THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1702 THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1702 THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1702    The English Siege of 1702 gaethis Spanfish fort its bapim of fire. Th ano The English Siege of 1702 gav this Spanish fortits bapis f fire. T~heano the icc The English Siege of 1702 gav this Spaish for t baptim of fire. Th ano is pato h pns 6pudrwihwsoecagdadbe pdrn  THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1702 by Charles W. Arnade THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1702 by Charles W. Arnade THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1702 by Charles W. Arnade University of Florida Monographs SOCIAL SCIENCES No. 3, Summer 1959 C8964 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS / GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA 96 University of Florida Monographs SOCIAL SCIENCES No. 3, Summer 1959 C 326 4 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS / GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA 96 University of Florida Monographs SOCIAL SCIENCES No. 3, Summer 1959 C a96 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS / GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA O5PEOiY OFMYLU~4 UIRSTY EFFO, ,,- UNVESTY OF FLRTIZJI  EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Social Sciences Monographs L. N. McAUSTER, Chairman Associate Professor of History ARTHUR W. COMBS Professor of Education MANNING J. DAUER Professor of Political Science ALLEN M. SIEVERS Professor of Economics T. LYNN SMrrT Professor of Sociology WILSE B. WEBB Professor of Psychology F, 3 EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Social Sciences Monographs L. N. McALISTER, Chairman Associate Professor of History ARTHUR W. COMBS Professor of Education MANNING J. DAUER Professor of Political Science ALLEN M. SIEVERS Professor of Economics T. LYNN SMITH Professor of Sociology WILsE B. WEB Professor of Psychology F7 X) t / EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Social Sciences Monographs L. N. McALISTER, Chairman Associate Professor of History ARTHUR W. COMBS Professor of Education MANNING . DAUER Professor of Political Science ALLEN M. SIEVERS Professor of Economics T. LYNN SMITH Professor of Sociology WiLsE B. WEBB Professor of Psychology FIr COPYRIHT, 1959, BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF FLORIDA - LIBRARY OF CONCRESS CATALOGUE CARD No. 59463743 PRINTED BY THE RECORD PRESS ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA COPYRIGHT, 1959, BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF FLORIDA LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUE CARD No. 59-63743 PRINTED BY THE RECORD PRESS ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA COPYRIGHT, 1959, BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF FLORIDA LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOCUE CARD No. 59-63743 PRINTED BY THE RECORD PRESS ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS R esearch for this monograph was made possible by a generous grant from the St. Augustine Historical Society. The grant enabled me to dedicate a full two months in the summer of 1958 to research and writing. Mr. J. Carver Harris, Mrs. Doris Wiles, Mr. J. T. Van Campen, Mr. X. L. Pellicer, Mrs. Max Kettner, Mrs. Luis Arana, and Mr. William Griffen of the Society were helpful at various times. Mr. Albert Manucy, Mr. Luis Arana, and Mr. Ray Vinten of the United States National Park Service (which today administers Castillo de San Marcos National Me,ment, the historic fort that is so much a part f tt...a arative) gave valuable tech- nical and scholarly help. Professors Hale Smith, Charles Fairbanks, Benjamin Rogers of Florida State University, and Donald Worcester, Lyle Mc- Alister, Rembert Patrick, John Mahon, Curtis Wil- gus, John Coggin, and Ripley Bullen of the Univer- sity of Florida offered valuable advice. A special word of thanks goes to Mr. Julien C. Yonge and Miss Margaret Chapman of the P. K. Yonge Li- brary of Florida History for their help and for making many facilities available to me. Dr. Mark Boyd of Tallahassee, Mr. David True of Miami, and Mr. Edward Lawson of St. Augustine at one time or another were extremely helpful. My wife, Marjorie, as usual had the tedious chore of typing the various drafts. To these friends, and especially to the St. Augustine Historical Society, many thanks. Naturally I assume full responsibility for the content of the monograph. CHARLES W. ARNADE GAINESvILLE, FLORIDA SEPTEMBER, 1959 R eerchfor this monograph was made posile by a generous grant from the St. Augustine Historical Society. The grant enabled me to dedicate a full two months in the summer of 1958 to research and writing. Mr. J. Carver Harris, Mrs. Doris Wiles, Mr. J. T. Van Campen, Mr. X. L. Pellicer, Mrs. Max Kettner, Mrs. Luis Arana, and Mr. William Griffen of the Society were helpful at various times. Mr. Albert Manucy, Mr. Luis Arana, and Mr. Ray Vinten of the United States National Park Service (which today administers Castillo de San Marcos National Mor,ment, the historic fort that is so much a part of ti arrative) gave valuable tech- nical and scholarly help. Professors Hale Smith, Charles Fairbanks, Benjamin Rogers of Florida State University, and Donald Worcester, Lyle Mc- Alister, Rembert Patrick, John Mahon, Curtis Wil- gus, John Coggin, and Ripley Bullen of the Univer- sity of Florida offered valuable advice. A special word of thanks goes to Mr. Julien C. Yonge and Miss Margaret Chapman of the P. K. Yonge Li- brary of Florida History for their help and for making many facilities available to me. Dr. Mark Boyd of Tallahassee, Mr. David True of Miami, and Mr. Edward Lawson of St. Augustine at one time or another were extremely helpful. My wife, Marjorie, as usual had the tedious chore of typing the various drafts. To these friends, and especially to the St. Augustine Historical Society, many thanks. Naturally I assume full responsibility for the content of the monograph. CHARLES W. ARNADE GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA SEPTEMBER, 1959 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Rearch for this monograph was made possible J by a generous grant from the St. Augustine Historical Society. The grant enabled me to dedicate a full two months in the summer of 1958 to research and writing. Mr. J. Carver Harris, Mrs. Doris Wiles, Mr. J. T. Van Campen, Mr. X. L. Pellicer, Mrs. Max Kettner, Mrs. Luis Arana, and Mr. William Griffen of the Society were helpful at various times. Mr. Albert Manucy, Mr. Luis Arana, and Mr. Ray Vinten of the United States National Park Service (which today administers Castillo de San Marcos National Mr-ment, the historic fort that is so much a part .f ti a.arative) gave valuable tech- nical and Scholarly help. Professors Hale Smith, Charles Fairbanks, Benjamin Rogers of Florida State University, and Donald Worcester, Lyle Mc- Alister, Rembert Patrick, John Mahon, Curtis Wil- gus, John Goggin, and Ripley Bullen of the Univer- sity of Florida offered valuable advice. A special word of thanks goes to Mr. Julien C. Yonge and Miss Margaret Chapman of the P. K. Yonge Li- brary of Florida History for their help and for making many facilities available to me. Dr. Mark Boyd of Tallahassee, Mr. David True of Miami, and Mr. Edward Lawson of St. Augustine at one time or another were extremely helpful. My wife, Marjorie, as usual had the tedious chore of typing the various drafts. To these friends, and especially to the St. Augustine Historical Society, many thanks. Naturally I assume full responsibility for the content of the monograph. CHARLES W. ARNADE GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA SEPTEMBER, 1959   CONTENTS CONTENTS List of Illustrations viii 1. Florida and Carolina Around 1700 1 2. The English Approach 14 3. The Siege 37 4. The English Withdrawal 53 Bibliography 62 List of Illustrations viii 1. Florida and Carolina Around 1700 1 2. The English Approach 14 CONTENTS List of Illustrations viii 1. Florida and Carolina Around 1700 1 2. The English Approach 14 3. The Siege 37 4. The English Withdrawal 53 Bibliography 62 3. The Siege 4. The English Withdrawal Bibliography 37 53 62  ILLUSTRATIONS ILLUSTRATIONS ILLUSTRATIONS Castillo de San Marcos Frontispiece English Advance on St. Augustine 6 St. Augustine and Western Florida, 1702 12 English Advance and Retreat Routes 16-17 Spanish Map of St. Johns River Area 18 The Attack Time Table 23 Plan of the Fort 25 Seventeenth Century Warfare facing 38 Spanish Defense Zone in St. Augustine 43 Diagram of the Siege 48-49 Plan of Port and Fort of St. Augustine 56 The British Withdrawal 58 Castillo de San Marcos Frontispiece English Advance on St. Augustine 6 St. Augustine and Western Florida, 1702 12 English Advance and Retreat Routes 16-17 Spanish Map of St. Johns River Area 18 The Attack Time Table 23 Plan of the Fort 25 Seventeenth Century Warfare facing 38 Spanish Defense Zone in St. Augustine 43 Diagram of the Siege 48-49 Plan of Port and Fort of St. Augustine 56 The British Withdrawal 58 Castillo de San Marcos Frontispiece English Advance on St. Augustine 6 St. Augustine and Western Florida, 1702 12 English Advance and Retreat Routes 16-17 Spanish Map of St. Johns River Area 18 The Attack Time Table 23 Plan of the Fort 25 Seventeenth Century Warfare facing 38 Spanish Defense Zone in St. Augustine 43 Diagram of the Siege 48-49 Plan of Port and Fort of St. Augustine 56 The British Withdrawal 58  1. FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 n 167Q new English colony had come into existence on the North American continent. Its first colonists came from England and Barbados and called their new home Carolina. They established their towns and plantations in territory claimed exclusively by Spain as part of Florida. Although Spansh hegemony in the Carolina land was hardly perceivable since the Spanish frontier had been withdrawn to the south, the very soil on which the first Carolinians stepped was historical ground where once the Spanish banner proudly flew. The famous Pedro Men6ndez de Avil6s had personally established forts and outposts in Carolina a century before the English arrival. Overextension, lack of gold and precious metals, apathy, ferocious Indians, maladmin- istration, jealousies, and other causes forced the Spanish to retreat toward St. Augustine and Apalachee. Carolina and north Georgia as well as Alabama remained Spanish only in name and on paper. The settlers of Carolina, imbued by a restless energy, a religious fervor, a shrewd business instinct, and a hatred for Catholic Spain, were determined to remain and expand. This they did. In all directions, but especially west and south, the pioneers and traders of Carolina blazed the trail. The forceful story of this chapter of American colonial history has been written with scholarly pen by Professor Verner Crane in his study The Southern Frontier (11)*, today a classic of American history. The men of Carolina, according to the Spaniards, were living, moving, and expanding on Spanish soil. Surely a controversy, if not war, was in the making over the "debatable land," a phrase employed by Professor Herbert Bolton (6). For more than thirty years an undeclared war was waged in this disi lack of gold and precious metals, apathy, ferocious Indians, maladmin- istration, jealousies, and other causes forced the Spanish to retreat toward St. Augustine and Apalachee. Carolina and north Georgia as well as Alabama remained Spanish only in name and on paper. The settlers of Carolina, imbued by a restless energy, a religious fervor, a shrewd business instinct, and a hatred for Catholic Spain, were determined to remain and expand. This they did. In all directions, but especially west and south, the pioneers and traders of Carolina blazed the trail. The forceful story of this chapter of American colonial history has been written with scholarly pen by Professor Verner Crane in his study The Southern Frontier (11) *, today a classic of American history. The men of Carolina, according to the Spaniards, were living, moving, and expanding on Spanish soil. Surely a controversy, if not war, was in the making over the "debatable land," a phrase employed by Professor Herbert Bolton (6). For more than thirty years an undeclared war was waged in this disjuied land with Guale, or eastern Georgia, as the main battleground. Spain's efforts to eradicate English Carolina from St. Augustine were complete failures. Many natives flocked to the English side, the side which had more goods to offer. Those Indians who remained loyal to Spain were eagerly considered slave material by the Carolina plantation owners. Therefore raiding parties by the English and their Indian allies forced the Spaniards to fall back farther south. One Spanish governor *Citations throughout refer to the numbered items in the Bibliography. 1. FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 n 1670.onew English colony had come into existence on the North American continent. Its first colonists came from England and Barbados and called their new home Carolina. They established their towns and plantations in territory claimed exclusively by Spain as part of Florida. Although Spansh hegemony in the Carolina land was hardly perceivable since the Spanish frontier had been withdrawn to the south, the very soil on which the first Carolinians stepped was historical ground where once the Spanish banner proudly flew. The famous Pedro Menendez de Avil6s had personally established forts and outposts in Carolina a century before the English arrival. Overextension,' lack of gold and precious metals, apathy, ferocious Indians, maladmin- istration, jealousies, and other causes forced the Spanish to retreat toward St. Augustine and Apalachee. Carolina and north Georgia as well as Alabama remained Spanish only in name and on paper. The settlers of Carolina, imbued by a restless energy, a religious fervor, a shrewd business instinct, and a hatred for Catholic Spain, were determined to remain and expand. This they did. In all directions, but especially west and south, the pioneers and traders of Carolina blazed the trail. The forceful story of this chapter of American colonial Eistory has been written with scholarly pen by Professor Verner Crane in his study The Southern Frontier (11)*, today a classic of American history. The men of Carolina, according to the Spaniards, were living, moving, and expanding on Spanish soil. Surely a controversy, if not war, was in the making over the "debatable land," a phrase employed by Professor Herbert Bolton (6). For more than thirty years an undeclared war was waged in this dispued land with Guale,"or eastern Georgia, as the main battleground. Spain's efforts to eradicate English Carolina from St. Augustine were complete failures. Many natives flocked to the English side, the side which had more goods to offer. Those Indians who remained loyal to Spain were eagerly considered slave material by the Carolina plantation owners. Therefore raiding parties by the English and their Indian allies forced the Spaniards to fall back farther south. One Spanish governor *Citations throughout refer to the numbered items in the Bibliography.  THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE after ansother requested help to destroy the Eaglish mesace, bat nothinug wsforthcaamiag. Our pasitive actiaa was sadertahen, however, whea St. Asguatiae weas msade a asain hastion for Spansish defrase af the At- lantic.Aassivestonarfort, the dreamaofcerygvrr sice Meis- dea do Anuls, hecamue a reatity. It was atarted is 1672, aad hy the ead of theenatury the fort atSt. Agustise was the srogst and largestsun the caatiaeat thia side of Veracrua (17). The stage wat set far a larger English-Spanish eagagemseut. Interaatiaaal esveats siowly led ta its fal- fillment. Fance's aonership of the heat wcaterwcays of North America seas yet iucoasplete wcithout sacereigaty ever the Mississippi, eapecially its mouth. By the tad af the seveatenth ceatury, just when Caralina was expanding, Fraace derided to act since Spaia had aeglected the Gulf coast. By 1700 France had achieved her purpose and Louisiana was in the moahiag. The Spaoish crowa, wishiag to farestall the Freach, area- pied Pensacola Bay aad ia this sway a newc area of conflict was created. Furthermore, while Garoliniaao gained at the expesse of Spain ia east Grorgia, their more esterprising traders were moviag wrst, approaching the Missiosippi. Anothr regional clash was shsaping up. The outloaok was far a triangular struggle aver the Southeast. To the Caroliniaas thr main rnemy had hrru Spain ecer since the creation of their pravince. This was mast natural as they had intruded ansoail laimed by Spain, and they swere livnag "is the very chaps of the Spaniard" (11, p. 3, a. 1). At the same time they were disdainful of the Spaniards, sure that Spain's forced exit from North Amuerica was just a matter of time. The Curolisiaouadtrcstimated the stresgth and might of Spain; theyha-damoe hralthy rrspect for the Preach. Fiance was the mightirst natio is Europe with a great colony is North Amuer. ica. Although rermoved from the hattlefirld of King William's War (1689-1697), Caralina hnew that England had failrd to ejrct France from Canada. Bath coutries had fought to a stalemate is Amoerica. Is Carolina F'rance's power was overestimated. The sews of thr rstah- lishment of Louisiana memnt that Carolina traders going west would meet with Frenchmeamoviganorthandrcast, andthiswascosideed a serious matter. The Spanish dauger was relegated to a secondary position. The struggle for the Mississippi, is which Carolina would play unvto1 role, surged to the forefroat. But a sudden new international development is Europe hrought ahoot a shift in the triangular picture of the North American Southeast. 2 THE StEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE after another requested help to destroy the English enace, hut uothing was forthcoming. Our positive action was udrtaken, howerer, whes St. Augustine was made a main bastion for Spanish defese of the At- lantic. Amassivetoue fort,thedeaomof every goeror sisce Menfa- dez de Asilis, hecame a reality. It was started is 1672, aud hy the eud uf the century the fort at St. Augustinc was the strongest ad largest on the continent this side of Veracruz (17). The stage was set far a larger Eaglish-Spasish engagement. Intecuational errots slowly led to its ful- fillment. Frascr's ownership of the hero waterways of North America was yet iscomplete with out socerignty aver the Mississippi, especially its mouth. By the end of the seventeenth century, just when Carolina was espandiug, France derided to act since Spain had neglected the Gulf roast. By 1700QFrance hod achieced her purpose asd Louisisaawas is the makiug. The Spanish crown, wishisg to forestall the French, ores- pied Pensacola Bay and is this way a sew area of conflict was created. Furthermore, while Curolinians gaiurd at the expense of Spain is rust Georgia, their more enterprising traders were moviug west, approaching the Mississippi. Auother regirol clash was shapiug up. The outlook was for a oriasgular struggle ovr the Southeast. Ta the Carolinians the main euemy had hers Spain ecer sisce the creation of their province. This was most natural as they had intruded us soil claimed by Spain, and they were living "is the very chaps of the Spasiard" (11, p. 3, a. 1). At the same time they were disdainful of the Spanards, sure that Spains forced exit from North Atmerica was just a matter of time. The Carol. iiou uderestimated the strength asd might of Spai they hiad amore hralthy respect for the Freach. France' -was the mightiestonation in Europe with a great colony is North Aumer- ica. Although removed from the hattlefield of King William's War (1689-1697), Carolisa knew that England had failrd to eject France from Canada. Both coustries had fought to a stalemate is America. Is Carolina France's power was overestismated. The uews of the estah- lishment of Louisiana memnt that Carolina traders going west would meet with Frenchmern moving north andreast, and this was considred aserious matter. The Spasish danger was relegated to a secondary positios. The struggle for the Mississippi, in which Carolina would play a vital role, surged to the forefront. But a sudden sew inrernational development is Europr hrought about a shift is the triasgular picture of the North Amercan Southeast. aftrr another requested help to destroy the Euglish menace, hut sothing was forthcoming. Our positive oction was udertaken, however, when St. Augustine was made a mais hastion for Spanish defeuse of the Ao- lantic. Amamsive stone fort, the deamsof everyoveror sice Meuiu- dez de Arils, heroine a reality. It was started is 1672, aud hy the ead of the century the fort at St. Augustine was the stronfgest and largest on the costinent this aide of Veracrur (17). The stage was set foe a larger Eaglish-Spasish engagemeut. International eveuts slowly led to its ful- fillmsent. Frasce's ownership of the hint waterways of North America was yet incomplewe without sovereiguty over the Mississippi, especially its mouth. By theaed of the seventeenth century, just when Carolina was espauding, France derided to art sioce Spaio had neglected the Gulf roast. By 1700OFrance had achieved her purpose and Louisiasa was is the mahisg. The Spanish crows, wishisg to forestall the Freach, occu- pied Pensacola Bay and is this way a new area of conflict was created. Furthermore, while Caroliniaus gained at the eopensr of Spain is east Georgia, their more eutrprising traders were moving west, approachiug the Mississippi. Another regioual clash was shaping up. The outlook was for a triangulac struggle over the Southeast. To the Carolinass the maiu enemy had hecn Spain ever sisce the creationsof theirproice. This was most natural as they had intruded onssoilrlaimed by Spain, and they were living "is the very chaps of the Spaniard" (11, p. 2, a. 1). At the same time they were disdainful of the Spaniards, sure that Spain'sforced exit from North America was just a matter of time. The Curcdisiaos uderestimated the strength and might of Spaiu; they had a more hralthy respect for the Freach. France was the mightiestonation is Europe with a great colony in North Amer- ica. Although remored from the hattlefield of King William's War (1689-1697), Carolisa knew that England had failed to eject France from Canada. Both coutries had fought to a stalemate is America, In Carolina Frasce's power was overestimated. The uews of the estah- lishament of Louisiana memnt that Carolina traders going west would meet with Frenchmenumovingunorth andeast, adthiswaconidered a serious matter. The Spanish danger was relegated to a secondary position. The struggle for the Mississippi, iu which Carolina would play a vital role, surged to the forefront. But a sudden sew international develapmeut iu Europe hrought ahoot a shift is the triangular picture of the Ninth American Southeast. 2  FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 Io 1700 the-Luropeon Rations chonged theie olliooces. The hiog of Spi~ddied without soccessor. Posceefol King Loois XIV of Feusnce cloimoed the throne foe his Boorhoo groudsoo. The othee Eoropeoo nations wee uswilling to see Spoio ood Ferooce ooited oodere con oud on international swor seenmed likely. The waoccloods sooneached English North Ameeico,voousinggeotcooternotiou. Spoin uod France united wcoold mean nearly totl encirclemoent. In Carolina the dismay wavngeotee. Profesor Crooe tells 00 "thot the soore timoid settlers toihed of remsoval to tof ec regions" (10, p. 303) should the union of the two croswns hecomse a reolity. To he ooee, the moajority of the Caro- linianswho hod braved the elemoents of nature, Indians, and Spaniards oosvunilling to give op 00 easily. Neveetheless onsiety lay ovee the aggeessive Peotestoot colony. The gos'eeoe of Looisiaoo hod oleody foesulated a pian to stop-- the Esoglisho advoece westwaed oed to teihe ot the Atlantic coost via Spaoioh Floeido to o combhinsed ollied offenoive. St. Augutine would> seese as the maoin huse foe this flank attack. Spain would recover the dehotahie loud, with Fenoch hetp, ood in returo would tueo Pesssacolu ovee to Louiuiaoa. Although the ptou was only uu paper, a faucy uf the Fench goverore and one which appaceutly foiled to aeouse the Spuoioeds to equal enthusiasmo, it did emahe sense. Moreethan onse is- telligeut uud foe-oighted CaolisniaR msuot have poudeeed the possihility of a comhiued Feuch-Spaoish offesosive in the west, feoso the southeast, and by the watees of the Atlantic. If woe camse in Europe over the Spanish successiou, suhounottock wasquitepeohahle. Astudy hand swasoneeded in Corolina to goide the poicethoughotheomig times. Jo Septemhee, 1700, Jamos Moore, oas ootspoheo colooist, "ambitious and imopecunious pluotee" (11, p. 40), oactivo, usohitious oasd aggeessive higho-chuechmoan" (20, p. 157), ond ruthless slove dealee, heconse guov- eeoe of Caroliou. Seeioos reseaech hus yet to shetch his teue peesooality. Peofessor Crane considers himsao impoetont mao who played a "geeat role intheceutioo of tesouthernofotieradof povinilwestern policy' (11,p. 40). He woo uoquestiooohly iotelligeot, hot ulso reckless. Moore understood the forthcoming international daoger. He feared and respected the French and despised and underestimated the Spaniards. Theonew goveror was aware of the dongee that the union of the two ceowns would meoo. He had heoed of the geeat Spaoish foet and gue- eison at St. Augostioe. It was his opioion thut if woe eame, the Eoglish of Caeolioa must steihe at SL. Augustine hefoce it hecame an allied hue. FLORIDA AND CROLINA AROUND 1700 Io 1700 the florspeapnaotioos changed theie ollioces. The hiog of Sp had died without suvcsoe. Poweeful King Louis XIV uof Feaoce claimed the theooe foe his Bouehos gcaodsoo. The othee Eoeopeao nations soeee unwilling to see Spalo aod Ferance uited uodere con aud an internotional wue seemed lihely. The woe clouds soon euched English North Americo, causinggeotcosteratio. Spaio and Fraoce united would mean neorly totol cncirclement. Ins Caeolina the dismay was even greatee. Peofessoc Crooe tells us "thot the moee timid settlees talhed of removal to sofee regions" (10, p. 303) should the uoion of the two ceowsoo hocome a reality. To he sue, the maoriety of the Caru- linians who hod heaved the elemeots of nature, Indians, and Spaniards soere oowilling to give op so easily. Neveetheless oooiety lay over the aggressive Protestant colony. The goveeo of Louisioeo hod already foemuloted a plao to stop ) the Eoglish advance westwaed ood to strike ot the Atlaotio coost via Spanish Florido in a comhined allied offeosive. St. Aoguotioe would> seese an the main base foe this flook attack. Spain would recover the dehotuhle laud, with Feoch help, ond in retuco would turo Peosacola uver to Louisiana. Although the plan was only on poper, a fancy of the Feoch governsor and ooe which appaeotly failed to arouse the Spaniards toequal enthusism, it did makesense. Moreethanoein- telligeot ond for-sighted Carolioiao most hove ponedered the possihility of a combined French-Spanish offensive in the west, from the sootheast, aod hy the woatees of the Atlootic. If woe come to Europe over the Spanish succession, such an attoch was quite prohahle. A sturdy hand wosneededin Corolioa to gaide the provioce through the comiog times. Io Septemer, 1700, James Mooce, au outspohen colooist, "asuhitius msd impecumious plaoter" (11, p. 4), "octive, oamhitious and aggensive high-churchmon" (20, p. 557), and cuthless olaoe deolee, hecame guov- eeor of Caroliou. Serios research has yet to shetoh his true personolity. Professoe Ceone considers him ao importont man who ployed a 'geat eole to the ceation of the southero frootier aod of provincial westeen policy" (11, p.s40). He was unqoestiooohly intelligeot, hut olso rekhlss. Mooreeundersood the forthcoming internationaldanger. Hefeaed sod respected the Frenchand dspisedadudeestimated the Spaiad. Ths oew governor wonasaae of she dongee thut the ution of the two crowos woold mean. He had heard of the geat Spanish foet and gar- rison at St. Augostine. It was his opinioo thst if soar come, the Eoglish of Carolioa must steihe at SL. Augustine hefore it hecome an allied hase. FLORIDA AD CAROLINA AROUND 1700 In 1700_theEtarspeon nations changed theie oliaooces. The hiog of Spaio had died without soccessor. Powoeful King Louis XIV of Fraoce claimed the throne foe his Bourbon grandson. The othee Eoropeao natioos were t uonwilling so, see Spoie ond Fraocccuoited uodere con aod- an intenotional woe seemed lihely. The woe clouds sooo reached English North America, cosiog geat costeroto. Spaio and Fance nited would meanoearly total encirclemnt. InCarolinasthe dismay soas eveo greutee. Peofessor Crooe tells os "thot the more timid settlers talhed of removal to sofee regioos" (10, p. 303) should the uoioe of the two ceowns hecome o reality. To he sure, the majorisy of the Caru- linians whohadhraved theelmets ofntue, Idias,ndSpniads weee uowilling to give op so eosily. Neveetheless onxiety lay over the aggressive Protestant colony. The govero of Looisiona hod alreody formolated o plao to stop'11 the Eoglish advooce westwoed mod to strihe at the Atlootic coost via Spaoish Florida to o combhined allied offeosive. St. Augustine would> seese as the moin huse foe this flonk attack. Spain woold recover the dehatahle loud, with Feoch help, ond io returo would turn Pensacola over to Louisiaoo. Although the plosn was only son paper, u fancy of the Feovh govcrsor aod ooe which appoeotly failed to arouse the Spaniards toequal enthusiasm, it did mae sese. Moethanoni- telligent aod foe-sighted CaroliniaR most have pondered the possihility of a combined Fench-Spancish offensive in the west, from the sootheast, andhbytheswoteesof the Atlatic. Ho ar cameton Europe svee the Spanish succession, such an attach woe quite probable. A sturdy haod was needed in Corolina to guide the province throughothe coming times. Io Septemher, 1700, James Moore, an outspokeu volonis, "amhitious and impecunious plooter" (11, p. 4), "octive, amhitious and aggressive high-churchman" (20, p. 157), aud ruthless slave deolee, hecams gev- eeor of Caolina. Serious esearch has yet to sketch his true pernonality. Professoe Ceone coosiders him an importaot mao who played o "great roletintheceotioo of the southeeo feootier ond of provincial westeen polivy" (11, p. 40). He wos uoquestiooahly iotelligent, hut also eeckles. Moore Understood the forthcoming insternational dunger. He feared and respected the French and despised and underestimated the Spaniard. The new goveroor wan oware of the daoger that the unoo of the Iwo ceowons would meao. He had heord of the geeat Spanish foes and for- rieon ot St. Augustine. It woo his upioion that if woe come, the English of Caeolina must steihe at SL. Augutine hefore it hecame an allied hase.  If St. Augustine were to be reinforced by French troops and equipment the survival of Caolina swould be seriously endansgered. He Sried to coninceIU public opinion in favoe of swae policies. In May, 1702, the Propretors in England sent word to Caolina of Ibe begiuuiug of the Wae of the Spanish Succeosion, kosc in American history us Queen Anne's War. By August the official newcs had not yet coached Chaeleston, but Goeenoe Moore bud advance intelligence of lbs war's outbeak. On Auguot 20, 1702, he ueged son the Caeolina Commons "the taheing, of St. Augustine befcee it be steesgthened with feenchfoerms" (23, p.f64). At fisttheCommsonsrefusedto gnt per- mission foe the St. Augustine espedition but eathee favoeed defensive measues. On August 26 the official newes of the outbeak of the war reached Carolina and the Commons lashed scith more favor on Mooee's peoposul. By early Septembee the legislative body authoeiaed the of- fenoive. Enthusiosm peevailed in the eslony ond the Assembly pea- claimed "the Encouragement to freeePlundereand a shareeof oll Slaves" (23, p. 04). It also anonced that "oll persos that go on this expe- dition shall hose an equal shaee of all plunder1 (20, p. 163). Thereupon the legislatuee appeopeiated Iwo thousand pounds steeling foe expenses. In this way woo been the Moore attach on St. Augustine, a vital bottle in Spanish Flocida histoey. The Assembly had estimated that the espedition should hase at least 350 white men, og which the majoeity should be teanspoeted in sxo moe vessels. It calculated that attach on St. Augustine could be teemi- outed victoriously in two months. Because of thio the body appeopeiated seven hundred pounds of thestwo thousand in salaries foe the men, each man receiving ten pounds a month besides an "equal share of plunder" (23, p. 85). The Conanoos House og Assembly on August 20 thought that Colonel Robeet Daniel, Lieutenant Colonel Geoege Dnesley, Majoe Will Smith, Captains James Risbee, William Davie, and othees wee "Oitt to be Commandees on the pesent Espedition." Some of these men indeed turned op in the attach on St. Augustine. There was sams senti- ment in the House to appoint Colonel Robert Daniel commandee of the espedition, but the question "carrisd in the negative" (23, p. 04). It was resolved that Governor Moore would be commandsr-in-chief. The members wrote Mooreethat "having turned oue eyeseround about uswe can find no peeson so very capable s your Honor." The Carolinian eresentatives thought that by giving the job to Mooee they could not "in the least doubt of all imaginable success' (23, p. 86). Motee said If St. Augustine were to be reinforced by Feench teos and equipment the suevival of Caeolina would be seeiously endangeeed. He teied to convince public opinion io favoe of wae policies. In May, 1702, the Peopeietoes in England sent word to Caolina of the beginning of the Wae of the Spanish Succession, known in American history as Queen Anne's War. By August the official news had not yet reached Chaeleston, hot Goveenoe Mooee had advance intelligeoce of the wue's outbreak. On Auguat 20, 5702, he ueged on the Caeolina Commons "the tahetug of St. Augustine befoee it be steengthsened with french foems" (23, p. 64).At fisttheCommosefused to gant pe- mission foe the St. Auguotine expedition but rothee favoeed defensive measures. On August 26 the official news of the outbreak of the war roached Caralina and the Commons lashed with more favor on Mote's proposal. By early Septembee the legislative body authoriaed the of- fensive. Enthusiasm prevailed in the colony nd the Assembly pet- claimed "the Encouragement to free Plundereand a share of all Slaves" (23, p. 84). Is alo announced that "all persons that go on this expe- dition shall have an equal share of all plondee" (28, p. 162). Thereupon the legislatuee appropeiated two thousand pounds steeling foe espenes. In this way woo barn the Mooee attach on St. Augustine, a vital batler in Spanish Floeida history. The Assembly had estimated that the espedition should have at least 350 white men, of which she majority should be transported in sin or more vessels. It calcoloted that attach on St. Augustine could be termi- nated victoriomly in two months. Because of this the body appropriated seven hundred pounds of the two thousand in ealaries for the men, each man receiving ten pounds a month besides an "equal shore of plunder" (23, p. 85). The Commons House of Assembly an August 20 thought that Colonel Robert Doniel, Lieutenant Cslonel George Dearoley, Majoe Will Smith, Captains James Risbee, William Davio, and othero were "fill to be Commanders on the present Espeditios." Some of these men indeed turned op in she attack on St. Augustine. There was some senti- ment in the House to appoint Colonel Robert Daeiel commander of the espedition, bat the question "carried in the negative" (23, p. 04). It was resolvedlthatGovernor Moore would beroaoander-in-chief. The members wroteMoore that "having turned our eyes round about us we can find no person so very capable as your Honor." The Carolinian repesentatives thought that by giving the job to Moore they could not "in the least doubt of all imaginable success" (23, p. 86). Moore said If St. Augustine were to beeifoeced by French troops and equipment the survival of Carolina would be seriously endangered. He tried to convince public opinion io favor of woe policies. In May, 1702, the Proprietors in England sent word to Carolina of the beginoing of the War of the Spanish Succession, hnown to American history as Queen Anne's War. By August the official news bad ot yet reached Charlesson, but Covernor Moore had advance intelligence of the war's outbrea. On August 20, 1702, he urged on the Carolina Commons "the tabriug of St. Augustine before it be strengthaeed with frenchftorsos" (23,.p.64). At first the Commons rfused to grant per- mission foe the St. Augustine espedition bat rather favored defensive measures. Os August 26 the official news of the outbreak of the war reached Carolina and the Commos loohed with more favor on Moore's proposal. By early Sepsember she legiolative body authoriaed the of- fensive. Enthusiasm prevailed in the colony and the Assembly pro- claimed "the Ecoragement to free Plunder and a share of all Slaves" (23, p. 04). It aleso announced that "all persons that go on this expe- dillon shall have an equal share of all plonder" (2, p. 103). Thereupon the legislature appropriated two thoosand pounds sterling for espenses. In this way was born the Moore attach on St. Augustine, a vital battle in Spanish Florida history. The Assembly had estimated that the espedition should have at least 350 white men, of which the majority should be teanospoeted in sin or mare vessels. It calculated that attach on St. Augustine could be termi- nated victoriously in two months. Because of this the body appropriased seven hundred pounds of the two thousand in salaries for the men, each man receiving ten pounds amonth besides an "equal shore of plunder" (23, p-O85). The Commons House of Assembly on August 28 thoaght that Colonel Robert Daniel, Lieutenant Colonel George Dearsley, Major Will Smith, Captains James Risbee, William Davio, and othees were "fill to be Commanders on the present Espedision." Same of these men indeed suraed op io the attach on Ss. Augustine. There was some senti- ment is the House to appoint Colonel Robert Daniel commander of the espedition, but the qsestion "carried in the negative" (23, p. 04). Is was resolved thot Governor Moore would be commrander-is-chief. The members wrote Moore that "having turned our eyes round about us we ran find no person so veery ycapableoas your Honor." The Carolisian representatives thought thut by giving the job to Moore they could not "in the least doubt of all imaginable success" (23, p. 86). Moore said  FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 "that nothing but delay can make me doubt of Success" (23, p. 92). In another act during the same month the House ordered "that all vessels be imbargoed" (23, p. 83). In all, the Commons House of Assembly had acceded readily to Governor Moore. Once convinced of the feasibility of an offensive the legislators gathered momentum in being cooperative. By September Moore was ready to move south. / The printed English sources about the St. Augustine expedition are sparse and somewhat contradictory. In summary this is what happened: David Ramsay states that about 500 provincial militiamen together with some 300 Indians, mostly Yamasees, made up the expeditionary force which gathered at Port Royal, the "fixed place of rendezvous" (21, p. 127). John Oldmixon tells us that "the Number of Men which were enlisted for this Enterprise were 1,200, 600 English and 600 Indians" (19, p. 342). Michael Cole reports "five hundred men and three hundred Indians sayled from hence about ye 16 October" (97). Fourteen boats, mostly confiscated from private sources, were available to transport the men south. A very simple plan of operation was adopted. Colonel Robert Daniel approached St. Augustine by a land route; Commander Moore attacked the Spanish presidio by sea and blocked the harbor with part of his fleet. The route to St. Augustine was a victorious one and several Spanish outposts along the coast were de- stroyed. According to Oldmixon, Colonel Robert Daniel, "a very brave Man," marched on St. Augustine "up the River in Periagas and came upon Augustino on the land side, while the Governor sail'd thither and attacked it by Sea.... Col. Daniel in his way took St. John's, a small Spanish settlement; as also St. Mary's, another little village, belonging to the Spaniards. After which he proceeded to Augustino, came before the Town, enter'd and took it; Col. Moor not being yet arrived with the Fleet" (19, pp. 342-343). The city of St. Augustine was easily captured and the English soldiers marvelled at the riches of the town, with its large church and comfortable Franciscan friary. But the English land and sea forces occupied only an empty town. The garrison and inhabitants had retreated into St. Augustine's formidable citadel, the Castillo de San Marcos. The conquest of St. Augustine and Florida without the capture of this fort would indeed have been an empty victory. Governor Moore decided to take it, but discovered that he lacked the necessary artillery. He therefore dispatched Colonel Daniel to Jamaica to bring siege can- non, bombs, and mortars. In the meanwhile Moore laid siege to the FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 "that nothing but delay can make me doubt of Success" (23, p. 92). In another act during the same month the House ordered "that all vessels be imbargoed" (23, p. 83). In all, the Commons House of Assembly had acceded readily to Governor Moore. Once convinced of the feasibility of an offensive the legislators gathered momentum in being cooperative. By September Moore was ready to move south. / The printed English sources about the St. Augustine expedition are sparse and somewhat contradictory. In summary this is what happened: David Ramsay states that about 500 provincial militiamen together with some 300 Indians, mostly Yamasees, made up the expeditionary force which gathered at Port Royal, the "fixed place of rendezvous" (21, p. 127). John Oldmixon tells us that "the Number of Men which were enlisted for this Enterprise were 1,200, 600 English and 600 Indians" (19, p. 342). Michael Cole reports "five hundred men and three hundred Indians sayled from hence about ye 16 October" (97). Fourteen boats, mostly confiscated from private sources, were available to transport the men south. A very simple plan of operation was adopted. Colonel Robert Daniel approached St. Augustine by a land route; Commander Moore attacked the Spanish presidio by sea and blocked the harbor with part of his fleet. The route to St. Augustine was a victorious one and several Spanish outposts along the coast were de- stroyed. According to Oldmixon, Colonel Robert Daniel, "a very brave Man," marched on St. Augustine "up the River in Periagas and came upon Augustino on the land side, while the Governor sail'd thither and attacked it by Sea.. .. Col. Daniel in his way took St. John's, a small Spanish settlement; as also St. Mary's, another little village, belonging to the Spaniards. After which he proceeded to Augustino, came before the Town, enter'd and took it; Col. Moor not being yet arrived with the Fleet" (19, pp. 342-343). The city of St. Augustine was easily captured and the English soldiers marvelled at the riches of the town, with its large church and comfortable Franciscan friary. But the English land and sea forces occupied only an empty town. The garrison and inhabitants had retreated into St. Augustine's formidable citadel, the Castillo de San Marcos. The conquest of St. Augustine and Florida without the capture of this fort would indeed have been an empty victory. Governor Moore decided to take it, but discovered that he lacked the necessary artillery. He therefore dispatched Colonel Daniel to Jamaica to bring siege can- non, bombs, and mortars. In the meanwhile Moore laid siege to the FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 "that nothing but delay can make me doubt of Success" (23, p. 92). In another act during the same month the House ordered "that all vessels be imbargoed" (23, p. 83). In all, the Commons House of Assembly had acceded readily to Governor Moore. Once convinced of the feasibility of an offensive the legislators gathered momentum in being cooperative. By September Moore was ready to move south. / The printed English sources about the St. Augustine expedition are sparse and somewhat contradictory. In summary this is what happened: David Ramsay states that about 500 provincial militiamen together with some 300 Indians, mostly Yamasees, made up the expeditionary force which gathered at Port Royal, the "fixed place of rendezvous" (21, p. 127). John Oldmixon tells us that "the Number of Men which were enlisted for this Enterprise were 1,200, 600 English and 600 Indians" (19, p. 342). Michael Cole reports "five hundred men and three hundred Indians sayled from hence about ye 16 October" (97). Fourteen boats, mostly confiscated from private sources, were available to transport the men south. A very simple plan of operation was adopted. Colonel Robert Daniel approached St. Augustine by a land route; Commander Moore attacked the Spanish presidio by sea and blocked the harbor with part of his fleet. The route to St. Augustine was a victorious one and several Spanish outposts along the coast were de- stroyed. According to Oldmixon, Colonel Robert Daniel, "a very brave Man," marched on St. Augustine "up the River in Periagas and came upon Augustino on the land side, while the Governor sail'd thither and attacked it by Sea.. .. Col. Daniel in his way took St. John's, a small Spanish settlement; as also St. Mary's, another little village, belonging to the Spaniards. After which he proceeded to Augustino, came before the Town, enter'd and took it; Col. Moor not being yet arrived with the Fleet" (19, pp. 342-343). The city of St. Augustine was easily captured and the English soldiers mavelled at the riches of the town, with its large church and comfortable Franciscan friary. But the English land and sea forces occupied only an empty town. The garrison and inhabitants had retreated into St. Augustine's formidable citadel, the Castillo de San Marcos. The conquest of St. Augustine and Florida without the capture of this fort would indeed have been an empty victory. Governor Moore decided to take it, but discovered that he lacked the necessary artillery. He therefore dispatched Colonel Daniel to Jamaica to bring siege can- non, bombs, and mortars. In the meanwhile Moore laid siege to the  THE ENGLISH ADVANCE ON ST. AUGUSTINE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1702 THE ENGLISH ADVANCE ON ST. AUGUSTINE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1702 THE ENGLISH ADVANCE ON ST. AUGUSTINE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1702  FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 fort, hoping that he might induce the surrender of the garrison by starvation. The Spaniards inside the castle showed endurance and strength, and the seinforements from Jamaica failed to arrive. The morale of the Carolina force began to crumble after a two-month siege. Then suddenly, without advance intelligence, two large Spanish ships with heavy guns arrived from Havana and "bottled up" (11, p. 77) the eight English vessels. Oldmixon insists that the two Spanish ships were "two small Frigats, one of 22, and the other of 16 guns" (19, p. 344). According to John Ash, Moore "resolved bravely to put on Board his Eight Vessels then riding in the Harbour all their Goods and Plunder, and with his few men about 500, Fight thro' the Enemy, and so come Home. But the Pillow, which often let out Heat to make way for Caution, changed this his Resolution" (4, p. 272). Seeing his pre- carious situation, Governor Moore set fire to his cornered fleet and retreated hastily by land 40 miles north to the mouth of the St. Johns. Here he embarked his tired men in his relief ships and returned to Caro- lina. Oldmixon tells us that "Arratommakaw, King of the Yanioseaves [Yamasees?], who commanded the Indians, retreated to the Periagas [Piragua=small, shallow-draft vessel] with the rest, and there slept upon his Oars, with a great deal of Bravery and Unconcern. The Gover- nor's Soldiers taking false Alarm, and thinking the Spaniards were coming, did not like this slow Pace of the Indian King in his Flight; and to quicken him in it, bad him make more Haste: But he reply'd, No; tho your Governour leaves you, I will not stir till I have seen all my Men before me" (19, p. 344). The expedition had been a failure from the over-all point of view. The powerful fort, or castillo, was not conquered and consequently Spanish Florida continued to exist. The cost of the campaign went far beyond the appropriated 2,000 pounds, costing exactly 8,495 pounds, 14 t., 9d. (28, p. 163; 24, pp. 87-92 and pp. 126-127). Professor Crane says that consequently Carolina "entered upon the evil course of paper- money issue" (11, p. 77). Governor Moore became thoroughly dis- credited. The Carolina House voted him thanks "for his Courage and Conduct" but the powerful Mr. John Ash dissented because "he thinks the General much wanting in his conduct particularly in not using his power to punish disobedient and cowardly oficers to which in a great measure he [Ash] thinks our ill success may be imputed" (24, p. 25). John Archdale, in his survey of Carolina written in 1707, said that Moore's adventure in St. Augustine "was ready to make a Mutiny among FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 fort, hoping that he might induce the surrender of the garrison by starvation. The Spaniards inside the castle showed endurance and strength, and the ceinforcements from Jamaica failed to arrive. The morale of the Carolina force began to crumble after a two-month siege. Then suddenly, without advance intelligence, two large Spanish ships with heavy guns arrived from Havana and "bottled up" (11, p. 77) the eight English vessels. Oldmixon insists that the two Spanish ships were "two small Frigats, one of 22, and the other of 16 guns" (19, p. 344). According to John Ash, Moore "resolved bravely to put on Board his Eight Vessels then riding in the Harbour all their Goods and Plunder, and with his few men about 500, Fight thro' the Enemy, and so come Home. But the Pillow, which often let out Heat to make way for Caution, changed this his Resolution" (4, p. 272). Seeing his pre- carious situation, Governor Moore set fire to his cornered fleet and retreated hastily by land 40 miles north to the mouth of the St. Johns. Here be embarked his tired men in his relief ships and returned to Caro- lina. Oldmixon tells us that "Arratommakaw, King of the Yanioseaves [Yamasees?], who commanded the Indians, retreated to the Periagas [Piragua=small, shallow-draft vessel] with the rest, and there slept upon his Oars, with a great deal of Bravery and Unconcern. The Gover- nor's Soldiers taking false Alarm, and thinking the Spaniards were coming, did not like this slow Pace of the Indian King in his Flight; and to quicken him in it, bad him make more Haste: But he reply'd, No; tho your Governour leaves you, I will not stir till I have seen all my Men before me" (19, p. 344). The expedition had been a failure from the over-all point of view. The powerful fort, or castillo, was not conquered and consequently Spanish Florida continued to exist. The cost of the campaign went far beyond the appropriated 2,000 pounds, costing exactly 8,495 pounds, 14 s., 9d. (28, p. 163; 24, pp. 87-92 and pp. 126-127). Professor Crane says that consequently Carolina "entered upon the evil course of paper- money issue" (11, p. 77). Governor Moore became thoroughly dis- credited. The Carolina House voted him thanks "for his Courage and Conduct" but the powerful Mr. John Ash dissented because "he thinks the General much wanting in his conduct particularly in not using his power to punish disobedient and cowardly oficers to which in a great measure he [Ash] thinks our ill success may be imputed" (24, p. 25). John Archdale, in his survey of Carolina written in 1707, said that Moore's adventure in St. Augustine "was ready to make a Mutiny among FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 fort, hoping that he might induce the surrender of the garrison by starvation. The Spaniards inside the castle showed endurance and strength, and the xpinforcements from Jamaica failed to arrive. The morale of the Carolina force began to crumble after a two-month siege. Then suddenly, without advance intelligence, two large Spanish ships with heavy guns arrived from Havana and "bottled up" (11, p. 77) the eight English vessels. Oldmixon insists that the two Spanish ships were "two small Frigats, one of 22, and the other of 16 guns" (19, p. 344). According to John Ash, Moore "resolved bravely to put on Board his Eight Vessels then riding in the Harbour all their Goods and Plunder, and with his few men about 500, Fight thro' the Enemy, and so come Home. But the Pillow, which often let out Heat to make way for Caution, changed this his Resolution" (4, p. 272). Seeing his pre- carious situation, Governor Moore set fire to his cornered fleet and retreated hastily by land 40 miles north to the mouth of the St. Johns. Here he embarked his tired men in his relief ships and returned to Caro- lina. Oldmixon tells us that "Arratommakaw, King of the Yanioseaves [Yamasees?), who commanded the Indians, retreated to the Periagas [Piragua=small, shallow-draft vessel] with the rest, and there slept upon his Oars, with a great deal of Bravery and Unconcern. The Gover- nor's Soldiers taking false Alarm, and thinking the Spaniards were coming, did not like this slow Pace of the Indian King in his Flight; and to quicken him in it, bad him make more Haste: But he reply'd, No; tho your Governour leaves you, I will not stir till I have seen all my Men before me" (19, p. 344). The expedition had been a failure from the over-all point of view. The powerful fort, or castillo, was not conquered and consequently Spanish Florida continued to exist. The cost of the campaign went far beyond the appropriated 2,000 pounds, costing exactly 8,495 pounds, 14 s., 9d. (28, p. 163; 24, pp. 87-92 and pp. 126-127). Professor Crane says that consequently Carolina "entered upon the evil course of paper- money issue" (11, p. 77). Governor Moore became thoroughly dis- credited. The Carolina House voted him thanks "for his Courage and Conduct" but the powerful Mr. John Ash dissented because "he thinks the General much wanting in his conduct particularly in not using his power to punish disobedient and cowardly oicers to which in a great measure he [Ash] thinks our ill success may be imputed" (24, p. 25). John Archdale, in his survey of Carolina written in 1707, said that Moore's adventure in St. Augustine "was ready to make a Mutiny among  the People; foe soosy Vessels hod hero press'd to thot Servire, wrhich beinsg boro'd by the Goversoor's order, beroose they shoold not foll into the Spooiord's Hoods, the Mosters deorooded Sotisfoction; ood as Asseosbly beinog soli'd, greaot Debotes ood Divisios arose, which, like a Floose, grew greoter sod greotr" (3, p. 313). Furthermsore, Moore and Coptoin Dooiel and somse of his officrs swere openly cused of hoving kept the ricb plsnder sod ignoring the low tbat hod prosmised free plonder and on equol shore of it (24, pp. 86, 126). The foilue of the St. Augustioe siege eocouroged forther ottempts to destroy Spooish Florido. Althoogh eding is portiol sorress, it dtd sot ochiere the desired g9AI of eliomisotisg Spoin frsm sootheost North Americo. The moech on St. Asgustise of 1702 hod o few positive, feotores. Moore osd his legions hod deoteoyed the gorrisooc of Amoliar island and therefore "forced the Sponish frostier so foil book another step" (6, p. 60). Althouegh the eopedition woe costly is foods osd ships, Moore'e ormsy lost only two lives. Token by surprise when the Spanish reiofoecemens oppeored is the horbor, the goveeoor wsoableto so- neuveehisoarmy outof enemoycountry. OneofGovernor Mooe's per- sonol politico1 rnemies, Jobs Ash, hod to odosit thot Moore "retreoted with such costion and dispatch, that hr lost cot one oman by the enemsy" (d, p. 273).-Coroiiaos hod lerned that Sponish Florido woe not so rosy prey ood thot the Sponiords hod still plenty of initiotive. Is soot- omory, she siege of St. Asgustine is 1702 was one of the first lorge en- gogemoents is the istrnaotionol strsggle on the Noeth Asereicon rooti- nent,oadispte thtwoudossumevst prporionsosthe eighteeth ceotory peogressed. This porticslor engogeosent waos msore than a roid foe pluoder, but rather crked the beginoing of a ceotury of worfore is North Americo. The position of Florida is 8702 and the years peceding waos foirly adeqote, if comredwith century before. By 16005Sposish Florido cloaimed oil of North Amserico est of New Mexico, althousgh is reality only St. Augostioe ood o few msissions on tbe soothern Georgio coostol islands were inhobited by the Sponiards. St. Asgossine itself woe mirserable ploce with a rotting wooden fort. By 1700, a hunodred years later, Spoin's Florido cloimed lest territory, bot the inhobited ploces over which the Spanish bannrflewbad grownoin nmer. Instheerest, the People; foe mony Vesels hod bees prese'd to thot Service, erhich being horo'd by the Goversoor's order, becasse they shoold sot foill into the Spasird's Hons, the Mosters demsoded Sotisfoctios; osd 00 Assembly being cruld, great Debotes ond Divisions orose, which, like a Flome, grew greoter rod grester" (3, p. 313). Forthermore, Moore rod Coptain Doniel and some of his officers were opeoly accused of bovicg kept the rich plsnder sod ignoring the low shot hod promised free plsoder osd so equal shore of it (2d, pp. 86, 120). The foilsre of the St. Asgustine siege encosuraged further ottempto to destroy Sponish Florida. Althoogh ending is partiol sucesm, it did sot ochieve the desired gill of eliminating Spain from sostheost North Americo.The morch on St. Augostinerof 1702 hodoafewr positive_ feotoree. Moore rod his legions hod destroyed the gorrisons of Amselia Island and therefore 'forced the Sponsh frostier to foil hock aother step" (6, p. 60). Althoogh the espedition was costly is foods rod ships, Moore's army lost only two lives. Taken by sureprise wrhen the Spsoish reinforcements oppeored is the horbor, she governor wasoableto ma- neuveehisoarmy outofrenemy coutry. Oneof Govror Moore's pr- sonol politicol enemies, Jobs Ash, hod to admis thot Moore "retreated with such caution rod dispatch, that he loet not one moo by the enemy" (d, p. 273). Carolinions hod leorned that Sponish Florido waos set so rosy prey osd that the Spaniards hod still plenty of initiative. Is sum- mary, she siege of St. Augustine is 1702 mrs one of the first lorge en- gogements is the internosional struggle on the North Asoreicon conti- nent,sadipte thatwouldrssumevst popotionss theeigheeth rectory peogreosed. This particular engagemens was more thano raeid foe plunder, hot rather marked the beginning of a century of warfare is North Americo. The position of Florida is 1702 sod the years preceding waos fairly adequate, if compared with aocentory before. By 16005Spanish Florido claimed oil of North America east of New Mexico, although is reality only St. Augustine rod a few missions on she sooshers Georgia costal islands were inhabited by the Spaniards. St. Augustine itself erosa miserable plrce with a rotting wooden fort. By 1700, o hunred years lrter, Spains's Florida claimed loss territory, hot the ishabited pisces overewhich the Spanish banner flew bad geroinnumber. Inthe est, 8 the People; foe masy Veesels hod bees peess'd to that Service, which being horsed by the Goversoor's order, because they should sot foill into the Sposird's Hoods, the Massers demanded Satisfaction; ood os Assembly being cruld, great Debates sod Divisions arose, which, like a Flome, grew grester rod greater" (3, p. 313). Furthermore, Moore rod Captain Daniel and some of his officers mere openly accused of having kept the rich plunder rod ignoring she low shot hod promised free plsoder rod so eqoal shore of it (3d, pp. 86, 126). The failue of the St. Augostine siege enoraged forther attempts to destroy Sposish Florida, Although ending is partial socces, 6t did cot achieve the desired gill of elimioating Spain from southeast North Americ. The morch on St. Augostine of 1702 hadoafewr positive features. Moore rod his legions hod detroyed she garrisons of Amelia Islood rod therefore "forced the Spanso frostier to foil bock soother step" (6, p. 60). Althoogh she expedition errs costly is foods sod ships, Moore's army lost only two lives. Token by surprise whes the Spanish reinforcemesrsapperedinoshe hrrbor,she govrnor waseobietom- revrhisoarmy outofreemy coutry. Oeof Goveror Moore's pe- soona political ecemies, Jobs Ash, hod to admit that Moore "retreated with such caution sod dispatch, that he lost not one moo by the enemy" )d, p. 273)..Carolicioss hod leorned that Spanish Florido was sot as rosy prey sod thot the Spaniards hod still plenty of initiative. Is sum- mary, the siege of St. Augustine is 1702 waos one of the first large en- gagements is the international struggle on she North Americanoconti- sect, a dispose that would ssume vast proportiossr the eighteenth cestory progressed. This particolar engagement errs more than r raid for plunder, butratheremaredthe beginning of aocentoryofewarfare is North America. The position of Florida is 1702 rod the yeses preceding errs fairly adequate, if compared with r century before. Byl600 paish Forida claimed oil of North Americo east of Neer Mexico, although is reality only St. Augostise rod a few missios on the southers Georgia coastal isloods were inhabited by the Spasiords. St. Augustine itself wasa mserable place with a rotting wooden fort. By 1700, a hundred yeas later, Spoin's Florida claimed less territory, hot the inhabited pisces over which the Spanish bannsr firer hod grows is somber. Is the eet,  FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 Pensacola had come into existence as the second largest Spanish com- munity of Florida. In between lay the rich region of Apalachee with abundant natives and Spanish missions, with its center in today's Tal- lahassee. A considerable cattle-growing region with Spanish creole ranchers from St. Augustine was flourishing in Timucua, with today's Gainesville area as its focal point. By 1700 the Georgia missions, which had achieved their maximum growth by the mid-seventeenth century, had been severely decimated by the English. Even so, they continued their existence around Amelia Island. South Florida remained unoccu- pied by the Spanish. But the St. Johns, Suwanee, Santa Fe, and St. Marks rivers were Spanish waterways. The presidio of St. Augustine, still an undesirable place compared with other towns in the Americas, had improved considerably. The massive fort dominating the city gave it stature and prestige. A spacious church and beautiful Franciscan friary added to the decorum. Professor John R. Dunkle, studying the birth records, estimates the number of inhabitants of the town at 912 in 1701 (12, p. 8). The real size of the population of Florida remains a matter of speculation. The most precise census is one from the year 1689 when the Bishop of Cuba sent the crown a list of Florida doctrinas (Indian parishes under the supervision of a priest) with their number of native families. Florida was divided into four provinces. Guale with six doctrinas had a total of 185 families. Timucua had thirteen doctrinas with 591 fam- ilies. Apalachee, the most prosperous of the Florida provinces, was also listed with thirteen doctrinas containing 1,920 families. The fourth province was identified as "Provincia Nueba" and was unquestionably located in south Florida. It contained only two villages with 100 families. The total for the four provinces was 2,796 families, and it was estimated that each family was composed of five people, making a total of 13,980. In addition, the city of St. Augustine was listed as having 500 families or 1,444 people, including whites, Indians, and Negroes (31). From this census it can be seen that the families in St. Augustine did not measure up to the ratio of five to a family indicated by the bishop. This was because St. Augustine was a strictly military town. The whole life of the place gravitated around the fort. According to law the garrison for the protection of all of Florida was to be 355 men strong. Most of these men by 1700 were criollos from St. Augustine and could be classified as local boys. Even so, the city with its extremely low birth rate (due to the lack of women) could not satisfy the demand FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 Pensacola had come into existence as the second largest Spanish com- 0 munity of Florida. In between lay the rich region of Apalachee with abundant natives and Spanish missions, with its center in today's Tal- lahassee. A considerable cattle-growing region with Spanish creole ranchers from St. Augustine was flourishing in Timucua, with today's Gainesville area as its focal point. By 1700 the Georgia missions, which had achieved their maximum growth by the mid-seventeenth century, had been severely decimated by the English. Even so, they continued their existence around Amelia Island. South Florida remained unoccu- pied by the Spanish. But the St. Johns, Suwanee, Santa Fe, and St. Marks rivers were Spanish waterways. The presidio of St. Augustine, still an undesirable place compared with other towns in the Americas, had improved considerably. The massive fort dominating the city gave it stature and prestige. A spacious church and beautiful Franciscan friary added to the decorum. Professor John R. Dunkle, studying the birth records, estimates the number of inhabitants of the town at 912 in 1701 (12, p. 8). The real size of the population of Florida remains a matter of speculation. The most precise census is one from the year 1689 when the Bishop of Cuba sent the crown a list of Florida doctrina (Indian parishes under the supervision of a priest) with their number of native families. Florida was divided into four provinces. Guale with six doctrinas had a total of 185 families. Timucua had thirteen doctrinas with 591 fam- ilies. Apalachee, the most prosperous of the Florida provinces, was also listed with thirteen doctrinas containing 1,920 families. The fourth province was identified as "Provincia Nueba" and was unquestionably located in south Florida. It contained only two villages with 100 families. The total for the four provinces was 2,796 families, and it was estimated that each family was composed of five people, making a total of 13,980. In addition, the city of St. Augustine was listed as having 500 families or 1,444 people, including whites, Indians, and Negroes (31). From this census it can be seen that the families in St. Augustine did not measure up to the ratio of five to a family indicated by the bishop. This was because St. Augustine was a strictly military town. The whole life of the place gravitated around the fort. According to law the garrison for the protection of all of Florida was to be 355 men strong. Most of these men by 1700 were criollos from St. Augustine and could be classified as local boys. Even so, the city with its extremely low birth rate (due to the lack of women) could not satisfy the demand FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 Pensacola bad come into existence as the second largest Spanish com- C munity of Florida. In between lay the rich region of Apalachee with abundant natives and Spanish missions, with its center in today's Tal- lahassee. A considerable cattle-growing region with Spanish creole ranchers from St. Augustine was flourishing in Timucua, with today's Gainesville area as its focal point. By 1700 the Georgia missions, which had achieved their maximum growth by the mid-seventeenth century, had been severely decimated by the English. Even so, they continued their existence around Amelia Island. South Florida remained unoccu- pied by the Spanish. But the St. Johns, Sawanee, Santa Fe, and St. Marks rivers were Spanish waterways. The presidio of St. Augustine, still an undesirable place compared with other towns in the Americas, had improved considerably. The massive fort dominating the city. gave it stature and prestige. A spacious church and beautiful Franciscan friary added to the decorum. Professor John R. Dunkle, studying the birth records, estimates the number of inhabitants of the town at 912 in 1701 (12, p. 8). The real size of the population of Florida remains a matter of speculation. The most precise census is one from the year 1689 when the Bishop of Cuba sent the crown a list of Florida doctrinas (Indian parishes under the supervision of a priest) with their number of native families. Florida was divided into four provinces. Guale with six doctrinas had a total of 185 families. Timucua had thirteen doctrinas with 591 fam- ilies. Apalachee, the most prosperous of the Florida provinces, was also listed with thirteen doctrinas containing 1,920 families. The fourth province was identified as "Provincia Nueba" and was unquestionably located in south Florida. It contained only two villages with 100 families. The total for the four provinces was 2,796 families, and it was estimated that each family was composed of five people, making a total of 13,980. In addition, the city of St. Augustine was listed as having 500 families or 1,444 people, including whites, Indians, and Negroes (31). From this census it can be seen that the families in St. Augustine did not measure up to the ratio of five to a family indicated by the bishop. This was became St. Augustine was a strictly military town. The whole life of the place gravitated around the fort. According to law the garrison for the protection of all of Florida was to be 355 men strong. Most of these men by 1700 were criollos from St. Augustine and could be classified as local boys. Even so, the city with its extremely low birth rate (due to the lack of women) could not satisfy the demand  foo she foil qooto of 355. Requests by the governos to befog the gorrison op to foil stoensgth use of comsmon occurencee io the oevhivs. In 0699 the garrison w~as voesposed of eighteeo staff offives, of which two wvere on peosion. Is hod 234 mnse in the infaotry, divided juts those conmpaniss. Of these, 30 men were iosopovitated foe one see soothes reason. The artillery woascomposed of l8osen, one of whom was permanently sich. The navy had 23 ohio men. These mess two foil-time Indion iterpoeteos. This giem u total uf 315 men on the payroii, which was 40 shoot of the oeqoirod qoota. But of the 315 men, 33 were either on pension or incapacitatod. Thus, in 1699 Florida had a military garrson of only ,282 able-bodied men to guaod tho vast uses that composed the ions provinces (32). By 1702, the yeas of the Moose ottack, the number of the garrison had risen to 323, of which 25 mess listed us pensioned sor inoapavitated because of age sor sicknss. These men so faced the Moose offensive weeorganized and distributed in the folloswing manner. Floss woo the goveror, supreme somander of Florida, who was not included in the 355-man quota. He held eotensive military, esevutive, legisilive, judicial, and administratise power. Two royal officials, the tresurer and the accountant, shared thedmiistrative poerthshegoveno; they too wee not past of the garrisan quota. The main military figue was the sergeantnmajor. Hewastheoopcommande, dictlsyorspon- oible tothesgvernor andmwhoincasesofvacanvy of thegoversoship assumed that position util the new goseenor aerived. Below hims woos listed the thee captains of the those infautry companim. The infantey alto hod three ensigns, those sergeants, twelve corporals, six drummers, them fifers, and three pages. The artillery bad only one captain and nineeses artillerymen. Besides these these were fifteen moss staff or administrative officern, including a military accountant, a customs offi- viol, the commander of the foot who hod four adjutants, two foremen who watched the slaves and convicts, two scribet, on armorer, a blach- smith, a hashes (physician), and on apothecaey. Post of the garrison woos the tins Indian interpreters who woee conversant in the languages of Guole, Apalachee, and Timocua. One hundred and thioey-svven in- fastry soldiers were stationed in St. Augustine, living in the foot which they and the astillerymen guarded twenty-four hous a day. Thirty sol- dies and on offices were utationed in Apuloche, especially iu the Tal- lahassee region. They were the soldiers farthest eemoved from St. Au- gustine. In 1702 twelve infantrymen and one offices guarded Goals, wcith 10 foe she full quota of 355. Requests by the governors to bring the garrison up to fall strength see of common occurrence is the archivs. Is 16099 the garsison wus composed of eighteen staff officers, of which two mess on pension. It hod 254 men in she infantry, divided into shoes companies. Of shine, 30 men were incapacitated foe one sor soothes season. The artillery was composed of 18 mes, one of whom was permanently sich. The navy hod 23 able men. These mess two full-time Indian interprseters. This gives a total of 315 men on the payoll, which was 40 shoot of the required quota. Bus of she 315 moo, 33 mete either on pension er incapacitated. Thus, in 1699 Flosida had a militory garrison of only :202 able-bodied men so guard the vase ses that compoosed thc four pooisces (32). By 1702, she yeas of the Moose attach, the number of the garrison had rswo to 323, of which 25 were listed as pensioned sor incapacitated because of ageo sicknss. These men so faced the Moose offensive mess organized and disributed in the following manner. Fist was the goevernor, supreme commander of Florida, who was not included in she 355-man quota. He held esteosive military, eeutive, legislative, judicial, and admuinistrative power. Two royal officials, the tresurer and the accountant, shared the adminsistrativespowerowith the gveror; they too soere ot past of she garrisan quota. The main msilitary figue wastthoeegeantsmajor. Hewas the toop comade,diectlyrspo- sible tothe goveror and whouiseofsvcancy ofhe goveroship assumed that position until the new goveenor aerived. Below him mess listed the three captains of the shoes iufantry companies. The infantry alto hod those ensigns, those sergeanes, twelse corporals, sis drummers, them fifers, and those pages. The artillery had only sue captain and nineteen artillerymuen. Besides these these mess fifteen moss staff sor administrative officers, including a military accountans, a customs offi- cial, the commander of the foes who hod four adjutants, two forsmen who watched the slaves and convicts, two scribes, so armorer, a black- swish, a hashes (physician), and so upothecary. Pass of the garrison mess the two Indian interpreters who were conversant in the languages of Guole, Apolaches, and Timucus. One huodred and thirey-sevsn is- faotsy soldiers mess stationed in St. Augustine, living in ohs lost which they and the ortillssymeno guarded twenty-four hones a day. Thisty eel- diets and on offices soere stationed in Apalachee, especially is the Tat- lahassee region. They mess the soldiees farthest emoved loom St. Au- gustine. In 1702 twelve infantrymen and one offices guarded Gools, with 10 foe she foil quota of 355. Requests by the governors to briug the gaseison up to foil trength ass of common occurencoe is the arshives. Is 1699 the garrison was composed of eighteen staff officers, of which two mess on pension. Is hod 254 men in the infantry, divided into those companies. Of these, 30 men mess incapacitated foe one sor another reason. The astillery was composod of 18 men, one of whom was permanently sich. The navy had 23 able men. These were two full-time Indian interpreters. This gives a total af 315 men son the payroll, which was 40 shoot of she required quota. But of the 315 men, 33 mee either on pension sor incapacitated. Thus, in 1699 Florida hod a military garrison of only ,202 ohio-bodied men to guard the vast acea that composed the foss psovioces (32). By 1702, the yeas of the Moose attuch, the number of the gaerison had rsen to 323, of which 25 were listed as pensioned sor incapaitated because of age sor sickness. These men who faced the Moore offensive were organized and disributed in the following mousser. Fist was the governo, supreme cumnesder of Florida, who woo sot included in she 355-man quota. He held extensive military, sxecutive, legislative, judicial, and administrative power. Two royal officials, the tresurer andsthe accountant, shared the admiistrative powerswith the gveo; they too wese not pest of she gurrisan quota. The main milieary figure wsathessergeant major. Hewasthetoop coande, dietyrepo- sibletohe governor andwhosin casesfvaancyslfthe gverosship assumed that posiain until the new governos aerived. Below him were listed she thre saptoins of the those infantry companies. The infantry also bud those ensigns, three sergeans, twelve corporals, six deummers, shoes fifers, and those pages. The artillery had only one captain and ninessen astillsrymen. Besides these shoe moss fifteen more staff sor adminissoative officers, including a military accountant, a customs offi- cial, the commander of the fast who hod four adjutants, two foremen who watched the slaves and convicts, two scribes, on armorer, a black- smish, a hashes (physivian), and so apothecary. Post of the garrison were the two Indian interpreters who soe conversant in the languages of Guole, Apalachee, and Timucus. One hundred and shisty-osee is- bontsy soldies meestationed in St. Augustine, living in the lost which they and the artillerymen guarded twenty-fous hous a day. Thirty sol- diers and an offices mess stationed in Apalachee, especially is she Tal- lahasseesregion. They were the soldiers farthessremovdfromlSt.Au- gustine. In 1702 twelve infantrymen and one offices goarded Goole, wish 10  FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 their headquarters on Amelia Island. In the province of Timucua there were only three soldiers stationed in the Gainesville-Lake Santa Fe re- gion. Two soldiers were located on the crossing of the Salamototo [St. Johns] River that led from St. Augustine to Timucua and Apalachee. These two men maintained contact with the small Timucua garrison. The various sentinel posts around St. Augustine required 25 men. The navy had fifteen sailors and a pilot in charge of the small vessels that be- longed to the presidio. All these men, including the incapacitated and pensioned and excluding the governor and two royal oficials, came to 323. This made the garrison 32 men below the 355-man quota. In fact, the effective fighting force of Florida, exclusive of Pensacola, which was not considered part of the provinces, was only 298. The actual strength at St. Augustine, including the sentinel posts, was 249 pro- fessional soldiers and oficers, plus the governor and the two royal offcials (33). This was the force that must defeat Governor Moore and his attacking army. The first news the Spanish governor of Florida, Joseph de Znniga y Zerda, had about the approaching attack of Governor Moore came from a baptized Indian woman of the Chacato tribe (30, fol. 3280). She had gone from Apalachee to the lands of the Apalachicolas in today's western Georgia, a region which had fallen under the influence of the English traders from Carolina. At the village of Achito in Apa- lachicola, the native woman had attended a town council in which plans were being discussed for an English-inspired and -supervised attack on Spanish Apalachee. The Chacato woman subsequently witnessed some war preparations by the Apalachicolas. Being devoted to the Spaniards, she fled to San Luis de Apalachee (today's Tallahassee), where she arrived on the afternoon of October 21, to report the news. Immediately she talked to Captain Juan Solana, the Spanish commander of Apa- lachee, and Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza, who had recently arrived from St. Augustine with reinforcements. Among other things, the Cha- cato Indian told the two captains the amazing news that the governor of "San Jorge," which was the Spanish name for Charleston, would come down the Atlantic coast with as many as a hundred small boats to attack St. Augustine. The next day, October 22, Solana and Romo de Uriza forwarded the news to St. Augustine by a speedy messenger who arrived at the fort five days later (34, 35). Governor Zaniga was quite worried about this news and thought it credible, though perhaps exaggerated. He issued a proclamation on 11 FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 their headquarters on Amelia Island. In the province of Timucua there were only three soldiers stationed in the Gainesville-Lake Santa Fe re- gion. Two soldiers were located on the crossing of the Salamototo [St. Johns] River that led from St. Augustine to Timucua and Apalachee. These two men maintained contact with the small Timucua garrison. The various sentinel posts around St. Augustine required 25 men. The navy had fifteen sailors and a pilot in charge of the small vessels that be- longed to the presidio. All these men, including the incapacitated and pensioned and excluding the governor and two royal oficials, came to 323. This made the garrison 32 men below the 355-man quota. In fact, the effective fighting force of Florida, exclusive of Pensacola, which was not considered part of the provinces, was only 298. The actual strength at St. Augustine, including the sentinel posts, was 249 pro- fessional soldiers and ofcers, plus the governor and the two royal offcials (33). This was the force that must defeat Governor Moore and his attacking army. The first news the Spanish governor of Florida, Joseph de Zniga y Zerda, had about the approaching attack of Governor Moore came from a baptized Indian woman of the Chacato tribe (30, fol. 3280). She had gone from Apalachee to the lands of the Apalachicolas in today's western Georgia, a region which had fallen under the influence of the English traders from Carolina. At the village of Achito in Apa- lachicola, the native woman had attended a town council in which plans were being discussed for an English-inspired and -supervised attack on Spanish Apalachee. The Chacato woman subsequently witnessed some war preparations by the Apalachicolas. Being devoted to the Spaniards, she fled to San Luis de Apalachee (today's Tallahassee), where she arrived on the afternoon of October 21, to report the news. Immediately she talked to Captain Juan Solana, the Spanish commander of Apa- lachee, and Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza, who had recently arrived from St. Augustine with reinforcements. Among other things, the Cha- cato Indian told the two captains the amazing news that the governor of "San Jorge," which was the Spanish name for Charleston, would come down the Atlantic coast with as many as a hundred small boats to attack St. Augustine. The next day, October 22, Solana and Romo de Uriza forwarded the news to St. Augustine by a speedy messenger who arrived at the fort five days later (34, 35). Governor Zniiga was quite worried about this news and thought it credible, though perhaps exaggerated. He issued a proclamation on 11 FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 their headquarters on Amelia Island. In the province of Timucua there were only three soldiers stationed in the Gainesville-Lake Santa Fe re- gion. Two soldiers were located on the crossing of the Salamototo [St. Johns] River that led from St. Augustine to Timucua and Apalachee. These two men maintained contact with the small Timucua garrison. The various sentinel posts around St. Augustine required 25 men. The navy had fifteen sailors and a pilot in charge of the small vessels that be- longed to the presidio. All these men, including the incapacitated and pensioned and excluding the governor and two royal ofcials, came to 323. This made the garrison 32 men below the 355-man quota. In fact, the effective fighting force of Florida, exclusive of Pensacola, which was not considered part of the provinces, was only 298. The actual strength at St. Augustine, including the sentinel posts, was 249 pro- fessional soldiers and oficers, plus the governor and the two royal officials (33). This was the force that must defeat Governor Moore and his attacking army. The first news the Spanish governor of Florida, Joseph de Zfiiga y Zerda, had about the approaching attack of Governor Moore came from a baptized Indian woman of the Chacato tribe (30, fol. 3280). She had gone from Apalachee to the lands of the Apalachicolas in today's western Georgia, a region which had fallen under the influence of the English traders from Carolina. At the village of Achito in Apa- lacbicola, the native woman had attended a town council in which plans were being discussed for an English-inspired and -supervised attack on Spanish Apalachee. The Chacato woman subsequently witnessed some war preparations by the Apalachicolas. Being devoted to the Spaniards, she fled to San Luis de Apalachee (today's Tallahassee), where she arrived on the afternoon of October 21, to report the news. Immediately she talked to Captain Juan Solana, the Spanish commander of Apa- lacbee, and Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza, who had recently arrived from St. Augustine with reinforcements. Among other things, the Cha- cato Indian told the two captains the amazing news that the governor of "San Jorge," which was the Spanish name for Charleston, would come down the Atlantic coast with as many as a hundred small boats to attack St. Augustine. The next day, October 22, Solana and Romo de Uriza forwarded the news to St. Augustine by a speedy messenger who arrived at the fort five days later (34, 35). Governor Zniiga was quite worried about this news and thought it credible, though perhaps exaggerated. He issued a proclamation on 11  October 27 telling tbe garrisoE osd people of St. Asgustine about she Chacaso inforations. Zdifiiga asked tbeso to lake the sews seriously and said shot althougho hr had continually askoed for help from Spains, Havana, Penasacola, ood Freoch Mobile, he coold ropert so imssaediate aid. Under theso circumstances she presidio ood garrison moot be mobilized and psI o ssensy-foor-boar nosie. Zfiiigo gore orders tbat beginning October 2800o inbobitaoo S. Augustine be allowoed Is leove tbe towo premises withoot eopress permission of she governor. All reserve soldiers ond sficers were rolled into octie duty; all leases were canceled. The garrison was ordered to check and clean weapons and base shem reody for a momeot's otice (36). The goveror was a energetic man of greot adminisrative talens, whs bad bad twenety-eigbt years of dedicated service to she crows, including war service io Africa and Flandrs. He was taking o chances since he was well aware of she affressiveness of she Esglish. He was oalso cognizast of she milisary weakness of his garrison insterms of en and arms. Oo Nosember 1 she worried governar again wrote ao orgent lettr to she crowns, outlining his estremely weak position. Hr was short of mes asdammasitios to defendsthesvast proincos ofFloidoswbicbsthe En~glish from Carolina were desermioed to conquer. Ziiiiga idosoified Florida as being composed of Apalachee, Timucsa, "La Riocosada, Bay of Taopa known as La Ascensiflo, she coast of Carlos, that of she South, Tororo, and Mayaca." All these places she correspondent identi- fled as basing isnhabisasnts, Apalochee and Timacaa passessiog she heaviess concenteotion. The morale of tke Indians from shese Iwo pros- inces, composed of four thousand Christians plus infidels sock as she "Sabacolos, Cbacases, Tabosas or Casases, Pocassas, Amacasos, and asker nations," was at a low psint. The English goal was to wean Indian allefiance away from she Spaniards and conqoer St. Augustine and Ike 12 Octaber 27 telling she farrison asd people of St. Aogstine ahoot she Chacaso informasion. Zfiiiga asked shem to tobe she sews seriously and said shat although he bad costinually asked for kelp from Spain, Havana, Pensacola, and French Mobile, he coold ropers no immediate aid. Under thrse circumrstances she presidio ond fareison moot be mobilized and pot on sweoly-foar-hosr notie. Zfiiiga gore orders shat beginanisg Ocsober 28 no inhabitans of St. Augustie be allowed Is lease she sown premises wishout express permission of she gavernor. All reserve soldiers and officers wre called int active dusy; all leases were canceled. The garrison soas ordered to cheek ansd clean weapons and base shem ready for a moment's nosie (36). The governor was an eergetic man of great administrative talents, who bad bad twenty-eight years of dedicased service so she crown, including war service in Africa and Flanders. He wasstakingochances since he was well aware of she aggressiveness of she English. He was also oognizant of she milisary weaknss of his garrison in terms of men and armas. On November 1 she worried governor again wrote an urgeot letter to she crown, outlining his extremely weak position. He was short of men and ammanition to defend she vast provinces of Florida whkick she English from Carolina were desermised ts conquer. Zflfliga identified Florida as being composed of Apalachee, Timuesa, "La Rinconada, Bay of Tanpa koown as La Ascensifin, she coast of Carlos, shot of she Soosh, Toesso, and Mayaca." All shese places she correspondent identi. fled as hosing inhabitants, Apalacher and Timacoa possessiog she -s A heaviest concentration. The morale of she Indians from shese Iwo prav- inces, compoed of four shousand Christians plus infidels sock as she "Sabacolas, Ckacates, Tabosas or Casases, Pocanr, Amacooss, and oshee nations," eras at a low psint. Tbe English goal was Is wean Indian allegiance away from she Spaniards and conqurr St. Aogustine and tke 12 October 27 telling she garrison and people of St. Aogustine ahoot she Choensa information. Zdiiga asked sheer to sake she nrews seriouasly and laid shas although hr bad consinusally asked for kelp from Spoin, Havana, Pensaola, and French Mobile, be coold exopect no immnediate aid. Under shese circumstances she presidio and garrison most be mobilized and psI on sweroy-foar-koor nosie. Zfifiiga gore orders shos beginsning October 28 no iohobitans sf51t. Augustine be allowed Is lease she sown premises wishoos eopress permission of she governor. All reserve soldiers ond officers were rolled int active dusy; all looses were canceled. The garrison was ordered to cheek and rcle weapons and hare them ready for a moment's notice (36). The governor was an ensergetic man of great administrative salens, who had bad twenty-eight years of dedicased arvice so Ike crown, including war service in Africa and Flanders. He wasstaking no chances since he was well awcarerof she oggressiveness of she English. He was also cognizant of she military weakness of his garrison in terms of men and areas. On NovembeeIsheworried goernor againswroteanaurgent leter to she craown, outlining his extemely weak position. He waos short of men and ammunsition to defend she sast provinces of Florida whkich she English from Carolina were determined to conquer. Zfiiga identified Florida as being composed of Apalachee, Timoesa, "La Rinconada, Bay of Tanpa known as La Aseensifin, she coast of Carlos, shot of she Soush, Tororo, and Mayaca." All these places she correspondent ideoti- fled os hosing inhabitants, Apalashee and Tserocsa possessssg she qsosnioAl W 1N MA heaviest roncentration. The morale of Ike Indians from shese Iwo pros- inces, composed of four shosand Christians plus infidels sack as she "Sabacolas, Charates, Tabosas or Casases, Pacoom, Amacanas, and othr nations," eras at a less print. The English gool was Is wean Indian allegiance away from she Spaniards and conquer St. Augustine and Ike 12  FLORIDA AND CAROLINA AROUND 1700 fnrt, and thereby gain control of the Bahama Channel, a vital Spanish route. The execative wcanted one hundred mace soldiers from Spain and fifty from Cuhn, pine wreapons and ammanitian. Fartheemare, Zfeiiiga again renminded the croan that Spain's goal in the Atlantic enact he ta deetroy Caralina, once and foeevee. Since time wan of the esence, he said hewa rdering thenloap from Havana, whbich wac in the pact af Apalachee. and the frigate "La Gloria" cf the St. Augutine preidia, toasailntoPennacola and French Mobile tnrequmetaid (37). On the namne day the royal officials, with the governoe'c approval, wroteea similar letercto the governor and roynl officials of Havana. The innaediate need wan reinfacemente to defend St. Augnstine fenom the English. The final goal ehoald and enact he a counteroffeneive. They naid that "the depopalatian and expaleion nf thmse Englishmen groin San Jorge in urgent. Thie can eaeily he done, becauee they have no fact or any other degenese." St. Augustine offered its fall coopeeation in the enpedition which wan rerommended for "thin spring" (39). By November 1 the governor and the admninistrative officern of St. Augustine were snre of an English attack hat had little intelligence information. A thied letter was cent to Solana, the lieatenant governor of Apalachee. He woe instracted to questian the Chacato woman again, and speed any further developments to St. Augustine. He woe also warned to be prepared far an attach by the English and their Indian allie. Even though material woe chart at the precidin, come bores and onces were ready to be dispatched to Solana for the purpoae of erecting a blockhonse. It in presumed that this wooden structure, "with a palisade big enough to hold snfficient people" woe to be located at San Luis. Captain Solana wan ordered to eoothe the varioue Indian chiefe. The Havana sloop, anchored ateSt. Macke, mact be confiscated and snt to Peneacola for aid. This drastie action wan adopted by consent of the warcouncil of all ntaff officrsn. Duercompensation mint be offered her captain and crewe fortheir work. Should the crew resist the order, Solana wan to pat the men under arrest and replace them with expe- rienced Apalacher soldiers. Captain Jacinto Boque woe assigned the tank of taking the reqauest foe aid to Pensacola, and Solana wan to amsign Roque the moldiers needed to funfill the order. Zfifiiga informed Solana that he wan dispatching the royal frigate of the St. Augustine garrion to Havana for farther aid. Nicolic Monn~n cantied the governor's in- stractions to Apalarhee on the royal trail, arriving at Son Luis eeral dayn later (38, 76). 13 FLORIRA ARN0 CAROLINA AROUND 1700 fart, and thereby gain control of the Bahama Channel, a vital Spanish route. The exercive wonted one hunded more soldiers from Spain and fifty from Cohn, plot weapons and ammanition. Furtheemore, Zliiiga again reminded the crown that Spain's goal in the Atlantic mact be to destroy Carolin, once and forever. Since time wasof the essenehe said he wasordringcthenloop from Havana, which wascin the port of Apolachee, and the frigate "La Gloria" of the St. Augostine precidia, to nail to Pensacola and French Mobile to request aid (37). On thy came day the royal officials, with the governores approval, wrotea similar letter to the governor and royal officials of Havana. The imnmediate nerd wan reinforcements to defend St. Augustine from the English. The final goal shoald and must be a couneroffensive. They naid that "the depopalation and eopalnion of threse Englishmnen from San Jorge is urgent. Thin eon racily hr done, becaerthey hove no fort or any other defenses." St. Augustine offered its fall cooperation in the enpedition which woe rerommended for "thin npring" (39). By November 1 the governor and the adaministrative officern of St. Augustine were earn of an English attach bat had little intelligence information. A third letter woe cent to Solana, the lieutenant governor of Apalorhee. He woe instructed to question the Chacoto woman again, and sperd any farther developments to St. Augustine. He woe alto warned to be prepared far an attach by the English and their Indian allien. Even though material woe short at the peidin, came bores and onxes were ready to be dispatched to Solana for the purpoae of erecting a blockhonse. It in presumced that thin wooden structure, "with a palisade big enough to hold sufficient people" won to he located at San Luts. Captain Solana wan ordered to soothe the various Indian chief. The Havana sloop, anchored ateSt. Mache, mant e confiscated and snt to Peneacola for aid. Thic drastic action cone adopted by content of the near cooncio all staff officers. Due compensation mint he offered her captain and crew for their teach. Should the crew resist the order, Solana was to pat the men under arrest and replace them with expe- cleared Apalnoher soldiers. Captain Jacinto Boqae woe assigned the each of taking the reqest for aid to P'ensacola, and Solana was to assign Boque the moldiers needed to fulfill the order. Zfifiiga informed Soana that be wan dinpatehing the royal frigate of the St. Augustine gareison to Havana Ice further aid. Nicolfle Manefle cantied the governor' i n- structions to Apalneher on the royal trail, arriving at Son Lniseseveral dayn later (38, 76). 13 FLORtDA AND CAROLtNA AROUCND 1700 fort, and thereby gain control of the Bahama Channel, aovital Spanish route. Theexecutive wanted one hundred moesoldiersefrom Spain and fifty from Cua, pine weaons and ammanition. Furthermore, Zfifliga again reminded the crown that Spain's foal in the Atlantic mace be to destroy Carolina, oce and forever. Since time woe of the essece, be said he wasorderingthenloop from Havana, which wascin the port of Apalachee, and the frigate "La Gloria" of the St. Augastine prenidia, to sail en Penscola and French Mobile to request aid (37). On the came day the royal official, with the governor's approval, wroteoanimilar letter to the govrnor and royalofficialsof Havana. The iammediate need wan reinforcements to defend St. Angustine from the English. The final gal nhouid and mace be a counteroffensive. They naid that "the depopalation and expalsion of these Englishmen from San Jerge it urgent. This ran racily he done, becase they have no fort or any other defenses." St. Augutine offered its fall cooperation in the enpedition which wan rcommended far "thin spring" (39). By Navember 1 the governor and the adminietrative efficers of St. Angastine were snre of an English attack hat hod little intelligence information. A third letter woo cent to Solana, the lieutenant governor of Apalacher. He woe intructed to quetion the Charato woman again, and speed any farther developmente to St. Augustine. He woe alto warned to be prepared far an attach by the English and their Indian allires. Even though mteril wan chart at the peidin, name horn and axswere ready to he dispatched to Solana for the purpooe of erecting a blockhons. It in presmed that thie wooden structnre, "with a palinade big enough to hold sufficient people" woe to he located at San Lain. Captain Solana wan ordered to soothe the varioun Indian chief. The Havana sloop, anchored ne St. Mache, mact e confiscated and nent to Pennacola for aid. Thin drantic action woe adopted by content of the warrcouncil nf all staff officers. Duercompensation mint he offered her captain and crew for their work. Should the crew esaist the order, Solanasoput the mennunder aretand replacemthem withrnpe- rienced Apalnoher saidiers. Captain Jacinto Boque won anaigned the tack of taking the request for aid to Pensacola, and Solana was to assign Boque the soldiers needed to falfill the order. Zfifigo informed Solana that he won dispatehing the royal frigate of the St. Augustine garrison to Havana for farther aid. Nicalde Monefin cannied the governor' n-o structions to Apalarhee on the royal trail, arriving at Soc Luiscseveral dayn later (38, 76). 13  2. THE ENGLISH APPROACH While Zeilniga was sending south and west for hoelp the English were a'pp~roachtng~5tAagustine l eom herth, enteringT ~omse- held !frRitnjjD tfjeginning Novemher. They began their assault on Guale at midnight of Novem-ber he Carolina army surprised-the gardhouse of San Pedro Bar at Santa Maria I Land (Amelia) which overlooked the wate r p titaeirated it from San Pedro Island (Cum- berland). The two Spanish guards, Domingo Gonzales and Juan Tejada, died defending their post. Immediately afterward the attackers overran the native village of San Pedro de Tupiqui, which presumably was on the northern part of the island. Some of the Christian Indians were able to flee south to the missions and villages of San Felipe and Santa Maria located on the same island. These two places were close together; one was the administrative center of Guale and had a wooden fort with a strong palisade. In it lived Captain Francisco Fuentes de Galarza, the lieutenant governor of Guale, with his attractive and pregnant wife, their three charming daughters, and one small son. It was said that another daughter of Fuentes, voluptuous and beautiful, had an illicit relationship with Governor Zniiga in St. Augustine and for this reason the governor had removed the father and mother to Guale (30, fols. 3209-3207). At one o'clock in the morning of November 4 the fleeing Indians from the northern part nf the island arrived at the stockade, reportmg the unexpected English imvasion to Fnentes de Galarza. The captain and -the two Franciscan niars, Manuel de Urissa and Domingo Santos, im- mediately rang the church bells, alerting the people to the oncoming attack and asking them to defend the stockade, the mission, and the villages. Instead, panic broke out among the neophytes and spread to all the natives, who began to flee the island or hide in the woods and swamps. Fuentes de Galarza and the friars tried desperately to calm the Indians, but their companions from San Pedro de Tupiqui had spread exaggerated tales of English atrocities. The lieutenant governor reported that with his few soldiers he was unable to stop the fleeing Indians as the native leaders were unable or unwilling to cooperate. Consequently the captain ordered complete evacuation of the fort mission, and i esan. eiifi e- fec i ec1eurch oaments 14 2. THE ENGLISH APPROACH W hile Z6iiga was sendinsouth and west for help the English were oppranomgSt. Augstine from the narth enteringihnopans hl territor ytspheginning of November. They began their assault on Guale at midnight of Novembrt The Carolina army sarprised-the guardhouse of San Pedro Bar at Santa Maria I and (Amelia) which overlooked the wae aIiiip0ra ed it from San Pedro Island (Cum- berland).The two Spanish guards, Domingo Gonzales and Juan Tejada, died defending their post. Immediately afterward the attackers overran the native village of San Pedro de Tupiqui, which presumably was on the northern part of the island. Some of the Christian Indians were able to flee south to the missions and villages of San Felipe and Santa Maria located on the same island. Them two places were close together; one was the administrative center of Guale and had a wooden fort with a strong palisade. In it lived Captain Francisco Fuentes de Galarza, the lieutenant governor of Guale, with his attractive and pregnant wife, their three charming daughters, and one small son. It was said that another daughter of Fuentes, voluptuous and beautiful, had an illicit relationship with Governor Zniiga in St. Augustine and for this reason the governor had removed the father and mother to Guale (30, fols. 3209-3207). At one o'clock im the morning of November 4 the fleeing Indians from the northern part of the islad arrnied at the stockade, reportmn then unexpected English iNvasioa to luentes de Galarza. The captain amd thietwo Franciscan friars, Manuel de Uissa and Domigo Santos, im- mediately rang the church bells, alerting the people to the oncoming attack and asking them to defend the stockade, the mission, and the villages. Instead, panic broke out among the neophytes and spread to all the natives, who began to flee the island or hide in the woods and swamps. Fuentes de Galarza and the friars tried desperately to calm the Indians, but their companions from San Pedro de Tupiqui had spread exaggerated tales of English atrocities. The lieutenant governor reported that with his few soldiers he was unable to stop the fleeing Indians as the native leaders were unable or unwilling to cooperate. Consequently the captain ordered complete evacuation of the for, missi, and el rhiffaoTc e Iurchoaments 14 2. THE ENGLISH APPROACH Wlhile Ztiiiiga was sendingsouth and west for help the English were apiro c~-inj t'A gustine from the nort ,-enterini nopi held territor o thLrceginning of iNove_e br. They began their assault on Guale at midnight of Nove-mber XThe Carolina army surprisedth guardhouse of San Pedro Bar at Santa Mariaeland (Amelia) which overloolkedthe water teht lparate it from San Pedro Island (Cum- berland). The two Spanish guards, Domingo Gonzales and Juan Tejada, died defending their post. Immediately afterward the attackers overran the native village of San Pedro de Tupiqui, which presumably was on the northern part of the island. Some of the Christian Indians were able to flee south to the missions and villages of San Felipe and Santa Maria located on the same island. These two places were close together; one was the administrative center of Guale and had a wooden fort with a strong palisade. In it lived Captain Francisco Fuentes de Galarza, the lieutenant governor of Guale, with his attractive and pregnant wife, their three charming daughters, and one small son. It was said that another daughter of Fuentes, voluptuous and beautiful, had an illicit relationship with Governor Ziiiga in St. Augustine and for this reason the governor had removed the father and mother to Guale (30, fols. 3209-3207). At one o'clock in the morning of November 4 the fleeing Indians from the northern part of lthe ioland arcve at the stockade, reportmg the unexpected English im oni To Pusentes de Calarza. The captain and ie two Franciscan friars, Manuel de Urissa and Domigo Santos, im mediately rang the church bells, alerting the people to the oncoming attack and asking them to defend the stockade, the mission, and the villages. Instead, panic broke out among the neophytes and spread to all the natives, who began to flee the island or hide in the woods and swamps. Fuentes de Galarza and the friars tried desperately to calm the Indians, but their companions from San Pedro de Tupiqui had spread exaggerated tales of English atrocities. The lieutenant governor reported that with his few soldiers he was unable to stop the fleeing Indians as the native leaders were unable or unwilling to cooperate. Consequently the captain ordered complete evacuation of the fore mission, and sland. eHendtne irirei letc lurch raents 14  and statues. just at this momtent the English arrived and showered the fort and mssion wit bring Spars whli - e o I c ' a arett roo a. kLonce Housnes enUgulfed the utfidctttes, lighsting the dark night of the island. Apparently ecerynne gut out, including the soldiers, the cons- sounder, and the friars. They fled to the next imortant Spanish outposts of Son Juan del Puro-nTo--~-geT~-nJ-fic-~ii if--- Santa Cruis tse-inlan1..d ocrotsron:tswestern shoreof the island, anfden the stoickadeand sniss-in of Pirihirika located just across fromt thIalnud na th oauthern .hor --- _-_e of the Sgaott River, near today's Maypors. Captain Fuentes arrived at San Juan del Puerto, the last out- pust of Goale, in the late afternoon of Novenmber 4. He iummediately rushed the grave news to the governor in St. Augustine (d0, d1, dd). Cugnoru~ Zkhfigasxeceivrd the dispatch at noon on Ngnoosakan5-.IL. told him of rapture of Vmc1IaT.and by the Eglio and the retreat tCSun funoH -delFuiro "loated twe lve lragueS- lenin tire p prsdo& Captain Fuentes do Galuoza reported that the Caralna -forc wacm puted of "English, Indian, and Negro soldiers." Zsiiiiga, aware that his fears had come true, thought it ofjpie muran t ul anta deuet whchcn eed as "the kervtothprin oful" It was also the outer defense line of St. Augustine. And "if the enemy capture it, they can come overland and besiege the fort," thought the governor. Therefore he commissioned Captain Joseph do Harroytinoc, who was in change of the guards at the fort and lookout pasts, to take twenty infantrymen to reinforce the decimated army of Captain Fuentrs do Calaraa, anad defend San Juan del Puerto and thracrossing of the Salamatato River, Horruytinor's force left immtediately (44). In another order of the day all men, including "fret Negrors and Mulattoes," aver fourteen years who wer not part of the garriton, were ordered to go to the fart wcithin one hour to receive armstand am- munition. This militia woo put an a tscenty-four-hour alert. No inhuba.. itantswere allowcedo leave the toswn limits and a fine of two hundred 'ducilaos-iias eifaied far infractiottuaf the orders of the day, so he deducted from the accumulated salary debts owed to each one. A ine of two hundred lashes was ussigned foe delinquent St. Augustinians clussified an free persons of color (pus-dax and maones) (41). Also, all farmers w~ere ordered tobrio thi poucespecially corn, and deposit it inside the foot within twenty-four housrs. I-aso-B~le fiaiildcrd o e tct mnsander of trforwoms measure it und give a signed receipt to the farmers. Every family was allowed to draw out 15 and statueo. joot at this moment the English arrived and showered the fort and misma with karoln- fobar w iTfi~i~pTifi 1):L once aatmct enul1fed the otilfcntres, lighting the dark night of the island . Apparently everyone got ont, iucluding the soldiers, the com- mander, and the friars. They led so the next importunt Spanish outposts of Sun Juan del Puertaon- ot- oreIln,-htfAi.f~l Suta Cru tE~ruin~asd across frns the! estern share of the inland, and to-thestockadeuandmission of Pirihirika locauted jutit ucross from theftjjgd Lan the sauhee share of the Sala.ata to River, near today't Maypoet. Captain Fuentes arrived at San Juan del Puerto, the last out- post of Guolr, in the lute afteroon of Novemher 4. He immediately ruohed the gorave newma to the governor in St. Augustine (40, 41, 44). GDYscrnorifiigaereived the dispatch at noun aon Ng~oaakaa.S.IL told him of rapture ofXmiilTssland ky the English and the retreat tCKHun an eT Piisrts_" "bued tweulve leagues frot ir roii Cuptuin Fuentes ale Uasar reported that the Carolina farce 'was com- pared of "English, Indian, and Negro soldiers." Zfiuliga, aware thut his fears had came true, thought it of prime imnRtaNar to hold San luan d!luot mihhe coaqieredas "th kev totheorvnoful. It was also the outer defense line of St. Augustine. And "if the enemy capture it, they ran came overland and besiege the foot," thought the governor. Therefore he commissioned Captain Joreph do Harraysinee, who mao in charge of the guards at the fart and lookout posts, to take twenty infantrymen to reinforce the decimated army of Captain Fuentes do Galuraa, ad defend San Juan del Puerto and the crossing of the Salamotota River. Horroytiner's farce left immediately (44). In another order of the day all men, including "free Negroes and Muluttoes," aver fourteen years who sore not part of the garrion, wore ordered to go to the fart within one hour to receive armi-and am- munition. This miitis mat put on a swraty-fauehaue alert. Na Aqinhlao_ itants were allowed to leave the town limits and a fine of twa hundred daililas 'was de-lared 'far infraction& of the orders of the day, to he deducted from the accumulated salary debts owed to each one. A fine of two hundred lushes was assigned for delinquent St. Augustinians classified an free persons of color )pardas and marot) (41). Also, all farmers were ordered toarg thirprdueespecially corn, and deposit it inside the fart within twenty-four~hus swsflOfuflo irOSOsundr ofthe artwho ust measure it and give a signrd receipt to the farmers. Every family was allowed to draw out 15 and statues. joot at this moment the Eaglish arrived and showered the fort and missio, wt hun at c tRapiis Xt-ocae engulfe thtee rioes, lighting the dark night of the island. Apparently everyonse gas out, including the soldiers, the com- mande,and the friars. They Red tothe net imprant Spnish outposts of Sun Juan del Puersa n q rtGorg IbadieA i li i Santa 'ruaauo-nthr ninlaad across from the westeen share of the island, and ta the stockade and mission of Piribiriha located just across fromo thje ilund anl the tooth em shore of te ISalastato River, noe today's Maypoes. Captain Fuentes arrived at San Juan del Puerto, the last out- post of Cuale, iu the late afteroon of Novembier 4. He immediately rushed the grave newt to the governor in St. Augustine (40, 41, 44). Caceppot.Zfitigaxeceived the dispatch _at _nuon on Noaoxmkna-5-.lL told him of rapture of Xmetia Iasad ky the English and the retreat tlo n-Psan JoeT Pif6rta"bate twelve l - -- i 1 S-eagues eans fit presid-lu. Captaio Fentso ale 'alara reparted that the Carolina farce was com- pared of "English, Indian, and Negro soldiers." Zfiiga, aware that his fears had came true, thought it of prime imoortance, to hold San uau del uro hrheasdered as"the keyvtotheopovincef Guale." It was alto the outer defense lioe of St. Augustine. And 'if the enemy capture it, they can came overland and besiege the fart," thought the governor. Therefore hr commissioned Captain Joseph de Horraytinor, who was in charge of the guards at the fart and lookout pasts, to take twenty infantrymen en reinforce the decimated army of Captain Fuentes de Galarza, and defend San Juan del Puerto and the crossing of the Salamatato River, Harroytiner's farce left immediately (44). In another order of the day all men, including "free Negroes and Mulattoes," aver fourteen years who were nut part of the garrion, were ordered to go to the fort withio one hour to receive arme and am- munitiou. This militia was put an a twenty-fu-hour alert.~ Ninhgbac itants were allowed to leave the towns limits and a fine of two hundred difwaS-de-clied Tr infeactiuna af the orders of the day, to ho deducted from the accumulated salary debitsowed to each one. A fine of twa hundred lashee wan assigned far delinquent St. Augustinloans classified us free persons of color (pus-dan and macanna) (41). Also, all farmers were ordered to bring theijr ruue, especially carn, and d oais it inside the fort within twenty-four hous.IiPOas TVe ahnhed_ overto t;conmanoer of thefart whomuttmeasure it and give a signed receipt to the farmers. Every family was allowed to draw out 15  THE ENGLISH ADVANCE ON ST. OCTOBER.NOVEMBER 1702 THE ENGLISH ADVANCE ON ST. OCrOBER.NOVEMBER 1702 THE ENGLISH ADVANCE ON N -0-0 3 N V V I- N rh () 30-V Al 0 V  CAROLINA CAROLINA CAROLINA UGUSTINE UGUSTINE > , )UGUSTINE ATLATICATLATICATLANTIC OCEANOCEANOCEAN =- , ATSAN SO S TUS= -ATAN-pmm ZAC3KATAX- SANTA~~ SA1N AT U =A SA AN A  Thi udtd adanoymousSpaishmphowth placesttkd y the ist linet facsimtil, fromtt phtocopy of the original wasth drawting [Al 58-2-81. Note that Little Talbot Island,* the soutthely third of wthich is anacrtinsic This undated and anonymous Spanish map shows the places attacked by the English near the St. Johns River on the approach to St. Augustine. The illustration is a line facsimile, from a photocopy of the original wash drawing [AI SS-2'8). Note that Little Talbot Island, the southerly third of which is an accretion since colonial times, is shown as one with Big Talbot (Sarabay). Note also that D of the key is on the map as Y. The facsimile omits illegible words, as the names of the two shore lookouts near B and E, and a phrase written in the narrow space between Costia and the key. This undated and anonymous Spanish map shows the places attacked by the English near the St. Johns River on the approach to St. Augustine. The illustration is a line facsimile, from a photocopy of the original wash drawing [AI 58-2"81. Note that Little Talbot Island, the southerly third of which is an accretion since colonial times, is shown as one with Big Talbot (Sarabay). Note also that D of the key is on the map as Y. The facsimile omits illegible words, as the names of the two shore lookouts near B and E, and a phrase written in the narrow space between Costta and the key.  TRANSLATION OF THE KEY A-Fort of Piribiriba and two Indian villages, on the mainland with San Agustin. B--Ba. Z-Lookouts. D-Islands. E-San Pablo Creek, which ends eight leagues from San Agustin. f-Mouths [of creeks] that lead into the San Agustin mainland. g-Mouths [of creeks] which end at Aramtasaca. H-Mainland to San Jorge [Charleston]. Y-Sara Creek. J-Santa Cruz. K-Seacoast. L-San Mateo, on the mainland with San Agustin. m-Fichinuica Channel, through which the enemy came. N-Channel which runs along all the islands up to San Jorge [Charleston], which is 60 leagues from this presidio, eight days' travel by the island waterway and three days by open sea, &c. PLACE NAMES ON THE MAP WmcH ARE NoT IDENTIFIED IN THE KEY Lookout for San Pedro [St. Marys River] Bar. Santa Maria [Amelial Island, where the garrison was. Santa Maria [Nassau River] Bar. Acale Lookout. Sarabay [Talbot] Island. Sarabay [Fort George River] Bar (small). San Juan [St. Johns River] Bar. San Juan [Fort George] Island, where there was a village. TRANSLATION OF THE KEY A-Fort of Piribiriba and two Indian villages, on the mainland with San Agustin. B-Bars. Z-Lookouts. D-Islands. E-San Pablo Creek, which ends eight leagues from San Agustin. f-Mouths [of creeks] that lead into the San Agustin mainland. g-Mouths [of ereeks] which end at Aramasaca. H-Mainland to San Jorge [Charleston]. Y-Sara Creek. J-Santa Cruz. K-Seacoast. L-San Mateo, on the mainland with San Agustin. m-Fichinuica Channel, through which the enemy came. N-Channel which runs along all the islands up to San Jorge [Charlestot], which is 60 leagues from this presidi, eight days' travel by the island waterway and three days by open sea, &c. PLACE NAMES ON THE MAP WHICH ARE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE KEY Lookout for San Pedro [St. Marys River] Bar. Santa Maria [Amelia] Island, where the garrison was. Santa Maria [Nassau River] Bar. Acale Lookout. Sarabay [Talbot] Island. Sarabay [Fort George River] Bar (small). San Juan [St. Johns River] Bar. San Juan [Fort George] Island, where there was a village. TRANSLATION OF THE KEY A--Fort of Piribiriba and two Indian villages, on the mainland with San Agustin. B-Bars. Z-Lookouts. D-Islands. E-San Pablo Creek, which ends eight leagues from San Agustin. f-Mouths [of creeks] that lead into the San Agustin mainland. g-Mouths [of creeks] which end at Aramasaca. H-Mainland to San Jorge [Charleston]. Y-Sara Creek. J-Santa Cruz. K-Seacoast. L-San Mateo, on the mainland with San Agustin. m-Fichinuica Channel, through which the enemy came. N-Channel which runs along all the islands up to San Jorge [Charleston], which is 60 leagues from this presidio, eight days' travel by the island waterway and three days by open sea, &c. PLACE NAMES ON THE MAP WgmCg ARE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE KEY Lookout for San Pedro [St. Marys River] Bar. Santa Maria [Amelia] Island, where the garrison was. Santa Maria [Nassau River] Bar. Acale Lookout. Sarbay [Talbot] Island. Sarabay [ort George River] Bar (s-all). San Juan [St. Johns River] Bar. San Juan [Fort George} Island, where there was a village.  thesorn needed daily, butan eatwriten HaccountImust be kept of eash transaction. Any infraction of thin last order must ha presented Is the gavrntor, whs would impale a fine according Is hin pleasare (43). Plansing an te pssibilsty tlaat the English assalt maight be delayed an the St. Jshnn by Fuentes de Guineas and Hsraytiner wchile the Spaninsh cautisusly retired ints tbs fsrt fsr a siegs, the gsvernsr, tens- nine, and auditsr talked absat sendling-assath r hq ee fee elz Is Havyana byJlgr93yal figeat. Tby, (1ded to tgl~j. gtha casuilaf Anmelia Ilssu lagiltLg sbsauaagpalptsaad St Augantine. 'BSE55IE a) the lack af men, arms, and anasunitian," they w ent an, --e are fsrcet Islose sttenelves, iii the furl as sass a s the enemy ..v.s, Nss only did they fear the Engliah, hut they esn7' nidered the ponsibility that same of the Indiant might take the oppor- tunity Is rebel, and they recited the shligation Is "pealect the hsly images, ornamenuts, jewcels of the Charch, the cleegy, friars, pesple of the environs, women, and rhildren." Immsediate aid by sea was requested. A naval tank forceswas thoughtl ho e more advisable because it would help Is lift any siege that the English imposed milk the Caeolina aemy. A second chaice of at leant twoa hundred infantrysnen mat listed. A farther eequest man the sending of twsenty ssldiern with the roal St. Augnstine frigate to bolster the garrison of Apalachee. All thmse de- mands wcere considered urgent since sther help, especially frsm the weest, wsconsidered beysnd the realm of possibility and the presidias asmmuniinswastss low fsra sntained siege. jZggndthr sL officials agreed that the friss* laGes ne ~~I~s. Ar~aiiezuhuld arryrthe gmfisas nt EH qliputIE~nd readyts . o a clier o te frt culde pared as official messenger, hut the governor suggested the appointmnent of Fray Feancisco Camacho, who wasnconsidered an able and coscientios man. It ws adecided to request the pernmiss for Camacho's appointment from the Franciscan taperior, Pray Marcss de Satalangs. Alsnss Alvarer mould infsrmsally rontast the authorities of Hasana and ast present St Augastine's plight (45, 47). Just after suspper a messenger arrived frsm the sentinel psst at San Jaan del Puerto, twelve leagues fronm St. Augustine, saying that thee English sails had been sighted. At nine, Zujiiga srdered the alarm sounded and sent every man tshis stationufsraltenate wathes (46). Then, at the end of this eventful days Novenmber 5, 1702, Governsr 20 the corn needed daily,hbut an eatritten acsunt musrhekeptsof each transaction. Any infraction of this last order must he presented Is the gsveenor, whs maul4 impute a fine acsording Is his pleasure (43). Planning sn the possibility that the English assault might he delayed on the St. Jshns by Fuentes de Calarza and Harraytiner while the Spanish cautiously retired mit the fart fur a siege, the governor, tens- seer, and auditor talked absut se tI- Havagagjtthegsoyal fgatgq..TUUdscgjgd to tgtl - - pctqf Amelia Ils~s dsn alsuru St. Augussisse.,"Rccagsg af the lack of men, arms, andaeunis" they Iveut an, "we are fussed Is rlose ouselves in the fsrt as- Sss. as the eneiny grgjygn," Nat only did they fear the English, huL they sun- sidered the possibility that same of the Indians might take the oppor- tunity to rebel, and they recited the obligation ts "protect the holy images, ornaments, jewels of Ihe Church, the clergy, friars, people of lbe enviros, women, and rhildren." Immediate aid by sea was requested. A naval task forcerwas thught Is he muse advisable because it would help Is lift any siege that the English imputed with she Carslina army. A sesond chaice of at least two hundred infantrymen was listed. A farther request was the tending of twenty soldiers with the royal St. Augustine frigate to bolster the garrisn of Apulashee. All shine de- mnands weeconsidered urgent sinse other help, especially fromlthe west, ws considered beyond the realm of posmibility and the presidia's ammnitin was tooulowfor asutainednieg. Zifiiaand thee offisials agreed that the frist "a lra udrC5 Arvaren shunts carry_1 the sagrtsndse ttiue ain rea Is fl~lif0 0th fear culd be spared as official messenger, hut the governor suggested the appointmnent of Fray Francisco Camacho, who was cnsidered an able and conscientios mean. It was decided to request the permission forCamash's appointmentsfrom the Fransan superioe, Pray Marsos de Satulunga. Alunsa Alvarez would informally contact the suthorities of Hasana and also present St. Augustine's plight (45, 47). just after supper a messenger arrived from the sentinel past at San Juan del Puerto, twelve leagues from St. Augustine, saying lbat thee English sails had been sighted. At nine, Zfiiiga ordered the alarm sounded and sent eveey man tohisasationafralternatemathes (46). Then, at the end of this evsntful day, November 5, 1702, Governor 20 lbessorn needed daily,hbut an exactlwrittenaccoutlmustbe keptaof each transaction. Any infraction of this last order must he presented Is the governur, who would impose a fine acording Is his pleasure (43). Planning an the possibility that the English assault might he delayed othe SI. Johns by Fuentes de Caarza and Hsrruytiner whils the Spanish cautiously retired into the fart far a siege, the governor, treas- uree, and auditor talked about se nnteree afre~ Havaggg 1woaJcyhesasifrute.Jgc eie i eJg b.caggks AmeliaIsud sncmlogdlgnadasigriilptsai St. Augusine. "~Because of the lack of men, arms, and ammunition," they NenI an, "we ass fussed Is cla sesevsi h ata asa the eesv ajyg,' Nat snly did they fear the Einglish, bus they con: sidered the passihility that same of the Indians might take the oppor- tunity Is rebel, and they recited the obligation Is "protect the holy imagee, ornaments, jeswels of the Church, the leegy, friars, people of the environs, women, and children." Immediate aid by sea was requested. A naval task forceswasthought ts hr mare advisable because it wsul4 help Is lift any siege that the English imputed with the Carolina army. A second shakce of at least two hundred infantrymen mas listed. A farther request wan the sending uf twenty soldiers with the royal St. Augustine frigate to bolster the garrison of Apalashee. All these de- mands were considred urgent since other help, especially from the went, was considered beyond the realm of posmibility and the pemidia's ammsunitin watooulowmfor asustained siege, 2d 4fidlsr a oficials agreed that the feiut IsGaria" under Capt-n A~IG. theat ,u carry the mwug~isd~gsgapg n e~t -lN-B-oegroi a fore fecould he spared as oficial messenger, hut the governor suggested the appointment of Fray Francisco Camacho, who as aconsidered an able and conscientius man. It was decided ts request the perxnmiinnfor Camsshuusappointment fromlte Francscan superior, Pray Marcus de Satulungs. Alunsa Alvarer would informally contact the authorities tf Havana and asu present St. Augustine's plight (45, 47). Just after supper amesenger arrived from the sentinel post atSan Juan del Puerto, twelve leagues from St. Augustine, saying that thee English sails had been sighted. At nine, Zflfigu ordered the alarm sounded and sentrevery man tohis station foraltrntematches (46). Then, at the end of this eventful day, November 5, 1702, Cavemn 20  THE ENGLISH APPROACH Ziiiga decided to write one more letter to the crown before retiring for the night. He was incensed at thepresent plighLofloridaand SLt. Augostine, which he blamed on the negligence of the viceroy in Mexico and the executive pfficers of avana. Consistently they lhad ignored requests for reinforcements and the talk about a counteroffensive "to throw out the enemy from San Jorge." Even though the enemy was at the gates of the fort, thoughts about a Spanish attack on Carolina should not be abandoned. Znniga offered full cooperation in this venture and suggested St. Augustine as the base for the invasion. The king was asked to increase the garrison "by 250 men in order to bring it up to six hundred" and to send fifty new recruits every two years in order to maintain the roster. With the present garrison it was impossible to guard the vast expanse of Florida, since it was eighty leagues to Apa- lachee, thirty leagues to Timucua, and twenty-five leagues to Guale. It was the governor's opinion that the English had dared to attack because they knew that Florida was short of armed forces (44). At two in the morning the governor was awakened by the arrival of another messenger from the Salamototo estuary, sent by Captain Hor- ruytiner. The man reported that a Carolinian sloop had landed a launch, and the Spanish forces had captured three men, two English soldiers, and "one Indian of the Chiluque nation." The Indian was cooperative when interrogated by the Guale interpreter and declared that "the governor of San Jorge is advancing personally with many vessels and many men by land and sea in order to conquer the fort and town of St. Augustine." Several hours later more discouraging news arrived at the fort. The English appeared to have crossed the Salamototo success- fully din Santa Cru.Therait~ happenings along the estuary remain unknown, for Captain Horruytiner was never able to establish full contact with the Guale force. The panic of the Santa Maria Island Indians fleeing southward had spread to the Indians of the three estuary villages and facilitated their rapid capture. The twenty soldiers of the San Juan del Puerto stockade and the few at Piribiriba were routed and some were captured by the Eng- lish. Captain Fuentes, accom'panied by the two Franciscan fathers, was able to cross the river, still carrying the church ornaments. He wanted to regroup the men and offer resistance on the south side of the river, but his army disintegrated and he had to flee into the "woods, swamps, and palmettos" with his family. Thus he was unable to gather the fifty men he needed to harass the enemy. The captain praised the courage 21 THE ENGLISH APPROACH Zfifiiga decided to write one more letter to the crown before retiring for the night. He was incensed at teh presentjligLuf lorida and St.. Augustine. which he blamed on the negligence of the viceroy in Mexico and the xeive pflis of Hvana. Consistently they had ignored requests for reinforcements ande'talak about a counteroffensive "to throw out the enemy from San Jorge." Even though the enemy was at the gates of the fort, thoughts about a Spanish attack on Carolina should not be abandoned. Znniga offered full cooperation in this venture and suggested St. Augustine as the base for the invasion. The king was asked to increase the garrison "by 250 men in order to bring it up to six hundred" and to send fifty new recruits every two years in order to maintain the roster. With the present garrison it was impossible to guard the vast expanse of Florida, since it was eighty leagues to Apa- lachee, thirty leagues to Timucua, and twenty-five leagues to Goale. It was the governor's opinion that the English had dared to attack because they knew that Florida was short of armed forces (44). At two in the morning the governor was awakened by the arrival of another messenger from the Salamototo estuary, sent by Captain Hor- ruytiner. The man reported that a Carolinian sloop had landed a launch, and the Spanish forces had captured three men, two English soldiers, and "one Indian of the Chiluque nation." The Indian was cooperative when interrogated by the Guale interpreter and declared that "the governor of San Jorge is advancing personally with many vessels and many men by land and sea in order to conquer the fort and town of St. Augustine." Several hours later more discouraging news arrived at the fort. The English appeared to have crossed the Salamototo success- f igan'Jn nta Cruz_The e-nact happenings along the estuary remain unknown, for Captain Horruytiner was never able to establish full contact with the Guale force. The panic of the Santa Maria Island Indians fleeing southward had spread to the Indians of the three estuary villages and facilitated their rapid capture. The twenty soldiers of the San Juan del Puerto stockade and the few at Piribiriba were routed and some were captured by the Eng- lish. Captain Fuentes, accopanied by the two Franciscan fathers, was able to cross the river, still carrying the church ornaments. He wanted to regroup the men and offer resistance on the south side of the river, but his army disintegrated and he had to flee into the "woods, swamps, and palmettos" with his family. Thus he was unable to gather the fifty men he needed to harass the enemy. The captain praised the courage 21 THE ENGLISH APPROACH ,Z6Eiga decided to write one more letter to the crown before retiring for the night. He was incensed at the present IightofElonida and St. Augustine, which he blamed on the negligence of the viceroy in Mexico and the executne gfcr, s of Havana Consistently they had ignored requests for reinforcemens and te talk about a counteroffensive "to throw out the enemy from San Jorge." Even though the enemy was at the gates of the fort, thoughts about a Spanish attack on Carolina should not be abandoned. Zfnnliga offered full cooperation in this venture and suggested St. Augustine as the base for the invasion. The king was asked to increase the garrison "by 250 men in order to bring it up to six hundred" and to send fifty new recruits every two years in order to maintain the roster. With the present garrison it was impossible to guard the vast expanse of Florida, since it was eighty leagues to Apa- lachee, thirty leagues to Timucua, and twenty-five leagues to Guale. It was the governor's opinion that the English had dared to attack because they knew that Florida was short of armed forces (44). At two in the morning the governor was awakened by the arrival of another messenger from the Salamototo estuary, sent by Captain Hor- ruytiner. The man reported that a Carolinian sloop had landed a launch, and the Spanish forces had captured three men, two English soldiers, and "one Indian of the Chiluque nation." The Indian was cooperative when interrogated by the Guale interpreter and declared that "the governor of San Jorge is advancing personally with many vessels and many men by land and sea in order to conquer the fort and town of St. Augustine." Several hours later more discouraging news arrived at the fort. The English appeared to have crossed the Salamototo success- fully, taing an Juan d Puerto, Piribiri aadnd Santa Cruz.Th e enact happenings along the estuary remain unknown, for Captain Horruytiner was never able to establish full contact with the Guale force. The panic of the Santa Maria Island Indians fleeing southward had spread to the Indians of the three estuary villages and facilitated their rapid capture. The twenty soldiers of the San Juan del Puerto stockade and the few at Piribiriba were routed and some were captured by the Eng- lish. Captain Fuentes, accompanied by the two Franciscan fathers, was able to cross the river, still carrying the church ornaments. He wanted to regroup the men and offer resistance on the south side of the river, but his army disintegrated and he had to flee into the "woods, swamps, and palmettos" with his family. Thus he was unable to gather the fifty men he needed to harass the enemy. The captain praised the courage 21  THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE and enterprise of the two friars, who were, incidentally, later captured by the English and sent to Charleston. Fuentes was unable to send a messenger to St. Augustine until the end of November, keeping the governor completely in the dark about the Spanish troops in Guale (46, 87). On an undetermined date the captain and his family were also captured and taken to Charleston where his wife delivered their next child (24, p. 51). Although the news was disjointed, it was obvious that the English had surmounted the last obstacle before attacking St. Augustine. Consequent- ly, on the morning of November 6 Zniiiga d-it -issu"-afrank roc- lamation to his army and the people of St. Augustine. He told them of the retiieafthll6btfe- Ooatne iniyideEE eitsiieand its defeat at Santa Maria Island and at the Salamototo River because of superior English forces. The governor told his people that "the enemy is approaching by land and by sea and they are bringing the means to attack and besiege the royal fort." It was stated that there was a genuine fear that the loyalty of some Indians was questionable, and the Carolina forces would take advantage of this. Some natives who were well informed about conditions in St. Augustine might rush to the English forces, and tell them "everything about this town, its streets, entrances, environs, creeks, bars, tidelands, paths to the cattle and other ranches, savannas, and other places." The proclamation did not hide the deficient situation of the garrison. Especially bad was the status of the infantry, which since 1687 had not received a recruit from the outside. Ziiiga reminded the people that he and his predecessors had tried many times to remedy this situa- tion but were ignored by higher authorities. He had finally dispatched the popular and extremely capable Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar to Spain, but he had not yet returned. Furthermore no provisions had arrived at St. Augustine for the last three months; there was a shortage of everything. The governor an n t bwastgoingto order ee d . the forismnntall the inhabitants of 6t Ognstn sd he enviroig, including friarsprts women chidre, -gtLgeves, free Negroes, and "all Indians of whatever nation which have rendered obidiince to his Cathohe . Lumga eitSumama nofiS bring into theearsc about 1,500 to 1,600 persons. Most of these people were "poor as a churchmouse"; for a long time the garrison's only pay had been "two breads a day," so it would be the responsibility of the authorities to feed everyone inside the fort. This would be a most difficult task. But 22 THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE and enterprise of the two friars, who were, incidentally, later captured by the English and sent to Charleston. Fuentes was unable to send a messenger to St. Augustine until the end of November, keeping the governor completely in the dark about the Spanish troops in Goale (46, 87). On an undetermined date the captain and his family were also captured and taken to Charleston where his wife delivered their next child (24, p. 51). Although the news was disjointed, it was obvious that the English had surmounted the last obstacle before attacking St. Augustine. Consequent- ly, on the morning of November 6 Znnigadeeided-issu-a "frank proc- lamation to his army and the people of St. Augustige. He told them of the endar-dhlfetaoe aiiiiidgi Tf76-eiliand its defeat at Santa Maria Island and at the Salamototo River because of superior English forces. The governor told his people that "the enemy is approaching by land and by sea and they are bringing the means to attack and besiege the royal fort." It was stated that there was a genuine fear that the loyalty of some Indians was questionable, and the Carolina forces would take advantage of this. Some natives who were well informed about conditions in St. Augustine might rush to the English forces, and tell them "everything about this town, its streets, entrances, environs, creeks, bars, tidelands, paths to the cattle and other ranches, savannas, and other places." The proclamation did not hide the deficient situation of the garrison. Especially bad was the status of the infantry, which since 1687 had not received a recruit from the outside. Zifiiga reminded the people that he and his predecessors had tried many times to remedy this situa- tion but were ignored by higher authorities. He had finally dispatched the popular and extremely capable Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar to Spain, but he had not yet returned. Furthermore no provisions had arrived at St. Augustine for the last three months; there was a shortage of everything. The governor anoyAed-thathes going to oyrdery ne- ide-, the iflt h nsmott the inhabitants of s A ng'tnn sod te enyi9, includino friars, prists women chdrn, lSe lavset, free Negroes, and "all Indians of whatever nation which have rendered obfiience to hi7is Cathoe ies ii i *ga emftl nel-ictioiriing into thet fen about 1,500 to 1,600 persons. Most of these people were "poor as a churchmouse"; for a long time the garrison's only pay had been "two breads a day," so it would be the responsibility of the authorities to feed everyone inside the fort. This would be a most difficult task. But 22 THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE and enterprise of the two friars, who were, incidentally, later captured by the English and sent to Charleston. Fuentes was unable to send a messenger to St. Augustine until the end of November, keeping the governor completely in the dark about the Spanish troops in Guale (46, 87). On an undetermined date the captain and his family were also captured and taken to Charleston where his wife delivered their next child (24, p. 51). Although the news was disjointed, it was obvious that the English had surmounted the last obstacle before attacking St. Augustine. Consequent- ly, on the morning of November_6 Z;figakdee-tn4l.A _feashproc- lamation to his army and the people of St. Augusting. He told them of the e6iat3lhle&Cralraiii"ei2ifiiisd its defeat at Santa Maria Island and at the Salamototo River because of superior English forces. The governor told his people that "the enemy is approaching by land and by sea and they are bringing the means to attack and besiege the royal fort." It was stated that there was a genuine fear that the loyalty of some Indians was questionable, and the Carolina forces would take advantage of this. Some natives who were well informed about conditions in St. Augustine might rush to the English forces, and tell them "everything about this town, its streets, entrances, environs, creeks, bars, tidelands, paths to the cattle and other ranches, savannas, and other places." The proclamation did not hide the deficient situation of the garrison. Especially bad was the status of the infantry, which since 1687 had not received a recruit from the outside. Zfifiga reminded the people that he and his predecessors had tried many times to remedy this situa- tion but were ignored by higher authorities. He had finally dispatched the popular and extremely capable Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar to Spain, but he had not yet returned. Furthermore no provisions had arrived at St. Augustine for the last three months; there was a shortage of everything. The governor annoi d tahwasgoing to order eYoyese-issidn the for;Th'iment the inhabitarts of St Anenm ad the esng§ including friarspriest wormen ehtidrDnggr laves, free Negroes, and "all Indians of whatever nation which have rendered obedience to hi lbe Maiesty /Sin itt'eisThtltfltn