of War, and the Cattle free and facred, efpecially when his own Regiment had been fo fcan- tily fubfifled before ? A Carolina Setler and [ 45 ] all a Joke, for having never been let into it, they could never have dreamt of fuch a warlike Refinement. This Step fo con- trary to Juffice and Policy, made them refolve to return Home; and it was at the earneft Intreaty and Inifance of the Carolina Officers, they were prevailed on to flay. And this will appear the more unaccountable, when we recollea, that upon the Arrival of fome Indians in the General's Camp, he wrote to Colonel Vanderduffen to fend him Come Prefents for them, with a Power to difaribute them, becaufe (to ufe his own Words) "much " depends on the Nations." Certainly then fome Indulgence to them was at leaft necefary; and this extreme, romantic Ten- dernefs, upon a due Confideration of all Circumifances, muff have been truly in- judicious and unfeafonable. What can be thought of the Capitula- tion of Diego, a Palifade Fort, whereby the Garrifon were to be Prifoners of War, and the Cattle free and facred, efpecially when his own Regiment had been fo fcan- tily fubfifled before ? A Carolina Setler and [ 45 ] all a Joke, for having never been let into it, they could never have dreamt of fuch a warlike Refinement. This Step fo con- trary to Juffice and Policy, made them refolve to return Home; and it was at the earneff Intreaty and Inflance of the Carolina Officers, they were prevailed on to flay. And this will appear the more unaccountable, when we recollea, that upon the Arrival of fome Indians in the General's Camp, he wrote to Colonel Vanderdufen to fend him fome Prefents for them, with a Power to difiribute them, becaufe (to ufe his own Words) "much " depends on the Nations." Certainly then fome Indulgence to them was at leaft necefary ; and this extreme, romantic Ten- dernefs, upon a due Confideration of all Circumfaances, muff have been truly in- judicious and unfeafonable. What can be thought of the Capitula- tion of Diego, a Palifade Fort, whereby the Garrifon were to be Ptifoners of War, and the Cattle free and facred, efpecially when his own Regiment had been Co fcan- tily fubfifted before ? A Carolina Seder and  [ 46 ] and Soldier, who made bold with a Kid- ney of one of thofe who were faid to be purchafed from Signior Diego, very nar- rowly efcaped Punifhment for it, at the earneff Interceffion of his Officers. They are ufed to Plenty of Meat in their own Country, and could not conceive the lealt Reafon for being denied it in an Enemy's. it may be obferved by the Way, that this fame Signior, this Diego, was a Negro or Mulatto, who had been a confiderable Time a Prifoner at large in the Camp, and whofe Parole was afterwards taken for his Return from Augufline but this Grand Perfon who had capitulated in fuch Form, and obtained fuch honourable Conditions for his Bullocks, forgot his perfonal Ho- nour, and was content to be as cunning as thofe who depended on it. Two other ,Spaniph Prifoners were fent into Augufline before this by the General, to induce the Garrifon to defert, as he faid, who never returned to inform us of their Succefs. Many other Failures, tho' very evident and pernicious, are purpofely omitted here; and indeed the Number and Magnitude of thefe ( 46 ] and Soldier, who made bold with a Kid- ney of one of thofe who were faid to be purchafed ftom Signior Diego, very nar- rowly efcaped Punifhment for it, at the earnefi Interceflion of his Officers. They are ufed to Plenty of Meat in their own Country, and could not conceive the leaft Reafon for being denied it in an Enemy's. it may be obferved by the Way, that this fame Signior, this Diego, was a Negro or Mulatto, who had been a confiderable Time a Prifoner at large in the Camp, and whofe Parole was afterwards taken for his Return from Augufline; but this Grand Perfon who had capitulated in fuch Form, and obtained fuch honourable Conditions for his Bullocks, forgot his perfonal Ho- nour, and was content to be as cunning as thofe who depended on it. Two other Spanip Prifoners were fent into AuguJine before this by the General, to induce the Garrifon to defert, as he faid, who never returned to inform us of their Succefs. Many other Failures, tho' very evident and pernicious, are purpofely omitted here; and indeed the Number and Magnitude of thefe [ 46 ] and Soldier, who made bold with a Kid- ney of one of thofe who were faid to be purchafed from Signior Diego, very nar- rowly efcaped Punifhmenr for it, at the earneft Interce(fion of his Officers. They are ufed to Plenty of Meat in their own Country, and could not conceive the leali Reafon for being denied it in an Enemy's. it may be obferved by the Way, that this fame Signior, this Diego, was a Negro or Mulatto, who had been a confiderable Time a Prifoner at large in the Camp, and whofe Parole was afterwards taken for his Return from Augufline; but this Grand Perfon who had capitulated in fuch Form, and obtained fuch honourable Conditions for his Bullocks, forgot his perfonal Ho. nour, and was content to be as cunning as thofe who depended on it. Two other Spaniph Prifoners were fent into Augujline before this by the General, to induce the Garrifon to defert, as he faid, who never returned to inform us of their Succefs. Many other Failures, tho' very evident and pernicious, are purpofely omitted here; and indeed the Number and Magnitude of thefe  [ 47 ] thefe are lefs furprizing, when we obferve they were not the Confequences of any Councils of War, but the fole Refulc of the opinion and arbitrary Will of the Chief Commander, whofe Orders were binding on all others. He never called a fingle Council throughout the Expedition (for which it was well known in Charles- Town he quoted the Conduft of Cafar) tho' his own Regiment contained brave Officers of undoubted Zeal and long Experience. And the Carolina Regiment defired nothing more than fome right Plan of Aaion, in which they were prepared to co-operate at the utmoE Hazard. It is acknowledged, that in fome Letters from the General to Colonel Vanderdufen, he tells him, " He " thanks him for his Advice, which will " always have great Weight with him," and the like. But how can we fuppofe this beyond meer Compliment, if it were not an Artifice, in fome degree to co- lour over this grofs Negled of martial Councils, It does not appear that the Meafures purfued were the Advice of any other Officer, but it may be very confi- dently [ 47 ] thefe are lefs furprizing, when we obferve they were not the Confequences of any Councils of War, but the fole Refult of the Opinion and arbitrary Will of the Chief Commander, whofe Orders were binding on all others. He never called a fingle Council throughout the Expedition (for which it was well known in Charles- Toum he quoted the Condu& of Cefar) tho' his own Regiment contained brave Officers of undoubted Zeal and long Experience. And the Carolina Regiment defired nothing more than fome right Plan of Aaion, in which they were prepared to co-operate at the utmoft Hazard. It is acknowledged, that in fome Letters from the General to Colonel Vanderdufen, he tells him, " He " thanks him for his Advice, which will " always have great Weight with him," and the like. But how can we fuppofe this beyond meet Compliment, if it were not an Artifice, in fome degree to co- lour over this grofs Negled of martial Councils. It does not appear that the Meafures purfued were the Advice of any other Officer, but it may be very confi- dently [ 47 1 thefe are lefs furprizing, when we obferve they were not the Confequences of any Councils of War, but the fole Refult of the Opinion and arbitrary Will of the Chief Commander, whofe Orders were binding on all others. He never called a fingle Council throughout the Expedition (for which it was well known in Charles- 7own he quoted the Condua of Cefar) tho' his own Regiment contained brave Officers of undoubted Zeal and long Experience. And the Carolina Regiment defired nothing more than fome right Plan of Aaion, in which they were prepared to co-operate at the utmoft Hazard. It is acknowledged, that in fome Letters from the General to Colonel Vanderdufen, he tells him, " He " thanks him for his Advice, which will " always have great Weight with him," and the like. But how can we fuppofe this beyond meer Compliment, if it were not an Artifice, in fome degree to co- lour over this grofs Neglea of martial Councils. It does not appear that the Meafures purfued were the Advice of any other Officer, but it may be very confi- dently  [ 48 ] dently affirmed, that as many as had Judg- ment in fuch Affairs, and were zealous for the Succefs of this Expedion, conifantly difapproved them : And fome of the moft experienced made an early Prediaion of the ill Event, from the backward Steps that were made to a good one. But in Mat- ters thus fituated, who will venture to difobey or contend The Subordinate can only be fafe in executing Commands they may obferve with Reluaance, or by acquiefcing to fuch Inafion as they muff confider with Contempt. And whenever any Commander has loft the Confidence, the Efleem and Love of his Forces, what Good can be expeded, what Evil may not be prefumed, when his Courage a- gainit a publick Enemy may be refirain- ed by his Horror of concealed ones ? Neither is it at all improbable that this Mifcarriage might have been prevented by free Deliberation, and a timely Purfuit of different Councils. For it appears, that at a Conference in Colonel r/anderdufen's Tent, on Anaflatia, ?une 22, where be- fides himfelf and Lieutenant Colonel Cook, Commo- E 48 ] dently affirmed, that as many as had Judg- ment in fuch Affairs, and were zealous for the Succefs of this Expedion, conifantly difapproved them : And fome of the molt experienced made an early Prediftion of the ill Event, from the backward Steps that were made to a good one. But in Mat- ters thus ituated, who will venture to difobey or contend ? The Subordinate can only be fafe in executing Commands they may obferve with Relutance, or by acquiefcing to fuch Ination as they muff confider with Contempt. And whenever any Commander has loft the Confidence, the Efteem and Love of his Forces, what Good can be expeded, what Evil may not be preCfumed, when his Courage a- gainft a publick Enemy may be reRrain- ed by his Horror of concealed ones ? Neither is it at all improbable that this Mifcarriage might have been prevented by free Deliberation, and a timely Purfuit of different Councils. For it appears, that at a Conference in Colonel I/anderdufen's Tent, on Anaflatia, June 22, where be- fides himfelf and Lieutenant Colonel Cook, Commo- E 48 ] dently affirmed, that as many as had Judg- ment in fuch Affairs, and were zealous for the Succefi of this Expedion, conflantly difapproved them: And fome of the molt experienced made an early Prediaion of the ill Event, from the backward Steps that were made to a good one. But in Mat- ters thus fituated, who will venture to difobey or contend ? The Subordinate can only be fafe in executing Commands they may obferve with Reluaance, or by acquiefcing to fuch Inaaion as they muff confider with Contempt. And whenever any Commander has loft the Confidence, the Effeem and Love of his Forces, what Good can be expeded, what Evil may not be prefumed, when his Courage a- gainfi a publick Enemy may be refIrain- ed by his Horror of concealed ones ? Neither is it at all improbable that this Mifcarriage might have been prevented by free Deliberation, and a timely Purfuir of different Councils. For it appears, that at a Conference in Colonel Tanderdufen's Tent, on Anaftatia, fune 2 z, where be- fides himfelf and Lieutenant Colonel Cook, Commo-  [ 49 1 CommodorePearfe, Captain WTrren, and Captain Laws were prefent, it was their unanimous Opinion, " That the General " rather retarded than forwarded Matters, and that they fhould proceed with more Vigour, when he was gone over on the Main. " And indeed it appears that Captain Warren was very uneafy at his Conduct before, complaining, " that he " was not two Minutes of one Mind;" for which Reafon he faid, " he would " take no Notice of any but written Or- ders from him, " adding, " That the General was come there without any Ammunition, Provifions, or other Ne- " ceffaries but what he had from him, " which Lieutenant Colonel Cook very juftly called, " a new Syfem of War, and be- ginning it at the wrong End." Having thus enumerated the principal Errors that occurred in the Management of the Land Forces, it remains to confider, with the fame Truth and Impartiality, if any thing tranfac'ed or omitted by the Fleet may be judged to have contributed to this Di6ppointment. [ 49 1 Commodore Pearfe, Captain W'rren, and Captain Laws were prefent, it was their unanimous Opinion, " That the General " rather retarded than forwarded Matters, " and that they fhould proceed with more Vigour, when he was gone over on " the Main. " And indeed it appears that Captain Wfarren was very uneafy at his Condua before, complaining, " that he " was not two Minutes of one Mind;" for which Reafon he faid, " he would " take no Notice of any but written O-r- ders from him, " adding, " That the General was come there without any Ammunition, Provifions, or other Ne- " ceffaries but what he had from him, " which Lieutenant Colonel Cook very jultly called, " a new Syftem of War, and be- ginning it at the wrong End." Having thus enumerated the principal Errors that occurred in the Management of the Land Forces, it remains to confider, with the fame Truth and Impartiality, if any thing tranfaded or omitted by the Fleet may be judged to have contributed to this Di6ppointmrent. [ 49 1 ComniodorePearfe, Captain fkarren, and Captain Laws were prefent, it was their unanimous Opinion, " That the General " rather retarded than forwarded Matters, " and that they fhould proceed with more Vigour, when he was gone over on " the Main. " And indeed it appears that Captain Warren was very uneafy at his Conduct before, complaining, " that he " was not two Minutes of one Mind for which Reafon he faid, " he would " take no Notice of any but written O-r- ders from him, " adding, " That the General was come there without any Ammunition, Provifions, or other Ne- " ceffaries but what he had from him, " which Lieutenant Colonel Cook very juftly called, " a new Syffen of War, and be- ginning it at the wrong End." Having thus enumerated the principal Errors that occurred in the Management of the Land Forces, it remains to confider, with the fame Truth and Impartiality, if any thing tranfadted or omitted by the Fleet may be judged to have contributed to this Di6ppoinrment. G Here Ga Here G Here  [ 50 ] Here then we readily acknowledge that whatever Meafures were taken, or not taken, feem in Confequence of fome Confulta. tion of the Commanders, and were founded on the Unanimity or Majority of the Board, which muft in fome Mea- fure alter the Complexion of their Pro- ceedings. And firf it feems, that not attacking the half Gallies, which are allowed to have chiefly affe6ted our Forces, was an Er- ror of great Importance. It appears that Commodore Pearfe, in a Letter to Co- lonel Vanderdufen, of June 2 5, " recom- " mends the Affair of attacking the Half- cc Gallies to the Confideration of the Sea Commanders on Shore; and the Land Officers." In purfiance of which Re- commendation, it appears, that June 26. a Conference was held in Colonel Vander- dufen's Tent, where himfelf, Lieutenant. Colonel Cook, Capt. Warren, Capt. 7 .xn- fiend, and Capt. Laws being prefent, it was refolved to attack the Gallies pro- vided there was Water enough on the Swa7 oppofite to the Cafile, for the Boats to [ 50 1 Here then we readily acknowledge that whatever Meafures were taken, or not taken, feem in Confequence of fome Confulta- tion of the Commanders, and were founded on the Unanimity or Majority of the Board, which muff in fome Mea- fure alter the Complexion of their Pro. ceedings. And firif it feems, that not attacking the half Gallies, which are allowed to have chiefly affe6ted our Forces, was an Er- ror of great Importance. It appears that Commodore Pearfe, in a Letter to Co- lonel Vanderduffen, of June 25 , " recoim- a mends the Affair of attacking the Half- " Gallies to the Confideration of the Sea " Commanders on Shore; and the Land " Officers." In purfuance of which Re- commendation, it appears, that June 26. a Conference was held in Colonel Vander- duFen's Tent, where himfelf, Lieutenant. Colonel Cook, Capt. Warren, Capt. 7vn- fiend, and Capt. Laws being prefent, it was refolved to attack the Gallies pro- vided there was Water enough on the Swqy75 oppofite to the Caftle, for the Boats to [ 50 ] Here then we readily acknowledge that whatever Meafures were taken, or not taken, feem in Confequence of fome Confulta. tion of the Commanders, and were founded on the Unanimity or Majority of the Board, which muff in fome Mea- fure alter the Complexion of their Pro- ceedings. And firif it feems, that not attacking the half Gallies, which are allowed to have chiefly affeded our Forces, was an Er- ror of great Importance. It appears that Commodore Pearfe, in a Letter to Co- lonel anderdufen, of June 25, " recom- " mends the Affair of attacking the Half- " Gallies to the Confideration of the Sea " Commanders on Shore; and the Land Officers." In purfuance of which Re- commendation, it appears, that June 26. a Conference was held in Colonel Vander- dufen's Tent, where himfelf, Lieutenant. Colonel Cook, Capt. Warren, Capt. 7wn- iend, and Capt. Laws being prefent, it was refolved to attack the Gallies pro- vided there was Water enough on the Swaib oppofte to the Caftle, for the Boats to  [ 5 J to go round. The fame Afternoon Capt. Warren went on Board the Commodore, where a Counfel being held, the Refult: was, that the Thing was impra6licable, of which Refoution, without annexing one Reafon for it, the Commodore fent the General and the Colonel a Copy the fame Evening ; and that Afternoon he alfo made a Signal for Capt. Fanjhaw, who was cruiz- ing off the Metanfar, to come and join him. To what Purpofe can it appear, that the Commodore recommended this Affair to the Confideration of thefe Offi- cers on Shore ? Was it to approve his own Condut in recommending it, if it had been difapproved there ? or to telify his extreme Caution, in getting it rejet- ed, after they had refolved on the Execution of it? It appears further, that on ne 27, between One and Two in the Morning, Capt. Richard Tyrrel, Commander of the Schooner belonging to Caro/ina, went in a Boat, and founded between the Point and the keys oppoite to the Caffle, and found four Feet on the North, and fix on the G 2 South [ 5' ] to go round. The fame Afternoon Capt. Warren went on Board the Commodore, where a Counfel being held, the Refult was, that the Thing was impradicable, of which Refolution, without annexing one Reafon for it, the Commodore fent the General and the Colonel a Copy the fame Evening; and that Afternoon he alfo made a Signal for Capt. Fanfiaw, who was cruiz- ing off the Metanfar, to come and join him. To what Purpofe can it appear, that the Commodore recommended this Affair to the Confideration of thefe Offi- cers on Shore ? Was it to approve his own Condua in recommending it, if it had been difipproved there ? or to telrify his extreme Caution, in getting it rejet- ed, after they had refolved on the Execution of it? It appears further, that on 7une 27, between One and Two in the Morning, Capt. Richard Tyrrel, Commander of the Schooner belonging to Carolina, went in a Boat, and founded between the Point and the keys oppofite to the Caftle, and found four Feet on the North, and fix on the G 2 South [ 5' ] to go round. The fame Afternoon Capt. Warren went on Board the Commodore, where a Counfel being held, the Refult was, that the Thing was impradicable, of which Refolution, without annexing one Reafon for it, the Commodore fent the General and the Colonel a Copy the fame Evening; and that Afternoon he alfo made a Signal for Capt. Fanfhaw, who was cruiz- ing off the Metanfar, to come and join him. To what Purpofe can it appear, that the Commodore recommended this Affair to the Confideration of thefe Offi- cers on Shore ? Was it to approve his own Condut in recommending it, if it had been difapproved there ? or to tellify his extreme Caution, in getting it rejeC- ed, after they had refolved on the Execution of it? It appears further, that on June 27, between One and Two in the Morning, Capt. Richard Tyrrel, Commander of the Schooner belonging to Caro/ina, went in a Boat, and founded between the Point and the keys oppofite to the Cantle, and found four Feet on the North, and fix on the G 2 South  [ 52 ] South End of the SwaJh at Half Flood, and returned Cafe without Difcovery. Yet notwithilanding this Objefion, as to the Depth of Water, being thus plainly re- moved, the fame Day the Commodore fent Word to Colonel Vanderdufen, " he would give no AfEfiance towards at- tacking the Gallies, as thinking it impraaicable :" Upon which the Co- lonel went on Board the Commodore, and reprefented to the Captains aflembled there, the bad Confequence of their go- ing away without attacking them, but to no Purpofe, the Majority voting it im- praalicable. When it was frft propofed to attack the Gallies, it appears to have been projeaed in the following Manner, viz. The Gene- ral was to make a Diverfion on the Main, by attacking the Town ; Colonel Vander- duffen, with Part of his Regiment, was to keep a continual Fire on the Town and Cafile from the Batteries; while Capt. Tyrrel was to have fet upon the Gallies with the Seamen and the rell of the Colo- nI's Regiment. The General was ac- cording~y [ 52 ] South End of the Swajh at Half Flood, and returned fafe without Difcovery. Yet notwithnlanding this Objection, as to the Depth of Water, being thus plainly re- moved, the fame Day the CommQdore fent Word to Colonel Vanderduffen, " he " would give no Afliftance towards at- tacking the Gallies, as thinking it impradicable :" Upon which the Co- lonel went on Board the Commodore, and reprefented to the Captains aflembled there, the bad Confequence of their go- ing away without attacking them, but to no Purpofe, the Majority voting it im- prafticable. When it was frl propofed to attack the Gallies, it appears to have been projeded in the following Manner, viz. The Gene- ral was to make a Diverfion on the Main, by attacking the Town ; Colonel Vander- duffen, with Part of his Regiment, was ro keep a continual Fire on the Town and Cafile from the Batteries; while Capt. Tyrrel was to have fet upon the Gallies with the Seamen and the rell of the Colo- nI's Regiment. The General was ac- cordingly [ 52 ] South End of the Swaj1 at Half Flood, and returned Cafe without Difcovery. Yet notwithaanding this Objetion, as to the Depth of Water, being thus plainly re- moved, the fame Day the CommQdore fent Word to Colonel Vanderduffen, " he would give no Affiftance towards at- tacking the Gallies, as thinking it impraicable:" Upon which the Co- lonel went on Board the Commodore, and reprefented to the Captains aflembled there, the bad Confequence of their go- ing away without attacking them, but to no Purpofe, the Majority voting it im- praticable. When it was 6rlt propofed to attack the Gallies, it appears to have been projeded in the following Manner, viz. The Gene- ral was to make a Diverfion on the Main, by attacking the Town ; Colonel Vander- dufen, with Part of his Regiment, was ro keep a continual Fire on the Town and Cattle from the Batteries; while Capt. Tyrrel was to have fet upon the Gallies with the Seamen and the rell of the Colo- nel's Regiment. The General was ac- cordingly  [ 53 ] cordingly on the Main with his Troops, expeaing that Service: But the Commo- dore difapproving this; and it being yet a fecond Time agreed to be attempted, up- on the Remonftrances of Colonel Vander- durffen and Capt. Jfarren, when the Com- modore's Lieutenant was to have com- manded the Attack, new Difficulties were further flarted when they came on Shore, and to it was lill unattempted. Yet it appears that foon after the Men of War flipping their Cables, and putting our to Sea in a Storm, the Colonel endeavour- ed to revive the Attempt on the Gallies in their Abfence. But propofing it to the Commodore's Lieutenant, Mr. Swan- ton, who appeared to be a Gentleman of Spirit, and commanded the Seamen left on Shore, he was told, " He had Orders "1 left not to venture any of them before " the Return of the Shipping." It feems but too evident, that there was an cxccffive Care to avoid any Hazard here, on this very important Service; and that it coil fome Pains and Trouble to e- lude the Refolution of the brave Sea Com11- [ 53 ] cordingly on the Main with his Troops, expeding that Service: But the Commo- dore difapproving this ; and it being yet a fecond Time agreed to be attempted, up- on the Remonafrances of Colonel Vander- duSfen and Capt. Warren, when the Com- modore's Lieutenant was to have com- manded the Attack, new Difficulties were further flarted when they came on Shore, and fo it was fill unattempted. Yet it appears that foon after the Men of War flipping their Cables, and putting out to Sea in a Storm, the Colonel endeavour- ed to revive the Attempt on the Gallies in their Abfence. But proporing it to the Commodore's Lieutenant, Mr. Swan- ton, who appeared to be a Gentleman of Spirit, and commanded the Seamen left on Shore, he was told, " He had Orders " left not to venture any of them before " the Return of the Shipping." It feems but too evident, that there was an exceflive Care to avoid any Hazard here, on this very important Service; and that it cont fome Pains and Trouble to e- lude the Refolution of the brave Sea Com- [ 53 ] cordingly on the Main with his Troops, expe6ing that Service: But the Commo- dore difapproving this ; and it being yet a fecond Time agreed to be attempted, up- on the Remonfrances of Colonel Vander- dufen and Capt. Warren, when the Com- modore's Lieutenant was to have com- manded the Attack, new Difficulties were further flarted when they came on Shore, and fo it was fill unattempted. Yet it appears that foon after the Men of War flipping their Cables, and putting out to Sea in a Storm, the Colonel endeavour- ed to revive the Attempt on the Gallies in their Abfence. But propoing it to the Commodore's Lieutenant, Mr. Swan- ton, who appeared to be a Gentleman of Spirit, and commanded the Seamen left on Shore, he was told, " He had Orders left not to venture any of them before " the Return of the Shipping." It feems but too evident, that there was an exceflive Care to avoid any Hazard here, on this very important Service; and that it colt Come Pains and Trouble to e- lude the Refolution of the brave Sca Corn-  [ 54] Commanders on Shore and the Land Officers. 'Tis granted, that extreme Te- merity muff neceffarily be reifrained, not- withifanding the furprizing Succefs that has fometimes attended it: But furely Men that profefs to affail and offend, may be alfo over cautious in War, where many Diffi- culties are ever fuppofed to be encounter- ed, and Courage is to be exercifed. This Attack was always judged not only prac- ticable, but very likely to fucceed by the Land Officers and the Commanders of the Ships who were afhore. The Seamen expreffed their wonted Ardour for this Service, as well as the Land Forces, who were to join them in it; and the Spani- ards were like to be fo warmly employed on all Hands, that it was but a reafon- able Prefumption they might have prov'd too weak fomewhere. This would at leaR have manifefted a Difpofition to aft from fome Quarter, and have fhewn t hat the Lethargy afhore had not infeded the Fleet : The Force of thefe Half Gallies, as they are rightly called, confifIs in one Nine Pounder in the Bow, called a Ca- fhue [ 54] Commanders on Shore and the Land Officers. 'Tis granted, that extreme Te- merity muff neceffarily be reffrained, not- withflanding the furprizing Succefs that has fometimes attended it: But furely Men that profefs to affail and offend, may be alfo over cautious in War, where many Diffi- culties are ever fuppofed to be encounter- ed, and Courage is to be exercifed. This Attack was always judged not only prac- ticable, but very likely to fucceed by the Land Officers and the Commanders of the Ships who were afhore. The Seamen expreffed their wonted Ardour for this Service, as well as the Land Forces, who were to join them in it; and the Spani- ards were like to be fo warmly employed on all Hands, that it was but a reafon- able Prefumption they might have prov'd too weak fomewhere. This would at leaR have manifeffed a Difpofition to act from fome Quarter, and have fhewn t hat the Lethargy afliore had not infeced the Fleet : The Force of thefe Half Gallies, as they are rightly called, confias in one Nine Pounder in the Bow, called a Ca- fhue [ 54] Commanders on Shore and the Land Officers. 'Tis granted, that extreme Te- merity muff neceffarily be reffrained, not- withftanding the furprizing Succefs that has fometimes attended it: But furely Men that profefs to affail and offend, may be alfo over cautious in War, where many Diffi- culties are ever fuppofed to be encounter- ed, and Courage is to be exercifed. This Attack was always judged not only prac- ticable, but very likely to fucceed by the Land Officers and the Commanders of the Ships who were afhore. The Seamen expreffed their wonted Ardour for this Service, as well as the Land Forces, who were to join them in it; and the Spani- ards were like to be fo warmly employed on all Hands, that it was but a reafon- able Prefumption they might have prov'd too weak fomewhere. This would at leaR have manifefted a Difpofition to af from fome Quarter, and have fhewn t hat the Lethargy afhore had not infeced the Fleet : The Force of thefe Half Gallies, as they are rightly called, confifts in one Nine Pounder in the Bow, called a Ca- fhue  [ 55 ] fhue Piece, and fome Swivel Guns fore and aft. They have 2o Oars, and may be fuppofed to have had about 3 0 Men each. Befides, if the Six had been judg- ed too formidable, there was a Junature, when three of them were feparated two Days from the reff. But upon a mature Confideration of the Force and Manner of the propofed Attack, it mutt needs appear a firange Omiffion, and the more fo, as the Commodore contributed greatly to this Expedition, by ftrongly encourag- ing the Committee of Conference to re- port in Favour of it, and making light of all the Difficulties that fiould arife in the Progrefs of it. But this indeed was the Conference. I believe it will be thought univerfally furprizing, that feven of his Majeffy's Ships of War and the Country Schooner were infufficient to intercept, or keep off the Sup- plies that arrived, notwithfianding there was ani Information by two Deferters, that the Garrifon expefted them; efpecially when we conider that the Country Schooner which remained within the Harbour, was put- chafed [ 55 ] Ihue Piece, and fome Swivel Guns fore and aft. They have 0 o Oars, and may be fuppofed to have had about 3 o Men each. Befides, if the Six had been judg- ed too formidable, there was a Juntlure, when three of them were feparated two Days from the reft. But upon a mature Confideration of the Force and Manner of the propofed Attack, it mutt needs appear a flrange Omiffion, and the more fo, as the Commodore contributed greatly to this Expedition, by firongly encourag- ing the Committee of Conference to re- port in Favour of it, and making light of all the Difficulties that fihould arife in the Progrefs of it. But this indeed was the Conference. I believe it will be thought univerfally furprizing, that even of his Majefly's Ships of War and the Country Schooner were infufficient to intercept, or keep off the Sup- plies that arrived, notwithftanding there was ani Information by two Deferters, that the Garrifon expeaed them; efpecially when we conider that the Country Schooner which remained within the Harbour, was pur- chafed [ 55 J fhue Piece, and fome Swivel Guns fore and aft. They have zo Oars, and may be fuppofed to have had about 30 Men each. Befides, if the Six had been judg- ed too formidable, there was a JunftUre, when three of them were feparated two Days from the reff. But upon a mature Confideration of the Force and Manner of the propofed Attack, it muff needs appear a firange Omifflon, and the more Co, as the Commodore contributed greatly to this Expedition, by lirongly encourag- ing the Committee of Conference to re- port in Favour of it, and making light of all the Difficulties that Ihould arife in the Progrefs of it. But this indeed was the Conference. I believe it will be thought univerfally furprizing, that feven of his Majefty's Ships of War and the Country Schooner were infufficient to intercept, or keep off the Sup- plies that arrived, notwithftanding there was ai Information by two Deferters, that the Garrifon expeaed them; efpecially when we conider that the Country Schooner which remained within the Harbour, was put- chafed  [ 56 ] chafed exprely for the Purpofe of guard- ing the Inlet to the Southward of the Town, and the Paffage of thofe Sup- plies through the Harbour of Augufline was fuficienly obviated by the Batteries on Anaflatia, and Point 9uartel. At the fame time it is not to be doubted but the rcfpedive Commanders of the King's Ships, or the Commanding Officer of each in their Abfence on hore, difpofed their Ships and Motions in due Obedience to their proper Orders. And yet furely their Difpofition or Inattention mua have been very unaccountable, and it is hard to con- ceive what could intervene to have pre- vented fome of them from falling in with thofe Supplies, if there had been any to- lerable Vigilance and Affiduity. But fome have imagined there might not have been a requifite Number of Captains to form proper Councils of War, if they had been employ'd on the cruizing which mull be confidered as a principal Reafon for their being ordered before the Place. And this mol material Neglect, which determined the Enterprize, was the more unexpeded, as ( 56 ] chafed exprefly for the Purpofe of guard- ing the Inlet to the Southward of the Town, and the Paffage of thofe Sup- plies through the Harbour of Augufline was fufficiently obviated by the Batteries on Anafatia, and Point uartel. At the fame time it is not to be doubted but the refpedive Commanders of the King's Ships, or the Commanding Officer of each in their Abfence on fhore, difpofed their Ships and Motions in due Obedience to their proper Orders. And yet furely their Difpofition or Inattention muft have been very unaccountable, and it is hard to con- ceive what could intervene to have pre- vented fome of them from falling in with thofe Supplies, if there had been any to- lerable Vigilance and Afliduity. But fome have imagined there might not have been a requifite Number of Captains to form proper Councils of War, if they had been employ'd on the cruizing which mull be confidered as a principal Reafon for their being ordered before the Place. And this moft material Neglect, which determined the Enterprize, was the more unexpeded, as [ 56 ] chafed exprefly for the Purpofe of guard- ing the Inlet to the Southward of the Town, and the Paflage of thofe Sup- plies through the Harbour of Augufline was fufficiently obviated by the Batteries on Anaflatia, and Point 9uartel. At the fame time it is not to be doubted but the refpe6tive Commanders of the King's Ships, or the Commanding Officer of each in their Abfence on fhore, difpofed their Ships and Motions in due Obedience to their proper Orders. And yet furely their Difpofition or Inattention muft have been very unaccountable, and it is hard to con- ceive what could intervene to have pre- vented fome of them from falling in with thofe Supplies, if there had been any to- lerable Vigilance and Affiduity. But fome have imagined there might not have been a requifite Number of Captains to form proper Councils of War, if they had been employ'd on the cruizing which mull be confidered as a principal Reafon for their being ordered before the Place. And this molt, material Negleat, which determined the Enterprize, was the more unexpeded, as  E 57 ] as the Commodore affured the Committee of Conference, " He would anfwer for it, that the Place fhould have no Re- lief by Sea." Neverthelefs as thofe Supplies which got into the Mufquito's, were afterwards tranf- ported thro' the Metanfas, and up the River St. Sebaflian to Augufiine, had the Metanfair been properly guarded by the Sloops of War, or the Country Schooner; or even. by a Battery that was propofed to the South- ward of the Town, thofe Stores muff have been carried a long way over Land, and might have been intercepted by a feafonable Detachment. When it was certain that the Gallies were not to be attacked, and the Men of War were determined to fail in a fhort Time, and carry off all their Men, Co- lonel Vanderdufen reprefented to them, " That he thought it would at lean be ne- " ceffary to fend the two Men of War " Sloops into the Metanfas to guard that, and either fecure the Retreat of the Forces on Anaflatia, if they fhould be " reduced to one, or afliff in continuing H " the [ 57 3 as the Commodore afFured the Committee of Conference, " He would anfwer for " it, that the Place fhould have no Re- " lief by Sea." Neverthelefs as thofe Supplies which got into the Mufquito's, were afterwards tranf- ported thro' the Metanfas, and up the River St. Sebaflian to Auguine, had the Metanfair been properly guarded by the Sloops of War, or the Country Schooner ; or even by a Battery that was propofed to the South- ward of the Town, thofe Stores muff have been carried a long way over Land, and might have been intercepted by a feafonable Detachment. When it was certain that the Gallies were not to be attacked, and the Men of War were determined to fail in a fhort Time, arid carry off all their Men, Co- lonel Vanderdufen reprefented to them, " That he thought it would at leaft be ne- ceffary to fend the two Men of War Sloops into the Metanfas to guard that, and either fecure the Retreat of the Forces on Anafiatia, if they ihould be reduced to one, or aflift in continuing H " the [ S7 3 as the Commodore aflured the Committee of Conference, " He would anfwer for it, that the Place fhould have no Re- " lief by Sea." Neverthelefs as thofe Supplies which got into the Mufquito's, were afterwards tranf- ported thro' the Metanfas, and up the River St. Sebaflian to Auguoine, had the Metanfar been properly guarded by the Sloops of War, or the Country Schooner; or even by a Battery that was propofed to the South- ward of the Town, thofe Stores muff have been carried a long way over Land, and might have been intercepted by a feafonable Detachment. When it was certain that the Gallies were not to be attacked, and the Men of War were determined to fail in a Ihort Time, and carry off all their Men, Co- lonel Vanderdufj en reprefented to them, " That he thought it would at leaff be ne- " ceffary to fend the two Men of War Sloops into the Metanfas to guard that, and either fecure the Retreat of the " Forces on Anaflatia, if they fhould be reduced to one, or aflift in continuing H " the  [ s8 ] " the Blockade, till they thould be enabled C to aa more offenfively by a further Afli- " fance." To this Propofal it was agreed, provided the Sloops had Water enough to get in there. And we find, that upon their Return from Sea, a Council was held, July 3. wherein Come of the Pilots that had been fent to found, declared upon Oath, " There was not Water enough on the Bar of the Metimfaf for the Sloops to go in ; and if they could go in, they could not lie fafe-there from a Hurricane, nor could they fight above one a Breafi, in cafe they were attacked by the Gallies." But the Commodore afterwards asking Mr. Blomfield Barradel, Lieutenant of the Wolf Sloop, who had been along wirh the Pi- lots, and happen'd to be a Board his Ship that Night with fome Captains, what he had to fay in that Affair, he reply'd, That the Pilots had given their Opinion, and that he was not then to be examined; but if they ask'd his Opinion, he would give it. They then defiring he would, he affirmed, " That there was Water enough " on the Bar for the Sloops to get in that [ 58 ] the Blockade, till they thould be enabled " to a& more offenfively by a further Affi- " fance." To this Propofal it was agreed, provided the Sloops had Water enough to get in there. And we find, that upon their Return from Sea, a Council was held, July 3. wherein fome of the Pilots that had been fent to found, declared upon Oath, " There was not Water enough on the Bar " of the Metrnfas for the Sloops to go in ; and if they could go in, they could not " lie fafe.there from a Hurricane, nor could " they fight above one a Breaff, in cafe " they were attacked by the Gallies." But the Commodore afterwards asking Mr. Blomfield Barradel, Lieutenant of the Wolf Sloop, who had been along with the Pi- lots, and happen'd to be a Board hisShip that Night with fome Captains, what he had to fay in that Affair, he reply'd, That the Pilots had given their Opinion, and that he was not then to be examined; but if they ask'd his Opinion, he would give it. They then deGring he would, he affirmed, " That there was Water enough on the Bar for the Sloops to get in; "that [ 58 ] the Blockade, till they fhould be enabled " to ad more offenfively by a further A-fl- " fance." To this Propofal it was agreed, provided the Sloops had Water enough to get in there. And we find, that upon their Return from Sea, a Council was held, July 3. wherein fome of the Pilots that had been Cent to found, declared upon Oath, " There was not Water enough on the Bar " of the Metanfas for the Sloops to go in ; and if they could go in, they could not lie faferhere from a Hurricane, nor could " they fight above one a Breafi, in cafe " they were attacked by the Gallies." But the Commodore afterwards asking Mr. Blomfeld Barradel, Lieutenant of the Wolf Sloop, who had been along with the Pi- lots, and happen'd to be a Board his Ship that Night with fome Captains, what he had to fay in that Affair, he reply'd, That the Pilots had given their Opinion, and that he was not then to be examined; but if they ask'd his Opinion, he would give it. They then deliring he would, he affirmed, " That there was Water enough on the Bar for the Sloops to get in ; "that  [ 59 ] that they could lie fafe from a Hurri- " cane when in ; and that there was alfo " fuflcient Room when in, to fight three a Breaff, in cafe they were attacked." Upon the Pilot's after wards objeding to their lying fafe, he asked them, " Whe- ther they remember'd to have feen fuch an Ifland, when they were there? " and when they acknowledged they did, he replied, c" that they ought to know, " they could lie fafe from a Hurricane " under that Ifland." Norwithitanding which, it was refolved afterwards in Coun- cil, that they thould take off all their Men, and fail away, leaving Captain Townjhend at Frederica. 'Tis truly furprizing that the Commo. dore's Affurances to the Committee of his utmoft Services in this Expedition, had nor a fficient Influence to prevent fuch a precipitate, hafly Refolution, when an adtive and experienced Ofcer, who was with thefe Pilots, contradiced them in every Particular. Certainly luch a rong Circumafance, and the Importance, or ra- ther Necceflity of the Service might have H 2 very E 59 ] " that they could lie fafe from a Hurri- " cane when in ; and that there was alfo " fuflicient Room when in, to fight three C" a Breaff, in cafe they were attacked." Upon the Pilot's after wards objeffing to their lying fafe, he asked them, " Whe- " ther they remember'd to have feen fuch Cc an Ifland, when they were there?" and when they acknowledged they did, he replied, " that they ought to know, they could lie fafe from a Hurricane under that Ifland." Notwithanding which, it was refolved afterwards in Coun- cil, that they 1hould take off all their Men, and fail away, leaving Captain To-wnjhend at Frederica. 'Tis truly furprizing that the Commo- dore's AfFurances to the Committee of his utmoff Services in this Expedition, had not a fufficient Influence to prevent fuch a precipitate, hafny Refolution, when an adive and experienced Officer, who was with thefe Pilots, contradiaed them in every Particular. Certainly (uch a rong Circumalance, and the Importance, or ra- ther Neceflity of the Service might have II 2. very 1 59 1 " that they could lie fafe from a Hurri- " cane when in ; and that there was alfo cc fuflicient Room when in, to fight three " a Breaa, in cafe they were attacked." Upon the Pilot's after wards objeaing to their lying fafe, he asked them, " Whe- cc ther they remember'd to have feen fuch " an Ifland, when they were there?" and when they acknowledged they did, he replied, " that they ought to know, " they could lie fafe from a Hurricane " under that Ifland." Notwith'anding which, it was refolved afterwards in Coun- cil, that they thould take off all their Men, and fail away, leaving Captain To-wnftend at Frederica. 'Tis truly furprizing that the Commo- dore's Aflurances to the Committee of his utmoft Services in this Expedition, had nor a fufficient Influence to prevent fuch a precipitate, hafny Refolution, when an aaive and experienced Officer, who was with thefe Pilots, contradiaed them in every Particular. Certainly (uch a firong Circumiaance, and the Importance, or ra- ther Neceflity of the Servicc might have 11 2. very  [ 6o ] very reafonably inclined them to a more intimate Inquiry into the true State of this Matter. But poffibly the Commo- dore might have been allowed a Sight of thofe extraordinary Orders, which have been occafionally hinted at in the former Part of this Narrative. The Commanders of the Men of War undoubtedly declared, at Charles 7own, be- fore their failing on this Expedition, that they fhould flay no longer before the Place than the 5 th of ruly. This indeed ought to have excited the Land Forces to a more vigorous Profecution of the Enterprize a- fhore: Tho' it is very certain, that no Hurricane happened near fo early there, in the Memory of any Inhabitant. The laft, which was Augul 2. 17z8, being ac- counted very extraordinary indeed, in Point of Time. But had they ferioufly apprehended fo unufjal a Hurricane, fhould it not have equally flimulated them to fome notable Service, fome generous Effort, be- fore this fhort Term was fpun out in bar- ren )eiiberations ? Should it be omitted here, all others muff obferve, from thefe frequent [ 6o ] very reafonably inclined them to a more intimate Inquiry into the true State of this Matter. But poffibly the Commo- dore might have been allowed a Sight of thofe extraordinary Orders, which have been occafionally hinted at in the former Part of this Narrative. The Commanders of the Men of War undoubtedly declared, at Charles 7own, be- fore their failing on this Expedition, that they fliould flay no longer before the Place than the 5 th of Yuly. This indeed ought to have excited the Land Forces to a more vigorous Profecution of the Enterprize a- fhore: Tho' it is very certain, that no Hurricane happened near fo early there, in the Memory of any Inhabitant. The laft, which was Aagufl 2. 1728, being ac- counted very extraordinary indeed, in Point of Time. But had they ferioufly apprehended 6o unufiual a Hurricane, fliould it not have equally ftimulated them to fome notable Service, fome generous Effort, be- fore this fhort Term was fpun our in bar- ren Deliberations ? Should it be omitted here, all others muff obfcrve, from thefe frequent [ 6o ] very reafonably inclined them to a more intimate Inquiry into the true State of this Matter. But poifibly the Commo- dore might have been allowed a Sight of thofe extraordinary Orders, which have been occafionally hinted at in the former Part of this Narrative. The Commanders of the Men of War undoubtedly declared, at Charles 7own, be- fore their failing on this Expedition, that they ihould flay no longer before the Place than the 5 th of July. This indeed ought to have excited the Land Forces to a more vigorous Profecution of the Enterprize a- fhore: Tho' it is very certain, that no Hurricane happened near fo early there, in the Memory of any Inhabitant. The laft, which was Augu7 2.. 1728, being ac- counted very extraordinary indeed, in Point of Time. But had they ferioufly apprehended fo unuial a Hurricane, fiould it not have equally flimulated them to fome notable Service, fome generous Effort, be- fore th;s fhort Term was fpun out in bar- ren Deliberations ? Should it be omitted here, all others muf obferve, from thefe frequent  [ 61 ] frequent Confultarions, without even the Confequence of an Attempt, that there was much confulting to do little; a very unu- faal Condua in a Briti, Squadron, who commonly confalt in order to Aaion. And if it were pofible to fuggefi any thing in Extenuation of this firange Irre- folurion afloat, it can only be fuppofed, that as they wholly difapproved the Ma- nagernent on Shore, their Defpair of ar- riving at a general Succefi from fuch Mea- fures, might infed them with a greater Re- miflfefs and Inattention to their diftina Service. Thus have I endeavoured, from fuch authentic Accounts as I have feen, to re- prefent the moff obvious Errors, on all Sides, that have caufed or contributed to this Difappointment. And I can fay with fome Satisfadion on this unlucky Occa- fion, that I have been condu6ted in fuch Reprefentation by the 11riaeft Attachment to Truth and ReLfon, and have really en- deavoured to abfiraL' my felt from every Partiality and Prejudice whatfoever Nor can I difeern either the Honefty or Ad- vantrage aXWp [ 61 ) frequent Confultations, without even the Confequence of an Attempt, that there was much confulting to do little; a very unu- faal Condua in a Briti/h Squadron, who commonly confult in order to Aftion. And if it were poflible to fuggeft any thing in Extenuation of this firange Irre- folution afloat, it can only be fuppofed, that as they wholly difhpproved the Ma- nagement on Shore, their Defpair of ar- riving at a general Succels from fuch Mea- fures, might infect them with a greater Re- miffnefs and Inattention to their difint Service, Thus have I endeavoured, from fuch authentic Accounts as I have feen, to re- prefent the moft obvious Errors, on all Sides, that have caufed or contributed to this DiFappointment. And I can fay with fome SatisfaCtion on this unlucky Occa- fion, that I have been conducted in fich Reprefentation by the 11rideft Attachment to Truth and Reafon, and have really en- deavoured to abfiract my felf froi every Partiality and Prejudice whatfoever Nor can I difcern either the Hone!ly or Ad- vantage [ 61 ] frequent Confuitations, without even the Confequence of an Attempt, that there was much confultig. to do little; a very unu- fual Condua in a Briti/G Squadron, who commonly confalt in order to Aftion. And if it were poflible to fuggeft any thing in Extenuation of this firange Irre- folurion afloat, it can only be fuppofed, that as they wholly difhpproved the Ma- nagement on Shore, their Defpair of at- riving at a general Succefs from fuch Mea- fures, might infec them with a greater Re- miffaefs and Inattention to their diffina Service. Thus have I endeavoured, from fuch authentic Accounts as I have feen, to re- prefent the moff obvious Errors, on all Sides, that have caufed or contributed to this Difappointment. And I can fay with fome Satisfaftion on this unlucky Occa- fion, that I have been conduLted in fuch Reprefentation by the friaeft Attachment to Truth and Reafon, and have really en- deavoured to abilrad my felt fiom every Partiality and Prejudice whatfoever Nor can I difcern either the Honefty or Ad- van tage 0  [ 62 ] vantage of a different Condua. I have no Hatred to any Individual concerned in this Affair, for I am too indolent to en- courage any Emotion that affeas me pain- fully ; and no Favour fhall oblige me to undergo the mortifying Confequences of a confcious Lye, which mutt be attended with the fecret Contempt even of thofe it is intended to gratify, and muff avowedly Difguft all others. I believe it would ap- pear, upon Examination, that there is no Difference in Faca between this Narrative and a Journal of the Siege cent over by the late Captain Norbury, who was prefent at it, to the Secretary of War ; only one may have been more particular than the o- ther in different Refpeds and Occurrences. What muff add not a little to our Cha- grin on this Occaflon, is the Refleffion, that tho' we are reduced to acknowledge the Enemies better Condua, we can jufily attribute little or nothing to their Cou- rage; for excepting the Defeat at Moofa, where at leaf s oo of them furpriz'd lefs than half the Number cf fatigu'd Men, among whom, I believe were not fix Caroli- [ 62 3 vantage of a different Condua. I have no Hatred to any Individual concerned in this Affair, for I am too indolent to en- courage any Emotion that affeas me pain- fully ; and no Favour fhall oblige me to undergo the mortifying Confequences of a contcious Lye, which mutt be attended with the fecret Contempt even of thofe it is intended to gratify, and mutt avowedly Difguff all others. I believe it would ap- pear, upon Examination, that there is no Difference in Faa between this Narrative and a Journal of the Siege fent over by the late Captain Norbury, who was prefent at it, to the Secretary of War ; only one may have been more particular than the o- ther in different Refpeats and Occurrences. What mutt add not a little to our Cha- grin on this Occafion, is the Refleffion, that tho' we are reduced to acknowledge the Enemies better Conduat, we can jufily attribute little or nothing to their Cou- rage; for excepting the Defeat at Moofa, where at leaff oo of them furpriz'd lefs than half the Number cf fatigu'd Men, among whom, I believe were not fix Caroli- [ 62 3 vantage of a different Condut. I have no Hatred to any Individual concerned in this Affair, for I am too indolent to en- courage any Emotion that affets me pain- fully ; and no Favour fhall oblige me to undergo the mortifying Confequences of a confcious Lye, which mutt be attended with the fecret Contempt even of thofe it is intended to gratify, and muff avowedly Difgufl all others. I believe it would ap- pear, upon Examination, that there is no Difference in Faat between this Narrative and a Journal of the Siege fent over by the late Captain Norbury, who was prefent at it, to the Secretary of War ; only one may have been more particular than the o- ther in different Refpeas and Occurrences. What muff add not a little to our Cha- grin on this Occafion, is the Reflefion, that tho' we are reduced to acknowledge the Enemies better Conduat, we can jufily attribute little or nothing to their Cou- rage; for excepting the Defeat at Moofa, where at leaff 3 oo of them furpriz'd lefs than half the Number cf fatigu'd Men, among whom, I believe were not fix Caroli-  [ 63 ] Carolinians) we hear of but one Perfon killed or wounded by them, and that by a Shot from the Gallies. And indeed had every Man at Moofa behaved like Colonel Palmer, 'tis very pomfible that all the Dif- advantages that little Party lay under, might have been furmounted. It appeared upon Oath, that after he had received (in all Pro. bability) his mortal Wound, bleeding thro' his Mouth, he kept loading his Piece, and crying " Whirra Boys, the Day is our " own, I have been in many Battles, and " never loll one." By the fame Depofiri- on it appears, that Mr. Hugh Mackay cry'd out, " Every Man muff fhift for himfelf. The Colonel behaved like one determined to die or conquer ; and fell where he fix- ed. Indeed his Fire was generally ac- counted rather extreme, and yet his Cou- rage was Co antique and unpoliffied, fo lit- tle converfant in our fenfelefs modern Abu- fes of it, that I have never heard of his engaging on any Account of his own, but like the old Heroes, his Bravery was wholly exerted on the Enemies of his Coun- try. Content [ 63 ] Carolinians) we hear of but one Perfon killed or wounded by them, and that by a Shot from the Gallies. And indeed had every Man at Moofa behaved like Colonel Palmer, 'tis very poflible that all theDif- advantages that little Parry lay under, might have been furmounted. It appeared upon Oath, that after he had received (in all Pro. bability) his mortal Wound, bleeding thro' his Mouth, he kept loading his Piece, and crying " Whirra Boys, the Day is our own, I have been in many Battles, and " never loft one." By the fame Depofiti- on it appears, that Mr. Hugh Mackay cry'd out, " Every Man muff fhift for himfelf. The Colonel behaved like one determined to die or conquer ; and fell where he fix- ed. Indeed his Fire was generally ac- counted rather extreme, and yet his Cou- rage was fo antique and unpolifhed, fo lit- tle converfant in our fenfelefs modern Abu- fes of it, that I have never heard of his engaging on any Account of his own, but like the old Heroes, his Bravery was wholly exerted on the Enemies of his Coun- try. Content [ 63 ] Carolinians) we hear of but one Perfon killed or wounded by them, and that by a Shot from the Gallies. And indeed had every Man at Moofa behaved like Colonel Palmer, 'tis very pomfible that all theDif- advantages that little Party lay under, might have been furmounted. It appeared upon Oath, that after he had received (in all Pro- bability) his mortal Wound, bleeding thro' his Mouth, he kept loading his Piece, and crying " Whirra Boys, the Day is our own, I have been in many Battles, and " never loft one." By the fame Depofiti- on it appears, that Mr. Hugh Mackay cry'd out, " Every Man muff fhift for himfelf. The Colonel behaved like one determined to die or conquer ; and fell where he fix- ed. Indeed his Fire was generally ac- counted rather extreme, and yet his Cou- rage was Co antique and unpolifhed, fo lit- tle converfant in our fenfelefs modern Abu- fes of it, that I have never heard of his engaging on any Account of his own, but like the old Heroes, his Bravery was wholly exerted on the Enemies of his Coun- try. Content  [ 64 ] Content in 7imes of Peace to be unknown, And only in the Field of Battle fiewn. ADDISON. In fhorr, if the Bravery of the Ene- my had been truly Superior, 'tis im- probable the Carolina Regiment could have made fo regular and uninterrupted a Retreat. Our little Army undoubtedly contained many brave Men, who never had an Opportunity of exercifing their Courage there, our very Indians telling the General, he kept on an Ifland to avoid fighting the Spaniards. And this is a convincing Circumafance that it did not require the moft exquiite Condua, the moft extraordinaryVigour, to have fucceed- ed in this Attempt. To avoid grofs Mi- flakes, and employ that Spirit in Affion, which was broke in unneceffatry March and Fatigue, or evaporated in barren Delibe- rations muft, in all human Probability, have been fufficient; efpecially when we obferve that Mr. Bailey, one of the Rang- ers taken Prifoner at Moofa, affirmed, that one [ 64 ] Content in Times of Peace to be unknown, And only in the Field of Battle #ewn. ADDISON. In fhort, if the Bravery of the Ene- my had been truly Superior, 'tis im- probable the Carolina Regiment could have made fo regular and uninterrupted a Retreat. Our little Army undoubtedly contained many brave Men, who never had an Opportunity of exerciflng their Courage there, our very Indians telling the General, he kept on an Ifland to avoid fighting the Spaniards. And this is a convincing Circumfiance that it did not require the mott exquilite Condu&, the moff extraordinaryVigour, to have fucceed- ed in this Attempt. To avoid grofs Mi- flakes, and employ that Spirit in Alion, which was broke in unneceffary March and Fatigue, or evaporated in barren Delibe- rations muff, in all human Probability, have been fuficient; efpecially when we obferve that Mr. Bailey, one of the Rang- ers taken Prifoner at Moofa, affirmed, that one [ 64 ] Content in Times of Peace to be unknown, And only in the Field of Battle Jpewn. ADDISON. In fhort, if the Bravery of the Ene- my had been truly Superior, 'tis im- probable the Carolina Regiment could have made fo regular and uninterrupted a Retreat. Our little Army undoubtedly contained many brave Men, who never had an Opportunity of exercifing their Courage there, our very Indians telling the General, he kept on an Ifland to avoid fighting the Spaniards. And this is a convincing Circumifance that it did not require the moff exquifite Conduft, the mott extraordinaryVigour, to have fucceed- ed in this Attempt. To avoid grofs Mi- flakes, and employ that Spirit in Aaion, which was broke in unnecelfaty March and Fatigue, or evaporated in barren Delibe- rations muff, in all human Probability, have been fufficient; efpecially when we obferve that Mr. Bailey, one of the Rang- ers taken Prifoner at Moofa, affirmed, that one  [ 65 ] one Side of the Fort Wall was broke down and (upported with Logs and Palifadoes. Were a Man to repeat fuch Rumours only, as were but too much of a Piece with evident Fads, his Imagination muft feem to amplify, but his Limits certainly would. It was affirmed, the firif Defer- ter, who belonged to the General's Regi- ment, offered Half a Crown Sterling for a Bisket a little before. It was faid, the General declared againif burning and de- flroying the Town, faying, "What Ihould " he do for Quarters for his People when " he had taken the Place. The like Ar- gument would do for fparing the Catle too, fince a Fort may be alfo neceffary. The fame Tendernefs he was reported to extend to the very Cattle, who were to be referved to breed from. His Name, in his own Opinion, was to produce a Surrender, the landing on Ana/latia, which no Body difputed, was the Conquefl of Anafatia, the coming to Moofa afrer Palmer's Defeat, was the Retaking of Moofa --- from no Body too. But thefe and many other Things, how- ever true or probable, we mention as Ru- I mours: [ 65 ] one Side of the Fort Wall was broke down and fupported with Logs and Palifadoes. Were a Man to repeat fuch Rumours only, as were but too much of a Piece with evident Fads, his Imagination muft feem to amplify, but his Limits certainly would. It was affirmed, the firfi Defer- ter, who belonged to the General's Regi- ment, offered Half a Crown Sterling for a Bisket a little before. It was faid, the General declared againft burning and de- llroying the Town, faying, "What fhould " he do for Quarters for his People when " he had taken the Place. The like Ar- gument would do for fparing the Cattle too, fince a Fort may be alfo neceffary. The fame Tendernefs he was reported to extend to the very Cattle, who were to be referved to breed from. His Name, in his own Opinion, was to produce a Surrender, the landing on Anaflatia, which no Body difputed, was the Conquef of Anaflatia, the coming to Moofa after Palmer's Defeat, was the Retaking of Moofa --- from no Body too. But thefe and many other Things, how- ever true or probable, we mention as Ru- I mours: [ 65 ] one Side of the Fort Wall was broke down and fupported with Logs and Palifadoes. Were a Man to repeat fuch Rumours only, as were but too much of a Piece with evident Fads, his Imagination muft feem to amplify, but his Limits certainly would. It was affirmed, the firft Defer- ter, who belonged to the General's Regi- ment, offered Half a Crown Sterling for a Bisket a little before. It was faid, the General declared againif burning and de- flroying the Town, faying, " What fhould " he do for Quarters for his People when " he had taken the Place. The like Ar- gument would do for fparing the Cattle too, fince a Fort may be alfo neceffary. The fame Tendernefs he was reported to extend to the very Cattle, who were to be referved to breed from. His Name, in his own Opinion, was to produce a Surrender, the landing on Anaflatia, which no Body difputed, was the Conquef ofAnaflatia, the coming to Moofa afrer Palmer's Defeat, was the Retaking of Moofa --- from no Body too. But thefe and many other Things, how- ever true or probable, we mention as Ru- I mours:  [ 66 ] mours : It is indifferent to the main Affair if all fhould concur to rejec them. It is undoubtedly very natural upon Mif- carriages of this kind, for Perfons to en- deavour to fhift the Difcredit reciprocally upon one another, each endeavouring to acquit himfelf. Thus I have heard f6me Gendemen here fond of attributing this final ill Event to not attacking the Gal- lies ; which I have formerly known others talk of as an infignificant Service, which could not have availed a great deal, after the Condua that preceded that Propofal. The Reader may judge in this Cafe where the Merit chiefly lies, or how the Honour is to be divided. And there are not want- ing Advocates on either Side. But when I hear the Conduft of the Carolina People arraigned on this Score, who feem to have been deferted by a Friend, an Agent here, I muff take the Liberty to fay, I believe it very difficult to fix an Imputation of this Nature upon them. That Province was peculiarly intereffed in the Affair, they were at full 1o,ooo L. Sterling Expence by it, had voted a much larger Sum to- wards [ 66 ] mours : It is indifferent to the main AfTair if all fhould concur to rejea them. It is undoubtedly very natural upon Mif- carriages of this kind, for Perfons to en- deavour to fhift the Difcredit reciprocally upon one another, each endeavouring to acquit himfelf. Thus I have heard fome Gentlemen here fond of attributing this final ill Event to not attacking the Gal- lies ; which I have formerly known others talk of as an infignificant Service, which could not have availed a great deal, after the Conduat that preceded that Propofal. The Reader may judge in this Cafe where the Merit chiefly lies, or how the Honour is to be divided. And there are not want- ing Advocates on either Side. But when I hear the Conduft of the Carolina People arraigned on this Score, who feem to have been deferred by a Friend, an Agent here, I muff take the Liberty to fay, I believe it very difficult to fix an Imputation of this Nature upon them. That Province was peculiarly intereffed in the Affair, they were at full 1o,ooo 1. Sterling Expence by it, had voted a much larger Sum to- wards ( 66 ] mours : It is indifferent to the main AfTair if all tiould concur to reject them. It is undoubtedly very natural upon Mif carriages of this kind, for Perfons to en- deavour to fhift the Difcredit reciprocally upon one another, each endeavouring to acquit himfelf. Thus I have heard fome Gentlemen here fond of attributing this final ill Event to not attacking the Gal- lies ; which I have formerly known others talk of as an infignificant Service, which could not have availed a great deal, after the Conduat that preceded that Propofal. The Reader may judge in this Cafe where the Merit chiefly lies, or how the Honour is to be divided. And there are not want- ing Advocates on either Side. But when I hear the Conduft of the Carolina People arraigned on this Score, who feem to have been deferred by a Friend, an Agent here, I muff take the Liberty to fay, I believe it very difficulk to fix an Imputation of this Nature upon them. That Province was peculiarly interefled in the Affiir, they were at full o,ooo 1. Sterling Expence by it, had voted a much larger Sum to- wards  [ 67 ] wards it, and would gladly have contri- buted (till further to conclude it effeatu- ally. And as their Forces were under the General's Command, I can't fee how 'cis poffible to blame them, if they did what they were commanded, which I never heard even difputed. I muff fuppofe they were not to take the Place without proper Commands and Diredions for it : That muff have been Contempt and Mutiny. And pray what has been done by the Whole ? Have the Spaniards received a Breach in their Fort or Fortifications, or how many Men have they loft that we are certain of? While the very Horfes we had taken Prifoners were refcu'd at Moofa. But if the Copy of the Report fent over by the Province had been printed accord- ing to their Direaion, their Conduc muft have remained unqueffioned by every fair Perufer. And as that Report contained a great Number of Proofs and Papers we are fo unfortunate to want in this, if any Fad herein afferted fiall be as pub- lickly deny'd, there is no doubt but the fame authentick Proofs may be tranfmitted here again [ 67 ] wards it, and would gladly have contri- buted (till further to conclude it effedu- ally. And as their Forces were under the General's Command, I can't fee how 'tis poffible to blame them, if they did what they were commanded, which I never heard even difputed. I muff fuppofe they were not to take the Place without proper Commands and Diredions for it : That muff have been Contempt and Mutiny. And pray what has been done by the Whole ? Have the Spaniards received a Breach in their Fort or Fortifications, or how many Men have they loft that we are certain of ? While the very Horfes we had taken Prifoners were refcu'd at Moofa. But if the Copy of the Report fent over by the Province had been printed accord- ing to their Direaion, their Conduc muff have remained unqueffioned by every fair Perufer. And as that Report contained a great Number of Proofs and Papers we are fo unfortunate to want in this, if any Fad herein afferted flhall be as pub- lickly deny'd, there is no doubt but the fame authentick Proofs may be tranfmitted here agamn [ 67 ] wards it, and would gladly have contri- buted (till further to conclude it effeau- ally. And as their Forces were under the General's Command, I can't fee how 'tis poflible to blame them, if they did what they were commanded, which I never heard even difputed. I muft fuppofe they were not to take the Place without proper Commands and Diredions for it : That muff have been Contempt and Mutiny. And pray what has been done by the Whole ? Have the Spaniards received a Breach in their Fort or Fortifications, or how many Men have they loft that we are certain of? While the very Horfes we had taken Prifoners were refcu'd at Moofa. But if the Copy of the Report fent over by the Province had been printed accord- ing to their Diredion, their Conduc muff have remained unqueffioned by every fair Perufer. And as that Report contained a great Number of Proofs and Papers we are fo unfortunate to want in this, if any Fad herein afferted flall be as pub- lickly deny'd, there is no doubt but the fame authentick Proofs may be tranfmitted here again  [ 68 ] again, if this Specimen fhall not prove entiely fatisfadory to all Perfons. To conclude, the ill Confequences of this Di6ppointment to the neighbouring Settlements would have been too obvious to particularize, even tho' they had not been already briefly enumerated : And they are render'd fill lefs neceffary by a former Remontirance of the General Af- fembly of South Carohna to His moft fa- cred Majefty. Nothing indeed could fo cffeaeually reflore the Credit of the Britif Arms among the Indians, as the Reduation of that Fortrefs, which they confider as very difficult. The Views of France and Spain in Europe,feem at prefent to be the chief Security of thofe Britilh Frontiers ; but if their Succefs at Home fliould give them Leifure to extend their Arms to America ; the particular Cir- cumifances of Carolina, and very declining State of Georgia confider'd, it will be nearly impoflible to defend and maintain thofeColonies, without a large Addition of His moft facred Majefly's powerful Support and Protection. [ 68 ] again, if this Specimen fiall not prove entiely fatisfaftory to all Perfons. To conclude, the ill Confequences of this Difappointment to the neighbouring Settlements would have been too obvious to particularize, even tho' they had not been already briefly enumerated : And they are render'd fill lefs neceffary by a former Remonflrance of the General Af- fembly of South Carohna to His moft fa- cred Majefty. Nothing indeed could fo effeaually reflore the Credit of the Britifh Arms among the Indians, as the Reduaion of that Fortrefs, which they confider as very difficult. The Views of France and Spain in Europe,feem at prefent to be the chief Security of rhofe Briti/h Frontiers ; but if their Succefs at Home fhould give them Leifure to extend their Arms to America ; the particular Cir- cumafances of Carolina, and very declining State of Georgia confider'd, it will be nearly impoffible to defend and maintain thofe Colonies, without a large Addition of His moft facred Majefty's powerful Support and Protc6tion. [ 68 ] again, if this Specimen (hall not prove entiely fatisfa6tory to all Perfons. To conclude, the ill Confequences of this Difippointment to the neighbouring Settlements would have been too obvious to particularize, even tho' they had not been already briefly enumerated : And they are render'd fill lefs neceffary by a former Remonlrance of the General Af- fembly of South Carohna to His mof fa- cred Majefly. Nothing indeed could o effectually reflore the Credit of the Briti# Arms among the Indians, as the Reduftion of that Fortrefs, which they confider as very difficult. The Views of France and Spain in Europe,feem at prefent to be the chief Security of thofe BritiA Frontiers ; but if their Succefs at Home fhould give them Leifure to extend their Arms to America ; the particular Cir- cumrances of Carolina, and very declining State of Georgia confider'd, it will be nearly impoflible to defend and maintain rhofeColonies, without a large Addition of His moft facred Majefty's powerful Support and Protection. F I N I S. F I N I S. F I N I S.  INDEX TO INTRODUCTION. Altamaha River, xiii Amelia Island, xxi Anastasia Island, xxx, xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxvi, xxxvii Anne (queen of England), xiv Apalache, xvii, xxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xliii, xlvi, xlvii Arredondo, Antonio de, xiii, xvii Benavides, Field Marshal Antonio de, xl Bull, William, xviii, xxi, xxv, xxx Cadogan, George, xxx Castelnau, Juan, xvii Castillo, Captain Francisco del, xxxv-xxxvi Catalonians, xxxvi Charles II (king of England), xiv Charleston, xvii, xx, xxi, xxii, xxvi, xxvii, xxx, xxxii Cherokee nation, xviii Cochran, Lieutenant Colonel James, xv, xvi, xvii Coweta, xviii Creek nation, xviii Cruz, Captain Domingo de la, xxxi, xxxii, xxxvi Cuba, xxx, xxxiii Cumberland Island, xv Dale, Dr. Thomas, xxvii Dem6r6, Lieutenant Raymond, xviii Dempsey, Charles, xiv INDEX TO INTRODUCTION. Altamaha River, xiii Amelia Island, xxi Anastasia Island, xxx, xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxvi, xxxvii Anne (queen of England), xiv Apalache, xvii, xxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xliii, xlvi, xlvii Arredondo, Antonio de, xiii, xvii Benavides, Field Marshal Antonio de, xl Bull, William, xviii, xxi, xxv, xxx Cadogan, George, xxx Castelnau, Juan, xvii Castillo, Captain Francisco del, xxxv-xxxvi Catalonians, xxxvi Charles II (king of England), xiv Charleston, xvii, xx, xxi, xxii, xxvi, xxvii, xxx, xxxii Cherokee nation, xviii Cochran, Lieutenant Colonel James, xv, xvi, xvii Coweta, xviii Creek nation, xviii Cruz, Captain Domingo de la, xxxi, xxxii, xxxvi Cuba, xxx, xxxiii Cumberland Island, xv Dale, Dr. Thomas, xxvii Dem6re, Lieutenant Raymond, xviii Dempsey, Charles, xiv INDEX TO INTRODUCTION. Altamaha River, xiii Amelia Island, xxi Anastasia Island, xxx, xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxvi, xxxvii Anne (queen of England), xiv Apalache, xvii, xxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xliii, xlvi, xlvii Arredondo, Antonio de, xiii, xvii Benavides, Field Marshal Antonio de, xl Bull, William, xviii, xxi, xxv, xxx Cadogan, George, xxx Castelnau, Juan, xvii Castillo, Captain Francisco del, xxxv-xxxvi Catalonians, xxxvi Charles II (king of England), xiv Charleston, xvii, xx, xxi, xxii, xxvi, xxvii, xxx, xxxii Cherokee nation, xviii Cochran, Lieutenant Colonel James, xv, xvi, xvii Coweta, xviii Creek nation, xviii Cruz, Captain Domingo de la, xxxi, xxxii, xxxvi Cuba, xxx, xxxiii Cumberland Island, xv Dale, Dr. Thomas, xxvii Dem6r6, Lieutenant Raymond, xviii Dempsey, Charles, xiv  El Pardo, xii Espinosa, Diego de, xxxiv Fandiio, Captain Juan de Le6n, xxxv Florida, xi, xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxiv, xliv, xlvi, xlvii Fort Frederica, xiii, xvi Fort Picolata, xv, xxi, xxix, xxxiv Fort St. Andrews, xiii, xv, xvi Fort St. George, xiii, xiv Fort St. Simons, xviii, xv, xvi, xvii Fort San Diego, xxxiv, xxxvi, xliii Fort San Francisco de Pupo, xxi, xxix, xxxiv, xxxv, x, xlii Fort William, xiii Fury, Peregrine, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii Galleys. See Galliots Galliots, xxxv, xl, xlv George II (king of England), xxxvi, xliv Georgia, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xxvi, xxxvi, xlvi; Trustees, xii, xiii, xviii Geraldino, Thomas, xi Glen, James, xxv Gracia Real. See Moze Guale, xiii Guarico, xxxi Giemes y Horcasitas, Juan Francisco de, xiii, xiv, xvii, xix, xxxv, xlv Havana, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xvii, xxiii, xxxiii, xxxvi House of Commons, xii Indians, xiii, xv, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii. See also Cherokee nation; Creek nation; Uchize In- dians; Yamasee Indians El Pardo, xii Espinosa, Diego de, xxxiv Fandiaio, Captain Juan de Le6n, xxxv Florida, xi, xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxiv, xliv, xlvi, xlvii Fort Frederica, xiii, xvi Fort Picolata, xv, xxi, xxix, xxxiv Fort St. Andrews, xiii, xv, xvi Fort St. George, xiii, xiv Fort St. Simons, xviii, xv, xvi, xvii Fort San Diego, xxxiv, xxxvi, xliii Fort San Francisco de Pupo, xxi, xxix, xxxiv, xxxv, xl, xlii Fort William, xiii Fury, Peregrine, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii Galleys. See Galliots Galliots, xxxv, xl, xlv George II (king of England), xxxvi, xliv Georgia, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xxvi, xxxvi, xlvi; Trustees, xii, xiii, xviii Geraldino, Thomis, xi Glen, James, xxv Gracia Real. See Moze Guale, xiii Guarico, xxxi Giiemes y Horcasitas, Juan Francisco de, xiii, xiv, xvii, xix, xxxv, xlv Havana, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xvii, xxiii, xxxiii, xxxvi House of Commons, xii Indians, xiii, xv, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii. See also Cherokee nation; Creek nation; Uchize In- dians; Yamasee Indians El Pardo, xii Espinosa, Diego de, xxxiv Fandifno, Captain Juan de Le6n, xxxv Florida, xi, xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxiv, xliv, xlvi, xlvii Fort Frederica, xiii, xvi Fort Picolata, xv, xxi, xxix, xxxiv Fort St. Andrews, xiii, xv, xvi Fort St. George, xiii, xiv Fort St. Simons, xviii, xv, xvi, xvii Fort San Diego, xxxiv, xxxvi, xliii Fort San Francisco de Pupo, xxi, xxix, xxxiv, xxxv, xl, xlii Fort William, xiii Fury, Peregrine, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii Galleys. See Galliots Galliots, xxxv, xl, xlv George II (king of England), xxxvi, xliv Georgia, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xxvi, xxxvi, xlvi; Trustees, xii, xiii, xviii Geraldino, Thomis, xi Glen, James, xxv Gracia Real. See Moze Guale, xiii Guarico, xxxi Giemes y Horcasitas, Juan Francisco de, xiii, xiv, xvii, xix, xxxv, xlv Havana, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xvii, xxiii, xxxiii, xxxvi House of Commons, xii Indians, xiii, xv, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii. See also Cherokee nation; Creek nation; Uchize In- dians; Yamasee Indians  Jenkins, Captain Robert, xii Killpatrick, James, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, xxix, xxx Lamberto, Captain Pedro, xvii, xxxiv, xxxv, xIv Lords Proprietors of Carolina, xiv Madrid, Treaty of, xix Matanzas Inlet, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxvi, xli, xliii, xlvii Mexico, xxxiii, xli Mobile, xxii, xxiii Montiano, Colonel Manuel de: accomplishments in office, xlvi-xlvii; intelligence gathering and preparation for defense of St. Augustine, xv-xviii, xxxiii, xxxv; re- ports of the siege, xxxvi-xlvii; reprimanded, xlvi- xlvii Moral Sinchez, Francisco del, xv Moosa. See Moze Mosquito Inlet, xli Moze, xxxi, xxxvi, xxxvii, xliii Negroes, free, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxix; fugitive slave, xix, xxxviii, xxxix Newcastle, Duke of, xi Nieto de Carvajal, Ensign Antonio, xli Oglethorpe, James Edward: conduct of St. Augustine expedition, xxiv-xxv, xlii, xlv, xlvi; explanation of failure of expedition, xxix, xxx-xxxi; negotiations with governors of Havana and Florida, xiii-xv; prep- arations for expedition, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxii, xxiii Palmer (Palma), Colonel John, xxiii, xxxix, xl, In 30 Palmer, Captain William, xl, In 30 Pearse (Pierse), Captain Vincent, xxiii, xxiv, xxxi, xxxvu, xliii Jenkins, Captain Robert, xii Killpatrick, James, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, xxix, xxx Lamberto, Captain Pedro, xvii, xxxiv, xxxv, xlv Lords Proprietors of Carolina, xiv Madrid, Treaty of, xix Matanzas Inlet, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxvi, xli, xliii, xlvii Mexico, xxxiii, xli Mobile, xxii, xxiii Montiano, Colonel Manuel de: accomplishments in office, xlvi-xlvii; intelligence gathering and preparation for defense of St. Augustine, xv-xviii, xxxiii, xxxv; re- ports of the siege, xxxvi-xlvii; reprimanded, xlvi- xlvii Moral SAnchez, Francisco del, xv Moosa. See Moze Mosquito Inlet, xli Moze, xxxi, xxxvi, xxxvii, xliii Negroes, free, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxix; fugitive slave, xix, xxxviii, xxxix Newcastle, Duke of, xi Nieto de Carvajal, Ensign Antonio, xli Oglethorpe, James Edward: conduct of St. Augustine expedition, xxiv-xxv, xlii, xlv, xlvi; explanation of failure of expedition, xxix, xxx-xxxi; negotiations with governors of Havana and Florida, xiii-xv; prep- arations for expedition, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxii, xxiii Palmer (Palma), Colonel John, xxiii, xxxix, xl, In 30 Palmer, Captain William, xl, In 30 Pearse (Pierse), Captain Vincent, xxiii, xxiv, xxxi, xxxvii, xliii Jenkins, Captain Robert, xii Killpatrick, James, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, xxix, xxx Lamberto, Captain Pedro, xvii, xxxiv, xxxv, xlv Lords Proprietors of Carolina, xiv Madrid, Treaty of, xix Matanzas Inlet, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxvi, xli, xliii, xlvii Mexico, xxxiii, xli Mobile, xxii, xxiii Montiano, Colonel Manuel de: accomplishments in office, xlvi-xlvii; intelligence gathering and preparation for defense of St. Augustine, xv-xviii, xxxiii, xxxv; re- ports of the siege, xxxvi-xlvii; reprimanded, xlvi- xlvii Moral Sinchez, Francisco del, xv Moosa. See Moze Mosquito Inlet, xli Moze, xxxi, xxxvi, xxxvii, xliii Negroes, free, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxix; fugitive slave, xix, xxxviii, xxxix Newcastle, Duke of, xi Nieto de Carvajal, Ensign Antonio, xli Oglethorpe, James Edward: conduct of St. Augustine expedition, xxiv-xxv, xlii, xlv, xlvi; explanation of failure of expedition, xxix, xxx-xxxi; negotiations with governors of Havana and Florida, xiii-xv; prep- arations for expedition, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxii, xxiii Palmer (Palma), Colonel John, xxiii, xxxix, xl, In 30 Palmer, Captain William, xl, ln 30 Pearse (Pierse), Captain Vincent, xxiii, xxiv, xxxi, xxxvii, xliii  Philip V (king of Spain), xi, xii, xv, xix, xxxvi, xlv, xlvi Port Royal, xvi, xxxv Quartell. See San Matheo Point Reyes, Juan Ignazio de los, xv, xxxiv Ruiz de Olano, Pedro, xvii, xxxii, xxxv St. Augustine, xiv, xvi, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxx, xxxi, xxxv, xlvii St. Johns River, xiii, xvi, xxi, xxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xlii St. Mattheo's River. See St. Johns River St. Simons Island, xiii, xv, xvi, xviii Salgado, Captain Antonio, xxxix SAnchez, Sebastiin, xvi, xlv San Matheo Point, xxx, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii San Nicolis, xxxiv, xxxv Santa Anastasia Island. See Anastasia Island Savannah, xvi Savannah River, xiii South Carolina General Assembly, xviii, xx, xxiii, xxv, xxvii; committee appointed to enquire, xxiv, xxv, xxviii; committee of correspondence, xxv, xxviii; com- mons house, xx, xxii, xxiv, xxvi South Carolinians, xvii, xix, xxxii, xlvi Stono, xx Tejada, Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura y, O.F.M., xxxii, xliii, xliv, xlv Timothy, Peter, xxv Toonahowi, xviii Uchize Indians, xxxix, xlvi, xlvii Utrecht, Treaty of, xix Vanderdussen, Colonel Alexander, xxiii, xxix, xxxi Philip V (king of Spain), xi, xii, xv, xix, xxxvi, xlv, xlvi Port Royal, xvi, xxxv Quartell. See San Matheo Point Reyes, Juan Ignazio de los, xv, xxxiv Ruiz de Olano, Pedro, xvii, xxxii, xxxv St. Augustine, xiv, xvi, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxx, xxxi, xxxv, xlvii St. Johns River, xiii, xvi, xxi, xxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xlii St. Mattheo's River. See St. Johns River St. Simons Island, xiii, xv, xvi, xviii Salgado, Captain Antonio, xxxix Sinchez, SebastiAn, xvi, xlv San Matheo Point, xxx, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii San NicolAs, xxxiv, xxxv Santa Anastasia Island. See Anastasia Island Savannah, xvi Savannah River, xiii South Carolina General Assembly, xviii, xx, xxiii, xxv, xxvii; committee appointed to enquire, xxiv, xxv, xxviii; committee of correspondence, xxv, xxviii; com- mons house, xx, xxii, xxiv, xxvi South Carolinians, xvii, xix, xxxii, xlvi Stono, xx Tejada, Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura y, O.F.M., xxxii, xliii, xliv, xlv Timothy, Peter, xxv Toonahowi, xviii Uchize Indians, xxxix, xlvi, xlvii Utrecht, Treaty of, xix Vanderdussen, Colonel Alexander, xxiii, xxix, xxxi Philip V (king of Spain), xi, xii, xv, xix, xxxvi, xlv, xlvi Port Royal, xvi, xxxv Quartell. See San Matheo Point Reyes, Juan Ignazio de los, xv, xxxiv Ruiz de Olano, Pedro, xvii, xxxii, xxxv St. Augustine, xiv, xvi, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxx, xxxi, xxxv, xlvii St. Johns River, xiii, xvi, xxi, xxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xlii St. Mattheo's River. See St. Johns River St. Simons Island, xiii, xv, xvi, xviii Salgado, Captain Antonio, xxxix Sinchez, SebastiAn, xvi, xlv San Mathen Point, xxx, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii San Nicolis, xxxiv, xxxv Santa Anastasia Island. See Anastasia Island Savannah, xvi Savannah River, xiii South Carolina General Assembly, xviii, xx, xxiii, xxv, xxvii; committee appointed to enquire, xxiv, xxv, xxviii; committee of correspondence, xxv, xxviii; com- mons house, xx, xxii, xxiv, xxvi South Carolinians, xvii, xix, xxxii, xlvi Stono, xx Tejada, Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura y, O.F.M., xxxii, xliii, xliv, xlv Timothy, Peter, xxv Toonahowi, xviii Uchize Indians, xxxix, xlvi, xivii Utrecht, Treaty of, xix Vanderdussen, Colonel Alexander, xxiii, xxix, xxxi  Vera Cruz, xli Viceroy of New Spain, xli Walpole, Robert, xi, xii War of Jenkins' Ear, xii, xlvi Yamasee Indians, xxi Vera Cruz, xli Viceroy of New Spain, xli Walpole, Robert, xi, xii War of Jenkina' Ear, xii, xlvi Yamasee Indians, xxi Vera Cruz, xli Viceroy of New Spain, xli Walpole, Robert, xi, xii War of Jenkins' Ear, xii, xlvi Yaniaaee Indians, xxi  INDEX TO Impartial Account. Anastasia Island, 23, 24, 25, 26, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 56, 57, 65 Bailey, Mr., 65 Barnwell, Colonel Nathanial, 33, 40 Barradel, Lieutenant Blomfield, 58, 59 Bull, Lieutenant Governor William, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20 Caesar, quoted by Oglethorpe, 47 Carolina Regiment, 16, 21, 22, 24, 45, 49, 64 Carolinians, 10, 14, 63, 66 Castle (Castillo de San Marcos), 9, 10, 25, 38, 39, 41, 50 Cattle, 39, 45, 46, 65 Charles Town (Charleston), 11, 17, 18, 27, 47 Cherokee Indians, 22 Chickasaw Indians, 44 Committee of Conference, 16, 20, 55, 57, 59 Cook, Lieutenant Colonel William, 26, 39, 40, 49, 50 Country schooner, 20, 21, 55, 56, 57 Creek Indians, 43 Cuba, 14,31 Desertions, 34 Fanshaw, Captain Charles, 25, 51 Fort Diego, 22, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45 Fort Frederica, 34, 59 INDEX TO Impartial Account. Anastasia Island, 23, 24, 25, 26, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 56, 57, 65 Bailey, Mr., 65 Barnwell, Colonel Nathanial, 33, 40 Barradel, Lieutenant Blomfield, 58, 59 Bull, Lieutenant Governor William, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20 Caesar, quoted by Oglethorpe, 47 Carolina Regiment, 16, 21, 22, 24, 45, 49, 64 Carolinians, 10, 14, 63, 66 Castle (Castillo de San Marcos), 9, 10, 25, 38, 39, 41, 50 Cattle, 39, 45, 46, 65 Charles Town (Charleston), 11, 17, 18, 27, 47 Cherokee Indians, 22 Chickasaw Indians, 44 Committee of Conference, 16, 20, 55, 57, 59 Cook, Lieutenant Colonel William, 26, 39, 40, 49, 50 Country schooner, 20, 21, 55, 56, 57 Creek Indians, 43 Cuba, 14, 31 Desertions, 34 Fanshaw, Captain Charles, 25, 51 Fort Diego, 22, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45 Fort Frederica, 34, 59 INDEX TO Impartial Account. Anastasia Island, 23, 24, 25, 26, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 56, 57, 65 Bailey, Mr., 65 Barnwell, Colonel Nathanial, 33, 40 Barradel, Lieutenant Blomfield, 58, 59 Bull, Lieutenant Governor William, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20 Caesar, quoted by Oglethorpe, 47 Carolina Regiment, 16, 21, 22, 24, 45, 49, 64 Carolinians, 10, 14, 63, 66 Castle (Castillo de San Marcos), 9, 10, 25, 38, 39, 41, 50 Cattle, 39, 45, 46, 65 Charles Town (Charleston), 11, 17, 18, 27, 47 Cherokee Indians, 22 Chickasaw Indians, 44 Committee of Conference, 16, 20, 55, 57, 59 Cook, Lieutenant Colonel William, 26, 39, 40, 49, 50 Country schooner, 20, 21, 55, 56, 57 Creek Indians, 43 Cuba, 14,31 Desertions, 34 Fanshaw, Captain Charles, 25, 51 Fort Diego, 22, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45 Fort Frederica, 34, 59  Fort Moosa, 23, 24, 38, 43, 62, 63, 65, 67 Fort St. Francis de Pupa, 31, 32 France,68 French, 19,44 Fury, Peregrine, vii, 21, 66 Indians, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 2 3, 24, 40, 43, 44, 45, 63, 68 Laws, Captain William, 24, 49, 50 Mackay, Captain Hugh, 63 Metansas (Matanzas), 25, 51, 57, 58 Moore, Colonel James, 10 Musquito's (Mosquito Inlet), 25, 57 Negroes, 12, 24, 30; fugitive slaves, 11, 12, 22, 30 Oglethorpe, General James Edward: alienation of Indi- ans, 44; conduct, 22-26; disposition of troops, 39-43; "extraordinary orders," 27, 60; failure to call Councils of War, 47; proposals to South Carolina General As- sembly, 13-15, 17, 35 Palmer, Colonel John, 10, 24, 40, 63, 65 Pearse, Captain Vincent, 18, 19, 49-52, 57, 60 Phoenix, the, 25 Pioneers, 16 Point Quartell, 23, 38, 40, 56 Rangers, 17, 20, 64 Rice, 12 St. Augustine, 9, 10, 16, 19, 27, 30, 33, 37, 38, 56 St. Augustine Expedition: capitulation of Fort Diego, 22, 45-46; conduct of expedition, 48-49, 61, 64, 66; mo- tives for expedition, 9-13; occupation of Anastasia Fort Moosa, 23, 24, 38, 43, 62, 63, 65, 67 Fort St. Francis de Pupa, 31, 32 France,68 French, 19, 44 Fury, Peregrine, vii, 21, 66 Indians, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 40, 43, 44, 45, 63, 68 Laws, Captain William, 24, 49, 50 Mackay, Captain Hugh, 63 Metansas (Matanzas), 25, 51, 57, 58 Moore, Colonel James, 10 Musquito's (Mosquito Inlet), 25, 57 Negroes, 12, 24, 30; fugitive slaves, 11, 12, 22, 30 Oglethorpe, General James Edward: alienation of Indi- ans, 44; conduct, 22-26; disposition of troops, 39-43; "extraordinary orders," 27, 60; failure to call Councils of War, 47; proposals to South Carolina General As- sembly, 13-15, 17, 35 Palmer, Colonel John, 10, 24, 40, 63, 65 Pearse, Captain Vincent, 18, 19, 49-52, 57, 60 Phoenix, the, 25 Pioneers, 16 Point Quartell, 23, 38, 40, 56 Rangers, 17, 20, 64 Rice, 12 St. Augustine, 9, 10, 16, 19, 27, 30, 33, 37, 38, 56 St. Augustine Expedition: capitulation of Fort Diego, 22, 45-46; conduct of expedition, 48-49, 61, 64, 66; mo- tives for expedition, 9-13; occupation of Anastasia Fort Moosa, 23, 24, 38, 43, 62, 63, 65, 67 Fort St. Francis de Pupa, 31, 32 France,68 French, 19,44 Fury, Peregrine, vii, 21, 66 Indians, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 40, 43, 44, 45, 63, 68 Laws, Captain William, 24, 49, 50 Mackay, Captain Hugh, 63 Metansas (Matanzas), 25, 51, 57, 58 Moore, Colonel James, 10 Musquito's (Mosquito Inlet), 25, 57 Negroes, 12, 24, 30; fugitive slaves, 11, 12, 22, 30 Oglethorpe, General James Edward: alienation of Indi- ans, 44; conduct, 22-26; disposition of troops, 39-43; "extraordinary orders," 27, 60; failure to call Councils of War, 47; proposals to South Carolina General As- sembly, 13-15, 17, 35 Palmer, Colonel John, 10, 24, 40, 63, 65 Pearse, Captain Vincent, 18, 19, 49-52, 57, 60 Phoenix, the, 25 Pioneers, 16 Point Quartell, 23, 38, 40, 56 Rangers, 17, 20, 64 Rice, 12 St. Augustine, 9, 10, 16, 19, 27, 30, 33, 37, 38, 56 St. Augustine Expedition: capitulation of Fort Diego, 22, 45-46; conduct of expedition, 48-49, 61, 64, 66; mo- tives for expedition, 9-13; occupation of Anastasia  Island and Point Quartell, 23, 25; occupation of Fort Moosa, 24; plan to attack Spanish galleys, 25; proposed by Oglethorpe, 13-18; raising of blockade, 26; refusal of Navy to attack galleys, 52-57; rendezvous at St. Johns River, 21; South Carolina's contributions, 19-20 St. Johns River, 18, 21, 32 St. Marks, 32 St. Rosana, 32 St. Sebastian River, 57 Smallpox, 13 South Carolina: General Assembly, 14-16, 20, 66, 68; province, 11, 21, 33, 68 Spain, 11, 14 Spaniards, 11, 22, 23, 24, 27, 38, 41, 42, 44, 54, 67 Spanish governor, 31, 32 Spinosa, Seignior Diego (Diego de Espinosa), 22, 46 Swanton, Mr., 53 Townshend, Captain George, 24, 50, 59 Tyrrell, Captain Richard, 21, 51, 52 Vanderdussen, Colonel Alexander, 21, 23, 26, 45, 47; con- ference in his tent, 48-49; proposed placing a battery south of the town, 57; proposed sending sloops into Metansas, 59; urged attack on Spanish galleys, 50-52 Warren, Captain Peter, 24, 31, 49, 50, 51, 53 Wolf, the, 58 Yamasee Indians, 11 Island and Point Quartell, 23, 25; occupation of Fort Moosa, 24; plan to attack Spanish galleys, 25; proposed by Oglethorpe, 13-18; raising of blockade, 26; refusal of Navy to attack galleys, 52-57; rendezvous at St. Johns River, 21; South Carolina's contributions, 19-20 St. Johns River, 18, 21, 32 St. Marks, 32 St. Rosana, 32 St. Sebastian River, 57 Smallpox, 13 South Carolina: General Assembly, 14-16, 20, 66, 68; province, 11, 21, 33, 68 Spain, 11, 14 Spaniards, 11, 22, 23, 24, 27, 38, 41, 42, 44, 54, 67 Spanish governor, 31, 32 Spinosa, Seignior Diego (Diego de Espinosa), 22, 46 Swanton, Mr., 53 Townshend, Captain George, 24, 50, 59 Tyrrell, Captain Richard, 21, 51, 52 Vanderdussen, Colonel Alexander, 21, 23, 26, 45, 47; con- ference in his tent, 48-49; proposed placing a battery south of the town, 57; proposed sending sloops into Metansas, 59; urged attack on Spanish galleys, 50-52 Warren, Captain Peter, 24, 31, 49, 50,51, 53 Wolf, the, 58 Yamasee Indians, 11 Island and Point Quartell, 23, 25; occupation of Fort Moosa, 24; plan to attack Spanish galleys, 25; proposed by Oglethorpe, 13-18; raising of blockade, 26; refusal of Navy to attack galleys, 52-57; rendezvous at St. Johns River, 21; South Carolina's contributions, 19-20 St. Johns River, 18, 21, 32 St. Marks, 32 St. Rosana, 32 St. Sebastian River, 57 Smallpox, 13 South Carolina: General Assembly, 14-16, 20, 66, 68; province, 11, 21, 33, 68 Spain, 11, 14 Spaniards, 11, 22, 23, 24, 27, 38, 41, 42, 44, 54, 67 Spanish governor, 31, 32 Spinosa, Seignior Diego (Diego de Espinosa), 22, 46 Swanton, Mr., 53 Townshend, Captain George, 24, 50, 59 Tyrrell, Captain Richard, 21, 51, 52 Vanderdussen, Colonel Alexander, 21, 23, 26, 45, 47; con- ference in his tent, 48-49; proposed placing a battery south of the town, 57; proposed sending sloops into Metansas, 59; urged attack on Spanish galleys, 50-52 Warren, Captain Peter, 24, 31, 49,50, 51, 53 Wolf, the, 58 Yamasee Indians, 11