The CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS The CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS The CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS SERIES ONE VOLUME VI SERIES ONE VOLUME VI SERIES ONE VOLUME VI A publiation of the SCHOOL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES Caribbean, held at the University of Florida, Deceber 1, 2, and 3, 1955. A publication of the SCHOOL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES w~hich cotan the papers delivered at the sithh cofrneo the Car~ibbean held at the Uivers~,ity of Florida, Deember 1, 2, an.td 3, 1955. A publictio~n of the SCHOOL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES w~hich cotains the papers delivered at the sixth conftereceo the Caribbean held att the Untiversity of Floidat, Deemttber' 1, 2, antd 3, 1955. ISSUEDt WTH~s AtSSISTANEt FROMt ISSED WITH AtSSSTANCE FRtOtM T HE WALTsER B . FR AS E R PUBLICATION FUND ISSUD WITH ASSITAt.NCEH FROMt~ THE WALTER B. F R A ER ULICATION FUND  MA MAMA CIBACAIBBA CA IBBA GUF GU o GULF f ~ -- - PA IFIC EA PA IFIC EA0 PA NII A~ OLEAN 0QEAN .OCA  The CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS edited by A. Curtis Wilgus 1962 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS Gainesville The CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS edited by A. Curtis Wilgus 1962 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS Gainesville The CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS edited by A. Curtis Wilgus 1962 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS Gainesville LOS!UA U ~ FORM LIT  Copyright, 1956, by the UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA ALLRGTRSRVED Copyrigh, 1956, by the UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA ALRGHSRESRVE Copyrigh, 1956, by the UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA A University of Floria Pr-es Book L. C. Catalogueo Card Numober: 51-12532 FIRST RDITION, 1956 LITHIOPRINTRD FDITION, 1962 A Unversity of FlordaPrss Book L. C. Catlogue Card Number: 51-12532 A UnivrosityofjFlorida Prs Book L. C. Catalogueo Card Numober: 51-12532 FIRST EDITION, 1956 LITHOPERINTRD EDITION, 1962 FIRST RDITION, 1916 LITHOPRINTRD RDITION, 1962 LithoprintRd by Lithopinted by DOUGLAS PRINTING COMPANY, INC. JALRSONVILLE, FLORIDA DOGLAS PRINTING COMPANY, INC. JACKSONVILLE, FLORIRA DOUGLAS PRINTING COMPANY, INC. JACKSONILLR, FLORIDA  Contributors Contributors Contributors ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, Department of Economics, Rutgers University JOsE A. BAQUERO, Department of Economics, The Catholic Uni- versity of Ecuador HARRY BERNSTEIN, Department of History, Brooklyn College GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN, Department of Political Science, North- western University ANITA BRENNER, Author, Editor, and Lecturer, Mexico City CHARLEs C. CUMBERLAND, Department of History, Michigan State College RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, Department of Political Science, Uni- versity of California at Los Angeles ALBERT GOMEs, Minister for Labor, Industry and Commerce, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B.W.I. EDWARD M. HEILIGER, Director, University of Illinois Library, Chicago HUBERT HERRING, Department of History, Claremont Graduate School and Pomona College, Claremont SAMUEL GUY INMAN, Specialist in Inter-American Relations, Bronxville GERHARD MASUR, Department of History, Sweet Briar College ELENA MEDEROS DE GONZALEZ, Cultural, Political, and Social Welfare Leader, Havana, Cuba ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, Department of Economics, Rutgers University JOsE A. BAQUERO, Department of Economics, The Catholic Uni- versity of Ecuador HARRY BERNSTEIN, Department of History, Brooklyn College GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN, Department of Political Science, North- western University ANITA BRENNER, Author, Editor, and Lecturer, Mexico City CHARLES C. CUMBERLAND, Department of History, Michigan State College RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, Department of Political Science, Uni- versity of California at Los Angeles ALBERT COMES, Minister for Labor, Industry and Commerce, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B.W.I. EDwARD M. HEILIGER, Director, University of Illinois Library, Chicago HUBERT HERRING, Department of History, Claremont Graduate School and Pomona College, Claremont SAMUEL GUY INMAN, Specialist in Inter-American Relations, Bronxville GERHARD MASUR, Department of History, Sweet Briar College ELENA MEDEROS DE GONZALEZ, Cultural, Political, and Social Welfare Leader, Havana, Cuba ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, Department of Economics, Rutgers University JosE A. BAQUERO, Department of Economics, The Catholic Uni- versity of Ecuador HARRY BERNSTEIN, Department of History, Brooklyn College GEORGE I. BLANEsTEN, Department of Political Science, North- western University ANITA BRENNER, Author, Editor, and Lecturer, Mexico City CHARLES C. CUMBERLAND, Department of History, Michigan State College RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, Department of Political Science, Uni- versity of California at Los Angeles ALBERT GOMES, Minister for Labor, Industry and Commerce, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B.W.I. EDWARD M. HEILIGER, Director, University of Illinois Library, Chicago HUBERT HERRING, Department of History, Claremont Graduate School and Pomona College, Claremont SAMUEL Guy INMAN, Specialist in Inter-American Relations, Bronxville GERHARD MASUR, Department of History, Sweet Briar College ELENA MEDEROS DE GONZALEZ, Cultural, Political, and Social Welfare Leader, Havana, Cuba  vi The Caribbean DANA G. MUNRO, Director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University WILLIAM M. PEPPER, JR., Editor, The Gainesville Daily Sun, Gainesville HERMINIO PORTELL-VILA, Department of History, University of Havana, Cuba J. WAYNE REITZ, President, University of Florida STANLEY R. Ross, Department of History, University of Ne- braska ROBERT E. SCOTT, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois WILLIAM S. STOKEs, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin ALFRED B. THOMAs, Department of History, University of Ala- bama A. CURTIs WILGUS, Director, School of Inter-American Studies, University of Florida IONE STUESSY WRIGHT, Department of History, University of Miami vi The Caribbean DANA G. MUNRO, Director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University WILLIAM M. PEPPER, JR., Editor, The Gainesville Daily Sun, Gainesville HERMINIO PORTELL-VILA, Department of History, University of Havana, Cuba J. WAYNE REITZ, President, University of Florida STANLEY R. Ross, Department of History, University of Ne- braska ROBERT E. SCOTT, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois WILLIAM S. STOKEs, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin ALFRED B. THOMAs, Department of History, University of Ala- bama A. CURTIs WILGUS, Director, School of Inter-American Studies, University of Florida IONE STUESSY WRIGHT, Department of History, University of Miami vi The Caribbean DANA G. MUNRO, Director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University WILLIAM M. PEPPER, JR., Editor, The Gainesville Daily Sun, Gainesville HERMINIO PORTELL-VILA, Department of History, University of Havana, Cuba J. WAYNE REITZ, President, University of Florida STANLEY R. Ross, Department of History, University of Ne- braska ROBERT E. ScOTT, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois WILLIAM S. STOKEs, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin ALFRED B. THOMAS, Department of History, University of Ala- bama A. CURTIs WILGUs, Director, School of Inter-American Studies, University of Florida IONE STUESSY WRIGHT, Department of History, University of Miami  Foreword Foreword Foreword THIS SIXTH VOLUME in our Caribbean Conference Series constitutes a collection of integrated studies of the current political scene in the area. By its very nature the volume is not only a reference, but it has in some respects the character of a textbook for the study of both the history and political science of these countries. In these conferences we consider the Caribbean area to embrace Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Venezuela on the mainland of South America, the island republics, and the non-self-governing areas of the region. This rather compact geo- graphical unit is one in which the state of Florida is especially interested, and it is only natural that the University should stress in these conferences the history, culture, and civilization of the area, of which we are really a part. For more than sixty years the University of Florida has attracted students from the islands and mainlands of the Caribbean. The affairs of our state, however, have been intimately associated with this region for a much longer period. Indeed, during the Spanish colonial regime in the Caribbean, "La Florida" was administered from the islands and from Mexico for some three centuries. It seemed only natural, therefore, in 1950 for the University to inaugurate this series of annual meetings where scholars from various disciplines are able to exchange ideas and information, and gain inspiration in their attempts to deal with the facts and factors of our immediate neighbors. In accomplishing these objectives, especially during the past five conferences, we have been greatly assisted by the Aluminum Company of America through the Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. In publishing the resulting volumes we have had the generous vii THIS SIXTH VOLUME in our Caribbean Conference Series constitutes a collection of integrated studies of the current political scene in the area. By its very nature the volume is not only a reference, but it has in some respects the character of a textbook for the study of both the history and political science of these countries. In these conferences we consider the Caribbean area to embrace Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Venezuela on the mainland of South America, the island republics, and the non-self-governing areas of the region. This rather compact geo- graphical unit is one in which the state of Florida is especially interested, and it is only natural that the University should stress in these conferences the history, culture, and civilization of the area, of which we are really a part. For more than sixty years the University of Florida has attracted students from the islands and mainlands of the Caribbean. The affairs of our state, however, have been intimately associated with this region for a much longer period. Indeed, during the Spanish colonial regime in the Caribbean, "La Florida" was administered from the islands and from Mexico for some three centuries. It seemed only natural, therefore, in 1950 for the University to inaugurate this series of annual meetings where scholars from various disciplines are able to exchange ideas and information, and gain inspiration in their attempts to deal with the facts and factors of our immediate neighbors. In accomplishing these objectives, especially during the past five conferences, we have been greatly assisted by the Aluminum Company of America through the Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. In publishing the resulting volumes we have had the generous vii THIS SIXTH VOLUME in our Caribbean Conference Series constitutes a collection of integrated studies of the current political scene in the area. By its very nature the volume is not only a reference, but it has in some respects the character of a textbook for the study of both the history and political science of these countries. In these conferences we consider the Caribbean area to embrace Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Venezuela on the mainland of South America, the island republics, and the non-self-governing areas of the region. This rather compact geo- graphical unit is one in which the state of Florida is especially interested, and it is only natural that the University should stress in these conferences the history, culture, and civilization of the area, of which we are really a part. For more than sixty years the University of Florida has attracted students from the islands and mainlands of the Caribbean. The affairs of our state, however, have been intimately associated with this region for a much longer period. Indeed, during the Spanish colonial regime in the Caribbean, "La Florida" was administered from the islands and from Mexico for some three centuries. It seemed only natural, therefore, in 1950 for the University to inaugurate this series of annual meetings where scholars from various disciplines are able to exchange ideas and information, and gain inspiration in their attempts to deal with the facts and factors of our immediate neighbors. In accomplishing these objectives, especially during the past five conferences, we have been greatly assisted by the Aluminum Company of America through the Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. In publishing the resulting volumes we have had the generous  viii The Caribbean assistance and cooperation of former State Senator Walter B. Fraser of St. Augustine. Through the Publication Fund which bears his name, our University Press has been able to issue the volumes yearly. Our appreciation of this dual assistance is grate- fully acknowledged. We plan to continue to present each year a conference in this series and to make the papers which result available to scholars throughout the world. As a matter of fact we attach as much importance to this series of reference volumes as to the series of meetings, for in this way we give through the printed word a permanence which is lost by the spoken word. It is not without pride that we have received praise for our contribution to an understanding of the Caribbean area. We hope to continue to merit this commendation in succeeding conferences and volumes. J. WAYNE REITZ, President University of Florida viii The Caribbean viii The Caribbean assistance and cooperation of former State Senator Walter B. Fraser of St. Augustine. Through the Publication Fund which bears his name, our University Press has been able to issue the volumes yearly. Our appreciation of this dual assistance is grate- fully acknowledged. We plan to continue to present each year a conference in this series and to make the papers which result available to scholars throughout the world. As a matter of fact we attach as much importance to this series of reference volumes as to the series of meetings, for in this way we give through the printed word a permanence which is lost by the spoken word. It is not without pride that we have received praise for our contribution to an understanding of the Caribbean area. We hope to continue to merit this commendation in succeeding conferences and volumes. J. WAYNE REITz, President University of Florida assistance and cooperation of former State Senator Walter B. Fraser of St. Augustine. Through the Publication Fund which bears his name, our University Press has been able to issue the volumes yearly. Our appreciation of this dual assistance is grate- fully acknowledged. We plan to continue to present each year a conference in this series and to make the papers which result available to scholars throughout the world. As a matter of fact we attach as much importance to this series of reference volumes as to the series of meetings, for in this way we give through the printed word a permanence which is lost by the spoken word. It is not without pride that we have received praise for our contribution to an understanding of the Caribbean area. We hope to continue to merit this commendation in succeeding conferences and volumes. J. WAYNE REITr, President University of Florida  Contents Contents Contents Map of Caribbean Area . . . . . . . . Frontispi List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . Foreword-J. WAYNE REITZ . . . . . . . . . Introduction: LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS A. CURTIS WILGUS . Part I - CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1. Harry Bernstein: THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . 2. Gerhard Masur: FOREIGN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 3. Russell H. Fitzgibbon: POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN THE CARIBBEAN .. ece Map of Caribbean Area . . . . . . . . Frontispiece V List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . v Vii Foreword-J. WAYNE REITZ . . . . . . Vii Introduction: LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS xi A. CURTIS WILGUS Xi Map of Caribbean Area . . . . . . . . Frontispiece List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . v Foreword-J. WAYNE REITZ .Vi Introduction: LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS A- CmII WOra.... . 3 12 25 Part I - CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1. Harry Bernstein: THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN. . . 2. Gerhard Masur: FOREIGN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 3. Russell H. Fitzgibbon: POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN THE CARIBBEAN .. Part II - POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 4. lone Stuessy Wright: FACTORS AFFECTING POPULAR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN 5. Elena Mederos de Gonzalez: THE FRANCHISE IN THE CARIBBEAN . ... 3 12 25 41 53 Part II - POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 4. lone Stuessy Wright: FACTORS AFFECTING POPULAR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN . 41 5. Elena Mederos de Gonzalez: THE FRANCHISE IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . 53 v6. Robert J. Alexander: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN . 74 Part III - REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 7. Charles C. Cumberland: BASES OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . 89 8. Stanley R. Ross: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY COUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 110 ix Part I - CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1. Harry Bernstein: THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . 2. Gerhard Masur: FOREIGN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 3. Russell H. Fitzgibbon: POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN THE CARIBBEAN .. Part II - POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 4. lone Stuessy Wright: FACTORS AFFECTING POPULAR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN .. 5. Elena Mederos de GonzleZ: THE FRANCHISE IN THE CARIBBEAN . ... '6. Robert J. Alexander: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN .. Part III - REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 7. Charles C. Curnberland: BASES OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN ..... 3 12 25 41 53 74 '6. Robert J. Alexander: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 74 Part III - REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 7. Charles C. Cumberland: BASES OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN . ... 89 8. Stanley R. Ross: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY COUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 110 8. Stanley R. Ross: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY COUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 110  x The Caribbean 9. William S. Stokes: NONVIOLENT METHODS OF MOBILIZING POLITICAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN 129 Part IV - PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 10. Samuel Guy Inman: THE BACKGROUND OF DICTATORS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN. . . 161 11. Alfred B. Thomas: THE CAUDILLO IN THE CARIBBEAN: AN INTERPRETATION . . . 174 12. Robert E. Scott: USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 187 Part V -- PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 13. Herminio Portell-Vili: BACKGROUNDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN.. . 199 14. George I. Blanksten: PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . 215 15. Jose A. Baquero: MAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 232 Part VI - SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 16. Hubert Herring: PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRACY . 249 17. William M. Pepper, Jr.: PRESS FREEDOM . . 257 18. Dana G. Munro: CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES 266 19. Albert Gomes: FEDERATION IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES . . 275 20. Anita Brenner: A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POLITICAL LIFE AND INFLUENCES . . 290 Part VII - CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 21. Edward M. Heiliger: SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS . . . . . . . 301 x The Caribbean x The Caribbean 9. William S. Stokes: NONVIOLENT METHODS OF MOBILIZING POLITICAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN 129 Part IV - PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 10. Samuel Guy Inman: THE BACKGROUND OF DICTATORS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN. . . 161 11. Alfred B. Thomas: THE CAUDILLO IN THE CARIBBEAN: AN INTERPRETATION . . . 174 12. Robert E. Scott: USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN , . 187 9. William S. Stokes: NONVIOLENT METHODS OF MOBILIZING POLITICAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN 129 Part IV - PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 10. Samuel Guy Inman: THE BACKGROUND OF DICTATORS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN. . . 161 11. Alfred B. Thomas: THE CAUDILLO IN THE CARIBBEAN: AN INTERPRETATION . . . 174 12. Robert E. Scott: USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN . . 187 Part V - PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 13. Herminio Portell-Vild: BACKGROUNDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN . .. 14. George . Blanksten: PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN .. 15. Jose A. Baquero: MAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN . Part VI - SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 16. Hubert Herring: PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRACY. 17. William M. Pepper, Jr.: PRESS FREEDOM . 18. Dana G. Munro: CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES . 19. Albert Comes: FEDERATION IN THE Part V - PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 13. Herminio Portell-Vili: BACKGROUNDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 199 IN THE CARIBBEAN . 14. George . Blanksten: PROBLEMS OF LOCAL 215 GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN . 15. Jose A. Baqurero: MAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC 232 ADMINISTRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN Part VI - SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 249 16. Hubert Herring: PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRACY. 257 17. William M. Pepper, Jr.: PRESS FREEDOM . 266 18. Dana G. Munro: CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES 19. Albert Gomes: FEDERATION IN THE 215 232 249 257 266 BRITISH WEST INDIES . . 275 20. Anita Brenner: A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POLITICAL LIFE AND INFLUENCES . . . 290 BRITISH WEST INDIES . . 275 20. Anita Brenner: A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POLITICAL LIFE AND INFLUENCES . . . 290 Part VII - CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 21. Edward M. Heiliger: SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS . . . . . Part VII - CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 21. Edward M. Heiliger: SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL .301 PROBLEMS . . . .  Introduction Introduction Introduction LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY all the governments of Latin America on occasion have been guided in their national destinies by executives popularly known as dictators. These pilots of the ship of state have made for themselves famous or infamous reputations, both among their own people and among foreigners. Therefore, in a volume such as this dealing with practical politics in the Caribbean area at the present time, it may be worth while to examine somewhat in detail some of the characteristics of the so-called dictator, or caudillo, who has so frequently and widely appeared on the Latin American political stage. Shortly before committing suicide on September 19, 1891, President Jos6 Balmaceda of Chile wrote a letter to his good friend Jose Uriburu defending and justifying his actions. One sentence in this pessimistic note is of interest to us. Balmaceda wrote: "I have lost all hope that a government that is arbitrary in form will work with justice." An elaboration of this observation would of course be superfluous for it states a truism that many Latin Ameri- can executives have come to realize much more clearly than when these lines were written. There is a Spanish proverb which says in substance, "The man who at eighteen is not a revolutionist has no heart, while a man xi LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY all the governments of Latin America on occasion have been guided in their national destinies by executives popularly known as dictators. These pilots of the ship of state have made for themselves famous or infamous reputations, both among their own people and among foreigneers. Therefore, in a volume such as this dealing with practical politics in the Caribbean area at the present time, it may be worth while to examine somewhat in detail some of the characteristics of the so-called dictator, or caudillo, who has so frequently and widely appeared on the Latin American political stage. Shortly before committing suicide on September 19, 1891, President Jose Balmaceda of Chile wrote a letter to his good friend Jose Uriburu defending and justifying his actions. One sentence in this pessimistic note is of interest to us. Balmaceda wrote: "I have lost all hope that a government that is arbitrary in form will work with justice." An elaboration of this observation would of course be superfluous for it states a truism that many Latin Ameri- can executives have come to realize much more clearly than when these lines were written. There is a Spanish proverb which says in substance, "The man who at eighteen is not a revolutionist has no heart, while a man xi LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORS FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY all the governments of Latin America on occasion have been guided in their national destinies by executives popularly known as dictators. These pilots of the ship of state have made for themselves famous or infamous reputations, both among their own people and among foreigners. Therefore, in a volume such as this dealing with practical politics in the Caribbean area at the present time, it may be worth while to examine somewhat in detail some of the characteristics of the so-called dictator, or caudillo, who has so frequently and widely appeared on the Latin American political stage. Shortly before committing suicide on September 19, 1891, President Jose Balmaceda of Chile wrote a letter to his good friend Jose Uriburu defending and justifying his actions. One sentence in this pessimistic note is of interest to us. Balmaceda wrote: "I have lost all hope that a government that is arbitrary in form will work with justice." An elaboration of this observation would of course be superfluous for it states a truism that many Latin Ameri- can executives have come to realize much more clearly than when these lines were written. There is a Spanish proverb which says in substance, "The man who at eighteen is not a revolutionist has no heart, while a man  xii The Caribbean who at forty-five is not a conservative has no head." How true this statement is when applied to many Latin American political leaders during the past century! It is almost possible to predict with a fair degree of accuracy what the political life history of a rising Latin American politico will be, barring of course acts of God or assassination. During the past century there has been what might be con- sidered a periodicity in Latin American dictatorships, with major peaks about the years 1835, 1850, 1865, 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1952. Generally speaking the earlier dictators were bloody, vicious, brutal, and overbearing-like Facundo, described by Sar- miento of Argentina. They were less polished and sophisticated, socially and culturally. They often accomplished their aim with violence. As Francisco Garcia Caldern of Peru said, they sprang from barbarism and periodic anarchy. But the later dictators have become more conscious of political etiquette and have mixed per- sonal suavity with their actions and decrees. And while they have often been supported by the army, they have with few exceptions attempted to give a semblance of legality to their actions, and have by forceful argument persuaded their followers to see the light of reason and the advantages of their rule. II The character traits of Latin American dictators often have been influenced by past history, by racial inheritance, by geo- graphical and cultural environment, by physical and mental health, and by moral and religions attitudes. The first invaders of the Iberian Peninsula developed a one- man rule which was to become traditional and habitual for cen- turies. This fact made the few attempts to establish democratic institutions in Spain and Portugal almost impossible and so con- trary to history and tradition as to appear exotic. In the struggle with the Moors, the Kingship rapidly gained prestige and was gradually consolidated through political gains within family limits. Because the Reconquest was a religious crusade and xii The Caribbean who at forty-five is not a conservative has no head." How true this statement is when applied to many Latin American political leaders during the past century! It is almost possible to predict with a fair degree of accuracy what the political life history of a rising Latin American politico will be, barring of course acts of God or assassination. During the past century there has been what might be con- sidered a periodicity in Latin American dictatorships, with major peaks about the years 1835, 1850, 1865, 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1952. Generally speaking the earlier dictators were bloody, vicious, brutal, and overbearing-like Facundo, described by Sar- miento of Argentina. They were less polished and sophisticated, socially and culturally. They often accomplished their aim with violence. As Francisco Garcia Calderon of Peru said, they sprang from barbarism and periodic anarchy. But the later dictators have become more conscious of political etiquette and have mixed per- sonal suavity with their actions and decrees. And while they have often been supported by the army, they have with few exceptions attempted to give a semblance of legality to their actions, and have by forceful argument persuaded their followers to see the light of reason and the advantages of their rule. II The character traits of Latin American dictators often have been influenced by past history, by racial inheritance, by geo- graphical and cultural environment, by physical and mental health, and by moral and religioas attitudes. The first invaders of the Iberian Peninsula developed a one- man rule which was to become traditional and habitual for cen- turies. This fact made the few attempts to establish democratic institutions in Spain and Portugal almost impossible and so con- trary to history and tradition as to appear exotic. In the struggle with the Moors, the Kingship rapidly gained prestige and was gradually consolidated through political gains within family limits. Because the Reconquest was a religious crusade and xii The Caribbean who at forty-five is not a conservative has no head." How true this statement is when applied to many Latin American political leaders during the past century! It is almost possible to predict with a fair degree of accuracy what the political life history of a rising Latin American politico will be, barring of course acts of God or assassination. During the past century there has been what might be con- sidered a periodicity in Latin American dictatorships, with major peaks about the years 1835, 1850, 1865, 1890, 1910, 1935, and 1952. Generally speaking the earlier dictators were bloody, vicious, brutal, and overbearing-like Facundo, described by Sar- miento of Argentina. They were less polished and sophisticated, socially and culturally. They often accomplished their aim with violence. As Francisco Garcia Calderon of Peru said, they sprang from barbarism and periodic anarchy. But the later dictators have become more conscious of political etiquette and have mixed per- sonal suavity with their actions and decrees. And while they have often been suppreorted by the army, they have with few exceptions attempted to give a semblance of legality to their actions, and have by forceful argument persuaded their followers to see the light of reason and the advantages of their rule. II The character traits of Latin American dictators often have been influenced by past history, by racial inheritance, by geo- graphical and cultural environment, by physical and mental health, and by moral and religious attitudes. The first invaders of the Iberian Peninsula developed a one- man rule which was to become traditional and habitual for cen- turies. This fact made the few attempts to establish democratic institutions in Spain and Portugal almost impossible and so con- trary to history and tradition as to appear exotic. In the struggle with the Moors, the Kingship rapidly gained prestige and was gradually consolidated through political gains within family limits. Because the Reconquest was a religious crusade and  EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION Xiii because the Pope supported the Iberian Kings, their prestige was not only immensely increased but widely recognized. Even- tually the King controlled all power and "could do no wrong." When the Iberians discovered America they found the natives organized under a one-man rule of caciques, or chiefs, and formed into tribes for social and political reasons. This fact enabled the Iberian crowns to rapidly incorporate the Indian tribes into their empires by methods of military conquest and religious persuasion, much in the same way as numerous political and geographical divisions of the Iberian Peninsula had been forcibly united for political purposes. Intermarriage between Iberians and American natives, a natural result of the shock of impact of the two races, resulted in a furthering of political unity. But at the same time this process failed to produce any greater democratic feelings in the offspring of the union than had existed in either race. Throughout the Colonial era, a period of more than ten gen- erations, the King's person, power, and prestige were represented in the colonies by a viceroy or someone with similar royal power, who exercised the Crown's function in such a paternalistic man- ner as to discourage constructive thinking, individual initiative, and general cooperation. Thus, the tradition of one-man rale was naturally perpetuated in America with little opposition, and even the elements of democracy existing in the Spanish colonial munic- ipalities in the sixteenth century disappeared before the over- whelming preponderance of historical factors and traditions. No matter how far back one looks in Latin American history, one sees a vast panorama of nearly absolute rulers extending from the Roman emperors through Germanic chieftains, Moorish caliphs, Iberian kings, Indian chiefs, and colonial viceroys. What worse preparation for democracy could Latin Americans have had than this; and what excellent precedents were established for the justi- fication of dictatorships! The blood that flows through the veins of Latin Americans is as varied as that coursing through the bodies of any group of people on earth. A man's race may not be easily identified, but EDITORS INTRODUCTION Xiii because the Pope supported the Iberian Kings, their prestige was not only immensely increased but widely recognized. Even- tually the King controlled all power and "could do no wrong." When the Iberians discovered America they found the natives organized under a one-man rule of caciques, or chiefs, and formed into tribes for social and political reasons. This fact enabled the Iberian crowns to rapidly incorporate the Indian tribes into their empires by methods of military conquest and religious persuasion, much in the same way as numerous political and geographical divisions of the Iberian Peninsula had been forcibly united for political purposes. Intermarriage between Iberians and American natives, a natural result of the shock of impact of the two races, resulted in a furthering of political unity. But at the same time this process failed to produce any greater democratic feelings in the offspring of the union than had existed in either race. Throughout the Colonial era, a period of more than ten gen- erations, the King's person, power, and prestige were represented in the colonies by a viceroy or someone with similar royal power, who exercised the Crown's function in such a paternalistic man- ner as to discourage constructive thinking, individual initiative, and general cooperation. Thus, the tradition of one-man tule was naturally perpetuated in America with little opposition, and even the elements of democracy existing in the Spanish colonial munic- ipalities in the sixteenth century disappeared before the over- whehning preponderance of historical factors and traditions. No matter how far back one looks in Latin American history, one sees a vast panorama of nearly absolute rulers extending from the Roman emperors through Germanic chieftains, Moorish caliphs, Iberian kings, Indian chiefs, and colonial viceroys. What worse preparation for democracy could Latin Americans have had than this; and what excellent precedents were established for the justi- fication of dictatorships! The blood that flows through the veins of Latin Americans is as varied as that coursing through the bodies of any group of people on earth. A man's race may not be easily identified, but EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION Xiii because the Pope supported the Iberian Kings, their prestige was not only immensely increased but widely recognized. Even- tually the King controlled all power and "could do no wrong." When the Iberians discovered America they found the natives organized under a one-man rule of caciques, or chiefs, and formed into tribes for social and political reasons. This fact enabled the Iberian crowns to rapidly incorporate the Indian tribes into their empires by methods of military conquest and religious persuasion, much in the same way as numerous political and geographical divisions of the Iberian Peninsula had been forcibly united for political purposes. Intermarriage between Iberians and American natives, a natural result of the shock of impact of the two races, resulted in a furthering of political unity. But at the same time this process failed to produce any greater democratic feelings in the offspring of the union than had existed in either race. Throughout the Colonial era, a period of more than ten gen- erations, the King's person, power, and prestige were represented in the colonies by a viceroy or someone with similar royal power, who exercised the Crown's function in such a paternalistic man- ner as to discourage constructive thinking, individual initiative, and general cooperation. Thus, the tradition of one-man rule was naturally perpetuated in America with little opposition, and even the elements of democracy existing in the Spanish colonial munic- ipalities in the sixteenth century disappeared before the over- whelming preponderance of historical factors and traditions. No matter how far back one looks in Latin American history, one sees a vast panorama of nearly absolute rulers extending from the Roman emperors through Germanic chieftains, Moorish caliphs, Iberian kings, Indian chiefs, and colonial viceroys. What worse preparation for democracy could Latin Americans have had than this; and what excellent precedents were established for the justi- fication of dictatorships! The blood that flows through the veins of Latin Americans is as varied as that coursing through the bodies of any group of people on earth. A man's race may not be easily identified, but  xiv The Caribbean the traits which he has inherited may give him a variation in character from his fellow men which is traceable in the dim past to one of his numerous racial forebears. When such a variant occurs he may stand out from his contemporaries-especially if the traits are aggressive-as an individual of unusual ability. When such characteristics assume a political nature, that man is naturally a potential leader. These individual character differ- ences based on some racial traits are often sufficient to account for the rise of a dictator in Latin America. In the Latin American character itself there are many contra- dictions which tend to make the masses tolerant of dictators. Rufino Blanco Fombona of Venezuela has expressed this clearly: As a people the Latin Americans "are essentially democratic and at the same time eminently despotic. . . . They are of indomi- table personal independence but as a nation submit to the most personal absolutism. . . . The Spaniard and the Spanish-Ameri- can do not tolerate abuses from servility, but from excess of indi- vidualism, through lack of social cohesion, and through failure to exercise their rights." When popular conditions are propitious there is always a leader to take advantage of opportunities. Josd Gil Fortoul of Venezuela has stated a corollary idea by saying that in the people of Venezuela-as with others in Latin America -there is the initiative to govern rather than to follow. The factor of environment, of course, has been recognized as of great importance in the rise of Latin American dictators. Mountains, deserts, plains, jungles, and rivers, have all played a part in making not only the people of Latin America but the states of Latin America what they are today. Vast distances, or great elevations, or impassable terrain have tended to isolate peoples and to give them a feeling of self-importance and self-dependence which otherwise they might not have. A remote seat of govern- mental authority encourages unrest and divides the state into individualistic communities which are easily led by local power- aspiring persons. Had it not been for the vast pampa of Argen- tina, Juan Manuel de Rosas might never have appeared; or had xiv The Caribbean xiv The Caribbean the traits which he has inherited may give him a variation in character from his fellow men which is traceable in the dim past to one of his numerous racial forebears. When such a variant occurs he may stand out from his contemporaries-especially if the traits are aggressive-as an individual of unusual ability. When such characteristics assume a political nature, that man is naturally a potential leader. These individual character differ- ences based on some racial traits are often sufficient to account for the rise of a dictator in Latin America. In the Latin American character itself there are many contra- dictions which tend to make the masses tolerant of dictators. Rufino Blanco Fombona of Venezuela has expressed this clearly: As a people the Latin Americans "are essentially democratic and at the same time eminently despotic. . . . They are of indomi- table personal independence but as a nation submit to the most personal absolutism. . . . The Spaniard and the Spanish-Ameri- can do not tolerate abuses from servility, but from excess of indi- vidualism, through lack of social cohesion, and through failure to exercise their rights." When popular conditions are propitious there is always a leader to take advantage of opportunities. Jose Gil Fortoul of Venezuela has stated a corollary idea by saying that in the people of Venezuela-as with others in Latin America -there is the initiative to govern rather than to follow. The factor of environment, of course, has been recognized as of great importance in the rise of Latin American dictators. Mountains, deserts, plains, jungles, and rivers, have all played a part in making not only the people of Latin America but the states of Latin America what they are today. Vast distances, or great elevations, or impassable terrain have tended to isolate peoples and to give them a feeling of self-importance and self-dependence which otherwise they might not have. A remote seat of govern- mental authority encourages unrest and divides the state into individualistic communities which are easily led by local power- aspiring persons. Had it not been for the vast pampa of Argen- tina, Juan Manuel de Rosas might never have appeared; or had the traits which he has inherited may give him a variation in character from his fellow men which is traceable in the dim past to one of his numerous racial forebears. When such a variant occurs he may stand out from his contemporaries-especially if the traits are aggressive-as an individual of unusual ability. When such characteristics assume a political nature, that man is naturally a potential leader. These individual character differ- ences based on some racial traits are often sufficient to account for the rise of a dictator in Latin America. In the Latin American character itself there are many contra- dictions which tend to make the masses tolerant of dictators. Rufino Blanco Fombona of Venezuela has expressed this clearly: As a people the Latin Americans "are essentially democratic and at the same time eminently despotic. . . . They are of indomi- table personal independence but as a nation submit to the most personal absolutism. . . . The Spaniard and the Spanish-Ameri- can do not tolerate abuses from servility, but from excess of indi- vidualism, through lack of social cohesion, and through failure to exercise their rights." When popular conditions are propitious there is always a leader to take advantage of opportunities. Jos4 Gil Fortoul of Venezuela has stated a corollary idea by saying that in the people of Venezuela-as with others in Latin America -there is the initiative to govern rather than to follow. The factor of environment, of course, has been recognized as of great importance in the rise of Latin American dictators. Mountains, deserts, plains, jungles, and rivers, have all played a part in making not only the people of Latin America but the states of Latin America what they are today. Vast distances, or great elevations, or impassable terrain have tended to isolate peoples and to give them a feeling of self-importance and self-dependence which otherwise they might not have. A remote seat of govern- mental authority encourages unrest and divides the state into individualistic communities which are easily led by local power- aspiring persons. Had it not been for the vast pampa of Argen- tina, Juan Manuel de Rosas might never have appeared; or had  EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XV the altitude been lower in Peru and Bolivia, Andres Santa Cruz might never have achieved his political pinnacle; or had the climate been less tropical Jose Gaspar Rodriguez Francia might never have played the overpowering despot for so many years in Paraguay. Moreover, the prevalence of numerous diseases (ma- laria, dysentery, yellow fever, and venereal infection), and the oppressive and steady moist heat of the tropics make for weak wills, little self-restraint, and lack of ambition on the part of the masses. An individual who can rise above such handicaps has potential material for the making of a dictator. A man's physical and mental health also affect his political activities and aspirations. Some dictators have been diseased, some have been cripples, some have been food faddists, some have been superstitious to the nth degree, some have sought sooth- sayers and sorcerers to find out what actions they should take, some have been religious fanatics, and some have actually been mental cases. Many of these individual characteristics have de- termined not only political, but economic, social, cultural, educa- tional, and religious actions of individuals, once they arrive in dictatorial positions. Mad men in high office are found through- out history. The morality of dictators, like their honesty, is often open to wide criticism. The wealth, power, and freedom of action which goes with dictatorship affords opportunities to be both dishonest and amoral. Some dictators have maintained harems at the public expense, most have kept mistresses, and all undoubtedly have been accused of dishonest and moral lapses whether or not they deserved it. For the most part, religion has played only a slight role in their lives-lip service to religious principles is convenient at times for the caudillo, but it need not be effectively binding on him nor constitute a guide for his personal actions. Means to an end are justified by the results. Murder, mutilation, rapine, and rape have been used throughout history by unscrupulous rulers. Emotion, anger, and revenge are stronger than self-dis- cipline in the weak moral characters often found among dictators. EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XV the altitude been lower in Peru and Bolivia, Andres Santa Cruz might never have achieved his political pinnacle; or had the climate been less tropical Jose Gaspar Rodriguez Francia might never have played the overpowering despot for so many years in Paraguay. Moreover, the prevalence of numerous diseases (ma- laria, dysentery, yellow fever, and venereal infection), and the oppressive and steady moist heat of the tropics make for weak wills, little self-restraint, and lack of ambition on the part of the masses. An individual who can rise above such handicaps has potential material for the making of a dictator. A man's physical and mental health also affect his political activities and aspirations. Some dictators have been diseased, some have been cripples, some have been food faddists, some have been superstitious to the nth degree, some have sought sooth- sayers and sorcerers to find out what actions they should take, some have been religious fanatics, and some have actually been mental cases. Many of these individual characteristics have de- termined not only political, but economic, social, cultural, educa- tional, and religious actions of individuals, once they arrive in dictatorial positions. Mad men in high office are found through- out history. The morality of dictators, like their honesty, is often open to wide criticism. The wealth, power, and freedom of action which goes with dictatorship affords opportunities to be both dishonest and amoral. Some dictators have maintained harems at the public expense, most have kept mistresses, and all undoubtedly have been accused of dishonest and moral lapses whether or not they deserved it. For the most part, religion has played only a slight role in their lives-lip service to religious principles is convenient at times for the caudillo, but it need not be effectively binding on him nor constitute a guide for his personal actions. Means to an end are justified by the results. Murder, mutilation, rapine, and rape have been used throughout history by unscrupulous rulers. Emotion, anger, and revenge are stronger than self-dis- cipline in the weak moral characters often found among dictators. EDITORS INTRODUCTION XV the altitude been lower in Peru and Bolivia, Andres Santa Cruz might never have achieved his political pinnacle; or had the climate been less tropical Jos6 Gaspar Rodriguez Francia might never have played the overpowering despot for so many years in Paraguay. Moreover, the prevalence of numerous diseases (ma- laria, dysentery, yellow fever, and venereal infection), and the oppressive and steady moist heat of the tropics make for weak wills, little self-restraint, and lack of ambition on the part of the masses. An individual who can rise above such handicaps has potential material for the making of a dictator. A man's physical and mental health also affect his political activities and aspirations. Some dictators have been diseased, some have been cripples, some have been food faddists, some have been superstitious to the nth degree, some have sought sooth- sayers and sorcerers to find out what actions they should take, some have been religious fanatics, and some have actually been mental cases. Many of these individual characteristics have de- termined not only political, but economic, social, cultural, educa- tional, and religious actions of individuals, once they arrive in dictatorial positions. Mad men in high office are found through- out history. The morality of dictators, like their honesty, is often open to wide criticism. The wealth, power, and freedom of action which goes with dictatorship affords opportunities to be both dishonest and amoral. Some dictators have maintained harems at the public expense, most have kept mistresses, and all undoubtedly have been accused of dishonest and moral lapses whether or not they deserved it. For the most part, religion has played only a slight role in their lives-lip service to religious principles is convenient at times for the caudillo, but it need not be effectively binding on him nor constitute a guide for his personal actions. Means to an end are justified by the results. Murder, mutilation, rapine, and rape have been used throughout history by unscrupulous rulers. Emotion, anger, and revenge are stronger than self-dis- cipline in the weak moral characters often found among dictators.  xvi The Caribbean III Perhaps no truer words were ever spoken in fiction than those put into the mouth of Doctor Francia of Paraguay by Edward Lucas White in his incomparable novel entitled El Supremo. Francia is made to say that a dictator is "a ruler who endeavors to make his people happy by giving them what he considers good for them, instead of what they want, and then wonders why they are not pleased." No doubt there are as many definitions of the term dictator as there are dictators, for each has his own opinion on the subject of his high aims and ideals. Each considers himself a savior of his country, and usually speaks of himself as "Protector of the Constitution," "Restorer of the Laws," "Pacificator," "Benefactor," and "Liberator"; or he may use some other title calculated to mesmerize his people into a blind support of his policies. Dictators have first of all been individualists and, first and last, firm believers in the tradition of one-man control. Hence the con- cepts of personalismo, caciquismo, and caudillismo have been in- troduced into Latin American political speech. Not only are such men as good as their neighbors, but they are better. There is a Spanish phrase, del rey abajo ninguno, which has been rendered "no person below the king is any better than I am." This very indi- vidualistic feeling among all Latin Americans has been the un- doing of many a dictator, for his enemies consider themselves as good or better than he, and then the political cycle is turned to the next step by revolution. A dictator may be illiterate or well educated, but often he is instinctive in his actions and reactions, and he is frequently fanatical, usually impressionable, and in many respects unstable in character. Garcia Calderon has said that in character the dictator displays "heroic audacity," and a "perpetual and virile unrest." He rules "by virtue of personal valor and repute. . . . His religious training gives him no conception of tolerance, and he aims to achieve political victory by imprisoning, exiling, or ex- terminating his enemies. He is an ardent idealist and any actions xvi The Caribbean xvi The Caribbean III Perhaps no truer words were ever spoken in fiction than those put into the mouth of Doctor Francia of Paraguay by Edward Lucas White in his incomparable novel entitled El Supremo. Francia is made to say that a dictator is "a ruler who endeavors to make his people happy by giving them what he considers good for them, instead of what they want, and then wonders why they are not pleased." No doubt there are as many definitions of the term dictator as there are dictators, for each has his own opinion on the subject of his high aims and ideals. Each considers himself a savior of his country, and usually speaks of himself as "Protector of the Constitution," "Restorer of the Laws," "Pacificator," "Benefactor," and "Liberator"; or he may use some other title calculated to mesmerize his people into a blind support of his policies. Dictators have first of all been individualists and, first and last, firm believers in the tradition of one-man control. Hence the con- cepts of personalismo, caciquismo, and caudillismo have been in- troduced into Latin American political speech. Not only are such men as good as their neighbors, but they are better. There is a Spanish phrase, del rey abajo ninguno, which has been rendered "no person below the king is any better than I am." This very indi- vidualistic feeling among all Latin Americans has been the un- doing of many a dictator, for his enemies consider themselves as good or better than he, and then the political cycle is turned to the next step by revolution. A dictator may be illiterate or well educated, but often he is instinctive in his actions and reactions, and he is frequently fanatical, usually impressionable, and in many respects unstable in character. Garcia Calder6n has said that in character the dictator displays "heroic audacity," and a "perpetual and virile unrest." He rules "by virtue of personal valor and repute. . . . His religious training gives him no conception of tolerance, and he aims to achieve political victory by imprisoning, exiling, or ex- terminating his enemies. He is an ardent idealist and any actions III Perhaps no truer words were ever spoken in fiction than those put into the mouth of Doctor Francia of Paraguay by Edward Lucas White in his incomparable novel entitled El Supremo. Francia is made to say that a dictator is "a ruler who endeavors to make his people happy by giving them what he considers good for them, instead of what they want, and then wonders why they are not pleased." No doubt there are as many definitions of the term dictator as there are dictators, for each has his own opinion on the subject of his high aims and ideals. Each considers himself a savior of his country, and usually speaks of himself as "Protector of the Constitution," "Restorer of the Laws," "Pacificator," "Benefactor," and "Liberator"; or he may use some other title calculated to mesmerize his people into a blind support of his policies. Dictators have first of all been individualists and, first and last, firm believers in the tradition of one-man control. Hence the con- cepts of personalismo, caciquismo, and caudillismo have been in- troduced into Latin American political speech. Not only are such men as good as their neighbors, but they are better. There is a Spanish phrase, del rey abajo ninguno, which has been rendered "no person below the king is any better than I am." This very indi- vidualistic feeling among all Latin Americans has been the un- doing of many a dictator, for his enemies consider themselves as good or better than he, and then the political cycle is turned to the next step by revolution. A dictator may be illiterate or well educated, but often he is instinctive in his actions and reactions, and he is frequently fanatical, usually impressionable, and in many respects unstable in character. Garcia Calder6n has said that in character the dictator displays "heroic audacity," and a "perpetual and virile unrest." He rules "by virtue of personal valor and repute. . . ." His religious training gives him no conception of tolerance, and he aims to achieve political victory by imprisoning, exiling, or ex- terminating his enemies. He is an ardent idealist and any actions  EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XVii are justified if his ideals can be attained. Quite often the dictator lacks a sense of humor, for how else can his quixotic acts be explained? In any case, a dictator is a "do-it-now" man, where in a land in which maiana is the busiest day of the week he is by contrast with his fellow humans an exceedingly superior individual. Usually a dictator is a hero-worshiper having in mind a bril- liant example of individual accomplishments on the part of some past leader. Probably he has a Greek or Roman example before him. But if not a Caesar or a Themistocles, an Alexander or a Hercules, he may condescend to emulate a Napoleon and even a George Washington. The best place to study the psychology of conceit is in the thoughts and actions of a Latin American dictator. IV But unquestionably the dictators have played pre-eminent roles in the progress made by the Latin American states. Although they have been "adventurers in politics" as the English scholar Cecil Jane called them, they have helped their countries through great struggles in times of crises just as surely as they have brought to their countries great national catastrophes and international embarrassments. Dictators have taken advantage of the political inexperience of their people, and by appealing to their fanatical patriotism they have climbed into office literally over the dead bodies of their personal enemies. With the use of political trickery and military force, dictators have paved the way for their own rapid decline. For with the use of force to enter office, dictators have found that they must continue the use of force to remain in office. Thus despotism has been inescapable. But too much despotism is a cure for dictatorship, as many people have dis- covered, and the political cycle continues with a revolution. In Latin America the national armies have always been over- supplied with generals, each of whom is likely to he a dictator on a small scale. When once the generals-and admirals too!- EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XVii are justified if his ideals can be attained. Quite often the dictator lacks a sense of humor, for how else can his quixotic acts be explained? In any case, a dictator is a "do-it-now" man, where in a land in which manana is the busiest day of the week he is by contrast with his fellow humans an exceedingly superior individual. Usually a dictator is a hero-worshiper having in mind a bril- liant example of individual accomplishments on the part of some past leader. Probably he has a Greek or Roman example before him. But if not a Caesar or a Themistocles, an Alexander or a Hercules, he may condescend to emulate a Napoleon and even a George Washington. The best place to study the psychology of conceit is in the thoughts and actions of a Latin American dictator. IV But unquestionably the dictators have played pre-eminent roles in the progress made by the Latin American states. Although they have been "adventurers in politics" as the English scholar Cecil Jane called them, they have helped their countries through great struggles in times of crises just as surely as they have brought to their countries great national catastrophes and international embarrassments. Dictators have taken advantage of the political inexperience of their people, and by appealing to their fanatical patriotism they have climbed into office literally over the dead bodies of their personal enemies. With the use of political trickery and military force, dictators have paved the way for their own rapid decline. For with the use of force to enter office, dictators have found that they must continue the use of force to remain in office. Thus despotism has been inescapable. But too much despotism is a cure for dictatorship, as many people have dis- covered, and the political cycle continues with a revolution. In Latin America the national armies have always been over- supplied with generals, each of whom is likely to be a dictator on a small scale. When once the generals-and admirals too!- EDITORS INTRODUCTION XVii are justified if his ideals can be attained. Quite often the dictator lacks a sense of humor, for how else can his quixotic acts be explained? In any case, a dictator is a "do-it-now" man, where in a land in which maana is the busiest day of the week he is by contrast with his fellow humans an exceedingly superior individual. Usually a dictator is a hero-worshiper having in mind a bril- liant example of individual accomplishments on the part of some past leader. Probably he has a Greek or Roman example before him. But if not a Caesar or a Themistocles, an Alexander or a Hercules, he may condescend to emulate a Napoleon and even a George Washington. The best place to study the psychology of conceit is in the thoughts and actions of a Latin American dictator. IV But unquestionably the dictators have played pre-eminent roles in the progress made by the Latin American states. Although they have been "adventurers in politics" as the English scholar Cecil Jane called them, they have helped their countries through great struggles in times of crises just as surely as they have brought to their countries great national catastrophes and international embarrassments. Dictators have taken advantage of the political inexperience of their people, and by appealing to their fanatical patriotism they have climbed into office literally over the dead bodies of their personal enemies. With the use of political trickery and military force, dictators have paved the way for their own rapid decline. For with the use of force to enter office, dictators have found that they must continue the use of force to remain in office. Thus despotism has been inescapable. But too much despotism is a cure for dictatorship, as many people have dis- covered, and the political cycle continues with a revolution. In Latin America the national armies have always been over- supplied with generals, each of whom is likely to be a dictator on a small scale. When once the generals-and admirals too!-  xviii The Caribbean feel themselves slighted or double-crossed by the general whom they and the military have helped into the office of president, they begin to jostle each other for an advantageous position from which one of their number may spring into the presidential chair and push the offending executive into exile. Only the presidency is on a higher plane and affords greater privileges than the posi- tion of a general, for in this highest executive office a brilliant uniform is mandatory, a dashing charger with brilliant trappings may be ridden through the streets, or, in more recent times, a bulletproof limousine of the latest pattern may go careening about the capital. Another ego-inflating satisfaction derived from being a dictator is the right to be supported-together with his family and rela- tives-in a fitting fashion by the state. Even the wealthiest of dictators may thus live in a style of ostentation beyond their fondest dreams. For example, the constitution of Paraguay once provided certain honorary marks of distinction which appealed to the inordinate self-love of the dictator Francisco Solano Lipez: 1. The President of the Republic shall wear the uniform of a captain-general, and underneath the uniform a tri-colored ribbon from right to left, from which shall he pendant over his breast a national emblem or jewel of honor, both being at the cost of the Treasury of the Republic. 2. The jewel of honor shall be a star of gold set in diamonds, in the center of which may be read on one side Executive Power, and on the other Republic of Paraguay. 3. The President of the Republic shall have the attributes and prerogatives of the Captain-General and be entitled to form a guard of honor for the safety of his person. The guard shall not exceed the number of seventy-five. 4. He shall have besides, two or three aides-de-camp in waiting at the palace, who shall perform their duties in turn; as also a warden and such domestic servants as may be required, the salaries of the same to be paid by the National Treasury. When in office dictators seldom tinker with the public debt, but they invariably doctor the constitutions into untimely deaths or amend them into the limbo of impractical and unworkable politi- xviii The Caribbean xviii The Caribbean feel themselves slighted or double-crossed by the general whom they and the military have helped into the office of president, they begin to jostle each other for an advantageous position from which one of their number may spring into the presidential chair and push the offending executive into exile. Only the presidency is on a higher plane and affords greater privileges than the posi- tion of a general, for in this highest executive office a brilliant uniform is mandatory, a dashing charger with brilliant trappings may be ridden through the streets, or, in more recent times, a bulletproof limousine of the latest pattern may go careening about the capital. Another ego-inflating satisfaction derived from being a dictator is the right to be supported-together with his family and rela- tives-in a fitting fashion by the state. Even the wealthiest of dictators may thus live in a style of ostentation beyond their fondest dreams. For example, the constitution of Paraguay once provided certain honorary marks of distinction which appealed to the inordinate self-love of the dictator Francisco Solano Lspez: 1. The President of the Republic shall wear the uniform of a captain-general, and underneath the uniform a tri-colored ribbon from right to left, from which shall be pendant over his breast a national emblem or jewel of honor, both being at the cost of the Treasury of the Republic. 2. The jewel of honor shall be a star of gold set in diamonds, in the center of which may he read on one side Executive Power, and on the other Republic of Paraguay. 3. The President of the Republic shall have the attributes and prerogatives of the Captain-General and be entitled to form a guard of honor for the safety of his person. The guard shall not exceed the number of seventy-five. 4. He shall have besides, two or three aides-de-camp in waiting at the palace, who shall perform their duties in turn; as also a warden and such domestic servants as may be required, the salaries of the same to be paid by the National Treasury. When in office dictators seldom tinker with the public debt, but they invariably doctor the constitutions into untimely deaths or amend them into the limbo of impractical and unworkable politi- feel themselves slighted or double-crossed by the general whom they and the military have helped into the office of president, they begin to jostle each other for an advantageous position from which one of their number may spring into the presidential chair and push the offending executive into exile. Only the presidency is on a higher plane and affords greater privileges than the posi- tion of a general, for in this highest executive office a brilliant uniform is mandatory, a dashing charger with brilliant trappings may be ridden through the streets, or, in more recent times, a bulletproof limousine of the latest pattern may go careening about the capital. Another ego-inflating satisfaction derived from being a dictator is the right to be supported-together with his family and rela- tives-in a fitting fashion by the state. Even the wealthiest of dictators may thus live in a style of ostentation beyond their fondest dreams. For example, the constitution of Paraguay once provided certain honorary marks of distinction which appealed to the inordinate self-love of the dictator Francisco Solano Lopez: 1. The President of the Republic shall wear the uniform of a captain-general, and underneath the uniform a tri-colored ribbon from right to left, from which shall be pendant over his breast a national emblem or jewel of honor, both being at the cost of the Treasury of the Republic. 2. The jewel of honor shall be a star of gold set in diamonds, in the center of which may be read on one side Executive Power, and on the other Republic of Paraguay. 3. The President of the Republic shall have the attributes and prerogatives of the Captain-General and be entitled to form a guard of honor for the safety of his person. The guard shall not exceed the number of seventy-five. 4. He shall have besides, two or three aides-de-camp in waiting at the palace, who shall perform their duties in turn; as also a warden and such domestic servants as may be required, the salaries of the same to be paid by the National Treasury. When in office dictators seldom tinker with the public debt, but they invariably doctor the constitutions into untimely deaths or amend them into the limbo of impractical and unworkable politi-  EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XIX cal ideas. Such activities on the part of dictators indicate a com- mon weakness. Of necessity their governments must have con- stitutions, for national policies demand them and international opinion requires them. But often they consider their predecessors' constitutions as "outgrown," "past history," or "incompatible with the public good." Besides, to the Latin American, change means progress. So new political instruments are necessary to meet new needs, and a "new deal" is planned by each new dictator. Usu- ally new constitutions in Latin America are considered panaceas for political ills, but they frequently are theoretical rather than practical and workable. Even when a benevolent dictator widens the constitutional franchise, he frequently finds that his people prefer bullets to ballots as being much more exciting, and often more profitable. The executive power under the constitution, while patterned generally after that in the United States, is in reality largely what the dictator conceives his functions to be. Porfirio Diaz once described what characteristics he considered the president of the Republic of Mexico should have in order to fully exercise the executive power. He said that the president should be "a lion in order to fight, a tiger in order to devour, a dog in order to bark or to caress, an ass in order to bray, a monkey in order to climb, a cat in order to scratch, a rat in order to gnaw, a mouse in order to hide himself, a fox in order to display astuteness, a fish in order to swim, a cock in order to crow, a snake in order to crawl, and a crocodile in order to weep." One of Diaz' political enemies once described his rapid increase in personal political power as president by saying that he progressed from the office of revolu- tionary president, to protector, to consul, to consul-for-life, to anointed supreme chief, to emperor, and to grand mogul! Since every Latin American constitution has a provision which sanctions the declaration of a "state-of-siege," it often becomes the delightful experience of a chief excutive to suspend constitu- tional guarantees in times of crisis by declaring a state-of-siege and becoming a legal constitutional dictator. Even a president EDITORS INTRODUCTION XIX cal ideas. Such activities on the part of dictators indicate a com- mon weakness. Of necessity their governments must have con- stitutions, for national policies demand them and international opinion requires them. But often they consider their predecessors' constitutions as "outgrown," "past history," or "incompatible with the public good." Besides, to the Latin American, change means progress. So new political instruments are necessary to meet new needs, and a "new deal" is planned by each new dictator. Usu- ally new constitutions in Latin America are considered panaceas for political ills, but they frequently are theoretical rather than practical and workable. Even when a benevolent dictator widens the constitutional franchise, he frequently finds that his people prefer bullets to ballots as being much more exciting, and often more profitable. The executive power under the constitution, while patterned generally after that in the United States, is in reality largely what the dictator conceives his functions to be. Porfirio Diaz once described what characteristics he considered the president of the Republic of Mexico should have in order to fully exercise the executive power. He said that the president should be "a lion in order to fight, a tiger in order to devour, a dog in order to bark or to caress, an ass in order to bray, a monkey in order to climb, a cat in order to scratch, a rat in order to gnaw, a mouse in order to hide himself, a fox in order to display astuteness, a fish in order to swim, a cock in order to crow, a snake in order to crawl, and a crocodile in order to weep." One of Diaz' political enemies once described his rapid increase in personal political power as president by saying that he progressed from the office of revolu- tionary president, to protector, to consul, to consul-for-life, to anointed supreme chief, to emperor, and to grand mogul! Since every Latin American constitution has a provision which sanctions the declaration of a "state-of-siege," it often becomes the delightful experience of a chief excutive to suspend constitu- tional guarantees in times of crisis by declaring a state-of-siege and becoming a legal constitutional dictator. Even a president EDITORS INTRODUCTION XIX cal ideas. Such activities on the part of dictators indicate a com- mon weakness. Of necessity their governments must have con- stitutions, for national policies demand them and international opinion requires them. But often they consider their predecessors' constitutions as "outgrown," "past history," or "incompatible with the public good." Besides, to the Latin American, change means progress. So new political instruments are necessary to meet new needs, and a "new deal" is planned by each new dictator. Usu- ally new constitutions in Latin America are considered panaceas for political ills, but they frequently are theoretical rather than practical and workable. Even when a benevolent dictator widens the constitutional franchise, he frequently finds that his people prefer bullets to ballots as being much more exciting, and often more profitable. The executive power under the constitution, while patterned generally after that in the United States, is in reality largely what the dictator conceives his functions to be. Porfirio Diaz once described what characteristics he considered the president of the Republic of Mexico should have in order to fully exercise the executive power. He said that the president should be "a lion in order to fight, a tiger in order to devour, a dog in order to bark or to caress, an ass in order to bray, a monkey in order to climb, a cat in order to scratch, a rat in order to gnaw, a mouse in order to hide himself, a fox in order to display astuteness, a fish in order to swim, a cock in order to crow, a snake in order to crawl, and a crocodile in order to weep." One of Diaz' political enemies once described his rapid increase in personal political power as president by saying that he progressed from the office of revolu- tionary president, to protector, to consul, to consul-for-life, to anointed supreme chief, to emperor, and to grand mogul! Since every Latin American constitution has a provision which sanctions the declaration of a "state-of-siege," it often becomes the delightful experience of a chief excutive to suspend constitu- tional guarantees in times of crisis by declaring a state-of-siege and becoming a legal constitutional dictator. Even a president  xx The Caribbean who is not dictatorially inclined finds this constitutional clause a sore temptation for him to test, if only to prove that it will work. When this expedient is once tried, the process easily be- comes habit-forming and the political cycle may again turn by revolution. Often political parties, like constitutions, are as clay in the hands of dictators. When a political faction places its leader in office, the members do so often from selfish personal motives, hoping to get their individual shares of the public treasury. An unusually honest dictator may be repudiated by his followers unless he can deliver to them the right to spend national funds; or if he is unusually dishonest, he may be deposed for stealing too much for himself. Dictatorships and factional political jeal- ousies invite and sanction revolutions, making it appear the divine right of the people to, overthrow any executive not looking after their individual or collective welfare. In many countries, there- fore, the system of political factions maintained by the people is only a pseudolegal means of accomplishing their collective politi- cal ends. In some cases politics are treated as a fetish, and political campaigns become civic circuses and specialized spectacles in which the candidates kiss babes and babies, shake innumerable hands, embrace legions of shoulders, make glowing but impos- sible promises, and confuse issues through personal magnetism. Would-be dictators often go through the motions of campaigning for office if only to please the people, even when the controlled election results are obvious. Most dictators are little concerned with educational improve- ment, for the illiteracy of the people is a convenient excuse for the establishment and maintenance of a strong government controlled by a will which knows better what the people need than do the people themselves. Generally speaking, the higher percentage of illiteracy in a country, the greater the number of dictators that country is likely to have. Internal improvements often are concerns of the dictator, for xx The Caribbean xx The Caribbean who is not dictatorially inclined finds this constitutional clause a sore temptation for him to test, if only to prove that it will work. When this expedient is once tried, the process easily be- comes habit-forming and the political cycle may again turn by revolution. Often political parties, like constitutions, are as clay in the hands of dictators. When a political faction places its leader in office, the members do so often from selfish personal motives, hoping to get their individual shares of the public treasury. An unusually honest dictator may be repudiated by his followers unless he can deliver to them the right to spend national funds; or if he is unusually dishonest, he may be deposed for stealing too much for himself. Dictatorships and factional political jeal- ousies invite and sanction revolutions, making it appear the divine right of the people to overthrow any executive not looking after their individual or collective welfare. In many countries, there- fore, the system of political factions maintained by the people is only a pseudolegal means of accomplishing their collective politi- cal ends. In some cases politics are treated as a fetish, and political campaigns become civic circuses and specialized spectacles in which the candidates kiss babes and babies, shake innumerable hands, embrace legions of shoulders, make glowing but impos- sible promises, and confuse issues through personal magnetism. Would-be dictators often go through the motions of campaigning for office if only to please the people, even when the controlled election results are obvious. Most dictators are little concerned with educational improve- ment, for the illiteracy of the people is a convenient excuse for the establishment and maintenance of a strong government controlled by a will which knows better what the people need than do the people themselves. Generally speaking, the higher percentage of illiteracy in a country, the greater the number of dictators that country is likely to have. Internal improvements often are concerns of the dictator, for who is not dictatorially inclined finds this constitutional clause a sore temptation for him to test, if only to prove that it will work. When this expedient is once tried, the process easily be- comes habit-forming and the political cycle may again turn by revolution. Often political parties, like constitutions, are as clay in the hands of dictators. When a political faction places its leader in office, the members do so often from selfish personal motives, hoping to get their individual shares of the public treasury. An unusually honest dictator may be repudiated by his followers unless he can deliver to them the right to spend national funds; or if he is unusually dishonest, he may be deposed for stealing too much for himself. Dictatorships and factional political jeal- ousies invite and sanction revolutions, making it appear the divine right of the people to overthrow any executive not looking after their individual or collective welfare. In many countries, there- fore, the system of political factions maintained by the people is only a pseudolegal means of accomplishing their collective politi- cal ends. In some cases politics are treated as a fetish, and political campaigns become civic circuses and specialized spectacles in which the candidates kiss babes and babies, shake innumerable hands, embrace legions of shoulders, make glowing but impos- sible promises, and confuse issues through personal magnetism. Would-be dictators often go through the motions of campaigning for office if only to please the people, even when the controlled election results are obvious. Most dictators are little concerned with educational improve- ment, for the illiteracy of the people is a convenient excuse for the establishment and maintenance of a strong government controlled by a will which knows better what the people need than do the people themselves. Generally speaking, the higher percentage of illiteracy in a country, the greater the number of dictators that country is likely to have. Internal improvements often are concerns of the dictator, for  EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XXi the people can be put to work and their general living conditions can be so improved that they reward the government with their support because of the visible evidence of its activities in their behalf. Moreover, good railroads and highways enable the dicta- tor to move troops rapidly to points of unrest or opposition. Besides, it is to the advantage of a dictator to perpetuate his all- too-fleeting fame, in the form of public buildings, bridges, and other edifices which may bear his name in a conspicuous place or record his deeds sealed in cornerstones. One of the character- istic weaknesses of a dictator is to show a much too vulgar haste to immortalize his name in marble, brick, bronze, or brass. In their dealings with foreign nations, dictators are likely to reach the pinnacle of diplomatic absurdity in seeking recognition, not so much of their states as of themselves, so that they may win the much-coveted decorations necessary to convince many of their followers of their permanent place in the society of great statesmen. Even the slightest provocation is sufficient for a dic- tator to display on the front of his uniform or on the bosom of his dress shirt, the ribbons, sunbursts, medallions, and crests of numerous awards from abroad. When such foreign recogni- tion is not forthcoming, a convenient substitute is to be found in the erection of monuments or statues, or in the naming of streets, cities, theaters, and babies after the gracious benefactor of the country. One Central American statesman even went so far as to award himself a medal for promoting a sewage system Dictators are much like small boys who have never grown up. But the crowning crime of dictators is too frequently corrup- tion. They are masters in double talk, double-dealing and double- entry bookkeeping. There are too many demands from insistent henchmen for the dictator successfully to resist his friends. Since his enemies accuse him anyway of the peculation of public funds, it benefits him very little to be honest. How often have Latin American governments been overthrown for the simple reason that an irresponsible individual wished to get his hands into the public treasury! And in some cases the hand was immediately EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XXi the people can be put to work and their general living conditions can be so improved that they reward the government with their support because of the visible evidence of its activities in their behalf. Moreover, good railroads and highways enable the dicta- tor to move troops rapidly to points of unrest or opposition. Besides, it is to the advantage of a dictator to perpetuate his all- too-fleeting fame, in the form of public buildings, bridges, and other edifices which may bear his name in a conspicuous place or record his deeds sealed in cornerstones. One of the character- istic weaknesses of a dictator is to show a much too vulgar haste to immortalize his name in marble, brick, bronze, or brass. In their dealings with foreign nations, dictators are likely to reach the pinnacle of diplomatic absurdity in seeking recognition, not so much of their states as of themselves, so that they may win the much-coveted decorations necessary to convince many of their followers of their permanent place in the society of great statesmen. Even the slightest provocation is sufficient for a dic- tator to display on the front of his uniform or on the bosom of his dress shirt, the ribbons, sunbursts, medallions, and crests of numerous awards from abroad. When such foreign recogni- tion is not forthcoming, a convenient substitute is to be found in the erection of monuments or statues, or in the naming of streets, cities, theaters, and babies after the gracious benefactor of the country. One Central American statesman even went so far as to award himself a medal for promoting a sewage system! Dictators are much like small boys who have never grown up. But the crowning crime of dictators is too frequently corrup- tion. They are masters in double talk, double-dealing and double- entry bookkeeping. There are too many demands from insistent henchmen for the dictator successfully to resist his friends. Since his enemies accuse him anyway of the peculation of public funds, it benefits him very little to be honest. How often have Latin American governments been overthrown for the simple reason that an irresponsible individual wished to get his hands into the public treasury! And in some cases the hand was immediately EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XXi the people can be put to work and their general living conditions can be so improved that they reward the government with their support because of the visible evidence of its activities in their behalf. Moreover, good railroads and highways enable the dicta- tor to move troops rapidly to points of unrest or opposition. Besides, it is to the advantage of a dictator to perpetuate his all- too-fleeting fame, in the form of public buildings, bridges, and other edifices which may bear his name in a conspicuous place or record his deeds sealed in cornerstones. One of the character- istic weaknesses of a dictator is to show a much too vulgar haste to immortalize his name in marble, brick, bronze, or brass. In their dealings with foreign nations, dictators are likely to reach the pinnacle of diplomatic absurdity in seeking recognition, not so much of their states as of themselves, so that they may win the much-coveted decorations necessary to convince many of their followers of their permanent place in the society of great statesmen. Even the slightest provocation is sufficient for a dic- tator to display on the front of his uniform or on the bosom of his dress shirt, the ribbons, sunbursts, medallions, and crests of numerous awards from abroad. When such foreign recogni- tion is not forthcoming, a convenient substitute is to be found in the erection of monuments or statues, or in the naming of streets, cities, theaters, and babies after the gracious benefactor of the country. One Central American statesman even went so far as to award himself a medal for promoting a sewage system! Dictators are much like small boys who have never grown up. But the crowning crime of dictators is too frequently corrup- tion. They are masters in double talk, double-dealing and double- entry bookkeeping. There are too many demands from insistent henchmen for the dictator successfully to resist his friends. Since his enemies accuse him anyway of the peculation of public funds, it benefits him very little to be honest. How often have Latin American governments been overthrown for the simple reason that an irresponsible individual wished to get his hands into the public treasury! And in some cases the hand was immediately  xxii The Caribbean withdrawn and the booty sent abroad. Most prodigal dictators have expressed a secret desire to die in Paris, and there is an old Spanish proverb, which though not very elegant is quite to the point. It says, "he who has not spit in Paris has not lived." And why should not a dictator escape abroad, for this is prefer- able to dying before a bullet-pocked wall or in a dungeon of one's own creation. One example will suffice to indicate how intensely the enemies of a dictator may denounce him. Of Henri Christophe of Haiti it was said that his person was a rude, indigested mass of matter; his laugh, the grimace of a tiger; and when he opened his mouth in a rage it extended from ear to ear, disclosing a double row of long, pointed, cannibal teeth. "He was without honor, without faith, without law and without religion-in obscenities surpass- ing all the sacrilegious and filthy horrors with which Sardanapalus and Nebuchadnezzar were formerly reproached-a slave to his passions, an enemy of justice, cruel, arbitrary, avaricious, proud, selfish, blood-thirsty, incapable of the least sentiment and grati- tude. Such, and much more is the fallen Henri described by those who have succeeded to his power and who say that to give a detail of his vices would require volumes, and that no language could furnish expressions sufficiently strong to give an adequate idea of the excesses of his barbarity or of the horror it ought to inspire in the human heart." Though much evil has been attributed to Latin American dictators, some good may be said of each one of them. No blanket condemnation is entirely justifiable. Among the general run of dictators are men with some rare ability which sets their per- sonalities at a tangent from the average type. Francia benefited the Paraguayan masses, Diaz for a brief period made Mexico in the eyes of Europeans greater than the United States, while Juan Vincente GOmez freed Venezuela from international debt and began to develop the natural resources. But even successful dic- xxii The Caribbean withdrawn and the booty sent abroad. Most prodigal dictators have expressed a secret desire to die in Paris, and there is an old Spanish proverb, which though not very elegant is quite to the point. It says, "he who has not spit in Paris has not lived." And why should not a dictator escape abroad, for this is prefer- able to dying before a bullet-pocked wall or in a dungeon of one's own creation. One example will suffice to indicate how intensely the enemies of a dictator may denounce him. Of Henri Christophe of Haiti it was said that his person was a rude, indigested mass of matter; his laugh, the grimace of a tiger; and when he opened his mouth in a rage it extended from ear to ear, disclosing a double row of long, pointed, cannibal teeth. "He was without honor, without faith, without law and without religion-in obscenities surpass- ing all the sacrilegious and filthy horrors with which Sardanapalus and Nebuchadnezzar were formerly reproached-a slave to his passions, an enemy of justice, cruel, arbitrary, avaricious, proud, selfish, blood-thirsty, incapable of the least sentiment and grati- tude. Such, and much more is the fallen Henri described by those who have succeeded to his power and who say that to give a detail of his vices would require volumes, and that no language could furnish expressions sufficiently strong to give an adequate idea of the excesses of his barbarity or of the horror it ought to inspire in the human heart." V Though much evil has been attributed to Latin American dictators, some good may be said of each one of them. No blanket condemnation is entirely justifiable. Among the general run of dictators are men with some rare ability which sets their per- sonalities at a tangent from the average type. Francia benefited the Paraguayan masses, Diaz for a brief period made Mexico in the eyes of Europeans greater than the United States, while Juan Vincente Gmez freed Venezuela from international debt and began to develop the natural resources. But even successful dic- xxii The Caribbean withdrawn and the booty sent abroad. Most prodigal dictators have expressed a secret desire to die in Paris, and there is an old Spanish proverb, which though not very elegant is quite to the point. It says, "he who has not spit in Paris has not lived." And why should not a dictator escape abroad, for this is prefer- able to dying before a bullet-pocked wall or in a dungeon of one's own creation. One example will suffice to indicate how intensely the enemies of a dictator may denounce him. Of Henri Christophe of Haiti it was said that his person was a rude, indigested mass of matter; his laugh, the grimace of a tiger; and when he opened his mouth in a rage it extended from ear to ear, disclosing a double row of long, pointed, cannibal teeth. "He was without honor, without faith, without law and without religion-in obscenities surpass- ing all the sacrilegious and filthy horrors with which Sardanapalus and Nebuchadnezzar were formerly reproached-a slave to his passions, an enemy of justice, cruel, arbitrary, avaricious, proud, selfish, blood-thirsty, incapable of the least sentiment and grati- tude. Such, and much more is the fallen Henri described by those who have succeeded to his power and who say that to give a detail of his vices would require volumes, and that no language could furnish expressions sufficiently strong to give an adequate idea of the excesses of his barbarity or of the horror it ought to inspire in the human heart." V Though much evil has been attributed to Latin American dictators, some good may be said of each one of them. No blanket condemnation is entirely justifiable. Among the general run of dictators are men with some rare ability which sets their per- sonalities at a tangent from the average type. Francia benefited the Paraguayan masses, Diaz for a brief period made Mexico in the eyes of Europeans greater than the United States, while Juan Vincente Gmez freed Venezuela from international debt and began to develop the natural resources. But even successful die-  EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION tators have made innumerable enemies for themselves and tual strife for their countries. Dictators still appear froL to time in Latin America, and no one can say to what ex they may yet go or what heights they may yet attain in I or promoting the development of the national interests o countries. History must tell this. XXiii EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION XXiii EDITORS INTRODUCTION tators have made innumerable enemies for themselves and even- tual strife for their countries. Dictators still appear from time to time in Latin America, and no one can say to what extremes they may yet go or what heights they may yet attain in ruining or promoting the development of the national interests of their countries. History must tell this. A. CURTIS WILGUs, Director School of Inter-American Studies tators have made innumerable enemies for themselves and even- tual strife for their countries. Dictators still appear from time to time in Latin America, and no one can say to what extremes they may yet go or what heights they may yet attain in ruining or promoting the development of the national interests of their countries. History must tell this. A. CURTIs WILGUs, Director School of Inter-American Studies A. CURTIs WILGUS, Director School of Inter-American Studies   Part I Part I Part I CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY   1 Harry Bernstein: THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE HISTORIC CAUDILLO FIGURE rides roughly through and across any picture of Latin American constitutional and political philosophy. In dealing with the background of current political problems in the Caribbean, this personalista tradition stares out from almost every historic factor and experience. Its influence is as old as man in America, from Indian to Spaniard to mestizo, and there is no getting away from it in the sixteenth or the twentieth century. The fact is that the modern "power" concept of the nation-state-which is so scarce in Latin American thought-and the civilian processes of constitutional reform have not been able to reduce this caudillo figure to democratic or repre- sentative size. Neither the abstract "state" philosophy nor the romance of nationalism competed with the politics of the hero. There must be, and are, historic and intellectual reasons for this. One unusual point is that, while there is little or no affirma- tive philosophy about the caudillo, the systems of legal and phil- osophical argument which might have replaced the man with an idea or a charter were too busy competing with each other or too involved in systems to carry their weight into practical effect. So, for example, the wide vogue of positivism from 1870 to 1914, with its attack upon metaphysics, must have done a good job in undermining the mystique of the nation-state in Latin America. 3 Harry Bernstein: THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE HISTORIC CAUDILLO FIGURE rides roughly through and across any picture of Latin American constitutional and political philosophy. In dealing with the background of current political problems in the Caribbean, this personalista tradition stares out from almost every historic factor and experience. Its influence is as old as man in America, from Indian to Spaniard to mestizo, and there is no getting away from it in the sixteenth or the twentieth century. The fact is that the modern "power" concept of the nation-state-which is so scarce in Latin American thought-and the civilian processes of constitutional reform have not been able to reduce this caudillo figure to democratic or repre- sentative size. Neither the abstract "state" philosophy nor the romance of nationalism competed with the politics of the hero. There must be, and are, historic and intellectual reasons for this. One unusual point is that, while there is little or no affirma- tive philosophy about the caudillo, the systems of legal and phil- osophical argument which might have replaced the man with an idea or a charter were too busy competing with each other or too involved in systems to carry their weight into practical effect. So, for example, the wide vogue of positivism from 1870 to 1914, with its attack upon metaphysics, must have done a good job in undermining the mystique of the nation-state in Latin America. Harry Bernstein: THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE HISTORIC CAUDILLO FIGURE rides roughly through and across any picture of Latin American constitutional and political philosophy. In dealing with the background of current political problems in the Caribbean, this personalista tradition stares out from almost every historic factor and experience. Its influence is as old as man in America, from Indian to Spaniard to mestizo, and there is no getting away from it in the sixteenth or the twentieth century. The fact is that the modern "power" concept of the nation-state-which is so scarce in Latin American thought-and the civilian processes of constitutional reform have not been able to reduce this caudillo figure to democratic or repre- sentative size. Neither the abstract "state" philosophy nor the romance of nationalism competed with the politics of the hero. There must be, and are, historic and intellectual reasons for this. One unusual point is that, while there is little or no affirma- tive philosophy about the caudillo, the systems of legal and phil- osophical argument which might have replaced the man with an idea or a charter were too busy competing with each other or too involved in systems to carry their weight into practical effect. So, for example, the wide vogue of positivism from 1870 to 1914, with its attack upon metaphysics, must have done a good job in undermining the mystique of the nation-state in Latin America.  4 The Caribbean Even if the machinery of the nation had gone far with an appa- ratus of centralism, bureaucracy, unitario laws, and strong execu- tive traditions, the fiction of the nation-state left onlookers cold. They were better warmed by the jefe politico. The hold of experience, social conditions, the laws of geog- raphy, and the Iberian psychology in Latin American minds were far more influential than anything that might have been borrowed from European statists or romantics. Historic Spanish- Iberian ideas of government were feudal, personal. The thought of a State more sovereign than a King was difficult for both legists and monarchs to swallow. Later on, it also became too much for caudillos, "great men," and presidents-for-life. Latin America inherited Spanish practices on the subject. But Spanish regalist interests, the supremacy of the lawyer over the political philos- opher, and the localist patria chica tradition, were not the only forces critical of the power of the state. The Roman Catholic Church established and encouraged doctrines of the individual and society which limited the state to a fraction of possible powers. Certainly nationalism cast a worldly, secular shadow across the Church's idea of government. Consequently, we find that in Latin America a curious misalliance between positivism, caudillismo, monarchism, personalism, and Catholicism prevented a philosophy of statist politics from taking hold. As if these intellectual and institutional enemies were not enough to wrestle such lofty philosophy to earth, we know from contemporary psychology how strong is the "leader" cult, and how Latin American masses find it easier to personalize and empathize their minds and loyalties. In defeating political philos- ophy, however, other earthly forces took their toll of ideological aims and values. Illiteracy was one negative; militarism was another. But the hazards, barriers, and interruptions of geogra- phy, distance, and ethnocultural elements did just as much to prevent too great a uniformity of ideal nationalism. Only the 4 The Caribbean Even if the machinery of the nation had gone far with an appa- ratus of centralism, bureaucracy, unitario laws, and strong execu- tive traditions, the fiction of the nation-state left onlookers cold. They were better warmed by the jefe politico. The hold of experience, social conditions, the laws of geog- raphy, and the Iberian psychology in Latin American minds were far more influential than anything that might have been borrowed from European statists or romantics. Historic Spanish- Iberian ideas of government were feudal, personal. The thought of a State more sovereign than a King was difficult for both legists and monarchs to swallow. Later on, it also became too much for caudillos, "great men," and presidents-for-life. Latin America inherited Spanish practices on the subject. But Spanish regalist interests, the supremacy of the lawyer over the political philos- opher, and the localist patria chica tradition, were not the only forces critical of the power of the state. The Roman Catholic Church established and encouraged doctrines of the individual and society which limited the state to a fraction of possible powers. Certainly nationalism cast a worldly, secular shadow across the Church's idea of government. Consequently, we find that in Latin America a curious misalliance between positivism, caudillismo, monarchism, personalism, and Catholicism prevented a philosophy of statist politics from taking hold. As if these intellectual and institutional enemies were not enough to wrestle such lofty philosophy to earth, we know from contemporary psychology how strong is the "leader" cult, and how Latin American masses find it easier to personalize and empathize their minds and loyalties. In defeating political philos- ophy, however, other earthly forces took their toll of ideological aims and values. Illiteracy was one negative; militarism was another. But the hazards, barriers, and interruptions of geogra- phy, distance, and ethnocultural elements did just as much to prevent too great a uniformity of ideal nationalism. Only the 4 The Caribbean Even if the machinery of the nation had gone far with an appa- ratus of centralism, bureaucracy, unitario laws, and strong execu- tive traditions, the fiction of the nation-state left onlookers cold. They were better warmed by the jefe politico. The hold of experience, social conditions, the laws of geog- raphy, and the Iberian psychology in Latin American minds were far more influential than anything that might have been borrowed from European statists or romantics. Historic Spanish- Iberian ideas of government were feudal, personal. The thought of a State more sovereign than a King was difficult for both legists and monarchs to swallow. Later on, it also became too much for caudillos, "great men," and presidents-for-life. Latin America inherited Spanish practices on the subject. But Spanish regalist interests, the supremacy of the lawyer over the political philos- opher, and the localist patria chica tradition, were not the only forces critical of the power of the state. The Roman Catholic Church established and encouraged doctrines of the individual and society which limited the state to a fraction of possible powers. Certainly nationalism cast a worldly, secular shadow across the Church's idea of government. Consequently, we find that in Latin America a curious misalliance between positivism, caudillismo, monarchism, personalism, and Catholicism prevented a philosophy of statist politics from taking hold. As if these intellectual and institutional enemies were not enough to wrestle such lofty philosophy to earth, we know from contemporary psychology how strong is the "leader" cult, and how Latin American masses find it easier to personalize and empathize their minds and loyalties. In defeating political philos- ophy, however, other earthly forces took their toll of ideological aims and values. Illiteracy was one negative; militarism was another. But the hazards, barriers, and interruptions of geogra- phy, distance, and ethnocultural elements did just as much to prevent too great a uniformity of ideal nationalism. Only the  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 5 cacique and caudillo thrived under these natural and human divides; in fact, the leaders made Latin American history under these conditions. The governments of men succeeded where those of-laws and ideas failed. The dictator found a short cut to power, bypassing any metaphysical road to the top. The Ameri- can caudillo followed a formula based upon human beings and their natures. One question is, do any of the contemporary designs for the nation-state enter into the background and present state of Latin American political problems? That is, how could the nation- state idea force a unity and uniformity upon chronic economic, social, ethnic, and political conflicts in the Caribbean lands? And if not, what more New World or more American patterns of behavior tend to conform to Latin American history, tradition, experience, and geography? Do we not leave behind both the classical logic of the philosophy of the republic and the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century as we go west from Europe towards the more pragmatic America? It is paradoxical to point out that European Rome and Madrid regulated both the force of logic and the pull of nationalism. That would make the story very simple, by giving the New World merely the Old World setting of feudalism, i.e., personalist authority and obedience. Ideas were not needed; fealty and faith took over all loyalties. The history of Latin America shows, almost everywhere, that medieval monarchy and religion stifled both romantic and ab- stract thought even before positivism came along. So the answer might be that few, if any, contemporary "isms" can compete with historic, geographic, and psychocultural rivals. II From the time of Porfirio Diaz' rule in Mexico and Rafael Ndnez' Itegeneracin in Colombia, to the post-1930 chieftains of government, the painful fact of personalist rule has challenged, even persecuted, the constitutionalists, social thinkers, and philos- ophers of Latin America. Even in Mexico, where philosophy has CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 5 cacique and caudillo thrived under these natural and human divides; in fact, the leaders made Latin American history under these conditions. The governments of men succeeded where those of-laws and ideas failed. The dictator found a short cut to power, bypassing any metaphysical road to the top. The Ameri- can caudillo followed a formula based upon human beings and their natures. One question is, do any of the contemporary designs for the nation-state enter into the background and present state of Latin American political problems? That is, how could the nation- state idea force a unity and uniformity upon chronic economic, social, ethnic, and political conflicts in the Caribbean lands? And if not, what more New World or more American patterns of behavior tend to conform to Latin American history, tradition, experience, and geography? Do we not leave behind both the classical logic of the philosophy of the republic and the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century as we go west from Europe towards the more pragmatic America? It is paradoxical to point out that European Rome and Madrid regulated both the force of logic and the pull of nationalism. That would make the story very simple, by giving the New World merely the Old World setting of feudalism, i.e., personalist authority and obedience. Ideas were not needed; fealty and faith took over all loyalties. The history of Latin America shows, almost everywhere, that medieval monarchy and religion stifled both romantic and ab- stract thought even before positivism came along. So the answer might be that few, if any, contemporary "isms" can compete with historic, geographic, and psychocultural rivals. II From the time of Porfirio Diaz' rule in Mexico and Rafael Niez' Regeneraciion in Colombia, to the post-1930 chieftains of government, the painful fact of personalist rule has challenged, even persecuted, the constitutionalists, social thinkers, and philos- ophers of Latin America. Even in Mexico, where philosophy has CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 5 cacique and caudillo thrived under these natural and human divides; in fact, the leaders made Latin American history under these conditions. The governments of men succeeded where those of-laws and ideas failed. The dictator found a short cut to power, bypassing any metaphysical road to the top. The Ameri- can caudillo followed a formula based upon human beings and their natures. One question is, do any of the contemporary designs for the nation-state enter into the background and present state of Latin American political problems? That is, how could the nation- state idea force a unity and uniformity upon chronic economic, social, ethnic, and political conflicts in the Caribbean lands? And if not, what more New World or more American patterns of behavior tend to conform to Latin American history, tradition, experience, and geography? Do we not leave behind both the classical logic of the philosophy of the republic and the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century as we go west from Europe towards the more pragmatic America? It is paradoxical to point out that European Rome and Madrid regulated both the force of logic and the pull of nationalism. That would make the story very simple, by giving the New World merely the Old World setting of feudalism, i.e., personalist authority and obedience. Ideas were not needed; fealty and faith took over all loyalties. The history of Latin America shows, almost everywhere, that medieval monarchy and religion stifled both romantic and ab- stract thought even before positivism came along. So the answer might be that few, if any, contemporary "isms" can compete with historic, geographic, and psychocultural rivals. II From the time of Porfirio Diaz' rule in Mexico and Rafael Nnnez' Regeneracidon in Colombia, to the post-1930 chieftains of government, the painful fact of personalist rule has challenged, even persecuted, the constitutionalists, social thinkers, and philos- ophers of Latin America. Even in Mexico, where philosophy has  6 The Caribbean enjoyed a restoration of health since 1900, the philosophers have rejected the collectivism of the state and of the masses to reaffirm an individualism which is historically Hispanic. This individual- ism has some connection with the prevalence of personalism, even if it expressly disavows the caudillo. It can be found in Benito Juarez, certainly in Francisco Madero. It is hard to reconcile this individuality with the "revolt of the masses." In Latin American history the "men on horseback" are met on every city boulevard and country road, and their statues occupy most plazas and city squares. Is there a State in Latin America, or is there just the Man? Are there people or the masses? When socialism came along into Latin America it offered another philosophy of the State, with a panacea for the masses, and had little to say about personality, leadership, and the indi- vidual. It merely rejected the nation, or rather, put forth the concept of the class-state to offset the nation-state. But it did not succeed any more than the other in stripping caudillismo of power. It is not likely, given the historic tradition, that equally recent forces such as industrialization, economic planning, state development corporations, trade-unionism, and even the state- supported political party, will find it easy to get along without a great man. A Rosas, Diaz, Perlin, or Vargas, if he watches his country's history, will be made in its image. III We must certainly distinguish between patriotism in Latin America and the nationalism of the nation-state, on the one hand, and personal loyalty to the jefe politico, on the other. Patriotism, an emotional experience, yields an individual energy which, I think, identifies its bearer with the chieftains and leaders of the Independence era. These venerable heroes are quite properly re- ferred to as proceres, leaders who are sanctified by something noble, are not mere war lords, as some have written, but are rather more like Latin American (not Spanish) grandees. There is a vast difference in the attitude toward a founding father of 6 The Caribbean enjoyed a restoration of health since 1900, the philosophers have rejected the collectivism of the state and of the masses to reaffrm an individualism which is historically Hispanic. This individual- ism has some connection with the prevalence of personalism, even if it expressly disavows the caudillo. It can be found in Benito Juarez, certainly in Francisco Madero. It is hard to reconcile this individuality with the "revolt of the masses." In Latin American history the "men on horseback" are met on every city boulevard and country road, and their statues occupy most plazas and city squares. Is there a State in Latin America, or is there just the Man? Are there people or the masses? When socialism came along into Latin America it offered another philosophy of the State, with a panacea for the masses, and had little to say about personality, leadership, and the indi- vidual. It merely rejected the nation, or rather, put forth the concept of the class-state to offset the nation-state. But it did not succeed any more than the other in stripping caudillismo of power. It is not likely, given the historic tradition, that equally recent forces such as industrialization, economic planning, state development corporations, trade-unionism, and even the state- supported political party, will find it easy to get along without a great man. A Rosas, Diaz, Perin, or Vargas, if he watches his country's history, will be made in its image. III We must certainly distinguish between patriotism in Latin America and the nationalism of the nation-state, on the one hand, and personal loyalty to the jefe politico, on the other. Patriotism, an emotional experience, yields an individual energy which, I think, identifies its bearer with the chieftains and leaders of the Independence era. These venerable heroes are quite properly re- ferred to as prdceres, leaders who are sanctified by something noble, are not mere war lords, as some have written, but are rather more like Latin American (not Spanish) grandees. There is a vast difference in the attitude toward a founding father of 6 The Caribbean enjoyed a restoration of health since 1900, the philosophers have rejected the collectivism of the state and of the masses to reaffirm an individualism which is historically Hispanic. This individual- ism has some connection with the prevalence of personalism, even if it expressly disavows the caudillo. It can be found in Benito Juirez, certainly in Francisco Madero. It is hard to reconcile this individuality with the "revolt of the masses." In Latin American history the "men on horseback" are met on every city boulevard and country road, and their statues occupy most plazas and city squares. Is there a State in Latin America, or is there just the Man? Are there people or the masses? When socialism came along into Latin America it offered another philosophy of the State, with a panacea for the masses, and had little to say about personality, leadership, and the indi- vidual. It merely rejected the nation, or rather, put forth the concept of the class-state to offset the nation-state. But it did not succeed any more than the other in stripping caudillismo of power. It is not likely, given the historic tradition, that equally recent forces such as industrialization, economic planning, state development corporations, trade-unionism, and even the state- supported political party, will find it easy to get along without a great man. A Rosas, Diaz, Pern, or Vargas, if he watches his country's history, will be made in its image. III We must certainly distinguish between patriotism in Latin America and the nationalism of the nation-state, on the one hand, and personal loyalty to the jefe politico, on the other. Patriotism, an emotional experience, yields an individual energy which, I think, identifies its bearer with the chieftains and leaders of the Independence era. These venerable heroes are quite properly re- ferred to as proceres, leaders who are sanctified by something noble, are not mere war lords, as some have written, but are rather more like Latin American (not Spanish) grandees. There is a vast difference in the attitude toward a founding father of  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 7 long ago and an ordinary, that is, a recent caudillo. Those who wrested emancipation from Spain are charged with very great affect, winning an identification with motherland and fatherland images, and sharing, possibly personalizing, both freedom and the flag. In contrast, those who manipulate the new nation, forcing its laws, and coercing nationality into personalist hands, lose much respect and even glamor because they are very close at hand and within reach. Of course, they are feared and obeyed. Those whom we call caudillos also respond most promptly to family, clan, and blood ties. Anthropologists have begun to study the compadrazgo dependency more closely, in order to see how clannish relations can lead to local politics. In almost all these countries strong sectional and local forces expressed their resist- ance to the center of government by states' rights issues, or fed- eralism. In both the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean lands, the deep variations in geography, race, and culture were bound to- gether by an iron thread in politics. What seemed to have hap- pened in the history of these nations was that the jefe politico of one section became the head of combined other sections, to which the name "nation" was given. There was no constitutional or legal philosophy, only a political process, very reminiscent of the making of the modern European nations during the Middle Ages. The historian can show that political growth in Latin America was quite ad hoc, even pragmatic. Latin America's pragmatism, however, was not connected to philosophy. It was not a system of thought so much as a way of political life. The caudillo may be said to have been anti- intellectual, although the whole truth of that would probably apply more to the Argentine Rosas than to the Mexican Diaz. In Archibald MacLeish's celebrated epic of the Conquest, Bernal Diaz speaks with jealousy and a soldier's contempt for those with the "school-taught skip to their writing." Preferring facts to the formation of ideas, the caudillo has not wanted to know any "con- stitutional and legal philosophy." He himself was not always as ignorant nor as illiterate as some historians, philosophers, and CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 7 long ago and an ordinary, that is, a recent caudillo. Those who wrested emancipation from Spain are charged with very great affect, winning an identification with motherland and fatherland images, and sharing, possibly personalizing, both freedom and the flag. In contrast, those who manipulate the new nation, forcing its laws, and coercing nationality into personalist hands, lose much respect and even glamor because they are very close at hand and within reach. Of course, they are feared and obeyed. Those whom we call caudillos also respond most promptly to family, clan, and blood ties. Anthropologists have begun to study the compadrazgo dependency more closely, in order to see how clannish relations can lead to local politics. In almost all these countries strong sectional and local forces expressed their resist- ance to the center of government by states' rights issues, or fed- eralism. In both the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean lands, the deep variations in geography, race, and culture were bound to- gether by an iron thread in politics. What seemed to have hap- pened in the history of these nations was that the jefe politico of one section became the head of combined other sections, to which the name "nation" was given. There was no constitutional or legal philosophy, only a political process, very reminiscent of the making of the modern European nations during the Middle Ages. The historian can show that political growth in Latin America was quite ad hoc, even pragmatic. Latin America's pragmatism, however, was not connected to philosophy. It was not a system of thought so much as a way of political life. The caudillo may be said to have been anti- intellectual, although the whole truth of that would probably apply more to the Argentine Rosas than to the Mexican Diaz. In Archibald MacLeish's celebrated epic of the Conquest, Bernal Diaz speaks with jealousy and a soldier's contempt for those with the "school-taught skip to their writing." Preferring facts to the formation of ideas, the caudillo has not wanted to know any "con- stitutional and legal philosophy." He himself was not always as ignorant nor as illiterate as some historians, philosophers, and CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 7 long ago and an ordinary, that is, a recent caudillo. Those who wrested emancipation from Spain are charged with very great affect, winning an identification with motherland and fatherland images, and sharing, possibly personalizing, both freedom and the flag. In contrast, those who manipulate the new nation, forcing its laws, and coercing nationality into personalist hands, lose much respect and even glamor because they are very close at hand and within reach. Of course, they are feared and obeyed. Those whom we call caudillos also respond most promptly to family, clan, and blood ties. Anthropologists have begun to study the compadrazgo dependency more closely, in order to see how clannish relations can lead to local politics. In almost all these countries strong sectional and local forces expressed their resist- ance to the center of government by states' rights issues, or fed- eralism. In both the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean lands, the deep variations in geography, race, and culture were bound to- gether by an iron thread in politics. What seemed to have hap- pened in the history of these nations was that the jefe politico of one section became the head of combined other sections, to which the name "nation" was given. There was no constitutional or legal philosophy, only a political process, very reminiscent of the making of the modern European nations during the Middle Ages. The historian can show that political growth in Latin America was quite ad hoc, even pragmatic. Latin America's pragmatism, however, was not connected to philosophy. It was not a system of thought so much as a way of political life. The caudillo may be said to have been anti- intellectual, although the whole truth of that would probably apply more to the Argentine Rosas than to the Mexican Diaz. In Archibald MacLeish's celebrated epic of the Conquest, Bernal Diaz speaks with jealousy and a soldier's contempt for those with the "school-taught skip to their writing." Preferring facts to the formation of ideas, the caudillo has not wanted to know any "con- stitutional and legal philosophy." He himself was not always as ignorant nor as illiterate as some historians, philosophers, and  8 The Caribbean intellectuals have liked to label him. In his supreme power, the caudillo descends from the Spanish kings, whose stark egoism is marked in their signatures, "Yo, el Rey." After all, once upon a time some kings started as feudal caudillos in their own districts. The powerful executive was too high a wall for even the exalted theory of nation-state to climb. The fiction of the state never took hold. Mexico is quite a case in point. There, still another enemy of the state concept took up cudgels. In addition to Porfirian personalism, positivism, revolution, and other hurdles, the nation-state idea was hit by anarchism, syndicalism, and the combination of both. In Europe, where Marxism lifted the state to a great political role on behalf of the forces of history and of the working class, the intellectual's concern with that concept was imperative. But Latin American anarchism thought, and thinks, quite differently about abstract political ideas. For that matter, so does APRA. Both socialist and communist Marxism were also leading carriers of the state idea in the twentieth century. IV The problem we have to answer in facing up to political proc- esses in Latin America, is whether we need to tie dictatorship in that continent to personalist fealty and the heritage of political vassalage, or should it be derived from the Jacobin dictatorship of the masses under the nation, or can we trace a debt to German- Italian romantic nationalism or fascism. There are some super- ficial resemblances: the precedent of the one indispensable man and his single-party following came out of Latin America a long time ago. Not until the Colombian constitutional amendments of 1936 and the Brazilian corporate constitution issued by Getulio Vargas, do we find the term "state" used in the sense of authority over the nation, the people in it, and their elected rulers. But these did not last long. All that is left in Latin America is the continued preference for the personal, the visible, the tangible: viceroys, presidential dictators, and political chiefs. No thoughts of destiny here. 8 The Caribbean intellectuals have liked to label him. In his supreme power, the caudillo descends from the Spanish kings, whose stark egoism is marked in their signatures, "Yo, el Rey." After all, once upon a time some kings started as feudal caudillos in their own districts. The powerful executive was too high a wall for even the exalted theory of nation-state to climb. The fiction of the state never took hold. Mexico is quite a case in point. There, still another enemy of the state concept took up cudgels. In addition to Porfirian personalism, positivism, revolution, and other hurdles, the nation-state idea was hit by anarchism, syndicalism, and the combination of both. In Europe, where Marxism lifted the state to a great political role on behalf of the forces of history and of the working class, the intellectual's concern with that concept was imperative. But Latin American anarchism thought, and thinks, quite differently about abstract political ideas. For that matter, so does APRA. Both socialist and communist Marxism were also leading carriers of the state idea in the twentieth century. IV The problem we have to answer in facing up to political proc- esses in Latin America, is whether we need to tie dictatorship in that continent to personalist fealty and the heritage of political vassalage, or should it be derived from the Jacobin dictatorship of the masses under the nation, or can we trace a debt to German- Italian romantic nationalism or fascism. There are some super- ficial resemblances: the precedent of the one indispensable man and his single-party following came out of Latin America a long time ago. Not until the Colombian constitutional amendments of 1936 and the Brazilian corporate constitution issued by Getulio Vargas, do we find the term "state" used in the sense of authority over the nation, the people in it, and their elected rulers. But these did not last long. All that is left in Latin America is the continued preference for the personal, the visible, the tangible: viceroys, presidential dictators, and political chiefs. No thoughts of destiny here. 8 The Caribbean intellectuals have liked to label him. In his supreme power, the caudillo descends from the Spanish kings, whose stark egoism is marked in their signatures, "Yo, el Rey." After all, once upon a time some kings started as feudal caudillos in their own districts. The powerful executive was too high a wall for even the exalted theory of nation-state to climb. The fiction of the state never took hold. Mexico is quite a case in point. There, still another enemy of the state concept took up cudgels. In addition to Porfirian personalism, positivism, revolution, and other hurdles, the nation-state idea was hit by anarchism, syndicalism, and the combination of both. In Europe, where Marxism lifted the state to a great political role on behalf of the forces of history and of the working class, the intellectual's concern with that concept was imperative. But Latin American anarchism thought, and thinks, quite differently about abstract political ideas. For that matter, so does APRA. Both socialist and communist Marxism were also leading carriers of the state idea in the twentieth century. IV The problem we have to answer in facing up to political proc- esses in Latin America, is whether we need to tie dictatorship in that continent to personalist fealty and the heritage of political vassalage, or should it be derived from the Jacobin dictatorship of the masses under the nation, or can we trace a debt to German- Italian romantic nationalism or fascism. There are some super- ficial resemblances: the precedent of the one indispensable man and his single-party following came out of Latin America a long time ago. Not until the Colombian constitutional amendments of 1936 and the Brazilian corporate constitution issued by Getulio Vargas, do we find the term "state" used in the sense of authority over the nation, the people in it, and their elected rulers. But these did not last long. All that is left in Latin America is the continued preference for the personal, the visible, the tangible: viceroys, presidential dictators, and political chiefs. No thoughts of destiny here.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 9 A political scientist tells us that in Ecuador both constitutional philosophy and the caudillo depend upon everyday regionalism, not power processes nor philosophy. There, government is tra- ditional, not contemporary, not economic, not philosophical. In that case the caudillo of the recent past and the present is the feudal senor natural of Old Spain in modern dress. But in Amer- ica the ancient habit of "follow the leader" was also as primitive as the Indian cacique, as natural to politics as the worship of sun, soil, and plants was to aboriginal religion. We can now speak of American feudalism, with survival vestiges. The Spanish Con- quest of America blended the fealty owed the senor natural with Indian obedience to the cacique, and the resultant offspring be- came the caudillo, the chief political personality in modern Latin American history. Like the Iberian lord in his patria chica, the American caudillo first looked out on his subjects from a local region, small enough for him to know well. There was little of constitutional and political philosophy in the patria chica, and the paisano was directed by habit, history, and loyalty, rather than ideas or law. This narrow orbit of political movement presented many difficulties in the nineteenth century, but is even more serious in the twentieth where such views have to be reconciled with civil liberty, modern education, industrial society, scientific and technological changes, our studies of personality and behavior, and the widened aims of both na- tional and international organization. Latin American peoples, governments, and officials have hardly progressed to an acceptance of stable national ways, and now have to learn about foreign and international values. Can a strong personal leader bring this about sooner or better than a long-drawn process? Perhaps the benevolent caudillo can do better than schools, economy, ideas, and agencies to make adjustments and adaptation compulsory. I doubt it. The roots and traditions of the caudillo must be changed in order to bridge the great gap between feudalism and modern times, as well as between personalities and impersonal processes. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 9 A political scientist tells us that in Ecuador both constitutional philosophy and the caudillo depend upon everyday regionalism, not power processes nor philosophy. There, government is tra- ditional, not contemporary, not economic, not philosophical. In that case the caudillo of the recent past and the present is the feudal senor natural of Old Spain in modern dress. But in Amer- ica the ancient habit of "follow the leader" was also as primitive as the Indian cacique, as natural to politics as the worship of sun, soil, and plants was to aboriginal religion. We can now speak of American feudalism, with survival vestiges. The Spanish Con- quest of America blended the fealty owed the senor natural with Indian obedience to the cacique, and the resultant offspring be- came the caudillo, the chief political personality in modern Latin American history. Like the Iberian lord in his patria chica, the American caudillo first looked out on his subjects from a local region, small enough for him to know well. There was little of constitutional and political philosophy in the patria chica, and the paisano was directed by habit, history, and loyalty, rather than ideas or law. This narrow orbit of political movement presented many difficulties in the nineteenth century, but is even more serious in the twentieth where such views have to be reconciled with civil liberty, modern education, industrial society, scientific and technological changes, our studies of personality and behavior, and the widened aims of both na- tional and international organization. Latin American peoples, governments, and officials have hardly progressed to an acceptance of stable national ways, and now have to learn about foreign and international values. Can a strong personal leader bring this about sooner or better than a long-drawn process? Perhaps the benevolent caudillo can do better than schools, economy, ideas, and agencies to make adjustments and adaptation compulsory. I doubt it. The roots and traditions of the caudillo must be changed in order to bridge the great gap between feudalism and modern times, as well as between personalities and impersonal processes. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 9 A political scientist tells us that in Ecuador both constitutional philosophy and the caudillo depend upon everyday regionalism, not power processes nor philosophy. There, government is tra- ditional, not contemporary, not economic, not philosophical. In that case the caudillo of the recent past and the present is the feudal senor natural of Old Spain in modern dress. But in Amer- ica the ancient habit of "follow the leader" was also as primitive as the Indian cacique, as natural to politics as the worship of sun, soil, and plants was to aboriginal religion. We can now speak of American feudalism, with survival vestiges. The Spanish Con- quest of America blended the fealty owed the senor natural with Indian obedience to the cacique, and the resultant offspring be- came the caudillo, the chief political personality in modern Latin American history. Like the Iberian lord in his patria chica, the American caudillo first looked out on his subjects from a local region, small enough for him to know well. There was little of constitutional and political philosophy in the patria chica, and the paisano was directed by habit, history, and loyalty, rather than ideas or law. This narrow orbit of political movement presented many difficulties in the nineteenth century, but is even more serious in the twentieth where such views have to be reconciled with civil liberty, modern education, industrial society, scientific and technological changes, our studies of personality and behavior, and the widened aims of both na- tional and international organization. Latin American peoples, governments, and officials have hardly progressed to an acceptance of stable national ways, and now have to learn about foreign and international values. Can a strong personal leader bring this about sooner or better than a long-drawn process? Perhaps the benevolent caudillo can do better than schools, economy, ideas, and agencies to make adjustments and adaptation compulsory. I doubt it. The roots and traditions of the caudillo must be changed in order to bridge the great gap between feudalism and modern times, as well as between personalities and impersonal processes.  10 The Caribbean V It is as important to see the varied meaning of the term "indi- vidualism" as it is to understand words like "personality" and "pragmatism." The North American experience and tradition with these words is not like the Latin American. The individual- ism of the caudillo system or of the Iberian background has no historic resemblance to that individualism which always goes with private enterprise. Nor is it anything at all like the rugged in- dividualism of "social Darwinism." The North American person- ality sent his energy into business and profit, instead of into power politics, or into science and scholarship-which is just as individualist. The caudillo's personalism is quite different: regional, political, and traditional. If the caudillo dominated men better than systems of ideas or charters of government, he also understood that constitutions look good and protect him from force. The paz porfiriana rested upon the great liberal document of 1857; Ninez' took care of Colom- bia under the Constitution of 1886. What, if any, could have been the Mexican and Colombian love for civilian constitutional authority? Political science answers that the constitutions wrote down their own high executive authority; cynicism (is it reality?) suggests that constitutions help keep opposition as open and as visible as possible. Also, Ndinez, Vargas, Rosas, Diaz, and some others, were legal caudillos, constitutional because they ran for office. Because they were elected, they upheld formal government publicly, and personalist rule privately. If Simdn Bolivar did write of Latin American kings with the name of president, then these caudillos are the lords and grandees of political struggles for power. They seem to have had no deep need for social and political institutions to help them rule. They did not create (albeit they did not destroy) courts, universities, congresses, commercial chambers. Caudillos, whether by election or natural selection, were practical politicians interested in the fact of supremacy, not the theory of sovereignty; in discipline, not destiny; in patronage, 10 The Caribbean 10 The Caribbean It is as important to see the varied meaning of the term "indi- vidualism" as it is to understand words like "personality" and "pragmatism." The North American experience and tradition with these words is not like the Latin American. The individual- ism of the caudillo system or of the Iberian background has no historic resemblance to that individualism which always goes with private enterprise. Nor is it anything at all like the rugged in- dividualism of "social Darwinism." The North American person- ality sent his energy into business and profit, instead of into power politics, or into science and scholarship-which is just as individualist. The caudillo's personalism is quite different: regional, political, and traditional. If the caudillo dominated men better than systems of ideas or charters of government, he also understood that constitutions look good and protect him from force. The paz porfiriana rested upon the great liberal document of 1857; Nnez' took care of Colom- bia under the Constitution of 1886. What, if any, could have been the Mexican and Colombian love for civilian constitutional authority? Political science answers that the constitutions wrote down their own high executive authority; cynicism (is it reality?) suggests that constitutions help keep opposition as open and as visible as possible. Also, Nuiez, Vargas, Rosas, Diaz, and some others, were legal caudillos, constitutional because they ran for office. Because they were elected, they upheld formal government publicly, and personalist rule privately. If Sim6n Bolivar did write of Latin American kings with the name of president, then these caudillos are the lords and grandees of political struggles for power. They seem to have had no deep need for social and political institutions to help them rule. They did not create (albeit they did not destroy) courts, universities, congresses, commercial chambers. Caudillos, whether by election or natural selection, were practical politicians interested in the fact of supremacy, not the theory of sovereignty; in discipline, not destiny; in patronage, It is as important to see the varied meaning of the term "indi- vidualism" as it is to understand words like "personality" and "pragmatism." The North American experience and tradition with these words is not like the Latin American. The individual- ism of the caudillo system or of the Iberian background has no historic resemblance to that individualism which always goes with private enterprise. Nor is it anything at all like the rugged in- dividualism of "social Darwinism." The North American person- ality sent his energy into business and profit, instead of into power politics, or into science and scholarship-which is just as individualist. The caudillo's personalism is quite different: regional, political, and traditional. If the caudillo dominated men better than systems of ideas or charters of government, he also understood that constitutions look good and protect him from force. The paz porflriana rested upon the great liberal document of 1857; Ndnez' took care of Colom- bia under the Constitution of 1886. What, if any, could have been the Mexican and Colombian love for civilian constitutional authority? Political science answers that the constitutions wrote down their own high executive authority; cynicism (is it reality?) suggests that constitutions help keep opposition as open and as visible as possible. Also, Nniez, Vargas, Rosas, Diaz, and some others, were legal caudillos, constitutional because they ran for office. Because they were elected, they upheld formal government publicly, and personalist rule privately. If Simon Bolivar did write of Latin American kings with the name of president, then these caudillos are the lords and grandees of political struggles for power. They seem to have had no deep need for social and political institutions to help them rule. They did not create (albeit they did not destroy) courts, universities, congresses, commercial chambers. Caudillos, whether by election or natural selection, were practical politicians interested in the fact of supremacy, not the theory of sovereignty; in discipline, not destiny; in patronage,  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 11 not philosophy. Thus they not only were the mirror of their people and history, but because they were so identified could also make the people over in their own image. Conditions bred them, not propaganda. They did not know the formulas for surprising a population with leader symbols and ritual, but they understood very well how a swollen ego attracts the popular eye. They there- fore did not try to make a nation-state, and did not march their peoples; they dictated the existing order, instead of making a new order. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 11 not philosophy. Thus they not only were the mirror of their people and history, but because they were so identified could also make the people over in their own image. Conditions bred them, not propaganda. They did not know the formulas for surprising a population with leader symbols and ritual, but they understood very well how a swollen ego attracts the popular eye. They there- fore did not try to make a nation-state, and did not march their peoples; they dictated the existing order, instead of making a new order. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 11 not philosophy. Thus they not only were the mirror of their people and history, but because they were so identified could also make the people over in their own image. Conditions bred them, not propaganda. They did not know the formulas for surprising a population with leader symbols and ritual, but they understood very well how a swollen ego attracts the popular eye. They there- fore did not try to make a nation-state, and did not march their peoples; they dictated the existing order, instead of making a new order.  2 2 Gerhard Masur: FOREIGN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE CARIBBEAN FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES have played a significant role in the history of Central and South America. Ever since the people of Latin America severed their ties with the mother countries, they have been in search of and in need of the ideological support which they hoped to find in parallel experiences in the Western Hemisphere or in the Old World. It is common knowledge that the Independence movement was hastened by the impact of eighteenth-century rationalism. Likewise, the Constitution of the United States exercised a profound influence on many charters in Latin American lands, being used as a model for a system of checks and balances and as a solution of the thorny problem of regional autonomy versus central government. Although Latin America was prolific in giving birth to new ideas in the field of international relations, her contributions in the realm of do- mestic political philosophy were slim. This discrepancy explains the many adherents gained on Latin American soil first by the American and French revolutions and later by the theories of liberalism, positivism, and Marxism. Even in the twentieth cen- tury we find but few original answers for specific Latin American problems. The philosophy of the Mexican Revolution, the Aprista movement of Victor Ra6l Haya de Ia Torre, and Juan Domingo Pertn's Justicialismo are some attempts to find a solution. Gerhard Masur: FOREIGN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE CARIBBEAN FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES have played a significant role in the history of Central and South America. Ever since the people of Latin America severed their ties with the mother countries, they have been in search of and in need of the ideological support which they hoped to find in parallel experiences in the Western Hemisphere or in the Old World. It is common knowledge that the Independence movement was hastened by the impact of eighteenth-century rationalism. Likewise, the Constitution of the United States exercised a profound influence on many charters in Latin American lands, being used as a model for a system of checks and balances and as a solution of the thorny problem of regional autonomy versus central government. Although Latin America was prolific in giving birth to new ideas in the field of international relations, her contributions in the realm of do- mestic political philosophy were slim. This discrepancy explains the many adherents gained on Latin American soil first by the American and French revolutions and later by the theories of liberalism, positivism, and Marxism. Even in the twentieth cen- tury we find but few original answers for specific Latin American problems. The philosophy of the Mexican Revolution, the Aprista movement of Victor Ra61 Haya de la Torre, and Juan Domingo Peron's Justicialismo are some attempts to find a solution. 12 Gerhard Masr: FOREIGN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE CARIBBEAN FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES have played a significant role in the history of Central and South America. Ever since the people of Latin America severed their ties with the mother countries, they have been in search of and in need of the ideological support which they hoped to find in parallel experiences in the Western Hemisphere or in the Old World. It is common knowledge that the Independence movement was hastened by the impact of eighteenth-century rationalism. Likewise, the Constitution of the United States exercised a profound influence on many charters in Latin American lands, being used as a model for a system of checks and balances and as a solution of the thorny problem of regional autonomy versus central government. Although Latin America was prolific in giving birth to new ideas in the field of international relations, her contributions in the realm of do- mestic political philosophy were slim. This discrepancy explains the many adherents gained on Latin American soil first by the American and French revolutions and later by the theories of liberalism, positivism, and Marxism. Even in the twentieth cen- tury we find but few original answers for specific Latin American problems. The philosophy of the Mexican Revolution, the Aprista movement of Victor Ra6l Haya de la Torre, and Juan Domingo Pern's Justicialismo are some attempts to find a solution. 12  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 13 In the area which concerns us here we must be prepared to note even stronger ideological influences from foreign sources. The Caribbean is the only region in the Western Hemisphere where, in addition to the United States, three European powers still hold territorial possessions.' Side by side with independent republics are colonial dependencies of diverse legal status. Just as the variety of languages is greater here than anywhere else in the Americas, just so must we expect to find markedly differing and far-reaching ideological influences at work in the Caribbean. The picture is further complicated by the global civil war between the "Free World" and communism, which has had its reflections and repercussions in the Caribbean as elsewhere. We may, there- fore, feel certain that this area, which seems to be unified by geographical position, racial traits, and economic conditions, may in reality offer the observer a surprising variety of ideological trends and patterns. I trust I am justified in stating that the present-day ideological struggle in the Caribbean area became apparent for the first time during the thirties.' As a consequence of the Great Depression the Caribbean territories, with their monocultural system, were particularly hard hit. In the British possessions labor riots took place in Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Barbados, and the demand for legal recognition of trade-unions was voiced. At the time, these islands were still crown colonies; that is to say, they were the wards of more or less enlightened civil servants who found it difficult to cope with the political and economic unrest other For the problems of the Caribbean, see: A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean at Mid-Century (Gainesville, Fla., 1951); M. Follick, The Twelve Republics (London, 1952); Paul Blanshard, Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean (New York, 1947); Dexter Perkins, The United States and The Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); R. A. Platt, The European Possessions in the Caribbean (New York, 1941); J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York, 1940); and C. L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York, 1936). ' Blanshard, p. 23. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 13 In the area which concerns us here we must be prepared to note even stronger ideological influences from foreign sources. The Caribbean is the only region in the Western Hemisphere where, in addition to the United States, three European powers still hold territorial possessions.' Side by side with independent republics are colonial dependencies of diverse legal status. Just as the variety of languages is greater here than anywhere else in the Americas, just so must we expect to find markedly differing and far-reaching ideological influences at work in the Caribbean. The picture is further complicated by the global civil war between the "Free World" and communism, which has had its reflections and repercussions in the Caribbean as elsewhere. We may, there- fore, feel certain that this area, which seems to be unified by geographical position, racial traits, and economic conditions, may in reality offer the observer a surprising variety of ideological trends and patterns. I trust I am justified in stating that the present-day ideological struggle in the Caribbean area became apparent for the first time during the thirties.2 As a consequence of the Great Depression the Caribbean territories, with their monocultural system, were particularly hard hit. In the British possessions labor riots took place in Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Barbados, and the demand for legal recognition of trade-unions was voiced. At the time, these islands were still crown colonies; that is to say, they were the wards of more or less enlightened civil servants who found it difficult to cope with the political and economic unrest other For the problems of the Caribbean, see: A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean at Mid-Century (Gainesville, Fla., 1951); M. Follick, The Twelve Republics (London, 1952); Paul Blanshard, Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean (New York, 1947); Dexter Perkins, The United States and The Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); R. A. Platt, The European Possessions in the Caribbean (New York, 1941); J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York, 1940); and C. L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York, 1936). Blanshard, p. 23. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 13 In the area which concerns us here we must be prepared to note even stronger ideological influences from foreign sources. The Caribbean is the only region in the Western Hemisphere where, in addition to the United States, three European powers still hold territorial possessions.' Side by side with independent republics are colonial dependencies of diverse legal status. Just as the variety of languages is greater here than anywhere else in the Americas, just so must we expect to find markedly differing and far-reaching ideological influences at work in the Caribbean. The picture is further complicated by the global civil war between the "Free World" and communism, which has had its reflections and repercussions in the Caribbean as elsewhere. We may, there- fore, feel certain that this area, which seems to be unified by geographical position, racial traits, and economic conditions, may in reality offer the observer a surprising variety of ideological trends and patterns. I trust I am justified in stating that the present-day ideological struggle in the Caribbean area became apparent for the first time during the thirties.' As a consequence of the Great Depression the Caribbean territories, with their monocultural system, were particularly hard hit. In the British possessions labor riots took place in Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Barbados, and the demand for legal recognition of trade-unions was voiced. At the time, these islands were still crown colonies; that is to say, they were the wards of more or less enlightened civil servants who found it difficult to cope with the political and economic unrest other For the problems of the Caribbean, see: A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean at Mid-Century (Gainesville, Fla., 1951); M. Follick, The Twelve Republics (London, 1952); Paul Blanshard, Democracy and Empire in the Caribbean (New York, 1947); Dexter Perkins, The United States and The Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); R. A. Platt, The European Possessions in the Caribbean (New York, 1941); J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York, 1940); and C. L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York, 1936). 2 Blanshard, p. 23.  14 The Caribbean than by political suppression.' But Great Britain kept a watchful eye on her West Indian territories, among which are some of the oldest possessions of the Crown. An investigating committee was appointed and sent on location to study the situation and to recommend remedies for the ailments that afflicted the region. The chairman of the commission was an experienced colonial ad- ministrator, determined to cover the ground thoroughly. Although the findings of the commission were completed in 1939, the report was not made public until 1945. Its effect, however, was felt earlier. In point of fact, the Lord Moyne report represents an epoch in the history of the Caribbean.' The first positive step to be taken was the appointment of a Comptroller for Development and Welfare who was to supervise the vast program of reforms outlined by the Royal Commission, a program which covered not only the economic grievances but also the retarded cultural conditions in the Caribbean and which, in addition, took as a goal the gradual reform and revision neces- sary for the establishment of self-government and free democratic institutions.' The British pattern of educating colonials of whatever racial or cultural backgrounds through a gradual advance toward com- plete political autonomy is an integral part of that country's ide- ology. I consider the British pattern one of the most influential political ideologies of our day, albeit a less systematic and articu- late one than, say liberalism or Marxism. Its underlying prin- ciples have often been expressed. The secretary for the colonies in the Labor government of 1945 made the following definitive statement: "It is our policy to develop the colonies and all their resources in such a way as to enable their people speedily and substantially to improve their economic and social conditions and, as soon as it may be practicable, to attain responsible self-govern- ment."' We may add that the attainment of self-government is ' E. H. Carter, History of the West Indian Peoples (London, 1953). * Report of the West India Royal Commission, 2 vols. (London, 1945). ' Blanshard, p. 323. * Ibid., p. 80. 14 The Caribbean than by political suppression.' But Great Britain kept a watchful eye on her West Indian territories, among which are some of the oldest possessions of the Crown. An investigating committee was appointed and sent on location to study the situation and to recommend remedies for the ailments that afflicted the region. The chairman of the commission was an experienced colonial ad- ministrator, determined to cover the ground thoroughly. Although the findings of the commission were completed in 1939, the report was not made public until 1945. Its effect, however, was felt earlier. In point of fact, the Lord Moyne report represents an epoch in the history of the Caribbean.' The first positive step to be taken was the appointment of a Comptroller for Development and Welfare who was to supervise the vast program of reforms outlined by the Royal Commission, a program which covered not only the economic grievances but also the retarded cultural conditions in the Caribbean and which, in addition, took as a goal the gradual reform and revision neces- sary for the establishment of self-government and free democratic institutions., The British pattern of educating colonials of whatever racial or cultural backgrounds through a gradual advance toward com- plete political autonomy is an integral part of that country's ide- ology. I consider the British pattern one of the most influential political ideologies of our day, albeit a less systematic and articu- late one than, say liberalism or Marxism. Its underlying prin- ciples have often been expressed. The secretary for the colonies in the Labor government of 1945 made the following definitive statement: "It is our policy to develop the colonies and all their resources in such a way as to enable their people speedily and substantially to improve their economic and social conditions and, as soon as it may be practicable, to attain responsible self-govern- ment.", We may add that the attainment of self-government is E. H. Carter, History of the West Indian Peoples (London, 1953). ' Report of the West India Royal Commission, 2 vols. (London, 1945). ' Blanshard, p. 323. * Ibid., p. so. 14 The Caribbean than by political suppression.' But Great Britain kept a watchful eye on her West Indian territories, among which are some of the oldest possessions of the Crown. An investigating committee was appointed and sent on location to study the situation and to recommend remedies for the ailments that afflicted the region. The chairman of the commission was an experienced colonial ad- ministrator, determined to cover the ground thoroughly. Although the findings of the commission were completed in 1939, the report was not made public until 1945. Its effect, however, was felt earlier. In point of fact, the Lord Moyne report represents an epoch in the history of the Caribbean.' The first positive step to be taken was the appointment of a Comptroller for Development and Welfare who was to supervise the vast program of reforms outlined by the Royal Commission, a program which covered not only the economic grievances but also the retarded cultural conditions in the Caribbean and which, in addition, took as a goal the gradual reform and revision neces- sary for the establishment of self-government and free democratic institutions.' The British pattern of educating colonials of whatever racial or cultural backgrounds through a gradual advance toward com- plete political autonomy is an integral part of that country's ide- ology. I consider the British pattern one of the most influential political ideologies of our day, albeit a less systematic and articu- late one than, say liberalism or Marxism. Its underlying prin- ciples have often been expressed. The secretary for the colonies in the Labor government of 1945 made the following definitive statement: "It is our policy to develop the colonies and all their resources in such a way as to enable their people speedily and substantially to improve their economic and social conditions and, as soon as it may be practicable, to attain responsible self-govern- ment."' We may add that the attainment of self-government is * E. H. Carter, History of the West Indian Peoples (London, 1953). * Report of the West India Royal Comission, 2 vols. (London, 1945). " Blanshard, p. 323. * Ibid., p. 80.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 expected to take place within the framework of the British Com- monwealth of Nations, with its globe-encircling connections and its loose but resilient relationship. It may be safely maintained.that during the last'two decades the British colonies in the Caribbean have gone a long way toward becoming recognized members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Perhaps the most interesting case in point is Jamaica. From the labor riots of the 1930's previously mentioned, there arose a union movement that was soon acknowledged by the colonial authorities. The two leaders of this trade-union move- ment, William Alexander Bustamante and Norman W. Manley, represent opposite ideological positions, but both reveal British influence and indoctrination. Norman Manley, who is at present prime minister of Jamaica, is a scholarly socialist, clever, honor- able, and incorruptible. He has modeled his own party, the Peoples' National Party, closely after the British Labor Party; he has fought for full representative government in Jamaica, and is, though pro-British, an outspoken foe of imperialism.' His opponent, Bustamante, on the other hand, is the leader of the largest trade-union in Jamaica and has supported the British Empire as a God-given instrument of democratic rule. He has attacked communism and even socialism with great vigor and has sometimes been suspected of fascist tendencies. It was Busta- mante who in 1944 triumphed in the first free elections ever to be held in Jamaica over his rival Manley, and it was Bustamante who represented his country in the coronation ceremonies in Lon- don in 1953. The picture in which, with other prime ministers of the Commonwealth, he appeared with Queen Elizabeth is an indication of the progress that democratic thought has made in the Caribbean. It must, however, be freely admitted that such progress, or progress at such a pace, would not have been possible without the accelerating impulse of World War II. Although the war en- ' Ibid., pp. 94fE. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 expected to take place within the framework of the British Com- monwealth of Nations, with its globe-encircling connections and its loose but resilient relationship. It may be safely maintained that during the last'two decades the British colonies in the Caribbean have gone a long way toward becoming recognized members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Perhaps the most interesting case in point is Jamaica. From the labor riots of the 1930's previously mentioned, there arose a union movement that was soon acknowledged by the colonial authorities. The two leaders of this trade-union move- ment, William Alexander Bustamante and Norman W. Manley, represent opposite ideological positions, but both reveal British influence and indoctrination. Norman Manley, who is at present prime minister of Jamaica, is a scholarly socialist, clever, honor- able, and incorruptible. He has modeled his own party, the Peoples' National Party, closely after the British Labor Party; he has fought for full representative government in Jamaica, and is, though pro-British, an outspoken foe of imperialism.' His opponent, Bustamante, on the other hand, is the leader of the largest trade-union in Jamaica and has supported the British Empire as a God-given instrument of democratic rule. He has attacked communism and even socialism with great vigor and has sometimes been suspected of fascist tendencies. It was Busta- mante who in 1944 triumphed in the first free elections ever to be held in Jamaica over his rival Manley, and it was Bustamante who represented his country in the coronation ceremonies in Lon- don in 1953. The picture in which, with other prime ministers of the Commonwealth, he appeared with Queen Elizabeth is an indication of the progress that democratic thought has made in the Caribbean. It must, however, be freely admitted that such progress, or progress at such a pace, would not have been possible without the accelerating impulse of World War II. Although the war en- ' Ibid., pp. 9411. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 expected to take place within the framework of the British Com- monwealth of Nations, with its globe-encircling connections and its loose but resilient relationship. It may be safely maintained.that during the last'two decades the British colonies in the Caribbean have gone a long way toward becoming recognized members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Perhaps the most interesting case in point is Jamaica. From the labor riots of the 1930's previously mentioned, there arose a union movement that was soon acknowledged by the colonial authorities. The two leaders of this trade-union move- ment, William Alexander Bustamante and Norman W. Manley, represent opposite ideological positions, but both reveal British influence and indoctrination. Norman Manley, who is at present prime minister of Jamaica, is a scholarly socialist, clever, honor- able, and incorruptible. He has modeled his own party, the Peoples' National Party, closely after the British Labor Party; he has fought for full representative government in Jamaica, and is, though pro-British, an outspoken foe of imperialism.' His opponent, Bustamante, on the other hand, is the leader of the largest trade-union in Jamaica and has supported the British Empire as a God-given instrument of democratic rule. He has attacked communism and even socialism with great vigor and has sometimes been suspected of fascist tendencies. It was Busta- mante who in 1944 triumphed in the first free elections ever to be held in Jamaica over his rival Manley, and it was Bustamante who represented his country in the coronation ceremonies in Lon- don in 1953. The picture in which, with other prime ministers of the Commonwealth, he appeared with Queen Elizabeth is an indication of the progress that democratic thought has made in the Caribbean. It must, however, be freely admitted that such progress, or progress at such a pace, would not have been possible without the accelerating impulse of World War II. Although the war en- ' Ibid., pp. 94fE.  16 The Caribbean dangered the maritime connections of the islands and subsequently brought a great deal of hardship to their tropical economies, it also carried with it innovations of revolutionary perspective. The Anglo-American agreement of 1940, by which the United States acquired military bases in these islands for a ninety- nine-year period, led to enormous improvements in air and naval communications. Jobs became plentiful and wages rose sharply. The standard of living and the general level of education showed marked improvement. This Anglo-American collabora- tion in the Caribbean led to the creation of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, established in 1942.8 The Commission was originally appointed to strengthen social and economic co- operation between the United States and the United Kingdom and its possessions in this area. It survived the great war and was reorganized in 1946 to include the two other European powers who still hold territories in the Caribbean, France and the Netherlands.? Although this four-power commission is strictly an advisory body, it must be counted among the principal agents of ideological fermentation in the West Indies. It concerns itself with such varied problems as health, labor migration, develop- ment of tourism, diversification of agricultural and industrial pro- duction, and especially with the betterment of education on all levels."" Today the existence in the Caribbean of a health center in Trinidad, an active Caribbean research council, a university for the West Indies in Kingston is, to a large extent, the result ' Bernard L Poole, The Caribbean Commission: Background of Co- operation in the West Indies (University of South Carolina Press, 1951); Etienne Flory, La Commission des Caraibes (Paris, 1952); The Carib- bean Commission and the War (Washington, 1943); Charles W. Taus- sig, "A Four-Power Program in the Caribbean," Foreign Affairs (July, 1946); Annette Baker Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean: A Colonial Dilemma, Yale University Institute of International Studies (New York, 1949). t Blanshard, p. 329. Caribbean Commission, West Indian Conference (United Nations publ.). Reports on the third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the West Indian Conference. 16 The Caribbean dangered the maritime connections of the islands and subsequently brought a great deal of hardship to their tropical economies, it also carried with it innovations of revolutionary perspective. The Anglo-American agreement of 1940, by which the United States acquired military bases in these islands for a ninety- nine-year period, led to enormous improvements in air and naval communications. Jobs became plentiful and wages rose sharply. The standard of living and the general level of education showed marked improvement. This Anglo-American collabora- tion in the Caribbean led to the creation of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, established in 1942.8 The Commission was originally appointed to strengthen social and economic co- operation between the United States and the United Kingdom and its possessions in this area. It survived the great war and was reorganized in 1946 to include the two other European powers who still hold territories in the Caribbean, France and the Netherlands.' Although this four-power commission is strictly an advisory body, it must be counted among the principal agents of ideological fermentation in the West Indies. It concerns itself with such varied problems as health, labor migration, develop- ment of tourism, diversification of agricultural and industrial pro- duction, and especially with the betterment of education on all levels30 Today the existence in the Caribbean of a health center in Trinidad, an active Caribbean research council, a university for the West Indies in Kingston is, to a large extent, the result ' Bernard L. Poole, The Caribbean Commission: Background of Co- operation in the West Indies (University of South Carolina Press, 1951); Etienne Flory, La Commission des Caraibes (Paris, 1952); The Carib- bean Commission and the War (Washington, 1943); Charles W. Taus- sig, "A Four-Power Program in the Caribbean," Foreign Affairs (July, 1946); Annette Baker Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean: A Colonial Dilemma, Yale University Institute of International Studies (New York, 1949). Blanshard, p. 329. * Caribbean Commission, West Indian Conference (United Nations publ.). Reports on the third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the West Indian Conference. 16 The Caribbean dangered the maritime connections of the islands and subsequently brought a great deal of hardship to their tropical economies, it also carried with it innovations of revolutionary perspective. The Anglo-American agreement of 1940, by which the United States acquired military bases in these islands for a ninety- nine-year period, led to enormous improvements in air and naval communications. Jobs became plentiful and wages rose sharply. The standard of living and the general level of education showed marked improvement. This Anglo-American collabora- tion in the Caribbean led to the creation of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, established in 1942.8 The Commission was originally appointed to strengthen social and economic co- operation between the United States and the United Kingdom and its possessions in this area. It survived the great war and was reorganized in 1946 to include the two other European powers who still hold territories in the Caribbean, France and the Netherlands.' Although this four-power commission is strictly an advisory body, it must be counted among the principal agents of ideological fermentation in the West Indies. It concerns itself with such varied problems as health, labor migration, develop- ment of tourism, diversification of agricultural and industrial pro- duction, and especially with the betterment of education on all levels." Today the existence in the Caribbean of a health center in Trinidad, an active Caribbean research council, a university for the West Indies in Kingston is, to a large extent, the result ' Bernard L Poole, The Caribbean Commission: Background of Co- operation in the West Indies (University of South Carolina Press, 1951); Etienne Flory, La Commission des Caraibes (Paris, 1952); The Carib- bean Commission and the War (Washington, 1943); Charles W. Taus- sig, "A Four-Power Program in the Caribbean," Foreign Affairs (July, 1946); Annette Baker Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean: A Colonial Dilemma, Yale University Institute of International Studies (New York, 1949). * Blanshard, p. 329. Caribbean Commission, West Indian Conference (United Nations publ.). Reports on the third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the West Indian Conference.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17 of the work of the Caribbean Commission. Its labor has met with "a modest but respectable success."" From these manifold influences, crystallized in the mid-1940's, an ever-increasing trend toward democracy became observable. The system of government was gradually changed from that of crown colonies to that of self-governing communities." The Jamaica Constitution of 1943 set the pattern which was followed by the Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana. It provides for a bicameral legislature with a nominated upper house and an elected lower house. Universal suffrage has been granted. An embryo cabinet of five members, called the Executive Council, has been instituted; the principle of parliamentary responsibility has been introduced, and the office and title of prime minister has been created. Such advancements speak for themselves. One further development must be mentioned in this connec- tion. The road to social and economic betterment in the West Indies has been obstructed by the atomization or, if you prefer, the fragmentation of political life. The islands, and even British Guiana, are too small to make rapid strides by themselves. Prog- ress can only be achieved through the regional approach as the Caribbean Commission has urged time and again. Although it seems useless to expect that the entire Caribbean area will ever become a closely knit unit, there are promising signs that at least the British West Indies may attain federation in the not-too- distant future. The necessity for such a federation was acknowl- edged early in the nineteenth century, but only in the last two decades has there been substantial progress in this direction." After several meetings had taken place, a basic agreement on the " Ibid., pp. 4-6. Sir Frank Stockdale, Development and Welfare in the West Indies (London, 1944). Sir Frank was the first Comptroller for De- velopment and Welfare in the West Indies. " Sir Allan Burns, "Toward a Caribbean Federation," Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1955); Agnes M. Whitson and Lucy F. Horsfall, Britain and the West Indies (London, 1948), pp. 36, 43. " Charles S. Salmon, The Caribbean Confederation (London, 1888). CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17 of the work of the Caribbean Commission. Its labor has met with "a modest but respectable success."" From these manifold influences, crystallized in the mid-1940's, an ever-increasing trend toward democracy became observable. The system of government was gradually changed from that of crown colonies to that of self-governing communities." The Jamaica Constitution of 1943 set the pattern which was followed by the Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana. It provides for a bicameral legislature with a nominated upper house and an elected lower house. Universal suffrage has been granted. An embryo cabinet of five members, called the Executive Council, has been instituted; the principle of parliamentary responsibility has been introduced, and the office and title of prime minister has been created. Such advancements speak for themselves. One further development must be mentioned in this connec- tion. The road to social and economic betterment in the West Indies has been obstructed by the atomization or, if you prefer, the fragmentation of political life. The islands, and even British Guiana, are too small to make rapid strides by themselves. Prog- ress can only be achieved through the regional approach as the Caribbean Commission has urged time and again. Although it seems useless to expect that the entire Caribbean area will ever become a closely knit unit, there are promising signs that at least the British West Indies may attain federation in the not-too- distant future. The necessity for such a federation was acknowl- edged early in the nineteenth century, but only in the last two decades has there been substantial progress in this direction." After several meetings had taken place, a basic agreement on the " Ibid., pp. 4-6. Sir Frank Stockdale, Development and Welfare in the West Indies (London, 1944). Sir Frank was the first Comptroller for De- velopment and Welfare in the West Indies. "s Sir Allan Burns, "Toward a Caribbean Federation," Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1955); Agnes M. Whitson and Lucy F. Horsfall, Britain and the West Indies (London, 1948), pp. 36, 43. " Charles S. Salmon, The Caribbean Confederation (London, 1888). CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17 of the work of the Caribbean Commission. Its labor has met with "a modest but respectable success."" From these manifold influences, crystallized in the mid-1940's, an ever-increasing trend toward democracy became observable. The system of government was gradually changed from that of crown colonies to that of self-governing communities."5 The Jamaica Constitution of 1943 set the pattern which was followed by the Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana. It provides for a bicameral legislature with a nominated upper house and an elected lower house. Universal suffrage has been granted. An embryo cabinet of five members, called the Executive Council, has been instituted; the principle of parliamentary responsibility has been introduced, and the office and title of prime minister has been created. Such advancements speak for themselves. One further development must be mentioned in this connec- tion. The road to social and economic betterment in the West Indies has been obstructed by the atomization or, if you prefer, the fragmentation of political life. The islands, and even British Guiana, are too small to make rapid strides by themselves. Prog- ress can only be achieved through the regional approach as the Caribbean Commission has urged time and again. Although it seems useless to expect that the entire Caribbean area will ever become a closely knit unit, there are promising signs that at least the British West Indies may attain federation in the not-too- distant future. The necessity for such a federation was acknowl- edged early in the nineteenth century, but only in the last two decades has there been substantial progress in this direction." After several meetings had taken place, a basic agreement on the " Ibid., pp. 4-6. Sir Frank Stockdale, Development and Welfare in the West Indies (London, 1944). Sir Frank was the first Comptroller for De- velopment and Welfare in the West Indies. " Sir Allan Burns, "Toward a Caribbean Federation," Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1955); Agnes M. Whitson and Lucy F. Horsfall, Britain and the West Indies (London, 1948), pp. 36, 43. o Charles S. Salmon, The Caribbean Confederation (London, 1888).  18 The Caribbean formation of a Caribbean federation was reached in Trinidad in March, 1955. Although this agreement has not yet been accepted by all British territories in the Caribbean, and while important questions remain to be ironed out, one is warranted in saying that the Caribbean federation is more than a hope; it is a goal that can be reached." Once the British federation in the Carib- bean has been instituted, it will soon be recognized as a new dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The influ- ence of the federate idea on the people of the West Indies is without doubt one of the most significant results of foreign ide- ology in the Caribbean." This bright outlook is, however, dimmed at least temporarily in one possession: British Guiana. Here, too, the socioeconomic development was greatly accelerated by World War II. In response, the British authorities granted Guiana a constitution closely modeled upon the one given to Jamaica in 1943." But the first election under the new franchise in April, 1953, re- turned a parliament that was openly procommunist. The People's Progressive Party obtained a comfortable majority in the lower house. Its leaders, Cheddi and Janet Jagan, were bent on stirring up trouble; they promoted race hatred, economic unrest, and political sedition. Great Britain, as a protest to the lack of dis- cipline, suspended the constitution of Guiana and imposed law and order by the use of armed force. Sir Oliver Littelton, secre- tary for the colonies, declared in the House of Commons, "Her Majesty's government is not willing to allow a communist state to be organized within the British Commonwealth." The attempt to absorb British Guiana has been one of the two all-out efforts made by international communism to rise to power in the Western Hemisphere. " Sir Allan Burns, p. 139. " See the words of Albert Comes, Minister for Labour, Commerce, and Industry in the government of Jamaica, quoted by Burns, p. 139. " Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on British Guiana (London, 1952). 18 The Caribbean 18 The Caribbean formation of a Caribbean federation was reached in Trinidad in March, 1955. Although this agreement has not yet been accepted by all British territories in the Caribbean, and while important questions remain to be ironed out, one is warranted in saying that the Caribbean federation is more than a hope; it is a goal that can be reached." Once the British federation in the Carib- bean has been instituted, it will soon be recognized as a new dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The influ- ence of the federate idea on the people of the West Indies is without doubt one of the most significant results of foreign ide- ology in the Caribbean." This bright outlook is, however, dimmed at least temporarily in one possession: British Guiana. Here, too, the socioeconomic development was greatly accelerated by World War II. In response, the British authorities granted Guiana a constitution closely modeled upon the one given to Jamaica in 1943.1 But the first election under the new franchise in April, 1953, re- turned a parliament that was openly procommunist. The People's Progressive Party obtained a comfortable majority in the lower house. Its leaders, Cheddi and Janet Jagan, were bent on stirring up trouble; they promoted race hatred, economic unrest, and political sedition. Great Britain, as a protest to the lack of dis- cipline, suspended the constitution of Guiana and imposed law and order by the use of armed force. Sir Oliver Littelton, secre- tary for the colonies, declared in the House of Commons, "Her Majesty's government is not willing to allow a communist state to be organized within the British Commonwealth." The attempt to absorb British Guiana has been one of the two all-out efforts made by international communism to rise to power in the Western Hemisphere. " Sir Allan Burns, p. 139. " See the words of Albert Gomes, Minister for Labour, Commerce, and Industry in the government of Jamaica, quoted by Burns, p. 139. " Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on British Guiana (London, 1952). formation of a Caribbean federation was reached in Trinidad in March, 1955. Although this agreement has not yet been accepted by all British territories in the Caribbean, and while important questions remain to be ironed out, one is warranted in saying that the Caribbean federation is more than a hope; it is a goal that can be reached." Once the British federation in the Carib- bean has been instituted, it will soon be recognized as a new dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The influ- ence of the federate idea on the people of the West Indies is without doubt one of the most significant results of foreign ide- ology in the Caribbean." This bright outlook is, however, dimmed at least temporarily in one possession: British Guiana. Here, too, the socioeconomic development was greatly accelerated by World War It. In response, the British authorities granted Guiana a constitution closely modeled upon the one given to Jamaica in 1943." But the first election under the new franchise in April, 1953, re- turned a parliament that was openly procommunist. The People's Progressive Party obtained a comfortable majority in the lower house. Its leaders, Cheddi and Janet Jagan, were bent on stirring up trouble; they promoted race hatred, economic unrest, and political sedition. Great Britain, as a protest to the lack of dis- cipline, suspended the constitution of Guiana and imposed law and order by the use of armed force. Sir Oliver Littelton, secre- tary for the colonies, declared in the House of Commons, "Her Majesty's government is not willing to allow a communist state to be organized within the British Commonwealth." The attempt to absorb British Guiana has been one of the two all-out efforts made by international communism to rise to power in the Western Hemisphere. " Sir Allan Burns, p. 139. " See the words of Albert Gomes, Minister for Labour, Commerce, and Industry in the government of Jamaica, quoted by Bus, p. 139. " Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on British Guiana (London, 1952).  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 19 II Before we turn our attention to the other communist venture in the Caribbean, it may be well to glance briefly at developments in other West Indian lands. Here too we find interesting ex- amples of progress in democratic thought. However, each power -France, the United States, the Netherlands-has followed its own particular bent. France, for instance, has pursued the idea of a republic one-and-indivisible which is ultimately the offspring of the ideas of 1789 and 1793. By the law of March 19, 1946, she converted the territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana into departments of the Fourth Republic." These lands now have prefects instead of governors, and send their representatives to the great constitutional bodies of France, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the assembly of the Union Frangaise. The Netherlands, by imperial decree promulgated in December, 1942, has made all parts of the colonial empire co- equals in their commonwealth." The United States has steered a course which seems to lie halfway between the system of centralization followed by France and the idea of decentralization and federation that has guided Great Britain. We have maintained close ties with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and at the same time have granted Puerto Rico the status of commonwealth and an administrative and legislative autonomy that will satisfy the aspirations of all but the most fanatic nationalists. III If we turn our attention now to the independent republics in the Caribbean, we find the scene in great part dominated by a process which some years ago I termed "Democracy in Eclipse."" " Jean Pouquet, Les Antilles Frangaises (Presses Uni. de France, 1952), p. 33; see also Les Carnets d'Outre Mer (Paris). " Blanshard, p. 272. " Gerhard Masur, "Democracy in Eclipse," Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1950), p. 340. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 19 II Before we turn our attention to the other communist venture in the Caribbean, it may be well to glance briefly at developments in other West Indian lands. Here too we find interesting ex- amples of progress in democratic thought. However, each power -France, the United States, the Netherlands-has followed its own particular bent. France, for instance, has pursued the idea of a republic one-and-indivisible which is ultimately the offspring of the ideas of 1789 and 1793. By the law of March 19, 1946, she converted the territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana into departments of the Fourth Republic." These lands now have prefects instead of governors, and send their representatives to the great constitutional bodies of France, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the assembly of the Union Frangaise. The Netherlands, by imperial decree promulgated in December, 1942, has made all parts of the colonial empire co- equals in their commonwealth." The United States has steered a course which seems to lie halfway between the system of centralization followed by France and the idea of decentralization and federation that has guided Great Britain. We have maintained close ties with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and at the same time have granted Puerto Rico the status of commonwealth and an administrative and legislative autonomy that will satisfy the aspirations of all but the most fanatic nationalists. III If we turn our attention now to ,the independent republics in the Caribbean, we find the scene in great part dominated by a process which some years ago I termed "Democracy in Eclipse."" " Jean Pouquet, Les Antilles Frangaises (Presses Uni. de France, 1952), p. 33; see also Les Carnets d'Outre Mer (Paris). " Blanshard, p. 272. " Gerhard Masur, "Democracy in Eclipse," Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1950), p. 340. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 19 II Before we turn our attention to the other communist venture in the Caribbean, it may be well to glance briefly at developments in other West Indian lands. Here too we find interesting ex- amples of progress in democratic thought. However, each power -France, the United States, the Netherlands-has followed its own particular bent. France, for instance, has pursued the idea of a republic one-and-indivisible which is ultimately the offspring of the ideas of 1789 and 1793. By the law of March 19, 1946, she converted the territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana into departments of the Fourth Republic." These lands now have prefects instead of governors, and send their representatives to the great constitutional bodies of France, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the assembly of the Union Frangaise. The Netherlands, by imperial decree promulgated in December, 1942, has made all parts of the colonial empire co- equals in their commonwealth." The United States has steered a course which seems to lie halfway between the system of centralization followed by France and the idea of decentralization and federation that has guided Great Britain. We have maintained close ties with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and at the same time have granted Puerto Rico the status of commonwealth and an administrative and legislative autonomy that will satisfy the aspirations of all but the most fanatic nationalists. III If we turn our attention now to the independent republics in the Caribbean, we find the scene in great part dominated by a process which some years ago I termed "Democracy in Eclipse."'" " Jean Pouquet, Les Antilles Francaises (Presses Uni. de France, 1952), p. 33; see also Les Carnets d'Outre Mer (Paris). " Blanshard, p. 272. * Gerhard Masur, "Democracy in Eclipse," Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1950), p. 340.  20 The Caribbean In Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, and Nica- ragua, the political stage is dominated by the strong man of mili- tary background and ascendancy. There is nothing new in this phenomenon, all too familiar in the development of Latin America; rather is it a reverting to type, the type of the caudillo, which has exercised a predominant influence on Latin American political life since the dawn of independence. I cannot detect any ideolog- ical coloring in the rise of these men that might be attributed to foreign ideologies. Fascism was defeated in World War II and will hardly be revived in the Caribbean. The influence of Fran- cisco Franco's Hispanismo or Pern's Justicialismo has, at best, been negligible on the dictatorships of the Caribbean. What we do find in most cases is a practical business sense for the eco- nomic necessities of these republics going hand in hand with a repression of civil and individual liberties. American public opinion has, therefore, been of a divided mind in viewing the caudillos of the Caribbean; it has alternately praised the prosper- ity that countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Santo Domingo, and even Nicaragua enjoy, and condemned the police-state methods which have made the boom possible. There is some disparity in this picture when we come to Costa Rica and Guatemala. Costa Rica, under the leadership of Jose Figueres, has continued its well- cemented democratic development; Guatemala, on the other hand, has been the stage of communist infiltration. The latter is, therefore, of particular interest in our discussion." In 1944 Guatemala experienced a revolutionary uprising that terminated the long dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. The next presi- dent, Juan J. Ardvalo, called himself a "spiritual socialist," but in reality he represented a trend not at all exceptional in Latin America at the close of World War II. His spiritual socialism may be compared to parallel tendencies in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela." It was a blend of nationalistic and socialistic ideas * Department of State, Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala (Washington, 1954). " Masur, p. 342. 20 The Caribbean In Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, and Nica- ragua, the political stage is dominated by the strong man of mili- tary background and ascendancy. There is nothing new in this phenomenon, all too familiar in the development of Latin America; rather is it a reverting to type, the type of the caudillo, which has exercised a predominant influence on Latin American political life since the dawn of independence. I cannot detect any ideolog- ical coloring in the rise of these men that might be attributed to foreign ideologies. Fascism was defeated in World War II and will hardly be revived in the Caribbean. The influence of Fran- cisco Franco's Hispanismo or Pern's Justicialismo has, at best, been negligible on the dictatorships of the Caribbean. What we do find in most cases is a practical business sense for the eco- nomic necessities of these republics going hand in hand with a repression of civil and individual liberties. American public opinion has, therefore, been of a divided mind in viewing the caudillos of the Caribbean; it has alternately praised the prosper- ity that countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Santo Domingo, and even Nicaragua enjoy, and condemned the police-state methods which have made the boom possible. There is some disparity in this picture when we come to Costa Rica and Guatemala. Costa Rica, under the leadership of Jose Figueres, has continued its well- cemented democratic development; Guatemala, on the other hand, has been the stage of communist infiltration. The latter is, therefore, of particular interest in our discussion."e In 1944 Guatemala experienced a revolutionary uprising that terminated the long dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. The next presi- dent, Juan J. Arevalo, called himself a "spiritual socialist," but in reality he represented a trend not at all exceptional in Latin America at the close of World War II. His spiritual socialism may be compared to parallel tendencies in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela."' It was a blend of nationalistic and socialistic ideas * Department of State, Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala (Washington, 1954). " Masur, p. 342. 20 The Caribbean In Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, and Nica- ragua, the political stage is dominated by the strong man of mili- tary background and ascendancy. There is nothing new in this phenomenon, all too familiar in the development of Latin America; rather is it a reverting to type, the type of the caudillo, which has exercised a predominant influence on Latin American political life since the dawn of independence. I cannot detect any ideolog- ical coloring in the rise of these men that might be attributed to foreign ideologies. Fascism was defeated in World War II and will hardly be revived in the Caribbean. The influence of Fran- cisco Franco's Hispanismo or Peron's Justicialismo has, at best, been negligible on the dictatorships of the Caribbean. What we do find in most cases is a practical business sense for the eco- nomic necessities of these republics going hand in hand with a repression of civil and individual liberties. American public opinion has, therefore, been of a divided mind in viewing the caudillos of the Caribbean; it has alternately praised the prosper- ity that countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Santo Domingo, and even Nicaragua enjoy, and condemned the police-state methods which have made the boom possible. There is some disparity in this picture when we come to Costa Rica and Guatemala. Costa Rica, under the leadership of Jose Figueres, has continued its well- cemented democratic development; Guatemala, on the other hand, has been the stage of communist infiltration. The latter is, therefore, of particular interest in our discussion." In 1944 Guatemala experienced a revolutionary uprising that terminated the long dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. The next presi- dent, Juan J. Arevalo, called himself a "spiritual socialist," but in reality he represented a trend not at all exceptional in Latin America at the close of World War II. His spiritual socialism may be compared to parallel tendencies in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela." It was a blend of nationalistic and socialistic ideas " Department of State, Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala (Washington, 1954). " Masur, p. 342.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 21 very characteristic of the immediate aftermath of the great cata- clysm. Although the new constitution of Guatemala of March, 1945, forbade the formation and functioning of political organi- zations of international character, the communist movement easily penetrated the public agencies of the convulsed republic. Guatemala had remained a backward, dictator-ridden country where 2 per cent of the population controlled 70 per cent of the arable land, and where more than half the population con- sisted of illiterate Indians who continued to live by their age-old customs and manners." There was, however, a middle groap composed of ladinos, which included civil servants, soldiers, teachers, journalists, and clerics, who had felt the intellectual fermentation of the war years and who were now clamoring for reforms." It was, indeed, not surprising that they showed them- selves susceptible to the tenents of nationalism or that they tried to amalgamate these with socialist ideas after the fashion of the Mexican Revolution. Among the provisions of the new constitution was a broad authorization for land reform as well as the comprehensive recognition of the rights of organized labor. It was through land reform and trade-unionism that communism infiltrated into Guatemala. Land reform was obviously a justified and pressing issue, but communism used it here, as it had used it in Europe and in East Asia, as the entering wedge for revolution. The fact that three great American corporations-the United Fruit Com- pany, the International Railways of Central America, and the Empresa Electrica-were among the great landowners, provided communism with a popular platform. It accused these corpora- tions of monopolistic practices, of ruthless exploitation, of paying starvation wages, and of preventing the establishment of a healthy peasant class.?4 In this manner the cry for land reform merged " Department of State, p. 36. " Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present (New York, 1955), pp. 440-443. " Time, June 28, 1954. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 21 very characteristic of the immediate aftermath of the great cata- clysm. Although the new constitution of Guatemala of March, 1945, forbade the formation and functioning of political organi- zations of international character, the communist movement easily penetrated the public agencies of the convulsed republic. Guatemala had remained a backward, dictator-ridden country where 2 per cent of the population controlled 70 per cent of the arable land, and where more than half the population con- sisted of illiterate Indians who continued to live by their age-old customs and manners.22 There was, however, a middle group composed of ladinos, which included civil servants, soldiers, teachers, journalists, and clerics, who had felt the intellectual fermentation of the war years and who were now clamoring for reforms."3 It was, indeed, not surprising that they showed them- selves susceptible to the tenents of nationalism or that they tried to amalgamate these with socialist ideas after the fashion of the Mexican Revolution. Among the provisions of the new constitution was a broad authorization for land reform as well as the comprehensive recognition of the rights of organized labor. It was through land reform and trade-unionism that communism infiltrated into Guatemala. Land reform was obviously a justified and pressing issue, but communism used it here, as it had used it in Europe and in East Asia, as the entering wedge for revolution. The fact that three great American corporations-the United Fruit Com- pany, the International Railways of Central America, and the Empresa Electrica-were among the great landowners, provided communism with a popular platform. It accused these corpora- tions of monopolistic practices, of ruthless exploitation, of paying starvation wages, and of preventing the establishment of a healthy peasant class.24 In this manner the cry for land reform merged " Department of State, p. 36. " Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present (New York, 1955), pp. 440-443. " Time, June 28, 1954. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 21 very characteristic of the immediate aftermath of the great cata- clysm. Although the new constitution of Guatemala of March, 1945, forbade the formation and functioning of political organi- zations of international character, the communist movement easily penetrated the public agencies of the convulsed republic. Guatemala had remained a backward, dictator-ridden country where 2 per cent of the population controlled 70 per cent of the arable land, and where more than half the population con- sisted of illiterate Indians who continued to live by their age-old customs and manners."2 There was, however, a middle groupp composed of ladinos, which included civil servants, soldiers, teachers, journalists, and clerics, who had felt the intellectual fermentation of the war years and who were now clamoring for reforms."3 It was, indeed, not surprising that they showed them- selves susceptible to the tenents of nationalism or that they tried to amalgamate these with socialist ideas after the fashion of the Mexican Revolution. Among the provisions of the new constitution was a broad authorization for land reform as well as the comprehensive recognition of the rights of organized labor. It was through land reform and trade-unionism that communism infiltrated into Guatemala. Land reform was obviously a justified and pressing issue, but communism used it here, as it had used it in Europe and in East Asia, as the entering wedge for revolution. The fact that three great American corporations-the United Fruit Com- pany, the International Railways of Central America, and the Empresa Electrica-were among the great landowners, provided communism with a popular platform. It accused these corpora- tions of monopolistic practices, of ruthless exploitation, of paying starvation wages, and of preventing the establishment of a healthy peasant class."4 In this manner the cry for land reform merged " Department of State, p. 36. " Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present (New York, 1955), pp. 440-443. " Time, June 28, 1954.  22 The Caribbean 22 The Caribbean 22 The Caribbean with an anti-imperialistic agitation, the main target being the United States. Equally important was the labor issue, which proved to be instrumental for the invasion of the Guatemalan body politic by communist leaders-"professional revolutionaries," as Lenin would have called them. We know already that the constitution outlawed organizations and parties of international affiliation. The communist party was therefore forced to adopt various dis- guises to cover up its activities. Nevertheless, its leaders, like Jos6 Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, and Alfredo Guerra Borges were able to obtain key positions in the Confedera- cidn General de Trabajo. It has been proven that these same "professional revolutionaries" maintained close ties with inter- national communist organizations and that they paid frequent visits to Moscow. With the ascent of Jacobo Arbenz to the presidency of Guate- mala in March, 1951; events began to move more rapidly. An agrarian reform law was passed in June, 1952, and the United Fruit Company became the first victim of the revolutionary fervor. Almost a quarter of a million acres of the company's holdings on the Pacific coast were expropriated. The law provided for equi- table compensation, but the government and the company gave widely different estimates of the value of the land in question. Arbenz had brought a French communist, Louis Saillant, into the country as an advisor on agrarian reforms, and close connec- tions with comunist headquarters were maintained. Although the communists were relatively few in number and held no cabi- net posts, their influence on the president was considerable. Not only did they control the Confederacidn General de Trabajo, but they also gained supremacy in the newly created Seguridad Social. As is well known, communism has throughout its history pre- ferred to launch a coup d'itat from a minority position. Inevitably the communist ascendency in Guatemala produced domestic and international repercussions. Although the army had originally backed Arbenz, himself a professional soldier, it re- with an anti-imperialistic agitation, the main target being the United States. Equally important was the labor issue, which proved to be instrumental for the invasion of the Guatemalan body politic by communist leaders-"professional revolutionaries," as Lenin would have called them. We know already that the constitution outlawed organizations and parties of international affiliation. The communist party was therefore forced to adopt various dis- guises to cover up its activities. Nevertheless, its leaders, like Jose Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, and Alfredo Guerra Borges were able to obtain key positions in the Confedera- cidn General de Trabajo. It has been proven that these same "professional revolutionaries" maintained close ties with inter- national communist organizations and that they paid frequent visits to Moscow. With the ascent of Jacobo Arbenz to the presidency of Guate- mala in March, 1951; events began to move more rapidly. An agrarian reform law was passed in June, 1952, and the United Fruit Company became the first victim of the revolutionary fervor. Almost a quarter of a million acres of the company's holdings on the Pacific coast were expropriated. The law provided for equi- table compensation, but the government and the company gave widely different estimates of the value of the land in question. Arbenz had brought a French communist, Louis Saillant, into the country as an advisor on agrarian reforms, and close connec- tions with comounist headquarters were maintained. Although the communists were relatively few in number and held no cabi- net posts, their influence on the president was considerable. Not only did they control the Confederacion General de Trabajo, but they also gained supremacy in the newly created Seguridad Social. As is well known, communism has throughout its history pre- ferred to launch a coup d'itat from a minority position. Inevitably the communist ascendency in Guatemala produced domestic and international repercussions. Although the army had originally backed Arbenz, himself a professional soldier, it re- with an anti-imperialistic agitation, the main target being the United States. Equally important was the labor issue, which proved to be instrumental for the invasion of the Guatemalan body politic by communist leaders-"professional revolutionaries," as Lenin would have called them. We know already that the constitution outlawed organizations and parties of international affiliation. The communist party was therefore forced to adopt various dis- guises to cover up its activities. Nevertheless, its leaders, like Jose Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutidrrez, and Alfredo Guerra Borges were able to obtain key positions in the Confedera- cion General de Trabajo. It has been proven that these same "professional revolutionaries" maintained close ties with inter- national communist organizations and that they paid frequent visits to Moscow. With the ascent of Jacobo Arbenz to the presidency of Guate- mala in March, 1951, events began to move more rapidly. An agrarian reform law was passed in June, 1952, and the United Fruit Company became the first victim of the revolutionary fervor. Almost a quarter of a million acres of the company's holdings on the Pacific coast were expropriated. The law provided for equi- table compensation, but the government and the company gave widely different estimates of the value of the land in question. Arbenz had brought a French communist, Louis Saillant, into the country as an advisor on agrarian reforms, and close connec- tions with comunist headquarters were maintained. Although the communists were relatively few in number and held no cabi- net posts, their influence on the president was considerable. Not only did they control the Confederacidn General de Trabajo, but they also gained supremacy in the newly created Seguridad Social. As is well known, communism has throughout its history pre- ferred to launch a coup d'ietat from a minority position. Inevitably the communist ascendency in Guatemala produced domestic and international repercussions. Although the army had originally backed Arbenz, himself a professional soldier, it re-  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 23 mained aloof from his erratic course, a group of officers even taking refuge in Nicaragua and Honduras. The great landholding families and the American corporations could hardly be expected to accept the expropriation procedures lying down. The State Department viewed the events with growing concern as the first determined effort on the part of communist imperialism to effect a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Open intervention, as it had been exercised in previous emergencies, seemed out of ques- tion since it would arouse the suspicions of other Latin American nations and would be grist for Russia's propaganda mills. The Secretary of State took his case to the Pan American Conference that met in Caracas in March, 1954. A declaration of solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of the American states against communist intervention was passed, against the vote of Guatemala. But such a resolution had little more than theoretical value. Matters came to a head when the motor ship "Alfhem" arrived at Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954, carrying a cargo of arms for Guatemala from Poland. Washington countered by sending mili- tary equipment to Honduras and Nicaragua, some of which must have reached the opponents of Arbenz assembled in these coun- tries. When the uprising against Arbenz finally took place in June, 1954, the rebels had at their disposal four old-fashioned aircraft which played a decisive role in bringing the Arbenz regime to an end. That the leader of the counterrevolution, Carlos Castillo Armas, had the backing of the United States is an open secret. It is difficult to assess the seriousness of the threat to our security that the Arbenz government constituted, and there may be some question as to whether it was sufficiently dangerous to warrant the methods we employed. That the communist infil- tration of Guatemala had the blessing of the Politbureau can hardly be questioned. It is likely that the Russian leaders felt they had nothing to lose in this game. Had Arbenz succeeded, communism would have gained a beachhead in the Western CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 23 mained aloof from his erratic course, a group of officers even taking refuge in Nicaragua and Honduras. The great landholding families and the American corporations could hardly be expected to accept the expropriation procedures lying down. The State Department viewed the events with growing concern as the first determined effort on the part of communist imperialism to effect a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Open intervention, as it had been exercised in previous emergencies, seemed out of ques- tion since it would arouse the suspicions of other Latin American nations and would be grist for Russia's propaganda mills. The Secretary of State took his case to the Pan American Conference that met in Caracas in March, 1954. A declaration of solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of the American states against communist intervention was passed, against the vote of Guatemala. But such a resolution had little more than theoretical value. Matters came to a head when the motor ship "Alfhem" arrived at Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954, carrying a cargo of arms for Guatemala from Poland. Washington countered by sending mili- tary equipment to Honduras and Nicaragua, some of which must have reached the opponents of Arbenz assembled in these coun- tries. When the uprising against Arbenz finally took place in June, 1954, the rebels had at their disposal four old-fashioned aircraft which played a decisive role in bringing the Arbenz regime to an end. That the leader of the counterrevolution, Carlos Castillo Armas, had the backing of the United States is an open secret. It is difficult to assess the seriousness of the threat to our security that the Arbenz government constituted, and there may be some question as to whether it was sufficiently dangerous to warrant the methods we employed. That the communist infil- tration of Guatemala had the blessing of the Politbureau can hardly be questioned. It is likely that the Russian leaders felt they had nothing to lose in this game. Had Arbenz succeeded, communism would have gained a beachhead in the Western CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 23 mained aloof from his erratic course, a group of officers even taking refuge in Nicaragua and Honduras. The great landholding families and the American corporations could hardly be expected to accept the expropriation procedures lying down. The State Department viewed the events with growing concern as the first determined effort on the part of communist imperialism to effect a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Open intervention, as it had been exercised in previous emergencies, seemed out of ques- tion since it would arouse the suspicions of other Latin American nations and would be grist for Russia's propaganda mills. The Secretary of State took his case to the Pan American Conference that met in Caracas in March, 1954. A declaration of solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of the American states against communist intervention was passed, against the vote of Guatemala. But such a resolution had little more than theoretical value. Matters came to a head when the motor ship "Alfhem" arrived at Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954, carrying a cargo of arms for Guatemala from Poland. Washington countered by sending mili- tary equipment to Honduras and Nicaragua, some of which must have reached the opponents of Arbenz assembled in these coun- tries. When the uprising against Arbenz finally took place in June, 1954, the rebels had at their disposal four old-fashioned aircraft which played a decisive role in bringing the Arbenz regime to an end. That the leader of the counterrevolution, Carlos Castillo Armas, had the backing of the United States is an open secret. It is difficult to assess the seriousness of the threat to our security that the Arbenz government constituted, and there may be some question as to whether it was sufficiently dangerous to warrant the methods we employed. That the communist infil- tration of Guatemala had the blessing of the Politbureau can hardly be questioned. It is likely that the Russian leaders felt they had nothing to lose in this game. Had Arbenz succeeded, communism would have gained a beachhead in the Western  24 The Caribbean 24 The Caribbean 24 The Caribbean Hemisphere, which could have been used to foster the inter- national conspiracy in other Latin American countries; if he lost, the United States could be accused of military intervention and dollar imperialism. As it happened, the second alternative took place, and the Russian politicians must have been well pleased with the resentment that the United States action provoked in Panama, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and Argentina. IV The Caribbean reflects the world-wide struggle between the "Free World" and communism. However, we have seen that the political philosophy of democracy has scored some remarkable victories in territories that, until 1939, were solely colonial de- pendencies and which are now enjoying a good measure of self- government. Many are well on their way toward the achieve- ment of an independent structure compatible with their desires and the economic and geographical necessities that govern their lives. Fascism is dead; communism has failed in its two whole- sale attempts. The political outlook in the Caribbean for the fur- ther progress of free government is dampened, it is true, by the great number of dictatorships, but the picture is not an entirely bleak one. Hemisphere, which could have been used to foster the inter- national conspiracy in other Latin American countries; if he lost, the United States could be accused of military intervention and dollar imperialism. As it happened, the second alternative took place, and the Russian politicians must have been well pleased with the resentment that the United States action provoked in Panama, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and Argentina. IV The Caribbean reflects the world-wide struggle between the "Free World" and communism. However, we have seen that the political philosophy of democracy has scored some remarkable victories in territories that, until 1939, were solely colonial de- pendencies and which are now enjoying a good measure of self- government. Many are well on their way toward the achieve- ment of an independent structure compatible with their desires and the economic and geographical necessities that govern their lives. Fascism is dead; communism has failed in its two whole- sale attempts. The political outlook in the Caribbean for the fur- ther progress of free government is dampened, it is true, by the great number of dictatorships, but the picture is not an entirely bleak one. Hemisphere, which could have been used to foster the inter- national conspiracy in other Latin American countries; if he lost, the United States could be accused of military intervention and dollar imperialism. As it happened, the second alternative took place, and the Russian politicians must have been well pleased with the resentment that the United States action provoked in Panama, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and Argentina. IV The Caribbean reflects the world-wide struggle between the "Free World" and communism. However, we have seen that the political philosophy of democracy has scored some remarkable victories in territories that, until 1939, were solely colonial de- pendencies and which are now enjoying a good measure of self- government. Many are well on their way toward the achieve- ment of an independent structure compatible with their desires and the economic and geographical necessities that govern their lives. Fascism is dead; communism has failed in its two whole- sale attempts. The political outlook in the Caribbean for the fur- ther progress of free government is dampened, it is true, by the great number of dictatorships, but the picture is not an entirely bleak one.  Russell H. Fitzgibbon: POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE PHRASING OF THE TOPIC implies, and correctly so, that those two aspects of constitutional and political philosophy in the political units of the Caribbean area are not identical, that they represent some degree of divergence from each other. It is essential in the first place to establish one or two premises and definitions as points of departure. Whereas demographic, economic, cultural, or certain other analyses of the Caribbean area-or, we might better say, Middle America-can, within limits, properly ignore political boundaries and circumstances, a political analysis obviously cannot do so. The area under consideration includes approximately twenty-five political units, twelve of them independent states. An arbitrary, and naturally not the only, dividing line which, then, separates the units involved is that which isolates those possessing sover- eignty from those which do not. In considering questions of constitutional and political phi- losophy, for example, it becomes immediately and basically im- portant to distinguish the one category from the other. Those units which are not independent must necessarily consider their political affairs (including any theoretical aspects which may arise) in terms of their respective relations with an external agency, namely, the mother country. Those relations may be 25 Russell H. Fitzgibbon: POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE PHRASING OF THE TOPIC implies, and correctly so, that those two aspects of constitutional and political philosophy in the political units of the Caribbean area are not identical, that they represent some degree of divergence from each other. It is essential in the first place to establish one or two premises and definitions as points of departure. Whereas demographic, economic, cultural, or certain other analyses of the Caribbean area-or, we might better say, Middle America-can, within limits, properly ignore political boundaries and circumstances, a political analysis obviously cannot do so. The area under consideration includes approximately twenty-five political units, twelve of them independent states. An arbitrary, and naturally not the only, dividing line which, then, separates the units involved is that which isolates those possessing sover- eignty from those which do not. In considering questions of constitutional and political phi- losophy, for example, it becomes immediately and basically im- portant to distinguish the one category from the other. Those units which are not independent must necessarily consider their political affairs (including any theoretical aspects which may arise) in terms of their respective relations with an external agency, namely, the mother country. Those relations may be 25 Russell H. Fitzgibbon: POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE PHRASING OF THE TOPIC implies, and correctly so, that those two aspects of constitutional and political philosophy in the political units of the Caribbean area are not identical, that they represent some degree of divergence from each other. It is essential in the first place to establish one or two premises and definitions as points of departure. Whereas demographic, economic, cultural, or certain other analyses of the Caribbean area-or, we might better say, Middle America-can, within limits, properly ignore political boundaries and circumstances, a political analysis obviously cannot do so. The area under consideration includes approximately twenty-five political units, twelve of them independent states. An arbitrary, and naturally not the only, dividing line which, then, separates the units involved is that which isolates those possessing sover- eignty from those which do not. In considering questions of constitutional and political phi- losophy, for example, it becomes immediately and basically im- portant to distinguish the one category from the other. Those units which are not independent must necessarily consider their political affairs (including any theoretical aspects which may arise) in terms of their respective relations with an external agency, namely, the mother country. Those relations may be  26 The Caribbean entirely amicable or they may show varying degrees of strain but they cannot, in the nature of things, be dismissed so that the respective units can assume the same control over constitutional and political thinking which would be possible for even a nomi- nally sovereign state. It is in order, then, to eliminate from our present consideration the portions of Middle America which have not achieved full independence. Units which are in an intermediate stage might conceivably be considered. Puerto Rico, for example, has devel- oped certain elements of what might be called political and constitutional theory. But, on the other hand, such units, very few in number, can be omitted from this analysis without undue loss, and it simplifies the problem to do so. If it be assumed that political and constitutional theory was initially removed from practice in the Caribbean and, indeed, in the whole Latin American community of independent states, it is in order first to ask why. An answer to that question becomes as complicated as the question itself appears simple. It involves the whole complex of background elements: the political inheri- tance from the Colonial period and before that from Spain- and prior to that, indeed, from the Visigothic Kingdom and the Roman Empire. There must also be taken into account the cir- cumstances under which the fabric patterns of the newly inde- pendent states of the area were chosen, cut, and put together more than a century and a quarter ago. In other words, did the new states borrow, politically and constitutionally, from sources which were not philosophically in tune with their own historical inheritance? Let us first look briefly at the nature of the inheritance of the Middle American states from a long and influential past. The great weight of an impressive past had firmly cemented on the Spanish empire in America, including the portions in the Caribbean, an authoritarian tradition and structure of politics and government. A whole book would be necessary to trace in 26 The Caribbean 26 The Caribbean entirely amicable or they may show varying degrees of strain but they cannot, in the nature of things, be dismissed so that the respective units can assume the same control over constitutional and political thinking which would be possible for even a nomi- nally sovereign state. It is in order, then, to eliminate from our present consideration the portions of Middle America which have not achieved full independence. Units which are in an intermediate stage might conceivably be considered. Puerto Rico, for example, has devel- oped certain elements of what might be called political and constitutional theory. But, on the other hand, such units, very few in number, can be omitted from this analysis without undue loss, and it simplifies the problem to do so. If it be assumed that political and constitutional theory was initially removed from practice in the Caribbean and, indeed, in the whole Latin American community of independent states, it is in order first to ask why. An answer to that question becomes as complicated as the question itself appears simple. It involves the whole complex of background elements: the political inheri- tance from the Colonial period and before that from Spain- and prior to that, indeed, from the Visigothic Kingdom and the Roman Empire. There must also be taken into account the cir- cumstances under which the fabric patterns of the newly inde- pendent states of the area were chosen, cut, and put together more than a century and a quarter ago. In other words, did the new states borrow, politically and constitutionally, from sources which were not philosophically in tune with their own historical inheritance? Let us first look briefly at the nature of the inheritance of the Middle American states from a long and influential past. The great weight of an impressive past had firmly cemented on the Spanish empire in America, including the portions in the Caribbean, an authoritarian tradition and structure of politics and government. A whole book would be necessary to trace in entirely amicable or they may show varying degrees of strain but they cannot, in the nature of things, be dismissed so that the respective units can assume the same control over constitutional and political thinking which would be possible for even a nomi- nally sovereign state. It is in order, then, to eliminate from our present consideration the portions of Middle America which have not achieved full independence. Units which are in an intermediate stage might conceivably be considered. Puerto Rico, for example, has devel- oped certain elements of what might be called political and constitutional theory. But, on the other hand, such units, very few in number, can be omitted from this analysis without undue loss, and it simplifies the problem to do so. If it be assumed that political and constitutional theory was initially removed from practice in the Caribbean and, indeed, in the whole Latin American community of independent states, it is in order first to ask why. An answer to that question becomes as complicated as the question itself appears simple. It involves the whole complex of background elements: the political inheri- tance from the Colonial period and before that from Spain- and prior to that, indeed, from the Visigothic Kingdom and the Roman Empire. There must also be taken into account the cir- cumstances under which the fabric patterns of the newly inde- pendent states of the area were chosen, cut, and put together more than a century and a quarter ago. In other words, did the new states borrow, politically and constitutionally, from sources which were not philosophically in tune with their own historical inheritance? Let us first look briefly at the nature of the inheritance of the Middle American states from a long and influential past. The great weight of an impressive past had firmly cemented on the Spanish empire in America, including the portions in the Caribbean, an authoritarian tradition and structure of politics and government. A whole book would be necessary to trace in  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 27 detail the development of that process, but it is sufficient here to say that it dates back to the long conditioning centuries of the Reconquest and especially to the tremendously significant generation of Ferdinand and Isabella. The lines of Hispanic political destiny were firmly set during the fateful last few decades of the fifteenth century. In such large and old units as Mexico and Colombia or, on the other hand, in the weakest units or such young independent ones as Cuba and Panama (the youngest of all Latin America), the inheritance of an authoritarian pattern was all but taken for granted. For reasons which are much too involved to consider now, the Spanish had a remarkable success in implanting their institutions even in widely differing situations. In the case of Haiti, the only one of the independent states in the Caribbean area which did not have its institutional in- heritance from Spain, it is necessary to make a side excursion, but not a long one, to look for causes. The Spanish and the French political structures and processes had numerous points in common prior to the end of the eighteenth century, but the most important element in the picture was not any similarity in detail but rather in the broad and intangible likeness of authori- tarian political approach and temper. This impact was true, cer- tainly insofar as Haiti was concerned, despite the leaven which proceeded into Latin America from the sources of the French intellectuals of the eighteenth century. Rousseau and Voltaire, Diderot and Montesquieu, had had little chance to make a politi- cally significant impact in Haiti by the time of its independence. It is but repeating an elementary historical fact to point out that the groups which were dominant in the new states during their early independent periods-and here we must make neces- sary exceptions of Haiti, Cuba, and Panama-were from the creole aristocracy which would, under normal circumstances, have been quite willing to continue government on an authori- tarian and undemocratic basis with themselves instead of the peninsulars in the saddle. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 27 detail the development of that process, but it is sufficient here to say that it dates back to the long conditioning centuries of the Reconquest and especially to the tremendously significant generation of Ferdinand and Isabella. The lines of Hispanic political destiny were firmly set during the fateful last few decades of the fifteenth century. In such large and old units as Mexico and Colombia or, on the other hand, in the weakest units or such young independent ones as Cuba and Panama (the youngest of all Latin America), the inheritance of an authoritarian pattern was all but taken for granted. For reasons which are much too involved to consider now, the Spanish had a remarkable success in implanting their institutions even in widely differing situations. In the case of Haiti, the only one of the independent states in the Caribbean area which did not have its institutional in- heritance from Spain, it is necessary to make a side excursion, but not a long one, to look for causes. The Spanish and the French political structures and processes had numerous points in common prior to the end of the eighteenth century, but the most important element in the picture was not any similarity in detail but rather in the broad and intangible likeness of authori- tarian political approach and temper. This impact was true, cer- tainly insofar as Haiti was concerned, despite the leaven which proceeded into Latin America from the sources of the French intellectuals of the eighteenth century. Rousseau and Voltaire, Diderot and Montesquieu, had had little chance to make a politi- cally significant impact in Haiti by the time of its independence. It is but repeating an elementary historical fact to point out that the groups which were dominant in the new states during their early independent periods-and here we must make neces- sary exceptions of Haiti, Cuba, and Panama-were from the creole aristocracy which would, under normal circumstances, have been quite willing to continue government on an authori- tarian and undemocratic basis with themselves instead of the peninsulars in the saddle. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 27 detail the development of that process, but it is sufficient here to say that it dates back to the long conditioning centuries of the Reconquest and especially to the tremendously significant generation of Ferdinand and Isabella. The lines of Hispanic political destiny were firmly set during the fateful last few decades of the fifteenth century. In such large and old units as Mexico and Colombia or, on the other hand, in the weakest units or such young independent ones as Cuba and Panama (the youngest of all Latin America), the inheritance of an authoritarian pattern was all but taken for granted. For reasons which are much too involved to consider now, the Spanish had a remarkable success in implanting their institutions even in widely differing situations. In the case of Haiti, the only one of the independent states in the Caribbean area which did not have its institutional in- heritance from Spain, it is necessary to make a side excursion, but not a long one, to look for causes. The Spanish and the French political structures and processes had numerous points in common prior to the end of the eighteenth century, but the most important element in the picture was not any similarity in detail but rather in the broad and intangible likeness of authori- tarian political approach and temper. This impact was true, cer- tainly insofar as Haiti was concerned, despite the leaven which proceeded into Latin America from the sources of the French intellectuals of the eighteenth century. Rousseau and Voltaire, Diderot and Montesquieu, had had little chance to make a politi- cally significant impact in Haiti by the time of its independence. It is but repeating an elementary historical fact to point out that the groups which were dominant in the new states during their early independent periods-and here we must make neces- sary exceptions of Haiti, Cuba, and Panama-were from the creole aristocracy which would, under normal circumstances, have been quite willing to continue government on an authori- tarian and undemocratic basis with themselves instead of the peninsulars in the saddle.  28 The Caribbean 28 The Caribbean But this was not to be. By the early nineteenth century a new liberalism was infecting many areas which a generation or so before would have been considered safe for the ancien regime and its monarchical allies in other countries. For the Caribbean area the specific impetus was partly Latin: from such documen- tary milestones as the atypical Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1820 and from the constitutional monuments of the French Revolution. The impetus was to some slight degree British, al- though Bolivar, had he had his way, would have welcomed much more British influence. And finally, the stimulus was in important part North American. II For a political philosophy to undergird the new regimes, the architects of the new states looked almost exclusively to France. This was natural. France had produced the world's most impor- tant political thinkers of the recent past. But for details of governmental structure the United States was a far more imitated model. This, too, was natural. With only temporary exceptions in Haiti and Mexico, the newly formed governments were repub- lican; and even then the United States was the cicerone most frequently followed through the new and intriguing pathways of governmental experimentation. The United States had made it- self, in a sense, the champion of republicanism as against the dynastic legitimacy which, under Metternich's leadership, was reasserting itself in Europe. A nutshell formulation of the phil- osophical divergence was perhaps nowhere better made than by President Monroe in his famous message-just at the time when Latin American independence was being consolidated-when he said that "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America." The extension of "their political system to any portion of either continent" would be dangerous for us; nor could anyone think that the Latin American states "would adopt it of their own accord." Now, Monroe was taking somewhat too much for granted- But this was not to be. By the early nineteenth century a new liberalism was infecting many areas which a generation or so before would have been considered safe for the ancien regime and its monarchical allies in other countries. For the Caribbean area the specific impetus was partly Latin: from such documen- tary milestones as the atypical Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1820 and from the constitutional monuments of the French Revolution. The impetus was to some slight degree British, al- though Bolivar, had he had his way, would have welcomed much more British influence. And finally, the stimulus was in important part North American. II For a political philosophy to undergird the new regimes, the architects of the new states looked almost exclusively to France. This was natural. France had produced the world's most impor- tant political thinkers of the recent past. But for details of governmental structure the United States was a far more imitated model. This, too, was natural. With only temporary exceptions in Haiti and Mexico, the newly formed governments were repub- lican; and even then the United States was the cicerone most frequently followed through the new and intriguing pathways of governmental experimentation. The United States had made it- self, in a sense, the champion of republicanism as against the dynastic legitimacy which, under Metternich's leadership, was reasserting itself in Europe. A nutshell formulation of the phil- osophical divergence was perhaps nowhere better made than by President Monroe in his famous message-just at the time when Latin American independence was being consolidated-when he said that "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America." The extension of "their political system to any portion of either continent" would be dangerous for us; nor could anyone think that the Latin American states "would adopt it of their own accord." Now, Monroe was taking somewhat too much for granted- 28 The Caribbean But this was not to be. By the early nineteenth century a new liberalism was infecting many areas which a generation or so before would have been considered safe for the ancien regime and its monarchical allies in other countries. For the Caribbean area the specific impetus was partly Latin: from such documen- tary milestones as the atypical Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1820 and from the constitutional monuments of the French Revolution. The impetus was to some slight degree British, al- though Bolivar, had he had his way, would have welcomed much more British influence. And finally, the stimulus was in important part North American. II For a political philosophy to undergird the new regimes, the architects of the new states looked almost exclusively to France. This was natural. France had produced the world's most impor- tant political thinkers of the recent past. But for details of governmental structure the United States was a far more imitated model. This, too, was natural. With only temporary exceptions in Haiti and Mexico, the newly formed governments were repub- lican; and even then the United States was the cicerone most frequently followed through the new and intriguing pathways of governmental experimentation. The United States had made it- self, in a sense, the champion of republicanism as against the dynastic legitimacy which, under Metternich's leadership, was reasserting itself in Europe. A nutshell formulation of the phil- osophical divergence was perhaps nowhere better made than by President Monroe in his famous message-just at the time when Latin American independence was being consolidated-when he said that "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America." The extension of "their political system to any portion of either continent" would be dangerous for us; nor could anyone think that the Latin American states "would adopt it of their own accord." Now, Monroe was taking somewhat too much for granted-  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29 witness the long and generally successful experiment with mon- archy in Brazil-but, by and large, he was correct in assuming an almost inevitable commitment on the part of the Caribbean and other Latin American states to a republican form. The stock of the United States was high in Caribbean markets in the early years after independence. The gestures of El Salvador and Yucatan toward political affiliation with the stronger repub- lic to the north were straws in the wind. It was natural, indeed inevitable, then, that details of governmental organization used in the United States would be copied in numerous Caribbean states. The general pattern of the judiciary, a bicameral legisla- ture in several states, in Mexico and Venezuela a federal form of organization, a presidential type of government and a superficially similar pattern of executive-legislative relationships, these were some of the points at which the new Caribbean states in numerous instances borrowed heavily-and often unthinkingly-from the United States. It was that unthinking borrowing which resulted in much difficulty. In the United States many of the details of govern- mental organization and practice which developed were peculiarly pragmatical. They were necessarily the product of a whole politi- cal complex which differed importantly from the political complex from which the new Caribbean states inherited. That they worked with reasonable success in the United States was of course no reason why they would be equally successful in a state with a different political inheritance. The borrowing of the exciting new French philosophical con- cepts was equally synthetic and equally unsuccessful. The leaven which had been working in France for a generation past had no real counterpart in either Spain or Spanish America. The revo- lutions in Spanish America were political-pointed toward sever- ance of the ties with the mother country-but they were not, as in France, social, economic, and cultural. Haiti, it is true, had a much deeper convulsion in achieving its independence but the contagion did not spread to other areas in the Caribbean. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29 witness the long and generally successful experiment with mon- archy in Brazil-but, by and large, he was correct in assuming an almost inevitable commitment on the part of the Caribbean and other Latin American states to a republican form. The stock of the United States was high in Caribbean markets in the early years after independence. The gestures of El Salvador and YucatAn toward political affiliation with the stronger repub- lic to the north were straws in the wind. It was natural, indeed inevitable, then, that details of governmental organization used in the United States would be copied in numerous Caribbean states. The general pattern of the judiciary, a bicameral legisla- ture in several states, in Mexico and Venezuela a federal form of organization, a presidential type of government and a superficially similar pattern of executive-legislative relationships, these were some of the points at which the new Caribbean states in numerous instances borrowed heavily-and often unthinkingly-from the United States. It was that unthinking borrowing which resulted in much difficulty. In the United States many of the details of govern- mental organization and practice which developed were peculiarly pragmatical. They were necessarily the product of a whole politi- cal complex which differed importantly from the political complex from which the new Caribbean states inherited. That they worked with reasonable success in the United States was of course no reason why they would be equally successful in a state with a different political inheritance. The borrowing of the exciting new French philosophical con- cepts was equally synthetic and equally unsuccessful. The leaven which had been working in France for a generation past had no real counterpart in either Spain or Spanish America. The revo- lutions in Spanish America were political-pointed toward sever- ance of the ties with the mother country-but they were not, as in France, social, economic, and cultural. Haiti, it is true, had a much deeper convulsion in achieving its independence but the contagion did not spread to other areas in the Caribbean. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29 witness the long and generally successful experiment with mon- archy in Brazil-but, by and large, he was correct in assuming an almost inevitable commitment on the part of the Caribbean and other Latin American states to a republican form. The stock of the United States was high in Caribbean markets in the early years after independence. The gestures of El Salvador and Yucatin toward political affiliation with the stronger repub- lic to the north were straws in the wind. It was natural, indeed inevitable, then, that details of governmental organization used in the United States would be copied in numerous Caribbean states. The general pattern of the judiciary, a bicameral legisla- ture in several states, in Mexico and Venezuela a federal form of organization, a presidential type of government and a superficially similar pattern of executive-legislative relationships, these were some of the points at which the new Caribbean states in numerous instances borrowed heavily-and often unthinkingly-from the United States. It was that unthinking borrowing which resulted in much difficulty. In the United States many of the details of govern- mental organization and practice which developed were peculiarly pragmatical. They were necessarily the product of a whole politi- cal complex which differed importantly from the political complex from which the new Caribbean states inherited. That they worked with reasonable success in the United States was of course no reason why they would be equally successful in a state with a different political inheritance. The borrowing of the exciting new French philosophical con- cepts was equally synthetic and equally unsuccessful. The leaven which had been working in France for a generation past had no real counterpart in either Spain or Spanish America. The revo- lutions in Spanish America were political-pointed toward sever- ance of the ties with the mother country-but they were not, as in France, social, economic, and cultural. Haiti, it is true, had a much deeper convulsion in achieving its independence but the contagion did not spread to other areas in the Caribbean.  30 The Caribbean III The pensadores in various countries had a field day in drawing up neat, symmetrical, rhetorical, theoretically admirable-and usually highly impractical-constitutions. Whether the borrow- ing was of philosophical principles from France or of structural details from the United States was of little moment in achieving any leveling-off of the political ship in any of the Caribbean states. The pensador's approach was academic and doctrinaire; he had had little or no apprenticeship in genuine public adminis- tration, he had no awareness of the realities of the political land- scape surrounding him. The new states must have constitutions. Virtually none of the Caribbean caudillos followed Rosas' lead in Argentina in ruling, for practical purposes, without a constitution. It was fashionable to have a constitution: it was a mark of the new liberalism which was sweeping the nineteenth century, at least in the Americas. Whether the document was realistic and im- plemental was unimportant; the main consideration was to make it symbolic, symmetrical, and philosophical. Caudillo and pensador were at opposite ends of the political spectrum. The one was a hard-bitten realist, often entranced, it is true, by the presumed importance of having a constitutional flooring under his regime, but, withal, impatient with constitu- tional trammels on his freedom of political action. Santander, "el hombre de los leyes," was, by that token, not a caudillo. The pensador was an intellectualized theoretician, devoted to the con- stitutions he wrote so prolifically, but blind to their unrealistic nature. Truly, the two types seemed as mutually remote as Kip- ling's "East and West" That, then, in brief, was the general nature of the political scene in the various Caribbean states in the first years after at- tainment of independence. That it was an artificial situation goes without saying. Government had to be carried on-it was a twenty-four-hour-a-day job there as elsewhere-but the forms under which it operated did not at all match the realities of 30 The Caribbean 30 The Caribbean III The pensadores in various countries had a field day in drawing up neat, symmetrical, rhetorical, theoretically admirable-and usually highly impractical-constitutions. Whether the borrow- ing was of philosophical principles from France or of structural details from the United States was of little moment in achieving any leveling-off of the political ship in any of the Caribbean states. The pensador's approach was academic and doctrinaire; he had had little or no apprenticeship in genuine public adminis- tration, he had no awareness of the realities of the political land- scape surrounding him. The new states must have constitutions. Virtually none of the Caribbean caudillos followed Rosas' lead in Argentina in ruling, for practical purposes, without a constitution. It was fashionable to have a constitution: it was a mark of the new liberalism which was sweeping the nineteenth century, at least in the Americas. Whether the document was realistic and im- plemental was unimportant; the main consideration was to make it symbolic, symmetrical, and philosophical. Caudillo and pensador were at opposite ends of the political spectrum. The one was a hard-bitten realist, often entranced, it is true, by the presumed importance of having a constitutional flooring under his regime, but, withal, impatient with constitu- tional trammels on his freedom of political action. Santander, "el hombre de los leyes," was, by that token, not a caudillo. The pensador was an intellectualized theoretician, devoted to the con- stitutions he wrote so prolifically, but blind to their unrealistic nature. Truly, the two types seemed as mutually remote as Kip- ling's "East and West." That, then, in brief, was the general nature of the political scene in the various Caribbean states in the first years after at- tainment of independence. That it was an artificial situation goes without saying. Government had to be carried on-it was a twenty-four-hour-a-day job there as elsewhere-but the forms under which it operated did not at all match the realities of III The pensadores in various countries had a field day in drawing up neat, symmetrical, rhetorical, theoretically admirable-and usually highly impractical-constitutions. Whether the borrow- ing was of philosophical principles from France or of structural details from the United States was of little moment in achieving any leveling-off of the political ship in any of the Caribbean states. The pensador's approach was academic and doctrinaire; he had had little or no apprenticeship in genuine public adminis- tration, he had no awareness of the realities of the political land- scape surrounding him. The new states must have constitutions. Virtually none of the Caribbean caudillos followed Rosas' lead in Argentina in ruling, for practical purposes, without a constitution. It was fashionable to have a constitution: it was a mark of the new liberalism which was sweeping the nineteenth century, at least in the Americas. Whether the document was realistic and im- plemental was unimportant; the main consideration was to make it symbolic, symmetrical, and philosophical. Caudillo and pensador were at opposite ends of the political spectrum. The one was a hard-bitten realist, often entranced, it is true, by the presumed importance of having a constitutional flooring under his regime, but, withal, impatient with constitu- tional trammels on his freedom of political action. Santander, "el hombre de los leyes," was, by that token, not a caudillo. The pensador was an intellectualized theoretician, devoted to the con- stitutions he wrote so prolifically, but blind to their unrealistic nature. Truly, the two types seemed as mutually remote as Kip- ling's "East and West." That, then, in brief, was the general nature of the political scene in the various Caribbean states in the first years after at- tainment of independence. That it was an artificial situation goes without saying. Government had to be carried on-it was a twenty-four-hour-a-day job there as elsewhere-but the forms under which it operated did not at all match the realities of  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 31 ruling. Until the twain, i.e., the caudillo and the pensador, could be brought to meet in some fashion, the artificiality of the situ- ation would continue. Some Latin American states-and we may take Paraguay as an example remote from the Caribbean area-still present a picture of a frequently violent fluctuation between caudillo and pensador in the presidency. A general is tried and then, in revul- sion against him, a professor or litterateur is elected. Both fall short of the mark in providing the sort of government Paraguay needs. The country has not yet succeeded in bridging the gap between the types which were its heritage at the time of inde- pendence. The experience of the independent states in the Carib- bean frequently has offered something in common with the example cited; the differences are ones of degree. IV The imitative blight in constitution-making in the Caribbean was to remain for long decades. What could remove it? what did remove it? The answer, in one word, was "integration." It is an answer, however, which requires a bit of explanation. Political colonialism was ended for most of the Caribbean republics, and independence-at least on a nominal basis- achieved by approximately the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. That is not to say, though, that psychologi- cal, cultural, economic, and perhaps other forms of colonialism ended simultaneously. They did not. If certain of the states were not under a formal foreign domination-specifically, Mexico and the Dominican Republic in the 1860's-they were quite possibly submerged psychologically, often in so subtle a fashion that they did not always recognize the submersion. Sometimes that psychological subjugation was to a home-grown caudillo. Even if he were native-born and a leader of genuine charismatic quality, the circumstances would still prevent the effective development of any significant political ethos. Porfirio Diaz, for example, had his roots in the real soil of Mexico about CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 31 ruling. Until the twain, i.e., the caudillo and the pensador, could be brought to meet in some fashion, the artificiality of the situ- ation would continue. Some Latin American states-and we may take Paraguay as an example remote from the Caribbean area-still present a picture of a frequently violent fluctuation between caudillo and pensador in the presidency. A general is tried and then, in revul- sion against him, a professor or litterateur is elected. Both fall short of the mark in providing the sort of government Paraguay needs. The country has not yet succeeded in bridging the gap between the types which were its heritage at the time of inde- pendence. The experience of the independent states in the Carib- bean frequently has offered something in common with the example cited; the differences are ones of degree. IV The imitative blight in constitution-making in the Caribbean was to remain for long decades. What could remove it? what did remove it? The answer, in one word, was "integration." It is an answer, however, which requires a bit of explanation. Political colonialism was ended for most of the Caribbean republics, and independence-at least on a nominal basis- achieved by approximately the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. That is not to say, though, that psychologi- cal, cultural, economic, and perhaps other forms of colonialism ended simultaneously. They did not. If certain of the states were not under a formal foreign domination-specifically, Mexico and the Dominican Republic in the 1860's-they were quite possibly submerged psychologically, often in so subtle a fashion that they did not always recognize the submersion. Sometimes that psychological subjugation was to a home-grown caudillo. Even if he were native-born and a leader of genuine charismatic quality, the circumstances would still prevent the effective development of any significant political ethos. Porfirio Diaz, for example, had his roots in the real soil of Mexico about CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 31 ruling. Until the twain, i.e., the caudillo and the pensador, could be brought to meet in some fashion, the artificiality of the situ- ation would continue. Some Latin American states-and we may take Paraguay as an example remote from the Caribbean area-still present a picture of a frequently violent fluctuation between caudillo and pensador in the presidency. A general is tried and then, in revul- sion against him, a professor or litterateur is elected. Both fall short of the mark in providing the sort of government Paraguay needs. The country has not yet succeeded in bridging the gap between the types which were its heritage at the time of inde- pendence. The experience of the independent states in the Carib- bean frequently has offered something in common with the example cited; the differences are ones of degree. IV The imitative blight in constitution-making in the Caribbean was to remain for long decades. What could remove it? what did remove it? The answer, in one word, was "integration." It is an answer, however, which requires a bit of explanation. Political colonialism was ended for most of the Caribbean republics, and independence-at least on a nominal basis- achieved by approximately the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. That is not to say, though, that psychologi- cal, cultural, economic, and perhaps other forms of colonialism ended simultaneously. They did not. If certain of the states were not under a formal foreign domination-specifically, Mexico and the Dominican Republic in the 1860's-they were quite possibly submerged psychologically, often in so subtle a fashion that they did not always recognize the submersion. Sometimes that psychological subjugation was to a home-grown caudillo. Even if he were native-born and a leader of genuine charismatic quality, the circumstances would still prevent the effective development of any significant political ethos. Porfirio Diaz, for example, had his roots in the real soil of Mexico about  32 The Caribbean as little as did Maximilian before him. Benito Judrez, on the other hand, stemmed from the spiritually good earth of his country, and it is for that reason that the Mexican Constitution of 1857, which represented the high point, document-wise, of Juiez' regime, was far more politically realistic and significant than anything which can be extracted from the practices of the Porefirian era. Juirez was an exception, however; neither Mexico nor many of the other countries of Middle America bred many of his kind in the nineteenth century. It has been remarked that caudillo and pensador were poles apart in the positions they occupied, and that between them lay a void. Other sorts of vacuums existed to delay integration. One of the most important was that which characterized the social organization of the various countries. Many people have com- mented about the existence in most of the states under survey of a small, aristocratic, elitist oligarchy and, at the bottom of the social ladder, a great mass of politically inarticulate people, with a gulf between the two unequal groups. That gulf long consti- tuted a sociopolitical vacuum of much significance. Another explanation of the retarded integration of the Carib- bean states was to be found in the long delay in absorbing them in the main current of international affairs. On the occasion of the first Hague Conference in 1899, Mexico was the only state, not simply in the Caribbean area but in all Latin America, to be invited. The reason for that invitation was not so much the actual weight exerted by Mexico in world politics but rather the super- ficial prestige enjoyed at the time by the Diaz regime. For the most part, in terms of international relations throughout the nine- teenth century, the Caribbean states were simply little chips float- ing idly and erratically in small eddies on the sides of the river; the main current of the stream carried the logs which were the larger powers in a straighter and more purposeful line down the center. The Caribbean states seldom attracted the attention of the larger powers except in an exploitive or acquisitive way. Gradually-indeed, almost imperceptibly and invisibly-this 32 The Caribbean 32 The Caribbean as little as did Maximilian before him. Benito Judrez, on the other hand, stemmed from the spiritually good earth of his country, and it is for that reason that the Mexican Constitution of 1857, which represented the high point, document-wise, of Judrez' regime, was far more politically realistic and significant than anything which can be extracted from the practices of the Porfirian era. Juirez was an exception, however; neither Mexico nor many of the other countries of Middle America bred many of his kind in the nineteenth century. It has been remarked that caudillo and pensador were poles apart in the positions they occupied, and that between them lay a void. Other sorts of vacuums existed to delay integration. One of the most important was that which characterized the social organization of the various countries. Many people have com- mented about the existence in most of the states under survey of a small, aristocratic, elitist oligarchy and, at the bottom of the social ladder, a great mass of politically inarticulate people, with a gulf between the two unequal groups. That gulf long consti- tuted a sociopolitical vacuum of much significance. Another explanation of the retarded integration of the Carib- bean states was to be found in the long delay in absorbing them in the main current of international affairs. On the occasion of the first Hague Conference in 1899, Mexico was the only state, not simply in the Caribbean area but in all Latin America, to be invited. The reason for that invitation was not so much the actual weight exerted by Mexico in world politics but rather the super- ficial prestige enjoyed at the time by the Diaz regime. For the most part, in terms of international relations throughout the nine- teenth century, the Caribbean states were simply little chips float- ing idly and erratically in small eddies on the sides of the river; the main current of the stream carried the logs which were the larger powers in a straighter and more purposeful line down the center. The Caribbean states seldom attracted the attention of the larger powers except in an exploitive or acquisitive way. Gradually-indeed, almost imperceptibly and invisibly-this as little as did Maximilian before him. Benito Judrez, on the other hand, stemmed from the spiritually good earth of his country, and it is for that reason that the Mexican Constitution of 1857, which represented the high point, document-wise, of Judrez' regime, was far more politically realistic and significant than anything which can be extracted from the practices of the Porfirian era. Juarez was an exception, however; neither Mexico nor many of the other countries of Middle America bred many of his kind in the nineteenth century. It has been remarked that caudillo and pensador were poles apart in the positions they occupied, and that between them lay a void. Other sorts of vacuums existed to delay integration. One of the most important was that which characterized the social organization of the various countries. Many people have com- mented about the existence in most of the states under survey of a small, aristocratic, elitist oligarchy and, at the bottom of the social ladder, a great mass of politically inarticulate people, with a gulf between the two unequal groups. That gulf long consti- tuted a sociopolitical vacuum of much significance. Another explanation of the retarded integration of the Carib- bean states was to be found in the long delay in absorbing them in the main current of international affairs. On the occasion of the first Hague Conference in 1899, Mexico was the only state, not simply in the Caribbean area but in all Latin America, to be invited. The reason for that invitation was not so much the actual weight exerted by Mexico in world politics but rather the super- ficial prestige enjoyed at the time by the Diaz regime. For the most part, in terms of international relations throughout the nine- teenth century, the Caribbean states were simply little chips float- ing idly and erratically in small eddies on the sides of the river; the main current of the stream carried the logs which were the larger powers in a straighter and more purposeful line down the center. The Caribbean states seldom attracted the attention of the larger powers except in an exploitive or acquisitive way. Gradually-indeed, almost imperceptibly and invisibly-this  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33 disheartening picture of society and politics in the nineteenth century began to change. Most of the change has come in the present century, it goes on now at mid-century, and it probably will continue indefinitely. Certain Caribbean states still fluctuate between caudillo and pensador, between the man whose weapon is the sword and the one who wields the pen. Others have pro- gressed notably beyond that stage. Mexico is a case in point. The wild fluctuation between the two types was illustrated in the shift from the impractical and idealistic Madero to the harsh and realistic Adolfo de la Huerta. The first few years of the Revolution displayed the extremes; since then, the presidents have progressively approached a mean until now, in the person of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, we find a very practical executive who exhibits none of the characteristics of the two types previously referred to. Then, too, social integration has set in with the development of a middle class in several of the countries. This group, still rudimentary in some states, gradually fills in the void between top and bottom; the intermediate rungs on the ladder are coming to be occupied. We may continue to use Mexico as an example of the way in which the process of integration operates. That country is developing its own middle class in significant numbers and with a recognizable influence on politics as well as other aspects of life. This filling in of the social vacuum by the development of a middle class has many by-products, most of them good, all of them significant. They can at this time only be hinted at. One of the most spectacular is industrialization. Industrialization diversifies the economy, raises the standard of living, allows escape from a primitive type of social organization, more easily permits an increased population, and has other consequencs. A related result of the emergence of a middle class is the growth of a more politically conscious segment of the city popu- lation; the middle class is largely urban in residence, of course. It is almost a truism that an urban population is more fluid and CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33 disheartening picture of society and politics in the nineteenth century began to change. Most of the change has come in the present century, it goes on now at mid-century, and it probably will continue indefinitely. Certain Caribbean states still fluctuate between caudillo and pensador, between the man whose weapon is the sword and the one who wields the pen. Others have pro- gressed notably beyond that stage. Mexico is a case in point. The wild fluctuation between the two types was illustrated in the shift from the impractical and idealistic Madero to the harsh and realistic Adolfo de Ia Huerta. The first few years of the Revolution displayed the extremes; since then, the presidents have progressively approached a mean until now, in the person of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, we find a very practical executive who exhibits none of the characteristics of the two types previously referred to. Then, too, social integration has set in with the development of a middle class in several of the countries. This group, still rudimentary in some states, gradually fills in the void between top and bottom; the intermediate rungs on the ladder are coming to be occupied. We may continue to use Mexico as an example of the way in which the process of integration operates. That country is developing its own middle class in significant numbers and with a recognizable influence on politics as well as other aspects of life. This filling in of the social vacuum by the development of a middle class has many by-products, most of them good, all of them significant. They can at this time only be hinted at. One of the most spectacular is industrialization. Industrialization diversifies the economy, raises the standard of living, allows escape from a primitive type of social organization, more easily permits an increased population, and has other consequenes. A related result of the emergence of a middle class is the growth of a more politically conscious segment of the city popu- lation; the middle class is largely urban in residence, of course. It is almost a truism that an urban population is more fluid and CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33 disheartening picture of society and politics in the nineteenth century began to change. Most of the change has come in the present century, it goes on now at mid-century, and it probably will continue indefinitely. Certain Caribbean states still fluctuate between caudillo and pensador, between the man whose weapon is the sword and the one who wields the pen. Others have pro- gressed notably beyond that stage. Mexico is a case in point. The wild fluctuation between the two types was illustrated in the shift from the impractical and idealistic Madero to the harsh and realistic Adolfo de la Huerta. The first few years of the Revolution displayed the extremes; since then, the presidents have progressively approached a mean until now, in the person of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, we find a very practical executive who exhibits none of the characteristics of the two types previously referred to. Then, too, social integration has set in with the development of a middle class in several of the countries. This group, still rudimentary in some states, gradually fills in the void between top and bottom; the intermediate rungs on the ladder are coming to be occupied. We may continue to use Mexico as an example of the way in which the process of integration operates. That country is developing its own middle class in significant numbers and with a recognizable influence on politics as well as other aspects of life. This filling in of the social vacuum by the development of a middle class has many by-products, most of them good, all of them significant. They can at this time only be hinted at. One of the most spectacular is industrialization. Industrialization diversifies the economy, raises the standard of living, allows escape from a primitive type of social organization, more easily permits an increased population, and has other consequencs. A related result of the emergence of a middle class is the growth of a more politically conscious segment of the city popu- lation; the middle class is largely urban in residence, of course. It is almost a truism that an urban population is more fluid and  34 The Caribbean dynamic than a rural one, that it has more social interests and needs. Government has to so great an extent become the instru- ment through which social wants are attained, replacing the Church in large measure in that respect, that a middle-class impact on politics is inevitable. In general that impact is de- mocratizing and productive of a more genuinely rooted political expression. V In the third place, the Caribbean states have been drawn much more widely than formerly into the main current of international affairs. What began as a sort of prelude in Latin American par- ticipation in the old League of Nations has gone on as a much more definite trend in Latin activity in the United Nations and other international agencies and channels. Alberto Lleras Ca- margo, Jaime Torres Bodet, Antonio Sinchez de Bustamante, and Ricardo Alfaro are only outstanding examples of Caribbean Latins who have not only made constructive contributions in interna- tional circles but who also have felt at home in those circles. The approach of Caribbean states to international affairs now re- flects much less timorousness and self-consciousness. In terms of its effect on the philosophy of politics we may safely conclude that this increased international interest and activity has given the several states a positive role which in con- siderable degree precludes foreign-office concern with petty and artificial problems as was formerly often the case. A given government now has a more respectable international position to occupy and it thereby gains more self-esteem and self-assurance. The people who are governed take greater pride in their country's foreign role, and the growth of a constructive sort of nationalism is thereby furthered. VI All these tendencies-and others-help to pull society in its political aspects in toward a center which was formerly unoccu- pied. The politics of the given country gains a solid core which 34 The Caribbean 34 The Caribbean dynamic than a rural one, that it has more social interests and needs. Government has to so great an extent become the instru- ment through which social wants are attained, replacing the Church in large measure in that respect, that a middle-class impact on politics is inevitable. In general that impact is de- mocratizing and productive of a more genuinely rooted political expression. V In the third place, the Caribbean states have been drawn much more widely than formerly into the main current of international affairs. What began as a sort of prelude in Latin American par- ticipation in the old League of Nations has gone on as a much more definite trend in Latin activity in the United Nations and other international agencies and channels. Alberto Lleras Ca- margo, Jaime Torres Bodet, Antonio Sinchez de Bustamante, and Ricardo Alfaro are only outstanding examples of Caribbean Latins who have not only made constructive contributions in interna- tional circles but who also have felt at home in those circles. The approach of Caribbean states to international affairs now re- flects much less timorousness and self-consciousness. In terms of its effect on the philosophy of politics we may safely conclude that this increased international interest and activity has given the several states a positive role which in con- siderable degree precludes foreign-office concern with petty and artificial problems as was formerly often the case. A given government now has a more respectable international position to occupy and it thereby gains more self-esteem and self-assurance. The people who are governed take greater pride in their country's foreign role, and the growth of a constructive sort of nationalism is thereby furthered. VI All these tendencies-and others-help to pull society in its political aspects in toward a center which was formerly unoccu- pied. The politics of the given country gains a solid core which dynamic than a rural one, that it has more social interests and needs. Government has to so great an extent become the instru- ment through which social wants are attained, replacing the Church in large measure in that respect, that a middle-class impact on politics is inevitable. In general that impact is de- mocratizing and productive of a more genuinely rooted political expression. V In the third place, the Caribbean states have been drawn much more widely than formerly into the main current of international affairs. What began as a sort of prelude in Latin American par- ticipation in the old League of Nations has gone on as a much more definite trend in Latin activity in the United Nations and other international agencies and channels. Alberto Lleras Ca- margo, Jaime Torres Bodet, Antonio SAnchez de Bustamante, and Ricardo Alfaro are only outstanding examples of Caribbean Latins who have not only made constructive contributions in interna- tional circles but who also have felt at home in those circles. The approach of Caribbean states to international affairs now re- flects much less timorousness and self-consciousness. In terms of its effect on the philosophy of politics we may safely conclude that this increased international interest and activity has given the several states a positive role which in con- siderable degree precludes foreign-office concern with petty and artificial problems as was formerly often the case. A given government now has a more respectable international position to occupy and it thereby gains more self-esteem and self-assurance. The people who are governed take greater pride in their country's foreign role, and the growth of a constructive sort of nationalism is thereby furthered. VI All these tendencies-and others-help to pull society in its political aspects in toward a center which was formerly unoccu- pied. The politics of the given country gains a solid core which  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 35 it previously lacked. The government is supported, not by irregu- larly spaced and often flimsy posts around the periphery but rather by a monolithic pillar in the center which provides much greater strength and stability. As this subtle transformation takes place, constitution-making becomes more genuine, less imitative. Constitutions can then spring from a soil profoundly stirred, turned over, and cultivated. The Mexican Constitution of 1857 came from such soil, as did its successor sixty years later. The resulting documents drew a rich nourishment from an invigorated medium and they thus reflected more substance than many other basic laws which have been spoon-fed on a thin gruel of foreign concoction. Except for unfortunate circumstance the Mexican Constitution of 1857 might have gained the stature and influence that the later one of 1917 did; it was, however, supplanted by Maximilian and then sabotaged by Diaz. As the sources of political inspiration in the Caribbean coun- tries come more from native soil and less from abroad the political process becomes more meaningful. Theory and practice are less divergent. Theory becomes less theoretical, practice less anarchic. If the ship of state veered toward one side of the perilous channel it ran the risk of reliance on charts (i.e., constitutions) so aca- demic and unrealistic that it might easily founder. If the ship got too close to the other side the danger was one of discarding all charts (or constitutions), relying on rule-of-thumb navigation with a caudillo as pilot, and again foundering. But in recent years Scylla and Charybdis have begun to fade away, if you will. The dangers from the extremes are no longer so great; the chan- nel is much easier to pass. VII It is in order to inquire what might interfere with this trend which now seems to have set in so strongly. If we look at the other side of the coin examined previously, we may conclude that anything which contributes to the disintegration of the com- CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 35 it previously lacked. The government is supported, not by irregu- larly spaced and often flimsy posts around the periphery but rather by a monolithic pillar in the center which provides much greater strength and stability. As this subtle transformation takes place, constitution-making becomes more genuine, less imitative. Constitutions can then spring from a soil profoundly stirred, turned over, and cultivated. The Mexican Constitution of 1857 came from such soil, as did its successor sixty years later. The resulting documents drew a rich nourishment from an invigorated medium and they thus reflected more substance than many other basic laws which have been spoon-fed on a thin gruel of foreign concoction. Except for unfortunate circumstance the Mexican Constitution of 1857 might have gained the stature and influence that the later one of 1917 did; it was, however, supplanted by Maximilian and then sabotaged by Diaz. As the sources of political inspiration in the Caribbean coun- tries come more from native soil and less from abroad the political process becomes more meaningful. Theory and practice are less divergent. Theory becomes less theoretical, practice less anarchic. If the ship of state veered toward one side of the perilous channel it ran the risk of reliance on charts (i.e., constitutions) so aca- demic and unrealistic that it might easily founder. If the ship got too close to the other side the danger was one of discarding all charts (or constitutions), relying on rule-of-thumb navigation with a caudillo as pilot, and again foundering. But in recent years Scylla and Charybdis have begun to fade away, if you will. The dangers from the extremes are no longer so great; the chan- nel is much easier to pass. VII It is in order to inquire what might interfere with this trend which now seems to have set in so strongly. If we look at the other side of the coin examined previously, we may conclude that anything which contributes to the disintegration of the com- CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 35 it previously lacked. The government is supported, not by irregu- larly spaced and often flimsy posts around the periphery but rather by a monolithic pillar in the center which provides much greater strength and stability. As this subtle transformation takes place, constitution-making becomes more genuine, less imitative. Constitutions can then spring from a soil profoundly stirred, turned over, and cultivated. The Mexican Constitution of 1857 came from such soil, as did its successor sixty years later. The resulting documents drew a rich nourishment from an invigorated medium and they thus reflected more substance than many other basic laws which have been spoon-fed on a thin gruel of foreign concoction. Except for unfortunate circumstance the Mexican Constitution of 1857 might have gained the stature and influence that the later one of 1917 did; it was, however, supplanted by Maximilian and then sabotaged by Diaz. As the sources of political inspiration in the Caribbean coun- tries come more from native soil and less from abroad the political process becomes more meaningful. Theory and practice are less divergent. Theory becomes less theoretical, practice less anarchic. If the ship of state veered toward one side of the perilous channel it ran the risk of reliance on charts (i.e., constitutions) so aca- demic and unrealistic that it might easily founder. If the ship got too close to the other side the danger was one of discarding all charts (or constitutions), relying on rule-of-thumb navigation with a caudillo as pilot, and again foundering. But in recent years Scylla and Charybdis have begun to fade away, if you will. The dangers from the extremes are no longer so great; the chan- nel is much easier to pass. VII It is in order to inquire what might interfere with this trend which now seems to have set in so strongly. If we look at the other side of the coin examined previously, we may conclude that anything which contributes to the disintegration of the com-  36 The Caribbean munity will operate again to separate rather than to join theory and practice. The extension of an overriding foreign influence in any of the states of the Caribbean would, for example, introduce elements of unreality and bitterness in the political life of that state which would almost inevitably militate against unity and toward discord and division. The theory of constitutional political operation might remain much the same; the practice would necessarily change. The successful promotion of extreme political ideologies would produce the same result. The native elitism which, without phil- osophical labeling or refinement, so long prevailed in many of the Caribbean and other Latin American states, had much in common with fascism. If, then, some neofascist movement were, inconceivably, to make great headway in a Caribbean state it would logically introduce centrifugal currents in society which would in turn result in the further divergence of the theory and practice of government. By the same token, communism, were it to make the headway in a Caribbean state in the future that it recently did in Guatemala, would prove a divisive factor point- ing in the same direction. Who can honestly say that a demo- cratic theory of government coincided with practice under the Arbenz regime in the early 1950's. Another possible threat might come from the building up of vast fortunes as a conceivable product of industrialization. If the economic gap between the masters and the masses were greatly broadened, and especially if the intervening economic area were uninhabited, the result could be equally disruptive in terms of its effect on a coalescence of theory and practice. But these threats do not seem very real. The whole trend appears to be away from foreign domination, either political or economic, and, indeed, given the present state of nationalism in most of the Caribbean republics, anything resembling a classic sort of imperialism would be virtually impossible. Most of the states seem to be adequately on their guard against political 36 The Caribbean 36 The Caribbean munity will operate again to separate rather than to join theory and practice. The extension of an overriding foreign influence in any of the states of the Caribbean would, for example, introduce elements of unreality and bitterness in the political life of that state which would almost inevitably militate against unity and toward discord and division. The theory of constitutional political operation might remain much the same; the practice would necessarily change. The successful promotion of extreme political ideologies would produce the same result. The native elitism which, without phil- osophical labeling or refinement, so long prevailed in many of the Caribbean and other Latin American states, had much in common with fascism. If, then, some neofascist movement were, inconceivably, to make great headway in a Caribbean state it would logically introduce centrifugal currents in society which would in turn result in the further divergence of the theory and practice of government. By the same token, communism, were it to make the headway in a Caribbean state in the future that it recently did in Guatemala, would prove a divisive factor point- ing in the same direction. Who can honestly say that a demo- cratic theory of government coincided with practice under the Arbenz regime in the early 1950's. Another possible threat might come from the building up of vast fortunes as a conceivable product of industrialization. If the economic gap between the masters and the masses were greatly broadened, and especially if the intervening economic area were uninhabited, the result could be equally disruptive in terms of its effect on a coalescence of theory and practice. But these threats do not seem very real. The whole trend appears to be away from foreign domination, either political or economic, and, indeed, given the present state of nationalism in most of the Caribbean republics, anything resembling a classic sort of imperialism would be virtually impossible. Most of the states seem to be adequately on their guard against political munity will operate again to separate rather than to join theory and practice. The extension of an overriding foreign influence in any of the states of the Caribbean would, for example, introduce elements of unreality and bitterness in the political life of that state which would almost inevitably militate against unity and toward discord and division. The theory of constitutional political operation might remain much the same; the practice would necessarily change. The successful promotion of extreme political ideologies would produce the same result. The native elitism which, without phil- osophical labeling or refinement, so long prevailed in many of the Caribbean and other Latin American states, had much in common with fascism. If, then, some neofascist movement were, inconceivably, to make great headway in a Caribbean state it would logically introduce centrifugal currents in society which would in turn result in the further divergence of the theory and practice of government. By the same token, communism, were it to make the headway in a Caribbean state in the future that it recently did in Guatemala, would prove a divisive factor point- ing in the same direction. Who can honestly say that a demo- cratic theory of government coincided with practice under the Arbenz regime in the early 1950's. Another possible threat might come from the building up of vast fortunes as a conceivable product of industrialization. If the economic gap between the masters and the masses were greatly broadened, and especially if the intervening economic area were uninhabited, the result could be equally disruptive in terms of its effect on a coalescence of theory and practice. But these threats do not seem very real. The whole trend appears to be away from foreign domination, either political or economic, and, indeed, given the present state of nationalism in most of the Caribbean republics, anything resembling a classic sort of imperialism would be virtually impossible. Most of the states seem to be adequately on their guard against political  CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 37 excesses, whether from the right or the left. All governments and peoples need to keep in mind John Curran's dictum about eternal vigilance, but as of now those in the Caribbean appear to be aware of the shape and color of both fascism and com- munism. Industrialization will of course produce large fortunes but it is not conceivable that it will not also contribute to the growth of a middle class. Caribbean governments are quite aware of the possibility of using tax policies to control the growth of great wealth, although they have not always had the courage or the freedom to undertake such control. It would seem, then, that we need not be too worried about threats to the recent trend. The current toward integration now appears strong and irresistible. As it continues it will pull ex- pression of theory and formulation of practice toward a common center, just as the various elements of political, economic, and cultural society are pulled toward union in a common center. We must not expect the process to be rapid or always to be visible. We must not expect it to be completely uniform, to show no regressions. But it is coming. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 37 excesses, whether from the right or the left. All governments and peoples need to keep in mind John Curran's dictum about eternal vigilance, but as of now those in the Caribbean appear to be aware of the shape and color of both fascism and com- munism. Industrialization will of course produce large fortunes but it is not conceivable that it will not also contribute to the growth of a middle class. Caribbean governments are quite aware of the possibility of using tax policies to control the growth of great wealth, although they have not always had the courage or the freedom to undertake such control. It would seem, then, that we need not be too worried about threats to the recent trend. The current toward integration now appears strong and irresistible. As it continues it will pull ex- pression of theory and formulation of practice toward a common center, just as the various elements of political, economic, and cultural society are pulled toward union in a common center. We must not expect the process to be rapid or always to be visible. We must not expect it to be completely uniform, to show no regressions. But it is coming. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 37 excesses, whether from the right or the left. All governments and peoples need to keep in mind John Curran's dictum about eternal vigilance, but as of now those in the Caribbean appear to be aware of the shape and color of both fascism and com- munism. Industrialization will of course produce large fortunes but it is not conceivable that it will not also contribute to the growth of a middle class. Caribbean governments are quite aware of the possibility of using tax policies to control the growth of great wealth, although they have not always had the courage or the freedom to undertake such control. It would seem, then, that we need not be too worried about threats to the recent trend. The current toward integration now appears strong and irresistible. As it continues it will pull ex- pression of theory and formulation of practice toward a common center, just as the various elements of political, economic, and cultural society are pulled toward union in a common center. We must not expect the process to be rapid or always to be visible. We must not expect it to be completely uniform, to show no regressions. But it is coming.   Part II Part II Part II POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS   lone Stuessy Wright: FACTORS AFFECTING POPULAR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN IDEAS, HOWEVER EFFECTIVE, do not operate in a vacuum, and political ideas can be translated into real governments only through the use of political techniques and institutions. Latin American peoples shared with Anglo-Americans the devotion to the exciting ideas of liberty and equality that were current during the Enlightenment. They, also, sought independence from the mother country in order to set up that kind of government which was desired in each particular country. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate those traditions, factors, and influences which affected the various Caribbean areas as each moved toward popu- lar self-government, along with those problems, both inherited and newly acquired, which these governments were called upon to solve. It happened that the thirteen English colonies along the At- lantic seaboard of North America were the first to break the tie with the mother country and to strike out on their own. Within the span of a decade and a half these Americans declared, fought for, and won their independence, transformed their indi- vidual colonies into commonwealths, united these together in a federal republic under an enduring constitution, and proceeded 41 lone StueSsy Wright: FACTORS AFFECTING POPULAR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN IDEAS, HOWEVER EFFECTIVE, do not operate in a vacuum, and political ideas can be translated into real governments only through the use of political techniques and institutions. Latin American peoples shared with Anglo-Americans the devotion to the exciting ideas of liberty and equality that were current during the Enlightenment. They, also, sought independence from the mother country in order to set up that kind of government which was desired in each particular country. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate those traditions, factors, and influences which affected the various Caribbean areas as each moved toward popu- lar self-government, along with those problems, both inherited and newly acquired, which these governments were called upon to solve. It happened that the thirteen English colonies along the At- lantic seaboard of North America were the first to break the tie with the mother country and to strike out on their own. Within the span of a decade and a half these Americans declared, fought for, and won their independence, transformed their indi- vidual colonies into commonwealths, united these together in a federal republic under an enduring constitution, and proceeded 41 lone Stuessy Wright: FACTORS AFFECTING POPULAR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN IDEAS, HOWEVER EFFECTIVE, do not operate in a vacuum, and political ideas can be translated into real governments only through the use of political techniques and institutions. Latin American peoples shared with Anglo-Americans the devotion to the exciting ideas of liberty and equality that were current during the Enlightenment. They, also, sought independence from the mother country in order to set up that kind of government which was desired in each particular country. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate those traditions, factors, and influences which affected the various Caribbean areas as each moved toward popu- lar self-government, along with those problems, both inherited and newly acquired, which these governments were called upon to solve. It happened that the thirteen English colonies along the At- lantic seaboard of North America were the first to break the tie with the mother country and to strike out on their own. Within the span of a decade and a half these Americans declared, fought for, and won their independence, transformed their indi- vidual colonies into commonwealths, united these together in a federal republic under an enduring constitution, and proceeded  42 The Caribbean 42 The Caribbean 42 The Caribbean to govern themselves effectively and without any great outbreaks of violence. The deceptive ease with which all this was accomplished encouraged other peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere as they fought for their own independence and set up their own free governments. It was natural to believe that the government which seemed to he proving itself successful in the United States was the best form-or at least a good one-through which to express the liberal ideas of the period. Surely other countries had only to adopt the same political formula-a somewhat liberal written constitution with some popular participation in govern- ment-to secure similar happy results for themselves. Free elections (although with limited suffrage) were regarded as the only acceptable way in which people could express their will and give popular direction to governmental policies. With high hopes and few fears, resolutely disregarding the warnings of many cautious and concerned leaders, including Bolivar him- self, the people in the newly independent Caribbean nations, along with other Latin Americans, adopted these and other demo- cratic practices which had stood the test of time in the United States, confidently expecting them to produce the desired freedom and liberty in their own governments. The results were at first surprising, then disappointing, and finally intolerable. "Political chaos inevitably descended upon the newborn states."' Interference with voters, intimidation of voters, unsatisfactory ballot forms, disputes over qualifications of the voters, fraudulence in counting the votes, the lack of im- partial electoral courts to decide disputes, the impossibility of upper officials controlling their subordinates who feared the loss of their jobs in a change of government-all contributed to make elections a farce. Why? The obvious answers are certainly true as far as they go. Spanish Americans lacked experience in such electoral tech- Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present (New York, 1955), p. 294. to govern themselves effectively and without any great outbreaks of violence. The deceptive ease with which all this was accomplished encouraged other peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere as they fought for their own independence and set up their own free governments. It was natural to believe that the government which seemed to be proving itself successful in the United States was the best form-or at least a good one-through which to express the liberal ideas of the period. Surely other countries had only to adopt the same political formula-a somewhat liberal written constitution with some popular participation in govern- ment-to secure similar happy results for themselves. Free elections (although with limited suffrage) were regarded as the only acceptable way in which people could express their will and give popular direction to governmental policies. With high hopes and few fears, resolutely disregarding the warnings of many cautious and concerned leaders, including Bolivar him- self, the people in the newly independent Caribbean nations, along with other Latin Americans, adopted these and other demo- cratic practices which had stood the test of time in the United States, confidently expecting them to produce the desired freedom and liberty in their own governments. The results were at first surprising, then disappointing, and finally intolerable. "Political chaos inevitably descended upon the newborn states."' Interference with voters, intimidation of voters, unsatisfactory ballot forms, disputes over qualifications of the voters, fraudulence in counting the votes, the lack of im- partial electoral courts to decide disputes, the impossibility of upper officials controlling their subordinates who feared the loss of their jobs in a change of government-all contributed to make elections a farce. Why? The obvious answers are certainly true as far as they go. Spanish Americans lacked experience in such electoral tech- ' Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present (New York, 1955), p. 294. to govern themselves effectively and without any great outbreaks of violence. The deceptive ease with which all this was accomplished encouraged other peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere as they fought for their own independence and set up their own free governments. It was natural to believe that the government which seemed to be proving itself successful in the United States was the best form-or at least a good one-through which to express the liberal ideas of the period. Surely other countries had only to adopt the same political formula-a somewhat liberal written constitution with some popular participation in govern- ment-to secure similar happy results for themselves. Free elections (although with limited suffrage) were regarded as the only acceptable way in which people could express their will and give popular direction to governmental policies. With high hopes and few fears, resolutely disregarding the warnings of many cautious and concerned leaders, including Bolivar him- self, the people in the newly independent Caribbean nations, along with other Latin Americans, adopted these and other demo- cratic practices which had stood the test of time in the United States, confidently expecting them to produce the desired freedom and liberty in their own governments. The results were at first surprising, then disappointing, and finally intolerable. "Political chaos inevitably descended upon the newborn states."' Interference with voters, intimidation of voters, unsatisfactory ballot forms, disputes over qualifications of the voters, fraudulence in counting the votes, the lack of im- partial electoral courts to decide disputes, the impossibility of upper officials controlling their subordinates who feared the loss of their jobs in a change of government-all contributed to make elections a farce. Why? The obvious answers are certainly true as far as they go. Spanish Americans lacked experience in such electoral tech- ' Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present (New York, 1955), p. 294.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 43 niques. Whatever democratic practices there might have been in the early cabildos had long since disappeared and been super- seded by an authoritarian, paternalistic government. Ignorance, corruption, transportation problems, regionalism, illiteracy, per- sonal ambitions, social and racial problems played their part. Underlying all these factors, however, was the simple reality that people in the Caribbean did not feel at home with electoral pro- cedures nor with the forms of government which they were de- signed to implement. Hubert Herring, in his recent book on Latin America, expresses it well: "The people of Latin America were catapulted at dizzy speed from a governmental pattern in which they had almost no voice into an unfamiliar political system that required them to elect their own rulers and lawmakers." It might even be argued that the priority of the establishment of popular self-government in the United States bore some respon- sibility for the political tragedy experienced by her neighbors to the south. This is not the place to speculate as to whether the Anglo-Americans were the first to seek independence because they sensed intuitively that they were most ready for it, or whether that priority of action came fortuitously as the result of chance circumstances. We must, however, note that the United States, which was the first American nation to break free from European domination, was, in fact, that one best suited by colonial develop- ment and European tradition to put the political theories of the Enlightenment into practice. What people elsewhere (and in the United States, for that matter) failed to realize was that the rep- resentative, federal republican form of government worked for us because it was a natural outgrowth of our colonial and revolu- tionary experience and, at the grassroots level at least, presented no startling political innovations. Instead, the impression became widespread that the political forms, techniques, and institutions that worked for the United States must be inherently good, where- as it is conceivable that they were good only for the United States because they were our own and natural to us. ' Ibid. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 43 niques. Whatever democratic practices there might have been in the early cabildos had long since disappeared and been super- seded by an authoritarian, paternalistic government. Ignorance, corruption, transportation problems, regionalism, illiteracy, per- sonal ambitions, social and racial problems played their part. Underlying all these factors, however, was the simple reality that people in the Caribbean did not feel at home with electoral pro- cedures nor with the forms of government which they were de- signed to implement. Hubert Herring, in his recent book on Latin America, expresses it well: "The people of Latin America were catapulted at dizzy speed from a governmental pattern in which they had almost no voice into an unfamiliar political system that required them to elect their own rulers and lawmakers."' It might even be argued that the priority of the establishment of popular self-government in the United States bore some respon- sibility for the political tragedy experienced by her neighbors to the south. This is not the place to speculate as to whether the Anglo-Americans were the first to seek independence because they sensed intuitively that they were most ready for it, or whether that priority of action came fortuitously as the result of chance circumstances. We must, however, note that the United States, which was the first American nation to break free from European domination, was, in fact, that one best suited by colonial develop- ment and European tradition to put the political theories of the Enlightenment into practice. What people elsewhere (and in the United States, for that matter) failed to realize was that the rep- resentative, federal republican form of government worked for us because it was a natural outgrowth of our colonial and revolu- tionary experience and, at the grassroots level at least, presented no startling political innovations. Instead, the impression became widespread that the political forms, techniques, and institutions that worked for the United States must be inherently good, where- as it is conceivable that they were good only for the United States because they were our own and natural to us. ' Ibid. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 43 niques. Whatever democratic practices there might have been in the early cabildos had long since disappeared and been super- seded by an authoritarian, paternalistic government. Ignorance, corruption, transportation problems, regionalism, illiteracy, per- sonal ambitions, social and racial problems played their part. Underlying all these factors, however, was the simple reality that people in the Caribbean did not feel at home with electoral pro- cedures nor with the forms of government which they were de- signed to implement. Hubert Herring, in his recent book on Latin America, expresses it well: "The people of Latin America were catapulted at dizzy speed from a governmental pattern in which they had almost no voice into an unfamiliar political system that required them to elect their own rulers and lawmakers." It might even be argued that the priority of the establishment of popular self-government in the United States bore some respon- sibility for the political tragedy experienced by her neighbors to the south. This is not the place to speculate as to whether the Anglo-Americans were the first to seek independence because they sensed intuitively that they were most ready for it, or whether that priority of action came fortuitously as the result of chance circumstances. We must, however, note that the United States, which was the first American nation to break free from European domination, was, in fact, that one best suited by colonial develop- ment and European tradition to put the political theories of the Enlightenment into practice. What people elsewhere (and in the United States, for that matter) failed to realize was that the rep- resentative, federal republican form of government worked for us because it was a natural outgrowth of our colonial and revolu- tionary experience and, at the grassroots level at least, presented no startling political innovations. Instead, the impression became widespread that the political forms, techniques, and institutions that worked for the United States must be inherently good, where- as it is conceivable that they were good only for the United States because they were our own and natural to us. ' Ibid.  44 The Caribbean 44 The Caribbean Economic historians have long been interested in the difficul- ties encountered in the introduction of new crops even to areas which seem favorable for them. We recall the persistent efforts of the Spaniards to grow wheat in the New World before success was finally achieved. A more recent experience of the same kind was recounted by J. G. Harrar, of the Rockefeller Foundation, at the very first luncheon meeting of the first of these annual Caribbean conferences,' as he expressed the surprise which Amer- ican agriculturists felt when they found that their attempts to increase Mexico's corn production by introducing heavy-bearing varieties from the United States were unsatisfactory and had to turn their efforts, instead, to the improvement of native varieties. We are only recently learning that transplanted political and social institutions often experience these same painful difficulties in taking root in new soils. II The causes of the political difficulties in the Caribbean area must be sought in the social, economic, and cultural complex. One distinguished North American political scientist places the blame for Latin America's difficulty in making democracy work on a basic lack of integration.' This is especially and peculiarly applicable to the Caribbean areas which are racially more richly varied than any other part of the Americas. Haiti is Negro, Guatemala is Indian, Costa Rica is white, Honduras is mestizo, and so it goes-with every conceivable gradation and combination of these elements. Differences in goals, values, traditions, and institutions among * Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947), p. 252, esp. footnote 1. ' Conference on "The Caribbean at Mid-Century," University of Flori- da, Gainesville, Dec. 7-9, 1950. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Political Scientists' Point of View" in W. W. Pierson (ed.), "Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Sym- posium," American Political Science Review, XLIV, 1 (March, 1950), 120-121. Economic historians have long been interested in the difficul- ties encountered in the introduction of new crops even to areas which seem favorable for them. We recall the persistent efforts of the Spaniards to grow wheat in the New World before success was finally achieved.' A more recent experience of the same kind was recounted by J. G. Harrar, of the Rockefeller Foundation, at the very first luncheon meeting of the first of these annual Caribbean conferences,' as he expressed the surprise which Amer- ican agriculturists felt when they found that their attempts to increase Mexico's corn production by introducing heavy-bearing varieties from the United States were unsatisfactory and had to turn their efforts, instead, to the improvement of native varieties. We are only recently learning that transplanted political and social institutions often experience these same painful difficulties in taking root in new soils. II The causes of the political difficulties in the Caribbean area must be sought in the social, economic, and cultural complex. One distinguished North American political scientist places the blame for Latin America's difficulty in making democracy work on a basic lack of integration.' This is especially and peculiarly applicable to the Caribbean areas which are racially more richly varied than any other part of the Americas. Haiti is Negro, Guatemala is Indian, Costa Rica is white, Honduras is mestizo, and so it goes-with every conceivable gradation and combination of these elements. Differences in goals, values, traditions, and institutions among ' Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947), p. 252, esp. footnote 1. ' Conference on "The Caribbean at Mid-Century," University of Flori- da, Gainesville, Dec. 7-9, 1950. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Political Scientists' Point of View" in W. W. Pierson (ed.), "Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Sym- posium," American Political Science Review, XLIV, 1 (March, 1950), 120-121. 44 The Caribbean Economic historians have long been interested in the difficul- ties encountered in the introduction of new crops even to areas which seem favorable for them. We recall the persistent efforts of the Spaniards to grow wheat in the New World before success was finally achieved.' A more recent experience of the same kind was recounted by J. G. Harrar, of the Rockefeller Foundation, at the very first luncheon meeting of the first of these annual Caribbean conferences,' as he expressed the surprise which Amer- ican agriculturists felt when they found that their attempts to increase Mexico's corn production by introducing heavy-bearing varieties from the United States were unsatisfactory and had to turn their efforts, instead, to the improvement of native varieties. We are only recently learning that transplanted political and social institutions often experience these same painful difficulties in taking root in new soils. II The causes of the political difficulties in the Caribbean area must be sought in the social, economic, and cultural complex. One distinguished North American political scientist places the blame for Latin America's difficulty in making democracy work on a basic lack of integration.' This is especially and peculiarly applicable to the Caribbean areas which are racially more richly varied than any other part of the Americas. Haiti is Negro, Guatemala is Indian, Costa Rica is white, Honduras is mestizo, and so it goes-with every conceivable gradation and combination of these elements. Differences in goals, values, traditions, and institutions among ' Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947), p. 252, esp. footnote 1. ' Conference on "The Caribbean at Mid-Century," University of Flori- da, Gainesville, Dec. 7-9, 1950. * Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Political Scientists' Point of View" in W. W. Pierson (ed.), "Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Sym- posium," American Political Science Review, XLIV, 1 (March, 1950), 120-121.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 45 these racial groups could be multiplied endlessly to illustrate the difficulties facing these areas when they were first given a share in the responsibility for their own destiny. Generally speaking, the Indians were not interested in politics per se, but turned to such activities to accomplish purposes of their own. The Span- iards were politically minded from the family on up through the complicating relationships of society,' but the Negroes were not only not politically minded but they were not even family- minded. Not only in Jamaica but in other areas large numbers of Negro girls shunned marriage as another form of slavery and steadfastly refused to establish homes in the monogamous Chris- tian pattern.' Religious differences, often closely related to racial differences, have been responsible for-or have become the symbols of- resorts to force when special groups felt that their interests had not been protected by proper political procedures. The so-called "Baptist War" in Jamaica' and the Cruzoob movement' in Yuca- tdn are cases in point. Even without violence, cultural differences rooted in hundreds of years of independent development have often made themselves felt at election time. If democratic govern- ment can function successfully only in those countries where there is general agreement on basic principles and significant issues, we need scarcely wonder at the difficulties which it has experienced in the Caribbean." The travail through which such diverse elements must pass in the creation of a newly integrated society is described with * Miguel Jorrin, Governments of Latin America (New York, 1953), p. 184. Philip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830-1865 (Cambridge, 1955), p. 169. ° Ibid., p. 86. ' Howard F. Cline, "Related Studies in Early Nineteenth Century Yucatecan Social History," Microfilm collection of manuscripts on Middle American Cultural Anthropology, No. XXXII, University of Chicago Li- brary (Chicago, 1950), p. 11. " Arthur P. Whitaker, "A Historian's Point of View" in W. W. Pierson (ed.), op. cit., 118. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 45 these racial groups could be multiplied endlessly to illustrate the difficulties facing these areas when they were first given a share in the responsibility for their own destiny. Generally speaking, the Indians were not interested in politics per se, but turned to such activities to accomplish purposes of their own. The Span- iards were politically minded from the family on up through the complicating relationships of society,' but the Negroes were not only not politically minded but they were not even family- minded. Not only in Jamaica but in other areas large numbers of Negro girls shunned marriage as another form of slavery and steadfastly refused to establish homes in the monogamous Chris- tian pattern.' Religious differences, often closely related to racial differences, have been responsible for-or have become the symbols of- resorts to force when special groups felt that their interests had not been protected by proper political procedures. The so-called "Baptist War" in Jamaica' and the Cruzoob movement' in Yuca- tan are cases in point. Even without violence, cultural differences rooted in hundreds of years of independent development have often made themselves felt at election time. If democratic govern- ment can function successfully only in those countries where there is general agreement on basic principles and significant issues, we need scarcely wonder at the difficulties which it has experienced in the Caribbean." The travail through which such diverse elements must pass in the creation of a newly integrated society is described with Miguel Jorrin, Governments of Latin America (New York, 1953), p. 184. ' Philip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830-1865 (Cambridge, 1955), p. 169. a Ibid., p. 86. ' Howard F. Cline, "Related Studies in Early Nineteenth Century Yucatecan Social History," Microfim collection of manuscripts on Middle American Cultural Anthropology, No. XXXII, University of Chicago IU- brary (Chicago, 1950), p. 11. " Arthur P. Whitaker, "A Historian's Point of View" in W. W. Pierson (ed.), op. cit., 118. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 45 these racial groups could be multiplied endlessly to illustrate the difficulties facing these areas when they were first given a share in the responsibility for their own destiny. Generally speaking, the Indians were not interested in politics per se, but turned to such activities to accomplish purposes of their own. The Span- iards were politically minded from the family on up through the complicating relationships of society,' but the Negroes were not only not politically minded but they were not even family- minded. Not only in Jamaica but in other areas large numbers of Negro girls shunned marriage as another form of slavery and steadfastly refused to establish homes in the monogamous Chris- tian pattern.' Religious differences, often closely related to racial differences, have been responsible for-or have become the symbols of- resorts to force when special groups felt that their interests had not been protected by proper political procedures. The so-called "Baptist War" in Jamaica' and the Cruzoob movement' in Yuca- tin are cases in point. Even without violence, cultural differences rooted in hundreds of years of independent development have often made themselves felt at election time. If democratic govern- ment can function successfully only in those countries where there is general agreement on basic principles and significant issues, we need scarcely wonder at the difficulties which it has experienced in the Caribbean.0 The travail through which such diverse elements must pass in the creation of a newly integrated society is described with " Miguel Jorrin, Governments of Latin America (New York, 1953), p. 184. ' Philip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Colony, 1830-1865 (Cambridge, 1955), p. 169. * Ibid., p. 86. * Howard F. Cline, "Related Studies in Early Nineteenth Century Yucatecan Social History," Microfilm collection of manuscripts on Middle American Cultural Anthropology, No. XXXII, University of Chicago Li- brary (Chicago, 1950), p. 11. n Arthur P. Whitaker, "A Historian's Point of View" in W. W. Pierson (ed.), op. cit., 118.  46 The Caribbean insight and brilliance by Philip Curtin in his very fine study of Jamaican development in the nineteenth century:" colonial peoples have accepted what the Europeans of- fered them-a superior technology, more efficient government, sometimes a new religion, and, for a minority, elements of a European education. They have also lost what the Europeans took from them-their older social and governmental organiza- tion, their traditional economy, and the sanctions of sentiment, religion and custom that formerly held their society together. The earlier hope that both the indigenous population and the transplanted Negroes would rapidly-or at least eventually- become completely civilized along the lines of the mother country has not come true. "European ideas and European ways have not been accepted in toto. Colonial peoples have taken part of the offering and rejected the rest. They have dropped some of their indigenous ideas and institutions, but others have shown surprising vigor." (Those of us who have watched with sympathetic interest the determination of the Seminoles to preserve their own way of life in our particular portion of the Caribbean area scarcely need to be reminded of this.) "It now seems likely that the present ferment will result eventually in the formation of new societies where neither the European nor the indigenous will have sur- vived in its entirety. Instead, there will be an amalgam of both -a product of the adjustment of a diverse inheritance to the problems. .." of a new kind of world. III Political changes in Europe growing out of the American and French revolutions, the growth of nationalism in the Napoleonic Wars, and the whole series of economic changes often included under the name "Industrial Revolution," also vitally affected Caribbean life. The revolt of the North American colonies, the successful slave revolt in Haiti, the dissolution of the Spanish " Curtin, p. viii in Preface. 46 The Caribbean insight and brilliance by Philip Curtin in his very fine study of Jamaican development in the nineteenth century:" colonial peoples have accepted what the Europeans of- fered them-a superior technology, more efficient government, sometimes a new religion, and, for a minority, elements of a European education. They have also lost what the Europeans took from them-their older social and governmental organiza- tion, their traditional economy, and the sanctions of sentiment, religion and custom that formerly held their society together. The earlier hope that both the indigenous population and the transplanted Negroes would rapidly-or at least eventually- become completely civilized along the lines of the mother country has not come true. "European ideas and European ways have not been accepted in toto. Colonial peoples have taken part of the offering and rejected the rest. They have dropped some of their indigenous ideas and institutions, but others have shown surprising vigor." (Those of us who have watched with sympathetic interest the determination of the Seminoles to preserve their own way of life in our particular portion of the Caribbean area scarcely need to be reminded of this.) "It now seems likely that the present ferment will result eventually in the formation of new societies where neither the European nor the indigenous will have sur- vived in its entirety. Instead, there will be an amalgam of both -a product of the adjustment of a diverse inheritance to the problems. .." of a new kind of world. III Political changes in Europe growing out of the American and French revolutions, the growth of nationalism in the Napoleonic Wars, and the whole series of economic changes often included under the name "Industrial Revolution," also vitally affected Caribbean life. The revolt of the North American colonies, the successful slave revolt in Haiti, the dissolution of the Spanish "Curtn, p. viii in Preface. 46 The Caribbean insight and brilliance by Philip Curtin in his very fine study of Jamaican development in the nineteenth century:" colonial peoples have accepted what the Europeans of- fered them-a superior technology, more efficient government, sometimes a new religion, and, for a minority, elements of a European education. They have also lost what the Europeans took from them-their older social and governmental organiza- tion, their traditional economy, and the sanctions of sentiment, religion and custom that formerly held their society together. The earlier hope that both the indigenous population and the transplanted Negroes would rapidly-or at least eventually- become completely civilized along the lines of the mother country has not come true. "European ideas and European ways have not been accepted in torn. Colonial peoples have taken part of the offering and rejected the rest. They have dropped some of their indigenous ideas and institutions, but others have shown surprising vigor." (Those of us who have watched with sympathetic interest the determination of the Seminoles to preserve their own way of life in our particular portion of the Caribbean area scarcely need to be reminded of this.) "It now seems likely that the present ferment will result eventually in the formation of new societies where neither the European nor the indigenous will have sur- vived in its entirety. Instead, there will be an amalgam of both -a product of the adjustment of a diverse inheritance to the problems..." of a new kind of world. III Political changes in Europe growing out of the American and French revolutions, the growth of nationalism in the Napoleonic Wars, and the whole series of economic changes often included under the name "Industrial Revolution," also vitally affected Caribbean life. The revolt of the North American colonies, the successful slave revolt in Haiti, the dissolution of the Spanish " Curtin, p. viii in Preface.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 47 empire, along with the greater measure of self-rule offered by Britain to some of her colonies, changed forever the political map of the Caribbean; while the Haitian revolt and the British eman- cipation of slaves in the 1830's ruptured the traditional relation- ships between whites and blacks, forcing them to grope their way toward a new social balance. This process was made more diffi- cult by the continuing existence of slavery in the United States and other places nearby. Haiti gave up the struggle and elimi- nated her whites, thereby solving part of her problem but by no means making those of her neighbors easier. During this same period the Caribbean faced economic changes amounting to a revolution. The system of tropical plantation colonies designed to provide the mother country with desirable products was destroyed. France lost her most valuable colony, Haiti. The American Revolution destroyed the triangular as well as the direct New England trade upon which the islands had counted. The Napolenic Wars forced Europe to become more self-sufficient and to seek new avenues of trade"* Haiti turned her back on profits, indulging in a century-long rest from planta- tion labor, and the British and the French islands entered into a period of prolonged depression. It is, perhaps, worth noting that even in the British colonies where self-government had long been a cherished tradition, these problems of racial differences and economic depression caused the surrender, almost with relief, of government responsibility back to the mother country. Other economic changes brought new prosperity to some of the more neglected areas of the Colonial period. Even these demanded their price as they shifted social and political balances. New trade brought prosperity to Puerto Rico and Cuba, as did the increasing sugar production toward the close of the century, but the problems of a monoculture economy and the resulting concentrations of wealth plagued the political atmosphere of both islands for decades and are still factors in their political life. " Ibid., pp. 4-5. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 47 empire, along with the greater measure of self-rule offered by Britain to some of her colonies, changed forever the political map of the Caribbean; while the Haitian revolt and the British eman- cipation of slaves in the 1830's ruptured the traditional relation- ships between whites and blacks, forcing them to grope their way toward a new social balance. This process was made more diffi- cult by the continuing existence of slavery in the United States and other places nearby. Haiti gave up the struggle and elimi- nated her whites, thereby solving part of her problem but by no means making those of her neighbors easier. During this same period the Caribbean faced economic changes amounting to a revolution. The system of tropical plantation colonies designed to provide the mother country with desirable products was destroyed. France lost her most valuable colony, Haiti. The American Revolution destroyed the triangular as well as the direct New England trade upon which the islands had counted. The Napolenic Wars forced Europe to become more self-sufficient and to seek new avenues of trade." Haiti turned her back on profits, indulging in a century-long rest from planta- tion labor, and the British and the French islands entered into a period of prolonged depression, It is, perhaps, worth noting that even in the British colonies where self-government had long been a cherished tradition, these problems of racial differences and economic depression caused the surrender, almost with relief, of government responsibility back to the mother country. Other economic changes brought new prosperity to some of the more neglected areas of the Colonial period. Even these demanded their price as they shifted social and political balances. New trade brought prosperity to Puerto Rico and Cuba, as did the increasing sugar production toward the close of the century, but the problems of a monoculture economy and the resulting concentrations of wealth plagued the political atmosphere of both islands for decades and are still factors in their political life. " Ibid., pp. 4-5. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 47 empire, along with the greater measure of self-rule offered by Britain to some of her colonies, changed forever the political map of the Caribbean; while the Haitian revolt and the British eman- cipation of slaves in the 1830's ruptured the traditional relation- ships between whites and blacks, forcing them to grope their way toward a new social balance. This process was made more diffi- cult by the continuing existence of slavery in the United States and other places nearby. Haiti gave up the struggle and elimi- nated her whites, thereby solving part of her problem but by no means making those of her neighbors easier. During this same period the Caribbean faced economic changes amounting to a revolution. The system of tropical plantation colonies designed to provide the mother country with desirable products was destroyed. France lost her most valuable colony, Haiti. The American Revolution destroyed the triangular as well as the direct New England trade upon which the islands had counted. The Napolenic Wars forced Europe to become more self-sufficient and to seek new avenues of trade." Haiti turned her back on profits, indulging in a century-long rest from planta- tion labor, and the British and the French islands entered into a period of prolonged depression. It is, perhaps, worth noting that even in the British colonies where self-government had long been a cherished tradition, these problems of racial differences and economic depression caused the surrender, almost with relief, of government responsibility back to the mother country. Other economic changes brought new prosperity to some of the more neglected areas of the Colonial period. Even these demanded their price as they shifted social and political balances. New trade brought prosperity to Puerto Rico and Cuba, as did the increasing sugar production toward the close of the century, but the problems of a monoculture economy and the resulting concentrations of wealth plagued the political atmosphere of both islands for decades and are still factors in their political life. " Ibid., pp. 4-5.  48 The Caribbean The demands of the farmers on the western plains of the United States for a durable binding twine for their grain brought henequen plantations to Yucatan, but these, in turn, combined with other factors to set off the bitter War of the Castes which lasted almost a century." Before the Caribbean areas could successfully master the tech- niques of self-government well enough to solve these problems, they were compounded by new developments of the twentieth century. Insistent demands for improved transportation dimin- ished regionalism but cost one Caribbean nation--Colombia-a portion of its national territory and has since dominated the life of another-Panama. Urbanization and industrialization have brought organized labor, a new political force. The activities of foreign oil and mining companies, as well as the United Fruit Company, have served to introduce new political issues. Loans of foreign capital have resulted in economic pressures. Such economic unity as these countries may once have had has been destroyed as new economic forces added their political pressures to those generated by ideological, racial, or social friction. As the crossroads of America, it is little wonder that the Caribbean has not been permitted to work out its own destiny without foreign interest and intervention. The people of this area have always been uneasily aware of the explosively expansive United States to the north, fearing its imperialism, its color line, its economic power, and finally, its great might, while sheltering themselves, perhaps unconsciously, behind its Monroe Doctrine. European nations have played varying roles in the economy and politics of these nations, ranging all the way from the armed French invasion which placed Maximilian on a precarious Mexi- can throne to small business operations. A significant develop- ment of the past few decades has been the powerful attempt of Russia to orient these areas toward her communist world. Less important by far, but worth noting, has been the increased inter- " See Howard F. Cline's study of the causes of this war, already cited. 48 The Caribbean 48 The Caribbean The demands of the farmers on the western plains of the United States for a durable binding twine for their grain brought henequen plantations to Yucatan, but these, in turn, combined with other factors to set off the bitter War of the Castes which lasted almost a century." Before the Caribbean areas could successfully master the tech- niques of self-government well enough to solve these problems, they were compounded by new developments of the twentieth century. Insistent demands for improved transportation dimin- ished regionalism but cost one Caribbean nation-Colombia--a portion of its national territory and has since dominated the life of another-Panama. Urbanization and industrialization have brought organized labor, a new political force. The activities of foreign oil and mining companies, as well as the United Fruit Company, have served to introduce new political issues. Loans of foreign capital have resulted in economic pressures. Such economic unity as these countries may once have had has been destroyed as new economic forces added their political pressures to those generated by ideological, racial, or social friction. As the crossroads of America, it is little wonder that the Caribbean has not been permitted to work out its own destiny without foreign interest and intervention. The people of this area have always been uneasily aware of the explosively expansive United States to the north, fearing its imperialism, its color line, its economic power, and finally, its great might, while sheltering themselves, perhaps unconsciously, behind its Monroe Doctrine. European nations have played varying roles in the economy and politics of these nations, ranging all the way from the armed French invasion which placed Maximilian on a precarious Mexi- can throne to small business operations. A significant develop- ment of the past few decades has been the powerful attempt of Russia to orient these areas toward her communist world. Less important by far, but worth noting, has been the increased inter- " See Howard F. Cline's study of the causes of this war, already cited. The demands of the farmers on the western plains of the United States for a durable binding twine for their grain brought henequen plantations to Yucatin, but these, in turn, combined with other factors to set off the bitter War of the Castes which lasted almost a century." Before the Caribbean areas could successfully master the tech- niques of self-government well enough to solve these problems, they were compounded by new developments of the twentieth century. Insistent demands for improved transportation dimin- ished regionalism but cost one Caribbean nation-Colombia-a portion of its national territory and has since dominated the life of another-Panama. Urbanization and industrialization have brought organized labor, a new political force. The activities of foreign oil and mining companies, as well as the United Fruit Company, have served to introduce new political issues. Loans of foreign capital have resulted in economic pressures. Such economic unity as these countries may once have had has been destroyed as new economic forces added their political pressures to those generated by ideological, racial, or social friction. As the crossroads of America, it is little wonder that the Caribbean has not been permitted to work out its own destiny without foreign interest and intervention. The people of this area have always been uneasily aware of the explosively expansive United States to the north, fearing its imperialism, its color line, its economic power, and finally, its great might, while sheltering themselves, perhaps unconsciously, behind its Monroe Doctrine. European nations have played varying roles in the economy and politics of these nations, ranging all the way from the armed French invasion which placed Maximilian on a precarious Mexi- can throne to small business operations. A significant develop- ment of the past few decades has been the powerful attempt of Russia to orient these areas toward her communist world. Less important by far, but worth noting, has been the increased inter- " See Howard F. Cline's study of the causes of this war, already cited.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 49 est which India has been sliowing toward the East Indians in the British territories of the Caribbean, an interest which coin- cides with the rapidly increasing importance of their role in these territories." Perhaps the most important foreign interference in the internal politics of the Caribbean nations has come from each other. Parties in Central America and elsewhere have crossed boundaries at will. Such activities have been somewhat reduced by Pan American diplomacy during the past half-century, especially since the creation of the Organization of American States. These, then, are the social, economic, and political problems which the Caribbean nations and semiautonomous colonies have tried to solve in the past century and a quarter by means of the political techniques borrowed from their northern neighbors or from Europe. Their success has been limited and qualified. In terms of actual fact, the use of free, honest elections in which free, independent, and vigorous parties present their candidates and policies to the people for a choice which both sides will accept in good spirit, has rarely been found for any extended period of time in any of these countries. The odds have been too great against it. IV Faced with what Federico G. Gils calls the chief political problem of all Latin America-not "democracy versus the lack of democracy," but how to get along in an orderly fashion under any political system-Caribbeans have turned to the three isms: per- sonalismo, the rule of a strong executive or dictator to whom the vocal or influential majority of the country is willing to trust the nation; continuismo, keeping a relatively satisfactory government in power long past its legal term, rather than risk the disorders attendant upon change; and machetismo, the use of force. Under " Mary M. Proudfoot, Britain and the United States in the Caribbean (New York, 1953), p. 95. " Federico G. Gil, in comments on the papers in W. W. Pierson (ed.), 149. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 49 est which India has been showing toward the East Indians in the British territories of the Caribbean, an interest which coin- cides with the rapidly increasing importance of their role in these territories." Perhaps the most important foreign interference in the internal politics of the Caribbean nations has come from each other. Parties in Central America and elsewhere have crossed boundaries at will. Such activities have been somewhat reduced by Pan American diplomacy during the past half-century, especially since the creation of the Organization of American States. These, then, are the social, economic, and political problems which the Caribbean nations and semiautonomous colonies have tried to solve in the past century and a quarter by means of the political techniques borrowed from their northern neighbors or from Europe. Their success has been limited and qualified. In terms of actual fact, the use of free, honest elections in which free, independent, and vigorous parties present their candidates and policies to the people for a choice which both sides will accept in good spirit, has rarely been found for any extended period of time in any of these countries. The odds have been too great against it. IV Faced with what Federico G. Gil" calls the chief political problem of all Latin America-not "democracy versus the lack of democracy," but how to get along in an orderly fashion under any political system-Caribbeans have turned to the three isms: per- sonalismo, the rule of a strong executive or dictator to whom the vocal or influential majority of the country is willing to trust the nation; continuismo, keeping a relatively satisfactory government in power long past its legal term, rather than risk the disorders attendant upon change; and machetismo, the use of force. Under " Mary M. Proudfoot, Britain and the United States in the Caribbean (New York, 1953), p. 95. " Federico G. Gil, in comments on the papers in W. W. Pierson (ed.), 149. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 49 est which India has been sliowing toward the East Indians in the British territories of the Caribbean, an interest which coin- cides with the rapidly increasing importance of their role in these territories." Perhaps the most important foreign interference in the internal politics of the Caribbean nations has come from each other. Parties in Central America and elsewhere have crossed boundaries at will. Such activities have been somewhat reduced by Pan American diplomacy during the past half-century, especially since the creation of the Organization of American States. These, then, are the social, economic, and political problems which the Caribbean nations and semiautonomous colonies have tried to solve in the past century and a quarter by means of the political techniques borrowed from their northern neighbors or from Europe. Their success has been limited and qualified. In terms of actual fact, the use of free, honest elections in which free, independent, and vigorous parties present their candidates and policies to the people for a choice which both sides will accept in good spirit, has rarely been found for any extended period of time in any of these countries. The odds have been too great against it. IV Faced with what Federico G. Gil" calls the chief political problem of all Latin America-not "democracy versus the lack of democracy," but how to get along in an orderly fashion under any political system--Caribbeans have turned to the three isms: per- sonalismo, the rule of a strong executive or dictator to whom the vocal or influential majority of the country is willing to trust the nation; continuismo, keeping a relatively satisfactory government in power long past its legal term, rather than risk the disorders attendant upon change; and machetismo, the use of force. Under * Mary M. Proudfoot, Britain and the United States in the Caribbean (New York, 1953), p. 95. " Federico G. Gil, in comments on the papers in W. W. Pierson (ed.), 149.  50 The Caribbean the latter, one may run the full gamut from the mere threat of force to the mob action of those Haitians who literally tore apart their unpopular president Guillaume Sam. It is axiomatic in at least one Caribbean country (Cuba) that you can win an election with the Army, you can win an election without the Army, but you cannot win an election against the Army." In a surprising number of Caribbean countries, government today is firmly in the hands of strong rulers-who may or may not have a legal basis for their continued tenure in office-who remain there primarily because their countries believe that they enjoy a greater degree of peace, prosperity, and efficient administration while they are there. With such practices, what becomes of elections? Sometimes they are manipulated-by force, by bribes, by fraud. Often the opposition stays away from the polls, rather than expose itself to the humiliation of defeat. The party in power nearly always wins. When a strongly entrenched government becomes suffi- ciently unpopular, its opponents unite to overthrow it. To the question as to why groups defeated in Latin American elections do not wait for another election one student of Latin American politics, Miguel Jorrin gives the laconic answer: "Be- cause economically it is not possible for them to wait. . . . The loss of political power means, for the individual and the family, unemployment and serious economic difficulties, not counting social prestige and possibilities of doing business with the govern- ment."" Are we to conclude then that democracy and such practices as free elections have lost their meaning for the Caribbean and may have no place in the future? Perhaps not. It is true that there have been disappointments, especially with countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica which had seemed to have matured politically, but these very disappointments may carry their own answer. It may be that their political institutions failed for the " Miguel Jorrin,.p. 204. " Ibi., p. 184. 50 The Caribbean 50 The Caribbean the latter, one may run the full gamut from the mere threat of force to the mob action of those Haitians who literally tore apart their unpopular president Guillaume Sam. It is axiomatic in at least one Caribbean country (Cuba) that you can win an election with the Army, you can win an election without the Army, but you cannot win an election against the Army." In a surprising number of Caribbean countries, government today is firmly in the hands of strong rulers-who may or may not have a legal basis for their continued tenure in office-who remain there primarily because their countries believe that they enjoy a greater degree of peace, prosperity, and efficient administration while they are there. With such practices, what becomes of elections? Sometimes they are manipulated-by force, by bribes, by fraud. Often the opposition stays away from the polls, rather than expose itself to the humiliation of defeat. The party in power nearly always wins. When a strongly entrenched government becomes suffi- ciently unpopular, its opponents unite to overthrow it. To the question as to why groups defeated in Latin American elections do not wait for another election one student of Latin American politics, Miguel Jorrin gives the laconic answer: "Be- cause economically it is not possible for them to wait. . . . The loss of political power means, for the individual and the family, unemployment and serious economic difficulties, not counting social prestige and possibilities of doing business with the govern- ment."" Are we to conclude then that democracy and such practices as free elections have lost their meaning for the Caribbean and may have no place in the future? Perhaps not. It is true that there have been disappointments, especially with countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica which had seemed to have matured politically, but these very disappointments may carry their own answer. It may be that their political institutions failed for the Miguel Jorrin, p. 204. " Ibid., p. 184. the latter, one may run the full gamut from the mere threat of force to the mob action of those Haitians who literally tore apart their unpopular president Guillaume Sam. It is axiomatic in at least one Caribbean country (Cuba) that you can win an election with the Army, you can win an election without the Army, but you cannot win an election against the Army." In a surprising number of Caribbean countries, government today is firmly in the hands of strong rulers-who may or may not have a legal basis for their continued tenure in office-who remain there primarily because their countries believe that they enjoy a greater degree of peace, prosperity, and efficient administration while they are there. With such practices, what becomes of elections? Sometimes they are manipulated-by force, by bribes, by fraud. Often the opposition stays away from the polls, rather than expose itself to the humiliation of defeat. The party in power nearly always wins. When a strongly entrenched government becomes suffi- ciently unpopular, its opponents unite to overthrow it. To the question as to why groups defeated in Latin American elections do not wait for another election one student of Latin American politics, Miguel Jorrin gives the laconic answer: "Be- cause economically it is not possible for them to wait. . . . The loss of political power means, for the individual and the family, unemployment and serious economic difficulties, not counting social prestige and possibilities of doing business with the govern- ment."" Are we to conclude then that democracy and such practices as free elections have lost their meaning for the Caribbean and may have no place in the future? Perhaps not. It is true that there have been disappointments, especially with countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica which had seemed to have matured politically, but these very disappointments may carry their own answer. It may be that their political institutions failed for the " Miguel Jorrin, p. 204. " Ibid., p. 184.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 51 very same reason that they were admired by us-that is, they were our kind of ways, rather than those that best suited the Colom- bians or the Costa Ricans. Democracy, in order to work for the Caribbean peoples, must be indigenous, and there are heartening signs of such a develop- ment. Professor Harold Davis reminds us that, despite the breaches in the observance of principles of political democracy, "all in all, republican self-government in Latin America remains one of the great facts in modern political history." He also calls attention to the consistency with which political leaders and public opinion have adhered to these principles." The Carib- bean offers many examples of what Federico Gil characterizes as a "groping toward a more realistic basis of political thinking in terms of its own environment, conditioning circumstances and peoples. The long-established practice of blindly following the foreign gods is slowly, but effectively, breaking down."" Such Caribbean nations as Mexico, which has discovered a national sense of destiny and is creating or adapting those social, economic, and political institutions with which to fulfil it, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which shows signs of doing for itself what others were unable to do for it, seem to have advanced well along this way. Many of the other countries have also made progress toward solving their problems through means that do not seem too costly to them. Curiously enough-or perhaps one might more truly say, naturally enough-one of the results of this valiant and often violent struggle toward stable self-government has been the in- creasing strength of popular elections. Accepting the reality that this still represents an ideal rather than an invariable practice, one may detect signs that this institution has at last taken root in the Caribbean area and may some day become genuinely " Harold E. Davis, "The Political Experience of Latin America and Its Changing Cultural Context," Paper read for Panel 2, American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept., 1954. " Gil, in comments on the papers in W. W. Pierson (ed.), 149. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 51 very same reason that they were admired by us-that is, they were our kind of ways, rather than those that best suited the Colom- bians or the Costa Ricans. Democracy, in order to work for the Caribbean peoples, must be indigenous, and there are heartening signs of such a develop- ment. Professor Harold Davis reminds us that, despite the breaches in the observance of principles of political democracy, "all in all, republican self-government in Latin America remains one of the great facts in modern political history." He also calls attention to the consistency with which political leaders and public opinion have adhered to these principles." The Carib- bean offers many examples of what Federico Gil characterizes as a "groping toward a more realistic basis of political thinking in terms of its own environment, conditioning circumstances and peoples. The long-established practice of blindly following the foreign gods is slowly, but effectively, breaking down."" Such Caribbean nations as Mexico, which has discovered a national sense of destiny and is creating or adapting those social, economic, and political institutions with which to fulfil it, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which shows signs of doing for itself what others were unable to do for it, seem to have advanced well along this way. Many of the other countries have also made progress toward solving their problems through means that do not seem too costly to them. Curiously enough-or perhaps one might more truly say, naturally enough-one of the results of this valiant and often violent struggle toward stable self-government has been the in- creasing strength of popular elections. Accepting the reality that this still represents an ideal rather than an invariable practice, one may detect signs that this institution has at last taken root in the Caribbean area and may some day become genuinely * Harold E. Davis, "The Political Experience of Latin America and Its Changing Cultural Context," Paper read for Panel 2, American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept., 1954. " Gil, in comments on the papers in W. W. Pierson (ed.), 149. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 51 very same reason that they were admired by us-that is, they were our kind of ways, rather than those that best suited the Colom- bians or the Costa Ricans. Democracy, in order to work for the Caribbean peoples, must be indigenous, and there are heartening signs of such a develop- ment. Professor Harold Davis reminds us that, despite the breaches in the observance of principles of political democracy, "all in all, republican self-government in Latin America remains one of the great facts in modern political history." He also calls attention to the consistency with which political leaders and public opinion have adhered to these principles." The Carib- bean offers many examples of what Federico Gil characterizes as a "groping toward a more realistic basis of political thinking in terms of its own environment, conditioning circumstances and peoples. The long-established practice of blindly following the foreign gods is slowly, but effectively, breaking down."" Such Caribbean nations as Mexico, which has discovered a national sense of destiny and is creating or adapting those social, economic, and political institutions with which to fulfil it, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which shows signs of doing for itself what others were unable to do for it, seem to have advanced well along this way. Many of the other countries have also made progress toward solving their problems through means that do not seem too costly to them. Curiously enough-or perhaps one might more truly say, naturally enough-one of the results of this valiant and often violent struggle toward stable self-government has been the in- creasing strength of popular elections. Accepting the reality that this still represents an ideal rather than an invariable practice, one may detect signs that this institution has at last taken root in the Caribbean area and may some day become genuinely " Harold E. Davis, "The Political Experience of Latin America and Its Changing Cultural Context," Paper read for Panel 2, American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept., 1954. " Gil, in comments on the papers in W. W. Pierson (ed.), 149.  52 The Caribbean productive. It is academic to argue whether this represents a successful graft (or transplantation) or an imperceptibly and undefinably different technique of self-government which has developed naturally. More truly significant is the evidence that the Caribbean peoples are producing electoral forms which they are increasingly eager to use. Popular interest in voting is widespread and, even in those countries where voting is not compulsory, as it is in Cuba, the percentage of people voting is apt to be greater than that in the United States, for example. In short, those areas in the Carib- bean which have apparently made the most progress toward that national integration necessary for democratic government seem to be committing themselves more definitely to electoral processes than ever before."- It has been said that the Caribbean, the meeting ground of Europe, Asia, and Africa, presents more clearly than most other regions of the world the basic problems of human society." To the extent that this is true, one may hope that the answers which the Caribbean nations discover to their political problems and the processes by which they arrive at them may serve to light the way for other nations more newly come to the practice of self- government. " Henry Wells, in "Ideology and Leadership in Puerto Rican Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIX, 1 (1955), 22-39, praises the effective use of elections in Puerto Rico. " Bernard L. Poole, The Caribbean Commission: Background of Co- operation in the West Indies (Columbia, S.C.: 1951), p. 5, quoting Harold Stannard, "The British West Indies," Fabian Colonial Essays, ed. by Rita Hinden (London, 1945), p. 214. 52 The Caribbean 52 The Caribbean productive. It is academic to argue whether this represents a successful graft (or transplantation) or an imperceptibly and undefinably different technique of self-government which has developed naturally. More truly significant is the evidence that the Caribbean peoples are producing electoral forms which they are increasingly eager to use. Popular interest in voting is widespread and, even in those countries where voting is not compulsory, as it is in Cuba, the percentage of people voting is apt to be greater than that in the United States, for example. In short, those areas in the Carib- bean which have apparently made the most progress toward that national integration necessary for democratic government seem to be committing themselves more definitely to electoral processes than ever beforea"c It has been said that the Caribbean, the meeting ground of Europe, Asia, and Africa, presents more clearly than most other regions of the world the basic problems of human society.a To the extent that this is true, one may hope that the answers which the Caribbean nations discover to their political problems and the processes by which they arrive at them may serve to light the way for other nations more newly come to the practice of self- government. " Henry Wells, in "Ideology and Leadership in Puerto Rican Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIX, 1 (1955), 22-39, praises the effective use of elections in Puerto Rico. " Bernard L. Poole, The Caribbean Commission: Background of Co- operation in the West Indies (Columbia, S.C.: 1951), p. 5, quoting Harold Stannard, "The British West Indies," Fabian Colonial Essays, ed. by Rita Hinden (London, 1945), p. 214. productive. It is academic to argue whether this represents a successful graft (or transplantation) or an imperceptibly and undefinably different technique of self-government which has developed naturally. More truly significant is the evidence that the Caribbean peoples are producing electoral forms which they are increasingly eager to use. Popular interest in voting is widespread and, even in those countries where voting is not compulsory, as it is in Cuba, the percentage of people voting is apt to be greater than that in the United States, for example. In short, those areas in the Carib- bean which have apparently made the most progress toward that national integration necessary for democratic government seem to be committing themselves more definitely to electoral processes than ever before."a It has been said that the Caribbean, the meeting ground of Europe, Asia, and Africa, presents more clearly than most other regions of the world the basic problems of human society."5 To the extent that this is true, one may hope that the answers which the Caribbean nations discover to their political problems and the processes by which they arrive at them may serve to light the way for other nations more newly come to the practice of self- government. " Henry Wells, in "Ideology and Leadership in Puerto Rican Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIX, 1 (1955), 22-39, praises the effective use of elections in Puerto Rico. " Bernard L. Poole, The Caribbean Commission: Background of Co- operation in the West Indies (Columbia, S.C.: 1951), p. 5, quoting Harold Stannard, "The British West Indies," Fabian Colonial Essays, ed. by Rita Hinden (London, 1945), p. 214.  Elena Mederos de Gonzalez: THE FRANCHISE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, which for our purposes here in- cludes all the islands and mainland countries in the region of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, might be described as an enormous sampler of diverse human groups, colorful and picturesque with its legends in which pirates and hurricanes have played principal parts. When we look at a map of the Caribbean, we observe that it is practically a universe in itself. Each piece of this huge mosaic has its own characteristics, but the pieces also have much in common. Under the sea, they still are closely united. It is the purpose of this paper to consider suffrage in the Carib- bean area, and in order to do so, perhaps it would be helpful for us to review: its meaning and functions; the conditions required for its effective operation; how these conditions are being met in the Caribbean area; how they reflect on suffrage, both with respect to its legal aspects and its actual operation; and finally, to consider a tentative program of constructive action. It is im- portant to bear in mind the influence of tradition on the structure of any political and governmental process, but since this subject has already been amply treated, I am only mentioning it in pass- ing so that you may be reminded of its basic and fundamental significance. 53 Elena Mederos de GonzAlez: THE FRANCHISE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, which for our purposes here in- cludes all the islands and mainland countries in the region of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, might be described as an enormous sampler of diverse human groups, colorful and picturesque with its legends in which pirates and hurricanes have played principal parts. When we look at a map of the Caribbean, we observe that it is practically a universe in itself. Each piece of this huge mosaic has its own characteristics, but the pieces also have much in common. Under the sea, they still are closely united. It is the purpose of this paper to consider suffrage in the Carib- bean area, and in order to do so, perhaps it would be helpful for us to review: its meaning and functions; the conditions required for its effective operation; how these conditions are being met in the Caribbean area; how they reflect on suffrage, both with respect to its legal aspects and its actual operation; and finally, to consider a tentative program of constructive action. It is im- portant to bear in mind the influence of tradition on the structure of any political and governmental process, but since this subject has already been amply treated, I am only mentioning it in pass- ing so that you may be reminded of its basic and fundamental significance. 53 Elena Mederos de Gonzalez: THE FRANCHISE IN THE CARIBBEAN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, which for our purposes here in- cludes all the islands and mainland countries in the region of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, might be described as an enormous sampler of diverse human groups, colorful and picturesque with its legends in which pirates and hurricanes have played principal parts. When we look at a map of the Caribbean, we observe that it is practically a universe in itself. Each piece of this huge mosaic has its own characteristics, but the pieces also have much in common. Under the sea, they still are closely united. It is the purpose of this paper to consider suffrage in the Carib- bean area, and in order to do so, perhaps it would be helpful for us to review: its meaning and functions; the conditions required for its effective operation; how these conditions are being met in the Caribbean area; how they reflect on suffrage, both with respect to its legal aspects and its actual operation; and finally, to consider a tentative program of constructive action. It is im- portant to bear in mind the influence of tradition on the structure of any political and governmental process, but since this subject has already been amply treated, I am only mentioning it in pass- ing so that you may be reminded of its basic and fundamental significance.  54 The Caribbean The franchise, substantially synonymous with democratic po- litical activity, is defined as voting in support of a candidate for office or for some opinion or measure, thus fulfilling an individu- al's right or privilege of participating in elections. Those exercis- ing the franchise constitute the electorate, which of course should not be identified with the people as a whole, but refers rather to the adult population eligible to vote. In general today, the form of government which responds directly to prevailing political con- cepts necessarily emphasizes the importance of the franchise, since it is considered the best organ for the implementation of democracy.' The basic concepts on which its efforts are centered are: a) The establishment of the right of the whole adult com- munity to share in the direction of the state. b) The means of attaining this diffusion of power. On whom the suffrage is conferred and to what extent the decisions of the electorate determine the powers of the state are the indications by which the democratic character of a govern- ment may be analyzed. Restrictive criteria based on sex, educa- tion, or on tax-paying qualifications, justified on the ground of making the electorate a more efficient organ of government, are gradually giving way, the world over, to more liberal policies growing out of the recognition that so far "no test has been devised which enables us to limit the franchise in such a fashion as to equate civic virtue with its possession."s 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, United Na- tions Charter: (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. ' Harold Laski, Grammar of Politics, quoted in "Suffrage," Encyclo- 54 The Caribbean 54 The Caribbean The franchise, substantially synonymous with democratic po- litical activity, is defined as voting in support of a candidate for office or for some opinion or measure, thus fulfilling an individu- al's right or privilege of participating in elections. Those exercis- ing the franchise constitute the electorate, which of course should not be identified with the people as a whole, but refers rather to the adult population eligible to vote. In general today, the form of government which responds directly to prevailing political con- cepts necessarily emphasizes the importance of the franchise, since it is considered the best organ for the implementation of democracy.' The basic concepts on which its efforts are centered are: a) The establishment of the right of the whole adult com- munity to share in the direction of the state. b) The means of attaining this diffusion of power. On whom the suffrage is conferred and to what extent the decisions of the electorate determine the powers of the state are the indications by which the democratic character of a govern- ment may be analyzed. Restrictive criteria based on sex, educa- tion, or on tax-paying qualifications, justified on the ground of making the electorate a more efficient organ of government, are gradually giving way, the world over, to more liberal policies growing out of the recognition that so far "no test has been devised which enables us to limit the franchise in such a fashion as to equate civic virtue with its possession."s 1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, United Na- tions Charter: (t) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. ' Harold Laski, Grammar of Politics, quoted in "Suffrage," Encyclo- The franchise, substantially synonymous with democratic po- litical activity, is defined as voting in support of a candidate for office or for some opinion or measure, thus fulfilling an individu- al's right or privilege of participating in elections. Those exercis- ing the franchise constitute the electorate, which of course should not be identified with the people as a whole, but refers rather to the adult population eligible to vote. In general today, the form of government which responds directly to prevailing political con- cepts necessarily emphasizes the importance of the franchise, since it is considered the best organ for the implementation of democracy.' The basic concepts on which its efforts are centered are: a) The establishment of the right of the whole adult com- munity to share in the direction of the state. b) The means of attaining this diffusion of power. On whom the suffrage is conferred and to what extent the decisions of the electorate determine the powers of the state are the indications by which the democratic character of a govern- ment may be analyzed. Restrictive criteria based on sex, educa- tion, or on tax-paying qualifications, justified on the ground of making the electorate a more efficient organ of government, are gradually giving way, the world over, to more liberal policies growing out of the recognition that so far "no test has been devised which enables us to limit the franchise in such a fashion as to equate civic virtue with its possession."s ' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, United Na- tions Charter: (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. * Harold Laski, Grammar of Politics, quoted in "Suffrage," Encyclo-  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS SS Social scientists have not reached an agreement as to whether suffrage should he considered a function of citizenship, a vested right, a natural right, a function of government, or an essential ethical resource for the development of the more mature person- ality of citizens. However, some consistent criteria have been reached as to the basic factors which tend to make it a more efficient means toward the actual representation of individuals, for the collective interests of the citizenry, and for furthering the progressive development of a country as a whole. II In regard to the franchise in the Caribbean, a review of pre- vailing conditions cannot be made without careful consideration and impartial evaluation of the many interrelated factors which directly affect its operation in this area. A brief background is therefore essential if we are to examine the question with any perspective. In the Caribbean almost all races and peoples are represented; the languages which are spoken-be they indigenous or imported -have an intonation of their own. Even the rhythms are peculiar to themselves. There are Negroes of African origin, white-faced men of English, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dan- ish, and Dutch ancestry. There are Indians from different tribes of both Americas and large nuclei of immigrants of European, Oriental, Indian, and Near Eastern extraction. This ethnical diversity, including the variegated and multitudinous mixed races which are a natural legacy of the Colonial period, represents a negative factor in the development of closely knit nationalities. The economic aspect is not less important. The sweet sugar cane, aromatic coffee, tobacco, bananas, oranges, pineapples, chocolate, spices, and some root vegetables constitute the basic elements of the agricultural production of this area. There is a paedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XIV, eds. Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942). POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 55 Social scientists have not reached an agreement as to whether suffrage should be considered a function of citizenship, a vested right, a natural right, a function of government, or an essential ethical resource for the development of the more mature person- ality of citizens. However, some consistent criteria have been reached as to the basic factors which tend to make it a more efficient means toward the actual representation of individuals, for the collective interests of the citizenry, and for furthering the progressive development of a country as a whole. II In regard to the franchise in the Caribbean, a review of pre- vailing conditions cannot be made without careful consideration and impartial evaluation of the many interrelated factors which directly affect its operation in this area. A brief background is therefore essential if we are to examine the question with any perspective. In the Caribbean almost all races and peoples are represented; the languages which are spoken-be they indigenous or imported -have an intonation of their own. Even the rhythms are peculiar to themselves. There are Negroes of African origin, white-faced men of English, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dan- ish, and Dutch ancestry. There are Indians from different tribes of both Americas and large nuclei of immigrants of European, Oriental, Indian, and Near Eastern extraction. This ethnical diversity, including the variegated and multitudinous mixed races which are a natural legacy of the Colonial period, represents a negative factor in the development of closely knit nationalities. The economic aspect is not less important. The sweet sugar cane, aromatic coffee, tobacco, bananas, oranges, pineapples, chocolate, spices, and some root vegetables constitute the basic elements of the agricultural production of this area. There is a paedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XIV, eds. Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942). POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 55 Social scientists have not reached an agreement as to whether suffrage should be considered a function of citizenship, a vested right, a natural right, a function of government, or an essential ethical resource for the development of the more mature person- ality of citizens. However, some consistent criteria have been reached as to the basic factors which tend to make it a more efficient means toward the actual representation of individuals, for the collective interests of the citizenry, and for furthering the progressive development of a country as a whole. It In regard to the franchise in the Caribbean, a review of pre- vailing conditions cannot be made without careful consideration and impartial evaluation of the many interrelated factors which directly affect its operation in this area. A brief background is therefore essential if we are to examine the question with any perspective. In the Caribbean almost all races and peoples are represented; the languages which are spoken-be they indigenous or imported -have an intonation of their own. Even the rhythms are peculiar to themselves. There are Negroes of African origin, white-faced men of English, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dan- ish, and Dutch ancestry. There are Indians from different tribes of both Americas and large nuclei of immigrants of European, Oriental, Indian, and Near Eastern extraction. This ethnical diversity, including the variegated and multitudinous mixed races which are a natural legacy of the Colonial period, represents a negative factor in the development of closely knit nationalities. The economic aspect is not less important. The sweet sugar cane, aromatic coffee, tobacco, bananas, oranges, pineapples, chocolate, spices, and some root vegetables constitute the basic elements of the agricultural production of this area. There is a paedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XIV, eds. Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942).  56 The Caribbean lack of fuel and limited mineral resources on the islands except for Cuba, where there are iron, copper, nickel, and manganese, Jamaica with its newly discovered deposits of aluminum white, and Trinidad with some oil and bauxite. But on the mainland, Venezuela is second in producing oil for the world, and Colombia and Mexico have ample resources of platinum and silver, besides oil; British and Dutch Guianas are producers of bauxite. One need only recall the history of -the large companies working the oil wells, the sugar mills, banana plantations, and mines, to be made aware of the fact that the land is mostly in the hands of foreign capital, while those who work on it have no claim to its ownership. Crops are seasonal, and the limitation of their mar- kets, as well as the lack of merchant fleets, confine industrial development. This, in turn, constitutes one of several basic problems that impeded the forming of a stable middle class. Of great importance also, and as factors which adversely affect the sociopolitical progress of the area, are the standards of health and education, both of which are intimately tied up to the economy of the Caribbean. Education can be a capital instrument in the development of the economy of a nation. If its inhabitants aspire to raise their standards of living, their aspirations must be premised on a better general education. The actual operating of a democratic society depends to a large degree on the efficiency of its educational system. Education, besides being a basic element in the develop- ment of the individual and collective personality of a people, fills an important role in the evolution of a country's economy. Edu- cation should and does offer the fundamental knowledge on which technological investigation-a necessary practical step in improving standards of living-will be based. It should and does discover and stimulate capable personnel for specialized fields in agriculture, commerce, and industry, as well as facilitate the development of new lines of industry. Education also tends to further cooperation amongst individuals and groups through greater understanding of their mutual problems. 56 The Caribbean 56 The Caribbean lack of fuel and limited mineral resources on the islands except for Cuba, where there are iron, copper, nickel, and manganese, Jamaica with its newly discovered deposits of aluminum white, and Trinidad with some oil and bauxite. But on the mainland, Venezuela is second in producing oil for the world, and Colombia and Mexico have ample resources of platinum and silver, besides oil; British and Dutch Guianas are producers of bauxite. One need only recall the history of the large companies working the oil wells, the sugar mills, banana plantations, and mines, to be made aware of the fact that the land is mostly in the hands of foreign capital, while those who work on it have no claim to its ownership. Crops are seasonal, and the limitation of their mar- kets, as well as the lack of merchant fleets, confine industrial development. This, in turn, constitutes one of several basic problems that impeded the forming of a stable middle class. Of great importance also, and as factors which adversely affect the sociopolitical progress of the area, are the standards of health and education, both of which are intimately tied up to the economy of the Caribbean. Education can be a capital instrument in the development of the economy of a nation. If its inhabitants aspire to raise their standards of living, their aspirations must be premised on a better general education. The actual operating of a democratic society depends to a large degree on the efficiency of its educational system. Education, besides being a basic element in the develop- ment of the individual and collective personality of a people, fills an important role in the evolution of a country's economy. Edu- cation should and does offer the fundamental knowledge on which technological investigation-a necessary practical step in improving standards of living-will be based. It should and does discover and stimulate capable personnel for specialized fields in agriculture, commerce, and industry, as well as facilitate the development of new lines of industry. Education also tends to further cooperation amongst individuals and groups through greater understanding of their mutual problems. lack of fuel and limited mineral resources on the islands except for Cuba, where there are iron, copper, nickel, and manganese, Jamaica with its newly discovered deposits of aluminum white, and Trinidad with some oil and bauxite. But on the mainland, Venezuela is second in producing oil for the world, and Colombia and Mexico have ample resources of platinum and silver, besides oil; British and Dutch Guianas are producers of bauxite. One need only recall the history of the large companies working the oil wells, the sugar mills, banana plantations, and mines, to be made aware of the fact that the land is mostly in the hands of foreign capital, while those who work on it have no claim to its ownership. Crops are seasonal, and the limitation of their mar- kets, as well as the lack of merchant fleets, confine industrial development. This, in turn, constitutes one of several basic problems that impeded the forming of a stable middle class. Of great importance also, and as factors which adversely affect the sociopolitical progress of the area, are the standards of health and education, both of which are intimately tied up to the economy of the Caribbean. Education can be a capital instrument in the development of the economy of a nation. If its inhabitants aspire to raise their standards of living, their aspirations must be premised on a better general education. The actual operating of a democratic society depends to a large degree on the efficiency of its educational system. Education, besides being a basic element in the develop- ment of the individual and collective personality of a people, fills an important role in the evolution of a country's economy. Edu- cation should and does offer the fundamental knowledge on which technological investigation--a necessary practical step in improving standards of living-will be based. It should and does discover and stimulate capable personnel for specialized fields in agriculture, commerce, and industry, as well as facilitate the development of new lines of industry. Education also tends to further cooperation amongst individuals and groups through greater understanding of their mutual problems.  ,POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 57 In the Caribbean, we must recognize that our educational systems are far from being prepared to cover a demand of such magnitude. Our index of illiteracy is painfully high there. Costa Rica, with practically a uniform white population and represent- ing perhaps the highest level of democracy in all Latin Ameri- ca, has the lowest illiteracy rate in the Caribbean, 21 per cent, in contrast with Nicaragua and Honduras, its close neighbors, which have 63 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Guate- mala's proportion is 72 per cent; Mexico's, 43 per cent. Towards the south, Panama presents an illiteracy index of 28 per cent (excluding indigenous tribes), Colombia 44 per cent, and Vene- zuela 59 per cent. Of the islands in the area, Cuba and Puerto Rico have the lowest rates, both 24 per cent; Dominican Repub- lic has a higher rate, while Haiti is reported as reaching a 90 per cent rate of illiteracy. In the colonies, the average is compara- tively low: Barbados has only 8 per cent; Jamaica and its depen- dencies 26 per cent; Windward Islands, 31 per cent; British Honduras, 17 per cent; British Guiana, 22 per cent; and the Virgin Islands, 13 per cent. The countries of the Caribbean, with few exceptions, are also faced with serious health problems, including parasitism, nutri- tional deficiencies, malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal and epi- demic diseases. These stand in the way of healthful living and form a part of the vicious circle of poverty, hunger, sickness, ignorance, low level of production, and so on. The per capita income in most of the countries of this area is extremely low. Political liberty requires a certain degree of economic well-being and equality. Ignorance, misery, and morbidity pave the way for bribery and corruption. There are parents who sell their votes for a bottle of medicine for their sick child; to others, the fran- chise represents the means of being fed, even though only for a few days. Can it be said under these circumstances that elections are free? The factors mentioned are definitely if indirectly co- ercive. It is evident that in an environment in which they prevail, purity of suffrage is at best a pleasant myth. ,POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 57 In the Caribbean, we must recognize that our educational systems are far from being prepared to cover a demand of such magnitude. Our index of illiteracy is painfully high there. Costa Rica, with practically a uniform white population and represent- ing perhaps the highest level of democracy in all Latin Ameri- ca, has the lowest illiteracy rate in the Caribbean, 21 per cent, in contrast with Nicaragua and Honduras, its close neighbors, which have 63 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Guate- mala's proportion is 72 per cent; Mexico's, 43 per cent. Towards the south, Panama presents an illiteracy index of 28 per cent (excluding indigenous tribes), Colombia 44 per cent, and Vene- zuela 59 per cent. Of the islands in the area, Cuba and Puerto Rico have the lowest rates, both 24 per cent; Dominican Repub- lic has a higher rate, while Haiti is reported as reaching a 90 per cent rate of illiteracy. In the colonies, the average is compara- tively low: Barbados has only 8 per cent; Jamaica and its depen- dencies 26 per cent; Windward Islands, 31 per cent; British Honduras, 17 per cent; British Guiana, 22 per cent; and the Virgin Islands, 13 per cent. The countries of the Caribbean, with few exceptions, are also faced with serious health problems, including parasitism, nutri- tional deficiencies, malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal and epi- demic diseases. These stand in the way of healthful living and form a part of the vicious circle of poverty, hunger, sickness, ignorance, low level of production, and so on. The per capita income in most of the countries of this area is extremely low. Political liberty requires a certain degree of economic well-being and equality. Ignorance, misery, and morbidity pave the way for bribery and corruption. There are parents who sell their votes for a bottle of medicine for their sick child; to others, the fran- chise represents the means of being fed, even though only for a few days. Can it be said under these circumstances that elections are free? The factors mentioned are definitely if indirectly co- ercive. It is evident that in an environment in which they prevail, purity of suffrage is at best a pleasant myth. ,POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 57 In the Caribbean, we must recognize that our educational systems are far from being prepared to cover a demand of such magnitude. Our index of illiteracy is painfully high there. Costa Rica, with practically a uniform white population and represent- ing perhaps the highest level of democracy in all Latin Ameri- ca, has the lowest illiteracy rate in the Caribbean, 21 per cent, in contrast with Nicaragua and Honduras, its close neighbors, which have 63 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Guate- mala's proportion is 72 per cent; Mexico's, 43 per cent. Towards the south, Panama presents an illiteracy index of 28 per cent (excluding indigenous tribes), Colombia 44 per cent, and Vene- zuela 59 per cent. Of the islands in the area, Cuba and Puerto Rico have the lowest rates, both 24 per cent; Dominican Repub- lic has a higher rate, while Haiti is reported as reaching a 90 per cent rate of illiteracy. In the colonies, the average is compara- tively low: Barbados has only 8 per cent; Jamaica and its depen- dencies 26 per cent; Windward Islands, 31 per cent; British Honduras, 17 per cent; British Guiana, 22 per cent; and the Virgin Islands, 13 per cent. The countries of the Caribbean, with few exceptions, are also faced with serious health problems, including parasitism, nutri- tional deficiencies, malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal and epi- demic diseases. These stand in the way of healthful living and form a part of the vicious circle of poverty, hunger, sickness, ignorance, low level of production, and so on. The per capita income in most of the countries of this area is extremely low. Political liberty requires a certain degree of economic well-being and equality. Ignorance, misery, and morbidity pave the way for bribery and corruption. There are parents who sell their votes for a bottle of medicine for their sick child; to others, the fran- chise represents the means of being fed, even though only for a few days. Can it be said under these circumstances that elections are free? The factors mentioned are definitely if indirectly co- ercive. It is evident that in an environment in which they prevail, purity of suffrage is at best a pleasant myth.  58 The Caribbean Even though it is painful, we must recognize that in the major- ity of the countries in the Caribbean area, participation in suf- frage is often merely a matter of outward form. Democracy necessarily requires certain formalities, but these must be accom- panied by a concrete effort to give sovereignty to the people in order that they may voice their mandates freely. When some of our nations-in spite of the negative factors mentioned here- have attempted to implant a highly democratic type of govern- ment, they have often failed in this heroic enterprise because the forces of ignorance, guided by ulterior motives, vested interests, and impure politics, have been too great. In these cases, the feel- ing of frustration foments even greater difficulties in convincing capable men and women to run for office and serve the nobler destinies of their country. When apathy, indifference, dishonesty, or lack of faith prevail in politics, as is true in many of our countries, suffrage becomes a rather confusing instrument. III Returning more specifically to the question of the franchise, consideration should be given to two aspects. The first, which refers to conditions of a legal character, involves the method of choosing candidates, the mechanism of referendum and recall, and the proper size of a constituency, their prerequisites, and so on. It also includes specifying the exact powers which an elected member should exercise, the representation of minorities, whether elections are to be partisan or nonpartisan, and, last but not least, the prevention of fraud through the establishment of guaranties to the electorate. Although some restrictive criteria still prevail, broad strides have been taken in the last few years, especially in colonial legislation, towards setting up an ample democratic basis for the use of the franchise. In general terms, it would seem that the wording of the law is not solely responsible for the inefficiency of its functioning, but rather its tortuous interpreta- tion and defective application is to blame. The second consider- ation refers to sociopolitical conditions. The characteristics of the 58 The Caribbean 58 The Caribbean Even though it is painful, we must recognize that in the major- ity of the countries in the Caribbean area, participation in suf- frage is often merely a matter of outward form. Democracy necessarily requires certain formalities, but these must be accom- panied by a concrete effort to give sovereignty to the people in order that they may voice their mandates freely. When some of our nations-in spite of the negative factors mentioned here- have attempted to implant a highly democratic type of govern- ment, they have often failed in this heroic enterprise because the forces of ignorance, guided by ulterior motives, vested interests, and impure politics, have been too great. In these cases, the feel- ing of frustration foments even greater difficulties in convincing capable men and women to run for office and serve the nobler destinies of their country. When apathy, indifference, dishonesty, or lack of faith prevail in politics, as is true in many of our countries, suffrage becomes a rather confusing instrument. III Returning more specifically to the question of the franchise, consideration should be given to two aspects. The first, which refers to conditions of a legal character, involves the method of choosing candidates, the mechanism of referendum and recall, and the proper size of a constituency, their prerequisites, and so on. It also includes specifying the exact powers which an elected member should exercise, the representation of minorities, whether elections are to be partisan or nonpartisan, and, last but not least, the prevention of fraud through the establishment of guaranties to the electorate. Although some restrictive criteria still prevail, broad strides have been taken in the last few years, especially in colonial legislation, towards setting up an ample democratic basis for the use of the franchise. In general terms, it would seem that the wording of the law is not solely responsible for the inefficiency of its functioning, but rather its tortuous interpreta- tion and defective application is to blame. The second consider- ation refers to sociopolitical conditions. The characteristics of the Even though it is painful, we must recognize that in the major- ity of the countries in the Caribbean area, participation in suf- frage is often merely a matter of outward form. Democracy necessarily requires certain formalities, but these must be accom- panied by a concrete effort to give sovereignty to the people in order that they may voice their mandates freely. When some of our nations-in spite of the negative factors mentioned here- have attempted to implant a highly democratic type of govern- ment, they have often failed in this heroic enterprise because the forces of ignorance, guided by ulterior motives, vested interests, and impure politics, have been too great. In these cases, the feel- ing of frustration foments even greater difficulties in convincing capable men and women to run for office and serve the nobler destinies of their country. When apathy, indifference, dishonesty, or lack of faith prevail in politics, as is true in many of our countries, suffrage becomes a rather confusing instrument. III Returning more specifically to the question of the franchise, consideration should be given to two aspects. The first, which refers to conditions of a legal character, involves the method of choosing candidates, the mechanism of referendum and recall, and the proper size of a constituency, their prerequisites, and so on. It also includes specifying the exact powers which an elected member should exercise, the representation of minorities, whether elections are to be partisan or nonpartisan, and, last but not least, the prevention of fraud through the establishment of guaranties to the electorate. Although some restrictive criteria still prevail, broad strides have been taken in the last few years, especially in colonial legislation, towards setting up an ample democratic basis for the use of the franchise. In general terms, it would seem that the wording of the law is not solely responsible for the inefficiency of its functioning, but rather its tortuous interpreta- tion and defective application is to blame. The second consider- ation refers to sociopolitical conditions. The characteristics of the  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 59 electoral body itself which are conducive to the efficient function- ing of the democratic process can be summarized under the following three major respects: homogeneity of the electorate, absence of wide economic differences between citizens, and a generalized and adequate level of education. In reality, democracy is a formative process that passes through different stages. In the countries of the Caribbean, as in all others, suffrage has been its most indicative and efficient in- strument and has had to evolve in step with the development of the area. In no case did the majority of the population vote when suffrage was introduced. The electoral body was limited and only the higher social classes had the privilege of voting. However, the concept of the right of general suffrage has been gaining favor along with general democratic progress. For in- stance, with regard to the extension of the vote to women in national elections, the sequence has been as follows: Cuba, 1934; Panama, 1945; Guatemala, 1946; Venezuela, 1947; Dominican Republic, 1947; Costa Rica, 1948; El Salvador, 1950; Mexico, 1953; Colombia, 1954; Nicaragua, 1955; Honduras, 1955. In the English colonies until 1950, only Trinidad, Tobago, and Jamaica' and its dependencies had universal suffrage. In most of the territorial colonies of the Caribbean, certain requirements of property, income qualifications, residence, and literacy tests, were demanded. Today, in all, universal suffrage prevails. In fact, in practically all countries and colonies of the Caribbean, suffrage can be said to be universal, direct, equal (for men and women), secret, and obligatory. Exceptional cases are the following: in Colombia, illiterates cannot vote; in Costa Rica, the vote is optional. In Guatemala and Honduras, the vote is optional for women and obligatory for men. In Haiti, the vote is optional and indirect, * Data taken from note of Electoral Office, Kingston, Jamaica, B.W.I., Nov. 4, 1955. In the year 1661, elections were held in Jamaica for a small Council. Further, in the year 1864, there was a House of Assembly elected with 47 members. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 59 electoral body itself which are conducive to the efficient function- ing of the democratic process can be summarized under the following three major respects: homogeneity of the electorate, absence of wide economic differences between citizens, and a generalized and adequate level of education. In reality, democracy is a formative process that passes through different stages. In the countries of the Caribbean, as in all others, suffrage has been its most indicative and efficient in- strument and has had to evolve in step with the development of the area. In no case did the majority of the population vote when suffrage was introduced. The electoral body was limited and only the higher social classes had the privilege of voting. However, the concept of the right of general suffrage has been gaining favor along with general democratic progress. For in- stance, with regard to the extension of the vote to women in national elections, the sequence has been as follows: Cuba, 1934; Panama, 1945; Guatemala, 1946; Venezuela, 1947; Dominican Republic, 1947; Costa Rica, 1948; El Salvador, 1950; Mexico, 1953; Colombia, 1954; Nicaragua, 1955; Honduras, 1955. In the English colonies until 1950, only Trinidad, Tobago, and Jamaica' and its dependencies had universal suffrage. In most of the territorial colonies of the Caribbean, certain requirements of property, income qualifications, residence, and literacy tests, were demanded. Today, in all, universal suffrage prevails. In fact, in practically all countries and colonies of the Caribbean, suffrage can be said to be universal, direct, equal (for men and women), secret, and obligatory. Exceptional cases are the following: in Colombia, illiterates cannot vote; in Costa Rica, the vote is optional. In Guatemala and Honduras, the vote is optional for women and obligatory for men. In Haiti, the vote is optional and indirect, ' Data taken from note of Electoral Office, Kingston, Jamaica, B.W.L, Nov. 4, 1955. In the year 1661, elections were held in Jamaica for a small Council. Further, in the year 1864, there was a House of Assembly elected with 47 members. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 59 electoral body itself which are conducive to the efficient function- ing of the democratic process can be summarized under the following three major respects: homogeneity of the electorate, absence of wide economic differences between citizens, and a generalized and adequate level of education. In reality, democracy is a formative process that passes through different stages. In the countries of the Caribbean, as in all others, suffrage has been its most indicative and efficient in- strument and has had to evolve in step with the development of the area. In no case did the majority of the population vote when suffrage was introduced. The electoral body was limited and only the higher social classes had the privilege of voting. However, the concept of the right of general suffrage has been gaining favor along with general democratic progress. For in- stance, with regard to the extension of the vote to women in national elections, the sequence has been as follows: Cuba, 1934; Panama, 1945; Guatemala, 1946; Venezuela, 1947; Dominican Republic, 1947; Costa Rica, 1948; El Salvador, 1950; Mexico, 1953; Colombia, 1954; Nicaragua, 1955; Honduras, 1955. In the English colonies until 1950, only Trinidad, Tobago, and Jamaica' and its dependencies had universal suffrage. In most of the territorial colonies of the Caribbean, certain requirements of property, income qualifications, residence, and literacy tests, were demanded. Today, in all, universal suffrage prevails. In fact, in practically all countries and colonies of the Caribbean, suffrage can be said to be universal, direct, equal (for men and women), secret, and obligatory. Exceptional cases are the following: in Colombia, illiterates cannot vote; in Costa Rica, the vote is optional. In Guatemala and Honduras, the vote is optional for women and obligatory for men. In Haiti, the vote is optional and indirect, " Data taken from note of Electoral Office, Kingston, Jamaica, B.W.L, Nov. 4, 1955. In the year 1661, elections were held in Jamaica for a small Council. Further, in the year 1864, there was a House of Assembly elected with 47 members.  60 The Caribbean and it is the only country of the Caribbean in which women can participate only in municipal elections; however, the law now provides that in 1958, women will vote in general elections. With reference to the age of voters, in some countries (as in Guatemala and El Salvador), citizens can vote at the age of eighteen; in the Dominican Republic, only those married can vote if younger than eighteen; in Mexico, a married citizen can vote when eighteen and single persons at twenty-one; in Nicaragua and Honduras, illiterates vote at twenty-one, and those who can read and write at eighteen; in Costa Rica and Cuba, the vote is conceded at twenty years of age. In Panama, Colombia, Vene- zuela, Haiti, and the territories of France, Great Britain, and the United States, twenty-one is the age at which they may begin to exercise the right to vote, while in the Dutch territories it is twenty-three. IV Since it is not possible to give the full details for each country, a condensed history of suffrage in Cuba will be presented, as being similar to developments in other republics of the Caribbean area. The starting point of the evolution of political rights in Cuba can be traced to the approval by the Parliament of Cidiz (1810 to 1812) of the Spanish Constitution, also applicable to the colonies. Cuba's two delegates to this Parliament had been ap- pointed, not elected. The Charter of Cadiz granted Cuba the right of electing her deputies to the Spanish Parliament. This advantage was subsequently neutralized in Cuba at the elections which took place in 1813, by such difficulties as the absence of an electoral census, poor communications, and budget limita- tions which again led to the appointment rather than the election of the Cuban deputies. This first constitutional monarchy in Spain, which was interrupted from 1814 until 1820 during the reign of the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII, had no further repercussions in Cuba, except the emergence of local political 60 The Caribbean and it is the only country of the Caribbean in which women can participate only in municipal elections; however, the law now provides that in 1958, women will vote in general elections. With reference to the age of voters, in some countries (as in Guatemala and El Salvador), citizens can vote at the age of eighteen; in the Dominican Republic, only those married can vote if younger than eighteen; in Mexico, a married citizen can vote when eighteen and single persons at twenty-one; in Nicaragua and Honduras, illiterates vote at twenty-one, and those who can read and write at eighteen; in Costa Rica and Cuba, the vote is conceded at twenty years of age. In Panama, Colombia, Vene- zuela, Haiti, and the territories of France, Great Britain, and the United States, twenty-one is the age at which they may begin to exercise the right to vote, while in the Dutch territories it is twenty-three. IV Since it is not possible to give the full details for each country, a condensed history of suffrage in Cuba will be presented, as being similar to developments in other republics of the Caribbean area. The starting point of the evolution of political rights in Cuba can be traced to the approval by the Parliament of CAdiz (1810 to 1812) of the Spanish Constitution, also applicable to the colonies. Cuba's two delegates to this Parliament had been ap- pointed, not elected. The Charter of CAdiz granted Cuba the right of electing her deputies to the Spanish Parliament. This advantage was subsequently neutralized in Cuba at the elections which took place in 1813, by such difficulties as the absence of an electoral census, poor communications, and budget limita- tions which again led to the appointment rather than the election of the Cuban deputies. This first constitutional monarchy in Spain, which was interrupted from 1814 until 1820 during the reign of the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII, had no further repercussions in Cuba, except the emergence of local political 60 The Caribbean and it is the only country of the Caribbean in which women can participate only in municipal elections; however, the law now provides that in 1958, women will vote in general elections. With reference to the age of voters, in some countries (as in Guatemala and El Salvador), citizens can vote at the age of eighteen; in the Dominican Republic, only those married can vote if younger than eighteen; in Mexico, a married citizen can vote when eighteen and single persons at twenty-one; in Nicaragua and Honduras, illiterates vote at twenty-one, and those who can read and write at eighteen; in Costa Rica and Cuba, the vote is conceded at twenty years of age. In Panama, Colombia, Vene- zuela, Haiti, and the territories of France, Great Britain, and the United States, twenty-one is the age at which they may begin to exercise the right to vote, while in the Dutch territories it is twenty-three. IV Since it is not possible to give the full details for each country, a condensed history of suffrage in Cuba will be presented, as being similar to developments in other republics of the Caribbean area. The starting point of the evolution of political rights in Cuba can be traced to the approval by the Parliament of Cddiz (1810 to 1812) of the Spanish Constitution, also applicable to the colonies. Cuba's two delegates to this Parliament had been ap- pointed, not elected. The Charter of Cidiz granted Cuba the right of electing her deputies to the Spanish Parliament. This advantage was subsequently neutralized in Cuba at the elections which took place in 1813, by such difficulties as the absence of an electoral census, poor communications, and budget limita- tions which again led to the appointment rather than the election of the Cuban deputies. This first constitutional monarchy in Spain, which was interrupted from 1814 until 1820 during the reign of the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII, had no further repercussions in Cuba, except the emergence of local political  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 01 issues and the consequent formation of two large opposing groups. One was composed of merchants and high officers of the colonial bureaucracy and the other of landowners, cattlemen, and farmers, in their majority native born. From that time on and as long as Cuba remained a Spanish colony, these two groups, under dif- ferent names, constituted two opposing forces which constantly fought each other for the official representation of the colony. The Charter of Cddiz of 1812, the Royal Statute of 1834, and the Spanish Constitution of 1876, made provisions for suffrage in the colonies in general, which were applicable also to Cuba. However, these political rights bestowed at intervals were very far from establishing universal suffrage. The same is true of the different constitutional drafts which were studied and presented on different occasions-by Joaquin Infante in 1812, by Governor Francisco Serrano y Dominguez in 1860, and by the Minister of Overseas Affairs, Becerra, in 1890. In 1900, the American intervention government called an election for delegates to a Constituent Assembly. Suffrage in these elections was still only partial, as the vote was granted only to those who had belonged to the revolutionary army, to those having certain property, and to those who could read and write. During the Constituent Assembly discussions on political rights, a great majority was in favor of universal suffrage, and one of the delegates, Miguel Gener,' defended the criterion that universal suffrage must include the vote for women-as one woman, Ana Betancourt de Moras had already declared in 1878 * Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso, Discursos y conferencias, tomo II (La Ha- bana, Molina y Comp., 1942), p. 212: It is our opinion that once universal suffrage has been accepted the decision is not complete if women do not take part. . We have all agreed already in recognizing that not only man has participated in the revolution but that the Cuban woman has also taken a very principal part in it-therefore, there is no reason to believe that the Cuban woman is uninterested in politics or ignorant of politics. The Cuban woman has the same aspiration of the Cuban people. There are many Cuban men who know less than the generality of Cuban women. " Emeterio S. Santovenia, Huellas de gloria, segunda edicidon (La Ha- bana: Editorial Tr6pico, 1944), p. 73: POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 61 issues and the consequent formation of two large opposing groups. One was composed of merchants and high officers of the colonial bureaucracy and the other of landowners, cattlemen, and farmers, in their majority native born. From that time on and as long as Cuba remained a Spanish colony, these two groups, under dif- ferent names, constituted two opposing forces which constantly fought each other for the official representation of the colony. The Charter of Cadiz of 1812, the Royal Statute of 1834, and the Spanish Constitution of 1876, made provisions for suffrage in the colonies in general, which were applicable also to Cuba. However, these political rights bestowed at intervals were very far from establishing universal suffrage. The same is true of the different constitutional drafts which were studied and presented on different occasions-by Joaquin Infante in 1812, by Governor Francisco Serrano y Dominguez in 1860, and by the Minister of Overseas Affairs, Brcerra, in 1890. In 1900, the American intervention government called an election for delegates to a Constituent Assembly. Suffrage in these elections was still only partial, as the vote was granted only to those who had belonged to the revolutionary army, to those having certain property, and to those who could read and write. During the Constituent Assembly discussions on political rights, a great majority was in favor of universal suffrage, and one of the delegates, Miguel Gener,' defended the criterion that universal suffrage must include the vote for women-as one woman, Ana Betancourt de Mora, had already declared in 1878 * Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso, Discursos y conferencias, tomo II (La Ha- bana, Molina y Comp., 1942), p. 212: It is our opinion that once universal suffrage has been accepted the decision is not complete if women do not take part . .. We have all agreed already in recognizing that not only man has participated in the revolution but that the Cuban woman has also taken a very principal part in it-therefore, there is no reason to believe that the Cuban woman is uninterested in politics or ignorant of politics. The Cuban woman has the same aspiration of the Cuban people. There are many Cuban men who know less than the generality of Cuban women. ' Emeterio S. Santovenia, Huellas de gloria, segunda ediciOn (La Ha- bana: Editorial Tr6pico, 1944), p. 73: POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 61 issues and the consequent formation of two large opposing groups. One was composed of merchants and high officers of the colonial bureaucracy and the other of landowners, cattlemen, and farmers, in their majority native born. From that time on and as long as Cuba remained a Spanish colony, these two groups, under dif- ferent names, constituted two opposing forces which constantly fought each other for the official representation of the colony. The Charter of Cddiz of 1812, the Royal Statute of 1834, and the Spanish Constitution of 1876, made provisions for suffrage in the colonies in general, which were applicable also to Cuba. However, these political rights bestowed at intervals were very far from establishing universal suffrage. The same is true of the different constitutional drafts which were studied and presented on different occasions-by Joaquin Infante in 1812, by Governor Francisco Serrano y Dominguez in 1860, and by the Minister of Overseas Affairs, Becerra, in 1890. In 1900, the American intervention government called an election for delegates to a Constituent Assembly. Suffrage in these elections was still only partial, as the vote was granted only to those who had belonged to the revolutionary army, to those having certain property, and to those who could read and write. During the Constituent Assembly discussions on political rights, a great majority was in favor of universal suffrage, and one of the delegates, Miguel Gener,' defended the criterion that universal suffrage must include the vote for women-as one woman, Ana Betancourt de Mora,, had already declared in 1878 * Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso, Discursos y conferencias, tomo II (La Ha- bana, Molina y Comp., 1942), p. 212: It is our opinion that once universal suffrage has been accepted the decision is not complete if women do not take part. ... We have all agreed already in recognizing that not only man has participated in the revolution but that the Cuban woman has also taken a very principal part in it-therefore, there is no reason to believe that the Cuban woman is uninterested in politics or ignorant of politics. The Cuban woman has the same aspiration of the Cuban people. There are many Cuban men who know less than the generality of Cuban women. ° Emeterio S. Santovenia, Huellas de gloria, segunda edici6n (La Ha- bana. Editorial Trdpico, 1944), p. 73:  62 The Caribbean in Guaimaro, when the constitution of the "Republic in Arms" was adopted. But the concept of universal suffrage was already considered extremely ample when it included Negroes and illiter- ates and, in accordance with these prevailing political ideas, women were deprived of their rights for the time being. The article on suffrage, in the first Cuban constitution, adopted after the proclamation of independence, reads as follows: Art. 38. All Cuban males over 21 years of age have the right of suffrage excepting the following: 1. Inmates of any asylum. 2. Those legally declared mentally unfit. 3. Those legally declared disqualified because of law infrac- tion. 4. Members of the armed forces of land or sea. The Constitution of 1928, so negative for Cuba in other respects, signalled as far as suffrage was concerned a step of progress, in that it eliminated women's total exclusion from the right to vote (in an amendment to Article 38) by establishing that the law would provide the degree and manner in which Cuban women were to exercise suffrage. This constitution was annulled in 1933 before women actually exercised their vote. During the brief provisional governments of Ramon Gran San Martin and Colonel Carlos Mendieta y Montdfur in 1934, two decrees were enacted recognizing women's political rights, and, although they were never put into effect, they served as prec- edents for the Constitutional Law of 1935 which provided for Citizens: The Cuban woman, in the dark and quiet corner of her home, waited patiently and resignedly for this sublime hour, in which a just revolution would break her yoke, would untie her wings. Everything was slave in Cuba-cradle, color and sex. You have wished to destroy the slavery of the cradle-fighting until death, if necessary. Slavery of color no longer exists-you have already freed the serf. When the moment comes of liberating woman-Cuban man who has done away with the slavery of the cradle and the slavery of color-will also consecrate his generous soul to the conquest of the rights of her who is today in war his sister of charity, devoted, and who tomorrow will be as yesterday-his unfailing companion. 62 The Caribbean in Guaimaro, when the constitution of the "Republic in Arms" was adopted. But the concept of universal suffrage was already considered extremely ample when it included Negroes and illiter- ates and, in accordance with these prevailing political ideas, women were deprived of their rights for the time being. The article on suffrage, in the first Cuban constitution, adopted after the proclamation of independence, reads as follows: Art. 38. All Cuban males over 21 years of age have the right of suffrage excepting the following: 1. Inmates of any asylum. 2. Those legally declared mentally unfit. 3. Those legally declared disqualified because of law infrac- tion. 4. Members of the armed forces of land or sea. The Constitution of 1928, so negative for Cuba in other respects, signalled as far as suffrage was concerned a step of progress, in that it eliminated women's total exclusion from the right to vote (in an amendment to Article 38) by establishing that the law would provide the degree and manner in which Cuban women were to exercise suffrage. This constitution was annulled in 1933 before women actually exercised their vote. During the brief provisional governments of Ramdn Gran San Martin and Colonel Carlos Mendieta y Montafur in 1934, two decrees were enacted recognizing women's political rights, and, although they were never put into effect, they served as prec- edents for the Constitutional Law of 1935 which provided for Citizens: The Cuban woman, in the dark and quiet corner of her home, waited patiently and resignedly for this sublime hour, in which a just revolution would break her yoke, would untie her wings. Everything was slave in Cuba-cradle, color and sex. You have wished to destroy the slavery of the cradle-fighting until death, if necessary. Slavery of color no longer exists-you have already freed the serf. When the moment comes of liberating woman-Cuban man who has done away with the slavery of the cradle and the slavery of color-will also consecrate his generous soul to the conquest of the rights of her who is today in war his sister of charity, devoted, and who tomorrow will be as yesterday-his unfailing companion. 62 The Caribbean in Gudimaro, when the constitution of the "Republic in Arms" was adopted. But the concept of universal suffrage was already considered extremely ample when it included Negroes and illiter- ates and, in accordance with these prevailing political ideas, women were deprived of their rights for the time being. The article on suffrage, in the first Cuban constitution, adopted after the proclamation of independence, reads as follows: Art. 38. All Cuban males over 21 years of age have the right of suffrage excepting the following: 1. Inmates of any asylum. 2. Those legally declared mentally unfit. 3. Those legally declared disqualified because of law infrac- tion. 4. Members of the armed forces of land or sea. The Constitution of 1928, so negative for Cuba in other respects, signalled as far as suffrage was concerned a step of progress, in that it eliminated women's total exclusion from the right to vote (in an amendment to Article 38) by establishing that the law would provide the degree and manner in which Cuban women were to exercise suffrage. This constitution was annulled in 1933 before women actually exercised their vote. During the brief provisional governments of Ram6n Grau San Martin and Colonel Carlos Mendieta y Montsfur in 1934, two decrees were enacted recognizing women's political rights, and, although they were never put into effect, they served as prec- edents for the Constitutional Law of 1935 which provided for Citizens: The Cuban woman, in the dark and quiet corner of her home, waited patiently and resignedly for this sublime hour, in which a just revolution would break her yoke, would untie her wings. Everything was slave in Cuba-cradle, color and sex. You have wished to destroy the slavery of the cradle-fighting until death, if necessary. Slavery of color no longer exists-you have already freed the serf. When the moment comes of liberating woman-Cuban man who has done away with the slavery of the cradle and the slavery of color-will also consecrate his generous soul to the conquest of the rights of her who is today in war his sister of charity, devoted, and who tomorrow will be as yesterday-his unfailing companion.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 63 women's participation in the elections of 1936. Woman suffrage was definitely established in the constitution adopted in 1940, which also recognized the principle of equal civil rights for women. However, it cannot yet be said that suffrage has completed its cycle of evolution in Cuba with satisfactory results. Bribery, fraud, and coercion, which were already present in the elections of 1836, when Cuba was still a colony, have continued to frus- trate the democratic significance of almost all the electoral proc- esses in Republican Cuba and have provoked insurrections and revolts. In 1906, after the forced re-election of President Tomis Estrada Palma, the leaders of the opposition rebelled, causing the second intervention of the United States in Cuba. Again after the elections in 1912 and 1916, revolt swept the island, and the same thing happened when President Alfredo Zayas was elected in 1920. In 1924, Gerardo Machado was elected presi- dent with such a broad margin that the losing party did not attempt a protest. In 1928, and for the purpose of extending his term, President Machado forced a constitutional reform. He also provided for his own re-election and adopted the policies of a dictator. He was deposed in 1933 after an extremely tense and prolonged revolutionary period. Between 1933 and 1940, Cuba had nine presidents, in addi- tion to five commissioners who jointly directed national affairs during a period of several months. During those seven years, only one presidential election was held-in 1936. It was the first election in which women participated and the winning can- didate, Miguel Mariano GOmez, was deposed through a question- able impeachment five months after taking office. Notwithstanding this distressing process, it can truthfully be said that Cubans have been developing political consciousness. The 1939 elections for Constituent Assembly delegates were exemplary in their order and for the acceptance of the will of the people. The same can be said of the presidential election POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 63 women's participation in the elections of 1936. Woman suffrage was definitely established in the constitution adopted in 1940, which also recognized the principle of equal civil rights for women. However, it cannot yet be said that suffrage has completed its cycle of evolution in Cuba with satisfactory results. Bribery, fraud, and coercion, which were already present in the elections of 1836, when Cuba was still a colony, have continued to frus- trate the democratic significance of almost all the electoral proc- esses in Republican Cuba and have provoked insurrections and revolts. In 1906, after the forced re-election of President Tomis Estrada Palma, the leaders of the opposition rebelled, causing the second intervention of the United States in Cuba. Again after the elections in 1912 and 1916, revolt swept the island, and the same thing happened when President Alfredo Zayas was elected in 1920. In 1924, Gerardo Machado was elected presi- dent with such a broad margin that the losing party did not attempt a protest. In 1928, and for the purpose of extending his term, President Machado forced a constitutional reform. He also provided for his own re-election and adopted the policies of a dictator. He was deposed in 1933 after an extremely tense and prolonged revolutionary period. Between 1933 and 1940, Cuba had nine presidents, in addi- tion to five commissioners who jointly directed national affairs during a period of several months. During those seven years, only one presidential election was held-in 1936. It was the first election in which women participated and the winning can- didate, Miguel Mariano Gomez, was deposed through a question- able impeachment five months after taking office. Notwithstanding this distressing process, it can truthfully be said that Cubans have been developing political consciousness. The 1939 elections for Constituent Assembly delegates were exemplary in their order and for the acceptance of the will of the people. The same can be said of the presidential election POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 63 women's participation in the elections of 1936. Woman suffrage was definitely established in the constitution adopted in 1940, which also recognized the principle of equal civil rights for women. However, it cannot yet be said that suffrage has completed its cycle of evolution in Cuba with satisfactory results. Bribery, fraud, and coercion, which were already present in the elections of 1836, when Cuba was still a colony, have continued to frus- trate the democratic significance of almost all the electoral proc- esses in Republican Cuba and have provoked insurrections and revolts. In 1906, after the forced re-election of President Tomis Estrada Palma, the leaders of the opposition rebelled, causing the second intervention of the United States in Cuba. Again after the elections in 1912 and 1916, revolt swept the island, and the same thing happened when President Alfredo Zayas was elected in 1920. In 1924, Gerardo Machado was elected presi- dent with such a broad margin that the losing party did not attempt a protest. In 1928, and for the purpose of extending his term, President Machado forced a constitutional reform. He also provided for his own re-election and adopted the policies of a dictator. He was deposed in 1933 after an extremely tense and prolonged revolutionary period. Between 1933 and 1940, Cuba had nine presidents, in addi- tion to five commissioners who jointly directed national affairs during a period of several months. During those seven years, only one presidential election was held-in 1936. It was the first election in which women participated and the winning can- didate, Miguel Mariano Gmez, was deposed through a question- able impeachment five months after taking office. Notwithstanding this distressing process, it can truthfully be said that Cubans have been developing political consciousness. The 1939 elections for Constituent Assembly delegates were exemplary in their order and for the acceptance of the will of the people. The same can be said of the presidential election  64 The Caribbean held in 1944, in which the opposition's candidate defeated the government's candidate, and in which a large percentage of the electorate participated.r The Electoral Code has suffered a series of modifications, sometimes for the purpose of making it more efficient, at other times precisely to facilitate maneuvers which would favor given parties or candidates.' There is, however, considerable alertness on the part of the public at large as to the significance and implications of measures of this type. At the present moment, there is a growing demand for a revision of the Code. Another example of political maturity was shown five years ago when, in spite of the ample financial and political backing given by President Carlos Prio Socorris to his brother, who ran for mayor of Havana in 1950, the people sensed the imposition and repudiated the candidate at the elections. It then began to look as if Cuba had overcome the stage of convulsion and forced substitutions of men in power, and that the country had acquired the maturity necessary for normal democratic processes. But a new coup on the tenth of March, 1952, again interrupted the constitutional rhythm of the country and marked a political set- back of twenty years. The masses of the people felt disillusioned with this new imposition of government by force. Unpopular, yet backed by the Army, President Fulgencio Batista took over power, creating a new impasse in the political life of Cuba. General elections were called for last November, but since guaran- ties were lacking to carry on free political campaigns, no other party went to the elections and few people voted. However, to play out the comedy of this sham election, official figures on the number of voters were high. The fact is that it was one of the "Reports of Office of Electoral Statistics," Cuba (not published). Under normal conditions in Cuba an average of over 70 per cent of the electorate has participated in elections, and since women have the vote they have been half of the voters; however, relatively few have been candidates. ' Elections held in Cuba since 1900, with dates and Electoral Code applied: 64 The Caribbean held in 1944, in which the opposition's candidate defeated the government's candidate, and in which a large percentage of the electorate participated." The Electoral Code has suffered a series of modifications, sometimes for the purpose of making it more efficient, at other times precisely to facilitate maneuvers which would favor given parties or candidates.' There is, however, considerable alertness on the part of the public at large as to the significance and implications of measures of this type. At the present moment, there is a growing demand for a revision of the Code. Another example of political maturity was shown five years ago when, in spite of the ample financial and political backing given by President Carlos Prfo Socorris to his brother, who ran for mayor of Havana in 1950, the people sensed the imposition and repudiated the candidate at the elections. It then began to look as if Cuba had overcome the stage of convulsion and forced substitutions of men in power, and that the country had acquired the maturity necessary for normal democratic processes. But a new coup on the tenth of March, 1952, again interrupted the constitutional rhythm of the country and marked a political set- back of twenty years. The masses of the people felt disillusioned with this new imposition of government by force. Unpopular, yet backed by the Army, President Fulgencio Batista took over power, creating a new impasse in the political life of Cuba. General elections were called for last November, but since guaran- ties were lacking to carry on free political campaigns, no other party went to the elections and few people voted. However, to play out the comedy of this sham election, official figures on the number of voters were high. The fact is that it was one of the * "Reports of Office of Electoral Statistics," Cuba (not published). Under normal conditions in Cuba an average of over 70 per cent of the electorate has participated in elections, and since women have the vote they have been half of the voters; however, relatively few have been candidates. ' Elections held in Cuba since 1900, with dates and Electoral Code applied: 64 The Caribbean held in 1944, in which the opposition's candidate defeated the government's candidate, and in which a large percentage of the electorate participated., The Electoral Code has suffered a series of modifications, sometimes for the purpose of making it more efficient, at other times precisely to facilitate maneuvers which would favor given parties or candidates.' There is, however, considerable alertness on the part of the public at large as to the significance and implications of measures of this type. At the present moment, there is a growing demand for a revision of the Code. Another example of political maturity was shown five years ago when, in spite of the ample financial and political backing given by President Carlos Prio Socorras to his brother, who ran for mayor of Havana in 1950, the people sensed the imposition and repudiated the candidate at the elections. It then began to look as if Cuba had overcome the stage of convulsion and forced substitutions of men in power, and that the country had acquired the maturity necessary for normal democratic processes. But a new coup on the tenth of March, 1952, again interrupted the constitutional rhythm of the country and marked a political set- back of twenty years. The masses of the people felt disillusioned with this new imposition of government by force. Unpopular, yet backed by the Army, President Fulgencio Batista took over power, creating a new impasse in the political life of Cuba. General elections were called for last November, but since guaran- ties were lacking to carry on free political campaigns, no other party went to the elections and few people voted. However, to play out the comedy of this sham election, official figures on the number of voters were high. The fact is that it was one of the "Reports of Office of Electoral Statistics," Cuba (not published). Under normal conditions in Cuba an average of over 70 per cent of the electorate has participated in elections, and since women have the vote they have been half of the voters; however, relatively few have been candidates. ' Elections held in Cuba since 1900, with dates and Electoral Code applied:  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 0)1 most shameful elections held in many years, and the people of Cuba are still without a clear vision of how normality can be restored to their political life. V In a general evaluation of the Caribbean countries, we may say that we are in a democratically underdeveloped area. The POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 65 most shameful elections held in many years, and the people of Cuba are still without a clear vision of how normality can be restored to their political life. In a general evaluation of the Caribbean countries, we may say that we are in a democratically underdeveloped area. The POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 65 most shameful elections held in many years, and the people of Cuba are still without a clear vision of how normality can be restored to their political life. V In a general evaluation of the Caribbean countries, we may say that we are in a democratically underdeveloped area. The Elections Dates Municipal June 16, 1900 Municipal June 1, 1901 Constitucional 3rd Saturday, Dec., 1901 General Dec. 31, 1901 Parcial Dec. 31, 1903 General Dec. 1, 1905 General Nov. 1, 1908 Parcial Nov. 1, 1910 General Nov. 1, 1912 Parcial Nov. 1, 1914 General Nov. 1, 1916 Parcial Nov. 1, 1918 General Nov. 1, 1920 Parcial Nov. 1, 1922 General Nov. I, 1924 Parcial Nov. 1, 1926 General Nov. 1, 1928 Parcial Nov. 1, 1930 General Jan. 15, 1936 Parcial March 5, 1938 Constitucional Nov. 15, 1939 General July 14, 1940 Parcial March 15, 1942 General June 1, 1944 Parcial June 1, 1946 General June 1, 1948 Parcial June 1, 1950 General 3rd Sunday, Nov., 1953 General Nov. 1, 1954 * O.M. means Military Order. t C.E. mea Electoral Code. I D.L. meas Law Decree. 1 L.D. means Decree Law. Electoral Code Applied O.M.* No. 164, April 18, 1900 G.M. No. 164-900 y 91, April 8, 1901 O.M. No. 164-900 y 91, April 8, 1901 C.E.f September 9, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. September 11, 1929 D.L.; No. 54, July 2, 1935 D.L. No. 54, July 2, 1935 C.E. Nov. 29 de 1937 (Emergency Code) C.E. Nov. 29, 1939 C.E. Nov. 29, 1939 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. Nov. 11, 1952 (Suspended) L.D.§ No. 1215, Nov. 26, 1953 Elections Dates Municipal June 16, 1900 Municipal June 1, 1901 Constitucional 3rd Saturday, Dec., 1901 General Dec. 31, 1901 Parcial Dec. 31, 1903 General Dec. 1, 1905 General Nov. 1, 1908 Parcial Nov. 1, 1910 General Nov. 1, 1912 Parcial Nov. 1, 1914 General Nov. 1, 1916 Parcial Nov. 1, 1918 General Nov. 1, 1920 Parcial Nov. 1, 1922 General Nov. 1, 1924 Parcial Nov. 1, 1926 General Nov. 1, 1928 Parcial Nov. 1, 1930 General Jan. 15, 1936 Parcial March 5, 1938 Constitucional Nov. 15, 1939 General July 14, 1940 Parcial March 15, 1942 General June 1, 1944 Parcial June 1, 1946 General June 1, 1948 Parcial June 1, 1950 General 3rd Sunday, Nov., 1953 General Nov. 1, 1954 t o.M. means Mlitary order. t C.E. mea Electoral Code. j D.L. means Law Decree. ¢ L.D. means Deeree Law, Electoral Code Applied O.M.* No. 164, April 18, 1900 G.M. No. 164-900 y 91, April 8, 1901 O.M. No. 164-900 y 91, April 8, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. September 11, 1929 D.L.: No. 54, July 2, 1935 D.L. No. 54, July 2, 1935 C.E. Nov. 29 de 1937 (Emergency Code) C.E. Nov. 29, 1939 C.E. Nov. 29, 1939 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. Nov. 11, 1952 (Suspended) L.D.§ No. 1215, Nov. 26, 1953 Elections Dates Municipal June 16, 1900 Municipal June 1, 1901 Constitucional 3rd Saturday, Dec., 1901 General Dec. 31, 1901 Parcial Dec. 31, 1903 General Dec. 1, 1905 General Nov. 1, 1908 Partial Nov. 1, 1910 General Nov. 1, 1912 Parcial Nov. 1, 1914 General Nov. 1, 1916 Parcial Nov. 1, 1918 General Nov. 1, 1920 Parcial Nov. 1, 1922 General Nov. 1, 1924 Parcial Nov. 1, 1926 General Nov. 1, 1928 Parcial Nov. 1, 1930 General Jan. 15, 1936 Parcial March 5, 1938 Constitucional Nov. 15, 1939 General July 14, 1940 Parcial March 15, 1942 General June 1, 1944 Parcial June 1, 1946 General June 1, 1948 Parial June 1, 1950 General 3rd Sunday, Nov., 1953 General Nov. 1, 1954 * O.M. means Military Order. t C.E. means Electoral Code. I D.L. means Law Deeree. i L.D. means Decree Law. Electoral Code Applied O.M.* No. 164, April 18, 1900 O.M. No. 164-900 y 91, April 8, 1901 O.M. No. 164-900 y 91, April 8, 1901 C.E.t September 9, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 9, 1901 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September 11, 1908 C.E. September , 191908 C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. August 8, 1919-Crowder C.E. September 11, 1929 D.L.t No. 54, July 2, 1935 D.L. No. 54, July 2, 1935 C.E. Nov. 29 de 1937 (Emergency Code) C.E. Nov. 29, 1939 C.E. Nov. 29, 1939 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. May 31, 1943 C.E. Nov. 11, 1952 (Suspended) L.D.§ No. 1215, Nov. 26, 1953  66 The Caribbean great tragedy of the countries which border this new mare nostrum is symbolized by the dictatorships which delay the pace of political responsibility and progress. Of course, we cannot look at the social phenomenon of Latin American dictatorships in a simplistic manner nor judge them as isolated situations, but as a consequence of the complex amalgamation of the negative aspects of cultural, economic, ethnical, and historic factors which we have already mentioned. The democratic development of the countries of the Caribbean is in direct relation to these factors, and I believe it is justifiable to state that, although the general picture is full of shadows, there has been some progress and that this will necessarily carry us all towards a common higher destiny. Costa Rica is already an index of what can be accomplished in this part of the world. Perhaps its high democratic standard is due to the fact that for many years it has had more teachers than soldiers. The struggle to achieve democracy in the Carib- bean can be said to take place between two poles: Costa Rica representing the positive one, with its years of democratic prac- tice, and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), the negative one, with its paternal pattern of despotism. In a political sense, the latter is probably the darkest spot in the Caribbean. The dic- tatorships of Nicaragua and Venezuela do not lag too far behind. Colombia represented a highly developed democracy until a few years ago, when a wave of dictatorship swept away all its con- quests. Mexico, in recent years-during the governments of Lizaro Cardenas, Miguel AlemAn, and Ruiz Cortines-seems to have made some progress towards reaffirming the concept which is expressed in the high philosophy of her revolutionary hero, Benito Juarez: "Respect for the rights of others in peace."* Haiti -desolately poor, with the highest index of illiteracy and 115 inhabitants per square kilometer-stands painfully in need of help. Such contrasts make it all the more useful to study the prob- Inscription on the monument of Benito JuArez, Mexico City. 66 The Caribbean great tragedy of the countries which border this new mare nostrum is symbolized by the dictatorships which delay the pace of political responsibility and progress. Of course, we cannot look at the social phenomenon of Latin American dictatorships in a simplistic manner nor judge them as isolated situations, but as a consequence of the complex amalgamation of the negative aspects of cultural, economic, ethnical, and historic factors which we have already mentioned. The democratic development of the countries of the Caribbean is in direct relation to these factors, and I believe it is justifiable to state that, although the general picture is full of shadows, there has been some progress and that this will necessarily carry us all towards a common higher destiny. Costa Rica is already an index of what can be accomplished in this part of the world. Perhaps its high democratic standard is due to the fact that for many years it has had more teachers than soldiers. The struggle to achieve democracy in the Carib- bean can be said to take place between two poles: Costa Rica representing the positive one, with its years of democratic prac- tice, and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), the negative one, with its paternal pattern of despotism. In a political sense, the latter is probably the darkest spot in the Caribbean. The dic- tatorships of Nicaragua and Venezuela do not lag too far behind. Colombia represented a highly developed democracy until a few years ago, when a wave of dictatorship swept away all its con- quests. Mexico, in recent years-during the governments of Lazaro Cirdenas, Miguel Alemin, and Ruiz Cortines-seems to have made some progress towards reaffirming the concept which is expressed in the high philosophy of her revolutionary hero, Benito JuArez: "Respect for the rights of others in peace." Haiti -desolately poor, with the highest index of illiteracy and 115 inhabitants per square kilometer-stands painfully in need of help. Such contrasts make it all the more useful to study the prob- Inscription on the monument of Benito JuArez, Mexico City. 66 The Caribbean great tragedy of the countries which border this new mare nostrum is symbolized by the dictatorships which delay the pace of political responsibility and progress. Of course, we cannot look at the social phenomenon of Latin American dictatorships in a simplistic manner nor judge them as isolated situations, but as a consequence of the complex amalgamation of the negative aspects of cultural, economic, ethnical, and historic factors which we have already mentioned. The democratic development of the countries of the Caribbean is in direct relation to these factors, and I believe it is justifiable to state that, although the general picture is full of shadows, there has been some progress and that this will necessarily carry us all towards a common higher destiny. Costa Rica is already an index of what can be accomplished in this part of the world. Perhaps its high democratic standard is due to the fact that for many years it has had more teachers than soldiers. The struggle to achieve democracy in the Carib- bean can be said to take place between two poles: Costa Rica representing the positive one, with its years of democratic prac- tice, and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), the negative one, with its paternal pattern of despotism. In a political sense, the latter is probably the darkest spot in the Caribbean. The dic- tatorships of Nicaragua and Venezuela do not lag too far behind. Colombia represented a highly developed democracy until a few years ago, when a wave of dictatorship swept away all its con- quests. Mexico, in recent years-during the governments of Lazaro CArdenas, Miguel AlemAn, and Ruiz Cortines-seems to have made some progress towards reaffirming the concept which is expressed in the high philosophy of her revolutionary hero, Benito Juirez: "Respect for the rights of others in peace."' Haiti -desolately poor, with the highest index of illiteracy and 115 inhabitants per square kilometer-stands painfully in need of help. Such contrasts make it all the more useful to study the prob- * Inscription on the monument of Benito Juirez, Mexico City.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 67 lems of the Caribbean together, since this permits an appreciation of the different stages existing in the working out of similar problems as well as of the value of the methods used in their solution.' In the confused racial picture of the region, there are several major elements which have not favored democratic development. The Spanish group, proudly individualistic and conservative, was held back in many respects by its more reactionary members and traditional institutions; the native Indian group, isolated by lan- guage and cultural distance, created further disunity owing to a natural tendency to individual reserve; and the Negro brought all the ballast of his slave origin. Overlapping all these mixed human conglomerates was the enervating economic drive of im- perialistic powers, who in addition to their prejudices felt it their right to sap from these territories, by fair means or foul, whatever wealth they had or could develop. No wonder that the process of democratization has been slow and that the cultural and economic awakening of the Caribbean has been delayed in spite of its privileged geographical position, strategic both from the point of view of the defense of the conti- nent and for its unique commercial and social significance as the crossroads of the Americas. The task ahead for those of us who live in the Caribbean area is complex. It must include strengthening of the moral forces within our countries and stimu- lating whatever factors may contribute to the dignification of our political conduct through a greater social consciousness. Not only the countries of the Caribbean but all of Latin America, which our Cuban apostle Jose Marti called the "Conti- Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Reform (Brit. ish Honduras: Government Printer, 1951), p. 8: It is our view that there is far less risk in giving more power to and placing greater responsibility in the hands of the people in a homogeneous society than in a society of cosmopolitan character, where the process of integration is still in a state of flux, and where there is the subtle ferment of racial cleavage arising from differences of languages, culture and out- look and inequality in educational and political progress. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 67 POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 67 lems of the Caribbean together, since this permits an appreciation lems of the Caribbean together, since this permits an appreciation of the different stages existing in the working out of similar of the different stages existing in the working out of similar problems as well as of the value of the methods used in their problems as well as of the value of the methods used in their solution.' solution.' In the confused racial picture of the region, there are several In the confused racial picture of the region, there are several major elements which have not favored democratic development. major elements which have not favored democratic development. The Spanish group, proudly individualistic and conservative, was The Spanish group, proudly individualistic and conservative, was held back in many respects by its more reactionary members and held back in many respects by its more reactionary members and traditional institutions; the native Indian group, isolated by lan- traditional institutions; the native Indian group, isolated by lan- guage and cultural distance, created further disunity owing to a guage and cultural distance, created further disunity owing to a natural tendency to individual reserve; and the Negro brought natural tendency to individual reserve; and the Negro brought all the ballast of his slave origin. Overlapping all these mixed all the ballast of his slave origin. Overlapping all these mixed human conglomerates was the enervating economic drive of im- human conglomerates was the enervating economic drive of im- perialistic powers, who in addition to their prejudices felt it their perialistic powers, who in addition to their prejudices felt it their right to sap from these territories, by fair means or foul, whatever right to sap from these territories, by fair means or foul, whatever wealth they had or could develop. wealth they had or could develop. No wonder that the process of democratization has been slow No wonder that the process of democratization has been slow and that the cultural and economic awakening of the Caribbean and that the cultural and economic awakening of the Caribbean has been delayed in spite of its privileged geographical position, has been delayed in spite of its privileged geographical position, strategic both from the point of view of the defense of the conti- strategic both from the point of view of the defense of the conti- nent and for its unique commercial and social significance as nent and for its unique commercial and social significance as the crossroads of the Americas. The task ahead for those of the crossroads of the Americas. The task ahead for those of us who live in the Caribbean area is complex. It must include us who live in the Caribbean area is complex. It must include strengthening of the moral forces within our countries and stimu- strengthening of the moral forces within our countries and stimu- lating whatever factors may contribute to the dignification of our lating whatever factors may contribute to the dignification of our political conduct through a greater social consciousness. political conduct through a greater social consciousness. Not only the countries of the Caribbean but all of Latin Not only the countries of the Caribbean but all of Latin America, which our Cuban apostle Jose Marti called the "Conti- America, which our Cuban apostle Jose Marti called the "Conti- * Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Reform (Brit- ' Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Reform (Brit- ish Honduras: Government Printer, 1951), p. 8: ish Honduras: Government Printer, 1951), p. 8: It is our view that there is far less risk in giving more power to and It is our view that there is far less risk in giving more power to and placing greater responsibility in the hands of the people in a homogeneous placing greater responsibility in the hands of the people in a homogeneous society than in a society of cosmopolitan character, where the process of society than in a society of cosmopolitan character, where the process of integration is still in a state of flux, and where there is the subtle ferment integration is still in a state of flux, and where there is the subtle ferment of racial cleavage arising from differences of languages, culture and out- of racial cleavage arising from differences of languages, culture and out- look and inequality in educational and political progress. look and inequality in educational and political progress.  68 The Caribbean nent of Human Hope," must make a strenuous effort to put an end to the dramatic process that through centuries has been delaying the full play of democracy, often giving the impression that it is inapplicable to our countries, when it has not as yet even been given a fair trial. The too-frequent overthrowing of our constitutionally elected governments, usually by a minority group which has some common interest with more aggressive factions in the army; the exaggerated size of the armed forces, in itself a standing invitation to interfere in the political field for personal gain; the pressure of imperialistic forces; the disregard of the elemental rights of man to voice his own mandates; dema- gogy and electoral fraud, bribe, and coercion-are some of the most outstanding forces that delay the definite political and social progress of almost all countries of this area. Nor should we silence another negative factor-perhaps one of the most difficult ones to overcome-caudillismo, for which a satisfactory counterpart in the English language has not been found, possibly because it is a more prevalent product of Latin American politics. It is a sort of hero worship of a given person- ality, whose admirers ignore his social or political value and follow him blindly through all sorts of vicissitudes, in spite of whatever maneuvers he may engage in for his own personal benefit as opposed to national interest. It is the upholding of a personal relationship in preference to a given platform. Un- doubtedly the personality of men in power is important, but citizens must learn to evaluate it in the light of integrity of character as proven by public conduct. Besides, in spite of the lonroe Doctrine, America has not been exclusively for Americans in the broad sense. For centuries, colonial exploitation has clouded the broad panorama of the Caribbean. Fortunately, since 1942, a revision of colonial policy has taken place. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which later became the Caribbean Commission, has worked per- sistently to raise the standard of living and the social conditions of the region. As a consequence, the situation of the population 68 The Caribbean nent of Human Hope," must make a strenuous effort to put an end to the dramatic process that through centuries has been delaying the full play of democracy, often giving the impression that it is inapplicable to our countries, when it has not as yet even been given a fair trial. The too-frequent overthrowing of our constitutionally elected governments, usually by a minority group which has some common interest with more aggressive factions in the army; the exaggerated size of the armed forces, in itself a standing invitation to interfere in the political field for personal gain; the pressure of imperialistic forces; the disregard of the elemental rights of man to voice his own mandates; dema- gogy and electoral fraud, bribe, and coercion-are some of the most outstanding forces that delay the definite political and social progress of almost all countries of this area. Nor should we silence another negative factor-perhaps one of the most difficult ones to overcome-caudillismo, for which a satisfactory counterpart in the English language has not been found, possibly because it is a more prevalent product of Latin American politics. It is a sort of hero worship of a given person- ality, whose admirers ignore his social or political value and follow him blindly through all sorts of vicissitudes, in spite of whatever maneuvers he may engage in for his own personal benefit as opposed to national interest. It is the upholding of a personal relationship in preference to a given platform. Un- doubtedly the personality of men in power is important, but citizens must learn to evaluate it in the light of integrity of character as proven by public conduct. Besides, in spite of the Monroe Doctrine, America has not been exclusively for Americans in the broad sense. For centuries, colonial exploitation has clouded the broad panorama of the Caribbean. Fortunately, since 1942, a revision of colonial policy has taken place. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which later became the Caribbean Commission, has worked per- sistently to raise the standard of living and the social conditions of the region. As a consequence, the situation of the population 68 The Caribbean nent of Human Hope," must make a strenuous effort to put an end to the dramatic process that through centuries has been delaying the full play of democracy, often giving the impression that it is inapplicable to our countries, when it has not as yet even been given a fair trial. The too-frequent overthrowing of our constitutionally elected governments, usually by a minority group which has some common interest with more aggressive factions in the army; the exaggerated size of the armed forces, in itself a standing invitation to interfere in the political field for personal gain; the pressure of imperialistic forces; the disregard of the elemental rights of man to voice his own mandates; dema- gogy and electoral fraud, bribe, and coercion-are some of the most outstanding forces that delay the definite political and social progress of almost all countries of this area. Nor should we silence another negative factor-perhaps one of the most difficult ones to overcome--caudillismo, for which a satisfactory counterpart in the English language has not been found, possibly because it is a more prevalent product of Latin American politics. It is a sort of hero worship of a given person- ality, whose admirers ignore his social or political value and follow him blindly through all sorts of vicissitudes, in spite of whatever maneuvers he may engage in for his own personal benefit as opposed to national interest. It is the upholding of a personal relationship in preference to a given platform. Un- doubtedly the personality of men in power is important, but citizens must learn to evaluate it in the light of integrity of character as proven by public conduct. Besides, in spite of the Monroe Doctrine, America has not been exclusively for Americans in the broad sense. For centuries, colonial exploitation has clouded the broad panorama of the Caribbean. Fortunately, since 1942, a revision of colonial policy has taken place. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which later became the Caribbean Commission, has worked per- sistently to raise the standard of living and the social conditions of the region. As a consequence, the situation of the population  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 69 in the Caribbean territories has improved greatly in comparison with their previous status.0 International cooperation has been extremely fruitful in the area of the Caribbean colonial territories. The Caribbean Com- mission, through the united efforts of Great Britain, the United States, Holland, and France has been a meaningful instrument. The various specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Or- ganization of American States, and diverse inter-American pro- grams have offered both technical and material assistance, as well as moral support, in developing sound, basic help in this region -help which has improved conditions benefiting the entire ppoulation. The evident strides of social progress in all Central America during the past decade can justly be attributed to the response of governments to the international collaboration offered by such organizations as UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, ILO, ICAO, and the United States Point Four program, now known as ICA (International Cooperation Administration). Attention should " Devere Allen, The Caribbean: Laboratory of World Cooperation (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1943), pp. 18-19: Political democracy, as well as economic security and freedom from racial prejudice, is an issue that will not down. Not the least bitter charge leveled by Britons at their own West Indian rule is that it dis- courages democratic practices. In St. Kitts, that sugar lump of despotism, for one instance, and in Nevis, only 4.3 per cent of the 38,000 inhabitants are registered electors. When electors do vote, they are up against the fact that most "representatives" are named by the authorities, instead of democratically elected. In order to become an elector one must own prop- erty worth 500 pounds-a fortune in such poor countries. On St. Lucia property qualifications are the same, and there only 2.2 per cent of the people are registered voters. In the foregoing regions the property test may give way to a test based on the amount of taxes paid on real estate, a tax of ten shillings sufficing. In Barbados, nobody can vote, under any circumstances, who is employed as a domestic servant or in any other "menial capacity," unless they are property owners. In the so-called legislative bodies of various West Indian dependencies, figures speak eloquently of anti-democratic rule. In Jamaica, 16 members of the Council are named by the authorities as against 16 elected. In Trinidad the ratio is 19 to seven. In Antigua it is six to five. In St. Lucia it is seven to five. The percentage of the population voting in Jamaica is 5.29; in Trinidad, 5.55; in Antigua, 3.00. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 69 in the Caribbean territories has improved greatly in comparison with their previous status.10 International cooperation has been extremely fruitful in the area of the Caribbean colonial territories. The Caribbean Com- mission, through the united efforts of Great Britain, the United States, Holland, and France has been a meaningful instrument. The various specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Or- ganization of American States, and diverse inter-American pro- grains have offered both technical and material assistance, as well as moral support, in developing sound, basic help in this region -help which has improved conditions benefiting the entire population. The evident strides of social progress in all Central America during the past decade can justly be attributed to the response of governments to the international collaboration offered by such organizations as UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, ILO, ICAO, and the United States Point Four program, now known as ICA (International Cooperation Administration). Attention should * Devere Allen, The Caribbean: Laboratory of World Cooperation (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1943), pp. 18-19: Political democracy, as well as economic security and freedom from racial prejudice, is an issue that will not down. Not the least bitter charge leveled by Britons at their own West Indian rule is that it dis- courages democratic practices. In St. Kitts, that sugar lump of despotism, for one instance, and in Nevis, only 4.3 per cent of the 38,000 inhabitants are registered electors. When electors do vote, they are up against the fact that most "representatives" are named by the authorities, instead of democratically elected. In order to become an elector one must own prop- erty worth 500 pounds-a fortune in such poor countries. On St. Lucia property qualifications are the same, and there only 2.2 per cent of the people are registered voters. In the foregoing regions the property test may give way to a test based on the amount of taxes paid on real estate, a tax of ten shillings sufficing. In Barbados, nobody can vote, under any circumstances, who is employed as a domestic servant or in any other "menial capacity," unless they are property owners. In the so-called legislative bodies of various West Indian dependencies, figures speak eloquently of anti-democratic rule. In Jamaica, 16 members of the Council are named by the authorities as against 16 elected. In Trinidad the ratio is 19 to seven. In Antigua it is six to five. In St. Lucia it is seven to five. The percentage of the population voting in Jamaica is 5.29; in Trinidad, 5.55; in Antigua, 3.00. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 69 in the Caribbean territories has improved greatly in comparison with their previous status.o International cooperation has been extremely fruitful in the area of the Caribbean colonial territories. The Caribbean Com- mission, through the united efforts of Great Britain, the United States, Holland, and France has been a meaningful instrument. The various specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Or- ganization of American States, and diverse inter-American pro- grams have offered both technical and material assistance, as well as moral support, in developing sound, basic help in this region -help which has improved conditions benefiting the entire population. The evident strides of social progress in all Central America during the past decade can justly be attributed to the response of governments to the international collaboration offered by such organizations as UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, ILO, ICAO, and the United States Point Four program, now known as ICA (International Cooperation Administration). Attention should * Devere Allen, The Caribbean: Laboratory of World Cooperation (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1943), pp. 18-19: Political democracy, as well as economic security and freedom from racial prejudice, is an issue that will not down. Not the least bitter charge leveled by Britons at their own West Indian rule is that it dis- courages democratic practices. In St. Kitts, that sugar lump of despotism, for one instance, and in Nevis, only 4.3 per cent of the 38,000 inhabitants are registered electors. When electors do vote, they are up against the fact that most "representatives" are named by the authorities, instead of democratically elected. In order to become an elector one must own prop- erty worth 500 pounds-a fortune in such poor countries. On St. Lucia property qualifications are the same, and there only 2.2 per cent of the people are registered voters. In the foregoing regions the property test may give way to a test based on the amount of taxes paid on real estate, a tax of ten shillings sufficing. In Barbados, nobody can vote, under any circumstances, who is employed as a domestic servant or in any other "menial capacity," unless they are property owners. In the so-called legislative bodies of various West Indian dependencies, figures speak eloquently of anti-democratic rule. In Jamaica, 16 members of the Council are named by the authorities as against 16 elected. In Trinidad the ratio is 19 to seven. In Antigua it is six to five. In St. Lucia it is seven to five. The percentage of the population voting in Jamaica is 5.29; in Trinidad, 5.55; in Antigua, 3.00.  70 The Caribbean also be called to the efforts of a considerable number of non- governmental international organizations which have their coun- terparts in this region. Most of these organizations have served the double purpose of actually carrying out programs of benefit to countries and of stimulating communities toward a new aware- ness of their problems and toward a desire to overcome their local difficulties by using their own resources. In fact, even the efforts now being realized in giving full support to ODECA may be attributed in part to the consciousness of the strength of united effort as demonstrated in the work of the international agencies. The heritage of the past, however, has not entirely disappeared in any of these territories or republics. Overcoming such negative factors is always a slow process, yet optimism is justified when we see evidence of steady improvement. A most dramatic change has been staged in Puerto Rico, which is now a commonwealth of the United States with the right to elect the head of its government and the future possibility of deciding by vote whether to maintain its present status or become a republic (a rather difficult dilemma for a population whose economic salvation seems to depend on the maintenance of non- taxable imports and exports with the United States). Each and every country must realize that it is one of a cluster of nations united by common interests and a common future. The welfare of one affects the welfare of them all. It is indis- pensable that they form a solid front of resistance against factors impeding their democratic development. Toward this end they must join forces to find a way to abolish venality and to make constitutions workable and respected. Our constitutions are un- usually broad and rather lyrical statements on liberty, democracy, and civicism, whose actual enforcement is blocked by laws and decrees which precisely circumvent their intention. No doubt there is often need for organic laws that will expedite the opera- tion of general established principles, but these must be carefully studied and strictly practiced. 70 The Caribbean also be called to the efforts of a considerable number of non- governmental international organizations which have their coun- terparts in this region. Most of these organizations have served the double purpose of actually carrying out programs of benefit to countries and of stimulating communities toward a new aware- ness of their problems and toward a desire to overcome their local difficulties by using their own resources. In fact, even the efforts now being realized in giving full support to ODECA may be attributed in part to the consciousness of the strength of united effort as demonstrated in the work of the international agencies. The heritage of the past, however, has not entirely disappeared in any of these territories or republics. Overcoming such negative factors is always a slow process, yet optimism is justified when we see evidence of steady improvement. A most dramatic change has been staged in Puerto Rico, which is now a commonwealth of the United States with the right to elect the head of its government and the future possibility of deciding by vote whether to maintain its present status or become a republic (a rather difficult dilemma for a population whose economic salvation seems to depend on the maintenance of non- taxable imports and exports with the United States). Each and every country must realize that it is one of a cluster of nations united by common interests and a common future. The welfare of one affects the welfare of them all. It is indis- pensable that they form a solid front of resistance against factors impeding their democratic development. Toward this end they must join forces to find a way to abolish venality and to make constitutions workable and respected. Our constitutions are un- usually broad and rather lyrical statements on liberty, democracy, and civicism, whose actual enforcement is blocked by laws and decrees which precisely circumvent their intention. No doubt there is often need for organic laws that will expedite the opera- tion of general established principles, but these must be carefully studied and strictly practiced. 70 The Caribbean also be called to the efforts of a considerable number of non- governmental international organizations which have their coun- terparts in this region. Most of these organizations have served the double purpose of actually carrying out programs of benefit to countries and of stimulating communities toward a new aware- ness of their problems and toward a desire to overcome their local difficulties by using their own resources. In fact, even the efforts now being realized in giving full support to ODECA may be attributed in part to the consciousness of the strength of united effort as demonstrated in the work of the international agencies. The heritage of the past, however, has not entirely disappeared in any of these territories or republics. Overcoming such negative factors is always a slow process, yet optimism is justified when we see evidence of steady improvement. A most dramatic change has been staged in Puerto Rico, which is now a commonwealth of the United States with the right to elect the head of its government and the future possibility of deciding by vote whether to maintain its present status or become a republic (a rather difficult dilemma for a population whose economic salvation seems to depend on the maintenance of non- taxable imports and exports with the United States). Each and every country must realize that it is one of a cluster of nations united by common interests and a common future. The welfare of one affects the welfare of them all. It is indis- pensable that they form a solid front of resistance against factors impeding their democratic development. Toward this end they must join forces to find a way to abolish venality and to make constitutions workable and respected. Our constitutions are un- usually broad and rather lyrical statements on liberty, democracy, and civicism, whose actual enforcement is blocked by laws and decrees which precisely circumvent their intention. No doubt there is often need for organic laws that will expedite the opera- tion of general established principles, but these must be carefully studied and strictly practiced.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS VI 71 POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS VI 71 POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS VI 71 Political liberty, economic security, and adequate education and health programs are the foundations on which the future of the nations of the Caribbean rest. They should be considered basic. To assure political liberty, a vigorous public opinion should be formed through the free presentation, at the level of the majority, of different discerning views on current affairs. The public press, radio, and other media of public information need to be encouraged to fulfill their responsible roles. Political edu- cation should be undertaken through public lectures, meetings, courses, and discussions. Group work and community organization furnish ideal experi- ence and background for participation in public life. They facili- tate the interpretation of general problems and methods into local language and atmosphere that can readily be felt and understood by the participants. Political apathy must be shaken, since those who neglect the duties and privileges of citizenship risk losing their democratic rights. It is the citizenry that makes govern- ment of the people a reality. Creating responsible citizens in spite of all adverse circumstances is the challenge we must issue if the franchise is to become a worthy instrument of democracy. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Arciniegas, Germin. Biografia del Caribe. Segunda ediciin. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1947. 543 pp. ---. The State of Latin America. Translated from the Spanish by Harriet de Onis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952. 416 pp. Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro. Azucar y poblaci6n en las Antillas. Tercera edition. La Habana: Cultural S. A., 1944. 320 pp. Gunther, John. El drama de America Latina. (Inside Latin America.) Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridor, 1942. 438 pp. Infiesta, Ram6n. Historia constitucional de Cuba. La Habana: Editorial Selecta, 1942. 382 pp. Lancis y Sanchez, Antonio. El proceso electoral de 1954. La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1955. 150 pp. ---. Elementos de derecho electoral. La Habana: Publicaciones Uni- versitarias, 1955. 164 pp. Political liberty, economic security, and adequate education and health programs are the foundations on which the future of the nations of the Caribbean rest. They should be considered basic. To assure political liberty, a vigorous public opinion should be formed through the free presentation, at the level of the majority, of different discerning views on current affairs. The public press, radio, and other media of public information need to be encouraged to fulfill their responsible roles. Political edu- cation should be undertaken through public lectures, meetings, courses, and discussions. Group work and community organization furnish ideal experi- ence and background for participation in public life. They facili- tate the interpretation of general problems and methods into local language and atmosphere that can readily be felt and understood by the participants. Political apathy must be shaken, since those who neglect the duties and privileges of citizenship risk losing their democratic rights. It is the citizenry that makes govern- ment of the people a reality. Creating responsible citizens in spite of all adverse circumstances is the challenge we must issue if the franchise is to become a worthy instrument of democracy. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Arciniegas, German. Biografia del Caribe. Segunda edici6n. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1947. 543 pp. --- The State of Latin America. Translated from the Spanish by Harriet de Onis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952. 416 pp. Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro. Azucar y poblaci6n en las Antillas. Tercera editi6n. La Habana: Cultural S. A., 1944. 320 pp. Gunther, John. El drama de Amirica Latina. (Inside Latin America.) Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridor, 1942. 438 pp. Infiesta, Ram6n. Historia constitucional de Cuba. La Habana: Editorial Selecta, 1942. 382 pp. Lancis y Snchez, Antonio. El proceso electoral de 1954. La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1955. 150 pp. Elementos de derecho electoral. La Habana: Publicaciones Uni- versitarias, 1955. 164 pp. Political liberty, economic security, and adequate education and health programs are the foundations on which the future of the nations of the Caribbean rest. They should be considered basic. To assure political liberty, a vigorous public opinion should be formed through the free presentation, at the level of the majority, of different discerning views on current affairs. The public press, radio, and other media of public information need to be encouraged to fulfill their responsible roles. Political edu- cation should be undertaken through public lectures, meetings, courses, and discussions. Group work and community organization furnish ideal experi- ence and background for participation in public life. They facili- tate the interpretation of general problems and methods into local language and atmosphere that can readily be felt and understood by the participants. Political apathy must be shaken, since those who neglect the duties and privileges of citizenship risk losing their democratic rights. It is the citizenry that makes govern- ment of the people a reality. Creating responsible citizens in spite of all adverse circumstances is the challenge we must issue if the franchise is to become a worthy instrument of democracy. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Arciniegas, German. Biografia del Caribe. Segunda edici6n. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1947. 543 pp. --- The State of Latin America. Translated from the Spanish by Harriet de Onis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952. 416 pp. Guerra y Sinchez, Ramiro. Azacar y poblacin en tas Antillas. Tererra editi6n. La Habana: Cultural S. A., 1944. 320 pp. Gunther, John. El drama de America Latina. (Inside Latin America.) Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridor, 1942. 438 pp. Infiesta, Ram6n. Historia constitucional de Cuba. La Habana: Editorial Selecta, 1942. 382 pp. Lancis y Sinchez, Antonio. El proceso electoral de 1954. La Habana: Editorial Lex, 1955. 150 pp. ---. Elementos de derecho electoral. La Habana: Publicaciones Uni- versitarias, 1955. 164 pp.  72 The Caribbean Macdtoald, Austdo F. Lio Ameroican Politict ond Governmen~t. Newo York:~ Tbomoas Y. Coweoll Comopany, 1990. 642 pe. Satost Jimooneo, Raofael. Tratado do derecho electoral. La Hobana: Edi- torialtoex, 1946. 574 pee Sant oeni,FEmeterioS. Huellas deogoi. Segunoedicidtn. La Ha- boota: SF0a00 Ferntindez F Cia., 1944. 268 Fe. 2ay1s y Alfonso, Alfreodo. Discursos y coferencias. 'Tomoo It. La Ha- Sont: Molitta y Cootpoiio, 1942. 221 Fe. Public Documtsttt Allegneo, KeitS. Meotoir of 1hF Constittonatl Developettntt of St. Luc~ia. St. Lucoa Goveoooment Printing Office, 1950. 31 pp. Boiley, Sydney D. Contttions of the Britith Colootieo. tottdon: Tho Hootord Socjit, 1950. 52 Fe. Boits Guiono. Suspenon of tho Conttutiont. Lontdon: Hter Majetty's Stoationory Offioo, 1953. 19FFp. --Colooial OChioe. Reorot of the Cottstittiontol Commoissiont 1950-1951. Loodon: Hit Mojetty's Stattonero Offiot, 1991. 74 Fe. "Cooodtitob do So Reiblica do Cuba," 0aceta de lo Hoabana (Loutet 14 do abril do 1902). Coottitoooot do S Relblica do Cubao. La Habana:, Impentao p eleia deoRambla,BouzaoyCia., 1929. 572ep Consotitutiont of the Comontto Wealth of FPuerto Rico. SanoJuan: Depat- menttofducaionoPros, 1999. "Convenoidtn Cottttitoyooto. toy Ntit. 1,"' Goceta Oficia (La Habotto: Fditooo Modorto, Lounos 8 de jutlio do 1940). DuncanI, F. Contitutionaol Developentt io St. Vittcettt. Kintgston: Coo- erotttPrinttintttgfffio, 1990. 18FFp. Estttos eolitios do So Roepublica do CGuatemala. Cootottala C.A.: Tieo- grafia Ntional, 1994. 24 pp. Gtoat Bitoio, Colonial Officeo. Tho Colottiol Territories 1954-1955. Lon- dot, Hor Majesty's Stationoty Oftlce, 1999. 119 ee. InterntoiooalBankfooReconotrtotiotttdfDevelopent. Reort ontCuba. Wothiogton, D.C., 1991. 1049 Fe. Oogattiztion of Atmoticoo Sttos. Comoitidt Iteratmttoicaoo do Mujooos. Derechost cioiles F politios do So mu050r do Amttrica. Vol. 5. Washing- too, D.C., 1994. - - Meoria do So pesidento do So Comtishmt Iteramericanatt do Mo/tret. Periodo 1953-155. Washingtoo, D.C.: Union Ptttamerti- 0a00, 1955. 29FF. Repor of the Aoglo-Ameican Caribbeant Commotitsioto t e overnmot ts of the United Stateo ood Coeot Britain. Woohittgtott, D.C., 1949. 94 Fe. Rleport of the Coommistiott of Inquiry ont Constitu~tol Refooro. Brtish Hoodooos: Coootonmtont Foitero, 1951. 26 pp. Reiblica do Coba. Cento do 1943. Lo Htoboot: F. Feroodezdt F Cio., 1949. 1979 pp. Trinidad ood Tobago. Report of the Froanchise Commoittee of Tritnidod ood Tobatgo. Goooettmeot Friteo, 1944. 149 pp. 72 The Caribbean Modold, Autin F. Lio Ameroioott Folitict ond Goooernomont. Newo Yorkt: Thomato Y. Coweoll Compeany, 1990. 642 ppe Sotos /imolooz, Rafael. Trotodo do derechoo eleotorol. Lo Haobana, Edi- torial Leo, 1946. 574 pp. Santoooni, Emtroi. S. Hueollas do glorio. Seguntda odicibn. Lo Ho- banao: Soone Foorolndoz y Cio., 1944. 260 pp. Zoyas y Alfonsto, Alfrodo. Ditcoso y onfeoronoias. Totto II. to Ho- bano: Molinao F Cooeoiita, 1942. 221 pp. FPdblic D~ocumntst Allegtto, KoitS. Moomoir of the Consotitutionaol Deop~en~tt of St. Lucio. St. Luoia: Coooetotmont Friting Offioo, 1990. 91 Fe. Boiley, Sydney D. Cottstitutiots of the British Colonoiet. Londton: Tho Hoantood Society, 1990. 52 pp. Brtish Couiano. Suspenttiott of t Conootitutio. totdon: Hot Moajet' Stoaltioey Ottio, 1953. 19eep. --Colotnial Ofllco. Repoot of the Cotitutiottal Comoisiont 1950-151. totndon: Hit Maj/otyts Stadtioep ODioo, 1991. 74 ee. "Cottoito do So Repblica do Cuoba, Gcooa do So Hobotta (Lounos 14 do abril do 1902). Coootitooiono do lo Reulica do Cubo. to Haboana: Imoeta F Faeloria doelRambl, Bouza y Cit., 1920. 57 pp. Coottituttiott of the Comooot Weolth of FPuerto Rico. Sot Juaon: Depart- met oofEducotiontPrest, 1999. "Cottooooido Contotuyete. Loy Noim. I,"' Gcoto Ofociol (to Hoboano, Editoro Modootot, tLuneo 8 do julio do 1940). Dunttoo, F. Constitutionol Developentt int St. Vincottt. Kioogstont: Coo- ertmttoPtriotiog tOoc, 1950. 18 ep. Estotutoo po/liios do So Reublica do Guoatemalo. Gutemaotlo C.A.. Tieo- goafio Naonatl, 1994. 24 pp. Great Britoin, Colotnial Offico. The Colontial Territooios 1954-1955. too- doo: Hot Mo/est's Statonery Offico, 1999. 185 op. InotrntionalBak folRontrttoionoad Deolopmen. ReortottCudbo. Washinogtoo, D.C., 1951. 1049 pp. Orgaoiztioo of Atmeoicon Stotes. Comtisin Iteoomtoricotto do Mojooot. Derechos civiots peolitios do So mujerO do Aomtrica. Vol. I5. Washoing- too, D.C., 1954. --oMttoria do So pesideoto do So Comtioidn Iteooomeoicotto do Mu/orot. Periodo 1953-195. Woashitono, D.C.: Coion Fotottooi- oooa, 1999. 29FFp. Roeport of the Attglo-Ameroicao Coribbeon Commotistiot to the Goveoomtottt of the Uite~d Stt ottd Greot Bohitai. Washinogton, D.C., 1943. 94 Fe. Roepor of the Commtissiont of Intquiry on Consttittiottol Reformt. Bitish Honduros: Coovoonmont Frioteo, 1951. 26 pp. Repblica do Cobo. Censo do 1943. Lo Hobaoo, P. Ferttdez y Cio., 1949. 1373 pF. Trioidad ood Tobogo. Report of the Froanchise Cotomittee of Trittidad ond Tobago. Coooeonoont Fritto, 1944. 149 Fe. 72 The Caribbean Moodontld, Atstin F. Lotin Aotooicott Folitics tttd Goooornmeott. Newt Yook, Thomoto Y. Coweoll Comopany, 1950, 642 Fe. Saotos Jimoine, Raofool. Tratodo do dooecho eletorol. to Habana:, Edi- toriol Leo, 1946. 574eep. Saotooeoi, Emtoolooo S. Houelots do glooio. Sogoodo odhiio. ta Ho- booa: Soaneo Ferodedo y Cio., 1944. 260 ppe Zoyos y Alfooso, Alfrodo. Ditcuosos p onofoertnoia. Too II. to Ho- botno: Molino y Cototeiiio, 1942. 221 Fe. Fubio Documtsoot Alleto, Keitho. Memooir of 1t Consttituotionaol Deopenott of St. tuci. St. tLucio, Gootontont Foitog Offio, 1990. 31 Fe. Stilop, Sydooy D. Cottttitotiottt of tho Britioh Colonie. tondon, Tho Hansood Society, 1990. 92 Fe. Btsh Gttiant. Susensoion of the Cottttitutiott. tondon:, Hot Maj/styts Stationooy flc, 1999. S9 pp. --Colooiol Offico. Reort of tho Cottstitutiottal Commtoisiont 1950-1951. tondoo: Hit Mojetty's Stoatoototy Offioo, 1991. 74 ee. "Conttittion do to Rlepiblioo do Cubo," Gceta do So Hobanto (totos 14 do obril do 1902). Cotitooiot do So Reublico do Cuba. ta Habaoa: Imprtaty p elotio do Ra00b51, Booto y Cio., 1920. 97 ee- Constittiont of the Comonot Woalth of Foeoto Rioo. Sot Jooan: Deoart- 00001 of Eduono Fress, 1999. "Convenci61o Coostituyento. toy Ntit. 1;" Gceto Ofioil (to Habana: Editota Modeoto, toutot 9 do jolio do 1940). Duocao, E. Constituional Developent00 ino St. Vincottt. Kiogston: Coo- ertmtoPrtntinOfficeSO, 1990. 18 p. Estatuoos eolitiost do So Reublica do CGuatemala. Cuatemala C.A.: Tipo- grafio Naoioool, 1954. 24 Fe. Great Britain, Coloiol Offio. Tho Colonoial Territooies 1954-1955. too- don: Hot Mo/estyts Statiotorp Offioo, 1959. 185 p. Ioteroooioool BooS too Reonotruoodoo and Developmenot. Reort 00 Cubo. Woashiogon, D.C., 1991. 1049 pp. Ogaoizttion of Ameroicao Stotet. Comoioin Iotetramerictoa do Mo/oro. Derecos civilot peolitiost do So 000500 do Am0oric. Vol. I . Wathinog- too, D.C., 1994. - - Meoria do So peoidento do So Com0iibno Interame0ca0a do Mu/ooos. Feoiodo 1953-l955. Wasington, D.C.: Uoion FPooameo- 0000, 1995. 29 Fe. Repoot of tho Anglo-Ameroicoan Caoibbeon Commotission to tho Goveoomtstt of the Uttitod States ond Goeat Britain. Washiogtoo, D.C., 1943. 94 Fe. Report of tho Commoiiono of Inquiop ont Conostttionl Roformt. Britsh Hoodoras: Coveonmoto Foiteor, 1991. 26 p. R~eublica do Coba. Cooso do 1943. to Habana, F. Footlndet p Cit., 1945. 1373 pp. Toinidad aod Tobago. Repoot of the Foranoie Cootmoitoee of Trinidad and Tobago. Cooototooot Priotot, 1944. 149 pp.  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 73 Unlited Nations. Estudio econdicos sde Amerpica LainaS, 1951-1952. Mixf- c,1954. Usnited Nptionss. Montly Busllin of Stastisics, frpom Asugst, 1954, to Augst, 1955. News York: Uited Nssiosss. UNESCO. Datos y cifrass. Paris: Talleres Chabs, 1955. 94 pp. Pam~sphless Allen,, Devere. The Caribbean: Laboratorssy of World Cooperations. New, York: League for Insdstsial Deocracys, 1943. 40 pp. Chaberb of Cpppmerce of Puertop Ricp. The Angl-Ameripcans Plansfs ts hel Caribbean,. ISan Juan, 1945. 36 pp. Cuper, George. Caribbean Affapirs. Sosial Stpsucturp fth sitish3, Car,- ibbeans. Extra-Mural Department. Univerity College sof the West Isn- dies. Kistons, 1949. Portell Viii, Ilpsssisi. H~~istoi de Amssrica. Apunteps de clse, tomasds per S. Zaldivar. Follptos. La Habanas. Shlockp, P. M. The~ Developmensst sltp Middle Clsa ss ip h Casribbeans. Lonsdon: Internaional Istsitute of Differing Civiizinss 1995. 7 pp. Artsicles Laski, Harosld J. "eocracssy," Encsyclspaedias of slip Social Spienceps. Eds., Fdwsin R. A. Seligmans ssd Al Joson~s. Vol. V. New, York: The Macmsillan Comspssp, 1942. Shpard, W. J. "Suffrage," Escplpa.dia o pth Sli ocsial Sciences. Eds., Edwins R. A. Seligmanss and Ailin Josonss. VoI. XIV. Npew York: The Macmdllans Cssspansy, 1942. vansGorkom J. A. J. "Psrssership ins aKissgdoss," The~ Caribbpan, VIII, 7 (Februassy, 1959). POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 73 Unsispd Naionss. Estsudip pppsdpmics de Amsdpica Latina, 1951-1952. 6x- co, 1954. United Nations. Montshly Buslletin ot Statistics, ftrom Asugss 1954, Is Augs, 1955. New, York: Unied Natios. UNESCO. Dates y cifras. Paris: Talleres Chais, 1911. 94 pp. Pamsphles Allen, Dpvppp. The~ Caribbean: Labsoratsry ot Wopld Cssperatisos. New, York:Leau forg Inssdustrial Deocracpsy, 1943. 40 pp. Chabesrlp pf Commesrpce of Puprso Rico. Thep Angl-Amerpican Plan fo ts hess Cariibpsan. ISa, Jssas, 1949. 36 pp. Camsper, George. Csribbpean Affais. Sociapl Structureof sth slit iishs Ca- ibbpsn. Extss-Murssl Dpsrtmsen. University College of slip Wpst Isn- dips. Kinsgstons, 1949. Ferrell Vila, Heprmsinip. Histppia de Amserics. Apusntes dppclsepssssds psr S. Zsldivap. Fpllpsps. La Habanass. Shloppk, P. M. Thp Develpmens t oflih Midle Classs is, sthp Cspibbess. Lonpdon: Intppseraionl Istitute sof Diffeing Civilizatsions, 1939. 7 pp. Articles Lsski, Harol~d J. Deocracsy," Esnpyclopsedia o thsli SocialSiencps. Eds., Edwins E. A. Seligmans ssnd Alvis Johnsos. Vpl. V. New, Ypsk: Tbhe Macmsillsn Copansy, 1942. Shpasrd, W. J. "Ssffrage," Encsyslopsediso sthsli Sociasl Sciences. PEds., Edins R. A. Sligmasn snd Alins Josonss. Vol. XIV. Np,, York: The, Msacmillsan Copansy, 1942. va orkoms, J. A. J. Psrnshsplip is p Kinsgdos," Tlip Cspibbpsss, VIII, 7 (Febrsary, 1919). POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 73 Unispd Natipns. Estudip spppd,,ipp de Ameiia Lstins, 1951-1952. Mi- pp. 1994. Unitpd Nstipons. Montshly Bullpsin Pt Statistics, fprom Asugst, 1954, to Ausgss, 1955. Npw Yprk: Unsitpd Nstions. UNESCO. Dstps p cifpas. Pais: Talepps Chi, 1931. 94 pp. Pamsphles Allpen, Dpeperp. The~ Capibbpan: Lasboratory of Wsrld Coperatsipos. New, York: Lesgue fsor Insdstial Deocracssy, 1943. 40 pp. Chamsbpp sof Cpompseppp of Psuerto Eico. The~ Anglo-Americsan Pla,, for sthp Cppibbepan. OSan Jsuan, 1945. 36 pp. Cupep, Ceorge. Capibbppan Affairs. ocial Structurep ofth slit iishi Car- ibbeps,. Extssa-Mupal Deparstsess. Usiversity Cpllpge sof she Wpst Isn- dies. Kingston, 1949. Porspll Viii, Hermsisnio. Histppia dep Apsicp. Apustes dep ciase tosrsds psr S. Zaldivarp. Fpolpetps. La Habsn. Shlockpp, P. M. Thep elp mentp s sof slip Middle Clsss is, slip Cpribbea. Lpondpn: Intepsatipnal Isisstp sof Differisg Cipilizatos, 1995. 7 pp. Articles Lpski, Harpold J. Democracp," Encsyclpaedip sof slip Sppiial Scipencps. Eds., Edins R. A. Seligmass ssd Alpin Josonss. Vol. V. Np,, Yosi: Thp Mpacmillans Comspasy, 1942. Shpard, W. J. "Ssffrpge," Escyclopaediaso sthel Sopial Siences. Eds., Edwis E. A. Seligmans snd Alins Johnssn. Vol. XIV. New, York: Ths Msacmillan Comspssy, 1942. vans Gpsrkom, J. A. J. "Pareshssip is p Kisgdo," The Caribbppan, VIII, 7 (Febrssry, 1955).  Robert J. Alexander: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN AMONG CERTAIN STUDENTS of Latin American affairs, it has long been popular to deprecate the importance of political parties in Latin America and to argue either that they are mere vehicles for the personal ambitions of one or another caudillo, or that they do not matter because the military makes the final decisions in any case. I should like to take issue with that point of view and to try to outline the principal currents among the political parties of the Caribbean area. I should then like to sketch briefly the principal pressure groups outside the political parties which bring their weight to bear on these organizations and on Caribbean politics in general. I shall include references both to independent republics around the Caribbean and to colonial areas, notably Puerto Rico and the British West Indies. All these areas, it seems to me, are going through much the same basic process. To understand the role of parties in the politics of the region, we must comprehend that the Caribbean area and all of Latin America is going through a fundamental revolution. This trans- formation is coming about as a result of the effects of economic Robert J. Alexander: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN AMONG CERTAIN STUDENTS of Latin American affairs, it has long been popular to deprecate the importance of political parties in Latin America and to argue either that they are mere vehicles for the personal ambitions of one or another caudillo, or that they do not matter because the military makes the final decisions in any case. I should like to take issue with that point of view and to try to outline the principal currents among the political parties of the Caribbean area. I should then like to sketch briefly the principal pressure groups outside the political parties which bring their weight to bear on these organizations and on Caribbean politics in general. I shall include references both to independent republics around the Caribbean and to colonial areas, notably Puerto Rico and the British West Indies. All these areas, it seems to me, are going through much the same basic process. To understand the role of parties in the politics of the region, we must comprehend that the Caribbean area and all of Latin America is going through a fundamental revolution. This trans- formation is coming about as a result of the effects of economic 74 Robert J. Alexander: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN AMONG CERTAIN STUDENTS of Latin American affairs, it has long been popular to deprecate the importance of political parties in Latin America and to argue either that they are mere vehicles for the personal ambitions of one or another caudillo, or that they do not matter because the military makes the final decisions in any case. I should like to take issue with that point of view and to try to outline the principal currents among the political parties of the Caribbean area. I should then like to sketch briefy the principal pressure groups outside the political parties which bring their weight to bear on these organizations and on Caribbean politics in general. I shall include references both to independent republics around the Caribbean and to colonial areas, notably Puerto Rico and the British West Indies. All these areas, it seems to me, are going through much the same basic process. To understand the role of parties in the politics of the region, we must comprehend that the Caribbean area and all of Latin America is going through a fundamental revolution. This trans- formation is coming about as a result of the effects of economic 74  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS / S development and industrialization within the region and as a reflection of world-wide events. The Latin American Social Revolution resolves itself into four fundamental phenomena: the rearrangement of class relation- ships; the rise of nationalism; the drive for economic develop- ment; and the attempt to achieve a greater degree of political democracy. The desire for a rearrangement of age-old relationships among various classes in the area arises from the growth of industry and commerce, which has brought into being new classes-most par- ticularly a growing middle class and a wage-earning industrial or semi-industrial working group. With the growing importance of these elements in the economic life of the nations of the region, they are no longer willing to accept the political domination of the small landed aristocracy which has controlled since time im- memorial most of these countries. In some parts of the Caribbean area, particularly in the British West Indian islands, this drive for altering class relationships has racial overtones. Until a few short years ago the dominant elements in most of the British West Indian islands-the groups which had the franchise, got the education, held the government jobs-consisted of European officials, the few remaining descen- dants of the old British landowners or merchants, and the mulatto groups which were most closely associated with them. In recent years, there has been a great desire on the part of the darker- skinned masses to upset this old order of things and to end the economic, social, and political domination of these traditional elements. The Mexican Revolution presented a similar picture of the combination of class and racial revulsion against the status quo. Revolt against the domination of the landowning descendants of the old conquistadores has brought to the fore the mestizo and to a lesser degree the Indian masses. These aspirations for a rearrangement of classes has been expressed particularly in two concrete ways. On the one hand, POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 75 development and industrialization within the region and as a reflection of world-wide events. The Latin American Social Revolution resolves itself into four fundamental phenomena: the rearrangement of class relation- ships; the rise of nationalism; the drive for economic develop- ment; and the attempt to achieve a greater degree of political democracy. The desire for a rearrangement of age-old relationships among various classes in the area arises from the growth of industry and commerce, which has brought into being new classes-most par- ticularly a growing middle class and a wage-earning industrial or semi-industrial working group. With the growing importance of these elements in the economic life of the nations of the region, they are no longer willing to accept the political domination of the small landed aristocracy which has controlled since time im- memorial most of these countries. In some parts of the Caribbean area, particularly in the British West Indian islands, this drive for altering class relationships has racial overtones. Until a few short years ago the dominant elements in most of the British West Indian islands-the groups which had the franchise, got the education, held the government jobs-consisted of European officials, the few remaining descen- dants of the old British landowners or merchants, and the mulatto groups which were most closely associated with them. In recent years, there has been a great desire on the part of the darker- skinned masses to upset this old order of things and to end the economic, social, and political domination of these traditional elements. The Mexican Revolution presented a similar picture of the combination of class and racial revulsion against the status quo. Revolt against the domination of the landowning descendants of the old conquistadores has brought to the fore the mestizo and to a lesser degree the Indian masses. These aspirations for a rearrangement of classes has been expressed particularly in two concrete ways. On the one hand, POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 75 development and industrialization within the region and as a reflection of world-wide events. The Latin American Social Revolution resolves itself into four fundamental phenomena: the rearrangement of class relation- ships; the rise of nationalism; the drive for economic develop- ment; and the attempt to achieve a greater degree of political democracy. The desire for a rearrangement of age-old relationships among various classes in the area arises from the growth of industry and commerce, which has brought into being new classes-most par- ticularly a growing middle class and a wage-earning industrial or semi-industrial working group. With the growing importance of these elements in the economic life of the nations of the region, they are no longer willing to accept the political domination of the small landed aristocracy which has controlled since time im- memorial most of these countries. In some parts of the Caribbean area, particularly in the British West Indian islands, this drive for altering class relationships has racial overtones. Until a few short years ago the dominant elements in most of the British West Indian islands-the groups which had the franchise, got the education, held the government jobs-consisted of European officials, the few remaining descen- dants of the old British landowners or merchants, and the mulatto groups which were most closely associated with them. In recent years, there has been a great desire on the part of the darker- skinned masses to upset this old order of things and to end the economic, social, and political domination of these traditional elements. The Mexican Revolution presented a similar picture of the combination of class and racial revulsion against the status quo. Revolt against the domination of the landowning descendants of the old conquistadores has brought to the fore the mestizo and to a lesser degree the Indian masses. These aspirations for a rearrangement of classes has been expressed particularly in two concrete ways. On the one hand,  76 The Caribbean there has been a continuous drive on the part of the new working class for a chance to organize and a chance to participate to a greater extent in the income of the various countries through successful collective bargaining and extensive labor and social legislation. In the second place, there has been a growing demand in some of the countries-most particularly Mexico and Guate- mala-for agrarian reform. In the former case, the agrarian reform has been largely accomplished, with most of the more productive land being transferred from the large landholders to one or another species of ejido, or "cooperative farm," In Guate- mala, after a rather demagogic start, the immediate future of agrarian reform is now in some doubt. The second major aspect of the Latin American Social Revo- lution has been the rise of nationalism. It could not be expected that the countries of the Caribbean and the rest of the Hemi- sphere would be exempted from the effects of this, one of the most powerful ideological forces of our time. Ever since World War I, the tide of nationalism has risen higher and higher in the area. It has resulted, in the British islands and Puerto Rico, particularly in the last fifteen to twenty years, in urgent demands for a new sort of arrangement between the colonial areas and the mother countries. In the former case this is likely, within a short span of years, to result in the creation of a new British Dominion; in the latter it has resulted in one of the most fasci- nating political experiments of the contemporary world. In the independent countries of the Caribbean area the effects of nationalism have been felt in the form of deep resentment against past attempts by the United States and European Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of these nations and against any apparent contemporary continuation of such interventionist policies. It has also taken the form of a drive to have the control of the economies of the respective Caribbean countries placed firmly in the hands of the people of those nations. Hence we have the drive of Mexico to nationalize those foreign firms which the Mexicans felt behaved badly in their midst, the establishment 76 The Caribbean there has been a continuous drive on the part of the new working class for a chance to organize and a chance to participate to a greater extent in the income of the various countries through successful collective bargaining and extensive labor and social legislation. In the second place, there has been a growing demand in some of the countries-most particularly Mexico and Guate- mala-for agrarian reform. In the former case, the agrarian reform has been largely accomplished, with most of the more productive land being transferred from the large landholders to one or another species of ejido, or "cooperative farm." In Guate- mala, after a rather demagogic start, the immediate future of agrarian reform is now in some doubt. The second major aspect of the Latin American Social Revo- lution has been the rise of nationalism. It could not be expected that the countries of the Caribbean and the rest of the Hemi- sphere would be exempted from the effects of this, one of the most powerful ideological forces of our time. Ever since World War I, the tide of nationalism has risen higher and higher in the area. It has resulted, in the British islands and Puerto Rico, particularly in the last fifteen to twenty years, in urgent demands for a new sort of arrangement between the colonial areas and the mother countries. In the former case this is likely, within a short span of years, to result in the creation of a new British Dominion; in the latter it has resulted in one of the most fasci- nating political experiments of the contemporary world. In the independent countries of the Caribbean area the effects of nationalism have been felt in the form of deep resentment against past attempts by the United States and European Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of these nations and against any apparent contemporary continuation of such interventionist policies. It has also taken the form of a drive to have the control of the economies of the respective Caribbean countries placed firmly in the hands of the people of those nations. Hence we have the drive of Mexico to nationalize those foreign firms which the Mexicans felt behaved badly in their midst, the establishment 76 The Caribbean there has been a continuous drive on the part of the new working class for a chance to organize and a chance to participate to a greater extent in the income of the various countries through successful collective bargaining and extensive labor and social legislation. In the second place, there has been a growing demand in some of the countries-most particularly Mexico and Guate- mala-for agrarian reform. In the former case, the agrarian reform has been largely accomplished, with most of the more productive land being transferred from the large landholders to one or another species of ejido, or "cooperative farm." In Guate- mala, after a rather demagogic start, the immediate future of agrarian reform is now in some doubt. The second major aspect of the Latin American Social Revo- lution has been the rise of nationalism. It could not be expected that the countries of the Caribbean and the rest of the Hemi- sphere would be exempted from the effects of this, one of the most powerful ideological forces of our time. Ever since World War I, the tide of nationalism has risen higher and higher in the area. It has resulted, in the British islands and Puerto Rico, particularly in the last fifteen to twenty years, in urgent demands for a new sort of arrangement between the colonial areas and the mother countries. In the former case this is likely, within a short span of years, to result in the creation of a new British Dominion; in the latter it has resulted in one of the most fasci- nating political experiments of the contemporary world. In the independent countries of the Caribbean area the effects of nationalism have been felt in the form of deep resentment against past attempts by the United States and European Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of these nations and against any apparent contemporary continuation of such interventionist policies. It has also taken the form of a drive to have the control of the economies of the respective Caribbean countries placed firmly in the hands of the people of those nations. Hence we have the drive of Mexico to nationalize those foreign firms which the Mexicans felt behaved badly in their midst, the establishment  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS T/ by Cuba and the Dominican Republic of their own Central Banks with the issuance of their own currency, and widespread restric- tion on the employment of foreigners in many of these nations. Closely allied to the nationalist drive is that for economic development. The Caribbean countries have resented the fact that the well-being of their economies has depended so largely on forces outside their own control. They have therefore felt the impelling necessity for diversification of their economies and industrialization. They have felt that it is necessary for them to produce at least the basic consumer goods which they will need whether or not the rest of the world is engaged in war or suffer- ing from a depression. Thus in the Caribbean area, as throughout Latin America, industrialization and economic development has become an article of faith. Governments have set up development corporations and other institutions to openly encourage the diversification and ex- pansion of their economies. They have made as full use of tariffs and other legal devices for encouraging industries as their inter- national commitments will allow. Finally, a great yearning for political democracy has been sweeping over the area since World War II. In the British West Indies, it has taken the form of a demand for a revision of antiquated constitutions, so as to extend the franchise to all adults; and of demands for responsible self-government. In the independent republics, it has meant a growing desire by hitherto- depressed classes to participate more actively in the government of their nations, as well as an aspiration-unfortunately in some of the countries it is little more than this-for a fuller application of the customary democratic freedoms of speech, press organiza- tion, and the like. II This Latin American Social Revolution, in which the Carib- bean area has shared, has brought about a profound transforma- tion in the nature of the political parties of the region. The POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 77 by Cuba and the Dominican Republic of their own Central Banks with the issuance of their own currency, and widespread restric- tion on the employment of foreigners in many of these nations. Closely allied to the nationalist drive is that for economic development. The Caribbean countries have resented the fact that the well-being of their economies has depended so largely on forces outside their own control. They have therefore felt the impelling necessity for diversification of their economies and industrialization. They have felt that it is necessary for them to produce at least the basic consumer goods which they will need whether or not the rest of the world is engaged in war or suffer- ing from a depression. Thus in the Caribbean area, as throughout Latin America, industrialization and economic development has become an article of faith. Governments have set up development corporations and other institutions to openly encourage the diversification and ex- pansion of their economies. They have made as full use of tariffs and other legal devices for encouraging industries as their inter- national commitments will allow. Finally, a great yearning for political democracy has been sweeping over the area since World War IL In the British West Indies, it has taken the form of a demand for a revision of antiquated constitutions, so as to extend the franchise to all adults; and of demands for responsible self-government. In the independent republics, it has meant a growing desire by hitherto- depressed classes to participate more actively in the government of their nations, as well as an aspiration-unfortunately in some of the countries it is little more than this-for a fuller application of the customary democratic freedoms of speech, press organiza- tion, and the like. II This Latin American Social Revolution, in which the Carib- bean area has shared, has brought about a profound transforma- tion in the nature of the political parties of the region. The POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 77 by Cuba and the Dominican Republic of their own Central Banks with the issuance of their own currency, and widespread restric- tion on the employment of foreigners in many of these nations. Closely allied to the nationalist drive is that for economic development. The Caribbean countries have resented the fact that the well-being of their economies has depended so largely on forces outside their own control. They have therefore felt the impelling necessity for diversification of their economies and industrialization. They have felt that it is necessary for them to produce at least the basic consumer goods which they will need whether or not the rest of the world is engaged in war or suffer- ing from a depression. Thus in the Caribbean area, as throughout Latin America, industrialization and economic development has become an article of faith. Governments have set up development corporations and other institutions to openly encourage the diversification and ex- pansion of their economies. They have made as full use of tariffs and other legal devices for encouraging industries as their inter- national commitments will allow. Finally, a great yearning for political democracy has been sweeping over the area since World War II. In the British West Indies, it has taken the form of a demand for a revision of antiquated constitutions, so as to extend the franchise to all adults; and of demands for responsible self-government. In the independent republics, it has meant a growing desire by hitherto- depressed classes to participate more actively in the government of their nations, as well as an aspiration-unfortunately in some of the countries it is little more than this-for a fuller application of the customary democratic freedoms of speech, press organiza- tion, and the like. II This Latin American Social Revolution, in which the Carib- bean area has shared, has brought about a profound transforma- tion in the nature of the political parties of the region. The  78 The Caribbean traditional parties were the tools of the small ruling elite, and the more conservative among them still play a significant role as the defenders of the status quo against the Latin American Social Revolution. However, the traditional Liberal parties have either had to expand their ranks and broaden their programs, or they have had to give way to new political organizations. The Liberal parties of Colombia and Honduras, for example, so changed their composition and ideologies as to keep abreast of the times. In Cuba, on the other hand, the traditional Liberal Party failed to do so, and it and other old-fashioned parties have been supplanted in large part by the so-called "revolutionary" parties which have come along since 1933. A whole range of new parties has evolved. These are of vary- ing philosophies and ideologies, but all of them in one way or another respond to the needs of the Latin American Social Revo- lution. In the first place, there are the more or less orthodox Socialist parties, which in the Caribbean area are confined largely to the British islands. In Jamaica, Barbados, and some of the smaller islands, vigorous democratic socialist organizations have arisen and have even been able to take over the reins of government. Communist parties also have arisen in response to the Social Revolution in the Caribbean. Those of Cuba, Costa Rica, British Guiana, and Guatemala have had a considerable degree of suc- cess at one time or another in convincing large segments of the people that they were the truest representatives of the needs of their respective countries and could best carry out the revolution- ary aspirations of the electorate. However, the communists met stiff opposition, and at the present time their organizations are more important potentially than actually. Several types of what we may call indigenous revolutionary parties have appeared. One of these types, which I like to call the Aprista parties (taking the name from the oldest Latin Ameri- can representative of this group, the Aprista party of Peru), has perhaps been most important. Representatives of this type 78 The Caribbean 78 The Caribbean traditional parties were the tools of the small ruling elite, and the more conservative among them still play a significant role as the defenders of the status quo against the Latin American Social Revolution. However, the traditional Liberal parties have either had to expand their ranks and broaden their programs, or they have had to give way to new political organizations. The Liberal parties of Colombia and Honduras, for example, so changed their composition and ideologies as to keep abreast of the times. In Cuba, on the other hand, the traditional Liberal Party failed to do so, and it and other old-fashioned parties have been supplanted in large part by the so-called "revolutionary" parties which have come along since 1933. A whole range of new parties has evolved. These are of vary- ing philosophies and ideologies, but all of them in one way or another respond to the needs of the Latin American Social Revo- lution. In the first place, there are the more or less orthodox Socialist parties, which in the Caribbean area are confined largely to the British islands. In Jamaica, Barbados, and some of the smaller islands, vigorous democratic socialist organizations have arisen and have even been able to take over the reins of government. Communist parties also have arisen in response to the Social Revolution in the Caribbean. Those of Cuba, Costa Rica, British Guiana, and Guatemala have had a considerable degree of suc- cess at one time or another in convincing large segments of the people that they were the truest representatives of the needs of their respective countries and could best carry out the revolution- ary aspirations of the electorate. However, the communists met stiff opposition, and at the present time their organizations are more important potentially than actually. Several types of what we may call indigenous revolutionary parties have appeared. One of these types, which I like to call the Aprista parties (taking the name from the oldest Latin Ameri- can representative of this group, the Aprista party of Peru), has perhaps been most important. Representatives of this type traditional parties were the tools of the small ruling elite, and the more conservative among them still play a significant role as the defenders of the status quo against the Latin American Social Revolution. However, the traditional Liberal parties have either had to expand their ranks and broaden their programs, or they have had to give way to new political organizations. The Liberal parties of Colombia and Honduras, for example, so changed their composition and ideologies as to keep abreast of the times. In Cuba, on the other hand, the traditional Liberal Party failed to do so, and it and other old-fashioned parties have been supplanted in large part by the so-called "revolutionary" parties which have come along since 1933. A whole range of new parties has evolved. These are of vary- ing philosophies and ideologies, but all of them in one way or another respond to the needs of the Latin American Social Revo- lution. In the first place, there are the more or less orthodox Socialist parties, which in the Caribbean area are confined largely to the British islands. In Jamaica, Barbados, and some of the smaller islands, vigorous democratic socialist organizations have arisen and have even been able to take over the reins of government. Communist parties also have arisen in response to the Social Revolution in the Caribbean. Those of Cuba, Costa Rica, British Guiana, and Guatemala have had a considerable degree of suc- cess at one time or another in convincing large segments of the people that they were the truest representatives of the needs of their respective countries and could best carry out the revolution- ary aspirations of the electorate. However, the communists met stiff opposition, and at the present time their organizations are more important potentially than actually. Several types of what we may call indigenous revolutionary parties have appeared. One of these types, which I like to call the Aprista parties (taking the name from the oldest Latin Ameri- can representative of this group, the Aprista party of Peru), has perhaps been most important. Representatives of this type  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS /9 of political organization in the Caribbean area include the Demo- cratic Action Party of Venezuela, the Liberacion Nacional party of Jos6 Figueres in Costa Rica, Luis Mufioz Marin's Popular Democrats in Puerto Rico, and the Autintcos in Cuba. These groups are socialistic though not avowedly Socialist; they are nationalistic, though not extremely so; they make their appeal largely to the industrial workers, the lower middle class, and the intellectuals. They seek to develop their programs on the basis of the individual needs of the country in which they are operat- ing, though carrying out the objectives of the Latin American Social Revolution-that is, an alteration of class relationships, assertion of nationalism, stimulation of economic development, and political democracy. The Social Catholics are another group which has its represent- atives among those parties which have sought to meet the needs of the rapidly changing situation in the Caribbean area. The principal representative of this group is the Copei Party of Vene- zuela, though perhaps the People's United Party of British Honduras might also be put in this category. They base their philosophy on the papal encyclicals Rerum novarum and Quad- ragesimo anno and attempt to apply Christian principles to the economic, social, and political problems of their nations. Finally, mention should be made of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) of Mexico. This does not fit conveniently into any of the categories which we have listed. It is the party of the Mexican Revolution par excellence. Through various changes of name during the last quarter of a century, it has continued to represent the living tradition of the Revolution- that it is a tradition by now is shown by the very name of the party at the present time. It is still pledged to a completion of the agrarian reform, to "Mexico for the Mexicans," and to the eventual attainment of full-fledged political democracy. It draws its backing and its very life from those elements in the popu- lation that support the continuation of the revolutionary process which began in 1910. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 79 of political organization in the Caribbean area include the Demo- cratic Action Party of Venezuela, the Liberacion Nacional party of Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, Luis Muioz Marin's Popular Democrats in Puerto Rico, and the Autnticos in Cuba. These groups are socialistic though not avowedly Socialist; they are nationalistic, though not extremely so; they make their appeal largely to the industrial workers, the lower middle class, and the intellectuals. They seek to develop their programs on the basis of the individual needs of the country in which they are operat- ing, though carrying out the objectives of the Latin American Social Revolution-that is, an alteration of class relationships, assertion of nationalism, stimulation of economic development, and political democracy. The Social Catholics are another group which has its represent- atives among those parties which have sought to meet the needs of the rapidly changing situation in the Caribbean area. The principal representative of this group is the Copei Party of Vene- zuela, though perhaps the People's United Party of British Honduras might also be put in this category. They base their philosophy on the papal encyclicals Rerum novarum and Quad- ragesimo anno and attempt to apply Christian principles to the economic, social, and political problems of their nations. Finally, mention should be made of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) of Mexico. This does not fit conveniently into any of the categories which we have listed. It is the party of the Mexican Revolution par excellence. Through various changes of name during the last quarter of a century, it has continued to represent the living tradition of the Revolution- that it is a tradition by now is shown by the very name of the party at the present time. It is still pledged to a completion of the agrarian reform, to "Mexico for the Mexicans," and to the eventual attainment of full-fledged political democracy. It draws its backing and its very life from those elements in the popu- lation that support the continuation of the revolutionary process which began in 1910. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 79 of political organization in the Caribbean area include the Demo- cratic Action Party of Venezuela, the Liberacidn Nacional party of Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, Luis Munoz Mario's Popular Democrats in Puerto Rico, and the Autdnticos in Cuba. These groups are socialistic though not avowedly Socialist; they are nationalistic, though not extremely so; they make their appeal largely to the industrial workers, the lower middle class, and the intellectuals. They seek to develop their programs on the basis of the individual needs of the country in which they are operat- ing, though carrying out the objectives of the Latin American Social Revolution-that is, an alteration of class relationships, assertion of nationalism, stimulation of economic development, and political democracy. The Social Catholics are another group which has its represent- atives among those parties which have sought to meet the needs of the rapidly changing situation in the Caribbean area. The principal representative of this group is the Copei Party of Vene- zuela, though perhaps the People's United Party of British Honduras might also be put in this category. They base their philosophy on the papal encyclicals Rerum novarum and Quad- ragesimo anno and attempt to apply Christian principles to the economic, social, and political problems of their nations. Finally, mention should be made of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) of Mexico. This does not fit conveniently into any of the categories which we have listed. It is the party of the Mexican Revolution par excellence. Through various changes of name during the last quarter of a century, it has continued to represent the living tradition of the Revolution- that it is a tradition by now is shown by the very name of the party at the present time. It is still pledged to a completion of the agrarian reform, to "Mexico for the Mexicans," and to the eventual attainment of full-fledged political democracy. It draws its backing and its very life from those elements in the popu- lation that support the continuation of the revolutionary process which began in 1910.  80 The Caribbean Aside from the traditional parties and the new ones thrown up by the Revolution, one should note the continued existence of personalist parties. Perhaps the most important representative of this group in the present-day scene is the PRUD (Revolution- ary Party for Democratic Unification) of El Salvador. This is a group organized to back the candidacy of Colonel Oscar Osorio for the presidency of the republic, and will probably die with his exit from office. Although in a vague way pledged to the principles of the very moderate revolution through which El Salvador has been passing since 1948, it cannot be called an ideological party. Other examples of this type of organization are found in the British West Indies. Those parties which, in the beginning of the wave of unrest that swept the British Caribbean fifteen years ago, first caught the imagination of the people, were largely organized around colorful individuals who had little in the way of political philosophy except discontent with the status quo and burning personal ambition. Such groups as William Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica Labor Party and Uriah Butler's Ratepayers' Party in Trinidad were of this nature. They have now for the most part either been eclipsed or are on the way to such a fate. Even in the other types of parties there are still strong elements of personalism. Certainly the personalities of Pepe Figueres, Rsmulo Betancourt, Norman Manley, Munoz Marin are powerful elements in the success of their respective political organizations. Yet these parties aspire to something more than mere personal- ism, and they do have an ideological content in their program which differentiates them from the parties which we have called "personalist." III So much for the political parties. We have seen that the political organizations of the Caribbean area are, like parties in any other part of the world, organizations which have arisen out of the needs of their respective countries. Most of them have 80 The Caribbean 80 The Caribbean Aside from the traditional parties and the new ones thrown up by the Revolution, one should note the continued existence of personalist parties. Perhaps the most important representative of this group in the present-day scene is the PRUD (Revolution- ary Party for Democratic Unification) of El Salvador. This is a group organized to back the candidacy of Colonel Oscar Osorio for the presidency of the republic, and will probably die with his exit from office. Although in a vague way pledged to the principles of the very moderate revolution through which El Salvador has been passing since 1948, it cannot be called an ideological party. Other examples of this type of organization are found in the British West Indies. Those parties which, in the beginning of the wave of unrest that swept the British Caribbean fifteen years ago, first caught the imagination of the people, were largely organized around colorful individuals who had little in the way of political philosophy except discontent with the status quo and burning personal ambition. Such groups as William Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica Labor Party and Uriah Butler's Ratepayers' Party in Trinidad were of this nature. They have now for the most part either been eclipsed or are on the way to such a fate. Even in the other types of parties there are still strong elements of personalism. Certainly the personalities of Pepe Figueres, RLmulo Betancourt, Norman Manley, Munoz Marin are powerful elements in the success of their respective political organizations. Yet these parties aspire to something more than mere personal- ism, and they do have an ideological content in their program which differentiates them from the parties which we have called "personalist." III So much for the political parties. We have seen that the political organizations of the Caribbean area are, like parties in any other part of the world, organizations which have arisen out of the needs of their respective countries. Most of them have Aside from the traditional parties and the new ones thrown up by the Revolution, one should note the continued existence of personalist parties. Perhaps the most important representative of this group in the present-day scene is the PRUD (Revolution- ary Party for Democratic Unification) of El Salvador. This is a group organized to back the candidacy of Colonel Oscar Osorio for the presidency of the republic, and will probably die with his exit from office. Although in a vague way pledged to the principles of the very moderate revolution through which El Salvador has been passing since 1948, it cannot be called an ideological party. Other examples of this type of organization are found in the British West Indies. Those parties which, in the beginning of the wave of unrest that swept the British Caribbean fifteen years ago, first caught the imagination of the people, were largely organized around colorful individuals who had little in the way of political philosophy except discontent with the status quo and burning personal ambition. Such groups as William Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica Labor Party and Uriah Butler's Ratepayers' Party in Trinidad were of this nature. They have now for the most part either been eclipsed or are on the way to such a fate. Even in the other types of parties there are still strong elements of personalism. Certainly the personalities of Pepe Figueres, Rdmulo Betancourt, Norman Manley, Munoz Marin are powerful elements in the success of their respective political organizations. Yet these parties aspire to something more than mere personal- ism, and they do have an ideological content in their program which differentiates them from the parties which we have called "personalist." III So much for the political parties. We have seen that the political organizations of the Caribbean area are, like parties in any other part of the world, organizations which have arisen out of the needs of their respective countries. Most of them have  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 31 well-defined ideologies or philosophies, and the most important ones are those which have either known how to adapt themselves to or have grown out of the Latin American Social Revolution. However, political parties in the Caribbean region, as every- where else, are subject to pressure of one kind or another from various groups outside their ranks. We must now turn our atten- tion to the most important of these groups. Certainly first on the list is the Army. With the exception of Costa Rica, every independent country in the region has an Army which is more or less accustomed to participating actively in political life. Except for Costa Rica, there is not an independ- ent country in the region in which the rulers do not have to keep in the back of their minds the possible reaction of the Army to almost anything they do. There is not an independent nation in the area except Costa Rica in which the attitude of the Army is not an important consideration at election time. Most of the countries actually have military or semimilitary dictatorships. The Army has generally been a conservative influence in the politics of Latin America and of the Caribbean. However, in recent years there have appeared left-wing tendencies among particularly the junior officers of the Caribbean armies. The Army was one of the chief elements in the coalition which backed the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations in Guatemala. A number of junior oficers of the Venezuelan Army joined with the Democratic Action Party in the 1945 Revolution, and some of them have worked with this group ever since. Army officers have been the principal element behind the moderately reformist regime which has ruled El Salvador since December, 1948. However, though some of the younger military men of the Caribbean area have gained sympathy with the Latin American Social Revolution, there are few of them who are willing to give up the tradition that the Army has the last say in the nation's politics. The Democratic Actionists of Venezuela found this out in 1948 when they were too successful in building up civilian organizations which threatened in time to become a challenge to POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS well-defined ideologies or philosophies, and the most impor ones are those which have either known how to adapt themse to or have grown out of the Latin American Social Revolut However, political parties in the Caribbean region, as ev where else, are subject to pressure of one kind or another f various groups outside their ranks. We must now turn our at tion to the most important of these groups. Certainly first on the list is the Army. With the exceptio Costa Rica, every independent country in the region has Army which is more or less accustomed to participating acti in political life. Except for Costa Rica, there is not an indep< ent country in the region in which the rulers do not hav keep in the back of their minds the possible reaction of the A to almost anything they do. There is not an independent na in the area except Costa Rica in which the attitude of the A is not an important consideration at election time. Most of countries actually have military or semimilitary dictatorship The Army has generally been a conservative influence in politics of Latin America and of the Caribbean. However recent years there have appeared left-wing tendencies an particularly the junior officers of the Caribbean armies. Army was one of the chief elements in the coalition w: backed the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations in Guaten A number of junior officers of the Venezuelan Army joined, the Democratic Action Party in the 1945 Revolution, and s of them have worked with this group ever since. Army off have been the principal element behind the moderately refor regime which has ruled El Salvador since December, 1948. However, though some of the younger military men of Caribbean area have gained sympathy with the Latin Amer Social Revolution, there are few of them who are willing to up the tradition that the Army has the last say in the nat. politics. The Democratic Actionists of Venezuela found this in 1948 when they were too successful in building up civ. organizations which threatened in time to become a challen 81 POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 81 well-defined ideologies or philosophies, and the most important ones are those which have either known how to adapt themselves to or have grown out of the Latin American Social Revolution. However, political parties in the Caribbean region, as every- where else, are subject to pressure of one kind or another from various groups outside their ranks. We must now turn our atten- tion to the most important of these groups. Certainly first on the list is the Army. With the exception of Costa Rica, every independent country in the region has an Army which is more or less accustomed to participating actively in political life. Except for Costa Rica, there is not an independ- ent country in the region in which the rulers do not have to keep in the back of their minds the possible reaction of the Army to almost anything they do. There is not an independent nation in the area except Costa Rica in which the attitude of the Army is not an important consideration at election time. Most of the countries actually have military or semimilitary dictatorships. The Army has generally been a conservative influence in the politics of Latin America and of the Caribbean. However, in recent years there have appeared left-wing tendencies among particularly the junior officers of the Caribbean armies. The Army was one of the chief elements in the coalition which backed the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations in Guatemala. A number of junior officers of the Venezuelan Army joined with the Democratic Action Party in the 1945 Revolution, and some of them have worked with this group ever since. Army oficeers have been the principal element behind the moderately reformist regime which has ruled El Salvador since December, 1948. However, though some of the younger military men of the Caribbean area have gained sympathy with the Latin American Social Revolution, there are few of them who are willing to give up the tradition that the Army has the last say in the nation's politics. The Democratic Actionists of Venezuela found this out in 1948 when they were too successful in building up civilian organizations which threatened in time to become a challenge to  82 The Caribbean the Army's control of the nation's civic life. As a result, the Army ousted them from control of the government and has since ruled through a military dictatorship. Thus the Army remains the most significant and powerful pressure group in Latin American politics. However, there are others of considerable weight. One of these consists of the land- owners and agriculturalists. In most of the countries of the Caribbean area the agricultural interests are organized in coffee federations, agricultural associations, and other similar organiza- tions. In most of the countries of the region this class still is the dominant element in the economic and social life of the nation, and hence is of tremendous importance in political affairs. Perhaps the most complete monopoly of economic, social, and political power by the agriculturalists is found in the Republic of El Salvador. Virtually all the arable land of the country is owned by a limited number of great families whose principal wealth is in coffee plantations. These same families, however, also control the nation's cattle industry and the expanding sugar and rice cultivation. They also control most of the banking system and a large part of the nation's commerce, including most of its foreign trade. This same small band of coffee planters constitutes the nation's aristocracy and dominates its social life. They also have the last word in the country's politics. Though the government which has ruled El Salvador since December, 1948, has ostensibly been controlled by the Army and has been a reform regime, even the military has not dared to touch the interests of the landholding aristocracy. Even in countries where the hold of the landowners is not so complete as in El Salvador, their position is a strong one. They are a powerful element in the political life of most of the Carib- bean countries and make their wishes known from time to time. Another basically conservative element consists of those foreign economic interests-frequently backed by their home govern- ments-which play such an important role in the life of the 82 The Caribbean the Army's control of the nation's civic life. As a result, the Army ousted them from control of the government and has since ruled through a military dictatorship. Thus the Army remains the most significant and powerful pressure group in Latin American politics. However, there are others of considerable weight. One of these consists of the land- owners and agriculturalists. In most of the countries of the Caribbean area the agricultural interests are organized in coffee federations, agricultural associations, and other similar organiza- tions. In most of the countries of the region this class still is the dominant element in the economic and social life of the nation, and hence is of tremendous importance in political affairs. Perhaps the most complete monopoly of economic, social, and political power by the agriculturalists is found in the Republic of El Salvador. Virtually all the arable land of the country is owned by a limited number of great families whose principal wealth is in coffee plantations. These same families, however, also control the nation's cattle industry and the expanding sugar and rice cultivation. They also control most of the banking system and a large part of the nation's commerce, including most of its foreign trade. This same small band of coffee planters constitutes the nation's aristocracy and dominates its social life. They also have the last word in the country's politics. Though the government which has ruled El Salvador since December, 1948, has ostensibly been controlled by the Army and has been a reform regime, even the military has not dared to touch the interests of the landholding aristocracy. Even in countries where the hold of the landowners is not so complete as in El Salvador, their position is a strong one. They are a powerful element in the political life of most of the Carib- bean countries and make their wishes known from time to time. Another basically conservative element consists of those foreign economic interests-frequently backed by their home govern- ments-which play such an important role in the life of the 82 The Caribbean the Army's control of the nation's civic life. As a result, the Army ousted them from control of the government and has since ruled through a military dictatorship. Thus the Army remains the most significant and powerful pressure group in Latin American politics. However, there are others of considerable weight. One of these consists of the land- owners and agriculturalists. In most of the countries of the Caribbean area the agricultural interests are organized in coffee federations, agricultural associations, and other similar organiza- tions. In most of the countries of the region this class still is the dominant element in the economic and social life of the nation, and hence is of tremendous importance in political affairs. Perhaps the most complete monopoly of economic, social, and political power by the agriculturalists is found in the Republic of El Salvador. Virtually all the arable land of the country is owned by a limited number of great families whose principal wealth is in coffee plantations. These same families, however, also control the nation's cattle industry and the expanding sugar and rice cultivation. They also control most of the banking system and a large part of the nation's commerce, including most of its foreign trade. This same small band of coffee planters constitutes the nation's aristocracy and dominates its social life. They also have the last word in the country's politics. Though the government which has ruled El Salvador since December, 1948, has ostensibly been controlled by the Army and has been a reform regime, even the military has not dared to touch the interests of the landholding aristocracy. Even in countries where the hold of the landowners is not so complete as in El Salvador, their position is a strong one. They are a powerful element in the political life of most of the Carib- bean countries and make their wishes known from time to time. Another basically conservative element consists of those foreign economic interests-frequently backed by their home govern- ments-which play such an important role in the life of the  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 83 Caribbean countries. Companies such as the United Fruit and Standard Fruit companies, the International Railways of Central America, the public utility companies, the oil and mining firms, and the airlines certainly constitute some of the most formidable of all pressure groups in the region. The foreign firms have for the most part become more dis- creet in recent years. The oil companies certainly learned a bitter lesson in this regard in the expropriation of their Mexican hold- ings. The United Fruit Company has found it somewhat harder to adjust to changes of the times. Certainly the day is gone when the foreign companies can openly subsidize political parties, can overtly encourage revolu- tions, can constantly call upon their home governments to defend their interests no matter into what kind of mess they may get themselves. However, there is no doubt that these foreign cor- porations are still a major force in the political life of the coun- tries in which they are operating. Though behaving more subtly, they still wield tremendous influence and still, upon occasion, call upon their home governments to come to their defense. Behind the scenes they remain one of the region's most powerful pressure groups. Another economic interest of considerable and growing weight in Caribbean affairs is the commercial and industrial class. Cer- tain segments of the trading class were associated traditionally with the landholding aristocracy and shared the management of the ancien rdgime. The industrial middle classes are another thing. The owners of the new manufacturing industries have interests which clash profoundly with those of the agriculturalists and foreign traders. They want protection for their industries; the agriculturalists want cheap foreign goods. The industrialists want a larger internal market; the creation of such a market means the transformation of the rural masses from semiserfs to small landowners or well-paid workers with rising standards of living, which is anathema to the old landholding group. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 83 Caribbean countries. Companies such as the United Fruit and Standard Fruit companies, the International Railways of Central America, the public utility companies, the oil and mining firms, and the airlines certainly constitute some of the most formidable of all pressure groups in the region. The foreign firms have for the most part become more dis- creet in recent years. The oil companies certainly learned a bitter lesson in this regard in the expropriation of their Mexican hold- ings. The United Fruit Company has found it somewhat harder to adjust to changes of the times. Certainly the day is gone when the foreign companies can openly subsidize political parties, can overtly encourage revolu- tions, can constantly call upon their home governments to defend their interests no matter into what kind of mess they may get themselves. However, there is no doubt that these foreign cor- porations are still a major force in the political life of the coun- tries in which they are operating. Though behaving more subtly, they still wield tremendous influence and still, upon occasion, call upon their home governments to come to their defense. Behind the scenes they remain one of the region's most powerful pressure groups. Another economic interest of considerable and growing weight in Caribbean affairs is the commercial and industrial class. Cer- tain segments of the trading class were associated traditionally with the landholding aristocracy and shared the management of the ancien regime. The industrial middle classes are another thing. The owners of the new manufacturing industries have interests which clash profoundly with those of the agriculturalists and foreign traders. They want protection for their industries; the agriculturalists want cheap foreign goods. The industrialists want a larger internal market; the creation of such a market means the transformation of the rural masses from semiserfs to small landowners or well-paid workers with rising standards of living, which is anathema to the old landholding group. POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 83 Caribbean countries. Companies such as the United Fruit and Standard Fruit companies, the International Railways of Central America, the public utility companies, the oil and mining firms, and the airlines certainly constitute some of the most formidable of all pressure groups in the region. The foreign firms have for the most part become more dis- creet in recent years. The oil companies certainly learned a bitter lesson in this regard in the expropriation of their Mexican hold- ings. The United Fruit Company has found it somewhat harder to adjust to changes of the times. Certainly the day is gone when the foreign companies can openly subsidize political parties, can overtly encourage revolu- tions, can constantly call upon their home governments to defend their interests no matter into what kind of mess they may get themselves. However, there is no doubt that these foreign cor- porations are still a major force in the political life of the coun- tries in which they are operating. Though behaving more subtly, they still wield tremendous influence and still, upon occasion, call upon their home governments to come to their defense. Behind the scenes they remain one of the region's most powerful pressure groups. Another economic interest of considerable and growing weight in Caribbean affairs is the commercial and industrial class. Cer- tain segments of the trading class were associated traditionally with the landholding aristocracy and shared the management of the ancien redgime. The industrial middle classes are another thing. The owners of the new manufacturing industries have interests which clash profoundly with those of the agriculturalists and foreign traders. They want protection for their industries; the agriculturalists want cheap foreign goods. The industrialists want a larger internal market; the creation of such a market means the transformation of the rural masses from semiserfs to small landowners or well-paid workers with rising standards of living, which is anathema to the old landholding group.  84 The Caribbean 84 The Caribbean 84 The Caribbean The industrial middle class and that segment of the mercantile classes associated with it is becoming increasingly vocal. It is taking an active part in politics and is a pressure group of con- siderable and growing importance. The urban working class is another new element in the political picture of the Caribbean countries. It constitutes one of the most powerful forces in some of these nations. Not only are the organized workers able to bring their considerable numbers to bear insofar as votes are concerned, but they also are a con- siderable power factor even where cruder methods of changing regimes are in vogue. As a voting force the labor movement is more important in the British colonies of the Caribbean than in the independent nations. It is no accident that virtually every important political party in the British West Indies is intimately linked with a trade- union group-hence the National Workers Union of Jamaica, for instance, is virtually the alter ego of the People's National Party, while the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union has the same relationship to the Jamaica Labor Party. The organized workers are probably the only group in the Caribbean countries and in Latin America generally which is in a position to challenge the age-old influence of the military as the ultimate arbiter of government in the region. Through their use of the general strike, through their relatively disciplined behavior, they are in a position not only to cripple the economy of a nation but to provide manpower for insurrections and even civil wars. Of course, the power of the urban working class grows as the industrialization of a country progresses. As the economy becomes increasingly complex and interdependent, the potential damage which trade-union action can do mounts, and hence the power of the labor movement increases. Thus the trade-unions are a pressure group of increasing importance throughout the Carib- bean area. A fourth pressure group which is of increasing importance in The industrial middle class and that segment of the mercantile classes associated with it is becoming increasingly vocal. It is taking an active part in politics and is a pressure group of con- siderable and growing importance. The urban working class is another new element in the political picture of the Caribbean countries. It constitutes one of the most powerful forces in some of these nations. Not only are the organized workers able to bring their considerable numbers to bear insofar as votes are concerned, but they also are a con- siderable power factor even where cruder methods of changing regimes are in vogue. As a voting force the labor movement is more important in the British colonies of the Caribbean than in the independent nations. It is no accident that virtually every important political party in the British West Indies is intimately linked with a trade- union group-hence the National Workers Union of Jamaica, for instance, is virtually the alter ego of the People's National Party, while the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union has the same relationship to the Jamaica Labor Party. The organized workers are probably the only group in the Caribbean countries and in Latin America generally which is in a position to challenge the age-old influence of the military as the ultimate arbiter of government in the region. Through their use of the general strike, through their relatively disciplined behavior, they are in a position not only to cripple the economy of a nation but to provide manpower for insurrections and even civil wars. Of course, the power of the urban working class grows as the industrialization of a country progresses. As the economy becomes increasingly complex and interdependent, the potential damage which trade-union action can do mounts, and hence the power of the labor movement increases. Thus the trade-unions are a pressure group of increasing importance throughout the Carib- bean area. A fourth pressure group which is of increasing importance in The industrial middle class and that segment of the mercantile classes associated with it is becoming increasingly vocal. It is taking an active part in politics and is a pressure group of con- siderable and growing importance. The urban working class is another new element in the political picture of the Caribbean countries. It constitutes one of the most powerful forces in some of these nations. Not only are the organized workers able to bring their considerable numbers to bear insofar as votes are concerned, but they also are a con- siderable power factor even where cruder methods of changing regimes are in vogue. As a voting force the labor movement is more important in the British colonies of the Caribbean than in the independent nations. It is no accident that virtually every important political party in the British West Indies is intimately linked with a trade- union group-hence the National Workers Union of Jamaica, for instance, is virtually the alter ego of the People's National Party, while the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union has the same relationship to the Jamaica Labor Party. The organized workers are probably the only group in the Caribbean countries and in Latin America generally which is in a position to challenge the age-old influence of the military as the ultimate arbiter of government in the region. Through their use of the general strike, through their relatively disciplined behavior, they are in a position not only to cripple the economy of a nation but to provide manpower for insurrections and even civil wars. Of course, the power of the urban working class grows as the industrialization of a country progresses. As the economy becomes increasingly complex and interdependent, the potential damage which trade-union action can do mounts, and hence the power of the labor movement increases. Thus the trade-unions are a pressure group of increasing importance throughout the Carib- bean area. A fourth pressure group which is of increasing importance in  POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 85 the politics of the whole region is the peasantry. In Cuba, for instance, the so-called colonos and the agricultural wage earners are perhaps the decisive influence in the nation's elections. In Mexico the peasants played a key role in the Revolution and are one of the most potent political forces in the country today. In Guatemala the peasants were aroused by the ten-year revolution- ary regime of Arevalo and Arbenz, and, if they are in eclipse at the present time, they are not likely to remain on the side lines of national politics for very long. Even in El Salvador, where the peasant is mute, he is the great silent pressure group. Every politician-and every land- holder-keeps one eye cocked for the day when the Salvadorean peasant is going to awaken and demand fundamental changes in the economic and political life of the country. Though still quiet, he is potentially of tremendous power. To greater or lesser degree the same picture holds in the rest of the independent nations of the Caribbean as well as in the colonies. The rural tenant and wageworker still constitutes the great majority of the population of most Caribbean countries, and he is becoming increasingly awake, is formulating new demands, and is insisting on having an increasingly important voice in the political life of the Caribbean nations. Finally, among the pressure groups one cannot fail to mention the Church. The Roman Catholic Church has always been a potent force in the political life of the independent countries of the region. However, its role has somewhat altered in recent years. Traditionally, the Church has been one of the great con- servative forces in these republics. It has seemed to many that it was more interested in saving its property than in saving souls. However, in recent years this situation has changed markedly. In a number of countries large elements of both the clergy and the laity of the Church have sought to overcome what they con- sider the mistakes of the past. The result of this new attitude is the development of a strongly socially conscious wing of the Catholic Church in many if not POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS ti) the politics of the whole region is the peasantry. In Cuba, for instance, the so-called colonos and the agricultural wage earners are perhaps the decisive influence in the nation's elections. In Mexico the peasants played a key role in the Revolution and are one of the most potent political forces in the country today. In Guatemala the peasants were aroused by the ten-year revolution- ary regime of Arevalo and Arbenz, and, if they are in eclipse at the present time, they are not likely to remain on the side lines of national politics for very long. Even in El Salvador, where the peasant is mute, he is the great silent pressure group. Every politician-and every land- holder-keeps one eye cocked for the day when the Salvadorean peasant is going to awaken and demand fundamental changes in the economic and political life of the country. Though still quiet, he is potentially of tremendous power. To greater or lesser degree the same picture holds in the rest of the independent nations of the Caribbean as well as in the colonies. The rural tenant and wageworker still constitutes the great majority of the population of most Caribbean countries, and he is becoming increasingly awake, is formulating new demands, and is insisting on having an increasingly important voice in the political life of the Caribbean nations. Finally, among the pressure groups one cannot fail to mention the Church. The Roman Catholic Church has always been a potent force in the political life of the independent countries of the region. However, its role has somewhat altered in recent years. Traditionally, the Church has been one of the great con- servative forces in these republics. It has seemed to many that it was more interested in saving its property than in saving souls. However, in recent years this situation has changed markedly. In a number of countries large elements of both the clergy and the laity of the Church have sought to overcome what they con- sider the mistakes of the past. The result of this new attitude is the development of a strongly socially conscious wing of the Catholic Church in many if not POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS 85 the politics of the whole region is the peasantry. In Cuba, for instance, the so-called colonos and the agricultural wage earners are perhaps the decisive influence in the nation's elections. In Mexico the peasants played a key role in the Revolution and are one of the most potent political forces in the country today. In Guatemala the peasants were aroused by the ten-year revolution- ary regime of Ardvalo and Arbenz, and, if they are in eclipse at the present time, they are not likely to remain on the side lines of national politics for very long. Even in El Salvador, where the peasant is mute, he is the great silent pressure group. Every politician-and every land- holder-keeps one eye cocked for the day when the Salvadorean peasant is going to awaken and demand fundamental changes in the economic and political life of the country. Though still quiet, he is potentially of tremendous power. To greater or lesser degree the same picture holds in the rest of the independent nations of the Caribbean as well as in the colonies. The rural tenant and wageworker still constitutes the great majority of the population of most Caribbean countries, and he is becoming increasingly awake, is formulating new demands, and is insisting on having an increasingly important voice in the political life of the Caribbean nations. Finally, among the pressure groups one cannot fail to mention the Church. The Roman Catholic Church has always been a potent force in the political life of the independent countries of the region. However, its role has somewhat altered in recent years. Traditionally, the Church has been one of the great con- servative forces in these republics. It has seemed to many that it was more interested in saving its property than in saving souls. However, in recent years this situation has changed markedly. In a number of countries large elements of both the clergy and the laity of the Church have sought to overcome what they con- sider the mistakes of the past. The result of this new attitude is the development of a strongly socially conscious wing of the Catholic Church in many if not  86 The Caribbean most of these countries. In Costa Rica the late Archbishop Sana- bria gained continent-wide fame as one of the great voices of protest against the poverty, injustice, and misery in which the majority of the Latin Americans live. In Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela prominent clergymen and/or Catholic laymen have taken a leading part in organizing trade- union groups; and in Colombia the Church has been particularly active in organizing the peasants and helping them express their grievances. Even in Mexico there is a growing evidence of a new attitude on the part of the Church towards social and economic issues. Thus the Church continues to be a powerful pressure group. It still is a potent influence among the masses of the people, and in recent years elements in the Church have become aware of and anxious to do something about the grievances of the humble. However, a large part of the Church hierarchy and laity remains obstinately conservative and a defender of the status quo. Hence we find that there are powerful pressure groups work- ing behind the scenes in Caribbean politics. Some of these, such as the Army, the landowners, certain foreign economic interests, and one wing of the Church, bring their weight to bear on the side of the status quo and against the changes which are being brought by the impact of industrialization and world events. Other behind-the-scenes elements, such as the labor movement, the industrial middle class, and certain elements in the Church, are harbingers of the Latin American Social Revolution. Both defenders of the status quo and those elements seeking change bring their weight to bear on the parties of the region, which, though varying widely in philosophy, are also organized largely around this issue of conservatism versus revolutionary transforma- tion of the economic, social, and political life of the region. 86 The Caribbean most of these countries. In Costa Rica the late Archbishop Sana- bria gained continent-wide fame as one of the great voices of protest against the poverty, injustice, and misery in which the majority of the Latin Americans live. In Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela prominent clergymen and/or Catholic laymen have taken a leading part in organizing trade- union groups; and in Colombia the Church has been particularly active in organizing the peasants and helping them express their grievances. Even in Mexico there is a growing evidence of a new attitude on the part of the Church towards social and economic issues. Thus the Church continues to be a powerful pressure group. It still is a potent influence among the masses of the people, and in recent years elements in the Church have become aware of and anxious to do something about the grievances of the humble. However, a large part of the Church hierarchy and laity remains obstinately conservative and a defender of the status quo. Hence we find that there are powerful pressure groups work- ing behind the scenes in Caribbean politics. Some of these, such as the Army, the landowners, certain foreign economic interests, and one wing of the Church, bring their weight to bear on the side of the status quo and against the changes which are being brought by the impact of industrialization and world events. Other behind-the-scenes elements, such as the labor movement, the industrial middle class, and certain elements in the Church, are harbingers of the Latin American Social Revolution. Both defenders of the status quo and those elements seeking change bring their weight to bear on the parties of the region, which, though varying widely in philosophy, are also organized largely around this issue of conservatism versus revolutionary transforma- tion of the economic, social, and political life of the region. 86 The Caribbean most of these countries. In Costa Rica the late Archbishop Sana- bria gained continent-wide fame as one of the great voices of protest against the poverty, injustice, and misery in which the majority of the Latin Americans live. In Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela prominent clergymen and/or Catholic laymen have taken a leading part in organizing trade- union groups; and in Colombia the Church has been particularly active in organizing the peasants and helping them express their grievances. Even in Mexico there is a growing evidence of a new attitude on the part of the Church towards social and economic issues. Thus the Church continues to be a powerful pressure group. It still is a potent influence among the masses of the people, and in recent years elements in the Church have become aware of and anxious to do something about the grievances of the humble. However, a large part of the Church hierarchy and laity remains obstinately conservative and a defender of the status quo. Hence we find that there are powerful pressure groups work- ing behind the scenes in Caribbean politics. Some of these, such as the Army, the landowners, certain foreign economic interests, and one wing of the Church, bring their weight to bear on the side of the status quo and against the changes which are being brought by the impact of industrialization and world events. Other behind-the-scenes elements, such as the labor movement, the industrial middle class, and certain elements in the Church, are harbingers of the Latin American Social Revolution. Both defenders of the status quo and those elements seeking change bring their weight to bear on the parties of the region, which, though varying widely in philosophy, are also organized largely around this issue of conservatism versus revolutionary transforma- tion of the economic, social, and political life of the region.  Part III Part III Part III REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES   Charles C. Cumberland: BASES OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN ONE OF THE MOST NOTABLE, and to us the least attrac- tive, characteristics of the Caribbean area has been the startling number of revolts, revolutions, coups d'4tat, cuartelazos, macheta- zos, and other violent attempts to change government.' No Carib- bean country has escaped this type of violence during the past fifty years, and it would appear that no country at the present time is stable enough to justify a prediction that revolts have disappeared as a part of the political milieu. There has been to the movements no semblance of pattern; in detail of operation, depth of change wrought, immediate causes and extensiveness (both in time and area), the number of types has ahnost equalled the number of movements.t But all of them For an analysis and description of these types, see William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (September, 1952), 445-468. * Mexico appears to have arrived at a position which makes revolution highly unlikely, and Costa Rican development indicates relative peace for the future; but in both cases the distinct possibility of revolt exists. ' For some of the voluminous literature on the subject of revolts and revolutions in the region, see Sydney Greenbie, The Central Five: Guate- mala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Evanston, Ill., 1943); A Curtis Wilgus, ed., South American Dictators (Washington, 1937); Thomas Rourke (Daniel Joseph Clinton), GDomez, Tyrant of the Andes (New York, 1936); Pedro Manuel Arcaya, The Gdmez Regime (Washington, 1936); Jos6 Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional de Vene- 89 Charles C. Cumberland: BASES OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN ONE OF THE MOST NOTABLE, and to us the least attrac- tive, characteristics of the Caribbean area has been the startling number of revolts, revolutions, coups d'etat, cuartelazos, macheta- zos, and other violent attempts to change government.' No Carib- bean country has escaped this type of violence during the past fifty years, and it would appear that no country at the present time is stable enough to justify a prediction that revolts have disappeared as a part of the political milieu. There has been to the movements no semblance of pattern; in detail of operation, depth of change wrought, immediate causes and extensiveness (both in time and area), the number of types has almost equalled the number of movements.t But all of them ' For an analysis and description of these types, see William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (September, 1952), 445-468. ' Mexico appears to have arrived at a position which makes revolution highly unlikely, and Costa Rican development indicates relative peace for the future; but in both cases the distinct possibility of revolt exists. ' For some of the voluminous literature on the subject of revolts and revolutions in the region, see Sydney Greenbie, The Central Five: Guate- mala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Evanston, Ill., 1943); A Curtis Wilgus, ed., South American Dictators (Washington, 1937); Thomas Rourke (Daniel Joseph Clinton), GOmez, Tyrant of the Andes (New York, 1936); Pedro Manuel Arcaya, The Gomez Regime (Washington, 1936); Jos6 Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional de Vene- 89 Charles C. Cumberland: BASES OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN ONE OF THE MOST NOTABLE, and to us the least attrac- tive, characteristics of the Caribbean area has been the startling number of revolts, revolutions, coups d'itat, cuartelazos, macheta- zos, and other violent attempts to change government. No Carib- bean country has escaped this type of violence during the past fifty years, and it would appear that no country at the present time is stable enough to justify a prediction that revolts have disappeared as a part of the political milieu.2 There has been to the movements no semblance of pattern; in detail of operation, depth of change wrought, immediate causes and extensiveness (both in time and area), the number of types has almost equalled the number of movements. But all of them ' For an analysis and description of these types, see William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (September, 1952), 445-468. ' Mexico appears to have arrived at a position which makes revolution highly unlikely, and Costa Rican development indicates relative peace for the future; but in both cases the distinct possibility of revolt exists. ' For some of the voluminous literature on the subject of revolts and revolutions in the region, see Sydney Greenbie, The Central Five: Guate- mala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Evanston, Ill., 1943); A Curtis Wilgus, ed., South American Dictators (Washington, 1937); Thomas Rourke (Daniel Joseph Clinton), GOmez, Tyrant of the Andes (New York, 1936); Pedro Manuel Arcaya, The Gomez Regime (Washington, 1936); Jose Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional de Vne-  90 The Caribbean have one common characteristic: the attempt to change the administration through violence, without recourse to the con- stitutional and legal provisions concerning succession. In some cases the change has been wrought through a bloodless coup with army cooperation-witness Batista's overthrow of the Prio regime.' In others, of which El Salvador in 1944 and Cuba in 1933 were the most successful, the change has come from rela- tively peaceful action by the public at large.' In still others, the violence has been devastating, enormously destructive to life and property, with great armies engaged in long and bitter battles.' All these types, and many more not mentioned, are included within the general sphere of revolts and revolutions under dis- cussion, and all are expressions of more or less common traditions, factors, and influences. Before any attempt is made at describing or analyzing those traditions and factors, some clarification concerning the nature of the Caribbean area itself is perhaps not amiss. Even though the Caribbean countries have much in common which set them apart from the other Latin American nations,' the region itself zuela, 3rd ed. (Caracas, 1942); Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New York, 1927); Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950); W. H. Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, 1930); Stanley Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York, 1955); Charles C. Cumber- land, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin, Texas, 1952); Chester L. Jones, Gautemala, Past and Present (Minneapolis, 1940); Sum- ner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 2 vols. (New York, 1928); Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933). Many other excellent works dealing with Latin America in general have sections devoted to the Caribbean. * For a biased view, see Blas Roca and Juan Marinello, "The March Coup d'Etat in Cuba," Political Affairs (April, 1952), 42-51. * A general strike by the public forced Machado's resignation; the same technique was used against Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez in May, 1944; in June, 1944, Jorge Ubico was forced to resign in Guatemala through a public strike. ' The Mexican Revolution is the most outstanding example of destruc- tion; for example, the total population was approximately .8 million less in 1921 than in 1910, according to official figures, and some 2.5 million less than could have been expected had the growth rate remained constant. ' For material treating the regiona a a compact area (though in no 90 The Caribbean 90 The Caribbean have one common characteristic: the attempt to change the administration through violence, without recourse to the con- stitutional and legal provisions concerning succession. In some cases the change has been wrought through a bloodless coup with army cooperation-witness Batista's overthrow of the Prio regime.' In others, of which El Salvador in 1944 and Cuba in 1933 were the most successful, the change has come from rela- tively peaceful action by the public at large.' In still others, the violence has been devastating, enormously destructive to life and property, with great armies engaged in long and bitter battles.r All these types, and many more not mentioned, are included within the general sphere of revolts and revolutions under dis- cussion, and all are expressions of more or less common traditions, factors, and influences. Before any attempt is made at describing or analyzing those traditions and factors, some clarification concerning the nature of the Caribbean area itself is perhaps not amiss. Even though the Caribbean countries have much in common which set them apart from the other Latin American nations,' the region itself zuela, 3rd ed. (Caracas, 1942); Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New York, 1927); Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950); W. H. Callcot, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, 1930); Stanley Ross, Francisco . Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York, 1955); Charles C. Cumber- land, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin, Texas, 1952); Chester L. Jones, Gautemala, Past and Present (Minneapolis, 1940); Sum- ner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 2 vols. (New York, 1928); Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933). Many other excellent works dealing with Latin America in general have sections devoted to the Caribbean. ' For a biased view, see Blas Roca and Juan Marinello, "The March Coup d'Etat in Cuba," Political Affairs (April, 1952), 42-51. ' A general strike by the public forced Machado's resignation; the same technique was used against Maximiliano Hernindez Martinez in May, 1944; in June, 1944, Jorge Ubico was forced to resign in Guatemala through a public strike. ' The Mexican Revolution is the most outstanding example of destruc- tion; for example, the total population was approximately .8 million less in 1921 than in 1910, according to official figures, and some 2.5 million less than could have been expected had the growth rate remained constant. ' For material treating the region as a compact area (though in no have one common characteristic: the attempt to change the administration through violence, without recourse to the con- stitutional and legal provisions concerning succession. In some cases the change has been wrought through a bloodless coup with army cooperation-witness Batista's overthrow of the Prio regime.' In others, of which El Salvador in 1944 and Cuba in 1933 were the most successful, the change has come from rela- tively peaceful action by the public at large.' In still others, the violence has been devastating, enormously destructive to life and property, with great armies engaged in long and bitter battles. All these types, and many more not mentioned, are included within the general sphere of revolts and revolutions under dis- cussion, and all are expressions of more or less common traditions, factors, and influences. Before any attempt is made at describing or analyzing those traditions and factors, some clarification concerning the nature of the Caribbean area itself is perhaps not amiss. Even though the Caribbean countries have much in common which set them apart from the other Latin American nations,7 the region itself zuela, 3rd ed. (Caracas, 1942); Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New York, 1927); Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950); W. H. Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, 1930); Stanley Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York, 1955); Charles C. Cumber- land, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin, Texas, 1952); Chester L. Jones, Gautemala, Past and Present (Minneapolis, 1940); Sum- ner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 2 vols. (New York, 1928); Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933). Many other excellent works dealing with Latin America in general have sections devoted to the Caribbean. ' For a biased view, see Blas Roca and Juan Marinello, "The March Coup d'Etat in Cuba," Political Affairs (April, 1952), 42-51. * A general strike by the public forced Machado's resignation; the same technique was used against Maximiliano Hernindez Martinez in May, 1944; in June, 1944, Jorge Ubico was forced to resign in Guatemala through a public strike. " The Mexican Revolution is the most outstanding example of destruc- tion; for example, the total population was approximately .8 million less in 1921 than in 1910, according to official figures, and some 2.5 million less than could have been expected had the growth rate remained constant. For material treating the region as a compact area (though in no  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 91 is not a homogeneous whole, but is a geographically rather than a culturally compact unit.' Institutions, attitudes, traditions, social stratification, and economies vary widely from country to country, and from region to region within the various countries. Certainly the details of factors influencing Costa Rican revolts or revolutions differ markedly from those of Haiti, or Mexico, or Venezuela, or Guatemala. And certainly the Francisco Villa movement in Mexico after 1914 was born of a different set of standards than that of Fdlix Diaz in 1912 or that of Adolfo de la Huerta in 1923; and as standards and values differed, so the participants differed. The nature and length of this study pro- hibits a detailed examination of each country or even of the major revolutions in the Caribbean area; the following portrayal accord- ingly concerns itself with common denominators and pays little heed to differences. Furthermore, the analysis will be limited to the independent nations, with no mention of the colonial hold- ings. These are self-imposed limitations, deliberately although perhaps erroneously chosen. sense lumping them all together), see Chester L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York, 1936); Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); Scot Nearing and James Free- man, Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1928); A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean Area (Washington, 1934); and German Arciniegas, Caribbean: Sea of the New World (New York, 1946). * Material concerning the differences may he found in Francisco J. Ponte Dominguez La huella francesa en la historia politica de Cuba (La Habana, 1948); Carlos Siso, La formacion del pueblo venezolano (New York, 1944); Stephen Alexis, Black Liberator: Life of Toussaint L'Ouver- ture (New York, 1949); J. G. Leyburn, The Haitian People (New Haven, 1941); William S. Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison, Wis., 1950); John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New York, 1944); W. W. Pierson, "Foreign Influences on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830-1930," Hispanic American Historical Review, XV, 1 (Feb., 1935), 3-42; R. E. Ceist, "The Bases of Social Instability in Venezuela," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, I, 1 (Oct., 1941), 37-44; and Francis M. Stanger, "National Origins in Central America," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII, 1 (Feb., 1932), 18-45. In addition, a cursory perusal of the various economic publica- tions which will be cited later will show the wide differences between the nations. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES is not a homogeneous whole, but is a geographically rather a culturally compact unit Institutions, attitudes, tradit social stratification, and economies vary widely from count country, and from region to region within the various coun Certainly the details of factors influencing Costa Rican revol revolutions differ markedly from those of Haiti, or Mexic< Venezuela, or Guatemala. And certainly the Francisco movement in Mexico after 1914 was born of a different s standards than that of Felix Diaz in 1912 or that of Adoll la Huerta in 1923; and as standards and values differed, s< participants differed. The nature and length of this study hibits a detailed examination of each country or even of the e revolutions in the Caribbean area; the following portrayal as ingly concerns itself with common denominators and pays heed to differences. Furthermore, the analysis will be lie to the independent nations, with no mention of the colonial ] ings. These are self-imposed limitations, deliberately alth perhaps erroneously chosen. sense lumping them all together), see Chester L Jones, The Caril Since 1900 (New York, 1936); Dexter Perkins, The United State the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); Scot Nearing and James man, Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1928); A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., Caribbean Area (Washington, 1934); and Germin Arciniegas, Carib Sea of the New World (New York, 1946). "Material concerning the differences may be found in Franci: Poote Dominguez La huella francesa en la historia politica de Cubi Habana, 1948); Carlos Siso, La formacion del pueblo venezolano i York, 1944); Stephen Alexis, Black Liberator: Life of Toussaint L'C ure (New York, 1949); J. G. Leyburn, The Haitian People (New H 1941); William S. Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Govern (Madison, Wis., 1950); John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life ; York, 1944); W. W. Pierson, "Foreign Influences on Venezuelan Po Thought, 1830-1930," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (Feb., 1935), 342; R. E. Crist, "The Bases of Social Instabili Venezuela," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, I, 1 ( 1941), 37-44; and Francis M. Stanger, "National Origins in C< America," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII, 1 (Feb., 1! 18-45. In addition, a cursory perusal of the various economic pu tions which will be cited later will show the wide differences bei the nations. 91 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 91 is not a homogeneous whole, but is a geographically rather than a culturally compact unit.' Institutions, attitudes, traditions, social stratification, and economies vary widely from country to country, and from region to region within the various countries. Certainly the details of factors influencing Costa Rican revolts or revolutions differ markedly from those of Haiti, or Mexico, or Venezuela, or Guatemala. And certainly the Francisco Villa movement in Mexico after 1914 was born of a different set of standards than that of Felix Diaz in 1912 or that of Adolfo de la Huerta in 1923; and as standards and values differed, so the participants differed. The nature and length of this study pro- hibits a detailed examination of each country or even of the major revolutions in the Caribbean area; the following portrayal accord- ingly concerns itself with common denominators and pays little heed to differences. Furthermore, the analysis will be limited to the independent nations, with no mention of the colonial hold- ings. These are self-imposed limitations, deliberately although perhaps erroneously chosen. sense lumping them all together), see Chester L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York, 1936); Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947); Scot Nearing and James Free- man, Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1928); A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean Area (Washington, 1934); and German Arciniegas, Caribbean: Sea of the New World (New York, 1946). ' Material concerning the differences may be found in Francisco J. Ponte Dominguez La huella francesa en la historia politica de Cuba (La Habana, 1948); Carlos Siso, La formacion del pueblo venezolano (New York, 1944); Stephen Alexis, Black Liberator: Life of Toussaint L'Ouver- ture (New York, 1949); J. G. Leyburn, The Haitian People (New Haven, 1941); William S. Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison, Wis., 1950); John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New York, 1944); W. W. Pierson, "Foreign Influences on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830-1930," Hispanic American Historical Review, XV, 1 (Feb., 1935), 3-42; R. E. Crist, "The Bases of Social Instability in Venezuela," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, I, 1 (Oct., 1941), 37-44; and Francis M. Stanger, "National Origins in Central America," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII, 1 (Feb., 1932), 18-45. In addition, a cursory perusal of the various economic publica- tions which will be cited later will show the wide differences between the nations.  92 The Caribbean Twentieth-century instability in the Caribbean area has not been completely a product of conditions and ideologies peculiar to the twentieth century; it is a part of a constant stream begun in the nineteenth and having roots in earlier centuries. This is not to be construed as a denial of the importance of ideological change in the last half century, nor is it intended to imply that the basic factors have remained unchanged since the Colonial period. The changes resulting from world ideological evolution will be examined at the proper time. One of the basic factors in nineteenth-century instability, and its carry-over into the twentieth, was the nature of the independ- ence movements. Whether independence was achieved only after long and costly struggles such as those of Venezuela, Mexico, and Cuba, or through a simple severance of ties without military action such as characterized Central American independence,' one element was common to all: independence created rather than solved problems of a fundamental nature. The principal issue involved in the independence movements was the severance of political ties;" although some movements had overtones of social and political change," in no case did such fundamentals as class structure, political philosophy and administrative struc- ture, economic attitudes, ethnic vitality, or cultural assimilation receive adequate attention." The victorious leaders were not * This refers to independence from Spain only; the Central American area saw considerable military action before the formation of the United Provinces of Central America, but the point at issue was union with Mexico, not independence from Spain. See Hubert Howe Bancroft, Works, VIII: History of Central America, III (San Francisco, 1887), for the details of these military actions. " Haiti was an exception. " For widely divergent interpretations of the two Venezuelan and Co- lombian movements under Bolivar, see Waldo D. Frank, Birth of a World: Bolivar in Terms of His Peoples (Boston, 1951); Gerhard Masur, Simrdn Bolivar (Albuquerque, 1948); and Salvador de Madariaga, Bolivar, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1951). " Even a hasty reading of the best of the voluminous literature on the independence movements will show the gaps in the thinking, while the 92 The Caribbean 92 The Caribbean Twentieth-century instability in the Caribbean area has not been completely a product of conditions and ideologies peculiar to the twentieth century; it is a part of a constant stream begun in the nineteenth and having roots in earlier centuries. This is not to be construed as a denial of the importance of ideological change in the last half century, nor is it intended to imply that the basic factors have remained unchanged since the Colonial period. The changes resulting from world ideological evolution will be examined at the proper time. One of the basic factors in nineteenth-century instability, and its carry-over into the twentieth, was the nature of the independ- ence movements. Whether indipendence was achieved only after long and costly struggles such as those of Venezuela, Mexico, and Cuba, or through a simple severance of ties without military action such as characterized Central American independence,' one element was common to all: independence created rather than solved problems of a fundamental nature. The principal issue involved in the independence movements was the severance of political ties;" although some movements had overtones of social and political change," in no case did such fundamentals as class structure, political philosophy and administrative struc- ture, economic attitudes, ethnic vitality, or cultural assimilation receive adequate attention." The victorious leaders were not * This refers to independence from Spain only; the Central American area saw considerable military action before the formation of the United Provinces of Central America, but the point at issue was union with Mexico, not independence from Spain. See Hubert Howe Bancroft, Works, VihI: History of Central America, III (San Francisco, 1887), for the details of these military actions. " Haiti was an exception. " For widely divergent interpretations of the two Venezuelan and Co- lombian movements under Bolivar, see Waldo D. Frank, Birth of a World: Bolvar in Terms of His Peoples (Boston, 1951); Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque, 1948); and Salvador de Madariaga, Bolivar, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1951). " Even a hasty reading of the best of the voluminous literature on the independence movements will show the gaps in the thinking, while the Twentieth-century instability in the Caribbean area has not been completely a product of conditions and ideologies peculiar to the twentieth century; it is a part of a constant stream begun in the nineteenth and having roots in earlier centuries. This is not to be construed as a denial of the importance of ideological change in the last half century, nor is it intended to imply that the basic factors have remained unchanged since the Colonial period. The changes resulting from world ideological evolution will be examined at the proper time. One of the basic factors in nineteenth-century instability, and its carry-over into the twentieth, was the nature of the independ- ence movements. Whether independence was achieved only after long and costly struggles such as those of Venezuela, Mexico, and Cuba, or through a simple severance of ties without military action such as characterized Central American independence,' one element was common to all: independence created rather than solved problems of a fundamental nature. The principal issue involved in the independence movements was the severance of political ties;10 although some movements had overtones of social and political change," in no case did such fundamentals as class structure, political philosophy and administrative struc- ture, economic attitudes, ethnic vitality, or cultural assimilation receive adequate attention." The victorious leaders were not * This refers to independence from Spain only; the Central American area saw considerable military action before the formation of the United Provinces of Central America, but the point at issue was union with Mexico, not independence from Spain. See Hubert Howe Bancroft, Works, VHII: History of Central America, III (San Francisco, 1887), for the details of these military actions. H Haiti was an exception. a For widely divergent interpretations of the two Venezuelan and Co- lombian movements under Bolivar, see Waldo D. Frank, Birth of a World: Bolivar in Terms of His Peoples (Boston, 1951); Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque, 1948); and Salvador de Madariaga, Bolivar, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1951). " Even a hasty reading of the best of the voluminous literature on the independence movements will show the gaps in the thinking, while the  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 93 representative of a triumphant ideology, carefully integrated and fully cohesive. To use Mexico as the most outstanding example, certainly the ultimate aims of Miguel Hidalgo, Jose Morelos, Vicente Guerrero, Guadalupe Victoria (Manuel Felix Fernan- dez), and Agustin de Iturbide were poles apart-and yet they were all a part of the triumphant complex." In actuality, the independence movements served on the one hand to destroy existing stabilizing institutions without creating adequate sub- stitutes" and unleashed desires and hopes which could not be immediately fulfilled on the other. The subsequent fears and frustrations were not only in themselves factors of instability, but they served to emphasize and exaggerate other unstable influences which were the products of colonial Hispanic culture. The absence of leaders experienced in political activities has been well recognized and widely commented upon as conducive most careful reading will fail to disclose major attention to the problems created by independence. The best of these works, in addition to those on Bolivar already cited, are Lillian E. Fisher, Background of the Revolu- tion of Mexican Independence (Boston, 1934); Agustin Iturbide, Breve reseno critico de la emancipacidn y la libertad de la nacidn mexicana (Mexico, 1822?); William Spence Robertson, Iturbide of Mexico (Dur- ham, 1952); Jorge Manach, Marti: Apostle of Freedom (New York, 1950); R. G. B. Cunninghame Graham, Josi Antonio Pdez (London, 1929); William Spence Robertson, The Diary of Francisco de Miranda (New York, 1928), and The Life of Miranda, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1929); Victor A. Belaunde, Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution (Baltimore, 1938); Bernard Moses, The Intellectual Background of the Revolution in South America, 1810-1824 (New York, 1926); and Alfred Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America (New York, 1928). In addition, published documentary commentaries by foreigners, as well as standard works on foreign interest in the independence of Latin America, indicate the same weakness. 4 Hidalgo and Morelos, of course, were long since dead, but their aims and spirits lived on, even though in perverted form. a The undermining of Church power was one of the most marked of these developments. See particularly J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1934); Mary Waters, A History of the Church in Venezuela, 1810-1830 (Chapel Hill, 1933); Mary P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (New York, 1949); and Carey Shaw, "Church and State in Colombia as Observed by American Diplomats, 1834-1906," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI (1941), 577- 613. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 93 representative of a triumphant ideology, carefully integrated and fully cohesive. To use Mexico as the most outstanding example, certainly the ultimate aims of Miguel Hidalgo, Jose Morelos, Vicente Guerrero, Guadalupe Victoria (Manuel Felix Ferndn- dez), and Agustin de Iturbide were poles apart-and yet they were all a part of the triumphant complex." In actuality, the independence movements served on the one hand to destroy existing stabilizing institutions without creating adequate sub- stitutes" and unleashed desires and hopes which could not be immediately fulfilled on the other. The subsequent fears and frustrations were not only in themselves factors of instability, but they served to emphasize and exaggerate other unstable influences which weere the products of colonial Hispanic culture. The absence of leaders experienced in political activities has been well recognized and widely commented upon as conducive most careful reading will fail to disclose major attention to the problems created by independence. The best of these works, in addition to those on Bolivar already cited, are Lillian E. Fisher, Background of the Revolu- tion of Mexican Independence (Boston, 1934); Agustin Iturbide, Breve reseno critico de la emancipaci6n y la libertad de la naci6n mexicana (Mexico, 1822?); William Spence Robertson, Iturbide of Mexico (Dur- ham, 1952); Jorge Manach, Marti: Apostle of Freedom (New York, 1950); R. G. B. Cunninghame Graham, Josi Antonio Pdez (London, 1929); William Spence Robertson, The Diary of Francisco de Miranda (New York, 1928), and The Life of Miranda, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1929); Victor A. Belaunde, Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution (Baltimore, 1938); Bernard Moses, The Intellectual Background of the Revolution in South America, 1810-1824 (New York, 1926); and Alfred Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America (New York, 1928). In addition, published documentary commentaries by foreigners, as well as standard works on foreign interest in the independence of Latin America, indicate the same weakness. " Hidalgo and Morelos, of course, were long since dead, but their aims and spirits lived on, even though in perverted form. " The undermining of Church power was one of the most marked of these developments. See particularly J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1934); Mary Watters, A History of the Church in'Venezuela, 1810-1830 (Chapel Hill, 1933); Mary P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (New York, 1949); and Carey Shaw, "Church and State in Colombia as Observed by American Diplomats, 1834-1906," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI (1941), 577- 613. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 93 representative of a triumphant ideology, carefully integrated and fully cohesive. To use Mexico as the most outstanding example, certainly the ultimate aims of Miguel Hidalgo, Jose Morelos, Vicente Guerrero, Guadalupe Victoria (Manuel Felix Ferndn- dez), and Agustin de Iturbide were poles apart-and yet they were all a part of the triumphant complex.3 In actuality, the independence movements served on the one hand to destroy existing stabilizing institutions without creating adequate sub- stitutes"4 and unleashed desires and hopes which could not be immediately fulfilled on the other. The subsequent fears and frustrations were not only in themselves factors of instability, but they served to emphasize and exaggerate other unstable influences which were the products of colonial Hispanic culture. The absence of leaders experienced in political activities has been well recognized and widely commented upon as conducive most careful reading will fail to disclose major attention to the problems created by independence. The best of these works, in addition to those on Bolivar already cited, are Lillian E. Fisher, Background of the Revolu- tion of Mexican Independence (Boston, 1934); Agustin Iturbide, Breve reseno critico de la emancipacidn y la libertad de la nacidn mexicana (Mexico, 1822?); William Spence Robertson, Iturbide of Mexico (Dur- ham, 1952); Jorge Manach, Marti: Apostle of Freedom (New York, 1950); R. G. B. Cunninghame Graham, Josd Antonio Pdez (London, 1929); William Spence Robertson, The Diary of Francisco de Miranda (New York, 1928), and The Life of Miranda, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1929); Victor A. Belaunde, Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution (Baltimore, 1938); Bernard Moses, The Intellectual Background of the Revolution in South America, 1810-1824 (New York, 1926); and Alfred Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America (New York, 1928). In addition, published documentary commentaries by foreigners, as well as standard works on foreign interest in the independence of Latin America, indicate the same weakness. " Hidalgo and Morelos, of course, were long since dead, but their aims and spirits lived on, even though in perverted form. " The undermining of Church power was one of the most marked of these developments. See particularly J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1934); Mary Wasters, A History of the Church in Venezuela, 1810-1830 (Chapel Hill, 1933); Mary P. Holleran, Church and State in Guatemala (New York, 1949); and Carey Shaw, "Church and State in Colombia as Observed by American Diplomats, 1834-1906," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI (1941), 577- 613.  94 The Caribbean 94 The Caribbean 94 The Caribbean to instability and the consequent violence characteristic of the Caribbean area. But the lack of political experience, in an ad- ministrative and technical sense, was in itself not as important as we sometimes suppose. The history of any country is replete with examples of individuals who have become highly successful politicians and political administrators after little or no political experience;t the important lack was that of political sophisti- cation which comes either as a result of political experience or close observance of political activity. This political sophistication can best be described as an insight into what can be accomplished politically within the particular cultural complex within which the politician operates. Morelos' Constitution of Apatzingin, or Ramos Arispe's arguments in behalf of federalism, or Francisco Morazin's attempt to introduce the Livingston Code, or Bolivar's concept of government for the Granadan Republic were all ex- pressive of a political naivet4 as appalling as it was appealing.18 It was this naivete which gave rise to unrealistic schemes for reform on the one hand, and on the other to the determination by some to maintain the colonial system even under a national governments--and both were factors of instability and so en- couraging to violence. " The United States has had two presidents who never cast a ballot or held an elective public office before becoming president. Five others had never held an administrative public office of any consequence, nor had they been active in political questions. For indications of this lack, and for some comments upon it, the following should be consulted: Anonymous, Cartas de un americano sobre las ventaias de los gobiernos republicanos federativos, published in 1826 in Mexico; H. G. Ward, Mexico in 1827 (London, 1828); Archivo del General Miranda, 15 vols., ed. Vicente Davila (Caracas, 1928- 1938); William M. Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham, 1948), and the already-cited work by Arcaya. " Some indications of this tendency may be found in Jos6 C. Valades, Alamdn, estadista y historiador (Mexico, 1938); J. L. Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas, and Yucatdn, new edition, Richard L. Predmore, ed., 2 vols. (New Brunswick, N. J., 1949); William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations, 3 vols. (New York, 1925); Charles K. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812- 1830,2 vols. (London, 1938); and R. A. Humphreys, ed., British Consular to instability and the consequent violence characteristic of the Caribbean area. But the lack of political experience, in an ad- ministrative and technical sense, was in itself not as important as we sometimes suppose. The history of any country is replete with examples of individuals who have become highly successful politicians and political administrators after little or no political experience;5 the important lack was that of political sophisti- cation which comes either as a result of political experience or close observance of political activity. This political sophistication can best be described as an insight into what can be accomplished politically within the particular cultural complex within which the politician operates. Morelos' Constitution of Apatzingin, or Ramos Arispe's arguments in behalf of federalism, or Francisco Morazin's attempt to introduce the Livingston Code, or Bolivar's concept of government for the Granadan Republic were all ex- pressive of a political naivetd as appalling as it was appealing.16 It was this naivetd which gave rise to unrealistic schemes for reform on the one hand, and on the other to the determination by some to maintain the colonial system even under a national governmentlr-and both were factors of instability and so en- couraging to violence. " The United States has had two presidents who never cast a ballot or held an elective public office before becoming president. Five others had never held an administrative public office of any consequence, nor had they been active in political questions. " For indications of this lack, and for some comments upon it, the following should be consulted: Anonymous, Cartas de un americano sobre las ventaias de los gobiernos republicanos federativos, published in 1826 in Mexico; H. G. Ward, Mexico in 1827 (London, 1828); Archivo del General Miranda, 15 vols., ed. Vicente Davila (Caracas, 1928- 1938); William M. Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham, 1948), and the already-ited work by Arcaya. " Some indications of this tendency may be found in Jose C. Valades, Alamdn, estadista y historiador (Mexico, 1938); J. L. Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas, and Yucatan, new edition, Richard L. Predmore, ed., 2 vols. (New Brunswick, N. J., 1949); William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations, 3 vols. (New York, 1925); Charles K. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812- 1830, 2 vols. (London, 1938); and R. A. Humphreys, ed., British Consular to instability and the consequent violence characteristic of the Caribbean area. But the lack of political experience, in an ad- ministrative and technical sense, was in itself not as important as we sometimes suppose. The history of any country is replete with examples of individuals who have become highly successful politicians and political administrators after little or no political experience;" the important lack was that of political sophisti- cation which comes either as a result of political experience or close observance of political activity. This political sophistication can best be described as an insight into what can be accomplished politically within the particular cultural complex within which the politician operates. Morelos' Constitution of Apatzingin, or Ramos Arispe's arguments in behalf of federalism, or Francisco Morazan's attempt to introduce the Livingston Code, or Bolivar's concept of government for the Granadan Republic were all ex- pressive of a political naivetd as appalling as it was appealing."e It was this naivete which gave rise to unrealistic schemes for reform on the one hand, and on the other to the determination by some to maintain the colonial system even under a national government"-and both were factors of instability and so en- couraging to violence. " The United States has had two presidents who never cast a ballot or held an elective public office before becoming president. Five others had never held an administrative public office of any consequence, nor had they been active in political questions. " For indications of this lack, and for some comments upon it, the following should be consulted: Anonymous, Cartas de un americano sobre las ventaias de los gobiernos republicanos federativos, published in 1826 in Mexico; H. G. Ward, Mexico in 1827 (London, 1828); Archivo del General Miranda, 15 vols., ed. Vicente Davila (Caracas, 1928- 1938); William M. Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham, 1948), and the already-cited work by Arcaya. " Some indications of this tendency may be found in Jose C. Valades, Alamdn, estadista y historiador (Mxico, 1938); J. L. Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas, and Yucatdn, new edition, Richard L. Predmore, ed., 2 vols. (New Brunswick, N. J., 1949); William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations, 3 vols. (New York, 1925); Charles K. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812- 1830, 2 vols. (London, 1938); and R. A. Humphreys, ed., British Consular  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 95 One of the most difficult elements to assess in terms of importance is the personal factor. It is as easy as it is erroneous to hold particular leaders responsible for revolutionary activity; but at the same time it is equally easy and equally erroneous to discount completely the importance of particular individuals in their nation's development. The classical or true type of charis- matic leader analyzed by Weber'" has been relatively unimportant in the Caribbean area, but some of the principles of "chieftain- ship" would seem to apply. While this writer holds no brief for the "devil theory of history," the role of Juan Vincente Gomez, or Antonio Guzmin Blanco, or Batista, or Anastasia Somoza, or Venustiano Carranza, or the great number of other outstanding revolutionary leaders simply cannot be dismissed as unimportant." It is here fully recognized that fundamental conditions, and not individuals, make revolutions possible or effective; the indi- viduals take advantage of especial conditions to launch a cam- paign of violence. But under conditions which existed in the Caribbean area in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and which still exist in most of these countries, the individual's role in determining the course of history becomes much more important than it is in a nation with tested and stable institutions upon which the populace may with confidence rely. In a dis- Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-1826 (London, 1940); as well as the already-cited works of Bancroft, Mecham, Gil For- toul, and Ward. " See Talcott Parsons' translation of Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1947), pp. 358-407, for a dis- cussion of the charismatic leader. " The best available studies of individuals are W. H. Callcott, Santa Anna: The Story of an Enigma Who Once Was Mexico (Norman, Okla., 1936); William F. Sprague, Vicente Guerrero, Mexican Liberator (Chi- cago, 1939); Daniel Cosio Villegas, Porfirio Diaz y la revuelta de La Noria (Mexico, 1953); George S. Wise, Caudillo: A Portrait of Antonio Guzmdn Blanco (New York, 1951)-in addition to the already-cited works of Stanley Ross, William Spence Robertson (Iturbide), Jorge Manach, Stephen Alexis, and Thomas Rourke. Further, short sketches of various leaders may be found in Wilgus (ed.), South American Dictators (see footnote 3). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 95 One of the most difficult elements to assess in terms of importance is the personal factor. It is as easy as it is erroneous to hold particular leaders responsible for revolutionary activity; but at the same time it is equally easy and equally erroneous to discount completely the importance of particular individuals in their nation's development. The classical or true type of charis- matic leader analyzed by Weber's has been relatively unimportant in the Caribbean area, but some of the principles of "chieftain- ship" would seem to apply. While this writer holds no brief for the "devil theory of history," the role of Juan Vincente Gdmez, or Antonio Guzman Blanco, or Batista, or Anastasia Somoza, or Venustiano Carranza, or the great number of other outstanding revolutionary leaders simply cannot be dismissed as unimportant.'t It is here fully recognized that fundamental conditions, and not individuals, make revolutions possible or effective; the indi- viduals take advantage of especial conditions to launch a cam- paign of violence. But under conditions which existed in the Caribbean area in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and which still exist in most of these countries, the individual's role in determining the course of history becomes much more important than it is in a nation with tested and stable institutions upon which the populace may with confidence rely. In a dis- Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-1826 (London, 1940); as well as the already-cited works of Bancroft, Mecham, Gil For- toul, and Ward. " See Talcott Parsons' translation of Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1947), pp. 358-407, for a dis- cussion of the charismatic leader. " The best available studies of individuals are W. H. Callcott, Santa Anna: The Story of an Enigma Who Once Was Mexico (Norman, Okla., 1936); William F. Sprague, Vicente Guerrero, Mexican Liberator (Chi- cago, 1939); Daniel Cosio Villegas, Poririo Diaz y la revuelta de La Noria (Mexico, 1953); George S. Wise, Caudillo: A Portrait of Antonio Guzadn Blanco (New York, 1951)-in addition to the already-cited works of Stanley Ross, William Spence Robertson (Iturbide), Jorge Manach, Stephen Alexis, and Thomas Rourke. Further, short sketches of various leaders may be found in Wilgus (ed.), South American Dictators (see footnote 3). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 95 One of the most difficult elements to assess in terms of importance is the personal factor. It is as easy as it is erroneous to hold particular leaders responsible for revolutionary activity; but at the same time it is equally easy and equally erroneous to discount completely the importance of particular individuals in their nation's development. The classical or true type of charis- matic leader analyzed by Weber" has been relatively unimportant in the Caribbean area, but some of the principles of "chieftain- ship" would seem to apply. While this writer holds no brief for the "devil theory of history," the role of Juan Vincente Gomez, or Antonio Guzman Blanco, or Batista, or Anastasia Somoza, or Venustiano Carranza, or the great number of other outstanding revolutionary leaders simply cannot be dismissed as unimportant." It is here fully recognized that fundamental conditions, and not individuals, make revolutions possible or effective; the indi- viduals take advantage of especial conditions to launch a cam- paign of violence. But under conditions which existed in the Caribbean area in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and which still exist in most of these countries, the individual's role in determining the course of history becomes much more important than it is in a nation with tested and stable institutions upon which the populace may with confidence rely. In a dis- Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-1826 (London, 1940); as well as the already-cited works of Bancroft, Mecham, Gil For- toul, and Ward. a See Talcott Parsons' translation of Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1947), pp. 358-407, for a dis- cussion of the charismatic leader. " The best available studies of individuals are W. H. Callcott, Santa Anna: The Story of an Enigma Who Once Was Mexico (Norman, Okla., 1936); William F. Sprague, Vicente Guerrero, Mexican Liberator (Chi- cago, 1939); Daniel Cosio Villegas, Porfirio Diaz y la revuelta de La Noria (Mexico, 1953); George S. Wise, Caudillo: A Portrait of Antonio Guzmdn Blanco (New York, 1951)-in addition to the already-cited works of Stanley Ross, William Spence Robertson (Iturbide), Jorge Maiach, Stephen Alexis, and Thomas Rourke. Further, short sketches of various leaders may be found in Wilgus (ed.), South American Dictators (see footnote 3).  96 The Caribbean organized society (which most Caribbean nations have been to a greater or lesser degree) lacking familiar social institutions, the role of leadership assumes an importance which it could not have under more static conditions. The dynamic leader in the Carib- bean area, then, became the substitute institution, and symbol of the desires of the public, and the instrument through which the fears and frustrations, the anxieties and uncertainties, were expressed. II But perhaps the biggest factor in nineteenth-century instability, and one which exists today in most countries, is what Pedro Manuel Arcaya of Venezuela chose to call the "myth of democ- racy."" To some leaders in the Caribbean nations, steeped in oligarchic, paternalistic, and authoritarian patterns, the demo- cratic concept was a dangerous interloper which, unless checked in time, could cause untold damage. And in fact democracy was the invader, the new doctrine which undermined the very foundations of the existing structure, politically, socially, and economically. In the minds of the traditionalists, the acceptance of democracy meant the destruction of a way of life: changes in relations between father and son, between hacendado and peon, between clerk and president. It meant the disappearance of the old landed aristocracy as the focal point of power, and of tradi- tional institutions upon which the entire social structure was based. This destruction the traditionalists could not accept with- out a struggle. To others, the doctrine was beautifully simple and highly attractive, conducive to progress and orderly development. To these, democracy meant growth and economic development to parallel that of the United States or Great Britain, it meant justice based upon immutable principles and not injustice based " Op. cit.; his central thesis was that G6mez gave Venezuela the only kind of government possible under the situation, and that any criticism of the Gomez regime on the basis of undemocratic practices was to judge Gmez within a context which never actually existed in Venezuela. 96 The Caribbean organized society (which most Caribbean nations have been to a greater or lesser degree) lacking familiar social institutions, the role of leadership assumes an importance which it could not have under more static conditions. The dynamic leader in the Carib- bean area, then, became the substitute institution, and symbol of the desires of the public, and the instrument through which the fears and frustrations, the anxieties and uncertainties, were expressed. II But perhaps the biggest factor in nineteenth-century instability, and one which exists today in most countries, is what Pedro Manuel Arcaya of Venezuela chose to call the "myth of democ- racy."" To some leaders in the Caribbean nations, steeped in oligarchic, paternalistic, and authoritarian patterns, the demo- cratic concept was a dangerous interloper which, unless checked in time, could cause untold damage. And in fact democracy was the invader, the new doctrine which undermined the very foundations of the existing structure, politically, socially, and economically. In the minds of the traditionalists, the acceptance of democracy meant the destruction of a way of life: changes in relations between father and son, between hacendado and peon, between clerk and president. It meant the disappearance of the old landed aristocracy as the focal point of power, and of tradi- tional institutions upon which the entire social structure was based. This destruction the traditionalists could not accept with- out a struggle. To others, the doctrine was beautifully simple and highly attractive, conducive to progress and orderly development. To these, democracy meant growth and economic development to parallel that of the United States or Great Britain, it meant justice based upon immutable principles and not injustice based * Op. cit.; his central thesis was that G6mez gave Venezuela the only kind of government possible under the situation, and that any criticism of the G6mez regime on the basis of undemocratic practices was to judge Gomez within a context which never actually existed in Venezuela. 96 The Caribbean organized society (which most Caribbean nations have been to a greater or lesser degree) lacking familiar social institutions, the role of leadership assumes an importance which it could not have under more static conditions. The dynamic leader in the Carib- bean area, then, became the substitute institution, and symbol of the desires of the public, and the instrument through which the fears and frustrations, the anxieties and uncertainties, were expressed. II But perhaps the biggest factor in nineteenth-century instability, and one which exists today in most countries, is what Pedro Manuel Arcaya of Venezuela chose to call the "myth of democ- racy."" To some leaders in the Caribbean nations, steeped in oligarchic, paternalistic, and authoritarian patterns, the demo- cratic concept was a dangerous interloper which, unless checked in time, could cause untold damage. And in fact democracy was the invader, the new doctrine which undermined the very foundations of the existing structure, politically, socially, and economically. In the minds of the traditionalists, the acceptance of democracy meant the destruction of a way of life: changes in relations between father and son, between hacendado and peon, between clerk and president. It meant the disappearance of the old landed aristocracy as the focal point of power, and of tradi- tional institutions upon which the entire social structure was based. This destruction the traditionalists could not accept with- out a struggle. To others, the doctrine was beautifully simple and highly attractive, conducive to progress and orderly development. To these, democracy meant growth and economic development to parallel that of the United States or Great Britain, it meant justice based upon immutable principles and not injustice based * Op. cit.; his central thesis was that Gomez gave Venezuela the only kind of government possible under the situation, and that any criticism of the Gomez regime on the basis of undemocratic practices was to judge Gomez within a context which never actually existed in Venezuela.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 9/J upon whim and special privilege, it meant efficiency in govern- ment and the disappearance of a corrupt bureaucracy. In short, the general vision of democracy seemed to hold promise of a future which would make life complete for all men. But neither the opponents nor the proponents actually under- stood the nature and the limitations of a democratic form of government, nor did they comprehend the tremendous complex- ity of the doctrine with its demand for a responsible and informed citizenry, its need for understanding and compromise, and its emphasis on political sophistication and orderliness. Whether the doctrine in its entirety was understood or not, however, it could be and was used for propaganda purposes; the very word itself came almost to be a fetish to which all made some form of obei- sance. Democratic trappings were widely used-but democratic practices and concepts were almost completely overlooked. Some facet of democracy was the almost inevitable motto for any revolt or revolution; even Venezuela's Gdmez, probably the most tyran- nical and least democratic of all twentieth-century Caribbean dictators, consistently gave lip service to democracy. This con- stant reference to democracy, even by those violently opposed to its basic principles, beclouded and confused the issue. At the same time, even those who were seriously concerned with a developing democracy and who came into positions of power soon learned that democracy was a two-way instrument. In order for the president to maintain a democratic form in his administration, he needed democratic action by the public-and only on rare occasions was the public willing to accept the dis- advantages along with the advantages. Experimental democracy among an untutored people often brought chaotic and inefficient administration that approached anarchy; this in turn led to the gradual imposition of dictatorial or nondemocratic policies by the president or to an overthrow of the existing regime. Many examples of this tendency could be cited; let it suffice here to mention only Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti, Juarez of Mexico, and Manuel Jose Arce of Central America during the nineteenth REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES upon whim and special privilege, it meant efficiency in gov ment and the disappearance of a corrupt bureaucracy. In sh the general vision of democracy seemed to hold promise future which would make life complete for all men. But neither the opponents nor the proponents actually on stood the nature and the limitations of a democratic form government, nor did they comprehend the tremendous comt ity of the doctrine with its demand for a responsible and infor citizenry, its need for understanding and compromise, and emphasis on political sophistication and orderliness. Whether doctrine in its entirety was understood or not, however, it a be and was used for propaganda purposes; the very word i came almost to be a fetish to which all made some form of o sance. Democratic trappings were widely used-but democ practices and concepts were almost completely overlooked. S facet of democracy was the almost inevitable motto for any re or revolution; even Venezuela's Gdmez, probably the most ty nical and least democratic of all twentieth-century Carib] dictators, consistently gave lip service to democracy. This stant reference to democracy, even by those violently opp to its basic principles, beclouded and confused the issue. At the same time, even those who were seriously concer with a developing democracy and who came into position power soon learned that democracy was a two-way instrum In order for the president to maintain a democratic form in administration, he needed democratic action by the public- only on rare occasions was the public willing to accept the advantages along with the advantages. Experimental democ among an untutored people often brought chaotic and ineffic administration that approached anarchy; this in turn led to gradual imposition of dictatorial or nondemocratic policies the president or to an overthrow of the existing regime. M examples of this tendency could be cited; let it suffice her mention only Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti, Juarez of Mexico, Manuel Jose Arce of Central America during the ninetee 97 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 97 ern- upon whim and special privilege, it meant efficiency in govern- iort, ment and the disappearance of a corrupt bureaucracy. In short, of a the general vision of democracy seemed to hold promise of a future which would make life complete for all men. der- But neither the opponents nor the proponents actually under- of stood the nature and the limitations of a democratic form of rlex- government, nor did they comprehend the tremendous complex- med ity of the doctrine with its demand for a responsible and informed its citizenry, its need for understanding and compromise, and its the emphasis on political sophistication and orderliness. Whether the ould doctrine in its entirety was understood or not, however, it could tself be and was used for propaganda purposes; the very word itself bei- came almost to be a fetish to which all made some form of obei- ratic sance. Democratic trappings were widely used-but democratic ome practices and concepts were almost completely overlooked. Some volt facet of democracy was the almost inevitable motto for any revolt ran- or revolution; even Venezuela's Gomez, probably the most tyran- bean nical and least democratic of all twentieth-century Caribbean con- dictators, consistently gave lip service to democracy. This con- osed stant reference to democracy, even by those violently opposed to its basic principles, beclouded and confused the issue. ned At the same time, even those who were seriously concerned s of with a developing democracy and who came into positions of ent. power soon learned that democracy was a two-way instrument. his In order for the president to maintain a democratic form in his and administration, he needed democratic action by the public-and dis- only on rare occasions was the public willing to accept the dis- racy advantages along with the advantages. Experimental democracy ient among an untutored people often brought chaotic and inefficient the administration that approached anarchy; this in turn led to the by gradual imposition of dictatorial or nondemocratic policies by any the president or to an overthrow of the existing regime. Many e to examples of this tendency could be cited; let it suffice here to and mention only Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti, Juirez of Mexico, and nth Manuel Jos6 Arce of Central America during the nineteenth  98 The Caribbean century, and Estrada Palma of Cuba, Madero of Mexico, R6mulo Gallegos of Venezuela, and Manual Enrique Araujo of El Salva- dor in the twentieth. The obverse of democracy is the familiar pattern of dictator- ship. As has already been mentioned, all public leaders in the Caribbean have given lip service to the democratic ideal in one form or another, but only rarely has the incumbent made any attempt to govern democratically or constitutionally. Politically ambitious people, whether democratically inclined or motivated only by the desire for lucrative public office, have been frustrated in their ambitions by a system which excludes them from any hope of officeholding by peaceful means. To these men, only one instrument remains: revolt. This was the case in the Madero revolution in Mexico and the more recent Figueres revolution in Costa Rica; in both cases the legitimate political aspirations of groups were blocked by existing administrations which used highly undemocratic means; and in both cases the choice of revolution was made reluctantly as the lesser of two grave evils. The same complex applies to the Accion Democrdtica revolution of 1945 in Venezuela which ultimately brought Gallegos to the presidential chair. Dictatorship with its accompanist continuismo is probably still the greatest single factor of instability in the Caribbean, but in reality it is rather a symptom than an actual cause, springing from the more fundamental influences here discussed. The cycle of events in Venezuela during the past twenty years clearly demonstrates the character of dictatorship as a symptom. Had stable political institutions existed at the death of Gmez, whether those institutions were plutocratic, oligarchic, or demo- cratic, the end of the dictatorship should have ushered in a period of cahn and return to normal. But invading democracy was unwilling to accept the plutocracy represented by Eleazar L6pez Contreras and Isaias Medina Angarita and, faced with the impossibility of coming to power through legal means, sought relief in revolt. The Betancourt and Gallegos administrations 98 The Caribbean century, and Estrada Palma of Cuba, Madero of Mexico, R6mulo Gallegos of Venezuela, and Manual Enrique Araujo of El Salva- dor in the twentieth. The obverse of democracy is the familiar pattern of dictator- ship. As has already been mentioned, all public leaders in the Caribbean have given lip service to the democratic ideal in one form or another, but only rarely has the incumbent made any attempt to govern democratically or constitutionally. Politically ambitious people, whether democratically inclined or motivated only by the desire for lucrative public office, have been frustrated in their ambitions by a system which excludes them from any hope of officeholding by peaceful means. To these men, only one instrument remains: revolt. This was the case in the Madero revolution in Mexico and the more recent Figueres revolution in Costa Rica; in both cases the legitimate political aspirations of groups were blocked by existing administrations which used highly undemocratic means; and in both cases the choice of revolution was made reluctantly as the lesser of two grave evils. The same complex applies to the Accion Democrdtica revolution of 1945 in Venezuela which ultimately brought Gallegos to the presidential chair. Dictatorship with its accompanist continuismo is probably still the greatest single factor of instability in the Caribbean, but in reality it is rather a symptom than an actual cause, springing from the more fundamental influences here discussed. The cycle of events in Venezuela during the past twenty years clearly demonstrates the character of dictatorship as a symptom. Had stable political institutions existed at the death of Gmez, whether those institutions were plutocratic, oligarchic, or demo- cratic, the end of the dictatorship should have ushered in a period of calm and return to normal. But invading democracy was unwilling to accept the plutocracy represented by Eleazar Ilpez Contreras and Isaias Medina Angarita and, faced with the impossibility of coming to power through legal means, sought relief in revolt. The Betancourt and Gallegos administrations 98 The Caribbean century, and Estrada Palma of Cuba, Madero of Mexico, R6mulo Gallegos of Venezuela, and Manual Enrique Araujo of El Salva- dor in the twentieth. The obverse of democracy is the familiar pattern of dictator- ship. As has already been mentioned, all public leaders in the Caribbean have given lip service to the democratic ideal in one form or another, but only rarely has the incumbent made any attempt to govern democratically or constitutionally. Politically ambitious people, whether democratically inclined or motivated only by the desire for lucrative public office, have been frustrated in their ambitions by a system which excludes them from any hope of officeholding by peaceful means. To these men, only one instrument remains: revolt. This was the case in the Madero revolution in Mexico and the more recent Figueres revolution in Costa Rica; in both cases the legitimate political aspirations of groups were blocked by existing administrations which used highly undemocratic means; and in both cases the choice of revolution was made reluctantly as the lesser of two grave evils. The same complex applies to the Accion Democrdtica revolution of 1945 in Venezuela which ultimately brought Gallegos to the presidential chair. Dictatorship with its accompanist continuismo is probably still the greatest single factor of instability in the Caribbean, but in reality it is rather a symptom than an actual cause, springing from the more fundamental influences here discussed. The cycle of events in Venezuela during the past twenty years clearly demonstrates the character of dictatorship as a symptom. Had stable political institutions existed at the death of Gmez, whether those institutions were plutocratic, oligarchic, or demo- cratic, the end of the dictatorship should have ushered in a period of calm and return to normal. But invading democracy was unwilling to accept the plutocracy represented by Eleazar Lspez Contreras and Isaias Medina Angarita and, faced with the impossibility of coming to power through legal means, sought relief in revolt. The Betancourt and Gallegos administrations  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 99 were in turn beset by the disadvantages of democracy, while suffering from lack of political sophistication; the weaknesses of the government then brought on the coup d'itat of 1948 and the subsequent dictatorship of Marco Perez Jimenez, thus com- pleting the cycle. The Cuban double-cycle of Machado through Carlos Manuel de Cispedes to Batista, and then through Grau and Prio back to Batista, demonstrates the same characteristic."' III Impinging upon, but not coexistent with, the problem of demo- cratic government has been the inability of administrations to fulfill the promises made-whether in good faith or in bad. This failure is intimately related to the political naivete earlier men- tioned, both on the part of the administrators and the public. Often the "outs" have seen a problem's solution in fabulously easy terms; within this frame of reference they have made great and sometimes sincere promises to solve an economic, or social, or political problem as soon as elevated to office. But fundamental problems in the social or economic realm are seldom satisfactorily solved either quickly, easily, or painlessly; in the process, some interests are inevitably hurt. In an ordered society, with estab- lished, stable institutions, the damage to a class is absorbed; but in a volatile setting the interested group takes positive action to prevent damage. This Tomis Cipriano de Mosquera discovered in Colombia in the nineteenth century, and Carranza of Mexico " In addition to the rfrernces already cited for specific cases of dic- tatorship, the following should be consulted for the insittiton of dictator- ship: Guy Stanton Ford, ed., Dictatorship in the Modern World (Minne- apolis, 1939); Albert Carr, Juggernaut (New York, 1939); Amber Reeves Blanco-White, The New Propaganda (London, 1939); Diana Spearman, Modern Dictatorship (London, 1939); Lionel Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (Oxford, 1929); on democracy, see Luis Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks (New York, 1943); Carl L. Becker, Modern Democracy (New Haven, 1941); Ezequiel Padilla, Free Men of America (Chicago, 1943). See also David Spitz, Patterns of Undemo- cratic Thought (New York, 1949). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 99 were in turn beset by the disadvantages of democracy, while suffering from lack of political sophistication; the weaknesses of the government then brought on the coup d'tat of 1948 and the subsequent dictatorship of Marco Perez Jimenez, thus com- pleting the cycle. The Cuban double-cycle of Machado through Carlos Manuel de Cespedes to Batista, and then through Grau and Prio back to Batista, demonstrates the same characteristic." III Impinging upon, but not coexistent with, the problem of demo- cratic government has been the inability of administrations to fulfill the promises made-whether in good faith or in bad. This failure is intimately related to the political naivete earlier men- tioned, both on the part of the administrators and the public. Often the "outs" have seen a problem's solution in fabulously easy terms; within this frame of reference they have made great and sometimes sincere promises to solve an economic, or social, or political problem as soon as elevated to office. But fundamental problems in the social or economic realm are seldom satisfactorily solved either quickly, easily, or painlessly; in the process, some interests are inevitably hurt. In an ordered society, with estab- lished, stable institutions, the damage to a class is absorbed; but in a volatile setting the interested group takes positive action to prevent damage. This Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera discovered in Colombia in the nineteenth century, and Carranza of Mexico " In addition to the references already cited for specific cases of dic- tatorship, the following should be consulted for the institution of dictator- ship: Guy Stanton Ford, ed., Dictatorship in the Modern World (Minne- apolis, 1939); Albert Carr, Juggernaut (New York, 1939); Amber Reeves Blanco-White, The New Propaganda (London, 1939); Diana Spearman, Modern Dictatorship (London, 1939); Lionel Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (Oxford, 1929); on democracy, see Luis Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks (New York, 1943); Carl L. Becker, Modern Democracy (New Haven, 1941); Ezequiel Padilla, Free Men of America (Chicago, 1943). See also David Spitz, Patterns of Undemo- cratic Thought (New York, 1949). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 99 were in turn beset by the disadvantages of democracy, while suffering from lack of political sophistication; the weaknesses of the government then brought on the coup ddtat of 1948 and the subsequent dictatorship of Marco Pirez Jiminez, thus com- pleting the cycle. The Cuban double-cycle of Machado through Carlos Manuel de Cespedes to Batista, and then through Grau and Prio back to Batista, demonstrates the same characteristic." III Impinging upon, but not coexistent with, the problem of demo- cratic government has been the inability of administrations to fulfill the promises made-whether in good faith or in bad. This failure is intimately related to the political naivete earlier men- tioned, both on the part of the administrators and the public. Often the "outs" have seen a problem's solution in fabulously easy terms; within this frame of reference they have made great and sometimes sincere promises to solve an economic, or social, or political problem as soon as elevated to office. But fundamental problems in the social or economic realm are seldom satisfactorily solved either quickly, easily, or painlessly; in the process, some interests are inevitably hurt. In an ordered society, with estab- lished, stable institutions, the damage to a class is absorbed; but in a volatile setting the interested group takes positive action to prevent damage. This Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera discovered in Colombia in the nineteenth century, and Carranza of Mexico " In addition to the references already cited for specific cases of dic- tatorship, the following should be consulted for the institution of dictator- ship: Guy Stanton Ford, ed., Dictatorship in the Modern World (Minne- apolis, 1939); Albert Carr, Juggernaut (New York, 1939); Amber Reeves Blanco-White, The New Propaganda (London, 1939); Diana Spearman, Modem Dictatorship (London, 1939); Lionel Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (Oxford, 1929); on democracy, see Luis Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks (New York, 1943); Carl L. Becker, Modern Democracy (New Haven, 1941); Ezequiel Padilla, Free Men of America (Chicago, 1943). See also David Spitz, Patterns of Undemo- cratic Thought (New York, 1949).  100 The Caribbean 100 The Caribbean 100 The Caribbean found in the twentieth. In other situations, of course, the prom- ises were dishonestly made, good for public consumption only, and were followed by no attempt at fulfillment. But regardless of the reason in any particular case for the failure to comply with promises, broken pledges in any society create ill will and ani- mosity. Within the milieu of Caribbean culture, the broken pledge was dangerous, changing ardent supporters into equally ardent opponents. Probably the outstanding twentieth-century example of this shift of a large group is Emiliano Zapata of Mexico, who gave unstinting support to the Madero cause in early 1911. Zapata became convinced that Madero's promises would not be kept once the revolution against Diaz had been successful; by late 1911 the name of Madero had become ana- thema to the zapatistas, and Zapata rose in rebellion against the government." In spite of its danger, however, the inability or refusal to comply with pledges assumes an importance only because of the lack of stable institutions or mechanisms for regular and orderly change of government. The broken political pledge is, in most stable governments, accepted as a matter of course and is not of sufficient import to bring on revolution. But where violence is endemic, and governmental change comes more often through extralegal means than through legal, reprisal is apt to be sudden and somewhat primitive. IV To some extent connected with this failure to comply with promises has been the constant spectre of financial and moral corruption. The use of public office for private gain, above and beyond the remuneration set by the statutes, is deeply rooted in Spanish colonial tradition in spite of the rather careful structure built by the Spanish crown to prevent the loss of public revenue. " The animosities thus created tend to perpetuate themselves, whether justly or unjustly. In the case of Madero and Zapata, for example, the zapatistas now alive still consider Madero to have been the greatest traitor to the Mexican Revolution and insist that even Huerta was less evil. found in the twentieth. In other situations, of course, the prom- ises were dishonestly made, good for public consumption only, and were followed by no attempt at fulfillment. But regardless of the reason in any particular case for the failure to comply with promises, broken pledges in any society create ill will and ani- mosity. Within the milieu of Caribbean culture, the broken pledge was dangerous, changing ardent supporters into equally ardent opponents. Probably the outstanding twentieth-century example of this shift of a large group is Emiliano Zapata of Mexico, who gave unstinting support to the Madero cause in early 1911. Zapata became convinced that Madero's promises would not be kept once the revolution against Diaz had been successful; by late 1911 the name of Madero had become ana- thema to the zapatistas, and Zapata rose in rebellion against the government." In spite of its danger, however, the inability or refusal to comply with pledges assumes an importance only because of the lack of stable institutions or mechanisms for regular and orderly change of government. The broken political pledge is, in most stable governments, accepted as a matter of course and is not of sufficient import to bring on revolution. But where violence is endemic, and governmental change comes more often through extralegal means than through legal, reprisal is apt to be sudden and somewhat primitive. IV To some extent connected with this failure to comply with promises has been the constant spectre of financial and moral corruption. The use of public office for private gain, above and beyond the remuneration set by the statutes, is deeply rooted in Spanish colonial tradition in spite of the rather careful structure built by the Spanish crown to prevent the loss of public revenue. " The animosities thus created tend to perpetuate themselves, whether justly or unjustly. In the case of Madero and Zapata, for example, the zapatistas now alive still consider Madero to have been the greatest traitor to the Mexican Revolution and insist that even Huerta was less evil. found in the twentieth. In other situations, of course, the prom- ises were dishonestly made, good for public consumption only, and were followed by no attempt at fulfillment. But regardless of the reason in any particular case for the failure to comply with promises, broken pledges in any society create ill will and ani- mosity. Within the milieu of Caribbean culture, the broken pledge was dangerous, changing ardent supporters into equally ardent opponents. Probably the outstanding twentieth-century example of this shift of a large group is Emiliano Zapata of Mexico, who gave unstinting support to the Madero cause in early 1911. Zapata became convinced that Madero's promises would not be kept once the revolution against Diaz had been successful; by late 1911 the name of Madero had become ana- thema to the zapatistas, and Zapata rose in rebellion against the government." In spite of its danger, however, the inability or refusal to comply with pledges assumes an importance only because of the lack of stable institutions or mechanisms for regular and orderly change of government. The broken political pledge is, in most stable governments, accepted as a matter of course and is not of sufficient import to bring on revolution. But where violence is endemic, and governmental change comes more often through extralegal means than through legal, reprisal is apt to be sudden and somewhat primitive. IV To some extent connected with this failure to comply with promises has been the constant spectre of financial and moral corruption. The use of public office for private gain, above and beyond the remuneration set by the statutes, is deeply rooted in Spanish colonial tradition in spite of the rather careful structure built by the Spanish crown to prevent the loss of public revenue. " The animosities thus created tend to perpetuate themselves, whether justly or unjustly. In the case of Madero and Zapata, for example, the zapatistas now alive still consider Madero to have been the greatest traitor to the Mexican Revolution and insist that even Huerta was less evil.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES IU1 While peculation by government officials has been expected and generally overlooked in the Caribbean area-indeed, to some extent the salary scales of civil servants have almost demanded the use of the mordida or its kin-there are limits beyond which a president or his administration cannot go. Even though there is no case of a revolt based primarily on the issue of corruption, in many cases the practice of self-enrichment at the expense of the treasury has been a strongly contributing cause. It is doubtful that Batista could have overthrown the Prio government, for example, had the Cubans not been so thoroughly disgusted by the obvious graft in which Prio and his cohorts were engaged. Mario Garcia Menocal's obvious graft, Machado's penchant for enriching himself and his friends, and Zelaya's free use of the treasury as though it were a personal bank account certainly were important factors in stimulating revolt. V But even more important than financial corruption and graft has been a type of activity which can best be described as moral corruption. Within this category may be placed the double- dealing characteristics of many administrations, the penchant for bringing members of the family into the government circle, and the subsidization of the press to guarantee adulation and support. Perhaps an even more important aspect of moral corruption has been the attempts by many presidents to perpetuate themselves in power, either through re-election or through the imposition of puppets. Among the nondictatorial presidents, Carranza affords the best example of this type of moral corruption. He himself was scrupulously honest financially; even his worst enemies could never make a case of personal graft against him," but he was corrupted by power to an appalling degree. He was no dictator in the generally accepted meaning of the term, and certainly he " Many charges of graft were made against his close advisors, par- ticularly Fdlix Fulgencio Palavicin,, the Madero brothers, the Cabreras, and Juan B. Barragin Rodriguez; but there is neither accusation nor evidence that Carranza profited personally. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 101 While peculation by government officials has been expected and generally overlooked in the Caribbean area-indeed, to some extent the salary scales of civil servants have almost demanded the use of the mordida or its kin-there are limits beyond which a president or his administration cannot go. Even though there is no case of a revolt based primarily on the issue of corruption, in many cases the practice of self-enrichment at the expense of the treasury has been a strongly contributing cause. It is doubtful that Batista could have overthrown the Prio government, for example, had the Cubans not been so thoroughly disgusted by the obvious graft in which Prio and his cohorts were engaged. Mario Garcia Menocal's obvious graft, Machado's penchant for enriching himself and his friends, and Zelaya's free use of the treasury as though it were a personal bank account certainly were important factors in stimulating revolt. V But even more important than financial corruption and graft has been a type of activity which can best be described as moral corruption. Within this category may be placed the double- dealing characteristics of many administrations, the penchant for bringing members of the family into the government circle, and the subsidization of the press to guarantee adulation and support. Perhaps an even more important aspect of moral corruption has been the attempts by many presidents to perpetuate themselves in power, either through re-election or through the imposition of puppets. Among the nondictatorial presidents, Carranza affords the best example of this type of moral corruption. He himself was scrupulously honest financially; even his worst enemies could never make a case of personal graft against him," but he was corrupted by power to an appalling degree. He was no dictator in the generally accepted meaning of the term, and certainly he " Many charges of graft were made against his close advisors, par- ticularly Filix Fulgencio Palavicim, the Madero brothers, the Cabreras, and Juan B. Barragin Rodriguez; but there is neither accusation nor evidence that Carranza profited personally. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 101 While peculation by government officials has been expected and generally overlooked in the Caribbean area-indeed, to some extent the salary scales of civil servants have almost demanded the use of the mordida or its kin-there are limits beyond which a president or his administration cannot go. Even though there is no case of a revolt based primarily on the issue of corruption, in many cases the practice of self-enrichment at the expense of the treasury has been a strongly contributing cause. It is doubtful that Batista could have overthrown the Prio government, for example, had the Cubans not been so thoroughly disgusted by the obvious graft in which Prio and his cohorts were engaged. Mario Garcia Menocal's obvious graft, Machado's penchant for enriching himself and his friends, and Zelaya's free use of the treasury as though it were a personal bank account certainly were important factors in stimulating revolt. V But even more important than financial corruption and graft has been a type of activity which can best be described as moral corruption. Within this category may be placed the double- dealing characteristics of many administrations, the penchant for bringing members of the family into the government circle, and the subsidization of the press to guarantee adulation and support. Perhaps an even more important aspect of moral corruption has been the attempts by many presidents to perpetuate themselves in power, either through re-election or through the imposition of puppets. Among the nondictatorial presidents, Carranza affords the best example of this type of moral corruption. He himself was scrupulously honest financially; even his worst enemies could never make a case of personal graft against him,' but he was corrupted by power to an appalling degree. He was no dictator in the generally accepted meaning of the term, and certainly he " Many charges of graft were made against his close advisors, par- ticularly Flix Fulgencio Palavicim, the Madero brothers, the Cabreras, and Juan B. Barragin Rodriguez; but there is neither accusation nor evidence that Carranza profited personally.  102 The Caribbean did not perceive himself as one; and yet he was convinced that he, and he alone, had to make all decisions, guide all activities, determine all future policies. His was the don de mando which others were never allowed to forget. Accordingly, those who agreed with him were accepted as honest men of vision; those who disagreed were traitors and as such castigated. It was this characteristic which was primarily responsible for Villa's rebellion in 1914,"4 for several small outbreaks between 1915 and 1920, and for the Alvaro Obregon revolt which finally brought about his overthrow and death. Moral corruption of a similar but not identical type can be seen in the administrations of Medina Angrita of Venezuela, Mariano Ospina Pdrez of Colombia, Teo- doro Picado of Costa Rica, Ubico and Arbenz of Guatemala, Her- nindez Martinez and Salvador Castafneda Castro of El Salvador, and Arnulfo Arias of Panama. Each attempted to perpetuate him- self or his government either in person or through close friends; each made a mockery of constitutional government even though most of them were not dictators; and each had to confront a major revolution. Only Ospina Pirez emerged victorious. VI Of a completely different nature as a factor in political insta- bility has been a tendency at times for other nations to interfere in the domestic policies of some of the small Caribbean nations. Generally this intervention has been one of two kinds: either direct intervention by a near neighbor,"0 or the kind of interven- tion which has been stigmatized as "economic imperialism." In actuality, intervention by the so-called powers of imperialism" has been a relatively insignificant factor in revolts and revolu- It may be argued in a strictly technical sense that Villa did not rebel, but that Carranza rebelled against the Convention government; in actual fact, Villa was in rebellion against Carranza long before the Convention met,. oSometimes the techniques used have appeared as indirect. "England, the United States, France, Germany, and Spain. 102 The Caribbean did not perceive himself as one; and yet he was convinced that he, and he alone, had to make all decisions, guide all activities, determine all future policies. His was the don de mando which others were never allowed to forget. Accordingly, those who agreed with him were accepted as honest men of vision; those who disagreed were traitors and as such castigated. It was this characteristic which was primarily responsible for Villa's rebellion in 1914,24 for several small outbreaks between 1915 and 1920, and for the Alvaro Obreg6n revolt which finally brought about his overthrow and death. Moral corruption of a similar but not identical type can be seen in the administrations of Medina Angrita of Venezuela, Mariano Ospina Pdrez of Colombia, Teo- doro Picado of Costa Rica, Ubico and Arbenz of Guatemala, Her- ndndez Martinez and Salvador Castafneda Castro of El Salvador, and Arnulfo Arias of Panama. Each attempted to perpetuate him- self or his government either in person or through close friends; each made a mockery of constitutional government even though most of them were not dictators; and each had to confront a major revolution. Only Ospina Perez emerged victorious. VI Of a completely different nature as a factor in political insta- bility has been a tendency at times for other nations to interfere in the domestic policies of some of the small Caribbean nations. Generally this intervention has been one of two kinds: either direct intervention by a near neighbor,25 or the kind of interven- tion which has been stigmatized as "economic imperialism." In actuality, intervention by the so-called powers of imperialisms has been a relatively insignificant factor in revolts and revolu- * It may be argued in a strictly technical sense that Villa did not rebel, but that Carranza rebelled against the Convention government; in actual fact, Villa was in rebellion against Caranza long before the Convention met. " Sometimes the techniques used have appeared as indirect. England, the United States, France, Germany, and Spain. 102 The Caribbean did not perceive himself as one; and yet he was convinced that he, and he alone, had to make all decisions, guide all activities, determine all future policies. His was the don de mando which others were never allowed to forget. Accordingly, those who agreed with him were accepted as honest men of vision; those who disagreed were traitors and as such castigated. It was this characteristic which was primarily responsible for Villa's rebellion in 1914," for several small outbreaks between 1915 and 1920, and for the Alvaro Obreg6n revolt which finally brought about his overthrow and death. Moral corruption of a similar but not identical type can be seen in the administrations of Medina Angrita of Venezuela, Mariano Ospina Pirez of Colombia, Teo- doro Picado of Costa Rica, Ubico and Arbenz of Guatemala, Her- ndndez Martinez and Salvador Castafleda Castro of El Salvador, and Arnulfo Arias of Panama. Each attempted to perpetuate him- self or his government either in person or through close friends; each made a mockery of constitutional government even though most of them were not dictators; and each had to confront a major revolution. Only Ospina Perez emerged victorious. VI Of a completely different nature as a factor in political insta- bility has been a tendency at times for other nations to interfere in the domestic policies of some of the small Caribbean nations. Generally this intervention has been one of two kinds: either direct intervention by a near neighbor," or the kind of interven- tion which has been stigmatized as "economic imperialism." In actuality, intervention by the so-called powers of imperialism"s has been a relatively insignificant factor in revolts and revolu- It may be argued in a strictly technical sense that Villa did not rebel, but that Carranza rebelled against the Convention government; in actual fact, Villa was in rebellion against Carranza long before the Convention met. " Sometimes the techniques used have appeared as indirect. " England, the United States, France, Germany, and Spain.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 103 tions." Very often the rebel leaders have used "imperialistic intervention" as propaganda tools, but such blasts have normally been made to attract adherents and can hardly be considered as factors of revolt. Pascual Orozco in 1912 put great emphasis on Madero's subservience to the United States as a reason for his revolt, but Orozco and all his subordinates knew full well that Madero was anything but subservient to Washington. Menocal of Cuba was similarly accused, as were Elie Lescot of Haiti and Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua, but the revolts against them were stimulated by other causes. On the other hand, existing regimes often charge that those in revolt are supported by foreign money. So the Porfirio Diaz regime charged against Madero, and the Arbenz regime insisted about Castillo Armas. Foreign imperial- ism can be credited, or debited, as a factor in only two ways. American occupation or quasioccupation of Cuba, Santo Do- mingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama tended to postpone revo- lutionary activity which other conditions made almost inevitable, and this in turn made the explosions somewhat more violent when they did occur. More importantly, American-trained con- stabularies have been the instrument through which successful revolutions were carried out in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Occasionally, ambitious or fearful leaders within the Caribbean nations themselves have been a source of instability in neighbor- ing countries. Much of the instability in Central America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was directly attributable to intervention by other governments-either active or tacit. Both Jos6 Santos Zelaya and Manuel Estrada Cabrera " Many writers in the United States have taken the position that vir- tually all Caribbean political instability can be attributed to economic imperalism, with the United Fruit Company coming in for more than its share of opprobrium. See particularly C. D. Kepner and J. H. Soothill, The Banana Empire (New York, 1935); Carleton Beals, Banana Gold (Philadelphia, 1932); Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Do- mingo (New York, 1928); and Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (New York, 1928). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES tions."7 Very often the rebel leaders have used "imperi; intervention" as propaganda tools, but such blasts have nor been made to attract adherents and can hardly be consider factors of revolt. Pascual Orozco in 1912 put great emphas Madero's subservience to the United States as a reason fc revolt, but Orozco and all his subordinates knew full well Madero was anything but subservient to Washington. Me of Cuba was similarly accused, as were Elie Lescot of Hait Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua, but the revolts against them stimulated by other causes. On the other hand, existing re often charge that those in revolt are supported by foreign m So the Porfirio Diaz regime charged against Madero, an< Arbenz regime insisted about Castillo Arnas. Foreign imp ism can be credited, or debited, as a factor in only two American occupation or quasioccupation of Cuba, Sante mingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama tended to postpone lutionary activity which other conditions made almost inevi and this in turn made the explosions somewhat more v: when they did occur. More importantly, American-trained stabularies have been the instrument through which suct. revolutions were carried out in Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua. Occasionally, ambitious or fearful leaders within the Caril nations themselves have been a source of instability in neig ing countries. Much of the instability in Central America d the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was di attributable to intervention by other governments-either or tacit. Both Jos Santos Zelaya and Manuel Estrada Ca " Many writers in the United States have taken the position th tually all Caribbean political instability can be attributed to ecc imperalism, with the United Fruit Company coming in for more tl share of opprobrium. See particularly C. D. Kepner and J. H. St The Banana Empire (New York, 1935); Carleton Beals, Banana (Philadelphia, 1932); Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in San mingo (New York, 1928); and Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban 1 (New York, 1928). 103 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 103 tions."7 Very often the rebel leaders have used "imperialistic intervention" as propaganda tools, but such blasts have normally been made to attract adherents and can hardly be considered as factors of revolt. Pascual Orozco in 1912 put great emphasis on Madero's subservience to the United States as a reason for his revolt, but Orozco and all his subordinates knew full well that Madero was anything but subservient to Washington. Menocal of Cuba was similarly accused, as were Elie Lescot of Haiti and Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua, but the revolts against them were stimulated by other causes. On the other hand, existing regimes often charge that those in revolt are supported by foreign money. So the Porfirio Diaz regime charged against Madero, and the Arbenz regime insisted about Castillo Armas. Foreign imperial- ism can be credited, or debited, as a factor in only two ways. American occupation or quasioccupation of Cuba, Santo Do- mingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama tended to postpone revo- lutionary activity which other conditions made almost inevitable, and this in turn made the explosions somewhat more violent when they did occur. More importantly, American-trained con- stabularies have been the instrument through which successful revolutions were carried out in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Occasionally, ambitious or fearful leaders within the Caribbean nations themselves have been a source of instability in neighbor- ing countries. Much of the instability in Central America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was directly attributable to intervention by other governments-either active or tacit. Both Jos Santos Zelaya and Manuel Estrada Cabrera " Many writers in the United States have taken the position that vir- tually all Caribbean political instability can be attributed to economic imperalism, with the United Fruit Company coming in for more than its share of opprobrium. See particularly C. D. Kepner and J. H. Soothill, The Banana Empire (New York, 1935); Carleton Beals, Banana Gold (Philadelphia, 1932); Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Do- mingo (New York, 1928); and Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (New York, 1928).  104 The Caribbean 104 The Caribbean 104 The Caribbean created domestic trouble in the other Central American nations, and more recently the so-called Caribbean Legion has been credited with causing revolts-abortive to be sure-in Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Nicaragua. More recently still, Nicaragua certainly had a hand in revolts against Figueres of Costa Rica, Guatemala encouraged revolt in both Honduras and El Salvador," and almost certainly both Honduras and Nicaragua gave aid to the Castillo Armas revolution which evicted Arbenz from Guate- mala. But even when the governments themselves have not been involved in supporting revolution in neighboring countries, many governments have given solace and comfort to exiles and refugees who in turn have led revolts. In numerous instances since 1948, this failure to fulfill the obligations of friendly neighbors has led not only to revolts but to international complications. The military arm has often been named as a major culprit in bringing about instability, but military intervention in political affairs is a symptom rather than a cause. It is quite true that the military in Haiti removed Lescot and imposed Dumarsais Estime, only to replace Estime with Paul Magloire. It is further true that the army in Venezuela overthrew Gallegos, that the army rebelled against Obregon in 1923," that Batista depended upon the army to evict Prio, and that most present governments depend to some degree on military friendliness to remain in power. But the elimination of the army and the substitution of a constabulary in many countries has not prevented revolts, nor has it made them less severe; the new police forces have merely taken over the role previously occupied by the armies. In a cul- tural milieu lacking traditional institutions and instruments of stability, the role of the military (or any other strongly integrated power group) becomes highly important. When other factors of instability and inefficiency produce chaos, actual or potential, the " This was a special case, involving the spread of communism, which will be considered later. " Almost sixty per cent of the army, and a greater proportion of the officers, joined Huerta. created domestic trouble in the other Central American nations, and more recently the so-called Caribbean Legion has been credited with causing revolts-abortive to be sure-in Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Nicaragua. More recently still, Nicaragua certainly had a hand in revolts against Figueres of Costa Rica, Guatemala encouraged revolt in both Honduras and El Salvador," and almost certainly both Honduras and Nicaragua gave aid to the Castillo Armas revolution which evicted Arbenz from Guate- mala. But even when the governments themselves have not been involved in supporting revolution in neighboring countries, many governments have given solace and comfort to exiles and refugees who in turn have led revolts. In numerous instances since 1948, this failure to fulfill the obligations of friendly neighbors has led not only to revolts but to international complications. The military arm has often been named as a major culprit in bringing about instability, but military intervention in political affairs is a symptom rather than a cause. It is quite true that the military in Haiti removed Lescot and imposed Dumarsais Estim6, only to replace Estime with Paul Magloire. It is further true that the army in Venezuela overthrew Gallegos, that the army rebelled against Obregon in 1923," that Batista depended upon the army to evict Prio, and that most present governments depend to some degree on military friendliness to remain in power. But the elimination of the army and the substitution of a constabulary in many countries has not prevented revolts, nor has it made them less severe; the new police forces have merely taken over the role previously occupied by the armies. In a cul- tural milieu lacking traditional institutions and instruments of stability, the role of the military (or any other strongly integrated power group) becomes highly important. When other factors of instability and inefficiency produce chaos, actual or potential, the " This was a special case, involving the spread of communism, which will be considered later. " Almost sixty per cent of the army, and a greater proportion of the officers, joined Huerta. created domestic trouble in the other Central American nations, and more recently the so-called Caribbean Legion has been credited with causing revolts-abortive to be sure-in Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Nicaragua. More recently still, Nicaragua certainly had a hand in revolts against Figueres of Costa Rica, Guatemala encouraged revolt in both Honduras and El Salvador," and almost certainly both Honduras and Nicaragua gave aid to the Castillo Armas revolution which evicted Arbenz from Guate- mala. But even when the governments themselves have not been involved in supporting revolution in neighboring countries, many governments have given solace and comfort to exiles and refugees who in turn have led revolts. In numerous instances since 1948, this failure to fulfill the obligations of friendly neighbors has led not only to revolts but to international complications. The military arm has often been named as a major culprit in bringing about instability, but military intervention in political affairs is a symptom rather than a cause. It is quite true that the military in Haiti removed Lescot and imposed Dumarsais Estime, only to replace Estimd with Paul Magloire. It is further true that the army in Venezuela overthrew Gallegos, that the army rebelled against Obreg6n in 1923," that Batista depended upon the army to evict Prio, and that most present governments depend to some degree on military friendliness to remain in power. But the elimination of the army and the substitution of a constabulary in many countries has not prevented revolts, nor has it made them less severe; the new police forces have merely taken over the role previously occupied by the armies. In a cul- tural milieu lacking traditional institutions and instruments of stability, the role of the military (or any other strongly integrated power group) becomes highly important. When other factors of instability and inefficiency produce chaos, actual or potential, the " This was a special case, involving the spread of communism, which will be considered later. " Almost sixty per cent of the army, and a greater proportion of the officers, joined Hurtae.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 105 military or police force intervenes; this intervention often comes at the urging of civilian groups. The rather scanty empirical evidence now available seems to indicate that the military, as an institution or an organization, is low on the prestige scale and could not normally exercise strong leadership. On the other hand, the officers within the military, representing a cohesive power factor, find themselves often in the fulcrum position of the power balance; in these situations the officer class exercises apparently great power which in turn has tended to overem- phasize the army's importance in revolts and revolutions. One can safely say that had there been no army or national police in any Caribbean republic, the course of revolution would have run roughly the same over the past fifty years.ao VII Basic to the entire pattern of revolt and revolution has been the tenuous hold which the individual has had on economic well- being and on life itself. It has often been stated, categorically and with great force, that social and economic unrest and depravity are completely unrelated to political unrest.a But all available evidence, empirical or circumstantial, leads to the oppo- site conclusion. Certainly the studies of Siegfried, Heberle, and " Unfortunately, there have been no serious studies of the military position and function in the area, and as a consequence the above inter- pretation has come from observations concerning recruitment difficulties, the nature of military establishments, and the part played by civilians in military coups. The only case of which the author is aware in which a segment of the military rebelled as a result of ostensible military reasons was that of Felix Diaz in 1912 in Mexico; within a matter of days the revolt was quelled. Recent data extracted by Roy Clifford seems to indi- cate the reverse of the position here taken, but his study concerned a disaster situation in which there were many unique factors. See his The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of Border Communities in Dis- aster (East Lansing, Mich., 1955). " The author on one occasion saw a group of Americans, all experi- enced in Latin America, pass by an overwhelming majority a resolution to this effect. This is the position, also, taken publicly on many occasions by the Peruvian Ambassador to the United States. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 105 military or police force intervenes; this intervention often comes at the urging of civilian groups. The rather scanty empirical evidence now available seems to indicate that the military, as an institution or an organization, is low on the prestige scale and could not normally exercise strong leadership. On the other hand, the officers within the military, representing a cohesive power factor, find themselves often in the fulcrum position of the power balance; in these situations the officer class exercises apparently great power which in turn has tended to overem- phasize the army's importance in revolts and revolutions. One can safely say that had there been no army or national police in any Caribbean republic, the course of revolution would have run roughly the same over the past fifty years.e VII Basic to the entire pattern of revolt and revolution has been the tenuous hold which the individual has had on economic well- being and on life itself. It has often been stated, categorically and with great force, that social and economic unrest and depravity are completely unrelated to political unrest." But all available evidence, empirical or circumstantial, leads to the oppo- site conclusion. Certainly the studies of Siegfried, Heberle, and " Unfortunately, there have been no serious studies of the military position and function in the area, and as a consequence the above inter- pretation has come from observations concerning recruitment difficulties, the nature of military establishments, and the part played by civilians in military coups. The only case of which the author is aware in which a segment of the military rebelled as a result of ostensible military reasons was that of Felix Diaz in 1912 in Mexico; within a matter of days the revolt was quelled. Recent data extracted by Roy Clifford seems to indi- cate the reverse of the position heere taken, but his study concerned a disaster situation in which there were many unique factors. See his The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of Border Communities in Dis- aster (East Lansing, Mich., 1955). " The author on one occasion saw a group of Americans, all experi- enced in Latin America, pass by an overwhelming majority a resolution to this effect. This is the position, also, taken publicly on many occasions by the Peruvian Ambassador to the United States. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 105 military or police force intervenes; this intervention often comes at the urging of civilian groups. The rather scanty empirical evidence now available seems to indicate that the military, as an institution or an organization, is low on the prestige scale and could not normally exercise strong leadership. On the other hand, the officers within the military, representing a cohesive power factor, find themselves often in the fulcrum position of the power balance; in these situations the officer class exercises apparently great power which in turn has tended to overem- phasize the army's importance in revolts and revolutions. One can safely say that had there been no army or national police in any Caribbean republic, the course of revolution would have run roughly the same over the past fifty years." VII Basic to the entire pattern of revolt and revolution has been the tenuous hold which the individual has had on economic well- being and on life itself. It has often been stated, categorically and with great force, that social and economic unrest and depravity are completely unrelated to political unrest." But all available evidence, empirical or circumstantial, leads to the oppo- site conclusion. Certainly the studies of Siegfried, Heberle, and " Unfortunately, there have been no serious studies of the military position and function in the area, and as a consequence the above inter- pretation has come from observations concerning recruitment difficulties, the nature of military establishments, and the part played by civilians in military coups. The only case of which the author is aware in which a segment of the military rebelledas a result of ostensible military reasons was that of Felix Diaz in 1912 in Mexico; within a matter of days the revolt was quelled. Recent data extracted by Roy Clifford seems to indi- cate the reverse of the position here taken, but his study concerned a disaster situation in which there were many unique factors. See his The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of Border Communities in Dis- aster (East Lansing, Mich., 1955). " The author on one occasion saw a group of Americans, all experi- enced in Latin America, pass by an overwhelming majority a resolution to this effect. This is the position, also, taken publicly on many occasions by the Peruvian Ambassador to the United States.  106 The Caribbean others in the United States and in Europe strongly suggest that economic uncertainty leads to political inconstancy, and that groups engaged in one-crop economy of uncertain income tend to accept panaceas for their ills." Furthermore, the alost uni- versal pattern of tumbling Latin American governments under the impact of economic hardship following the 1929 Wall Street collapse seems to suggest economic hardship as a potent force in political instability. The unbelievably low standards of living to which the majority of the Caribbean people have been subjected for the past hundred years and more has certainly not tended to create a solid citizenry interested in maintaining the status quo.t5 The majority of the Caribbean peoples during this century have had little to lose in a revolution, but they have had much to gain if promises were kept. Class distinction has led to some degree to class resentment, which in turn has made the mass of the population ready to follow a leader who promises equality and justice. Further, the limited economic opportunities open to the majority have created an attitude favoring revolution as a method of gaining material things through more or less legalized pillage. " See Andr Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de I'Ouest sous la Troisidme Republique (Paris, 1913); Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany (Baton Rouge, 1945); A. N. Holcombe, The New Party Politics (New York, 1933); Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States (Washington, 1942). " On economic conditions, see United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America (New York, 1951); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Report on Cuba (Baltimore, 1951); U.S. Office of International Trade, Cuba: Summary of Basic Economic Informa- tion (Washington, 1948); Institute of International Finance, The Eco- nomic Position of Cuba (IIF Bulletin No. 165, 1950); Stacy May, Economic Development in Cuba (New York, 1948); Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis, 1950); IBRD, The Economic Development of Guate- mala (Baltimore, 1951); IBRD, The Economic Development of Nicaragua (Baltimore, 1953); IBRD, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia (Baltimore, 1950); Stacy May and others, Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development (New York, 1952); Henry C. Wallich and J. H. Adler, Public Finance in a Developing Country: El Salvador-A Case Study (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); and Nathan C. Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago, 1948). 106 The Caribbean 106 The Caribbean others in the United States and in Europe strongly suggest that economic uncertainty leads to political inconstancy, and that groups engaged in one-crop economy of uncertain income tend to accept panaceas for their ills."s Furthermore, the almost uni- versal pattern of tumbling Latin American governments under the impact of economic hardship following the 1929 Wall Street collapse seems to suggest economic hardship as a potent force in political instability. The unbelievably low standards of living to which the majority of the Caribbean people have been subjected for the past hundred years and more has certainly not tended to create a solid citizenry interested in maintaining the status quo.5 The majority of the Caribbean peoples during this century have had little to lose in a revolution, but they have had much to gain if promises were kept. Class distinction has led to some degree to class resentment, which in turn has made the mass of the population ready to follow a leader who promises equality and justice. Further, the limited economic opportunities open to the majority have created an attitude favoring revolution as a method of gaining material things through more or less legalized pillage. " See Andr6 Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisihme Republique (Paris, 1913); Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany (Baton Rouge, 1945); A. N. Holcombe, The New Party Politics (New York, 1933); Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States (Washington, 1942). " On economic conditions, see United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America (New York, 1951); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Report on Cuba (Baltimore, 1951); U.S. Office of International Trade, Cuba: Summary of Basic Economic Informa- tion (Washington, 1948); Institute of International Finance, The Eco- nomic Position of Cuba (IIF Bulletin No. 165, 1950); Stacy May, Economic Development in Cuba (New York, 1948); Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis, 1950); IBRD, The Economic Development of Guate- mala (Baltimore, 1951); IBRD, The Economic Development of Nicaragua (Baltimore, 1953); IBRD, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia (Baltimore, 1950); Stacy May and others, Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development (New York, 1952); Henry C. Wallich and J. H. Adler, Public Pinonce in a Developing Country: El Salvador-A Case Study (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); and Nathan C. Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago, 1948). others in the United States and in Europe strongly suggest that economic uncertainty leads to political inconstancy, and that groups engaged in one-crop economy of uncertain income tend to accept panaceas for their ills." Furthermore, the almost uni- versal pattern of tumbling Latin American governments under the impact of economic hardship following the 1929 Wall Street collapse seems to suggest economic hardship as a potent force in political instability. The unbelievably low standards of living to which the majority of the Caribbean people have been subjected for the past hundred years and more has certainly not tended to create a solid citizenry interested in maintaining the status quo." The majority of the Caribbean peoples during this century have had little to lose in a revolution, but they have had much to gain if promises were kept. Class distinction has led to some degree to class resentment, which in turn has made the mass of the population ready to follow a leader who promises equality and justice. Further, the limited economic opportunities open to the majority have created an attitude favoring revolution as a method of gaining material things through more or less legalized pillage. See Andre Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisime Republique (Paris, 1913); Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany (Baton Rouge, 1945); A. N. Holcombe, The New Party Politics (New York, 1933); Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States (Washington, 1942). " On economic conditions, see United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America (New York, 1951); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Report on Cuba (Baltimore, 1951); U.S. Office of International Trade, Cuba: Summary of Basic Economic Informa- tion (Washington, 1948); Institute of International Finance, The Eco- nomic Position of Cuba (IIF Bulletin No. 165, 1950); Stacy May, Economic Development in Cuba (New York, 1948); Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba (Minneapolis, 1950); IBRD, The Economic Development of Guate- mala (Baltimore, 1951); IBRD, The Economic Development of Nicaragua (Baltimore, 1953); IBRD, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia (Baltimore, 1950); Stacy May and others, Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development (New York, 1952); Henry C. Wallich and J. H. Adler, Public Finonce in a Developing Country: El Salvador-A Case Study (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); and Nathan C. Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago, 1948).  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES IU/ Revolt and revolution in the Caribbean has been a great level- ing social instrument-or at least it is considered as a possible leveler. Through revolution men of humble origin have risen to positions of fame and power, positions probably unachievable by other means. Within this century Gomez of Venezuela, Villa, Zapata, Csrdoba, and the Arrieta brothers of Mexico, Batista of Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic exemplify the "rags to riches" possibilities of revolution. Whether economic and social oppression alone will bring on revolution, whether there is a likelihood of an ignorant or oppressed mass creating its own leadership for revolutionary purposes, are debatable points for the solution of which there are not sufficient data. The leadership generally has come from the upper middle or aristo- cratic classes, but the fighting men have come from the lower- which occasionally also supplies a forceful leader. The successes of the latter act as a constant reminder that elevation to high status is possible through the instrumentality of revolution; as such, it is a strong motivating force. VIII Added to the historical factors already discussed, the chaos created by revolution itself has tended to make more likely suc- ceeding revolutions. The frequency of revolts and revolutions has created an atmosphere in which the revolutionary leader is considered a patriot, not a traitor, and even the unsuccessful rebel is surrounded by an aura of respectability. Only on rare occasions is a revolt treated as a breach of law, punishable through court action; this probably has resulted from the high proportion of successful revolts. In those cases in which the government has attempted to apply the law as a punishment, the public, for the most part, has viewed the unsuccessful leader as a victim of capricious government, rather than as a criminal deserving criminal prosecution. Furthermore, revolt and revolu- tion disturb economic progress and perpetuate economic and social retardation; military movements drain off untold millions REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 107 Revolt and revolution in the Caribbean has been a great level- ing social instrument-or at least it is considered as a possible leveler. Through revolution men of humble origin have risen to positions of fame and power, positions probably unachievable by other means. Within this century Gomez of Venezuela, Villa, Zapata, Cordoba, and the Arrieta brothers of Mexico, Batista of Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic exemplify the "rags to riches" possibilities of revolution. Whether economic and social oppression alone will bring on revolution, whether there is a likelihood of an ignorant or oppressed mass creating its own leadership for revolutionary purposes, are debatable points for the solution of which there are not sufficient data. The leadership generally has come from the upper middle or aristo- cratic classes, but the fighting men have come from the lower- which occasionally also supplies a forceful leader. The successes of the latter act as a constant reminder that elevation to high status is possible through the instrumentality of revolution; as such, it is a strong motivating force. VIII Added to the historical factors already discussed, the chaos created by revolution itself has tended to make more likely suc- ceeding revolutions. The frequency of revolts and revolutions has created an atmosphere in which the revolutionary leader is considered a patriot, not a traitor, and even the unsuccessful rebel is surrounded by an aura of respectability. Only on rare occasions is a revolt treated as a breach of law, punishable through court action; this probably has resulted from the high proportion of successful revolts. In those cases in which the government has attempted to apply the law as a punishment, the public, for the most part, has viewed the unsuccessful leader as a victim of capricious government, rather than as a criminal deserving criminal prosecution. Furthermore, revolt and revolu- tion disturb economic progress and perpetuate economic and social retardation; military movements drain off untold millions REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 107 Revolt and revolution in the Caribbean has been a great level- ing social instrument-or at least it is considered as a possible leveler. Through revolution men of humble origin have risen to positions of fame and power, positions probably unachievable by other means. Within this century Gsmez of Venezuela, Villa, Zapata, Cdrdoba, and the Arrieta brothers of Mexico, Batista of Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic exemplify the "rags to riches" possibilities of revolution. Whether economic and social oppression alone will bring on revolution, whether there is a likelihood of an ignorant or oppressed mass creating its own leadership for revolutionary purposes, are debatable points for the solution of which there are not sufficient data. The leadership generally has come from the upper middle or aristo- cratic classes, but the fighting men have come from the lower- which occasionally also supplies a forceful leader. The successes of the latter act as a constant reminder that elevation to high status is possible through the instrumentality of revolution; as such, it is a strong motivating force. VIII Added to the historical factors already discussed, the chaos created by revolution itself has tended to make more likely suc- ceeding revolutions. The frequency of revolts and revolutions has created an atmosphere in which the revolutionary leader is considered a patriot, not a traitor, and even the unsuccessful rebel is surrounded by an aura of respectability. Only on rare occasions is a revolt treated as a breach of law, punishable through court action; this probably has resulted from the high proportion of successful revolts. In those cases in which the government has attempted to apply the law as a punishment, the public, for the most part, has viewed the unsuccessful leader as a victim of capricious government, rather than as a criminal deserving criminal prosecution. Furthermore, revolt and revolu- tion disturb economic progress and perpetuate economic and social retardation; military movements drain off untold millions  108 The Caribbean from possible economic development into the sterile waste of expended ammunition; and violence creates animosities which make compromise and understanding difficult if not impossible. In general, frequent revolts and revolutions exaggerate all the factors of instability already discussed. IX Finally, the ideological factor must be considered. Perhaps enough has already been said, in the sections dealing with the independence movements and with democracy, concerning the fundamental cleavages between traditional "liberal" and "con- servative" positions. Within recent years a new factor, which is likely to become more important with the passage of years, has been introduced. Although the issue of communism as a factor of political instability, and of revolts and revolutions, has been of rather limited application in the past in the Caribbean area, the doctrine has already been held directly or indirectly respon- sible for a number of disturbances. It is quite clear that com- munism was a major factor (but in no sense the only one) in the most recent Guatemalan revolution; it was probably also involved as a major factor in a minor movement against Osorio in El Salvador and against Tiburcio Carias Andino in Honduras. In both Colombia and Costa Rica the communists have been intimately concerned with riots or revolutions," but in these cases the evidence is fairly clear that the communists used an existing situation to create confusion rather than that they created the disturbance. Most other public pronouncements of commu- nist influence as a factor in Caribbean revolution (such as that of Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador) have been propaganda techniques rather than accurate assessments of the situation. " The Bogoti riots in 1948 did not, in the strict sense, constitute a revolt or revolution, but there were many of the same characteristics. In Costa Rica, the communists supported the Picado group, but Figueres rebelled because Otilio Ulate was prevented from taking office, not because of communist influence in Picado's government. 108 The Caribbean from possible economic development into the sterile waste of expended ammunition; and violence creates animosities which make compromise and understanding difficult if not impossible. In general, frequent revolts and revolutions exaggerate all the factors of instability already discussed. IX Finally, the ideological factor must be considered. Perhaps enough has already been said, in the sections dealing with the independence movements and with democracy, concerning the fundamental cleavages between traditional "liberal" and "con- servative" positions. Within recent years a new factor, which is likely to become more important with the passage of years, has been introduced. Although the issue of communism as a factor of political instability, and of revolts and revolutions, has been of rather limited application in the past in the Caribbean area, the doctrine has already been held directly or indirectly respon- sible for a number of disturbances. It is quite clear that com- munism was a major factor (but in no sense the only one) in the most recent Guatemalan revolution; it was probably also involved as a major factor in a minor movement against Osorio in El Salvador and against Tiburcio Carias Andino in Honduras. In both Colombia and Costa Rica the communists have been intimately concerned with riots or revolutions," but in these cases the evidence is fairly clear that the communists used an existing situation to create confusion rather than that they created the disturbance. Most other public pronouncements of commu- nist influence as a factor in Caribbean revolution (such as that of Hernandez Martinez of EI Salvador) have been propaganda techniques rather than accurate assessments of the situation. The Bogota riots in 1948 did not, in the strict sense, constitute a revolt or revolution, but there were many of the same characteristics. In Costa Rica, the communists supported the Picado group, but Figueres rebelled because Otilio Ulate was prevented from taking office, not because of communist influence in Picado's government. 108 The Caribbean from possible economic development into the sterile waste of expended ammunition; and violence creates animosities which make compromise and understanding difficult if not impossible. In general, frequent revolts and revolutions exaggerate all the factors of instability already discussed. IX Finally, the ideological factor must be considered. Perhaps enough has already been said, in the sections dealing with the independence movements and with democracy, concerning the fundamental cleavages between traditional "liberal" and "con- servative" positions. Within recent years a new factor, which is likely to become more important with the passage of years, has been introduced. Although the issue of communism as a factor of political instability, and of revolts and revolutions, has been of rather limited application in the past in the Caribbean area, the doctrine has already been held directly or indirectly respon- sible for a number of disturbances. It is quite clear that com- munism was a major factor (but in no sense the only one) in the most recent Guatemalan revolution; it was probably also involved as a major factor in a minor movement against Osorio in El Salvador and against Tiburcio Carias Andino in Honduras. In both Colombia and Costa Rica the communists have been intimately concerned with riots or revolutions," but in these cases the evidence is fairly clear that the communists used an existing situation to create confusion rather than that they created the disturbance. Most other public pronouncements of commu- nist influence as a factor in Caribbean revolution (such as that of Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador) have been propaganda techniques rather than accurate assessments of the situation. " The Bogoti riots in 1948 did not, in the strict sense, constitute a revolt or revolution, but theremre many of the same characteristics. In Costa Rica, the communists supported the Picado group, but Figueres rebelled because Otilio Ulate was prevented from taking office, not because of communist influence in Picado's government.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 109 X From the above considerations, certain generalizations flow with respect to factors and traditions influencing Caribbean re- volts and revolutions. In the first place, the stimuli for violent change in government are deeply rooted in the basic culture inherited from Spain through the colonial experience; Indian culture and tradition has been of negligible importance. But only when the basic Spanish culture pattern has been impinged upon by new concepts or new conditions have the stimuli been of sufficient force to bring about revolt. Secondly, while time has tended to dull the sharpness of certain factors (political inexperience, for example), rapid world change within the past one hundred years has not allowed the Caribbean nations to stabilize their institutions to such a degree that revolution has disappeared as an instrument of political change. Thirdly, there are vast differences between the countries in the degree to which stable institutions have developed, from which it follows that the factors here discussed will be relatively inapplicable to some countries in the near future, while in others there is little room for optimism. And finally, the elimination by force or through natural causes of any one or two of the factors will not bring an end to revolt and revolution; only through the eradication of a majority of the stimuli can peaceful progress be expected. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 109 X From the above considerations, certain generalizations flow with respect to factors and traditions influencing Caribbean re- volts and revolutions. In the first place, the stimuli for violent change in government are deeply rooted in the basic culture inherited from Spain through the colonial experience; Indian culture and tradition has been of negligible importance. But only when the basic Spanish culture pattern has been impinged upon by new concepts or new conditions have the stimuli been of sufficient force to bring about revolt. Secondly, while time has tended to dull the sharpness of certain factors (political inexperience, for example), rapid world change within the past one hundred years has not allowed the Caribbean nations to stabilize their institutions to such a degree that revolution has disappeared as an instrument of political change. Thirdly, there are vast differences between the countries in the degree to which stable institutions have developed, from which it follows that the factors here discussed will be relatively inapplicable to some countries in the near future, while in others there is little room for optimism. And finally, the elimination by force or through natural causes of any one or two of the factors will not bring an end to revolt and revolution; only through the eradication of a majority of the stimuli can peaceful progress be expected. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 109 X From the above considerations, certain generalizations flow with respect to factors and traditions influencing Caribbean re- volts and revolutions. In the first place, the stimuli for violent change in government are deeply rooted in the basic culture inherited from Spain through the colonial experience; Indian culture and tradition has been of negligible importance. But only when the basic Spanish culture pattern has been impinged upon by new concepts or new conditions have the stimuli been of sufficient force to bring about revolt. Secondly, while time has tended to dull the sharpness of certain factors (political inexperience, for example), rapid world change within the past one hundred years has not allowed the Caribbean nations to stabilize their institutions to such a degree that revolution has disappeared as an instrument of political change. Thirdly, there are vast differences between the countries in the degree to which stable institutions have developed, from which it follows that the factors here discussed will be relatively inapplicable to some countries in the near future, while in others there is little room for optimism. And finally, the elimination by force or through natural causes of any one or two of the factors will not bring an end to revolt and revolution; only through the eradication of a majority of the stimuli can peaceful progress be expected.  Stanley R. Ross: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY COUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN THE INSTABILITY AND VOLATILITY of political life in the Caribbean area are notorious, and militarism, which has been virtually endemic, is clearly a principal cause. Indeed, militarism is cited frequently as one of the main threats to freedom in the region. This problem is rooted in the colonial tradition, the socio- economic structure of the nations involved, and in the political realities of the past and present. It was natural that the established Spanish tradition of a privileged military caste should be transplanted in the colonial empire born of military conquest. "In the colon[ies] the career of arms had implied social prestige and legal privileges, and the inevitable distinction accorded the soldier in a society that rests mainly on force."' Colonial institutions were authoritarian in character and conditioned the populace to forceful rule. The wars for independence aggravated the situation by un- leashing military passions and fostering military virtues in addi- tion to affording opportunities for enrichment, advancement, and ' Lucas Alam4n, Historia de Mico (Mxico, 1849), IV, 42, 445-448. Stanley R. Ross: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY COUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN THE INSTABILITY AND VOLATILITY of political life in the Caribbean area are notorious, and militarism, which has been virtually endemic, is clearly a principal cause. Indeed, militarism is cited frequently as one of the main threats to freedom in the region. This problem is rooted in the colonial tradition, the socio- economic structure of the nations involved, and in the political realities of the past and present. It was natural that the established Spanish tradition of a privileged military caste should be transplanted in the colonial empire born of military conquest. "In the colon[ies] the career of arms had implied social prestige and legal privileges, and the inevitable distinction accorded the soldier in a society that rests mainly on force."' Colonial institutions were authoritarian in character and conditioned the populace to forceful rule. The wars for independence aggravated the situation by un- leashing military passions and fostering military virtues in addi- tion to affording opportunities for enrichment, advancement, and * Lucas Alamin, Historia de Miteo (Msxico, 1849), IV, 42, 445-448. 110 Stanley R. Ross: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY COUPS IN THE CARIBBEAN THE INSTABILITY AND VOLATILITY of political life in the Caribbean area are notorious, and militarism, which has been virtually endemic, is clearly a principal cause. Indeed, militarism is cited frequently as one of the main threats to freedom in the region. This problem is rooted in the colonial tradition, the socio- economic structure of the nations involved, and in the political realities of the past and present. It was natural that the established Spanish tradition of a privileged military caste should be transplanted in the colonial empire born of military conquest. "In the colon[ies] the career of arms had implied social prestige and legal privileges, and the inevitable distinction accorded the soldier in a society that rests mainly on force."' Colonial institutions were authoritarian in character and conditioned the populace to forceful rule. The wars for independence aggravated the situation by un- leashing military passions and fostering military virtues in addi- tion to affording opportunities for enrichment, advancement, and * Lucas Alamin, Historia de Majico (Miico, 1849), IV, 42, 445-448. 110  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES IlI seizure of power. Counterbalancing institutions were weakened in the dissolution of society, and authority, discredited by the overthrow of Spanish control, was exercised only fitfully for fifteen years. The new states, their populations ill-equipped for self-government, emerged weak, disorganized, and at the mercy of the military element. The civil wars of the nineteenth century fortified the tradition of militarism and encouraged what is very nearly an acceptance of anarchy. Although political independence had been achieved, true na- tionhood proved more difficult to attain. Inadequate transporta- tion and communication facilities slowed the physical integration of the countries while encouraging regionalism and abetting up- risings against the government. The area remained economically dependent subject to vagaries beyond internal control and the object of external rivalries, exploitation, and threats. Extremes of wealth and poverty contributed to discontent and facilitated demagogic appeals by the unscrupulous. The grave economic problems of the area handicapped efforts to achieve an integrated society where large elements remained unincorporated in the life of the nation because of illiteracy, social and racial distinctions, and economic disabilities. A final consideration in any understanding of Caribbean mili- tarism is the realities of the political milieu of the region. The process of transferring political power has been accomplished by violence because, "in the judgment of the political opposition, it could not be accomplished otherwise."' Where those in power sought to perpetuate their rule by fraud and violence, force became an accepted and expected political instrument, and the military uprising functioned as an electoral device.' Under these circumstances the army inevitably assumes an exaggerated importance. Where the state is weak and lacking in 2 Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Jan., 1949), 274-288. ' William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (Sept., 1952), 445. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 111 seizure of power. Counterbalancing institutions were weakened in the dissolution of society, and authority, discredited by the overthrow of Spanish control, was exercised only fitfully for fifteen years. The new states, their populations ill-equipped for self-government, emerged weak, disorganized, and at the mercy of the military element. The civil wars of the nineteenth century fortified the tradition of militarism and encouraged what is very nearly an acceptance of anarchy. Although political independence had been achieved, true na- tionhood proved more difficult to attain. Inadequate transporta- tion and communication facilities slowed the physical integration of the countries while encouraging regionalism and abetting up- risings against the government. The area remained economically dependent subject to vagaries beyond internal control and the object of external rivalries, exploitation, and threats. Extremes of wealth and poverty contributed to discontent and facilitated demagogic appeals by the unscrupulous. The grave economic problems of the area handicapped efforts to achieve an integrated society where large elements remained unincorporated in the life of the nation because of illiteracy, social and racial distinctions, and economic disabilities. A final consideration in any understanding of Caribbean mili- tarism is the realities of the political milieu of the region. The process of transferring political power has been accomplished by violence because, "in the judgment of the political opposition, it could not be accomplished otherwise."' Where those in power sought to perpetuate their rule by fraud and violence, force became an accepted and expected political instrument, and the military uprising functioned as an electoral device.' Under these circumstances the army inevitably assumes an exaggerated importance. Where the state is weak and lacking in ' Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Jan., 1949), 274-288. ' William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (Sept, 1952), 445. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 111 seizure of power. Counterbalancing institutions were weakened in the dissolution of society, and authority, discredited by the overthrow of Spanish control, was exercised only fitfully for fifteen years. The new states, their populations ill-equipped for self-government, emerged weak, disorganized, and at the mercy of the military element. The civil wars of the nineteenth century fortified the tradition of militarism and encouraged what is very nearly an acceptance of anarchy. Although political independence had been achieved, true na- tionhood proved more difficult to attain. Inadequate transporta- tion and communication facilities slowed the physical integration of the countries while encouraging regionalism and abetting up- risings against the government. The area remained economically dependent subject to vagaries beyond internal control and the object of external rivalries, exploitation, and threats. Extremes of wealth and poverty contributed to discontent and facilitated demagogic appeals by the unscrupulous. The grave economic problems of the area handicapped efforts to achieve an integrated society where large elements remained unincorporated in the life of the nation because of illiteracy, social and racial distinctions, and economic disabilities. A final consideration in any understanding of Caribbean mili- tarism is the realities of the political milieu of the region. The process of transferring political power has been accomplished by violence because, "in the judgment of the political opposition, it could not be accomplished otherwise."' Where those in power sought to perpetuate their rule by fraud and violence, force became an accepted and expected political instrument, and the military uprising functioned as an electoral device.' Under these circumstances the army inevitably assumes an exaggerated importance. Where the state is weak and lacking in ' Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Jan., 1949), 274-288. ' William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (Sept., 1952), 445.  112 The Caribbean organized popular support and where force is the deciding factor in political events, the army becomes the arbiter of political destinies and the instigator or instrument of political changes. The army emerged from the independence struggle as the main pillar of the new regimes and soon found in rebellion the path to promotion, wealth, and power. The military establishment inverted the order of things by destroying the established govern- ment which it was intended to sustain.' II During World War II only the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama were overthrown by armed rebellions. Since the close of the war, however, there has been an accen- tuation of militarism and a reappearance of the revolutionary tendency in the Caribbean region. In El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti the situation has been characterized by the continuation of established dictatorial regimes based on armed might or by augmented political inter- vention by the army. Where there is no army, control of the police force has proved just as effective a means to political power. In Panama Colonel Jose Antonio Remsn, as chief of the twenty-five-hundred-man national police force, was able to make and break four presidents in less than six years.' Recent events in Cuba and Venezuela offer striking evidence of a noteworthy increase of militarism. A few years ago a Cuban speaker could observe with some justification that, at least after 1944, in Cuba the army depended on the government rather than the other way around. All that has changed now. The presidential election scheduled for June, 1952, was never held because, in the best cuartelazo tradition, Colonel Batista seized control of the government. He boasted that "I did it with cap- * J. M. L. Mora, Ensayos, ideas y retratos (Mexico, 1941), p. 101. " K. C. Arnade, "Technique of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," United Nations World (Feb., 1950), 21-25. 112 The Caribbean organized popular support and where force is the deciding factor in political events, the army becomes the arbiter of political destinies and the instigator or instrument of political changes. The army emerged from the independence struggle as the main pillar of the new regimes and soon found in rebellion the path to promotion, wealth, and power. The military establishment inverted the order of things by destroying the established govern- ment which it was intended to sustain.' II During World War II only the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama were overthrown by armed rebellions. Since the close of the war, however, there has been an accen- tuation of militarism and a reappearance of the revolutionary tendency in the Caribbean region. In El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti the situation has been characterized by the continuation of established dictatorial regimes based on armed might or by augmented political inter- vention by the army. Where there is no army, control of the police force has proved just as effective a means to political power. In Panama Colonel Jose Antonio Rem6n, as chief of the twenty-five-hundred-man national police force, was able to make and break four presidents in less than six years.' Recent events in Cuba and Venezuela offer striking evidence of a noteworthy increase of militarism. A few years ago a Cuban speaker could observe with some justification that, at least after 1944, in Cuba the army depended on the government rather than the other way around. All that has changed now. The presidential election scheduled for June, 1952, was never held because, in the best cuartelazo tradition, Colonel Batista seized control of the government. He boasted that "I did it with cap- J. M. L. Mora, Ensayos, ideas y retratos (Mexico, 1941), p. 101. ' K. C. Arnade, "Technique of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," United Nations World (Feb., 1950), 21-25. 112 The Caribbean organized popular support and where force is the deciding factor in political events, the army becomes the arbiter of political destinies and the instigator or instrument of political changes. The army emerged from the independence struggle as the main pillar of the new regimes and soon found in rebellion the path to promotion, wealth, and power. The military establishment inverted the order of things by destroying the established govern- ment which it was intended to sustain.' II During World War II only the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama were overthrown by armed rebellions. Since the close of the war, however, there has been an accen- tuation of militarism and a reappearance of the revolutionary tendency in the Caribbean region. In El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti the situation has been characterized by the continuation of established dictatorial regimes based on armed might or by augmented political inter- vention by the army. Where there is no army, control of the police force has proved just as effective a means to political power. In Panama Colonel Jose Antonio Remn, as chief of the twenty-five-hundred-man national police force, was able to make and break four presidents in less than six years. Recent events in Cuba and Venezuela offer striking evidence of a noteworthy increase of militarism. A few years ago a Cuban speaker could observe with some justification that, at least after 1944, in Cuba the army depended on the government rather than the other way around. All that has changed now. The presidential election scheduled for June, 1952, was never held because, in the best cuartelazo tradition, Colonel Batista seized control of the government. He boasted that "I did it with cap- J. M. L. Mora, Ensayos, ideas y retratos (Mexico, 1941), p. 101. K. C. Arnade, "Technique of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," United Nations World (Feb., 1950), 21-25.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 113 tains and lieutenants," and affirmed that the new government would be "strictly civil." Nevertheless, the armed forces have become once again the base of presidential power.e Venezuela is, perhaps, the most tragic illustration of the resurgence of militarism since the army toppled what was vir- tually the first popularly elected government in the country's history. R6mulo Gallegos, the country's most distinguished novel- ist, became president in an election in December, 1947, which followed a coup engineered by a group of young army officers allied with Accion Democrdtica, a liberal opposition party. Before very long Gallegos had made the mistake of alienating the army officers who had helped his party to power. The military men resented the influence of the civilian political leaders, and their basic conservatism made them view some of the reforms projected with a jaundiced eye. Worst of all was the president's remarks about reducing the army to the status of a police force. The army officers decided that they must play a larger role and delivered an ultimatum to Gallegos. The president refused to accede to the demands for the reorganization of the cabinet and sadly noted that "once more our country is undergoing the shame of seeing how ambition, lack of discipline and of military honor are bringing confusion into the life of the whole nation."' Ten days later, on November 24, 1948, the tanks and trucks rumbled into action and, within a few hours, R6mulo Gallegos had been deposed and an exclusively military government had Conferencia de Dr. Garcia Amador at Columbia University, Oct. 16, 1946; in Excelsior (Mexico City), Mar. 11, 1952. Although the outlook for democracy in Cuba is unpromising at present, the situation is not without hopeful signs. The New York Times, on Feb. 28, 1954, reported that "most Cubans ... do not want it [the army] mixed up in politics." Roberto Esquenazi Mayo concurs that the body politic is not sleeping. He has contributed a discussion of the bases for political activity intended to maintain democratic principles, in Funda- mentos para on partido nuevo (Havana, 1955). ' Germin Arciniegas, The State of Latin America (New York, 1952), p. 108; R6mulo Betancourt, Pensamiento y accion (Mexico, 1951), p. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 113 tains and lieutenants," and affirmed that the new government would be "strictly civil." Nevertheless, the armed forces have become once again the base of presidential power.e Venezuela is, perhaps, the most tragic illustration of the resurgence of militarism since the army toppled what was vir- tually the first popularly elected government in the country's history. R6mulo Gallegos, the country's most distinguished novel- ist, became president in an election in December, 1947, which followed a coup engineered by a group of young army officers allied with Accidon Democrdtica, a liberal opposition party. Before very long Gallegos had made the mistake of alienating the army officers who had helped his party to power. The military men resented the influence of the civilian political leaders, and their basic conservatism made them view some of the reforms projected with a jaundiced eye. Worst of all was the president's remarks about reducing the army to the status of a police force. The army officers decided that they must play a larger role and delivered an ultimatum to Gallegos. The president refused to accede to the demands for the reorganization of the cabinet and sadly noted that "once more our country is undergoing the shame of seeing how ambition, lack of discipline and of military honor are bringing confusion into the life of the whole nation."' Ten days later, on November 24, 1948, the tanks and trucks rumbled into action and, within a few hours, Romulo Gallegos had been deposed and an exclusively military government had ' Conferencia de Dr. Garcia Amador at Columbia University, Oct. 16, 1946; in Excelsior (Mexico City), Mar. 11, 1952. Although the outlook for democracy in Cuba is unpromising at present, the situation is not without hopeful signs. The New York Times, on Feb. 28, 1954, reported that "most Cubans ... do not want it [the army] mixed up in politics." Roberto Esquenazi Mayo concurs that the body politic is not sleeping. He has contributed a discussion of the bases for political activity intended to maintain democratic principles, in Funda- mentos Para un partido nuevo (Havana, 1955). ' Germin Arciniegas, The State of Latin America (New York, 1952), p. 108; R6mulo Betancourt, Pensamiento y accion (Mexico, 1951), p. 150. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 113 tains and lieutenants," and affirmed that the new government would be "strictly civil." Nevertheless, the armed forces have become once again the base of presidential power.' Venezuela is, perhaps, the most tragic illustration of the resurgence of militarism since the army toppled what was vir- tually the first popularly elected government in the country's history. Romulo Gallegos, the country's most distinguished novel- ist, became president in an election in December, 1947, which followed a coup engineered by a group of young army officers allied with Accion Democrdtica, a liberal opposition party. Before very long Gallegos had made the mistake of alienating the army officers who had helped his party to power. The military men resented the influence of the civilian political leaders, and their basic conservatism made them view some of the reforms projected with a jaundiced eye. Worst of all was the president's remarks about reducing the army to the status of a police force. The army officers decided that they must play a larger role and delivered an ultimatum to Gallegos. The president refused to accede to the demands for the reorganization of the cabinet and sadly noted that "once more our country is undergoing the shame of seeing how ambition, lack of discipline and of military honor are bringing confusion into the life of the whole nation."T Ten days later, on November 24, 1948, the tanks and trucks rumbled into action and, within a few hours, R6mulo Gallegos had been deposed and an exclusively military government had Conferencia de Dr. Garcia Amador at Columbia University, Oct. 16, 1946; in Excelsior (Mexico City), Mar. 11, 1952. Although the outlook for democracy in Cuba is unpromising at present, the situation is not without hopeful signs. The New York Times, on Feb. 28, 1954, reported that "most Cubans ... do not want it [the army] mixed up in politics." Roberto Esquenazi Mayo concurs that the body politic is not sleeping. He has contributed a discussion of the bases for political activity intended to maintain democratic principles, in Funda- mentos Para un partido nuevo (Havana, 1955). ' German Arciniegas, The State of Latin America (New York, 1952), p. 108; R6mulo Betancourt, Pensamiento y accion (Mxico, 1951), p. 150.  114 The Caribbean been organized. These events marked the beginning of the pres- ent military dictatorship in Venezuela. The army rules, having taken away the incipient democracy which it had presented to the country a scant three years before. Three final examples offer some interesting sidelights on the problem of militarism. Colombia offers an illustration of asso- ciation between the military and a political party, which resulted in the increasing ascendancy of the uniformed element and cul- minated, in 1953, in the establishment of a military government. In Guatemala the army showed little enthusiasm for fighting the rebel invaders from Honduras in June, 1954. At the last minute the army deserted the Arbenz regime and made the victory of Castillo Armas relatively easy. By its negative attitude the army had influenced the course of events and remains a very real power in Guatemalan politics.a Triumph in 1948 by Jose Figueres' civilian army of "national liberation" in Costa Rica was the result of determined leadership, popular support, and some outside assistance. Foreign aid and intervention frequently are a factor in the internal conflicts of the Caribbean nations. One of the first items of business for the new Costa Rican government was the abolition of the army and the conversion of its principal barracks into a Museum of Fine Arts. These gestures defined the position of the new ad- ministration and indicated an awareness of the potential threat to democratic institutions inherent in an irresponsible military establishment. III A complete explanation of increased militarism in the Carib- bean area since World War II, with detailed analysis of the special causal factors of each locality, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain influences of an external and gen- ' D. Grant, "Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 70; J. Vielman, "Guatemalan Sta- bilization," ibid., 80. 114 The Caribbean 114 The Caribbean been organized. These events marked the beginning of the pres- ent military dictatorship in Venezuela. The army rules, having taken away the incipient democracy which it had presented to the country a scant three years before. Three final examples offer some interesting sidelights on the problem of militarism. Colombia offers an illustration of asso- ciation between the military and a political party, which resulted in the increasing ascendancy of the uniformed element and cul- minated, in 1953, in the establishment of a military government. In Guatemala the army showed little enthusiasm for fighting the rebel invaders from Honduras in June, 1954. At the last minute the army deserted the Arbenz regime and made the victory of Castillo Armas relatively easy. By its negative attitude the army had influenced the course of events and remains a very real power in Guatemalan politics.' Triumph in 1948 by Jose Figueres' civilian army of "national liberation" in Costa Rica was the result of determined leadership, popular support, and some outside assistance. Foreign aid and intervention frequently are a factor in the internal conflicts of the Caribbean nations. One of the first items of business for the new Costa Rican government was the abolition of the army and the conversion of its principal barracks into a Museum of Fine Arts. These gestures defined the position of the new ad- ministration and indicated an awareness of the potential threat to democratic institutions inherent in an irresponsible military establishment. III A complete explanation of increased militarism in the Carib- bean area since World War II, with detailed analysis of the special causal factors of each locality, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain influences of an external and gen- " D. Grant, "Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 70; J. Vielman, "Guatemalan Sta- bilization," ibid., 80. been organized. These events marked the beginning of the pres- ent military dictatorship in Venezuela. The army rules, having taken away the incipient democracy which it had presented to the country a scant three years before. Three final examples offer some interesting sidelights on the problem of militarism. Colombia offers an illustration of asso- ciation between the military and a political party, which resulted in the increasing ascendancy of the uniformed element and cul- minated, in 1953, in the establishment of a military government. In Guatemala the army showed little enthusiasm for fighting the rebel invaders from Honduras in June, 1954. At the last minute the army deserted the Arbenz regime and made the victory of Castillo Armas relatively easy. By its negative attitude the army had influenced the course of events and remains a very real power in Guatemalan politics.' Triumph in 1948 by Jos6 Figueres' civilian army of "national liberation" in Costa Rica was the result of determined leadership, popular support, and some outside assistance. Foreign aid and intervention frequently are a factor in the internal conflicts of the Caribbean nations. One of the first items of business for the new Costa Rican government was the abolition of the army and the conversion of its principal barracks into a Museum of Fine Arts. These gestures defined the position of the new ad- ministration and indicated an awareness of the potential threat to democratic institutions inherent in an irresponsible military establishment. III A complete explanation of increased militarism in the Carib- bean area since World War II, with detailed analysis of the special causal factors of each locality, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain influences of an external and gen- ' D. Grant, "Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 70; J. Vielman, "Guatemalan Sta- bilization," ibid., 80.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 115 eral nature are worthy of attention: postwar economic develop- ments, the military assistance program, the principle of noninter- vention, and the practice followed in the recognition of de facto governments. Since 1945 the basic social and economic maladjustments within the Caribbean region have been seriously aggravated. During the war the area prospered and immense dollar credits were accumulated. After the war the credits began to run dry, the purchasing of raw materials, except of the strategic variety, slackened off, and dollar shortages and exchange difficulties made their appearance. Allocation of civilian goods was discontinued, forcing the Caribbean nations to scramble to purchase their re- quirements in a highly competitive seller's market at grossly inflated prices. During the postwar years the cost of living of these countries has risen from two to five times as rapidly as it has in the United States. Where annual personal income is tragically low this could only mean acute suffering. Social and economic discontent has served as an excuse for armed rebellion and, in some instances, has provoked a degree of popular support for the military coups. The militarists have been considerably strengthened in their position as the only effective force in society by the program of military assistance initiated by the United States during World War II. Hemispheric security in the face of Nazi and, later, communist ideological and military threats from abroad is the justification for this policy. As the chasm between Russia and the Western allies widened, an expanded program in this direc- tion was undertaken. The United States Congress in 1951-1952 appropriated some ninety millions of dollars for direct military assistance to Latin America. In addition, nations which became signatories to bilateral agreements were given opportunities to buy surplus military supplies and to obtain United States Army, Navy, and Air Force missions to help train Latin American forces. Within three years agreements had been signed with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 115 eral nature are worthy of attention: postwar economic develop- ments, the military assistance program, the principle of noninter- vention, and the practice followed in the recognition of de facto governments. Since 1945 the basic social and economic maladjustments within the Caribbean region have been seriously aggravated. During the war the area prospered and immense dollar credits were accumulated. After the war the credits began to run dry, the purchasing of raw materials, except of the strategic variety, slackened off, and dollar shortages and exchange difficulties made their appearance. Allocation of civilian goods was discontinued, forcing the Caribbean nations to scramble to purchase their re- quirements in a highly competitive seller's market at grossly inflated prices. During the postwar years the cost of living of these countries has risen from two to five times as rapidly as it has in the United States. Where annual personal income is tragically low this could only mean acute suffering. Social and economic discontent has served as an excuse for armed rebellion and, in some instances, has provoked a degree of popular support for the military coups. The militarists have been considerably strengthened in their position as the only effective force in society by the program of military assistance initiated by the United States during World War II. Hemispheric security in the face of Nazi and, later, communist ideological and military threats from abroad is the justification for this policy. As the chasm between Russia and the Western allies widened, an expanded program in this direc- tion was undertaken. The United States Congress in 1951-1952 appropriated some ninety millions of dollars for direct military assistance to Latin America. In addition, nations which became signatories to bilateral agreements were given opportunities to buy surplus military supplies and to obtain United States Army, Navy, and Air Force missions to help train Latin American forces. Within three years agreements had been signed with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 115 eral nature are worthy of attention: postwar economic develop- ments, the military assistance program, the principle of noninter- vention, and the practice followed in the recognition of de facto governments. Since 1945 the basic social and economic maladjustments within the Caribbean region have been seriously aggravated. During the war the area prospered and immense dollar credits were accumulated. After the war the credits began to run dry, the purchasing of raw materials, except of the strategic variety, slackened off, and dollar shortages and exchange difficulties made their appearance. Allocation of civilian goods was discontinued, forcing the Caribbean nations to scramble to purchase their re- quirements in a highly competitive seller's market at grossly inflated prices. During the postwar years the cost of living of these countries has risen from two to five times as rapidly as it has in the United States. Where annual personal income is tragically low this could only mean acute suffering. Social and economic discontent has served as an excuse for armed rebellion and, in some instances, has provoked a degree of popular support for the military coups. The militarists have been considerably strengthened in their position as the only effective force in society by the program of military assistance initiated by the United States during World War I. Hemispheric security in the face of Nazi and, later, communist ideological and military threats from abroad is the justification for this policy. As the chasm between Russia and the Western allies widened, an expanded program in this direc- tion was undertaken. The United States Congress in 1951-1952 appropriated some ninety millions of dollars for direct military assistance to Latin America. In addition, nations which became signatories to bilateral agreements were given opportunities to buy surplus military supplies and to obtain United States Army, Navy, and Air Force missions to help train Latin American forces. Within three years agreements had been signed with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and  116 The Caribbean Colombia, and training missions were functioning in an advisory capacity in most Caribbean countries.' The total effect of this military assistance is difficult to gauge. Undoubtedly the strengthening of the military establishments affords greater security against internal subversion. However, the primary justification for the program is based on the premise that by strengthening the American republics they will be better able to contribute to their own defense and that of the Hemisphere against external aggression. The efforts of Mexico and Brazil, as well as the patrol activities by several of the nations during World War II, may be cited as illustrations, but the premise seems questionable in regard to the smaller nations, particularly in the light of the character of modern warfare. Shipments of military supplies to the smaller nations during World War II probably did not increase the military security of the Hemisphere, but rather won for the United States the political and economic cooperation of the regimes governing those countries and desiring the assistance.'0 Those who question the effects of the military assistance pro- gram are concerned lest the equipment strengthen dictators, who quickly proclaim themselves "anti-Communists," and increase the already overwhelming strength of the military elements. This is the basis for the allegation by Jesds Silva Herzog that the military dictatorship in Venezuela had its origin in the tradition of the cuartelazo and in the ambition and disloyalty of military men "sustained by tanks and planes [intended] for the defense of the continent."" President Jose Figueres succinctly pointed out the true source of the dilemma when he observed that "of course the problem would be simplified if we were not in the midst of U.S. Department of State, Military Assistance to Latin America, Pub. 4917, Inter-American Series, No. 44 (Jan., 1953). " Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "American Wartime Objectives in Latin Amer- ica," World Politics, II, 3 (April, 1950), 385. " "Reflexiones sobre las dictaduras," Cuadernos Americanos (Aug., 1952), 62. 116 The Caribbean 116 The Caribbean Colombia, and training missions were functioning in an advisory capacity in most Caribbean countries.' The total effect of this military assistance is difficult to gauge. Undoubtedly the strengthening of the military establishments affords greater security against internal subversion. However, the primary justification for the program is based on the premise that by strengthening the American republics they will be better able to contribute to their own defense and that of the Hemisphere against external aggression. The efforts of Mexico and Brazil, as well as the patrol activities by several of the nations during World War II, may be cited as illustrations, but the premise seems questionable in regard to the smaller nations, particularly in the light of the character of modern warfare. Shipments of military supplies to the smaller nations during World War II probably did not increase the military security of the Hemisphere, but rather won for the United States the political and economic cooperation of the regimes governing those countries and desiring the assistance. Those who question the effects of the military assistance pro- gram are concerned lest the equipment strengthen dictators, who quickly proclaim themselves "anti-Communists," and increase the already overwhelming strength of the military elements. This is the basis for the allegation by Jesds Silva Herzog that the military dictatorship in Venezuela had its origin in the tradition of the cuartelazo and in the ambition and disloyalty of military men "sustained by tanks and planes [intended] for the defense of the continent."" President Jose Figueres succinctly pointed out the true source of the dilemma when he observed that "of course the problem would be simplified if we were not in the midst of * U.S. Department of State, Military Assistance to Latin America, Pub. 4917, Inter-American Series, No. 44 (Jan., 1953). " Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "American Wartime Objectives in Latin Amer- ica," World Politics, II, 3 (April, 1950), 385. " "Reflexiones sobre las dictaduras," Cuadernos Americanos (Aug., 1952), 62. Colombia, and training missions were functioning in an advisory capacity in most Caribbean countries.' The total effect of this military assistance is difficult to gauge. Undoubtedly the strengthening of the military establishments affords greater security against internal subversion. However, the primary justification for the program is based on the premise that by strengthening the American republics they will be better able to contribute to their own defense and that of the Hemisphere against external aggression. The efforts of Mexico and Brazil, as well as the patrol activities by several of the nations during World War II, may be cited as illustrations, but the premise seems questionable in regard to the smaller nations, particularly in the light of the character of modern warfare. Shipments of military supplies to the smaller nations during World War It probably did not increase the military security of the Hemisphere, but rather won for the United States the political and economic cooperation of the regimes governing those countries and desiring the assistance." Those who question the effects of the military assistance pro- gram are concerned lest the equipment strengthen dictators, who quickly proclaim themselves "anti-Communists," and increase the already overwhelming strength of the military elements. This is the basis for the allegation by Jesds Silva Herzog that the military dictatorship in Venezuela had its origin in the tradition of the cuartelazo and in the ambition and disloyalty of military men "sustained by tanks and planes [intended] for the defense of the continent."" President Jose Figueres succinctly pointed out the true source of the dilemma when he observed that "of course the problem would be simplified if we were not in the midst of * U.S. Department of State, Military Assistance to Latin America, Pub. 4917, Inter-American Series, No. 44 (Jan., 1953). " Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "American Wartime Objectives in Latin Amer- ica," World Politics, II, 3 (April, 1950), 385. " "Reflexiones sobre las dictaduras," Cuadernos Americanos (Aug., 1952), 62.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES Il/ a cold war and if the demands of strategic defense of the hemi- sphere were not so pressing. . . ."12 The principle of "nonintervention" as well as the present prac- tice of recognition obviate the possibility of external prevention of military coups and may even serve as an encouragement to those who consider perpetrating such action." As small, weak nations the Latin American countries have experienced many threats and acts of external interposition. Consequently, they long have advocated the elevation of the principle of noninter- vention to the status of international law. Since the First World War these efforts have been prompted principally by fear of the United States, and the objective has been the acceptance of non- intervention as a cornerstone of the regional organization of the Americas. The Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo marked the turning point on the problem of non- intervention. The delegates adopted a Convention on the Rights and Duties of States including a Special Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. Although the delegation from the United States made some reservations, the conference was assured that no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States and cited the words and actions of the Roosevelt administration as proof. This avowed support of nonintervention inspired trust among the Latin Americans who could sense that the day of formal adherence by the United States to the sacred principle was not too distant." This expectation was fulfilled at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace con- vened in Buenos Aires in 1936, when the commitment to the principle of nonintervention became formal and unequivocal. " "The Problems of Democracy in Latin America," Journal of Inter- national Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 17. " The military regime in Venezuela has been described as using "a noisy anti-communism as a polished shield and the doctrine of non- intervention as a parapet," in L. I. Rodriguez, La patria de Bolivar se- cuestrada (Mixico, 1954), p. 16. " W. Manger, "The Seventh International Conference of American States," Bulletin of the Pan American Union (Apr., 1934), 276. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 117 a cold war and if the demands of strategic defense of the hemi- sphere were not so pressing. . . ."" The principle of "nonintervention" as well as the present prac- tice of recognition obviate the possibility of external prevention of military coups and may even serve as an encouragement to those who consider perpetrating such action." As small, weak nations the Latin American countries have experienced many threats and acts of external interposition. Consequently, they long have advocated the elevation of the principle of noninter- vention to the status of international law. Since the First World War these efforts have been prompted principally by fear of the United States, and the objective has been the acceptance of non- intervention as a cornerstone of the regional organization of the Americas. The Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo marked the turning point on the problem of non- intervention. The delegates adopted a Convention on the Rights and Duties of States including a Special Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. Although the delegation from the United States made some reservations, the conference was assured that no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States and cited the words and actions of the Roosevelt administration as proof. This avowed support of nonintervention inspired trust among the Latin Americans who could sense that the day of formal adherence by the United States to the sacred principle was not too distant." This expectation was fulfilled at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace con- vened in Buenos Aires in 1936, when the commitment to the principle of nonintervention became formal and unequivocal. " "The Problems of Democracy in Latin America," Journal of Inter- national Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 17. " The military regime in Venezuela has been described as using "a noisy anti-communism as a polished shield and the doctrine of non- intervention as a parapet," in L. I. Rodriguez, La patria de Bolivar se- cuestrada (Mexico, 1954), p. 16. " W. Manger, "The Seventh International Conference of American States," Bulletin of the Pan American Union (Apr., 1934), 276. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 117 a cold war and if the demands of strategic defense of the hemi- sphere were not so pressing. . .."" The principle of "nonintervention" as well as the present prac- tice of recognition obviate the possibility of external prevention of military coups and may even serve as an encouragement to those who consider perpetrating such action." As small, weak nations the Latin American countries have experienced many threats and acts of external interposition. Consequently, they long have advocated the elevation of the principle of noninter- vention to the status of international law. Since the First World War these efforts have been prompted principally by fear of the United States, and the objective has been the acceptance of non- intervention as a cornerstone of the regional organization of the Americas. The Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo marked the turning point on the problem of non- intervention. The delegates adopted a Convention on the Rights and Duties of States including a Special Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. Although the delegation from the United States made some reservations, the conference was assured that no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States and cited the words and actions of the Roosevelt administration as proof. This avowed support of nonintervention inspired trust among the Latin Americans who could sense that the day of formal adherence by the United States to the sacred principle was not too distant." This expectation was fulfilled at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace con- vened in Buenos Aires in 1936, when the commitment to the principle of nonintervention became formal and unequivocal. " "The Problems of Democracy in Latin America," Journal of Inter- national Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 17. " The military regime in Venezuela has been described as using "a noisy anti-communism as a polished shield and the doctrine of non- intervention as a parapet," in L. I. Rodriguez, La patria de Bolivar se- cuestrada (Mixico, 1954), p. 16. " W. Manger, "The Seventh International Conference of American States," Bulletin of the Pan American Union (Apr., 1934), 276.  118 The Caribbean After World War II the doctrine of nonintervention was in- corporated in the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the principle was amplified to prohibit not only interposition of armed force but also any other forms of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State. Both post- war administrations in the United States have affirmed their adherence to nonintervention. During a visit to Mexico in 1947, President Harry Truman declared that "the policy of the good neighbor includes specifically the doctrine of non-intervention." However, he warned that "non-intervention does not and cannot mean indifference to what goes on beyond our borders. . . . The community of nations feels concern at the violation of accepted principles of national behavior by any one of its mem- bers. The lawlessness of one nation may threaten the very existence of the law on which all nations depend. . . ."" Closely associated with the problem of nonintervention is the question of the recognition of governments which have come to power by other than constitutional means. Recognition, particu- larly when exercised by a powerful nation, may be a potent political weapon. Accordingly, the Latin Americans, antagonistic to intervention in any form, generally have opposed the withhold- ing of recognition from de facto governments. The classic state- ment of this position is the Estrada Doctrine, to the effect that recognition should be given automatically regardless of the origin of the new government. Estrada explained that recognition by the Mexican government does not imply judgment, but is con- fined to "the maintenance or withdrawal, as may be desirable, of diplomatic agents."" " El Universal (Mexico City), Mar. 3, 1947. At Caracas in 1954, Secretary of State Dulles went to considerable lengths to reaffirm United States adherence to the principle of nonintervention. Two events, widely regarded as instances of United States "intervention," provoked signifi- cantly divergent reactions in the Americas. Alleged unilateral action by the United States in the Guatemalan situation in 1954 provoked angry charges throughout Latin America and harvested considerable ill will. In contrast, United States assistance to Costa Rica during difficulties with Nicaragua were based on the prior authorization of the OAS and generally elicited a favorable reaction. " Ibid., Sept. 27, 1930. 118 The Caribbean After World War II the doctrine of nonintervention was in- corporated in the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the principle was amplified to prohibit not only interposition of armed force but also any other forms of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State. Both post- war administrations in the United States have affirmed their adherence to nonintervention. During a visit to Mexico in 1947, President Harry Truman declared that "the policy of the good neighbor includes specifically the doctrine of non-intervention." However, he warned that "non-intervention does not and cannot mean indifference to what goes on beyond our borders. . . . The community of nations feels concern at the violation of accepted principles of national behavior by any one of its mem- bers. The lawlessness of one nation may threaten the very existence of the law on which all nations depend. . . ."" Closely associated with the problem of nonintervention is the question of the recognition of governments which have come to power by other than constitutional means. Recognition, particu- larly when exercised by a powerful nation, may be a potent political weapon. Accordingly, the Latin Americans, antagonistic to intervention in any form, generally have opposed the withhold- ing of recognition from de facto governments. The classic state- ment of this position is the Estrada Doctrine, to the effect that recognition should be given automatically regardless of the origin of the new government. Estrada explained that recognition by the Mexican government does not imply judgment, but is con- fined to "the maintenance or withdrawal, as may be desirable, of diplomatic agents."" El Universal (Mexico City), Mar. 3, 1947. At Caracas in 1954, Secretary of State Dulles went to considerable lengths to reaffirm United States adherence to the principle of nonintervention. Two events, widely regarded as instances of United States "intervention," provoked signifli- cantly divergent reactions in the Americas. Alleged unilateral action by the United States in the Guatemalan situation in 1954 provoked angry charges throughout Latin America and harvested considerable ill will. In contrast, United States assistance to Costa Rica during difficulties with Nicaragua were based on the prior authorization of the OAS and generally elicited a favorable reaction. " Ibid., Sept. 27, 1930. 118 The Caribbean After World War II the doctrine of nonintervention was in- corporated in the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the principle was amplified to prohibit not only interposition of armed force but also any other forms of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State. Both post- war administrations in the United States have affirmed their adherence to nonintervention. During a visit to Mexico in 1947, President Harry Truman declared that "the policy of the good neighbor includes specifically the doctrine of non-intervention." However, he warned that "non-intervention does not and cannot mean indifference to what goes on beyond our borders. . . . The community of nations feels concern at the violation of accepted principles of national behavior by any one of its mem- bers. The lawlessness of one nation may threaten the very existence of the law on which all nations depend. . . ."" Closely associated with the problem of nonintervention is the question of the recognition of governments which have come to power by other than constitutional means. Recognition, particu- larly when exercised by a powerful nation, may be a potent political weapon. Accordingly, the Latin Americans, antagonistic to intervention in any form, generally have opposed the withhold- ing of recognition from de facto governments. The classic state- ment of this position is the Estrada Doctrine, to the effect that recognition should be given automatically regardless of the origin of the new government. Estrada explained that recognition by the Mexican government does not imply judgment, but is con- fined to "the maintenance or withdrawal, as may be desirable, of diplomatic agents."" " El Universal (Mexico City), Mar. 3, 1947. At Caracas in 1954, Secretary of State Dulles went to considerable lengths to reaffirm United States adherence to the principle of nonintervention. Two events, widely regarded as instances of United States "intervention," provoked signifi- cantly divergent reactions in the Americas. Alleged unilateral action by the United States in the Guatemalan situation in 1954 provoked angry charges throughout Latin America and harvested considerable ill will. In contrast, United States assistance to Costa Rica during difficulties with Nicaragua were based on the prior authorization of the OAS and generally elicited a favorable reaction. " Ibid., Sept. 27, 1930.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 119 Thomas Jefferson justifiably is credited with being the formu- lator of the recognition policy of the United States. He evolved the concept of de facto recognition. "We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under whatever forms it pleases and to change these forms at its own will. . .."" His advocacy of such recognition was based. on the assumption that the new government represented the will of the majority of the people. The nominal practice of the United States government has been to accord recognition on the grounds of the adequate control of the machinery of government, the pros- pect of future stability, and an expressed willingness to respect and an ability to fulfill international obligations. The second prerequisite was assumed to meet the Jeffersonian requirement for popular consent."t It frequently has been asserted that Woodrow Wilson departed from the traditional policy in refusing to grant de facto recogni- tion to the Huerta regime in Mexico. However, Wilson was influenced not only by the means used to achieve power, but also by what he considered the absence of popular approval.' The first consideration did represent a departure from the Jeffersonian approach, but beyond that Wilson's policy would appear to be a revitalization of the original insistence on "consent of the governed." The Wilsonian principle of "constitutionality" was followed by his immediate successors, but was applied sparingly and not uniformly. In 1923 the United States adopted as its policy in Central America the principle which had been agreed to by the nations of the area of nonrecognition of new govern- ments born of military coup or revolution."a " Jefferson to Pinckney, Dec. 30, 1792, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. P. L. Ford (New York, 1892-1899), III, 500. * S. A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico (Baltimore, 1933), p. 102; S. S. Goodspeed, "United States Recognition Policies Toward Latin America," World Affairs (July, 1952), 127. * U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), p. 7. " Conference n Central American Affairs, 1922-23 (Washington, REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 119 Thomas Jefferson justifiably is credited with being the formu- lator of the recognition policy of the United States. He evolved the concept of de facto recognition. "We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under whatever forms it pleases and to change these forms at its own will. . . .""' His advocacy of such recognition was based on the assumption that the new government represented the will of the majority of the people. The nominal practice of the United States government has been to accord recognition on the grounds of the adequate control of the machinery of government, the pros- pect of future stability, and an expressed willingness to respect and an ability to fulfill international obligations. The second prerequisite was assumed to meet the Jeffersonian requirement for popular consent.a It frequently has been asserted that Woodrow Wilson departed from the traditional policy in refusing to grant de facto recogni- tion to the Huerta regime in Mexico. However, Wilson was influenced not only by the means used to achieve power, but also by what he considered the absence of popular approval.,' The first consideration did represent a departure from the Jeffersonian approach, but beyond that Wilson's policy would appear to be a revitalization of the original insistence on "consent of the governed." The Wilsonian principle of "constitutionality" was followed by his immediate successors, but was applied sparingly and not uniformly. In 1923 the United States adopted as its policy in Central America the principle which had been agreed to by the nations of the area of nonrecognition of new govern- ments born of military coup or revolution."o " Jefferson to Pinckney, Dec. 30, 1792, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. P. L. Ford (New York, 1892-1899), III, 500. a S. A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico (Baltimore, 1933), p. 102; S. S. Goodspeed, "United States Recognition Policies Toward Latin America," World Affairs (July, 1952), 127. " U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), p. 7. * Conference an Central American Affairs, 1922-23 (Washington, REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 119 Thomas Jefferson justifiably is credited with being the formu- lator of the recognition policy of the United States. He evolved the concept of de facto recognition. "We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under whatever forms it pleases and to change these forms at its own will. . . ."" His advocacy of such recognition was based on the assumption that the new government represented the will of the majority of the people. The nominal practice of the United States government has been to accord recognition on the grounds of the adequate control of the machinery of government, the pros- pect of future stability, and an expressed willingness to respect and an ability to fulfill international obligations. The second prerequisite was assumed to meet the Jeffersonian requirement for popular consent.t It frequently has been asserted that Woodrow Wilson departed from the traditional policy in refusing to grant de facto recogni- tion to the Huerta regime in Mexico. However, Wilson was influenced not only by the means used to achieve power, but also by what he considered the absence of popular approval.' The first consideration did represent a departure from the Jeffersonian approach, but beyond that Wilson's policy would appear to be a revitalization of the original insistence on "consent of the governed." The Wilsonian principle of "constitutionality" was followed by his immediate successors, but was applied sparingly and not uniformly. In 1923 the United States adopted as its policy in Central America the principle which had been agreed to by the nations of the area of nonrecognition of new govern- ments born of military coup or revolution." " Jefferson to Pinckney, Dec. 30, 1792, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. P. L. Ford (New York, 1892-1899), III, 500. "S. A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico (Baltimore, 1933), p. 102; S. S. Goodspeed, "United States Recognition Policies Toward Latin America," World Affairs (July, 1952), 127. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), p. 7. " Conference on Central American Affairs, 1922-23 (Washington,  120 The Caribbean 120 The Caribbean 120 The Caribbean Faced by a series of depression-ignited revolutions and on the grounds that Wilson's policy of "constitutionality," however laud- able in theory, was ineffective in practice and unacceptable to Latin Americans as a form of intervention, President Hoover and Secretary Stimson reverted to the "traditional" bases for de facto recognition which generally have been followed down to the present. After the Batista coup in Cuba, a Department of State spokesman indicated that recognition would be contingent on the existence of three conditions of fact: the control of the machinery of government, the absence of foreign intervention, and the abil- ity and willingness of the new government to discharge interna- tional obligations." Plotters are encouraged by the assurance that prompt recognition will follow seizure of power and the pro- nouncement of appropriate pledges. In the case of the overthrow of the Gallegos government, a Washington newspaper reported that recognition of the de facto military regime in Peru served as the "green light" for the military conspirators in Venezuela." President Truman wrote a letter to Gallegos in which he stated, "I believe that the use of force to effect political changes is not only deplorable, but also contrary to the ideals of the American peoples. The Government of the United States proposes to do everything possible, in accordance with its international obliga- tions, to fortify the democratic forces in this hemisphere." Mr. Truman also indicated that his government was engaged in con- sultation with the other American nations in an effort to find ways to fortify democratic and constitutional procedures in the Americas." At BogotA in 1948, efforts to resolve the recognition problem could accomplish little because of the impossibility of reconciling 1923), pp. 228-229. "Constitutionality" continued to be applied as a test for Central American governments until the 1923 Treaty expired on Jan. 1, 1934, as the result of formal abrogation by two of the signatories. Excelsior (Mexico City), Mar. 11, 1952. " Rdmulo Betancourt, "El caso de Venezuela y el destino de la democ- racia en America," Cuadernos Americanos (Aug., 1949), 55. " Bohemia (Havana), Feb. 13, 1949. Faced by a series of depression-ignited revolutions and on the grounds that Wilson's policy of "constitutionality," however laud- able in theory, was ineffective in practice and unacceptable to Latin Americans as a form of intervention, President Hoover and Secretary Stimson reverted to the "traditional" bases for de facto recognition which generally have been followed down to the present. After the Batista coup in Cuba, a Department of State spokesman indicated that recognition would be contingent on the existence of three conditions of fact: the control of the machinery of government, the absence of foreign intervention, and the abil- ity and willingness of the new government to discharge interna- tional obligations." Plotters are encouraged by the assurance that prompt recognition will follow seizure of power and the pro- nouncement of appropriate pledges. In the case of the overthrow of the Gallegos government, a Washington newspaper reported that recognition of the de facto military regime in Peru served as the "green light" for the military conspirators in Venezuela." President Truman wrote a letter to Gallegos in which he stated, "I believe that the use of force to effect political changes is not only deplorable, but also contrary to the ideals of the American peoples. The Government of the United States proposes to do everything possible, in accordance with its international obliga- tions, to fortify the democratic forces in this hemisphere." Mr. Truman also indicated that his government was engaged in con- sultation with the other American nations in an effort to find ways to fortify democratic and constitutional procedures in the Americas." At Bogota in 1948, efforts to resolve the recognition problem could accomplish little because of the impossibility of reconciling 1923), pp. 228-229. "Constitutionality" continued to be applied as a test for Central American governments until the 1923 Treaty expired on Jan. 1, 1934, as the result of formal abrogation by two of the signatories. " Excelsior (Mexico City), Mar. 11, 1952. " Romulo Betancourt, "El caso de Venezuela y el destino de la democ- racia en America," Cuadernos Americanos (Aug., 1949), 55. " Bohemia (Havana), Feb. 13, 1949. Faced by a series of depression-ignited revolutions and on the grounds that Wilson's policy of "constitutionality," however laud- able in theory, was ineffective in practice and unacceptable to Latin Americans as a form of intervention, President Hoover and Secretary Stimson reverted to the "traditional" bases for de facto recognition which generally have been followed down to the present. After the Batista coup in Cuba, a Department of State spokesman indicated that recognition would be contingent on the existence of three conditions of fact: the control of the machinery of government, the absence of foreign intervention, and the abil- ity and willingness of the new government to discharge interna- tional obligations." Plotters are encouraged by the assurance that prompt recognition will follow seizure of power and the pro- nouncement of appropriate pledges. In the case of the overthrow of the Gallegos government, a Washington newspaper reported that recognition of the de facto military regime in Peru served as the "green light" for the military conspirators in Venezuela.' President Truman wrote a letter to Gallegos in which he stated, "I believe that the use of force to effect political changes is not only deplorable, but also contrary to the ideals of the American peoples. The Government of the United States proposes to do everything possible, in accordance with its international obliga- tions, to fortify the democratic forces in this hemisphere." Mr. Truman also indicated that his government was engaged in con- sultation with the other American nations in an effort to find ways to fortify democratic and constitutional procedures in the Americas." At Bogota in 1948, efforts to resolve the recognition problem could accomplish little because of the impossibility of reconciling 1923), pp. 228-229. "Constitutionality" continued to be applied as a test for Central American governments until the 1923 Treaty expired on Jan. 1, 1934, as the result of formal abrogation by two of the signatories. " Excelsior (Mexico City), Mar. 11, 1952. " Romulo Betancourt, "El caso de Venezuela y el destino de la democ- racia en America," Cuadernos Americanos (Aug., 1949), 55. " Bohemia (Havana), Feb. 13, 1949.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 121 the differences between those who favored and those who op- posed examination of the circumstances by which a government achieved power. The Inter-American Council of Jurists, assigned the task of preparing a project on the subject, has proposed that de facto recognition be granted whenever a new government can establish that it enjoys effective control of the national territory, is willing to fulfill international obligations, and is based on the adequately manifested acquiescence of the people." It would appear that the pendulum is swinging back to criteria resembling those of Jefferson. If some satisfactory method for determining the existence or lack of "popular consent" can be found and the system of inter-American consultation on such matters be amplified and formalized, the problem of recognition might be resolved. Forgotten would be the question of "consti- tutionality" as well as the device of unilateral nonrecognition already rejected by the United States as ineffective and a source of Latin American fear and suspicion. Eliminated, or at least minimized, would be the encouragement to military cliques in- herent in automatic recognition. IV The recent history of Mexico, almost free from the ravages of militarism, offers a striking contrast to events in some of the Caribbean countries. Seventeen years have passed since a regional caudillo last challenged with gun in hand the authority of the central government. More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the presidential succession prompted an armed uprising on a national scale, and the last successful overthrow of a legally constituted government occurred some thirty-five years ago. The explanation of this contrast cannot be found in the colonial heritage nor in the early national history of the country. Mexico inherited the same military tradition as the other Spanish dominions and experienced a prolonged, bitter struggle for inde- " Goodspeed, 138-140. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 121 the differences between those who favored and those who op- posed examination of the circumstances by which a government achieved power. The Inter-American Council of Jurists, assigned the task of preparing a project on the subject, has proposed that de facto recognition be granted whenever a new government can establish that it enjoys effective control of the national territory, is willing to fulfill international obligations, and is based on the adequately manifested acquiescence of the people." It would appear that the pendulum is swinging back to criteria resembling those of Jefferson. If some satisfactory method for determining the existence or lack of "popular consent" can be found and the system of inter-American consultation on such matters be amplified and formalized, the problem of recognition might be resolved. Forgotten would be the question of "consti- tutionality" as well as the device of unilateral nonrecognition already rejected by the United States as ineffective and a source of Latin American fear and suspicion. Eliminated, or at least minimized, would be the encouragement to military cliques in- herent in automatic recognition. IV The recent history of Mexico, almost free from the ravages of militarism, offers a striking contrast to events in some of the Caribbean countries. Seventeen years have passed since a regional caudillo last challenged with gun in hand the authority of the central government. More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the presidential succession prompted an armed uprising on a national scale, and the last successful overthrow of a legally constituted government occurred some thirty-five years ago. The explanation of this contrast cannot be found in the colonial heritage nor in the early national history of the country. Mexico inherited the same military tradition as the other Spanish dominions and experienced a prolonged, bitter struggle for inde- " Goodspeed, 138-140. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 121 the differences between those who favored and those who op- posed examination of the circumstances by which a government achieved power. The Inter-American Council of Jurists, assigned the task of preparing a project on the subject, has proposed that de facto recognition be granted whenever a new government can establish that it enjoys effective control of the national territory, is willing to fulfill international obligations, and is based on the adequately manifested acquiescence of the people." It would appear that the pendulum is swinging back to criteria resembling those of Jefferson. If some satisfactory method for determining the existence or lack of "popular consent" can be found and the system of inter-American consultation on such matters be amplified and formalized, the problem of recognition might be resolved. Forgotten would be the question of "consti- tutionality" as well as the device of unilateral nonrecognition already rejected by the United States as ineffective and a source of Latin American fear and suspicion. Eliminated, or at least minimized, would be the encouragement to military cliques in- herent in automatic recognition. IV The recent history of Mexico, almost free from the ravages of militarism, offers a striking contrast to events in some of the Caribbean countries. Seventeen years have passed since a regional caudillo last challenged with gun in hand the authority of the central government. More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the presidential succession prompted an armed uprising on a national scale, and the last successful overthrow of a legally constituted government occurred some thirty-five years ago. The explanation of this contrast cannot be found in the colonial heritage nor in the early national history of the country. Mexico inherited the same military tradition as the other Spanish dominions and experienced a prolonged, bitter struggle for inde- Goodspeed, 138-140.  122 The Caribbean 122 The Caribbean pendence with all the unhappy consequences. Freedom from Spain was achieved finally by an act of military treason, and the new government preserved an aristocratic character with the privileged segments of society, including the military, left un- disturbed. Independence ushered in an era of almost sixty years of vio- lence. Armed force was the customary and accepted means to power, and the army, instead of serving as an instrument for the maintenance of the government, became the main source of internal disorder and the primary gainer from the general dis- solution of authority. Mexico was saddled with an irresponsible military class which constituted the main drain on the public resources without the normal channels for public control."r On several occasions, in the 1830's and 1850's, unsuccessful efforts were made to curtail the privileges and to curb the power of the military. During the War of the Reform and the subse- quent struggle to expel the French, conservative military elements received crushing blows which were accentuated by the defeat of their natural allies, the Church and the large landowners. How- ever, these events brought forth a new group of militarists asso- ciated with the liberal movement who soon demonstrated that militarism was not dead. During the rule of Porfirio Diaz, Mexico experienced the first prolonged period of internal peace since the Colonial era. The army was converted into a pillar of the regime at first by ruthless suppression of military uprisings and the elimination of ambitious officers and later by fear and favor. The government was able to reward loyalty handsomely in an atmosphere of economic development which, in turn, was furthered by the unparalleled internal peace. However, when confronted by a popularly sup- ported uprising in 1910, the seemingly magnificent military structure crumbled. Elements of the old military clique managed to destroy the Madero government. However, the struggle against " Alamin, V, 51, 86-87, 100-105, 151-153, 205-212, and 242; J. M. L. Mora, Mixico y sus revoluciones (Paris, 1836), I, 415-416. pendence with all the unhappy consequences. Freedom from Spain was achieved finally by an act of military treason, and the new government preserved an aristocratic character with the privileged segments of society, including the military, left un- disturbed. Independence ushered in an era of almost sixty years of vio- lence. Armed force was the customary and accepted means to power, and the army, instead of serving as an instrument for the maintenance of the government, became the main source of internal disorder and the primary gainer from the general dis- solution of authority. Mexico was saddled with an irresponsible military class which constituted the main drain on the public resources without the normal channels for public control." On several occasions, in the 1830's and 1850's, unsuccessful efforts were made to curtail the privileges and to curb the power of the military. During the War of the Reform and the subse- quent struggle to expel the French, conservative military elements received crushing blows which were accentuated by the defeat of their natural allies, the Church and the large landowners. How- ever, these events brought forth a new group of militarists asso- ciated with the liberal movement who soon demonstrated that militarism was not dead. During the rule of Porfirio Diaz, Mexico experienced the first prolonged period of internal peace since the Colonial era. The army was converted into a pillar of the regime at first by ruthless suppression of military uprisings and the elimination of ambitious officers and later by fear and favor. The government was able to reward loyalty handsomely in an atmosphere of economic development which, in turn, was furthered by the unparalleled internal peace. However, when confronted by a popularly sup- ported uprising in 1910, the seemingly magnificent military structure crumbled. Elements of the old military clique managed to destroy the Madero government. However, the struggle against * Alamin, V, 51, 86-87, 100-105, 151-153, 205-212, and 242; J. M. L. Mora, Mixico y sus revoluciones (Paris, 1836), I, 415-416. 122 The Caribbean pendence with all the unhappy consequences. Freedom from Spain was achieved finally by an act of military treason, and the new government preserved an aristocratic character with the privileged segments of society, including the military, left un- disturbed. Independence ushered in an era of almost sixty years of vio- lence. Armed force was the customary and accepted means to power, and the army, instead of serving as an instrument for the maintenance of the government, became the main source of internal disorder and the primary gainer from the general dis- solution of authority. Mexico was saddled with an irresponsible military class which constituted the main drain on the public resources without the normal channels for public control." On several occasions, in the 1830's and 1850's, unsuccessful efforts were made to curtail the privileges and to curb the power of the military. During the War of the Reform and the subse- quent struggle to expel the French, conservative military elements received crushing blows which were accentuated by the defeat of their natural allies, the Church and the large landowners. How- ever, these events brought forth a new group of militarists asso- ciated with the liberal movement who soon demonstrated that militarism was not dead. During the rule of Porfirio Diaz, Mexico experienced the first prolonged period of internal peace since the Colonial era. The army was converted into a pillar of the regime at first by ruthless suppression of military uprisings and the elimination of ambitious officers and later by fear and favor. The government was able to reward loyalty handsomely in an atmosphere of economic development which, in turn, was furthered by the unparalleled internal peace. However, when confronted by a popularly sup- ported uprising in 1910, the seemingly magnificent military structure crumbled. Elements of the old military clique managed to destroy the Madero government. However, the struggle against SAlamain, V, 51, 86-87, 100-105, 151-153, 205-212, and 242; J. M. L. Mora, Mixico y sus revoluciones (Paris, 1836), , 415-416.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 123 Huerta brought forth once more a popular, revolutionary army before which the federal army went completely to pieces, to be officially disbanded as a vestigial institution of the dictatorship of Diaz. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 may best be viewed, perhaps, as an effort to strengthen the state and to weaken rival institu- tions. In an atmosphere pervaded by nascent nationalism, the Mexicans sought to establish their country as a nation which came to be viewed as something Mexican belonging to the people. In the Constitution of 1917, which gave legal framework to the Revolution, the central government was strengthened greatly and its base of support significantly broadened by the creation and stimulation of agrarian groups and labor organizations. Its rela- tive power grew with attacks on the vested status of the foreign- ers, the clergy, and the hacendados. In place of the old, caste- conscious federal army there came into being an army derived from the people and responsive to their needs and aspirations." Nonetheless, the years of the Revolution were marked by a return to militarism. The new army was not national, but rather each segment was a private army belonging to the leader who had created it. The irresponsible local caudillo reappeared, dis- cipline became rare, and centralized control was difficult, if not impossible, to exercise. Mexico returned to the chaos which had prevailed prior to the Diaz regime. Carranza, who tried unsuc- cessfully to reduce the size and influence of the army, lamented that "the trouble with Mexico has always been, and still is mili- tarism."" Only after ten years of violence and civil war was it possible to re-establish acceptable and adequate national author- ity. The Revolution left the country bristling with arms and " Dr. Arturo Arntiz y Freg contends that a stable liberal regime has been possible in Mexico only when the united strength of the professional army and conservative elements, including the clergy, has been broken and a nonprofessional, improvised army has stood guard. "Mexico's Place in Western Culture," Mexican Life (July, 1954), 52. " V. Blasco Ibanez, Mexico in Revolution (New York, 1920), p. 4; Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution (New York, 1933), pp. 119- 120. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 123 Huerta brought forth once more a popular, revolutionary army before which the federal army went completely to pieces, to be officially disbanded as a vestigial institution of the dictatorship of Diaz. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 may best be viewed, perhaps, as an effort to strengthen the state and to weaken rival institu- tions. In an atmosphere pervaded by nascent nationalism, the Mexicans sought to establish their country as a nation which came to be viewed as something Mexican belonging to the people. In the Constitution of 1917, which gave legal framework to the Revolution, the central government was strengthened greatly and its base of support significantly broadened by the creation and stimulation of agrarian groups and labor organizations. Its rela- tive power grew with attacks on the vested status of the foreign- ers, the clergy, and the hacendados. In place of the old, caste- conscious federal army there came into being an army derived from the people and responsive to their needs and aspirations." Nonetheless, the years of the Revolution were marked by a return to militarism. The new army was not national, but rather each segment was a private army belonging to the leader who had created it. The irresponsible local caudillo reappeared, dis- cipline became rare, and centralized control was difficult, if not impossible, to exercise. Mexico returned to the chaos which had prevailed prior to the Diaz regime. Carranza, who tried unsuc- cessfully to reduce the size and influence of the army, lamented that "the trouble with Mexico has always been, and still is mili- tarism."" Only after ten years of violence and civil war was it possible to re-establish acceptable and adequate national author- ity. The Revolution left the country bristling with arms and " Dr. Arturo Arniz y Freg contends that a stable liberal regime has been possible in Mexico only when the united strength of the professional army and conservative elements, including the clergy, has been broken and a nonprofessional, improvised army has stood guard. "Mexico's Place in Western Culture," Mexican Life (July, 1954), 52. " V. Blasco Ibinez, Mexico in Revolution (New York, 1920), p. 4; Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution (New York, 1933), pp. 119- 120. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 123 Huerta brought forth once more a popular, revolutionary army before which the federal army went completely to pieces, to be officially disbanded as a vestigial institution of the dictatorship of Diaz. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 may best be viewed, perhaps, as an effort to strengthen the state and to weaken rival institu- tions. In an atmosphere pervaded by nascent nationalism, the Mexicans sought to establish their country as a nation which came to be viewed as something Mexican belonging to the people. In the Constitution of 1917, which gave legal framework to the Revolution, the central government was strengthened greatly and its base of support significantly broadened by the creation and stimulation of agrarian groups and labor organizations. Its rela- tive power grew with attacks on the vested status of the foreign- ers, the clergy, and the hacendados. In place of the old, caste- conscious federal army there came into being an army derived from the people and responsive to their needs and aspirations." Nonetheless, the years of the Revolution were marked by a return to militarism. The new army was not national, but rather each segment was a private army belonging to the leader who had created it. The irresponsible local caudillo reappeared, dis- cipline became rare, and centralized control was difficult, if not impossible, to exercise. Mexico returned to the chaos which had prevailed prior to the Diaz regime. Carranza, who tried unsuc- cessfully to reduce the size and influence of the army, lamented that "the trouble with Mexico has always been, and still is mili- tarism."" Only after ten years of violence and civil war was it possible to re-establish acceptable and adequate national author- ity. The Revolution left the country bristling with arms and " Dr. Arturo Arnadiz y Freg contends that a stable liberal regime has been possible in Mexico only when the united strength of the professional army and conservative elements, including the clergy, has been broken and a nonprofessional, improvised army has stood guard. "Mexico's Place in Western Culture," Mexican Life (July, 1954), 52. " V. Blasco Ibinez, Mexico in Revolution (New York, 1920), p. 4; Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution (New York, 1933), pp. 119- 120.  124 The Caribbean 124 The Caribbean overstocked with officers, particularly on the upper levels. The army continued to be a heavy drain on the government's revenues, and, when trouble appeared, military expenditures were swelled by special allocations. "It was an octopus which absorbed the blood of the taxpayer."" Before peace and stability could settle over the land it was necessary four times to overcome rebellions by caudillos who had to be convinced that the power of the government was greater than that of the individual commander. During the Huerta and Jose Gonzalo Escobar rebellions, large numbers of generals and other officers, as well as a considerable portion of the rank and file of the army, deserted to the rebels. That the government, although hard pressed, managed to survive these challenges marked the dawn of a new era." The Revolution had created new elements of support for the government in the peasants' and workers' organizations. These proved of real military value in the struggle for survival against resurgent militarism. A second factor which tipped the scales in favor of the government was the moral support and material aid from the United States. Thirdly, a succession of individuals, Obreg6n, Plutarco Elias Calles, and Cardenas, provided effective leadership. Obregon, who enjoyed prestige with the army and evidenced a desire to satisfy popular aspirations, re-established effective gov- ernmental authority. When armed rebellion recurred, Obreg6n and Calles proved themselves forceful and ruthless enough to crush the uprisings and to liquidate the troublemakers. Calles, through his Secretary of War General Joaquin Amaro, made a valiant effort to train and discipline the army. Zone commanders were shifted regularly to new areas, and educational and recrea- tional programs were initiated for service personnel. When Presi- dent-elect Obregon was assassinated, Calles dramatically refused 25 L. Araquistain, La revolucidn mejicana (Madrid, 1929), p. 146; G. F. Aguilar, Los presupuestos mexicanos desde los tiempos de la colonia hasta nuestros dias (Mxico, 1947). ' Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950), pp. 91-95. overstocked with officers, particularly on the upper levels. The army continued to be a heavy drain on the government's revenues, and, when trouble appeared, military expenditures were swelled by special allocations. "It was an octopus which absorbed the blood of the taxpayer."" Before peace and stability could settle over the land it was necessary four times to overcome rebellions by caudillos who had to be convinced that the power of the government was greater than that of the individual commander. During the Huerta and Jose Gonzalo Escobar rebellions, large numbers of generals and other officers, as well as a considerable portion of the rank and file of the army, deserted to the rebels. That the government, although hard pressed, managed to survive these challenges marked the dawn of a new era." The Revolution had created new elements of support for the government in the peasants' and workers' organizations. These proved of real military value in the struggle for survival against resurgent militarism. A second factor which tipped the scales in favor of the government was the moral support and material aid from the United States. Thirdly, a succession of individuals, Obreg6n, Plutarco Elias Calles, and CArdenas, provided effective leadership. Obreg6n, who enjoyed prestige with the army and evidenced a desire to satisfy popular aspirations, re-established effective gov- ernmental authority. When armed rebellion recurred, Obreg6n and Calles proved themselves forceful and ruthless enough to crush the uprisings and to liquidate the troublemakers. Calles, through his Secretary of War General Joaquin Amaro, made a valiant effort to train and discipline the army. Zone commanders were shifted regularly to new areas, and educational and recrea- tional programs were initiated for service personnel. When Presi- dent-elect Obregon was assassinated, Calles dramatically refused L. Araquistain, La revolucion mejicana (Madrid, 1929), p. 146; G. F. Aguilar, Los presupuestos mexicanos desde los tiempos de la colonia hasta nuestros dias (Mixico, 1947). " Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950), pp. 91-95. 124 The Caribbean overstocked with officers, particularly on the upper levels. The army continued to be a heavy drain on the government's revenues, and, when trouble appeared, military expenditures were swelled by special allocations. "It was an octopus which absorbed the blood of the taxpayer."" Before peace and stability could settle over the land it was necessary four times to overcome rebellions by caudillos who had to be convinced that the power of the government was greater than that of the individual commander. During the Huerta and Jose Gonzalo Escobar rebellions, large numbers of generals and other officers, as well as a considerable portion of the rank and file of the army, deserted to the rebels. That the government, although hard pressed, managed to survive these challenges marked the dawn of a new era." The Revolution had created new elements of support for the government in the peasants' and workers' organizations. These proved of real military value in the struggle for survival against resurgent militarism. A second factor which tipped the scales in favor of the government was the moral support and material aid from the United States. Thirdly, a succession of individuals, Obregon, Plutarco Elias Calles, and CArdenas, provided effective leadership. Obreg6n, who enjoyed prestige with the army and evidenced a desire to satisfy popular aspirations, re-established effective gov- ernmental authority. When armed rebellion recurred, Obreg6n and Calles proved themselves forceful and ruthless enough to crush the uprisings and to liquidate the troublemakers. Calles, through his Secretary of War General Joaquin Amaro, made a valiant effort to train and discipline the army. Zone commanders were shifted regularly to new areas, and educational and recrea- tional programs were initiated for service personnel. When Presi- dent-elect Obregon was assassinated, Calles dramatically refused L. Araquistain, La revolucin mejicana (Madrid, 1929), p. 146; G. F. Aguilar, Los presupuestos mexicanos desde los tiempos de la colonia hasta nuestros dis (Mexico, 1947). " Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950), pp. 91-95.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 145 to again occupy elective office and announced the end of caudil- lismo. Although as jefe mdximo he remained the effective force within the government until 1934, Calles never again occupied the presidential chair and re-election, continuismo by an indivi- dual, died with Obreg6n. Cdrdenas considered it essential for the army to know and to identify itself with the people. "[It] has to be oriented socially so that it will acquire full consciousness of its mission and be able to take part in the Revolution and reinforce it."" Increased pay, a reorganized system of military justice, and expanded educa- tional opportunities for service personnel and their families raised morale and won for Cdrdenas the loyalty of the younger officers and the enlisted personnel. As a consequence the government enjoyed almost unanimous army support during the abortive Saturnino Cedillo uprising in 1938. Since 1940 the changes in Mexico's economic, social, and political patterns have been accelerated and enlarged, and the conditions of peace and stability seem more firmly established. Economic advance, with attention focused on industrialization, has been the key objective of the last three administrations. Despite the disabilities of corruption and inflation, the expansion and diversification of the national economy has brought improved conditions, some elevation of the standard of living, and promise of further advances in the future. Politically this would signify the reduction of discontent which normally provides the basis for demagogic appeals by opposition extremists. One of the most striking developments of the recent economic advance has been the improved transportation system resulting from the railroad rehabilitation program and the extension of the highway network of the country. As never before Mexico is tied together by roads and rails which have facilitated economic growth, made more effective the central government's control, and advanced the country toward the status of an integrated nation. * Memoria de la segunda convencidn nacional del P.N.R. (Mxico, 1934), pp. 197-204; El Universal (Mexico City), Jan. 2, 1935. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 125 to again occupy elective office and announced the end of caudil- lismo. Although as jefe mdximo he remained the effective force within the government until 1934, Calles never again occupied the presidential chair and re-election, continuismo by an indivi- dual, died with Obregdn. Cardenas considered it essential for the army to know and to identify itself with the people. "[It] has to be oriented socially so that it will acquire full consciousness of its mission and be able to take part in the Revolution and reinforce it."" Increased pay, a reorganized system of military justice, and expanded educa- tional opportunities for service personnel and their families raised morale and won for Cdrdenas the loyalty of the younger officers and the enlisted personnel. As a consequence the government enjoyed almost unanimous army support during the abortive Saturnino Cedillo uprising in 1938. Since 1940 the changes in Mexico's economic, social, and political patterns have been accelerated and enlarged, and the conditions of peace and stability seem more firmly established. Economic advance, with attention focused on industrialization, has been the key objective of the last three administrations. Despite the disabilities of corruption and inflation, the expansion and diversification of the national economy has brought improved conditions, some elevation of the standard of living, and promise of further advances in the future. Politically this would signify the reduction of discontent which normally provides the basis for demagogic appeals by opposition extremists. One of the most striking developments of the recent economic advance has been the improved transportation system resulting from the railroad rehabilitation program and the extension of the highway network of the country. As never before Mexico is tied together by roads and rails which have facilitated economic growth, made more effective the central government's control, and advanced the country toward the status of an integrated nation. " Memoria de la segunda convencidn nacional del P.N.R. (Mexico, 1934). pp. 197-204; El Universal (Mexico City), Jan. 2, 1935. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 125 to again occupy elective office and announced the end of caudil- lismo. Although as jefe mdximo he remained the effective force within the government until 1934, Calles never again occupied the presidential chair and re-election, continuismo by an indivi- dual, died with Obregdn. Cdrdenas considered it essential for the army to know and to identify itself with the people. "[It] has to be oriented socially so that it will acquire full consciousness of its mission and be able to take part in the Revolution and reinforce it."" Increased pay, a reorganized system of military justice, and expanded educa- tional opportunities for service personnel and their families raised morale and won for Cdrdenas the loyalty of the younger officers and the enlisted personnel. As a consequence the government enjoyed almost unanimous army support during the abortive Saturnino Cedillo uprising in 1938. Since 1940 the changes in Mexico's economic, social, and political patterns have been accelerated and enlarged, and the conditions of peace and stability seem more firmly established. Economic advance, with attention focused on industrialization, has been the key objective of the last three administrations. Despite the disabilities of corruption and inflation, the expansion and diversification of the national economy has brought improved conditions, some elevation of the standard of living, and promise of further advances in the future. Politically this would signify the reduction of discontent which normally provides the basis for demagogic appeals by opposition extremists. One of the most striking developments of the recent economic advance has been the improved transportation system resulting from the railroad rehabilitation program and the extension of the highway network of the country. As never before Mexico is tied together by roads and rails which have facilitated economic growth, made more effective the central government's control, and advanced the country toward the status of an integrated nation. * Memoria de la segunda conventixn nacional del P.N.R. (Mexico, 1934). pp. 197-204; El Universal (Mexico City), Jan. 2, 1935.  126 The Caribbean This economic progress of Mexico has added a growing middle class to the agrarian and labor elements already included in the government's broadened base of support. Tremendous strides have been made toward elevating the general level of the popu- lation and toward integrating it into a social whole. Key to this effort has been a greatly expanded educational program, including a strenuous drive to eliminate illiteracy. Although the rapidly growing population has tended to outstrip both the educational effort and the available funds, real progress has been recorded. Political advances have accompanied the economic and social developments. Mexico has been described as a "maturing democ- racy," and there is no question that the prospects for further advances in this direction are encouraging." The government of Mexico is not a tyranny, unresponsive to popular desires. Public criticism is freely exercised and not without some influence. Although the tradition of personal leadership is strong, no Mexi- can leader could try to perpetuate himself in office without stir- ring up the proverbial hornet's nest. Although the official party continues to win at the polls, it has become more representative, and a very vocal, legally functioning opposition has come into being. During the congressional elections of 1955 the three opposition parties polled over one-third of the total votes cast and were awarded a handful of seats in the new Chamber of Deputies. The absence of armed upheaval is only partly explicable in terms of the economic, social, and political advances of recent years. During and after the election of 1940, there was con- siderable talk of the possibility of rebellion led by General Juan Andreu Almazan. The rebellion never materialized because the prospective rebels knew that they could not win. Cardenas' per- sonal popularity with the people and with the army, as well as the support of the United States for the established government, precluded any chance of a successful rebellion. The United States has exercised a significant role in the maintenance of "Howard F. Cline, "Mexico: A Maturing Democracy," Current History (Mar., 1953), 136-142; Frank Tannenbaum, "Reflections on the Mexican Revolution," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 44. 126 The Caribbean This economic progress of Mexico has added a growing middle class to the agrarian and labor elements already included in the government's broadened base of support. Tremendous strides have been made toward elevating the general level of the popu- lation and toward integrating it into a social whole. Key to this effort has been a greatly expanded educational program, including a strenuous drive to eliminate illiteracy. Although the rapidly growing population has tended to outstrip both the educational effort and the available funds, real progress has been recorded. Political advances have accompanied the economic and social developments. Mexico has been described as a "maturing democ- racy," and there is no question that the prospects for further advances in this direction are encouraging." The government of Mexico is not a tyranny, unresponsive to popular desires. Public criticism is freely exercised and not without some influence. Although the tradition of personal leadership is strong, no Mexi- can leader could try to perpetuate himself in office without stir- ring up the proverbial hornet's nest. Although the official party continues to win at the polls, it has become more representative, and a very vocal, legally functioning opposition has come into being. During the congressional elections of 1955 the three opposition parties polled over one-third of the total votes cast and were awarded a handful of seats in the new Chamber of Deputies. The absence of armed upheaval is only partly explicable in terms of the economic, social, and political advances of recent years. During and after the election of 1940, there was con- siderable talk of the possibility of rebellion led by General Juan Andreu Ahnazdn. The rebellion never materialized because the prospective rebels knew that they could not win. Cardenas' per- sonal popularity with the people and with the army, as well as the support of the United States for the established government, precluded any chance of a successful rebellion. The United States has exercised a significant role in the maintenance of " Howard F. Cline, "Mexico: A Maturing Democracy," Current History (Mar., 1953), 136-142; Frank Tannenbaum, "Reflections on the Mexican Revolution," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 44. 126 The Caribbean This economic progress of Mexico has added a growing middle class to the agrarian and labor elements already included in the government's broadened base of support. Tremendous strides have been made toward elevating the general level of the popu- lation and toward integrating it into a social whole. Key to this effort has been a greatly expanded educational program, including a strenuous drive to eliminate illiteracy. Although the rapidly growing population has tended to outstrip both the educational effort and the available funds, real progress has been recorded. Political advances have accompanied the economic and social developments. Mexico has been described as a "maturing democ- racy," and there is no question that the prospects for further advances in this direction are encouraging." The government of Mexico is not a tyranny, unresponsive to popular desires. Public criticism is freely exercised and not without some influence. Although the tradition of personal leadership is strong, no Mexi- can leader could try to perpetuate himself in office without stir- ring up the proverbial hornet's nest. Although the official party continues to win at the polls, it has become more representative, and a very vocal, legally functioning opposition has come into being. During the congressional elections of 1955 the three opposition parties polled over one-third of the total votes cast and were awarded a handful of seats in the new Chamber of Deputies. The absence of armed upheaval is only partly explicable in terms of the economic, social, and political advances of recent years. During and after the election of 1940, there was con- siderable talk of the possibility of rebellion led by General Juan Andreu Almazin. The rebellion never materialized because the prospective rebels knew that they could not win. Cardenas' per- sonal popularity with the people and with the army, as well as the support of the United States for the established government, precluded any chance of a successful rebellion. The United States has exercised a significant role in the maintenance of " Howard F. Cline, "Mexico: A Maturing Democracy," Current History (Mar., 1953), 136-142; Frank Tannenbaum, "Reflections on the Mexican Revolution," Journal of International Affairs, IX, 1 (1955), 44.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 127 political continuity and the achievement of peace in Mexico. The material assistance to the Mexican government faced with armed rebellion in the 1920's was followed by the admirable exercise of restraint by the Roosevelt administration during the tense situation created in 1938 by the expropriation of foreign petrol- eum holdings. The presence of Vice-President Henry Wallace at the inauguration of the Mexican president in 1940 and the attendance of Vice-President-elect Richard Nixon at the same function in 1952 visibly demonstrated the support of the United States for the established government. A similar effect has been achieved by the exchange of good-will visits by the heads of the two governments. During World War II, representatives of the two countries reached a general accord which paved the way to a settlement of the majority of the outstanding issues, and Ameri- can capital and technical assistance played a major role in the economic development program. It was inevitable that in an era of peace and the development of general stability, economic advance, and social integration the role of the army should diminish. Since 1930 the principle that army units do not belong to the individual commander has been firmly established. Shifts in military command occur frequently and serve to prevent the personalization of military units, to keep a commander from developing roots in a particular locality, and to rotate the desirable assignments. During the past decade mili- tary leaders have not been as prominent in public affairs as heretofore. Civilian candidates triumphed in the last two presi- dential elections. Under current organization there are six mili- tary regions, each subdivided into four zones. When thirty of the ranking officers were assigned to these new commands, only six or seven of their names were familiar to an informed ob- server." There are several exceedingly influential generals, and the army has not been eliminated from the political scene. Its exclusive control and the tone of its participation have changed. The Mexican army remains the principal source of strength of the government, but it is no longer the only element of support. " Interview with Lic. Daniel Coso Villegas, July, 1955. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 127 political continuity and the achievement of peace in Mexico. The material assistance to the Mexican government faced with armed rebellion in the 1920's was followed by the admirable exercise of restraint by the Roosevelt administration during the tense situation created in 1938 by the expropriation of foreign petrol- eum holdings. The presence of Vice-President Henry Wallace at the inauguration of the Mexican president in 1940 and the attendance of Vice-President-elect Richard Nixon at the same function in 1952 visibly demonstrated the support of the United States for the established government. A similar effect has been achieved by the exchange of good-will visits by the heads of the two governments. During World War II, representatives of the two countries reached a general accord which paved the way to a settlement of the majority of the outstanding issues, and Ameri- can capital and technical assistance played a major role in the economic development program. It was inevitable that in an era of peace and the development of general stability, economic advance, and social integration the role of the army should diminish. Since 1930 the principle that army units do not belong to the individual commander has been firmly established. Shifts in military command occur frequently and serve to prevent the personalization of military units, to keep a commander from developing roots in a particular locality, and to rotate the desirable assignments. During the past decade mili- tary leaders have not been as prominent in public affairs as heretofore. Civilian candidates triumphed in the last two presi- dential elections. Under current organization there are six mili- tary regions, each subdivided into four zones. When thirty of the ranking officers were assigned to these new commands, only six or seven of their names were familiar to an informed ob- server." There are several exceedingly influential generals, and the army has not been eliminated from the political scene. Its exclusive control and the tone of its participation have changed. The Mexican army remains the principal source of strength of the government, but it is no longer the only element of support. " Interview with Lic. Daniel Cosio Villegas, July, 1955. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 127 political continuity and the achievement of peace in Mexico. The material assistance to the Mexican government faced with armed rebellion in the 1920's was followed by the admirable exercise of restraint by the Roosevelt administration during the tense situation created in 1938 by the expropriation of foreign petrol- eum holdings. The presence of Vice-President Henry Wallace at the inauguration of the Mexican president in 1940 and the attendance of Vice-President-elect Richard Nixon at the same function in 1952 visibly demonstrated the support of the United States for the established government. A similar effect has been achieved by the exchange of good-will visits by the heads of the two governments. During World War II, representatives of the two countries reached a general accord which paved the way to a settlement of the majority of the outstanding issues, and Ameri- can capital and technical assistance played a major role in the economic development program. It was inevitable that in an era of peace and the development of general stability, economic advance, and social integration the role of the army should diminish. Since 1930 the principle that army units do not belong to the individual commander has been firmly established. Shifts in military command occur frequently and serve to prevent the personalization of military units, to keep a commander from developing roots in a particular locality, and to rotate the desirable assignments. During the past decade mili- tary leaders have not been as prominent in public affairs as heretofore. Civilian candidates triumphed in the last two presi- dential elections. Under current organization there are six mili- tary regions, each subdivided into four zones. When thirty of the ranking officers were assigned to these new commands, only six or seven of their names were familiar to an informed ob- server." There are several exceedingly influential generals, and the army has not been eliminated from the political scene. Its exclusive control and the tone of its participation have changed. The Mexican army remains the principal source of strength of the government, but it is no longer the only element of support. " Interview with Lic. Daniel Cosio Villegas, July, 1955.  128 The Caribbean The system of compulsory military training, introduced during World War II, offered some promise of recreating a more popular army similar to that which had arisen during the Revolution. Although the program did facilitate the anti-illiteracy campaign, only ten per cent of those called actually went to camp as full- time trainees. After the war ended, military training became compulsory for all young men, but is limited to marching and elementary exercises on Sundays." The regular army, therefore, has developed into a somewhat professional establishment, but without the rigid, castelike quality of other times and other countries. With stability achieved, the army receives its pay regularly and on time and is enjoying greater security and improving facili- ties." Unquestionably, difficulties arising from low salaries and limited opportunities for advancement still exist. After the presi- dential election of 1952 there were rumors that the followers of Miguel Henriquez Guzman would cause trouble. The Presidential Guard and other units of the armed forces patrolled the Paseo de la Reforma in a demonstration of readiness and loyalty, and the rumblings were stilled by the reminder of General Cardenas that "it is not with pistols and uprisings that national problems are overcome."" The Mexican army today gives the impression of being an institution dedicated to the maintenance of internal order and defense of the country against external threats. " There is a deeply rooted opposition to compulsory military training in Mexico because of association with the historic method of recruitment, the leva, and the accompanying maltreatment of noncommissioned person- nel. The leva, supposedly suppressed in 1867, was reinstituted during the Diaz regime. From 1914 until June 2, 1942, when Obligatory Military Service was established, a voluntary system prevailed. Since Sept. 28, 1945, actual army service has been voluntary with compulsory training limited to Sunday marching. Felix Fulgencia Palavicini, Mixico: historia de su evolucidn constructiva (Mexico, 1945), II, 223. " On Sept. 1, 1955, President Ruiz Cortines in his third annual mes- sage reported that the armed forces were being accorded salary increases, greater opportunities for professional preparation, and improvements in housing, food, and security, and that in addition to normal services they are cooperating in national health and construction programs. Novedades (Mexico City), Sept. 2, 1955. * Cline, 142. 128 The Caribbean The system of compulsory military training, introduced during World War II, offered some promise of recreating a more popular army similar to that which had arisen during the Revolution. Although the program did facilitate the anti-illiteracy campaign, only ten per cent of those called actually went to camp as full- time trainees. After the war ended, military training became compulsory for all young men, but is limited to marching and elementary exercises on Sundays." The regular army, therefore, has developed into a somewhat professional establishment, but without the rigid, castelike quality of other times and other countries. With stability achieved, the army receives its pay regularly and on time and is enjoying greater security and improving facili- ties." Unquestionably, difficulties arising from low salaries and limited opportunities for advancement still exist. After the presi- dential election of 1952 there were rumors that the followers of Miguel Henriquez Guzmdn would cause trouble. The Presidential Guard and other units of the armed forces patrolled the Paseo de la Reforma in a demonstration of readiness and loyalty, and the rumblings were stilled by the reminder of General Crdenas that "it is not with pistols and uprisings that national problems are overcome."" The Mexican army today gives the impression of being an institution dedicated to the maintenance of internal order and defense of the country against external threats. " There is a deeply rooted opposition to compulsory military training in Mexico because of association with the historic method of recruitment, the leva, and the accompanying maltreatment of noncommissioned person- nel. The leva, supposedly suppressed in 1867, was reinstituted during the Diaz regime. From 1914 until June 2, 1942, when Obligatory Military Service was established, a voluntary system prevailed. Since Sept. 28, 1945, actual army service has been voluntary with compulsory training limited to Sunday marching. Filix Fulgencia Palavicini, Mixico: historia de su evolutidn constructiva (Mxico, 1945), II, 223. On Sept. 1, 1955, President Ruiz Cortines in his third annual mes- sage reported that the armed forces were being accorded salary increases, greater opportunities for professional preparation, and improvements in housing, food, and security, and that in addition to normal services they are cooperating in national health and construction programs. Novedades (Mexico City), Sept. 2, 1955. " Cline, 142. 128 The Caribbean The system of compulsory military training, introduced during World War II, offered some promise of recreating a more popular army similar to that which had arisen during the Revolution. Although the program did facilitate the anti-illiteracy campaign, only ten per cent of those called actually went to camp as full- time trainees. After the war ended, military training became compulsory for all young men, but is limited to marching and elementary exercises on Sundays." The regular army, therefore, has developed into a somewhat professional establishment, but without the rigid, castelike quality of other times and other countries. With stability achieved, the army receives its pay regularly and on time and is enjoying greater security and improving facili- ties." Unquestionably, difficulties arising from low salaries and limited opportunities for advancement still exist. After the presi- dential election of 1952 there were rumors that the followers of Miguel Henriquez Guzman would cause trouble. The Presidential Guard and other units of the armed forces patrolled the Paseo de la Reforma in a demonstration of readiness and loyalty, and the rumblings were stilled by the reminder of General Cirdenas that "it is not with pistols and uprisings that national problems are overcome."" The Mexican army today gives the impression of being an institution dedicated to the maintenance of internal order and defense of the country against external threats. " There is a deeply rooted opposition to compulsory military training in Mexico because of association with the historic method of recruitment, the leva, and the accompanying maltreatment of noncommissioned person- nel. The trea, supposedly suppressed in 1867, was reinstituted during the Diaz regime. From 1914 until June 2, 1942, when Obligatory Military Service was established, a voluntary system prevailed. Since Sept. 28, 1945, actual army service has been voluntary with compulsory training limited to Sunday marching. Filix Fulgencia Palavicini, Mexico: historia de su evolucidon constructiva (Mexico, 1945), II, 223. " On Sept. 1, 1955, President Ruiz Cortines in his third annual mes- sage reported that the armed forces were being accorded salary increases, greater opportunities for professional preparation, and improvements in housing, food, and security, and that in addition to normal services they are cooperating in national health and construction programs. Novedades (Mexico City), Sept. 2, 1955. " Cline, 142.  9 William S. Stokes: NONVIOLENT METHODS OF MOBILIZING POLITICAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN IN A PLURALISTIC CULTURE such as that of the United States, the individual may acquire power, influence, status, and dignity in the community in many ways. Political power, al- though widely coveted, does not constitute the only and probably not even the most important method of acquiring status. Those who lack the skills for playing politics or who have no stomach for the game can develop their potentialities in other fields in the realization that their efforts, if superior, will be rewarded. In Hispanic culture, on the other hand, the avenues to status and influence have traditionally been more narrowly limited. Among the relatively few methods of acquiring status and in- fluence, political power has always ranked high indeed. Politics is supremely important, and people avidly seek political power. The Brazilian scholar Francisco Jose de Oliveira Vianna puts it this way: Among us politics is, above all, a means of life; one lives from the State, as one lives from Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry, and everyone finds it infinitely more sweet to live from the State than from anything else.o Quoted in George C. A. Boehrer, "From Monarchy to Republic: A History of the Republican Party of Brazil, 1870-1889" (Washington: Catholic University of America, Ph.D. diss., 1951), p. 13. 129 William S. Stokes: NONVIOLENT METHODS OF MOBILIZING POLITICAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN IN A PLURALISTIC CULTURE such as that of the United States, the individual may acquire power, influence, status, and dignity in the community in many ways. Political power, al- though widely coveted, does not constitute the only and probably not even the most important method of acquiring status. Those who lack the skills for playing politics or who have no stomach for the game can develop their potentialities in other fields in the realization that their efforts, if superior, will be rewarded. In Hispanic culture, on the other hand, the avenues to status and influence have traditionally been more narrowly limited. Among the relatively few methods of acquiring status and in- fluence, political power has always ranked high indeed. Politics is supremely important, and people avidly seek political power. The Brazilian scholar Francisco Jose de Oliveira Vianna puts it this way: Among us politics is, above all, a means of life; one lives from the State, as one lives from Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry, and everyone finds it infinitely more sweet to live from the State than from anything else.' * Quoted in George C. A. Boehrer, "From Monarchy to Republic: A History of the Republican Party of Brazil, 1870-1889" (Washington: Catholic University of America, Ph.D. diss., 1951), p. 13. 129 William S. Stokes: NONVIOLENT METHODS OF MOBILIZING POLITICAL POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN IN A PLURALISTIC CULTURE such as that of the United States, the individual may acquire power, influence, status, and dignity in the community in many ways. Political power, al- though widely coveted, does not constitute the only and probably not even the most important method of acquiring status. Those who lack the skills for playing politics or who have no stomach for the game can develop their potentialities in other fields in the realization that their elforts, if superior, will be rewarded. In Hispanic culture, on the other hand, the avenues to status and influence have traditionally been more narrowly limited. Among the relatively few methods of acquiring status and in- fluence, political power has always ranked high indeed. Politics is supremely important, and people avidly seek political power. The Brazilian scholar Francisco Jose de Oliveira Vianna puts it this way: Among us politics is, above all, a means of life; one lives from the State, as one lives from Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry, and everyone finds it infinitely more sweet to live from the State than from anything else.' * Quoted in George C. A. Boehrer, "From Monarchy to Republic: A History of the Republican Party of Brazil, 1870-1889" (Washington: Catholic University of America, Ph.D. diss., 1951), p. 13.  130 The Caribbean Francis Herron perceived the significance of politics in Argen- tina in a remarkably sensitive series of commentaries. In one he writes: . . . as I am at last beginning to appreciate, government is important, important beyond anything which North Americans can imagine. Argentine society depends upon governmental pa- ternalism. Government, not individuals or individual enterprise, creates the great utilities of the nation, influences the educational system, and directs the development of the country. Enterprise in the Argentine is something which the people believe must be "fomented" by government.' I. Introduction That many Latin Americans with political power derive not only a living but a very good living from government is seen in the most cursory studies one can make of how public funds are used. In analyzing the Cuban "Revolution," I found evidence that many politicians in the administrations of Ramon Grau San Martin (1944-1948) and Carlos Prio Socorras (1948-1952) had become wealthy in the public service. Dr. Gran was actually indicted in Cuban courts for allegedly misappropriating more than $174,000,000 during his administration. Josd Manuel AlemAn, the Minister of Education, left an estate when he died worth many millions. Former President Prio Socorris' 66-acre estate, "La Chata," located about 15 miles southeast of Havana, would seem to me to be worth several millions at least.' Every study I have seen of the governments of the Mexican Revolution has called attention to callous plundering of the public treasury. Some reports charge that in the administration of Miguel Aleman alone possibly as much as $500,000,000 to $800,000,000 were ' Francis Herron, Letters from the Argentine (New York: G. P. Put- nam's Sons, 1943), pp. 154-155. ' William S. Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution' and the Presidential Elec- tions of 1948," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXI, 1 (Feb., 1951), 41-42, 62, 77. See also, Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary Sys- tem in Action," Journal of Politics (April, 1949), 335-364. 130 The Caribbean 130 The Caribbean Francis Herron perceived the significance of politics in Argen- tina in a remarkably sensitive series of commentaries. In one he writes: . . . as I am at last beginning to appreciate, government is important, important beyond anything which North Americans can imagine. Argentine society depends upon governmental pa- ternalism. Government, not individuals or individual enterprise, creates the great utilities of the nation, influences the educational system, and directs the development of the country. Enterprise in the Argentine is something which the people believe must be "fomented" by government.2 . Introduction That many Latin Americans with political power derive not only a living but a very good living from government is seen in the most cursory studies one can make of how public funds are used. In analyzing the Cuban "Revolution," I found evidence that many politicians in the administrations of Ramon Grau San Martin (1944-1948) and Carlos Prio Socorris (1948-1952) had become wealthy in the public service. Dr. Grau was actually indicted in Cuban courts for allegedly misappropriating more than $174,000,000 during his administration. Jose Manuel AlemAn, the Minister of Education, left an estate when he died worth many millions. Former President Prio Socorris' 66-acre estate, "La Chata," located about 15 miles southeast of Havana, would seem to me to be worth several millions at least.' Every study I have seen of the governments of the Mexican Revolution has called attention to callous plundering of the public treasury. Some reports charge that in the administration of Miguel Aleman alone possibly as much as $500,000,000 to $800,000,000 were ' Francis Herron, Letters from the Argentine (New York: G. P. Put- nam's Sons, 1943), pp. 154-155. ' William S. Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution' and the Presidential Elec- tions of 1948," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXI, 1 (Feb., 1951), 41-42, 62, 77. See also, Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary Sys- tem in Action," Journal of Politics (April, 1949), 335-364. Francis Herron perceived the significance of politics in Argen- tina in a remarkably sensitive series of commentaries. In one he writes: . . . as I am at last beginning to appreciate, government is important, important beyond anything which North Americans can imagine. Argentine society depends upon governmental pa- ternalism. Government, not individuals or individual enterprise, creates the great utilities of the nation, influences the educational system, and directs the development of the country. Enterprise in the Argentine is something which the people believe must be "fomented" by government.' . Introduction That many Latin Americans with political power derive not only a living but a very good living from government is seen in the most cursory studies one can make of how public funds are used. In analyzing the Cuban "Revolution," I found evidence that many politicians in the administrations of Ramon Gras San Martin (1944-1948) and Carlos Prio Socorras (1948-1952) had become wealthy in the public service. Dr. Grau was actually indicted in Cuban courts for allegedly misappropriating more than $174,000,000 during his administration. Jose Manuel Aleman, the Minister of Education, left an estate when he died worth many millions. Former President Prio Socorras' 66-acre estate, "La Chata," located about 15 miles southeast of Havana, would seem to me to be worth several millions at least.' Every study I have seen of the governments of the Mexican Revolution has called attention to callous plundering of the public treasury. Some reports charge that in the administration of Miguel AlemAn alone possibly as much as $500,000,000 to $800,000,000 were ' Francis Herron, Letters from the Argentine (New York: G. P. Put- nam's Sons, 1943), pp. 154-155. ' William S. Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution' and the Presidential Elec- tions of 1948," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXI, 1 (Feb., 1951), 41-42, 62, 77. See also, Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary Sys- tem in Action," Journal of Politics (April, 1949), 335-364.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 131 taken by high-level officials and deposited in United States, Ca- nadian, Swiss, and Cuban banks.' Even in Argentina, and before the days of General Per6n and Evita, Felix Weil writes: From the vantage point of a director of some leading Argentine corporations, though I was never active in Argentine politics and never joined a party, I gained first-hand knowledge of enough corruption among leading personalities in both Radical and Con- servative circles to fill more than this book., If the importance of politics in Hispanic culture can be as- sumed, what are the approved, or at least accepted, methods of mobilizing political power? The intelligent, educated, traveled, cultured, and wealthy members of the upper-middle classes who govern everywhere in Latin America realize as thoroughly as any people on earth that violence is a socially wasteful method of organizing and utilizing political power. Yet, so great is the moral and social value of exercising supreme power in the state that the elitist groups will use or permit the use of assassination, murder, mutilation, and mass destruction of lives and property in their ecstatically excit- ing game of "ins" and "outs." Indeed, violence is a characteristic of Hispanic culture. It is found in all historical periods in Latin America, in the large states and in the small ones, in the advanced countries and in the less-advanced ones. Violence is probably institutionalized in Latin American politics. In my opinion, it derives from the authoritarian conditioning of such institutions as the class system, family, Church, army, latifundia, and the like. If violence is a part of Hispanic culture, the Latin Americanist must be concerned with such forceful methods of mobilizing political power as machetismo, cuartelazo, golpe de * The New York Times (Sept. 19, 1952; Mar. 24, Apr. 9, and Apr. 28, 1953; Mar. 25, 1954). See also the caustic commentary by Mende on official corruption in Mexico: Tibor Mende, Amirica Latina entra en escena (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, S.A., 1953), pp. 268-344. ' Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle (New York: The John Day Company, 1944), p. 61. See also pp. 35-37. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 131 taken by high-level officials and deposited in United States, Ca- nadian, Swiss, and Cuban banks.' Even in Argentina, and before the days of General Per6n and Evita, Felix Weil writes: From the vantage point of a director of some leading Argentine corporations, though I was never active in Argentine politics and never joined a party, I gained first-hand knowledge of enough corruption among leading personalities in both Radical and Con- servative circles to fill more than this book.' If the importance of politics in Hispanic culture can be as- sumed, what are the approved, or at least accepted, methods of mobilizing political power? The intelligent, educated, traveled, cultured, and wealthy members of the upper-middle classes who govern everywhere in Latin America realize as thoroughly as any people on earth that violence is a socially wasteful method of organizing and utilizing political power. Yet, so great is the moral and social value of exercising supreme power in the state that the elitist groups will use or permit the use of assassination, murder, mutilation, and mass destruction of lives and property in their ecstatically excit- ing game of "ins" and "outs." Indeed, violence is a characteristic of Hispanic culture. It is found in all historical periods in Latin America, in the large states and in the small ones, in the advanced countries and in the less-advanced ones. Violence is probably institutionalized in Latin American politics. In my opinion, it derives from the authoritarian conditioning of such institutions as the class system, family, Church, army, latifundia, and the like. If violence is a part of Hispanic culture, the Latin Americanist must be concerned with such forceful methods of mobilizing political power as machetismo, cuartelazo, golpe de ' The New York Times (Sept. 19, 1952; Mar. 24, Apr. 9, and Apr. 28, 1953; Mar. 25, 1954). See also the caustic commentary by Mende on official corruption in Mexico: Tibor Mende, Amdrica Latina entra en escena (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, S.A., 1953), pp. 268-344. Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle (New York: The John Day Company, 1944), p. 61. See also pp. 35-37. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 131 taken by high-level officials and deposited in United States, Ca- nadian, Swiss, and Cuban banks.4 Even in Argentina, and before the days of General Peron and Evita, Felix Weil writes: From the vantage point of a director of some leading Argentine corporations, though I was never active in Argentine politics and never joined a party, I gained first-hand knowledge of enough corruption among leading personalities in both Radical and Con- servative circles to fill more than this book.' If the importance of politics in Hispanic culture can be as- sumed, what are the approved, or at least accepted, methods of mobilizing political power? The intelligent, educated, traveled, cultured, and wealthy members of the upper-middle classes who govern everywhere in Latin America realize as thoroughly as any people on earth that violence is a socially wasteful method of organizing and utilizing political power. Yet, so great is the moral and social value of exercising supreme power in the state that the elitist groups will use or permit the use of assassination, murder, mutilation, and mass destruction of lives and property in their ecstatically excit- ing game of "ins" and "outs." Indeed, violence is a characteristic of Hispanic culture. It is found in all historical periods in Latin America, in the large states and in the small ones, in the advanced countries and in the less-advanced ones. Violence is probably institutionalized in Latin American politics. In my opinion, it derives from the authoritarian conditioning of such institutions as the class system, family, Church, army, latifundia, and the like. If violence is a part of Hispanic culture, the Latin Americanist must be concerned with such forceful methods of mobilizing political power as machetismo, cuartelazo, golpe de ' The New York Times (Sept. 19, 1952; Mar. 24, Apr. 9, and Apr. 28, 1953; Mar. 25, 1954). See also the caustic commentary by Mende on official corruption in Mexico: Tibor Mende, Amdrica Latina entra en escena (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, S.A., 1953), pp. 268-344. ' Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle (New York: The John Day Company, 1944), p. 61. See also pp. 35-37.  132 The Caribbean estado, and revolution.' On the other hand, many students of Latin American affairs refuse to link violence to Hispanic culture in the way I have done. Some writers conclude that modern-day violence is rooted in economic distress of the masses,' whereas others, like my good friend Harold Davis, seem to regard violence in politics as a temporary and passing phenomenon in a rapidly changing cultural context.' Asher Christensen insists that ". . . the desire for a politically responsible government is as great in Latin America as it is elsewhere."' Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, supports this point of view when he stated in 1950: . in spite of certain contrary practices in the internal poli- tics of some American states, not a single one of them has in all its history repudiated the juridical concept of representative democracy.10 From chapters in volume under preparation, "The Nature of Power in Latin American Politics" and Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Politicat Quarterly, V, 3 (Sept., 1952), 445-468; "Violence-the South American Way," United Nations World, V, 12 (Dec., 1951), 51-54; "National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (Sept., 1953), 57-63. Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Jan., 1949), 274-288. ' Harold E. Davis, "The Political Experience of Latin America and Its Changing Cultural Context" (Paper, American Political Science Associa- tion Convention, Chicago, 1954). * Asher N. Christensen, "Government in Latin America," Current His- tory (March, 1953), 131. * Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Organization of Ameri- can States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1950 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1950), p. 3. See also Josi Vasconcelos, Bolivarismo y monroismo (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Ercilla, 1937), p. 57, and Josi Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio, Aspects of Mexican Civilization (Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 45-55. Lizaso contends that the Cuban citizenry has always been opposed to dictatorship. Felix Lizaso, Panorama de la cultura cubana (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econimica, 1949), p. 136. After recent experience in Brazil, Walker states, "Present day Brazil has passed successfully through the temporary stage of dictator- ship to emerge in the full light of democracy." Harvey Walker, "Brazil in Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," The Torch (Oct., 1954), 6-7. Of course, many Latin Americans are not so sanguine. See, for 132 The Caribbean 132 The Caribbean estado, and revolution." On the other hand, many students of Latin American affairs refuse to link violence to Hispanic culture in the way I have done. Some writers conclude that modern-day violence is rooted in economic distress of the masses,' whereas others, like my good friend Harold Davis, seem to regard violence in politics as a temporary and passing phenomenon in a rapidly changing cultural context.' Asher Christensen insists that ". . . the desire for a politically responsible government is as great in Latin America as it is elsewhere."' Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, supports this point of view when he stated in 1950: . in spite of certain contrary practices in the internal poli- tics of some American states, not a single one of them has in all its history repudiated the juridical concept of representative democracy."o From chapters in volume under preparation, "The Nature of Power in Latin American Politics" and Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (Sept., 1952), 445-468; "Violence-the South American Way," United Nations World, V, 12 (Dec., 1951), 51-54; "National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (Sept., 1953), 57-63. ' Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Jan., 1949), 274-288. * Harold E. Davis, "The Political Experience of Latin America and Its Changing Cultural Context" (Paper, American Political Science Associa- tion Convention, Chicago, 1954). " Asher N. Christensen, "Government in Latin America," Current His- tory (March, 1953), 131. " Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Organization of Ameri- can States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1950 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1950), p. 3. See also Jose Vasconcelos, Bolivarismo y monroismo (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Ercilla, 1937), p. 57, and Jose Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio, Aspects of Mexican Civilization (Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 45-55. Lizaso contends that the Cuban citizenry has always been opposed to dictatorship. F6ix Lizaso, Panorama de la cultura cubana (Mixico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1949), p. 136. After recent experience in Brazil, Walker states, "Present day Brazil has passed successfully through the temporary stage of dictator- ship to emerge in the full light of democracy." Harvey Walker, "Brazil in Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," The Torch (Oct., 1954), 6-7. Of course, many Latin Americans are not so sanguine. See, for estado, and revolution.t On the other hand, many students of Latin American affairs refuse to link violence to Hispanic culture in the way I have done. Some writers conclude that modern-day violence is rooted in economic distress of the masses,' whereas others, like my good friend Harold Davis, seem to regard violence in politics as a temporary and passing phenomenon in a rapidly changing cultural context.t Asher Christensen insists that ". . . the desire for a politically responsible government is as great in Latin America as it is elsewhere." Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, supports this point of view when he stated in 1950: . in spite of certain contrary practices in the internal poli- tics of some American states, not a single one of them has in all its history repudiated the juridical concept of representative democracy.0 s From chapters in volume under preparation, "The Nature of Power in Latin American Politics" and Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V, 3 (Sept., 1952), 445-468; "Violence-the South American Way," United Nations World, V, 12 (Dec., 1951), 51-54; "National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (Sept., 1953), 57-63. ' Donald Marquand Dozer, "Roots of Revolution in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Jan., 1949), 274-288. Harold E. Davis, "The Political Experience of Latin America and Its Changing Cultural Context" (Paper, American Political Science Associa- tion Convention, Chicago, 1954). Asher N. Christensen, "Government in Latin America," Current His- tory (March, 1953), 131. a* Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Organization of Ameri- can States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1950 (Washington: Pan American Union, 1950), p. 3. See also Josi Vasconcelos, Bolivarismo v monroismo (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Ercilla, 1937), p. 57, and Josi Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio, Aspects of Mexican Civilization (Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 45-55. Lizaso contends that the Cuban citizenry has always been opposed to dictatorship. Felix Lizaso, Panorama de la cultura cubana (Mixico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1949), p. 136. After recent experience in Brazil, Walker states, "Present day Brazil has passed successfully through the temporary stage of dictator- ship to emerge in the full light of democracy." Harvey Walker, "Brazil in Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," The Torch (Oct, 1954), 6-7. Of course, many Latin Americans are not so sanguine. See, for  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 133 Authoritarian governments themselves commonly produce the most impassioned protestations of democracy. The President of the Electoral Commission in Cuba, for example, declared in 1953 (after General Batista had seized power by force in March, 1952): General Batista and his Government, inspired by an unshak- able democratic line, desire that the Cuban public should decide its problems through the exercise of universal suffrage in free elections, and they have done and will do whatever is necessary to achieve that goal." However, despite this evidence and much more that could be produced, the profound value of violence in Latin American politics is demonstrated by its continued widespread use. On the other hand, every Latin Americanist knows that non- violent methods of mobilizing political power, such as imposicidn,; candidato dnico, continuismo, and election, are also in continual use. Violence is widely understood and, I think, widely approved in most of the Latin American countries. However, even when a great caudillo (whether he be "doctor" or "general" or both) has acquired power by force and has eliminated all opposition, the evidence shows that he usually is not yet completely happy. The political ingredient that is lacking is legitimacy. With the great popularity of the values of the liberal-democratic state in the recent centuries of Western Civilization, legitimacy has come uncompromisingly to be associated with such methods of organiz- ing and changing political power as elections, plebiscites, refer- enda, and the like. Although a tradition of hundreds of years example, Francisco Garcia Calderdn, "Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Apr., 1925), or Genaro M. Gonzilez, Apuntes sobre doctrina politica de to constitucidn mexicana (M6xico: Editorial Jus, 1947), 233 pp., passim. There are, of course, classic works by Jos6 Ingenieros, Juan Agustin Garcia, C. O. Bunge, Agustin Alvarez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Sarmiento, Alcides Arguedas, and others which supply evidence in support of the author's position. " Justo Luis Pozo y del Puerto, in a letter to The New York Ties (Dec. 9, 1953). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES Authoritarian governments themselves commonly produc most impassioned protestations of democracy. The Preside the Electoral Commission in Cuba, for example, declar< 1953 (after General Batista had seized power by force in M 1952): General Batista and his Government, inspired by an ur able democratic line, desire that the Cuban public should c its problems through the exercise of universal suffrage it elections, and they have done and will do whatever is nec< to achieve that goal." However, despite this evidence and much more that cou produced, the profound value of violence in Latin Amt politics is demonstrated by its continued widespread use. On the other hand, every Latin Americanist knows that violent methods of mobilizing political power, such as impos candidato snico, continuismo, and election, are also in coni use. Violence is widely understood and, I think, widely app in most of the Latin American countries. However, even a great caudillo (whether he be "doctor" or "general" or 1 has acquired power by force and has eliminated all oppos the evidence shows that he usually is not yet completely h The political ingredient that is lacking is legitimacy. Wit great popularity of the values of the liberal-democratic stt the recent centuries of Western Civilization, legitimacy has uncompromisingly to be associated with such methods of or ing and changing political power as elections, plebiscites, enda, and the like. Although a tradition of hundreds of example, Francisco Garcia Calderin, "Dictatorship and Democre Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Apr., 1925), or Genaro M. Go Apuntes sobre doctrina politica de la constitucian mexicana (M Editorial Jus, 1947), 233 pp., passim. There are, of course, works by Jose Ingenieros, Juan Agustin Garcia, C. O. Bunge, A Alvarez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Sarmiento, Alcides Argaeda others which supply evidence in support of the author's position. " Justo Luis Pozo y del Puerto, in a letter to The New York (Dec. 9, 1953). 133 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 133 Authoritarian governments themselves commonly produce the most impassioned protestations of democracy. The President of the Electoral Commission in Cuba, for example, declared in 1953 (after General Batista had seized power by force in March, 1952): General Batista and his Government, inspired by an unshak- able democratic line, desire that the Cuban public should decide its problems through the exercise of universal suffrage in free elections, and they have done and will do whatever is necessary to achieve that goal." However, despite this evidence and much more that could be produced, the profound value of violence in Latin American politics is demonstrated by its continued widespread use. On the other hand, every Latin Americanist knows that non- violent methods of mobilizing political power, such as imposicidn, candidato snico, continuismo, and election, are also in continual use. Violence is widely understood and, I think, widely approved in most of the Latin American countries. However, even when a great caudillo (whether he be "doctor" or "general" or both) las acquired power by force and has eliminated all opposition, the evidence shows that he usually is not yet completely happy. The political ingredient that is lacking is legitimacy. With the great popularity of the values of the liberal-democratic state in the recent centuries of Western Civilization, legitimacy has come uncompromisingly to be associated with such methods of organiz- ing and changing political power as elections, plebiscites, refer- enda, and the like. Although a tradition of hundreds of years example, Francisco Garcia Calderin, "Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America," Foreign Affairs (Apr., 1925), or Genaro M. Gonzslez, Apuntes sobre doctrina politica de Ia constituci6n mexicana (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1947), 233 pp., passim. There are, of course, classic works by Josf Ingenieros, Juan Agustin Garcia, C. O. Bunge, Agustin Alvarez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Sarmienom, Alcides Argiiedas, and others which supply evidence in support of the author's position. Justo Luis Pozo y del Puerto, in a letter to The New York Times (Dec. 9, 1953).  134 The Caribbean of monarchy without the detailed psychological and institutional preparation" was required to make the newer techniques function properly, Latin American leadership hungrily seeks the fagade of democratic methods in order to acquire the comforting badge of legitimacy which their employment offers. II. Imposicidn Imposicidn is a nominally peaceful method of organizing power in which the dominant political element in the state hand-picks a candidate or slate of candidates and then rigs the election to guarantee victory. Its major principle is the presupposition of success for the privileged candidate. That being the case, the opposition must never become convinced that an imposicidn is operating, because then there logically is no further premium in maintaining peace, and force is likely to result. The conditions under which imposicidn enjoys maximum possibilities for develop- ment include: (1) the existence of a caudillo of such stature, power, and personal popularity that no opposition dares stand against him; (2) a well-organized, permanent political party which overshadows all other political groupings in the state; (3) a government firmly in power; (4) active, long-time participation of the armed forces in national politics; (5) the principal parties or major elements of political strength in the country in agree- ment on the same candidate for supreme power. As we will see, sometimes only one, sometimes several, or a combination of these factors of feasibility may exist in a country when imposicidon is " I have already argued, without taking time in this paper to produce the evidence, that Hispanic political psychology is conditioned more by authoritarian social and economic institutions than by a democratic am- biente. The local governmental institutions of Spanish America are regarded as the nearest approximation to training in political democracy one can find in the Colonial period, yet the cabildos were more aristo- cratic than democratic. Positions were purchased and inherited. Even the cabildo abierto was not really open to the public. Only the important citizens were invited to attend and participate in the deliberations. See Constantino Bayle, Los cabildos seculares en la Amirica Espanola (Ma- drid: Sapientia, S. A. de Ediciones, 1952), 814 pp., passim. 134 The Caribbean 134 The Caribbean of monarchy without the detailed psychological and institutional preparation" was required to make the newer techniques function properly, Latin American leadership hungrily seeks the fagade of democratic methods in order to acquire the comforting badge of legitimacy which their employment offers. I. Imposicidon Imposicidn is a nominally peaceful method of organizing power in which the dominant political element in the state hand-picks a candidate or slate of candidates and then rigs the election to guarantee victory. Its major principle is the presupposition of success for the privileged candidate. That being the case, the opposition must never become convinced that an imposicidn is operating, because then there logically is no further premium in maintaining peace, and force is likely to result. The conditions under which imposicidon enjoys maximum possibilities for develop- ment include: (1) the existence of a caudillo of such stature, power, and personal popularity that no opposition dares stand against him; (2) a well-organized, permanent political party which overshadows all other political groupings in the state; (3) a government firmly in power; (4) active, long-time participation of the armed forces in national politics; (5) the principal parties or major elements of political strength in the country in agree- ment on the same candidate for supreme power. As we will see, sometimes only one, sometimes several, or a combination of these factors of feasibility may exist in a country when imposicidon is 1 I have already argued, without taking time in this paper to produce the evidence, that Hispanic political psychology is conditioned more by authoritarian social and economic institutions than by a democratic am- biente. The local governmental institutions of Spanish America are regarded as the nearest approximation to training in political democracy one can find in the Colonial period, yet the cabildos were more aristo- cratic than democratic. Positions were purchased and inherited. Even the cabildo abierto was not really open to the public. Only the important citizens were invited to attend and participate in the deliberations. See Constantino Boyle, Los cabildos seculares en la Amrica Espanola (Ma- drid: Sapientia, S. A. de Edicions, 1952), 814 pp., passim. of monarchy without the detailed psychological and institutional preparation" was required to make the newer techniques function properly, Latin American leadership hungrily seeks the fagade of democratic methods in order to acquire the comforting badge of legitimacy which their employment offers. II. Imposicidn Imposicidn is a nominally peaceful method of organizing power in which the dominant political element in the state hand-picks a candidate or slate of candidates and then rigs the election to guarantee victory. Its major principle is the presupposition of success for the privileged candidate. That being the case, the opposition must never become convinced that an imposicion is operating, because then there logically is no further premium in maintaining peace, and force is likely to result. The conditions under which imposicidon enjoys maximum possibilities for develop- ment include: (1) the existence of a caudillo of such stature, power, and personal popularity that no opposition dares stand against him; (2) a well-organized, permanent political party which overshadows all other political groupings in the state; (3) a government firmly in power; (4) active, long-time participation of the armed forces in national politics; (5) the principal parties or major elements of political strength in the country in agree- ment on the same candidate for supreme power. As we will see, sometimes only one, sometimes several, or a combination of these factors of feasibility may exist in a country when imposicidn is " I have already argued, without taking time in this paper to produce the evidence, that Hispanic political psychology is conditioned more by authoritarian social and economic institutions than by a democratic am- biente. The local governmental institutions of Spanish America are regarded as the nearest approximation to training in political democracy one can find in the Colonial period, yet the cabildos were more aristo- cratic than democratic. Positions were purchased and inherited. Even the cabildo abierto was not really open to the public. Only the important citizens were invited to attend and participate in the deliberations. See Constantino Bayle, Los cabildos seculares en la Ammica Espanola (Ma- drid: Sapientia, S. A. de Ediciones, 1952), 814 pp., passim.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 135 attempted. Even under the most favorable conditions, however, imposicidn is exceedingly difficult to exploit, and only the most mature, prepared, and experienced individuals or groups have been able to utilize it successfully. A firmly established, confident government can, of course, openly announce support for a particular candidate and success- fully carry through a campaign. This is especially true when an institutional party exists and there is an amicable relationship or at least a modus vivendi established with one additional im- portant source of political power, such as the army. Mexico in the past several decades provides an excellent case study of the use of imposicion under such favorable circumstances. Robert Scott quotes Emilio Portes Gil, former president of Mexico, president of the official party at one time, and governor of a state as saying: The group or party that has succeeded in placing itself in power feels the need-the debt, I will say-of leaving a replace- ment who will continue to carry out the program begun. . No government in Mexico, all through our political history, has failed to intervene in favor of one of the candidates for power; much less has it omitted any action to obtain the victory of the party that it considers as its continuation. This is perfectly moral, and there is nothing censorable in it. . . . In 1954 General Abelardo Rodriguez, speaking in the presence of President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and most of the cabinet and leaders of the official party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario In- stitutional), said: To speak honestly, it is only fair to point out that one of the basic postulates of the revolution has not been fully realized; the full and total realization of free voting in elections." " Emilio Portes Gil, Quince anos de politica mexicana (Mexico: Edi- ciones Botas, 1941), pp. 215-216, in Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism 1917-1948" (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1949), p. 153. " The New York Times (July 22, 1954). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 135 attempted. Even under the most favorable conditions, however, imposicion is exceedingly difficult to exploit, and only the most mature, prepared, and experienced individuals or groups have been able to utilize it successfully. A firmly established, confident government can, of course, openly announce support for a particular candidate and success- fully carry through a campaign. This is especially true when an institutional party exists and there is an amicable relationship or at least a modus vivendi established with one additional im- portant source of political power, such as the army. Mexico in the past several decades provides an excellent case study of the use of imposicidn under such favorable circumstances. Robert Scott quotes Emilio Portes Gil, former president of Mexico, president of the official party at one time, and governor of a state as saying: The group or party that has succeeded in placing itself in power feels the need-the debt, I will say-of leaving a replace- ment who will continue to carry out the program begun. . No government in Mexico, all through our political history, has failed to intervene in favor of one of the candidates for power; much less has it omitted any action to obtain the victory of the party that it considers as its continuation. This is perfectly moral, and there is nothing censorable in it. . . .la In 1954 General Abelardo Rodriguez, speaking in the presence of President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and most of the cabinet and leaders of the official party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario In- stitutional), said: To speak honestly, it is only fair to point out that one of the basic postulates of the revolution has not been fully realized; the full and total realization of free voting in elections. " Emilio Portes Gil, Quince anos de politica mexicana (Mixico: Edi- ciones Botas, 1941), pp. 215-216, in Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism 1917-1948" (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1949), p. 153. " The New York Times (July 22, 1954). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 135 attempted. Even under the most favorable conditions, however, imposicion is exceedingly difficult to exploit, and only the most mature, prepared, and experienced individuals or groups have been able to utilize it successfully. A firmly established, confident government can, of course, openly announce support for a particular candidate and success- fully carry through a campaign. This is especially true when an institutional party exists and there is an amicable relationship or at least a modus vivendi established with one additional im- portant source of political power, such as the army. Mexico in the past several decades provides an excellent case study of the use of imposicidn under such favorable circumstances. Robert Scott quotes Emilio Portes Gil, former president of Mexico, president of the official party at one time, and governor of a state as saying: The group or party that has succeeded in placing itself in power feels the need-the debt, I will say-of leaving a replace- ment who will continue to carry out the program begun. . No government in Mexico, all through our political history, has failed to intervene in favor of one of the candidates for power; much less has it omitted any action to obtain the victory of the party that it considers as its continuation. This is perfectly moral, and there is nothing censorable in it. . . .1 In 1954 General Abelardo Rodriguez, speaking in the presence of President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and most of the cabinet and leaders of the official party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario In- stitutional), said: To speak honestly, it is only fair to point out that one of the basic postulates of the revolution has not been fully realized; the full and total realization of free voting in elections." " Emilio Portes Gil, Quince aos de politica mexicana (Mdxico: Edi- ciones Botas, 1941), pp. 215-216, in Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism 1917-1948" (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1949), p. 153. " The New York Times (July 22, 1954).  136 The Caribbean 136 The Caribbean Others who have studied Mexican politics since the Revolution of 1910-1911 have called attention to the clear use of imposicion by the government." Long experience has made Mexican poli- ticians and the politically conscious citizenry exceptionally sensi- tive to fraud, and an imposicion has to be very ably executed to forestall violence. In Mexico, every change in power from the fall of Diaz to the imposicidn of General Manuel Avila Camacho in 1940 was followed by armed revolt. On the other hand, the technique of the imposicidn has been so perfected in Mexico in recent elections that only threats of violence have come from disgruntled office seekers. In Mexico where the institutional party (PRI) has strong alliances with the army and a monolithic labor organization, the most important fact of a politician's life is his relationship with the jefe supremo and the government party. He seeks merit in the eyes of those who have power and who will select the office- holders for the next constitutional term. He does not try, there- fore, to appeal directly to the electorate. Mexico's system of imposicidn consequently makes possible acquisition of the presi- dency by relatively obscure figures, such as the incumbent, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. * Probably the most brilliant and penetrating analysis of modern Mexi- can politics in English is Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); see pp. 81-101. In addition, see Mende, pp. 268-344; Eugene Maur Braderman, "A Study of Political Parties and Politics in Mexico Since 1890" (University of Illinois, Ph.D. diss., 1938), passim; Toribio Esquivel Obreg6n, Mi labor en servicio de Mixico partido antire- eleccionista (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1934), passim; Luis Cabrera, Veinte anos despues. El balance de la revolucin. La campana presi- dencial de 1934 (Mexico: Ediciones Betas, 1938), passim; Lucio Mendieta y N6iez, Los partidos politicos (Mexico: Logos, Gaceta Biblio-Cultural, 1947), passim; William Cameron Townsend, Ldzaro Cdrdenas: Mexican Democrat (Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1952), 379 pp., passim; Alberto J. Pani, Una encuesta sobre la cuestidn democrdtica de Mexico (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1948), passim; Ramn Beteta, Pensamiento y dindmica de ia revolucidn mexicana (Mexico: Editorial Mexico Nuevo, 1950), 579 pp., passim; Shirley E. Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election of 1940 as Seen Through the Press of the Capital" (Columbia University, M.A. thesis, 1948), passim; Alberto G. Salceda, "La eleecidn del presi- dente de la rep6blica," Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de Mexico (abril-junio, 1952), 35-52. Others who have studied Mexican politics since the Revolution of 1910-1911 have called attention to the clear use of imposicion by the government." Long experience has made Mexican poli- ticians and the politically conscious citizenry exceptionally sensi- tive to fraud, and an imposicidn has to be very ably executed to forestall violence. In Mexico, every change in power from the fall of Diaz to the imposicidn of General Manuel Avila Camacho in 1940 was followed by armed revolt. On the other hand, the technique of the imposicidn has been so perfected in Mexico in recent elections that only threats of violence have come from disgruntled office seekers. In Mexico where the institutional party (PRI) has strong alliances with the army and a monolithic labor organization, the most important fact of a politician's life is his relationship with the jefe supremo and the government party. He seeks merit in the eyes of those who have power and who will select the office- holders for the next constitutional term. He does not try, there- fore, to appeal directly to the electorate. Mexico's system of imposicidn consequently makes possible acquisition of the presi- dency by relatively obscure figures, such as the incumbent, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. " Probably the most brilliant and penetrating analysis of modern Mexi- can politics in English is Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); see pp. 81-101. In addition, see Mende, pp. 268-344; Eugene Maur Braderman, "A Study of Political Parties and Politics in Mexico Since 1890" (University of Illinois, Ph.D. diss., 1938), passim; Toribio Esquivel Obreg6n, Mi labor en servicio de Mexico partido antire- eleccionista (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1934), passim; Luis Cabrera, Veinte anos despues. El balance de la revolucion. La campana presi- dencial de 1934 (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1938), passim; Lucis Mendieta y Ninez, Los partidos politicos (Mexico: Logos, Gaceta Biblio-Cultural, 1947), passim; William Cameron Townsend, Ldzaro Cdrdenas: Mexican Democrat (Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1952), 379 pp., passim; Alberto J. Pani, Una encuesta sobre la cuestian democratica de Mexico (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1948), passim; Ramin Berets, Pensamiento y dindmica de to revolucin mexicana (Mexico: Editorial Mexico Nuevo, 1950), 579 pp., passim; Shirley E. Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election of 1940 as Seen Through the Press of the Capital" (Columbia University, M.A. thesis, 1948), passim; Alberto G. Salceda, "La eleccion del presi- dente de la rephblica," Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de Mexico (abril-junio, 1952), 35-52. 136 The Caribbean Others who have studied Mexican politics since the Revolution of 1910-1911 have called attention to the clear use of imposicion by the government." Long experience has made Mexican poli- ticians and the politically conscious citizenry exceptionally sensi- tive to fraud, and an imposicion has to be very ably executed to forestall violence. In Mexico, every change in power from the fall of Diaz to the imposicidn of General Manuel Avila Camacho in 1940 was followed by armed revolt. On the other hand, the technique of the imposicion has been so perfected in Mexico in recent elections that only threats of violence have come from disgruntled office seekers. In Mexico where the institutional party (PRI) has strong alliances with the army and a monolithic labor organization, the most important fact of a politician's life is his relationship with the jefe supremo and the government party. He seeks merit in the eyes of those who have power and who will select the office- holders for the next constitutional term. He does not try, there- fore, to appeal directly to the electorate. Mexico's system of imposicion consequently makes possible acquisition of the presi- dency by relatively obscure figures, such as the incumbent, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. " Probably the most brilliant and penetrating analysis of modern Mexi- can politics in English is Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); see pp. 81-101. In addition, see Mende, pp. 268-344; Eugene Maur Braderman, "A Study of Political Parties and Politics in Mexico Since 1890" (University of Illinois, Ph.D. diss., 1938), passim; Toribio Esquivel Obreg6n, Mi labor en servicio de Mxico partido antire- eleccionista (Mexico: Ediciones Boras, 1934), passim; Luis Cabrera, Veinte anos despues. El balance de la revolucin. La campana presi- dencial de 1934 (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1938), passim; Lucio Mendieta y Niez, Los partidos polfticos (Mexico: Logos, Gaceta Biblio-Cultural, 1947), passim; William Cameron Townsend, Ldzaro Cardenas: Mexican Democrat (Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1952), 379 pp., passim; Alberto J. Pani, Una encuesta sobre la cuestidn democrdtica de Mixico (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1948), passim; Ramin Beteta, Pensamiento y dindmica de la revolucin mexicana (Mexico: Editorial Mexico Nuevo, 1950), 579 pp., passim; Shirley E. Stone, "The Mexican Presidential Election of 1940 as Seen Through the Press of the Capital" (Columbia University, M.A. thesis, 1948), passim; Alberto G. Salceda, "La eleccidc del presi- dente de la rep6blica," Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de Mexico (abril-junio, 1952), 35-52.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 137 In the politics of the Mexican imposicion, therefore, politicians ambitious for supreme power maneuver within the governing party, seeking support and currying favor from those with influ- ence with the president who will make the final decision as to his successor. It is customary for a prominent politician, who has failed to be designated, to leave the party and form an opposition group. This is what General Miguel Henriquez Guzmin did in the most recent imposicion, that of 1952. He resented the fact that former President Miguel Aleman picked Ruiz Cortines. General Henriquez Guzman campaigned with his Federation of Peoples Party. When he inevitably lost, which is implicit in any imposicidn, by custom he should have either (1) offered his support to the PRI, or (2) quietly permitted his party to fade out of existence. When he did neither and the party continued to show some possibility of a threat to the government of the Revolution, the government logically banned it early in 1954.16 Where a government has complete power, little or no opposi- tion, and is confident, it feels free to take for itself almost all the votes for the presidency in an imposicion and almost 100 per cent of all the other elective posts as well. This is shown in figures Cline cites from Tiempo of the results of Mexican elections from 1917-1952:" REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 137 In the politics of the Mexican imposicion, therefore, politicians ambitious for supreme power maneuver within the governing party, seeking support and currying favor from those with influ- ence with the president who will make the final decision as to his successor. It is customary for a prominent politician, who has failed to be designated, to leave the party and form an opposition group. This is what General Miguel Henriquez Guzmin did in the most recent imposicidn, that of 1952. He resented the fact that former President Miguel Aleman picked Ruiz Cortines. General Henriquez Guzmin campaigned with his Federation of Peoples Party. When he inevitably lost, which is implicit in any imposicion, by custom he should have either (1) offered his support to the PRI, or (2) quietly permitted his party to fade out of existence. When he did neither and the party continued to show some possibility of a threat to the government of the Revolution, the government logically banned it early in 1954." Where a government has complete power, little or no opposi- tion, and is confident, it feels free to take for itself almost all the votes for the presidency in an imposicion and almost 100 per cent of all the other elective posts as well. This is shown in figures Cline cites from Tiempo of the results of Mexican elections from 1917-1952:" REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 137 In the politics of the Mexican imposicion, therefore, politicians ambitious for supreme power maneuver within the governing party, seeking support and currying favor from those with influ- ence with the president who will make the final decision as to his successor. It is customary for a prominent politician, who has failed to be designated, to leave the party and form an opposition group. This is what General Miguel Henriquez Guzmin did in the most recent imposicidn, that of 1952. He resented the fact that former President Miguel AlemAn picked Ruiz Cortines. General Henriquez Guzmin campaigned with his Federation of Peoples Party. When he inevitably lost, which is implicit in any imposicion, by custom he should have either (1) offered his support to the PRI, or (2) quietly permitted his party to fade out of existence. When he did neither and the party continued to show some possibility of a threat to the government of the Revolution, the government logically banned it early in 1954." Where a government has complete power, little or no opposi- tion, and is confident, it feels free to take for itself almost all the votes for the presidency in an imposicidn and almost 100 per cent of all the other elective posts as well. This is shown in figures Cline cites from Tiempo of the results of Mexican elections from 1917-1952:7 1917 Venustiano Carranza Pablo Gonzalez Alvaro Obregtn 1920 Alvaro Obregtn Alfredo Robles Dominguez 1924 Plutarco Elias Calles Angel Flores 1929 Pascual Ortiz Rubio Jose Vasconcelos Pedro V. Rodriguez Triana 797,305 11,615 4,008 1,131,751 47,442 1,340,634 250,599 1,948,848 110,949 23,279 1917 Venustiano Carranza Pablo Gonzalez Alvaro Obreg6n 1920 Alvaro Obregn Alfredo Robles Dominguez 1924 Plutarco Elias Calles Angel Flores 1929 Pascual Ortiz Rubio Jose Vasconcelos Pedro V. Rodriguez Triana 797,305 11,615 4,008 1,131,751 47,442 1,340,634 250,599 1,948,848 110,949 23,279 1917 Venustiano Carranza Pablo Gonzalez Alvaro Obregn 1920 Alvaro Obregbn Alfredo Robles Dominguez 1924 Plutarco Elias Calles Angel Flores 1929 Pascual Ortiz Rubio Jose Vasconcelos Pedro V. Rodriguez Triana 797,305 11,615 4,008 1,131,751 47,442 1,340,634 250,599 1,948,848 110,949 23,279 " See The New York Times (June 5 and Sept. 13, 1952; Mar. 6, 1953; Feb. 10, Mar. 13, and Nov. 1, 1954); El Universal (Caracas, Aug. 14, 1955). " Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1953), p. 417. " See The New York Times (June 5 and Sept. 13, 1952; Mar. 6, 1953; Feb. 10, Mar. 13, and Nov. 1, 1954); El Universal (Caracas, Aug. 14, 1955). " Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1953), p. 417. a See The New York Times (June 5 and Sept. 13, 1952; Mar. 6, 1953; Feb. 10, Mar. 13, and Nov. 1, 1954); El Universal (Caracas, Aug. 14, 1955). " Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, 1953), p. 417.  138 1934 LAzaro Cardenas Antonio I. Villareal Adalberto Tejeda Hernin Laborde 1940 Manuel Avila Camacho Juan Andreu Almazin Rafael SAnchez Tapia 1946 Miguel Aleman Ezequiel Padilla J. Agustin Castro Carlos I. Calder6n 1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines Miguel Henriquez GuzmAn Efrain Gonzilez Luna Vicente Lombardo Toledano The Caribbean 2,225,000 24,395 16,037 539 2,176,641 151,101 9,840 1,786,901 443,357 28,537 1,181 2,713,419 579,745 285,555 72,482 138 1934 Ldzaro CArdenas Antonio I. Villareal Adalberto Tejeda Hernin Laborde 1940 Manuel Avila Camacho Juan Andreu Almazdn Rafael SAnchez Tapia 1946 Miguel Aleman Ezequiel Padilla J. Agustin Castro Carlos I. Calder6n 1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines Miguel Henriquez GuzmAn Efrain GonzAlez Luna Vicente Lombardo Toledano The Caribbean 2,225,000 24,395 16,037 539 2,176,641 151,101 9,840 1,786,901 443,357 28,537 1,181 2,713,419 579,745 285,555 72,482 138 The Caribbean The confident government of President Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala organized a blunt imposicion for October 10, 1954, in which 66 deputies to a Constituent Assembly would be chosen and a plebiscite held to determine whether he should continue in power. The National Anti-Communist Front of Castillo Armas had thoughtfully eliminated the leadership of the groups of the old communist-dominated government of President Arbenz. The procedure for the plebiscite of October 10 is described in this way: Each voter stepped before the election board and stated orally whether or not he favored continuing Castillo Armas in power. His answer was written down in the election book and he was required to sign his name after the "si" or "no."r The final returns showed 485,531 votes to 393 to continue President Castillo Armas in power. The government also won 20 of the 22 provinces in the election of delegates to the Constituent Assembly." Other, almost classic, illustrations of the imposicidn in one- party states in recent years can be seen in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. President Anastasio Somoza, with absolute * This is the report of Cyril Allen, writing from Guatemala City, Dec. 27, 1954. See The New York Times (Jan. 5, 1954). " The New York Times (Oct. 26, 1954). The confident government of President Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala organized a blunt imposicion for October 10, 1954, in which 66 deputies to a Constituent Assembly would be chosen and a plebiscite held to determine whether he should continue in power. The National Anti-Communist Front of Castillo Armas had thoughtfully eliminated the leadership of the groups of the old communist-dominated government of President Arbenz. The procedure for the plebiscite of October 10 is described in this way: Each voter stepped before the election board and stated orally whether or not he favored continuing Castillo Armas in power. His answer was written down in the election book and he was required to sign his name after the "si" or "no.", The final returns showed 485,531 votes to 393 to continue President Castillo Armas in power. The government also won 20 of the 22 provinces in the election of delegates to the Constituent Assembly." Other, alost classic, illustrations of the imposicion in one- party states in recent years can be seen in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. President Anastasio Somoza, with absolute * This is the report of Cyril Allen, writing from Guatemala City, Dec. 27, 1954. See The New York Times (Jan. 5, 1954). " The New York Times (Oct. 26, 1954). 1934 Ldzaro Cdrdenas 2,225,000 Antonio I. Villareal 24,395 Adalberto Tejeda 16,037 Hernin Laborde 539 1940 Manuel Avila Camacho 2,176,641 Juan Andreu Almazan 151,101 Rafael Sanchez Tapia 9,840 1946 Miguel Aleman 1,786,901 Ezequiel Padilla 443,357 J. Agustin Castro 28,537 Carlos I. Calder6n 1,181 1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 2,713,419 Miguel Henriquez GuzmAn 579,745 Efrain Gonzalez Luna 285,555 Vicente Lombardo Toledano 72,482 The confident government of President Carlos Castillo Armas of Guatemala organized a blunt imposicion for October 10, 1954, in which 66 deputies to a Constituent Assembly would be chosen and a plebiscite held to determine whether he should continue in power. The National Anti-Communist Front of Castillo Armas had thoughtfully eliminated the leadership of the groups of the old communist-dominated government of President Arbenz. The procedure for the plebiscite of October 10 is described in this way: Each voter stepped before the election board and stated orally whether or not he favored continuing Castillo Armas in power. His answer was written down in the election book and he was required to sign his name after the "si" or "no."1 The final returns showed 485,531 votes to 393 to continue President Castillo Armas in power. The government also won 20 of the 22 provinces in the election of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Other, almost classic, illustrations of the imposicidon in one- party states in recent years can be seen in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. President Anastasio Somoza, with absolute " This is the report of Cyril Allen, writing from Guatemala City, Dec. 27, 1954. See The New York Times (Jan. 5, 1954). The New York Times (Oct. 26, 1954).  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 139 control of the army, absolute control over the political chiefs appointed in every district of the country, and absolute party con- trol can encourage an opposition, even in congress, and can invite the impartial scrutiny of outside observers as to the honesty and fairness of Nicaragua's elections-and yet win every time."0 "His Excellency the Generalissimo and Dr. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, Benefactor of the Fatherland," through the Dominican Republic's only party, the Dominican Party, provides hand-picked lists of candidates who always win. Although voting is not compulsory, everyone wants his identity card (cddula) stamped "votado" in order to show that he is not in opposition to the General. The procedure calls for straight-ticket voting without provision for blank ballots or write-ins." However, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic employ a kind of imposicidon which only a few Latin American countries can use successfully at any given time. To openly support a candidate for the presidency invites the oppo- sition to unite and opens the way to charges of official unfairness which might result in undesirable violence. The more typical imposicidn is more subtle. It usually begins with an official announcement from the highest sources in the state that the government is neutral and will guarantee free, fair elections. These protestations of impartiality and fairness are repeated continually throughout the campaign through all the media of communication. The president frequently will issue an impres- sive order to all government personnel calling attention to the principles of representative democracy and outlining specifically The New York Times (Nov. 17, 1953). " The New York Times (Mar. 28, 1953). The techniques and meth- ods President Trujillo uses to mobilize political power in the Domin- ican Republic are remarkably similar to those employed by nineteenth- century dictators in his country. For example, Buenaventura Bez was always concerned with creating at least a facade of popular support. In one instance he so skillfully organized a plebiscite that the vote in his favor was 20,000 to 13. See Charles Christian Hauch, "The Dominican Republic and Its Foreign Relations, 1844-1882" (University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss., 1942), p. 248. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES control of the army, absolute control over the political i appointed in every district of the country, and absolute part) trol can encourage an opposition, even in congress, and can : the impartial scrutiny of outride observers as to the honest: fairness of Nicaragua's elections-and yet win every time." Excellency the Generalissimo and Dr. Rafael Le6nidas Tn Benefactor of the Fatherland," through the Dominican Rept only party, the Dominican Party, provides hand-picked lii: candidates who always win. Although voting is not compu everyone wants his identity card (cidula) stamped "votad order to show that he is not in opposition to the General. procedure calls for straight-ticket voting without provisio blank ballots or write-ins." However, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Domi Republic employ a kind of imposicion which only a few American countries can use successfully at any given time openly support a candidate for the presidency invites the sition to unite and opens the way to charges of official unfa which might result in undesirable violence. The more t imposicidon is more subtle. It usually begins with an o announcement from the highest sources in the state tha government is neutral and will guarantee free, fair elec These protestations of impartiality and fairness are rep continually throughout the campaign through all the med communication. The president frequently will issue an in sive order to all government personnel calling attention t principles of representative democracy and outlining specil o The New York Times (Nov. 17, 1953). " The New York Times (Mar. 28, 1953). The techniques and ods President Trujillo uses to mobilize political power in the T ican Republic are remarkably similar to those employed by nines century dictators in his country. For example, Buenaventura Bi always concerned with creating at least a faade of popular suppo one instance he so skillfully organized a plebiscite that the vote favor was 20,000 to 13. See Charles Christian Hauch, "The Dom Republic and Its Foreign Relations, 1844-1882" (University of Cl Ph.D. diss., 1942), p. 248. 139 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 139 control of the army, absolute control over the political chiefs appointed in every district of the country, and absolute party con- trol can encourage an opposition, even in congress, and can invite the impartial scrutiny of outside observers as to the honesty and fairness of Nicaragua's elections-and yet win every time.0 "His Excellency the Generalissimo and Dr. Rafael Le6nidas Trujillo, Benefactor of the Fatherland," through the Dominican Republic's only party, the Dominican Party, provides hand-picked lists of candidates who always win. Although voting is not compulsory, everyone wants his identity card (cdula) stamped "votado' in order to show that he is not in opposition to the General. The procedure calls for straight-ticket voting without provision for blank ballots or write-ins.t' However, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic employ a kind of imposicidon which only a few Latin American countries can use successfully at any given time. To openly support a candidate for the presidency invites the oppo- sition to unite and opens the way to charges of official unfairness which might result in undesirable violence. The more typical imposicidon is more subtle. It usually begins with an official announcement from the highest sources in the state that the government is neutral and will guarantee free, fair elections. These protestations of impartiality and fairness are repeated continually throughout the campaign through all the media of communication. The president frequently will issue an impres- sive order to all government personnel calling attention to the principles of representative democracy and outlining specifically The New York Times (Nov. 17, 1953). ° The New York Times (Mar. 28, 1953). The techniques and meth- ods President Trujillo uses to mobilize political power in the Domin- ican Republic are remarkably similar to those employed by nineteenth- century dictators in his country. For example, Buenaventura Biez was always concerned with creating at least a fagade of popular support. In one instance he so skillfully organized a plebiscite that the vote in his favor was 20,000 to 13. See Charles Christian Hauch, "The Dominican Republic and Its Foreign Relations, 1844-1882" (University of Chicago, Ph.D. diss., 1942), p. 248.  140 The Caribbean the provisions of the electoral law relating to proper conduct by government employees. It has been the function of the Nationalist Party in Honduras for many years to keep the Liberals from capturing the presidency. General Tiburcio Carias Andino was a caudillo of such stature that during his long period as president (1933 to 1949) the Liberals were completely demoralized and offered but little oppo- sition. However, on October 10, 1954, fiercely contested elec- tions were held in which the Nationalist votes were divided between aging General Carias, 77,726, and General Abraham Williams, 53,041. The Liberal candidate, Dr. Ram6n Villeda Morales, received 121,213, which was short of the constitutional majority required. In order to bar a Liberal victory, General Carias boycotted the Congress which under the Constitution has the responsibility to select a president when no candidate has a majority. The Congress met on December 5, but lacking a quorum it dissolved. At midnight of December 5, Dr. Julio Lozano Diaz, who had been acting-president since November 16 when President Juan Manuel Gdlvez departed for Panama on sick leave, was installed as "supreme chief of state." This ma- neuver saved the presidency from the Liberals and provided time for the Nationalists to make preparations for the next change of power." Despite the fact that Colonel Jose Antonio Rem6n was com- mandant of the National Police of Panama and undoubtedly the most important single source of political power in the country, President Alcibiades Arosemena repeatedly assured citizens of the good faith of the government and promised a free, fair elec- tion on May 11. Although opposition claims of unfairness were common throughout the campaign, people went to the polls, and Remon was proclaimed the winner by 133,208 to 78,094 for " Stokes, "Honduras," The Americana Annual (1955), p. 327. For a background of politics in Honduras, see Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950), pp. 29-58, 228-264. 140 The Caribbean the provisions of the electoral law relating to proper conduct by government employees. It has been the function of the Nationalist Party in Honduras for many years to keep the Liberals from capturing the presidency. General Tiburcio Carias Andino was a caudillo of such stature that during his long period as president (1933 to 1949) the Liberals were completely demoralized and offered but little oppo- sition. However, on October 10, 1954, fiercely contested elec- tions were held in which the Nationalist votes were divided between aging General Carias, 77,726, and General Abraham Williams, 53,041. The Liberal candidate, Dr. Ram6n Villeda Morales, received 121,213, which was short of the constitutional majority required. In order to bar a Liberal victory, General Carias boycotted the Congress which under the Constitution has the responsibility to select a president when no candidate has a majority. The Congress met on December 5, but lacking a quorum it dissolved. At midnight of December 5, Dr. Julio Lozano Diaz, who had been acting-president since November 16 when President Juan Manuel Galvez departed for Panama on sick leave, was installed as "supreme chief of state." This ma- neuver saved the presidency from the Liberals and provided time for the Nationalists to make preparations for the next change of power." Despite the fact that Colonel Jos4 Antonio Remon was com- mandant of the National Police of Panama and undoubtedly the most important single source of political power in the country, President Alcibiades Arosemena repeatedly assured citizens of the good faith of the government and promised a free, fair elec- tion on May 11. Although opposition claims of unfairness were common throughout the campaign, people went to the polls, and Rem6n was proclaimed the winner by 133,208 to 78,094 for " Stokes, "Honduras," The Americana Annual (1955), p. 327. For a background of politics in Honduras, see Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950), pp. 29-58, 228-264. 140 The Caribbean the provisions of the electoral law relating to proper conduct by government employees. It has been the function of the Nationalist Party in Honduras for many years to keep the Liberals from capturing the presidency. General Tiburcio Carias Andino was a caudillo of such stature that during his long period as president (1933 to 1949) the Liberals were completely demoralized and offered but little oppo- sition. However, on October 10, 1954, fiercely contested elec- tions were held in which the Nationalist votes were divided between aging General Carias, 77,726, and General Abraham Williams, 53,041. The Liberal candidate, Dr. Ram6n Villeda Morales, received 121,213, which was short of the constitutional majority required. In order to bar a Liberal victory, General Carias boycotted the Congress which under the Constitution has the responsibility to select a president when no candidate has a majority. The Congress met on December 5, but lacking a quorum it dissolved. At midnight of December 5, Dr. Julio Lozano Diaz, who had been acting-president since November 16 when President Juan Manuel Gdlvez departed for Panama on sick leave, was installed as "supreme chief of state." This ma- neuver saved the presidency from the Liberals and provided time for the Nationalists to make preparations for the next change of power." Despite the fact that Colonel Jos4 Antonio Rem6n was com- mandant of the National Police of Panama and undoubtedly the most important single source of political power in the country, President Alcibiades Arosemena repeatedly assured citizens of the good faith of the government and promised a free, fair elec- tion on May 11. Although opposition claims of unfairness were common throughout the campaign, people went to the polls, and Rem6n was proclaimed the winner by 133,208 to 78,094 for " Stokes, "Honduras," The Americana Annual (1955), p. 327. For a background of politics in Honduras, see Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950), pp. 29-58, 228-264.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 141 Roberto Francisco Chiari, who was supported by five parties, all calling for civilian rule." General Fulgencio Batista is unquestionably one of the ablest Latin American politicians of the twentieth century. To follow his preparations through the media of communication in Cuba for the imposicidn of November 1, 1954, is interesting indeed. On May 4, President Batista repealed the last provisions of Public Order No. 997 (which regulated freedom of expression) and decreed a political amnesty law under which many exiles bene- fited. Despite earlier assertions that he would not be a candidate, General Batista announced on July 10 that he would run for the presidency. One important evidence of an impending impo- sicion was seen in the registration figures of the Cuban Electoral Commission, which showed pro-Batista parties to have 1,686,- 345 registrants and anti-Batista parties only 230,850 registrants. However, the opposition leader, former president Dr. Ramn Grau San Martin, believed there was a chance for victory down to the eve of the November 1 elections. At that time, Dr. Grau withdrew from the campaign, charged that the election had been rigged, and urged his supporters to refrain from voting. General Batista, of course, went on to win overwhelmingly as a candidato ,inico." Colombia, despite claims that it is one of the most advanced countries in Latin America, has a long record of imposicion in the nineteenth century." In addition, there is much evidence of imposici6n in more recent times. For example, President Gustavo Pinilla (a lieutenant general) seized the presidency on June 13, 1953, promised on August 19 that he would hold national elec- tions, but instead reneged on his word and had a Constituent " The New York Times (May 7, May 12, June 2, 1952). " Stokes, "Cuba," The Americana Annual (1955), 190. See in particular, Josd Joaquin Guerra, Estudios histdricos (Bogota: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1952), Vol. II, Chaps. 8, 9; Vol. III, Chap. 13; Vol. IV, pp. 71-121; Rafael Nisez, La reforma politica en Colombia (Bogota: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1950), VII, 242 pp., passim. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 141 Roberto Francisco Chiari, who was supported by five parties, all calling for civilian rule."' General Fulgencio Batista is unquestionably one of the ablest Latin American politicians of the twentieth century. To follow his preparations through the media of communication in Cuba for the imposicidn of November 1, 1954, is interesting indeed. On May 4, President Batista repealed the last provisions of Public Order No. 997 (which regulated freedom of expression) and decreed a political amnesty law under which many exiles bene- fited. Despite earlier assertions that he would not be a candidate, General Batista announced on July 10 that he would run for the presidency. One important evidence of an impending impo- sicidn was seen in the registration figures of the Cuban Electoral Commission, which showed pro-Batista parties to have 1,686,- 345 registrants and anti-Batista parties only 230,850 registrants. However, the opposition leader, former president Dr. Ramdn Grau San Martin, believed there was a chance for victory down to the eve of the November I elections. At that time, Dr. Gran withdrew from the campaign, charged that the election had been rigged, and urged his supporters to refrain from voting. General Batista, of course, went on to win overwhelmingly as a candidato inico.2 Colombia, despite claims that it is one of the most advanced countries in Latin America, has a long record of imposicidn in the nineteenth century." In addition, there is much evidence of imposicion in more recent times. For example, President Gustavo Pinilla (a lieutenant general) seized the presidency on June 13, 1953, promised on August 19 that he would hold national elec- tions, but instead reneged on his word and had a Constituent " The New York Times (May 7, May 12, June 2, 1952). " Stokes, "Cuba," The Americana Annual (1955), 190. See in particular, Jos4 Joaquin Guerra, Estudios historicos (Bogoti: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1952), Vol. II, Chaps. 8, 9; Vol. III, Chap. 13; Vol. IV, pp. 71-121; Rafael Nifnez, La reforma politica en Colombia (Bogoti: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1950), VII, 242 pp., passim. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 141 Roberto Francisco Chiari, who was supported by five parties, all calling for civilian rule." General Fulgencio Batista is unquestionably one of the ablest Latin American politicians of the twentieth century. To follow his preparations through the media of communication in Cuba for the imposici6n of November 1, 1954, is interesting indeed. On May 4, President Batista repealed the last provisions of Public Order No. 997 (which regulated freedom of expression) and decreed a political amnesty law under which many exiles bene- fited. Despite earlier assertions that he would not be a candidate, General Batista announced on July 10 that he would run for the presidency. One important evidence of an impending impo- sicidn was seen in the registration figures of the Cuban Electoral Commission, which showed pro-Batista parties to have 1,686,- 345 registrants and anti-Batista parties only 230,850 registrants. However, the opposition leader, former president Dr. Ramdn Grau San Martin, believed there was a chance for victory down to the eve of the November 1 elections. At that time, Dr. Grau withdrew from the campaign, charged that the election had been rigged, and urged his supporters to refrain from voting. General Batista, of course, went on to win overwhelmingly as a candidato A nico." Colombia, despite claims that it is one of the most advanced countries in Latin America, has a long record of imposicion in the nineteenth century." In addition, there is much evidence of imposicion in more recent times. For example, President Gustavo Pinilla (a lieutenant general) seized the presidency on June 13, 1953, promised on August 19 that he would hold national elec- tions, but instead reneged on his word and had a Constituent " The New York Times (May 7, May 12, June 2, 1952). " Stokes, "Cuba," The Americana Annual (1955), 190. " See in particular, Jose Joaquin Guerra, Estudios histdricos (Bogota: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1952), Vol. II, Chaps. 8, 9; Vol. III, Chap. 13; Vol. IV, pp. 71-121; Rafael Ninez, La reforma politica en Colombia (Bogota: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1950), VII, 242 pp., passim.  142 The Caribbean Assembly formally elect him president on August 3, 1954. In his New Year's speech of 1955 he declared that national elections would not be held before August, 1958. He has made it difficult for a political opposition to develop by press censorship and in some cases by suspending publication of certain newspapers. General Rojas Pinilla announced on September 23, 1955, a press decree which "forbids publication of any matter directly or indirectly disrespectful to the President. . . .""8 On August 4, 1955, the government suppressed Eduardo Santos' (former Liberal president of Colombia) famous newspaper El Tiempo. General Rojas Pinilla defended his action in a speech on August 13." Venezuela has had a long experience in the use of imposicion. Antonio Guzman Blanco (his title was Ilustre Americano y Re- generador de Venezuela) won the presidency by 239,691 votes to 18 for his combined opposition in 18731" In more recent times, Rbmulo Gallegos was brought to the presidency in Decem- ber 14, 1947, in what was widely applauded by the press in the United States as the only free, fair election in Venezuela's history. I am inclined to believe that the December 14, 1947, election was an imposicidn. Accion Democrdtica, a civilian political orga- nization dominated by socialist ideology, in association with mili- tary officers seized power by force in a bloody, multiple cuartelazo October 18-21, 1945. About a month later, in November, the revolutionary junta exiled deposed president Isaias Medina Anga- rita and high political and military figures who supported him. General Medina did not return to Venezuela until September 22, 1952." The way was thus prepared for Dr. Rmulo Gallegos " The New York Times (Mar. 16, Sept. 12, and Sept. 28, 1953) June 12, 1954; Feb. 24, Sept. 16, and Sept. 24, 1955). " El Universal (Caracas, Aug. 14, 1955). George S. Wise, Caudillo, a Portrait of Antonio Guzm n Blanco (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 91. See also some of the works of the great Venezuelan novelist Rufino Blanco Fombona, such as La barbarocracia triunfante, La mdscara herdica, and El hombre de oro. " The New York Times (Sept. 16 and Sept. 23, 1952). 142 The Caribbean Assembly formally elect him president on August 3, 1954. In his New Year's speech of 1955 he declared that national elections would not be held before August, 1958. He has made it difficult for a political opposition to develop by press censorship and in some cases by suspending publication of certain newspapers. General Rojas Pinilla announced on September 23, 1955, a press decree which "forbids publication of any matter directly or indirectly disrespectful to the President. . . ."2 On August 4, 1955, the government suppressed Eduardo Santos' (former Liberal president of Colombia) famous newspaper El Tiempo. General Rojas Pinilla defended his action in a speech on August 13." Venezuela has had a long experience in the use of imposicidn. Antonio Guzmn Blanco (his title was Ilustre Americano y Re- generador de Venezuela) won the presidency by 239,691 votes to 18 for his combined opposition in 1873!" In more recent times, Rsmulo Gallegos was brought to the presidency in Decem- ber 14, 1947, in what was widely applauded by the press in the United States as the only free, fair election in Venezuela's history. I am inclined to believe that the December 14, 1947, election was an imposicidn. Accidn Democrdtica, a civilian political orga- nization dominated by socialist ideology, in association with mili- tary officers seized power by force in a bloody, multiple cuartelazo October 18-21, 1945. About a month later, in November, the revolutionary junta exiled deposed president Isaias Medina Anga- rita and high political and military figures who supported him. General Medina did not return to Venezuela until September 22, 1952.28 The way was thus prepared for Dr. Rmulo Gallegos " The New York Times (Mar. 16, Sept. 12, and Sept. 28, 1953) June 12, 1954; Feb. 24, Sept. 16, and Sept. 24, 1955). " El Universal (Caracas, Aug. 14, 1955). " George S. Wise, Caudillo, a Portrait of Antonio Guzmdn Blanco (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 91. See also some of the works of the great Venezuelan novelist Rufino Blanco Fombona, such as La barbarocracia triunfante, La mdscara herdica, and El hombre de oro. * The New York Times (Sept. 16 and Sept. 23, 1952). 142 The Caribbean Assembly formally elect him president on August 3, 1954. In his New Year's speech of 1955 he declared that national elections would not be held before August, 1958. He has made it difficult for a political opposition to develop by press censorship and in some cases by suspending publication of certain newspapers. General Rojas Pinilla announced on September 23, 1955, a press decree which "forbids publication of any matter directly or indirectly disrespectful to the President. . . ."6 On August 4, 1955, the government suppressed Eduardo Santos' (former Liberal president of Colombia) famous newspaper El Tiempo. General Rojas Pinilla defended his action in a speech on August 13." Venezuela has had a long experience in the use of imposicidn. Antonio Guzmdn Blanco (his title was Ilustre Americano y Re- generador de Venezuela) won the presidency by 239,691 votes to 18 for his combined opposition in 18731"8 In more recent times, Rt6mulo Gallegos was brought to the presidency in Decem- ber 14, 1947, in what was widely applauded by the press in the United States as the only free, fair election in Venezuela's history. I am inclined to believe that the December 14, 1947, election was an imposicidn. Accion Democrdtica, a civilian political orga- nization dominated by socialist ideology, in association with mili- tary officers seized power by force in a bloody, multiple cuartelazo October 18-21, 1945. About a month later, in November, the revolutionary junta exiled deposed president Isaias Medina Anga- rita and high political and military figures who supported him. General Medina did not return to Venezuela until September 22, 1952." The way was thus prepared for Dr. Rbmulo Gallegos * The New York Times (Mar. 16, Sept. 12, and Sept. 28, 1953) June 12, 1954; Feb. 24, Sept. 16, and Sept. 24, 1955). " El Universal (Caracas, Aug. 14, 1955). " George S. Wise, Caudillo, a Portrait of Antonio Guzmadn Blanco (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 91. See also some of the works of the great Venezuelan novelist Rufino Blanco Fombona, such as La barbarocracia triunfante, La mdscara herdica, and El hombre de oro. " The New York Times (Sept. 16 and Sept. 23, 1952).  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 143 (formerly a communist) to win the presidency by more than 171,000 votes. Accion Democrdtica also got 38 of the 46 sena- torial seats and 83 of the 110 seats in the lower house, along with all the state legislatures except Tachira." After the military ousted Accion Democrdtica by force in November, 1948, the new junta prepared to achieve legitimacy by imposician. Herbert L. Matthews quotes the following state- ment attributed to prominent Venezuelans and endorsed by North Americans in Venezuela: Accidn Democrdtica came into power by a military coup in 1945, exactly as we did in November, 1948. At that time it had 25,000 votes. Two years later, when it ran its own election, it received 875,000 votes. That is always the way in Venezuela. Accion Democrdtica's 1947 election was no different than any previous election and will be no different than the one we are holding in November. The strength of Accidn Democrdtica was and is grossly over- rated abroad. The government in power always wins Venezuelan elections, and we will win this time." The government of the three-man junta stacked campaign pro- cedures for the November 30 elections in its favor by outlawing Accion Democratica, exiling its leaders (branding some of them "common criminals"), providing for censorship, prohibiting street demonstrations and speeches, and permitting meetings only if permission were secured in advance. The main opposition to the government's Independent Organizations (the feistas) was Union Republicana Democratica (the urredistas) and the Catholic Com- mittee for Independent Electoral Political Organizations (Copei). The government went through the usual ritual of ostentatiously guaranteeing fairness in the balloting. The Supreme Electoral " Leo B. Lot, "Venezuelan Federalism, a Case Study in Frustration" (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1954), pp. 242-243. See also Re- pubtica de Venezuela, Documentos oficiales relativos al movimiento militar del 24 de noviembre de 1948 (Caracas: Oficina Nacional de Informaci6n y Publicaciones, 1949), pp. 37, 43. " The New York Times (Apr. 7, 1952). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES (formerly a communist) to win the presidency by more 171,000 votes. Accion Democrdtica also got 38 of the 46 torial seats and 83 of the 110 seats in the lower house, with all the state legislatures except Tachira." After the military ousted Accion Democrdtica by for November, 1948, the new junta prepared to achieve legit by imposicion. Herbert L. Matthews quotes the following ment attributed to prominent Venezuelans and endorsed by ] Americans in Venezuela: Accion Democrdtica came into power by a military coi 1945, exactly as we did in November, 1948. At that ti had 25,000 votes. Two years later, when it ran its own ele it received 875,000 votes. That is always the way in Vene; Accion Democrdtica's 1947 election was no different that previous election and will be no different than the one w holding in November. The strength of Accion Democrdtica was and is grossly rated abroad. The government in power always wins Venez elections, and we will win this time." The government of the three-man junta stacked campaigt cedures for the November 30 elections in its favor by outh Accidn Democrdtica, exiling its leaders (branding some of "common criminals"), providing for censorship, prohibiting demonstrations and speeches, and permitting meetings or permission were secured in advance. The main opposition t government's Independent Organizations (the feistas) was I Republicana Democrdtica (the urredistas) and the Catholic mittee for Independent Electoral Political Organizations (Co The government went through the usual ritual of ostentati guaranteeing fairness in the balloting. The Supreme Ele< " Leo B. Lot, "Venezuelan Federalism, a Case Study in Frustr (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1954), pp. 242.243. See al peblica de Venezuela, Documentos oflciales relativos at movimiento a del 24 de noviembre de 1948 (Caracas: Oficina Nacional de Infom y Publicaciones, 1949), pp. 37, 43. " The New York Times (Apr. 7, 1952). 143 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 143 (formerly a communist) to win the presidency by more than 171,000 votes. Accion Democrdtica also got 38 of the 46 sena- torial seats and 83 of the 110 seats in the lower house, along with all the state legislatures except Tachira." After the military ousted Accidn Democrdtica by force in November, 1948, the new junta prepared to achieve legitimacy by imposicidn. Herbert L. Matthews quotes the following state- ment attributed to prominent Venezuelans and endorsed by North Americans in Venezuela: Accion Democrdtica came into power by a military coup in 1945, exactly as we did in November, 1948. At that time it had 25,000 votes. Two years later, when it ran its own election, it received 875,000 votes. That is always the way in Venezuela. Accion Democrdtica's 1947 election was no different than any previous election and will be no different than the one we are holding in November. The strength of Accion Democrdtica was and is grossly over- rated abroad. The government in power always wins Venezuelan elections, and we will win this time." The government of the three-man junta stacked campaign pro- cedures for the November 30 elections in its favor by outlawing Accidn Democrdtica, exiling its leaders (branding some of them "common criminals"), providing for censorship, prohibiting street demonstrations and speeches, and permitting meetings only if permission were secured in advance. The main opposition to the government's Independent Organizations (the feistas) was Unidn Republicana Democrdtica (the urredistas) and the Catholic Com- mittee for Independent Electoral Political Organizations (Copei). The government went through the usual ritual of ostentatiously guaranteeing fairness in the balloting. The Supreme Electoral " Leo B. Lot, "Venezuelan Federalism, a Case Study in Frustration" (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1954), pp. 242-243. See also Re- publica de Venezuela, Documentos ofciales relativos at movimiento militar del 24 de noviembre de 1948 (Caracas: Oficina Nacional de Informaci6n y Publicaciones, 1949), pp. 37, 43. " The New York Times (Apr. 7, 1952).  144 The Caribbean 144 The Caribbean Council issued three bulletins, the last one of which showed, with one-fourth of the total of 2,014,952 votes counted, that URD was leading the government by 147,065 votes. This news was followed by tighter restrictions on electoral news. On Decem- ber 2, Colonel Pirez Jiminez broadcast from Miraflores Palace to announce that the junta had resigned and returned power to the armed forces, which had made him provisional president. The fifth bulletin of the Supreme Electoral Council, issued on December 3, now proclaimed with two-thirds of the votes counted that the feista parties were leading with 570,000 votes, URD next with 478,000, and Copei last with 138,000 votes. The final figures (official bulletin nine) were: Independent Organiza- tions 788,086; URD, 652,823; Copei, 300,949; all others, 62,- 481.2 Thus the imposicidon succeeded, but not without the embarassing necessity of stopping the counting and then starting again in a surer direction. On April 9 the Constituent Assembly endowed itself with the power to elect Perez Jimenez president for a five-year term beginning April 19, 1953. It also under- took to elect the state legislatures, municipal councils, a con- troller general, and an attorney general, and to promulgate a new constitution." In addition, evidence would seem to indicate that imposicidn was present in other recent changes of government in Guatemala (Juan Ardvalo in December, 1947, and Jacobo Arbenz in No- vember, 1950) and in El Salvador (January, 1945)." Although this Conference is devoted to the political problems of the Caribbean, it is appropriate to call attention to similarities and contrasts among republics elsewhere in the Hemisphere. In South America, the large and small countries alike use imposicion. In Argentina, for example, a standard history text such as that by Ricardo Levene will recount many instances of imposicidn * Lott, pp. 280-282. " The New York Times (Apr. 11, 1953). " Departamento de Publicidad de la Presidencia de la Republica, Tray- ectoria de la revolutiin guatemalteca (n.d.), p. 3. Council issued three bulletins, the last one of which showed, with one-fourth of the total of 2,014,952 votes counted, that URD was leading the government by 147,065 votes. This news was followed by tighter restrictions on electoral news. On Decem- ber 2, Colonel Pdrez Jimenez broadcast from Miraflores Palace to announce that the junta had resigned and returned power to the armed forces, which had made him provisional president. The fifth bulletin of the Supreme Electoral Council, issued on December 3, now proclaimed with two-thirds of the votes counted that the feista parties were leading with 570,000 votes, URD next with 478,000, and Copei last with 138,000 votes. The final figures (official bulletin nine) were: Independent Organiza- tions 788,086; URD, 652,823; Copei, 300,949; all others, 62,- 481." Thus the imposicion succeeded, but not without the embarassing necessity of stopping the counting and then starting again in a surer direction. On April 9 the Constituent Assembly endowed itself with the power to elect Pdrez Jimenez president for a five-year term beginning April 19, 1953. It also under- took to elect the state legislatures, municipal councils, a con- troller general, and an attorney general, and to promulgate a new constitution." In addition, evidence would seem to indicate that imposicidn was present in other recent changes of government in Guatemala (Juan Ardvalo in December, 1947, and Jacobo Arbenz in No- vember, 1950) and in El Salvador (January, 1945)." Although this Conference is devoted to the political problems of the Caribbean, it is appropriate to call attention to similarities and contrasts among republics elsewhere in the Hemisphere. In South America, the large and small countries alike use imposicion. In Argentina, for example, a standard history text such as that by Ricardo Levene will recount many instances of imposicidn " Lott, pp. 280-282. The New York Times (Apr. 11, 1953). " Departamento de Publicidad de la Presidencia de la Repnblica, Tray- ectoria de la revolucin guatemalteca (n.d.), p. 3. 144 The Caribbean Council issued three bulletins, the last one of which showed, with one-fourth of the total of 2,014,952 votes counted, that URD was leading the government by 147,065 votes. This news was followed by tighter restrictions on electoral news. On Decem- her 2, Colonel Perez Jimenez broadcast from Miraflores Palace to announce that the junta had resigned and returned power to the armed forces, which had made him provisional president. The fifth bulletin of the Supreme Electoral Council, issued on December 3, now proclaimed with two-thirds of the votes counted that the feista parties were leading with 570,000 votes, URD next with 478,000, and Copei last with 138,000 votes. The final figures (official bulletin nine) were: Independent Organiza- tions 788,086; URD, 652,823; Copei, 300,949; all others, 62,- 481." Thus the imposicidon succeeded, but not without the embarassing necessity of stopping the counting and then starting again in a surer direction. On April 9 the Constituent Assembly endowed itself with the power to elect Perez Jimenez president for a five-year term beginning April 19, 1953. It also under- took to elect the state legislatures, municipal councils, a con- troller general, and an attorney general, and to promulgate a new constitution." In addition, evidence would seem to indicate that imposicidn was present in other recent changes of government in Guatemala (Juan Ardvalo in December, 1947, and Jacobo Arbenz in No- vember, 1950) and in El Salvador (January, 1945)." Although this Conference is devoted to the political problems of the Caribbean, it is appropriate to call attention to similarities and contrasts among republics elsewhere in the Hemisphere. In South America, the large and small countries alike use imposicidn. In Argentina, for example, a standard history text such as that by Ricardo Levene will recount many instances of imposicion Lott, pp. 280-282. " The New York Times (Apr. 11, 1953). " Departamento de Publicidad de la Presidencia de la Repdblica, Tray- ectoria de la revolucion guatemalteca (n.d.), p. 3.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 145 in the nineteenth century." George Blanksten's excellent study of the more recent period analyzes peronista techniques." Al- though Major General Eduardo Lonardi ousted General Perin by force in 1955 in the name of "libertad" and "democracia," and promised that neither he nor any member of his cabinet would be a candidate "under any circumstances" in elections he would hold, he also declared that no Peronista Party would be permitted to participate." I gathered the impression in Argentina in July, 1955, that the Peronistas were strong and would do well, at least in the urban centers, in a free, fair election. Of all the countries of South America, Uruguay and Chile have perhaps been freest of imposicidon, yet Jose Batile y Ord6nez (president of Uruguay in 1903 and again in 1911), was able to dictate selections to the presidency until his death in 1929. A complicated electoral system aids the Colorados in winning every election." Even in Chile there is fear from time to time that an election might be rigged and victory stolen. For example, the managers of Carlos Ibanez del Campo told a campaign rally in October, 1952, that they were sure to win the election and must not therefore let anyone "snatch the victory away." They were quoted as saying, "Be ready in case it becomes necessary to act in the streets."" In many instances of imposicidon, the government is likely to encourage a large number of candidates to offer their names in * Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), pp.- 482, 292, 502, 513. " George I. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (University of Chicago Press, 1953), see especially Chapter 4. See also Saturnino Salcedo, Las pri- meras formas de elegir y los actuales sistemas electorales, regimen politico de las provincias argentinas (Buenos Aires: E.T.G.L.A., 1948), 479 pp., passim; Weil, pp. 65-67; G. Kletch, "L'Argentine 'peroniste,' Neologisme et redalites," Politique Etrangere (fev.-mars, 1950), 87-105; The New York Times (Jan. 15 and Apr. 27, 1954). " The New York Times (Oct. 24, 1955). " See Philip B. Taylor, The Executive Power in Uruguay (Berkeley, 1951), pp. 8, 22, 58-64. " The New York Times (Sept. 2, 1952). See also Alberto Cabero, Chile y los chilenos (Santiago: Editorial Lyceum, 1948), pp. 214-215. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 145 in the nineteenth century." George Blanksten's excellent study of the more recent period analyzes peronista techniques." Al- though Major General Eduardo Lonardi ousted General Perdn by force in 1955 in the name of "libertad" and "democracia," and promised that neither be nor any member of his cabinet would be a candidate "under any circumstances" in elections he would hold, he also declared that no Peronista Party would be permitted to participate." I gathered the impression in Argentina in July, 1955, that the Peronistas were strong and would do well, at least in the urban centers, in a free, fair election. Of all the countries of South America, Uruguay and Chile have perhaps been freest of imposicion, yet Jose Batle y Ord65ez (president of Uruguay in 1903 and again in 1911), was able to dictate selections to the presidency until his death in 1929. A complicated electoral system aids the Colorados in winning every election." Even in Chile there is fear from time to time that an election might be rigged and victory stolen. For example, the managers of Carlos Ibanez del Campo told a campaign rally in October, 1952, that they were sure to win the election and must not therefore let anyone "snatch the victory away." They were quoted as saying, "Be ready in case it becomes necessary to act in the streets."" In many instances of imposicidn, the government is likely to encourage a large number of candidates to offer their names in * Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), pp. 482, 292, 502, 513. " George I. Blanksten, Perdn's Argentina (University of Chicago Press, 1953), see especially Chapter 4. See also Saturnino Salcedo, Las pri- meras formas de elegir y los actuales sistemas electorales, regimen politico de las provincias argentinas (Buenos Aires: E.T.G.L.A., 1948), 479 pp., passim; Weil, pp. 65-67; G. Kletch, "L'Argentine 'peroniste,' Neologisme et rialitis," Politique Etrangdre (firv-mars, 1950), 87-105; The New York Times (Jan. 15 and Apr. 27, 1954). " The New York Times (Oct. 24, 1955). " See Philip B. Taylor, The Executive Power in Uruguay (Berkeley, 1951), pp. 8, 22, 58-64. " The New York Times (Sept. 2, 1952). See also Alberto Cabero, Chile y los chilenos (Santiago: Editorial Lyceum, 1948), pp. 214-215. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 145 in the nineteenth century." George Blanksten's excellent study of the more recent period analyzes peronista techniques." Al- though Major General Eduardo Lonardi ousted General Perdn by force in 1955 in the name of "libertad" and "democracia," and promised that neither he nor any member of his cabinet would be a candidate "under any circumstances" in elections he would hold, he also declared that no Peronista Party would be permitted to participate." I gathered the impression in Argentina in July, 1955, that the Peronistas were strong and would do well, at least in the urban centers, in a free, fair election. Of all the countries of South America, Uruguay and Chile have perhaps been freest of imposicidon, yet Jose Batlle y Ord6iiez (president of Uruguay in 1903 and again in 1911), was able to dictate selections to the presidency until his death in 1929. A complicated electoral system aids the Colorados in winning every election." Even in Chile there is fear from time to time that an election might be rigged and victory stolen. For example, the managers of Carlos Ibinez del Campo told a campaign rally in October, 1952, that they were sure to win the election and must not therefore let anyone "snatch the victory away." They were quoted as saying, "Be ready in case it becomes necessary to act in the streets."" In many instances of imposicidn, the government is likely to encourage a large number of candidates to offer their names in o Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), pp.. 482, 292, 502, 513. " George I. Blanksten, Prin's Argentina (University of Chicago Press, 1953), see especially Chapter 4. See also Saturnine Salcedo, Las pri- meras formas de elegir y los actuales sistemas electorales, regimen politico de las provincias argentinas (Buenos Aires: E.T.G.L.A., 1948), 479 pp., passim; Weil, pp. 65-67; G. Kletch, "L'Argentine 'peroniste,' Niologisme et rialitis," Politique Etrangere (fev.-mars, 1950), 87-105; The New York Times (Jan. 15 and Apr. 27, 1954). " The New York Times (Oct. 24, 1955). " See Philip B. Taylor, The Executive Power in Uruguay (Berkeley, 1951), pp. 8, 22, 58-64. * The New York Times (Sept. 2, 1952). See also Alberto Cabero, Chile y los chilenos (Santiago: Editorial Lyceum, 1948), pp. 214-215.  146 The Caribbean the election. The politically ambitious caudillo can reason thus: If the election is really fair, perhaps the vagaries of public opinion will favor his candidacy; if an imposicidn is under way, perhaps he is the chosen candidate of those who are manipulating power. All during the campaign the perpetrators of the imposicidn care- fully select and sharpen for effective use the methods required to insure success, whether they be control over the nominating machinery, registration fraud, appointment of key personnel at the polls, intervention in the escrutinio (official check of ballot- ing), or cruder techniques involving purchase of votes or employ- ment of violence through party workers, the police, or the armed forces. Imposicidn can be used for specialized purposes, such as a president perpetuating his own power. An excellent example is the re-election of Dr. Alfonso L6pez of Colombia in 1942. Or the president may prefer to transfer power to one of his close friends (compadrazgo). This technique was plainly the deter- minant in the important presidential election of 1948 in Cuba." If the election in an imposicidn is adroitly rigged, power will be maintained or changed peacefully, and the press and even scholars will hail the experience as a final demonstration of the democratic aspirations of the country. III. Candidato Unico Candidato dnico, or an election in which there is but one candidate running, occurs much less frequently than imposicin. It is not a method of mobilizing political power which is associ- ated with the techniques of the liberal-democratic state and thus does not have the value of legitimacy which is so earnestly desired. Indeed, candidato dUnico reminds some people of communist and fascist techniques of mobilizing political power. All other things being equal, Latin American politicians prefer to avoid the use of candidato unico. " Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution' and the Presidential Elections of 1948," 48-58. 146 The Caribbean the election. The politically ambitious caudillo can reason thus: If the election is really fair, perhaps the vagaries of public opinion will favor his candidacy; if an imposicion is under way, perhaps he is the chosen candidate of those who are manipulating power. All during the campaign the perpetrators of the imposicidn care- fully select and sharpen for effective use the methods required to insure success, whether they be control over the nominating machinery, registration fraud, appointment of key personnel at the polls, intervention in the escrutinio (official check of ballot- ing), or cruder techniques involving purchase of votes or employ- ment of violence through party workers, the police, or the armed forces. Imposicidn can be used for specialized purposes, such as a president perpetuating his own power. An excellent example is the re-election of Dr. Alfonso L6pez of Colombia in 1942. Or the president may prefer to transfer power to one of his close friends (compadrazgo). This technique was plainly the deter- minant in the important presidential election of 1948 in Cuba." If the election in an imposicidn is adroitly rigged, power will be maintained or changed peacefully, and the press and even scholars will hail the experience as a final demonstration of the democratic aspirations of the country. II. Candidato Unico Candidato Unico, or an election in which there is but one candidate running, occurs much less frequently than imposicidn. It is not a method of mobilizing political power which is associ- ated with the techniques of the liberal-democratic state and thus does not have the value of legitimacy which is so earnestly desired. Indeed, candidato unico reminds some people of communist and fascist techniques of mobilizing political power. All other things being equal, Latin American politicians prefer to avoid the use of candidato tnico. " Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution' and the Presidential Elections of 1948," 48-58. 146 The Caribbean the election. The politically ambitious caudillo can reason thus: If the election is really fair, perhaps the vagaries of public opinion will favor his candidacy; if an imposicidn is under way, perhaps he is the chosen candidate of those who are manipulating power. All during the campaign the perpetrators of the imposicidn care- fully select and sharpen for effective use the methods required to insure success, whether they be control over the nominating machinery, registration fraud, appointment of key personnel at the polls, intervention in the escrutinio (official check of ballot- ing), or cruder techniques involving purchase of votes or employ- ment of violence through party workers, the police, or the armed forces. Imposicidn can be used for specialized purposes, such as a president perpetuating his own power. An excellent example is the re-election of Dr. Alfonso L6pez of Colombia in 1942. Or the president may prefer to transfer power to one of his close friends (compadrazgo). This technique was plainly the deter- minant in the important presidential election of 1948 in Cuba.' If the election in an imposicion is adroitly rigged, power will be maintained or changed peacefully, and the press and even scholars will hail the experience as a final demonstration of the democratic aspirations of the country. III. Candidato Unico Candidato dnico, or an election in which there is but one candidate running, occurs much less frequently than imposicion. It is not a method of mobilizing political power which is associ- ated with the techniques of the liberal-democratic state and thus does not have the value of legitimacy which is so earnestly desired. Indeed, candidato dnico reminds some people of communist and fascist techniques of mobilizing political power. All other things being equal, Latin American politicians prefer to avoid the use of candidato dnico. * Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution' and the Presidential Elections of 1948," 48-58.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 141 On the other hand, the device possesses utility under certain circumstances. Candidato unico is used occasionally when a caudillo develops who is so overwhelming in stature that no other political figure dares oppose him. An excellent illustration is General Manuel Odria of Peru who obtained power by cuartelazo in October, 1948, then developed his position so strongly that he was able to run for the presidency on July 2, 1950, without opposition. It looked initially as though General Ernesto Mon- tagne would offer his name as an opposition candidate, but the National Electoral Board refused to accept it, and the general wisely did not persist in his presidential aspirations. President Felipe Molas L6pez of Paraguay achieved power in a candidato 4nico election of April 17, 1949, as did Federico Chaves on July 16, 1950, and again on February 15, 1953. General Alfredo Stroessner won as the candidato anico in Paraguay on July 11, 1954 (132,606 votes to 3,180 blanks) and assumed office August 15." However, political leadership generally is cautious about using candidato unico, because it may be inter- preted as an open, blunt repudiation of representative democracy and hence open the administration to attack at home and abroad. More frequently the astute jefe supremo of the country will select imposicion as a more subtle, mature method of realizing his objectives. For an outstanding caudillo, it is a relatively simple matter to persuade a respectable, distinguished man to run against him, with the understanding that the dummy candi- date will receive enough votes to make the campaign appear authentic and to maintain his honor. Candidato unico is used much more frequently when one major party is unified, the others hopelessly fragmented. When victory for the latter seems utterly impossible they commonly will refuse to campaign, and will count their strength by the number of people who stay away from the polls. The Liberals have not campaigned in Colombia since the presidential elections of 1949. The New York Times (Feb. 16, 1953; July 15, 1954; Aug. 16, 1954; May 11, 1954; Jan. 26, 1955). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 147 On the other hand, the device possesses utility under certain circumstances. Candidato unico is used occasionally when a caudillo develops who is so overwhelming in stature that no other political figure dares oppose him. An excellent illustration is General Manuel Odria of Peru who obtained power by cuartelazo in October, 1948, then developed his position so strongly that he was able to run for the presidency on July 2, 1950, without opposition. It looked initially as though General Ernesto Mon- tagne would offer his name as an opposition candidate, but the National Electoral Board refused to accept it, and the general wisely did not persist in his presidential aspirations. President Felipe Molas L6pez of Paraguay achieved power in a candidato unico election of April 17, 1949, as did Federico Chaves on July 16, 1950, and again on February 15, 1953. General Alfredo Stroessner won as the candidato dnico in Paraguay on July 11, 1954 (132,606 votes to 3,180 blanks) and assumed office August 15." However, political leadership generally is cautious about using candidato unico, because it may be inter- preted as an open, blunt repudiation of representative democracy and hence open the administration to attack at home and abroad. More frequently the astute jefe supremo of the country will select imposicion as a more subtle, mature method of realizing his objectives. For an outstanding caudillo, it is a relatively simple matter to persuade a respectable, distinguished man to run against him, with the understanding that the dummy candi- date will receive enough votes to make the campaign appear authentic and to maintain his honor. Candidato unico is used much more frequently when one major party is unified, the others hopelessly fragmented. When victory for the latter seems utterly impossible they commonly will refuse to campaign, and will count their strength by the number of people who stay away from the polls. The Liberals have not campaigned in Colombia since the presidential elections of 1949. " The New York Times (Feb. 16, 1953; July 15, 1954; Aug. 16, 1954; May 11, 1954; Jan. 26, 1955). REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 147 On the other hand, the device possesses utility under certain circumstances. Candidato dnico is used occasionally when a caudillo develops who is so overwhelming in stature that no other political figure dares oppose him. An excellent illustration is General Manuel Odria of Peru who obtained power by cuartelazo in October, 1948, then developed his position so strongly that he was able to run for the presidency on July 2, 1950, without opposition. It looked initially as though General Ernesto Mon- tagne would offer his name as an opposition candidate, but the National Electoral Board refused to accept it, and the general wisely did not persist in his presidential aspirations. President Felipe Molas L6pez of Paraguay achieved power in a candidato dnico election of April 17, 1949, as did Federico Chaves on July 16, 1950, and again on February 15, 1953. General Alfredo Stroessner won as the candidato 4nico in Paraguay on July 11, 1954 (132,606 votes to 3,180 blanks) and assumed office August 15."1 However, political leadership generally is cautious about using candidato 4nico, because it may be inter- preted as an open, blunt repudiation of representative democracy and hence open the administration to attack at home and abroad. More frequently the astute jefe supremo of the country will select imposicion as a more subtle, mature method of realizing his objectives. For an outstanding caudillo, it is a relatively simple matter to persuade a respectable, distinguished man to run against him, with the understanding that the dummy candi- date will receive enough votes to make the campaign appear authentic and to maintain his honor. Candidato mnico is used much more frequently when one major party is unified, the others hopelessly fragmented. When victory for the latter seems utterly impossible they commonly will refuse to campaign, and will count their strength by the number of people who stay away from the polls. The Liberals have not campaigned in Colombia since the presidential elections of 1949. " The New York Times (Feb. 16, 1953; July 15, 1954; Aug. 16, 1954; May 11, 1954; Jan. 26, 1955).  148 The Caribbean In the congressional elections of May 11, 1952, President Oscar Osorio's Revolutionary Party for Democratic Unification (PRUD) ran unopposed in El Salvador. The opposition candi- dates withdrew at the last moment, charging the government with imposicion." IV. Continuismo The large number of long-term dictatorships in Latin America in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries points to the significance of continuismo. Continuismo is a peaceful, consti- tutional methodology for maintaining a chief executive in power beyond the legal term of his office. Garcia Calder6n thought of continuismo as a possible method of decreasing violence in poli- tics. In a thoughtful study which has had wide influence, he wrote: To increase the duration of the presidency in order to avoid the too frequent conflicts of parties; to simplify the political ma- chine, which transforms the increasingly numerous parliaments into mere bureaucratic institutions; to prolong the mandate of senators and deputies, so that the life of the people shall not be disturbed by continual elections; in short, to surrender the in- genuous dogmas of the political statutes in favour of concrete reforms: such would appear to be the ideal which in Tropical America-in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia-would arrest the de- structive action of revolutions." In the instances in which I have studied continuismo, I have always found the technique justified in part on the grounds that it would save the patria from inevitable violence. In this sense, it seems to me that Garcia Calder6n has a valid point. But the implication that continuismo is appropriate only for "tropical" America I cannot accept. Continuismo is a characteristic of His- panic culture, and illustrations of its use can be found not only * The New York Times (Jan. 29, 1955). " Francisco Garcia Calderon, Latin America: Its Rise and Progress (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 374. 148 The Caribbean In the congressional elections of May 11, 1952, President Oscar Osorio's Revolutionary Party for Democratic Unification (PRUD) ran unopposed in El Salvador. The opposition candi- dates withdrew at the last moment, charging the government with imposicidn." IV. Continuismo The large number of long-term dictatorships in Latin America in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries points to the significance of continuismo. Continuismo is a peaceful, consti- tutional methodology for maintaining a chief executive in power beyond the legal term of his office. Garcia Calder6n thought of continuismo as a possible method of decreasing violence in poli- tics. In a thoughtful study which has had wide influence, he wrote: To increase the duration of the presidency in order to avoid the too frequent conflicts of parties; to simplify the political ma- chine, which transforms the increasingly numerous parliaments into mere bureaucratic institutions; to prolong the mandate of senators and deputies, so that the life of the people shall not be disturbed by continual elections; in short, to surrender the in- genuous dogmas of the political statutes in favour of concrete reforms: such would appear to be the ideal which in Tropical America-in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia-would arrest the de- structive action of revolutions." In the instances in which I have studied continuismo, I have always found the technique justified in part on the grounds that it would save the patria from inevitable violence. In this sense, it seems to me that Garcia Calder6n has a valid point. But the implication that continuismo is appropriate only for "tropical" America I cannot accept. Continuismo is a characteristic of His- panic culture, and illustrations of its use can be found not only The New York Times (Jan. 29, 1955). " Francisco Gareia Caldern, Latin America: Its Rise and Progress (New York: Charles Scribne's Sons, 1913), p. 374. 148 The Caribbean In the congressional elections of May 11, 1952, President Oscar Osorio's Revolutionary Party for Democratic Unification (PRUD) ran unopposed in El Salvador. The opposition candi- dates withdrew at the last moment, charging the government with imposicidn." IV. Continuismo The large number of long-term dictatorships in Latin America in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries points to the significance of continuismo. Continuismo is a peaceful, consti- tutional methodology for maintaining a chief executive in power beyond the legal term of his office. Garcia Calderon thought of continuismo as a possible method of decreasing violence in poli- tics. In a thoughtful study which has had wide influence, he wrote: To increase the duration of the presidency in order to avoid the too frequent conflicts of parties; to simplify the political ma- chine, which transforms the increasingly numerous parliaments into mere bureaucratic institutions; to prolong the mandate of senators and deputies, so that the life of the people shall not be disturbed by continual elections; in short, to surrender the in- genuous dogmas of the political statutes in favour of concrete reforms: such would appear to be the ideal which in Tropical America-in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia-would arrest the de- structive action of revolutions." In the instances in which I have studied continuismo, I have always found the technique justified in part on the grounds that it would save the patria from inevitable violence. In this sense, it seems to me that Garcia Calderon has a valid point. But the implication that continuismo is appropriate only for "tropical" America I cannot accept. Continuismo is a characteristic of His- panic culture, and illustrations of its use can be found not only ' The New York Times (Jan. 29, 1955). " Francisco Garcia Calderon, Latin America: Its Rise and Progress (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 374.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 149 in Central America and the Caribbean, as Fitzgibbon has demon- strated in an important study published in 1940," but also in the larger countries of South America, including Argentina, usually regarded as the most advanced of the large countries of South America. From time to time in ahnost all of the Latin American countries a caudillo will discover at the termination of his tenure that no one wishes to challenge him, not necessarily because he has imposed a merciless dictatorship, eliminated all opposition, and repressed the legitimate desires of the people, but very possibly because he has proved himself to be an unusually popular leader. If he is a genuine jefe supremo, he very likely will be approached by representatives of major power groupings in the country with the appeal that he continue in office. If the constitution prohibits re-election, as it usually does-for Latin Americans believe alter- abilidad is a part of the values of legitimacy of the liberal-demo- cratic state-then continuismo must be embraced. This usually involves amending the constitution, drafting a new document (in which the major change will be a section providing for temporary abrogation of the "no re-election" article), enactment of legislative statute, plebiscite, or judicial interpretation. One or more of these conditions can be found in modern-day use of continuismo in Latin America. The new Argentine consti- tution of 1949, for example, eliminated the "no re-election" clause of the document of 1853 in order to permit General Juan Domingo Perin a second term of office." Almost any time an important leader is in power over a period of time, continuismo must be used. General Carias permitted continuismo in Hon- duras in 1936 and 1939. So did other Central American cau- " Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Continuismo in Central America and the Caribbean," Inter-American Quarterly, XI, 3 (July, 1940), 55-74. For details on continuismo in Honduras, see Stokes, "Honduras: An Area Study in Government," pp. 256-262. " Most studies I have seen of the new constitution have been critical. For one that applauds it, see J. Casiello, "Principios doctrinales que in- spiran la nueva constituciin argentina," Revista de Estudios Politicos, XXXVI, 56 (Madrid, marzo-abril, 1951), 155-167. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 149 in Central America and the Caribbean, as Fitzgibbon has demon- strated in an important study published in 1940," but also in the larger countries of South America, including Argentina, usually regarded as the most advanced of the large countries of South America. From time to time in almost all of the Latin American countries a caudillo will discover at the termination of his tenure that no one wishes to challenge him, not necessarily because he has imposed a merciless dictatorship, eliminated all opposition, and repressed the legitimate desires of the people, but very possibly because he has proved himself to be an unusually popular leader. If he is a genuine jefe supremo, he very likely will be approached by representatives of major power groupings in the country with the appeal that he continue in office. If the constitution prohibits re-election, as it usually does-for Latin Americans believe alter- abilidad is a part of the values of legitimacy of the liberal-demo- cratic state-then continuismo must be embraced. This usually involves amending the constitution, drafting a new document (in which the major change will be a section providing for temporary abrogation of the "no re-election" article), enactment of legislative statute, plebiscite, or judicial interpretation. One or more of these conditions can be found in modern-day use of continuismo in Latin America. The new Argentine consti- tution of 1949, for example, eliminated the "no re-election" clause of the document of 1853 in order to permit General Juan Domingo Per6n a second term of office." Almost any time an important leader is in power over a period of time, continuismo must be used. General Carias permitted continuismo in Hon- duras in 1936 and 1939. So did other Central American can- " Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Continuismo in Central America and the Caribbean," tnter-American Quarterly, XI, 3 (July, 1940), 55-74. For details on continuismo in Honduras, see Stokes, "Honduras: An Area Study in Government," pp. 256-262. o Most studies I have seen of the new constitution have been critical. For one that applauds it, see J. Casiello, "Principios doctrinales quoe in- spiran la nueva constitucion argentina," Revista de Estudios Politicos, XXXVI, 56 (Madrid, marzo-abril, 1951), 155-167. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 149 in Central America and the Caribbean, as Fitzgibbon has demon- strated in an important study published in 1940," but also in the larger countries of South America, including Argentina, usually regarded as the most advanced of the large countries of South America. From time to time in almost all of the Latin American countries a caudillo will discover at the termination of his tenure that no one wishes to challenge him, not necessarily because he has imposed a merciless dictatorship, eliminated all opposition, and repressed the legitimate desires of the people, but very possibly because he has proved himself to be an unusually popular leader. If he is a genuine jefe supremo, he very likely will be approached by representatives of major power groupings in the country with the appeal that he continue in office. If the constitution prohibits re-election, as it usually does-for Latin Americans believe alter- abilidad is a part of the values of legitimacy of the liberal-demo- cratic state-then continuismo must be embraced. This usually involves amending the constitution, drafting a new document (in which the major change will be a section providing for temporary abrogation of the "no re-election" article), enactment of legislative statute, plebiscite, or judicial interpretation. One or more of these conditions can be found in modern-day use of continuismo in Latin America. The new Argentine consti- tution of 1949, for example, eliminated the "no re-election" clause of the document of 1853 in order to permit General Juan Domingo Perin a second term of office."t Almost any time an important leader is in power over a period of time, continuismo must be used. General Carias permitted continuismo in Hon- duras in 1936 and 1939. So did other Central American can- " Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Continuismo in Central America and the Caribbean," Inter-American Quarterly, XI, 3 (July, 1940), 55-74. For details on continuismo in Honduras, see Stokes, "Honduras: An Area Study in Government," pp. 256-262. " Most studies I have seen of the new constitution have been critical. For one that applauds it, see J. Casiello, "Principios doctrinales que in- spiran la nueva constitucion argentina," Revista de Estudios Politicos, XXXVI, 56 (Madrid, marzo-abril, 1951), 155-167.  150 The Caribbean dillos in the same period. Getulio Vargas had finally been persuaded to call for presidential elections in 1938 in Brazil. However, when the Supreme Court declared that the constitution meant that President Vargas could not succeed himself, the elections were suspended, martial law declared, and the 1937 constitution of the Estado Novo brought forth, which permitted the great leader to continue until he was ousted by force in 1945. Even after being restored to power by election in 1950, President Vargas seemed, in 1954, to be bending all efforts to get a pro- Vargas Congress, above all a pro-Vargas Senate, elected. Under the Brazilian Constitution of 1946, Vargas could not be re- elected. But with strong backing in Congress, the constitution could be amended (no referendum or direct approval of the voters required) to permit continuismo. Study of the Brazilian press at that time would lead one to believe that many people thought President Vargas hoped for continuismo. In La Paz in July, 1955, I gathered the impression that the National Revo- lutionary Movement (MNR) was seeking some way to permit Victor Paz Estenssoro to continue beyond his constitutional term. I was told that a Constituent Assembly would be held late in 1955 to rewrite the constitution and draft Paz Estenssoro for another term. Continuismo as a peaceful procedure for continuing the chief executive power has been used in Latin America in the nineteenth century as well as in the twentieth." It is an idea of public power deeply rooted in Hispanic culture. Like other methods for mobilizing political power here discussed, it requires skill for suc- cessful use. Failures are not uncommon. For example, although " Many illustrations could be cited. In Venezuela, continuismo was effected in 1856 by the traditional method of changing the constitution. In 1882 the Congress unanimously voted that Guzmsn Blanco should continue as president despite the fact that the new constitution declared that Congress was to elect the president from the members of the Federal Council, of which Guzmin Blanco was not a member. See Wise, pp. 49, 100. In the Dominican Republic, Pedro Santana got a new con- stitution in 1854 which extended his term to two terms of six years each. See Hauch, p. 65. 150 The Caribbean 150 The Caribbean dillos in the same period. Getulio Vargas had finally been persuaded to call for presidential elections in 1938 in Brazil. However, when the Supreme Court declared that the constitution meant that President Vargas could not succeed himself, the elections were suspended, martial law declared, and the 1937 constitution of the Estado Novo brought forth, which permitted the great leader to continue until he was ousted by force in 1945. Even after being restored to power by election in 1950, President Vargas seemed, in 1954, to be bending all efforts to get a pro- Vargas Congress, above all a pro-Vargas Senate, elected. Under the Brazilian Constitution of 1946, Vargas could not be re- elected. But with strong backing in Congress, the constitution could be amended (no referendum or direct approval of the voters required) to permit continuismo. Study of the Brazilian press at that time would lead one to believe that many people thought President Vargas hoped for continuismo. In La Paz in July, 1955, I gathered the impression that the National Revo- lutionary Movement (MNR) was seeking some way to permit Victor Paz Estenssoro to continue beyond his constitutional term. I was told that a Constituent Assembly would be held late in 1955 to rewrite the constitution and draft Paz Estenssoro for another term. Continuismo as a peaceful procedure for continuing the chief executive power has been used in Latin America in the nineteenth century as well as in the twentieth." It is an idea of public power deeply rooted in Hispanic culture. Like other methods for mobilizing political power here discussed, it requires skill for suc- cessful use. Failures are not uncommon. For example, although " Many illustrations could be cited. In Venezuela, continuismo was effected in 1856 by the traditional method of changing the constitution. In 1882 the Congress unanimously voted that Guzman Blanco should continue as president despite the fact that the new constitution declared that Congress was to elect the president from the members of the Federal Council, of which Guzman Blanco was not a member. See Wise, pp. 49, 100. In the Dominican Republic, Pedro Santana got a new con- stitution in 1854 which extended his term to two terms of six years each. See Hauch, p. 65. dillos in the same period. Getulio Vargas had finally been persuaded to call for presidential elections in 1938 in Brazil. However, when the Supreme Court declared that the constitution meant that President Vargas could not succeed himself, the elections were suspended, martial law declared, and the 1937 constitution of the Estado Novo brought forth, which permitted the great leader to continue until he was ousted by force in 1945. Even after being restored to power by election in 1950, President Vargas seemed, in 1954, to be bending all efforts to get a pro- Vargas Congress, above all a pro-Vargas Senate, elected. Under the Brazilian Constitution of 1946, Vargas could not be re- elected. But with strong backing in Congress, the constitution could be amended (no referendum or direct approval of the voters required) to permit continuismo. Study of the Brazilian press at that time would lead one to believe that many people thought President Vargas hoped for continuismo. In La Paz in July, 1955, I gathered the impression that the National Revo- lutionary Movement (MNR) was seeking some way to permit Victor Paz Estenssoro to continue beyond his constitutional term. I was told that a Constituent Assembly would be held late in 1955 to rewrite the constitution and draft Paz Estenssoro for another term. Continuismo as a peaceful procedure for continuing the chief executive power has been used in Latin America in the nineteenth century as well as in the twentieth." It is an idea of public power deeply rooted in Hispanic culture. Like other methods for mobilizing political power here discussed, it requires skill for suc- cessful use. Failures are not uncommon. For example, although * Many illustrations could be cited. In Venezuela, continuismo was effected in 1856 by the traditional method of changing the constitution. In 1882 the Congress unanimously voted that Guzmin Blanco should continue as president despite the fact that the new constitution declared that Congress was to elect the president from the members of the Federal Council, of which Guzmdn Blanco was not a member. See Wise, pp. 49, 100. In the Dominican Republic, Pedro Santana got a new con- stitution in 1854 which extended his term to two terms of six years each. See Hauch, p. 65.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 151 Elie Lescot of Haiti acquired power by imposicidn in 1941 and was able to effect continuismo in 1944 by vote of the House and Senate, he was ousted by force in January, 1946. After an interim government, Congress elected Dumarsais Estimi president in August, 1946. When Estim4 tried to continue, the army inter- vened to deny his aspirations." V. Elections The electoral method, in the Anglo-American and Western European sense, has been employed at least once in all of the Latin American countries. This method of mobilizing political power presupposes certain conditions: (1) the existence of an opposition which is tolerated by the government and free to organize; (2) the availability of the media of communication (public addresses, newspapers, printed literature, radio, and tele- vision) to opposition groups; (3) universal suffrage; (4) demo- cratic, workable election procedures; (5) honest counting of the ballots; and (6), most important of all, a willingness on the part of those with power and influence in the community to accept adverse results without resorting to violence. Some of these conditions are satisfied in almost all of the Latin American countries at the present time. Universal suffrage is accepted as a principle. In practice, even illiterates are widely welcomed into the electorate. It is doubtful whether more than two or three countries will be holding out against women's suf- frage by the end of 1955. The legal provisions for the organiza- tion of parties, electoral campaigns, and polling compare favorably with the most advanced legislation to be found anywhere. In a culture in which the written and spoken word have high status, it is impossible, even in a dictatorship, to deny totally the benefits of the media of communication to the opposition. " The Milwaukee Journal (Jan. 3, 1954). The cultural background of Haitian politics is well described in Dantes Bellegarde, La Nation Hai- tienne (Paris: Gigord, 1938), 359 pp., passim. For a recent, popular account see Wenzell Brown, Angry Men-Laughing Men (New York, 1947), p. 94. On the fall of Estire, see Theodore Draper, "Haiti: Re- turn of the Elite," The Reporter (Oct. 2, 1951), 17-21. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 151 Elie Lescot of Haiti acquired power by imposicion in 1941 and was able to effect continuismo in 1944 by vote of the House and Senate, he was ousted by force in January, 1946. After an interim government, Congress elected Dumarsais Estim4 president in August, 1946. When Estim4 tried to continue, the army inter- vened to deny his aspirations." V. Elections The electoral method, in the Anglo-American and Western European sense, has been employed at least once in all of the Latin American countries. This method of mobilizing political power presupposes certain conditions: (1) the existence of an opposition which is tolerated by the government and free to organize; (2) the availability of the media of communication (public addresses, newspapers, printed literature, radio, and tele- vision) to opposition groups; (3) universal suffrage; (4) demo- cratic, workable election procedures; (5) honest counting of the ballots; and (6), most important of all, a willingness on the part of those with power and influence in the community to accept adverse results without resorting to violence. Some of these conditions are satisfied in almost all of the Latin American countries at the present time. Universal suffrage is accepted as a principle. In practice, even illiterates are widely welcomed into the electorate. It is doubtful whether more than two or three countries will be holding out against women's suf- frage by the end of 1955. The legal provisions for the organiza- tion of parties, electoral campaigns, and polling compare favorably with the most advanced legislation to be found anywhere. In a culture in which the written and spoken word have high status, it is impossible, even in a dictatorship, to deny totally the benefits of the media of communication to the opposition. " The Milwaukee Journal (Jan. 3, 1954). The cultural background of Haitian politics is well described in Dantes Bellegarde, La Nation Hai- tienne (Paris: Gigord, 1938), 359 pp., passim. For a recent, popular account see Wenzell Brown, Angry Men-Laughing Men (New York, 1947), p. 94. On the fall of Estim6, see Theodore Draper, "Haiti: Re- turn of the Elite," The Reporter (Oct. 2, 1951), 17-21. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 151 Elie Lescot of Haiti acquired power by imposicidn in 1941 and was able to effect continuismo in 1944 by vote of the House and Senate, he was ousted by force in January, 1946. After an interim government, Congress elected Dumarsais Estim4 president in August, 1946. When Estimd tried to continue, the army inter- vened to deny his aspirations." V. Elections The electoral method, in the Anglo-American and Western European sense, has been employed at least once in all of the Latin American countries. This method of mobilizing political power presupposes certain conditions: (1) the existence of an opposition which is tolerated by the government and free to organize; (2) the availability of the media of communication (public addresses, newspapers, printed literature, radio, and tele- vision) to opposition groups; (3) universal suffrage; (4) demo- cratic, workable election procedures; (5) honest counting of the ballots; and (6), most important of all, a willingness on the part of those with power and influence in the community to accept adverse results without resorting to violence. Some of these conditions are satisfied in almost all of the Latin American countries at the present time. Universal suffrage is accepted as a principle. In practice, even illiterates are widely welcomed into the electorate. It is doubtful whether more than two or three countries will be holding out against women's suf- frage by the end of 1955. The legal provisions for the organiza- tion of parties, electoral campaigns, and polling compare favorably with the most advanced legislation to be found anywhere. In a culture in which the written and spoken word have high status, it is impossible, even in a dictatorship, to deny totally the benefits of the media of communication to the opposition. " The Milwaukee Journal (Jan. 3, 1954). The cultural background of Haitian politics is well described in Dantes Bellegarde, La Nation Hai- tienne (Paris: Gigord, 1938), 359 pp., passim. For a recent, popular account see Wenzell Brown, Angry Men-Laughing Men (New York, 1947), p. 94. On the fall of Estim6, see Theodore Draper, "Haiti: Re- turn of the Elite," The Reporter (Oct. 2, 1951), 17-21.  152 The Caribbean Without applying our criteria so inflexibly as purposely to make the record seem undistinguished, what are some examples of the use of the electoral method in Latin America in the recent past? After violence and intolerance in the nineteenth century, Costa Rica developed a formula for politcial stability with more frequent democratic elections than the other Central American republics. An illustration of a democratic election in Costa Rica was that of July 26, 1953, in which Jose Figueres of the National Liberation Party received 121,108 votes to 65,625 for Fernando Castro Cervantes of the Democratic Party, his nearest competitor. Two other candidates were in the race." The October 28, 1928 election in Honduras was democratic. Dr. Vicente Mejia Colindres won with 62,319 to 47,745 for General Tiburcio Carias Andino. The government at the time was controlled by General Carias' party. Power changed hands peacefully. The October 28, 1932 election was also democratic, and power again changed from one major political group to another. This time Dr. Carias won with 81,211 votes to 61,643 for his opponent, Dr. Angel Zdiiga Huete." I haven't been able to study the documentary materials first hand or to talk to reliable informants, but my good friend Miguel Jorrin believes that the March, 1950, elections in El Salvador, won by Oscar Osorio, were free." Presi- dent Fulgencio Batista probably gave Cuba its most democratic election in recent times in the 1944 contest which was won by his enemy, Dr. Ram6n Grau San Martin with a majority of 181,890 votes out of a total of 1,821,710." Although tragic in its long-term consequences, the presidential elections of 1946 in Colombia were democratic. The Liberal vote was split between Jorge Eliecer Gaitdn and Dr. Gabriel Turbay, which permitted the Conservative Mariano Ospina Pirez to win, even though the two Liberal candidates received a majority of about 140,000." * The New York Times (July 27, July 28, and July 29, 1953). Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government, pp. 242-256. " Miguel Jorrin, Political Instability in Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1953), p. 9. * Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, " 351-355. " See El Tiempo and other BogotS newspapers for this period. In addi- 152 The Caribbean Without applying our criteria so inflexibly as purposely to make the record seem undistinguished, what are some examples of the use of the electoral method in Latin America in the recent past? After violence and intolerance in the nineteenth century, Costa Rica developed a formula for politcial stability with more frequent democratic elections than the other Central American republics. An illustration of a democratic election in Costa Rica was that of July 26, 1953, in which Jos4 Figueres of the National Liberation Party received 121,108 votes to 65,625 for Fernando Castro Cervantes of the Democratic Party, his nearest competitor. Two other candidates were in the race." The October 28, 1928 election in Honduras was democratic. Dr. Vicente Mejia Colindres won with 62,319 to 47,745 for General Tiburcio Caras Andino. The government at the time was controlled by General Carias' party. Power changed hands peacefully. The October 28, 1932 election was also democratic, and power again changed from one major political group to another. This time Dr. Carias won with 81,211 votes to 61,643 for his opponent, Dr. Angel Z6niga Huete." I haven't been able to study the documentary materials first hand or to talk to reliable informants, but my good friend Miguel Jorrin believes that the March, 1950, elections in El Salvador, won by Oscar Osorio, were free." Presi- dent Fulgencio Batista probably gave Cuba its most democratic election in recent times in the 1944 contest which was won by his enemy, Dr. Ram6n Gran San Martin with a majority of 181,890 votes out of a total of 1,821,710." Although tragic in its long-term consequences, the presidential elections of 1946 in Colombia were democratic. The Liberal vote was split between Jorge Eliecer Gaitan and Dr. Gabriel Turbay, which permitted the Conservative Mariano Ospina Perez to win, even though the two Liberal candidates received a majority of about 140,000." * The New York Times (July 27, July 28, and July 29, 1953). Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government, pp. 242-256. Miguel Jorrin, Political Instability in Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1953), p. 9. " Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, " 351-355. r See El Tiempo and other Bogoti newspapers for this period. In addi- 152 The Caribbean Without applying our criteria so inflexibly as purposely to make the record seem undistinguished, what are some examples of the use of the electoral method in Latin America in the recent past? After violence and intolerance in the nineteenth century, Costa Rica developed a formula for politcial stability with more frequent democratic elections than the other Central American republics. An illustration of a democratic election in Costa Rica was that of July 26, 1953, in which Jose Figueres of the National Liberation Party received 121,108 votes to 65,625 for Fernando Castro Cervantes of the Democratic Party, his nearest competitor. Two other candidates were in the race." The October 28, 1928 election in Honduras was democratic. Dr. Vicente Mejia Colindres won with 62,319 to 47,745 for General Tiburcio Carias Andino. The government at the time was controlled by General Carias' party. Power changed hands peacefully. The October 28, 1932 election was also democratic, and power again changed from one major political group to another. This time Dr. Carias won with 81,211 votes to 61,643 for his opponent, Dr. Angel Ziliga Huete." I haven't been able to study the documentary materials first hand or to talk to reliable informants, but my good friend Miguel Jorrin believes that the March, 1950, elections in El Salvador, won by Oscar Osorio, were free." Presi- dent Fulgencio Batista probably gave Cuba its most democratic election in recent times in the 1944 contest which was won by his enemy, Dr. Ram6n Grau San Martin with a majority of 181,890 votes out of a total of 1,821,710." Although tragic in its long-term consequences, the presidential elections of 1946 in Colombia were democratic. The Liberal vote was split between Jorge Eliecer Gaitan and Dr. Gabriel Turbay, which permitted the Conservative Mariano Ospina Pirez to win, even though the two Liberal candidates received a majority of about 140,000." ' The New York Times (July 27, July 28, and July 29, 1953). * Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government, pp. 242-256. "* Miguel Jorrin, Political Instability in Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1953), p. 9. " Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, " 351-355. " See El Tiempo and other Bogoti newspapers for this period. In addi-  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 153 The best records for employing the electoral method for mobilizing power in South America are enjoyed by Uruguay and Chile. Although the Colorados have dominated in Uruguay dur- ing the entire twentieth century and the latter part of the nine- teenth as well, the elections have been fair." Chile's elections have been orderly and reasonably democratic since 1932. Gen- eral Carlos Ibdnez del Campo won the presidency in elections of September 2, 1952, from the Radicals who had been govern- ing for fourteen years. The government (Radical) candidate ran third out of four presidential aspirants. The Congress confirmed General Ibdtiez' election on October 24 by a vote of 132-12, and power changed hands peacefully." Although Argentina has had honest elections in Buenos Aires, I am inclined to think the only democratic national election in recent decades was the elec- tion of Hip6lito Irigoyen in 1916. Harold Osborne claims that the May 6, 1951, elections in Bolivia were not rigged. Victor Paz Estenssoro got 54,129 out of 126,125 votes, thus failing to win the majority required by the constitution. Unfortunately, General Hugo Balliviin seized power by force before Congress could fulfill its duty of selecting a president from the three tion, see The New York Times (June 15, 1953). For background infor- mation, see Josei Maria Samper, Derecho publico intern de Colombia (BogotA: Biblioteca Popular Culturea Colombiana, 1951), I, 428; II, 526, passim; Rafael N65ez, op. cit., VII; Guerra, op. cit., Vols. II, III, and IV, and Francisco de P. Perez, Derecho constitucional colombiana (Bogota: Biblioteca de Autores Colombianos, 4th ed., n.d.), I, 341; II, 414, passim. Alberto Zum Felde, Evolucidn historial del Uruguay (Montevideo: Maximino Garcia, n.d.), 291 pp., passim; Fitzgibbon, Uruguay, op. cit., pp. 137-167; George Pendle, Uruguay (London: Royal Institute of Inter- national Afairs, 1952), pp. 9-34, 89-93; Taylor, pp. 58-64. a The New York Times (Oct. 25, 1952; March 2, 1953). For works on recent elections and election problems in Chile, see Gilbert J. Rutland, Chile (London: Royal Institute of International Afairs, 1951), pp. 2946; A. Silva-Bascuian, "La physionomie constitutionnelle du Chili," Revue Internationale de Droit Compari, II, 1 (janv.-mars, 1950), 91-107; Gabriel AunaAtegui, Partidos politicos (Santiago: Editorial Juri- dica de Chile, 1952,) 284 pp., passim; Ricardo Cruz Coke, Geografia electoral de Chile (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1952), 139 pp., passim. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 153 The best records for employing the electoral method for mobilizing power in South America are enjoyed by Uruguay and Chile. Although the Colorados have dominated in Uruguay dur- ing the entire twentieth century and the latter part of the nine- teenth as well, the elections have been fair." Chile's elections have been orderly and reasonably democratic since 1932. Gen- eral Carlos Ibdiez del Campo won the presidency in elections of September 2, 1952, from the Radicals who had been govern- ing for fourteen years. The government (Radical) candidate ran third out of four presidential aspirants. The Congress confirmed General Ibinez' election on October 24 by a vote of 132-12, and power changed hands peacefully." Although Argentina has had honest elections in Buenos Aires, I am inclined to think the only democratic national election in recent decades was the elec- tion of Hipolito Irigoyen in 1916. Harold Osborne claims that the May 6, 1951, elections in Bolivia were not rigged. Victor Paz Estenssoro got 54,129 out of 126,125 votes, thus failing to win the majority required by the constitution. Unfortunately, General Hugo Ballivian seized power by force before Congress could fulfill its duty of selecting a president from the three tion, see The New York Times (June 15, 1953). For background infor- mation, see Jose Maria Samper, Derecho publico interno de Colombia (BogotA: Biblioteca Popular Cultura Colombiana, 1951), I, 428; II, 526, passim; Rafael Nniez, op. cit., VII; Guerra, op. cit., Vols. II, III, and IV, and Francisco de P. Perez, Derecho constitucional colombiana (Bogota: Biblioteca de Autores Colombianos, 4th ed., n.d.), I, 341; II, 414, passim. " Alberto Zum Felde, Evolucion historial del Uruguay (Montevideo: Maximino Garcia, n.d.), 291 pp., passim; Fitzgibbon, Uruguay, op. cit., pp. 137-167; George Pendle, Uruguay (London: Royal Institute of Inter- national Afairs, 1952), pp. 9-34, 89-93; Taylor, pp. 58-64. The New York Times (Oct. 25, 1952; March 2, 1953). For works on recent elections and election problems in Chile, see Gilbert J. Brutland, Chile (London: Royal Institute of International Afairs, 1951), pp. 2946; A. Silva-Bascunan, "La physionomie constitutionnelle du Chili," Revue Internationale de Droit Compari, It, 1 (janv.-mars, 1950), 91-107; Gabriel Amunstegui, Partidos politicos (Santiago: Editorial Juri- dica de Chile, 1952,) 284 pp., passim; Ricardo Cruz Coke, Geografia electoral de Chile (Santiago: Editorial del Pacic, 1952), 139 pp., passim. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 153 The best records for employing the electoral method for mobilizing power in South America are enjoyed by Uruguay and Chile. Although the Colorados have dominated in Uruguay dur- ing the entire twentieth century and the latter part of the nine- teenth as well, the elections have been fair.t Chile's elections have been orderly and reasonably democratic since 1932. Gen- eral Carlos Ibinez del Campo won the presidency in elections of September 2, 1952, from the Radicals who had been govern- ing for fourteen years. The government (Radical) candidate ran third out of four presidential aspirants. The Congress confirmed General Ibinez' election on October 24 by a vote of 132-12, and power changed hands peacefully." Although Argentina has had honest elections in Buenos Aires, I am inclined to think the only democratic national election in recent decades was the elec- tion of Hip6lito Irigoyen in 1916. Harold Osborne claims that the May 6, 1951, elections in Bolivia were not rigged. Victor Paz Estenssoro got 54,129 out of 126,125 votes, thus failing to win the majority required by the constitution. Unfortunately, General Hugo Balliviin seized power by force before Congress could fulfill its duty of selecting a president from the three tion, see The New York Times (June 15, 1953). For background infor- mation, see Jose Maria Samper, Derecho publico interno de Colombia (Bogoti: Biblioteca Popular Cultura Colombiana, 1951), I, 428; II, 526, passim; Rafael Ndnez, op. cit., VII; Guerra, op. cit., Vols. II, III, and IV, and Francisco de P. Pirez, Derecho constitucional colombiana (Bogoti: Biblioteca de Autores Colombianos, 4th ed., n.d.), I, 341; II, 414, passim. " Alberto Zum Felde, Evolucidn historial del Uruguay (Montevideo: Maxhino Garcia, n.d.), 291 pp., passim; Fitzgibbon, Uruguay, op. cit., pp. 137-167; George Pendle, Uruguay (London: Royal Institute of Inter- national Affairs, 1952), pp. 9-34, 89-93; Taylor, pp. 58-64. " The New York Times (Oct. 25, 1952; March 2, 1953). For works on recent elections and election problems in Chile, see Gilbert J. Butland, Chile (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), pp. 29-46; A. Silva-Bascunan, "La physionomie constitutionnelle du Chili," Revue Internationale de Droit Compari, II, 1 (janv.-mars, 1950), 91-107; Gabriel Amunitegui, Partidos politicos (Santiago: Editorial Juri- dica de Chile, 1952,) 284 pp., passim; Ricardo Cruz Coke, Geografia electoral de Chile (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1952), 139 pp., passim.  154 The Caribbean leading candidates." The election of 1950, in which Getulio Vargas won with 3,800,000 votes out of 7,900,000, qualifies as a democratic election, as does the election of October 3, 1955, which was won by Juscelino Kubitschek with 2,745,024 votes as against 2,340,756 votes for Major General Juarez Tavora, his nearest competitor. (These figures were as of October 12, 1955.) I made a special effort to determine whether an im- posicion was under way in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in August, 1955. Although many people believed sharp practices were going on, and that some votes would be purchased, there was confidence that the elections would be generally honest." However, all through the campaign and later, Carlos Lacerda, editor of Tribuna da Imprensa in Rio, has argued for a golpe to be led by the military to set aside the election results. I met the editor in the Military Club in Rio and asked whether he was still in support of a golpe. He assured me that he was. Ecuador has had two recent democratic elections. The first was on June 6, 1948, when Galo Plaza Lasso won with 115,835 votes to his Conservative opponent's 112,052." Lilo Linke, in a volume respected in Ecuador for its accuracy and interpretation, states that the elections of June, 1952, in which Dr. Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra won by about 150,000 votes to 116,000 for the Con- servative and 84,000 votes for the Liberal candidates, was an honest election."s Reasonably honest, democratic elections therefore appear from time to time in all of the Latin American countries. Such elec- tions occur frequently in a small minority of the Latin American countries. Some Latin Americanists point with pride at each " Harold Osborne, Bolivia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 64. See also The New York Times (Apr. I1 and Apr. 16, 1952). " In addition to the Brazilian press, see The New York Times (Oct. 13, 1955). " Stokes, "Ecuador," The Americana Annual (1948). See also George I. Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), pp. 76.82. " Lilo Linke, Ecuador (London: Royal Institute of International Af- fairs, 1954), p. 32. 154 The Caribbean leading candidates." The election of 1950, in which Getulio Vargas won with 3,800,000 votes out of 7,900,000, qualifies as a democratic election, as does the election of October 3, 1955, which was won by Juscelino Kubitschek with 2,745,024 votes as against 2,340,756 votes for Major General Juarez Tavora, his nearest competitor. (These figures were as of October 12, 1955.) I made a special effort to determine whether an im- posicion was under way in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in August, 1955. Although many people believed sharp practices were going on, and that some votes would be purchased, there was confidence that the elections would be generally honest." However, all through the campaign and later, Carlos Lacerda, editor of Tribuna da Imprensa in Rio, has argued for a golpe to be led by the military to set aside the election results. I met the editor in the Military Club in Rio and asked whether he was still in support of a golpe. He assured me that he was. Ecuador has had two recent democratic elections. The first was on June 6, 1948, when Galo Plaza Lasso won with 115,835 votes to his Conservative opponent's 112,052.". Lilo Linke, in a volume respected in Ecuador for its accuracy and interpretation, states that the elections of June, 1952, in which Dr. Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra won by about 150,000 votes to 116,000 for the Con- servative and 84,000 votes for the Liberal candidates, was an honest election." Reasonably honest, democratic elections therefore appear from time to time in all of the Latin American countries. Such elec- tions occur frequently in a small minority of the Latin American countries. Some Latin Americanists point with pride at each " Harold Osborne, Bolivia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 64. See also The New York Times (Apr. 11 and Apr. 16, 1952). " In addition to the Brazilian press, see The New York Times (Oct. 13, 1955). " Stokes, "Ecuador," The Americana Annual (1948). See also George I. Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), pp. 76-82. " Lilo Linke, Ecuador (London: Royal Institute of International Af- fairs, 1954), p. 32. 154 The Caribbean leading candidates." The election of 1950, in which Getulio Vargas won with 3,800,000 votes out of 7,900,000, qualifies as a democratic election, as does the election of October 3, 1955, which was won by Juscelino Kubitschek with 2,745,024 votes as against 2,340,756 votes for Major General Juarez Tavora, his nearest competitor. (These figures were as of October 12, 1955.) I made a special effort to determine whether an im- posicidn was under way in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in August, 1955. Although many people believed sharp practices were going on, and that some votes would be purchased, there was confidence that the elections would be generally honest." However, all through the campaign and later, Carlos Lacerda, editor of Tribuna da Imprensa in Rio, has argued for a golpe to be led by the military to set aside the election results. I met the editor in the Military Club in Rio and asked whether he was still in support of a golpe. He assured me that he was. Ecuador has had two recent democratic elections. The first was on June 6, 1948, when Galo Plaza Lasso won with 115,835 votes to his Conservative opponent's 112,052." Lilo Linke, in a volume respected in Ecuador for its accuracy and interpretation, states that the elections of June, 1952, in which Dr. Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra won by about 150,000 votes to 116,000 for the Con- servative and 84,000 votes for the Liberal candidates, was an honest election." Reasonably honest, democratic elections therefore appear from time to time in all of the Latin American countries. Such elec- tions occur frequently in a small minority of the Latin American countries. Some Latin Americanists point with pride at each " Harold Osborne, Bolivia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 64. See also The New York Times (Apr. 11 and Apr. 16, 1952). " In addition to the Brazilian press, see The New York Times (Oct. 13, 1955). " Stokes, "Ecuador," The Americana Annual (1948). See also George . Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), pp. 76-82. " Lilo Linke, Ecuador (London: Royal Institute of International Af- fairs, 1954), p. 32.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 155 democratic triumph, dismiss antidemocratic methods as unrepre- sentative or even irrelevant, and insist that despite everything Latin America is democratic. This seems to be the point of view of Samuel Guy Inman, who is a keen student of Latin American affairs and widely respected by liberal groups in the Hemisphere. He writes: There is no doubt, whatever cynics or "realists" may say, that Latin America believes fundamentally in democracy." It is my hypothesis, however, that elections in the Anglo- American sense for the determination of executive leadership are resorted to mainly in Latin America when more satisfactory methods have for one reason or another proved inadequate. Election under such circumstances is not likely to produce a strong, popular leader, but the technique may provide time for reassembling and again bringing into play the more fundamental bases for determining political power. Latin American culture in the political realm still generally seeks authority, hierarchy, cen- tralization, and supreme, absolute government by the great man. VI. Conclusions If the assumption of force in Latin American politics to permit the outstanding leader to have power immediately-without the limitations of time, tenure, and method as established by the constitution and laws-can be accepted, then the question quite fairly can be raised: Why use nonviolent techniques of mobilizing power at all? The most important reason, which has already been stressed, is that the techniques of the liberal-democratic state produce legitimacy in Western culture as nothing else can. In addition, the following reasons merit consideration: (1) the need for the friendship and financial assistance of the United States, and to a lesser extent of the European democracies, dic- tates at least superficial respect for the political ideals of the liberal-democratic state; (2) elections have a public opinion role " Samuel Guy Inman, Latin America, Its Place in World Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 6. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 155 democratic triumph, dismiss antidemocratic methods as unrepre- sentative or even irrelevant, and insist that despite everything Latin America is democratic. This seems to be the point of view of Samuel Guy Inman, who is a keen student of Latin American affairs and widely respected by liberal groups in the Hemisphere. He writes: There is no doubt, whatever cynics or "realists" may say, that Latin America believes fundamentally in democracy." It is my hypothesis, however, that elections in the Anglo- American sense for the determination of executive leadership are resorted to mainly in Latin America when more satisfactory methods have for one reason or another proved inadequate. Election under such circumstances is not likely to produce a strong, popular leader, but the technique may provide time for reassembling and again bringing into play the more fundamental bases for determining political power. Latin American culture in the political reahn still generally seeks authority, hierarchy, cen- tralization, and supreme, absolute government by the great man. VI. Conclusions If the assumption of force in Latin American politics to permit the outstanding leader to have power immediately-without the limitations of time, tenure, and method as established by the constitution and laws-can be accepted, then the question quite fairly can be raised: Why use nonviolent techniques of mobilizing power at all? The most important reason, which has already been stressed, is that the techniques of the liberal-democratic state produce legitimacy in Western culture as nothing else can. In addition, the following reasons merit consideration: (1) the need for the friendship and financial assistance of the United States, and to a lesser extent of the European democracies, dic- tates at least superficial respect for the political ideals of the liberal-democratic state; (2) elections have a public opinion role Samuel Guy Inman, Latin America, Its Place in World Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 6. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 155 democratic triumph, dismiss antidemocratic methods as unrepre- sentative or even irrelevant, and insist that despite everything Latin America is democratic. This seems to be the point of view of Samuel Guy Inman, who is a keen student of Latin American affairs and widely respected by liberal groups in the Hemisphere. He writes: There is no doubt, whatever cynics or "realists" may say, that Latin America believes fundamentally in democracy." It is my hypothesis, however, that elections in the Anglo- American sense for the determination of executive leadership are resorted to mainly in Latin America when more satisfactory methods have for one reason or another proved inadequate. Election under such circumstances is not likely to produce a strong, popular leader, but the technique may provide time for reassembling and again bringing into play the more fundamental bases for determining political power. Latin American culture in the political realm still generally seeks authority, hierarchy, cen- tralization, and supreme, absolute government by the great man. VI. Conclusions If the assumption of force in Latin American politics to permit the outstanding leader to have power immediately-without the limitations of time, tenure, and method as established by the constitution and laws-can be accepted, then the question quite fairly can be raised: Why use nonviolent techniques of mobilizing power at all? The most important reason, which has already been stressed, is that the techniques of the liberal-democratic state produce legitimacy in Western culture as nothing else can. In addition, the following reasons merit consideration: (1) the need for the friendship and financial assistance of the United States, and to a lesser extent of the European democracies, dic- tates at least superficial respect for the political ideals of the liberal-democratic state; (2) elections have a public opinion role - Samuel Guy Inman, Latin America, Its Place in World Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 6.  156 The Caribbean to perform for the government-through the media of communi- cation the government can help to strengthen the conviction that it has chosen the right candidate; (3) elections are also useful to the opposition which can employ the campaigns to build up moral justification for revolt, and (4) there is the belief that the electoral technique of the liberal-democratic state should be developed as the most satisfactory procedure for organizing and changing governments." There was a great deal of literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which was pessimistic as to the possibilities for democratic development in Latin America. Most of such works argued that superimposing democratic structures.on social and economic systems based on hierarchy and authoritarianism would lead only to failure. Some major works of this kind are: Jose Ingenieros, Sociologia argentina (first published in 1913); Jose Ingenieros, El hombre mediocre (first published in 1903); Juan Agustin Garcia, La ciudad indiana (2nd edition, 1909); Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Conflicto y armonias de las razas en America (first published in 1883); Alcides Arguedas, Pueblo enfermo (1910); Albert Hale, The South Americans (1907); James Bryce, South America, Observations and Impressions (1914); C. Reginald Enock, The Republics of Central and South America (1913); Charles Edmond Akers, A History of South America, 1854- 1904 (1904); Salvador Mendieta, La enfermedad de Centro-America (1934); Manuel Gonzalez Prada, Horas de lucha (first published in 1908); Jose Carlos Mariitegui, Siete ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana (1934); Luis F. Aguilar, Cuestiones indigenas (1922); and Jaramillo Alvarado, El indio ecuatoriano (1925). Many Latin American intellectuals have informed me in recent years, particularly in trips to Cuba in 1944 and 1948 and to One can find many volumes of support for representative democracy in the literature of all the Latin American countries. 156 The Caribbean 156 The Caribbean to perform for the government-through the media of communi- cation the government can help to strengthen the conviction that it has chosen the right candidate; (3) elections are also useful to the opposition which can employ the campaigns to build up moral justification for revolt, and (4) there is the belief that the electoral technique of the liberal-democratic state should be developed as the most satisfactory procedure for organizing and changing governments." There was a great deal of literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which was pessimistic as to the possibilities for democratic development in Latin America. Most of such works argued that superimposing democratic structures.on social and economic systems based on hierarchy and authoritarianism would lead only to failure. Some major works of this kind are: Jos6 Ingenieros, Sociologia argentina (first published in 1913); Jos6 Ingenieros, El hombre mediocre (first published in 1903); Juan Agustin Garcia, La ciudad indiana (2nd edition, 1909); Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Conflicto y armonias de las razas en America (first published in 1883); Alcides Argiedas, Pueblo enfermo (1910); Albert Hale, The South Americans (1907); James Bryce, South America, Observations and Impressions (1914); C. Reginald Enock, The Republics of Central and South America (1913); Charles Edmond Akers, A History of South America, 1854- 1904 (1904); Salvador Mendieta, La enfermedad de Centro-America (1934); Manuel Gonzalez Prada, Horas de lucha (first published in 1908); Jose Carlos Maristegui, Siete ensayos de interpretacidn de la realidad peruana (1934); Luis F. Aguilar, Cuestiones indigenas (1922); and Jaramillo Alvarado, El indio ecuatoriano (1925). Many Latin American intellectuals have informed me in recent years, particularly in trips to Cuba in 1944 and 1948 and to * One can find many volumes of support for representative democracy in the literature of all the Latin American countries. to perform for the government-through the media of communi- cation the government can help to strengthen the conviction that it has chosen the right candidate; (3) elections are also useful to the opposition which can employ the campaigns to build up moral justification for revolt, and (4) there is the belief that the electoral technique of the liberal-democratic state should be developed as the most satisfactory procedure for organizing and changing governments." There was a great deal of literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which was pessimistic as to the possibilities for democratic development in Latin America. Most of such works argued that superimposing democratic structures.on social and economic systems based on hierarchy and authoritarianism would lead only to failure. Some major works of this kind are: Jose Ingenieros, Sociologia argentina (first published in 1913); Jos6 Ingenieros, El hombre mediocre (first published in 1903); Juan Agustin Garcia, La ciudad indiana (2nd edition, 1909); Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Conflicto y armonias de las razas en Amdrica (first published in 1883); Alcides Argdedas, Pueblo enfermo (1910); Albert Hale, The South Americans (1907); James Bryce, South America, Observations and Impressions (1914); C. Reginald Enock, The Republics of Central and South America (1913); Charles Edmond Akers, A History of South America, 1854- 1904 (1904); Salvador Mendieta, La enfermedad de Centro-Amdrica (1934); Manuel Gonzalez Prada, Horas de lucha (first published in 1908); Jos6 Carlos Mariategui, Siete ensayos de interpretacidn de la realidad peruana (1934); Luis F. Aguilar, Cuestiones indigenas (1922); and Jaramillo Alvarado, El indio ecuatoriano (1925). Many Latin American intellectuals have informed me in recent years, particularly in trips to Cuba in 1944 and 1948 and to " One can fid many volumes of support for representative democracy in the literature of all the Latin American countries.  REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 157 REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 157 the South American countries in 1955, that these books, or works the South American countries in 1955, that these books, or works like them, no longer have much influence. "They are too pessi- like them, no longer have much influence. "They are too pessi- mistic," I have been told. Remember, as Arturo Vilela found in mistic," I have been told. Remember, as Arturo Vilela found in an analytical survey of the classic works of the major South an analytical survey of the classic works of the major South American thinkers, that in the nineteenth century, contrary to American thinkers, that in the nineteenth century, contrary to what many of us have thought, the most influential works did what many of us have thought, the most influential works did not show much confidence in parliamentary institutions as means not show much confidence in parliamentary institutions as means of realizing significant ideals and objectives." of realizing significant ideals and objectives." What is the nature of the important publications in use today What is the nature of the important publications in use today in Latin America? Even a cursory survey of the works which in Latin America? Even a cursory survey of the works which seem to exercise the most influence in Latin American thought seem to exercise the most influence in Latin American thought today indicates that the masses, both urban and rural, now com- today indicates that the masses, both urban and rural, now com- mand almost hysterical attention. If I interpret this literature mand almost hysterical attention. If I interpret this literature accurately, however, the upper-middle classes are more aggres- accurately, however, the upper-middle classes are more aggres- sively eager to utilize the collective power of the state to provide sively eager to utilize the collective power of the state to provide direct economic and social benefits for the masses than they are direct economic and social benefits for the masses than they are to welcome them into a democratic polity on a basis approxi- to welcome them into a democratic polity on a basis approxi- mating equality. Even Alfredo Palacios, a self-styled "democratic mating equality. Even Alfredo Palacios, a self-styled "democratic socialist," in his widely quoted little essay, Masas y tlites en socialist," in his widely quoted little essay, Masas y Slites en Iberoamdrica (1954), speaks approvingly of a distinction be- Iberoameirca (1954), speaks approvingly of a distinction be- tween the informed and public-spirited elites and the unprepared tween the informed and public-spirited elites and the unprepared masses as to the possession and use of political power. masses as to the possession and use of political power. "Revolution," of course, is almost a sacred word in Latin "Revolution," of course, is almost a sacred word in Latin American political culture. Even second and third echelon cau- American political culture. Even second and third echelon cau- dillos may characterize their inept administrations as "revolution- dillos may characterize their inept administrations as "revolution- ary." There are many works dealing with leftist "revolutions," ary." There are many works dealing with leftist "revolutions," such as that of Mexico from 1910-1911 to the present or of such as that of Mexico from 1910-1911 to the present or of Cuba from the 1930's to 1952, and rightist "revolutions," such Cuba from the 1930's to 1952, and rightist "revolutions," such as peronismo in Argentina from the 1940's to 1955 or in Brazil as peronismo in Argentina from the 1940's to 1955 or in Brazil from 1930 to 1945. I submit that the procedural ideals of the from 1930 to 1945. I submit that the procedural ideals of the liberal-democratic state are not central in these "revolutionary" liberal-democratic state are not central in these "revolutionary" movements. Less is known about the "revolution" currently under movements. Less is known about the "revolution" currently under way in Bolivia. I endeavored recently to examine the works of way in Bolivia. I endeavored recently to examine the works of the "revolution" which were referred to me by people in La Paz the "revolution" which were referred to me by people in La Paz " Arturo Vilela, Interpretacin de la historia sudamericana (La Paz: * Arturo Vilela, Interpretacion de la historia sudamericana (La Paz: Biblioteca Pacena, 1953), pp. 135-205. Biblioteca Pacena, 1953), pp. 135-205. REVOLTS AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 157 the South American countries in 1955, that these books, or works like them, no longer have much influence. "They are too pessi- mistic," I have been told. Remember, as Arturo Vilela found in an analytical survey of the classic works of the major South American thinkers, that in the nineteenth century, contrary to what many of us have thought, the most influential works did not show much confidence in parliamentary institutions as means of realizing significant ideals and objectives." What is the nature of the important publications in use today in Latin America? Even a cursory survey of the works which seem to exercise the most influence in Latin American thought today indicates that the masses, both urban and rural, now com- mand almost hysterical attention. If I interpret this literature accurately, however, the upper-middle classes are more aggres- sively eager to utilize the collective power of the state to provide direct economic and social benefits for the masses than they are to welcome them into a democratic polity on a basis approxi- mating equality. Even Alfredo Palacios, a self-styled "democratic socialist," in his widely quoted little essay, Masas y dlites en Iberoamdrica (1954), speaks approvingly of a distinction be- tween the informed and public-spirited elites and the unprepared masses as to the possession and use of political power. "Revolution," of course, is almost a sacred word in Latin American political culture. Even second and third echelon cau- dillos may characterize their inept administrations as "revolution- ary." There are many works dealing with leftist "revolutions," such as that of Mexico from 1910-1911 to the present or of Cuba from the 1930's to 1952, and rightist "revolutions," such as peronismo in Argentina from the 1940's to 1955 or in Brazil from 1930 to 1945. I submit that the procedural ideals of the liberal-democratic state are not central in these "revolutionary" movements. Less is known about the "revolution" currently under way in Bolivia. I endeavored recently to examine the works of the "revolution" which were referred to me by people in La Paz * Arturo Vilela, Interpretacion de la historia sudamericana (La Paz: Biblioteca Pacena, 1953), pp. 135-205.  158 The Caribbean as the most influential publications yet to appear. There is much concern in these works as to how political power should be used but little concern as to how power should be mobilized. Cer- tainly it is fair to say that the question as to whether democratic means are employed in organizing and utilizing power is far from central to the themes expressed." Change is a universal characteristic of all culture. Changes are taking place everywhere in Latin America at varying rates of speed but with a similarity of pattern deriving from a common cultural origin. There is some evidence of progress toward democracy insofar as mobilizing and utilizing political power is concerned. But there is more evidence, in my opinion, of modern- day left-wing and right-wing authoritarianism, which, projected, means continued vitality for traditional methods of mobilizing and utilizing political power." " See Wilter Guevara Arce, Plan inmediato de politica econdmica del gobierno de la revolucidn nacional (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de "San Andreis," 1955), 135 pp; Roberto Perez Pat6n, La colaboracidn obrero- patronal y el control obrero de la industria (La Par: Universidad Mayor de "San Andres," 1953), 103 pp.; Jos Fellmann Velarde, Victor Paz Estenssoro, el hombre y la revolucion (La Paz: Alfonso Tejerina, 1954), 279 pp.; Alberto Cocoejo S., Programas politicos de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imprenta Universitaria, 1949), 392 pp.; Repablica de Bolivia, El libro blanco de la independencia econ6mica de Bolivia (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1952), 188 pp.; Secretaria Ejecutiva del Comit6 Politico Nacional del M.N.R., El pensamiento revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro (La Paz: E. Burillo y Cia., 1954), 303 pp.; Saturnino Rodrigo, Diario de la revolucidn nacional (La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud," 1955), 389 pp. " See J. Lambert, "Structures sociales et regimes politiques," Revue Francaise de Science Politique (oct.-dec., 1951), 433-464; J. Yeara Tiger- ino, "El problema politico de Hispanoamerica," Revista de Estudios Poli- ticos (Madrid: setiembre-octubre, 1950), 151-167; H. F. Barth, "Latein- smerika seit dem 'Bogotazo,'" Aussenpolitik, I, 3 (September, 1950), 213-219; Lorimer Denis and Fransois Duvalier, Le probleme des classes a travers I'histoire d' Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Au Service de la Jeunesse, 1948), 128 pp.; J. Yeaza Tigerino, "La politica internacional hispano- americana," Caudernos de Policia International, I (Madrid, enero-marzo, 1950), 105-112; Francisco Jos6 de Oliveira Vianna, Institugces politicas brasiclras (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria JosS Olympio Editora, 1955), Vol. I, Chaps. XI-XIII; Vol. II, Chaps. VIII-XI; Segundo V. Linares Quintana, "The Etiology of Revolution in Latin America," Western Political Quarter- ly, IV, 2 (June, 1951), 254-267. 158 The Caribbean as the most influential publications yet to appear. There is much concern in these works as to how political power should be used but little concern as to how power should be mobilized. Cer- tainly it is fair to say that the question as to whether democratic means are employed in organizing and utilizing power is far from central to the themes expressed." Change is a universal characteristic of all culture. Changes are taking place everywhere in Latin America at varying rates of speed but with a similarity of pattern deriving from a common cultural origin. There is some evidence of progress toward democracy insofar as mobilizing and utilizing political power is concerned. But there is more evidence, in my opinion, of modern- day left-wing and right-wing authoritarianism, which, projected, means continued vitality for traditional methods of mobilizing and utilizing political power."5 " See Walter Guevara Arce, Plan inmediato de politica econdmica del gobierno de la revolucidn nacional (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de "San Andres," 1955), 135 pp; Roberto Perez Pat6n, La colaborarion obrero- patronal y el control obrero de la industria (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de "San Andres," 1953), 103 pp.; Jos Fellmann Velarde, Victor Paz Estessoro, el hombre y la revolucidn (La Paz: Alfonso Tejerina, 1954), 279 pp.; Alberto Cornejo S., Programas politicos de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imprenta Universitaria, 1949), 392 pp.; Repdblica de Bolivia, El libro blanco de la independencia econ6mica de Bolivia (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1952), 188 pp.; Secretaria Ejecutiva del Comit6 Politico Nacional del M.N.R., El pensamiento revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro (La Paz: E. Burillo y Cia., 1954), 303 pp.; Saturnino Rodrigo, Diario de la revolucion national (La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud," 1955), 389 pp. See J. Lambert, "Structures sociales et rdgimes politiques," Revue Frangaise de Science Politique (oct.-dec., 1951), 433-464; J. Yeaza Tiger- ino, "El problemsa politico de Hispanoamdrica," Revista de Estudios Poli- ticos (Madrid: setiembre-octubre, 1950), 151-167; H. F. Barth, "Latein- amerika seit deom 'Bogotazo,'" Aussenpolitik, I, 3 (September, 1950), 213-219; Lorimer Denis and Francois Duvalier, Le probleme des classes Stravers 'histoire d' Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Aa Service de Ia Jeunesse, 1948), 128 pp.; J. Yeaza Tigerino, "La politica internacional hispano- americana," Caudernos de Politica International, I (Madrid, enero-marzo, 1950), 105-112; Francisco Jos6 de Oliveira Vianna, Institugces politicas brasileiras (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, 1955), Vol. I, Chaps. XI-XIII; Vol. II, Chaps.. VIII-XI; Segundo V. Linares Quintana, "The Etiology of Revolution in Latin America," Western Political Quarter- ly, IV, 2 (June, 1951), 254-267. 158 The Caribbean as the most influential publications yet to appear. There is much concern in these works as to how political power should be used but little concern as to how power should be mobilized. Cer- tainly it is fair to say that the question as to whether democratic means are employed in organizing and utilizing power is far from central to the themes expressed." Change is a universal characteristic of all culture. Changes are taking place everywhere in Latin America at varying rates of speed but with a similarity of pattern deriving from a common cultural origin. There is some evidence of progress toward democracy insofar as mobilizing and utilizing political power is concerned. But there is more evidence, in my opinion, of modern- day left-wing and right-wing authoritarianism, which, projected, means continued vitality for traditional methods of mobilizing and utilizing political power." " See Walter Guevara Arce, Plan inmediato de politico economica del gobierno de la revolucidn naional (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de "San Andres," 1955), 135 pp; Roberto Pirez Pat6n, La colaboraciorn obrero- patronal y el control obrero de la industria (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de "San Andres," 1953), 103 pp.; Jos Fellmann Velarde, Victor Paz Estenssoro, el hombre y la revolucion (La Paz: Alfonso Tejerina, 1954), 279 pp.; Alberto Cornejo S., Programas politicos de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imprenta Universitaria, 1949), 392 pp.; Repdblica de Bolivia, El libro blanco de la independencia econdmica de Bolivia (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1952), 188 pp.; Secretaria Ejecutiva del Comit6 Politico Nacional del M.N.R., El pensamiento revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro (La Paz: E. Burillo y Cia., 1954), 303 pp.; Saturnino Rodrigo, Diario de la revolucidn naional (La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud," 1955), 389 pp. " See J. Lambert, "Structures sociales et regimes politiques," Revue Francaise de Science Politique (oct.-dec., 1951), 433464; J. Yeaza Tiger- ino, "El problema politico de Hispanoamerica," Revista de Estudios Poli- ticos (Madrid: setiembre-octubre, 1950), 151-167; H. F. Barth, "Latein- amerika seit dem 'Bogotazo,'" Aussenpolitik, I, 3 (September, 1950), 213-219; Lorimer Denis and Francois Duvalier, Le probleme des classes d travers 'histoire d' Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Ao Service de la Jeunesse, 1948), 128 pp.; J. Yeaza Tigerino, "La politica internacional hispano- americana," Caudernos de Politica International, I (Madrid, enero-marzo, 1950), 105-112; Francisco Josa de Oliveira Vianna, Institugces politicas brasileiras (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, 1955), Vol. I, Chaps. XI-XIII; Vol. II, Chaps. VIII-XI; Segundo V. Linares Quintana, "The Etiology of Revolution in Latin America," Western Political Quarter- ly, IV, 2 (June, 1951), 254-267.  Part IV Part IV Part IV PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS   10 Samuel Guy Inman: THE BACKGROUND OF DICTATORS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN PROBABLY THE GREATEST CHARACTER that ever lived in the Caribbean was Padre Bartolome de las Casas. The first priest ordained in the New World, he gave his life for improving the lot of the Indians. His greatest victory was won in a famous debate before Charles I of Spain concerning the treatment of the Indians. He was successful, and the laws approved directed the most elaborate protection of the aborigines ever adopted by a colonial power. But he died profoundly disappointed at the age of ninety-two because he was never able to get these laws obeyed. Thus the great "Protector of the Indians" typified the failure of the three hundred years of colonial Spanish government- idealistic conceptions seldom carried out. The situation grew so bad that Spanish officials in the colonies developed a standard phrase used when the king's messenger delivered a new directive: "I acknowledge, but I do not obey." Every detail of colonial life was covered by a directive-even the number of buttons one should have on his coat. Secret missions and detectives were ever watchful. But in the last years of Spanish dominance, before the separation movement, or revolution, began, govern- ment almost completely broke down. It was a fundamental Hispanic characteristic to build "castles in the air," to pass idealistic laws which are not practically en- 161 Samuel Guy Inman: THE BACKGROUND OF DICTATORS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN PROBABLY THE GREATEST CHARACTER that ever lived in the Caribbean was Padre Bartolome de las Casas. The first priest ordained in the New World, he gave his life for improving the lot of the Indians. His greatest victory was won in a famous debate before Charles I of Spain concerning the treatment of the Indians. He was successful, and the laws approved directed the most elaborate protection of the aborigines ever adopted by a colonial power. But he died profoundly disappointed at the age of ninety-two because he was never able to get these laws obeyed. Thus the great "Protector of the Indians" typified the failure of the three hundred years of colonial Spanish government- idealistic conceptions seldom carried out. The situation grew so bad that Spanish officials in the colonies developed a standard phrase used when the king's messenger delivered a new directive: "I acknowledge, but I do not obey." Every detail of colonial life was covered by a directive-even the number of buttons one should have on his coat. Secret missions and detectives were ever watchful. But in the last years of Spanish dominance, before the separation movement, or revolution, began, govern- ment ahnost completely broke down. It was a fundamental Hispanic characteristic to build "castles in the air," to pass idealistic laws which are not practically en- 161 Samuel Guy Inman: THE BACKGROUND OF DICTATORS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN PROBABLY THE GREATEST CHARACTER that ever lived in the Caribbean was Padre Bartolom4 de las Casas. The first priest ordained in the New World, he gave his life for improving the lot of the Indians. His greatest victory was won in a famous debate before Charles I of Spain concerning the treatment of the Indians. He was successful, and the laws approved directed the most elaborate protection of the aborigines ever adopted by a colonial power. But he died profoundly disappointed at the age of ninety-two because he was never able to get these laws obeyed. Thus the great "Protector of the Indians" typified the failure of the three hundred years of colonial Spanish government- idealistic conceptions seldom carried out. The situation grew so bad that Spanish officials in the colonies developed a standard phrase used when the king's messenger delivered a new directive: "I acknowledge, but I do not obey." Every detail of colonial life was covered by a directive-even the number of buttons one should have on his coat. Secret missions and detectives were ever watchful. But in the last years of Spanish dominance, before the separation movement, or revolution, began, govern- ment almost completely broke down. It was a fundamental Hispanic characteristic to build "castles in the air," to pass idealistic laws which are not practically en-  162 The Caribbean forceable-like the brave Las Casas, with his Leyes de Indias -decreed, but not carried out. Individualism dominated the Spaniard, likewise the Spanish American. In government, that usually means that the individual says to the king, the president, the policeman on the corner-"You run your affairs and I will run mine." "Debajo de mi manta al rey mato"-that is, "I'll kill the King himself, if he dares try to interfere with my private affairs." As long as the dictator sticks to running the government and does not attempt to run the individual and, vice versa, as long as the individual doesn't try to criticize government, both sides may tolerate one another for many years. Most Latin American dictators know this and observe limitations. Dictator Peron seemed safely seated in his presidential chair for life. But he overreached himself when he added to the dicta- tion of government policy interference in private, religious affairs of family life. In Buenos Aires the ordinary citizens so strenu- ously protested having to obey stop lights at street corners that the lights were removed; but there was little public outcry by his own people when Per6n shocked the world by closing a newspaper that criticized his government. It was Latin America's idealism that first brought her trouble in government. Most of the new countries insisted on patterning their governments after that of the United States. They often closely copied the constitution of the northern republic. It was a profound mistake and a fundamental cause of dictatorships. The Anglo-Saxon, with the Magna Carta, the habeas corpus, and trial by jury, had long prepared for government. English colonies were founded by liberals in Europe who came to North America in protest against absolute monarchy and limitations on religious freedom. English colonies were granted charters-that is, contracts stating clearly the political rights and economic privileges of colonists and limitations forced on the Crown. North American colonists came to establish a new world, a 162 The Caribbean 162 The Caribbean forceable-like the brave Las Casas, with his Leyes de Indias -decreed, but not carried out. Individualism dominated the Spaniard, likewise the Spanish American. In government, that usually means that the individual says to the king, the president, the policeman on the corner-"You run your affairs and I will run mine." "Debajo de mi manta al rey mato"-that is, "I'll kill the King himself, if he dares try to interfere with my private affairs." As long as the dictator sticks to running the government and does not attempt to run the individual and, vice versa, as long as the individual doesn't try to criticize government, both sides may tolerate one another for many years. Most Latin American dictators know this and observe limitations. Dictator Peron seemed safely seated in his presidential chair for life. But he overreached himself when he added to the dicta- tion of government policy interference in private, religious affairs of family life. In Buenos Aires the ordinary citizens so strenu- ously protested having to obey stop lights at street corners that the lights were removed; but there was little public outcry by his own people when Per6n shocked the world by closing a newspaper that criticized his government. It was Latin America's idealism that first brought her trouble in government. Most of the new countries insisted on patterning their governments after that of the United States. They often closely copied the constitution of the northern republic. It was a profound mistake and a fundamental cause of dictatorships. The Anglo-Saxon, with the Magna Carta, the habeas corpus, and trial by jury, had long prepared for government. English colonies were founded by liberals in Europe who came to North America in protest against absolute monarchy and limitations on religious freedom. English colonies were granted charters-that is, contracts stating clearly the political rights and economic privileges of colonists and limitations forced on the Crown. North American colonists came to establish a new world, a forceable-like the brave Las Casas, with his Leyes de Indias -decreed, but not carried out. Individualism dominated the Spaniard, likewise the Spanish American. In government, that usually means that the individual says to the king, the president, the policeman on the corner-"You run your affairs and I will run mine." "Debajo de mi manta al rey mato"-that is, "I'll kill the King himself, if he dares try to interfere with my private affairs." As long as the dictator sticks to running the government and does not attempt to run the individual and, vice versa, as long as the individual doesn't try to criticize government, both sides may tolerate one another for many years. Most Latin American dictators know this and observe limitations. Dictator Perin seemed safely seated in his presidential chair for life. But he overreached himself when he added to the dicta- tion of government policy interference in private, religious affairs of family life. In Buenos Aires the ordinary citizens so strenu- ously protested having to obey stop lights at street corners that the lights were removed; but there was little public outcry by his own people when Peron shocked the world by closing a newspaper that criticized his government. It was Latin America's idealism that first brought her trouble in government. Most of the new countries insisted on patterning their governments after that of the United States. They often closely copied the constitution of the northern republic. It was a profound mistake and a fundamental cause of dictatorships. The Anglo-Saxon, with the Magna Carta, the habeas corpus, and trial by jury, had long prepared for government. English colonies were founded by liberals in Europe who came to North America in protest against absolute monarchy and limitations on religious freedom. English colonies were granted charters-that is, contracts stating clearly the political rights and economic privileges of colonists and limitations forced on the Crown. North American colonists came to establish a new world, a  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 163 new kind of economic life, free enterprise, and separation of Church and State. Spanish colonists came to transplant the old home customs, the authoritative political and religious system, and dominance of the old king in the new world. The mentality of the Anglo-Saxon colonies was influenced by the Renaissance and the Reformation. Hispanic Americans were shut away completely from both these profound influences. The decision to pattern their constitutions after that of the United States of America was a fundamental mistake. All during the nineteenth century, rulers, however honest they might be, had to disobey the constitutions in order to be successful-that is, to bring enough order so that economic, social, and educational progress was possible. Simon Bolivar, decade by decade, proved himself to have been not only the greatest of the liberators but the greatest political philosopher of the Latin American people. None of his observa- tions deserve more attention than his famous description of his people: "We are not Europeans nor Indians, but an intermediate species, halfway between aborigines and Spaniards-Americans by birth, Europeans by right. Thus our situation is the most extraordinary, the most complicated." The fact is that Hispanic Americans appear less attractive in their government than in any other phase of their life. As writers they are brilliant, as conversationalists they are charming, as friends they are extraordinarily attentive, as advocates and prac- titioners of racial fraternity they are our examples, as students of international organization they led the world, from the days of Vitoria and Sudrez until the time of Oswaldo Aranha and Jos6 Maza in the United Nations. They have not lacked in students of political science, including Augustin Alvarez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Andres Bello, Jose Victorino Lastarria, Jose Bonifacio, and Jos6 Marti. When it came to putting into practice these principles, neither Bolivar himself, nor other great chiefs of government-call them caudillos, dictators, or presidents-were able to escape anarchy PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 163 new kind of economic life, free enterprise, and separation of Church and State. Spanish colonists came to transplant the old home customs, the authoritative political and religious system, and dominance of the old king in the new world. The mentality of the Anglo-Saxon colonies was influenced by the Renaissance and the Reformation. Hispanic Americans were shut away completely from both these profound influences. The decision to pattern their constitutions after that of the United States of America was a fundamental mistake. All during the nineteenth century, rulers, however honest they might be, had to disobey the constitutions in order to be successful-that is, to bring enough order so that economic, social, and educational progress was possible. Simon Bolivar, decade by decade, proved himself to have been not only the greatest of the liberators but the greatest political philosopher of the Latin American people. None of his observa- tions deserve more attention than his famous description of his people: "We are not Europeans nor Indians, but an intermediate species, halfway between aborigines and Spaniards-Americans by birth, Europeans by right. Thus our situation is the most extraordinary, the most complicated." The fact is that Hispanic Americans appear less attractive in their government than in any other phase of their life. As writers they are brilliant, as conversationalists they are charming, as friends they are extraordinarily attentive, as advocates and prac- titioners of racial fraternity they are our examples, as students of international organization they led the world, from the days of Vitoria and Suarez until the time of Oswaldo Aranha and Jose Maza in the United Nations. They have not lacked in students of political science, including Augustin Alvarez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Andres Bello, Josd Victorino Lastarria, Jose Bonifacio, and Jose Marti. When it came to putting into practice these principles, neither Bolivar himself, nor other great chiefs of government-call them caudillos, dictators, or presidents-were able to escape anarchy PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 163 new kind of economic life, free enterprise, and separation of Church and State. Spanish colonists came to transplant the old home customs, the authoritative political and religious system, and dominance of the old king in the new world. The mentality of the Anglo-Saxon colonies was influenced by the Renaissance and the Reformation. Hispanic Americans were shut away completely from both these profound influences. The decision to pattern their constitutions after that of the United States of America was a fundamental mistake. All during the nineteenth century, rulers, however honest they might be, had to disobey the constitutions in order to be successful-that is, to bring enough order so that economic, social, and educational progress was possible. Simon Bolivar, decade by decade, proved himself to have been not only the greatest of the liberators but the greatest political philosopher of the Latin American people. None of his observa- tions deserve more attention than his famous description of his people: "We are not Europeans nor Indians, but an intermediate species, halfway between aborigines and Spaniards-Americans by birth, Europeans by right. Thus our situation is the most extraordinary, the most complicated." The fact is that Hispanic Americans appear less attractive in their government than in any other phase of their life. As writers they are brilliant, as conversationalists they are charming, as friends they are extraordinarily attentive, as advocates and prac- titioners of racial fraternity they are our examples, as students of international organization they led the world, from the days of Vitoria and Suarez until the time of Oswaldo Aranha and Jos6 Maza in the United Nations. They have not lacked in students of political science, including Augustin Alvarez, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Andres Bello, Jose Victorino Lastarria, Jose Bonifacio, and Jose Marti. When it came to putting into practice these principles, neither Bolivar himself, nor other great chiefs of government-call them caudillos, dictators, or presidents-were able to escape anarchy  164 The Caribbean on the one hand and extreme authority on the other; that is, to rate as a middle-of-the-road democracy. The one exception is Uruguay. Difficult indeed would be the task of naming the heads of state who most nearly accomplished the combination of force and freedom, but my list would include Bernardino Riva- davia of Argentina, Judrez of Mexico, and Balmaceda of Chile, with a second guess including Domingo Sarmiento, Manuel Montt, Thomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Porfirio Diaz, and Lizaro Cardenas. II The one provision that Latin America should have taken over from the Philadelphia document was the one they rejected- the separation of the State and the Church. Bolivar was a strong advocate of the separation of these two powers. Liberal ecclesi- astics in the first constitutional conventions in Central America, Peru, and other republics argued for such separation. When the two were united, a fundamental division was created, as evi- denced by the very names of political parties-Clericals and Liberals (or Anti-Clericals). Every problem the young nations faced-educational, social, or political-brought an immediate lineup of those who believed in the conservative, church-domi- nating position on the one hand and the liberal, lay-governmental predominance on the other hand. With the exception of Portuguese monarchical Brazil, an out- standing obstacle to democracy was the eternal battle of the official church, along with the army and the great landlords, to control the nation's economic and cultural life. Not until 1917, when Uruguay and Mexico adopted new constitutions, did Latin American republics begin to write into their fundamental charters provisions to meet their own land, labor, fundamental education, social security, and health needs. It is notable that dictatorships in Hispanic America today are strongest where government and ecclesiastic power are mutual supporters; namely Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Dominican Re- 164 The Caribbean on the one hand and extreme authority on the other; that is, to rate as a middle-of-the-road democracy. The one exception is Uruguay. Difficult indeed would be the task of naming the heads of state who most nearly accomplished the combination of force and freedom, but my list would include Bernardino Riva- davia of Argentina, Juirez of Mexico, and Balmaceda of Chile, with a second guess including Domingo Sarmiento, Manuel Montt, ThomAs Cipriano de Mosquera, Porfirio Diaz, and Lizaro Cardenas. II The one provision that Latin America should have taken over from the Philadelphia document was the one they rejected- the separation of the State and the Church. Bolivar was a strong advocate of the separation of these two powers. Liberal ecclesi- astics in the first constitutional conventions in Central America, Peru, and other republics argued for such separation. When the two were united, a fundamental division was created, as evi- denced by the very names of political parties-Clericals and Liberals (or Anti-Clericals). Every problem the young nations faced-educational, social, or political-brought an immediate lineup of those who believed in the conservative, church-domi- nating position on the one hand and the liberal, lay-governmental predominance on the other hand. With the exception of Portuguese monarchical Brazil, an out- standing obstacle to democracy was the eternal battle of the official church, along with the army and the great landlords, to control the nation's economic and cultural life. Not until 1917, when Uruguay and Mexico adopted new constitutions, did Latin American republics begin to write into their fundamental charters provisions to meet their own land, labor, fundamental education, social security, and health needs. It is notable that dictatorships in Hispanic America today are strongest where government and ecclesiastic power are mutual supporters; namely Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Dominican Re- 164 The Caribbean on the one hand and extreme authority on the other; that is, to rate as a middle-of-the-road democracy. The one exception is Uruguay. Difficult indeed would be the task of naming the heads of state who most nearly accomplished the combination of force and freedom, but my list would include Bernardino Riva- davia of Argentina, Judrez of Mexico, and Balmaceda of Chile, with a second guess including Domingo Sarmiento, Manuel Montt, Thomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Porfirio Diaz, and Lazaro Cdrdenas. II The one provision that Latin America should have taken over from the Philadelphia document was the one they rejected- the separation of the State and the Church. Bolivar was a strong advocate of the separation of these two powers. Liberal ecclesi- astics in the first constitutional conventions in Central America, Peru, and other republics argued for such separation. When the two were united, a fundamental division was created, as evi- denced by the very names of political parties-Clericals and Liberals (or Anti-Clericals). Every problem the young nations faced-educational, social, or political-brought an immediate lineup of those who believed in the conservative, church-domi- nating position on the one hand and the liberal, lay-governmental predominance on the other hand. With the exception of Portuguese monarchical Brazil, an out- standing obstacle to democracy was the eternal battle of the official church, along with the army and the great landlords, to control the nation's economic and cultural life. Not until 1917, when Uruguay and Mexico adopted new constitutions, did Latin American republics begin to write into their fundamental charters provisions to meet their own land, labor, fundamental education, social security, and health needs. It is notable that dictatorships in Hispanic America today are strongest where government and ecclesiastic power are mutual supporters; namely Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Dominican Re-  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 165 public, Nicaragua, and until the last few months of his power, Peron's Argentina. It happens that the greatest advance in democracy (and probably in real religion) has taken place in those countries that have separation of Church and State: for example, Uruguay, Mexico, and Chile. In these countries are likewise found the strongest, most independent labor movements. Generally, historians and other intellectuals are likely to overlook the great power organized labor exerts against the dictator. III Bolivar's model constitution proposed a limitation on dictator- ship by taking from Greece and Rome a fourth division of government, a moral power. From Athens would be taken the Areopagus, from Rome its censors and domestic courts, and from Sparta its austerity. "Making a holy alliance of these moral institutions," said the Liberator, "let us revive in the world the idea of a people who are not contented with being free and strong, but also desire to be virtuous." It is impossible for either government or people to live an honest life in a dictatorship. To maintain a strict dictatorship, all classes of society must live a lie. The government officials must lie about their belief that their chief is the greatest man in history. Editors, suffering from a despised censorship, must publish eulogies which the editor, the public, and the pompous hero himself know are untrue. Foreign businessmen and religious workers must pretend approval when they despise the strutting tyrant. Diplomats who present medals must feel like spineless sycophants. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that every strong man who permits such hypocrisy is particeps criminis in lowering in every section of the world the moral life and the freedom of man as well as the worship of the one and only God. IV The United States entered into direct backing of dictators when President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the modern PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 165 public, Nicaragua, and until the last few months of his power, Per6n's Argentina. It happens that the greatest advance in democracy (and probably in real religion) has taken place in those countries that have separation of Church and State: for example, Uruguay, Mexico, and Chile. In these countries are likewise found the strongest, most independent labor movements. Generally, historians and other intellectuals are likely to overlook the great power organized labor exerts against the dictator. III Bolivar's model constitution proposed a limitation on dictator- ship by taking from Greece and Rome a fourth division of government, a moral power. From Athens would be taken the Areopagus, from Rome its censors and domestic courts, and from Sparta its austerity. "Making a holy alliance of these moral institutions," said the Liberator, "let us revive in the world the idea of a people who are not contented with being free and strong, but also desire to be virtuous." It is impossible for either government or people to live an honest life in a dictatorship. To maintain a strict dictatorship, all classes of society must live a lie. The government officials must lie about their belief that their chief is the greatest man in history. Editors, suffering from a despised censorship, must publish eulogies which the editor, the public, and the pompous hero himself know are untrue. Foreign businessmen and religious workers must pretend approval when they despise the strutting tyrant. Diplomats who present medals must feel like spineless sycophants. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that every strong man who permits such hypocrisy is particeps criminis in lowering in every section of the world the moral life and the freedom of man as well as the worship of the one and only God. IV The United States entered into direct backing of dictators when President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the modern PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 165 public, Nicaragua, and until the last few months of his power, Per6n's Argentina. It happens that the greatest advance in democracy (and probably in real religion) has taken place in those countries that have separation of Church and State: for example, Uruguay, Mexico, and Chile. In these countries are likewise found the strongest, most independent labor movements. Generally, historians and other intellectuals are likely to overlook the great power organized labor exerts against the dictator. III Bolivar's model constitution proposed a limitation on dictator- ship by taking from Greece and Rome a fourth division of government, a moral power. From Athens would be taken the Areopagus, from Rome its censors and domestic courts, and from Sparta its austerity. "Making a holy alliance of these moral institutions," said the Liberator, "let us revive in the world the idea of a people who are not contented with being free and strong, but also desire to be virtuous." It is impossible for either government or people to live an honest life in a dictatorship. To maintain a strict dictatorship, all classes of society must live a lie. The government officials must lie about their belief that their chief is the greatest man in history. Editors, suffering from a despised censorship, must publish eulogies which the editor, the public, and the pompous hero himself know are untrue. Foreign businessmen and religious workers must pretend approval when they despise the strutting tyrant. Diplomats who present medals must feel like spineless sycophants. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that every strong man who permits such hypocrisy is particeps criminis in lowering in every section of the world the moral life and the freedom of man as well as the worship of the one and only God. IV The United States entered into direct backing of dictators when President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the modern  166 The Caribbean world could not permit disorder on the American Continent because of the Monroe Doctrine. A decade later, President William Howard Taft announced that the Washington govern- ment would consider it a duty to protect its citizens who invested or loaned money in the Caribbean region. This meant complete intervention in the governments of these countries, and occu- pation by the Marines, under whose auspices elections were held, customs were collected, internal public works were established, and critics of the government were silenced. Naturally, chiefs of state, acting with the occupation authorities, had to have dic- tatorial powers. Liberals, who formerly found certain ways of protest, now were silenced or they protested only from foreign countries where they found asylum. The only two dictators who remain from that era are the two bright young recruits who were selected and trained by the United States Marines to head the National Guards trained to take over when the United States forces retired. These two, Rafael Le6ni- das Trujillo and Anastasio Somoza, literally "took over" their countries. They now own a large part of their country's land and a large share of the industrial life. They have developed a new technique adapted to the industrial age. Their power lies in the economic development of the country with the cooperation of favored nationals and foreigners. Trujillo has a vast income from many business interests. He owns all or part of the stock of the following: the national aviation company, the two newspapers of the capital, the only brewery, a fifth of the Dominican sugar business (with the right to legally dictate to foreign owners), the tobacco monopoly, a cement plant, a chain of modern dress shops, a shoe factory with a contract to supply all shoes to the army, an insurance company which must be patronized by government employees, a large part of the real estate in cities and rural sections, along with the power to buy more at his own price and sell it to the government on his own terms. Anastasio Somoza came to the headship of his dynasty in Nica- 166 The Caribbean world could not permit disorder on the American Continent because of the Monroe Doctrine. A decade later, President William Howard Taft announced that the Washington govern- ment would consider it a duty to protect its citizens who invested or loaned money in the Caribbean region. This meant complete intervention in the governments of these countries, and occu- pation by the Marines, under whose auspices elections were held, customs were collected, internal public works were established, and critics of the government were silenced. Naturally, chiefs of state, acting with the occupation authorities, had to have dic- tatorial powers. Liberals, who formerly found certain ways of protest, now were silenced or they protested only from foreign countries where they found asylum. The only two dictators who remain from that era are the two bright young recruits who were selected and trained by the United States Marines to head the National Guards trained to take over when the United States forces retired. These two, Rafael Le6ni- das Trujillo and Anastasio Somoza, literally "took over" their countries. They now own a large part of their country's land and a large share of the industrial life. They have developed a new technique adapted to the industrial age. Their power lies in the economic development of the country with the cooperation of favored nationals and foreigners. Trujillo has a vast income from many business interests. He owns all or part of the stock of the following: the national aviation company, the two newspapers of the capital, the only brewery, a fifth of the Dominican sugar business (with the right to legally dictate to foreign owners), the tobacco monopoly, a cement plant, a chain of modern dress shops, a shoe factory with a contract to supply all shoes to the army, an insurance company which must be patronized by government employees, a large part of the real estate in cities and rural sections, along with the power to buy more at his own price and sell it to the government on his own terms. Anastasio Somoza came to the headship of his dynasty in Nica- 166 The Caribbean world could not permit disorder on the American Continent because of the Monroe Doctrine. A decade later, President William Howard Taft announced that the Washington govern- ment would consider it a duty to protect its citizens who invested or loaned money in the Caribbean region. This meant complete intervention in the governments of these countries, and occu- pation by the Marines, under whose auspices elections were held, customs were collected, internal public works were established, and critics of the government were silenced. Naturally, chiefs of state, acting with the occupation authorities, had to have dic- tatorial powers. Liberals, who formerly found certain ways of protest, now were silenced or they protested only from foreign countries where they found asylum. The only two dictators who remain from that era are the two bright young recruits who were selected and trained by the United States Marines to head the National Guards trained to take over when the United States forces retired. These two, Rafael Leoni- das Trujillo and Anastasio Somoza, literally "took over" their countries. They now own a large part of their country's land and a large share of the industrial life. They have developed a new technique adapted to the industrial age. Their power lies in the economic development of the country with the cooperation of favored nationals and foreigners. Trujillo has a vast income from many business interests. He owns all or part of the stock of the following: the national aviation company, the two newspapers of the capital, the only brewery, a fifth of the Dominican sugar business (with the right to legally dictate to foreign owners), the tobacco monopoly, a cement plant, a chain of modern dress shops, a shoe factory with a contract to supply all shoes to the army, an insurance company which must be patronized by government employees, a large part of the real estate in cities and rural sections, along with the power to buy more at his own price and sell it to the government on his own terms. Anastasio Somoza came to the headship of his dynasty in Nica-  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 167 ragua by the same route as "Benefactor" Trujillo-picked and trained by the Marines to inherit their power as commanders of the National Guard. The Marines left Nicaragua in 1933. During three uneasy years, Juan B. Sacasa reigned, with Somoza and his guardia behind the throne. In 1937 he actually assumed the presi- dency. Since then he has officially dominated the country, either as president or chief of the armed forces. He is reputed to be one of the richest men of the Americas. A fresh crop of dictators arose in South America following the First World War which changed the United States from a debtor to a creditor country. Our bankers suddenly had large sums of money to loan. Their agents were sitting on the front steps of every president's home, waiting to waylay "his majesty" to urge a loan. Augusto B. Leguia of Peru, General Carlos Ibinez of Chile, and a succession of presidents in Bolivia, Colombia, and Central America, floated large loans on Wall Street, which had little diffi- culty in getting the Harding and Coolidge administrations to back them. The American Ambassador declared in Lima that "Next to God, came Leguia". The president's son was found to have accep- ted a large bribe from a New York City bank to persuade his father to make an additional loan. The whole "wildcat era" was closed by the big Wall Street crash in 1929. Then came the years of recrim- inations from both sides. One United States citizen stated it thus: "It cost us $160 million dollars to lose the friendship of Peru, when we could have lost it for nothing." Loans to El Salvador went so far as to guarantee in the contract that if there arose any differences between the bankers and the state, they would be re- ferred to a justice of the United States Supreme Court, with the explanation by the bankers that Washington had once sent a bat- tleship to Panama to support an arbitration decision of the Court. The policy of collecting loans by battleships and Marines was repudiated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the Montevideo Conference and has not been used since 1933. This elimination of force in the collection of debts was one of the greatest victories for democratic foreign policy ever attained and has received too PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 167 ragua by the same route as "Benefactor" Trujillo-picked and trained by the Marines to inherit their power as commanders of the National Guard. The Marines left Nicaragua in 1933. During three uneasy years, Juan B. Sacasa reigned, with Somoza and his guardia behind the throne. In 1937 he actually assumed the presi- dency. Since then he has officially dominated the country, either as president or chief of the armed forces. He is reputed to be one of the richest men of the Americas. A fresh crop of dictators arose in South America following the First World War which changed the United States from a debtor to a creditor country. Our bankers suddenly had large sums of money to loan. Their agents were sitting on the front steps of every president's home, waiting to waylay "his majesty" to urge a loan. Augusto B. Leguia of Peru, General Carlos Ibdfiez of Chile, and a succession of presidents in Bolivia, Colombia, and Central America, floated large loans on Wall Street, which had little diffi- culty in getting the Harding and Coolidge administrations to back them. The American Ambassador declared in Lima that "Next to God, came Leguia". The president's son was found to have accep- ted a large bribe from a New York City bank to persuade his father to make an additional loan. The whole "wildcat era" was closed by the big Wall Street crash in 1929. Then came the years of recrim- inations from both sides. One United States citizen stated it thus: "It cost us $160 million dollars to lose the friendship of Peru, when we could have lost it for nothing." Loans to El Salvador went so far as to guarantee in the contract that if there arose any differences between the bankers and the state, they would be re- ferred to a justice of the United States Supreme Court, with the explanation by the bankers that Washington had once sent a bat- tleship to Panama to support an arbitration decision of the Court. The policy of collecting loans by battleships and Marines was repudiated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the Montevideo Conference and has not been used since 1933. This elimination of force in the collection of debts was one of the greatest victories for democratic foreign policy ever attained and has received too PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 167 ragua by the same route as "Benefactor" Trujillo-picked and trained by the Marines to inherit their power as commanders of the National Guard. The Marines left Nicaragua in 1933. During three uneasy years, Juan B. Sacasa reigned, with Somoza and his guardia behind the throne. In 1937 he actually assumed the presi- dency. Since then he has officially dominated the country, either as president or chief of the armed forces. He is reputed to be one of the richest men of the Americas. A fresh crop of dictators arose in South America following the First World War which changed the United States from a debtor to a creditor country. Our bankers suddenly had large sums of money to loan. Their agents were sitting on the front steps of every president's home, waiting to waylay "his majesty" to urge a loan. Augusto B. Leguia of Peru, General Carlos Ibiez of Chile, and a succession of presidents in Bolivia, Colombia, and Central America, floated large loans on Wall Street, which had little diffi- culty in getting the Harding and Coolidge administrations to back them. The American Ambassador declared in Lima that "Next to God, came Leguia". The president's son was found to have accep- ted a large bribe from a New York City bank to persuade his father to make an additional loan. The whole "wildcat era" was closed by the big Wall Street crash in 1929. Then came the years of recrim- inations from both sides. One United States citizen stated it thus: "It cost us $160 million dollars to lose the friendship of Peru, when we could have lost it for nothing." Loans to El Salvador went so far as to guarantee in the contract that if there arose any differences between the bankers and the state, they would be re- ferred to a justice of the United States Supreme Court, with the explanation by the bankers that Washington had once sent a bat- tleship to Panama to support an arbitration decision of the Court. The policy of collecting loans by battleships and Marines was repudiated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the Montevideo Conference and has not been used since 1933. This elimination of force in the collection of debts was one of the greatest victories for democratic foreign policy ever attained and has received too  168 The Caribbean little attention in analyses of Pan American relations. It marked an immediate lessening of the number of dictatorships in Latin America. The Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogoti in 1948 was, however, marked by the reappearance of dic- tatorship. One of the most notable fascists in America, Laureano Gmez of Colombia was elected president of the Conference and delegates representing the dictators of Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and others were given positions of leadership, with the blessings of the United States delegation. This honoring of a fascist like Laureano Gmez was a greater disturber of peace than communism. In Bogoti twelve hundred people were killed in a week's rioting, and Laureano Gmez narrowly escaped death by fleeing for protection to his friend Francisco Franco in Madrid. Since the Bogoti conference, Latin American dictatorships have had a field day. The president of that supposedly democratic meeting, after a few months' preparation under Franco, returned to Colombia, one of the most democratic countries in America, and inaugurated what is today one of the worst dictatorships. The new democratic regime in Venezuela that distinguished R6mulo Gallegos and Accion Democertica was overthrown by an army coup d'rtat, which grows more arrogant as the months pass. The Odria dictatorship in Peru was confirmed, and Perin pushed his drive to combine the smaller Caesars into a league of fascist states. In the midst of this strange situation, the dictators and the com- munists had a wonderful time. The United States gave the dicta- tors anything they wanted, if they would only declare against the communists. Pern was ready with aid if they would take the advice of his labor attaches and oppose Yankee imperialism. The communists would make trouble and inspire strikes, if that would give the big shots the excuse for declaring martial law, jailing or exiling opponents. It often happened that while the dictators were receiving arms and loans from Washington, because of their strong pronouncements against communism, they were secretly manip- ulating affairs to confound government enemies. 168 The Caribbean 168 The Caribbean little attention in analyses of Pan American relations. It marked an immediate lessening of the number of dictatorships in Latin America. The Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota in 1948 was, however, marked by the reappearance of dic- tatorship. One of the most notable fascists in America, Laureano Gmez of Colombia was elected president of the Conference and delegates representing the dictators of Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and others were given positions of leadership, with the blessings of the United States delegation. This honoring of a fascist like Laureano C6mez was a greater disturber of peace than communism. In BogotA twelve hundred people were killed in a week's rioting, and Laureano Gmez narrowly escaped death by fleeing for protection to his friend Francisco Franco in Madrid. Since the BogotA conference, Latin American dictatorships have had a field day. The president of that supposedly democratic meeting, after a few months' preparation under Franco, returned to Colombia, one of the most democratic countries in America, and inaugurated what is today one of the worst dictatorships. The new democratic regime in Venezuela that distinguished R6mulo Gallegos and Accion Democrdtica was overthrown by an army coup d'itat, which grows more arrogant as the months pass. The Odria dictatorship in Peru was confirmed, and Perdn pushed his drive to combine the smaller Caesars into a league of fascist states. In the midst of this strange situation, the dictators and the com- munists had a wonderful time. The United States gave the dicta- tors anything they wanted, if they would only declare against the communists. Perdn was ready with aid if they would take the advice of his labor attaches and oppose Yankee imperialism. The communists would make trouble and inspire strikes, if that would give the big shots the excuse for declaring martial law, jailing or exiling opponents. It often happened that while the dictators were receiving arms and loans from Washington, because of their strong pronouncements against communism, they were secretly manip- ulating affairs to confound government enemies. little attention in analyses of Pan American relations. It marked an immediate lessening of the number of dictatorships in Latin America. The Ninth International Conference of American States in BogotA in 1948 was, however, marked by the reappearance of dic- tatorship. One of the most notable fascists in America, Laureano Gmez of Colombia was elected president of the Conference and delegates representing the dictators of Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and others were given positions of leadership, with the blessings of the United States delegation. This honoring of a fascist like Laureano G6mez was a greater disturber of peace than communism. In BogotA twelve hundred people were killed in a week's rioting, and Laureano Gmez narrowly escaped death by fleeing for protection to his friend Francisco Franco in Madrid. Since the BogotA conference, Latin American dictatorships have had a field day. The president of that supposedly democratic meeting, after a few months' preparation under Franco, returned to Colombia, one of the most democratic countries in America, and inaugurated what is today one of the worst dictatorships. The new democratic regime in Venezuela that distinguished fRomulo Gallegos and Accion Democrdtica was overthrown by an army coup d'ctat, which grows more arrogant as the months pass. The Odra dictatorship in Peru was confirmed, and Perin pushed his drive to combine the smaller Caesars into a league of fascist states. In the midst of this strange situation, the dictators and the com- munists had a wonderful time. The United States gave the dicta- tors anything they wanted, if they would only declare against the communists. Pern was ready with aid if they would take the advice of his labor attaches and oppose Yankee imperialism. The communists would make trouble and inspire strikes, if that would give the big shots the excuse for declaring martial law, jailing or exiling opponents. It often happened that while the dictators were receiving arms and loans from Washington, because of their strong pronouncements against communism, they were secretly manip- ulating affairs to confound government enemies.  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 169 In the meantime, Washington, innocently supposing that the shortest distance between two political points was a straight line, sent presents to the military dictators of Venezuela and Peru, made loans to Perdn and declared that he was one of the world's great men, and gave arms to all the strong men, which simply enabled them to stay in power. While all this was going on to strengthen dictators in America, Secretary Dulles was traveling through Europe, Asia, and Africa, trying to organize the world against tyranny. The picture, of course, is not as simple as this. The over- powering fact is that Washington is confronted with an enormous enemy, communism, which would like to overwhelm democratic government and the rights of man. To defeat that spirit and that power, Washington needs all the allies it can get. But I ask the question: are the dictators in Latin America greater than are the forces of freedom and democracy? Is Latin America unfit for democracy? Yes, say a long line of dictators, historians, and stu- dents of government. The Chilean, Bernardo O'Higgins, one of the best of the early dictators, said: "Democracy, so loudly proclaimed, is an absurdity in our countries. The republican system, yes; but a strong central government, with officials of true virtue and patriotism who will direct citizens along the path of true patriotism." The difficulty lay in the scarcity of virtue and patriotism. The long line of dic- tators believed like Porfirio Diaz, whose motto was "poca politica, mucha administracidn" (with Don Porfirio doing the administra- ting). When this writer was director of the Instituto del Pueblo in Mexico, he learned the meaning of the motto when he announ- ced a course on the Mexican Constitution. He was notified that the Constitution was to be revered-not discussed! If one desires an example of the way democracy can grow away from dictatorship, study the Mexican Revolution. In few countries is the constitution more discussed today than in Mexico. One of the principal streets of the capital is named "Articulo 123 de ]a Constitucon de 1917." PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 169 In the meantime, Washington, innocently supposing that the shortest distance between two political points was a straight line, sent presents to the military dictators of Venezuela and Peru, made loans to Pern and declared that he was one of the world's great men, and gave arms to all the strong men, which simply enabled them to stay in power. While all this was going on to strengthen dictators in America, Secretary Dulles was traveling through Europe, Asia, and Africa, trying to organize the world against tyranny. The picture, of course, is not as simple as this. The over- powering fact is that Washington is confronted with an enormous enemy, communism, which would like to overwhelm democratic government and the rights of man. To defeat that spirit and that power, Washington needs all the allies it can get. But I ask the question: are the dictators in Latin America greater than are the forces of freedom and democracy? Is Latin America unfit for democracy? Yes, say a long line of dictators, historians, and stu- dents of government. The Chilean, Bernardo O'Higgins, one of the best of the early dictators, said: "Democracy, so loudly proclaimed, is an absurdity in our countries. The republican system, yes; but a strong central government, with officials of true virtue and patriotism who will direct citizens along the path of true patriotism." The difficulty lay in the scarcity of virtue and patriotism. The long line of dic- tators believed like Porfirio Diaz, whose motto was "poca politica, mucha administracidn" (with Don Porfirio doing the administra- ting). When this writer was director of the Instituto del Pueblo in Mexico, he learned the meaning of the motto when he announ- ced a course on the Mexican Constitution. He was notified that the Constitution was to be revered-not discussed! If one desires an example of the way democracy can grow away from dictatorship, study the Mexican Revolution. In few countries is the constitution more discussed today than in Mexico. One of the principal streets of the capital is named "Articulo 123 de la Constitucion de 1917." PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 169 In the meantime, Washington, innocently supposing that the shortest distance between two political points was a straight line, sent presents to the military dictators of Venezuela and Peru, made loans to Peron and declared that he was one of the world's great men, and gave arms to all the strong men, which simply enabled them to stay in power. While all this was going on to strengthen dictators in America, Secretary Dulles was traveling through Europe, Asia, and Africa, trying to organize the world against tyranny. The picture, of course, is not as simple as this. The over- powering fact is that Washington is confronted with an enormous enemy, communism, which would like to overwhelm democratic government and the rights of man. To defeat that spirit and that power, Washington needs all the allies it can get. But I ask the question: are the dictators in Latin America greater than are the forces of freedom and democracy? Is Latin America unfit for democracy? Yes, say a long line of dictators, historians, and stu- dents of government. The Chilean, Bernardo O'Higgins, one of the best of the early dictators, said: "Democracy, so loudly proclaimed, is an absurdity in our countries. The republican system, yes; but a strong central government, with officials of true virtue and patriotism who will direct citizens along the path of true patriotism." The difficulty lay in the scarcity of virtue and patriotism. The long line of dic- tators believed like Porfirio Diaz, whose motto was "poca politica, mucha administracion" (with Don Porfirio doing the administra- ting). When this writer was director of the Instituto del Pueblo in Mexico, he learned the meaning of the motto when he announ- ced a course on the Mexican Constitution. He was notified that the Constitution was to be revered-not discussed! If one desires an example of the way democracy can grow away from dictatorship, study the Mexican Revolution. In few countries is the constitution more discussed today than in Mexico. One of the principal streets of the capital is named "Articulo 123 de la Constitucion de 1917."  170 The Caribbean The importance of this subject is shown by the fact that The New York Times has recently courageously editorialized on the dangers to freedom in the present world crisis of dictatorships like those in Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Argen- tina. The Times of September 15, 1955, says: The honest light of day is a salutary medicine for dictators. Men like Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Brig. Gen. Perez Jimenez of Venezuela work happily in the dark. They do not like visits from objective correspondents such as The Times has just sent to their countries. The dictatorship in the Dominican Republic can fairly be char- acterized as fantastic. One would have to go back to some of the more lurid tyrannies of the Italian city-states of the Renaissance to find something comparable. The same situation applies to Venezuela, where the fabulous wealth of oil has brought prosperity and material progress and where the tight military clique, . . . has always been coopera- tive with the United States and with American business. The State Department is often criticized for its willingness to deal on friendly terms with dictatorships of this sort. However, it is hard to see what else it can do. The criticism is legitimate when the United States goes out of its way to bolster such dictatorships un- necessarily. For instance, it was a major error ci policy for Presi- dent Eisenhower to give President Perez Jimenez the Legion of Merit, as he did last November. The incident shocked democrats and liberals throughout Latin America more than any single action by the United States in recent months. In the same way our policy toward President Pern of Argen- tina is an example of giving unnecessary encouragement to an especially unsavory type of dictator. In October, 1955, the Times said: As one dictatorship falls in Argentina, another rises in Colom- bia. Gen. Juan Peron goes into what we hope will be oblivion and Lieutenant General Rojas Pinilla steps onto the stage in a role as evil as that of the Argentine dictator and in a country that also is important in a material sense and has a long history of democracy now interrupted. It is like an ebb and flow, a systole and diastole, a pattern 170 The Caribbean The importance of this subject is shown by the fact that The New York Times has recently courageously editorialized on the dangers to freedom in the present world crisis of dictatorships like those in Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Argen- tina. The Times of September 15, 1955, says: The honest light of day is a salutary medicine for dictators. Men like Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Brig. Gen. Perez Jimenez of Venezuela work happily in the dark. They do not like visits from objective correspondents such as The Times has just sent to their countries. The dictatorship in the Dominican Republic can fairly be char- acterized as fantastic. One would have to go back to some of the more lurid tyrannies of the Italian city-states of the Renaissance to find something comparable. The same situation applies to Venezuela, where the fabulous wealth of oil has brought prosperity and material progress and where the tight military clique, ... has always been coopera- tive with the United States and with American business. The State Department is often criticized for its willingness to deal on friendly terms with dictatorships of this sort. However, it is hard to see what else it can do. The criticism is legitimate when the United States goes out of its way to bolster such dictatorships un- necessarily. For instance, it was a major error cf policy for Presi- dent Eisenhower to give President Perez Jimenez the Legion of Merit, as he did last November. The incident shocked democrats and liberals throughout Latin America more than any single action by the United States in recent months. In the same way our policy toward President Perdn of Argen- tina is an example of giving unnecessary encouragement to an especially unsavory type of dictator. In October, 1955, the Times said: As one dictatorship falls in Argentina, another rises in Colom- bia. Gen. Juan Peron goes into what we hope will be oblivion and Lieutenant General Rojas Pinilla steps onto the stage in a role as evil as that of the Argentine dictator and in a country that also is important in a material sense and has a long history of democracy now interrupted. It is like an ebb and flow, a systole and diastole, a pattern 170 The Caribbean The importance of this subject is shown by the fact that The New York Times has recently courageously editorialized on the dangers to freedom in the present world crisis of dictatorships like those in Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Argen- tina. The Times of September 15, 1955, says: The honest light of day is a salutary medicine for dictators. Men like Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Brig. Gen. Perez Jimenez of Venezuela work happily in the dark. They do not like visits from objective correspondents such as The Times has just sent to their countries. The dictatorship in the Dominican Republic can fairly be char- acterized as fantastic. One would have to go back to some of the more lurid tyrannies of the Italian city-states of the Renaissance to find something comparable. The same situation applies to Venezuela, where the fabulous wealth of oil has brought prosperity and material progress and where the tight military clique, . ..has always been coopera- tive with the United States and with American business. The State Department is often criticized for its willingness to deal on friendly terms with dictatorships of this sort. However, it is hard to see what else it can do. The criticism is legitimate when the United States goes out of its way to bolster such dictatorships un- necessarily. For instance, it was a major error cf policy for Presi- dent Eisenhower to give President Perez Jimenez the Legion of Merit, as he did last November. The incident shocked democrats and liberals throughout Latin America more than any single action by the United States in recent months. In the same way our policy toward President Peron of Argen- tina is an example of giving unnecessary encouragement to an especially unsavory type of dictator. In October, 1955, the Times said: As one dictatorship falls in Argentina, another rises in Colom- bia. Gen. Juan Peron goes into what we hope will be oblivion and Lieutenant General Rojas Pinilla steps onto the stage in a role as evil as that of the Argentine dictator and in a country that also is important in a material sense and has a long history of democracy now interrupted. It is like an ebb and flow, a systole and diastole, a pattern  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 1/1 that unhappily has reasserted itself again and again in Latin America. A military officer steps in to put an end to chaos, frus- tration or even a dictatorship. He promises that he will soon in- stitute or restore a democratic regime. But "all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Some of these men, like Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Somoza of Nicaragua, Tru- jillo of the Dominican Republic, Peerz Jimenez of Venezuela, Batista of Cuba, Pern of Argentina, are made drunk by the heady wine of power and they sell their political souls to the devil of dictatorship. In reply to the previous editorials, the Dominican Ambassador in Washington, Joaquin E. Salazar, writes: It is shocking to find in so reputable a newspaper as The New York Times such an unwarranted attack against the Dominican Government, . . . also . . . against the people of my country, who so overwhelmingly support their Government. It is passing strange that you should ignore the fact that the very material progress to which you point as having been achieved in the Dominican Republic over the last quarter of a century could not take place without, and is nothing but the outward manifestation of, a moral climate and outlook with which the Dominican people have been imbued through Generalissimo Tru- jillo's words and deeds. His wise policies ... enjoy the unani- mous support of the people of my country. The Consul General of Venezuela in New York, Delfin Piez, wrote to the Times: the Venezuelan people who are now better housed, better fed, better educated and enjoy more social protection than ever before, remain unimpressed by your editorial remarks every time you choose to smear the Government of our country, a stanch friend of the United States. . . . I am not afraid of the word dictator. . . . Democracy, as it is understood in more mature countries, may be a wonderful system for the American people, but it could become anarchy in other countries. . . . We have attained gains in the field of social equality and social legislation that are unknown in many other countries, including the United States. On June 13, 1955, the Colombian president, Rojas Pinilla PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 171 that unhappily has reasserted itself again and again in Latin America. A military officer steps in to put an end to chaos, frus- tration or even a dictatorship. He promises that he will soon in- stitute or restore a democratic regime. But "all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Some of these men, like Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Somoza of Nicaragua, Tru- jillo of the Dominican Republic, Perez Jimenez of Venezuela, Batista of Cuba, Peron of Argentina, are made drunk by the heady wine of power and they sell their political souls to the devil of dictatorship. In reply to the previous editorials, the Dominican Ambassador in Washington, Joaquin E. Salazar, writes: It is shocking to find in so reputable a newspaper as The New York Times such an unwarranted attack against the Dominican Government, . . . also . . . against the people of my country, who so overwhelmingly support their Government. It is passing strange that you should ignore the fact that the very material progress to which you point as having been achieved in the Dominican Republic over the last quarter of a century could not take place without, and is nothing but the outward manifestation of, a moral climate and outlook with which the Dominican people have been imbued through Generalissimo Tru- jillo's words and deeds. His wise policies . . . enjoy the unani- mous support of the people of my country. The Consul General of Venezuela in New York, Delfin Paez, wrote to the Times: the Venezuelan people who are now better housed, better fed, better educated and enjoy more social protection than ever before, remain unimpressed by your editorial remarks every time you choose to smear the Government of our country, a stanch friend of the United States. ... I am not afraid of the word dictator. . . . Democracy, as it is understood in more mature countries, may be a wonderful system for the American people, but it could become anarchy in other countries. . . . We have attained gains in the field of social equality and social legislation that are unknown in many other countries, including the United States. On June 13, 1955, the Colombian president, Rojas Pinilla PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 171 that unhappily has reasserted itself again and again in Latin America. A military officer steps in to put an end to chaos, frus- tration or even a dictatorship. He promises that he will soon in- stitute or restore a democratic regime. But "all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Some of these men, like Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Somoza of Nicaragua, Tru- jillo of the Dominican Republic, Perez Jimnez of Venezuela, Batista of Cuba, Peron of Argentina, are made drunk by the heady wine of power and they sell their political souls to the devil of dictatorship. In reply to the previous editorials, the Dominican Ambassador in Washington, Joaquin E. Salazar, writes: It is shocking to find in so reputable a newspaper as The New York Times such an unwarranted attack against the Dominican Government, . . . also . . . against the people of my country, who so overwhelmingly support their Government. It is passing strange that you should ignore the fact that the very material progress to which you point as having been achieved in the Dominican Republic over the last quarter of a century could not take place without, and is nothing but the outward manifestation of, a moral climate and outlook with which the Dominican people have been imbued through Generalissimo Tru- jillo's words and deeds. His wise policies . . . enjoy the unani- mous support of the people of my country. The Consul General of Venezuela in New York, Delfin Paez, wrote to the Times: the Venezuelan people who are now better housed, better fed, better educated and enjoy more social protection than ever before, remain unimpressed by your editorial remarks every time you choose to smear the Government of our country, a stanch friend of the United States. ... I am not afraid of the word dictator. . . . Democracy, as it is understood in more mature countries, may be a wonderful system for the American people, but it could become anarchy in other countries. ... We have attained gains in the field of social equality and social legislation that are unknown in many other countries, including the United States. On June 13, 1955, the Colombian president, Rojas Pinilla  172 The Caribbean declared: "The parliament system is the greatest attainment of democracy, but such a system is possible only when a country has attained a high cultural level and when the political parties have become civilized." "Intelligence, patriotism, and machine guns," said a Colombian official radio bulletin, "are the three uncontroversable arguments of military governments." Says Somoza: "You can't give a bunch of five-year-olds guns. . . . They will kill each other. You have to teach them to use freedom, not to abuse it." There is a growing school in Latin America which replies to Somoza: Right! No guns to five-year-olds. But give them picture books, playgrounds, stories of great lovers of freedom like Simon Bolivar and Abraham Lincoln. Early and late let their education be based on the Christian principle that they should know the truth and the truth will make them free. Most people fail to recognize how closely the various dictators are related and therefore underestimate their power. They vote together in the United Nations and the Organization of Ameri- can States, they visit one another and guarantee mutual aid, they scheme against neighboring democracies. In a gorgeous book re- porting a visit between the chiefs of state of Peru and Venezuela, June 5-11, 1955, is emphasized the fact that General Odria taught Colonel Perez Jimdnez when as a young man he attended the Peruvian Military Academy. This same Venezuelan dictator was accused of aiding Nicaragua in the recent attack on Costa Rica-although it was not proven. During the ten-year regime of Juan Pern, one of his most important activities was to aid-by arms, loans, and the organization of fascist labor unions-the weakening of neighboring democracies. The overthrow of Peron was a great victory for democracy. But the greatest leader of the dictators still remains-General Francisco Franco. All American dictators maintain close relations with him, while he sends his Falange to propagate clerical fascism throughout the Spanish-speaking world. 172 The Caribbean declared: "The parliament system is the greatest attainment of democracy, but such a system is possible only when a country has attained a high cultural level and when the political parties have become civilized." "Intelligence, patriotism, and machine guns," said a Colombian official radio bulletin, "are the three uncontroversable arguments of military governments." Says Somoza: "You can't give a bunch of five-year-olds guns. . . . They will kill each other. You have to teach them to use freedom, not to abuse it." There is a growing school in Latin America which replies to Somoza: Right! No guns to five-year-olds. But give them picture books, playgrounds, stories of great lovers of freedom like Simn Bolivar and Abraham Lincoln. Early and late let their education be based on the Christian principle that they should know the truth and the truth will make them free. Most people fail to recognize how closely the various dictators are related and therefore underestimate their power. They vote together in the United Nations and the Organization of Ameri- can States, they visit one another and guarantee mutual aid, they scheme against neighboring democracies. In a gorgeous book re- porting a visit between the chiefs of state of Peru and Venezuela, June 5-11, 1955, is emphasized the fact that General Odria taught Colonel Perez Jiminez when as a young man he attended the Peruvian Military Academy. This same Venezuelan dictator was accused of aiding Nicaragua in the recent attack on Costa Rica-although it was not proven. During the ten-year regime of Juan Peron, one of his most important activities was to aid-by arms, loans, and the organization of fascist labor unions-the weakening of neighboring democracies. The overthrow of Pern was a great victory for democracy. But the greatest leader of the dictators still remains-General Francisco Franco. All American dictators maintain close relations with him, while he sends his Falange to propagate clerical fascism throughout the Spanish-speaking world. 172 The Caribbean declared: "The parliament system is the greatest attainment of democracy, but such a system is possible only when a country has attained a high cultural level and when the political parties have become civilized." "Intelligence, patriotism, and machine guns," said a Colombian official radio bulletin, "are the three uncontroversable arguments of military governments." Says Somoza: "You can't give a bunch of five-year-olds guns. . . . They will kill each other. You have to teach them to use freedom, not to abuse it." There is a growing school in Latin America which replies to Somoza: Right! No guns to five-year-olds. But give them picture books, playgrounds, stories of great lovers of freedom like Simon Bolivar and Abraham Lincoln. Early and late let their education be based on the Christian principle that they should know the truth and the truth will make them free. Most people fail to recognize how closely the various dictators are related and therefore underestimate their power. They vote together in the United Nations and the Organization of Ameri- can States, they visit one another and guarantee mutual aid, they scheme against neighboring democracies. In a gorgeous book re- porting a visit between the chiefs of state of Peru and Venezuela, June 5-11, 1955, is emphasized the fact that General Odria taught Colonel Perez Jimenez when as a young man he attended the Peruvian Military Academy. This same Venezuelan dictator was accused of aiding Nicaragua in the recent attack on Costa Rica-although it was not proven. During the ten-year regime of Juan Pern, one of his most important activities was to aid-by arms, loans, and the organization of fascist labor unions-the weakening of neighboring democracies. The overthrow of Pern was a great victory for democracy. But the greatest leader of the dictators still remains-General Francisco Franco. All American dictators maintain close relations with him, while he sends his Falange to propagate clerical fascism throughout the Spanish-speaking world.  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS VI 173 PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS VI 173 PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS VI 173 In the race between fascism, communism, and democracy, fascism is winning in Latin America. While it is not possible to classify exactly any government, speaking generally, in 1945 there were five definite dictatorships: the Dominican Republic, Nicara- gua, Honduras, Bolivia, and Argentina. In 1955, five others had joined the group: Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, and Para- guay. Shifting back and forth across the border line were Haiti, El Salvador, Panama, and Honduras. With Per6n's fall in No- vember, 1955-an event of great importance-Argentina seems to be joining the democracies where historically she belongs. Along with this struggle between American systems, the third extracontinental ideology is communism. It has never attained control of any government and is legally outlawed in several countries. But it has a large place as a troublemaker and pro- moter of Yankee-hatred. On the sports page, the continental struggle might be reported as between two major leagues: fascism and democracy. Washing- ton is the umpire, calling the strikes, the errors, the outs, the score. While the regular game goes on, Moscow slips around in the confusion, robs the gate receipts, bribes a player now and then, starts the rhubarbs, and inspires the fans to boo the umpire. As of today, the winning team is fascism. There is little chance that it will not continue the lead, until the umpire changes his habit of calling every player safe as long as he obeys the one rule of hating the communists. I am making no charges when I state this. I am merely reporting the "open covenant, openly arrived at," that Washington today has the definite policy of recognizing any victorious army colonel who seizes power and promises to oppose communism. Recognition is practically automatic. That kind of partnership with those who slit the throat of liberty may be necessary, as many good people argue today. But neither history nor religion teaches that it has been either ennob- ling or superior strategy. If we are to win the battle for freedom, nothing is more important than our attitude toward dictatorships. In the race between fascism, communism, and democracy, fascism is winning in Latin America. While it is not possible to classify exactly any government, speaking generally, in 1945 there were five definite dictatorships: the Dominican Republic, Nicara- gua, Honduras, Bolivia, and Argentina. In 1955, five others had joined the group: Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, and Para- guay. Shifting back and forth across the border line were Haiti, El Salvador, Panama, and Honduras. With Per6n's fall in No- vember, 1955-an event of great importance-Argentina seems to be joining the democracies where historically she belongs. Along with this struggle between American systems, the third extracontinental ideology is communism. It has never attained control of any government and is legally outlawed in several countries. But it has a large place as a troublemaker and pro- moter of Yankee-hatred. On the sports page, the continental struggle might be reported as between two major leagues: fascism and democracy. Washing- ton is the umpire, calling the strikes, the errors, the outs, the score. While the regular game goes on, Moscow slips around in the confusion, robs the gate receipts, bribes a player now and then, starts the rhubarbs, and inspires the fans to boo the umpire. As of today, the winning team is fascism. There is little chance that it will not continue the lead, until the umpire changes his habit of calling every player safe as long as he obeys the one rule of hating the communists. I am making no charges when I state this. I am merely reporting the "open covenant, openly arrived at," that Washington today has the definite policy of recognizing any victorious army colonel who seizes power and promises to oppose communism. Recognition is practically automatic. That kind of partnership with those who slit the throat of liberty may be necessary, as many good people argue today. But neither history nor religion teaches that it has been either ennob- ling or superior strategy. If we are to win the battle for freedom, nothing is more important than our attitude toward dictatorships. In the race between fascism, communism, and democracy, fascism is winning in Latin America. While it is not possible to classify exactly any government, speaking generally, in 1945 there were five definite dictatorships: the Dominican Republic, Nicara- gua, Honduras, Bolivia, and Argentina. In 1955, five others had joined the group: Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, and Para- guay. Shifting back and forth across the border line were Haiti, El Salvador, Panama, and Honduras. With Per6n's fall in No- vember, 1955-an event of great importance-Argentina seems to be joining the democracies where historically she belongs. Along with this struggle between American systems, the third extracontinental ideology is communism. It has never attained control of any government and is legally outlawed in several countries. But it has a large place as a troublemaker and pro- moter of Yankee-hatred. On the sports page, the continental struggle might be reported as between two major leagues: fascism and democracy. Washing- ton is the umpire, calling the strikes, the errors, the outs, the score. While the regular game goes on, Moscow slips around in the confusion, robs the gate receipts, bribes a player now and then, starts the rhubarbs, and inspires the fans to boo the umpire. As of today, the winning team is fascism. There is little chance that it will not continue the lead, until the umpire changes his habit of calling every player safe as long as he obeys the one rule of hating the communists. I am making no charges when I state this. I am merely reporting the "open covenant, openly arrived at," that Washington today has the definite policy of recognizing any victorious army colonel who seizes power and promises to oppose communism. Recognition is practically automatic. That kind of partnership with those who slit the throat of liberty may be necessary, as many good people argue today. But neither history nor religion teaches that it has been either ennob- ling or superior strategy. If we are to win the battle for freedom, nothing is more important than our attitude toward dictatorships.  11 11 Alfred B. Thomas: THE CAUDILLO IN THE CARIBBEAN: AN INTERPRETATION CAUDILLISMO in its most important aspect was and is an institution resting upon military force for the purpose of preserv- ing the status quo in Latin American society. It is European in origin. Sixteenth-century Spain, transplanting its basic social organization to the colonies, established there an essentially feudal pattern. Some may object that the monarchy in Spain, in fact, had destroyed the feudal status of the Spanish nobility and even suppressed the rights of towns in the sixteenth century. But it is also true that the conquerors in the New World escaped from this loss of power imposed upon their counterparts in Spain. Indeed, the Spanish crown specifically recognized the prerogatives of the conquerors in contracts entered into with them. On this point Bolivar, in his famous "Jamaica Letter," writes explicitly: Emperor Charles V made a pact with the discoverers, conquer- ors and settlers of America, and this . . . is our social contract. The monarchs of Spain made a solemn agreement with them, to be carried out on their own account and at their own risk.. . In return, they were made the lords of the land, entitled to organize the public administration and act as the court of last appeal, together with many other exemptions. . . . The King committed himself never to alienate the American provinces, in- asmuch as he had no jurisdiction but that of sovereign domain. 174 Alfred B. Thomas: THE CAUDILLO IN THE CARIBBEAN: AN INTERPRETATION CAUDILLISMO in its most important aspect was and is an institution resting upon military force for the purpose of preserv- ing the status quo in Latin American society. It is European in origin. Sixteenth-century Spain, transplanting its basic social organization to the colonies, established there an essentially feudal pattern. Some may object that the monarchy in Spain, in fact, had destroyed the feudal status of the Spanish nobility and even suppressed the rights of towns in the sixteenth century. But it is also true that the conquerors in the New World escaped from this loss of power imposed upon their counterparts in Spain. Indeed, the Spanish crown specifically recognized the prerogatives of the conquerors in contracts entered into with them. On this point Bolivar, in his famous "Jamaica Letter," writes explicitly: Emperor Charles V made a pact with the discoverers, conquer- ors and settlers of America, and this . . . is our social contract. The monarchs of Spain made a solemn agreement with them, to be carried out on their own account and at their own-risk. . . . In return, they were made the lords of the land, entitled to organize the public administration and act as the court of last appeal, together with many other exemptions. . . . The King committed himself never to alienate the American provinces, in- asmuch as he had no jurisdiction but that of sovereign domain. 174 Alfred B. Thomas: THE CAUDILLO IN THE CARIBBEAN: AN INTERPRETATION CAUDILLISMO in its most important aspect was and is an institution resting upon military force for the purpose of preserv- ing the status quo in Latin American society. It is European in origin. Sixteenth-century Spain, transplanting its basic social organization to the colonies, established there an essentially feudal pattern. Some may object that the monarchy in Spain, in fact, had destroyed the feudal status of the Spanish nobility and even suppressed the rights of towns in the sixteenth century. But it is also true that the conquerors in the New World escaped from this loss of power imposed upon their counterparts in Spain. Indeed, the Spanish crown specifically recognized the prerogatives of the conquerors in contracts entered into with them. On this point Bolivar, in his famous "Jamaica Letter," writes explicitly: Emperor Charles V made a pact with the discoverers, conquer- ors and settlers of America, and this . . . is our social contract. The monarchs of Spain made a solemn agreement with them, to be carried out on their own account and at their own risk. . In return, they were made the lords of the land, entitled to organize the public administration and act as the court of last appeal, together with many other exemptions. . . . The King committed himself never to alienate the American provinces, in- asmuch as he had no jurisdiction but that of sovereign domain. 174  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 1/15 Thus, for themselves and their descendants, the conquistadores possessed what were tantamount to feudal holdings. . . . From the beginning Latin American landowners were ever- jealous in guarding these rights. The revolt of Gonzalo Pizarro in Peru is too well known to require detailed discussion. The essential point won by the followers of Pizarro was a change in the New Laws recognizing the rights of encomienda conferred by Francisco Pizarro at the time of the conquest. Research has vet to expose all the instances of American landowners maintain- ing their ancient prerogatives against royal attack. In the eigh- teenth century in the Caribbean area, in New Granada and Venezuela, occurred two well-known examples. In New Granada the Comuneros in 1781 revolted against both an attempt to increase the burdensome taxes they were paying and the brutality that accompanied the collection of the taxes. Before the revolt was put down, eighty-seven commanders from the provinces of Boyaca, Cundinamarca, and Santander were leading a force of some 20,000 men. A few years earlier in Venezuela the estab- lishment of the Guipuzcoana Company produced an insurrection, 1749-1752. Of this revolt, Gil Fortoul, the constitutional his- torian of Venezuela, stated that ". . . the great landowners of the colony who launched Lesn upon his adventure and abandoned him thereafter in disgrace, proposed no progressive political pur- pose beyond conserving intact, with the expulsion of the Guipuz- coanos, the privileges which as lords of the land and owners of slaves they had had since the time of the conquest. . . . In the development of colonial caudillismo, resistance to royal authority is in fact only one side of the coin. American land, mine, and factory owners, when the occasion demanded, used ' Selected Writings of Bolivar, comp. by Vicente Lecuna; ed. by Harold A. Bierck, Jr. 2 vols. (New York: Colonial Press, 1951), I, 112. ' Quoted from Augusto Mijares, La interpretaion pesimista de la sociologia hispanoamericana, 2a edici6n (Madrid, 1952), p. 106. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 175 Thus, for themselves and their descendants, the conquistadores possessed what were tantamount to feudal holdings. . . . From the beginning Latin American landowners were ever- jealous in guarding these rights. The revolt of Gonzalo Pizarro in Peru is too well known to require detailed discussion. The essential point won by the followers of Pizarro was a change in the New Laws recognizing the rights of encomienda conferred by Francisco Pizarro at the time of the conquest. Research has vet to expose all the instances of American landowners maintain- ing their ancient prerogatives against royal attack. In the eigh- teenth century in the Caribbean area, in New Granada and Venezuela, occurred two well-known examples. In New Granada the Comuneros in 1781 revolted against both an attempt to increase the burdensome taxes they were paying and the brutality that accompanied the collection of the taxes. Before the revolt was put down, eighty-seven commanders from the provinces of Boyaca, Cundinamarca, and Santander were leading a force of some 20,000 men. A few years earlier in Venezuela the estab- lishment of the Guipuzcoana Company produced an insurrection, 1749-1752. Of this revolt, Gil Fortoul, the constitutional his- torian of Venezuela, stated that ". . . the great landowners of the colony who launched Le6n upon his adventure and abandoned him thereafter in disgrace, proposed no progressive political pur- pose beyond conserving intact, with the expulsion of the Guipuz- coanos, the privileges which as lords of the land and owners of slaves they had had since the time of the conquest. . . ."z In the development of colonial caudillismo, resistance to royal authority is in fact only one side of the coin. American land, mine, and factory owners, when the occasion demanded, used - Selected Writings of Bolivar, comp. by Vicente Lecuna; ed. by Harold A. Bierck, Jr. 2 vols. (New York: Colonial Press, 1951), I, 112. ' Quoted from Augusto Mijares, La interpretaction pesimista de la sociologia hispanoamericana, 2a edici6n (Madrid, 1952), p. 106. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 175 Thus, for themselves and their descendants, the conquistadores possessed what were tantamount to feudal holdings. . . . From the beginning Latin American landowners were ever- jealous in guarding these rights. The revolt of Gonzalo Pizarro in Peru is too well known to require detailed discussion. The essential point won by the followers of Pizarro was a change in the New Laws recognizing the rights of encomienda conferred by Francisco Pizarro at the time of the conquest. Research has vet to expose all the instances of American landowners maintain- ing their ancient prerogatives against royal attack. In the eigh- teenth century in the Caribbean area, in New Granada and Venezuela, occurred two well-known examples. In New Granada the Comuneros in 1781 revolted against both an attempt to increase the burdensome taxes they were paying and the brutality that accompanied the collection of the taxes. Before the revolt was put down, eighty-seven commanders from the provinces of Boyacd, Cundinamarca, and Santander were leading a force of some 20,000 men. A few years earlier in Venezuela the estab- lishment of the Guipuzcoana Company produced an insurrection, 1749-1752. Of this revolt, Gil Fortoul, the constitutional his- torian of Venezuela, stated that ". . . the great landowners of the colony who launched Lein upon his adventure and abandoned him thereafter in disgrace, proposed no progressive political pur- pose beyond conserving intact, with the expulsion of the Guipuz- coanos, the privileges which as lords of the land and owners of slaves they had had since the time of the conquest. . . ."2 In the development of colonial caudillismo, resistance to royal authority is in fact only one side of the coin. American land, mine, and factory owners, when the occasion demanded, used ' Selected Writings of Bolivar, comp. by Vicente Lecuna; ed. by Harold A. Bierck, Jr. 2 vols. (New York: Colonial Press, 1951), I, 112. ' Quoted from Augusto Mijares, La interpretaction pesimista de la sociologia hispanoamericana, 2a edici6n (Madrid, 1952), p. 106.  176 The Caribbean 176 The Caribbean force to protect their privileged position from Indian revolts inspired by abuse of the natives under "rights" granted by the king. The history of colonial Peru is filled with such uprisings. The famous report of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa not only includes a description of the abuses of the corregidor but also details the burdens imposed upon the Indians in the mines, fac- tories, and on the estates of American owners and the church. Although the revolt of Tupac Amard in Peru began with an attack upon a corregidor, a royal official, he directed his campaign to free Indians on encomiendas held by landowners and factory owners. In this case the Americans who were threatened co- operated with the royal officials in crushing the uprising. It is a commonplace among students of Latin American history to recog- nize that the humanitarian laws enacted by Spanish monarchs to protect the Indians were evaded. This evasion was not con- fined solely to royal officials in the colonies. Leading colonial families, who occupied privileged status by virtue of their control over Indian labor, were never friendly to the enforcement of the humane laws listed in such detail in the Laws of the Indies. The growth of the institution of caudillismo in the Colonial period was capped in a very real sense by the military privileges extended to American families under the military reforms of Charles III in the late eighteenth century. "Perhaps," writes Professor McAlister, speaking of the effects of the military privi- leges and immunities. As the army increased in numbers and military program was the fuero militar with its associated privi- leges and immunities. As the army increased in numbers and importance, this concession, with subsequent amplifications, tended to create a military class exempt from civil responsibility and liability. This situation was particularly dangerous in the case of officers. . . . It was this class which was to produce an Agustin Iturbide and an Antonio Ldpez de Santa Anna."' a Lyle McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1767," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIII, I (Feb., 1953), 32. force to protect their privileged position from Indian revolts inspired by abuse of the natives under "rights" granted by the king. The history of colonial Peru is filled with such uprisings. The famous report of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa not only includes a description of the abuses of the corregidor but also details the burdens imposed upon the Indians in the mines, fac- tories, and on the estates of American owners and the church. Although the revolt of Tupac Amard in Peru began with an attack upon a corregidor, a royal official, he directed his campaign to free Indians on encomiendas held by landowners and factory owners. In this case the Americans who were threatened co- operated with the royal officials in crushing the uprising. It is a commonplace among students of Latin American history to recog- nize that the humanitarian laws enacted by Spanish monarchs to protect the Indians were evaded. This evasion was not con- fined solely to royal officials in the colonies. Leading colonial families, who occupied privileged status by virtue of their control over Indian labor, were never friendly to the enforcement of the humane laws listed in such detail in the Laws of the Indies. The growth of the institution of caudillismo in the Colonial period was capped in a very real sense by the military privileges extended to American families under the military reforms of Charles III in the late eighteenth century. "Perhaps," writes Professor McAlister, speaking of the effects of the military privi- leges and immunities. As the army increased in numbers and military program was the fuero militar with its associated privi- leges and immunities. As the army increased in numbers and importance, this concession, with subsequent amplifications, tended to create a military class exempt from civil responsibility and liability. This situation was particularly dangerous in the case of officers. . . . It was this class which was to produce an Agustin Iturbide and an Antonio Ldpez de Santa Anna."s Lyle McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1767," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIII, I (Feb., 1953), 32. 176 The Caribbean force to protect their privileged position from Indian revolts inspired by abuse of the natives under "rights" granted by the king. The history of colonial Peru is filled with such uprisings. The famous report of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa not only includes a description of the abuses of the corregidor but also details the burdens imposed upon the Indians in the mines, fac- tories, and on the estates of American owners and the church. Although the revolt of Tupac Amard in Peru began with an attack upon a corregidor, a royal official, he directed his campaign to free Indians on encomiendas held by landowners and factory owners. In this case the Americans who were threatened co- operated with the royal officials in crushing the uprising. It is a commonplace among students of Latin American history to recog- nize that the humanitarian laws enacted by Spanish monarchs to protect the Indians were evaded. This evasion was not con- fined solely to royal officials in the colonies. Leading colonial families, who occupied privileged status by virtue of their control over Indian labor, were never friendly to the enforcement of the humane laws listed in such detail in the Laws of the Indies. The growth of the institution of caudillismo in the Colonial period was capped in a very real sense by the military privileges extended to American families under the military reforms of Charles III in the late eighteenth century. "Perhaps," writes Professor McAlister, speaking of the effects of the military privi- leges and immunities. As the army increased in numbers and military program was the fuero militar with its associated privi- leges and immunities. As the army increased in numbers and importance, this concession, with subsequent amplifications, tended to create a military class exempt from civil responsibility and liability. This situation was particularly dangerous in the case of officers. . . . It was this class which was to produce an Agustin Iturbide and an Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna."a Lyle McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1767," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIII, I (Feb., 1953), 32.  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 1/ / Thus, on the one hand, the feudal leaders whom we may call colonial caudillos defied royal authority when they believed rights granted them during the Conquest or under the later fuero militar were invaded. On the other, they resorted to military force to put down Indian revolt which endangered the very basis of their privileged position. The tradition of resort to force to maintain the status quo had become well fixed in the Colonial period. But the character of caudillismo cannot be fully understood unless it is viewed in relation to a second colonial tradition which can be called the civilian. This civil tradition, too, had its origins in the institutions brought to the New World by Spain, more particularly in the establishment of municipalities. It is not the intention of the writer to argue that the municipal cabildo was a democratic body. The evidence seems to be in fact that its principal character was oligarchical. However, there is a deep chasm between the administration of a rural feudal estate and the carrying on of the business of a city or town. The former represents a virtual autocracy; the latter required the co- operation of a large number of individuals to make its govern- ment eifective. In this sense the cabildo of the Colonial period represented a tradition of law and order, of social cooperation. The powers exercised by the cabildos amply demonstrate its social and law-abiding characteristics. These powers, among others, included the administration of various funds, support for educational systems, imposition of health regulations, inspection of food, granting of licenses and franchises to traders, price fixing of food and retail commodities, distribution of town lots and lands, supervision of the construction of public buildings, defense of the towns against Indian and piratical attacks, support of the church, and inspection of charitable institutions.' In time these towns regarded their powers and activities suffi- For additional data on the powers of the cabildo, see the excellent study by J. Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs: A Study in the Origins and Powers of the Town Council in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1530-1700 (Durham, 1954)., PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 177 Thus, on the one hand, the feudal leaders whom we may call colonial caudillos defied royal authority when they believed rights granted them during the Conquest or under the later fuero militar were invaded. On the other, they resorted to military force to put down Indian revolt which endangered the very basis of their privileged position. The tradition of resort to force to maintain the status quo had become well fixed in the Colonial period. But the character of caudillismo cannot be fully understood unless it is viewed in relation to a second colonial tradition which can be called the civilian. This civil tradition, too, had its origins in the institutions brought to the New World by Spain, more particularly in the establishment of municipalities. It is not the intention of the writer to argue that the municipal cabildo was a democratic body. The evidence seems to be in fact that its principal character was oligarchical. However, there is a deep chasm between the administration of a rural feudal estate and the carrying on of the business of a city or town. The former represents a virtual autocracy; the latter required the co- operation of a large number of individuals to make its govern- ment effective. In this sense the cabildo of the Colonial period represented a tradition of law and order, of social cooperation. The powers exercised by the cabildos amply demonstrate its social and law-abiding characteristics. These powers, among others, included the administration of various funds, support for educational systems, imposition of health regulations, inspection of food, granting of licenses and franchises to traders, price fixing of food and retail commodities, distribution of town lots and lands, supervision of the construction of public buildings, defense of the towns against Indian and piratical attacks, support of the church, and inspection of charitable institutions.' In time these towns regarded their powers and activities sufi- * For additional data on the powers of the cabildo, see the excellent study by J. Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs: A Study in the Origins and Powers of the Town Council in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1530-1700 (Durham, 1954).. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 177 Thus, on the one hand, the feudal leaders whom we may call colonial caudillos defied royal authority when they believed rights granted them during the Conquest or under the later fuero militar were invaded. On the other, they resorted to military force to put down Indian revolt which endangered the very basis of their privileged position. The tradition of resort to force to maintain the status quo had become well fixed in the Colonial period. But the character of caudillismo cannot be fully understood unless it is viewed in relation to a second colonial tradition which can be called the civilian. This civil tradition, too, had its origins in the institutions brought to the New World by Spain, more particularly in the establishment of municipalities. It is not the intention of the writer to argue that the municipal cabildo was a democratic body. The evidence seems to be in fact that its principal character was oligarchical. However, there is a deep chasm between the administration of a rural feudal estate and the carrying on of the business of a city or town. The former represents a virtual autocracy; the latter required the co- operation of a large number of individuals to make its govern- ment effective. In this sense the cabildo of the Colonial period represented a tradition of law and order, of social cooperation. The powers exercised by the cabildos amply demonstrate its social and law-abiding characteristics. These powers, among others, included the administration of various funds, support for educational systems, imposition of health regulations, inspection of food, granting of licenses and franchises to traders, price fixing of food and retail commodities, distribution of town lots and lands, supervision of the construction of public buildings, defense of the towns against Indian and piratical attacks, support of the church, and inspection of charitable institutions.' In time these towns regarded their powers and activities suffi- ' For additional data on the powers of the cabildo, see the excellent study by J. Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs: A Study in the Origins and Powers of the Town Council in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1530-1700 (Durham, 1954).  178 The Caribbean 178 The Caribbean 178 The Caribbean ciently important to justify opposition to attempts by royal officials to change or curtail them. They were not always successful, but as Professor Pierson writes, "The cabildo was, in the opinion of its defenders, the medium for the expression of public will in opposition to misrule. There are dramatic instances when the cabildos, singly or in league, led armed resistance to royal officials, . . . resisted usurpation and illegal military service, denounced misgovernment and stood stanchly for local rights. . . ." This statement is eminently true of the revolt of the Comuneros in New Granada where more than sixty cabildos participated. The strength of this civil tradition Augusto Mijares makes strikingly clear in his interpretation of Bolivar's well-known and profound statement in the "Jamaica Letter": "We are a small part of the human race; we possess a world apart surrounded by broad seas, new in almost all the arts and sciences but in a certain manner old in the ways of civil society. . . ." (Italics are the writer's.) Mijares views this statement in the light of the his- tory of the cabildo. "Bolivar," he writes, "pointed out the existence of our special tradition which had commenced under the colonial regime, and was consequently neither the tradition of caudillo barbarism, which afterwards usurped the name of the American tradition, nor a mere reflection of the customs and laws of Spain."' Victor A. Belaunde re-enforces this interpretation with the flat statement: ". . . the cabildo was the real foundation of colonial society. ..." Thus the Colonial period saw the growth of two elements of unequal importance in Latin American society: one the institu- tion of caudillismo; the other, a history of civilian cooperation which gave, as Mijares states, a mature basis for Latin American society when the Wars of Independence arrived. ° William Whatley Pierson, Jr., "Some Reflections on the Cabildo as an Institution," in Hispanic American Historical Review, V (Nov., 1922), 589. * Op. cit., p. 52. Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revol- tion (Baltimore, 1938), p. 6. ciently important to justify opposition to attempts by royal officials to change or curtail them. They were not always successful, but as Professor Pierson writes, "The cabildo was, in the opinion of its defenders, the medium for the expression of public will in opposition to misrule. There are dramatic instances when the cabildos, singly or in league, led armed resistance to royal officials, . . . resisted usurpation and illegal military service, denounced misgovernment and stood stanchly for local rights. . . ." This statement is eminently true of the revolt of the Comuneros in New Granada where more than sixty cabildos participated. The strength of this civil tradition Augusto Mijares makes strikingly clear in his interpretation of Bolivar's well-known and profound statement in the "Jamaica Letter": "We are a small part of the human race; we possess a world apart surrounded by broad seas, new in almost all the arts and sciences but in a certain manner old in the ways of civil society. . . ." (Italics are the writer's.) Mijares views this statement in the light of the his- tory of the cabildo. "Bolivar," he writes, "pointed out the existence of our special tradition which had commenced under the colonial regime, and was consequently neither the tradition of caudillo barbarism, which afterwards usurped the name of the American tradition, nor a mere reflection of the customs and laws of Spain."6 Victor A. Belaunde re-enforces this interpretation with the flat statement: ". . . the cabildo was the real foundation of colonial society. . .." Thus the Colonial period saw the growth of two elements of unequal importance in Latin American society: one the institu- tion of caudillismo; the other, a history of civilian cooperation which gave, as Mijares states, a mature basis for Latin American society when the Wars of Independence arrived. * William Whatley Pierson, Jr., "Some Reflections on the Cabildo as an Institution," in Hispanic American Historical Review, V (Nov., 1922), 589. * Op. cit., p. 52. Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revoln- tion (Baltimore, 1938), p. 6. ciently important to justify opposition to attempts by royal officials to change or curtail them. They were not always successful, but as Professor Pierson writes, "The cabildo was, in the opinion of its defenders, the medium for the expression of public will in opposition to misrule. There are dramatic instances when the cabildos, singly or in league, led armed resistance to royal officials, . . . resisted usurpation and illegal military service, denounced misgovernment and stood stanchly for local rights. . .."' This statement is eminently true of the revolt of the Comuneros in New Granada where more than sixty cabildos participated. The strength of this civil tradition Augusto Mijares makes strikingly clear in his interpretation of Bolivar's well-known and profound statement in the "Jamaica Letter": "We are a small part of the human race; we possess a world apart surrounded by broad seas, new in almost all the arts and sciences but in a certain manner old in the ways of civil society. . . ." (Italics are the writer's.) Mijares views this statement in the light of the his- tory of the cabildo. "Bolivar," he writes, "pointed out the existence of our special tradition which had commenced under the colonial regime, and was consequently neither the tradition of caudillo barbarism, which afterwards usurped the name of the American tradition, nor a mere reflection of the customs and laws of Spain."' Victor A. Belaunde re-enforces this interpretation with the flat statement: ". . . the cabildo was the real foundation of colonial society. . . ." Thus the Colonial period saw the growth of two elements of unequal importance in Latin American society: one the institu- tion of caudillismo; the other, a history of civilian cooperation which gave, as Mijares states, a mature basis for Latin American society when the Wars of Independence arrived. William Whatley Pierson, Jr., "Some Reflections on the Cabildo as an Institution," in Hispanic American Historical Review, V (Nov., 1922), 589. * Op. cit., p. 52. I Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolu- tion (Baltimore, 1938), p. 6.  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 11 The Wars of Independence gave opportunity for the growth of both caudillismo and the civic tradition. The I of the cabildos in the Spanish colonies as centers for orga the revolution, developing the first declarations of indepens and providing for the establishment of the first republics i known. At the same time the extensive breakdown of SI military and political control gave rise to local leaders, m whom became caudillos in the early nineteenth century. A point it is customary to explain the period of so-called ar that followed the Wars of Independence. Reasons usually it difficulty of communication between the capitals and ou provinces, ignorance of democratic procedures in the new 1 lics, and widespread illiteracy among the masses. But wh become of the tradition of civil government which exhibited vigor in the Colonial period and assumed such effective I ship during the Wars of Independence? The tendency to emphasize the caudillo after indepen has obscured the important fact that the civic tradition re new strength from the growth of democratic and liberal during the struggle for freedom. I refer briefly to well-I examples, such as: the widespread teaching in colonial et of the ideas of Rousseau and other French thinkers; Ai Narino's distribution of liberal literature in New Granad promulgation in New Spain and other colonies of the SI constitutions of 1812 and 1820 with their provisions go frage, freedom of the press, and religion, and the aboliti colonial evils. Following the Wars of Independence, id( political liberty fitted naturally into the civic tradition < municipalities. "To the cabildo," writes Bauza, "is due the idea of the sentative system and the first glimpse of the division of I . . . The people observed that not everything depended c comprehensive authority of the military chief, and, . . 179 PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS if 179 PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS The Wars of Independence gave opportunity for the rapid growth of both caudillismo and the civic tradition. The history of the cabildos in the Spanish colonies as centers for organizing the revolution, developing the first declarations of independence, and providing for the establishment of the first republics is well known. At the same time the extensive breakdown of Spanish military and political control gave rise to local leaders, many of whom became caudillos in the early nineteenth century. At this point it is customary to explain the period of so-called anarchy that followed the Wars of Independence. Reasons usually include difficulty of communication between the capitals and outlying provinces, ignorance of democratic procedures in the new repub- lics, and widespread illiteracy among the masses. But what has become of the tradition of civil government which exhibited such vigor in the Colonial period and assumed such effective leader- ship during the Wars of Independence? The tendency to emphasize the caudillo after independence has obscured the important fact that the civic tradition received new strength from the growth of democratic and liberal ideas during the struggle for freedom. I refer briefly to well-known examples, such as: the widespread teaching in colonial colleges of the ideas of Rousseau and other French thinkers; Antonio Narino's distribution of liberal literature in New Granada; the promulgation in New Spain and other colonies of the Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1820 with their provisions for suf- frage, freedom of the press, and religion, and the abolition of colonial evils. Following the Wars of Independence, ideas of political liberty fitted naturally into the civic tradition of the municipalities. "To the cabildo," writes Bauza, "is due the idea of the repre- sentative system and the first glimpse of the division of power. . . . The people observed that not everything depended on the comprehensive authority of the military chief, and, . . . the The Wars of Independence gave opportunity for the rapid growth of both caudillismo and the civic tradition. The history of the cabildos in the Spanish colonies as centers for organizing the revolution, developing the first declarations of independence, and providing for the establishment of the first republics is well known. At the same time the extensive breakdown of Spanish military and political control gave rise to local leaders, many of whom became caudillos in the early nineteenth century. At this point it is customary to explain the period of so-called anarchy that followed the Wars of Independence. Reasons usually include difficulty of communication between the capitals and outlying provinces, ignorance of democratic procedures in the new repub- lics, and widespread illiteracy among the masses. But what has become of the tradition of civil government which exhibited such vigor in the Colonial period and assumed such effective leader- ship during the Wars of Independence? The tendency to emphasize the caudillo after independence has obscured the important fact that the civic tradition received new strength from the growth of democratic and liberal ideas during the struggle for freedom. I refer briefly to well-known examples, such as: the widespread teaching in colonial colleges of the ideas of Rousseau and other French thinkers; Antonio Narifno's distribution of liberal literature in New Granada; the promulgation in New Spain and other colonies of the Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1820 with their provisions for suf- frage, freedom of the press, and religion, and the abolition of colonial evils. Following the Wars of Independence, ideas of political liberty fitted naturally into the civic tradition of the municipalities. "To the cabildo," writes Bauzd, "is due the idea of the repre- sentative system and the first glimpse of the division of power. . . . The people observed that not everything depended on the comprehensive authority of the military chief, and, . . . the  180 The Caribbean 180 The Caribbean 180 The Caribbean rudiments of a system of government more complex than that of the one-man power began to permeate all minds. . . ." In the cities, wrote Sarmiento, "there were books, ideas, civic pride, courts, equity, laws, education, all points of contact and fellow- ship which we have in common with Europeans.", Thus liberal and democratic ideas fell on ground long prepared for their reception. However, the force of this democratic philosophy has not been appreciated. For example, Professor Chapman in his article on caudillismo, written as late as 1932, quotes a former rector of the San Marcos University in Lima: "There was no abrupt change from the colonial period with the winning of independence. The colonial period lived on." And Chapman added "it 'still lives.' " The most superficial look at Latin America immediately after in- dependence shows an abrupt change-the emergence of political parties totally unknown in the Colonial period. In all countries the thinking population divided itself into groups which had basic political outlooks, either liberal or conservative. Broadly speaking the conservatives represented the status quo. They included the large landowners, the church, military figures, wealthy Spanish merchants. The liberals, imbued with the egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution, admiration for the democracy of the United States, and the liberal economic ideas of Britain, found support among an emerging middle class, among Indian leaders seeking to better their race, and among many intellectuals wedded to the principles of democracy. "Not only the vice-president [San- tander]" writes Bushnell in his article on the press in Gran Colombia, "but most of the active intellectuals in Bogoti were firmly committed to the liberal creed of political freedom and constitutional government, an economy freed from colonial re- Quoted by Pierson, loc. cit., p. 590. Facundo, p. 79. (Grandes Escritores Argentinos, Vol. LXXV.) Charles E. Chapman, "The Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII (Aug., 1932), 291. rudiments of a system of government more complex than that of the one-man power began to permeate all minds. . . ."s In the cities, wrote Sarmiento, "there were books, ideas, civic pride, courts, equity, laws, education, all points of contact and fellow- ship which we have in common with Europeans."' Thus liberal and democratic ideas fell on ground long prepared for their reception. However, the force of this democratic philosophy has not been appreciated. For example, Professor Chapman in his article on caudillismo, written as late as 1932, quotes a former rector of the San Marcos University in Lima: "There was no abrupt change from the colonial period with the winning of independence. The colonial period lived on." And Chapman added "it 'still lives.' "o The most superficial look at Latin America immediately after in- dependence shows an abrupt change-the emergence of political parties totally unknown in the Colonial period. In all countries the thinking population divided itself into groups which had basic political outlooks, either liberal or conservative. Broadly speaking the conservatives represented the status quo. They included the large landowners, the church, military figures, wealthy Spanish merchants. The liberals, imbued with the egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution, admiration for the democracy of the United States, and the liberal economic ideas of Britain, found support among an emerging middle class, among Indian leaders seeking to better their race, and among many intellectuals wedded to the principles of democracy. "Not only the vice-president [San- tander]" writes Bushnell in his article on the press in Gran Colombia, "but most of the active intellectuals in Bogota were firmly committed to the liberal creed of political freedom and constitutional government, an economy freed from colonial re- Quoted by Pierson, loc. cit., p. 590. Facundo, p. 79. (Grander Escritores Argentinos, Vol. LXXV.) Charles E. Chapman, "The Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII (Aug., 1932), 291. rudiments of a system of government more complex than that of the one-man power began to permeate all minds. . . .' In the cities, wrote Sarmiento, "there were books, ideas, civic pride, courts, equity, laws, education, all points of contact and fellow- ship which we have in common with Europeans."' Thus liberal and democratic ideas fell on ground long prepared for their reception. However, the force of this democratic philosophy has not been appreciated. For example, Professor Chapman in his article on caudillismo, written as late as 1932, quotes a former rector of the San Marcos University in Lima: "There was no abrupt change from the colonial period with the winning of independence. The colonial period lived on." And Chapman added "it 'still lives.' "" The most superficial look at Latin America immediately after in- dependence shows an abrupt change-the emergence of political parties totally unknown in the Colonial period. In all countries the thinking population divided itself into groups which had basic political outlooks, either liberal or conservative. Broadly speaking the conservatives represented the status quo. They included the large landowners, the church, military figures, wealthy Spanish merchants. The liberals, imbued with the egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution, admiration for the democracy of the United States, and the liberal economic ideas of Britain, found support among an emerging middle class, among Indian leaders seeking to better their race, and among many intellectuals wedded to the principles of democracy. "Not only the vice-president [San- tander]" writes Bushnell in his article on the press in Gran Colombia, "but most of the active intellectuals in Bogoti were firmly committed to the liberal creed of political freedom and constitutional government, an economy freed from colonial re- Quoted by Pierson, loc. cit., p. 590. * Facundo, p. 79. (Grandes Escritores Argentinos, Vol. LXXV.) * Charles E. Chapman, "The Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII (Aug., 1932), 291.  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 1 85 strictions, and a program of education to rescue the masses from the clutches of religious 'fanaticism.'"" III Perhaps the most direct way of stating the chief role of cau- dillismo in the nineteenth century is to say that the colonial civic tradition re-enforced by the ideas of democracy and liberalism replaced royal power as the chief threat to the privileged position of the conservative classes. A few examples will illustrate the point. In Mexico the liberals, under their leader GOmez Farias, attempted in 1832 to end the privileged religious and military courts, establish a state system of education, and assume the patronal power formerly exercised by the king. To meet this threat the conservatives turned to a caudillo, Santa Anna. Pro- fessor Mecham stated the situation correctly when he wrote: "The aristocrats and high officers of the Church who had looked upon him with disdain, now appealed to him to save them from the reformists."" Together "the aristocrats and the Church" went into battle under the banner of "Religion and Privileges." After their success, the privileged classes attempted to freeze the status quo in the Constitution of 1836. The interpretation frequently put upon this document, namely, that it was designed to curb the power of the caudillo, Santa Anna, is quite unrealistic. Its provisions restricting suffrage to the wealthy, setting up a complicated system to select a president, and providing for a poder conservador which had power to suspend congress, annul laws, set aside judicial sentences, and require submission to its orders on penalty of being charged with treason, were not aimed at Santa Anna as an individual. They were designed to destroy the maturing liberal movement the program of which was so forthrightly expressed in the reforms of Gomez Farias. This " David Bushnell, "The Development of the Press in Great Colombia," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XXX (Nov., 1950), 436. " J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 416. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 181 strictions, and a program of education to rescue the masses from the clutches of religious 'fanaticism.'"" III Perhaps the most direct way of stating the chief role of cau- dillismo in the nineteenth century is to say that the colonial civic tradition re-enforced by the ideas of democracy and liberalism replaced royal power as the chief threat to the privileged position of the conservative classes. A few examples will illustrate the point. In Mexico the liberals, under their leader Gomez Farias, attempted in 1832 to end the privileged religious and military courts, establish a state system of education, and assume the patronal power formerly exercised by the king. To meet this threat the conservatives turned to a caudillo, Santa Anna. Pro- fessor Mecham stated the situation correctly when he wrote: "The aristocrats and high officers of the Church who had looked upon him with disdain, now appealed to him to save them from the reformists."" Together "the aristocrats and the Church" went into battle under the banner of "Religion and Privileges." After their success, the privileged classes attempted to freeze the status quo in the Constitution of 1836. The interpretation frequently put upon this document, namely, that it was designed to curb the power of the caudillo, Santa Anna, is quite unrealistic. Its provisions restricting suffrage to the wealthy, setting up a complicated system to select a president, and providing for a poder conservador which had power to suspend congress, annul laws, set aside judicial sentences, and require submission to its orders on penalty of being charged with treason, were not aimed at Santa Anna as an individual. They were designed to destroy the maturing liberal movement the program of which was so forthrightly expressed in the reforms of GOmez Farias. This " David Bushnell, "The Development of the Press in Great Colombia," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XXX (Nov., 1950), 436. " J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 416. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 181 strictions, and a program of education to rescue the masses from the clutches of religious 'fanaticism.'"" III Perhaps the most direct way of stating the chief role of cau- dillismo in the nineteenth century is to say that the colonial civic tradition re-enforced by the ideas of democracy and liberalism replaced royal power as the chief threat to the privileged position of the conservative classes. A few examples will illustrate the point. In Mexico the liberals, under their leader O6mez Farias, attempted in 1832 to end the privileged religious and military courts, establish a state system of education, and assume the patronal power formerly exercised by the king. To meet this threat the conservatives turned to a caudillo, Santa Anna. Pro- fessor Mecham stated the situation correctly when he wrote: "The aristocrats and high officers of the Church who had looked upon him with disdain, now appealed to him to save them from the reformists."" Together "the aristocrats and the Church" went into battle under the banner of "Religion and Privileges." After their success, the privileged classes attempted to freeze the status quo in the Constitution of 1836. The interpretation frequently put upon this document, namely, that it was designed to curb the power of the caudillo, Santa Anna, is quite unrealistic. Its provisions restricting suffrage to the wealthy, setting up a complicated system to select a president, and providing for a poder conservador which had power to suspend congress, annul laws, set aside judicial sentences, and require submission to its orders on penalty of being charged with treason, were not aimed at Santa Anna as an individual. They were designed to destroy the maturing liberal movement the program of which was so forthrightly expressed in the reforms of GOmez Farias. This " David Bushnell, "The Development of the Press in Great Colombia," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XXX (Nov., 1950), 436. " J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 416.  182 The Caribbean whole struggle repeated itself in the 1850's when Judrez and his liberal supporters launched their reform movement. The Constitution of 1857 laid down democratic principles; legislation abolished the courts of the Army and the Church, and the long existing colonial land monopoly. The conservatives denounced this constitution, demanded the restoration of their privileged courts, and finally revolted under their caudillo, Zuloaga. When he failed them they secured the services of a foreign caudillo, Maximilian. The role of Porfirio Diaz, the next caudillo in Mexico's history, in creating and protecting a privileged class and destroying all semblance of the democratic institutions maturing under Judrez, is too well known to require comment. And we also know that the Mexican liberal movement reasserted itself with such force that it destroyed once and for all the basis of caudillismo: lati- fundia, illiteracy, and the institutions associated with the historic privileged groups. The history of Colombia is replete with examples of struggles between liberals and conservatives, both of whom resorted to auto- cratic governments under caudillos to achieve their ends. But the difference was fundamental in the role played by a particular individual caudillo. The conservatives throughout the struggle, who achieved success under Rafael Ndnez in the Constitution of 1888 and the Concordat of the same year, fought consistently to maintain their historic position associated with latifundia, union of Church and State, and clerical control of education. To do so they restricted suffrage and abolished the freedoms of press, speech, and religion. The liberal caudillos fought for opposite principles. Jose Hilario Lopez and Jos6 Maria Obando were responsible for the Constitution of 1853 which abolished slavery and provided for religious liberty and directed manhood suffrage in the election of public officials. Examples from other Latin American countries, illustrating the role of caudillos as- sociated with one side or the other in the liberal-conservative struggle, are: Gabriel Garcia Moreno and Eloy Alfaro in Ecuador; 182 The Caribbean whole struggle repeated itself in the 1850's when Juirez and his liberal supporters launched their reform movement. The Constitution of 1857 laid down democratic principles; legislation abolished the courts of the Army and the Church, and the long existing colonial land monopoly. The conservatives denounced this constitution, demanded the restoration of their privileged courts, and finally revolted under their caudillo, Zuloaga. When he failed them they secured the services of a foreign caudillo, Maximilian. The role of Porfirio Diaz, the next caudillo in Mexico's history, in creating and protecting a privileged class and destroying all semblance of the democratic institutions maturing under Juarez, is too well known to require comment. And we also know that the Mexican liberal movement reasserted itself with such force that it destroyed once and for all the basis of caudillismo: lati- fundia, illiteracy, and the institutions associated with the historic privileged groups. The history of Colombia is replete with examples of struggles between liberals and conservatives, both of whom resorted to auto- cratic governments under caudillos to achieve their ends. But the difference was fundamental in the role played by a particular individual caudillo. The conservatives throughout the struggle, who achieved success under Rafael Ndnez in the Constitution of 1888 and the Concordat of the same year, fought consistently to maintain their historic position associated with latifundia, union of Church and State, and clerical control of education. To do so they restricted suffrage and abolished the freedoms of press, speech, and religion. The liberal caudillos fought for opposite principles. Josd Hilario Ldpez and Jose Maria Obando were responsible for the Constitution of 1853 which abolished slavery and provided for religious liberty and directed manhood suffrage in the election of public officials. Examples from other Latin American countries, illustrating the role of caudillos as- sociated with one side or the other in the liberal-conservative struggle, are: Gabriel Garcia Moreno and Eloy Alfaro in Ecuador; 182 The Caribbean whole struggle repeated itself in the 1850's when Juarez and his liberal supporters launched their reform movement. The Constitution of 1857 laid down democratic principles; legislation abolished the courts of the Army and the Church, and the long existing colonial land monopoly. The conservatives denounced this constitution, demanded the restoration of their privileged courts, and finally revolted under their caudillo, Zuloaga. When he failed them they secured the services of a foreign caudillo, Maximilian. The role of Porfirio Diaz, the next caudillo in Mexico's history, in creating and protecting a privileged class and destroying all semblance of the democratic institutions maturing under Jurez, is too well known to require comment. And we also know that the Mexican liberal movement reasserted itself with such force that it destroyed once and for all the basis of caudillismo: lati- fundia, illiteracy, and the institutions associated with the historic privileged groups. The history of Colombia is replete with examples of struggles between liberals and conservatives, both of whom resorted to auto- cratic governments under caudillos to achieve their ends. But the difference was fundamental in the role played by a particular individual caudillo. The conservatives throughout the struggle, who achieved success under Rafael N65ez in the Constitution of 1888 and the Concordat of the same year, fought consistently to maintain their historic position associated with latifundia, union of Church and State, and clerical control of education. To do so they restricted suffrage and abolished the freedoms of press, speech, and religion. The liberal caudillos fought for opposite principles. Jose Hilario Lapez and Jose Maria Obando were responsible for the Constitution of 1853 which abolished slavery and provided for religious liberty and directed manhood suffrage in the election of public officials. Examples from other Latin American countries, illustrating the role of caudillos as- sociated with one side or the other in the liberal-conservative struggle, are: Gabriel Garcia Moreno and Eloy Alfaro in Ecuador;  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 183 Jos6 Antonio Paez and Antonio Gszman Blanco in Venezuela; Rafael Carrera and Justo Rufino Barrios in Guatemala. This struggle, viewed by Latin American thinkers, produced in all of them an explanation of the role of the caudillo in Latin American life. Certain writers believed the caudillo stood be- tween the nation and chaos; others thought they detected inherent racial characteristics among Latin America's populations which justified the institution; still others recognized the menace of caudillismo and sought a solution to the problem. IV As was to be expected, conservative writers generally looked with approval upon the caudillo. The historian Garcia Calderon of Peru, for example, wrote: "The history of these republics can be reduced to the biographies of their representative men. The national spirit is concentrated in the caudillos, absolute chiefs, beneficent tyrants. They dominate by virtue of their valor, their personal prestige, their aggressive courage. They resemble the democracies which deify them."" To Garcia Caldern an attack upon the institution was an invitation to chaos. Other conservative thinkers professed a belief in racial inferior- ity of the masses. Their Indian and Negro background made them forever incapable of establishing stable governments; they were fit to be led only by caudillos. Thus writes Dr. Pedro Manuel Arcaya of Venezuela: . . . in Venezuela, on whose people gravitate with an enor- mous weight the psychic inheritance from the barbarous tribes we find the Indian of our forests and Negro of the African plains. The one and the other lived under the regime of absolute chiefs and their caciques or kings they venerated at times as gods. In the subconscious depths of the popular soul . .. psychical process of the submission of men to man has remained. . When there are several caudillos who aspire to impose themselves on the soul of the multitudes ... some will follow a definite chief and others will go away with a rival of that leader, but it " Quoted in Mijares, op. cit., p. 18. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 183 Jose Antonio Piez and Antonio Gdzman Blanco in Venezuela; Rafael Carrera and Justo Rufino Barrios in Guatemala. This struggle, viewed by Latin American thinkers, produced in all of them an explanation of the role of the caudillo in Latin American life. Certain writers believed the caudillo stood be- tween the nation and chaos; others thought they detected inherent racial characteristics among Latin America's populations which justified the institution; still others recognized the menace of caudillismo and sought a solution to the problem. IV As was to be expected, conservative writers generally looked with approval upon the caudillo. The historian Garcia Calderon of Peru, for example, wrote: "The history of these republics can be reduced to the biographies of their representative men. The national spirit is concentrated in the caudillos, absolute chiefs, beneficent tyrants. They dominate by virtue of their valor, their personal prestige, their aggressive courage. They resemble the democracies which deify them."" To Garcia Calderon an attack upon the institution was an invitation to chaos. Other conservative thinkers professed a belief in racial inferior- ity of the masses. Their Indian and Negro background made them forever incapable of establishing stable governments; they were fit to be led only by caudillos. Thus writes Dr. Pedro Manuel Arcaya of Venezuela: . . . in Venezuela, on whose people gravitate with an enor- mous weight the psychic inheritance from the barbarous tribes we find the Indian of our forests and Negro of the African plains. The one and the other lived under the regime of absolute chiefs and their caciques or kings they venerated at times as gods. In the subconscious depths of the popular soul . .. psychical process of the submission of men to man has remained. . When there are several caudillos who aspire to impose themselves on the soul of the multitudes ... some will follow a definite chief and others will go away with a rival of that leader, but it " Quoted in Mijares, op. cit., p. 18. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 183 Jose Antonio Pdez and Antonio Gnzman Blanco in Venezuela; Rafael Carrera and Justo Rufino Barrios in Guatemala. This struggle, viewed by Latin American thinkers, produced in all of them an explanation of the role of the caudillo in Latin American life. Certain writers believed the caudillo stood be- tween the nation and chaos; others thought they detected inherent racial characteristics among Latin America's populations which justified the institution; still others recognized the menace of caudillismo and sought a solution to the problem. IV As was to be expected, conservative writers generally looked with approval upon the caudillo. The historian Garcia Caldern of Peru, for example, wrote: "The history of these republics can be reduced to the biographies of their representative men. The national spirit is concentrated in the caudillos, absolute chiefs, beneficent tyrants. They dominate by virtue of their valor, their personal prestige, their aggressive courage. They resemble the democracies which deify them."" To Garcia Caldern an attack upon the institution was an invitation to chaos. Other conservative thinkers professed a belief in racial inferior- ity of the masses. Their Indian and Negro background made them forever incapable of establishing stable governments; they were fit to be led only by caudillos. Thus writes Dr. Pedro Manuel Arcaya of Venezuela: . . . in Venezuela, on whose people gravitate with an enor- mous weight the psychic inheritance from the barbarous tribes . . . we find the Indian of our forests and Negro of the African plains. The one and the other lived under the regime of absolute chiefs and their caciques or kings they venerated at times as gods. In the subconscious depths of the popular soul . .. psychical process of the submission of men to man has remained. . When there are several caudillos who aspire to impose themselves on the soul of the multitudes .. some will follow a definite chief and others will go away with a rival of that leader, but it " Quoted in Mijares, op. cit., p. 18.  184 The Caribbean is to be noticed that at bottom the same unthinking tendency works in all .. .14 Liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century regarded the insti- tution of caudillismo as a menace. They recognized it as part of the legacy handed down by Spain from the Colonial period. Some of them proposed to combat caudillismo by resort to force- to accept if need be the services of a leader who, using caudillo methods, would clear the ground for the development of democ- racy. The Chilean thinker and writer, Jose Lastarria, accepted this alternative. His word carries especial weight since he ex- amined the whole American picture in one of the first general histories of Latin America written in the nineteenth century. His position, bluntly, was that the social conditions of the times were due to the Spanish colonial heritage of autocratic govern- ment. In his opinion this background had to be balanced to achieve the objectives of democracy. Thus he wrote: "The prin- cipal cause of our political and social disaster lies in our Spanish task, and we cannot remedy these disasters except by reacting frankly, openly, and energetically against that civilization, in order to free our minds and adapt our society to the new form, democracy."" Another Chilean liberal writer, Valentine Letelier, recognizing also the realities of nineteenth-century Latin American social life, proclaimed boldly: "Above all, let the label of authoritarians not bother us so long as the freedom to think, to speak, to write, to read, the freedom to worship, of public meetings, of printing, of teaching, of movement, in short all the liberties that man needs to develop his capacities and society to develop its culture find in us the surest guarantee of their existence."" Among the Latin American thinkers who proposed means to end the institution of caudillismo, the most famous, of course, is " William Whatley Pierson, Jr., "Foreign Influence on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830-1930," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XV (Feb.,1935), 38-39. " Quoted in William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin-American Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), p. 68. * Ibid., p. 76. 184 The Caribbean is to be noticed that at bottom the same unthinking tendency works in all. .." Liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century regarded the insti- tution of caudillismo as a menace. They recognized it as part of the legacy handed down by Spain from the Colonial period. Some of them proposed to combat caudillismo by resort to force- to accept if need be the services of a leader who, using caudillo methods, would clear the ground for the development of democ- racy. The Chilean thinker and writer, Jose Lastarria, accepted this alternative. His word carries especial weight since he ex- amined the whole American picture in one of the first general histories of Latin America written in the nineteenth century. His position, bluntly, was that the social conditions of the times were due to the Spanish colonial heritage of autocratic govern- ment. In his opinion this background had to be balanced to achieve the objectives of democracy. Thus he wrote: "The prin- cipal cause of our political and social disaster lies in our Spanish task, and we cannot remedy these disasters except by reacting frankly, openly, and energetically against that civilization, in order to free our minds and adapt our society to the new form, democracy."" Another Chilean liberal writer, Valentine Letelier, recognizing also the realities of nineteenth-century Latin American social life, proclaimed boldly: "Above all, let the label of authoritarians not bother us so long as the freedom to think, to speak, to write, to read, the freedom to worship, of public meetings, of printing, of teaching, of movement, in short all the liberties that man needs to develop his capacities and society to develop its culture find in us the surest guarantee of their existence."st Among the Latin American thinkers who proposed means to end the institution of caudillismo, the most famous, of course, is " William Whatley Pierson, Jr., "Foreign Influence on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830-1930," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XV (Feb.,1935), 38-39. " Quoted in William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin-American Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), p. 68. * Ibid., p. 76. 184 The Caribbean is to be noticed that at bottom the same unthinking tendency works in all .. ."4 Liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century regarded the insti- tution of caudillismo as a menace. They recognized it as part of the legacy handed down by Spain from the Colonial period. Some of them proposed to combat caudillismo by resort to force- to accept if need be the services of a leader who, using caudillo methods, would clear the ground for the development of democ- racy. The Chilean thinker and writer, Jose Lastarria, accepted this alternative. His word carries especial weight since he ex- amined the whole American picture in one of the first general histories of Latin America written in the nineteenth century. His position, bluntly, was that the social conditions of the times were due to the Spanish colonial heritage of autocratic govern- ment. In his opinion this background had to be balanced to achieve the objectives of democracy. Thus he wrote: "The prin- cipal cause of our political and social disaster lies in our Spanish task, and we cannot remedy these disasters except by reacting frankly, openly, and energetically against that civilization, in order to free our minds and adapt our society to the new form, democracy."" Another Chilean liberal writer, Valentine Letelier, recognizing also the realities of nineteenth-century Latin American social life, proclaimed boldly: "Above all, let the label of authoritarians not bother us so long as the freedom to think, to speak, to write, to read, the freedom to worship, of public meetings, of printing, of teaching, of movement, in short all the liberties that man needs to develop his capacities and society to develop its culture find in us the surest guarantee of their existence."s Among the Latin American thinkers who proposed means to end the institution of caudillismo, the most famous, of course, is " William Whatley Pierson, Jr., "Foreign Influence on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830-1930," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XV (Feb.,1935), 38-39. " Quoted in William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin-American Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), p. 68. " Ibid., p. 76.  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 185 Sarmiento. He saw the caudillo as a symbol of barbarism. His solution in Facundo was the cultural Europeanization of Argen- tina. After he published his book, he went on an extended tour of Europe, Africa, and the United States. On his return he con- cluded that Europe was in fact a decaying society, while the United States was realizing its destiny through education. The northern republic was to Sarmiento the model to follow to end caudillismo in Argentina. Indeed, on one occasion he cried out to his countrymen: "Let us be the United States." Alberdi, Sarmiento's contemporary, recognized the danger of caudillismo as a social force. He, too, attributed it to the racial legacy left by Spain and to the backwardness of the native popu- lation. Together he felt they presented an insuperable obstacle to the growth of the republic. Radically he advocated immigra- tion from Anglo-Saxon countries as the principal weapon to over- come both the Spanish legacy and the characteristics of the Argentine population. Parenthetically it should he stated that the immigration from Europe which did pour into Argentina did not end caudillismo in that country. Obviously, the basic factor that has supported the institution has remained-latifundia. But what seems to the writer the best solution for the problem of caudillismo was advanced by a Venezuelan, Dr. Jesus Munoz Tibar, who combined recognition of Latin America's civic tradi- tion with the acceptance of democratic principles. He refused to recognize that race and heredity were decisive in a nation's life. Education, he insisted, moulded the character of men. It was precisely this factor that accounted for New World diver- gence in the development between Anglo-America and Latin America: "legalism on one side and personalism on the other." Writes Professor Pierson, "By this differentiation he meant not only the obvious implications of a government of laws as against one of men, but those of a system of government in which law is supreme and respected as against the arbitrary rule of dictator- ship." To achieve this objective he advocated civic education as a basis for changing social customs. It is interesting that Munoz PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 185 Sarmiento. He saw the caudillo as a symbol of barbarism. His solution in Facundo was the cultural Europeanization of Argen- tina. After he published his book, he went on an extended tour of Europe, Africa, and the United States. On his return he con- cluded that Europe was in fact a decaying society, while the United States was realizing its destiny through education. The northern republic was to Sarmiento the model to follow to end caudillismo in Argentina. Indeed, on one occasion he cried out to his countrymen: "Let us be the United States." Alberdi, Sarmiento's contemporary, recognized the danger of caudillismo as a social force. He, too, attributed it to the racial legacy left by Spain and to the backwardness of the native popu- lation. Together he felt they presented an insuperable obstacle to the growth of the republic. Radically he advocated immigra- tion from Anglo-Saxon countries as the principal weapon to over- come both the Spanish legacy and the characteristics of the Argentine population. Parenthetically it should be stated that the immigration from Europe which did pour into Argentina did not end caudillismo in that country. Obviously, the basic factor that has supported the institution has remained-latifundia. But what seems to the writer the best solution for the problem of caudillismo was advanced by a Venezuelan, Dr. Jesds Munoz Tibar, who combined recognition of Latin America's civic tradi- tion with the acceptance of democratic principles. He refused to recognize that race and heredity were decisive in a nation's life. Education, he insisted, moulded the character of men. It was precisely this factor that accounted for New World diver- gence in the development between Anglo-America and Latin America: "legalism on one side and personalism on the other." Writes Professor Pierson, "By this differentiation he meant not only the obvious implications of a government of laws as against one of men, but those of a system of government in which law is supreme and respected as against the arbitrary rule of dictator- ship." To achieve this objective he advocated civic education as a basis for changing social customs. It is interesting that Munoz PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 185 Sarmiento. He saw the caudillo as a symbol of barbarism. His solution in Facundo was the cultural Europeanization of Argen- tina. After he published his book, he went on an extended tour of Europe, Africa, and the United States. On his return he con- cluded that Europe was in fact a decaying society, while the United States was realizing its destiny through education. The northern republic was to Sarmiento the model to follow to end caudillismo in Argentina. Indeed, on one occasion he cried out to his countrymen: "Let us be the United States." Alberdi, Sarmiento's contemporary, recognized the danger of caudillismo as a social force. He, too, attributed it to the racial legacy left by Spain and to the backwardness of the native popu- lation. Together he felt they presented an insuperable obstacle to the growth of the republic. Radically he advocated immigra- tion from Anglo-Saxon countries as the principal weapon to over- come both the Spanish legacy and the characteristics of the Argentine population. Parenthetically it should be stated that the immigration from Europe which did pour into Argentina did not end caudillismo in that country. Obviously, the basic factor that has supported the institution has remained-latifundia. But what seems to the writer the best solution for the problem of caudillismo was advanced by a Venezuelan, Dr. Jests Munoz Tdbar, who combined recognition of Latin America's civic tradi- tion with the acceptance of democratic principles. He refused to recognize that race and heredity were decisive in a nation's life. Education, he insisted, moulded the character of men. It was precisely this factor that accounted for New World diver- gence in the development between Anglo-America and Latin America: "legalism on one side and personalism on the other." Writes Professor Pierson, "By this differentiation he meant not only the obvious implications of a government of laws as against one of men, but those of a system of government in which law is supreme and respected as against the arbitrary rule of dictator- ship." To achieve this objective he advocated civic education as a basis for changing social customs. It is interesting that Munoz  186 The Caribbean Tebar reached the identical conclusion arrived at by Sarmiento, namely, that the "way of progress for Hispanic America was for it to become like the United States."" While we appreciate the compliment extended to our country, it would seem more important to observe that the Latin American people themselves have ended the institution of caudillismo pre- cisely in those countries where they have instituted the civic education Munoz Tebar advocated-as well as social reforms, universal public education, extension of the suffrage, the creation of small landownership-and maintained the vitally important freedoms of press, speech, and religion. V Two conclusions suggest themselves from this brief survey of the role of the caudillo in Latin America. First, caudillismo is not an institution deeply rooted among the bulk of the population; rather it has been primarily associated with the fortunes of the privileged classes of Latin America. The second is that too much emphasis has been put upon the caudillo; not enough recognition has been extended to the history of the civic tradition, which is infinitely more significant in the development of Latin America. The long history of organized political, social, and economic life, represented by the cabildo in the colonial municipalities, formed the basis for the growth after independence of democratic and liberal institutions in Latin America. This tradition has ended caudillismo in the Caribbean area in Mexico and Costa Rica, and, further south in Uruguay and Chile, precisely because democratic movements in those coun- tries have destroyed the basis of the institution-namely, militar- ism, latifundia, illiteracy, and the historic privileges of a favored class. These countries are guideposts to the future history of Latin America. Caudillismo seen in its proper perspective has been and is a block-temporary in nature in the long view-to the development of democratic institutions in all Latin America. " Pierson, "Foreign Influences on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830- 1930," loc. cit., 31. 186 The Caribbean Tebar reached the identical conclusion arrived at by Sarmiento, namely, that the "way of progress for Hispanic America was for it to become like the United States."" While we appreciate the compliment extended to our country, it would seem more important to observe that the Latin American people themselves have ended the institution of caudillismo pre- cisely in those countries where they have instituted the civic education Munoz Tebar advocated-as well as social reforms, universal public education, extension of the suffrage, the creation of small landownership-and maintained the vitally important freedoms of press, speech, and religion. V Two conclusions suggest themselves from this brief survey of the role of the caudillo in Latin America. First, caudillismo is not an institution deeply rooted among the bulk of the population; rather it has been primarily associated with the fortunes of the privileged classes of Latin America. The second is that too much emphasis has been put upon the caudillo; not enough recognition has been extended to the history of the civic tradition, which is infinitely more significant in the development of Latin America. The long history of organized political, social, and economic life, represented by the cabildo in the colonial municipalities, formed the basis for the growth after independence of democratic and liberal institutions in Latin America. This tradition has ended caudillismo in the Caribbean area in Mexico and Costa Rica, and, further south in Uruguay and Chile, precisely because democratic movements in those coun- tries have destroyed the basis of the institution-namely, militar- ism, latifundia, illiteracy, and the historic privileges of a favored class. These countries are guideposts to the future history of Latin America. Caudillismo seen in its proper perspective has been and is a block-temporary in nature in the long view-to the development of democratic institutions in all Latin America. " Pierson, "Foreign Influences on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830- 1930," loc. cit., 31. 186 The Caribbean Tebar reached the identical conclusion arrived at by Sarmiento, namely, that the "way of progress for Hispanic America was for it to become like the United States."" While we appreciate the compliment extended to our country, it would seem more important to observe that the Latin American people themselves have ended the institution of caudillismo pre- cisely in those countries where they have instituted the civic education Mufnoz Tebar advocated-as well as social reforms, universal public education, extension of the suffrage, the creation of small landownership-and maintained the vitally important freedoms of press, speech, and religion. V Two conclusions suggest themselves from this brief survey of the role of the caudillo in Latin America. First, caudillismo is not an institution deeply rooted among the bulk of the population; rather it has been primarily associated with the fortunes of the privileged classes of Latin America. The second is that too much emphasis has been put upon the caudillo; not enough recognition has been extended to the history of the civic tradition, which is infinitely more significant in the development of Latin America. The long history of organized political, social, and economic life, represented by the cabildo in the colonial municipalities, formed the basis for the growth after independence of democratic and liberal institutions in Latin America. This tradition has ended caudillismo in the Caribbean area in Mexico and Costa Rica, and, further south in Uruguay and Chile, precisely because democratic movements in those coun- tries have destroyed the basis of the institution-namely, militar- ism, latifundia, illiteracy, and the historic privileges of a favored class. These countries are guideposts to the future history of Latin America. Caudillismo seen in its proper perspective has been and is a block-temporary in nature in the long view-to the development of democratic institutions in all Latin America. " Pierson, "Foreign Infuences on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830- 1930," loc. cit., 31.  12 Robert E. Scott: USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH MUCH OF THE LITERATURE on Latin Ameri- can government and particularly that on Caribbean politics one dominant theme seems to recur time and time again-the theme of the preponderant position of the president in the political proc- ess. In each of the countries of the Caribbean area, whether its constitution calls for presidential or parliamentary government, whether the chief executive is a civilian or a military man, whether he was elected popularly or came to office by less formal means, the president appears as the core of strength around which the lesser and weaker elements in the political system form. We normally attribute this exaggerated presidentialism to the personalistic tradition and accept it as an inevitable component of Latin American politics. But we must be careful not to overstate our case so as to leave the impression that presidential power in the Caribbean is unlimited, or that the president has the same amount of power whether he governs in Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, or some other country. This simply would not make sense in the light of the facts. These Caribbean states with which we are dealing are very un- like each other, despite their more or less similar Latin heritage. 187 Robert E. Scott: USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH MUCH OF THE LITERATURE on Latin Ameri- can government and particularly that on Caribbean politics one dominant theme seems to recur time and time again-the theme of the preponderant position of the president in the political proc- ess. In each of the countries of the Caribbean area, whether its constitution calls for presidential or parliamentary government, whether the chief executive is a civilian or a military man, whether he was elected popularly or came to office by less formal means, the president appears as the core of strength around which the lesser and weaker elements in the political system form. We normally attribute this exaggerated presidentialism to the personalistic tradition and accept it as an inevitable component of Latin American politics. But we must be careful not to overstate our case so as to leave the impression that presidential power in the Caribbean is unlimited, or that the president has the same amount of power whether he governs in Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, or some other country. This simply would not make sense in the light of the facts. These Caribbean states with which we are dealing are very un- like each other, despite their more or less similar Latin heritage. 187 Robert E. Scott: USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH MUCH OF THE LITERATURE on Latin Ameri- can government and particularly that on Caribbean politics one dominant theme seems to recur time and time again-the theme of the preponderant position of the president in the political proc- ess. In each of the countries of the Caribbean area, whether its constitution calls for presidential or parliamentary government, whether the chief executive is a civilian or a military man, whether he was elected popularly or came to office by less formal means, the president appears as the core of strength around which the lesser and weaker elements in the political system form. We normally attribute this exaggerated presidentialism to the personalistic tradition and accept it as an inevitable component of Latin American politics. But we must be careful not to overstate our case so as to leave the impression that presidential power in the Caribbean is unlimited, or that the president has the same amount of power whether he governs in Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, or some other country. This simply would not make sense in the light of the facts. These Caribbean states with which we are dealing are very un- like each other, despite their more or less similar Latin heritage.  188 The Caribbean They differ in size and population, in natural resources, in their levels of economic development, and in the degree of cultural and social integration which each has attained. In other words, many of the factors which normally combine to make up or to affect the functioning of a system of politics are wholly dissimilar from country to country. Even excluding the nonsovereign de- pendencies of the United States and Great Britain, twelve sep- arate and independent states comprise the Caribbean community, and among them are some at very different stages of political development. As area specialists who are aware of the basic differences in these twelve political systems, we might well question the feasi- bility of attempting to discuss limitations on the powers of their presidents. We shall exclude discussion of encyclopedic constitu- tional and legal detail, and confine our considerations to the more vital points of similarity and difference in the political process as it operates in the countries concerned. Normally we might not dismiss the formal constitution so lightly. In fact usually we would turn to it first for a description of the governmental structure in which the process of politics op- erates, but in Caribbean America an uncritical acceptance of the functioning of the political machinery set up in the constitution could prove more than a little misleading. Because of a strong respect for constitutional formalism, the outward forms of gov- ernment are apt to be observed rather carefully, but in most cases the constitution does not really describe the working political sys- tem, which may be quite distinct from the legal structure pictured in the words of the constitution. We need not discount the importance of the constitution en- tirely, of course, for it does influence the operation of the political system by its very existence. One of the most pregnant sources of presidential power, for example, results from the tendency to grant government a high degree of control over social and econom- ic matters by constitutional fiat. Conversely, some formal limi- tations over unbridled executive power also can he found in the 188 The Caribbean They differ in size and population, in natural resources, in their levels of economic development, and in the degree of cultural and social integration which each has attained. In other words, many of the factors which normally combine to make up or to affect the functioning of a system of politics are wholly dissimilar from country to country. Even excluding the nonsovereign de- pendencies of the United States and Great Britain, twelve sep- arate and independent states comprise the Caribbean community, and among them are some at very different stages of political development. As area specialists who are aware of the basic differences in these twelve political systems, we might well question the feasi- bility of attempting to discuss limitations on the powers of their presidents. We shall exclude discussion of encyclopedic constitu- tional and legal detail, and confine our considerations to the more vital points of similarity and difference in the political process as it operates in the countries concerned. Normally we might not dismiss the formal constitution so lightly. In fact usually we would turn to it first for a description of the governmental structure in which the process of politics op- erates, but in Caribbean America an uncritical acceptance of the functioning of the political machinery set up in the constitution could prove more than a little misleading. Because of a strong respect for constitutional formalism, the outward forms of gov- ernment are apt to be observed rather carefully, but in most cases the constitution does not really describe the working political sys- tem, which may be quite distinct from the legal structure pictured in the words of the constitution. We need not discount the importance of the constitution en- tirely, of course, for it does influence the operation of the political system by its very existence. One of the most pregnant sources of presidential power, for example, results from the tendency to grant government a high degree of control over social and econom- ic matters by constitutional fiat. Conversely, some formal limi- tations over unbridled executive power also can be found in the 188 The Caribbean They differ in size and population, in natural resources, in their levels of economic development, and in the degree of cultural and social integration which each has attained. In other words, many of the factors which normally combine to make up or to affect the functioning of a system of politics are wholly dissimilar from country to country. Even excluding the nonsovereign de- pendencies of the United States and Great Britain, twelve sep- arate and independent states comprise the Caribbean community, and among them are some at very different stages of political development. As area specialists who are aware of the basic differences in these twelve political systems, we might well question the feasi- bility of attempting to discuss limitations on the powers of their presidents. We shall exclude discussion of encyclopedic constitu- tional and legal detail, and confine our considerations to the more vital points of similarity and difference in the political process as it operates in the countries concerned. Normally we might not dismiss the formal constitution so lightly. In fact usually we would turn to it first for a description of the governmental structure in which the process of politics op- erates, but in Caribbean America an uncritical acceptance of the functioning of the political machinery set up in the constitution could prove more than a little misleading. Because of a strong respect for constitutional formalism, the outward forms of gov- ernment are apt to be observed rather carefully, but in most cases the constitution does not really describe the working political sys- tem, which may be quite distinct from the legal structure pictured in the words of the constitution. We need not discount the importance of the constitution en- tirely, of course, for it does influence the operation of the political system by its very existence. One of the most pregnant sources of presidential power, for example, results from the tendency to grant government a high degree of control over social and econom- ic matters by constitutional fiat. Conversely, some formal limi- tations over unbridled executive power also can be found in the  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS Ill constitution, for instance the prohibition against succession of an incumbent to the presidency for an immediate second term, which exists in every country except the Dominican Republic. Mexico and Guatemala go one step farther, prohibiting re-election of any person to the presidency during his entire lifetime. Generally, however, effective controls over presidential power are not found in constitutional limitations such as this, or in mechanical formulae such as separation of powers or judicial in- terpretation of the law, because the formal constitution as well as the working political system adjust to the realities of politics, per- mitting the executive to manipulate the machinery of government as the need arises. The decree power is a case in point. Only in the Dominican Republic is the president granted almost un- limited constitutional power to promulgate laws by decree, but in most of the other Caribbean states nominal legal restrictions on the president's authority to decree law give way if the execu- tive feels the need to act. If in Mexico the constitution specifically denies the decree power to the president during peacetime, he scarcely needs it, for he controls the revolutionary party organiza- tion that dominates all branches and agencies of the government. II Some natural questions arise here. Why are the Caribbean constitutions inoperative, practically speaking? Why has the president emerged as the pillar of strength that upholds the poli- tical system? Is his role the same, and does he have the same power in the governments of all twelve countries, in spite of their differences? To answer these questions we must first consider why government exists at all. The real function of government, any government, is to balance the competing interests which are politically active in a country. Where most of the citizens share a common set of social, econ- omic, and political values, the competition among groups and the interests the groups represent is not very intense and the con- stitutional system can balance the interests with a minimum of PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS constitution, for instance the prohibition against succession incumbent to the presidency for an immediate second term, exists in every country except the Dominican Republic. M and Guatemala go one step farther, prohibiting re-election o person to the presidency during his entire lifetime. Generally, however, effective controls over presidential p are not found in constitutional limitations such as this, mechanical formulae such as separation of powers or judici terpretation of the law, because the formal constitution as w the working political system adjust to the realities of politics mitting the executive to manipulate the machinery of govern as the need arises. The decree power is a case in point. in the Dominican Republic is the president granted ahnos limited constitutional power to promulgate laws by decree in most of the other Caribbean states nominal legal restrii on the president's authority to decree law give way if the e tive feels the need to act. If in Mexico the constitution specif denies the decree power to the president during peacetim scarcely needs it, for he controls the revolutionary party org tion that dominates all branches and agencies of the govern II 189 PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 189 of an constitution, for instance the prohibition against succession of an which incumbent to the presidency for an immediate second term, which lexico exists in every country except the Dominican Republic. Mexico f any and Guatemala go one step farther, prohibiting re-election of any person to the presidency during his entire lifetime. sower Generally, however, effective controls over presidential power or in are not found in constitutional limitations such as this, or in al in- mechanical formulae such as separation of powers or judicial in- ell as terpretation of the law, because the formal constitution as well as , per- the working political system adjust to the realities of politics, per- ment mitting the executive to manipulate the machinery of government Only as the need arises. The decree power is a case in point. Only t un- in the Dominican Republic is the president granted ahmost un- but limited constitutional power to promulgate laws by decree, but ctions in most of the other Caribbean states nominal legal restrictions xecu- on the president's authority to decree law give way if the execu- ically tive feels the need to act. If in Mexico the constitution specifically e, he denies the decree power to the president during peacetime, he miza- scarcely needs it, for he controls the revolutionary party organiza- ment. tion that dominates all branches and agencies of the government. Some natural questions arise here. Why are the Caribbean constitutions inoperative, practically speaking? Why has the president emerged as the pillar of strength that upholds the poli- tical system? Is his role the same, and does he have the same power in the governments of all twelve countries, in spite of their differences? To answer these questions we must first consider why government exists at all. The real function of government, any government, is to balance the competing interests which are politically active in a country. Where most of the citizens share a common set of social, econ- omic, and political values, the competition among groups and the interests the groups represent is not very intense and the con- stitutional system can balance the interests with a minimum of Some natural questions arise here. Why are the Caribbean constitutions inoperative, practically speaking? Why has the president emerged as the pillar of strength that upholds the poli- tical system? Is his role the same, and does he have the same power in the governments of all twelve countries, in spite of their differences? To answer these questions we must first consider why government exists at all. The real function of government, any government, is to balance the competing interests which are politically active in a country. Where most of the citizens share a common set of social, econ- omic, and political values, the competition among groups and the interests the groups represent is not very intense and the con- stitutional system can balance the interests with a minimum of  190 The Caribbean 190 The Caribbean 190 The Caribbean coercion. Unfortunately, the amount of shared values in most of the Caribbean states is very small, and the formal constitutions which establish the governmental system do not provide for po- litical machinery that can contain the stresses which the resultant competing power factors put upon it. Instead, it is the president, or the strong man behind the president, who builds his own power structure to provide political stability based on the force, physical or mental, at his command. Or, to put it another way, the man who can build an effective power structure is very likely to become president, sooner or later. The president's role in the political process of each country (and therefore the limitations over actions carried on as part of that role) depends on the nature of the political society in the country, the stage of its political development, and the intensity of interaction among the influences working for constitutional gov- ernment as opposed to those which make for personalistic and extralegal political control. To understand the president's func- tion we must take into account specialized political habit patterns such as personalismo and caudillismo, which influence the actions of all or nearly all the persons who participate in national gov- ernment and which enhance executive authority; but at the same time we can construct a more general operational logic that rec- ognizes some of the limitations on governmental actions which appear to be inherent in the very nature of most modern political systems, particularly as those systems become more complex to meet the demands of developing societies. In those Caribbean states where the popular base of govern- ment is narrow and not representative of the whole population, with a large proportion of the citizens outside of national life for one reason or another, the political system is likely to be quite simple. The politically active group is usually a small oligarchy that vies within its own membership for the advantages government can supply, and the process of politics consists pri- marily of a personalistic leader-a Somoza or a Trujillo-exer- cising domination over a limited number of power factors by coercion. Unfortunately, the amount of shared values in most of the Caribbean states is very small, and the formal constitutions which establish the governmental system do not provide for po- litical machinery that can contain the stresses which the resultant competing power factors put upon it. Instead, it is the president, or the strong man behind the president, who builds his own power structure to provide political stability based on the force, physical or mental, at his command. Or, to put it another way, the man who can build an effective power structure is very likely to become president, sooner or later. The president's role in the political process of each country (and therefore the limitations over actions carried on as part of that role) depends on the nature of the political society in the country, the stage of its political development, and the intensity of interaction among the influences working for constitutional gov- ernment as opposed to those which make for personalistic and extralegal political control. To understand the president's func- tion we must take into account specialized political habit patterns such as personalismo and caudillismo, which influence the actions of all or nearly all the persons who participate in national gov- ernment and which enhance executive authority; but at the same time we can construct a more general operational logic that rec- ognizes some of the limitations on governmental actions which appear to be inherent in the very nature of most modern political systems, particularly as those systems become more complex to meet the demands of developing societies. In those Caribbean states where the popular base of govern- ment is narrow and not representative of the whole population, with a large proportion of the citizens outside of national life for one reason or another, the political system is likely to be quite simple. The politically active group is usually a small oligarchy that vies within its own membership for the advantages government can supply, and the process of politics consists pri- marily of a personalistic leader-a Somoza or a Trujillo-exer- cising domination over a limited number of power factors by coercion. Unfortunately, the amount of shared values in most of the Caribbean states is very small, and the formal constitutions which establish the governmental system do not provide for po- litical machinery that can contain the stresses which the resultant competing power factors put upon it. Instead, it is the president, or the strong man behind the president, who builds his own power structure to provide political stability based on the force, physical or mental, at his command. Or, to put it another way, the man who can build an effective power structure is very likely to become president, sooner or later. The president's role in the political process of each country (and therefore the limitations over actions carried on as part of that role) depends on the nature of the political society in the country, the stage of its political development, and the intensity of interaction among the influences working for constitutional gov- ernment as opposed to those which make for personalistic and extralegal political control. To understand the president's func- tion we must take into account specialized political habit patterns such as personalismo and caudillismo, which influence the actions of all or nearly all the persons who participate in national gov- ernment and which enhance executive authority; but at the same time we can construct a more general operational logic that rec- ognizes some of the limitations on governmental actions which appear to be inherent in the very nature of most modern political systems, particularly as those systems become more complex to meet the demands of developing societies. In those Caribbean states where the popular base of govern- ment is narrow and not representative of the whole population, with a large proportion of the citizens outside of national life for one reason or another, the political system is likely to be quite simple. The politically active group is usually a small oligarchy that vies within its own membership for the advantages government can supply, and the process of politics consists pri- marily of a personalistic leader-a Somoza or a Trujillo-exer- cising domination over a limited number of power factors by  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 191 means of face-to-face contact with the persons who control them. Most of the Caribbean countries are more highly developed than this, with a greater proportion of persons who participate in politics and more numerous competing power factors. But to a greater or lesser extent, all these countries lack social inte- gration and broadly shared loyalties to a constitutional system that might unite the citizens in an effective political community. Here, as one might expect, the mechanisms for achieving political balance are more complex, and slightly different from country to country to suit particular political conditions. Usually in such countries the president tries to form a political organization that includes representatives of interests whose com- bined strength can provide stability by overwhelming any possible opposition, supplying the necessary integration through the strength of his own personality. In so doing he may be forced to extraordinary legal measures or perhaps to unconstitutional acts in order to avoid a breakdown in the political balance he has achieved. If he fails to control the situation and the power factors go out of balance, the president may find that institution- alized caudillismo in the army has overridden even this attempt at constitutionalism to impose a Perez Jimdnez or a Batista in his place. In one case, that of Mexico, the president no longer makes the system; instead the system makes the president. But even here, lack of national integration precludes true constitutional government, and in the closed power system by which Mexico's revolutionary party exercises its political monopoly the president exercises a vital control function. Government by organization, even an organization that by definition excludes disruptive "anti- revolutionary" elements, requires some final Solomon to balance the internal party forces. Thus in every country in the Caribbean save one, Costa Rica, the realities of politics require that the president overshadow the constitution in order to maintain political stability. And even the Costa Ricans, with all their national integration and rela- PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 191 means of face-to-face contact with the persons who control them. Most of the Caribbean countries are more highly developed than this, with a greater proportion of persons who participate in politics and more numerous competing power factors. But to a greater or lesser extent, all these countries lack social inte- gration and broadly shared loyalties to a constitutional system that might unite the citizens in an effective political community. Here, as one might expect, the mechanisms for achieving political balance are more complex, and slightly different from country to country to suit particular political conditions. Usually in such countries the president tries to form a political organization that includes representatives of interests whose com- bined strength can provide stability by overwhelming any possible opposition, supplying the necessary integration through the strength of his own personality. In so doing he may be forced to extraordinary legal measures or perhaps to unconstitutional acts in order to avoid a breakdown in the political balance he has achieved. If he fails to control the situation and the power factors go out of balance, the president may find that institution- alized caudillismo in the army has overridden even this attempt at constitutionalism to impose a Perez Jimenez or a Batista in his place. In one case, that of Mexico, the president no longer makes the system; instead the system makes the president. But even here, lack of national integration precludes true constitutional government, and in the closed power system by which Mexico's revolutionary party exercises its political monopoly the president exercises a vital control function. Government by organization, even an organization that by definition excludes disruptive "anti- revolutionary" elements, requires some final Solomon to balance the internal party forces. Thus in every country in the Caribbean save one, Costa Rica, the realities of politics require that the president overshadow the constitution in order to maintain political stability. And even the Costa Ricans, with all their national integration and rela- PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 191 means of face-to-face contact with the persons who control them. Most of the Caribbean countries are more highly developed than this, with a greater proportion of persons who participate in politics and more numerous competing power factors. But to a greater or lesser extent, all these countries lack social inte- gration and broadly shared loyalties to a constitutional system that might unite the citizens in an effective political community. Here, as one might expect, the mechanisms for achieving political balance are more complex, and slightly different from country to country to suit particular political conditions. Usually in such countries the president tries to form a political organization that includes representatives of interests whose com- bined strength can provide stability by overwhelming any possible opposition, supplying the necessary integration through the strength of his own personality. In so doing he may be forced to extraordinary legal measures or perhaps to unconstitutional acts in order to avoid a breakdown in the political balance he has achieved. If he fails to control the situation and the power factors go out of balance, the president may find that institution- alized caudillismo in the army has overridden even this attempt at constitutionalism to impose a Perez Jimenez or a Batista in his place. In one case, that of Mexico, the president no longer makes the system; instead the system makes the president. But even here, lack of national integration precludes true constitutional government, and in the closed power system by which Mexico's revolutionary party exercises its political monopoly the president exercises a vital control function. Government by organization, even an organization that by definition excludes disruptive "anti- revolutionary" elements, requires some final Solomon to balance the internal party forces. Thus in every country in the Caribbean save one, Costa Rica, the realities of politics require that the president overshadow the constitution in order to maintain political stability. And even the Costa Ricans, with all their national integration and rela-  192 The Caribbean tively general agreement on political values, had to fight to retain their constitutional government a few years ago. III Given the conditions under which politics operates in Carib- bean America, I believe it is fair to say that in any of the twelve countries if the constitution cannot provide adequate mechanisms for balancing the competing political interests, the president or some other strong man will take upon himself suffi- cient power to insure stability, constitutionally or otherwise, and on the whole the citizens will approve the action. It is fruitless, even naive, to point to legal limitations on such actions and to ignore the political conditions which force the president to step beyond the constitution's boundaries. In this sense presidential power in the Caribbean area is an unlimited quantity. But in another sense presidential power is by no means un- controlled. If legal restrictions and constitutional norms are not very meaningful controls, political considerations are, the more so because usually they do not operate in the context of a strong constitutional system that might set limits on the demands made for supporting the government. In none of the twelve countries -democratic or nondemocratic-is the president entirely a free agent; if he is not a servant of the formal constitutional system he is of necessity slave to the interests which enable him to govern outside of the legal system. As we have seen, almost every president is dependent upon and therefore vulnerable to the persons who control the power factors which provide stability and keep him in office. Rather than strengthen the president's position, the person- alistic nature of the relationship that supplies the necessary inte- gration in Caribbean politics makes him weaker. His supporters follow him because he can serve them; if he fails to satisfy them they will abandon him, for they are bound to the executive not by constitutional loyalties but by personal motivation in a quid 192 The Caribbean tively general agreement on political values, had to fight to retain their constitutional government a few years ago. III Given the conditions under which politics operates in Carib- bean America, I believe it is fair to say that in any of the twelve countries if the constitution cannot provide adequate mechanisms for balancing the competing political interests, the president or some other strong man will take upon himself suffi- cient power to insure stability, constitutionally or otherwise, and on the whole the citizens will approve the action. It is fruitless, even naive, to point to legal limitations on such actions and to ignore the political conditions which force the president to step beyond the constitution's boundaries. In this sense presidential power in the Caribbean area is an unlimited quantity. But in another sense presidential power is by no means un- controlled. If legal restrictions and constitutional norms are not very meaningful controls, political considerations are, the more so because usually they do not operate in the context of a strong constitutional system that might set limits on the demands made for supporting the government. In none of the twelve countries -democratic or nondemocratic-is the president entirely a free agent; if he is not a servant of the formal constitutional system he is of necessity slave to the interests which enable him to govern outside of the legal system. As we have seen, almost every president is dependent upon and therefore vulnerable to the persons who control the power factors which provide stability and keep him in office. Rather than strengthen the president's position, the person- alistic nature of the relationship that supplies the necessary inte- gration in Caribbean politics makes him weaker. His supporters follow him because he can serve them; if he fails to satisfy them they will abandon him, for they are bound to the executive not by constitutional loyalties but by personal motivation in a quid 192 The Caribbean tively general agreement on political values, had to fight to retain their constitutional government a few years ago. III Given the conditions under which politics operates in Carib- bean America, I believe it is fair to say that in any of the twelve countries if the constitution cannot provide adequate mechanisms for balancing the competing political interests, the president or some other strong man will take upon himself suffi- cient power to insure stability, constitutionally or otherwise, and on the whole the citizens will approve the action. It is fruitless, even naive, to point to legal limitations on such actions and to ignore the political conditions which force the president to step beyond the constitution's boundaries. In this sense presidential power in the Caribbean area is an unlimited quantity. But in another sense presidential power is by no means un- controlled. If legal restrictions and constitutional norms are not very meaningful controls, political considerations are, the more so because usually they do not operate in the context of a strong constitutional system that might set limits on the demands made for supporting the government. In none of the twelve countries -democratic or nondemocratic-is the president entirely a free agent; if he is not a servant of the formal constitutional system he is of necessity slave to the interests which enable him to govern outside of the legal system. As we have seen, almost every president is dependent upon and therefore vulnerable to the persons who control the power factors which provide stability and keep him in office. Rather than strengthen the president's position, the person- alistic nature of the relationship that supplies the necessary inte- gration in Caribbean politics makes him weaker. His supporters follow him because he can serve them; if he fails to satisfy them they will abandon him, for they are bound to the executive not by constitutional loyalties but by personal motivation in a quid  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS I5 pro quo arrangement. And if he loses them he loses the prop under his government. The president's dependence on his personal followers is as strong in complex as it is in less-developed political societies. If anything, the president enjoys less freedom of action in the former, for here the process of politics changes from a simple personalistic relationship between an individual leader and a small but fanatical following into a balancing act where the chief executive tries to satisfy an increasing number of interest- groups which can bring effective pressure against his government. Moreover, as society becomes more complex so must the means of controlling it. In every country of Caribbean America the formal mechanisms of government are beginning to take on new importance as they meet the demands of the new interest-groups which are entering the political system. But this results in an increasing estrangement between the president and his personal followers, for although the lingering tradition of personalistic identification of the state with its leader may make it appear that the president is in the forefront of every executive action, this is no longer possible. No matter how able or active an individual president may be, he must delegate authority to the lower echelons in the government, because no man can be every- where and do everything. The president is caught in a dilemma. If he attempts to rule in person he cannot govern efficiently enough to serve all of those personal followers he must satisfy, but if he delegates authority he becomes dependent upon formal government ma- chinery and loses direct control over his followers. He generally tries to solve his problem by attempting to do both, but this means that much of the real work of government must be left to the bureaucracy, with the president acting as little more than a figurehead. In a few of the more highly organized political systems, such as Mexico's, this results in the president following a formalized, almost conventionalized, pattern of behavior over which he personally has relatively little control. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 193 pro quo arrangement. And if he loses them he loses the prop under his government. The president's dependence on his personal followers is as strong in complex as it is in less-developed political societies. If anything, the president enjoys less freedom of action in the former, for here the process of politics changes from a simple personalistic relationship between an individual leader and a small but fanatical following into a balancing act where the chief executive tries to satisfy an increasing number of interest- groups which can bring effective pressure against his government. Moreover, as society becomes more complex so must the means of controlling it. In every country of Caribbean America the formal mechanisms of government are beginning to take on new importance as they meet the demands of the new interest-groups which are entering the political system. But this results in an increasing estrangement between the president and his personal followers, for although the lingering tradition of personalistic identification of the state with its leader may make it appear that the president is in the forefront of every executive action, this is no longer possible. No matter how able or active an individual president may be, he must delegate authority to the lower echelons in the government, because no man can he every- where and do everything. The president is caught in a dilemma. If he attempts to rule in person he cannot govern efficiently enough to serve all of those personal followers he must satisfy, but if he delegates authority he becomes dependent upon formal government ma- chinery and loses direct control over his followers. He generally tries to solve his problem by attempting to do both, but this means that much of the real work of government must be left to the bureaucracy, with the president acting as little more than a figurehead. In a few of the more highly organized political systems, such as Mexico's, this results in the president following a formalized, almost conventionalized, pattern of behavior over which he personally has relatively little control. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 193 pro quo arrangement. And if he loses them he loses the prop under his government. The president's dependence on his personal followers is as strong in complex as it is in less-developed political societies. If anything, the president enjoys less freedom of action in the former, for here the process of politics changes from a simple personalistic relationship between an individual leader and a small but fanatical following into a balancing act where the chief executive tries to satisfy an increasing number of interest- groups which can bring effective pressure against his government. Moreover, as society becomes more complex so must the means of controlling it. In every country of Caribbean America the formal mechanisms of government are beginning to take on new importance as they meet the demands of the new interest-groups which are entering the political system. But this results in an increasing estrangement between the president and his personal followers, for although the lingering tradition of personalistic identification of the state with its leader may make it appear that the president is in the forefront of every executive action, this is no longer possible. No matter how able or active an individual president may be, he must delegate authority to the lower echelons in the government, because no man can he every- where and do everything. The president is caught in a dilemma. If he attempts to rule in person he cannot govern efficiently enough to serve all of those personal followers he must satisfy, but if he delegates authority he becomes dependent upon formal government ma- chinery and loses direct control over his followers. He generally tries to solve his problem by attempting to do both, but this means that much of the real work of government must be left to the bureaucracy, with the president acting as little more than a figurehead. In a few of the more highly organized political systems, such as Mexico's, this results in the president following a formalized, almost conventionalized, pattern of behavior over which he personally has relatively little control.  194 The Caribbean 194 The Caribbean 194 The Caribbean IV The foregoing makes it appear that government in Caribbean America is run for the benefit of a privileged few who are in a position to take advantage of their influence on the political process. To some extent this is true, as it is everywhere, but in recent years the number and quality of the "few" has changed markedly as a result of technological advances. Industrialization of agriculture, for example, has resulted in much more than the farmer entering a cash-crop economy and adopting the use of mass-produced articles. Inevitably he has learned the advantages of participating in national politics and of making his influence felt to protect his own interests. Increasingly the executive must take into account this new power factor in the political systems of the area. Closer to the national capital, the president finds himself sur- rounded by new interest-groups-labor, professional, middle-class and the like, which are products of twentieth-century urban industrialization. The very extent of urbanization itself makes for a kind of mass pressure on the executive, for these people have that higher degree of political awareness that comes with city living. Gone are the "good old days" when the spoils of government could be divided among the representatives of the three major power factors-landowners, Church, and Army- fading before proliferation of interests which demand representa- tion in political life. Government by caprice may have been possible at one time, when politics was in the hands of a small elite who could act as they wished among the uneducated and isolated masses, but education, mass communications, and relatively easy transport have put new weapons into the hands of the people. Today, although the president may circumvent the spirit of the law in his relations with the other branches of government, he tends in most cases to be quite respectful of the constitutional pro- visions relating to the day-to-day activities of individual citizens. This is a natural outgrowth of the ability of the people to bring IV The foregoing makes it appear that government in Caribbean America is run for the benefit of a privileged few who are in a position to take advantage of their influence on the political process. To some extent this is true, as it is everywhere, but in recent years the number and quality of the "few" has changed markedly as a result of technological advances. Industrialization of agriculture, for example, has resulted in much more than the farmer entering a cash-crop economy and adopting the use of mass-produced articles. Inevitably he has learned the advantages of participating in national politics and of making his influence felt to protect his own interests. Increasingly the executive must take into account this new power factor in the political systems of the area. Closer to the national capital, the president finds himself sur- rounded by new interest-groups-labor, professional, middle-class and the like, which are products of twentieth-century urban industrialization. The very extent of urbanization itself makes for a kind of mass pressure on the executive, for these people have that higher degree of political awareness that comes with city living. Gone are the "good old days" when the spoils of government could be divided among the representatives of the three major power factors-landowners, Church, and Army- fading before proliferation of interests which demand representa- tion in political life. Government by caprice may have been possible at one time, when politics was in the hands of a small elite who could act as they wished among the uneducated and isolated masses, but education, mass communications, and relatively easy transport have put new weapons into the hands of the people. Today, although the president may circumvent the spirit of the law in his relations with the other branches of government, he tends in most cases to be quite respectful of the constitutional pro- visions relating to the day-to-day activities of individual citizens. This is a natural outgrowth of the ability of the people to bring IV The foregoing makes it appear that government in Caribbean America is run for the benefit of a privileged few who are in a position to take advantage of their influence on the political process. To some extent this is true, as it is everywhere, but in recent years the number and quality of the "few" has changed markedly as a result of technological advances. Industrialization of agriculture, for example, has resulted in much more than the farmer entering a cash-crop economy and adopting the use of mass-produced articles. Inevitably he has learned the advantages of participating in national politics and of making his influence felt to protect his own interests. Increasingly the executive must take into account this new power factor in the political systems of the area. Closer to the national capital, the president finds himself sur- rounded by new interest-groups-labor, professional, middle-class and the like, which are products of twentieth-century urban industrialization. The very extent of urbanization itself makes for a kind of mass pressure on the executive, for these people have that higher degree of political awareness that comes with city living. Gone are the "good old days" when the spoils of government could be divided among the representatives of the three major power factors-landowners, Church, and Army- fading before proliferation of interests which demand representa- tion in political life. Government by caprice may have been possible at one time, when politics was in the hands of a small elite who could act as they wished among the uneducated and isolated masses, but education, mass communications, and relatively easy transport have put new weapons into the hands of the people. Today, although the president may circumvent the spirit of the law in his relations with the other branches of government, he tends in most cases to be quite respectful of the constitutional pro- visions relating to the day-to-day activities of individual citizens. This is a natural outgrowth of the ability of the people to bring  PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS l'y pressure on the government, even indirectly, because in every political society the continuity of human activity must be pro- tected by the rule of law if that society is to flourish. Social, economic, and political activities have become so interdependent that if the fabric of society breaks down under prolonged and repeated attacks on the normal patterns of life, the political structure breaks down with it. In time, as the number and variety of interests which demand representation in the political process increases, the president will become more and more circumscribed in his freedom of action and increasingly dependent on the formal machinery of government, until a closer approach to the spirit of constitutional government is achieved. This should be reinforced by the strong influence in the Caribbean of the principal social myth of the twentieth century-the myth of democratic government. When the conditions are right the states of Caribbean America, bolstered by the example of Costa Rica, may make that myth a reality. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 195 pressure on the government, even indirectly, because in every political society the continuity of human activity must be pro- tected by the rule of law if that society is to flourish. Social, economic, and political activities have become so interdependent that if the fabric of society breaks down under prolonged and repeated attacks on the normal patterns of life, the political structure breaks down with it. In time, as the number and variety of interests which demand representation in the political process increases, the president will become more and more circumscribed in his freedom of action and increasingly dependent on the formal machinery of government, until a closer approach to the spirit of constitutional government is achieved. This should be reinforced by the strong influence in the Caribbean of the principal social myth of the twentieth century-the myth of democratic government. When the conditions are right the states of Caribbean America, bolstered by the example of Costa Rica, may make that myth a reality. PRESIDENTS AND DICTATORS 195 pressure on the government, even indirectly, because in every political society the continuity of human activity must be pro- tected by the rule of law if that society is to flourish. Social, economic, and political activities have become so interdependent that if the fabric of society breaks down under prolonged and repeated attacks on the normal patterns of life, the political structure breaks down with it. In time, as the number and variety of interests which demand representation in the political process increases, the president will become more and more circumscribed in his freedom of action and increasingly dependent on the formal machinery of government, until a closer approach to the spirit of constitutional government is achieved. This should be reinforced by the strong influence in the Caribbean of the principal social myth of the twentieth century-the myth of democratic government. When the conditions are right the states of Caribbean America, bolstered by the example of Costa Rica, may make that myth a reality.   Part V Part V Part V PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT   13 2-i Herminio Portell-Vild: BACKGROUNDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN POLITICAL HISTORIANS discussing Hispanic American con- temporary problems have consistently failed to notice the impor- tant correlation existing between these problems and the basic crisis in local government, going back for several centuries. Efficient and respectable public administration, on a national level, cannot exist if local government is inefficient, corrupted, and discredited. It is not that bad local government may be explained in terms of bad national government: it is the other way around, because local government is the foundation for the regular structure of the state and if such foundation is rotten, it will affect the whole structure. Elections, local or national, are conducted in the municipalities around the Caribbean and elsewhere. Provincial or state govern- ors, congressmen and senators, and presidents of the republics as well, are elected through the local political machineries. It is true that issues and the character of the candidates and their pop- ularity will influence the electoral vote, but only up to a certain degree, because in each municipality the local boss or cacique politico, with the ward bosses or sargentos politicos, will try to control the majority of the votes and will even succeed in many cases. At times the boss will not be the mayor and it is possible 199 Herminlo Portell-Vila: BACKGROUNDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN POLITICAL HISTORIANS discussing Hispanic American con- temporary problems have consistently failed to notice the impor- tant correlation existing between these problems and the basic crisis in local government, going back for several centuries. Efficient and respectable public administration, on a national level, cannot exist if local government is inefficient, corrupted, and discredited. It is not that bad local government may be explained in terms of bad national government: it is the other way around, because local government is the foundation for the regular structure of the state and if such foundation is rotten, it will affect the whole structure. Elections, local or national, are conducted in the municipalities around the Caribbean and elsewhere. Provincial or state govern- ors, congressmen and senators, and presidents of the republics as well, are elected through the local political machineries. It is true that issues and the character of the candidates and their pop- ularity will influence the electoral vote, but only up to a certain degree, because in each municipality the local boss or cacique politico, with the ward bosses or sargentos politicos, will try to control the majority of the votes and will even succeed in many cases. At times the boss will not be the mayor and it is possible 199 Herminlo Portell-Vjla: BACKGROUNDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN POLITICAL HISTORIANS discussing Hispanic American con- temporary problems have consistently failed to notice the impor- tant correlation existing between these problems and the basic crisis in local government, going back for several centuries. Efficient and respectable public administration, on a national level, cannot exist if local government is inefficient, corrupted, and discredited. It is not that bad local government may be explained in terms of bad national government: it is the other way around, because local government is the foundation for the regular structure of the state and if such foundation is rotten, it will affect the whole structure. Elections, local or national, are conducted in the municipalities around the Caribbean and elsewhere. Provincial or state govern- ors, congressmen and senators, and presidents of the republics as well, are elected through the local political machineries. It is true that issues and the character of the candidates and their pop- ularity will influence the electoral vote, but only up to a certain degree, because in each municipality the local boss or cacique politico, with the ward bosses or sargentos politicos, will try to control the majority of the votes and will even succeed in many cases. At times the boss will not be the mayor and it is possible  200 The Caribbean that he will not even be a politician holding public office, but an influential wealthy man who knows how to manipulate the politi- cal machine and who professes to be filled with indignation when discussing the antics of the professional politicians who are his instruments. To become a congressman it is indispensable to have the sup- port of an important municipality, notwithstanding that the elec- tion is held in a state or province. The strategy is that there will be pickings everywhere, but that it is necessary to count upon one municipality giving a sizable and decisive block of votes. A senator will need several municipalities helping him preferen- tially, in order to become elected. The president will be elected through the concerted efforts of municipalities giving him a plu- rality in key states or provinces. The root of everything, therefore, is to be found in the munic- ipality, at the local government level. This being a fact, public opinion throughout Hispanic America does not adopt a resolution to clean up first of all local govern- ment, to make it efficient, honest, and respectable, and to prevent bad government on the national level, but has its attention fixed on the national government, hoping that it will be a good one when it is the product of corrupted practices. Why is it that Hispanic American public opinion and political preferences look towards the presidential palaces and the senates and the houses of representatives, rather than towards the city halls? Someone might attempt to explain it in terms of longings for power on a larger scale. Of course, wielding power as a president or as a congressional leader may be the final ambition of many people. Also there is more glamor in the office of president of the republic, or in being the president of the senate or the speaker of the house of representatives, with a number of oppor- tunities for personal advantages, depending upon the honesty of each individual. But at the bottom of everything there is the problem, more than 200 The Caribbean that he will not even be a politician holding public office, but an influential wealthy man who knows how to manipulate the politi- cal machine and who professes to be filled with indignation when discussing the antics of the professional politicians who are his instruments. To become a congressman it is indispensable to have the sup- port of an important municipality, notwithstanding that the elec- tion is held in a state or province. The strategy is that there will be pickings everywhere, but that it is necessary to count upon one municipality giving a sizable and decisive block of votes. A senator will need several municipalities helping him preferen- tially, in order to become elected. The president will be elected through the concerted efforts of municipalities giving him a plu- rality in key states or provinces. The root of everything, therefore, is to be found in the munic- ipality, at the local government level. This being a fact, public opinion throughout Hispanic America does not adopt a resolution to clean up first of all local govern- ment, to make it efficient, honest, and respectable, and to prevent bad government on the national level, but has its attention fixed on the national government, hoping that it will be a good one when it is the product of corrupted practices. Why is it that Hispanic American public opinion and political preferences look towards the presidential palaces and the senates and the houses of representatives, rather than towards the city halls? Someone might attempt to explain it in terms of longings for power on a larger scale. Of course, wielding power as a president or as a congressional leader may be the final ambition of many people. Also there is more glamor in the office of president of the republic, or in being the president of the senate or the speaker of the house of representatives, with a number of oppor- tunities for personal advantages, depending upon the honesty of each individual. But at the bottom of everything there is the problem, more than 200 The Caribbean that he will not even be a politician holding public office, but an influential wealthy man who knows how to manipulate the politi- cal machine and who professes to be filled with indignation when discussing the antics of the professional politicians who are his instruments. To become a congressman it is indispensable to have the sup- port of an important municipality, notwithstanding that the elec- tion is held in a state or province. The strategy is that there will be pickings everywheere, but that it is necessary to count upon one municipality giving a sizable and decisive block of votes. A senator will need several municipalities helping him preferen- tially, in order to become elected. The president will be elected through the concerted efforts of municipalities giving him a plu- rality in key states or provinces. The root of everything, therefore, is to be found in the munic- ipality, at the local government level. This being a fact, public opinion throughout Hispanic America does not adopt a resolution to clean up first of all local govern- ment, to make it efficient, honest, and respectable, and to prevent bad government on the national level, but has its attention fixed on the national government, hoping that it will be a good one when it is the product of corrupted practices. Why is it that Hispanic American public opinion and political preferences look towards the presidential palaces and the senates and the houses of representatives, rather than towards the city halls? Someone might attempt to explain it in terms of longings for power on a larger scale. Of course, wielding power as a president or as a congressional leader may be the final ambition of many people. Also there is more glamor in the office of president of the republic, or in being the president of the senate or the speaker of the house of representatives, with a number of oppor- tunities for personal advantages, depending upon the honesty of each individual. But at the bottom of everything there is the problem, more than  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 201 four centuries old, of municipal institutions and governments in the Spanish-speaking world. Professor Jose Maria Ots y Capdequi, in his studies regarding colonial municipalities in Hispanic America, goes to the root of the problem after painstaking research; his points of view appear in several monographs' worth reading. Professor Ots y Capdequi states that in order to have a good knowledge of the history and traditions of local government in Hispanic America, it is necessary to follow this plan: the study of (a) legal precedents and rules in Castile, among the Indians, and in the laws given to the colonies by Spain; (b) the fundamental characteristics of the medieval municipalities of Castile; (c) conditions prevailing in the municipalities of Castile when the discovery of America took place, and (d) the rebirth of the old municipal legal institutions of Castile in the new colonial cities.' The student knows that Professor Ots y Capdequi makes a distinction between Castile and Spain because the discovery of the New World and the earlier colonization enterprises were the concern of the kingdom of Castile, as such, under Queen Isabel, and not of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon united to make Spain a nation under the Catholic Kings. Local government for the original municipality of Castile had to do with the regulation of communal natural resources like water, grazing grounds, and wood, the patterns of weights and measures, the adjustment of salaries and prices for food, and similar aspects of everyday life. There was enough activity of local government in all this; but many other functions were added from time to time in connection with taxes, recruiting of soldiers, war supplies, welfare, petty judicial matters, and so on. Some Jose Maria Ots y Capdequi, El municipio en AmErica (Madrid, 1930), 44 pp., and Estudios de historia del derecho espanol en las Indias (Bogoti, 1940), 421 pp. Ots y Capdequi, Estudios, pp. 136-137. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 201 four centuries old, of municipal institutions and governments in the Spanish-speaking world. Professor Jos6 Maria Ots y Capdequi, in his studies regarding colonial municipalities in Hispanic America, goes to the root of the problem after painstaking research; his points of view appear in several monographs' worth reading. Professor Ots y Capdequi states that in order to have a good knowledge of the history and traditions of local government in Hispanic America, it is necessary to follow this plan: the study of (a) legal precedents and rules in Castile, among the Indians, and in the laws given to the colonies by Spain; (b) the fundamental characteristics of the medieval municipalities of Castile; (c) conditions prevailing in the municipalities of Castile when the discovery of America took place, and (d) the rebirth of the old municipal legal institutions of Castile in the new colonial cities.' The student knows that Professor Ots y Capdequi makes a distinction between Castile and Spain because the discovery of the New World and the earlier colonization enterprises were the concern of the kingdom of Castile, as such, under Queen Isabel, and not of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon united to make Spain a nation under the Catholic Kings. Local government for the original municipality of Castile had to do with the regulation of communal natural resources like water, grazing grounds, and wood, the patterns of weights and measures, the adjustment of salaries and prices for food, and similar aspects of everyday life. There was enough activity of local government in all this; but many other functions were added from time to time in connection with taxes, recruiting of soldiers, war supplies, welfare, petty judicial matters, and so on. Some 1 Jos6 Maria Ots y Capdequi, El municipio en Amdrica (Madrid, 1930), 44 pp., and Estudios de historia del derecho espanol en las Indias (Bogotas, 1940), 421 pp. 2 Ots y Capdequi, Estudios, pp. 136-137. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 201 four centuries old, of municipal institutions and governments in the Spanish-speaking world. Professor Jose Maria Ots y Capdequi, in his studies regarding colonial municipalities in Hispanic America, goes to the root of the problem after painstaking research; his points of view appear in several monographs' worth reading. Professor Ots y Capdequi states that in order to have a good knowledge of the history and traditions of local government in Hispanic America, it is necessary to follow this plan: the study of (a) legal precedents and rules in Castile, among the Indians, and in the laws given to the colonies by Spain; (b) the fundamental characteristics of the medieval municipalities of Castile; (c) conditions prevailing in the municipalities of Castile when the discovery of America took place, and (d) the rebirth of the old municipal legal institutions of Castile in the new colonial cities.' The student knows that Professor Ots y Capdequi makes a distinction between Castile and Spain because the discovery of the New World and the earlier colonization enterprises were the concern of the kingdom of Castile, as such, under Queen Isabel, and not of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon united to make Spain a nation under the Catholic Kings. Local government for the original municipality of Castile had to do with the regulation of communal natural resources like water, grazing grounds, and wood, the patterns of weights and measures, the adjustment of salaries and prices for food, and similar aspects of everyday life. There was enough activity of local government in all this; but many other functions were added from time to time in connection with taxes, recruiting of soldiers, war supplies, welfare, petty judicial matters, and so on. Some ' Jose Maria Ots y Capdequi, El municipio en America (Madrid, 1930), 44 pp., and Estudios de historia del derecho espanol en las Indias (Bogoti, 1940), 421 pp. * Ots y Capdequi, Estudios, pp. 136-137.  202 The Caribbean 202 The Caribbean 202 The Caribbean of the municipalities, because of the role they had played in the fight against the Moslem invaders (Reconquista) or because of their population, wealth, or industrial importance, were later on given the power to appoint their representatives to the Cortes del Reino, or royal diet, meeting with a certain regularity at the call of the kings to decide national affairs. The office of regidor, or concejal, became an important one, and the men holding it were men of substance in the community. Their neighbors looked up to them as their representatives. The meetings of the cabildo, or town council, were very active and when issues affecting the livelihood of the citizenry were dis- cussed, not only the hidalgos, but all the town folks were inter- ested in what was going on. In certain cases there even was a cabildo abierto, or open forum, in which every neighbor was entitled to his opinion. There were towns having specific fueros, or charters of rights and privileges, granted because of services they had rendered to the kings; and along with the specific fueros there were the general ones covering the municipalities of Castile. So deeply rooted in Spanish national life were the importance and the functions of the municipalities, that some of the master- pieces of Spanish literature in the so-called Siglo de Oro have local governments and local officers as their themes, notably with Lope de Vega (Fuente ovejuna and El mejor alcalde, el rey), and Pedro Calder6n de la Barca (El alcalde de Zalamea). There was a time in which the influence of municipal represent- atives in the cortes, or royal diets, was more important than that of either the clergy or the knights. A noted Spanish historian even says that ". .. en las Cortes estaban representados, no los slbditos, sino las ciudades. ," that is to say, that local governments had made decisive inroads into the field of national government. Elections to fill positions of local government be- came important and, although the tendency to make certain offices the object of royal gifts or to make them hereditary and even Ramin Riaza and Alfonso Garcia Gallo, Manual de historia del derecho espahol (Madrid, 1934), p. 379. of the municipalities, because of the role they had played in the fight against the Moslem invaders (Reconquista) or because of their population, wealth, or industrial importance, were later on given the power to appoint their representatives to the Cortes del Reino, or royal diet, meeting with a certain regularity at the call of the kings to decide national affairs. The office of regidor, or concejal, became an important one, and the men holding it were men of substance in the community. Their neighbors looked up to them as their representatives. The meetings of the cabildo, or town council, were very active and when issues affecting the livelihood of the citizenry were dis- cussed, not only the hidalgos, but all the town folks were inter- ested in what was going on. In certain cases there even was a cabildo abierto, or open forum, in which every neighbor was entitled to his opinion. There were towns having specific fueros, or charters of rights and privileges, granted because of services they had rendered to the kings; and along with the specific fueros there were the general ones covering the municipalities of Castile. So deeply rooted in Spanish national life were the importance and the functions of the municipalities, that some of the master- pieces of Spanish literature in the so-called Siglo de Oro have local governments and local officers as their themes, notably with Lope de Vega (Fuente ovejuna and El mejor alcalde, el rey), and Pedro Calderon de la Barca (El alcalde de Zalamea). There was a time in which the influence of municipal represent- atives in the cortes, or royal diets, was more important than that of either the clergy or the knights. A noted Spanish historian even says that ". . . en las Cortes estaban representados, no los slbditos, sino las ciudades. . . ," that is to say, that local governments had made decisive inroads into the field of national government. Elections to fill positions of local government be- came important and, although the tendency to make certain offices the object of royal gifts or to make them hereditary and even ' Ram6n Riaza and Alfonso Garcia Gallo, Manual de historia del derecho espaSol (Madrid, 1934), p. 379. of the municipalities, because of the role they had played in the fight against the Moslem invaders (Reconquista) or because of their population, wealth, or industrial importance, were later on given the power to appoint their representatives to the Cortes del Reino, or royal diet, meeting with a certain regularity at the call of the kings to decide national affairs. The office of regidor, or concejal, became an important one, and the men holding it were men of substance in the community. Their neighbors looked up to them as their representatives. The meetings of the cabildo, or town council, were very active and when issues affecting the livelihood of the citizenry were dis- cussed, not only the hidalgos, but all the town folks were inter- ested in what was going on. In certain cases there even was a cabildo abierto, or open forum, in which every neighbor was entitled to his opinion. There were towns having specific fueros, or charters of rights and privileges, granted because of services they had rendered to the kings; and along with the specific fueros there were the general ones covering the municipalities of Castile. So deeply rooted in Spanish national life were the importance and the functions of the municipalities, that some of the master- pieces of Spanish literature in the so-called Siglo de Oro have local governments and local officers as their themes, notably with Lope de Vega (Fuente ovejuna and El mejor alcalde, el rey), and Pedro Calderon de la Barca (El alcalde de Zalamea). There was a time in which the influence of municipal represent- atives in the cortes, or royal diets, was more important than that of either the clergy or the knights. A noted Spanish historian even says that ". . . en las Cortes estaban representados, no los sbditos, sino las ciudades. .., that is to say, that local governments had made decisive inroads into the field of national government. Elections to fill positions of local government be- came important and, although the tendency to make certain offices the object of royal gifts or to make them hereditary and even ' Ram6n Riaza and Alfonso Garcia Gallo, Manual de historia del derecho espafiol (Madrid, 1934), p. 379.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 203 purchaseable grew stronger, the popular or democratic features opposed such practices and the guilds formed by artisans and workers were represented in local governments of Castile. Royalist interference with local government existed all the time, but as the kings became stronger and the threat of the Moors diminished, Spanish absolutism challenged the liberties and the power of local government in favor of the kings. This clash was a general one, extending all over Europe as monarchical institutions and nationalism sought centralization against feudal lords and cities, but in Spain it had special features because there was no national integration or national unity, while the country as a whole was committed to a fight to death against the Moslem kingdoms to the south, lasting some eight centuries. When Castile and Aragon were united in the persons of the Catholic Kings, Spanish centralization asserted itself, but was not yet able to destroy local governments. Legal precedents, tra- ditions, national interests, and other factors were postponing the final crisis. Queen Isabel died in 1504 and King Fernando had his difficulties with local governments and showed a marked tend- ency towards centralization and absolutism, which was instru- mental in arousing public sentiment against his policies and against him, personally. It was reserved, however, for his grand- son and successor (Juana la Loca and her German husband, Philip, did not really reign) to have a decisive fight against local governments. Carlos V, king of Spain and emperor of Germany, was actually challenged in the Guerra de las Comunidades de Castilla o de los Comuneros, and by the Germanias of Valencia. The Comuneros fought bravely but were crushed in pitched battles, and their cause, that of municipal liberties, was lost. The significance of the Comuneros was lost amidst the events of the wars between Spain and France for world supremacy, the Reformation, the splendors of the Renaissance, and the coloniza- tion of the New World; but the topic, if studied in the proper historical prospective, might throw very important light upon the process of the rise and fall of Spain as a world power. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 203 purchaseable grew stronger, the popular or democratic features opposed such practices and the guilds formed by artisans and workers were represented in local governments of Castile. Royalist interference with local government existed all the time, but as the kings became stronger and the threat of the Moors diminished, Spanish absolutism challenged the liberties and the power of local government in favor of the kings. This clash was a general one, extending all over Europe as monarchical institutions and nationalism sought centralization against feudal lords and cities, but in Spain it had special features because there was no national integration or national unity, while the country as a whole was committed to a fight to death against the Moslem kingdoms to the south, lasting some eight centuries. When Castile and Aragon were united in the persons of the Catholic Kings, Spanish centralization asserted itself, but was not yet able to destroy local governments. Legal precedents, tra- ditions, national interests, and other factors were postponing the final crisis. Queen Isabel died in 1504 and King Fernando had his difficulties with local governments and showed a marked tend- ency towards centralization and absolutism, which was instru- mental in arousing public sentiment against his policies and against him, personally. It was reserved, however, for his grand- son and successor (Juana la Loca and her German husband, Philip, did not really reign) to have a decisive fight against local governments. Carlos V, king of Spain and emperor of Germany, was actually challenged in the Guerra de las Comunidades de Castilla o de los Comuneros, and by the Germanias of Valencia. The Comuneros fought bravely but were crushed in pitched battles, and their cause, that of municipal liberties, was lost. The significance of the Comuneros was lost amidst the events of the wars between Spain and France for world supremacy, the Reformation, the splendors of the Renaissance, and the coloniza- tion of the New World; but the topic, if studied in the proper historical prospective, might throw very important light upon the process of the rise and fall of Spain as a world power. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 203 purchaseable grew stronger, the popular or democratic features opposed such practices and the guilds formed by artisans and workers were represented in local governments of Castile. Royalist interference with local government existed all the time, but as the kings became stronger and the threat of the Moors diminished, Spanish absolutism challenged the liberties and the power of local government in favor of the kings. This clash was a general one, extending all over Europe as monarchical institutions and nationalism sought centralization against feudal lords and cities, but in Spain it had special features because there was no national integration or national unity, while the country as a whole was committed to a fight to death against the Moslem kingdoms to the south, lasting some eight centuries. When Castile and Aragon were united in the persons of the Catholic Kings, Spanish centralization asserted itself, but was not yet able to destroy local governments. Legal precedents, tra- ditions, national interests, and other factors were postponing the final crisis. Queen Isabel died in 1504 and King Fernando had his difficulties with local governments and showed a marked tend- ency towards centralization and absolutism, which was instru- mental in arousing public sentiment against his policies and against him, personally. It was reserved, however, for his grand- son and successor (Juana la Loca and her German husband, Philip, did not really reign) to have a decisive fight against local governments. Carlos V, king of Spain and emperor of Germany, was actually challenged in the Guerra de las Comunidades de Castilla o de los Comuneros, and by the Germanias of Valencia. The Comuneros fought bravely but were crushed in pitched battles, and their cause, that of municipal liberties, was lost. The significance of the Comuneros was lost amidst the events of the wars between Spain and France for world supremacy, the Reformation, the splendors of the Renaissance, and the coloniza- tion of the New World; but the topic, if studied in the proper historical prospective, might throw very important light upon the process of the rise and fall of Spain as a world power.  204 The Caribbean 204 The Caribbean 204 The Caribbean 11 The thesis of this paper on the background, traditions, factors, and influences of public administration and local government in the Caribbean countries, is closely intertwined with the problem of public administration and local government in Spain. Nobody had a right to expect that if municipal liberties and rights were destroyed in metropolitan Spain, they were going to be preserved in the colonies. No colonial power has ever given better govern- ment to the colonies than to the mother country herself. At the time of the Guerra de las Comunidades there were but few municipalities around the Caribbean, most of them in the Greater Antilles, but it is very interesting that the news about the issues fought over in Spain by the municipalities and the king reached Cuba and almost provoked similar clashes. A Span- ish historian tells us that the town of Sancti Spiritus in Cuba, founded in 1514, was very much disturbed with rivalries among the neighbors ". . . turbando la paz de aquel lugar con ridiculas parodias de la guerra de las comunidades de Castilla que poco antes habta revuelto a Espana. . . - The governor of Cuba sent his most dependable henchman, Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa, to Sancti Spiritus, ordering him to put an end to municipal arrogance; the report of the harsh methods employed by Porcallo de Figueroa to quell the revolt reads thus in a contemporary document: . . - Vasco Porcallo, de veinte i ocho anos, natural de Cdzeres [sic] e vecino de la Trinidad dende el repartimiento . . . fue 4 . . Sancti Spiritus con deziocho u veinte de d caballo para facer lo que en nombre de S. S. M. M. les mandasse d fin de apaciguar la comunidad i escdndalos que en ella avia d imitacidn de las comunidades de Espana. Requirid al Ayuntamento i no contento con la respuesta invid por una vara; i Ilamados el Doctor Ojeda y los que aria . . . pidi6 d . . . Herndn Lopez . . . Alcalde para que se aplazasse con los comuneros . .. e que dejasse la * Jacobo de la Pezuela, Historia de la isla de Cuba (Madrid, 1868), I, 113. The thesis of this paper on the background, traditions, factors, and influences of public administration and local government in the Caribbean countries, is closely intertwined with the problem of public administration and local government in Spain. Nobody had a right to expect that if municipal liberties and rights were destroyed in metropolitan Spain, they were going to be preserved in the colonies. No colonial power has ever given better govern- ment to the colonies than to the mother country herself. At the time of the Guerra de las Comunidades there were but few municipalities around the Caribbean, most of them in the Greater Antilles, but it is very interesting that the news about the issues fought over in Spain by the municipalities and the king reached Cuba and almost provoked similar clashes. A Span- ish historian tells us that the town of Sancti Spiritus in Cuba, founded in 1514, was very much disturbed with rivalries among the neighbors ". . . turbando la paz de aquel lugar con ridiculas parodias de la guerra de las comunidades de Castilla que poco antes habta revuelto a Espana. . . ."4 The governor of Cuba sent his most dependable henchman, Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa, to Sancti Spiritus, ordering him to put an end to municipal arrogance; the report of the harsh methods employed by Porcallo de Figueroa to quell the revolt reads thus in a contemporary document: . . . Vasco Porcallo, de veinte i ocho anos, natural de Cdzeres [sic] e vecino de la Trinidad dende el repartimiento . . . fue a . . . Sancti Spiritus con deziocho u veinte de d caballo para facer lo que en nombre de S. S. M. M. les mandasse d fn de apaciguar la comunidad i escdndalos que en ella aria a imitacion de las comunidades de Espana. Requirid al Ayuntamento i no contento con la respuesta invid por una vara; i Ilamados el Doctor Ojeda y los que aria . . . pidio d . . . Herndn Lpez . . . Alcalde para que se aplazasse con los comuneros . .. e que dejasse la * Jacobo de la Pezuela, Historia de la isla de Cuba (Madrid, 1868), I, 113. The thesis of this paper on the background, traditions, factors, and influences of public administration and local government in the Caribbean countries, is closely intertwined with the problem of public administration and local government in Spain. Nobody had a right to expect that if municipal liberties and rights were destroyed in metropolitan Spain, they were going to be preserved in the colonies. No colonial power has ever given better govern- ment to the colonies than to the mother country herself. At the time of the Guerra de las Comunidades there were but few municipalities around the Caribbean, most of them in the Greater Antilles, but it is very interesting that the news about the issues fought over in Spain by the municipalities and the king reached Cuba and almost provoked similar clashes. A Span- ish historian tells us that the town of Sancti Spiritus in Cuba, founded in 1514, was very much disturbed with rivalries among the neighbors ". . . turbando la paz de aquel lugar con ridiculas parodias de la guerra de las comunidades de Castilla que poco antes habia revuelto a Espana. . . ."4 The governor of Cuba sent his most dependable henchman, Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa, to Sancti Spiritus, ordering him to put an end to municipal arrogance; the report of the harsh methods employed by Porcallo de Figueroa to quell the revolt reads thus in a contemporary document: . . Vasco Porcallo, de veinte i ocho anos, natural de Cazeres [sic] e vecino de la Trinidad dende el repartimiento . . . fue d . . . Sancti Spiritus con deziocho u veinte do d caballo para facer lo que en nombre de S. S. M. M. les mandassed fin de apaciguar la comunidad i escdndalos que en ella aria d imitaci6n de las comunidades de Espana. Requirio al Ayuntamento i no contento con la respuesta invid por una vara; i Ilamados el Doctor Ojeda y los que aria . . . pidi6 d . . . Herndn L6pez . . Alcalde para que se aplazasse con los comuneros . . . e que dejasse la Jacobo de la Pezuela, Historia de la isla de Cuba (Madrid, 1868), I, 113.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 205 vara . . Su respuesta fud sacar Ia espada; pero sin dalle tiempo Porcallo le did ciertas purnadas r le tomb la vara. Ech6 presos alcaldes 6 regidores. Uno destos ... Salazar, se huy6 d la Iglesia i Porcallo se entr6 tras 9l, do le recibid con una lan- za . . . Trav6se rina . .. e al cabo fue preso con los demds.... This incident at Sancti Spiritus was one of several taking place at that time. They tend to prove the fact that the crisis affecting local government in Spain was not limited to the mother country but made itself felt in the colonies as well. The first conquerors and settlers had tried to transplant to Spanish America the municipal institutions of old Spain, not only because of traditions and precedents, but also because local gov- ernment could protect them against arbitrary royal officers at the same time that they were setting up a local privileged caste among the newcomers and above the subjugated Indians. It is highly pertinent to point out that when Hernin Cortes defied Diego Velizquez the governor of Cuba to become the inde- pendent leader for the conquest of Mexico, he founded in 1519 the city of Veracruz, having very soon organized its city council, fictionally deriving from such a council the power to go ahead with his enterprise. Local government asserted itself everywhere as Spain con- quered and colonized the New World. The colonists felt that there was a shield protecting them in local government and that thus they could escape the shortcomings of a colonial administra- tion centered thousands of miles distant. This was not so in every case; but it cannot be denied that it worked this way very frequently. III It will be necessary for us to return later to the old ayunta- miento around the Caribbean to consider its membership and functions, but now we shall consider another singular feature of local government in the early municipalities of colonial Hispanic Ibid., 114. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 205 vara . Su respuesta fu sacar la espada; pero sin dalle tiempo Porcallo le did ciertas puaadas o le tomb la vara. Ech6 presos alcaldes d regidores. Uno destos ... Salazar, se huy6 d ta Iglesia i Porcallo se entr6 tras 61, do le recibid con una lan- za . . . Trav6se rina . .. o al cabo fug preso con los demds.... I This incident at Sancti Spiritus was one of several taking place at that time. They tend to prove the fact that the crisis affecting local government in Spain was not limited to the mother country but made itself felt in the colonies as well. The first conquerors and settlers had tried to transplant to Spanish America the municipal institutions of old Spain, not only because of traditions and precedents, but also because local gov- ernment could protect them against arbitrary royal officers at the same time that they were setting up a local privileged caste among the newcomers and above the subjugated Indians. It is highly pertinent to point out that when Hernin Cortes defied Diego Veldzquez the governor of Cuba to become the inde- pendent leader for the conquest of Mexico, he founded in 1519 the city of Veracruz, having very soon organized its city council, fictionally deriving from such a council the power to go ahead with his enterprise. Local government asserted itself everywhere as Spain con- quered and colonized the New World. The colonists felt that there was a shield protecting them in local government and that thus they could escape the shortcomings of a colonial administra- tion centered thousands of miles distant. This was not so in every case; but it cannot be denied that it worked this way very frequently. III It will be necessary for us to return later to the old ayunta- miento around the Caribbean to consider its membership and functions, but now we shall consider another singular feature of local government in the early municipalities of colonial Hispanic Ibid., 114. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 205 vara . . Su respuesta fu sacar la espada; pero sin dalle tiempo Porcallo le did ciertas punadas a le tom6 la vara. Echo presos alcaldes 6 regidores. Uno destos ... Salazar, se huy6 d la Iglesia i Porcallo se entr6 tras 9l, do le recibid con una Lan- za . . . Trav6se rina ... e al cabo fu preso con los demds....s This incident at Sancti Spiritus was one of several taking place at that time. They tend to prove the fact that the crisis affecting local government in Spain was not limited to the mother country but made itself felt in the colonies as well. The first conquerors and settlers had tried to transplant to Spanish America the municipal institutions of old Spain, not only because of traditions and precedents, but also because local gov- ernment could protect them against arbitrary royal officers at the same time that they were setting up a local privileged caste among the newcomers and above the subjugated Indians. It is highly pertinent to point out that when Hernin Cortes defied Diego Velazquez the governor of Cuba to become the inde- pendent leader for the conquest of Mexico, he founded in 1519 the city of Veracruz, having very soon organized its city council, fictionally deriving from such a council the power to go ahead with his enterprise. Local government asserted itself everywhere as Spain con- quered and colonized the New World. The colonists felt that there was a shield protecting them in local government and that thus they could escape the shortcomings of a colonial administra- tion centered thousands of miles distant. This was not so in every case; but it cannot be denied that it worked this way very frequently. III It will be necessary for us to return later to the old ayunta- miento around the Caribbean to consider its membership and functions, but now we shall consider another singular feature of local government in the early municipalities of colonial Hispanic Ibid., 114.  206 The Caribbean America, that of the procuradores and their juntas. Colonial municipalities elected as their representatives to plead their cases and defend their interest in Spain the so-called procuradores, whose office and functions were vaguely similar to those per- formed by Benjamin Franklin in London many years later in behalf of the American colonies. The procurador, in addition to his role as the representative of the municipal council or local government, was the direct representative of the neighbors as a body. The procuradores were usually elected at the time in which the gold that had been mined was going to be made into ingots and assayed. This was one of the most important occasions for public gatherings, as gold mining was considered to be the most profitable activity in the first years of colonization and everybody had an interest in the fundicion (melting) and in the assaying. The colonists came from everywhere to be present while their income-to-be was being calculated, and at that time the election of the procuradores took place in what, to a certain degree, was the equivalent of the cabildo abierto, or general assembly, of the people. The first election of procuradores for the municipalities of Cuba was held in Bayamo in 1515, when the gold was being melted and assayed; Pinfilo de Narviez and Antonio Veldzquez were elected to go to Spain. It was not long before the municipali- ties were at odds with the procuradores on fundamental issues of local government. Royal governors tried to interfere with the election of the procuradores so as to make these officers subservi- ent to them; and at one time, around 1528, the municipalities of Baracoa, Bayamo, Havana, Puerto Principe, and Trinidad-while Sancti Spiritus abstained from any participation in the protest- demanded that the neighbors of Santiago de Cuba be authorized to elect their procurador without the interference exerted by the royal governor. The procuradores, it was requested, had to be elected by the vote of the neighbors of the town and not by the municipal coun- cil, and it was thus that the first cleavage in local government in 206 The Caribbean 206 The Caribbean America, that of the procuradores and their juntas. Colonial municipalities elected as their representatives to plead their cases and defend their interest in Spain the so-called procuradores, whose office and functions were vaguely similar to those per- formed by Benjamin Franklin in London many years later in behalf of the American colonies. The procurador, in addition to his role as the representative of the municipal council or local government, was the direct representative of the neighbors as a body. The procuradores were usually elected at the time in which the gold that had been mined was going to be made into ingots and assayed. This was one of the most important occasions for public gatherings, as gold mining was considered to be the most profitable activity in the first years of colonization and everybody had an interest in the fundicion (melting) and in the assaying. The colonists came from everywhere to be present while their income-to-be was being calculated, and at that time the election of the procuradores took place in what, to a certain degree, was the equivalent of the cabildo abierto, or general assembly, of the people. The first election of procuradores for the municipalities of Cuba was held in Bayamo in 1515, when the gold was being melted and assayed; Panfilo de Narvdez and Antonio Veldzquez were elected to go to Spain. It was not long before the municipali- ties were at odds with the procuradores on fundamental issues of local government. Royal governors tried to interfere with the election of the procuradores so as to make these officers subservi- ent to them; and at one time, around 1528, the municipalities of Baracoa, Bayamo, Havana, Puerto Principe, and Trinidad-while Sancti Spiritus abstained from any participation in the protest- demanded that the neighbors of Santiago de Cuba be authorized to elect their procurador without the interference exerted by the royal governor. The procuradores, it was requested, had to be elected by the vote of the neighbors of the town and not by the municipal coun- cil, and it was thus that the first cleavage in local government in America, that of the procuradores and their juntas. Colonial municipalities elected as their representatives to plead their cases and defend their interest in Spain the so-called procuradores, whose office and functions were vaguely similar to those per- formed by Benjamin Franklin in London many years later in behalf of the American colonies. The procurador, in addition to his role as the representative of the municipal council or local government, was the direct representative of the neighbors as a body. The procuradores were usually elected at the time in which the gold that had been mined was going to be made into ingots and assayed. This was one of the most important occasions for public gatherings, as gold mining was considered to be the most profitable activity in the first years of colonization and everybody had an interest in the fundicidn (melting) and in the assaying. The colonists came from everywhere to be present while their income-to-be was being calculated, and at that time the election of the procuradores took place in what, to a certain degree, was the equivalent of the cabildo abierto, or general assembly, of the people. The first election of procuradores for the municipalities of Cuba was held in Bayamo in 1515, when the gold was being melted and assayed; Panfilo de Narvaez and Antonio Velizquez were elected to go to Spain. It was not long before the municipali- ties were at odds with the procuradores on fundamental issues of local government. Royal governors tried to interfere with the election of the procuradores so as to make these officers subservi- ent to them; and at one time, around 1528, the municipalities of Baracoa, Bayamo, Havana, Puerto Principe, and Trinidad-while Sancti Spiritus abstained from any participation in the protest- demanded that the neighbors of Santiago de Cuba be authorized to elect their procurador without the interference exerted by the royal governor. The procuradores, it was requested, had to be elected by the vote of the neighbors of the town and not by the municipal coun- cil, and it was thus that the first cleavage in local government in  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 207 Spanish America was started, to the benefit of centralized royal authority. The scope of this paper does not permit going into a detailed account of the activities of the procuradores and of the municipal councils, but whoever will feel tempted to conduct a thorough study of this important aspect of local government in colonial Hispanic America will find a mass of valuable information in the Coleccidn de documentos insdditos relativos at descubrimiento, conquista y colonizacion de las antiguas posesiones espaiolas de ultramar, edited by the Royal Academy of History, of Madrid. There will be found accounts of controversies between the people and the royal officers, of excellent suggestions of good government in the field of taxes, military matters, roads, buildings, water sup- plies, prices for food, and public order, and regarding agriculture, cattle raising, and mining. Perhaps the outstanding man among the procuradores was Alonso de Ciceres, whose name was given to the famous Ordenanzas municipales of 1564, the first attempt to put into legal code all the regulations dealing with local government in colonial Hispanic America. But special mention must also be made of Francisco de Paradas of Bayamo, a regidor, or alderman, of the city and also a procurador, who died in 1571, setting up a foundation with capital of more than 70,000 pesos to support a humanistic college in Bayamo. It is Professor Ots y Capdequi who points out that municipal institutions in Spain were decadent at the time of the Catholic Kings and entering into their final crisis, but that the old munic- ipal regime of Castile acquired surprising strength and vitality in colonial Hispanic America." IV When the Castilian municipality was structured and the ca- bildo abierto, or popular assembly, was set aside, the office of the rigidor, or councilman, became the link between the people ' Ots y Capdequi, Estudios, p. 148. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 207 Spanish America was started, to the benefit of centralized royal authority. The scope of this paper does not permit going into a detailed account of the activities of the procuradores and of the municipal councils, but whoever will feel tempted to conduct a thorough study of this important aspect of local government in colonial Hispanic America will find a mass of valuable information in the Coleccion de documentos indditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y colonizacion de las antiguas posesiones espaiolas de ultramar, edited by the Royal Academy of History, of Madrid. There will be found accounts of controversies between the people and the royal officers, of excellent suggestions of good government in the field of taxes, military matters, roads, buildings, water sup- plies, prices for food, and public order, and regarding agriculture, cattle raising, and mining. Perhaps the outstanding man among the procuradores was Alonso de Ciceres, whose name was given to the famous Ordenanzas municipales of 1564, the first attempt to put into legal code all the regulations dealing with local government in colonial Hispanic America. But special mention must also be made of Francisco de Paradas of Bayamo, a regidor, or alderman, of the city and also a procurador, who died in 1571, setting up a foundation with capital of more than 70,000 pesos to support a humanistic college in Bayamo. It is Professor Ots y Capdequi who points out that municipal institutions in Spain were decadent at the time of the Catholic Kings and entering into their final crisis, but that the old munic- ipal regime of Castile acquired surprising strength and vitality in colonial Hispanic America." IV When the Castilian municipality was structured and the ca- bildo abierto, or popular assembly, was set aside, the office of the rigidor, or councilman, became the link between the people Ots y Capdequi, Estudios, p. 148. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 207 Spanish America was started, to the benefit of centralized royal authority. The scope of this paper does not permit going into a detailed account of the activities of the procuradores and of the municipal councils, but whoever will feel tempted to conduct a thorough study of this important aspect of local government in colonial Hispanic America will find a mass of valuable information in the Coleccin de documentos insditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y colonizaci6n de las antiguas posesiones espanolas de ultramar, edited by the Royal Academy of History, of Madrid. There will be found accounts of controversies between the people and the royal officers, of excellent suggestions of good government in the field of taxes, military matters, roads, buildings, water sup- plies, prices for food, and public order, and regarding agriculture, cattle raising, and mining. Perhaps the outstanding man among the procuradores was Alonso de Ciceres, whose name was given to the famous Ordenanzas municipales of 1564, the first attempt to put into legal code all the regulations dealing with local government in colonial Hispanic America. But special mention must also be made of Francisco de Paradas of Bayamo, a regidor, or alderman, of the city and also a procurador, who died in 1571, setting up a foundation with capital of more than 70,000 pesos to support a humanistic college in Bayamo. It is Professor Ots y Capdequi who points out that municipal institutions in Spain were decadent at the time of the Catholic Kings and entering into their final crisis, but that the old munic- ipal regime of Castile acquired surprising strength and vitality in colonial Hispanic America. IV When the Castilian municipality was structured and the ca- bildo abierto, or popular assembly, was set aside, the office of the rigidor, or councihnan, became the link between the people * Ots y Capdequi, Estudios, p. 148.  208 The Caribbean and local government. The number of aldermen was variable according to regional customs and precedents, and there were municipalities having eight aldermen while others had as many as twenty-four and even thirty-six. To be a Caballero Veinte y Cuatro meant in southern Spain that a person was one of the twenty-four gentlemen in charge of local government. The origi- nal election of the regidores, either by direct or indirect vote, was first tampered with when the office was made hereditary by the king as a reward for important services rendered or just as a result of royal favor. The time came when the office of regidor was given in exchange for monetary contributions, and it was finally sold for money, too. The office of the corregidor (literally the one who is with the regidor), directly representing the central government, was another blow against local government. It could not be expected that colonial Hispanic America should escape the trend of royal encroachment upon municipal liberties. It is very likely that the first regidores in the Caribbean were appointed to this office by Columbus himself or by his son and successors. The original Hispanic-American ayuntamiento as a rule had four regidores, or half as many as the smallest Spanish municipality. There is contemporary documentary evidence to establish the fact that in 1529 by royal order the regidores in Cuba were elected by the votes of all the neighbors in a given town, but a few years later political corruption crept in and it was reported that voters succumbed to bribery. The electoral system was changed into what amounted to indirect voting. The alcalde of the times, who was partly a mayor and partly a sheriff, was elected for one year and he could not be re-elected unless two years had elapsed. A few years passed and we can read today the printed docu- ments dealing with municipal elections in Havana in 1551. The records of the ayuntamiento of San Cristobal de La Habana from 1550 to the present day are practically intact, and the papers from 1550 to 1578 have been published in three volumes. The student of local government will profit from reading the proceed- 208 The Caribbean and local government. The number of aldermen was variable according to regional customs and precedents, and there were municipalities having eight aldermen while others had as many as twenty-four and even thirty-six. To be a Caballero Veinte y Cuatro meant in southern Spain that a person was one of the twenty-four gentlemen in charge of local government. The origi- nal election of the regidores, either by direct or indirect vote, was first tampered with when the office was made hereditary by the king as a reward for important services rendered or just as a result of royal favor. The time came when the office of regidor was given in exchange for monetary contributions, and it was finally sold for money, too. The office of the corregidor (literally the one who is with the regidor), directly representing the central government, was another blow against local government. It could not be expected that colonial Hispanic America should escape the trend of royal encroachment upon municipal liberties. It is very likely that the first regidores in the Caribbean were appointed to this office by Columbus himself or by his son and successors. The original Hispanic-American ayuntamiento as a rule had four regidores, or half as many as the smallest Spanish municipality. There is contemporary documentary evidence to establish the fact that in 1529 by royal order the regidores in Cuba were elected by the votes of all the neighbors in a given town, but a few years later political corruption crept in and it was reported that voters succumbed to bribery. The electoral system was changed into what amounted to indirect voting. The alcalde of the times, who was partly a mayor and partly a sheriff, was elected for one year and he could not be re-elected unless two years had elapsed. A few years passed and we can read today the printed docu- ments dealing with municipal elections in Havana in 1551. The records of the ayuntamiento of San Cristobal de La Habana from 1550 to the present day are practically intact, and the papers from 1550 to 1578 have been published in three volumes. The student of local government will profit from reading the proceed- 208 The Caribbean and local government. The number of aldermen was variable according to regional customs and precedents, and there were municipalities having eight aldermen while others had as many as twenty-four and even thirty-six. To be a Caballero Veinte y Cuatro meant in southern Spain that a person was one of the twenty-four gentlemen in charge of local government. The origi- nal election of the regidores, either by direct or indirect vote, was first tampered with when the office was made hereditary by the king as a reward for important services rendered or just as a result of royal favor. The time came when the office of regidor was given in exchange for monetary contributions, and it was finally sold for money, too. The office of the corregidor (literally the one who is with the regidor), directly representing the central government, was another blow against local government. It could not be expected that colonial Hispanic America should escape the trend of royal encroachment upon municipal liberties. It is very likely that the first regidores in the Caribbean were appointed to this office by Columbus himself or by his son and successors. The original Hispanic-American ayuntamiento as a rule had four regidores, or half as many as the smallest Spanish municipality. There is contemporary documentary evidence to establish the fact that in 1529 by royal order the regidores in Cuba were elected by the votes of all the neighbors in a given town, but a few years later political corruption crept in and it was reported that voters succumbed to bribery. The electoral system was changed into what amounted to indirect voting. The alcalde of the times, who was partly a mayor and partly a sheriff, was elected for one year and he could not be re-elected unless two years had elapsed. A few years passed and we can read today the printed docu- ments dealing with municipal elections in Havana in 1551. The records of the ayuntamiento of San Crist6bal de La Habana from 1550 to the present day are practically intact, and the papers from 1550 to 1578 have been published in three volumes. The student of local government will profit from reading the proceed-  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 209 ings of the elections held on January 1, 1552, for instance.' At the beginning of every year elections were held to complete the number of the regidores and to choose the alcaldes, but when the practice of the hereditary and the perpetual regidor was general- ized and the office was even bought and sold, the annual elections gradually lost importance and the time came when they did not amount to anything. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because mu- nicipal elections were controlled from above or because there were fewer and fewer offices depending on elections, local govern- ment did not function. The regidor as a rule was a criollo; that is to say, a person born on this side of the Atlantic-in most cases a white person, although at times there were cases of mixed blood. The incum- bents were the most important members of the community, aside from the governors and other royal officers coming from Spain. They became the speakers for the local population, and they had been born and had grown up in the colonial town and were identified with it. The reader of the proceedings dealing with the meetings of the cabildos cannot but admire the wisdom, the foresight, and the public spirit evidenced by the records of their assemblies. Grant- ing lands, regulating building permits, looking over grazing lands or water supplies, fixing prices of foodstuff, collecting taxes, help- ing to defend the town, providing for honest amusements, aiding hospitals and orphanages, contracting for medical and pharmaceu- tical services in the community, and guaranteeing persons and property against crime, the regidores well demonstrated that they were capable, dedicated, and energetic citizens who had the public good in mind. Viceroys, governors, justices, generals, and admirals came and went, almost continuously. They were of European stock and in many cases without previous connection with the peoples they were going to rule, but the regidor and SActas capitulares del ayuntamiento de La Habana (Havana, 1937), I, 37-38. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 209 ings of the elections held on January 1, 1552, for instance.' At the beginning of every year elections were held to complete the number of the regidores and to choose the alcaldes, but when the practice of the hereditary and the perpetual regidor was general- ized and the office was even bought and sold, the annual elections gradually lost importance and the time came when they did not amount to anything. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because mu- nicipal elections were controlled from above or because there were fewer and fewer offices depending on elections, local govern- ment did not function. The regidor as a rule was a criollo; that is to say, a person born on this side of the Atlantic-in most cases a white person, although at times there were cases of mixed blood. The incum- bents were the most important members of the community, aside from the governors and other royal officers coming from Spain. They became the speakers for the local population, and they had been born and had grown up in the colonial town and were identified with it. The reader of the proceedings dealing with the meetings of the cabildos cannot but admire the wisdom, the foresight, and the public spirit evidenced by the records of their assemblies. Grant- ing lands, regulating building permits, looking over grazing lands or water supplies, fixing prices of foodstuff, collecting taxes, help- ing to defend the town, providing for honest amusements, aiding hospitals and orphanages, contracting for medical and pharmaceu- tical services in the community, and guaranteeing persons and property against crime, the regidores well demonstrated that they were capable, dedicated, and energetic citizens who had the public good in mind. Viceroys, governors, justices, generals, and admirals came and went, almost continuously. They were of European stock and in many cases without previous connection with the peoples they were going to rule, but the regidor and ' Actas capitulares del ayuntamiento de La Habana (Havana, 1937), I, 37-38. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 209 ings of the elections held on January 1, 1552, for instance.' At the beginning of every year elections were held to complete the number of the regidores and to choose the alcaldes, but when the practice of the hereditary and the perpetual regidor was general- ized and the office was even bought and sold, the annual elections gradually lost importance and the time came when they did not amount to anything. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because mu- nicipal elections were controlled from above or because there were fewer and fewer offices depending on elections, local govern- ment did not function. The regidor as a rule was a criollo; that is to say, a person born on this side of the Atlantic-in most cases a white person, although at times there were cases of mixed blood. The incum- bents were the most important members of the community, aside from the governors and other royal officers coming from Spain. They became the speakers for the local population, and they had been born and had grown up in the colonial town and were identified with it. The reader of the proceedings dealing with the meetings of the cabildos cannot but admire the wisdom, the foresight, and the public spirit evidenced by the records of their assemblies. Grant- ing lands, regulating building permits, looking over grazing lands or water supplies, fixing prices of foodstuff, collecting taxes, help- ing to defend the town, providing for honest amusements, aiding hospitals and orphanages, contracting for medical and pharmaceu- tical services in the community, and guaranteeing persons and property against crime, the regidores well demonstrated that they were capable, dedicated, and energetic citizens who had the public good in mind. Viceroys, governors, justices, generals, and admirals came and went, almost continuously. They were of European stock and in many cases without previous connection with the peoples they were going to rule, but the regidor and ' Actas capitulares del ayuntamiento de La Habana (Havana, 1937), I, 37-38.  210 The Caribbean the alcalde were always in the town and doing their best for the community. It is no wonder that the people grew accustomed to consider them as permanent fixtures of colonial government and as the colonial officers who were closest to them. There is no question that local government in colonial Hispanic America was the train- ing school for those people who wanted to enter political life in the restricted scale in which they could do so, and that around regidores and alcaldes the nonmetropolitan attitude of the criollos formed and developed. In practically every crisis between the mother country and any of the colonies, prior to the Wars of Independence, local officers were more closely identified with their neighbors than with the direct representatives of the Spanish crown. This being the case, when the first revolutionary outbreaks took place, regidores were among their leaders. Old grievances of the criollo led him into revolutionary paths, and these griev- ances were plentiful and at times of a very serious type. In more than one case the first real challenge to colonial authority was made by the regidores as a body, or in cabildo abierto. Some present-day specialists have tried to discover for us that the cabildo abierto, or general assembly, was not a thoroughly democratic body. It is highly debatable if there ever was a thoroughly democratic body. Burgesses, parishioners, city elders, and enfranchised voters in the Thirteen Colonies, at their best, made a selective democracy. As a matter of fact, even in the golden years of popular assemblies in Athens and Rome, there were human beings excluded from direct participation in public gatherings dealing with local government. Why should anybody expect that in Buenos Aires, or Lima, or Quito, or Caracas, local leaders opposing the colonial regime were going to be so drastically and thoroughly revolutionary that they should go farther than anyone else in the history of uprisings? What they did, they did with the limitations imposed by the social, economic, political, and traditional structure of which they 210 The Caribbean the alcalde were always in the town and doing their best for the community. It is no wonder that the people grew accustomed to consider them as permanent fixtures of colonial government and as the colonial officers who were closest to them. There is no question that local government in colonial Hispanic America was the train- ing school for those people who wanted to enter political life in the restricted scale in which they could do so, and that around regidores and alcaldes the nonmetropolitan attitude of the criollos formed and developed. In practically every crisis between the mother country and any of the colonies, prior to the Wars of Independence, local officers were more closely identified with their neighbors than with the direct representatives of the Spanish crown. This being the case, when the first revolutionary outbreaks took place, regidores were among their leaders. Old grievances of the criollo led him into revolutionary paths, and these griev- ances were plentiful and at times of a very serious type. In more than one case the first real challenge to colonial authority was made by the regidores as a body, or in cabildo abierto. Some present-day specialists have tried to discover for us that the cabildo abierto, or general assembly, was not a thoroughly democratic body. It is highly debatable if there ever was a thoroughly democratic body. Burgesses, parishioners, city elders, and enfranchised voters in the Thirteen Colonies, at their best, made a selective democracy. As a matter of fact, even in the golden years of popular assemblies in Athens and Rome, there were human beings excluded from direct participation in public gatherings dealing with local government. Why should anybody expect that in Buenos Aires, or Lima, or Quito, or Caracas, local leaders opposing the colonial regime were going to be so drastically and thoroughly revolutionary that they should go farther than anyone else in the history of uprisings? What they did, they did with the limitations imposed by the social, economic, political, and traditional structure of which they 210 The Caribbean the alcalde were always in the town and doing their best for the community. It is no wonder that the people grew accustomed to consider them as permanent fixtures of colonial government and as the colonial officers who were closest to them. There is no question that local government in colonial Hispanic America was the train- ing school for those people who wanted to enter political life in the restricted scale in which they could do so, and that around regidores and alcaldes the nonmetropolitan attitude of the criollos formed and developed. In practically every crisis between the mother country and any of the colonies, prior to the Wars of Independence, local officers were more closely identified with their neighbors than with the direct representatives of the Spanish crown. This being the case, when the first revolutionary outbreaks took place, regidores were among their leaders. Old grievances of the criollo led him into revolutionary paths, and these griev- ances were plentiful and at times of a very serious type. In more than one case the first real challenge to colonial authority was made by the regidores as a body, or in cabildo abierto. Some present-day specialists have tried to discover for us that the cabildo abierto, or general assembly, was not a thoroughly democratic body. It is highly debatable if there ever was a thoroughly democratic body. Burgesses, parishioners, city elders, and enfranchised voters in the Thirteen Colonies, at their best, made a selective democracy. As a matter of fact, even in the golden years of popular assemblies in Athens and Rome, there were human beings excluded from direct participation in public gatherings dealing with local government. Why should anybody expect that in Buenos Aires, or Lima, or Quito, or Caracas, local leaders opposing the colonial regime were going to be so drastically and thoroughly revolutionary that they should go farther than anyone else in the history of uprisings? What they did, they did with the limitations imposed by the social, economic, political, and traditional structure of which they  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 211 were an important part. It could not be otherwise, even when there were people who were far ahead of the times in which they lived and could envision the need and even the convenience of decisive reforms in the future. V It may seem strange, but the Wars of Independence, helping to set up national governments in the former colonies, gave the death blow to local governments. Leading people did not care any more for the offices of regidores and alcaldes. The upheaval had put an end to the system of high offices reserved for privi- leged people sent by the mother country. These high offices were now open to the criollos, hitherto limited at the most to be regidores and alcaldes. With the new setup they could be presi- dents of the republics, ministers, justices, senators, congressmen, generals, and admirals; and they wanted offices of national dis- tinction and big income. Local or municipal government fell into disrepute and into the hands of petty people, devoid of any preparation for public office. They were mostly the ignorant ones, without experience, who had not traveled and who did not know anything about what was going on in the world. The whole tradition of local government suffered when the people who had helped to develop it chose to step up into national prominence, to replace the upper caste of the trans- atlantic officers who had long looked down upon them. It became necessary to develop again the tradition of local government, start- at the bottom, way down where it had begun centuries before in Spain, before the time when capable and influential people were eager to become a Caballero Veinte y Cuatro because it meant prestige and power. It took centuries in Spain to do that, and there had been favorable circumstances to develop local government and to sur- round local officers with prestige and importance. In Hispanic America the revolutionary upheaval swept away all that in less than fifty years, and before the practice of local government ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 211 were an important part. It could not be otherwise, even when there were people who were far ahead of the times in which they lived and could envision the need and even the convenience of decisive reforms in the future. V It may seem strange, but the Wars of Independence, helping to set up national governments in the former colonies, gave the death blow to local governments. Leading people did not care any more for the offices of regidores and alcaldes. The upheaval had put an end to the system of high offices reserved for privi- leged people sent by the mother country. These high offices were now open to the criollos, hitherto limited at the most to be regidores and alcaldes. With the new setup they could be presi- dents of the republics, ministers, justices, senators, congressmen, generals, and admirals; and they wanted offices of national dis- tinction and big income. Local or municipal government fell into disrepute and into the hands of petty people, devoid of any preparation for public office. They were mostly the ignorant ones, without experience, who had not traveled and who did not know anything about what was going on in the world. The whole tradition of local government suffered when the people who had helped to develop it chose to step up into national prominence, to replace the upper caste of the trans- atlantic officers who had long looked down upon them. It became necessary to develop again the tradition of local government, start- at the bottom, way down where it had begun centuries before in Spain, before the time when capable and influential people were eager to become a Caballero Veinte y Cuatro because it meant prestige and power. It took centuries in Spain to do that, and there had been favorable circumstances to develop local government and to sur- round local officers with prestige and importance. In Hispanic America the revolutionary upheaval swept away all that in less than fifty years, and before the practice of local government ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 211 were an important part. It could not be otherwise, even when there were people who were far ahead of the times in which they lived and could envision the need and even the convenience of decisive reforms in the future. V It may seem strange, but the Wars of Independence, helping to set up national governments in the former colonies, gave the death blow to local governments. Leading people did not care any more for the offices of regidores and alcaldes. The upheaval had put an end to the system of high offices reserved for privi- leged people sent by the mother country. These high offices were now open to the criollos, hitherto limited at the most to be regidores and alcaldes. With the new setup they could be presi- dents of the republics, ministers, justices, senators, congressmen, generals, and admirals; and they wanted offices of national dis- tinction and big income. Local or municipal government fell into disrepute and into the hands of petty people, devoid of any preparation for public office. They were mostly the ignorant ones, without experience, who had not traveled and who did not know anything about what was going on in the world. The whole tradition of local government suffered when the people who had helped to develop it chose to step up into national prominence, to replace the upper caste of the trans- atlantic officers who had long looked down upon them. It became necessary to develop again the tradition of local government, start- at the bottom, way down where it had begun centuries before in Spain, before the time when capable and influential people were eager to become a Caballero Veinte y Cuatro because it meant prestige and power. It took centuries in Spain to do that, and there had been favorable circumstances to develop local government and to sur- round local officers with prestige and importance. In Hispanic America the revolutionary upheaval swept away all that in less than fifty years, and before the practice of local government  212 The Caribbean could be consolidated so as to permeate all the people in the dif- ferent communities and not have it restricted to a few neighbors. Ignorance was widespread, poor "whites" and "mixed bloods" lived without culture or property and did not have the proper opportunity for advancement or for training in public life. The large masses of colored slaves and the Indians were reduced to even more wretched living conditions. Thus it happened that into the political vacuum at the local level, brought about by independence on a national scale, fell the hordes of ignorant, untrained, and irresponsible people who had all the time been kept away from the actual government of the municipality. They were going to be the new alcaldes and regidores and they were not prepared for such jobs. The new important national leaders, shot into prominence because of the withdrawal of Spain at the end of the Wars of Independence, wanted centralization along national lines, with presidents of the republics, the congressmen, the ministers, and the generals in the role of dispensers of privileges and advantages formerly fulfilled by royal officers. They did not want capable and responsible local governments opposing their whims, and it was useless to expect that they were going to be interested in good government anywhere when they found themselves cata- pulted into the highest positions in the land through siding with the revolution. Those who had not joined the national armies or the new regimes because they had chosen to remain loyal to Spain could not retain their jobs as regidores and alcaldes. This was very logical. The republican government very rightly regarded them as enemies, and they were easily sacrificed to make room for former soldiers who had to be rewarded with something. VI The emergence'of republican government in Spanish America was everywhere accompanied by the downfall of local government hitherto entrusted to the trained, the experienced, and the capable ones. There had been a general failure during these years to pro- 212 The Caribbean could be consolidated so as to permeate all the people in the dif- ferent communities and not have it restricted to a few neighbors. Ignorance was widespread, poor "whites" and "mixed bloods" lived without culture or property and did not have the proper opportunity for advancement or for training in public life. The large masses of colored slaves and the Indians were reduced to even more wretched living conditions. Thus it happened that into the political vacuum at the local level, brought about by independence on a national scale, fell the hordes of ignorant, untrained, and irresponsible people who had all the time been kept away from the actual government of the municipality. They were going to be the new alcaldes and regidores and they were not prepared for such jobs. The new important national leaders, shot into prominence because of the withdrawal of Spain at the end of the Wars of Independence, wanted centralization along national lines, with presidents of the republics, the congressmen, the ministers, and the generals in the role of dispensers of privileges and advantages formerly fulfilled by royal officers. They did not want capable and responsible local governments opposing their whims, and it was useless to expect that they were going to be interested in good government anywhere when they found themselves cata- pulted into the highest positions in the land through siding with the revolution. Those who had not joined the national armies or the new regimes because they had chosen to remain loyal to Spain could not retain their jobs as regidores and alcaldes. This was very logical. The republican government very rightly regarded them as enemies, and they were easily sacrificed to make room for former soldiers who had to be rewarded with something. VI The emergence'of republican government in Spanish America was everywhere accompanied by the downfall of local government hitherto entrusted to the trained, the experienced, and the capable ones. There had been a general failure during these years to pro- 212 The Caribbean could be consolidated so as to permeate all the people in the dif- ferent communities and not have it restricted to a few neighbors. Ignorance was widespread, poor "whites" and "mixed bloods" lived without culture or property and did not have the proper opportunity for advancement or for training in public life. The large masses of colored slaves and the Indians were reduced to even more wretched living conditions. Thus it happened that into the political vacuum at the local level, brought about by independence on a national scale, fell the hordes of ignorant, untrained, and irresponsible people who had all the time been kept away from the actual government of the municipality. They were going to be the new alcaldes and regidores and they were not prepared for such jobs. The new important national leaders, shot into prominence because of the withdrawal of Spain at the end of the Wars of Independence, wanted centralization along national lines, with presidents of the republics, the congressmen, the ministers, and the generals in the role of dispensers of privileges and advantages formerly fulfilled by royal officers. They did not want capable and responsible local governments opposing their whims, and it was useless to expect that they were going to be interested in good government anywhere when they found themselves cata- pulted into the highest positions in the land through siding with the revolution. Those who had not joined the national armies or the new regimes because they had chosen to remain loyal to Spain could not retain their jobs as regidores and alcaldes. This was very logical. The republican government very rightly regarded them as enemies, and they were easily sacrificed to make room for former soldiers who had to be rewarded with something. VI The emergence'of republican government in Spanish America was everywhere accompanied by the downfall of local government hitherto entrusted to the trained, the experienced, and the capable ones. There had been a general failure during these years to pro-  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 213 vide for education, responsibility, and a certain degree of eco- nomic independence for the masses of the people, and as they were coming into their own, they were not prepared for the jobs left to them in municipal government. The new regidores or concejales were the illiterates, the poor tenants, and the totally ignorants. The examples they had from above were not the ones to teach them honest and capable man- agement of communal affairs. So it was that local government lost prestige and usefulness and was little by little reduced to the condition of sinecures for trusted henchmen without interest in the common good and utterly incapable of good government. Little or no provision was made for public services, urbanization, public buildings, education, welfare, recreational facilities, com- munications, or public health. Local taxes were collected in a haphazard way to pay salaries and compensations to municipal officers; corruption became widespread and there was a complete deterioration of local government. Proud and old colonial cities turned into capitals of independent republics fared a little better, and the time came when the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon said that the Latin American republics were immense corrals with a beautiful gate to enter them, represented by the national capital city or site of the government, The country as such, however, was not only the capital city, but all the other cities, the towns, the villages, the hamlets, and the isolated farms, mines, ranches, and fisheries covering the land and living in appalling backwardness. For nearly one century this was the picture of local conditions and local government in Span- ish America. The most progressive and the richest of these re- publics have been precisely the ones in which local government and local conditions have lifted themselves above the pernicious influence of political centralization and have again shown local pride and a great interest in the city or town driving ahead for good schools, waterworks, paved streets, public parks, libraries, museums, adequate taxation properly administered, and a local government in which honesty should be a rule. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 213 vide for education, responsibility, and a certain degree of eco- nomic independence for the masses of the people, and as they were coming into their own, they were not prepared for the jobs left to them in municipal government. The new regidores or concejales were the illiterates, the poor tenants, and the totally ignorants. The examples they had from above were not the ones to teach them honest and capable man- agement of communal affairs. So it was that local government lost prestige and usefulness and was little by little reduced to the condition of sinecures for trusted henchmen without interest in the common good and utterly incapable of good government. Little or no provision was made for public services, urbanization, public buildings, education, welfare, recreational facilities, com- munications, or public health. Local taxes were collected in a haphazard way to pay salaries and compensations to municipal officers; corruption became widespread and there was a complete deterioration of local government. Proud and old colonial cities turned into capitals of independent republics fared a little better, and the time came when the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon said that the Latin American republics were immense corrals with a beautiful gate to enter them, represented by the national capital city or site of the government, The country as such, however, was not only the capital city, but all the other cities, the towns, the villages, the hamlets, and the isolated farms, mines, ranches, and fisheries covering the land and living in appalling backwardness. For nearly one century this was the picture of local conditions and local government in Span- ish America. The most progressive and the richest of these re- publics have been precisely the ones in which local government and local conditions have lifted themselves above the pernicious influence of political centralization and have again shown local pride and a great interest in the city or town driving ahead for good schools, waterworks, paved streets, public parks, libraries, museums, adequate taxation properly administered, and a local government in which honesty should be a rule. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 213 vide for education, responsibility, and a certain degree of eco- nomic independence for the masses of the people, and as they were coming into their own, they were not prepared for the jobs left to them in municipal government. The new regidores or concejales were the illiterates, the poor tenants, and the totally ignorants. The examples they had from above were not the ones to teach them honest and capable man- agement of communal affairs. So it was that local government lost prestige and usefulness and was little by little reduced to the condition of sinecures for trusted henchmen without interest in the common good and utterly incapable of good government. Little or no provision was made for public services, urbanization, public buildings, education, welfare, recreational facilities, com- munications, or public health. Local taxes were collected in a haphazard way to pay salaries and compensations to municipal officers; corruption became widespread and there was a complete deterioration of local government. Proud and old colonial cities turned into capitals of independent republics fared a little better, and the time came when the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon said that the Latin American republics were immense corrals with a beautiful gate to enter them, represented by the national capital city or site of the government. The country as such, however, was not only the capital city, but all the other cities, the towns, the villages, the hamlets, and the isolated farms, mines, ranches, and fisheries covering the land and living in appalling backwardness. For nearly one century this was the picture of local conditions and local government in Span- ish America. The most progressive and the richest of these re- publics have been precisely the ones in which local government and local conditions have lifted themselves above the pernicious influence of political centralization and have again shown local pride and a great interest in the city or town driving ahead for good schools, waterworks, paved streets, public parks, libraries, museums, adequate taxation properly administered, and a local government in which honesty should be a rule.  214 The Caribbean 214 The Caribbean 214 The Caribbean VII The social absorption of the revolutionary upheaval has not been completed at the same time in all the Spanish American republics. It will be slower or faster according to circumstances and peoples, but it most certainly is going ahead. There are many cases of cities and towns in which outstanding neighbors have taken the lead for reform parties and civic movements for good local government, but the extraordinary feature of this ren- aissance of the old spirit of capability, experience, and dedica- tion in local government, may be found in the fact that they have the conscious and intelligent support of large groups of neighbors organized to this effect. This is a positive advantage over the colonial municipality in which the chosen elite ruled without the people as a whole participating in local government. A tree is as healthy as its roots, deeply penetrating the rich and well- watered soil. Local governments, covering the territory of a given nation, make the roots of the national government, and the latter will be as respectable, useful, and deserving-that is to say, as healthy-as the local governments will be. VII The social absorption of the revolutionary upheaval has not been completed at the same time in all the Spanish American republics. It will be slower or faster according to circumstances and peoples, but it most certainly is going ahead. There are many cases of cities and towns in which outstanding neighbors have taken the lead for reform parties and civic movements for good local government, but the extraordinary feature of this ren- aissance of the old spirit of capability, experience, and dedica- tion in local government, may be found in the fact that they have the conscious and intelligent support of large groups of neighbors organized to this effect. This is a positive advantage over the colonial municipality in which the chosen elite ruled without the people as a whole participating in local government. A tree is as healthy as its roots, deeply penetrating the rich and well- watered soil. Local governments, covering the territory of a given nation, make the roots of the national government, and the latter will be as respectable, useful, and deserving-that is to say, as healthy-as the local governments will be. VII The social absorption of the revolutionary upheaval has not been completed at the same time in all the Spanish American republics. It will be slower or faster according to circumstances and peoples, but it most certainly is going ahead. There are many cases of cities and towns in which outstanding neighbors have taken the lead for reform parties and civic movements for good local government, but the extraordinary feature of this ren- aissance of the old spirit of capability, experience, and dedica- tion in local government, may be found in the fact that they have the conscious and intelligent support of large groups of neighbors organized to this effect. This is a positive advantage over the colonial municipality in which the chosen elite ruled without the people as a whole participating in local government. A tree is as healthy as its roots, deeply penetrating the rich and well- watered soil. Local governments, covering the territory of a given nation, make the roots of the national government, and the latter will be as respectable, useful, and deserving-that is to say, as healthy-as the local governments will be.  George I. Blanksten: PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN TWO REMARKS I HAVE RECENTLY HEARD, one by a very learned gentleman and the other by quite the reverse, have inspired me to start this paper by attempting to kill two birds with one stone. The learned observation ran to the effect that scholarly papers are generally presented by two types of fools- those who begin with definitions, and those who begin without them. The other remark-made in shockingly abysmal ignorance -held that the Spanish language is essentially English with an o at the end of each word. . The Municipio These observations suggest that I might at the outset attempt to define the municipio, the basic unit of government in the Caribbean area, thus identifying the category of fools with which I should properly be associated. I feel confident that the defini- tion will demonstrate that the municipio is certainly and emphat- ically not the United States municipality with an o at the end. Thus the two birds. Let me now turn to the stone. Where Spanish cultural and political forms predominate in the Caribbean area, the fundamental unit of local government, the municipio, is primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity, variously known throughout the area as a depart- 215 George I. Blanksten: PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN TWO REMARKS I HAVE RECENTLY HEARD, one by a very learned gentleman and the other by quite the reverse, have inspired me to start this paper by attempting to kill two birds with one stone. The learned observation ran to the effect that scholarly papers are generally presented by two types of fools- those who begin with definitions, and those who begin without them. The other remark-made in shockingly abysmal ignorance -held that the Spanish language is essentially English with an o at the end of each word. I. The Municipio These observations suggest that I might at the outset attempt to define the municipio, the basic unit of government in the Caribbean area, thus identifying the category of fools with which I should properly be associated. I feel confident that the defini- tion will demonstrate that the municipio is certainly and emphat- ically not the United States municipality with an o at the end. Thus the two birds. Let me now turn to the stone. Where Spanish cultural and political forms predominate in the Caribbean area, the fundamental unit of local government, the municipio, is primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity, variously known throughout the area as a depart- 215 George I. Blanksten: PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN TWO REMARKS I HAVE RECENTLY HEARD, one by a very learned gentleman and the other by quite the reverse, have inspired me to start this paper by attempting to kill two birds with one stone. The learned observation ran to the effect that scholarly papers are generally presented by two types of fools- those who begin with definitions, and those who begin without them. The other remark-made in shockingly abysmal ignorance -held that the Spanish language is essentially English with an o at the end of each word. I. The Municipio These observations suggest that I might at the outset attempt to define the municipio, the basic unit of government in the Caribbean area, thus identifying the category of fools with which I should properly be associated. I feel confident that the defini- tion will demonstrate that the municipio is certainly and emphat- ically not the United States municipality with an o at the end. Thus the two birds. Let me now turn to the stone. Where Spanish cultural and political forms predominate in the Caribbean area, the fundamental unit of local government, the municipio, is primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity, variously known throughout the area as a depart- 215  216 The Caribbean ment or a province or-in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela- a state. It is difficult to compare the municipio meaningfully with anything familiar in United States experience. One might say this is something of a surveyor's term, represented by lines on a map and by little more; or, the municipio might be said to be roughly analogous to the United States county. The surveyor's analogy underestimates the constitutional position of the muni- cipio, which is overstated by the comparison with the county. Either of these bench marks, however, is far more accurate than the municipality as a guide to the nature of this unit of local government. Urban communities-corporate societies, even mu- nicipalities-may and do exist within municipios, to be sure; but my point for the moment is that this is neither central to their fundamental character nor true of most of the municipios of the area. In assessing some of the problems of local government in the Caribbean, it should be pointed out that, superimposed on indig- enous forms, three basic types of cultures have influenced the pattern of local politics and government in the area. One of these, of course, is Spanish, and this is the predominant cultural influence on patterns of local government throughout Central America, as well as in Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic; the second such cultural influence is French, operative in Haiti; and finally, the cultural influence of the United States upon matters of local politics in the Caribbean may be noted in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. I should like to examine briefly each of these three patterns with a view to their relationship to many of the problems of local government in the area. II. Spanish Influence It is an elementary proposition in political science that na- tional states may be internally organized in any one of three theoretically possible ways. The national or central government may have unlimited legal power over all territory within the state, in which case it is said that the organization is unitary; 216 The Caribbean ment or a province or-in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela- a state. It is difficult to compare the municipio meaningfully with anything familiar in United States experience. One might say this is something of a surveyor's term, represented by lines on a map and by little more; or, the municipio might be said to be roughly analogous to the United States county. The surveyor's analogy underestimates the constitutional position of the muni- cipio, which is overstated by the comparison with the county. Either of these bench marks, however, is far more accurate than the municipality as a guide to the nature of this unit of local government. Urban communities-corporate societies, even mu- nicipalities-may and do exist within municipios, to be sure; but my point for the moment is that this is neither central to their fundamental character nor true of most of the municipios of the area. In assessing some of the problems of local government in the Caribbean, it should be pointed out that, superimposed on indig- enous forms, three basic types of cultures have influenced the pattern of local politics and government in the area. One of these, of course, is Spanish, and this is the predominant cultural influence on patterns of local government throughout Central America, as well as in Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic; the second such cultural influence is French, operative in Haiti; and finally, the cultural influence of the United States upon matters of local politics in the Caribbean may be noted in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. I should like to examine briefly each of these three patterns with a view to their relationship to many of the problems of local government in the area. II. Spanish Influence It is an elementary proposition in political science that na- tional states may be internally organized in any one of three theoretically possible ways. The national or central government may have unlimited legal power over all territory within the state, in which case it is said that the organization is unitary; 216 The Caribbean ment or a province or-in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela- a state. It is difficult to compare the municipio meaningfully with anything familiar in United States experience. One might say this is something of a surveyor's term, represented by lines on a map and by little more; or, the municipio might be said to be roughly analogous to the United States county. The surveyor's analogy underestimates the constitutional position of the muni- cipio, which is overstated by the comparison with the county. Either of these bench marks, however, is far more accurate than the municipality as a guide to the nature of this unit of local government. Urban communities-corporate societies, even mu- nicipalities-may and do exist within municipios, to be sure; but my point for the moment is that this is neither central to their fundamental character nor true of most of the municipios of the area. In assessing some of the problems of local government in the Caribbean, it should be pointed out that, superimposed on indig- enous forms, three basic types of cultures have influenced the pattern of local politics and government in the area. One of these, of course, is Spanish, and this is the predominant cultural influence on patterns of local government throughout Central America, as well as in Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic; the second such cultural influence is French, operative in Haiti; and finally, the cultural influence of the United States upon matters of local politics in the Caribbean may be noted in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. I should like to examine briefly each of these three patterns with a view to their relationship to many of the problems of local government in the area. II. Spanish Influence It is an elementary proposition in political science that na- tional states may be internally organized in any one of three theoretically possible ways. The national or central government may have unlimited legal power over all territory within the state, in which case it is said that the organization is unitary;  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 217 political authority may be divided by the constitution between self-governing parts and the central whole, when the state is designated as federal; or legal power may inhere individually in a number of members loosely associated through a weak central organ, in which case the arrangement is called confederate. The nature of the choice among these alternatives exercises, of course, an appreciable influence upon the patterns and problems of local government. The Spanish tendency has been to lean heavily in the direction of the unitary as opposed to the federal and confederate arrange- ments. In the Caribbean area, this tendency is especially evident in Central America, in the Dominican Republic, and in Vene- zuela and Colombia. I have already suggested that the municipio is primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity. In the unitary states of the Caribbean, this latter entity is generally known as a department or province. This level of government has two basic characteristics of significance here. First, it is generally true of the unitary arrangement that the functions of the departments or provinces are primarily executive and admin- istrative rather than legislative or judicial, with the result that relatively little determination of major policies or resolution of significant conflicts of interests is performed on this level of government. Secondly, in the unitary state, the department or province itself operates essentially as the creature or agent of the national government, carrying out its instructions and serving its interests rather than those arising locally. National authorities thus virtually exercise the power of life and death over the departmental or provincial level of govern- ment. The functions performed here are determined in the national capital; the operation of departments and provinces is under constant national supervision; and the central power has the authority to change their number and boundaries as well as to redefine the functions they perform. I have pointed out that these functions are primarily executive and administrative in character. The chief executive officer of ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 217 political authority may be divided by the constitution between self-governing parts and the central whole, when the state is designated as federal; or legal power may inhere individually in a number of members loosely associated through a weak central organ, in which case the arrangement is called confederate. The nature of the choice among these alternatives exercises, of course, an appreciable influence upon the patterns and problems of local government. The Spanish tendency has been to lean heavily in the direction of the unitary as opposed to the federal and confederate arrange- ments. In the Caribbean area, this tendency is especially evident in Central America, in the Dominican Republic, and in Vene- zuela and Colombia. I have already suggested that the municipio is primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity. In the unitary states of the Caribbean, this latter entity is generally known as a department or province. This level of government has two basic characteristics of significance here. First, it is generally true of the unitary arrangement that the functions of the departments or provinces are primarily executive and admin- istrative rather than legislative or judicial, with the result that relatively little determination of major policies or resolution of significant conflicts of interests is performed on this level of government. Secondly, in the unitary state, the department or province itself operates essentially as the creature or agent of the national government, carrying out its instructions and serving its interests rather than those arising locally. National authorities thus virtually exercise the power of life and death over the departmental or provincial level of govern- ment. The functions performed here are determined in the national capital; the operation of departments and provinces is under constant national supervision; and the central power has the authority to change their number and boundaries as well as to redefine the functions they perform. I have pointed out that these functions are primarily executive and administrative in character. The chief executive officer of ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 217 political authority may be divided by the constitution between self-governing parts and the central whole, when the state is designated as federal; or legal power may inhere individually in a number of members loosely associated through a weak central organ, in which case the arrangement is called confederate. The nature of the choice among these alternatives exercises, of course, an appreciable influence upon the patterns and problems of local government. The Spanish tendency has been to lean heavily in the direction of the unitary as opposed to the federal and confederate arrange- ments. In the Caribbean area, this tendency is especially evident in Central America, in the Dominican Republic, and in Vene- zuela and Colombia. I have already suggested that the municipio is primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity. In the unitary states of the Caribbean, this latter entity is generally known as a department or province. This level of government has two basic characteristics of significance here. First, it is generally true of the unitary arrangement that the functions of the departments or provinces are primarily executive and admin- istrative rather than legislative or judicial, with the result that relatively little determination of major policies or resolution of significant conflicts of interests is performed on this level of government. Secondly, in the unitary state, the department or province itself operates essentially as the creature or agent of the national government, carrying out its instructions and serving its interests rather than those arising locally. National authorities thus virtually exercise the power of life and death over the departmental or provincial level of govern- ment. The functions performed here are determined in the national capital; the operation of departments and provinces is under constant national supervision; and the central power has the authority to change their number and boundaries as well as to redefine the functions they perform. I have pointed out that these functions are primarily executive and administrative in character. The chief executive officer of  218 The Caribbean the department or province is in most places called a governor. In some of the states in this group, he is appointed by the national authorities; in others, he is chosen by the local electorate. In either case, the governor serves national rather than local in- terests. His authority and instructions are nationally determined, and his position depends directly or indirectly on his ability to retain the confidence of the central authorities, who maintain liaison with him through a ministry or secretariat of internal government. Although the governors value is enhanced by a competent familiarity with and understanding of the peculiar problems of the department or province in which he functions, it is also true that the extent to which he might become identified with such local interests as might conflict with the national is the extent to which he weakens or undermines the unitary system. In some of the states of the area, the governor is assisted by a departmental or provincial assembly whose membership is in some cases elected and in others composed on an ex-officio basis of the officers of the several municipios in the department or province. The assembly, where it exists, does tend to represent local inter- ests. It is, however, a weak body in most places, with only minor legislative power, and is normally unable to advance such local projects as might differ with national policies. This, then, is the general context in which problems of local politics and government arise in those sections of the Caribbean area where the cultural influence on constitutional organization is primarily Spanish. In this connection, however, two states in this group-Venezuela and Colombia-merit a special word. At times in the past, Venezuela has experimented with federal as well as unitary forms. Today some terminology associated with federalism is retained in that country-for example, the inter- mediate level of government is occupied by what are called "states." In recent times-and especially since the revolution of 1948-government has been strongly centralized in Venezuela, with the pattern essentially unitary in nature despite the reten- tion of some federal terminology. 218 The Caribbean 218 The Caribbean the department or province is in most places called a governor. In some of the states in this group, he is appointed by the national authorities; in others, he is chosen by the local electorate. In either case, the governor serves national rather than local in- terests. His authority and instructions are nationally determined, and his position depends directly or indirectly on his ability to retain the confidence of the central authorities, who maintain liaison with him through a ministry or secretariat of internal government. Although the governor's value is enhanced by a competent familiarity with and understanding of the peculiar problems of the department or province in which he functions, it is also true that the extent to which he might become identified with such local interests as might conflict with the national is the extent to which he weakens or undermines the unitary system. In some of the states of the area, the governor is assisted by a departmental or provincial assembly whose membership is in some cases elected and in others composed on an ex-officio basis of the officers of the several municipios in the department or province. The assembly, where it exists, does tend to represent local inter- ests. It is, however, a weak body in most places, with only minor legislative power, and is normally unable to advance such local projects as might differ with national policies. This, then, is the general context in which problems of local politics and government arise in those sections of the Caribbean area where the cultural influence on constitutional organization is primarily Spanish. In this connection, however, two states in this group-Venezuela and Colombia-merit a special word. At times in the past, Venezuela has experimented with federal as well as unitary forms. Today some terminology associated with federalism is retained in that country-for example, the inter- mediate level of government is occupied by what are called "states." In recent times-and especially since the revolution of 1948-government has been strongly centralized in Venezuela, with the pattern essentially unitary in nature despite the reten- tion of some federal terminology. the department or province is in most places called a governor. In some of the states in this group, he is appointed by the national authorities; in others, he is chosen by the local electorate. In either case, the governor serves national rather than local in- terests. His authority and instructions are nationally determined, and his position depends directly or indirectly on his ability to retain the confidence of the central authorities, who maintain liaison with him through a ministry or secretariat of internal government. Although the governor's value is enhanced by a competent familiarity with and understanding of the peculiar problems of the department or province in which he functions, it is also true that the extent to which he might become identified with such local interests as might conflict with the national is the extent to which he weakens or undermines the unitary system. In some of the states of the area, the governor is assisted by a departmental or provincial assembly whose membership is in some cases elected and in others composed on an ex-officio basis of the officers of the several municipios in the department or province. The assembly, where it exists, does tend to represent local inter- ests. It is, however, a weak body in most places, with only minor legislative power, and is normally unable to advance such local projects as might differ with national policies. This, then, is the general context in which problems of local politics and government arise in those sections of the Caribbean area where the cultural influence on constitutional organization is primarily Spanish. In this connection, however, two states in this group-Venezuela and Colombia-merit a special word. At times in the past, Venezuela has experimented with federal as well as unitary forms. Today some terminology associated with federalism is retained in that country-for example, the inter- mediate level of government is occupied by what are called "states." In recent times-and especially since the revolution of 1948-government has been strongly centralized in Venezuela, with the pattern essentially unitary in nature despite the reten- tion of some federal terminology.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 219 The case of Colombia is almost the reverse. Here we have a technically unitary system, although there are many decentralized features normally associated with federalism. This reflects a historical context in which there developed a federal tradition upon which a unitary structure was later superimposed. In the half-century between 1830 and 1885, large powers were acquired by regional governmental units, and late in the 1850's the repub- lic became a federal union of several states. The unitary system was technically restored with the adoption of the Constitution of 1886, but the tradition of regional autonomy which had devel- oped in the fifty years preceding that date has not disappeared and remains an integral element of the Colombian system. With this exception, the basic pattern of that portion of the Caribbean area under predominantly Spanish constitutional influ- ence is unitary, in which not only the municipios but also the departments and provinces operate primarily as administrative subdivisions of larger units of government. I submit that this arrangement carries vast significance for the problems of local government in the states in this group. I shall return to these problems later. Meanwhile, we note a second-the French- cultural influence on local government in the Caribbean. III. French Influence The pattern of local government in Haiti reflects, of course, French forms and practices left largely as a part of the legacy of Colonial times. The department exists in Haiti, but is largely insignificant in terms of its relationship to local government. More crucial is the arrondissement, which serves as the principal unit of local administration. This unit of government has as its chief executive officer a prefect who is normally a military officer. Whether military or not, the prefect is appointed by the president of the republic and holds office during his pleasure. Responsible for the administration of local public services, the prefect issues the necessary decrees without the assistance of a legislative assem- bly. Within each arrondissement lie a number of communes, in ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 219 The case of Colombia is almost the reverse. Here we have a technically unitary system, although there are many decentralized features normally associated with federalism. This reflects a historical context in which there developed a federal tradition upon which a unitary structure was later superimposed. In the half-century between 1830 and 1885, large powers were acquired by regional governmental units, and late in the 1850's the repub- lic became a federal union of several states. The unitary system was technically restored with the adoption of the Constitution of 1886, but the tradition of regional autonomy which had devel- oped in the fifty years preceding that date has not disappeared and remains an integral element of the Colombian system. With this exception, the basic pattern of that portion of the Caribbean area under predominantly Spanish constitutional influ- ence is unitary, in which not only the municipios but also the departments and provinces operate primarily as administrative subdivisions of larger units of government. I submit that this arrangement carries vast significance for the problems of local government in the states in this group. I shall return to these problems later. Meanwhile, we note a second-the French- cultural influence on local government in the Caribbean. III. French Influence The pattern of local government in Haiti reflects, of course, French forms and practices left largely as a part of the legacy of Colonial times. The department exists in Haiti, but is largely insignificant in terms of its relationship to local government. More crucial is the arrondissement, which serves as the principal unit of local administration. This unit of government has as its chief executive officer a prefect who is normally a military officer. Whether military or not, the prefect is appointed by the president of the republic and holds office during his pleasure. Responsible for the administration of local public services, the prefect issues the necessary decrees without the assistance of a legislative assem- bly. Within each arrondissement lie a number of communes, in ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 219 The case of Colombia is almost the reverse. Here we have a technically unitary system, although there are many decentralized features normally associated with federalism. This reflects a historical context in which there developed a federal tradition upon which a unitary structure was later superimposed. In the half-century between 1830 and 1885, large powers were acquired by regional governmental units, and late in the 1850's the repub- lic became a federal union of several states. The unitary system was technically restored with the adoption of the Constitution of 1886, but the tradition of regional autonomy which had devel- oped in the fifty years preceding that date has not disappeared and remains an integral element of the Colombian system. With this exception, the basic pattern of that portion of the Caribbean area under predominantly Spanish constitutional influ- ence is unitary, in which not only the municipios but also the departments and provinces operate primarily as administrative subdivisions of larger units of government. I submit that this arrangement carries vast significance for the problems of local government in the states in this group. I shall return to these problems later. Meanwhile, we note a second-the French- cultural influence on local government in the Caribbean. III. French Influence The pattern of local government in Haiti reflects, of course, French forms and practices left largely as a part of the legacy of Colonial times. The department exists in Haiti, but is largely insignificant in terms of its relationship to local government. More crucial is the arrondissement, which serves as the principal unit of local administration. This unit of government has as its chief executive officer a prefect who is normally a military officer. Whether military or not, the prefect is appointed by the president of the republic and holds office during his pleasure. Responsible for the administration of local public services, the prefect issues the necessary decrees without the assistance of a legislative assem- bly. Within each arrondissement lie a number of communes, in  220 The Caribbean charge of magistrates who are also appointed. The Haitian com- mune is more analogous to the municipio than to the municipality of the United States. Elected councils exist in the Haitian com- munes; their powers are generally small. Although this Haitian pattern differs somewhat from that already discussed, it is probably true that the differences-largely in forms stressed and in terminology-are less significant than the similarities in the general Hispanic arrangement. The Haitian system is also unitary and strongly centralized, with local units of government exercising essentially small roles in the national life. In Haiti, as in the states dealt with above, this centralization carries a heavily controlling influence on problems of local govern- ment. This also merits examination, and I should like to turn to that business in a moment. Meanwhile, let us consider the third cultural influence-that of the United States-on local government in the Caribbean area. IV. United States Influence The influence of the United States on constitutional organi- zation in the area is in this context especially noteworthy in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. I do not mean to deny that this influence is substantial throughout Latin America. What I do mean to say is that I regard its relationship in the Caribbean area to local government as being especially significant in Mexico and in the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. "Poor Mexico," President Porfirio Diaz is said to have re- marked. "So far from God-so close to the United States!" Among the many influences the gringos have exerted-for better or for worse-in Mexico, I should like to single out one which I think relates particularly to local government in that country. This relates to the institution of federalism. This yanqui system was written by the Mexicans not only into their celebrated Con- stitution of 1857, but also into the redoubtable Revolutionary Constitution of 1917, now in force and determining the basic patterns of local government in the country. 220 The Caribbean charge of magistrates who are also appointed. The Haitian com- mune is more analogous to the municipio than to the municipality of the United States. Elected councils exist in the Haitian com- munes; their powers are generally small. Although this Haitian pattern differs somewhat from that already discussed, it is probably true that the differences-largely in forms stressed and in terminology-are less significant than the similarities in the general Hispanic arrangement. The Haitian system is also unitary and strongly centralized, with local units of government exercising essentially small roles in the national life. In Haiti, as in the states dealt with above, this centralization carries a heavily controlling influence on problems of local govern- ment. This also merits examination, and I should like to turn to that business in a moment. Meanwhile, let us consider the third cultural influence-that of the United States-on local government in the Caribbean area. IV. United States Influence The influence of the United States on constitutional organi- zation in the area is in this context especially noteworthy in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. I do not mean to deny that this influence is substantial throughout Latin America. What I do mean to say is that I regard its relationship in the Caribbean area to local government as being especially significant in Mexico and in the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. "Poor Mexico," President Porfirio Diaz is said to have re- marked. "So far from God-so close to the United States!" Among the many influences the gringos have exerted-for better or for worse-in Mexico, I should like to single out one which I think relates particularly to local government in that country. This relates to the institution of federalism. This yanqui system was written by the Mexicans not only into their celebrated Con- stitution of 1857, but also into the redoubtable Revolutionary Constitution of 1917, now in force and determining the basic patterns of local government in the country. 220 The Caribbean charge of magistrates who are also appointed. The Haitian com- mune is more analogous to the municipio than to the municipality of the United States. Elected councils exist in the Haitian com- munes; their powers are generally small. Although this Haitian pattern differs somewhat from that already discussed, it is probably true that the differences-largely in forms stressed and in terminology-are less significant than the similarities in the general Hispanic arrangement. The Haitian system is also unitary and strongly centralized, with local units of government exercising essentially small roles in the national life. In Haiti, as in the states dealt with above, this centralization carries a heavily controlling influence on problems of local govern- ment. This also merits examination, and I should like to turn to that business in a moment. Meanwhile, let us consider the third cultural influence-that of the United States-on local government in the Caribbean area. IV. United States Influence The influence of the United States on constitutional organi- zation in the area is in this context especially noteworthy in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. I do not mean to deny that this influence is substantial throughout Latin America. What I do mean to say is that I regard its relationship in the Caribbean area to local government as being especially significant in Mexico and in the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. "Poor Mexico," President Porfirio Diaz is said to have re- marked. "So far from God-so close to the United States!" Among the many influences the gringos have exerted-for better or for worse-in Mexico, I should like to single out one which I think relates particularly to local government in that country. This relates to the institution of federalism. This yanqui system was written by the Mexicans not only into their celebrated Con- stitution of 1857, but also into the redoubtable Revolutionary Constitution of 1917, now in force and determining the basic patterns of local government in the country.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 221 The resumption of the federal experiment in Mexico responds not only to United States cultural influences but also to the pro- found Mexican Revolution, which-launched in 1910-stands today as perhaps the most significant of the twentieth-century social movements of the Caribbean area. Decentralization of government emerged as one of the precepts of the Revolution, which encouraged a tendency for the various states and regions of the country to go separate ways in realizing revolutionary goals. It is thus a peculiarity of contemporary Mexico that emphases and interpretations of the Revolution differ from state to state and from region to region of the country, and that the order of priority in achieving revolutionary objectives has been rendered complex by decentralization. Few Mexicans will say that all elements of the social, economic, and ideological content of the Revolution are of equal urgency or importance; and the pattern of emphasis upon, and combination of, these elements varies considerably from region to region. In some areas, the land question receives first attention while other issues are submerged; in others, the problem of the Church comes first; in still others, the Indian question is a primary order of business. It should be stressed that regional and local autonomy on such basic issues is a matter of high significance in contemporary Mexico, and that an observer is likely to acquire a very different picture of revolu- tionary affairs in Mexico City than he would in Yucatan, Zaca- tecas, or Veracruz. Under Mexico's current federal arrangement, much of the authority to carry forward the Revolution falls to the various states. Thus land reform is, under the constitution, a matter for state governments; each state has the authority to make major decisions affecting the position of the Church; and the majority of Mexico's programs for the cultural salvation of the Indian are state programs entrusted to state governments. Thus the state level of government in Mexico lives a life of its own. This life is real and dynamic and plays a role of appre- ciable significance in the progress of politics and government. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 221 The resumption of the federal experiment in Mexico responds not only to United States cultural influences but also to the pro- found Mexican Revolution, which-launched in 1910-stands today as perhaps the most significant of the twentieth-century social movements of the Caribbean area. Decentralization of government emerged as one of the precepts of the Revolution, which encouraged a tendency for the various states and regions of the country to go separate ways in realizing revolutionary goals. It is thus a peculiarity of contemporary Mexico that emphases and interpretations of the Revolution differ from state to state and from region to region of the country, and that the order of priority in achieving revolutionary objectives has been rendered complex by decentralization. Few Mexicans will say that all elements of the social, economic, and ideological content of the Revolution are of equal urgency or importance; and the pattern of emphasis upon, and combination of, these elements varies considerably from region to region. In some areas, the land question receives first attention while other issues are submerged; in others, the problem of the Church comes first; in still others, the Indian question is a primary order of business. It should be stressed that regional and local autonomy on such basic issues is a matter of high significance in contemporary Mexico, and that an observer is likely to acquire a very different picture of revolu- tionary affairs in Mexico City than he would in Yucatdn, Zaca- tecas, or Veracruz. Under Mexico's current federal arrangement, much of the authority to carry forward the Revolution falls to the various states. Thus land reform is, under the constitution, a matter for state governments; each state has the authority to make major decisions affecting the position of the Church; and the majority of Mexico's programs for the cultural salvation of the Indian are state programs entrusted to state governments. Thus the state level of government in Mexico lives a life of its own. This life is real and dynamic and plays a role of appre- ciable significance in the progress of politics and government. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 221 The resumption of the federal experiment in Mexico responds not only to United States cultural influences but also to the pro- found Mexican Revolution, which-launched in 1910-stands today as perhaps the most significant of the twentieth-century social movements of the Caribbean area. Decentralization of government emerged as one of the precepts of the Revolution, which encouraged a tendency for the various states and regions of the country to go separate ways in realizing revolutionary goals. It is thus a peculiarity of contemporary Mexico that emphases and interpretations of the Revolution differ from state to state and from region to region of the country, and that the order of priority in achieving revolutionary objectives has been rendered complex by decentralization. Few Mexicans will say that all elements of the social, economic, and ideological content of the Revolution are of equal urgency or importance; and the pattern of emphasis upon, and combination of, these elements varies considerably from region to region. In some areas, the land question receives first attention while other issues are submerged; in others, the problem of the Church comes first; in still others, the Indian question is a primary order of business. It should he stressed that regional and local autonomy on such basic issues is a matter of high significance in contemporary Mexico, and that an observer is likely to acquire a very different picture of revolu- tionary affairs in Mexico City than he would in Yucatsn, Zaca- tecas, or Veracruz. Under Mexico's current federal arrangement, much of the authority to carry forward the Revolution falls to the various states. Thus land reform is, under the constitution, a matter for state governments; each state has the authority to make major decisions affecting the position of the Church; and the majority of Mexico's programs for the cultural salvation of the Indian are state programs entrusted to state governments. Thus the state level of government in Mexico lives a life of its own. This life is real and dynamic and plays a role of appre- ciable significance in the progress of politics and government.  222 The Caribbean State autonomy in Mexico carries substantial ramifications for the municipio level of government. In the Mexican-as in the United States-federal system, each state has the power to deter- mine the structure of local government within it. On this score, there is less variation in Mexico than in the United States. In the latter, some state legislatures determine a fairly rigid pattern for local government throughout the state; some extend different rules to different categories of local communities; and some offer measures of "home rule" to local units. In Mexico, however, the various states have adopted generally similar arrangements for local government. All provided for municipio presidents and councils, whose functions and responsibilities are essentially the same in all of the states. In only one state-Sinaloa-may local budgets be prepared on the municipio level. Thus, the influence of the United States upon local govern- ment in Mexico is reflected in large part through federal practices permitting the several states to exercise considerable autonomy with respect to local government within them. The states in the United States have developed a greater variety of approaches to this matter than have the Mexican states, but the basic picture is one of essential reflection by the latter of the former's cultural and constitutional influence upon them. Three points of significance for our purpose here should be made with respect to both Cuba and Puerto Rico. First, these islands remained under Spanish rule for a considerably longer period of time than the rest of the area. In the second place, both islands were geographically central to the seat of Spanish colonial power in the Western Hemisphere for some four cen- turies. An effect of this has been that, with Spanish civil and military power long heavily entrenched at Havana and San Juan, these large cities have not developed the degree of municipal autonomy to be found elsewhere in the Caribbean. Thus the striking imbalance between the large urban and the rural entities so characteristic of the area is not as major a problem of local politics and government in the cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 222 The Caribbean State autonomy in Mexico carries substantial ramifications for the municipio level of government. In the Mexican-as in the United States-federal system, each state has the power to deter- mine the structure of local government within it. On this score, there is less variation in Mexico than in the United States. In the latter, some state legislatures determine a fairly rigid pattern for local government throughout the state; some extend different rules to different categories of local communities; and some offer measures of "home rule" to local units. In Mexico, however, the various states have adopted generally similar arrangements for local government. All provided for municipio presidents and councils, whose functions and responsibilities are essentially the same in all of the states. In only one state-Sinaloa-may local budgets be prepared on the municipio level. Thus, the influence of the United States upon local govern- ment in Mexico is reflected in large part through federal practices permitting the several states to exercise considerable autonomy with respect to local government within them. The states in the United States have developed a greater variety of approaches to this matter than have the Mexican states, but the basic picture is one of essential reflection by the latter of the former's cultural and constitutional influence upon them. Three points of significance for our purpose here should be made with respect to both Cuba and Puerto Rico. First, these islands remained under Spanish rule for a considerably longer period of time than the rest of the area. In the second place, both islands were geographically central to the seat of Spanish colonial power in the Western Hemisphere for some four cen- turies. An effect of this has been that, with Spanish civil and military power long heavily entrenched at Havana and San Juan, these large cities have not developed the degree of municipal autonomy to be found elsewhere in the Caribbean. Thus the striking imbalance between the large urban and the rural entities so characteristic of the area is not as major a problem of local politics and government in the cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 222 The Caribbean State autonomy in Mexico carries substantial ramifications for the municipio level of government. In the Mexican-as in the United States-federal system, each state has the power to deter- mine the structure of local government within it. On this score, there is less variation in Mexico than in the United States. In the latter, some state legislatures determine a fairly rigid pattern for local government throughout the state; some extend different rules to different categories of local communities; and some offer measures of "home rule" to local units. In Mexico, however, the various states have adopted generally similar arrangements for local government. All provided for municipio presidents and councils, whose functions and responsibilities are essentially the same in all of the states. In only one state-Sinaloa-may local budgets be prepared on the municipio level. Thus, the influence of the United States upon local govern- ment in Mexico is reflected in large part through federal practices permitting the several states to exercise considerable autonomy with respect to local government within them. The states in the United States have developed a greater variety of approaches to this matter than have the Mexican states, but the basic picture is one of essential reflection by the latter of the former's cultural and constitutional influence upon them. Three points of significance for our purpose here should be made with respect to both Cuba and Puerto Rico. First, these islands remained under Spanish rule for a considerably longer period of time than the rest of the area. In the second place, both islands were geographically central to the seat of Spanish colonial power in the Western Hemisphere for some four cen- turies. An effect of this has been that, with Spanish civil and military power long heavily entrenched at Havana and San Juan, these large cities have not developed the degree of municipal autonomy to be found elsewhere in the Caribbean. Thus the striking imbalance between the large urban and the rural entities so characteristic of the area is not as major a problem of local politics and government in the cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 223 Finally, like Mexico, these islands have been in closer cultural and political contact with the United States than has most of the rest of the area. In the case of Cuba, the influence of this contact upon forms and structures of local government is not particularly obvious or direct. Both the unitary system and the pattern of local govern- ment operative in Cuba correspond primarily to the Spanish tradition rather than to any demonstrable influence of the United States. However, that influence has combined with the historic lack of autonomy on the part of Havana to produce a more bal- anced relationship between the capital and the rest of the island. Local government is but one of the sectors of Cuban life reflecting this circumstance. Although Cuba is both technically and funda- mentally a unitary state, the national government at Havana has acquiesced in a degree of autonomy for the other cities and for the rural areas which is quite striking. This condition exists on both the provincial and the community levels of government, relatively throughout the island, to an extent which is not only unusual in unitary arrangements but also atypical of the Carib- bean area as a whole. While these levels in Cuba do not possess home rule in the sense to be found in some of our own states, impressive local autonomy-effective outside Havana-is never- theless a noteworthy feature of the island republic's system. Turning to Puerto Rico, we have, of course, a situation in which the role of the United States is more direct. I think it eminently worthy of note that, despite the political status of Puerto Rico, the influence of the United States upon the forms and patterns of local government on the island has been essen- tially slight in the structural sense. The more balanced relation- ship between the capital and the rest of the island stems, as in the case of Cuba, more from the Spanish tradition than from the role of the United States. In Puerto Rico, the insular gov- ernment is in an essentially unitary relationship to the local levels, it is true; this, however, was neither introduced into, nor intensi- fied in, the island by the United States. Moreover, the forms of ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 223 Finally, like Mexico, these islands have been in closer cultural and political contact with the United States than has most of the rest of the area. In the case of Cuba, the influence of this contact upon forms and structures of local government is not particularly obvious or direct. Both the unitary system and the pattern of local govern- ment operative in Cuba correspond primarily to the Spanish tradition rather than to any demonstrable influence of the United States. However, that influence has combined with the historic lack of autonomy on the part of Havana to produce a more bal- anced relationship between the capital and the rest of the island. Local government is but one of the sectors of Cuban life reflecting this circumstance. Although Cuba is both technically and funda- mentally a unitary state, the national government at Havana has acquiesced in a degree of autonomy for the other cities and for the rural areas which is quite striking. This condition exists on both the provincial and the community levels of government, relatively throughout the island, to an extent which is not only unusual in unitary arrangements but also atypical of the Carib- bean area as a whole. While these levels in Cuba do not possess home rule in the sense to be found in some of our own states, impressive local autonomy-effective outside Havana-is never- theless a noteworthy feature of the island republic's system. Turning to Puerto Rico, we have, of course, a situation in which the role of the United States is more direct. I think it eminently worthy of note that, despite the political status of Puerto Rico, the influence of the United States upon the forms and patterns of local government on the island has been essen- tially slight in the structural sense. The more balanced relation- ship between the capital and the rest of the island stems, as in the case of Cuba, more from the Spanish tradition than from the role of the United States. In Puerto Rico, the insular gov- ernment is in an essentially unitary relationship to the local levels, it is true; this, however, was neither introduced into, nor intensi- fied in, the island by the United States. Moreover, the forms of ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 223 Finally, like Mexico, these islands have been in closer cultural and political contact with the United States than has most of the rest of the area. In the case of Cuba, the influence of this contact upon forms and structures of local government is not particularly obvious or direct. Both the unitary system and the pattern of local govern- ment operative in Cuba correspond primarily to the Spanish tradition rather than to any demonstrable influence of the United States. However, that influence has combined with the historic lack of autonomy on the part of Havana to produce a more bal- anced relationship between the capital and the rest of the island. Local government is but one of the sectors of Cuban life reflecting this circumstance. Although Cuba is both technically and funda- mentally a unitary state, the national government at Havana has acquiesced in a degree of autonomy for the other cities and for the rural areas which is quite striking. This condition exists on both the provincial and the community levels of government, relatively throughout the island, to an extent which is not only unusual in unitary arrangements but also atypical of the Carib- bean area as a whole. While these levels in Cuba do not possess home rule in the sense to be found in some of our own states, impressive local autonomy-effective outside Havana-is never- theless a noteworthy feature of the island republic's system. Turning to Puerto Rico, we have, of course, a situation in which the role of the United States is more direct. I think it eminently worthy of note that, despite the political status of Puerto Rico, the influence of the United States upon the forms and patterns of local government on the island has been essen- tially slight in the structural sense. The more balanced relation- ship between the capital and the rest of the island stems, as in the case of Cuba, more from the Spanish tradition than from the role of the United States. In Puerto Rico, the insular gov- ernment is in an essentially unitary relationship to the local levels, it is true; this, however, was neither introduced into, nor intensi- fied in, the island by the United States. Moreover, the forms of  224 The Caribbean local government are primarily Puerto Rican and Spanish rather than "North American" in nature. Two years ago, we were honored by the presence of Dona Felisa Rincdn de Gautier, the alcaldesa of San Juan, who attended the Fourth Annual Confer- ence on the Caribbean, held on this campus. We sometimes referred to her as the "city manager" of San Juan. We said this, not because we had brought to Puerto Rico the city-manager form of government to be found in many municipalities in this country, but rather because "city manager" was the closest term meaning- ful in the United States that we could apply to her position. We attempted through analogy to understand Doia Felisa's role in an essentially foreign system; we could not claim that even the city-manager arrangement followed the flag. I do not mean to be saying that the United States has had no influence whatsoever on local politics and government in Puerto Rico. This influence exists and is appreciable. What I do mean is that it must be sought elsewhere than in the comparison be- tween San Juan and other local communities on the island, in the unitary system, or in forms and structures of local government. Rather, the weight of the United States has been addressed direct- ly and primarily to the insular level of government in Puerto Rico. Here-corresponding to the national level elsewhere in the Caribbean-a remarkable degree of autonomy and self-govern- ment has developed during the course of Puerto Rico's association with the United States. This development has been of far-reach- ing significance for local politics and government on the island. I shall return to this point in a moment. V. Problem Areas In comparing the Spanish, French, and United States cultural influences in the Caribbean, I believe an important contrast emerges in the differing political roles they assign to local gov- ernment. In the Spanish pattern-and, as it operates in this area, in the French-this is an essentially weak political level performing minor functions. Where such matters as self-govern- 224 The Caribbean local government are primarily Puerto Rican and Spanish rather than "North American" in nature. Two years ago, we were honored by the presence of Dona Felisa Rincon de Gautier, the alcaldesa of San Juan, who attended the Fourth Annual Confer- ence on the Caribbean, held on this campus. We sometimes referred to her as the "city manager" of San Juan. We said this, not because we had brought to Puerto Rico the city-manager form of government to be found in many municipalities in this country, but rather because "city manager" was the closest term meaning- ful in the United States that we could apply to her position. We attempted through analogy to understand Dona Felisa's role in an essentially foreign system; we could not claim that even the city-manager arrangement followed the flag. I do not mean to be saying that the United States has had no influence whatsoever on local politics and government in Puerto Rico. This influence exists and is appreciable. What I do mean is that it must be sought elsewhere than in the comparison be- tween San Juan and other local communities on the island, in the unitary system, or in forms and structures of local government. Rather, the weight of the United States has been addressed direct- ly and primarily to the insular level of government in Puerto Rico. Here-corresponding to the national level elsewhere in the Caribbean-a remarkable degree of autonomy and self-govern- ment has developed during the course of Puerto Rico's association with the United States. This development has been of far-reach- ing significance for local politics and government on the island. I shall return to this point in a moment. V. Problem Areas In comparing the Spanish, French, and United States cultural influences in the Caribbean, I believe an important contrast emerges in the differing political roles they assign to local gov- ernment. In the Spanish pattern-and, as it operates in this area, in the French-this is an essentially weak political level performing minor functions. Where such matters as self-govern- 224 The Caribbean local government are primarily Puerto Rican and Spanish rather than "North American" in nature. Two years ago, we were honored by the presence of Doria Felisa Rincsn de Gautier, the alcaldesa of San Juan, who attended the Fourth Annual Confer- ence on the Caribbean, held on this campus. We sometimes referred to her as the "city manager" of San Juan. We said this, not because we had brought to Puerto Rico the city-manager form of government to be found in many municipalities in this country, but rather because "city manager" was the closest term meaning- ful in the United States that we could apply to her position. We attempted through analogy to understand Doia Felisa's role in an essentially foreign system; we could not claim that even the city-manager arrangement followed the flag. I do not mean to be saying that the United States has had no influence whatsoever on local politics and government in Puerto Rico. This influence exists and is appreciable. What I do mean is that it must be sought elsewhere than in the comparison be- tween San Juan and other local communities on the island, in the unitary system, or in forms and structures of local government. Rather, the weight of the United States has been addressed direct- ly and primarily to the insular level of government in Puerto Rico. Here-corresponding to the national level elsewhere in the Caribbean-a remarkable degree of autonomy and self-govern- ment has developed during the course of Puerto Rico's association with the United States. This development has been of far-reach- ing significance for local politics and government on the island. I shall return to this point in a moment. V. Problem Areas In comparing the Spanish, French, and United States cultural influences in the Caribbean, I believe an important contrast emerges in the differing political roles they assign to local gov- ernment. In the Spanish pattern-and, as it operates in this area, in the French-this is an essentially weak political level performing minor functions. Where such matters as self-govern-  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 225 ment and democracy are sought in the Caribbean, the local community is typically not the level of government on which these are particularly manifest. In the United States, on the other hand, we are accustomed to look to the "grass roots" and to local community politics as seedbeds of self-government; while our local governments are technically creatures of our states, local autonomy is impressive in this country and community politics contribute vitally to the peculiar form the democratic system has taken in the United States. While this country has certainly exercised an influence in the Caribbean-I have mentioned Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico as particularly illustrative of this-that influence has nowhere in the area gone so far as to transform the political role of local government. That role fol- lows essentially the patterns of other cultures. These affect local government in the Caribbean in three major senses. The first of these relates to the divergence between rural and urban munici- pios; the second, to the operation of the unitary system prevalent in the area; and the third, to political instability, to revolutions and coups, to dictators and caudillos. With respect to the first of these sets-the rural-urban diver- gence-I should like to remind you that I went to some lengths at the outset of this paper to sketch the basic nature of the municipio. I pointed out that it was primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity, and that the municipio is in a sense something of a surveyors term, sometimes represented by lines on a map and by little more. I said, further, that urban communities-corporate societies, even municipalities-may and do exist within municipios, but not in all or even in most of them. This circumstance underlies what, to my mind, is a basic distinc- tion between two types of municipios. One of these-let us call this type the urban municipio-contains a corporate society, a municipality, even a large metropolitan city. The other type-the rural municipio-contains no such urban community, its popula- tion being largely rural in culture and occupation. Although little constitutional distinction is made between these two types in ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 225 ment and democracy are sought in the Caribbean, the local community is typically not the level of government on which these are particularly manifest. In the United States, on the other hand, we are accustomed to look to the "grass roots" and to local community politics as seedbeds of self-government; while our local governments are technically creatures of our states, local autonomy is impressive in this country and community politics contribute vitally to the peculiar form the democratic system has taken in the United States. While this country has certainly exercised an influence in the Caribbean-I have mentioned Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico as particularly illustrative of this-that influence has nowhere in the area gone so far as to transform the political role of local government. That role fol- lows essentially the patterns of other cultures. These affect local government in the Caribbean in three major senses. The first of these relates to the divergence between rural and urban munici- pios; the second, to the operation of the unitary system prevalent in the area; and the third, to political instability, to revolutions and coups, to dictators and caudillos. With respect to the first of these sets-the rural-urban diver- gence-I should like to remind you that I went to some lengths at the outset of this paper to sketch the basic nature of the municipio. I pointed out that it was primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity, and that the municipio is in a sense something of a surveyors term, sometimes represented by lines on a map and by little more. I said, further, that urban communities-corporate societies, even municipalities-may and do exist within municipios, but not in all or even in most of them. This circumstance underlies what, to my mind, is a basic distinc- tion between two types of municipios. One of these-let us call this type the urban municipio-contains a corporate society, a municipality, even a large metropolitan city. The other type-the rural municipio-contains no such urban community, its popula- tion being largely rural in culture and occupation. Although little constitutional distinction is made between these two types in ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 225 ment and democracy are sought in the Caribbean, the local community is typically not the level of government on which these are particularly manifest. In the United States, on the other hand, we are accustomed to look to the "grass roots" and to local community politics as seedbeds of self-government; while our local governments are technically creatures of our states, local autonomy is impressive in this country and community politics contribute vitally to the peculiar form the democratic system has taken in the United States. While this country has certainly exercised an influence in the Caribbean-I have mentioned Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico as particularly illustrative of this-that influence has nowhere in the area gone so far as to transform the political role of local government. That role fol- lows essentially the patterns of other cultures. These affect local government in the Caribbean in three major senses. The first of these relates to the divergence between rural and urban munici- pios; the second, to the operation of the unitary system prevalent in the area; and the third, to political instability, to revolutions and coups, to dictators and caudillos. With respect to the first of these sets-the rural-urban diver- gence-I should like to remind you that I went to some lengths at the outset of this paper to sketch the basic nature of the municipio. I pointed out that it was primarily an administrative subdivision of a larger entity, and that the municipio is in a sense something of a surveyors term, sometimes represented by lines on a map and by little more. I said, further, that urban communities-corporate societies, even municipalities-may and do exist within municipios, but not in all or even in most of them. This circumstance underlies what, to my mind, is a basic distinc- tion between two types of municipios. One of these-let us call this type the urban municipio-contains a corporate society, a municipality, even a large metropolitan city. The other type-the rural municipio-contains no such urban community, its popula- tion being largely rural in culture and occupation. Although little constitutional distinction is made between these two types in  226 The Caribbean 226 The Caribbean 226 The Caribbean many of the states of the area, I submit that political life in the urban municipio is quite different from what is to be found in the rural, and the divergence between them constitutes a problem of first magnitude in local government in the Caribbean. Typically, the urban municipio enjoys far more local autonomy than does the rural. Indeed, the municipal autonomy of the urban center is frequently impressive. The roots of this condition are deeply embedded in the history of the Caribbean. In colonial days, the cities were the chief centers of political activity of the upper classes and, indeed, the only community levels upon which they-rather than the home government in Europe-could exer- cise power. The cabildos, or town councils, of the Colonial period thus became major centers of colonial politics. It is worth noting that, in some instances, the cabildos launched the movements resulting in national independence for some states of the area. Today, as we have seen, the unitary system, strongly centralizing in tendency, prevails in the Caribbean. This offsets, but does not destroy, the decentralizing effects of continued municipal au- tonomy enjoyed by the major cities. Thus the political position of the urban municipio is anomalous, cast in terms of a peculiar dualism. Caught in the cross fire of centralizing and decentraliz- ing tendencies, the urban municipio is, in a sense, the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde of Caribbean politics. This dualistic character of urban political life is curiously ambivalent. But nevertheless it is a political life, giving the large urban center-where political and economic power are normally located in conditions of con- centration-an effective voice in the progress of national politics and government. All this is in striking contrast to the typical situation of the rural municipio. The overwhelming majority of the municipios are of this type, and it is here that one is constrained to think of the municipio as a surveyor's term, as a place on a map largely devoid of political function and power, and lacking many of the rudimentary prerequisites of self-government. This is associated with a number of factors which are social, economic, and cul- many of the states of the area, I submit that political life in the urban municipio is quite different from what is to be found in the rural, and the divergence between them constitutes a problem of first magnitude in local government in the Caribbean. Typically, the urban municipio enjoys far more local autonomy than does the rural. Indeed, the municipal autonomy of the urban center is frequently impressive. The roots of this condition are deeply embedded in the history of the Caribbean. In colonial days, the cities were the chief centers of political activity of the upper classes and, indeed, the only community levels upon which they-rather than the home government in Europe-could exer- cise power. The cabildos, or town councils, of the Colonial period thus became major centers of colonial politics. It is worth noting that, in some instances, the cabildos launched the movements resulting in national independence for some states of the area. Today, as we have seen, the unitary system, strongly centralizing in tendency, prevails in the Caribbean. This offsets, but does not destroy, the decentralizing effects of continued municipal au- tonomy enjoyed by the major cities. Thus the political position of the urban municipio is anomalous, cast in terms of a peculiar dualism. Caught in the cross fire of centralizing and decentraliz- ing tendencies, the urban municipio is, in a sense, the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde of Caribbean politics. This dualistic character of urban political life is curiously ambivalent. But nevertheless it is a political life, giving the large urban center-where political and economic power are normally located in conditions of con- centration-an effective voice in the progress of national politics and government. All this is in striking contrast to the typical situation of the rural municipio. The overwhelming majority of the municipios are of this type, and it is here that one is constrained to think of the municipio as a surveyor's term, as a place on a map largely devoid of political function and power, and lacking many of the rudimentary prerequisites of self-government. This is associated with a number of factors which are social, economic, and cul- many of the states of the area, I submit that political life in the urban municipio is quite different from what is to be found in the rural, and the divergence between them constitutes a problem of first magnitude in local government in the Caribbean. Typically, the urban municipio enjoys far more local autonomy than does the rural. Indeed, the municipal autonomy of the urban center is frequently impressive. The roots of this condition are deeply embedded in the history of the Caribbean. In colonial days, the cities were the chief centers of political activity of the upper classes and, indeed, the only community levels upon which they-rather than the home government in Europe-could exer- cise power. The cabildos, or town councils, of the Colonial period thus became major centers of colonial politics. It is worth noting that, in some instances, the cabildos launched the movements resulting in national independence for some states of the area. Today, as we have seen, the unitary system, strongly centralizing in tendency, prevails in the Caribbean. This offsets, but does not destroy, the decentralizing effects of continued municipal au- tonomy enjoyed by the major cities. Thus the political position of the urban municipio is anomalous, cast in terms of a peculiar dualism. Caught in the cross fire of centralizing and decentraliz- ing tendencies, the urban municipio is, in a sense, the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde of Caribbean politics. This dualistic character of urban political life is curiously ambivalent. But nevertheless it is a political life, giving the large urban center-where political and economic power are normally located in conditions of con- centration-an effective voice in the progress of national politics and government. All this is in striking contrast to the typical situation of the rural municipio. The overwhelming majority of the municipios are of this type, and it is here that one is constrained to think of the municipio as a surveyor's term, as a place on a map largely devoid of political function and power, and lacking many of the rudimentary prerequisites of self-government. This is associated with a number of factors which are social, economic, and cul-  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 227 tural in nature. Socially, in terms of the class systems-rigid in much of the Caribbean-the lower classes tend, in the main, to be essentially rural dwellers. Lacking the prestigious positions and the opportunities for political expression enjoyed by the upper classes of the larger cities, the rural folk are typically not capable of placing the rural municipio in a situation even approaching political competition with the urban municipio. Further, eco- nomic as well as political power tends to concentrate in the urban rather than the rural units, and this division becomes further deepened as industrialization gets under way in the Caribbean. Culturally, much has been said and written about the prevalence in the area of such matters as illiteracy and traditional folk so- cieties. It needs only to be added that these phenomena are essentially typical of the rural rather than the urban municipios. Insofar as it can be said that Caribbean society is bicultural, the division between the two types of municipios becomes still more profound. This is especially true of those states of the area with large Indian populations, which are essentially rural rather than urban. In terms of political constitutions, the rural municipio is rela- tively insignificant in the sense that it exercises only minor func- tions and that self-government is hardly one of them. In cultural terms, however, the rural municipio rises to a curious signifi- cance, especially where illiteracy and folk cultures abound. Here the municipio is a species of social cement: in folk societies, it sets the style and color of dress, the manner of speech, the pat- tern of loyalties, the extent of community. For example, in Guatemala-a Caribbean state with a large Indian population- it is reported in a recent study that "the Indians of a municipio think of themselves as a distinct group of people, biologically and socially. Each municipio typically has its own costume, different from those of its neighbors, and this costume is a label wherever the Indians go. . . . Each municipio tends to have its own eco- nomic specialties, sometimes its own economic and social values, and even its own different standard of living. . . . All of the ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 227 tural in nature. Socially, in terms of the class systems-rigid in much of the Caribbean-the lower classes tend, in the main, to be essentially rural dwellers. Lacking the prestigious positions and the opportunities for political expression enjoyed by the upper classes of the larger cities, the rural folk are typically not capable of placing the rural municipio in a situation even approaching political competition with the urban municipio. Further, eco- nomic as well as political power tends to concentrate in the urban rather than the rural units, and this division becomes further deepened as industrialization gets under way in the Caribbean. Culturally, much has been said and written about the prevalence in the area of such matters as illiteracy and traditional folk so- cieties. It needs only to be added that these phenomena are essentially typical of the rural rather than the urban municipios. Insofar as it can be said that Caribbean society is bicultural, the division between the two types of municipios becomes still more profound. This is especially true of those states of the area with large Indian populations, which are essentially rural rather than urban, In terms of political constitutions, the rural municipio is rela- tively insignificant in the sense that it exercises only minor func- tions and that self-government is hardly one of them. In cultural terms, however, the rural municipio rises to a curious signifi- cance, especially where illiteracy and folk cultures abound. Here the municipio is a species of social cement: in folk societies, it sets the style and color of dress, the manner of speech, the pat- tern of loyalties, the extent of community. For example, in Guatemala-a Caribbean state with a large Indian population- it is reported in a recent study that "the Indians of a municipio think of themselves as a distinct group of people, biologically and socially. Each municipio typically has its own costume, different from those of its neighbors, and this costume is a label wherever the Indians go. . . . Each municipio tends to have its own eco- nomic specialties, sometimes its own economic and social values, and even its own different standard of living. . . . All of the ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 227 tural in nature. Socially, in terms of the class systems-rigid in much of the Caribbean-the lower classes tend, in the main, to be essentially rural dwellers. Lacking the prestigious positions and the opportunities for political expression enjoyed by the upper classes of the larger cities, the rural folk are typically not capable of placing the rural municipio in a situation even approaching political competition with the urban municipio. Further, eco- nomic as well as political power tends to concentrate in the urban rather than the rural units, and this division becomes further deepened as industrialization gets under way in the Caribbean. Culturally, much has been said and written about the prevalence in the area of such matters as illiteracy and traditional folk so- cieties. It needs only to be added that these phenomena are essentially typical of the rural rather than the urban municipios. Insofar as it can be said that Caribbean society is bicultural, the division between the two types of municipios becomes still more profound. This is especially true of those states of the area with large Indian populations, which are essentially rural rather than urban. In terms of political constitutions, the rural municipio is rela- tively insignificant in the sense that it exercises only minor func- tions and that self-government is hardly one of them. In cultural terms, however, the rural municipio rises to a curious signifi- cance, especially where illiteracy and folk cultures abound. Here the municipio is a species of social cement: in folk societies, it sets the style and color of dress, the manner of speech, the pat- tern of loyalties, the extent of community. For example, in Guatemala-a Caribbean state with a large Indian population- it is reported in a recent study that "the Indians of a municipio think of themselves as a distinct group of people, biologically and socially. Each municipio typically has its own costume, different from those of its neighbors, and this costume is a label wherever the Indians go. . . . Each municipio tends to have its own eco- nomic specialties, sometimes its own economic and social values, and even its own different standard of living. . . . All of the  228 The Caribbean 228 The Caribbean 228 The Caribbean Indians typical of one municipio are strictly part of that com- munity, wearing relatively the same costume, speaking the common dialect . . . participating in the politico-religious organ- ization, and having the common customs and beliefs."' Thus the rural municipio. In formal constitutional terms, it is allowed virtually no part in the political life of the Caribbean. In social and cultural terms, it is virtually the definition of com- munity itself. This brings me again to the influence of the unitary system on local government in the region. The effect of that arrange- ment differs as between urban and rural municipios. In the case of the former, especially the large city exercising an appreciable measure of municipal autonomy, the unitary system operates to offset excessive manifestations of that autonomy. Students of Latin American constitutional arrangements have pointed out that these are often anticipatory, normative, and corrective in character.' In the case of the urban municipio, it may be argued that unitary provisions are corrective in nature in the sense that they restrict or prohibit the municipal autonomy of the politically powerful large cities from running wild. These restrictions, typically, are never so great that they suppress the political life of the big city or deny it voice in the progress of national politics and government. In the case of the rural municipio, on the other hand, the restrictive force of the unitary system strikes an entity which, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons, possesses neither the effective political life nor the influence on national politics and government of the urban center. This condition finds expression in overwhelming problems of local government ' Quoted in K. H. Silvert, A Study in Government: Guatemala, Part I (New Orleans: Midtlte American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1954), p. 64. See, for example, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Constitutional Development in Latin America: A Synthesis," reprinted in Fitzgibbon, et at. (ed.), The Constitutions of the Americas, as of January 1, 1948 (University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 1-11. Indians typical of one municipio are strictly part of that com- munity, wearing relatively the same costume, speaking the common dialect . . . participating in the politico-religious organ- ization, and having the common customs and beliefs."' Thus the rural municipio. In formal constitutional terms, it is allowed virtually no part in the political life of the Caribbean. In social and cultural terms, it is virtually the definition of com- munity itself. This brings me again to the influence of the unitary system on local government in the region. The effect of that arrange- ment differs as between urban and rural municipios. In the case of the former, especially the large city exercising an appreciable measure of municipal autonomy, the unitary system operates to offset excessive manifestations of that autonomy. Students of Latin American constitutional arrangements have pointed out that these are often anticipatory, normative, and corrective in character.* In the case of the urban municipio, it may be argued that unitary provisions are corrective in nature in the sense that they restrict or prohibit the municipal autonomy of the politically powerful large cities from running wild. These restrictions, typically, are never so great that they suppress the political life of the big city or deny it voice in the progress of national politics and government. In the case of the rural municipio, on the other hand, the restrictive force of the unitary system strikes an entity which, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons, possesses neither the effective political life nor the influence on national politics and government of the urban center. This condition finds expression in overwhelming problems of local government ' Quoted in K. H. Silvert, A Study in Government: Guatemala, Part I (New Orleans: Midtle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1954), p. 64. See, for example, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Constitutional Development in Latin America: A Synthesis," reprinted in Fitzgibbon, et al. (ed.), The Constitutions of the Americas, as of January 1, 1948 (University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 1-11. Indians typical of one municipio are strictly part of that com- munity, wearing relatively the same costume, speaking the common dialect . . . participating in the politico-religious organ- ization, and having the common customs and beliefs."' Thus the rural municipio. In formal constitutional terms, it is allowed virtually no part in the political life of the Caribbean. In social and cultural terms, it is virtually the definition of com- munity itself. This brings me again to the influence of the unitary system on local government in the region. The effect of that arrange- ment differs as between urban and rural municipios. In the case of the former, especially the large city exercising an appreciable measure of municipal autonomy, the unitary system operates to offset excessive manifestations of that autonomy. Students of Latin American constitutional arrangements have pointed out that these are often anticipatory, normative, and corrective in character.' In the case of the urban municipio, it may be argued that unitary provisions are corrective in nature in the sense that they restrict or prohibit the municipal autonomy of the politically powerful large cities from running wild. These restrictions, typically, are never so great that they suppress the political life of the big city or deny it voice in the progress of national politics and government. In the case of the rural municipio, on the other hand, the restrictive force of the unitary system strikes an entity which, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons, possesses neither the effective political life nor the influence on national politics and government of the urban center. This condition finds expression in overwhelming problems of local government ' Quoted in K. H. Silvert, A Study in Government: Guatemala, Part I (New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1954),p.64. See, for example, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Constitutional Development in Latin America: A Synthesis," reprinted in Fitzgibbon, et al. (ed.), The Constitutions of the Americas, as of January 1, 1948 (University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 1-11.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 229 in the rural municipio. I have suggested that this entity is vir- tually the definition of the community of the rural folk. I think it also true that the municipio is the chief point of contact be- tween them and government. What is the nature of that contact in the rural municipio? Essentially, it is the mechanism for collecting taxes from the folk communities, for sending their members to prison when they have gotten into trouble, and for providing recruits for the military conscription officer. Beyond these, the contacts of the residents of the rural municipio with organized government-especially in the states with substantial Indian populations-are rare indeed. Let me turn again to an illustration drawn from Guatemalan experience: "To the aver- age Indian, even when elected to office, the national government is extremely remote and has a nebulous, almost mythical, appear- ance. He has very little, if any, direct contact with the gov- ernment . . . I should like to make it clear that I do not wish to damn or to bury the unitary system. Self-government and democracy are neither impossible within a unitary framework nor inevitable in a federal arrangement. Evidences of what can be done along these lines within the unitary formula can he found in much of Western Europe. Moreover, in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico may well point the way toward the strengthening of self-govern- ment through the unitary system. So long as that system remains prevalent in the area-and I do not count myself a crusader for the abolition of this condition-it is fruitless to look to a grass- roots or essentially a community approach to solutions of prob- lems of local government. Given a centralized over-all system, those problems can only be met through central governments which are not only stable but also in the enjoyment of popular support and participation. In the United States, this would be the long way around; but in much of the Caribbean it is the shorter-and, in some cases, the only available-route. More- over, it can be done, as Puerto Rico is now demonstrating. With ' Quoted in Silvert, p. 62. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 229 in the rural municipio. I have suggested that this entity is vir- tually the definition of the community of the rural folk. I think it also true that the municipio is the chief point of contact be- tween them and government. What is the nature of that contact in the rural municipio? Essentially, it is the mechanism for collecting taxes from the folk communities, for sending their members to prison when they have gotten into trouble, and for providing recruits for the military conscription officer. Beyond these, the contacts of the residents of the rural municipio with organized government-especially in the states with substantial Indian populations-are rare indeed. Let me turn again to an illustration drawn from Guatemalan experience: "To the aver- age Indian, even when elected to office, the national government is extremely remote and has a nebulous, almost mythical, appear- ance. He has very little, if any, direct contact with the gov- ernment . . . I should like to make it clear that I do not wish to damn or to bury the unitary system. Self-government and democracy are neither impossible within a unitary framework nor inevitable in a federal arrangement. Evidences of what can be done along these lines within the unitary formula can be found in much of Western Europe. Moreover, in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico may well point the way toward the strengthening of self-govern- ment through the unitary system. So long as that system remains prevalent in the area-and I do not count myself a crusader for the abolition of this condition-it is fruitless to look to a grass- roots or essentially a community approach to solutions of prob- lems of local government. Given a centralized over-all system, those problems can only be met through central governments which are not only stable but also in the enjoyment of popular support and participation. In the United States, this would be the long way around; but in much of the Caribbean it is the shorter-and, in some cases, the only available-route. More- over, it can be done, as Puerto Rico is now demonstrating. With ' Quoted in Silvert, p. 62. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 229 in the rural municipio. I have suggested that this entity is vir- tually the definition of the community of the rural folk. I think it also true that the municipio is the chief point of contact be- tween them and government. What is the nature of that contact in the rural municipio? Essentially, it is the mechanism for collecting taxes from the folk communities, for sending their members to prison when they have gotten into trouble, and for providing recruits for the military conscription officer. Beyond these, the contacts of the residents of the rural municipio with organized government-especially in the states with substantial Indian populations--are rare indeed. Let me turn again to an illustration drawn from Guatemalan experience: "To the aver- age Indian, even when elected to office, the national government is extremely remote and has a nebulous, almost mythical, appear- ance. He has very little, if any, direct contact with the gov- ernment . . ."9 I should like to make it clear that I do not wish to damn or to bury the unitary system. Self-government and democracy are neither impossible within a unitary framework nor inevitable in a federal arrangement. Evidences of what can be done along these lines within the unitary formula can be found in much of Western Europe. Moreover, in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico may well point the way toward the strengthening of self-govern- ment through the unitary system. So long as that system remains prevalent in the area-and I do not count myself a crusader for the abolition of this condition-it is fruitless to look to a grass- roots or essentially a community approach to solutions of prob- lems of local government. Given a centralized over-all system, those problems can only be met through central governments which are not only stable but also in the enjoyment of popular support and participation. In the United States, this would he the long way around; but in much of the Caribbean it is the shorter-and, in some cases, the only available-route. More- over, it can be done, as Puerto Rico is now demonstrating. With " Quoted in Silvert, p. 62.  230 The Caribbean 230 The Caribbean 230 The Caribbean a dynamic, stable, and popular government at the insular level, the unitary system may well be the most effective bridge over which the ingredients of strengthened, revitalized, and effective local government might travel. I believe this to be true of Puerto Rico today. It is not impossible elsewhere in the Caribbean. Finally, there is the matter of political instability: revolts and revolutions; military coups, dictators, and caudillos. It is obvious that these manifestations of the political instability of the region leave their marks on the local as well as other levels of government. When a revolution seizes a republic, it grips also the municipio; dictators and caudillos tend to retard steps toward self-government in the urban and rural communities as well as they do in national political affairs. I have already suggested that in the Caribbean the unitary system can be the most ef- fective bridge over which these steps can be taken. Chronic political instability at the national level obstructs the construc- tion of this bridge to the local level. In the United States, we could-and, to a large extent, did- build it from the side of the grass roots. In the Caribbean, many problems of local government-in a sense central problems of self-government and democracy-must depend on traffic moving along the bridge from the national level. Someone has said that he understood everything about building a bridge except how to get it to the other side. If this implies that he had the founda- tion well established on the first side, his problem was consider- ably simpler than that still facing the bulk of the states of the Caribbean area. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Christensen, Asher N. (ed.). The Evolution of Latin American Govern- ment: A Book of Readings. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Escuela de Administraci6n Piblica. La nueva constitucion de Puerto Rico. San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954. Fitzgibbon, Russell H., ot at. (eds.). The Constitutions of the Americas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. a dynamic, stable, and popular government at the insular level, the unitary system may well be the most effective bridge over which the ingredients of strengthened, revitalized, and effective local government might travel. I believe this to be true of Puerto Rico today. It is not impossible elsewhere in the Caribbean. Finally, there is the matter of political instability: revolts and revolutions; military coups, dictators, and caudillos. It is obvious that these manifestations of the political instability of the region leave their marks on the local as well as other levels of government. When a revolution seizes a republic, it grips also the municipio; dictators and caudillos tend to retard steps toward self-government in the urban and rural communities as well as they do in national political affairs. I have already suggested that in the Caribbean the unitary system can be the most ef- fective bridge over which these steps can be taken. Chronic political instability at the national level obstructs the construc- tion of this bridge to the local level. In the United States, we could-and, to a large extent, did- build it from the side of the grass roots. In the Caribbean, many problems of local government-in a sense central problems of self-government and democracy-must depend on traffic moving along the bridge from the national level. Someone has said that he understood everything about building a bridge except how to get it to the other side. If this implies that he had the founda- tion well established on the first side, his problem was consider- ably simpler than that still facing the bulk of the states of the Caribbean area. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Christensen, Asher N. (ed.). The Evolution of Latin American Govern- ment: A Book of Readings. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Escuela de Administracion Pdblica. La nueva constitucion de Puerto Rico. San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954. Fitzgibbon, Russell H., et al. (eds.). The Constitutions of the Americas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. a dynamic, stable, and popular government at the insular level, the unitary system may well be the most effective bridge over which the ingredients of strengthened, revitalized, and effective local government might travel. I believe this to be true of Puerto Rico today. It is not impossible elsewhere in the Caribbean. Finally, there is the matter of political instability: revolts and revolutions; military coups, dictators, and caudillos. It is obvious that these manifestations of the political instability of the region leave their marks on the local as well as other levels of government. When a revolution seizes a republic, it grips also the municipio; dictators and caudillos tend to retard steps toward self-government in the urban and rural communities as well as they do in national political affairs. I have already suggested that in the Caribbean the unitary system can be the most ef- fective bridge over which these steps can be taken. Chronic political instability at the national level obstructs the construc- tion of this bridge to the local level. In the United States, we could-and, to a large extent, did- build it from the side of the grass roots. In the Caribbean, many problems of local government-in a sense central problems of self-government and democracy-must depend on traffic moving along the bridge from the national level. Someone has said that he understood everything about building a bridge except how to get it to the other side. If this implies that he had the founda- tion well established on the first side, his problem was consider- ably simpler than that still facing the bulk of the states of the Caribbean area. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Christensen, Asher N. (ed.). The Evolution of Latin American Govern- ment: A Book of Readings. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Escuela de Administracion Pdblica. La nueva constitucion de Puerto Rico. San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954. Fitzgibbon, Russell H., et al. (eds.). The Constitutions of the Americas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 231 jorrio, Migoel. Governments of Latin Amerita. New Tork: D. Van Nosrand Comopany, Inc., 1950. Petrollo, Vinceozo. Puerto Rican Paradox. Philadelphia: Uoiveroity of Pennsylvania Pross, 1947. Riofrdo Villag6mezo, Edoardo. Gobieroo y finanzas muicipales. Qoito: Imoprenta Muicdipal, 1045. Silvert, K. H. A Study io Goverooment: Guotemaola. Porl I. New Or- leans: Middlo Amorioan Research Itoluol, Tulane Unoiversity, 1054. Stokes, Willioao S. Hdonduras: Aon Areo Study io Goveooooeot. Madison: Univeriy of WionsoinPress, 1000. Violich, Franois. Ciie of Lotin Aooorioo. Now York: Reiohold Pob- liohiog Corporotion, 1944. Wello, Hoooy. "Idoology ood Loodership in Poorto Riooo Politios," Americon Politicol Science Reoview, XLIX, 1 (Maroh, 1955), 22-39. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 231 joroin, Migool. Gooveoomeoto of Lotin Amorica. New York: D. Vao Nostand Comopany, Ioo., 1953. Potoollo, Vioooooo. Poerlo Ricoo Poradoo. Philadelphia: University of Peoooyloooio Pooss, 1047. Riofolo Viloagmoz, Edoordo. Gobiemo y foooooos ooooolipoleo. Quio: Imopreota Mooioipol, 1945. Silveri, K. H. A Study inGoverment: Gouatemala. PartlL NowoOr- leons: Middlo Aomoriooo Roooarch Inostut, Tolooo Univeosity, 1954. Stokoo, Willioam S. Honduras: Ao Mreo Stody io Goverooeo. Madisoo: Uoiveosity of Wisoooin Press, 1950. Violioh, Foroocio. Cities of Lollio Amoerico. New Took: Reiohold Pob- loshiog Corporotioo, 1944. Wello, Henroy. "Idoology ood Leodership in Poooto Ricoo Polltic," Aooeian Poliol Scieooe Review,, XLIX, 1 (March, 1955), 22-39. ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 231 jorrin, Migool. Gooeoomeoto of Lotio Amoeoico. Noe, Yorko D. Vano Noooand Comopaoy, Ioo., 1953. Poloollo, Vioooooo. Poeoto Riooo Pooodoo. Philodolphoia: Uoioeroity of Peoosylvooia Prooo, 1947. Riofrlo Vllogimeo, Edoaodo. Goierooo y finanzas omunicipaleo. Quito: Iooproolo Mooioipol, 1045. Siloooo, K. H. A Study 10 Gooooooent: Guaola~. Poot I. Now Or- leans: Middlo Aomeriooo Reoooooh Ioosiouo, Tolaoo Uoiooroity, 1054. Stokoo, Willioam S. Hoduraso: Ao Aoeo Stody io Goovooomen. Modion: Uoivoooity ofWionoon0Preoo, 1950. Violloh, Francis. Ciio of Latin Aooeoico. Now Yook: Roiohold Fob- liosoiog Corporatioo, 1944. Wollo, Hoooy. "Ideology ood Leodorship io Poorto Rioan Poltic," Ameroiooo Politicol Science Reoview, XLIX, 1 (Moogh, 1955), 22-39.  15 15 Jose A. Baquero: MAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION has a wide range, not only from the regional point of view, but from the subject as well. In order to be able to concentrate somewhat on the wide theme of "Public Administration," this paper deals mostly with current features of outstanding character in selected Caribbean countries and with the main trends which the governments must emphasize in their programs to solve their most important prob- lems in public administration. Before discussing specific problems, however, some general considerations are necessary as a background. The Caribbean countries under study were originally all Span- ish colonies. Public administration in those colonies was shaped, with very few exceptions, after the model of Spain. Although this European country reached a high degree of development in culture, art, and thought, practical aspects of state organization -and particularly public administration-were never too highly developed. One must wonder how Spain succeeded, in spite of poor management and physical difficulties, to keep together and to shape after her own image such a vast territory of the New World. 232 Jos A. Baquero: MAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION has a wide range, not only from the regional point of view, but from the subject as well. In order to be able to concentrate somewhat on the wide theme of "Public Administration," this paper deals mostly with current features of outstanding character in selected Caribbean countries and with the main trends which the governments must emphasize in their programs to solve their most important prob- lems in public administration. Before discussing specific problems, however, some general considerations are necessary as a background. The Caribbean countries under study were originally all Span- ish colonies. Public administration in those colonies was shaped, with very few exceptions, after the model of Spain. Although this European country reached a high degree of development in culture, art, and thought, practical aspects of state organization -and particularly public administration-were never too highly developed. One must wonder how Spain succeeded, in spite of poor management and physical difficulties, to keep together and to shape after her own image such a vast territory of the New World. 232 Jose A. Baquero: MAIN TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION has a wide range, not only from the regional point of view, but from the subject as well. In order to be able to concentrate somewhat on the wide theme of "Public Administration," this paper deals mostly with current features of outstanding character in selected Caribbean countries and with the main trends which the governments must emphasize in their programs to solve their most important prob- lems in public administration. Before discussing specific problems, however, some general considerations are necessary as a background. The Caribbean countries under study were originally all Span- ish colonies. Public administration in those colonies was shaped, with very few exceptions, after the model of Spain. Although this European country reached a high degree of development in culture, art, and thought, practical aspects of state organization -and particularly public administration-were never too highly developed. One must wonder how Spain succeeded, in spite of poor management and physical difficulties, to keep together and to shape after her own image such a vast territory of the New World. 232  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 233 Perhaps the strongest institution brought over from Iberia to America was the Municipality as an independent and powerful social unit within the State. Municipal autonomy has had such a tremendous influence in the development of Latin America, and certainly of the Caribbean countries, that even nowadays, when public law tends towards a stronger centralization of gov- ernment power, the mere suggestion that the Municipalities should yield some of their autonomy in favor of a more central- ized power is a touchy subject. This fact has been the major cause for the lack of sufficient authority on the part of central governments, for the regional jealousies and petty fights of local chieftains, and for the waste of efforts due to the dispersion of public funds. Another important feature of a general character, also in- herited from Spain, has been the reliance on a man, or on the man in power, more than on the republican institutions them- selves. The prestige of the Spanish conquerors and the urge to emulate them is perhaps one of the fundamental reasons for the existence of caudillos in our day. A consequence thereof is the lack of proper political parties which are responsible to the na- tion for their policies and for the men in power, or which are powerful enough to maintain a healthy opposition. Most of the isms still prevalent in the Caribbean countries have their roots in the strong men of each of them. When a strong man dies or is ousted from power, the Caribbean countries are not prepared to have a normal change of authority; they have to go through a difficult period of adaptation which is very trying. Hence, public administration in certain Caribbean countries has followed sim- ply the whims or the interests of political leaders; there has been no proper public administration policy as such. A natural consequence of the above has been the fact that public administration in certain Caribbean countries constituted, and may still constitute, just an instrument in the hands of politicians-an instrument which they may change and use at will. Thus, public servants are appointed or removed according ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 233 Perhaps the strongest institution brought over from Iberia to America was the Municipality as an independent and powerful social unit within the State. Municipal autonomy has had such a tremendous influence in the development of Latin America, and certainly of the Caribbean countries, that even nowadays, when public law tends towards a stronger centralization of gov- ernment power, the mere suggestion that the Municipalities should yield some of their autonomy in favor of a more central- ized power is a touchy subject. This fact has been the major cause for the lack of sufficient authority on the part of central governments, for the regional jealousies and petty fights of local chieftains, and for the waste of efforts due to the dispersion of public funds. Another important feature of a general character, also in- herited from Spain, has been the reliance on a man, or on the man in power, more than on the republican institutions them- selves. The prestige of the Spanish conquerors and the urge to emulate them is perhaps one of the fundamental reasons for the existence of caudillos in our day. A consequence thereof is the lack of proper political parties which are responsible to the na- tion for their policies and for the men in power, or which are powerful enough to maintain a healthy opposition. Most of the isms still prevalent in the Caribbean countries have their roots in the strong men of each of them. When a strong man dies or is ousted from power, the Caribbean countries are not prepared to have a normal change of authority; they have to go through a difficult period of adaptation which is very trying. Hence, public administration in certain Caribbean countries has followed sim- ply the whims or the interests of political leaders; there has been no proper public administration policy as such. A natural consequence of the above has been the fact that public administration in certain Caribbean countries constituted, and may still constitute, just an instrument in the hands of politicians-an instrument which they may change and use at will. Thus, public servants are appointed or removed according ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 233 Perhaps the strongest institution brought over from Iberia to America was the Municipality as an independent and powerful social unit within the State. Municipal autonomy has had such a tremendous influence in the development of Latin America, and certainly of the Caribbean countries, that even nowadays, when public law tends towards a stronger centralization of gov- ernment power, the mere suggestion that the Municipalities should yield some of their autonomy in favor of a more central- ized power is a touchy subject. This fact has been the major cause for the lack of sufficient authority on the part of central governments, for the regional jealousies and petty fights of local chieftains, and for the waste of efforts due to the dispersion of public funds. Another important feature of a general character, also in- herited from Spain, has been the reliance on a man, or on the man in power, more than on the republican institutions them- selves. The prestige of the Spanish conquerors and the urge to emulate them is perhaps one of the fundamental reasons for the existence of caudillos in our day. A consequence thereof is the lack of proper political parties which are responsible to the na- tion for their policies and for the men in power, or which are powerful enough to maintain a healthy opposition. Most of the isms still prevalent in the Caribbean countries have their roots in the strong men of each of them. When a strong man dies or is ousted from power, the Caribbean countries are not prepared to have a normal change of authority; they have to go through a difficult period of adaptation which is very trying. Hence, public administration in certain Caribbean countries has followed sim- ply the whims or the interests of political leaders; there has been no proper public administration policy as such. A natural consequence of the above has been the fact that public administration in certain Caribbean countries constituted, and may still constitute, just an instrument in the hands of politicians-an instrument which they may change and use at will. Thus, public servants are appointed or removed according  234 The Caribbean to the wishes or conveniences of the day. Hence, waste, corrup- tion, and improvization must necessarily appear wherever no fixed and respected policies are applied, and no public adminis- tration as such can be discussed. II Central America and the island countries of the Caribbean have been particularly affected by caudillos and faction politics. Nobody can deny, of course, that a few strong men have brought certain advantages to their countries, such as a stable govern- ment, the solution of some difficult economic and social problems, a responsibility in international relations, and so on; but it is also true that some of these strong men have brought only misery and depression to their peoples while they and their favorites enjoyed astounding excesses of wealth. During the past few years some Central American countries have shaken off their caudillos and have started an earnest move towards democracy and decent government. Guatemala, for in- stance-which unfortunately fell prey to international agitation and communism for ten years-after ousting its dictator is emerg- ing as an example of what clean politics can do for a country. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, in the short time he has been in power after a bloody war and in the face of tremendous problems which were left to him by the "reds," has proven an honest and efficient administrator and is putting his country back on its feet, using its own means. His respect for labor and the peasants, his measures in favor of education, and his love for order and efficiency in public service, have already rendered good results for his country. El Salvador is another example of what an honest govern- ment can do. This small country-in fact, the smallest country of Central America-is one of the richest, with the highest stand- ard of living among them. Good management and honest ad- ministration have existed in El Salvador for some years and have helped the country to be an outstanding example of prosperity. 234 The Caribbean to the wishes or conveniences of the day. Hence, waste, corrup- tion, and improvization must necessarily appear wherever no fixed and respected policies are applied, and no public adminis- tration as such can be discussed. II Central America and the island countries of the Caribbean have been particularly affected by caudillos and faction politics. Nobody can deny, of course, that a few strong men have brought certain advantages to their countries, such as a stable govern- ment, the solution of some difficult economic and social problems, a responsibility in international relations, and so on; but it is also true that some of these strong men have brought only misery and depression to their peoples while they and their favorites enjoyed astounding excesses of wealth. During the past few years some Central American countries have shaken off their caudillos and have started an earnest move towards democracy and decent government. Guatemala, for in- stance-which unfortunately fell prey to international agitation and communism for ten years-after ousting its dictator is emerg- ing as an example of what clean politics can do for a country. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, in the short time he has been in power after a bloody war and in the face of tremendous problems which were left to him by the "reds," has proven an honest and efficient administrator and is putting his country back on its feet, using its own means. His respect for labor and the peasants, his measures in favor of education, and his love for order and efficiency in public service, have already rendered good results for his country. El Salvador is another example of what an honest govern- ment can do. This small country-in fact, the smallest country of Central America-is one of the richest, with the highest stand- ard of living among them. Good management and honest ad- ministration have existed in El Salvador for some years and have helped the country to be an outstanding example of prosperity. 234 The Caribbean to the wishes or conveniences of the day. Hence, waste, corrup- tion, and improvization must necessarily appear wherever no fixed and respected policies are applied, and no public adminis- tration as such can be discussed. II Central America and the island countries of the Caribbean have been particularly affected by caudillos and faction politics. Nobody can deny, of course, that a few strong men have brought certain advantages to their countries, such as a stable govern- ment, the solution of some difficult economic and social problems, a responsibility in international relations, and so on; but it is also true that some of these strong men have brought only misery and depression to their peoples while they and their favorites enjoyed astounding excesses of wealth. During the past few years some Central American countries have shaken off their caudillos and have started an earnest move towards democracy and decent government. Guatemala, for in- stance-which unfortunately fell prey to international agitation and communism for ten years-after ousting its dictator is emerg- ing as an example of what clean politics can do for a country. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, in the short time he has been in power after a bloody war and in the face of tremendous problems which were left to him by the "reds," has proven an honest and efficient administrator and is putting his country back on its feet, using its own means. His respect for labor and the peasants, his measures in favor of education, and his love for order and efficiency in public service, have already rendered good results for his country. El Salvador is another example of what an honest govern- ment can do. This small country-in fact, the smallest country of Central America-is one of the richest, with the highest stand- ard of living among them. Good management and honest ad- ministration have existed in El Salvador for some years and have helped the country to be an outstanding example of prosperity.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 235 Costa Rica, in spite of internal revolts and uneasiness, has achieved a high degree of respectability among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When a few months ago this small coun- try was the victim of a belligerent neighbor, Costa Rica prided herself on having more teachers than soldiers. A bold program of education and economy by the current government is under way. Cuba, a typical land of the tropics, has weathered many a strong wind in politics, corruption, and bad management. Fortu- nately, after some years of experimenting with democratic life, the Cuban people are now more aware of the need to keep an eye on good public administration through a real budget and con- trol of government expenditures. Until a few years ago, Cuba was one of the few countries in the world which had not even the faintest or rudimental system of a real budget for its financial development, or the simplest office or organization for the control of public expenditures. Today, public administration has reached a higher degree of respectability, although much is still left to be done because political leaders still exercise a strong influence in public administration. After this brief account of how public administration stands in general in the Caribbean, we may now concentrate on certain main aspects of the problem prevailing in Colombia and on some other aspects of the matter prevailing in Mexico. III Colombia has been for a number of years an outstanding example of a peaceful and well-organized country. Colombia was at one time a living model of how democratic institutions, more than men, are the source of welfare and happiness to a country. Behind this appearance, however, political and ideological forces were struggling their way up for mastery at the expense of the democratic institutions prevailing in this great country. During the second administration of Alfonso Ldpez, these forces appeared on the surface and culminated with the division of the Liberal ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 235 Costa Rica, in spite of internal revolts and uneasiness, has achieved a high degree of respectability among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When a few months ago this small coun- try was the victim of a belligerent neighbor, Costa Rica prided herself on having more teachers than soldiers. A bold program of education and economy by the current government is under way. Cuba, a typical land of the tropics, has weathered many a strong wind in politics, corruption, and bad management. Fortu- nately, after some years of experimenting with democratic life, the Cuban people are now more aware of the need to keep an eye on good public administration through a real budget and con- trol of government expenditures. Until a few years ago, Cuba was one of the few countries in the world which had not even the faintest or rudimental system of a real budget for its financial development, or the simplest office or organization for the control of public expenditures. Today, public administration has reached a higher degree of respectability, although much is still left to be done because political leaders still exercise a strong influence in public administration. After this brief account of how public administration stands in general in the Caribbean, we may now concentrate on certain main aspects of the problem prevailing in Colombia and on some other aspects of the matter prevailing in Mexico. III Colombia has been for a number of years an outstanding example of a peaceful and well-organized country. Colombia was at one time a living model of how democratic institutions, more than men, are the source of welfare and happiness to a country. Behind this appearance, however, political and ideological forces were struggling their way up for mastery at the expense of the democratic institutions prevailing in this great country. During the second administration of Alfonso Lopez, these forces appeared on the surface and culminated with the division of the Liberal ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 235 Costa Rica, in spite of internal revolts and uneasiness, has achieved a high degree of respectability among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When a few months ago this small coun- try was the victim of a belligerent neighbor, Costa Rica prided herself on having more teachers than soldiers. A bold program of education and economy by the current government is under way. Cuba, a typical land of the tropics, has weathered many a strong wind in politics, corruption, and bad management. Fortu- nately, after some years of experimenting with democratic life, the Cuban people are now more aware of the need to keep an eye on good public administration through a real budget and con- trol of government expenditures. Until a few years ago, Cuba was one of the few countries in the world which had not even the faintest or rudimental system of a real budget for its financial development, or the simplest office or organization for the control of public expenditures. Today, public administration has reached a higher degree of respectability, although much is still left to be done because political leaders still exercise a strong influence in public administration. After this brief account of how public administration stands in general in the Caribbean, we may now concentrate on certain main aspects of the problem prevailing in Colombia and on some other aspects of the matter prevailing in Mexico. III Colombia has been for a number of years an outstanding example of a peaceful and well-organized country. Colombia was at one time a living model of how democratic institutions, more than men, are the source of welfare and happiness to a country. Behind this appearance, however, political and ideological forces were struggling their way up for mastery at the expense of the democratic institutions prevailing in this great country. During the second administration of Alfonso Lspez, these forces appeared on the surface and culminated with the division of the Liberal  236 The Caribbean 236 The Caribbean Party and the coming into power of the Conservative Party. Dur- ing the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogota, April 9th, 1948, a terrible outburst of violence, moti- vated by the assassination of the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitin, shook Colombia to her foundations and showed how much leftist and nihilist infiltration had corroded the very pillars of democracy in Colombia. From that time on, the struggle between the traditional parties-in the open-and the struggle for survival of democracy against totalitarian forces-behind the scenes-has replaced the usually pleasant development of Colom- bian public life. The main objective in current politics and public administra- tion in Colombia, one safely can assert, is the fight for the sur- vival of republican institutions against the infiltration of exotic ideas. Not always those who pretend to defend democracy are really on its side. Moreover, those who are attacked as totalitar- ians-blue or red-are not necessarily so. A state of confusion, prevalent not only in Colombia but the world over, hangs over the country and prevents clear-cut, specific measures to cope with the principal problems of public life. I should like to attempt, from an institutional point of view, to show what the outstanding features of our subject are in Colombia and what corrections are needed from a technical point of view. The Colombian constitution, like the constitutions of some other Latin American countries, is based upon the Montesquieu doctrine of division of power. This classical division has suffered, however, a deep change of concept in modern times, since the power of the State is considered unique and undivided and only the functions of that power are distributed among the several branches of the government. In Colombia, these branches are: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Their functions are separate and autonomous, but their aims are unique; hence, a close cooperation among these branches is prescribed in the constitution. Party and the coming into power of the Conservative Party. Dur- ing the Ninth International Conference of American States held in BogotA, April 9th, 1948, a terrible outburst of violence, moti- vated by the assassination of the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, shook Colombia to her foundations and showed how much leftist and nihilist infiltration had corroded the very pillars of democracy in Colombia. From that time on, the struggle between the traditional parties-in the open-and the struggle for survival of democracy against totalitarian forces-behind the scenes-has replaced the usually pleasant development of Colom- bian public life. The main objective in current politics and public administra- tion in Colombia, one safely can assert, is the fight for the sur- vival of republican institutions against the infiltration of exotic ideas. Not always those who pretend to defend democracy are really on its side. Moreover, those who are attacked as totalitar- ians--blue or red-are not necessarily so. A state of confusion, prevalent not only in Colombia but the world over, hangs over the country and prevents clear-cut, specific measures to cope with the principal problems of public life. I should like to attempt, from an institutional point of view, to show what the outstanding features of our subject are in Colombia and what corrections are needed from a technical point of view. The Colombian constitution, like the constitutions of some other Latin American countries, is based upon the Montesquieu doctrine of division of power. This classical division has suffered, however, a deep change of concept in modern times, since the power of the State is considered unique and undivided and only the functions of that power are distributed among the several branches of the government. In Colombia, these branches are: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Their functions are separate and autonomous, but their aims are unique; hence, a close cooperation among these branches is prescribed in the constitution. 236 The Caribbean Party and the coming into power of the Conservative Party. Dur- ing the Ninth International Conference of American States held in BogotA, April 9th, 1948, a terrible outburst of violence, moti- vated by the assassination of the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, shook Colombia to her foundations and showed how much leftist and nihilist infiltration had corroded the very pillars of democracy in Colombia. From that time on, the struggle between the traditional parties-in the open-and the struggle for survival of democracy against totalitarian forces-behind the scenes-has replaced the usually pleasant development of Colom- bian public life. The main objective in current politics and public administra- tion in Colombia, one safely can assert, is the fight for the sur- vival of republican institutions against the infiltration of exotic ideas. Not always those who pretend to defend democracy are really on its side. Moreover, those who are attacked as totalitar- ians-blue or red-are not necessarily so. A state of confusion, prevalent not only in Colombia but the world over, hangs over the country and prevents clear-cut, specific measures to cope with the principal problems of public life. I should like to attempt, from an institutional point of view, to show what the outstanding features of our subject are in Colombia and what corrections are needed from a technical point of view. The Colombian constitution, like the constitutions of some other Latin American countries, is based upon the Montesquieu doctrine of division of power. This classical division has suffered, however, a deep change of concept in modern times, since the power of the State is considered unique and undivided and only the functions of that power are distributed among the several branches of the government. In Colombia, these branches are: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Their functions are separate and autonomous, but their aims are unique; hence, a close cooperation among these branches is prescribed in the constitution.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 237 Although the constitution is supposed to be in full force, no legislative body convenes now in Colombia. Some of its functions are performed by the executive by virtue of special power con- ferred upon him by the National Assembly, which elected the president. The president of the republic, in normal circumstances, is the main authority in the executive branch of the government, but his power is limited by virtue of the constitutional provision that he must "share" his authority with his cabinet. This limitation is a handicap because, although the president appoints his cabinet ministers or secretaries and removes them whenever he may see fit, in actual fact the president cannot dismiss a minister any time and every time his views are not accepted. It is true that on rare occasions a wide gap may occur between the president and his cabinet, but his limitation of authority has proven to be, more than once, a source of irresponsibility. We all know, perhaps by our own experience, that whenever two or more share a responsibility, more likely than not each one tries to place his share of blame on the other fellow's shoulders. On the other hand, sharing of responsibilities of the president with his aides in the cabinet precludes him from assuming always a firm stand on major policies without the consent of his ministers. In some delicate cases the president may even be forced to influence votes among his own appointees, thus leaving him in a very awkward position. Experience has shown, moreover, that in any kind of administra- tion boards and councils should have only a voice or an advisory character, but no power to decide questions. Ultimate decision and responsibility should always be in the hands of the top ex- ecutives, otherwise decisions on vital matters necessarily suffer delays or are subject to negotiations of interests. On top of this difficulty, the president of the republic cannot delegate his authority for certain minor tasks. He is, therefore, a sort of prisoner of red tape, since he must sign hundreds or thousands of documents which, according to the constitution or the law, must be signed by him personally. Only between cabinet ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 237 Although the constitution is supposed to be in full force, no legislative body convenes now in Colombia. Some of its functions are performed by the executive by virtue of special power con- ferred upon him by the National Assembly, which elected the president. The president of the republic, in normal circumstances, is the main authority in the executive branch of the government, but his power is limited by virtue of the constitutional provision that he must "share" his authority with his cabinet. This limitation is a handicap because, although the president appoints his cabinet ministers or secretaries and removes them whenever he may see fit, in actual fact the president cannot dismiss a minister any time and every time his views are not accepted. It is true that on rare occasions a wide gap may occur between the president and his cabinet, but his limitation of authority has proven to be, more than once, a source of irresponsibility. We all know, perhaps by our own experience, that whenever two or more share a responsibility, more likely than not each one tries to place his share of blame on the other fellow's shoulders. On the other hand, sharing of responsibilities of the president with his aides in the cabinet precludes him from assuming always a firm stand on major policies without the consent of his ministers. In some delicate cases the president may even be forced to influence votes among his own appointees, thus leaving him in a very awkward position. Experience has shown, moreover, that in any kind of administra- tion boards and councils should have only a voice or an advisory character, but no power to decide questions. Ultimate decision and responsibility should always be in the hands of the top ex- ecutives, otherwise decisions on vital matters necessarily suffer delays or are subject to negotiations of interests. On top of this difficulty, the president of the republic cannot delegate his authority for certain minor tasks. He is, therefore, a sort of prisoner of red tape, since he must sign hundreds or thousands of documents which, according to the constitution or the law, must be signed by him personally. Only between cabinet ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 237 Although the constitution is supposed to be in full force, no legislative body convenes now in Colombia. Some of its functions are performed by the executive by virtue of special power con- ferred upon him by the National Assembly, which elected the president. The president of the republic, in normal circumstances, is the main authority in the executive branch of the government, but his power is limited by virtue of the constitutional provision that he must "share" his authority with his cabinet. This limitation is a handicap because, although the president appoints his cabinet ministers or secretaries and removes them whenever he may see fit, in actual fact the president cannot dismiss a minister any time and every time his views are not accepted. It is true that on rare occasions a wide gap may occur between the president and his cabinet, but his limitation of authority has proven to be, more than once, a source of irresponsibility. We all know, perhaps by our own experience, that whenever two or more share a responsibility, more likely than not each one tries to place his share of blame on the other fellow's shoulders. On the other hand, sharing of responsibilities of the president with his aides in the cabinet precludes him from assuming always a firm stand on major policies without the consent of his ministers. In some delicate cases the president may even be forced to influence votes among his own appointees, thus leaving him in a very awkward position. Experience has shown, moreover, that in any kind of administra- tion boards and councils should have only a voice or an advisory character, but no power to decide questions. Ultimate decision and responsibility should always be in the hands of the top ex- ecutives, otherwise decisions on vital matters necessarily suffer delays or are subject to negotiations of interests. On top of this difficulty, the president of the republic cannot delegate his authority for certain minor tasks. He is, therefore, a sort of prisoner of red tape, since he must sign hundreds or thousands of documents which, according to the constitution or the law, must be signed by him personally. Only between cabinet  238 The Caribbean meetings and the signing of papers can the president devote his time to other important tasks. Colombia is divided, for administrative purposes, into de- partments and municipalities. In practice, however, there is no clear-cut separation of rights and duties among the national, departmental, and local authorities. This fact results in con- fusion, irresponsibility, duplication of efforts, and waste. Some- times national conveniences have to yield to local demands, and although much has been done in the way of centralization of funds used to achieve objectives of national importance-such as electrification and irrigation projects-still, municipal inde- pendence is a major factor to face, considering its ramifications and consequences. Colombia has more than her share of red tape among the nations of the world. As in many Latin American countries, red tape in Colombia is mostly the result of the lack of confidence in her own officers and employees. Red tape is responsible for a great complexity in public administration because the lawmakers have decided that officers in public administration should check each other's actions through a lot of control apparatus. This feature, established with the purpose of checking the activities of the several responsible officers and avoiding therefore bad management, embezzling, or abuse, has proven absolutely wrong because, since no body is ultimately responsible for anything (responsibility being shared by all controlling officers among themselves) decisions are faulty, untimely, and frequently wrong. By the increase of bureaucracy for needless control, efficiency has been relaxed and corruption has taken its place, perhaps with more alarming results. The above problem of inefficiency is aggravated by the fact that in Colombia no public service law or administrative career as such exists now. Employees and officers of the government are appointed and removed according to the best interests of the party or the men in power. Theoretically, the president of the republic has to approve every appointment of government 238 The Caribbean meetings and the signing of papers can the president devote his time to other important tasks. Colombia is divided, for administrative purposes, into de- partments and municipalities. In practice, however, there is no clear-cut separation of rights and duties among the national, departmental, and local authorities. This fact results in con- fusion, irresponsibility, duplication of efforts, and waste. Some- times national conveniences have to yield to local demands, and although much has been done in the way of centralization of funds used to achieve objectives of national importance-such as electrification and irrigation projects-still, municipal inde- pendence is a major factor to face, considering its ramifications and consequences. Colombia has more than her share of red tape among the nations of the world. As in many Latin American countries, red tape in Colombia is mostly the result of the lack of confidence in her own officers and employees. Red tape is responsible for a great complexity in public administration because the lawmakers have decided that officers in public administration should check each other's actions through a lot of control apparatus. This feature, established with the purpose of checking the activities of the several responsible officers and avoiding therefore bad management, embezzling, or abuse, has proven absolutely wrong because, since no body is ultimately responsible for anything (responsibility being shared by all controlling officers among themselves) decisions are faulty, untimely, and frequently wrong. By the increase of bureaucracy for needless control, efficiency has been relaxed and corruption has taken its place, perhaps with more alarming results. The above problem of inefficiency is aggravated by the fact that in Colombia no public service law or administrative career as such exists now. Employees and officers of the government are appointed and removed according to the best interests of the party or the men in power. Theoretically, the president of the republic has to approve every appointment of government 238 The Caribbean meetings and the signing of papers can the president devote his time to other important tasks. Colombia is divided, for administrative purposes, into de- partments and municipalities. In practice, however, there is no clear-cut separation of rights and duties among the national, departmental, and local authorities. This fact results in con- fusion, irresponsibility, duplication of efforts, and waste. Some- times national conveniences have to yield to local demands, and although much has been done in the way of centralization of funds used to achieve objectives of national importance-such as electrification and irrigation projects-still, municipal inde- pendence is a major factor to face, considering its ramifications and consequences. Colombia has more than her share of red tape among the nations of the world. As in many Latin American countries, red tape in Colombia is mostly the result of the lack of confidence in her own officers and employees. Red tape is responsible for a great complexity in public administration because the lawmakers have decided that officers in public administration should check each other's actions through a lot of control apparatus. This feature, established with the purpose of checking the activities of the several responsible officers and avoiding therefore bad management, embezzling, or abuse, has proven absolutely wrong because, since no body is ultimately responsible for anything (responsibility being shared by all controlling officers among themselves) decisions are faulty, untimely, and frequently wrong. By the increase of bureaucracy for needless control, efficiency has been relaxed and corruption has taken its place, perhaps with more alarming results. The above problem of inefficiency is aggravated by the fact that in Colombia no public service law or administrative career as such exists now. Employees and officers of the government are appointed and removed according to the best interests of the party or the men in power. Theoretically, the president of the republic has to approve every appointment of government  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 239 employees and, although in practice it is absolutely impossible for him to do so, still he has to personally approve a large number of appointments of officers above a certain rank. The lack of a public service law in Colombia, although a handicap for the efficient organization of the State, is nevertheless a result of political conditions prevailing in that country for some years. It is contended that no matter how efficient persons may be for any jobs, unless they are loyal to country and government, they con- stitute security risks, and therefore it is better to dispense with their services and employ less efficient officers than to endanger the future of democratic institutions. According to this practice prevailing in Colombia, as well as in many countries now, public administration must not only be placed on a technical basis, but especially on the loyalty, the honesty, and decency of its officers and men. The Public Administration Mission in Colombia, headed by Lauchlin Currie, which went there as a result of the Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has advised the Colombian government' to assure its good men in public administration that their jobs are guaranteed no matter how politics go, and that they will enjoy a steady and respectable profession, if not a very lucrative one. This suggestion, which in my opinion is a very sound one, has not been applied yet because Colombia, as well as many Latin American countries, has suffered for a long time from an excess of personalism in all branches of public administration. To assure a career in public administration when there are too many jobs would mean the legalization of a harmful condition of affairs; it is preferable not to do so, although in actual fact little or nothing has been done to reduce bureaucracy. These circumstances, however, prompt capable men to drop their government connections whenever a good opportunity is open to them in private business. This ' Reorganizaci6n de la rema ejecutiva del gobierno de Colombia. In- forme de una misidn dirigida por Lauchlin Currie (BogotA: Imprenta Nacional, 1952). ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 239 employees and, although in practice it is absolutely impossible for him to do so, still he has to personally approve a large number of appointments of officers above a certain rank. The lack of a public service law in Colombia, although a handicap for the efficient organization of the State, is nevertheless a result of political conditions prevailing in that country for some years. It is contended that no matter how efficient persons may be for any jobs, unless they are loyal to country and government, they con- stitute security risks, and therefore it is better to dispense with their services and employ less efficient officers than to endanger the future of democratic institutions. According to this practice prevailing in Colombia, as well as in many countries now, public administration must not only be placed on a technical basis, but especially on the loyalty, the honesty, and decency of its officers and men. The Public Administration Mission in Colombia, headed by Lauchlin Currie, which went there as a result of the Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has advised the Colombian government' to assure its good men in public administration that their jobs are guaranteed no matter how politics go, and that they will enjoy a steady and respectable profession, if not a very lucrative one. This suggestion, which in my opinion is a very sound one, has not been applied yet because Colombia, as well as many Latin American countries, has suffered for a long time from an excess of personalism in all branches of public administration. To assure a career in public administration when there are too many jobs would mean the legalization of a harmful condition of affairs; it is preferable not to do so, although in actual fact little or nothing has been done to reduce bureaucracy. These circumstances, however, prompt capable men to drop their government connections whenever a good opportunity is open to them in private business. This ' Reorganizaci6n de la rama ejuectiva del gobierno de Colombia. In- forme de una misi6n dirigida por Lauchlin Currie (BogotA: Imprenta Nacional, 1952). ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 239 employees and, although in practice it is absolutely impossible for him to do so, still he has to personally approve a large number of appointments of officers above a certain rank. The lack of a public service law in Colombia, although a handicap for the efficient organization of the State, is nevertheless a result of political conditions prevailing in that country for some years. It is contended that no matter how efficient persons may be for any jobs, unless they are loyal to country and government, they con- stitute security risks, and therefore it is better to dispense with their services and employ less efficient officers than to endanger the future of democratic institutions. According to this practice prevailing in Colombia, as well as in many countries now, public administration must not only be placed on a technical basis, but especially on the loyalty, the honesty, and decency of its officers and men. The Public Administration Mission in Colombia, headed by Lauchlin Currie, which went there as a result of the Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has advised the Colombian government' to assure its good men in public administration that their jobs are guaranteed no matter how politics go, and that they will enjoy a steady and respectable profession, if not a very lucrative one. This suggestion, which in my opinion is a very sound one, has not been applied yet because Colombia, as well as many Latin American countries, has suffered for a long time from an excess of personalism in all branches of public administration. To assure a career in public administration when there are too many jobs would mean the legalization of a harmful condition of affairs; it is preferable not to do so, although in actual fact little or nothing has been done to reduce bureaucracy. These circumstances, however, prompt capable men to drop their government connections whenever a good opportunity is open to them in private business. This ' Reorganizacln de la rama ejecutiva del gobierno de Colombia. In- forme de una misi6n dirigida pr Lauchlin Currie (BogotA: Imprenta Nacional, 1952).  240 The Caribbean action forces the government to make hasty political or patronage appointments to fill the positions vacated by good men, thus re- ducing the efficiency and level of public servants. In view of these facts, some solution must be found sooner or later to this difficult problem. As to-the financial side of public administration in Colombia, let us consider the following: The government constitutes the biggest and most powerful single economic unit in the nation. More than 50,000 public servants manage a budget larger than half a billion pesos (over $250,000,000). Practically all eco- nomic activity hinges around or about the national, departmental, and local budgets. Hence, the tremendous importance and impact of public finance upon the general welfare of the country. The budget is originated in the executive branch and is approved by Congress. In the Treasury Department there is a budget office that prepares the budget according to the needs and demands of the several government branches and depart- ments, plans the different sources of income and expenditures to be submitted to Congress, and in normal times is in charge of the correct application of the budget after its legislative approval. This system has shown itself to be very weak, because several offices of the government above the rank of budget office bring tremendous pressures upon it, forcing it to yield to the demands of superiors, thus disregarding the technical aspects of the matter. Besides this difficulty, the budget itself is a complicated array of appropriations established in minute details, making its applica- tion too rigid and inflexible and allowing budget and higher authorities very little room for initiative. Since, however, a too rigid budget cannot meet the ever-changing needs of a nation, the president of the republic is forced to shift appropriations all around during the financial year, thus disrupting the unity and system of the budget which is its very essence. The Currie Mission has advised the Colombian government to simplify the budgetary system in order to make it less detailed and more flexible. 240 The Caribbean action forces the government to make hasty political or patronage appointments to fill the positions vacated by good men, thus re- ducing the efficiency and level of public servants. In view of these facts, some solution must be found sooner or later to this difficult problem. As to-the financial side of public administration in Colombia, let us consider the following: The government constitutes the biggest and most powerful single economic unit in the nation. More than 50,000 public servants manage a budget larger than half a billion pesos (over $250,000,000). Practically all eco- nomic activity hinges around or about the national, departmental, and local budgets. Hence, the tremendous importance and impact of public finance upon the general welfare of the country. The budget is originated in the executive branch and is approved by Congress. In the Treasury Department there is a budget office that prepares the budget according to the needs and demands of the several government branches and depart- ments, plans the different sources of income and expenditures to be submitted to Congress, and in normal times is in charge of the correct application of the budget after its legislative approval. This system has shown itself to be very weak, because several offices of the government above the rank of budget office bring tremendous pressures upon it, forcing it to yield to the demands of superiors, thus disregarding the technical aspects of the matter. Besides this difficulty, the budget itself is a complicated array of appropriations established in minute details, making its applica- tion too rigid and inflexible and allowing budget and higher authorities very little room for initiative. Since, however, a too rigid budget cannot meet the ever-changing needs of a nation, the president of the republic is forced to shift appropriations all around during the financial year, thus disrupting the unity and system of the budget which is its very essence. The Currie Mission has advised the Colombian government to simplify the budgetary system in order to make it less detailed and more flexible. 240 The Caribbean action forces the government to make hasty political or patronage appointments to fill the positions vacated by good men, thus re- ducing the efficiency and level of public servants. In view of these facts, some solution must be found sooner or later to this difficult problem. As to-the financial side of public administration in Colombia, let us consider the following: The government constitutes the biggest and most powerful single economic unit in the nation. More than 50,000 public servants manage a budget larger than half a billion pesos (over $250,000,000). Practically all eco- nomic activity hinges around or about the national, departmental, and local budgets. Hence, the tremendous importance and impact of public finance upon the general welfare of the country. The budget is originated in the executive branch and is approved by Congress. In the Treasury Department there is a budget office that prepares the budget according to the needs and demands of the several government branches and depart- ments, plans the different sources of income and expenditures to be submitted to Congress, and in normal times is in charge of the correct application of the budget after its legislative approval. This system has shown itself to be very weak, because several offices of the government above the rank of budget office bring tremendous pressures upon it, forcing it to yield to the demands of superiors, thus disregarding the technical aspects of the matter. Besides this difficulty, the budget itself is a complicated array of appropriations established in minute details, making its applica- tion too rigid and inflexible and allowing budget and higher authorities very little room for initiative. Since, however, a too rigid budget cannot meet the ever-changing needs of a nation, the president of the republic is forced to shift appropriations all around during the financial year, thus disrupting the unity and system of the budget which is its very essence. The Currie Mission has advised the Colombian government to simplify the budgetary system in order to make it less detailed and more flexible.  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 241 Along with budgetary matters it is necessary to mention their auxiliaries, namely accounting and auditing. Contraloria is the name of an official institution of high rank established in Colombia for the purpose of centralizing all accounts of a public nature and for auditing the expenditures of government agencies. In the past few years, Contralorfa has modernized its accounting system by means of an ever-increasing use of machines of the IBM type. Also, since the creation of this office in the late 1920's along the lines suggested by the Kem- merer Mission, much has been done to standardize accounting systems which previously were very primitive and different from one another. Contraloria, besides setting up the rules of account- ing and keeping a central record of all accounts of public insti- tutions, studies those accounts and establishes responsibilities of an economic and penal nature upon persons who handle public funds or property. This capacity to decide on the accounts sub- mitted to it with forceful resolutions-in other words, this capa- city to judge-makes Contraloria a court of judicial character, its resolutions not being liable to appeal except to the head of Con- traloria, who can revise resolutions only in case of flagrant errors of fact. Contraloria exerts also a control over expenditures of public funds by authorizing, previous to any expenditure, the transfer of funds according to the rules of law and other regulations and by auditing or controlling those expeditures after they have taken place. It seems odd that the same government office should con- trol expenditures after its own authorization of them. Auditing should be left in the hands of another office, according to the suggestions of the Currie Mission. One final word about Contralorfa. Despite all handicaps and difficulties, this organization has helped the country to straighten out its finances. Its impartiality and value could be increased, however, if the Contralor de la Nacion-that is, the head of Contraloria-were to be elected not for two years, as now, but for a larger number of years, in order that his election should ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 241 Along with budgetary matters it is necessary to mention their auxiliaries, namely accounting and auditing. Contraloria is the name of an official institution of high rank established in Colombia for the purpose of centralizing all accounts of a public nature and for auditing the expenditures of government agencies. In the past few years, Contraloria has modernized its accounting system by means of an ever-increasing use of machines of the IBM type. Also, since the creation of this office in the late 1920's along the lines suggested by the Kem- merer Mission, much has been done to standardize accounting systems which previously were very primitive and different from one another. Contraloria, besides setting up the rules of account- ing and keeping a central record of all accounts of public insti- tutions, studies those accounts and establishes responsibilities of an economic and penal nature upon persons who handle public funds or property. This capacity to decide on the accounts sub- mitted to it with forceful resolutions-in other words, this capa- city to judge-makes Contralorfa a court of judicial character, its resolutions not being liable to appeal except to the head of Con- traloria, who can revise resolutions only in case of flagrant errors of fact. Contraloria exerts also a control over expenditures of public funds by authorizing, previous to any expenditure, the transfer of funds according to the rules of law and other regulations and by auditing or controlling those expeditures after they have taken place. It seems odd that the same government office should con- trol expenditures after its own authorization of them. Auditing should be left in the hands of another office, according to the suggestions of the Currie Mission. One final word about Contralora. Despite all handicaps and difficulties, this organization has helped the country to straighten out its finances. Its impartiality and value could be increased, however, if the Contralor de la Nacidon-that is, the head of Contraloria-were to be elected not for two years, as now, but for a larger number of years, in order that his election should ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 241 Along with budgetary matters it is necessary to mention their auxiliaries, namely accounting and auditing. Contraloria is the name of an official institution of high rank established in Colombia for the purpose of centralizing all accounts of a public nature and for auditing the expenditures of government agencies. In the past few years, Contraloria has modernized its accounting system by means of an ever-increasing use of machines of the IBM type. Also, since the creation of this office in the late 1920's along the lines suggested by the Kem- merer Mission, much has been done to standardize accounting systems which previously were very primitive and different from one another. Contraloria, besides setting up the rules of account- ing and keeping a central record of all accounts of public insti- tutions, studies those accounts and establishes responsibilities of an economic and penal nature upon persons who handle public funds or property. This capacity to decide on the accounts sub- mitted to it with forceful resolutions-in other words, this capa- city to judge-makes Contraloria a court of judicial character, its resolutions not being liable to appeal except to the head of Con- traloria, who can revise resolutions only in case of flagrant errors of fact. Contraloria exerts also a control over expenditures of public funds by authorizing, previous to any expenditure, the transfer of funds according to the rules of law and other regulations and by auditing or controlling those expeditures after they have taken place. It seems odd that the same government office should con- trol expenditures after its own authorization of them. Auditing should be left in the hands of another office, according to the suggestions of the Currie Mission. One final word about Contraloria. Despite all handicaps and difficulties, this organization has helped the country to straighten out its finances. Its impartiality and value could be increased, however, if the Contralor de la Nacidon-that is, the head of Contralorfa-were to be elected not for two years, as now, but for a larger number of years, in order that his election should  242 The Caribbean 242 The Caribbean not be subject to the same political conditions as are the executive or the legislative, but rather be made on the basis of such con- siderations as the technical preparation of the candidates, their experience, and other factors. It was mentioned before that there is no clear-cut separation of authority between the national, departmental, and local gov- ernment agencies. There also exist a number of autonomous and semiautonomous agencies which complicate the already compli- cated system of public administration by overlapping, duplicating, and confusing functions, and by wasting effort and money. In Colombia, as well as in other Latin American countries, the creation of autonomous and semiautonomous organizations has been the result of the tremendous pressure of circumstances or of interests to solve certain problems which the government, as such, had been unable to solve. People with influence and know-how have forced the creation of those entities, taking away the rights and duties of government ministries and other agencies because they have become convinced that only by giving personal respon- sibility to a board or a junta, and by providing enough money to operate can specific problems be solved. Unfortunately, these entities, which have been created by the urge to solve serious problems, have not always been able to cope with the problems they were set up to fix, and in many instances they have failed after painful experiences. Some of the causes for the failures of these entities are: a) They have been created indiscriminately for commercial as well as noncommercial purposes, thus intervening in the free- dom of business enterprise; b) Their functions and responsibilities have not been well defined, thus creating a confusing situation among them and with the regular branches of the government; c) Their financial situation, using public funds for their ex- istence, is in general not too bright, thus there is a great deal of spending of their funds by bureaucracy and too little efficient investnent; not be subject to the same political conditions as are the executive or the legislative, but rather be made on the basis of such con- siderations as the technical preparation of the candidates, their experience, and other factors. It was mentioned before that there is no clear-cut separation of authority between the national, departmental, and local gov- ernment agencies. There also exist a number of autonomous and semiautonomous agencies which complicate the already compli- cated system of public administration by overlapping, duplicating, and confusing functions, and by wasting effort and money. In Colombia, as well as in other Latin American countries, the creation of autonomous and semiautonomous organizations has been the result of the tremendous pressure of circumstances or of interests to solve certain problems which the government, as such, had been unable to solve. People with influence and know-how have forced the creation of those entities, taking away the rights and duties of government ministries and other agencies because they have become convinced that only by giving personal respon- sibility to a board or a junta, and by providing enough money to operate can specific problems be solved. Unfortunately, these entities, which have been created by the urge to solve serious problems, have not always been able to cope with the problems they were set up to fix, and in many instances they have failed after painful experiences. Some of the causes for the failures of these entities are: a) They have been created indiscriminately for commercial as well as noncommercial purposes, thus intervening in the free- dom of business enterprise; b) Their functions and responsibilities have not been well defined, thus creating a confusing situation among them and with the regular branches of the government; c) Their financial situation, using public funds for their ex- istence, is in general not too bright, thus there is a great deal of spending of their funds by bureaucracy and too little efficient investment; 242 The Caribbean not be subject to the same political conditions as are the executive or the legislative, but rather be made on the basis of such con- siderations as the technical preparation of the candidates, their experience, and other factors. It was mentioned before that there is no clear-cut separation of authority between the national, departmental, and local gov- ernment agencies. There also exist a number of autonomous and semiautonomous agencies which complicate the already compli- cated system of public administration by overlapping, duplicating, and confusing functions, and by wasting effort and money. In Colombia, as well as in other Latin American countries, the creation of autonomous and semiautonomous organizations has been the result of the tremendous pressure of circumstances or of interests to solve certain problems which the government, as such, had been unable to solve. People with influence and know-how have forced the creation of those entities, taking away the rights and duties of government ministries and other agencies because they have become convinced that only by giving personal respon- sibility to a board or a junta, and by providing enough money to operate can specific problems be solved. Unfortunately, these entities, which have been created by the urge to solve serious problems, have not always been able to cope with the problems they were set up to fix, and in many instances they have failed after painful experiences. Some of the causes for the failures of these entities are: a) They have been created indiscriminately for commercial as well as noncommercial purposes, thus intervening in the free- dom of business enterprise; b) Their functions and responsibilities have not been well defined, thus creating a confusing situation among them and with the regular branches of the government; c) Their financial situation, using public funds for their ex- istence, is in general not too bright, thus there is a great deal of spending of their funds by bureaucracy and too little efficient investnent;  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 243 d) Their duplication of efforts and rivalry account for inevita- ble waste and uncreative competition. The tendency towards the multiplication of these autonomous and semiautonomous bodies is fortunately disappearing in Co- lombia, but powerful interests are opposed to their complete disappearance. IV The history of Mexico is full of revolutions and blood; its public administration and its main characteristics must, necessar- ily, take their roots from that history. After independence from Spain, Mexico followed for a number of years the old basic Spanish pattern of colonial government. In 1857 an anticlerical constitution, rather than a liberal one, was created as a result of years of painful civil struggles. Into this constitution some elements of the United States Constitution were incorporated, such as the individualistic taste in politics and economic matters. The anticlerical aspects of the 1857 Constitution were stiffened by the amendments of 1861-1862 after years of bloodshed and violence. Judrez' government, opposed to the imperial govern- ment of Maximilian (although both were liberal in conception), was frankly anticlerical and antireligious. By 1870 Mexico was torn asunder, but finally Porfirio Diaz appeared and commenced his long paternal dictatorship. Diaz' task was to unite the people so much divided by internal dissension, to modernize legislation, to soften attacks against the Church, and to reshape Mexican pride and nationalism after the loss of territories to the United States. Diaz organized a real and serious government and got rid of bandits. He became a benevolent and paternal dictator who abolished absolute independence of the states and strengthened the authority of the federal government. He imposed the obli- gation to pay taxes to the federal union, and not only to the chieftains of each state and territory. Diaz opened roads, pro- moted education on all levels, applying the constitution toward these ends. By 1910 Mexico, under Diaz, was considered a ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 243 d) Their duplication of efforts and rivalry account for inevita- ble waste and uncreative competition. The tendency towards the multiplication of these autonomous and semiautonomous bodies is fortunately disappearing in Co- lombia, but powerful interests are opposed to their complete disappearance. IV The history of Mexico is full of revolutions and blood; its public administration and its main characteristics must, necessar- ily, take their roots from that history. After independence from Spain, Mexico followed for a number of years the old basic Spanish pattern of colonial government. In 1857 an anticlerical constitution, rather than a liberal one, was created as a result of years of painful civil struggles. Into this constitution some elements of the United States Constitution were incorporated, such as the individualistic taste in politics and economic matters. The anticlerical aspects of the 1857 Constitution were stiffened by the amendments of 1861-1862 after years of bloodshed and violence. Judrez' government, opposed to the imperial govern- ment of Maximilian (although both were liberal in conception). was frankly anticlerical and antireligious. By 1870 Mexico was torn asunder, but finally Porfirio Diaz appeared and commenced his long paternal dictatorship. Diaz' task was to unite the people so much divided by internal dissension, to modernize legislation, to soften attacks against the Church, and to reshape Mexican pride and nationalism after the loss of territories to the United States. Diaz organized a real and serious government and got rid of bandits. He became a benevolent and paternal dictator who abolished absolute independence of the states and strengthened the authority of the federal government. He imposed the obli- gation to pay taxes to the federal union, and not only to the chieftains of each state and territory. Diaz opened roads, pro- moted education on all levels, applying the constitution toward these ends. By 1910 Mexico, under Diaz, was considered a ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 243 d) Their duplication of efforts and rivalry account for inevita- ble waste and uncreative competition. The tendency towards the multiplication of these autonomous and semiautonomous bodies is fortunately disappearing in Co- lombia, but powerful interests are opposed to their complete disappearance. IV The history of Mexico is full of revolutions and blood; its public administration and its main characteristics must, necessar- ily, take their roots from that history. After independence from Spain, Mexico followed for a number of years the old basic Spanish pattern of colonial government. In 1857 an anticlerical constitution, rather than a liberal one, was created as a result of years of painful civil struggles. Into this constitution some elements of the United States Constitution were incorporated, such as the individualistic taste in politics and economic matters. The anticlerical aspects of the 1857 Constitution were stiffened by the amendments of 1861-1862 after years of bloodshed and violence. Judrez' government, opposed to the imperial govern- ment of Maximilian (although both were liberal in conception), was frankly anticlerical and antireligious. By 1870 Mexico was torn asunder, but finally Porfirio Diaz appeared and commenced his long paternal dictatorship. Diaz' task was to unite the people so much divided by internal dissension, to modernize legislation, to soften attacks against the Church, and to reshape Mexican pride and nationalism after the loss of territories to the United States. Diaz organized a real and serious government and got rid of bandits. He became a benevolent and paternal dictator who abolished absolute independence of the states and strengthened the authority of the federal government. He imposed the obli- gation to pay taxes to the federal union, and not only to the chieftains of each state and territory. Diaz opened roads, pro- moted education on all levels, applying the constitution toward these ends. By 1910 Mexico, under Diaz, was considered a  244 The Caribbean progressive nation in the civilized world. With the revolution against Diaz came again many years of chaos, violence, and abuse. Venustiano Carranza, one of the best leaders of the revolution, managed to stay in power long enough to reorganize the army, to enact an agrarian law, a labor law, a family law, and to put education under federal control. In 1917, the current constitu- tion of Mexico was established, although it has gone through some important amendments. This constitution, which in a sense has become so sacred to Mexicans-almost as a second Bible-is a curious combination of a liberal structure with socialist institutions; a mixture of nationalism with antireligiousness; a sort of presidential system: strong, long, responsible. Property, according to the Mexican constitution, is a privilege which the State may grant or with- draw from individuals at will. Education is in the hands of the government and nobody can teach or mention religion in public schools, no matter how liberal the government might be. Private schools are frowned upon and nobody can pass official exams if he has not attended public schools. Clerics cannot open or man- age religious edifices unless they are under the supervision of the government. Of course, some of the extreme measures mentioned above have been somewhat slackened in actual practice, particularly during the present presidential administration. There was, how- ever, a time, during the Cardenas government particularly, when the constitution was applied to the letter in most instances. With this background in mind, it is obvious that the main objective of the Mexican public administration has been to apply the principles of the constitution, no matter what the difficulties may be in practice. The powers of the president of the republic are wider and more effective than in the case of Colombia. The president holds the "supreme executive power" of the Union of Mexican States, according to Article 80 of the constitution. He appoints and removes the secretaries or ministers of his cabinet and is respon- 244 The Caribbean progressive nation in the civilized world. With the revolution against Diaz came again many years of chaos, violence, and abuse. Venustiano Carranza, one of the best leaders of the revolution, managed to stay in power long enough to reorganize the army, to enact an agrarian law, a labor law, a family law, and to put education under federal control. In 1917, the current constitu- tion of Mexico was established, although it has gone through some important amendments. This constitution, which in a sense has become so sacred to Mexicans-almost as a second Bible-is a curious combination of a liberal structure with socialist institutions; a mixture of nationalism with antireligiousness; a sort of presidential system: strong, long, responsible. Property, according to the Mexican constitution, is a privilege which the State may grant or with- draw from individuals at will. Education is in the hands of the government and nobody can teach or mention religion in public schools, no matter how liberal the government might be. Private schools are frowned upon and nobody can pass official exams if he has not attended public schools. Clerics cannot open or man- age religious edifices unless they are under the supervision of the government. Of course, some of the extreme measures mentioned above have been somewhat slackened in actual practice, particularly during the present presidential administration. There was, how- ever, a time, during the Cdrdenas government particularly, when the constitution was applied to the letter in most instances. With this background in mind, it is obvious that the main objective of the Mexican public administration has been to apply the principles of the constitution, no matter what the difficulties may be in practice. The powers of the president of the republic are wider and more effective than in the case of Colombia. The president holds the "supreme executive power" of the Union of Mexican States, according to Article 80 of the constitution. He appoints and removes the secretaries or ministers of his cabinet and is respon- 244 The Caribbean progressive nation in the civilized world. With the revolution against Diaz came again many years of chaos, violence, and abuse. Venustiano Carranza, one of the best leaders of the revolution, managed to stay in power long enough to reorganize the army, to enact an agrarian law, a labor law, a family law, and to put education under federal control. In 1917, the current constitu- tion of Mexico was established, although it has gone through some important amendments. This constitution, which in a sense has become so sacred to Mexicans-almost as a second Bible-is a curious combination of a liberal structure with socialist institutions; a mixture of nationalism with antireligiousness; a sort of presidential system: strong, long, responsible. Property, according to the Mexican constitution, is a privilege which the State may grant or with- draw from individuals at will. Education is in the hands of the government and nobody can teach or mention religion in public schools, no matter how liberal the government might be. Private schools are frowned upon and nobody can pass official exams if he has not attended public schools. Clerics cannot open or man- age religious edifices unless they are under the supervision of the government. Of course, some of the extreme measures mentioned above have been somewhat slackened in actual practice, particularly during the present presidential administration. There was, how- ever, a time, during the Cdrdenas government particularly, when the constitution was applied to the letter in most instances. With this background in mind, it is obvious that the main objective of the Mexican public administration has been to apply the principles of the constitution, no matter what the difficulties may be in practice. The powers of the president of the republic are wider and more effective than in the case of Colombia. The president holds the "supreme executive power" of the Union of Mexican States, according to Article 80 of the constitution. He appoints and removes the secretaries or ministers of his cabinet and is respon-  ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 245 sible to the nation for the policies of his government; the ministers are responsible to the president and also must account for their actions to Congress, but the real power is vested in the president. The president of Mexico is elected for six years and not only controls national policy through his cabinet, but also state policy, since he appoints and removes all governors. Moreover, the president has a strong voice in the organization of the judiciary. He appoints the Justices of the Supreme Court, subject only to the ratification of the Senate, and Justices of the Superior Courts, subject only to the ratification of the House of Deputies. Of the high officers responsible directly to him, the president also appoints and removes the Attorney General of the nation and the General Comptroller, or Accountant. Thus, the Mexican president is vested with an amount of power that probably no other Latin American constitutional president enjoys. But he can never be re-elected, for Article 83 of the constitution is clear. It reads: "The citizen who has held the office of President of the Republic . . . in no case and by no motive whatsoever will be able to hold that office again." The budget of the nation is originated in the executive branch and is approved by the House. The Mexican budget is not as inflexible as the Colombian budget, but it must undergo also a series of changes within the annual fiscal period. Control of public funds is not yet well developed, particularly because of the direct dependence of the comptrolling office on the chief execu- tive. So far as accounting is concerned, however, Mexico has reached a high degree of development and technique. There is a sort of "unwritten" public service career, as a result of many years of peaceful government by the party in power under the Constitution of 1917, and slowly but surely a steady public service career is under development. The government tries to keep its best men by giving special allowances and by regular salary increases. One can safely say that nowadays there is a reasonably efficient public administration in Mexico, although ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 245 sible to the nation for the policies of his government; the ministers are responsible to the president and also must account for their actions to Congress, but the real power is vested in the president. The president of Mexico is elected for six years and not only controls national policy through his cabinet, but also state policy, since he appoints and removes all governors. Moreover, the president has a strong voice in the organization of the judiciary. He appoints the Justices of the Supreme Court, subject only to the ratification of the Senate, and Justices of the Superior Courts, subject only to the ratification of the House of Deputies. Of the high officers responsible directly to him, the president also appoints and removes the Attorney General of the nation and the General Comptroller, or Accountant. Thus, the Mexican president is vested with an amount of power that probably no other Latin American constitutional president enjoys. But he can never be re-elected, for Article 83 of the constitution is clear. It reads: "The citizen who has held the office of President of the Republic . . . in no case and by no motive whatsoever will be able to hold that office again." The budget of the nation is originated in the executive branch and is approved by the House. The Mexican budget is not as inflexible as the Colombian budget, but it must undergo also a series of changes within the annual fiscal period. Control of public funds is not yet well developed, particularly because of the direct dependence of the comptrolling office on the chief execu- tive. So far as accounting is concerned, however, Mexico has reached a high degree of development and technique. There is a sort of "unwritten" public service career, as a result of many years of peaceful government by the party in power under the Constitution of 1917, and slowly but surely a steady public service career is under development. The government tries to keep its best men by giving special allowances and by regular salary increases. One can safely say that nowadays there is a reasonably efficient public administration in Mexico, although ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 245 sible to the nation for the policies of his government; the ministers are responsible to the president and also must account for their actions to Congress, but the real power is vested in the president. The president of Mexico is elected for six years and not only controls national policy through his cabinet, but also state policy, since he appoints and removes all governors. Moreover, the president has a strong voice in the organization of the judiciary. He appoints the justices of the Supreme Court, subject only to the ratification of the Senate, and Justices of the Superior Courts, subject only to the ratification of the House of Deputies. Of the high officers responsible directly to him, the president also appoints and removes the Attorney General of the nation and the General Comptroller, or Accountant. Thus, the Mexican president is vested with an amount of power that probably no other Latin American constitutional president enjoys. But he can never be re-elected, for Article 83 of the constitution is clear. It reads: "The citizen who has held the office of President of the Republic . . . in no case and by no motive whatsoever will be able to hold that office again." The budget of the nation is originated in the executive branch and is approved by the House. The Mexican budget is not as inflexible as the Colombian budget, but it must undergo also a series of changes within the annual fiscal period. Control of public funds is not yet well developed, particularly because of the direct dependence of the comptrolling office on the chief execu- tive. So far as accounting is concerned, however, Mexico has reached a high degree of development and technique. There is a sort of "unwritten" public service career, as a result of many years of peaceful government by the party in power under the Constitution of 1917, and slowly but surely a steady public service career is under development. The government tries to keep its best men by giving special allowances and by regular salary increases. One can safely say that nowadays there is a reasonably efficient public administration in Mexico, although  246 The Caribbean certain difficulties and problems such as red tape and complicated organization still exist. After this brief sketch of how some of the Caribbean countries are struggling to modernize public administration on ideological and technical bases, we must reach the conclusion that they have come a long way since colonial and early republican days, and that in getting rid of some defects, each country is moving along the lines determined by its own particular problems and peculiarities. 246 The Caribbean 246 The Caribbean certain difficulties and problems such as red tape and complicated organization still exist. After this brief sketch of how some of the Caribbean countries are struggling to modernize public administration on ideological and technical bases, we must reach the conclusion that they have come a long way since colonial and early republican days, and that in getting rid of some defects, each country is moving along the lines determined by its own particular problems and peculiarities. certain difficulties and problems such as red tape and complicated organization still exist. After this brief sketch of how some of the Caribbean countries are struggling to modernize public administration on ideological and technical bases, we must reach the conclusion that they have come a long way since colonial and early republican days, and that in getting rid of some defects, each country is moving along the lines determined by its own particular problems and peculiarities.  Part VI Part VI Part VI SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS   Hubert Herring: PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRACY W E AMERICANS-ALL OF US, North and South-cherish democracy. Even Plato cannot discourage us: "Democracy," he wrote, "is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike." But we Americans find democracy hard to come by, and cer- tainly the Latin Americans share the struggle. Sim6n Bolivar's diagnosis still has pith: "The role of the inhabitants of the American Hemisphere," he wrote in 1816, "has for centuries been purely passive. Politically they are non-existent. . . . America was denied not only its freedom but even an active and effective tyranny." The people of Spanish and Portuguese America had been kept "in a state of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs." This has been notably true of the Caribbean world, although at various times some of the republics in that world have endured an "active and effective tyranny." Praise of democracy for this Caribbean region excites some stout "realists" to remind us that it is idle to expect the political patterns of Montclair, Oak Park, or Gainesville to prevail in Port- au-Prince, Caracas, or Tegucigalpa. Some of those realists must agree with the late Benito Mussolini who cautioned an American interviewer in 1928: "Democracy is talking itself to death, the 249 Hubert Herring: PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRACY W E AMERICANS-ALL OF US, North and South-cherish democracy. Even Plato cannot discourage us: "Democracy," he wrote, "is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike." But we Americans find democracy hard to come by, and cer- tainly the Latin Americans share the struggle. Sim6n Bolivar's diagnosis still has pith: "The role of the inhabitants of the American Hemisphere," he wrote in 1816, "has for centuries been purely passive. Politically they are non-existent. . . . America was denied not only its freedom but even an active and effective tyranny." The people of Spanish and Portuguese America had been kept "in a state of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs." This has been notably true of the Caribbean world, although at various times some of the republics in that world have endured an "active and effective tyranny." Praise of democracy for this Caribbean region excites some stout "realists" to remind us that it is idle to expect the political patterns of Montclair, Oak Park, or Gainesville to prevail in Port- au-Prince, Caracas, or Tegucigalpa. Some of those realists must agree with the late Benito Mussolini who cautioned an American interviewer in 1928: "Democracy is talking itself to death, the 249 Hubert Herring: PROBLEMS FACING DEMOCRACY WE AMERICANS-ALL OF US, North and South-cherish democracy. Even Plato cannot discourage us: "Democracy," he wrote, "is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike." But we Americans find democracy hard to come by, and cer- tainly the Latin Americans share the struggle. Sim6n Bolivar's diagnosis still has pith: "The role of the inhabitants of the American Hemisphere," he wrote in 1816, "has for centuries been purely passive. Politically they are non-existent. . . . America was denied not only its freedom but even an active and effective tyranny." The people of Spanish and Portuguese America had been kept "in a state of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs." This has been notably true of the Caribbean world, although at various times some of the republics in that world have endured an "active and effective tyranny." Praise of democracy for this Caribbean region excites some stout "realists" to remind us that it is idle to expect the political patterns of Montclair, Oak Park, or Gainesville to prevail in Port- au-Prince, Caracas, or Tegucigalpa. Some of those realists must agree with the late Benito Mussolini who cautioned an American interviewer in 1928: "Democracy is talking itself to death, the 249  250 The Caribbean people do not know what they want. They do not know what is best for them. There is too much foolishness, too much lost motion. I have stopped the talk and the nonsense. I am a man of action. Democracy is beautiful in theory; in practice it is a fallacy. You in America will see that some day." What, then, are the chances for democratic practice in the Caribbean world? There are grievous handicaps to block that happy state in which supreme power is vested in the people- power directly administered or through representatives freely chosen by the people. Confining our attention to the independ- ent republics of this region-eleven nations (excluding Mexico) with some 31,000,000 people-we must describe it as a largely undeveloped area. Culturally, most of it is backward. More than half the people cannot read and write; Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras offer the most melancholy exhibit on this score; Costa Rica, far and away the most hopeful. The public school systems are almost everywhere inadequate, although in most of the countries there is hopeful progress. University education is hampered by the dictatorial control of such governments as pre- vail in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and various others. Economically, the Caribbean nations present a mixed picture. National budgets reveal the general meagerness. The total of all the budgets (1953) of the eleven republics comes to about $1,674 million-an amount roughly equal to the annual ex- penditures of New York City. However, oil-rich Venezuela, with about one-sixth the population of the entire area, spends almost 45 per cent of that total. The budget of Honduras ($17.3 million) is about equal to that of the city of Portland, Oregon; that of Nicaragua ($23.2 million) is roughly that of Toledo; that of Haiti ($27.8 million) is equal to that of Indianapolis. Per capita annual income, figures to be used with care, tell a bit more about the general poverty. The average Haitian may have $65 per year; the Honduran, $127; the Nicaraguan, $138. 250 The Caribbean people do not know what they want. They do not know what is best for them. There is too much foolishness, too much lost motion. I have stopped the talk and the nonsense. I am a man of action. Democracy is beautiful in theory; in practice it is a fallacy. You in America will see that some day." What, then, are the chances for democratic practice in the Caribbean world? There are grievous handicaps to block that happy state in which supreme power is vested in the people- power directly administered or through representatives freely chosen by the people. Confining our attention to the independ- ent republics of this region-eleven nations (excluding Mexico) with some 31,000,000 people-we must describe it as a largely undeveloped area. Culturally, most of it is backward. More than half the people cannot read and write; Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras offer the most melancholy exhibit on this score; Costa Rica, far and away the most hopeful. The public school systems are almost everywhere inadequate, although in most of the countries there is hopeful progress. University education is hampered by the dictatorial control of such governments as pre- vail in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and various others. Economically, the Caribbean nations present a mixed picture. National budgets reveal the general meagerness. The total of all the budgets (1953) of the eleven republics comes to about $1,674 million-an amount roughly equal to the annual ex- penditures of New York City. However, oil-rich Venezuela, with about one-sixth the population of the entire area, spends almost 45 per cent of that total. The budget of Honduras ($17.3 million) is about equal to that of the city of Portland, Oregon; that of Nicaragua ($23.2 million) is roughly that of Toledo; that of Haiti ($27.8 million) is equal to that of Indianapolis. Per capita annual income, figures to be used with care, tell a bit more about the general poverty. The average Haitian may have $65 per year; the Honduran, $127; the Nicaraguan, $138. 250 The Caribbean people do not know what they want. They do not know what is best for them. There is too much foolishness, too much lost motion. I have stopped the talk and the nonsense. I am a man of action. Democracy is beautiful in theory; in practice it is a fallacy. You in America will see that some day." What, then, are the chances for democratic practice in the Caribbean world? There are grievous handicaps to block that happy state in which supreme power is vested in the people- power directly administered or through representatives freely chosen by the people. Confining our attention to the independ- ent republics of this region-eleven nations (excluding Mexico) with some 31,000,000 people-we must describe it as a largely undeveloped area. Culturally, most of it is backward. More than half the people cannot read and write; Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras offer the most melancholy exhibit on this score; Costa Rica, far and away the most hopeful. The public school systems are almost everywhere inadequate, although in most of the countries there is hopeful progress. University education is hampered by the dictatorial control of such governments as pre- vail in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and various others. Economically, the Caribbean nations present a mixed picture. National budgets reveal the general meagerness. The total of all the budgets (1953) of the eleven republics comes to about $1,674 million-an amount roughly equal to the annual ex- penditures of New York City. However, oil-rich Venezuela, with about one-sixth the population of the entire area, spends almost 45 per cent of that total. The budget of Honduras ($17.3 million) is about equal to that of the city of Portland, Oregon; that of Nicaragua ($23.2 million) is roughly that of Toledo; that of Haiti ($27.8 million) is equal to that of Indianapolis. Per capita annual income, figures to be used with care, tell a bit more about the general poverty. The average Haitian may have $65 per year; the Honduran, $127; the Nicaraguan, $138.  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 251 The Venezuelan seems to fare better, with a per capita income figure of $427, but the preponderance of petroleum (97 per cent of export revenue) gives the major returns to foreign operators and to those who control the government. Exhibits on health conditions are largely gloomy. Haiti seems to have one physician to each 10,000 of its people; Honduras, one to 6,500; Guatemala, one to 5,800; while Venezuela has one to 1,900. In most of the region, adequate medical attention is reserved for those in urban centers. Malaria, intestinal diseases, tuberculosis, and other scourges take too great a toll. There are no adequate statistics on infant mortality-a sure index to the health of any people-but the rate everywhere seems to be at least three times that of the United States; and, in some countries, far worse. Such melancholy description of the Caribbean area is subject to hopeful shading. Almost everywhere, there are growing oases of privilege, where life is increasingly pleasant and safe for more and more people, where a genuine middle class is emerging and demanding a voice. Everywhere, there is a slow extension of privilege to the outlying communities. But the great masses in all these nations are not enjoying a fair share of the national bounty. There is still bitter want and beggary, illiteracy and ignorance. Again one must note exceptions, but for the region as a whole, Henry George's warning applies: "To put political power in the hands of men embittered and degraded by poverty is to tie firebrands to foxes, and turn them loose amid the standing corn." II But there are powerful forces at work almost everywhere, forces which give substance to the faith that democratic institu- tions may still prevail. Economic forces. While the masses of the people are still living precariously from their little wages in sugar fields, coffee fincas, and cacao groves, the high prices of the commodities pro- OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 251 The Venezuelan seems to fare better, with a per capita income figure of $427, but the preponderance of petroleum (97 per cent of export revenue) gives the major returns to foreign operators and to those who control the government. Exhibits on health conditions are largely gloomy. Haiti seems to have one physician to each 10,000 of its people; Honduras, one to 6,500; Guatemala, one to 5,800; while Venezuela has one to 1,900. In most of the region, adequate medical attention is reserved for those in urban centers. Malaria, intestinal diseases, tuberculosis, and other scourges take too great a toll. There are no adequate statistics on infant mortality-a sure index to the health of any people-but the rate everywhere seems to be at least three times that of the United States; and, in some countries, far worse. Such melancholy description of the Caribbean area is subject to hopeful shading. Almost everywhere, there are growing oases of privilege, where life is increasingly pleasant and safe for more and more people, where a genuine middle class is emerging and demanding a voice. Everywhere, there is a slow extension of privilege to the outlying communities. But the great masses in all these nations are not enjoying a fair share of the national bounty. There is still bitter want and beggary, illiteracy and ignorance. Again one must note exceptions, but for the region as a whole, Henry George's warning applies: "To put political power in the hands of men embittered and degraded by poverty is to tie firebrands to foxes, and turn them loose amid the standing corn." II But there are powerful forces at work almost everywhere, forces which give substance to the faith that democratic institu- tions may still prevail. Economic forces. While the masses of the people are still living precariously from their little wages in sugar fields, coffee fincas, and cacao groves, the high prices of the commodities pro- OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 251 The Venezuelan seems to fare better, with a per capita income figure of $427, but the preponderance of petroleum (97 per cent of export revenue) gives the major returns to foreign operators and to those who control the government. Exhibits on health conditions are largely gloomy. Haiti seems to have one physician to each 10,000 of its people; Honduras, one to 6,500; Guatemala, one to 5,800; while Venezuela has one to 1,900. In most of the region, adequate medical attention is reserved for those in urban centers. Malaria, intestinal diseases, tuberculosis, and other scourges take too great a toll. There are no adequate statistics on infant mortality-a sure index to the health of any people-but the rate everywhere seems to be at least three times that of the United States; and, in some countries, far worse. Such melancholy description of the Caribbean area is subject to hopeful shading. Almost everywhere, there are growing oases of privilege, where life is increasingly pleasant and safe for more and more people, where a genuine middle class is emerging and demanding a voice. Everywhere, there is a slow extension of privilege to the outlying communities. But the great masses in all these nations are not enjoying a fair share of the national bounty. There is still bitter want and beggary, illiteracy and ignorance. Again one must note exceptions, but for the region as a whole, Henry George's warning applies: "To put political power in the hands of men embittered and degraded by poverty is to tie firebrands to foxes, and turn them loose amid the standing corn." II But there are powerful forces at work almost everywhere, forces which give substance to the faith that democratic institu- tions may still prevail. Economic forces. While the masses of the people are still living precariously from their little wages in sugar fields, coffee fincas, and cacao groves, the high prices of the commodities pro-  252 The Caribbean 252 The Caribbean duced has brought some measure of relief. It is still a "trickling- down" relief; there is still but little of the "percolating-up" which comes when government policy grapples resolutely with wage standards and improved living and working conditions. Labor unions, in the few spots where authentic unions exist, are helping. Foreign companies, chiefly American, are increasingly serving to lift the standards of life. Many good words can be said for United Fruit, the oil companies, and the shipping and mining interests. Partly driven by conscience, partly by compulsion, foreign cor- porations are setting higher standards of wages, and living and working conditions. They are still denounced as "imperialistic," but their contribution to the several national economies is in- creasingly, if grudgingly, admitted. The schools. Everywhere governments are talking of more and better schools; in most instances, there is commendable progress. Even in dictator-ridden lands, schools and teachers multiply. There is magic in those teachers; even dictators cannot quench their zeal. There is magic in books, even though dictators seek to control those books. Illiteracy is lessening. And the universi- ties, even in lands where liberty is shackled, bring some impulse to freedom. Free spirits still occasionally speak their minds in spite of dictators in many countries. And university students still get out of hand, and shout for the liberties denied them. The press. The Caribbean world presents a sorry exhibit of newspapers. El Tiempo of Bogota, long the best in the region, is in chains. But there is still some liberty of expression in Cuba, Guatemala, and elsewhere. There is complete liberty of the press in Costa Rica, but that nation's newspapers are poor sheets at best. But no matter how heavily dictatorship may bear down upon editors, their papers must publish something at least of the words spoken by Dwight Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson, Anthony Eden, Konrad Adenauer, and others. And no matter how limited may be the coverage of world events, there are ever more people who are aware of the pressures from Russia, the threats in the Near East and the Far East, the glowering threat of atomic duced has brought some measure of relief. It is still a "trickling- down" relief; there is still but little of the "percolating-up" which comes when government policy grapples resolutely with wage standards and improved living and working conditions. Labor unions, in the few spots where authentic unions exist, are helping. Foreign companies, chiefly American, are increasingly serving to lift the standards of life. Many good words can be said for United Fruit, the oil companies, and the shipping and mining interests. Partly driven by conscience, partly by compulsion, foreign cor- porations are setting higher standards of wages, and living and working conditions. They are still denounced as "imperialistic," but their contribution to the several national economies is in- creasingly, if grudgingly, admitted. The schools. Everywhere governments are talking of more and better schools; in most instances, there is commendable progress. Even in dictator-ridden lands, schools and teachers multiply. There is magic in those teachers; even dictators cannot quench their zeal. There is magic in books, even though dictators seek to control those books. Illiteracy is lessening. And the universi- ties, even in lands where liberty is shackled, bring some impulse to freedom. Free spirits still occasionally speak their minds in spite of dictators in many countries. And university students still get out of hand, and shout for the liberties denied them. The press. The Caribbean world presents a sorry exhibit of newspapers. El Tiempo of Bogota, long the best in the region, is in chains. But there is still some liberty of expression in Cuba, Guatemala, and elsewhere. There is complete liberty of the press in Costa Rica, but that nation's newspapers are poor sheets at best. But no matter how heavily dictatorship may bear down upon editors, their papers must publish something at least of the words spoken by Dwight Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson, Anthony Eden, Konrad Adenauer, and others. And no matter how limited may be the coverage of world events, there are ever more people who are aware of the pressures from Russia, the threats in the Near East and the Far East, the glowering threat of atomic 252 The Caribbean duced has brought some measure of relief. It is still a "trickling- down" relief; there is still but little of the "percolating-up" which comes when government policy grapples resolutely with wage standards and improved living and working conditions. Labor unions, in the few spots where authentic unions exist, are helping. Foreign companies, chiefly American, are increasingly serving to lift the standards of life. Many good words can be said for United Fruit, the oil companies, and the shipping and mining interests. Partly driven by conscience, partly by compulsion, foreign cor- porations are setting higher standards of wages, and living and working conditions. They are still denounced as "imperialistic," but their contribution to the several national economies is in- creasingly, if grudgingly, admitted. The schools. Everywhere governments are talking of more and better schools; in most instances, there is commendable progress. Even in dictator-ridden lands, schools and teachers multiply. There is magic in those teachers; even dictators cannot quench their zeal. There is magic in books, even though dictators seek to control those books. Illiteracy is lessening. And the universi- ties, even in lands where liberty is shackled, bring some impulse to freedom. Free spirits still occasionally speak their minds in spite of dictators in many countries. And university students still get out of hand, and shout for the liberties denied them. The press. The Caribbean world presents a sorry exhibit of newspapers. El Tienspo of BogotA, long the best in the region, is in chains. But there is still some liberty of expression in Cuba, Guatemala, and elsewhere. There is complete liberty of the press in Costa Rica, but that nation's newspapers are poor sheets at best. But no matter how heavily dictatorship may bear down upon editors, their papers must publish something at least of the words spoken by Dwight Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson, Anthony Eden, Konrad Adenauer, and others. And no matter how limited may be the coverage of world events, there are ever more people who are aware of the pressures from Russia, the threats in the Near East and the Far East, the glowering threat of atomic  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 253 warfare, and the race between chaos and international order. The emergence of a middle class. Everywhere there is taking shape an urban middle class of professional men and traders. In such countries as Honduras and Haiti, the growth is slow. In Colombia and Venezuela it is rapid. This development of a middle class injects a new degree of independence and vigor. The impact of the United States. American movies, magazines, and books are spreading news of the working of our own demo- cratic institutions. It is significant that Readers Digest, in its Spanish and Portuguese editions, has a wider circulation than any magazine published in the Caribbean. The net result is the popularizing of the political fashions of the United States. The influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Everywhere the Church in Latin America is feeling the impulse of the Catholic Church in the United States. Such American orders as the Mary- knoll Fathers are doing much to inject a greater sense of social concern among their spiritual kin. The growing strength of political parties. Theoretically, op- position parties exercise little function in the Dominican Repub- lic, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and some other countries. Actually, even an outlawed party such as Accidn Democrdtica in Venezuela has a powerful influence. In Nicaragua, it is notable that an opposition party was able to rally public opinion against Somoza's plan to welcome the exile, Juan Domingo Perdn. And in Colom- bia, the Liberals are far from silenced. There are two exhibits of effective democracy in the Caribbean region, each of which proves eloquent: one is the island of Puerto Rico, and the other the independent republic of Costa Rica. Puerto Rico, the tiny island-dependent of the United States, sadly overcrowded-an average of over 600 to the square mile- offers eloquent testimony to the good intentions and performance of the United States and to the possibility of developing a sound democracy in the Caribbean world. Long awkwardly ruled from Washington, Puerto Rico has emerged with a commonwealth status, free to elect its own governor and to control almost all its OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 253 warfare, and the race between chaos and international order. The emergence of a middle class. Everywhere there is taking shape an urban middle class of professional men and traders. In such countries as Honduras and Haiti, the growth is slow. In Colombia and Venezuela it is rapid. This development of a middle class injects a new degree of independence and vigor. The impact of the United States. American movies, magazines, and books are spreading news of the working of our own demo- cratic institutions. It is significant that Readers Digest, in its Spanish and Portuguese editions, has a wider circulation than any magazine published in the Caribbean. The net result is the popularizing of the political fashions of the United States. The influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Everywhere the Church in Latin America is feeling the impulse of the Catholic Church in the United States. Such American orders as the Mary- knoll Fathers are doing much to inject a greater sense of social concern among their spiritual kin. The growing strength of political parties. Theoretically, op- position parties exercise little function in the Dominican Repub- lic, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and some other countries. Actually, even an outlawed party such as Accidn Democrdtica in Venezuela has a powerful influence. In Nicaragua, it is notable that an opposition party was able to rally public opinion against Somoza's plan to welcome the exile, Juan Domingo Peron. And in Colom- bia, the Liberals are far from silenced. There are two exhibits of effective democracy in the Caribbean region, each of which proves eloquent: one is the island of Puerto Rico, and the other the independent republic of Costa Rica. Puerto Rico, the tiny island-dependent of the United States, sadly overcrowded-an average of over 600 to the square mile- offers eloquent testimony to the good intentions and performance of the United States and to the possibility of developing a sound democracy in the Caribbean world. Long awkwardly ruled from Washington, Puerto Rico has emerged with a commonwealth status, free to elect its own governor and to control almost all its OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 253 warfare, and the race between chaos and international order. The emergence of a middle class. Everywhere there is taking shape an urban middle class of professional men and traders. In such countries as Honduras and Haiti, the growth is slow. In Colombia and Venezuela it is rapid. This development of a middle class injects a new degree of independence and vigor. The impact of the United States. American movies, magazines, and books are spreading news of the working of our own demo- cratic institutions. It is significant that Readers Digest, in its Spanish and Portuguese editions, has a wider circulation than any magazine published in the Caribbean. The net result is the popularizing of the political fashions of the United States. The influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Everywhere the Church in Latin America is feeling the impulse of the Catholic Church in the United States. Such American orders as the Mary- knoll Fathers are doing much to inject a greater sense of social concern among their spiritual kin. The growing strength of political parties. Theoretically, op- position parties exercise little function in the Dominican Repub- lie, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and some other countries. Actually, even an outlawed party such as Accidon Democrdtica in Venezuela has a powerful influence. In Nicaragua, it is notable that an opposition party was able to rally public opinion against Somoza's plan to welcome the exile, Juan Domingo Perdn. And in Colom- bia, the Liberals are far from silenced. There are two exhibits of effective democracy in the Caribbean region, each of which proves eloquent: one is the island of Puerto Rico, and the other the independent republic of Costa Rica. Puerto Rico, the tiny island-dependent of the United States, sadly overcrowded-an average of over 600 to the square mile- offers eloquent testimony to the good intentions and performance of the United States and to the possibility of developing a sound democracy in the Caribbean world. Long awkwardly ruled from Washington, Puerto Rico has emerged with a commonwealth status, free to elect its own governor and to control almost all its  254 The Caribbean 254 The Caribbean 254 The Caribbean internal affairs. Progress towards the democratic goal has been dramatic under able Governor Luis Munoz Marin, who has fired the imagination of lovers of freedom throughout the Caribbean. Costa Rica, a little nation no larger than the state of West Virginia and with a population of 875,000, shares honors with Uruguay as the most soundly democratic in faith and practice of all the Latin American states. Largely of white European stock, its people are literate (more than 75 per cent of them can read and write), hard working, and devoted to liberty. The few dic- tatorships in Costa Rican history have been short-lived. Political parties are free and active; political discussion is avid. President Figueres, equally impatient with communism and dictatorship, is an eloquent defender of democracy in the Caribbean world. So there are bright spots in the Caribbean picture, despite the widespread denial of civil liberties, the lack of honest popular elections, and the strong-armed rule of dictators of varying degrees of virulence. We can well remind ourselves that it takes time to create a democratic society and can take heart that powerful forces are at work to liberate the Caribbean peoples. III The United States has an important role to play in the Carib- bean. We have a large financial stake in all of these nations. Our influence will be great and continuing. The fortunes of democracy in the entire region will be furthered or retarded by the way in which we conduct our business and diplomacy. Our past record in the Caribbean is not blameless. During the nineteenth century the American attitude towards the Caribbean peoples-and all the Latin Americans-was of bored indiffer- ence. At the end of that century came our intervention in Cuba. Then followed a period in which we played the policeman in Caribbean waters. We occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. We intervened time and again in Panama and elsewhere. These adventures were heavyhanded. Our Marines were never as ruthless as excited Yankee-haters described, but their stay was irritating and in the end futile. Finally, under internal affairs. Progress towards the democratic goal has been dramatic under able Governor Luis Munoz Marin, who has fired the imagination of lovers of freedom throughout the Caribbean. Costa Rica, a little nation no larger than the state of West Virginia and with a population of 875,000, shares honors with Uruguay as the most soundly democratic in faith and practice of all the Latin American states. Largely of white European stock, its people are literate (more than 75 per cent of them can read and write), hard working, and devoted to liberty. The few dic- tatorships in Costa Rican history have been short-lived. Political parties are free and active; political discussion is avid. President Figueres, equally impatient with communism and dictatorship, is an eloquent defender of democracy in the Caribbean world. So there are bright spots in the Caribbean picture, despite the widespread denial of civil liberties, the lack of honest popular elections, and the strong-armed rule of dictators of varying degrees of virulence. We can well remind ourselves that it takes time to create a democratic society and can take heart that powerful forces are at work to liberate the Caribbean peoples. III The United States has an important role to play in the Carib- bean. We have a large financial stake in all of these nations. Our influence will be great and continuing. The fortunes of democracy in the entire region will be furthered or retarded by the way in which we conduct our business and diplomacy. Our past record in the Caribbean is not blameless. During the nineteenth century the American attitude towards the Caribbean peoples-and all the Latin Americans-was of bored indiffer- ence. At the end of that century came our intervention in Cuba. Then followed a period in which we played the policeman in Caribbean waters. We occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. We intervened time and again in Panama and elsewhere. These adventures were heavyhanded. Our Marines were never as ruthless as excited Yankee-haters described, but their stay was irritating and in the end futile. Finally, under internal affairs. Progress towards the democratic goal has been dramatic under able Governor Luis Munoz Marin, who has fired the imagination of lovers of freedom throughout the Caribbean. Costa Rica, a little nation no larger than the state of West Virginia and with a population of 875,000, shares honors with Uruguay as the most soundly democratic in faith and practice of all the Latin American states. Largely of white European stock, its people are literate (more than 75 per cent of them can read and write), hard working, and devoted to liberty. The few dic- tatorships in Costa Rican history have been short-lived. Political parties are free and active; political discussion is avid. President Figueres, equally impatient with communism and dictatorship, is an eloquent defender of democracy in the Caribbean world. So there are bright spots in the Caribbean picture, despite the widespread denial of civil liberties, the lack of honest popular elections, and the strong-armed rule of dictators of varying degrees of virulence. We can well remind ourselves that it takes time to create a democratic society and can take heart that powerful forces are at work to liberate the Caribbean peoples. III The United States has an important role to play in the Carib- bean. We have a large financial stake in all of these nations. Our influence will be great and continuing. The fortunes of democracy in the entire region will be furthered or retarded by the way in which we conduct our business and diplomacy. Our past record in the Caribbean is not blameless. During the nineteenth century the American attitude towards the Caribbean peoples-and all the Latin Americans-was of bored indiffer- ence. At the end of that century came our intervention in Cuba. Then followed a period in which we played the policeman in Caribbean waters. We occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. We intervened time and again in Panama and elsewhere. These adventures were heavyhanded. Our Marines were never as ruthless as excited Yankee-haters described, but their stay was irritating and in the end futile. Finally, under  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 255 Presidents Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, there came the liquidation of our military adventures and the decision to abstain from intervention. We had accomplished some good ends in sanitation, policing, and financial reconstruction. But when the last Marine was withdrawn, we discovered that the national armed forces we had helped to train could impose new and more savage tyrannies upon such lands as Nicaragua and the Domini- can Republic. The balance sheet showed little if any gain for democratic institutions. In the name of the "Good Neighbor," we finally withdrew our Marines. And then, after 1934, we began to extend financial and technical aid. Much of this was soundly conceived: Ameri- can subsidies and loans have done much to improve sanitation, modernize agriculture, and create public works. Some of it was of dubious utility: the furnishing of guns and powder under various formulae of cooperation must probably be so described. What stand shall the United States take towards the Caribbean nations? Some conclusions seem to command general acceptance. 1. We are virtually agreed on the futility of intervention. It is not our job to police our neighbors' premises or to dictate what sort of governments they shall have. Specifically, it is not our job to overturn tyrants, no matter how much we deplore them; tyrants will never be effectively ejected until the people themselves do the task. But we did intervene in Guatemala in the summer of 1954, and helped to install Castillo Armas in office. A com- munist threat was there, and many argue that we had no choice. But we staged an awkward performance-one which suggests hard thinking lest we get caught again in such a predicament. 2. There is growing conviction that the government of the United States, while sedulously avoiding intervention, should make it crystal clear that it favors democratic institutions and looks with distaste upon dictatorships. We have no business to coddle, praise, and subsidize the strong-armed rulers who deny elemental human rights. The United States-many are saying- "should not go to bed with dictators." We did that with Peron in Argentina; we praised him, we loaned him money, we tacitly OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 255 OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS Presidents Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, there came the liquidation of our military adventures and the decision to abstain from intervention. We had accomplished some good ends in sanitation, policing, and financial reconstruction. But when the last Marine was withdrawn, we discovered that the national armed forces we had helped to train could impose new and more savage tyrannies upon such lands as Nicaragua and the Domini- can Republic. The balance sheet showed little if any gain for democratic institutions. In the name of the "Good Neighbor," we finally withdrew our Marines. And then, after 1934, we began to extend financial and technical aid. Much of this was soundly conceived: Ameri- can subsidies and loans have done much to improve sanitation, modernize agriculture, and create public works. Some of it was of dubious utility: the furnishing of guns and powder under various formulae of cooperation must probably be so described. What stand shall the United States take towards the Caribbean nations? Some conclusions seem to command general acceptance. 1. We are virtually agreed on the futility of intervention. It is not our job to police our neighbors' premises or to dictate what sort of governments they shall have. Specifically, it is not our job to overturn tyrants, no matter how much we deplore them; tyrants will never be effectively ejected until the people themselves do the task. But we did intervene in Guatemala in the summer of 1954, and helped to install Castillo Armas in office. A com- munist threat was there, and many argue that we had no choice. But we staged an awkward performance-one which suggests hard thinking lest we get caught again in such a predicament. 2. There is growing conviction that the government of the United States, while sedulously avoiding intervention, should make it crystal clear that it favors democratic institutions and looks with distaste upon dictatorships. We have no business to coddle, praise, and subsidize the strong-armed rulers who deny elemental human rights. The United States-many are saying- "should not go to bed with dictators." We did that with Perin in Argentina; we praised him, we loaned him money, we tacitly Presidents Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, there came the liquidation of our military adventures and the decision to abstain from intervention. We had accomplished some good ends in sanitation, policing, and financial reconstruction. But when the last Marine was withdrawn, we discovered that the national armed forces we had helped to train could impose new and more savage tyrannies upon such lands as Nicaragua and the Domini- can Republic. The balance sheet showed little if any gain for democratic institutions. In the name of the "Good Neighbor," we finally withdrew our Marines. And then, after 1934, we began to extend financial and technical aid. Much of this was soundly conceived: Ameri- can subsidies and loans have done much to improve sanitation, modernize agriculture, and create public works. Some of it was of dubious utility: the furnishing of guns and powder under various formulae of cooperation must probably be so described. What stand shall the United States take towards the Caribbean nations? Some conclusions seem to command general acceptance. 1. We are virtually agreed on the futility of intervention. It is not our job to police our neighbors' premises or to dictate what sort of governments they shall have. Specifically, it is not our job to overturn tyrants, no matter how much we deplore them; tyrants will never be effectively ejected until the people themselves do the task. But we did intervene in Guatemala in the summer of 1954, and helped to install Castillo Armas in office. A com- munist threat was there, and many argue that we had no choice. But we staged an awkward performance-one which suggests hard thinking lest we get caught again in such a predicament. 2. There is growing conviction that the government of the United States, while sedulously avoiding intervention, should make it crystal clear that it favors democratic institutions and looks with distaste upon dictatorships. We have no business to coddle, praise, and subsidize the strong-armed rulers who deny elemental human rights. The United States-many are saying- "should not go to bed with dictators." We did that with Peron in Argentina; we praised him, we loaned him money, we tacitly  256 The Caribbean 256 The Caribbean 256 The Caribbean encouraged him for ten years. We did that when we loaned money to Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. We did it again when President Eisenhower conferred a decoration upon Presi- dent Pdrez Jimenez of Venezuela. We have continued to make the way easy for Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. And we have lost prestige among lovers of freedom by doing these things. The alternative to such a course of appeasement is neither intervention nor scolding. The situation calls for eloquent defense of democratic institutions through our press, through the channels of our information service, and through the activities of our foreign service. Our spokesmen in the courts of dictators can be severely correct-and chilly. We can get our lesson across without indulging in either tasteless praise or irritating criticism. 3. We can, when occasion offers, defend governments which stand for democracy when they are threatened from without. We did that in January, 1955. An attack upon democratic Costa Rica, financed and based in Nicaragua, met firm and effective blocking. Working through the Organization of American States, our Department of State acted. Upon recommendation of a commission of the OAS, Washington sent the bombers to San Jose which brought a swift end to the commotion. The OAS's course-and Washington's-won general acclaim from the other American republics. 4. We can and should continue to extend economic coopera- tion for projects useful for economic development, for the ex- tension of sanitation, and for strengthening education. But we have no business to lend or give where our largess fortifies the hands of dictators. 5. We must strengthen our diplomatic force in all this Carib- bean world. The ambassadors who speak for us, and all their aides, can do much to fortify democratic sentiment. We have many excellent men and women in our embassies and consulates in the Caribbean republics. Their number must be increased and their hands upheld. These are the men who can help to make democracy a living and glowing thing. encouraged him for ten years. We did that when we loaned money to Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. We did it again when President Eisenhower conferred a decoration upon Presi- dent Perez Jimenez of Venezuela. We have continued to make the way easy for Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. And we have lost prestige among lovers of freedom by doing these things. The alternative to such a course of appeasement is neither intervention nor scolding. The situation calls for eloquent defense of democratic institutions through our press, through the channels of our information service, and through the activities of our foreign service. Our spokesmen in the courts of dictators can be severely correct-and chilly. We can get our lesson across without indulging in either tasteless praise or irritating criticism. 3. We can, when occasion offers, defend governments which stand for democracy when they are threatened from without. We did that in January, 1955. An attack upon democratic Costa Rica, financed and based in Nicaragua, met firm and effective blocking. Working through the Organization of American States, our Department of State acted. Upon recommendation of a commission of the OAS, Washington sent the bombers to San Jose which brought a swift end to the commotion. The OAS's course-and Washington's--won general acclaim from the other American republics. 4. We can and should continue to extend economic coopera- tion for projects useful for economic development, for the ex- tension of sanitation, and for strengthening education. But we have no business to lend or give where our largess fortifies the hands of dictators. 5. We must strengthen our diplomatic force in all this Carib- bean world. The ambassadors who speak for us, and all their aides, can do much to fortify democratic sentiment. We have many excellent men and women in our embassies and consulates in the Caribbean republics. Their number must be increased and their hands upheld. These are the men who can help to make democracy a living and glowing thing. encouraged him for ten years. We did that when we loaned money to Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. We did it again when President Eisenhower conferred a decoration upon Presi- dent Perez Jimenez of Venezuela. We have continued to make the way easy for Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. And we have lost prestige among lovers of freedom by doing these things. The alternative to such a course of appeasement is neither intervention nor scolding. The situation calls for eloquent defense of democratic institutions through our press, through the channels of our information service, and through the activities of our foreign service. Our spokesmen in the courts of dictators can be severely correct-and chilly. We can get our lesson across without indulging in either tasteless praise or irritating criticism. 3. We can, when occasion offers, defend governments which stand for democracy when they are threatened from without. We did that in January, 1955. An attack upon democratic Costa Rica, financed and based in Nicaragua, met firm and effective blocking. Working through the Organization of American States, our Department of State acted. Upon recommendation of a commission of the OAS, Washington sent the bombers to San Jose which brought a swift end to the commotion. The OAS's course-and Washington's-won general acclaim from the other American republics. 4. We can and should continue to extend economic coopera- tion for projects useful for economic development, for the ex- tension of sanitation, and for strengthening education. But we have no business to lend or give where our largess fortifies the hands of dictators. 5. We must strengthen our diplomatic force in all this Carib- bean world. The ambassadors who speak for us, and all their aides, can do much to fortify democratic sentiment. We have many excellent men and women in our embassies and consulates in the Caribbean republics. Their number must be increased and their hands upheld. These are the men who can help to make democracy a living and glowing thing.  William M. Pepper, Jr.: PRESS FREEDOM WHEN ONE STOPS TO THINK, one realizes that no dis- cussion of contemporary political problems in the Caribbean, or -for that matter-in any part of Latin America or in the entire world, would be complete without a discussion of the condition of the press and its role as a purveyor of information and opinion. It is axiomatic that with a free press there is democracy, and that with a controlled press there is autocracy in one or the other of its forms. Or to put it the other way-with true democracy there is always freedom of the press, but with dictatorship or any other form of totalitarian government, the press can never be wholly free. Therefore, the struggle for press freedom is the struggle toward democratic government, and this holds true in the Caribbean area as it does elsewhere. My paper is about Freedom of the Press in the Americas. It is also about the work of the Inter-American Press Association. To discuss the one intelligently, it is necessary to discuss the other. The two are intertwined and interrelated. The Inter- American Press Association, the IAPA-or, as it is known in Spanish, the Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, or simply, the SIP-is in the midst of every fight relating to press freedom. It 257 William M. Pepper, Jr.: PRESS FREEDOM WHEN ONE STOPS TO THINK, one realizes that no dis- cussion of contemporary political problems in the Caribbean, or -for that matter-in any part of Latin America or in the entire world, would be complete without a discussion of the condition of the press and its role as a purveyor of information and opinion. It is axiomatic that with a free press there is democracy, and that with a controlled press there is autocracy in one or the other of its forms. Or to put it the other way-with true democracy there is always freedom of the press, but with dictatorship or any other form of totalitarian government, the press can never be wholly free. Therefore, the struggle for press freedom is the struggle toward democratic government, and this holds true in the Caribbean area as it does elsewhere. My paper is about Freedom of the Press in the Americas. It is also about the work of the Inter-American Press Association. To discuss the one intelligently, it is necessary to discuss the other. The two are intertwined and interrelated. The Inter- American Press Association, the IAPA-or, as it is known in Spanish, the Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, or simply, the SIP-is in the midst of every fight relating to press freedom. It 257 William M. Pepper, Jr.: PRESS FREEDOM WHEN ONE STOPS TO THINK, one realizes that no dis- cussion of contemporary political problems in the Caribbean, or -for that matter-in any part of Latin America or in the entire world, would be complete without a discussion of the condition of the press and its role as a purveyor of information and opinion. It is axiomatic that with a free press there is democracy, and that with a controlled press there is autocracy in one or the other of its forms. Or to put it the other way-with true democracy there is always freedom of the press, but with dictatorship or any other form of totalitarian government, the press can never be wholly free. Therefore, the struggle for press freedom is the struggle toward democratic government, and this holds true in the Caribbean area as it does elsewhere. My paper is about Freedom of the Press in the Americas. It is also about the work of the Inter-American Press Association. To discuss the one intelligently, it is necessary to discuss the other. The two are intertwined and interrelated. The Inter- American Press Association, the IAPA-or, as it is known in Spanish, the Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, or simply, the SIP-is in the midst of every fight relating to press freedom. It 257  258 The Caribbean is actively on the scene. It has been there in every case in recent years. It will be in the vanguard of the battle in the future. But let me begin at the beginning. The IAPA was founded about eleven years ago. In its forma- tive years-I am told-the IAPA was mostly a gathering at which editors discussed their mutual problems and lamented their varying difficulties. It was in 1950 that the IAPA reorganized, took a new lease on life, and acquired an effectiveness that in- creases with each crisis with which it deals. The IAPA has truly become the champion of the independent press in the Americas. Under the reorganization, which took place at the 1950 meet- ing in New York, the IAPA established a permanent headquarters in that city, employed a full-time, bilingual newspaperman as its manager, organized an executive committee to function in the interim between meetings, and moved into a variety of activities in the interest of the press, which are constantly expanding. For one thing, it keeps close tabs on the newsprint market as it may affect the publishers of this Hemisphere. It has a scholarship fund-supported by donations from individual publishers and publishing companies-through which journalists are sent from Latin America to the United States, and from here to other parts of the Hemisphere for study. The first two awards of $2,500 each were made last month-one going to an editor from a small town in Argentina to study journalism in a North American uni- versity, and another to a young man from Chicago of Mexican parentage for study in Peru. More of these scholarships will be awarded in the spring and still more in the fall of 1956. The IAPA maintains a Technical Information Center for the exchange of all types of information relating to publishing. It also sponsored the new Office of Certified Circulations, which is similar to the Audit Bureau of Circulations in the United States and which will enable advertisers to buy space in Latin American publications with confidence that they are getting the circulation they pay for. The IAPA is also the agency for the selection of the Mergenthaler Awards winners. These awards-which cor- 258 The Caribbean 258 The Caribbean is actively on the scene. It has been there in every case in recent years. It will be in the vanguard of the battle in the future. But let me begin at the beginning. The IAPA was founded about eleven years ago. In its forma- tive years-I am told-the IAPA was mostly a gathering at which editors discussed their mutual problems and lamented their varying difficulties. It was in 1950 that the IAPA reorganized, took a new lease on life, and acquired an effectiveness that in- creases with each crisis with which it deals. The IAPA has truly become the champion of the independent press in the Americas. Under the reorganization, which took place at the 1950 meet- ing in New York, the IAPA established a permanent headquarters in that city, employed a full-time, bilingual newspaperman as its manager, organized an executive committee to function in the interim between meetings, and moved into a variety of activities in the interest of the press, which are constantly expanding. For one thing, it keeps close tabs on the newsprint market as it may affect the publishers of this Hemisphere. It has a scholarship fund-supported by donations from individual publishers and publishing companies-through which journalists are sent from Latin America to the United States, and from here to other parts of the Hemisphere for study. The first two awards of $2,500 each were made last month-one going to an editor from a small town in Argentina to study journalism in a North American uni- versity, and another to a young man from Chicago of Mexican parentage for study in Peru. More of these scholarships will be awarded in the spring and still more in the fall of 1956. The IAPA maintains a Technical Information Center for the exchange of all types of information relating to publishing. It also sponsored the new Office of Certified Circulations, which is similar to the Audit Bureau of Circulations in the United States and which will enable advertisers to buy space in Latin American publications with confidence that they are getting the circulation they pay for. The IAPA is also the agency for the selection of the Mergenthaler Awards winners. These awards-which cor- is actively on the scene. It has been there in every case in recent years. It will be in the vanguard of the battle in the future. But let me begin at the beginning. The IAPA was founded about eleven years ago. In its forma- tive years-I am told-the IAPA was mostly a gathering at which editors discussed their mutual problems and lamented their varying difficulties. It was in 1950 that the IAPA reorganized, took a new lease on life, and acquired an effectiveness that in- creases with each crisis with which it deals. The IAPA has truly become the champion of the independent press in the Americas. Under the reorganization, which took place at the 1950 meet- ing in New York, the IAPA established a permanent headquarters in that city, employed a full-time, bilingual newspaperman as its manager, organized an executive committee to function in the interim between meetings, and moved into a variety of activities in the interest of the press, which are constantly expanding. For one thing, it keeps close tabs on the newsprint market as it may affect the publishers of this Hemisphere. It has a scholarship fund-supported by donations from individual publishers and publishing companies-through which journalists are sent from Latin America to the United States, and from here to other parts of the Hemisphere for study. The first two awards of $2,500 each were made last month-one going to an editor from a small town in Argentina to study journalism in a North American uni- versity, and another to a young man from Chicago of Mexican parentage for study in Peru. More of these scholarships will be awarded in the spring and still more in the fall of 1956. The IAPA maintains a Technical Information Center for the exchange of all types of information relating to publishing. It also sponsored the new Office of Certified Circulations, which is similar to the Audit Bureau of Circulations in the United States and which will enable advertisers to buy space in Latin American publications with confidence that they are getting the circulation they pay for. The IAPA is also the agency for the selection of the Mergenthaler Awards winners. These awards-which cor-  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 259 respond to the famous Pulitzer Prizes in this country-amount to $2,500 annually, and are aimed at the promotion of journalis- tic standards of service to community, country, and civilization as a whole. Through these and other services, the IAPA aims to serve the best interests of its own members, both economically and journalistically. A monthly bulletin, Press of the Americas, pub- lished also in Spanish as Prensa de las Amdricas, keeps the mem- bers constantly informed of what is going on. All these things are more or less internal matters of the asso- ciation. I have mentioned them because I want you to know what type of organization the IAPA really is, what its functions are, and how it operates. It is in no sense of the word a fly-by- night organization that will be here today and gone tomorrow. It is the press of the Americas, banded together in a thoroughly democratic organization, and equipped to act all-for-one or one- for-all at a moment's notice. The IAPA has no connection with any government whatsoever, and it has no financial support other than the dues and contri- butions of its own members. It is not connected with the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or any other international body. It is, in short, composed only of publications and allied enterprises, throughout the Americas, which have banded together. There are members from Canada to Argentina and from Mexico to Trinidad. In fact, there are more than 400 members, and about half of them were actually represented by delegates at the recent New Orleans meeting. I am happy to make the statement that in every country of the Western Hemi- sphere, the leading newspapers and magazines as well as the smaller ones are active and enthusiastic participants in the IAPA. 11 In the above discussion I have deliberately omitted mention of what I consider to be perhaps the most important single activity of the IAPA-its continuing battle in behalf of freedom of the OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 259 respond to the famous Pulitzer Prizes in this country-amount to $2,500 annually, and are aimed at the promotion of journalis- tic standards of service to community, country, and civilization as a whole. Through these and other services, the IAPA aims to serve the best interests of its own members, both economically and journalistically. A monthly bulletin, Press of the Americas, pub- lished also in Spanish as Prensa de las Amiricas, keeps the mem- bers constantly informed of what is going on. All these things are more or less internal matters of the asso- ciation. I have mentioned them because I want you to know what type of organization the IAPA really is, what its functions are, and how it operates. It is in no sense of the word a fly-by- night organization that will be heere today and gone tomorrow. It is the press of the Americas, banded together in a thoroughly democratic organization, and equipped to act all-for-one or one- for-all at a moment's notice. The IAPA has no connection with any government whatsoever, and it has no financial support other than the dues and contri- butions of its own members. It is not connected with the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or any other international body. It is, in short, composed only of publications and allied enterprises, throughout the Americas, which have banded together. There are members from Canada to Argentina and from Mexico to Trinidad. In fact, there are more than 400 members, and about half of them were actually represented by delegates at the recent New Orleans meeting. I am happy to make the statement that in every country of the Western Hemi- sphere, the leading newspapers and magazines as well as the smaller ones are active and enthusiastic participants in the IAPA. II In the above discussion I have deliberately omitted mention of what I consider to be perhaps the most important single activity of the IAPA-its continuing battle in behalf of freedom of the OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 259 respond to the famous Pulitzer Prizes in this country-amount to $2,500 annually, and are aimed at the promotion of journalis- tic standards of service to community, country, and civilization as a whole. Through these and other services, the IAPA aims to serve the best interests of its own members, both economically and journalistically. A monthly bulletin, Press of the Americas, pub- lished also in Spanish as Prensa de las Americas, keeps the mem- bers constantly informed of what is going on. All these things are more or less internal matters of the asso- ciation. I have mentioned them because I want you to know what type of organization the IAPA really is, what its functions are, and how it operates. It is in no sense of the word a fly-by- night organization that will be here today and gone tomorrow. It is the press of the Americas, banded together in a thoroughly democratic organization, and equipped to act all-for-one or one- for-all at a moment's notice. The IAPA has no connection with any government whatsoever, and it has no financial support other than the dues and contri- butions of its own members. It is not connected with the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or any other international body. It is, in short, composed only of publications and allied enterprises, throughout the Americas, which have banded together. There are members from Canada to Argentina and from Mexico to Trinidad. In fact, there are more than 400 members, and about half of them were actually represented by delegates at the recent New Orleans meeting. I am happy to make the statement that in every country of the Western Hemi- sphere, the leading newspapers and magazines as well as the smaller ones are active and enthusiastic participants in the IAPA. It In the above discussion I have deliberately omitted mention of what I consider to be perhaps the most important single activity of the IAPA-its continuing battle in behalf of freedom of the  260 The Caribbean press. It is here that the news concerning the organization is made, it is here that its influence makes itself most widely felt, and it is here that the IAPA has a definite part to play in the creation of Hemispheric history. While the IAPA carries on the battle for press freedom in many ways and on many fronts, the spearhead lies in the activities of its Committee on Freedom of the Press. To head up this work, and to make the personal contacts that must take place in every country where press freedom is threatened, the IAPA is most for- tunate in having as chairman of the committee a man who is des- tined to go down in the annals of newspaperdom as one of the great leaders of the movement for the "people's right to know." I refer to Jules Dubois, the Latin American correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, who maintains his home and his headquarters in Panama. Mr. Dubois has headed the committee for many years, and for almost as many as I can remember he has sought to resign his chairmanship. In each instance, however, the mem- bership has overwhelmingly voted to decline his resignation and he has been prevailed upon to continue. Twice a year, at the directors meeting in the spring and at the general congress in the fall, Mr. Dubois and his committee render a report to the IAPA, similar to the one I hold in my hand. Its very thickness indicates the exhaustive treatment that it gives the subject. It covers efforts to muzzle the press which take place in the United States and Canada and the British West Indies as well as those which take place in the Latin American countries. Much of the report-or I should say most of it- is written from firsthand knowledge gained by Mr. Dubois in his travels to the various trouble spots. Whether the difficulty happens to be the seizure of La Prensa of Buenos Aires by the henchmen of Peron, the pillaging of Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, Bolivia, or the more recent tragic closure of El Tiempo of Bogota through an arbitrary whim of President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Mr. Dubois has been on hand to confer with those in authority, to enter protests in behalf of the entire membership 260 The Caribbean press. It is here that the news concerning the organization is made, it is here that its influence makes itself most widely felt, and it is here that the IAPA has a definite part to play in the creation of Hemispheric history. While the IAPA carries on the battle for press freedom in many ways and on many fronts, the spearhead lies in the activities of its Committee on Freedom of the Press. To head up this work, and to make the personal contacts that must take place in every country where press freedom is threatened, the IAPA is most for- tunate in having as chairman of the committee a man who is des- tined to go down in the annals of newspaperdom as one of the great leaders of the movement for the "people's right to know." I refer to Jules Dubois, the Latin American correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, who maintains his home and his headquarters in Panama. Mr. Dubois has headed the committee for many years, and for almost as many as I can remember he has sought to resign his chairmanship. In each instance, however, the mem- bership has overwhelmingly voted to decline his resignation and he has been prevailed upon to continue. Twice a year, at the directors meeting in the spring and at the general congress in the fall, Mr. Dubois and his committee render a report to the IAPA, similar to the one I hold in my hand. Its very thickness indicates the exhaustive treatment that it gives the subject. It covers efforts to muzzle the press which take place in the United States and Canada and the British West Indies as well as those which take place in the Latin American countries. Much of the report-or I should say most of it- is written from firsthand knowledge gained by Mr. Dubois in his travels to the various trouble spots. Whether the difficulty happens to be the seizure of La Prensa of Buenos Aires by the henchmen of Peron, the pillaging of Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, Bolivia, or the more recent tragic closure of El Tiempo of Bogoti through an arbitrary whim of President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Mr. Dubois has been on hand to confer with those in authority, to enter protests in behalf of the entire membership 260 The Caribbean press. It is here that the news concerning the organization is made, it is here that its influence makes itself most widely felt, and it is here that the IAPA has a definite part to play in the creation of Hemispheric history. While the IAPA carries on the battle for press freedom in many ways and on many fronts, the spearhead lies in the activities of its Committee on Freedom of the Press. To head up this work, and to make the personal contacts that must take place in every country where press freedom is threatened, the IAPA is most for- tunate in having as chairman of the committee a man who is des- tined to go down in the annals of newspaperdom as one of the great leaders of the movement for the "people's right to know." I refer to Jules Dubois, the Latin American correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, who maintains his home and his headquarters in Panama. Mr. Dubois has headed the committee for many years, and for almost as many as I can remember he has sought to resign his chairmanship. In each instance, however, the mem- bership has overwhelmingly voted to decline his resignation and he has been prevailed upon to continue. Twice a year, at the directors meeting in the spring and at the general congress in the fall, Mr. Dubois and his committee render a report to the IAPA, similar to the one I hold in my hand. Its very thickness indicates the exhaustive treatment that it gives the subject. It covers efforts to muzzle the press which take place in the United States and Canada and the British West Indies as well as those which take place in the Latin American countries. Much of the report-or I should say most of it- is written from firsthand knowledge gained by Mr. Dubois in his travels to the various trouble spots. Whether the difficulty happens to be the seizure of La Prensa of Buenos Aires by the henchmen of Peron, the pillaging of Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, Bolivia, or the more recent tragic closure of El Tiempo of BogotA through an arbitrary whim of President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Mr. Dubois has been on hand to confer with those in authority, to enter protests in behalf of the entire membership  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 261 of the IAPA, to keep the headquarters of IAPA informed of what is taking place, and to point out to the government concerned the general adverse reception that its action will receive in the rest of the Hemisphere when the members of IAPA make the action known to their millions of readers. I wish to make it plain that the IAPA does not intervene in the internal affairs of any country. It does, however, protest and expose all violations of the freedom of the press and arbitrary actions against publications or against newspapermen merely because of their connections with journalism. The IAPA, as I have said, has no power beyond that of the collective action of its members, and through them the impact of the public opinion which they serve. The necessity for direct and concerted action comes only when some government takes upon itself to restrict the "people's right to know." This right is not one given or entrusted to publishers alone. It is a right which belongs to all mankind, and it is bestowed on publishers only because they, too, are members of the general public. When one newspaper is closed or one publisher is restricted by limits narrower than those imposed by libel laws and the rules of common decency, all the people suffer by the loss of a channel of public information and by the threat, to other channels of information, that is inherent in the action. When the press of one nation ceases to be free, all the world suffers through lack of accurate information as to what is taking place there. And, again, the temptation to gag the press is likely to become contagious, spreading its vicious influence from one nation to another. As we know, the basic law of every country in the Western Hemisphere calls for the establishment of press freedom, so we of the Inter-American Press Association are not expounding some strange or foreign doctrine. Even the most despotic government gives lip service to the ideal of a free press. It is in the inter- pretation, abrogation, or disregard of these laws that the crimes against press freedom are committed. The basic problem of main- taining or restoring press freedom, therefore, becomes one of OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 261 of the IAPA, to keep the headquarters of IAPA informed of what is taking place, and to point out to the government concerned the general adverse reception that its action will receive in the rest of the Hemisphere when the members of IAPA make the action known to their millions of readers. I wish to make it plain that the IAPA does not intervene in the internal affairs of any country. It does, however, protest and expose all violations of the freedom of the press and arbitrary actions against publications or against newspapermen merely because of their connections with journalism. The IAPA, as I have said, has no power beyond that of the collective action of its members, and through them the impact of the public opinion which they serve. The necessity for direct and concerted action comes only when some government takes upon itself to restrict the "people's right to know." This right is not one given or entrusted to publishers alone. It is a right which belongs to all mankind, and it is bestowed on publishers only because they, too, are members of the general public. When one newspaper is closed or one publisher is restricted by limits narrower than those imposed by libel laws and the rules of common decency, all the people suffer by the loss of a channel of public information and by the threat, to other channels of information, that is inherent in the action. When the press of one nation ceases to be free, all the world suffers through lack of accurate information as to what is taking place there. And, again, the temptation to gag the press is likely to become contagious, spreading its vicious influence from one nation to another. As we know, the basic law of every country in the Western Hemisphere calls for the establishment of press freedom, so we of the Inter-American Press Association are not expounding some strange or foreign doctrine. Even the most despotic government gives lip service to the ideal of a free press. It is in the inter- pretation, abrogation, or disregard of these laws that the crimes against press freedom are committed. The basic problem of main- taining or restoring press freedom, therefore, becomes one of OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 261 of the IAPA, to keep the headquarters of IAPA informed of what is taking place, and to point out to the government concerned the general adverse reception that its action will receive in the rest of the Hemisphere when the members of IAPA make the action known to their millions of readers. I wish to make it plain that the IAPA does not intervene in the internal affairs of any country. It does, however, protest and expose all violations of the freedom of the press and arbitrary actions against publications or against newspapermen merely because of their connections with journalism. The IAPA, as I have said, has no power beyond that of the collective action of its members, and through them the impact of the public opinion which they serve. The necessity for direct and concerted action comes only when some government takes upon itself to restrict the "people's right to know." This right is not one given or entrusted to publishers alone. It is a right which belongs to all mankind, and it is bestowed on publishers only because they, too, are members of the general public. When one newspaper is closed or one publisher is restricted by limits narrower than those imposed by libel laws and the rules of common decency, all the people suffer by the loss of a channel of public information and by the threat, to other channels of information, that is inherent in the action. When the press of one nation ceases to be free, all the world suffers through lack of accurate information as to what is taking place there. And, again, the temptation to gag the press is likely to become contagious, spreading its vicious influence from one nation to another. As we know, the basic law of every country in the Western Hemisphere calls for the establishment of press freedom, so we of the Inter-American Press Association are not expounding some strange or foreign doctrine. Even the most despotic government gives lip service to the ideal of a free press. It is in the inter- pretation, abrogation, or disregard of these laws that the crimes against press freedom are committed. The basic problem of main- taining or restoring press freedom, therefore, becomes one of  262 The Caribbean 262 The Caribbean 262 The Caribbean day-by-day dealings with individual heads of government and of a constant campaign in behalf of press freedom in the press itself. At least two editors-Sr. Demetrio Canelas of Los Tiempos of Cochabamba and Sr. Hernan Robleto of La Flecha, Managua, Nicaragua-have stated publicly in IAPA meetings that they owe their very lives to the organization. Many others freely admit that it has been the instrument through which they have regained their property or have been released from political imprisonment. If there is a paramount message that the IAPA has for be- leaguered publishers today, it is this: You are no longer alone in your fight for the freedom of information. Your fellow pub- lishers throughout the Hemisphere are behind you, and through them all the world will hear of your case. The IAPA has a message for government, too. It is that honest government has nothing to fear from a free press, and that a free press-even though a large segment of it is critical-is actually a prop to any government that is representative of the wishes of its people. The theory of a free press is that the newspaper which does not meet a public demand or desire will perish or its influ- ence will dwindle proportionately. The newspaper which habitu- ally lies will become known as a liar, while that which strives to present the truth will be recognized for its effort. Government cannot become the arbiter of the truth of what is published, for it is about the actions of government itself, be they good or bad, that the press must inform its readers. III Let us look now at the actual fight that is going on for the maintenance of press freedom in the Americas. Those who have kept up with the subject, even superficially, know that I cannot, within the short space of this paper, give you a country-by-country analysis of what is taking place. Even the hundred or more pages of the IAPA report I have just shown you barely skim the surface in that regard. The report itself would take hours to read. I do, however, want to give you some idea of the kind of day-by-day dealings with individual heads of government and of a constant campaign in behalf of press freedom in the press itself. At least two editors-Sr. Demetrio Canelas of Los Tiempos of Cochabamba and Sr. Heroan Robleto of La Flecha, Managua, Nicaragua-have stated publicly in IAPA meetings that they owe their very lives to the organization. Many others freely admit that it has been the instrument through which they have regained their property or have been released from political imprisonment. If there is a paramount message that the IAPA has for be- leaguered publishers today, it is this: You are no longer alone in your fight for the freedom of information. Your fellow pub- lishers throughout the Hemisphere are behind you, and through them all the world will hear of your case. The IAPA has a message for government, too. It is that honest government has nothing to fear from a free press, and that a free press-even though a large segment of it is critical-is actually a prop to any government that is representative of the wishes of its people. The theory of a free press is that the newspaper which does not meet a public demand or desire will perish or its influ- ence will dwindle proportionately. The newspaper which habitu- ally lies will become known as a liar, while that which strives to present the truth will be recognized for its effort. Government cannot become the arbiter of the truth of what is published, for it is about the actions of government itself, be they good or bad, that the press must inform its readers. III Let us look now at the actual fight that is going on for the maintenance of press freedom in the Americas. Those who have kept up with the subject, even superficially, know that I cannot, within the short space of this paper, give you a country-by-country analysis of what is taking place. Even the hundred or more pages of the IAPA report I have just shown you barely skim the surface in that regard. The report itself would take hours to read. I do, however, want to give you some idea of the kind of day-by-day dealings with individual heads of government and of a constant campaign in behalf of press freedom in the press itself. At least two editors-Sr. Demetrio Canelas of Los Tiempos of Cochabamba and Sr, Heroin Robleto of La Flecha, Managua, Nicaragua-have stated publicly in IAPA meetings that they owe their very lives to the organization. Many others freely admit that it has been the instrument through which they have regained their property or have been released from political imprisonment. If there is a paramount message that the IAPA has for be- leaguered publishers today, it is this: You are no longer alone in your fight for the freedom of information. Your fellow pub- lishers throughout the Hemisphere are behind you, and through them all the world will hear of your case. The IAPA has a message for government, too. It is that honest government has nothing to fear from a free press, and that a free press-even though a large segment of it is critical-is actually a prop to any government that is representative of the wishes of its people. The theory of a free press is that the newspaper which does not meet a public demand or desire will perish or its influ- ence will dwindle proportionately. The newspaper which habitu- ally lies will become known as a liar, while that which strives to present the truth will be recognized for its effort. Government cannot become the arbiter of the truth of what is published, for it is about the actions of government itself, be they good or bad, that the press must inform its readers. III Let us look now at the actual fight that is going on for the maintenance of press freedom in the Americas. Those who have kept up with the subject, even superficially, know that I cannot, within the short space of this paper, give you a country-by-country analysis of what is taking place. Even the hundred or more pages of the IAPA report I have just shown you barely skim the surface in that regard. The report itself would take hours to read. I do, however, want to give you some idea of the kind of  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 205 thing that is taking place all too frequently in many of the nations whose governments are dictatorially inclined. The most flagrant of the recent cases, and the most widely publicized, has been that of the closure of El Tiempo of BogotA in early August. It is one of the two large liberal newspapers of Colombia, and one of the greatest of all newspapers in the Spanish language today. It is a newspaper owned and brought to greatness by Eduardo Santos, former president of Colombia, under whose regime complete freedom of the press prevailed at all times. Those of you who know of Dr. Santos know that he is a man of judgment and responsibility. Two of the former editors of El Tiempo have taken part in these Caribbean con- ferences and many of you know them personally. I refer to Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and to Dr. GermAn Arciniegas, the famed Colombian author. Both of them were working newspapermen whose stamp was impressed indelibly upon the character of El Tiempo. Dr. Arciniegas pre- sented the case for El Tiempo at the recent IAPA meeting, and Dr. Lleras Camargo, who also attended the New Orleans meeting, recently resigned his position as a member of the Advisory Council of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Colombia in protest against the closing of the newspaper. The report of the Dubois committee tells in detail of the inci- dents that led up to the closing of El Tiempo and of efforts to persuade the Colombian government to allow it to reopen. As many know, El Tiempo was closed because of a cable which Sr. Roberto Garcia Pena, its editor, sent to a newspaper in Ecuador. The cable offended President Rojas Pinilla and he demanded that El Tiempo-which had not published the cable at all-run a retraction on its front page every day for thirty consecutive days. This retraction had been written by the government, but the newspaper was told it must be published as its own without indi- cating that it had not been written by it. Sr. Garcia Pena offered to run a retraction of his own or even to publish the government OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 263 thing that is taking place all too frequently in many of the nations whose governments are dictatorially inclined. The most flagrant of the recent cases, and the most widely publicized, has been that of the closure of El Tiempo of BogotA in early August. It is one of the two large liberal newspapers of Colombia, and one of the greatest of all newspapers in the Spanish language today. It is a newspaper owned and brought to greatness by Eduardo Santos, former president of Colombia, under whose regime complete freedom of the press prevailed at all times. Those of you who know of Dr. Santos know that he is a man of judgment and responsibility. Two of the former editors of El Tiempo have taken part in these Caribbean con- ferences and many of you know them personally. I refer to Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and to Dr. German Arciniegas, the famed Colombian author. Both of them were working newspapermen whose stamp was impressed indelibly upon the character of El Tiempo. Dr. Arciniegas pre- sented the case for El Tiempo at the recent IAPA meeting, and Dr. Lleras Camargo, who also attended the New Orleans meeting, recently resigned his position as a member of the Advisory Council of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Colombia in protest against the closing of the newspaper. The report of the Dubois committee tells in detail of the inci- dents that led up to the closing of El Tiempo and of efforts to persuade the Colombian government to allow it to reopen. As many know, El Tiempo was closed because of a cable which Sr. Roberto Garcia Pena, its editor, sent to a newspaper in Ecuador. The cable offended President Rojas Pinilla and he demanded that El Tiempo-which had not published the cable at all-run a retraction on its front page every day for thirty consecutive days. This retraction had been written by the government, but the newspaper was told it must be published as its own without indi- cating that it had not been written by it. Sr. Garcia Pena offered to run a retraction of his own or even to publish the government OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 263 thing that is taking place all too frequently in many of the nations whose governments are dictatorially inclined. The most flagrant of the recent cases, and the most widely publicized, has been that of the closure of El Tiempo of Bogoti in early August. It is one of the two large liberal newspapers of Colombia, and one of the greatest of all newspapers in the Spanish language today. It is a newspaper owned and brought to greatness by Eduardo Santos, former president of Colombia, under whose regime complete freedom of the press prevailed at all times. Those of you who know of Dr. Santos know that he is a man of judgment and responsibility. Two of the former editors of El Tiempo have taken part in these Caribbean con- ferences and many of you know them personally. I refer to Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, former president of Colombia and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and to Dr. German Arciniegas, the famed Colombian author. Both of them were working newspapermen whose stamp was impressed indelibly upon the character of El Tiempo. Dr. Arciniegas pre- sented the case for El Tiempo at the recent IAPA meeting, and Dr. Lleras Camargo, who also attended the New Orleans meeting, recently resigned his position as a member of the Advisory Council of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Colombia in protest against the closing of the newspaper. The report of the Dubois committee tells in detail of the inci- dents that led up to the closing of El Tiempo and of efforts to persuade the Colombian government to allow it to reopen. As many know, El Tiempo was closed because of a cable which Sr. Roberto Garcia Pena, its editor, sent to a newspaper in Ecuador. The cable offended President Rojas Pinilla and he demanded that El Tiempo-which had not published the cable at all-run a retraction on its front page every day for thirty consecutive days. This retraction had been written by the government, but the newspaper was told it must be published as its own without indi- cating that it had not been written by it. Sr. Garcia Pena offered to run a retraction of his own or even to publish the government  264 The Caribbean 264 The Caribbean 264 The Caribbean retraction as his own with certain modifications that were essen- tial. This was not permitted. Government troops silenced El Tiempo-for how long we do not know. The Dubois report uses many pages to relate in detail the inci- dents that I have outlined here. Then it goes on to tell of the use of tear gas and fire hoses to disperse demonstrations of Colombian women-led by the wives of three former presidents -who marched with petitions for the reopening of El Tiempo. It tells of the arrest and imprisonment of former employees of El Tiempo who scribbled "Viva El Tiempo" and "Viva Libertad de Prensa" on the wall of a nearby building. It tells of a great banquet in the new Hotel Tequendama in honor of publisher Santos, at which ex-President Lleras Camargo was the principal speaker. It tells of the united action of the press of the Hemisphere against the closure. It tells of a petition for the reopening of El Tiempo signed by many of the country's most prominent citizens-members of both the Liberal and Con- servative parties. This petition was taken to the presidential palace on August 16, 1955, by a group composed of ex-Foreign Ministers Luis L6pez de Mesa and Antonio Rocha, representing the Liberals, and ex-Ministers Hernin Jaramillo Ocampo and Emilio Robledo Uribe, representing the Conservatives. They were not received by the President. I quote from the conclusion of this petition: Principally we want to invoke before Your Excellency our own rights as men and citizens. They are not the rights of the news- papers alone that have been violated; they are our very own- our right to be fully informed, our right to know all opinions, our right to choose our own sources of information and to keep vigil through the press over the acts of public officials. And that is really the theme of my message to this Caribbean conference today. The report on press freedom that I listened to in New Orleans consumed two or three hours in its delivery. It always does. There are cases here and cases there. There are trends toward and away from freedom. retraction as his own with certain modifications that were essen- tial. This was not permitted. Government troops silenced El Tiempo-for how long we do not know. The Dubois report uses many pages to relate in detail the inci- dents that I have outlined here. Then it goes on to tell of the use of tear gas and fire hoses to disperse demonstrations of Colombian women-led by the wives of three former presidents -who marched with petitions for the reopening of El Tiempo. It tells of the arrest and imprisonment of former employees of El Tiempo who scribbled "Viva El Tiempo" and "Viva Libertad de Prensa" on the wall of a nearby building. It tells of a great banquet in the new Hotel Tequendama in honor of publisher Santos, at which ex-President Lleras Camargo was the principal speaker. It tells of the united action of the press of the Hemisphere against the closure. It tells of a petition for the reopening of El Tiempo signed by many of the country's most prominent citizens-members of both the Liberal and Con- servative parties. This petition was taken to the presidential palace on August 16, 1955, by a group composed of ex-Foreign Ministers Luis Ldpez de Mesa and Antonio Rocha, representing the Liberals, and ex-Ministers Hernin Jaramillo Ocampo and Emilio Robledo Uribe, representing the Conservatives. They were not received by the President. I quote from the conclusion of this petition: Principally we want to invoke before Your Excellency our own rights as men and citizens. They are not the rights of the news- papers alone that have been violated; they are our very own- our right to be fully informed, our right to know all opinions, our right to choose our own sources of information and to keep vigil through the press over the acts of public officials. And that is really the theme of my message to this Caribbean conference today. The report on press freedom that I listened to in New Orleans consumed two or three hours in its delivery. It always does. There are cases here and cases there. There are trends toward and away from freedom. retraction as his own with certain modifications that were essen- tial. This was not permitted. Government troops silenced El Tiempo-for how long we do not know. The Dubois report uses many pages to relate in detail the inci- dents that I have outlined here. Then it goes on to tell of the use of tear gas and fire hoses to disperse demonstrations of Colombian women-led by the wives of three former presidents -who marched with petitions for the reopening of El Tiempo. It tells of the arrest and imprisonment of former employees of El Tiempo who scribbled "Viva El Tiempo" and "Viva Libertad de Prensa" on the wall of a nearby building. It tells of a great banquet in the new Hotel Tequendama in honor of publisher Santos, at which ex-President Lleras Camargo was the principal speaker. It tells of the united action of the press of the Hemisphere against the closure. It tells of a petition for the reopening of El Tiempo signed by many of the country's most prominent citizens-members of both the Liberal and Con- servative parties. This petition was taken to the presidential palace on August 16, 1955, by a group composed of ex-Foreign Ministers Luis L6pez de Mesa and Antonio Rocha, representing the Liberals, and ex-Ministers Herndn Jaramillo Ocampo and Emilio Robledo Uribe, representing the Conservatives. They were not received by the President. I quote from the conclusion of this petition: Principally we want to invoke before Your Excellency our own rights as men and citizens. They are not the rights of the news- papers alone that have been violated; they are our very own- our right to be fully informed, our right to know all opinions, our right to choose our own sources of information and to keep vigil through the press over the acts of public officials. And that is really the theme of my message to this Caribbean conference today. The report on press freedom that I listened to in New Orleans consumed two or three hours in its delivery. It always does. There are cases here and cases there. There are trends toward and away from freedom.  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 265 There is Colombia, occupying forty-one pages of the report and its appendices. There is also Mexico, on which the entire report is as follows: There is freedom of the press. Once again President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines has publicly enun- ciated that this freedom will continue inviolate. In his State of the Nation speech to Congress on September 1, he emphasized: "I reiterate that freedom of expression, religious beliefs, press and work will be maintained without restrictions." Which are we to have in the future-the conditions that prevail in Mexico or the conditions that prevail in Colombia? IV The Inter-American Press Association is working around the clock and throughout the entire year in order that genuine free- dom of the press may prevail in the part of the world from which it draws its membership. When you give the Inter-American Press Association your moral backing in cases such as those of La Prensa of Buenos Aires, El Intransigente of Salta, Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, La Nacidn of La Paz, El Comercio of Quito, and El Tiempo of Bogoti, you will be saying in effect with those Colombian citizens who petitioned for the reopening of El Tiempo-"They are not the rights of the newspapers alone that have been violated; they are our very own. . . . OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 265 There is Colombia, occupying forty-one pages of the report and its appendices. There is also Mexico, on which the entire report is as follows: There is freedom of the press. Once again President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines has publicly enun- ciated that this freedom will continue inviolate. In his State of the Nation speech to Congress on September 1, he emphasized: "I reiterate that freedom of expression, religious beliefs, press and work will be maintained without restrictions." Which are we to have in the future-the conditions that prevail in Mexico or the conditions that prevail in Colombia? IV The Inter-American Press Association is working around the clock and throughout the entire year in order that genuine free- dom of the press may prevail in the part of the world from which it draws its membership. When you give the Inter-American Press Association your moral backing in cases such as those of La Prensa of Buenos Aires, El Intransigente of Salta, Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, La Nacidon of La Paz, El Comercio of Quito, and El Tiempo of Bogota, you will be saying in effect with those Colombian citizens who petitioned for the reopening of El Tiempo-"They are not the rights of the newspapers alone that have been violated; they are our very own. . . . OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 265 There is Colombia, occupying forty-one pages of the report and its appendices. There is also Mexico, on which the entire report is as follows: There is freedom of the press. Once again President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines has publicly enun- ciated that this freedom will continue inviolate. In his State of the Nation speech to Congress on September 1, he emphasized: "I reiterate that freedom of expression, religious beliefs, press and work will be maintained without restrictions." Which are we to have in the future-the conditions that prevail in Mexico or the conditions that prevail in Colombia? IV The Inter-American Press Association is working around the clock and throughout the entire year in order that genuine free- dom of the press may prevail in the part of the world from which it draws its membership. When you give the Inter-American Press Association your moral backing in cases such as those of La Prensa of Buenos Aires, El Intransigente of Salta, Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, La Nacion of La Paz, El Comercio of Quito, and El Tiempo of Bogota, you will be saying in effect with those Colombian citizens who petitioned for the reopening of El Tiempo-"They are not the rights of the newspapers alone that have been violated; they are our very own. . . .  18 Dana G. Munro: CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE, REPUBLICAN gov- ernment in Latin America is a matter in which the United States has long taken a lively interest. If we study the history of our relations with the other American states, and particularly the history of our relations with the states of the Caribbean, we find repeatedly expressed the idea that the worst problems of these countries-the internal disorder and the financial disorgani- zation that frequently threaten their very independence-would be well on the way to solution if they could only have constitu- tional governments placed in office by free and fair elections. The United States has endeavored to help bring about the existence of such governments in some of the states where conditions were especially bad. The ways in which we have tried to exert our influence have changed over the years, but the basic idea has not. Today we are especially aware that a common belief in democ- racy, as opposed to any brand of totalitarianism, must be the basis of inter-American solidarity. It is more important than ever that our national policies should be directed toward helping the other American countries to create conditions where democ- racy can flourish. Twenty-five years ago this seemed a somewhat simpler matter than it does today. At that time many of us thought that Latin America was moving rather rapidly toward a democracy much 266 Dana G. Munro: CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE, REPUBLICAN gov- ernment in Latin America is a matter in which the United States has long taken a lively interest. If we study the history of our relations with the other American states, and particularly the history of our relations with the states of the Caribbean, we find repeatedly expressed the idea that the worst problems of these countries-the internal disorder and the financial disorgani- zation that frequently threaten their very independence-would be well on the way to solution if they could only have constitu- tional governments placed in office by free and fair elections. The United States has endeavored to help bring about the existence of such governments in some of the states where conditions were especially bad. The ways in which we have tried to exert our influence have changed over the years, but the basic idea has not. Today we are especially aware that a common belief in democ- racy, as opposed to any brand of totalitarianism, must be the basis of inter-American solidarity. It is more important than ever that our national policies should be directed toward helping the other American countries to create conditions where democ- racy can flourish. Twenty-five years ago this seemed a somewhat simpler matter than it does today. At that time many of us thought that Latin America was moving rather rapidly toward a democracy much 266 Dana G. Munro: CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE, REPUBLICAN gov- ernment in Latin America is a matter in which the United States has long taken a lively interest. If we study the history of our relations with the other American states, and particularly the history of our relations with the states of the Caribbean, we find repeatedly expressed the idea that the worst problems of these countries-the internal disorder and the financial disorgani- zation that frequently threaten their very independence-would be well on the way to solution if they could only have constitu- tional governments placed in office by free and fair elections. The United States has endeavored to help bring about the existence of such governments in some of the states where conditions were especially bad. The ways in which we have tried to exert our influence have changed over the years, but the basic idea has not. Today we are especially aware that a common belief in democ- racy, as opposed to any brand of totalitarianism, must be the basis of inter-American solidarity. It is more important than ever that our national policies should be directed toward helping the other American countries to create conditions where democ- racy can flourish. Twenty-five years ago this seemed a somewhat simpler matter than it does today. At that time many of us thought that Latin America was moving rather rapidly toward a democracy much 266  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 267 like our own. In several countries, constitutional procedures and free elections appeared to have taken the place of dictatorships and revolutions. It seemed unlikely that people who had once had experience with real republican government would permit a return of the old conditions, and it seemed reasonable to hope that the example of the more fortunate states would encourage the people of other countries to assert their right to have govern- ments of the same sort. It was clear that illiteracy and poverty and bad social conditions would make progress slow in some cases, but there was no reason why these obstacles should not eventually he overcome. Active efforts to help overcome them were an important part of the Good Neighbor Policy. Today it is more difficult to be quite so optimistic. The 1930's saw the rise of a whole new crop of rulers who came into power or kept themselves in power by force. Several of these were over- thrown after World War II by political groups that demanded more democratic governments, but few of these groups had any lasting success. In the past ten years there have been bloody civil wars in some of the countries that once prided themselves on their stability, and dictatorships have reappeared in countries that had free elections prior to 1930. It would be wrong, of course, to paint the picture too dark. Progress is always a matter of ups and downs, and this is espe- cially true where changes in political traditions are involved. A temporary breakdown of constitutional government in a few coun- tries does not mean that the people of Latin America as a whole are not advancing toward political maturity. Nevertheless, recent events in countries like Colombia and Costa Rica and Argentina make one wonder whether we should not reconsider some of our ideas about the way in which Latin American political institutions are going to develop. We have tended to assume, I think, that what our neighbors want, or ought to want, and what they should ultimately attain, is a democratic government much like our own. Are these assumptions justified? It is hardly necessary to point out how important this question OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 40 I like our own. In several countries, constitutional procedures and free elections appeared to have taken the place of dictatorships and revolutions. It seemed unlikely that people who had once had experience with real republican government would permit a return of the old conditions, and it seemed reasonable to hope that the example of the more fortunate states would encourage the people of other countries to assert their right to have govern- ments of the same sort. It was clear that illiteracy and poverty and bad social conditions would make progress slow in some cases, but there was no reason why these obstacles should not eventually be overcome. Active efforts to help overcome them were an important part of the Good Neighbor Policy. Today it is more difficult to be quite so optimistic. The 1930's saw the rise of a whole new crop of rulers who came into power or kept themselves in power by force. Several of these were over- thrown after World War II by political groups that demanded more democratic governments, but few of these groups had any lasting success. In the past ten years there have been bloody civil wars in some of the countries that once prided themselves on their stability, and dictatorships have reappeared in countries that had free elections prior to 1930. It would be wrong, of course, to paint the picture too dark. Progress is always a matter of ups and downs, and this is espe- cially true where changes in political traditions are involved. A temporary breakdown of constitutional government in a few coun- tries does not mean that the people of Latin America as a whole are not advancing toward political maturity. Nevertheless, recent events in countries like Colombia and Costa Rica and Argentina make one wonder whether we should not reconsider some of our ideas about the way in which Latin American political institutions are going to develop. We have tended to assume, I think, that what our neighbors want, or ought to want, and what they should ultimately attain, is a democratic government much like our own. Are these assumptions justified? It is hardly necessary to point out how important this question OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 267 like our own. In several countries, constitutional procedures and free elections appeared to have taken the place of dictatorships and revolutions. It seemed unlikely that people who had once had experience with real republican government would permit a return of the old conditions, and it seemed reasonable to hope that the example of the more fortunate states would encourage the people of other countries to assert their right to have govern- ments of the same sort. It was clear that illiteracy and poverty and bad social conditions would make progress slow in some cases, but there was no reason why these obstacles should not eventually be overcome. Active efforts to help overcome them were an important part of the Good Neighbor Policy. Today it is more difficult to be quite so optimistic. The 1930's saw the rise of a whole new crop of rulers who came into power or kept themselves in power by force. Several of these were over- thrown after World War II by political groups that demanded more democratic governments, but few of these groups had any lasting success. In the past ten years there have been bloody civil wars in some of the countries that once prided themselves on their stability, and dictatorships have reappeared in countries that had free elections prior to 1930. It would be wrong, of course, to paint the picture too dark. Progress is always a matter of ups and downs, and this is espe- cially true where changes in political traditions are involved. A temporary breakdown of constitutional government in a few coun- tries does not mean that the people of Latin America as a whole are not advancing toward political maturity. Nevertheless, recent events in countries like Colombia and Costa Rica and Argentina make one wonder whether we should not reconsider some of our ideas about the way in which Latin American political institutions are going to develop. We have tended to assume, I think, that what our neighbors want, or ought to want, and what they should ultimately attain, is a democratic government much like our own. Are these assumptions justified? It is hardly necessary to point out how important this question  268 The Caribbean 268 The Caribbean 268 The Caribbean is from the standpoint of our national policy. In the nature of things, whether we want to or not, the United States government and North American public opinion are going to exert an impor- tant influence on the political development of many of the Latin American countries, and this influence will not be helpful if it is misdirected. If a lot of the people who talk and write about Latin American affairs take a hostile attitude toward a government in one of the nearby republics, our diplomatic relations with that government are affected and the government's position is made more difficult. No one can ask us to refrain from criticizing actions that we disapprove, and often such criticism is proper and desirable, but it will not be very helpful if it is based on false assumptions or unreasonable expectations. Every student of Latin American affairs knows, of course, that Latin American political traditions are different from ours and that their political evolution has followed a different course. We have a fair understanding of the factors that have made it hard to achieve stable republican governments. But we have given less attention to the question whether a stable republican govern- ment, modelled on that of the United States, is really what the people of Latin America want, or perhaps what they ought to want-the goal which enlightened statesmen can reasonably hope to attain. Is it not possible that their political evolution is likely to follow somewhat different lines, resulting, as we must hope, in government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but in a constitutional political system more adapted to their own in- herited political traditions and psychology? Have we not perhaps assumed too readily that political traditions and psychology were obstacles to be overcome in the quest for good government, rather than factors that must be taken into account in any effort to say what a good government for Latin America would be? Is it not somewhat presumptuous, in fact, to think that our neighbors should change their way of looking at political matters is from the standpoint of our national policy. In the nature of things, whether we want to or not, the United States government and North American public opinion are going to exert an impor- tant influence on the political development of many of the Latin American countries, and this influence will not be helpful if it is misdirected. If a lot of the people who talk and write about Latin American affairs take a hostile attitude toward a government in one of the nearby republics, our diplomatic relations with that government are affected and the government's position is made more difficult. No one can ask us to refrain from criticizing actions that we disapprove, and often such criticism is proper and desirable, but it will not be very helpful if it is based on false assumptions or unreasonable expectations. Every student of Latin American affairs knows, of course, that Latin American political traditions are different from ours and that their political evolution has followed a different course. We have a fair understanding of the factors that have made it hard to achieve stable republican governments. But we have given less attention to the question whether a stable republican govern- ment, modelled on that of the United States, is really what the people of Latin America want, or perhaps what they ought to want-the goal which enlightened statesmen can reasonably hope to attain. Is it not possible that their political evolution is likely to follow somewhat different lines, resulting, as we must hope, in government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but in a constitutional political system more adapted to their own in- herited political traditions and psychology? Have we not perhaps assumed too readily that political traditions and psychology were obstacles to be overcome in the quest for good government, rather than factors that must be taken into account in any effort to say what a good government for Latin America would be? Is it not somewhat presumptuous, in fact, to think that our neighbors should change their way of looking at political matters is from the standpoint of our national policy. In the nature of things, whether we want to or not, the United States government and North American public opinion are going to exert an impor- tant influence on the political development of many of the Latin American countries, and this influence will not be helpful if it is misdirected. If a lot of the people who talk and write about Latin American affairs take a hostile attitude toward a government in one of the nearby republics, our diplomatic relations with that government are affected and the government's position is made more difficult. No one can ask us to refrain from criticizing actions that we disapprove, and often such criticism is proper and desirable, but it will not be very helpful if it is based on false assumptions or unreasonable expectations. Every student of Latin American affairs knows, of course, that Latin American political traditions are different from ours and that their political evolution has followed a different course. We have a fair understanding of the factors that have made it hard to achieve stable republican governments. But we have given less attention to the question whether a stable republican govern- ment. modelled on that of the United States, is really what the people of Latin America want, or perhaps what they ought to want-the goal which enlightened statesmen can reasonably hope to attain. Is it not possible that their political evolution is likely to follow somewhat different lines, resulting, as we must hope, in government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but in a constitutional political system more adapted to their own in- herited political traditions and psychology? Have we not perhaps assumed too readily that political traditions and psychology were obstacles to be overcome in the quest for good government, rather than factors that must be taken into account in any effort to say what a good government for Latin America would be? Is it not somewhat presumptuous, in fact, to think that our neighbors should change their way of looking at political matters  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 269 in order to make their governments conform to our ideas? Take, for example, the attitude toward constitutions. In the United States we regard the constitution as the permanent, supreme law of the land. In most Latin American countries it is the law of the land until it becomes inconvenient to abide by its provisions. Here, even a very popular president with a strong majority behind him may find it impossible to carry out a program that conflicts with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitution. In Latin America, a president can and does suspend the operation of parts of the constitution when he considers it necessary, or abrogates the whole constitution if he thinks that a new one is needed. He may be criticized, but most of the criticism will come from people who do not like him anyway, and the people who do like him will usually go on supporting him. Public opinion in general may feel that he is doing the right thing. In the United States, a president serves out his constitutional term even though his policies become extremely unpopular. In Latin America, even in the most stable countries a man who has come into office through a free election may be thrown out by force, with general public approval, if he proves incompetent or if he loses his popular support. We prefer our system, but many Latin Americans probably think that theirs is more sensible and better suited to the conditions that exist in their countries. Can we assume that this difference is one that will disappear as time goes on, or would it be more realistic to suppose that it may continue to exist? And are we always justified in criticizing Latin American governments, as we often do, because they do not conform to our ideas of constitutional procedure? II The attitude toward the constitution is one facet of a general attitude toward government which is somewhat different from ours. Professor Tannenbaum, in a very interesting article pub- lished six years ago in Foreign Affairs, stressed the point that the president of Mexico is expected to rule, that he must be able to OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 269 OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 269 in order to make their governments conform to our ideas? Take, in order to make their governments conform to our ideas? Take, for example, the attitude toward constitutions. In the United for example, the attitude toward constitutions. In the United States we regard the constitution as the permanent, supreme law States we regard the constitution as the permanent, supreme law of the land. In most Latin American countries it is the law of of the land. In most Latin American countries it is the law of the land until it becomes inconvenient to abide by its provisions. the land until it becomes inconvenient to abide by its provisions. Here, even a very popular president with a strong majority behind Here, even a very popular president with a strong majority behind him may find it impossible to carry out a program that conflicts him may find it impossible to carry out a program that conflicts with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitution. In with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitution. In Latin America, a president can and does suspend the operation Latin America, a president can and does suspend the operation of parts of the constitution when he considers it necessary, or of parts of the constitution when he considers it necessary, or abrogates the whole constitution if he thinks that a new one is abrogates the whole constitution if he thinks that a new one is needed. He may be criticized, but most of the criticism will needed. He may be criticized, but most of the criticism will come from people who do not like him anyway, and the people come from people who do not like him anyway, and the people who do like him will usually go on supporting him. Public who do like him will usually go on supporting him. Public opinion in general may feel that he is doing the right thing. opinion in general may feel that he is doing the right thing. In the United States, a president serves out his constitutional In the United States, a president serves out his constitutional term even though his policies become extremely unpopular. In term even though his policies become extremely unpopular. In Latin America, even in the most stable countries a man who has Latin America, even in the most stable countries a man who has come into office through a free election may be thrown out by come into ofice through a free election may he thrown out by force, with general public approval, if he proves incompetent or force, with general public approval, if he proves incompetent or if he loses his popular support. We prefer our system, but many if he loses his popular support. We prefer our system, but many Latin Americans probably think that theirs is more sensible and Latin Americans probably think that theirs is more sensible and better suited to the conditions that exist in their countries. Can better suited to the conditions that exist in their countries. Can we assume that this difference is one that will disappear as time we assume that this difference is one that will disappear as time goes on, or would it be more realistic to suppose that it may goes on, or would it be more realistic to suppose that it may continue to exist? And are we always justified in criticizing continue to exist? And are we always justified in criticizing Latin American governments, as we often do, because they do Latin American governments, as we often do, because they do not conform to our ideas of constitutional procedure? not conform to our ideas of constitutional procedure? II II The attitude toward the constitution is one facet of a general attitude toward government which is somewhat different from ours. Professor Tannenbaum, in a very interesting article pub- lished six years ago in Foreign Affairs, stressed the point that the president of Mexico is expected to rule, that he must be able to The attitude toward the constitution is one facet of a general attitude toward government which is somewhat different from ours. Professor Tannenbaum, in a very interesting article pub- lished six years ago in Foreign Affairs, stressed the point that the president of Mexico is expected to rule, that he must be able to  270 The Caribbean do everything he wants to do or he will be unable to do anything he wants to do. I think that this is true to a considerable degree in most of Latin America, even in countries where the legislature is freely elected and the judiciary is relatively independent. With all of the tremendous authority that the president of the United States has, we don't speak of his "coming into power," but the Latin American president must exercise power (el poder) and he must convince the public that he is the real head of the govern- ment. If he cannot control the congress, for example, the situa- tion is much more difficult than it is in the United States when the opposition party has a majority in both houses. He may find it necessary to dissolve the legislative body and rule by decree, and he may he supported in such action by public opinion. If the people feel that a president is not strong, his administration will be ineffective and possibly short-lived. This predilection for strong personal leadership is a factor with which we are all familiar. It operates in many other ways to make the political process in Latin America different from ours. It is not always easy for us, with our quite different ideas about the conduct to be expected of statesmen, to understand what are the qualities that make a leader popular, but courage and determi- nation are certainly among the more important ones. People adhere to a leader for what he is. The policies that he stands for seem less important. There are many instances in Latin American history where a leader has changed sides on bitterly contested questions of policy, or has made mistakes that would have ruined an Anglo-Saxon politician, without losing his personal following. III The relationship of the armed forces to the government is another example. We consider the subordination of the military to the political authority a prerequisite for real republican gov- ernment. We do not like to see political questions settled by the use of armed force. In Latin America, from the time of inde- 270 The Caribbean do everything he wants to do or he will be unable to do anything he wants to do. I think that this is true to a considerable degree in most of Latin America, even in countries where the legislature is freely elected and the judiciary is relatively independent. With all of the tremendous authority that the president of the United States has, we don't speak of his "coming into power," but the Latin American president must exercise power (el poder) and he must convince the public that he is the real head of the govern- ment. If he cannot control the congress, for example, the situa- tion is much more difficult than it is in the United States when the opposition party has a majority in both houses. He may find it necessary to dissolve the legislative body and rule by decree, and he may be supported in such action by public opinion. If the people feel that a president is not strong, his administration will be ineffective and possibly short-lived. This predilection for strong personal leadership is a factor with which we are all familiar. It operates in many other ways to make the political process in Latin America different from ours. It is not always easy for us, with our quite different ideas about the conduct to be expected of statesmen, to understand what are the qualities that make a leader popular, but courage and determi- nation are certainly among the more important ones. People adhere to a leader for what he is. The policies that he stands for seem less important. There are many instances in Latin American history where a leader has changed sides on bitterly contested questions of policy, or has made mistakes that would have ruined an Anglo-Saxon politician, without losing his personal following. III The relationship of the armed forces to the government is another example. We consider the subordination of the military to the political authority a prerequisite for real republican gov- ernment. We do not like to see political questions settled by the use of armed force. In Latin America, from the time of inde- 270 The Caribbean do everything he wants to do or he will be unable to do anything he wants to do. I think that this is true to a considerable degree in most of Latin America, even in countries where the legislature is freely elected and the judiciary is relatively independent. With all of the tremendous authority that the president of the United States has, we don't speak of his "coming into power," but the Latin American president must exercise power (el poder) and he must convince the public that he is the real head of the govern- ment. If he cannot control the congress, for example, the situa- tion is much more difficult than it is in the United States when the opposition party has a majority in both houses. He may find it necessary to dissolve the legislative body and rule by decree, and he may be supported in such action by public opinion. If the people feel that a president is not strong, his administration will be ineffective and possibly short-lived. This predilection for strong personal leadership is a factor with which we are all familiar. It operates in many other ways to make the political process in Latin America different from ours. It is not always easy for us, with our quite different ideas about the conduct to be expected of statesmen, to understand what are the qualities that make a leader popular, but courage and determi- nation are certainly among the more important ones. People adhere to a leader for what he is. The policies that he stands for seem less important. There are many instances in Latin American history where a leader has changed sides on bitterly contested questions of policy, or has made mistakes that would have ruined an Anglo-Saxon politician, without losing his personal following. III The relationship of the armed forces to the government is another example. We consider the subordination of the military to the political authority a prerequisite for real republican gov- ernment. We do not like to see political questions settled by the use of armed force. In Latin America, from the time of inde-  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 271 pendence, political questions have usually been settled by force. This has often been true even when the governments were con- trolled by civilian political leaders, or when the administration had come into office by election. Sometimes a president is so strongly supported by public opinion that he can afford to ignore and neglect the army, but not very often. The power and influence of the regular military establishment has in fact increased in recent years, because its efficiency has increased and because it is now usually the only group that can use force. A century ago any political leader could raise an army among his friends and followers, and could equip it with guns furnished by friends abroad or taken out of hiding places where they had been stored after the last civil war, and such an army could hope to overcome the equally untrained and ill-equipped forces of the government. Today, the army has tanks and air- planes, which insurgents cannot obtain so easily. The soldiers are usually better trained and the officers are usually profes- sionals. In most of the Latin American countries a revolt is possible only if part of the army joins it, and a change of govern- ment, even as the outcome of a free election, can take place only if the army consents. We should consider such a situation intolerable in the United States, and we deprecate the existence of military governments in Latin America. But are we justified in assuming the militarism is something that must be eradicated if Latin America is to progress toward better government? Will it be possible, in the foreseeable future, for governments to rely solely on respect for law and the force of public opinion to maintain their authority? Or is the idea that the government must always be prepared to assert its authority by force so deeply ingrained in the Latin American political tradition that it must simply be accepted as one of the facts of life? In Latin America one expects the man who has power to use it, and I suspect that a military chief who permitted civilian politicians to do something that he considered thoroughly wrong OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 271 OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 271 pendence, political questions have usually been settled by force. pendence, political questions have usually been settled by force. This has often been true even when the governments were con- This has often been true even when the governments were con- trolled by civilian political leaders, or when the administration had trolled by civilian political leaders, or when the administration had come into office by election. Sometimes a president is so strongly come into office by election. Sometimes a president is so strongly supported by public opinion that he can afford to ignore and supported by public opinion that he can afford to ignore and neglect the army, but not very often. neglect the army, but not very often. The power and influence of the regular military establishment The power and influence of the regular military establishment has in fact increased in recent years, because its efficiency has has in fact increased in recent years, because its efficiency has increased and because it is now usually the only group that can increased and because it is now usually the only group that can use force. A century ago any political leader could raise an army use force. A century ago any political leader could raise an army among his friends and followers, and could equip it with guns among his friends and followers, and could equip it with guns furnished by friends abroad or taken out of hiding places where furnished by friends abroad or taken out of hiding places where they had been stored after the last civil war, and such an army they had been stored after the last civil war, and such an army could hope to overcome the equally untrained and ill-equipped could hope to overcome the equally untrained and ill-equipped forces of the government. Today, the army has tanks and air- forces of the government. Today, the army has tanks and air- planes, which insurgents cannot obtain so easily. The soldiers planes, which insurgents cannot obtain so easily. The soldiers are usually better trained and the officers are usually profes- are usually better trained and the officers are usually profes- sionals. In most of the Latin American countries a revolt is sionals. In most of the Latin American countries a revolt is possible only if part of the army joins it, and a change of govern- possible only if part of the army joins it, and a change of govern- ment, even as the outcome of a free election, can take place only ment, even as the outcome of a free election, can take place only if the army consents. if the army consents. We should consider such a situation intolerable in the United We should consider such a situation intolerable in the United States, and we deprecate the existence of military governments States, and we deprecate the existence of military governments in Latin America. But are we justified in assuming the militarism in Latin America. But are we justified in assuming the militarism is something that must be eradicated if Latin America is to is something that must be eradicated if Latin America is to progress toward better government? Will it be possible, in the progress toward better government? Will it be possible, in the foreseeable future, for governments to rely solely on respect for foreseeable future, for governments to rely solely on respect for law and the force of public opinion to maintain their authority? law and the force of public opinion to maintain their authority? Or is the idea that the government must always be prepared to Or is the idea that the government must always be prepared to assert its authority by force so deeply ingrained in the Latin assert its authority by force so deeply ingrained in the Latin American political tradition that it must simply be accepted as American political tradition that it must simply be accepted as one of the facts of life? one of the facts of life? In Latin America one expects the man who has power to use In Latin America one expects the man who has power to use it, and I suspect that a military chief who permitted civilian it, and I suspect that a military chief who permitted civilian politicians to do something that he considered thoroughly wrong politicians to do something that he considered thoroughly wrong  272 The Caribbean would be less likely to be praised for respecting the constitution than to be criticized for failing to do his duty. In this connection Gilberto Freyre makes some very interesting observations in an article on Brazil published in a recent number of Foreign Affairs. In Brazil, he says, the army "has considered that one of its great responsibilities as a national force was to take the place of the Crown as an influence above parties in Brazilian national life. During the monarchical period it was corrective influence which in critical days prevented abuses of power by any individual or group-political, economic, ideological, or religious." More re- cently the Vargas regime was "tolerated but supervised by a socially democratic though politically protective Army." This statement, by a very intelligent citizen of one of the countries that is apparently making the most rapid progress toward demo- cratic government, seems to me an extremely suggestive one. There are other countries in Latin America where the armed forces have at times assumed a somewhat similar role. It is unfair to think that their intervention in politics is always motivated primarily by a selfish desire to seize power for the benefit of a few leaders. There have been cases in recent years, like the over- throw of the Laureano Grmez regime in Colombia and the 1955 revolution in Argentina, where the purpose was to correct a situation that the officers considered bad for the country and where the armed forces acted with the approval of a large part of the civilian population. We may feel, as many Latin Americans do, that there could be better ways of dealing with problems, but the point is that Latin Americans, even in countries which are among the most advanced in political development, often choose to deal with them this way. IV When we consider the implications of some of these elements in the Latin American political tradition, it becomes more difficult to classify Latin American governments as good, democratic ad- ministrations on the one hand, and bad, dictatorial regimes on 272 The Caribbean 272 The Caribbean would be less likely to be praised for respecting the constitution than to be criticized for failing to do his duty. In this connection Gilberto Freyre makes some very interesting observations in an article on Brazil published in a recent number of Foreign Affairs. In Brazil, he says, the army "has considered that one of its great responsibilities as a national force was to take the place of the Crown as an influence above parties in Brazilian national life. During the monarchical period it was corrective influence which in critical days prevented abuses of power by any individual or group-political, economic, ideological, or religious." More re- cently the Vargas regime was "tolerated but supervised by a socially democratic though politically protective Army." This statement, by a very intelligent citizen of one of the countries that is apparently making the most rapid progress toward demo- cratic government, seems to me an extremely suggestive one. There are other countries in Latin America where the armed forces have at times assumed a somewhat similar role. It is unfair to think that their intervention in politics is always motivated primarily by a selfish desire to seize power for the benefit of a few leaders. There have been cases in recent years, like the over- throw of the Laureano Gmez regime in Colombia and the 1955 revolution in Argentina, where the purpose was to correct a situation that the officers considered bad for the country and where the armed forces acted with the approval of a large part of the civilian population. We may feel, as many Latin Americans do, that there could be better ways of dealing with problems, but the point is that Latin Americans, even in countries which are among the most advanced in political development, often choose to deal with them this way. IV When we consider the implications of some of these elements in the Latin American political tradition, it becomes more difficult to classify Latin American governments as good, democratic ad- ministrations on the one hand, and bad, dictatorial regimes on would be less likely to be praised for respecting the constitution than to be criticized for failing to do his duty. In this connection Gilberto Freyre makes some very interesting observations in an article on Brazil published in a recent number of Foreign Affairs. In Brazil, he says, the army "has considered that one of its great responsibilities as a national force was to take the place of the Crown as an influence above parties in Brazilian national life. During the monarchical period it was corrective influence which in critical days prevented abuses of power by any individual or group-political, economic, ideological, or religious." More re- cently the Vargas regime was "tolerated but supervised by a socially democratic though politically protective Army." This statement, by a very intelligent citizen of one of the countries that is apparently making the most rapid progress toward demo- cratic government, seems to me an extremely suggestive one. There are other countries in Latin America where the armed forces have at times assumed a somewhat similar role. It is unfair to think that their intervention in politics is always motivated primarily by a selfish desire to seize power for the benefit of a few leaders. There have been cases in recent years, like the over- throw of the Laureano Gsmez regime in Colombia and the 1955 revolution in Argentina, where the purpose was to correct a situation that the officers considered bad for the country and where the armed forces acted with the approval of a large part of the civilian population. We may feel, as many Latin Americans do, that there could be better ways of dealing with problems, but the point is that Latin Americans, even in countries which are among the most advanced in political development, often choose to deal with them this way. IV When we consider the implications of some of these elements in the Latin American political tradition, it becomes more difficult to classify Latin American governments as good, democratic ad- ministrations on the one hand, and bad, dictatorial regimes on  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 273 the other. We would like to see democratic constitutional govern- ments in all of the other American states, and we shall want to help to create conditions wvhere such governments can flourish. We must do so, however, within the framework of a scrupulous respect for the right of our neighbors to make their own decisions. We have to realize that their idea of the best way to deal with political problems may be quite different from ours, and that even a dictatorship may at times represent the wishes of a majority of the people. This does not mean that we should give moral or material support to all dictatorships. We can have no sympathy for a regime that is thoroughly corrupt or that maintains its power by brutal repression, but we must be wary of assuming that a dictatorship is always "bad," even though we hear loud complaints from its opponents. It is true that a dictatorship is always, or almost always, a very undesirable form of government for any country, if only because it usually tends to become corrupt and oppressive, but under some conditions it may be the alternative to something worse. Some of the conditions that seem to us to be obstacles to stable republican institutions in Latin America will doubtless become less important as time goes on, but other inherited ways of doing things and ways of looking at things will probably always make their kind of democratic government different from ours. This does not mean that it will not be a good government. And if we take into consideration the facts of life in Latin American politics, the setbacks to democracy in some of the Latin American coun- tries during the past quarter century seem more apparent than real. It is unfortunate that dictators should replace freely elected presidents or that civil wars should break out in countries where stable republican governments seemed to be firmly established, but these events do not mean that the people of the continent as a whole are not making very real progress toward constitutional democracy. It seems to me that they are. There are many countries where elections are beginning to mean more than they did in the nine- OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 273 the other. We would like to see democratic constitutional govern- ments in all of the other American states, and we shall want to help to create conditions where such governments can flourish. We must do so, however, within the framework of a scrupulous respect for the right of our neighbors to make their own decisions. We have to realize that their idea of the best way to deal with political problems may be quite different from ours, and that even a dictatorship may at times represent the wishes of a majority of the people. This does not mean that we should give moral or material support to all dictatorships. We can have no sympathy for a regime that is thoroughly corrupt or that maintains its power by brutal repression, but we must be wary of assuming that a dictatorship is always "bad," even though we hear loud complaints from its opponents. It is true that a dictatorship is always, or almost always, a very undesirable form of government for any country, if only because it usually tends to become corrupt and oppressive, but under some conditions it may be the alternative to something worse. Some of the conditions that seem to us to be obstacles to stable republican institutions in Latin America will doubtless become less important as time goes on, but other inherited ways of doing things and ways of looking at things will probably always make their kind of democratic government different from ours. This does not mean that it will not be a good government. And if we take into consideration the facts of life in Latin American politics, the setbacks to democracy in some of the Latin American coun- tries during the past quarter century seem more apparent than real. It is unfortunate that dictators should replace freely elected presidents or that civil wars should break out in countries where stable republican governments seemed to be firmly established, but these events do not mean that the people of the continent as a whole are not making very real progress toward constitutional democracy. It seems to me that they are. There are many countries where elections are beginning to mean more than they did in the nine- OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 273 the other. We would like to see democratic constitutional govern- ments in all of the other American states, and we shall want to help to create conditions where such governments can flourish. We must do so, however, within the framework of a scrupulous respect for the right of our neighbors to make their own decisions. We have to realize that their idea of the best way to deal with political problems may be quite different from ours, and that even a dictatorship may at times represent the wishes of a majority of the people. This does not mean that we should give moral or material support to all dictatorships. We can have no sympathy for a regime that is thoroughly corrupt or that maintains its power by brutal repression, but we must be wary of assuming that a dictatorship is always "bad," even though we hear loud complaints from its opponents. It is true that a dictatorship is always, or almost always, a very undesirable form of government for any country, if only because it usually tends to become corrupt and oppressive, but under some conditions it may be the alternative to something worse. Some of the conditions that seem to us to be obstacles to stable republican institutions in Latin America will doubtless become less important as time goes on, but other inherited ways of doing things and ways of looking at things will probably always make their kind of democratic government different from ours. This does not mean that it will not be a good government. And if we take into consideration the facts of life in Latin American politics, the setbacks to democracy in some of the Latin American coun- tries during the past quarter century seem more apparent than real. It is unfortunate that dictators should replace freely elected presidents or that civil wars should break out in countries where stable republican governments seemed to be firmly established, but these events do not mean that the people of the continent as a whole are not making very real progress toward constitutional democracy. It seems to me that they are. There are many countries where elections are beginning to mean more than they did in the nine-  274 The Caribbean 274 The Caribbean 274 The Caribbean teenth century, when they were often a mere farce in which only the official candidates had any chance. The number of people who demand an opportunity to vote and to have their votes counted has increased greatly, and it is more difficult than it used to be to disregard the result of the voting. Almost every- where the leaders are beginning to have to consider the interests and the wishes of new groups-the lower middle class and the urban workers, and even the rural workers-whose participation in politics was hitherto unimportant. These changes, however, are coming at a time when grave economic and social problems- arising from inflation, rapid industrialization, and excesses of economic nationalism-have subjected the whole political system to strains and stresses which make the orderly development of republican institutions more difficult; and it is not surprising that political conflicts should be more violent than they were in the relatively prosperous and tranquil first decades of the century. We may have some misgivings about what may happen in the immediate future. But for the long run, there is little reason to doubt that the determination to achieve democratic constitu- tional government, which has always been so potent a force in Latin American history, will not persist. teenth century, when they were often a mere farce in which only the official candidates had any chance. The number of people who demand an opportunity to vote and to have their votes counted has increased greatly, and it is more difficult than it used to be to disregard the result of the voting. Almost every- where the leaders are beginning to have to consider the interests and the wishes of new groups-the lower middle class and the urban workers, and even the rural workers-whose participation in politics was hitherto unimportant. These changes, however, are coming at a time when grave economic and social problems- arising from inflation, rapid industrialization, and excesses of economic nationalism-have subjected the whole political system to strains and stresses which make the orderly development of republican institutions more difficult; and it is not surprising that political conflicts should be more violent than they were in the relatively prosperous and tranquil first decades of the century. We may have some misgivings about what may happen in the immediate future. But for the long run, there is little reason to doubt that the determination to achieve democratic constitu- tional government, which has always been so potent a force in Latin American history, will not persist. teenth century, when they were often a mere farce in which only the official candidates had any chance. The number of people who demand an opportunity to vote and to have their votes counted has increased greatly, and it is more difficult than it used to be to disregard the result of the voting. Almost every- where the leaders are beginning to have to consider the interests and the wishes of new groups-the lower middle class and the urban workers, and even the rural workers-whose participation in politics was hitherto unimportant. These changes, however, are coming at a time when grave economic and social problems- arising from inflation, rapid industrialization, and excesses of economic nationalism-have subjected the whole political system to strains and stresses which make the orderly development of republican institutions more difficult; and it is not surprising that political conflicts should be more violent than they were in the relatively prosperous and tranquil first decades of the century. We may have some misgivings about what may happen in the immediate future. But for the long run, there is little reason to doubt that the determination to achieve democratic constitu- tional government, which has always been so potent a force in Latin American history, will not persist.  19 Albert Gomes: FEDERATION IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES I INTEND TO SPEAK TO YOU as a politician. I could not hope to speak to you as a scholar or as a historian; I possess neither of those two qualifications. The politician inevitably has to deal with things of the moment. He may run the risk occasion- ally of projecting his thinking into the future, but it is primarily with the affairs of the present that he has to grapple and to treat realistically, because to fail to face realities is almost to abrogate one's right to be a politician. Nor can the politician run the risk of being as objective as the scholar. He has, essentially, to he himself; he has to be, if I may put it in a rather exaggerated form, very finite and very positive about these things. I say that I intend to speak to you as a politician, as a poli- tician in the British West Indies who I think can lay claim to having played some part in the development of free and au- tonomous institutions in that area. It has been my privilege to witness what I think we all hope will be the birth of a nation, but I have been privileged not only to witness the birth but to have been present as one of the midwives. It is very exciting to have this experience. You in this country had it many, many years ago and we are to some extent where you were when your Federal Constitutional Convention met in 1787. We are at the moment on the threshold of important and exciting events in the 275 Albert Gomes: FEDERATION IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES I INTEND TO SPEAK TO YOU as a politician. I could not hope to speak to you as a scholar or as a historian; I possess neither of those two qualifications. The politician inevitably has to deal with things of the moment. He may run the risk occasion- ally of projecting his thinking into the future, but it is primarily with the affairs of the present that he has to grapple and to treat realistically, because to fail to face realities is almost to abrogate one's right to be a politician. Nor can the politician run the risk of being as objective as the scholar. He has, essentially, to be himself; he has to be, if I may put it in a rather exaggerated form, very finite and very positive about these things. I say that I intend to speak to you as a politician, as a poli- tician in the British West Indies who I think can lay claim to having played some part in the development of free and au- tonomous institutions in that area. It has been my privilege to witness what I think we all hope will be the birth of a nation, but I have been privileged not only to witness the birth but to have been present as one of the midwives. It is very exciting to have this experience. You in this country had it many, many years ago and we are to some extent where you were when your Federal Constitutional Convention met in 1787. We are at the moment on the threshold of important and exciting events in the 275 Albert Gomes: FEDERATION IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES I INTEND TO SPEAK TO YOU as a politician. I could not hope to speak to you as a scholar or as a historian; I possess neither of those two qualifications. The politician inevitably has to deal with things of the moment. He may run the risk occasion- ally of projecting his thinking into the future, but it is primarily with the affairs of the present that he has to grapple and to treat realistically, because to fail to face realities is almost to abrogate one's right to be a politician. Nor can the politician run the risk of being as objective as the scholar. He has, essentially, to be himself; he has to be, if I may put it in a rather exaggerated form, very finite and very positive about these things. I say that I intend to speak to you as a politician, as a poli- tician in the British West Indies who I think can lay claim to having played some part in the development of free and au- tonomous institutions in that area. It has been my privilege to witness what I think we all hope will be the birth of a nation, but I have been privileged not only to witness the birth but to have been present as one of the midwives. It is very exciting to have this experience. You in this country had it many, many years ago and we are to some extent where you were when your Federal Constitutional Convention met in 1787. We are at the moment on the threshold of important and exciting events in the  276 The Caribbean 276 The Caribbean 276 The Caribbean British West Indies. We are about to finalize our plans for a federation of the islands. It is for this reason that I have made the main subject of my paper, "Federation in the British West Indies." I have chosen it because federation is the most important political question in our part of the world today. Indeed, all our past history, all our past political activity has been a preparation for the federal union we are about to achieve, and it is federal union that will make our future possible. Any discussion there- fore of any political problem in the British Caribbean today would be meaningless if it had not reference to federation. Federation is both our end and our beginning. When we achieve it, as we hope to in the near future, it will mark the end of protracted efforts to find a suitable vehicle in which to travel the road to nationhood. In common with all colonial peoples, our problem has always been the problem of graduating from colonial status to a position of full autonomy within the British Commonwealth of Nations. For a long time we made the mistake, many of us, of believing that it was possible for territories of our size and of our popula- tion to move towards self-government on the basis of individual island achievement. For a long time the great debate in the British Caribbean, a debate which divided most of the politicians and which embroiled them in very sharp conflict, was whether we should concentrate on this movement in each island as sepa- rate and distinct entities towards self-government or whether the more realistic, the more practical thing to do was to endeavor to bring the territories together where we could create a new iden- tity, an amalgam that would give us the necessary population and the necessary resources that would permit us to qualify ultimately for nationhood in a world that thinks in terms of large aggre- gations of persons and of large areas of land. Some of us, and I belong to that group, felt that it was com- British West Indies. We are about to finalize our plans for a federation of the islands. It is for this reason that I have made the main subject of my paper, "Federation in the British West Indies." I have chosen it because federation is the most important political question in our part of the world today. Indeed, all our past history, all our past political activity has been a preparation for the federal union we are about to achieve, and it is federal union that will make our future possible. Any discussion there- fore of any political problem in the British Caribbean today would be meaningless if it had not reference to federation. Federation is both our end and our beginning. When we achieve it, as we hope to in the near future, it will mark the end of protracted efforts to find a suitable vehicle in which to travel the road to nationhood. In common with all colonial peoples, our problem has always been the problem of graduating from colonial status to a position of full autonomy within the British Commonwealth of Nations. For a long time we made the mistake, many of us, of believing that it was possible for territories of our size and of our popula- tion to move towards self-government on the basis of individual island achievement. For a long time the great debate in the British Caribbean, a debate which divided most of the politicians and which embroiled them in very sharp conflict, was whether we should concentrate on this movement in each island as sepa- rate and distinct entities towards self-government or whether the more realistic, the more practical thing to do was to endeavor to bring the territories together where we could create a new iden- tity, an amalgam that would give us the necessary population and the necessary resources that would permit us to qualify ultimately for nationhood in a world that thinks in terms of large aggre- gations of persons and of large areas of land. Some of us, and I belong to that group, felt that it was com- British West Indies. We are about to finalize our plans for a federation of the islands. It is for this reason that I have made the main subject of my paper, "Federation in the British West Indies." I have chosen it because federation is the most important political question in our part of the world today. Indeed, all our past history, all our past political activity has been a preparation for the federal union we are about to achieve, and it is federal union that will make our future possible. Any discussion there- fore of any political problem in the British Caribbean today would be meaningless if it had not reference to federation. Federation is both our end and our beginning. When we achieve it, as we hope to in the near future, it will mark the end of protracted efforts to find a suitable vehicle in which to travel the road to nationhood. In common with all colonial peoples, our problem has always been the problem of graduating from colonial status to a position of full autonomy within the British Commonwealth of Nations. For a long time we made the mistake, many of us, of believing that it was possible for territories of our size and of our popula- tion to move towards self-government on the basis of individual island achievement. For a long time the great debate in the British Caribbean, a debate which divided most of the politicians and which embroiled them in very sharp conflict, was whether we should concentrate on this movement in each island as sepa- rate and distinct entities towards self-government or whether the more realistic, the more practical thing to do was to endeavor to bring the territories together where we could create a new iden- tity, an amalgam that would give us the necessary population and the necessary resources that would permit us to qualify ultimately for nationhood in a world that thinks in terms of large aggre- gations of persons and of large areas of land. Some of us, and I belong to that group, felt that it was com-  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 277 pletely futile to think of a struggle for self-government for indi- vidual territories in the British Caribbean. But there was the other point of view that is strongly backed but based perhaps unfortunately on too great a preoccupation with insular matters and insular consideration and thinking in terms of one's own particular slice of land. For a period of our development there was this sharp struggle between us. If we had to escape colonial- ism, and I think all of us have always admitted that we have to, then our salvation rested in federation. The desire to govern oneself is something that is very deeply rooted in the human being; it involves his self-respect and it is such a part of that sensitive make-up of the human being that nothing short of it will ever satisfy him. It is good to be able to say that at long last we have been able to convince more and more of our people, more and more of our politicians that the only route to freedom from colonialism and nationhood lies in the direction of federa- tion, of uniting the people of the British Caribbean in federal union. As separate isolated units, our territories could never hope to qualify for any effective measure of independence in the kind of world in which we live. I prefer to refer to it as the world of the colossi. Through federation, however, we shall be able to create that new entity which will make it possible for us some day, I hope, with dignity and self-respect, to take our place among the free nations of the world. II The road to federation has been a thorny one and we have been rather a long time traveling it. It is perhaps not surprising that we should have encountered this difficulty. I think it is in the nature of the task that we should have, seeing that we are attempting something unique and a little startling. All our islands are divided by miles of sea water. Jamaica, for example, is some thousand miles away from the rest of us. Moreover, it is not so long since we have begun to see more of each other. I think it OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 277 pletely futile to think of a struggle for self-government for indi- vidual territories in the British Caribbean. But there was the other point of view that is strongly backed but based perhaps unfortunately on too great a preoccupation with insular matters and insular consideration and thinking in terms of one's own particular slice of land. For a period of our development there was this sharp struggle between us. If we had to escape colonial- ism, and I think all of us have always admitted that we have to, then our salvation rested in federation. The desire to govern oneself is something that is very deeply rooted in the human being; it involves his self-respect and it is such a part of that sensitive make-up of the human being that nothing short of it will ever satisfy him. It is good to be able to say that at long last we have been able to convince more and more of our people, more and more of our politicians that the only route to freedom from colonialism and nationhood lies in the direction of federa- tion, of uniting the people of the British Caribbean in federal union. As separate isolated units, our territories could never hope to qualify for any effective measure of independence in the kind of world in which we live. I prefer to refer to it as the world of the colossi. Through federation, however, we shall be able to create that new entity which will make it possible for us some day, I hope, with dignity and self-respect, to take our place among the free nations of the world. II The road to federation has been a thorny one and we have been rather a long time traveling it. It is perhaps not surprising that we should have encountered this difficulty. I think it is in the nature of the task that we should have, seeing that we are attempting something unique and a little startling. All our islands are divided by miles of sea water. Jamaica, for example, is some thousand miles away from the rest of us. Moreover, it is not so long since we have begun to see more of each other. I think it OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 277 pletely futile to think of a struggle for self-government for indi- vidual territories in the British Caribbean. But there was the other point of view that is strongly backed but based perhaps unfortunately on too great a preoccupation with insular matters and insular consideration and thinking in terms of one's own particular slice of land. For a period of our development there was this sharp struggle between us. If we had to escape colonial- ism, and I think all of us have always admitted that we have to, then our salvation rested in federation. The desire to govern oneself is something that is very deeply rooted in the human being; it involves his self-respect and it is such a part of that sensitive make-up of the human being that nothing short of it will ever satisfy him. It is good to be able to say that at long last we have been able to convince more and more of our people, more and more of our politicians that the only route to freedom from colonialism and nationhood lies in the direction of federa- tion, of uniting the people of the British Caribbean in federal union. As separate isolated units, our territories could never hope to qualify for any effective measure of independence in the kind of world in which we live. I prefer to refer to it as the world of the colossi. Through federation, however, we shall be able to create that new entity which will make it possible for us some day, I hope, with dignity and self-respect, to take our place among the free nations of the world. II The road to federation has been a thorny one and we have been rather a long time traveling it. It is perhaps not surprising that we should have encountered this difficulty. I think it is in the nature of the task that we should have, seeing that we are attempting something unique and a little startling. All our islands are divided by miles of sea water. Jamaica, for example, is some thousand miles away from the rest of us. Moreover, it is not so long since we have begun to see more of each other. I think it  278 The Caribbean 278 The Caribbean is true to say that it is the stimulus of civil aviation more than any other single factor that has made possible close association between our territories, and it has done this during the past ten or twelve years as against a background of over a century of dis- cussion on the subject of West Indian federation. Without the airplane it would have taken us years and years to reach where we are today in our plans for federation. Indeed I sometimes wonder whether a federation of territories such as ours could ever be possible without the airplane. The islands are small and my experience has been that men tend to grow overfond of their particular slice of earth, especially when it is small and the cir- cumambient water is easily visible to them. I think that it has been our experience in the British Caribbean that it is not easy to persuade patriotism to cross the ocean. But there are such compelling reasons why we should come together that even insularity eventually had to capitulate. A common language, a common heritage, and, of course, the rule of a single metropolitan government-these have been consider- able influencing factors. And, in the main, the racial composition of all our societies is the same. They have this in common, that the basis and foundation of the society is of African origin. Even when our societies were comparatively isolated, the sense of be- longing, of sharing a common loyalty, was growing; and thus with time, as it became more apparent that regional cooperation was indispensable to the achievement of certain important ob- jectives, the federal mystique developed. To some extent it is true to say that in seeking to achieve federation in the final and absolute sense we are merely seeking to legalize long concubinage. Except in the political sense, we are already federated. All our important institutions and services are regional; and our only out- standing achievements have resulted from our cooperation; so that no matter what the reservations, and no matter how strong the prejudices, because these inexorable impulses tend more and more to persuade us that we ought to come together, we are in deed and in fact doing so. is true to say that it is the stimulus of civil aviation more than any other single factor that has made possible close association between our territories, and it has done this during the past ten or twelve years as against a background of over a century of dis- cussion on the subject of West Indian federation. Without the airplane it would have taken us years and years to reach where we are today in our plans for federation. Indeed I sometimes wonder whether a federation of territories such as ours could ever be possible without the airplane. The islands are small and my experience has been that men tend to grow overfond of their particular slice of earth, especially when it is small and the cir- cumambient water is easily visible to them. I think that it has been our experience in the British Caribbean that it is not easy to persuade patriotism to cross the ocean. But there are such compelling reasons why we should come together that even insularity eventually had to capitulate. A common language, a common heritage, and, of course, the rule of a single metropolitan government-these have been consider- able influencing factors. And, in the main, the racial composition of all our societies is the same. They have this in common, that the basis and foundation of the society is of African origin. Even when our societies were comparatively isolated, the sense of be- longing, of sharing a common loyalty, was growing; and thus with time, as it became more apparent that regional cooperation was indispensable to the achievement of certain important ob- jectives, the federal mystique developed. To some extent it is true to say that in seeking to achieve federation in the final and absolute sense we are merely seeking to legalize long concubinage. Except in the political sense, we are already federated. All our important institutions and services are regional; and our only out- standing achievements have resulted from our cooperation; so that no matter what the reservations, and no matter how strong the prejudices, because these inexorable impulses tend more and more to persuade us that we ought to come together, we are in deed and in fact doing so. 278 The Caribbean is true to say that it is the stimulus of civil aviation more than any other single factor that has made possible close association between our territories, and it has done this during the past ten or twelve years as against a background of over a century of dis- cussion on the subject of West Indian federation. Without the airplane it would have taken us years and years to reach where we are today in our plans for federation. Indeed I sometimes wonder whether a federation of territories such as ours could ever be possible without the airplane. The islands are small and my experience has been that men tend to grow overfond of their particular slice of earth, especially when it is small and the cir- cumambient water is easily visible to them. I think that it has been our experience in the British Caribbean that it is not easy to persuade patriotism to cross the ocean. But there are such compelling reasons why we should come together that even insularity eventually had to capitulate. A common language, a common heritage, and, of course, the rule of a single metropolitan government-these have been consider- able influencing factors. And, in the main, the racial composition of all our societies is the same. They have this in common, that the basis and foundation of the society is of African origin. Even when our societies were comparatively isolated, the sense of be- longing, of sharing a common loyalty, was growing; and thus with time, as it became more apparent that regional cooperation was indispensable to the achievement of certain important ob- jectives, the federal mystique developed. To some extent it is true to say that in seeking to achieve federation in the final and absolute sense we are merely seeking to legalize long concubinage. Except in the political sense, we are already federated. All our important institutions and services are regional; and our only out- standing achievements have resulted from our cooperation; so that no matter what the reservations, and no matter how strong the prejudices, because these inexorable impulses tend more and more to persuade us that we ought to come together, we are in deed and in fact doing so.  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 279 III It is in the economic sphere that the need for joint action is greatest and it is significant also that on every occasion that we have had to fight, either to preserve our existing standards of living or to improve them by securing guarantees of markets for our exports, we have fought together. When our sugar industry was again threatened by falling world prices, all the territories of the British Caribbean had to get together and form themselves into a delegation to go to the United Kingdom to fight for an adequately remunerative price for their main agricultural export. I had the honor of heading that delegation which went to London in 1950, and it is again merely stating the facts to say that, as a result of our labors on that occasion, there came into being the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which gave us the guarantees we needed and without which there would have been almost universal misery in the British Caribbean today. This agreement proved to be a great stimulus and a great inspiration to all those persons in the British Caribbean who previously had been either lukewarm or hostile to the idea of federation. When, recently-and this is of interest to all Florida -our citrus industry was similarly threatened, we had to get together, all of us from the various territories, and go to London; and after London we reached Washington, then we went back to London again-and we are all very happy that at least we have been able to secure our position in citrus for another five or six years. IV In February of 1956 we meet in London for our final con- ference on federation. The British government has promised that by the middle of 1956 federation of the British West Indies will be a legal fact. It is their intention to introduce into parliament a bill declaring the federation of the British Caribbean territories. We have an undertaking from Her Majesty's government to this effect. After this London conference it will be merely a matter OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 279 III It is in the economic sphere that the need for joint action is greatest and it is significant also that on every occasion that we have had to fight, either to preserve our existing standards of living or to improve them by securing guarantees of markets for our exports, we have fought together. When our sugar industry was again threatened by falling world prices, all the territories of the British Caribbean had to get together and form themselves into a delegation to go to the United Kingdom to fight for an adequately remunerative price for their main agricultural export. I had the honor of heading that delegation which went to London in 1950, and it is again merely stating the facts to say that, as a result of our labors on that occasion, there came into being the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which gave us the guarantees we needed and without which there would have been almost universal misery in the British Caribbean today. This agreement proved to be a great stimulus and a great inspiration to all those persons in the British Caribbean who previously had been either lukewarm or hostile to the idea of federation. When, recently-and this is of interest to all Florida -our citrus industry was similarly threatened, we had to get together, all of us from the various territories, and go to London; and after London we reached Washington, then we went back to London again-and we are all very happy that at least we have been able to secure our position in citrus for another five or six years. IV In February of 1956 we meet in London for our final con- ference on federation. The British government has promised that by the middle of 1956 federation of the British West Indies will be a legal fact. It is their intention to introduce into parliament a bill declaring the federation of the British Caribbean territories. We have an undertaking from Her Majesty's government to this effect. After this London conference it will be merely a matter OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 279 III It is in the economic sphere that the need for joint action is greatest and it is significant also that on every occasion that we have had to fight, either to preserve our existing standards of living or to improve them by securing guarantees of markets for our exports, we have fought together. When our sugar industry was again threatened by falling world prices, all the territories of the British Caribbean had to get together and form themselves into a delegation to go to the United Kingdom to fight for an adequately remunerative price for their main agricultural export. I had the honor of heading that delegation which went to London in 1950, and it is again merely stating the facts to say that, as a result of our labors on that occasion, there came into being the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which gave us the guarantees we needed and without which there would have been almost universal misery in the British Caribbean today. This agreement proved to be a great stimulus and a great inspiration to all those persons in the British Caribbean who previously had been either lukewarm or hostile to the idea of federation. When, recently-and this is of interest to all Florida -our citrus industry was similarly threatened, we had to get together, all of us from the various territories, and go to London; and after London we reached Washington, then we went back to London again-and we are all very happy that at least we have been able to secure our position in citrus for another five or six years. IV In February of 1956 we meet in London for our final con- ference on federation. The British government has promised that by the middle of 1956 federation of the British West Indies will be a legal fact. It is their intention to introduce into parliament a bill declaring the federation of the British Caribbean territories. We have an undertaking from Her Majesty's government to this effect. After this London conference it will be merely a matter  280 The Caribbean 280 The Caribbean 280 The Caribbean of settling details and of preparing for the first federal elections. The British government has cooperated fully in our effort to achieve federation, a fact which has provoked sharp conflicts of opinion among West Indian politicians. It has been suggested by some that because the British want it there must be a string to it somewhere. Others have taken the view which I share that, irrespective of the motives of the British, since federation is good for us we ought to grasp it quickly and use it to our ends, and that is precisely what we intend to do. For myself, I anticipate that not too long after federation we shall achieve dominion status. It is my hope that we shall nego- tiate the passage from federation to dominion status without storm or shipwreck. Indeed, I am confident that given the wisdom and the statesmanship, we shall be able to do it. I should like to see our political evolution in this regard, following firstly the pattern of constitution within the British Commonwealth of Nations achieved by Ceylon. Ceylon, as you know, was able to move from colonial status to dominion status without some of those periods of unrest and struggle which as a rule accompany the passage from one status to another. I think that there is no reason why this should not be so. Today our relations with the British government are made easier because of the acceptance by her statesmen of the principle that it is better to yield voluntarily than to be forced to. When discussing colonialism, I think there is a tendency to overlook the fact that because of pressures in the international sphere, indeed because of the rapid process of enlightenment that has taken place in the world within recent years, the old concepts no longer exist. The British government, I believe, is only too well aware that to resist legitimate claims to constitution- al advancement can only produce conflict and unrest and indeed create a state of mind in the colonial that will make it extremely difficult for him to live with the British government in the com- monwealth of the future. I know that colonialism has this ex- traordinary quality to it, and I have always compared it to the of settling details and of preparing for the first federal elections. The British government has cooperated fully in our effort to achieve federation, a fact which has provoked sharp conflicts of opinion among West Indian politicians. It has been suggested by some that because the British want it there must be a string to it somewhere. Others have taken the view which I share that, irrespective of the motives of the British, since federation is good for us we ought to grasp it quickly and use it to our ends, and that is precisely what we intend to do. For myself, I anticipate that not too long after federation we shall achieve dominion status. It is my hope that we shall nego- tiate the passage from federation to dominion status without storm or shipwreck. Indeed, I am confident that given the wisdom and the statesmanship, we shall be able to do it. I should like to see our political evolution in this regard, following firstly the pattern of constitution within the British Commonwealth of Nations achieved by Ceylon. Ceylon, as you know, was able to move from colonial status to dominion status without some of those periods of unrest and struggle which as a rule accompany the passage from one status to another. I think that there is no reason why this should not be so. Today our relations with the British government are made easier because of the acceptance by her statesmen of the principle that it is better to yield voluntarily than to be forced to. When discussing colonialism, I think there is a tendency to overlook the fact that because of pressures in the international sphere, indeed because of the rapid process of enlightenment that has taken place in the world within recent years, the old concepts no longer exist. The British government, I believe, is only too well aware that to resist legitimate claims to constitution- al advancement can only produce conflict and unrest and indeed create a state of mind in the colonial that will make it extremely difficult for him to live with the British government in the com- monwealth of the future. I know that colonialism has this ex- traordinary quality to it, and I have always compared it to the of settling details and of preparing for the first federal elections. The British government has cooperated fully in our effort to achieve federation, a fact which has provoked sharp conflicts of opinion among West Indian politicians. It has been suggested by some that because the British want it there must be a string to it somewhere. Others have taken the view which I share that, irrespective of the motives of the British, since federation is good for us we ought to grasp it quickly and use it to our ends, and that is precisely what we intend to do. For myself, I anticipate that not too long after federation we shall achieve dominion status. It is my hope that we shall nego- tiate the passage from federation to dominion status without storm or shipwreck. Indeed, I am confident that given the wisdom and the statesmanship, we shall be able to do it. I should like to see our political evolution in this regard, following firstly the pattern of constitution within the British Commonwealth of Nations achieved by Ceylon. Ceylon, as you know, was able to move from colonial status to dominion status without some of those periods of unrest and struggle which as a rule accompany the passage from one status to another. I think that there is no reason why this should not be so. Today our relations with the British government are made easier because of the acceptance by her statesmen of the principle that it is better to yield voluntarily than to be forced to. When discussing colonialism, I think there is a tendency to overlook the fact that because of pressures in the international sphere, indeed because of the rapid process of enlightenment that has taken place in the world within recent years, the old concepts no longer exist. The British government, I believe, is only too well aware that to resist legitimate claims to constitution- al advancement can only produce conflict and unrest and indeed create a state of mind in the colonial that will make it extremely difficult for him to live with the British government in the com- monwealth of the future. I know that colonialism has this ex- traordinary quality to it, and I have always compared it to the  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 281 relationship that exists between the nurse and the patient, espe- cially during a period of convalescence. There comes a time when it will no longer suffice that the nurse should say when the patient should either discard the crutches or leave the bed. Indeed, there comes a time when that decision has to be taken by the patient himself, and that is where the conflict occurs, between the ac- ceptance on the part of the colonial peoples of the imminence of their right to advance and the reluctance of the metropolitan government to make a similar acceptance of what should be an obvious fact. I know, however, that given the statesmanship, the vision, and the resourcefulness of which I feel we are capable, once we achieve federation we will be entering the British Common- wealth of Nations as a full-fledged dominion a short time after- wards. For myself I have great faith and profound belief in the British Commonwealth of Nations as a source for goodness and a guarantee against evil in the world of the present and of the future. V Whatever may be said of the British nexus, whatever may be said of colonialism, it is to a far greater extent than has been appreciated, a civilizing process. It is a civilizing process in the sense that certain countries-and there are many of them in the world-required that period of paternalism, even that period of domination since, whether we like it or not, in the world as we know it there is always the tendency of those who know more, those who have more resources, and those who are more color- ful often not merely to influence but to dominate those who lack these things. The fact that a conflict does exist, the fact that this phase inevitably is reached where, because of the desire of the force that is under this domination to struggle to move upwards -and even accepting that the force that is moving the other force downwards does so often without full justification-does not, I think, preclude one from saying that out of that torment, OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 281 relationship that exists between the nurse and the patient, espe- cially during a period of convalescence. There comes a time when it will no longer suffice that the nurse should say when the patient should either discard the crutches or leave the bed. Indeed, there comes a time when that decision has to be taken by the patient himself, and that is where the conflict occurs, between the ac- ceptance on the part of the colonial peoples of the imminence of their right to advance and the reluctance of the metropolitan government to make a similar acceptance of what should be an obvious fact. I know, however, that given the statesmanship, the vision, and the resourcefulness of which I feel we are capable, once we achieve federation we will be entering the British Common- wealth of Nations as a full-fledged dominion a short time after- wards. For myself I have great faith and profound belief in the British Commonwealth of Nations as a source for goodness and a guarantee against evil in the world of the present and of the future. V Whatever may be said of the British nexus, whatever may be said of colonialism, it is to a far greater extent than has been appreciated, a civilizing process. It is a civilizing process in the sense that certain countries-and there are many of them in the world-required that period of paternalism, even that period of domination since, whether we like it or not, in the world as we know it there is always the tendency of those who know more, those who have more resources, and those who are more color- ful often not merely to influence but to dominate those who lack these things. The fact that a conflict does exist, the fact that this phase inevitably is reached where, because of the desire of the force that is under this domination to struggle to move upwards -and even accepting that the force that is moving the other force downwards does so often without full justification-does not, I think, preclude one from saying that out of that torment, OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 281 relationship that exists between the nurse and the patient, espe- cially during a period of convalescence. There comes a time when it will no longer suffice that the nurse should say when the patient should either discard the crutches or leave the bed. Indeed, there comes a time when that decision has to be taken by the patient himself, and that is where the conflict occurs, between the ac- ceptance on the part of the colonial peoples of the imminence of their right to advance and the reluctance of the metropolitan government to make a similar acceptance of what should be an obvious fact. I know, however, that given the statesmanship, the vision, and the resourcefulness of which I feel we are capable, once we achieve federation we will be entering the British Common- wealth of Nations as a full-fledged dominion a short time after- wards. For myself I have great faith and profound belief in the British Commonwealth of Nations as a source for goodness and a guarantee against evil in the world of the present and of the future. V Whatever may be said of the British nexus, whatever may be said of colonialism, it is to a far greater extent than has been appreciated, a civilizing process. It is a civilizing process in the sense that certain countries-and there are many of them in the world-required that period of paternalism, even that period of domination since, whether we like it or not, in the world as we know it there is always the tendency of those who know more, those who have more resources, and those who are more color- ful often not merely to influence but to dominate those who lack these things. The fact that a conflict does exist, the fact that this phase inevitably is reached where, because of the desire of the force that is under this domination to struggle to move upwards -and even accepting that the force that is moving the other force downwards does so often without full justification-does not, I think, preclude one from saying that out of that torment,  282 The Caribbean out of that clash of forces, does emerge a process that ultimately brings those people who lack the technological skill, that sense of organization, and that institutional sense, to a position where they are able to demand equal recognition with any other country of the world. It is a process that is occurring in Africa today. If history ultimately writes about the African continent that it was able to emancipate itself, that as a result of this contact with, let us admit it, a superior civilization in the sense of a civilization more competent to deal with the problems of the sort of world in which we live, if history writes that as a result Africa emerged and the African was able to make good use of this experience- that he was able to profit by his contact with British civilization -then it seems to me that we will be justified in concluding that such a phase is necessary in the evolution of the immature and undeveloped countries of this world. Where our Hemisphere is concerned, I can think of yet another reason why the British nexus is important, and it is this, that when I look around me and I think of the Latin American coun- tries, and I ask myself, what fate has overtaken democracy in that part of the world, I derive some solace from the fact that in our part of the world no strong man could run the risk of de- stroying constitutions, no man could run the risk of destroying those basic liberties which the British respect, for the simple reason that whenever we achieve a constitution its basic and fundamental liberties are guaranteed by the British parliament, to whom in the final sense we are responsible for the proper ad- ministration of any constitution which we receive. Let us regard colonialism as a necessary period-perhaps if I may use the word, as a good school-in which the arts of democracy can be learned so that they will be practiced effectively in the future. I prefer to preserve a relationship with a country where the independence of the civil service is accepted as absolute and irrevocable, and where the independence of the courts of law are also similarly regarded. And if we are disposed to face 282 The Caribbean 282 The Caribbean out of that clash of forces, does emerge a process that ultimately brings those people who lack the technological skill, that sense of organization, and that institutional sense, to a position where they are able to demand equal recognition with any other country of the world. It is a process that is occurring in Africa today. If history ultimately writes about the African continent that it was able to emancipate itself, that as a result of this contact with, let us admit it, a superior civilization in the sense of a civilization more competent to deal with the problems of the sort of world in which we live, if history writes that as a result Africa emerged and the African was able to make good use of this experience- that he was able to profit by his contact with British civilization -then it seems to me that we will be justified in concluding that such a phase is necessary in the evolution of the immature and undeveloped countries of this world. Where our Hemisphere is concerned, I can think of yet another reason why the British nexus is important, and it is this, that when I look around me and I think of the Latin American coun- tries, and I ask myself, what fate has overtaken democracy in that part of the world, I derive some solace from the fact that in our part of the world no strong man could run the risk of de- stroying constitutions, no man could run the risk of destroying those basic liberties which the British respect, for the simple reason that whenever we achieve a constitution its basic and fundamental liberties are guaranteed by the British parliament, to whom in the final sense we are responsible for the proper ad- ministration of any constitution which we receive. Let us regard colonialism as a necessary period-perhaps if I may use the word, as a good school-in which the arts of democracy can be learned so that they will be practiced effectively in the future. I prefer to preserve a relationship with a country where the independence of the civil service is accepted as absolute and irrevocable, and where the independence of the courts of law are also similarly regarded. And if we are disposed to face out of that clash of forces, does emerge a process that ultimately brings those people who lack the technological skill, that sense of organization, and that institutional sense, to a position where they are able to demand equal recognition with any other country of the world. It is a process that is occurring in Africa today. If history ultimately writes about the African continent that it was able to emancipate itself, that as a result of this contact with, let us admit it, a superior civilization in the sense of a civilization more competent to deal with the problems of the sort of world in which we live, if history writes that as a result Africa emerged and the African was able to make good use of this experience- that he was able to profit by his contact with British civilization -then it seems to me that we will be justified in concluding that such a phase is necessary in the evolution of the immature and undeveloped countries of this world. Where our Hemisphere is concerned, I can think of yet another reason why the British nexus is important, and it is this, that when I look around me and I think of the Latin American coun- tries, and I ask myself, what fate has overtaken democracy in that part of the world, I derive some solace from the fact that in our part of the world no strong man could run the risk of de- stroying constitutions, no man could run the risk of destroying those basic liberties which the British respect, for the simple reason that whenever we achieve a constitution its basic and fundamental liberties are guaranteed by the British parliament, to whom in the final sense we are responsible for the proper ad- ministration of any constitution which we receive. Let us regard colonialism as a necessary period-perhaps if I may use the word, as a good school-in which the arts of democracy can be learned so that they will be practiced effectively in the future. I prefer to preserve a relationship with a country where the independence of the civil service is accepted as absolute and irrevocable, and where the independence of the courts of law are also similarly regarded. And if we are disposed to face  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 283 facts, let us admit that there is very little respect for these two things in the particular part of the world that we are discussing at this conference. Even India, whatever may have been her con- flicts with the British in the past, has to admit that the result of her long ordeal-whether she wishes to call it that or not-has been these important institutions: a reliable and incorruptible civil service, and judges and magistrates free from political duress. Those are the things that we need to consider, because we are too disposed to subscribe to what is the popular bogey of merely condemning colonialism "out of hand" without making some objective appraisal of its good points and its bad points. Perhaps one ought, in discussing a matter of this sort, to pay more attention to practice than to theory. VI So far as I am concerned, when I look around our own Hem- isphere and observe how rapidly the pattern of democracy is being altered, I become more resolute in determining that the future of the British West Indian peoples should be associated with that of the British Commonwealth. We shall of course in the future be neither a large nor a wealthy nor a powerful nation. Although it is necessary to observe that we will be starting in 1957, perhaps, with the same population that you had in this country in 1787, rather we hoped we would start with the same number of states that you had on that occasion. The mainland territories unfortunately are not as enthusiastic about federation of the British Caribbean as are the island territories, and here again we are confronted with this extraordinary tendency of the human animal to refuse to face facts. British Guiana, for some inex- plicable reason, prefers to regard herself as a country with a con- tinental destiny-whatever that means I have never been able to appreciate. She considers that her citizens are Americans. How she has come by that, again I must confess that I cannot under- stand. In British Honduras one finds the same sort of tendency, but it is more ludicrous, because it is a vast country with great OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 283 facts, let us admit that there is very little respect for these two things in the particular part of the world that we are discussing at this conference. Even India, whatever may have been her con- flicts with the British in the past, has to admit that the result of her long ordeal-whether she wishes to call it that or not-has been these important institutions: a reliable and incorruptible civil service, and judges and magistrates free from political duress. Those are the things that we need to consider, because we are too disposed to subscribe to what is the popular bogey of merely condemning colonialism "out of hand" without making some objective appraisal of its good points and its bad points. Perhaps one ought, in discussing a matter of this sort, to pay more attention to practice than to theory. VI So far as I am concerned, when I look around our own Hem- isphere and observe how rapidly the pattern of democracy is being altered, I become more resolute in determining that the future of the British West Indian peoples should be associated with that of the British Commonwealth. We shall of course in the future be neither a large nor a wealthy nor a powerful nation. Although it is necessary to observe that we will be starting in 1957, perhaps, with the same population that you had in this country in 1787, rather we hoped we would start with the same number of states that you had on that occasion. The mainland territories unfortunately are not as enthusiastic about federation of the British Caribbean as are the island territories, and here again we are confronted with this extraordinary tendency of the human animal to refuse to face facts. British Guiana, for some inex- plicable reason, prefers to regard herself as a country with a con- tinental destiny-whatever that means I have never been able to appreciate. She considers that her citizens are Americans. How she has come by that, again I must confess that I cannot under- stand. In British Honduras one finds the same sort of tendency, but it is more ludicrous, because it is a vast country with great OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 283 facts, let us admit that there is very little respect for these two things in the particular part of the world that we are discussing at this conference. Even India, whatever may have been her con- flicts with the British in the past, has to admit that the result of her long ordeal-whether she wishes to call it that or not-has been these important institutions: a reliable and incorruptible civil service, and judges and magistrates free from political duress. Those are the things that we need to consider, because we are too disposed to subscribe to what is the popular bogey of merely condemning colonialism "out of hand" without making some objective appraisal of its good points and its bad points. Perhaps one ought, in discussing a matter of this sort, to pay more attention to practice than to theory. VI So far as I am concerned, when I look around our own Hem- isphere and observe how rapidly the pattern of democracy is being altered, I become more resolute in determining that the future of the British West Indian peoples should be associated with that of the British Commonwealth. We shall of course in the future be neither a large nor a wealthy nor a powerful nation. Although it is necessary to observe that we will be starting in 1957, perhaps, with the same population that you had in this country in 1787, rather we hoped we would start with the same number of states that you had on that occasion. The mainland territories unfortunately are not as enthusiastic about federation of the British Caribbean as are the island territories, and here again we are confronted with this extraordinary tendency of the human animal to refuse to face facts. British Guiana, for some inex- plicable reason, prefers to regard herself as a country with a con- tinental destiny-whatever that means I have never been able to appreciate. She considers that her citizens are Americans. How she has come by that, again I must confess that I cannot under- stand. In British Honduras one finds the same sort of tendency, but it is more ludicrous, because it is a vast country with great  284 The Caribbean 284 The Caribbean forests which are subject to fires that from time to time destroy considerable amounts of timber. British Honduras has a very small population, needs more people to develop her territory, and at the same time permits implacable prejudice against Jamaicans in order to prevent them from coming into British Honduras for the purpose of developing it. British Hondurans lack capital and their only hope for the future lies within the sort of federation that we have decided on for ourselves. In British Guiana, where the country is very chaotic and where the future looks very dark, it is difficult to envisage any sort of future for British Guiana except by coming into a British Caribbean federation. But there is noth- ing that we can do about it. I think we have exhausted all the arts of persuasion in attempting to make British Guiana realize how important it is that she should enter this federation, but we have not succeeded. VII Now how important will these federated states be to the future of this area and indeed to the future of the world? What con- tribution can we hope to make? When I think of it I feel that the great contribution we could make to the world is in giving them an example, which perhaps they have never had, of how mixed people in a riotously heterogeneous community, a multiracial com- munity, can live together, with all colors, all races, and all creeds sharing a common national destiny. As a matter of fact, I should hope that we could give lessons to all the countries of the world, even to the United States, because I don't believe that any of you, no matter your amour-propre, would deny the fact that that is one problem that you have not yet solved for yourself, and that it is one problem that involves you in situations that create more prejudice against your democracy than any other single factor. In- deed, it is not putting it in an exaggerated form to say that all the millions you spend for your information services abroad, all the effort that you make to persuade others of the value of your way of life, all these things are vitiated by the fact that you have not forests which are subject to fires that from time to time destroy considerable amounts of timber. British Honduras has a very small population, needs more people to develop her territory, and at the same time permits implacable prejudice against Jamaicans in order to prevent them from coming into British Honduras for the purpose of developing it. British Hondurans lack capital and their only hope for the future lies within the sort of federation that we have decided on for ourselves. In British Guiana, where the country is very chaotic and where the future looks very dark, it is difficult to envisage any sort of future for British Guiana except by coming into a British Caribbean federation. But there is noth- ing that we can do about it. I think we have exhausted all the arts of persuasion in attempting to make British Guiana realize how important it is that she should enter this federation, but we have not succeeded. VII Now how important will these federated states be to the future of this area and indeed to the future of the world? What con- tribution can we hope to make? When I think of it I feel that the great contribution we could make to the world is in giving them an example, which perhaps they have never had, of how mixed people in a riotously heterogeneous community, a multiracial com- munity, can live together, with all colors, all races, and all creeds sharing a common national destiny. As a matter of fact, I should hope that we could give lessons to all the countries of the world, even to the United States, because I don't believe that any of you, no matter your amour-propre, would deny the fact that that is one problem that you have not yet solved for yourself, and that it is one problem that involves you in situations that create more prejudice against your democracy than any other single factor. In- deed, it is not putting it in an exaggerated form to say that all the millions you spend for your information services abroad, all the effort that you make to persuade others of the value of your way of life, all these things are vitiated by the fact that you have not 284 The Caribbean forests which are subject to fires that from time to time destroy considerable amounts of timber. British Honduras has a very small population, needs more people to develop her territory, and at the same time permits implacable prejudice against Jamaicans in order to prevent them from coming into British Honduras for the purpose of developing it. British Hondurans lack capital and their only hope for the future lies within the sort of federation that we have decided on for ourselves. In British Guiana, where the country is very chaotic and where the future looks very dark, it is difficult to envisage any sort of future for British Guiana except by coming into a British Caribbean federation. But there is noth- ing that we can do about it. I think we have exhausted all the arts of persuasion in attempting to make British Guiana realize how important it is that she should enter this federation, but we have not succeeded. VII Now how important will these federated states be to the future of this area and indeed to the future of the world? What con- tribution can we hope to make? When I think of it I feel that the great contribution we could make to the world is in giving them an example, which perhaps they have never had, of how mixed people in a riotously heterogeneous community, a multiracial com- munity, can live together, with all colors, all races, and all creeds sharing a common national destiny. As a matter of fact, I should hope that we could give lessons to all the countries of the world, even to the United States, because I don't believe that any of you, no matter your amour-propre, would deny the fact that that is one problem that you have not yet solved for yourself, and that it is one problem that involves you in situations that create more prejudice against your democracy than any other single factor. In- deed, it is not putting it in an exaggerated form to say that all the millions you spend for your information services abroad, all the effort that you make to persuade others of the value of your way of life, all these things are vitiated by the fact that you have not  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 2135 solved that problem yourself. One single incident in this country involving racial discrimination does more harm to the very worthy cause that you are pursuing in the world in your struggle against authoritarianism and totalitarianism. It is because of your failure to solve that problem that so many people in this world do not fully appreciate your good will and the extent to which you are endeavoring to put these matters right. It is that dark cloud always hovering around that clutters the landscape and makes it difficult for people to understand you, especially those who live in multiracial societies-and the West Indian society is a multiracial society. There is one extraordinary thing about all this, for no matter how potent prejudice may be, if people begin to live together in a society, if they try to under- stand each other, it is amazing to know what a good job they can make of it. I am not here to preach-I'm not given to that sort of thing, that is not my role in life. I do not profess any great knowledge of matters of this sort, but I will say this, that if the world is to be saved a great deal of war and suffering in the future, the white races of the world have got to find some way of solving the problem of living with the colored peoples of the world, because whether you like it or not Asia is emerging, so is Africa, and the world of the future is going to be manifestly dif- ferent from the world that we know today. Heaven only knows what damage South African race prejudice is doing to the position of the white races of the world, what sort of grim and tragic fu- ture is being built up for them, and what bitter seed of hate is being sowed. I take great pride in the fact that insignificant as we are in the global sense, as unimportant as we are, we are showing to the world how it is possible for mixed people to live together in amity and good will. VIII I think I should say something about the curious relationships that exist between the political and the economic problems in the OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 285 solved that problem yourself. One single incident in this country involving racial discrimination does more harm to the very worthy cause that you are pursuing in the world in your struggle against authoritarianism and totalitarianism. It is because of your failure to solve that problem that so many people in this world do not fully appreciate your good will and the extent to which you are endeavoring to put these matters right. It is that dark cloud always hovering around that clutters the landscape and makes it difficult for people to understand you, especially those who live in multiracial societies-and the West Indian society is a multiracial society. There is one extraordinary thing about all this, for no matter how potent prejudice may be, if people begin to live together in a society, if they try to under- stand each other, it is amazing to know what a good job they can make of it. I am not here to preach-I'm not given to that sort of thing, that is not my role in life. I do not profess any great knowledge of matters of this sort, but I will say this, that if the world is to be saved a great deal of war and suffering in the future, the white races of the world have got to find some way of solving the problem of living with the colored peoples of the world, because whether you like it or not Asia is emerging, so is Africa, and the world of the future is going to be manifestly dif- ferent from the world that we know today. Heaven only knows what damage South African race prejudice is doing to the position of the white races of the world, what sort of grim and tragic fu- ture is being built up for them, and what bitter seed of hate is being sowed. I take great pride in the fact that insignificant as we are in the global sense, as unimportant as we are, we are showing to the world how it is possible for mixed people to live together in amity and good will. VIII I think I should say something about the curious relationships that exist between the political and the economic problems in the OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 285 solved that problem yourself. One single incident in this country involving racial discrimination does more harm to the very worthy cause that you are pursuing in the world in your struggle against authoritarianism and totalitarianism. It is because of your failure to solve that problem that so many people in this world do not fully appreciate your good will and the extent to which you are endeavoring to put these matters right. It is that dark cloud always hovering around that clutters the landscape and makes it difficult for people to understand you, especially those who live in multiracial societies-and the West Indian society is a multiracial society. There is one extraordinary thing about all this, for no matter how potent prejudice may be, if people begin to live together in a society, if they try to under- stand each other, it is amazing to know what a good job they can make of it. I am not here to preach-I'm not given to that sort of thing, that is not my role in life. I do not profess any great knowledge of matters of this sort, but I will say this, that if the world is to be saved a great deal of war and suffering in the future, the white races of the world have got to find some way of solving the problem of living with the colored peoples of the world, because whether you like it or not Asia is emerging, so is Africa, and the world of the future is going to be manifestly dif- ferent from the world that we know today. Heaven only knows what damage South African race prejudice is doing to the position of the white races of the world, what sort of grim and tragic fu- ture is being built up for them, and what bitter seed of hate is being sowed. I take great pride in the fact that insignificant as we are in the global sense, as unimportant as we are, we are showing to the world how it is possible for mixed people to live together in amity and good will. VIII I think I should say something about the curious relationships that exist between the political and the economic problems in the  286 The Caribbean British West Indies and the extent to which it bears not only on the present but on the future. By a curious irony, as the spirit of political independence has grown in the British West Indies, so has developed also, concur- rently, an increasing economic dependence on the United King- dom. This is not peculiar to the British West Indies in the sense that, in relation to the United States, Puerto Rico has the same sort of problem; and it is a curious paradox that pari passu the movement towards self-determination there should be this in- creased dependence on the metropolitan country. But it exists in the case of Puerto Rico and it certainly exists in the case of the British West Indies and, oddly enough, as we go further on the road to self-government in the economic sense we are closer to the metropolitan government than we have ever been before. Yet the full measure of this dependence is only now beginning to be understood by our people. At the moment only too few are aware of it. I believe that this economic dependence upon the United Kingdom, which at present is almost the only market for our main exports, will be the major factor in the determina- tion of our ultimate political destiny. As a matter of fact it is likely to be the cement that will keep us together during those periods in the future when our political impulses may incline us in other directions. But it is an even more startling irony that Her Majesty's government has appeared on some occasions not to view this economic dependence too favorably and to wish to be relieved of it. Yet I suspect that in the future she will be pleased that, despite her reticence, we have fought for it on the grounds that if one has colonies one must see to it that their in- terests are well served. We have felt that colonialism, or the colonial attachment to the metropolitan government, is com- pletely meaningless unless it carries with it the obligation of the metropolitan government to some extent to underwrite the econ- omy of the dependent area, because in the British West Indies it is the economic factor that is always influencing the political attitudes of the people. 286 The Caribbean 286 The Caribbean British West Indies and the extent to which it bears not only on the present but on the future. By a curious irony, as the spirit of political independence has grown in the British West Indies, so has developed also, concur- rently, an increasing economic dependence on the United King- dom. This is not peculiar to the British West Indies in the sense that, in relation to the United States, Puerto Rico has the same sort of problem; and it is a curious paradox that pari passu the movement towards self-determination there should be this in- creased dependence on the metropolitan country. But it exists in the case of Puerto Rico and it certainly exists in the case of the British West Indies and, oddly enough, as we go further on the road to self-government in the economic sense we are closer to the metropolitan government than we have ever been before. Yet the full measure of this dependence is only now beginning to be understood by our people. At the moment only too few are aware of it. I believe that this economic dependence upon the United Kingdom, which at present is almost the only market for our main exports, will be the major factor in the determina- tion of our ultimate political destiny. As a matter of fact it is likely to be the cement that will keep us together during those periods in the future when our political impulses may incline us in other directions. But it is an even more startling irony that Her Majesty's government has appeared on some occasions not to view this economic dependence too favorably and to wish to be relieved of it. Yet I suspect that in the future she will be pleased that, despite her reticence, we have fought for it on the grounds that if one has colonies one must see to it that their in- terests are well served. We have felt that colonialism, or the colonial attachment to the metropolitan government, is com- pletely meaningless unless it carries with it the obligation of the metropolitan government to some extent to underwrite the econ- omy of the dependent area, because in the British West Indies it is the economic factor that is always influencing the political attitudes of the people. British West Indies and the extent to which it bears not only on the present but on the future. By a curious irony, as the spirit of political independence has grown in the British West Indies, so has developed also, concur- rently, an increasing economic dependence on the United King- dom. This is not peculiar to the British West Indies in the sense that, in relation to the United States, Puerto Rico has the same sort of problem; and it is a curious paradox that pari passu the movement towards self-determination there should be this in- creased dependence on the metropolitan country. But it exists in the case of Puerto Rico and it certainly exists in the case of the British West Indies and, oddly enough, as we go further on the road to self-government in the economic sense we are closer to the metropolitan government than we have ever been before. Yet the full measure of this dependence is only now beginning to be understood by our people. At the moment only too few are aware of it. I believe that this economic dependence upon the United Kingdom, which at present is ahost the only market for our main exports, will be the major factor in the determina- tion of our ultimate political destiny. As a matter of fact it is likely to be the cement that will keep us together during those periods in the future when our political impulses may incline us in other directions. But it is an even more startling irony that Her Majesty's government has appeared on some occasions not to view this economic dependence too favorably and to wish to be relieved of it. Yet I suspect that in the future she will be pleased that, despite her reticence, we have fought for it on the grounds that if one has colonies one must see to it that their in- terests are well served. We have felt that colonialism, or the colonial attachment to the metropolitan government, is com- pletely meaningless unless it carries with it the obligation of the metropolitan government to some extent to underwrite the econ- omy of the dependent area, because in the British West Indies it is the economic factor that is always influencing the political attitudes of the people.  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 287 If the fact of economic dependence proves in the future to be the consideration that decided us to stay within the Common- wealth when some persons wished us to do otherwise, I should, if I had to write our history at that later stage, comment on yet another strange irony by which our weakness became our strength. I say this because of my own conviction that the best part of the future of the British West Indies lies within the British Common- wealth of Nations. I feel that in the world of the future there will be a very narrow area of choice for nations such as the British West Indies is likely to become. It would be better to remain within the Commonwealth than to enjoy satellite stature or to be merely someone's sphere of influence. I hinted earlier that at present I could not envisage the British West Indies becoming a wealthy nation. One of the unpalatable facts of life that we must face is that our economy is weak and vulnerable, and there appear to be definite limits to the extent to which we can strengthen it. In every territory today strenuous efforts are being made to diversify economies that only yesterday were totally dependent upon agriculture (and in Jamaica and Trinidad everything is being done to encourage foreign investors to establish secondary industries). Here we are, of course, fol- lowing the lead given by Puerto Rico which has been a great source of inspiration to popular leadership in the British Carib- bean. We realize what an excellent achievement Puerto Rico has made in this connection and we consider that it is in the interest of all our territories to endeavor by industrialization to diversify our economies. In Jamaica and Trinidad everything is being done to encourage foreign investors to establish secondary indus- tries. But these are long-range plans and will take time. In the meantime we must face the fact that our tenuous hold on existing standards of living in these countries is made possible by the prices we are now receiving for our main agricultural exports and that if these prices plummeted tomorrow our future would be grim. A healthy democracy presupposes sound economic cir- cumstances for the people. In this sense our political position in OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 287 If the fact of economic dependence proves in the future to be the consideration that decided us to stay within the Common- wealth when some persons wished us to do otherwise, I should, if I had to write our history at that later stage, comment on yet another strange irony by which our weakness became our strength. I say this because of my own conviction that the best part of the future of the British West Indies lies within the British Common- wealth of Nations. I feel that in the world of the future there will be a very narrow area of choice for nations such as the British West Indies is likely to become. It would be better to remain within the Commonwealth than to enjoy satellite stature or to be merely someone's sphere of influence. I hinted earlier that at present I could not envisage the British West Indies becoming a wealthy nation. One of the unpalatable facts of life that we must face is that our economy is weak and vulnerable, and there appear to be definite limits to the extent to which we can strengthen it. In every territory today strenuous efforts are being made to diversify economies that only yesterday were totally dependent upon agriculture (and in Jamaica and Trinidad everything is being done to encourage foreign investors to establish secondary industries). Here we are, of course, fol- lowing the lead given by Puerto Rico which has been a great source of inspiration to popular leadership in the British Carib- bean. We realize what an excellent achievement Puerto Rico has made in this connection and we consider that it is in the interest of all our territories to endeavor by industrialization to diversify our economies. In Jamaica and Trinidad everything is being done to encourage foreign investors to establish secondary indus- tries. But these are long-range plans and will take time. In the meantime we must face the fact that our tenuous hold on existing standards of living in these countries is made possible by the prices we are now receiving for our main agricultural exports and that if these prices plummeted tomorrow our future would be grim. A healthy democracy presupposes sound economic cir- cumstances for the people. In this sense our political position in OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 287 If the fact of economic dependence proves in the future to be the consideration that decided us to stay within the Common- wealth when some persons wished us to do otherwise, I should, if I had to write our history at that later stage, comment on yet another strange irony by which our weakness became our strength. I say this because of my own conviction that the best part of the future of the British West Indies lies within the British Common- wealth of Nations. I feel that in the world of the future there will be a very narrow area of choice for nations such as the British West Indies is likely to become. It would be better to remain within the Commonwealth than to enjoy satellite stature or to be merely someone's sphere of influence. I hinted earlier that at present I could not envisage the British West Indies becoming a wealthy nation. One of the unpalatable facts of life that we must face is that our economy is weak and vulnerable, and there appear to be definite limits to the extent to which we can strengthen it. In every territory today strenuous efforts are being made to diversify economies that only yesterday were totally dependent upon agriculture (and in Jamaica and Trinidad everything is being done to encourage foreign investors to establish secondary industries). Here we are, of course, fol- lowing the lead given by Puerto Rico which has been a great source of inspiration to popular leadership in the British Carib- bean. We realize what an excellent achievement Puerto Rico has made in this connection and we consider that it is in the interest of all our territories to endeavor by industrialization to diversify our economies. In Jamaica and Trinidad everything is being done to encourage foreign investors to establish secondary indus- tries. But these are long-range plans and will take time. In the meantime we must face the fact that our tenuous hold on existing standards of living in these countries is made possible by the prices we are now receiving for our main agricultural exports and that if these prices plummeted tomorrow our future would be grim. A healthy democracy presupposes sound economic cir- cumstances for the people. In this sense our political position in  288 The Caribbean the Brrtish West Indies is insecure because, in our countries also, a man's ability to find a job and to work for good wages determines to a great extent his attitude toward the society in which he lives and toward those who govern him. It stands to the credit of popular leadership in the British West Indies islands that, despite the low standards of living that obtain in many parts of the region, it has been able to hold a difficult situation and provide sober and responsible enterprise in govern- ment. But heere it is necessary to stress yet another point, that the West Indian societies are now without the participation and the advice of the members of the business community, those elements in the society which, because of their wealth and position, have made the rather egregious error of ruling themselves out entirely from the field of political activity. They made the mistake of standing up against improvement and changes, and as a result they have lost the confidence of the people of the British West Indies. It is a very serious error of judgment of which they have been guilty, because, at a time when it should have been obvious to them that changes such as adult suffrage and the right of the humblest person in the land to represent the interests of the peo- ple had to take place, they nevertheless opposed these changes con- sistently. They did not react enthusiastically to trade-unions when they came, although they should have had the good sense to see that trade-unions had to come, that there had to be a more equit- able distribution of the wealth of the country if political stability were to be ensured, that there had to be the maintenance of sobriety in government if the country were to make progress and not embroil itself in a long period of political unrest and perhaps political chaos, and, lastly, that these changes had to take place. The alternative indeed would have been the sort of explosion that might have turned the clock back in the West Indies for many a long day. They failed to do these things, with the result that society is now without their participation in government. I lament that fact because I feel that a government can be ef- fective only when all the elements in the community are partici- 288 The Caribbean the Brtash West Indies is insecure because, in our countries also, a man's ability to find a job and to work for good wages determines to a great extent his attitude toward the society in which he lives and toward those who govern him. It stands to the credit of popular leadership in the British West Indies islands that, despite the low standards of living that obtain in many parts of the region, it has been able to hold a difficult situation and provide sober and responsible enterprise in govern- ment. But heere it is necessary to stress yet another point, that the West Indian societies are now without the participation and the advice of the members of the business community, those elements in the society which, because of their wealth and position, have made the rather egregious error of ruling themselves out entirely from the field of political activity. They made the mistake of standing up against improvement and changes, and as a result they have lost the confidence of the people of the British West Indies. It is a very serious error of judgment of which they have been guilty, because, at a time when it should have been obvious to them that changes such as adult suffrage and the right of the humblest person in the land to represent the interests of the peo- ple had to take place, they nevertheless opposed these changes con- sistently. They did not react enthusiastically to trade-unions when they came, although they should have had the good sense to see that trade-unions had to come, that there had to be a more equit- able distribution of the wealth of the country if political stability were to be ensured, that there had to be the maintenance of sobriety in government if the country were to make progress and not embroil itself in a long period of political unrest and perhaps political chaos, and, lastly, that these changes had to take place. The alternative indeed would have been the sort of explosion that might have turned the clock back in the West Indies for many a long day. They failed to do these things, with the result that society is now without their participation in government. I lament that fact because I feel that a government can be ef- fective only when all the elements in the community are partici- 288 The Caribbean the Brtish West Indies is insecure because, in our countries also, a man's ability to find a job and to work for good wages determines to a great extent his attitude toward the society in which he lives and toward those who govern him. It stands to the credit of popular leadership in the British West Indies islands that, despite the low standards of living that obtain in many parts of the region, it has been able to hold a difficult situation and provide sober and responsible enterprise in govern- ment. But here it is necessary to stress yet another point, that the West Indian societies are now without the participation and the advice of the members of the business community, those elements in the society which, because of their wealth and position, have made the rather egregious error of ruling themselves out entirely from the field of political activity. They made the mistake of standing up against improvement and changes, and as a result they have lost the confidence of the people of the British West Indies. It is a very serious error of judgment of which they have been guilty, because, at a time when it should have been obvious to them that changes such as adult suffrage and the right of the humblest person in the land to represent the interests of the peo- ple had to take place, they nevertheless opposed these changes con- sistently. They did not react enthusiastically to trade-unions when they came, although they should have had the good sense to see that trade-unions had to come, that there had to be a more equit- able distribution of the wealth of the country if political stability were to be ensured, that there had to be the maintenance of sobriety in government if the country were to make progress and not embroil itself in a long period of political unrest and perhaps political chaos, and, lastly, that these changes had to take place. The alternative indeed would have been the sort of explosion that might have turned the clock back in the West Indies for many a long day. They failed to do these things, with the result that society is now without their participation in government. I lament that fact because I feel that a government can be ef- fective only when all the elements in the community are partici-  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 289 pacing fully in it. Almost every single leader in the West Indies today is drawn from one particular class in the society, and it is the lack of vision and imagination of the privileged classes that have made this condition possible. But, despite the early misgiv- ings as to what sort of job these popular leaders would have done, I think it is true to say that they have shown us that the only way in which to make the irresponsible responsible is by giving them responsibility. That experiment is working, and I take very great pride in this achievement. We are, at the same time, moving from one phase to another. There was first the period of the demagogue, when all that the leader had to do was to make wild promises of utopia overnight. He got the votes and support, but I think more and more people are beginning to realize that one has to deliver the goods if one is to survive in government today; one has to produce results in a country if one expects to continue to receive the support of a people. And what is encouraging in the \est Indies is the fact that there is animating the present leadership a spirit of idealism and a spirit of constructive nationalism that augurs well for the future following federation. The conviction that we shall achieve federation and make a success of it is everywhere. I think it is for that reason that we go to London early in 1956 confident that we shall deliver a robust infant capable of resisting all those infec- tions of the body politic to which infant nations are susceptible. It will be a great experience for me to be there to witness this birth and indeed play a part. OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 289 pating fully in it. Almost every single leader in the West Indies today is drawn from one particular class in the society, and it is the lack of vision and imagination of the privileged classes that have made this condition possible. But, despite the early misgiv- ings as to what sort of job these popular leaders would have done, I think it is true to say that they have shown us that the only way in which to make the irresponsible responsible is by giving them responsibility. That experiment is working, and I take very great pride in this achievement. We are, at the same time, moving from one phase to another. There was first the period of the demagogue, when all that the leader had to do was to make wild promises of utopia overnight. He got the votes and support, but I think more and more people are beginning to realize that one has to deliver the goods if one is to survive in government today; one has to produce results in a country if one expects to continue to receive the support of a people. And what is encouraging in the West Indies is the fact that there is animating the present leadership a spirit of idealism and a spirit of constructive nationalism that augurs well for the future following federation. The conviction that we shall achieve federation and make a success of it is everywhere. I think it is for that reason that we go to London early in 1956 confident that we shall deliver a robust infant capable of resisting all those infec- tions of the body politic to which infant nations are susceptible. It will be a great experience for me to be there to witness this birth and indeed play a part. OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 289 pating fully in it. Almost every single leader in the West Indies today is drawn from one particular class in the society, and it is the lack of vision and imagination of the privileged classes that have made this condition possible. But, despite the early misgiv- ings as to what sort of job these popular leaders would have done, I think it is true to say that they have shown us that the only way in which to make the irresponsible responsible is by giving them responsibility. That experiment is working, and I take very great pride in this achievement. We are, at the same time, moving from one phase to another. There was first the period of the demagogue, when all that the leader had to do was to make wild promises of utopia overnight. He got the votes and support, but I think more and more people are beginning to realize that one has to deliver the goods if one is to survive in government today; one has to produce results in a country if one expects to continue to receive the support of a people. And what is encouraging in the West Indies is the fact that there is animating the present leadership a spirit of idealism and a spirit of constructive nationalism that augurs well for the future following federation. The conviction that we shall achieve federation and make a success of it is everywhere. I think it is for that reason that we go to London early in 1956 confident that we shall deliver a robust infant capable of resisting all those infec- tions of the body politic to which infant nations are susceptible. It will be a great experience for me to be there to witness this birth and indeed play a part.  20 Anita Brenner: A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POLITICAL LIFE AND INFLUENCES I HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY for almost four years, and we Mexicans have been hearing things about the United States. We heard that people were afraid to say what they thought, that you had to watch what you did, whom you knew, how you felt about things. And in Mexico we felt a little bit as if it were an occasion for mourning for something gone that was very important in the world. We were getting these reports that freedom of thought and freedom of speech in the United States, especially among professors in the universities, were curtailed. If you curtail that you might as well kill it because you are either free or you are not. In the last three days, listening to what has been said here, I have noticed certain fears and timidities on the part of some peo- ple who possibly might have been fearful and timid under any circumstances. But it has been such a pleasure to discover that all these things which we have been hearing in Mexico, if they were true at all certainly aren't true any more. People here have been talking "off the top of the head," freely, and without trying to curry favor or being afraid of what they said. That is a great relief to me because that is the only way I know how to talk. Unless you have this kind of communication you might as well not have any. So I am going to talk in that free spirit to friends Anita Brenner: A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POLITICAL LIFE AND INFLUENCES I HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY for almost four years, and we Mexicans have been hearing things about the United States. We heard that people were afraid to say what they thought, that you had to watch what you did, whom you knew, how you felt about things. And in Mexico we felt a little bit as if it were an occasion for mourning for something gone that was very important in the world. We were getting these reports that freedom of thought and freedom of speech in the United States, especially among professors in the universities, were curtailed. If you curtail that you might as well kill it because you are either free or you are not. In the last three days, listening to what has been said here, I have noticed certain fears and timidities on the part of some peo- ple who possibly might have been fearful and timid under any circumstances. But it has been such a pleasure to discover that all these things which we have been hearing in Mexico, if they were true at all certainly aren't true any more. People here have been talking "off the top of the head," freely, and without trying to curry favor or being afraid of what they said. That is a great relief to me because that is the only way I know how to talk. Unless you have this kind of communication you might as well not have any. So I am going to talk in that free spirit to friends 290 Anita Brenner: A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POLITICAL LIFE AND INFLUENCES I HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY for almost four years, and we Mexicans have been hearing things about the United States. We heard that people were afraid to say what they thought, that you had to watch what you did, whom you knew, how you felt about things. And in Mexico we felt a little bit as if it were an occasion for mourning for something gone that was very important in the world. We were getting these reports that freedom of thought and freedom of speech in the United States, especially among professors in the universities, were curtailed. If you curtail that you might as well kill it because you are either free or you are not. In the last three days, listening to what has been said here, I have noticed certain fears and timidities on the part of some peo- ple who possibly might have been fearful and timid under any circumstances. But it has been such a pleasure to discover that all these things which we have been hearing in Mexico, if they were true at all certainly aren't true any more. People here have been talking "off the top of the head," freely, and without trying to curry favor or being afraid of what they said. That is a great rellef to me because that is the only way I know how to talk. Unless you have this kind of communication you might as well not have any. So I am going to talk in that free spirit to friends 290  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 291 who I know are interested as much or more than I in the de- velopment of democratic freedom, the fight for it, the significance of it, and the protection of it from here on. As we all know, this is a historical moment that is probably the most dangerous in the history of mankind. I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I am a journalist. It's my business in a different way from yours to do the same thing you do, which is to observe, try to understand what is going on, search for the truth, think about it, and present it as honestly and clearly as one can; and my reading of the moment that we're in is that it is the most dangerous moment in the history of the world, of mankind. It is a moment in which any incident, a chance remark, an acci- dental happening, can start off a chain reaction that could wipe out the world. In this moment the interdependence of people and of nations and of individuals is such that it is absolutely unpredictable what will affect what. This fact gives each one of us-especially those of us who are functioning in the capacity of reporting the news historically or journalistically, therefore making opinion whether we like it or not-a very serious respon- sibility for what goes on in the world. Something we may say or write can affect the chain of events in such a way, for good or evil, that we have to be even more careful than we might ordi- narily have been, realizing the kind of powder-barrel world that we are in. I once had an amazing sort of experience about how what one says or writes can affect events. Some years ago at the confer- ence at Chapultepec, I was a correspondent for a New York paper, and among the people whom I wanted to see was Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, whom I wanted to interview. When I finally met him, he said: "You're not going to interview me, I'm going to interview you." And I said, "Why, what is this?" And he said, "Well, because you're the mother of the Bolivian revolution." OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 291 who I know are interested as much or more than I in the de- velopment of democratic freedom, the fight for it, the significance of it, and the protection of it from here on. As we all know, this is a historical moment that is probably the most dangerous in the history of mankind. I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I am a journalist. It's my business in a different way from yours to do the same thing you do, which is to observe, try to understand what is going on, search for the truth, think about it, and present it as honestly and clearly as one can; and my reading of the moment that we're in is that it is the most dangerous moment in the history of the world, of mankind. It is a moment in which any incident, a chance remark, an acci- dental happening, can start off a chain reaction that could wipe out the world. In this moment the interdependence of people and of nations and of individuals is such that it is absolutely unpredictable what will affect what. This fact gives each one of us-especially those of us who are functioning in the capacity of reporting the news historically or journalistically, therefore making opinion whether we like it or not-a very serious respon- sibility for what goes on in the world. Something we may say or write can affect the chain of events in such a way, for good or evil, that we have to be even more careful than we might ordi- narily have been, realizing the kind of powder-barrel world that we are in. I once had an amazing sort of experience about how what one says or writes can affect events. Some years ago at the confer- ence at Chapultepec, I was a correspondent for a New York paper, and among the people whom I wanted to see was Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, whom I wanted to interview. When I finally met him, he said: "You're not going to interview me, I'm going to interview you." And I said, "Why, what is this?" And he said, "Well, because you're the mother of the Bolivian revolution." OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 291 who I know are interested as much or more than I in the de- velopment of democratic freedom, the fight for it, the significance of it, and the protection of it from here on. As we all know, this is a historical moment that is probably the most dangerous in the history of mankind. I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I am a journalist. It's my business in a different way from yours to do the same thing you do, which is to observe, try to understand what is going on, search for the truth, think about it, and present it as honestly and clearly as one can; and my reading of the moment that we're in is that it is the most dangerous moment in the history of the world, of mankind. It is a moment in which any incident, a chance remark, an acci- dental happening, can start off a chain reaction that could wipe out the world. In this moment the interdependence of people and of nations and of individuals is such that it is absolutely unpredictable what will affect what. This fact gives each one of us-especially those of us who are functioning in the capacity of reporting the news historically or journalistically, therefore making opinion whether we like it or not-a very serious respon- sibility for what goes on in the world. Something we may say or write can affect the chain of events in such a way, for good or evil, that we have to be even more careful than we might ordi- narily have been, realizing the kind of powder-barrel world that we are in. I once had an amazing sort of experience about how what one says or writes can affect events. Some years ago at the confer- ence at Chapultepec, I was a correspondent for a New York paper, and among the people whom I wanted to see was Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, whom I wanted to interview. When I finally met him, he said: "You're not going to interview me, I'm going to interview you." And I said, "Why, what is this?" And he said, "Well, because you're the mother of the Bolivian revolution."  292 The Caribbean 292 The Caribbean 292 The Caribbean I replied, pretty startled, "That's a lot of responsibility to put on me. How do I know what you're doing with the child, and how do you get this? I never was in Bolivia, I know nothing at all about it, I never lit any red fires that I know of down your way." He said, "Well, it's like this. When we were planning the Bolivian revolution we looked for all the literature that we could find that would give us some clues as to how these affairs are conducted, and we found from your statements that the Mexican example was perhaps closer to us than any other, closer to us than Europe. Our conditions were not the same but similar enough. You gave us a very good play-by-play description of what the Mexicans did, and so we studied it carefully back and forth to know what to do next, who was Madero and who was Car- ranza, and to get the lines right so as not to have the thing fluff." He said, "We had only one problem, there were only six copies of your book available in Bolivia so we had to pass it around among the conspirators!" Well, you can imagine I was amazed indeed. I still knew nothing at all about Bolivia and I had the impression that what they had produced down there was a sort of semifascism which I would not touch with a ten-foot pole-and here I was being held responsible for it! It made a deep impression. You can never tell how what you have written or said will mushroom, but it also drove in on me something that had been increasingly apparent which I had known all along but had not realized, namely, that what Paz Estenssoro said in this naive way, "We studied the Mexican Revolution in order to know what the plays are," is something that has been going on right from the begin- ning. Mexico has been running a kind of school and workshop for Latin American revolutionaries from pretty far back without in- tending to, and without being conscious of it, but welcoming to itself all those engaged in the same sort of search for self-determi- nation, for self-government and self-discovery, and for independ- I replied, pretty startled, "That's a lot of responsibility to put on me. How do I know what you're doing with the child, and how do you get this? I never was in Bolivia, I know nothing at all about it, I never lit any red fires that I know of down your way." He said, "Well, it's like this. When we were planning the Bolivian revolution we looked for all the literature that we could find that would give us some clues as to how these affairs are conducted, and we found from your statements that the Mexican example was perhaps closer to us than any other, closer to us than Europe. Our conditions were not the same but similar enough. You gave us a very good play-by-play description of what the Mexicans did, and so we studied it carefully back and forth to know what to do next, who was Madero and who was Car- ranza, and to get the lines right so as not to have the thing fluff." He said, "We had only one problem, there were only six copies of your book available in Bolivia so we had to pass it around among the conspirators!" Well, you can imagine I was amazed indeed. I still knew nothing at all about Bolivia and I had the impression that what they had produced down there was a sort of semifascism which I would not touch with a ten-foot pole-and here I was being held responsible for it! It made a deep impression. You can never tell how what you have written or said will mushroom, but it also drove in on me something that had been increasingly apparent which I had known all along but had not realized, namely, that what Paz Estenssoro said in this naive way, "We studied the Mexican Revolution in order to know what the plays are," is something that has been going on right from the begin- ning. Mexico has been running a kind of school and workshop for Latin American revolutionaries from pretty far back without in- tending to, and without being conscious of it, but welcoming to itself all those engaged in the same sort of search for self-determi- nation, for self-government and self-discovery, and for independ- I replied, pretty startled, "That's a lot of responsibility to put on me. How do I know what you're doing with the child, and how do you get this? I never was in Bolivia, I know nothing at all about it, I never lit any red fires that I know of down your way." He said, "Well, it's like this. When we were planning the Bolivian revolution we looked for all the literature that we could find that would give us some clues as to how these affairs are conducted, and we found from your statements that the Mexican example was perhaps closer to us than any other, closer to us than Europe. Our conditions were not the same but similar enough. You gave us a very good play-by-play description of what the Mexicans did, and so we studied it carefully back and forth to know what to do next, who was Madero and who was Car- ranza, and to get the lines right so as not to have the thing fluff." He said, "We had only one problem, there were only six copies of your book available in Bolivia so we had to pass it around among the conspirators!" Well, you can imagine I was amazed indeed. I still knew nothing at all about Bolivia and I had the impression that what they had produced down there was a sort of semifascism which I would not touch with a ten-foot pole-and here I was being held responsible for it! It made a deep impression. You can never tell how what you have written or said will mushroom, but it also drove in on me something that had been increasingly apparent which I had known all along but had not realized, namely, that what Paz Estenssoro said in this naive way, "We studied the Mexican Revolution in order to know what the plays are," is something that has been going on right from the begin- ning. Mexico has been running a kind of school and workshop for Latin American revolutionaries from pretty far back without in- tending to, and without being conscious of it, but welcoming to itself all those engaged in the same sort of search for self-determi- nation, for self-government and self-discovery, and for independ-  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 293 ent strength. Mexico has become a sort of focus, a university in action for social change. For example, when I was a student we had as one of a member of a group that used to go horseback riding and eat together, Haya de Ia Torre, who was at that time an exile, one of the many exiles who come and go. We are ac- customed in Mexico to this phenomenon of Latin American exiles who come and go, but who study Mexico very closely, who make friendships with Mexicans, and who retain these connections. For example, an economist friend of mine told me that during the Arevalo regime he was taken down each week by plane to advise the Guatemalan government. I asked, "What sort of ad- vice?" He said, "You know what they wanted to know? They wanted to know: is this the Madero moment or is this the Car- ranza moment? What do we do next? Do we partition the land or do we shoot the generals?" This is matched by another story which another economist, Edmundo Flores, told me about having been requested by a rep- resentative of the Bolivian government to spend two years there sitting in on cabinet meetings-with a voice but no vote-to do what? to partition the land and to distribute the agrarian holdings properly. I said to him, "But look, Edmundo, you're not an agrarian engineer. As far as I know, your background is in banking and finance. How was it that they picked on you? Where do you get off going down there and running the agrarian program for Bolivia?" He replied, "I'm a Mexican. They figure that any Mexican knows how to make agrarian partition, or a good revolution if it comes to that," and he added, "as a matter of fact they frequently had trouble with me." "How?" I said. "Well, I'd sit in on cabinet meetings. The altitude there is different from ours, and they have to take it more calmly and carefully. I'd get mad about things and pound the table, and they'd say, 'Now look, Mexican, hold it, our pace has to be a little OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 293 ent strength. Mexico has become a sort of focus, a university in action for social change. For example, when I was a student we had as one of a member of a group that used to go horseback riding and eat together, Haya de la Torre, who was at that time an exile, one of the many exiles who come and go. We are ac- customed in Mexico to this phenomenon of Latin American exiles who come and go, but who study Mexico very closely, who make friendships with Mexicans, and who retain these connections. For example, an economist friend of mine told me that during the Arevalo regime he was taken down each week by plane to advise the Guatemalan government. I asked, "What sort of ad- vice?" He said, "You know what they wanted to know? They wanted to know: is this the Madero moment or is this the Car- ranza moment? What do we do next? Do we partition the land or do we shoot the generals?" This is matched by another story which another economist, Edmundo Flores, told me about having been requested by a rep- resentative of the Bolivian government to spend two years there sitting in on cabinet meetings-with a voice but no vote-to do what? to partition the land and to distribute the agrarian holdings properly. I said to him, "But look, Edmundo, you're not an agrarian engineer. As far as I know, your background is in banking and finance. How was it that they picked on you? Where do you get off going down there and running the agrarian program for Bolivia?" He replied, "I'm a Mexican. They figure that any Mexican knows how to make agrarian partition, or a good revolution if it comes to that," and he added, "as a matter of fact they frequently had trouble with me." "How?" I said. "Well, I'd sit in on cabinet meetings. The altitude there is different from ours, and they have to take it more calmly and carefully. I'd get mad about things and pound the table, and they'd say, 'Now look, Mexican, hold it, our pace has to be a little OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 293 ent strength. Mexico has become a sort of focus, a university in action for social change. For example, when I was a student we had as one of a member of a group that used to go horseback riding and eat together, Haya de la Torre, who was at that time an exile, one of the many exiles who come and go. We are ac- customed in Mexico to this phenomenon of Latin American exiles who come and go, but who study Mexico very closely, who make friendships with Mexicans, and who retain these connections. For example, an economist friend of mine told me that during the Arevalo regime he was taken down each week by plane to advise the Guatemalan government. I asked, "What sort of ad- vice?" He said, "You know what they wanted to know? They wanted to know: is this the Madero moment or is this the Car- ranza moment? What do we do next? Do we partition the land or do we shoot the generals?" This is matched by another story which another economist, Edmundo Flores, told me about having been requested by a rep- resentative of the Bolivian government to spend two years there sitting in on cabinet meetings-with a voice but no vote-to do what? to partition the land and to distribute the agrarian holdings properly. I said to him, "But look, Edmundo, you're not an agrarian engineer. As far as I know, your background is in banking and finance. How was it that they picked on you? Where do you get off going down there and running the agrarian program for Bolivia?" He replied, "I'm a Mexican. They figure that any Mexican knows how to make agrarian partition, or a good revolution if it comes to that," and he added, "as a matter of fact they frequently had trouble with me." "How?" I said. "Well, I'd sit in on cabinet meetings. The altitude there is different from ours, and they have to take it more calmly and carefully. I'd get mad about things and pound the table, and they'd say, 'Now look, Mexican, hold it, our pace has to be a little  294 The Caribbean slower, we're higher in the air,' And when I'd get really too pent up about the slow rate I was going, they just turned me loose in some part of the country where they figured I wouldn't do too much harm, and said, 'Go ahead, carry on with your agrarian program. " These stories sound pretty baroque, don't they? I mean, we're not accustomed to thinking of history being made in this way. Yet they are facts, and there is this childlike, genuine, sincere in- terest in learning something which many people feel they now have to know. And this feeling is not confined only to Latin America. One of the people I found most interesting to talk to not long ago was the Minister of Education of Pakistan who said, "We have a problem very similar to Mexico; we have a very poor country and we have a very illiterate population. Mexico started out with this and Mexico did a very good job. We want to know how you did it, because we have to work with pennies just the same way that Mexico did." And even talking to people from India, who are fairly frequent visitors, I began to have a sense that this is not just a Latin Ameri- can phenomenon, this searching for ways of standing on your own feet and the insistence of doing it yourself and on being free. II The present emergence of a fight for freedom all over the world is very similar to that in 1776, except that today Mexico is playing pretty much the same role that the United States did then, at least in relation to Latin America. After the American Revolution the United States, of course, was the "red menace" of the time; it was a very dangerous place, with very dangerous ideas. People with the same concerns from all over the world came to the United States for help, official or private, for the same reason Guatemalans, or Costa Ricans, or Peruvians, or Bolivians go to Mexico, as well as for instruction, for study, for guidance, and for fraternal help in kicking out dictators and in getting something achieved to help human beings. 294 The Caribbean slower, we're higher in the air,' And when I'd get really too pent up about the slow rate I was going, they just turned me loose in some part of the country where they figured I wouldn't do too much harm, and said, 'Go ahead, carry on with your agrarian program.' " These stories sound pretty baroque, don't they? I mean, we're not accustomed to thinking of history being made in this way. Yet they are facts, and there is this childlike, genuine, sincere in- terest in learning something which many people feel they now have to know. And this feeling is not confined only to Latin America. One of the people I found most interesting to talk to not long ago was the Minister of Education of Pakistan who said, "We have a problem very similar to Mexico; we have a very poor country and we have a very illiterate population. Mexico started out with this and Mexico did a very good job. We want to know how you did it, because we have to work with pennies just the same way that Mexico did." And even talking to people from India, who are fairly frequent visitors, I began to have a sense that this is not just a Latin Ameri- can phenomenon, this searching for ways of standing on your own feet and the insistence of doing it yourself and on being free. II The present emergence of a fight for freedom all over the world is very similar to that in 1776, except that today Mexico is playing pretty much the same role that the United States did then, at least in relation to Latin America. After the American Revolution the United States, of course, was the "red menace" of the time; it was a very dangerous place, with very dangerous ideas. People with the same concerns from all over the world came to the United States for help, official or private, for the same reason Guatemalans, or Costa Ricans, or Peruvians, or Bolivians go to Mexico, as well as for instruction, for study, for guidance, and for fraternal help in kicking out dictators and in getting something achieved to help human beings. 294 The Caribbean slower, we're higher in the air,' And when I'd get really too pent up about the slow rate I was going, they just turned me loose in some part of the country where they figured I wouldn't do too much harm, and said, 'Go ahead, carry on with your agrarian program.' " These stories sound pretty baroque, don't they? I mean, we're not accustomed to thinking of history being made in this way. Yet they are facts, and there is this childlike, genuine, sincere in- terest in learning something which many people feel they now have to know. And this feeling is not confined only to Latin America. One of the people I found most interesting to talk to not long ago was the Minister of Education of Pakistan who said, "We have a problem very similar to Mexico; we have a very poor country and we have a very illiterate population. Mexico started out with this and Mexico did a very good job. We want to know how you did it, because we have to work with pennies just the same way that Mexico did." And even talking to people from India, who are fairly frequent visitors, I began to have a sense that this is not just a Latin Ameri- can phenomenon, this searching for ways of standing on your own feet and the insistence of doing it yourself and on being free. II The present emergence of a fight for freedom all over the world is very similar to that in 1776, except that today Mexico is playing pretty much the same role that the United States did then, at least in relation to Latin America. After the American Revolution the United States, of course, was the "red menace" of the time; it was a very dangerous place, with very dangerous ideas. People with the same concerns from all over the world came to the United States for help, official or private, for the same reason Guatemalans, or Costa Ricans, or Peruvians, or Bolivians go to Mexico, as well as for instruction, for study, for guidance, and for fraternal help in kicking out dictators and in getting something achieved to help human beings.  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 295 I am frequently puzzled regarding the position of the United States today, because in our own history and in our own feeling we are deeply committed to independence, to self-determination of people, to respect for other people's independence, to tolerance for other people's opinions. That is what we live for, that is how we grew up. Yet in our dealings with many nations we are frequently con- tradictory. The question was asked yesterday, does the United States really want democracy elsewhere? Although the people of the United States would not hesitate for an instant in showing where their sympathies lie and where their assistance should go, the government of the United States does not act the same way. We all know that. Very frequently, by indirection, it supports governments which are the very opposite of what we believe in, and so at the very least what happens is that the people of other countries are confused and ask, "Well?, What do you really want with us?" The leadership of the spirit which the United States could very easily have in the world is lost. I mean that the strength, the unquestionable trust that the United States could have, is lost, is frittered away by these ambivalent and contradictory actions in supporting this dictator today or that one tomorrow. This is silly little power politics, this opportunism which costs us a tremen- dous amount in lost confidence of other people but which is, after all, what we are trying to gain. I am fairly innocent-minded about these conclusions I come to, but I can only say how it looks to me from where I live. I am observing history from Mexico, which is a country just coming to the end of its colonial period. III Recently Mexico was lashed by hurricanes. One completely wiped out the city of Chetumal. There was nothing left but splintered houses and mangled bodies. It was horrible. Tampico was flooded for almost a month. Hundreds of thousands of peo- ple were driven out. It was one disaster after another: first there OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 295 I am frequently puzzled regarding the position of the United States today, because in our own history and in our own feeling we are deeply committed to independence, to self-determination of people, to respect for other people's independence, to tolerance for other people's opinions. That is what we live for, that is how we grew up. Yet in our dealings with many nations we are frequently con- tradictory. The question was asked yesterday, does the United States really want democracy elsewhere? Although the people of the United States would not hesitate for an instant in showing where their sympathies lie and where their assistance should go, the government of the United States does not act the same way. We all know that. Very frequently, by indirection, it supports governments which are the very opposite of what we believe in, and so at the very least what happens is that the people of other countries are confused and ask, "Well?, What do you really want with us?" The leadership of the spirit which the United States could very easily have in the world is lost. I mean that the strength, the unquestionable trust that the United States could have, is lost, is frittered away by these ambivalent and contradictory actions in supporting this dictator today or that one tomorrow. This is silly little power politics, this opportunism which costs us a tremen- dous amount in lost confidence of other people but which is, after all, what we are trying to gain. I am fairly innocent-minded about these conclusions I come to, but I can only say how it looks to me from where I live. I am observing history from Mexico, which is a country just coming to the end of its colonial period. III Recently Mexico was lashed by hurricanes. One completely wiped out the city of Chetumal. There was nothing left but splintered houses and mangled bodies. It was horrible. Tampico was flooded for almost a month. Hundreds of thousands of peo- ple were driven out. It was one disaster after another: first there OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 295 I am frequently puzzled regarding the position of the United States today, because in our own history and in our own feeling we are deeply committed to independence, to self-determination of people, to respect for other people's independence, to tolerance for other people's opinions. That is what we live for, that is how we grew up. Yet in our dealings with many nations we are frequently con- tradictory. The question was asked yesterday, does the United States really want democracy elsewhere? Although the people of the United States would not hesitate for an instant in showing where their sympathies lie and where their assistance should go, the government of the United States does not act the same way. We all know that. Very frequently, by indirection, it supports governments which are the very opposite of what we believe in, and so at the very least what happens is that the people of other countries are confused and ask, "Well?, What do you really want with us?" The leadership of the spirit which the United States could very easily have in the world is lost. I mean that the strength, the unquestionable trust that the United States could have, is lost, is frittered away by these ambivalent and contradictory actions in supporting this dictator today or that one tomorrow. This is silly little power politics, this opportunism which costs us a tremen- dous amount in lost confidence of other people but which is, after all, what we are trying to gain. I am fairly innocent-minded about these conclusions I come to, but I can only say how it looks to me from where I live. I am observing history from Mexico, which is a country just coming to the end of its colonial period. III Recently Mexico was lashed by hurricanes. One completely wiped out the city of Chetumal. There was nothing left but splintered houses and mangled bodies. It was horrible. Tampico was flooded for almost a month. Hundreds of thousands of peo- ple were driven out. It was one disaster after another: first there  296 The Caribbean 296 The Caribbean 296 The Caribbean was a flood, then there was a fire, then there was a typhoon, then there was something else, until the country really felt that it could take no more. At this moment, without any pronounce- ment, without any statements of policy, without even one single news dispatch, American aircraft carriers started toward Mexico from wherever they happened to be. There were some in the Carib- bean and I think there were some in the Gulf, there were two or three of them, heading straight for the point of disaster. One of them, the minute that it started for Tampico, began baking bread! The entire crew just threw itself, day and night, into just baking bread for the flooded people. When they arrived at Tampico, the helicopters took off, and they spent twenty-four hours a day just ferrying people out of the flooded area and into Monterrey and to wherever else they could get them. There were delegations, I think, of Red Cross from Texas, and so forth. In any case, there was a kind of invasion of Americans from all the nearest points in the simplest kind of way, without a word being said, bringing help, and without making a thing of it-for the embassy did not say a word and did not give out any communi- que. Somehow the entire country began to get this news, and began to get it in the most dramatic way-by people coming out of Tampico with the story. I have never seen Mexico so deeply moved. All the little in- sults of the past, and the big insults, and the criticisms of su- perior-talking people who rubbed others the wrong way-all this was wiped out! How, why, what did the United States do at that moment? It was just itself-just acted like itself. It did what it automatically would do if there were a disaster in Florida, or in Texas, or in North Carolina, or wherever. It did not treat Mexico like something different from itself. There were no power poli- tics, no Machiavellian stuff, no conspiratorial business, and no deep, dark calculation-nothing. It was just one human being to another. And that was the best piece of "politicking" that I have ever seen. That was it! There was another example of this last year. After devalua- was a flood, then there was a fire, then there was a typhoon, then there was something else, until the country really felt that it could take no more. At this moment, without any pronounce- ment, without any statements of policy, without even one single news dispatch, American aircraft carriers started toward Mexico from wherever they happened to be. There were some in the Carib- bean and I think there were some in the Gulf, there were two or three of them, heading straight for the point of disaster. One of them, the minute that it started for Tampico, began baking bread! The entire crew just threw itself, day and night, into just baking bread for the flooded people. When they arrived at Tampico, the helicopters took off, and they spent twenty-four hours a day just ferrying people out of the flooded area and into Monterrey and to wherever else they could get them. There were delegations, I think, of Red Cross from Texas, and so forth. In any case, there was a kind of invasion of Americans from all the nearest points in the simplest kind of way, without a word being said, bringing help, and without making a thing of it-for the embassy did not say a word and did not give out any communi- qu6. Somehow the entire country began to get this news, and began to get it in the most dramatic way-by people coming out of Tampico with the story. I have never seen Mexico so deeply moved. All the little in- sults of the past, and the big insults, and the criticisms of su- perior-talking people who rubbed others the wrong way-all this was wiped out! How, why, what did the United States do at that moment? It was just itself-just acted like itself. It did what it automatically would do if there were a disaster in Florida, or in Texas, or in North Carolina, or wherever. It did not treat Mexico like something different from itself. There were no power poli- tics, no Machiavellian stuff, no conspiratorial business, and no deep, dark calculation-nothing. It was just one human being to another. And that was the best piece of "politicking" that I have ever seen. That was it! There was another example of this last year. After devalua- was a flood, then there was a fire, then there was a typhoon, then there was something else, until the country really felt that it could take no more. At this moment, without any pronounce- ment, without any statements of policy, without even one single news dispatch, American aircraft carriers started toward Mexico from wherever they happened to be. There were some in the Carib- bean and I think there were some in the Gulf, there were two or three of them, heading straight for the point of disaster. One of them, the minute that it started for Tampico, began baking bread! The entire crew just threw itself, day and night, into just baking bread for the flooded people. When they arrived at Tampico, the helicopters took off, and they spent twenty-four hours a day just ferrying people out of the flooded area and into Monterrey and to wherever else they could get them. There were delegations, I think, of Red Cross from Texas, and so forth. In any case, there was a kind of invasion of Americans from all the nearest points in the simplest kind of way, without a word being said, bringing help, and without making a thing of it-for the embassy did not say a word and did not give out any communi- qu6. Somehow the entire country began to get this news, and began to get it in the most dramatic way-by people coming out of Tampico with the story. I have never seen Mexico so deeply moved. All the little in- sults of the past, and the big insults, and the criticisms of su- perior-talking people who rubbed others the wrong way-all this was wiped out! How, why, what did the United States do at that moment? It was just itself-just acted like itself. It did what it automatically would do if there were a disaster in Florida, or in Texas, or in North Carolina, or wherever. It did not treat Mexico like something different from itself. There were no power poli- tics, no Machiavellian stuff, no conspiratorial business, and no deep, dark calculation-nothing. It was just one human being to another. And that was the best piece of "politicking" that I have ever seen. That was it! There was another example of this last year. After devalua-  OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 297 tion of the currency, Mexico took quite a stunning blow. Sud- denly one's money was 30 per cent gone, and this was true for business and for individuals. It was the hardest blow Mexico had had in a long time. Then, the American community did some- thing that made history. With the smartest kind of leadership two Americans took over. One was an Irish-Catholic Democrat with General Motors, J. J. McIntyre, and the other an Episco- palian with the National City Bank, Bill Richardson. Both of them have lived in Mexico for many years. They are people who love the country, who feel at home there, whose children have grown up there, who feel identified with it. They happened to nave enough power so that they could say to the rest of the community, "Look, let's do something. The Mexicans are in trouble, let us do something about it!" So they started a commit- tee of American citizens for action, pro-Mexico. To do what? To raise money to help promote travel, to help to interest invest- ors in the country. What was especially needed was to bring more dollars to Mexico. This was the first time American resi- dents in Mexico had ever acted like this. There is not too much that such a committee can do on a major scale, but what it did for international relations in showing good will to help was tremendous. It taught everybody living there a lesson and it made a very deep impression on me. The questions that I keep turning over in my mind are: How can we do these friendly things more often? How could we put into action this force that works internationally, eases away ten- sion, works for understanding, and makes friends? It is good- neighborism, Christianity, Judaism, it is what all the great re- ligions have taught, and it is common sense, too. How can we get peoples in communication with other peoples so that they lose their distrust of each other and are able to function together? What could happen to a threatened world if these impulses be- came working principles? What can we do to bring it about? I do not know, but perhaps if we think about it we can find ways to begin. Mexico and the United States have set a good example. OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 297 tion of the currency, Mexico took quite a stunning blow. Sud- denly one's money was 30 per cent gone, and this was true for business and for individuals. It was the hardest blow Mexico had had in a long time. Then, the American community did some- thing that made history. With the smartest kind of leadership two Americans took over. One was an Irish-Catholic Democrat with General Motors, J. J. McIntyre, and the other an Episco- palian with the National City Bank, Bill Richardson. Both of them have lived in Mexico for many years. They are people who love the country, who feel at home there, whose children have grown up there, who feel identified with it. They happened to nave enough power so that they could say to the rest of the community, "Look, let's do something. The Mexicans are in trouble, let us do something about it!" So they started a commit- tee of American citizens for action, pro-Mexico. To do what? To raise money to help promote travel, to help to interest invest- ors in the country. What was especially needed was to bring more dollars to Mexico. This was the first time American resi- dents in Mexico had ever acted like this. There is not too much that such a committee can do on a major scale, but what it did for international relations in showing good will to help was tremendous. It taught everybody living there a lesson and it made a very deep impression on me. The questions that I keep turning over in my mind are: How can we do these friendly things more often? How could we put into action this force that works internationally, eases away ten- sion, works for understanding, and makes friends? It is good- neighborism, Christianity, Judaism, it is what all the great re- ligions have taught, and it is common sense, too. How can we get peoples in communication with other peoples so that they lose their distrust of each other and are able to function together? What could happen to a threatened world if these impulses be- came working principles? What can we do to bring it about? I do not know, but perhaps if we think about it we can find ways to begin. Mexico and the United States have set a good example. OBSERVATIONS ON CARIBBEAN POLITICS 297 tion of the currency, Mexico took quite a stunning blow. Sud- denly one's money was 30 per cent gone, and this was true for business and for individuals. It was the hardest blow Mexico had had in a long time. Then, the American community did some- thing that made history. With the smartest kind of leadership two Americans took over. One was an Irish-Catholic Democrat with General Motors, J. J. McIntyre, and the other an Episco- palian with the National City Bank, Bill Richardson. Both of them have lived in Mexico for many years. They are people who love the country, who feel at home there, whose children have grown up there, who feel identified with it. They happened to nave enough power so that they could say to the rest of the community, "Look, let's do something. The Mexicans are in trouble, let us do something about it!" So they started a commit- tee of American citizens for action, pro-Mexico. To do what? To raise money to help promote travel, to help to interest invest- ors in the country. What was especially needed was to bring more dollars to Mexico. This was the first time American resi- dents in Mexico had ever acted like this. There is not too much that such a committee can do on a major scale, but what it did for international relations in showing good will to help was tremendous. It taught everybody living there a lesson and it made a very deep impression on me. The questions that I keep turning over in my mind are: How can we do these friendly things more often? How could we put into action this force that works internationally, eases away ten- sion, works for understanding, and makes friends? It is good- neighborism, Christianity, Judaism, it is what all the great re- ligions have taught, and it is common sense, too. How can we get peoples in communication with other peoples so that they lose their distrust of each other and are able to function together? What could happen to a threatened world if these impulses be- came working principles? What can we do to bring it about? I do not know, but perhaps if we think about it we can find ways to begin. Mexico and the United States have set a good example.   Part VII Part VII Part VII CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY   Edward M. Heiliger: SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS THE CARIBBEAN AREA, for the purposes of this Conference, includes Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, the re- publics of the West Indies, and the colonial mainland and island territories. This is a tremendous area. Many of the countries differ greatly from one another in customs, language, social and economic advancement, political stability, and in many other ways. The scope of this paper must be limited to classes of ma- terials available in most of the areas and to certain general works treating of them all. Special attention will be given to biblio- graphical aids, so that this paper may serve as a guide for anyone wishing to orient himself on any specific political problem in any given country. In defining "political problems," Noah Webster's definition: "the science and art of government . . ."' is good be- cause it mentions the "art of government." There is reason to feel that many Caribbean political problems have very little to do with political science, because they are essentially a struggle for personal power and advantage. This is changing, however. One cannot examine the literature now coming out without feeling ' Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., Pub- lishers, 1949). 301 Edward M. Heiliger: SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS THE CARIBBEAN AREA, for the purposes of this Conference, includes Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, the re- publics of the West Indies, and the colonial mainland and island territories. This is a tremendous area. Many of the countries differ greatly from one another in customs, language, social and economic advancement, political stability, and in many other ways. The scope of this paper must be limited to classes of ma- terials available in most of the areas and to certain general works treating of them all. Special attention will be given to biblio- graphical aids, so that this paper may serve as a guide for anyone wishing to orient himself on any specific political problem in any given country. In defining "political problems," Noah Webster's definition: "the science and art of government . . ."' is good be- cause it mentions the "art of government." There is reason to feel that many Caribbean political problems have very little to do with political science, because they are essentially a struggle for personal power and advantage. This is changing, however. One cannot examine the literature now coming out without feeling ' Websters New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., Pub- lishers, 1949). 301 Edward M. Heiliger: SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS THE CARIBBEAN AREA, for the purposes of this Conference, includes Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, the re- publics of the West Indies, and the colonial mainland and island territories. This is a tremendous area. Many of the countries differ greatly from one another in customs, language, social and economic advancement, political stability, and in many other ways. The scope of this paper must be limited to classes of ma- terials available in most of the areas and to certain general works treating of them all. Special attention will be given to biblio- graphical aids, so that this paper may serve as a guide for anyone wishing to orient himself on any specific political problem in any given country. In defining "political problems," Noah Webster's definition: "the science and art of government . . ."1 is good be- cause it mentions the "art of government." There is reason to feel that many Caribbean political problems have very little to do with political science, because they are essentially a struggle for personal power and advantage. This is changing, however. One cannot examine the literature now coming out without feeling ' Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., Pub- lishers, 1949).  302 The Caribbean 302 The Caribbean 302 The Caribbean that issues, rather than men, are having increasing importance. The increasing size of governments is forcing political leaders to pay more attention to the scientific aspects of government, and the addition of such elements as the labor movement, a growing middle class, and popular education, is affecting the political picture. It seems more in tune with the rapidly changing present and hopeful future to accept the broader definition and consider "problems of political science." "Source material," ac- cording to the American Library Association, is "Fundamental authoritative material relating to a subject, used in the prepara- tion of a later written work, e.g., original records, documents, etc."' This is usable, if we can include secondary source material of an authoritative nature. My own private list of Caribbean political problems includes problems not common to every political entity in the Caribbean area. Colonialism, for instance, is not a problem in certain countries, but a vital one in others. Other problems which af- fect one or another country in varying degrees are: the impor- tance of the military in government; election and voting; land ownership; caudillismo; the church and state; Central American union; press censorship; civil service; popular suffrage; labor; political revolutions; taxes; United States business; political par- ties; communism; education; nonre-election of presidents; social security; federalism; public administration; international prob- lems; and the problem of converting the constitution from an ideal into a practical instrument. These are not listed in order of their importance, since the order of their importance would be different for each country. Each country has issued public statements by its political lead- ers, messages of presidents, and similar material. These, like many other printed sources, represent the official point of view. There is usually a newspaper that acts as a government mouth- piece and a newspaper that goes as far in the other direction as " E. H. Thompson (ed.), Glossary of Library Terms (Chicago: Ameri- can Library Association, 1943), p. 129. that issues, rather than men, are having increasing importance. The increasing size of governments is forcing political leaders to pay more attention to the scientific aspects of government, and the addition of such elements as the labor movement, a growing middle class, and popular education, is affecting the political picture. It seems more in tune with the rapidly changing present and hopeful future to accept the broader definition and consider "problems of political science." "Source material," ac- cording to the American Library Association, is "Fundamental authoritative material relating to a subject, used in the prepara- tion of a later written work, e.g., original records, documents, etc."' This is usable, if we can include secondary source material of an authoritative nature. My own private list of Caribbean political problems includes problems not common to every political entity in the Caribbean area. Colonialism, for instance, is not a problem in certain countries, but a vital one in others. Other problems which af- fect one or another country in varying degrees are: the impor- tance of the military in government; election and voting; land ownership; caudillismo; the church and state; Central American union; press censorship; civil service; popular suffrage; labor; political revolutions; taxes; United States business; political par- ties; communism; education; nonre-election of presidents; social security; federalism; public administration; international prob- lems; and the problem of converting the constitution from an ideal into a practical instrument. These are not listed in order of their importance, since the order of their importance would be different for each country. Each country has issued public statements by its political lead- ers, messages of presidents, and similar material. These, like many other printed sources, represent the official point of view. There is usually a newspaper that acts as a government mouth- piece and a newspaper that goes as far in the other direction as E. H. Thompson (ed.), Glossary of Library Terms (Chicago: Ameri- can Library Association, 1943), p. 129. that issues, rather than men, are having increasing importance. The increasing size of governments is forcing political leaders to pay more attention to the scientific aspects of government, and the addition of such elements as the labor movement, a growing middle class, and popular education, is affecting the political picture. It seems more in tune with the rapidly changing present and hopeful future to accept the broader definition and consider "problems of political science." "Source material," ac- cording to the American Library Association, is "Fundamental authoritative material relating to a subject, used in the prepara- tion of a later written work, e.g., original records, documents, etc."' This is usable, if we can include secondary source material of an authoritative nature. My own private list of Caribbean political problems includes problems not common to every political entity in the Caribbean area. Colonialism, for instance, is not a problem in certain countries, but a vital one in others. Other problems which af- fect one or another country in varying degrees are: the impor- tance of the military in government; election and voting; land ownership; caudillismo; the church and state; Central American union; press censorship; civil service; popular suffrage; labor; political revolutions; taxes; United States business; political par- ties; communism; education; nonre-election of presidents; social security; federalism; public administration; international prob- lems; and the problem of converting the constitution from an ideal into a practical instrument. These are not listed in order of their importance, since the order of their importance would be different for each country. Each country has issued public statements by its political lead- ers, messages of presidents, and similar material. These, like many other printed sources, represent the official point of view. There is usually a newspaper that acts as a government mouth- piece and a newspaper that goes as far in the other direction as E. H. Thompson (ed.), Glossary of Library Terms (Chicago: Ameri- can Library Association, 1943), p. 129.  CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 303 CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 303 CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 303 it dares. In between, there are often others. To understand any political problem in any Caribbean country, one must know which newspapers stand for what and the individuals who write for those newspapers. Do not neglect provincial newspapers, as they are often revealing. An aid to finding these newspapers in the United States is Arthur Gropp's Union List of Latin American Newspapers in Libraries in the United States, published by the Pan American Union in 1953. There are more than 5,000 newspapers listed, representing 56 libraries. Each government has its official journal and the reports of its own departments. These are very important for the study of many political prob- lems, for statistics, historical background, and so forth, and in- clude the memorias of the Secretarias de Gobernacion, and of the various ministerios and departamentos of the government. Official plans of specific political parties, such as the Partido de la Revolucidn Mexicana, are very important. A comparison be- tween the programs of the liberal and conservative parties can often be revealing. Do not be fooled by the name of the party. The most conservative party may be called the "radical" party. For the study of the more "scientific" political problems such as social security, the congressional publications and publications of congressional commissions are important. Many countries have a Comisidn Nacional de Servicio Civil, whose publications are important for the study of civil service problems. University publications are very important. Those of the Escuela de Admin- istraci6n Pdblica, of the Universidad de Puerto Rico, are an ex- ample. Theses are improving in quality, and there are many which concern themselves with problems of government. Too many theses suffer from the lack of good bibliographical resources and well-organized library facilities. This has resulted in a tend- ency to work over some previous thesis, adding to it a bit, and presenting the resulting work as something new. The last ten years have seen a great increase in bibliographical resources, how- ever, and the quality of theses has shown a steady increase. There are certain important organizations in the United States it dares. In between, there are often others. To understand any political problem in any Caribbean country, one must know which newspapers stand for what and the individuals who write for those newspapers. Do not neglect provincial newspapers, as they are often revealing. An aid to finding these newspapers in the United States is Arthur Gropp's Union List of Latin American Newspapers in Libraries in the United States, published by the Pan American Union in 1953. There are more than 5,000 newspapers listed, representing 56 libraries. Each government has its official journal and the reports of its own departments. These are very important for the study of many political prob- lems, for statistics, historical background, and so forth, and in- clude the memorias of the Secretarias de Gobernacidn, and of the various ministerios and departamentos of the government. Official plans of specific political parties, such as the Partido de la Revolucidn Mexicana, are very important. A comparison be- tween the programs of the liberal and conservative parties can often be revealing. Do not be fooled by the name of the party. The most conservative party may be called the "radical" party. For the study of the more "scientific" political problems such as social security, the congressional publications and publications of congressional commissions are important. Many countries have a Comisi6n Nacional de Servicio Civil, whose publications are important for the study of civil service problems. University publications are very important. Those of the Escuela de Admin- istracidn Pnblica, of the Universidad de Puerto Rico, are an ex- ample. Theses are improving in quality, and there are many which concern themselves with problems of government. Too many theses suffer from the lack of good bibliographical resources and well-organized library facilities. This has resulted in a tend- ency to work over some previous thesis, adding to it a bit, and presenting the resulting work as something new. The last ten years have seen a great increase in bibliographical resources, how- ever, and the quality of theses has shown a steady increase. There are certain important organizations in the United States it dares. In between, there are often others. To understand any political problem in any Caribbean country, one must know which newspapers stand for what and the individuals who write for those newspapers. Do not neglect provincial newspapers, as they are often revealing. An aid to finding these newspapers in the United States is Arthur Gropp's Union List of Latin American Newspapers in Libraries in the United States, published by the Pan American Union in 1953. There are more than 5,000 newspapers listed, representing 56 libraries. Each government has its official journal and the reports of its own departments. These are very important for the study of many political prob- lems, for statistics, historical background, and so forth, and in- clude the memorias of the Secretarias de Gobernacidn, and of the various ministerios and departamentos of the government. Official plans of specific political parties, such as the Partido de la Revolucidn Mexicana, are very important. A comparison be- tween the programs of the liberal and conservative parties can often be revealing. Do not be fooled by the name of the party. The most conservative party may be called the "radical" party. For the study of the more "scientific" political problems such as social security, the congressional publications and publications of congressional commissions are important. Many countries have a Comision Nacional de Servicio Civil, whose publications are important for the study of civil service problems. University publications are very important. Those of the Escuela de Admin- istraci6n Publica, of the Universidad de Puerto Rico, are an ex- ample. Theses are improving in quality, and there are many which concern themselves with problems of government. Too many theses suffer from the lack of good bibliographical resources and well-organized library facilities. This has resulted in a tend- ency to work over some previous thesis, adding to it a bit, and presenting the resulting work as something new. The last ten years have seen a great increase in bibliographical resources, how- ever, and the quality of theses has shown a steady increase. There are certain important organizations in the United States  304 The Caribbean that should be mentioned at this point, because of the importance of their publications on Latin American subjects. One is the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Annals, published by this organization, include many important studies of the Caribbean scene. The Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago, with its excellent library, has a keen interest in the Caribbean, and its publications should be noted. The Library of Congress is, perhaps, the most important of all. It is especially noted for its Handbook of Latin American Studies,' which, actually, is a cooperative effort by many leading scholars in universities throughout the United States. The excellent edi- torial and supervision work is centered in the Hispanic Founda- tion of the Library of Congress in Washington. It is published by the University of Florida Press. The Library of Congress also has published guides to the official publications of the following countries in the Caribbean area: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela; and the very important Latin American Series. Included in this last series are guides to the law and legal literature of the various Latin American countries. The Library of Congress is famous for its Library of Congress Catalog; A Cumulative List of Works Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards. This publication, which appears prompt- ly and is cumulative, lists all the books that are cataloged by the Library by author and subject. It includes books received from the Caribbean area and is one of the few up-to-date listings of current Caribbean books. The printed general catalogs of the British Museum and the Bibliotheque Nationale are also useful, but are not as up to date. The latest Library of Congress publi- cation of interest to this study is Current National Bibliographies, an annotated list.' The Pan American Union Library has been very active in work ' Published annually for the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Con- gress, by the University of Florida Press, Gainesville. ' (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955). 304 The Caribbean that should be mentioned at this point, because of the importance of their publications on Latin American subjects. One is the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Annals, published by this organization, include many important studies of the Caribbean scene. The Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago, with its excellent library, has a keen interest in the Caribbean, and its publications should be noted. The Library of Congress is, perhaps, the most important of all. It is especially noted for its Handbook of Latin American Studies,' which, actually, is a cooperative effort by many leading scholars in universities throughout the United States. The excellent edi- torial and supervision work is centered in the Hispanic Founda- tion of the Library of Congress in Washington. It is published by the University of Florida Press. The Library of Congress also has published guides to the official publications of the following countries in the Caribbean area: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela; and the very important Latin American Series. Included in this last series are guides to the law and legal literature of the various Latin American countries. The Library of Congress is famous for its Library of Congress Catalog; A Cumulative List of Works Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards. This publication, which appears prompt- ly and is cumulative, lists all the books that are cataloged by the Library by author and subject. It includes books received from the Caribbean area and is one of the few up-to-date listings of current Caribbean books. The printed general catalogs of the British Museum and the Bibliotheque Nationale are also useful, but are not as up to date. The latest Library of Congress publi- cation of interest to this study is Current National Bibliographies, an annotated list.' The Pan American Union Library has been very active in work ' Published annually for the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Con- gress, by the University of Florida Press, Gainesville. ' (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955). 304 The Caribbean that should be mentioned at this point, because of the importance of their publications on Latin American subjects. One is the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Annals, published by this organization, include many important studies of the Caribbean scene. The Public Administration Clearing House in Chicago, with its excellent library, has a keen interest in the Caribbean, and its publications should be noted. The Library of Congress is, perhaps, the most important of all. It is especially noted for its Handbook of Latin American Studies,' which, actually, is a cooperative effort by many leading scholars in universities throughout the United States. The excellent edi- torial and supervision work is centered in the Hispanic Founda- tion of the Library of Congress in Washington. It is published by the University of Florida Press. The Library of Congress also has published guides to the official publications of the following countries in the Caribbean area: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela; and the very important Latin American Series. Included in this last series are guides to the law and legal literature of the various Latin American countries. The Library of Congress is famous for its Library of Congress Catalog; A Cumulative List of Works Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards. This publication, which appears prompt- ly and is cumulative, lists all the books that are cataloged by the Library by author and subject. It includes books received from the Caribbean area and is one of the few up-to-date listings of current Caribbean books. The printed general catalogs of the British Museum and the Bibliotheque Nationale are also useful, but are not as up to date. The latest Library of Congress publi- cation of interest to this study is Current National Bibliographies, an annotated list' The Pan American Union Library has been very active in work ' Published annually for the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Con- gress, by the University of Florida Press, Gainesville. ' (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).  CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 305 connected with the study of all phases of life in the Caribbean. Its "Bibliographic Series" is especially important. Number 43 of this series, entitled Bibliography on Public Administration in Latin America, considers all phases of public administration, and covers the Caribbean area. The United Nations Library has con- tributed to the search for materials on Caribbean political prob- lems in its Latin America, 1935-1949; a Selected Bibliography. The efforts being made by each country to list its own publica- tions are of importance in the search for information on current political problems. Cuba has three: the Anuario bibliogrdfico cubano, the Directorio de revistas y periddicos de Cuba, and the Revista de la Biblioteca Nacional in Havana. Puerto Rico has Anuario bibliogrdfico puertorriqueno; . . . Venezuela's national biblography, published by the Biblioteca Nacional, is entitled Anuario bibliogrdfico venezolano. The Boletin of the Archivo General de Ia Nacion is another source. Colombia has its Anuario bibliogrdfico colombiano; Costa Rica, the Boletin bibliogrdfico; the Dominican Republic, the Anuario bibliogrdfico dominicano; Mexi- co, the Boletin bibliogrdfico mexicano (of Porrua Hermanos, a reputable Mexican bookseller); Guatemala, the Indite biblio- grdico guatemalteco; El Salvador, Anaqueles: Revista de la Bibli- oteca Nacional; and Nicaragua, the bibliographical series of the Biblioteca Americana de Nicaragua, now a part of the Biblioteca Nacional. The Caribbean Commission's Current Caribbean Bibliography: An Alphabetical List of Publications Issued in the Caribbean Territories of France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States has useful material for the study of Carib- bean political problems. Most of these "national bibliographies" are of recent origin and are slow in coming out. Each country should have a good up-to-date national bibliography and a great deal can be done to improve the present situation. In the search for information on political problems in the Caribbean, one must not neglect the Revista Interamericana de Bibliografia, published quarterly in Washington by the Pan American Union. It is in four languages and includes a section CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 305 connected with the study of all phases of life in the Caribbean. Its "Bibliographic Series" is especially important. Number 43 of this series, entitled Bibliography on Public Administration in Latin America, considers all phases of public administration, and covers the Caribbean area. The United Nations Library has con- tributed to the search for materials on Caribbean political prob- lems in its Latin America, 1935-1949; a Selected Bibliography. The efforts being made by each country to list its own publica- tions are of importance in the search for information on current political problems. Cuba has three: the Anuario bibliogrdfico cubano, the Directorio de revistas y periddicos de Cuba, and the Revista de la Biblioteca National in Havana. Puerto Rico has Anuario bibliogrdfico puertorriqueno; . . . Venezuela's national biblography, published by the Biblioteca Nacional, is entitled Anuario bibliogrdfico venezolano. The Boletin of the Archivo General de la Naci6n is another source. Colombia has its Anuario bibliogrdfico colombiano; Costa Rica, the Boletin bibliogrdfico; the Dominican Republic, the Anuario bibliogrdfico dominicano; Mexi- co, the Boletin bibliogrdfico mexicano (of Porrua Hermanos, a reputable Mexican bookseller); Guatemala, the Indite biblio- grdfico guatemalteco; El Salvador, Anaqueles: Revista de la Bibli- oteca Nacional; and Nicaragua, the bibliographical series of the Biblioteca Americana de Nicaragua, now a part of the Biblioteca Nacional. The Caribbean Commission's Current Caribbean Bibliography: An Alphabetical List of Publications Issued in the Caribbean Territories of France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States has useful material for the study of Carib- bean political problems. Most of these "national bibliographies" are of recent origin and are slow in coming out. Each country should have a good up-to-date national bibliography and a great deal can be done to improve the present situation. In the search for information on political problems in the Caribbean, one must not neglect the Revista Interamericana de Bibliografia, published quarterly in Washington by the Pan American Union. It is in four languages and includes a section CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 305 connected with the study of all phases of life in the Caribbean. Its "Bibliographic Series" is especially important. Number 43 of this series, entitled Bibliography on Public Administration in Latin America, considers all phases of public administration, and covers the Caribbean area. The United Nations Library has con- tributed to the search for materials on Caribbean political prob- lems in its Latin America, 1935-1949; a Selected Bibliography. The efforts being made by each country to list its own publica- tions are of importance in the search for information on current political problems. Cuba has three: the Anuario bibliogrdfico cubano, the Directorio de revistas y periodicos de Cuba, and the Revista de la Biblioteca National in Havana. Puerto Rico has Anuario bibliogrdfico puertorriqueo; . . . Venezuela's national biblography, published by the Biblioteca Nacional, is entitled Anuario bibliogrdfico venezolano. The Boletn of the Archivo General de la Naci6n is another source. Colombia has its Anuario bibliogrdfico colombiano; Costa Rica, the Boletin bibliogrdfico; the Dominican Republic, the Anuario bibliogrdfico dominicano; Mexi- co, the Boletin bibliogrdfico mexicano (of Porrua Hermanos, a reputable Mexican bookseller); Guatemala, the Indite biblio- grdlco guatemalteco; El Salvador, Anaqueles: Revista de la Bibli- oteca Nacional; and Nicaragua, the bibliographical series of the Biblioteca Americana de Nicaragua, now a part of the Biblioteca Nacional. The Caribbean Commission's Current Caribbean Bibliography: An Alphabetical List of Publications Issued in the Caribbean Territories of France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States has useful material for the study of Carib- bean political problems. Most of these "national bibliographies" are of recent origin and are slow in coming out. Each country should have a good up-to-date national bibliography and a great deal can be done to improve the present situation. In the search for information on political problems in the Caribbean, one must not neglect the Revista Interamericana de Bibliografia, published quarterly in Washington by the Pan American Union. It is in four languages and includes a section  306 The Caribbean on political science which lists the new books and pamphlets on the subject. The Pan American Union also publishes monthly its List of Books Accessioned and Periodical Articles Indexed. This is a publication of the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan American Union. Other important magazines are: Boletin, Municipal Digest of the Americas; The Caribbean (formerly Monthly Information Bulletin) of the Caribbean Commission; Boletin de gerencia administrativa (Puerto Rico); Books Abroad; Public Administration Review; Revista de economia (Mexico); Indice de articulos en publicaciones periddicos of the Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Economicos in El Salvador. There is a long list of these journals in the Pan American Union's Biblio- graphy on Public Administration in Latin America. In the study of political situations, people are important, and one should know the biographical materials available. Each coun- try has its Quiin es Quien, or other biographical index. Most of these are very out of date and are not too helpful. However, in the appraisal of a given political problem, every bit of informa- tion about the principals involved can be very important. Memoirs and diaries are useful. Who's Who in Latin America, published by Stanford University, is very helpful. Letters, debate materials, society publications, and state and provincial papers provide an- other source. For general statistical information, the following are useful: The Statesman's Year Book; The World Almanac and Book of Facts; The Political Handbook of the World: Parlia- ments, Parties, and Press . . .; and the Annuaire General. The best known encyclopedia in Spanish is the "Espasa."s The famous "Millionth map" of the American Geographical Society is im- portant for matters concerned with political boundaries. An in- dex to this map was published by the American Geographical Society of New York in 1945.6 * Enciclopedia ilustrada europeo-americana, Espasa-Calpe. 72 vols., 10 suppl. (Barcelona, 1900-1934). * American Geographical Society of New York, Index to Map of His panic America; 1:1,000,000 (Washington: Government Printing Of- fice, 1945). 306 The Caribbean on political science which lists the new books and pamphlets on the subject. The Pan American Union also publishes monthly its List of Books Accessioned and Periodical Articles Indexed. This is a publication of the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan American Union. Other important magazines are: Boletin, Municipal Digest of the Americas; The Caribbean (formerly Monthly Information Bulletin) of the Caribbean Commission; Boletin de gerencia administrativa (Puerto Rico); Books Abroad; Public Administration Review; Revista de economia (Mexico); Indice de articulos en publicaciones periddicos of the Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Economicos in El Salvador. There is a long list of these journals in the Pan American Union's Biblio- graphy on Public Administration in Latin America. In the study of political situations, people are important, and one should know the biographical materials available. Each coun- try has its Quien es Quien, or other biographical index. Most of these are very out of date and are not too helpful. However, in the appraisal of a given political problem, every bit of informa- tion about the principals involved can be very important. Memoirs and diaries are useful. Who's Who in Latin America, published by Stanford University, is very helpful. Letters, debate materials, society publications, and state and provincial papers provide an- other source. For general statistical information, the following are useful: The Statesman's Year Book; The World Almanac and Book of Facts; The Political Handbook of the World: Parlia- ments, Parties, and Press . . .; and the Annuaire General. The best known encyclopedia in Spanish is the "Espasa."6 The famous "Millionth map" of the American Geographical Society is im- portant for matters concerned with political boundaries. An in- dex to this map was published by the American Geographical Society of New York in 1945.6 v Enciclopedia ilustrada europeo-americana, Espasa-Calpe. 72 vols., 10 suppl. (Barcelona, 1900-1934). ' American Geographical Society of New York, Index to Map of His- panic America; 1:1,000,000 (Washington: Government Printing Of- fice, 1945). 306 The Caribbean on political science which lists the new books and pamphlets on the subject. The Pan American Union also publishes monthly its List of Books Accessioned and Periodical Articles Indexed. This is a publication of the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan American Union. Other important magazines are: Boletin, Municipal Digest of the Americas; The Caribbean (formerly Monthly Information Bulletin) of the Caribbean Commission; Boletin de gerencia administrativa (Puerto Rico); Books Abroad; Public Administration Review; Revista de economia (Mexico); Indice de articulos en publicaciones periodicos of the Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Economicos in El Salvador. There is a long list of these journals in the Pan American Union's Biblio- graphy on Public Administration in Latin America. In the study of political situations, people are important, and one should know the biographical materials available. Each coun- try has its Quiin es Quien, or other biographical index. Most of these are very out of date and are not too helpful. However, in the appraisal of a given political problem, every bit of informa- tion about the principals involved can be very important. Memoirs and diaries are useful. Who's Who in Latin America, published by Stanford University, is very helpful. Letters, debate materials, society publications, and state and provincial papers provide an- other source. For general statistical information, the following are useful: The Statesman's Year Book; The World Almanac and Book of Facts; The Political Handbook of the World: Parlia- ments, Parties, and Press . . .; and the Annuaire General. The best known encyclopedia in Spanish is the "Espasa."s The famous "Millionth map" of the American Geographical Society is im- portant for matters concerned with political boundaries. An in- dex to this map was published by the American Geographical Society of New York in 1945.6 ' Enciclopedia ilustrada europeo-americana, Espasa-Calpe. 72 vols., 10 suppl. (Barcelona, 1900-1934). American Geographical Society of New York, Index to Map of His panic America; 1:1,000,000 (Washington: Government Printing Of- fice, 1945).  CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 307 CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 307 CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 307 I will mention only a few of the more or less recent books that one should know about in considering current Caribbean political problems. One of the most useful is Asher N. Christensen's The Evolution of Latin American Government, written by the University of Minnesota political scientist who has for many years written the "Government" section for the Handbook of Latin American Studies. The new book by Jesus de Galindez entitled Iberoamerica . . .7 has a chapter entitled "La evolucion politica y social. Partidos politicos, y anticlericalismo" that gives a resume of the political situation in each country. This is written in Spanish. Another recent book of value is that by Galo Plaza, Problems of Democracy in Latin America, published in 1955 by the University of North Carolina Press. The author devotes considerable space to the Caribbean area, especially Guatemala. Other useful books are: Bernard Poole's The Caribbean Com- mission . . . ; Miguel Jorrin's, Governments of Latin America; A. Curtis Wilgus', The Caribbean Area; Austin Macdonald's, Latin American Politics and Government; Paul Blanshard's De- mocracy and Empire in the Caribbean; and Howard Cline's, The United States and Mexico. Certain area studies are also useful. That of William Stokes on Honduras, and the Biesanzes on Costa Rica and Panama, are others. One must be extremely careful about selecting books written by local authors about the political situation in their respective countries. Political bias is very strong. Many of the important publications dealing with political problems in the Caribbean area are "fugitive" in nature-that is, published in small editions and distributed only through local channels. Libraries in the United States are now cooperating through the Farmington Plan to see to it that all world publica- tions arrive at one or another United States library. There are now Farmington Plan agents in all parts of the world. Each of these agents sends all current material on political science to the ' Jesus de Galindez, Iberoamirica, su evolucidn politica, socio-eco- ndmica, cultural e international (New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1954). I will mention only a few of the more or less recent books that one should know about in considering current Caribbean political problems. One of the most useful is Asher N. Christensen's The Evolution of Latin American Government, written by the University of Minnesota political scientist who has for many years written the "Government" section for the Handbook of Latin American Studies. The new book by Jesus de Galindez entitled Iberoamirica . . .' has a chapter entitled "La evolucion politica y social. Partidos politicos, y anticlericalismo" that gives a risume of the political situation in each country. This is written in Spanish. Another recent book of value is that by Galo Plaza, Problems of Democracy in Latin America, published in 1955 by the University of North Carolina Press. The author devotes considerable space to the Caribbean area, especially Guatemala. Other useful books are: Bernard Poole's The Caribbean Com- mission . . . ; Miguel Jorrin's, Governments of Latin America; A. Curtis Wilgus', The Caribbean Area; Austin Macdonald's, Latin American Politics and Government; Paul Blanshard's De- mocracy and Empire in the Caribbean; and Howard Cline's, The United States and Mexico. Certain area studies are also useful. That of William Stokes on Honduras, and the Biesanzes on Costa Rica and Panama, are others. One must be extremely careful about selecting books written by local authors about the political situation in their respective countries. Political bias is very strong. Many of the important publications dealing with political problems in the Caribbean area are "fugitive" in nature-that is, published in small editions and distributed only through local channels. Libraries in the United States are now cooperating through the Farmington Plan to see to it that all world publica- tions arrive at one or another United States library. There are now Farmington Plan agents in all parts of the world. Each of these agents sends all current material on political science to the ' Jesus de Galindez, Iberoamdrica, su evolucidn politica, socio-eco- ndmica, cultural a internacional (New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1954). I will mention only a few of the more or less recent books that one should know about in considering current Caribbean political problems. One of the most useful is Asher N. Christensen's The Evolution of Latin American Government, written by the University of Minnesota political scientist who has for many years written the "Government" section for the Handbook of Latin American Studies. The new book by Jesus de Galindez entitled Iberoamirica . . .r has a chapter entitled "La evolucion politica y social. Partidos politicos, y anticlericalismo" that gives a resume of the political situation in each country. This is written in Spanish. Another recent book of value is that by Galo Plaza, Problems of Democracy in Latin America, published in 1955 by the University of North Carolina Press. The author devotes considerable space to the Caribbean area, especially Guatemala. Other useful books are: Bernard Poole's The Caribbean Com- mission . . . ; Miguel Jorrin's, Governments of Latin America; A. Curtis Wilgus', The Caribbean Area; Austin Macdonald's, Latin American Politics and Government; Paul Blanshard's De- mocracy and Empire in the Caribbean; and Howard Cline's, The United States and Mexico. Certain area studies are also useful. That of William Stokes on Honduras, and the Biesanzes on Costa Rica and Panama, are others. One must be extremely careful about selecting books written by local authors about the political situation in their respective countries. Political bias is very strong. Many of the important publications dealing with political problems in the Caribbean area are "fugitive" in nature-that is, published in small editions and distributed only through local channels. Libraries in the United States are now cooperating through the Farmington Plan to see to it that all world publica- tions arrive at one or another United States library. There are now Farmington Plan agents in all parts of the world. Each of these agents sends all current material on political science to the ' Jesus de Galindez, Iberoamdrica, su evolucidn politica, socio-eco- ndmica, cultural a internacional (New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1954).  308 The Caribbean Columbia University Library. Material on colonies and coloniza- tions go to Harvard; on immigration and emigration to the Uni- versity of California in Berkeley; and on diplomacy, interna- tional arbitration, law, relations, and security, law and prisoners of war, peace, treaties, and United Nations (general) to the Harvard Law Library. Within each Caribbean country, impor- tant sources are: National libraries, libraries of government de- partments, private libraries, national archives, university libraries, and provincial libraries. In the United States, in addition to the Farmington Plan libraries, there are many libraries with good Caribbean collections. The Library of Congress, the University of Texas, the University of California, and the University of Florida are some of these. This paper has only touched on a large subject. Some im- portant older works have been omitted so that the newer ones could be mentioned. It can, however, be of help to some one wishing to learn more about Caribbean political problems. BIBLIOGRAPHY General Behrendt, Richard. Modern Latin America in Social Science Literature. Inter-American Series. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1949. Burchfield, Laverne. Student's Guide to Materials in Political Science. New York: Henry Holt and Company, c.1935. Marchant, Alexander. Boundaries of the Latin American Republics; An Annotated List of Documents, 1493-1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. South American Handbook, 1924-; A Yearbook and Guide to the Countries and Resources of South and Central America, Mexico and Cuba. London: Trade and Travel Publications, 1924-. United Nations. Latin America, 1935-1949; A Selected Bibliography. New York: United Nations, 1952. U.S. Library of Congress. Current National Bibliographies. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. U.S. Library of Congress. Catalog of Books Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards. Issued to July 31, 1942. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Bros., Inc., 1942-46. 167 vols. 308 The Caribbean Columbia University Library. Material on colonies and coloniza- tions go to Harvard; on immigration and emigration to the Uni- versity of California in Berkeley; and on diplomacy, interna- tional arbitration, law, relations, and security, law and prisoners of war, peace, treaties, and United Nations (general) to the Harvard Law Library. Within each Caribbean country, impor- tant sources are: National libraries, libraries of government de- partments, private libraries, national archives, university libraries, and provincial libraries. In the United States, in addition to the Farmington Plan libraries, there are many libraries with good Caribbean collections. The Library of Congress, the University of Texas, the University of California, and the University of Florida are some of these. This paper has only touched on a large subject. Some im- portant older works have been omitted so that the newer ones could be mentioned. It can, however, be of help to some one wishing to learn more about Caribbean political problems. BIBLIOGRAPHY General Behrendt, Richard. Modern Latin America in Social Science Literature. Inter-American Series. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1949. Burchfield, Laverne. Student's Guide to Materials in Political Science. New York: Henry Holt and Company, c.1935. Marchant, Alexander. Boundaries of the Latin American Republics; An Annotated List of Documents, 1493-1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. South American Handbook, 1924-; A Yearbook and Guide to the Countries and Resources of South and Central America, Mexico and Cuba. London: Trade and Travel Publications, 1924-. United Nations. Latin America, 1935-1949; A Selected Bibliography. New York: United Nations, 1952. U.S. Library of Congress. Current National Bibliographies. Washington: Government Prting Office, 1955. U.S. Library of Congress. Catalog of Books Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards. Issued to July 31, 1942. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Bros., Inc., 194246. 167 vols. 308 The Caribbean Columbia University Library. Material on colonies and coloniza- tions go to Harvard; on immigration and emigration to the Uni- versity of California in Berkeley; and on diplomacy, interna- tional arbitration, law, relations, and security, law and prisoners of war, peace, treaties, and United Nations (general) to the Harvard Law Library. Within each Caribbean country, impor- tant sources are: National libraries, libraries of government de- partments, private libraries, national archives, university libraries, and provincial libraries. In the United States, in addition to the Farmington Plan libraries, there are many libraries with good Caribbean collections. The Library of Congress, the University of Texas, the University of California, and the University of Florida are some of these. This paper has only touched on a large subject. Some im- portant older works have been omitted so that the newer ones could be mentioned. It can, however, be of help to some one wishing to learn more about Caribbean political problems. BIBLIOGRAPHY General Behrendt, Richard. Modern Latin America in Social Science Literature. Inter-American Series. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1949. Burchfield, Laverne. Student's Guide to Materials in Political Science. New York: Henry Holt and Company, c.1935. Marchant, Alexander. Boundaries of the Latin American Republics; An Annotated List of Documents, 1493-1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. South American Handbook, 1924-; A Yearbook and Guide to the Countries and Resources of South and Central America, Mexico and Cuba. London: Trade and Travel Publicetions, 1924-. United Nations. Latin America, 1935-1949; A Selected Bibliography. New York: United Nations, 1952. U.S. Library of Congress. Current National Bibliographies. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. U.S. Library of Congress. Catalog of Books Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards. Issued to July 31, 1942. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Bros., Inc., 194246. 167 vols.  CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 309 U.S. Librarpy of ongress. The Library of Contgress Au~thor Catalog; A Cumultative List of Works Repeseted by Library of Congress Printed4 Cards, 1948-. Wshington:; Library If 0ongress, 1940-. U.S. Library of 0ongres. The Library of ongress Subject Catalog, 1950-. Washintgton:Libar 6 of Con09ress, 1950-. Who't Whot in Lattin Americal; A Biographical 0Di1tionar7 If NotaleU Liv- ing Men1 and Woe o11 f 111i1 America1. Rona1d Hi11ton (ed.). 34 ed. revised1and1enlarged. Stanord UnistiyPres, 150-1951. Williams,, E4wi1 E. Farmin1gton1 Plan Handbook6. Cambridge: 11arv114 Unierity Printing 0f86ce, c.1953. Winchell, Constance1 M. 0Gu341 to Reference Books. 7th ed. Chicago: Americant LibraryAssociatIn, 1951. Burnt, W. L. The Bri1th West Indies. (Bitisth Emtpire History.) Lon1- don:; Hutchinsont's University library, 1951. 196 pp. Puerto Rico.. . New York: WoodrowP Wilon FoundaItion, 1954. Poole, Berntard. The Caribbean omm~littsion. Backgrountd If 011o1er1ti11 in the West 1114311. olum~bia: University of South Carlina1, 1951. Chapmanl, Chalest E. "The Age of the Ctaudillos: A Chapter int Hispanick Holt and omtpanty, 1951. Pp. 65-81. tensen, Ather N. (ed.), The Evtion3pt If Latin American1 overnmt:lt A Bookof Readintgt. Netw York: Henrty Holt1and omtpan1y, 1951. Pp. 401-414. Fittgihhttt, Rusttll H. "The Pathology9 If Democrac1y in Latn Ameica:l A Politcal 9111161st1 Point1 of View," in: Chritentsetn, Ather N. (1d.), New Yorh: Hettry Holt tand om~pany, 1991. Pp. 270-284. Jthtttttt, John J. "Foreign Factors int Dictatorship in Ltint America1, Pacific Hitoical Beiewt, XX, 2 (May, 1951), 127-141. Ather N. (ed.), The Evlutiont If Ltint Americanp Govlppmttt : A Boo6 If Reading91. Nptw Yorh: Hentty 11olt antd Comtpanty, 1181. Pp. 414429. Military Holmesl, 011ve. "Artty Chatllentge in1 Ltint Ametricat," Foreign1 Polc Re- ports, XXV, 14 (Dec. 1, 1949), 166-175. Guerrap, Marpinat y Aphiactt, Graf. Le4tnidast Pinepda M1., presentado1 t Congreso1 Nationall. Mlt Ilcon~tmico de 1950 a 1551. Teguci~glpat, 1951(?). 157 pp. 1948. 011111s, 1949. 118 pp. CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 309 U3.S. Librarpy of Congress. The Library of ongresst Atthor Catalog; A Cumltive Lit If Works Represented11469116ar0 If 0111g1111 Printed Cardst, 1948-. Wathington: Library of 0Congress, 1948-. U.S. Library If ontgrett. The Library If Congress Subject Catalog, 1950-. Washington: Librtry of ongrest, 1950-. Who't Who in1 Latin Amer~ica; A Biogralphicall Dictionar1y If Notable 1iv- revised 114 entlarged. S1tan0o14 0111111109 Ptptt, 1950-1951. Williams, Edwint E. Farmlington1 Plant Handbook1. Cambrhidge: Ha111114 Univer11t9 Printing Office, c.1953. Winchell, ontance M. Gu141 to Reference1 91161. 7th ed. Chic11o: AmianlILbrary Associato, 1951. don:t Htchinson's University Librarpy, 1951. 116 pp. Hatydpen, Sherman tt on11g. Non-Self-0Governing Teitor1ies: Statu1 pf Puerto1 Rico... New1 York: Woodrow Wilso11 Fountda4to, 1954. inthe16 West Indies. olumbia:l Universit91 of1Soth Carolitna, 1951. Chapmant, Charplps E. "Thp Age 110 the Caudtllot: A Chaptpr in1 Hispaick Ateicanl History," in: Chrlstensen, Ashpr N. (ed), The Evolution1 If Holt antd omtpany, 1951. Pp. 65-81. Fitzgibbon1, Rutsell H1. "Executve Power in 01111111 America1," in: Chrit- Aook6f Rea~ingt. New York: HenrlyHoltlandomttpay, 1951. Pp. 401-414. Fitzgibbont, Rusttll 11. "The Pathology of 0Dem111119 in Latin Amerpica: A Pol0t1c1 8111nt10111 Point 11f View," in:; 06hr11111111, Ather N. (ed.), The 011lu0111 If La111 Americanp Gover111ment: A Book If Readingst. Newt York: 111nr1 Holt 1114 ompatty, 1991. Pp. 270-284. Joh61ns11, Johnl J. "Foreign PFactors in Dictatorship in tin61 Ameriplpa," Pacific Historicl 9111iew, XX, 2 (May, 1951), 127-141. Tannenbaumttt,PFran. "Personalovernmtt in1thMexico," in:Ohrptensenpt, Athpp N. (ed.), The E111111111 If Lattin Americant Governmnt:1 A Book If Reading9s. Newp York: Henty Holt1 andt Com1pan, 1951. Pp. 414429. ports, XXV, 14 (Dec. 1, 1949), 166-175. Honduras1. Iltflnl l 1 ub1-SecreltplIo encargado 41 Uot despachost 41 0111g1111 National1. MIf 111116mico de 1950 a1981, Tegucigatlp, 1851(9). 157 pp. Venezla~l. 0011111 Naclional de btfolltttplt p Publicaciones. 011111111- 1848. Caracastt, 1949. 118 pp. CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 309 U.S. 1161119 of 0C119re11. The Librarpy If 0C111re11 Author Catalog; A Cumulatttive List If WIotk Represen1ted by 11bra1 of 0111g1111 Printed 01141, 1948-. Washington:1 Librarpy If 0111g1111, 1948-. U.S. 116110y of Congress. The Librarly If 0C115res1 Subject Catalog, 1950-. Washintgton:; 161119 of 0111gr111, 1950-. Wo's Wo in1 Latin America; A Biogrphical Dictionary If Notable Li1- ing5 0111 and WomenI1 If 11811 Americ. Ro11114 1151111 (ed.). 34 ed. 19vis14 1114 e1111914. Stanford Universtity Ppptt, 1950-1951. WincheO, 01111ta11e M. 011ide to Reference Books. 7th pd. Chicago: Amican1ptLthraryAssociationt, 1951. Clonialism B1111, W. L. Thp 8111116 West 1114311. (Britsh E11pir1 111story.) Lon- don:; Huttinso's 0Un11111319 ibtraty, 1951. 186 pp. Hatydent, 86111111 St1on9. Non1-Slf-Governin1g Territories: 51ta111 If Puer11o Rico... New1 York: Woodrow1 Wi1son Foundat48on, 1954. Poole, Bernard4. The Carpibpbean 01ommi1111n. 81165111111 If Coopertiont 311 t61 Welt 1114311. 01111mb611 01111111111 If South 011110111, 1981. 06191111, 0611111 E. "The Age of the 011411111; A Chatptet 61 Hispanic American Hitory," in: Chritensen1, Athet N. (ed), The Evolution1 If Latin1American1 Gover1ment:;Aook6of 9114111gs. New1York: Henr0 Holt 1114 om1pany, 1951. Pp. 65-81. Fitzgibbon1, Russell H. "Exectve Power1 itt Cetal America," 111: Cbris- A Bool- f0Reaig. New1York:Henr Ho11lt1an1d0Compan1y, 1951. Pp. 401-414. Fitzgibbon1, RusselI H. "Thp Pathology 110 0111111119 itt Ltn Amerpdca: A Polit1c1 0161118111s Point If View," itt; 061111111111, Ather N. (ed.), The 9Ev1610111 If 101311 Ameican1 Government:1 A 0116 of Read1151. New1 York: 111111 Holt 1114 0111p111, 1981. Pp. 270-284. Johnson1, Johtt J. P11re1gn Factors in Dictatorship Un Ltin Americat," Pacpific Historical Review, XX, 2 (Maty, 1851), 127-141. Asher N. (ed.), The E11610111 If La1tn Americant 0G1ver1111nt1 A Book If Readingst. New Yttrk: Henryp Holt antd 011119111, 1851. Pp. 414429. 1111mes1, Olive. "A1tmy 06al11191 in1 L10in Americat," Foreign Policy Re- por1s, XXV, 14 (Dec. 1, 1849), 166-175. 011151111 Na0ional. Alin ec1116111o dp 1950 a1951, Tegupigatlpat, 1951(?). 157 pp. Veneppuepla. 0611111 Nacional de IntoI9111U1 y Pubhllicione. Documen1- tls oficiale relatives t 11111116111mi113691d41124 411111611161141 1948. 0111111,18949. 1189pp.  310 The Caribbean Ghurch an~d State Editorial Sudameriana, 1948(5). 128 pp., i11us. Mecham, J. Lloyd. Cburch and Statp pn [atip America; A Hiisoy of Politico-Ecclesiasptica.l Relatios. Chapel Hill: Univsity of North Caroplina Prss 1934. 562 pp. Mechbam, J. Lloyd. "Cburcb and State in Lati, America," in: Christen,p,, Asber N. (ed.), The, Evolutionp of Latin American Government:o A ook of Reaings. New' York: Henpy Holt anpd Cmpany, 1951. Pp. 134- 160. Schutz, Wilissm. This New, World; tbe Civilizationo atsin Amerpica. New' York: E. P. Dution & Copapny, 1954. Popular Suffrage Appaijp Mendizabal, Roberto. Sufragio efectivop. Mexico, [1950). 80 pp. Lara AlemAn, Victorp. La presentacsidn politicas dentro del regimenp dem,- oprdtico. Mtdio, 1949. 72 pp. Lunap Morales, Clara. El sufrasgio t,,,,,,,i,, en Mexico,. Mexico, 1947. 59 pp. Mendez G6l,,o, Gelapip. El rgime presentatsive e Mexipp. [1949.] 96 pp. Centrasl American,, Union, Beltranena Valladares, Lus. Attempps to PForm a Union of Centra~l Amer- isca. Nptrp Dapmp, lna., 1947. 94 pp. Wbitakbr, Arthur P. "Tbhe Role of [stn Amerpica in elatipn to Current Trends in Intenaonal Organizatlpon," in: Cbhristensen, Asber N. (ed.), The, Evoplutiono at ,in Ameia Government:,l A Book of Readings,. Npew Yppb: Henry Holt and Com~pany, 1991. Pp. 710-721. Voting Elections Basidas Villota, Antpnio. Crplill del registrador municipal. 8Splementop a. to copilacin electoal de 1949. Apliocpip,, pr-dctipca de In legisla- p16., sobre, cidula a,, pip6.6.pi. Segunda edicitn. BogotA: Ismprenta Natipnal, [1949). 14 pp. Confrencisdemsrd on~p da efetualpdsdurantep I p6,pcom pan letrldl Senor Grpl. Ing. PFranciscp J. Crajpls op cadidapo del P.0.I. at gobiero del Estado de, Chiaps. Mexdpp: Tuxtla Guierrpp, [1948]. 295 pp., illus., masp. Cortpn,p,]ppManuel. ElIvtprefprto-,ial rte a .1la conilsid,,t. La Hasbana: Editorial Lpp, 1947. 18 pp. Guatemapla. Decretosp 255, 313, 324, 538 y 552. Ley Electorapl, Guate- masla: Publicaciones, del Minispeii, de Gobprnaidn [1948]. 85 pp. Holguinp, Carlps, an.d Antpnio Vicente Aren.s (eds.). Registraduria a pional] deI 1sd5 civil. Com~pilap'ldp electoral. Edipih, . coopdi- nada y dirigida.. Bogota, Imprenta Nacional, [1949). 292 pp. Moscoso B. Arnonio. Segunda Asmblea Naciponpl Cpnstituyente a,, to Repdblica PanamenaS, 1945. DocumentoS hip,6ripp contentivo de ora 310 The Caribbean Church an~d State, Payard, Marcelo I. En defensa, de, la libertapd religiosa. Bupepps Aipes: Editorial Sudamepricana, 1948(8). 128 pp., illus. Mpebham, [. [1loyd. Churchb and State pn [ptip America; A History of Politic-Ecclesiaical Relatippp. Chapel Hoill: University pf Noptb Carolina Prpss, 1994. 562 pp. Mechppp, J. Lloyd. "Chppch and State in Latip Ampepica, ip: Chpistepsep, Apher N. (ed.), Tbhe Evplution, of Lai Apmericpp Gpovepnpept: A Book pf Readings. Npw York: Henrpp Holt pnd Copanpyp, 1991. Pp. 154- 160. Scbsptz, Willipam. This Newp World; tbs Civilipatipp Sf [tin Americap. Newp Yppk: E. P. Duptton & Copanp~y, 1954. Popula Suffrage Ara6jp MppdizAbal, Ropberto. Sufrapgip eftivo. Mexico, [1950]. 80 pp. Lppp Alempan, Victor. LapresenptaciSdn politica, deptro del rdgimen, demp- pcrdticp. Mepicp, 1949. 72 pp. Lppa Morales, Clara. El sufragio femenppino ep Mdpipp. Mepico, 1947. 99 pp. Mdez Gd~pp., Gelacio. El rigimen,, rpepsentativo pn Mipicp. [1949.] 96 pp. Centra~l Amerpian Unipon Belranena Valladarps, Luis. Attes o Fo Ppa,, Un~ion of Central Amer- ipca. Notre Damep, Ind., 1947. 94 pp. Wbitakpr, Arthur P. "Tbhe olp of Lat6n Amerlica in Relaton tp Cpppent Trenpds in Interpatonal Orgnizat6on," in: Cbpistepsen, Ashep N. (ed.), The Evplptipon of [atin Amerpican Gp,'ernmepnt:p A Book pf Readings. Nppp Yppk: Henry Hltl apd Copanpyp, 1981. Pp. 718-721. Voting Electipo Bs6das Vilpota, Antppip. Caroilla del registra.dor munoicipal. Su.plemento,,P a, lapcopilappidp elecptoral de 1949. Aplicacion, prdctica de la legisla- eidn pobre, c4dula de, ciudadania. Segunda edicitn. Bogota: Imprenta Napipnsl, [1949]. 84 pp. Conferencias ~de mesa redonda eftuapds durantla cpanahlectoral dl Sepor Gral. lIng. Francisco J. Grajals comoS ppandidpto deI P.R.I. at gobierno,, del Estado de, Chiaps. Mdpicp: Tpplap Gptierre, [1948]. 299 pp., illus,., ma~p. Consp Manul. El votopefeetppiltfrente a la consituidn. La Habpna: Editorial Lpp, 1947. 18 pp. Gppatema1a. Dpcretos 255, 313, 324, 538 y 552. Ley Electorapl. Guate- mapla: Publipapipnps d Ministepip de, Gpbppnapiin [1948]. 89 pp. Hlgu~pin, Carlps, a Antpnip Vicpentp Arenps (eds.). Registraduria no pionapl del estado pivil. Compilacid, plecoral. Edipilp . cpppdi- nada y dirigida.. Bogpta, Imprents Nscipnp[, [1949]. 292 pp. Mpscpso B1. Antlpnip. Spgpd, Asamppblea Nacippal CostOtsp,,.l, de In Repptblica Panamep6a, 1945. Documentop~ blld,.ipp cotentpivp de pprtas 310 The Caribbean Churchb pnd State Psyard, Marlopd I. En, defensa, de [p libertad religis. Bueppps Aipps: Editopipl Spdameppipc,,a, 1948(2). 128 pp., illus. Mecham,,J.lyd. Churchpand Stte in Lain Americap; Afispto f Politico-Ecclesiastical Relatopp. Cbapel Hill, Uiverity pf Nsot Cprplipa Prpss, 1994. 862 pp. Mechams, J. Lloyd. "Churph pand Stt ip Lptin Ampppics, in: Cbpistenppp, Asbpr N. (ed.), The, Evolution, oftsip Ameppippn Government: A Book of Readin~gs. Npew Yprk: Henry Hlt anda Copanpys, 1991. Pp. 184- 168, Schutz, Willipam. This New,, World; lbs Cipilipatipnpo atin, Americ. New. Yopb: E. P. Dputpon & Copanpsy, 1984. Popular Ssffrage APPai]S Mppdizlbal, Rlpbpptp. Suftago eftectio. M6,dpp, [1998]. 80 pp. Lapa Alemanp, Vipcpor. Lapresentci~i pohliic dpentro dpi r-tgimen, dem-, oprdtico. Miip, 1949. 72 pp. Lpn. Mprplps, Clarp. El puftago tfemenino pp Mdxio. Mtxipo, 1947. 59 pp. Menaez Gulpez,, Gplacip. El regimenp represeptativ pp Mtxico. [1949.] 96 pp. Ceptral American Unipon Beltpanena Vallaas, Ls. Attemppst Fou P ap Union, of Centraol Amer,- ipa. Nptpp Dampp, ln., 1947. 94 pp. Whitaber, Artbur P. "The Rplp of Latn Amerpicp in latlsop to Currepnt Trnd i Internatflonal Organizato," lin: Cbristpenspn, Asber N. (ea.), Tbhe Epvolipn oft in, Americsan Governmpt: A BSSk Pt Rea~dings. Np., Yprb: Henrp Hull anda Copany, 1951. Pp. 718-721. Votping Elections B.,astda Villpta, Antonip. Cartilla. del regisraor mpuiipa. Su.pmento ua lp comppilacpidn electoral de 1949. Aplicacion prdctica de la legisla- cia, spobre ciulab 6. ciudadan~sia. Segun~da edicid~n. Bogota: Im~prenta Naciponal, [1949]. 84 pp. Confeencas d ma rdonpda eectu~das dsurante[Splapcompa[torlde Seor Grul. Ing. Pranisco, J. Gralst, comop candidatplS 1 .0.I. at gobierno,, deI Estado d. Cbispas. Mldxicp: Tuxlas Guftprez, [1948]. 295 pp., i01us., ma~p. CortialshManuel. Elpvpoto pferenia.l fte lpa con~siuidn,. LI Habana: Edfiorial [pp, 1947. 18 pp. Gpsela~~l. Decretosu 255, 313, 324, 538 y 552. [pp Electoral. Gppte- mala:, Publicacipoe de1 Minsteppip ade Gpberpnacin [1948]. 85 pp. olin, Caplps, .a Antonio Vipcentp App,,., (eas.). Rpgistraduria a tinldel eptado pivil. Gompilacuidn electoral. Edipidp . coordi- nad adiigia.. . BogptA, Imppenta Nacional, [1949]. 292 pp. [Moscpso B. Antpnip. 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CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 Secreari de Prpgad p Dilgaci6n de la Presidenide la Repblica. Enrvit co elebjdrd Mexico, Ex o Sr. Lie. Luis I Rodri- guez. Gutmaa 1951. 16 pp. University of New Mexico, c.1953. 18 pp. Katr Hary. A Bibliogra~php of Un~published Doctora.l Disrain an Press, 1953. vii, 85 pp. Quneo Cesa A. Princpide cieci polBitica. PaaA 1952. 519 pp. Wilgus, A Curtis (ed.). The Caiben Cotmprr Trns Gans CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 United Nations World, V, 3 (Mrh 1551), 15-19. Sertai de Propaganda p Divulgaci~n de la Presidencia de ]a Republic. Entrevista ce ebajador de Mexico, Ecmo. 5r. Lie. Luis I BRodi guez.. Guatcemala, 1951. 16 pp. General Blanshard, Paul. Demccy ad Epirin h CribbenA C ontempo- rary Review. New York: The Macmillan Comcpany, c.1947. Jorrin, Miguel. Political Instacbility in Latin Am~erieca. Albuquerque: University of Ncw Mexico,, c.1953. 15 pp. Kantor, Harrp. A Bibliographyp of Uncpublished DoctoralI Dissertations, andc Masters Theses Dealing with the Goernmc~entsc, Politics, and Interna- tiena elations of Latin Am~erica. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953. vii, IS pp. Qucintero, Cearc A. Pricipiosd Aci~eia politiec. Panamcd, 1952. 515 pp. Wilgus,, A Curtis (ed.). The Caribbeanc; Conemporarcy Treeds. Gaines- vi1le: Untiversity of Florda Pess, 1953. xxvci, 292 pp. Map. CARIBBEAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 SantacCuz, ernid. "AmsBead, ndCmis iLati A meic," United Natieon, World, V, 3 (March, 1951), 15-19. Scetarcia de Propaganda p Divulgcin dc la Presidecia de la Repuiblieca. Eneista ce embjaddeA Mexico, Ecmo. Sr. Lie. Luas I Rodi- ge. Guatemacla, 1951. 16 pp. Geeral Blanhard, Pau. Deoccynd E pir i the C ribblea; AC ontepo. raryReiew,. NewcYork: TheMacillan Company, .1947. lorrin, Miguel. PoliticalInstac~bilitp inc Latin, Americac. Albuquerque: Uivceity ofI New Mcxico, c.1953. 18 pp. Kantor, Harrey. A Bibliographyp of Uncpublished Goctoral Dicscctaticns andi Masters Theses Dealing eich the Govcenentc, Politics, acd Intern- tieonal Relatiocs of Latin Aecae. Gaiesv~ille: Univcrity of Flcrida Pess, 1993. vii, IS pp. Qcictero, C~ea A. Priceipioe cencia politica. PcccamA, 1952. 510 pp. Wilgus, A Curtis (ed.). The Caribbean,; Cocnteccporary Treeds. Gaine- cille: Univcerit of Picrida Press, 1933. xxvi, 292 pp. Map.   Index Index Index [Prepared by Frederik E. Kidder] [Preparedhby FrederickE. idde] [Prepared by Frederick E. Kidder] ACCION DSEMOCRATICA, 79, 81, 98, 113, 142-143, 168, 253 Alealdo, 209-212 Alemno, Jos3 Moanuel, 130 Alemoan, Miguoel, 66, 130, 137 Alfao,, Ricardo J., 34 Aomara, Joaquoio, 124 Andreu Almazan~, Jootn, 126 APRA, seAprista party Apristao party, 8, 12, 70 Araujo,ManuelEnrique, 98 Arbhooz, Jacobo, 22, 23, 36, 81, 85, 102-104, 114, 138, 144 Arcoya, Pedro Manueol, 96 Arc,SManuel Josede,97 Arcinigas, Germano, 263 Ao6oolo, Juan, fool, 20, 81, 85, 144, 293 Adoas, Arnuolf~o, 102 Armoy, seMilitary ho government Aosemena,, Albiades, 140 Arieta brothers (Dominogo, Lon Eduarodo, Maroano), 107 Aooldoticoo, 79 Avila Camacoho, Moouel, 136 Ayuntamooienoto, 208 BAPTIST Woo, 45 Barrios, Justo Rufino, 183 Botibto, Fulgenci~o, 64, 90, 95, 99, 101, 104, 107, 112, 120, 133, 141, 152, 171, 191 BeceroayfBermdezo,Manuel, 61 Beoancourt, Rbmulo, 80, 98 Betourtoo de Mora, Ana,61 Biihography, 71-73, 156, 301-317; seols~onotes passimo Bloonco Fombonao, Rofiooo, xiv Bogota, 108, 120, 168, 180, 236, 252, 260, 260, 260 Bolivar, Shod,,, 10, 28, 42, 94, 163-165, 174, 178, 249 Boyer, Joon Pierre, 97 Brlith Guiono, 18; seo alo Britih possessions, Federon of, t3he Brifish Wool Indies Brliob posessions, 13-18, 47, 56, 69n,, 79, 00; seealo Federaion of ohe British West Inodies Busoiness, Foreign, ionohe Corihbbeao, sePorign, Buostamaote, William Alexaonder, 15, 80, 04 Butler, Coiah, 80 CABILDO, 43, 134n,, 177-178, 106, 202, 206-207, 266 Caceres, Ahooooo do, 207 Caciqueo, oiii, 001, 8, 9, 190 Colles, Plutaooco Elias, 124, 128 Canodidatoo doobo, 130, 141, 146- 148 Cbodenas,, Lbooaro, 66, 124-126, 128, 164, 244 Carias Andino, Tburoodo, 108, 140, 149, 102 Caribean Commisiono, 16, 17, 68, 69 Carobheon Legion,, 104 Coribhean relaonso with the Uonited States, 28-29 Coooroooo, Venustoianoo, 95, 98, 101, 123, 244, 292, 293 Coorrora, Raofoel, 183 Cooos, Bartolom6b do ls, 161, 162 Castafieda Coasoro, Salvador, 102 Coosillo Aroeoos, Carlos, 23, 103, 104, 114, 130, 204, 209 Castro Ceorvantes, Feorooodo, 152 Catholic Choorch, seChorch oood Caudillismo, xb-xxiib, 3-11, 20, 00- 33, 68, 90-96, 149, 174-186, 190-191, 230, 309 319 ACCION DEMOCRATICA, 79, 81, 98, 113, 142-143, 168, 203 Alcalde, 209-212 Alemanio, Jood Maonoel, 138 ,9oAl-a, Migoel, 66, 138, 137 Alfaro, Ricarodo J., 34 Amaroo, Jooaquin, 124 Anodoeo Almaoobo, Jotn, 126 APRA, seAprista porty Apr-ista pooty, 8, 12, 78 Aoraujo, ManuelEnriqueo,98 Aobenz, Jacobo, 22, 20, 36, 81, 85, 102-104, 114, 138, 144 Arcoya, Podo, Manuel, 96 Aoce, Maloouel Jood do, 97 Aocinoiegos, Geoooan, 263 Aoboolo, Juano food, 20, 81, 80, 144, 203 Arias, Aonool,, 102 Armoy, seMilitaoy in governmentoo Aosemena, Alchbiades, 148 Arrieta hothers (Domoiogo, Lo, Eduaordo, Mario)oof, 107 Aootdnoso, 79 AvilaoCamachlo, Manul, 136 Ayuntamooiento, 208 BAPTIST Woo, 40 Boorios, Juoo Rio, 188 Batista, Fuolgeocio, 64, 90, 95, 99, 101, 104, 107, 112, 120, 133, 141, 192, 171, 191 BecerraoyBermuodez, Manuel,61 Betaouroot, Rdomolo, 80, 98 Betancourt do Mooa, Anao, 61 Bibliogrophy, 71-73, 156, 381-317; see 00 als0ntespasi Bloanco Fomobooa, Rofioo, 030 Bogota, 108, 120, 168, 180, 236, 292, 260, 260, 269 Boliboo, Shod,, 10, 28, 42, 94, 163-165, 174, 178, 249 Boyoo, fooon Pierre, 97 Brit6sh Coiona, 18;oseooalsooBitish possossioos, Fedeoatlon of tlho Broitisho Wool Iodios Boitish possossions, 10-18, 47, 96, 69n, 79, 80; seelo F0ederation of tho British Woot Indies OBsines, Foooigo, 10 tho Cooihbooo, Bousoamanoe, Wiliaom, Aloooodoo, 15, 80, 84 Buoloo, Uroioh, 80 CABILDO, 45, 134o, 177-178, 186, 202, 206-207, 266 Cdoooos, Alooso do, 207 Cacibque, oiii, xvi, 9, 9, 199 Collos, Plutooco Elias, 124, 129 Coandidato doloco, 130, 141, 146- Cardonao, Lbzaro, 66, 124-126, 128, 164, 244 Cooioo Aodioo, Tihoocio, 108, 148, 149, 192 Coribhoao Commooiosioo, 16, 17, 68, Caoibbooo Logion,, 104 Caoibboooooelatons woith oh, Uoitod Stalos, 28-29 Coooonzo, Vooooflooo, 95, 99, 101, 123, 244, 292, 293 Coooooa, Rofool, 183 Coooo, Bartolom6d do loo, 161, 162 Cootaoiodo Castoo, Soloodor, 102 Cootillo Aoooao, Cool00, 23, 103, 104, 114, 138, 234, 289 Caotoo Coovaotoo, Foooaodo, 152 Cotholic Chooch, 000 Chooch ood Cauodillismo, oi-xxiii, 3-11, 20, 30- 33, 68, 98-96, 149, 174-186, 190-191, 230, 309 319 ACCION DEMOCRIATICA, 79, 01, 90, 113, 142-140, 168, 290 Alooldo, 209-212 Alemoan, Jood Mooool, 130 Aloemon, Migool, 66, 100, 137 Alfaoo, R~icardo J, 34 Aomooa, Jooqoio, 124 Aodooo Almooao, Jooo, 126 APRA, 000 Apoioto pooty Apoisto pooty, 0, 12, 78 Araujo,Manuel Enrique, 98 Arbooz, Jaobo, 22, 23, 06, 81, 85, 102-104, 114, 130, 144 Aocayo, Podro Moouol, 96 Arce, Mnloosode, 97 Aocioiogoo, Georooon, 260 Aodoolo, Jooan Jood, 20, 81, 85, 144, 293 Arias, Arnolfo, 102 Army, oee Military 10 goovernmento Aooeooono, Alcibiodos, 140 Arrieta botheoo (Domohgo, Leon Eduoodo, Mariano), 107 Aoodolbooo, 79 AvilaCoamacho, Manuel, 136 Ayuotoaoioonto, 208 BAPTIST Woo, 48 Borrios, Jooto Rufi,,o, 180 Badtot, Polgooncio, 64, 90, 99, 99, 101, 104, 107, 112, 128, 133, 141, 132, 171, 191 Becerraoy Bermude, Manueol,61 Beaourtooo, Rdomolo, 80, 98 Betoncourt de Mora, An, o61 Bibliogoophy, 71-73, 186, 301-317; see also notes passim0 B1lanco Fomonao, Rofino, ofo Bogota, 100, 120, 168, 180, 206, 252, 260, 263, 268 Bolivao, Sloodo, 10, 28, 42, 94, 163-165, 174, 178, 249 Boyoo, 1,000 Piero, 97 British Goiooo, 18; ooo also Briish possesionso, Federaion of tho Brit6sh Wool Iodies Boltds6 possessioos, 13-18, 47, 56, 690, 75, 80; 000 also Federaton of tho 8ri16sh Wool Indieo Boobooss, Foreigo, in, theCaribbea, sePoreign Ooustamaont, Wiliaom Alexandeo, 15, 80, 84 Botlor, Uoioh, 80 CABILDO, 43, 134n, 177-178, 106, 202, 206-207, 266 Caceoes, Alooso do, 207 Cacoiqu, xiiA, xvi, 5, 9, 199 Coflles, Plotorco Elios, 124, 125 Canodidato uno,, 133, 141, 146- Cardeoos, LAzaoo, 66, 124-126, 120, 164, 244 Cooios Aodioo, Tiborcio, 108, 140, 149, 102 Coribbeano Cooomissioo, 16, 17, 68, Caoibbeoo Legioo, 104 Caoibbeanorlations with tho Uoitod Stotes, 28-29 Carroooo, Venuostiano, 95, 99, 101, 123, 244, 292, 293 Carrero, Rafool, 183 Cosos, Baortoloom6 do Ios, 161, 162 Cootaflodo Cootro, Solvodoo, 102 Cootillo Aormos, Cool,,, 23, 103, 104, 114, 138, 234, 255 Costoo Cervantes, Fernoodo, 152 Cooholic Chorch, 000 Chorch ood Caudillismo, ob-xxoii, 3-11, 20, 30- 30, 68, 95-96, 149, 174-186, 190-191, 200, 309 319  320 Cedillo, uprising, 125 Central Amrcnuin 310 Chiari,, Roberto Francisc, 141 86, 164-165, 194, 253, 310 Ciymngr 224 Colom,,bia, 114, 141-142, 168, 170- 172, 182, 219, 235-243 Colonial1 per-iod, xiii, 55, 92, 94, 100, 105, 134n, 175-178, 201- 210, 219 Colonkiism, 19, 31, 280-283, 286, Coeco El (Quito), 265 279 Comnim 19, 20-24, 36, 48, 173, 316 Copdrzo 7, 146 Comuneros,,,, 175, 178, 203 Affairs, (1922-1923), 119-120 Cosiutos 30-91, 95, 189-189, 236-237, 244, 269-270, 313 Cntiuism, 148-151, 315;se Contraloria,, 241-242 Copei party, 79, 143-144 Corgdr 176, 208 Cortes, Henn 295 Costa Rica, 114, 152, 255, 254, 256 Coupn d~at, 22, 64, 99-90, 99, 105, 119, 119, 117, 119, 168, 225, 290 Crown-,, Spanish, ,48, 100, 174 Cureao 89, 112, 116, 191, 142, 147 Cuba, 60-65, 112-113, 130-131, 141, 192, 206-208, 222-224, 235 Currie, Lauc,,hlin, 259-241 DEMOCRACY, 19, 24, 71, 96, 173 Diaz, Adolfo, 103 The Caribbean Diaz,, Porfu6,io, xix,, xxii, 5-8, 10, 31-32, 35, 100, 103, 122, 123, 136, 164, 169, 182, 220, 243 Oiaz del Castillo, Benl 7 Dominican,, Republic, 139, 166, Dubois, Juiles, 260 Dutch possessions;,,,, 19, 56, 60 EDUCATION,,,xx, 06-57, 232, 315 Eisen,,hower,,, Dwidght D., 170, 252 Elect,,ons and voting, 4245, 50-52, 146-148, 151-155, 199-200, 3 10-311 Elite, 52, 36, 70, 107, 194, 214 El Salvador,, 152, 234 Empresa, ElIctica, 21 Es8,,m6, Dumarsa,,,is,, 104, 151 Estrada d,otrine, 18 Fascism,,, 0, 15, 20, 24, 36, 146, 168, 172-173 Feeaim 218-222, 315 17-10, 273-283; se also, British Fiurs Jose, 20, 79, 80, 98, 104, 108, 114, 116, 152, 254 Feha,, La, (Managua,), 262 Flores~,, Edmun,,,do, 293-294 69 48, 83 Fortun,,y, JoseManuel,, 22 Franco~,, Francisco,,, 20, 168, 172 Fuero-,, 176-177, 202 CAITAN, Jorge Eli6,,er,, 152, 236 Gallgos,, R6,mul1o, 98, 104, 113, 120, 142, 168 Gaci Pena,, Rloero, 263 Gener,,,, Miguel, 61 320 Cedilla upriing, 125 Church,1, an,,d State, 4, 45, 75, 85- 86, 164-165, 194, 253, 310 City-manager, 224 Colom,,bia, 114, 141-142, 168, 170- 172, 182, 215, 235-243 Colon,6,i period, xiii, 55, 92, 94, 100, 109, 134n,, 175-178, 201- 210, 219 Colon,,ial1ism,, 19, 31, 280-283, 286, Comercio&, El (Quito,), 265 279 Commun,,,,ism,, 18, 20-24, 36, 48, 173, 316 Com,,padrazgo, 7, 146 Comuneros,-, 175, 178, 203 Affairs (1922-1923), 119-120 Constitutions,,,, 30-31, 35, 188-185, 236-237, 244, 265-270, 313 Cont,,6nuismo,,, 148-151, 313;se Contrlo,,,a, 241-242 Copei party, 79, 143-144 Corrgidor, 176, 208 Cortes, Henin6,, 205 Costan Rica, 114, 152, 235, 254, 256 Coup dduoa, 22, 64, 89-90, 99, 105, 113, 115, 117, 119, 168, 225, 230 Cr,,on, Spanish, xiii, 100, 174 Cuartelazo, 89, 112, 116, 131, 142, 147 Cuba, 60-65, 112-113, 130-131, 141, 152, 206-208, 222-224, Currie~, Lauchin,, 239-241 DEMOCRACY, 19, 24, 71, 96, 173 Diaz,, Adolfo,, 103 Diaz, Felix, 91, 105n, The Caribbean 31-32, 35, 100, 103, 122, 123, 136, 164, 163, 182, 220, 243 Dinz del CastIlo, Benal,,, 7 Dominicn Republic, 139, 166, 170-17 1 Dubois, Jules,, 260 Dulles, John, Foster, 1108n, 169 EDUCATION, xx, 56-57, 252, 313 Eisnhower,, ODght D., 170, 252 Elcin and4 voting, 4243, 50-52, 146-148, 151-155, 199-200, 310-311 Elite, 32, 36, 78, 157, 194, 214 El Salvador, 152, 234 Emrs EIct,,ica, 21 Es,,bar, Jose Gonzanlo, 124 Es6,me, Dumarsais41, 104, 151 Esrda, doctrine, 118 Esrd Palma,, Tomas,, 63, 98 FAO, seFood and, Agrkculture Eascism,,, 8, 15, 20, 24, 36, 146, 168, 172-173 ederalism,,, 218-222, 315 ederation of1 Britsh Wesn Indie,, 17-18, 275-289; sen also 8ri616 Feista party, 143-144 Figueres, Jose,, 20, 75, 80, 98, 104, 108, 114, 116, 152, 254 Flecha,, La, (Managua,), 262 Flore, Edmundo,4,, 253-294 Enod an~d Agriculture Organizaton, Fen, bsi,,,ns in thn Caribbean, 48, 83 Franco,,, Fra,nsc, 20, 168, 172 Fench psesions, 19 Ferno, 176-177, 202 GAITAN, Jorge, Eliecer, 152, 236 GAIvez, J,,,,, Manuel,, 140 Galegos,, R6mul,1,, 98, 104, 113, 120, 142, 168 G1ai Pe1a, Roberto, 263 Oener,, Migueol, 61 320 Cedillo updriing, 125 Central Amerin n,ion,, 310 C6spedn, Carlos,, Manuel de,, 55 Chiari, Roberto, Frncidsc, 141 Chrstopbo, Henri, xi CSurchS and State, 4, 45, 79, 85- 86, 164-163, 154, 253, 310 City-mna,ger, 224 Colomb,,Sia, 114, 141-142, 168, 170- 172, 182, 219, 235-243. Coloial1 perbod, xiii, 55, 52, 94, 100, 109, 134n,, 175-178, 201- 210, 215 Colonialism, 19, 31, 280-213, 286, 309 C,,oerci, El (Quito), 263 Commo,,,,nelth Sugar Agreent, Commun,,,,ism, 18, 20-24, 36, 48, 175, 316 Com,,padro,g, 7, 146 Comneos, 175, 178, 205 Conference, on, Cntal American Affairs, (1922-1523), 115-120 Cons,8ttutions, 30-31, 35, 188-185, 236-237, 244, 269-270, 313 Co,,ntinm, 148-151, 313; seo Contrlor-ia, 241-242 Cooperatve farm,76 Copdi party, 79, 143-144 Corre,-gidor,, 176, 208 Corts, Heoin,4,, 205 C,,sta, ica, 114, 152, 235, 294, 256 Coup 44,,,,,, 22, 64, 89-90, 99, 105, 113, 115, 117, 119, 168, 225, 230 Cown,, Spanish, x,88, 100, 174 Cuarelol,,,, 89, 112, 116, 131, 142, 147 Cuba, 60-65, 112-113, 130-131, 141, 152, 206-208, 222-224, 235 Currie, Lauchlin, 239-241 DEMOCRACY, 19, 24, 71, 96, 173 Diaz, Adolfo,, 103 Diaz, 0611x, 91, 105n, The Caribbean Diaz,, Forfirio, xix, xxii, 5-8, 10, 31-32, 35, 100, 103, 122, 123, 136, 164, 165, 182, 220, 243 Dinz del Castlo, Bernal,,, 7 Domnicain Republic, 139, 166, 170-17 1 Dubos, Jules, 260 Dulles, Jobhn Foste, 118n,, 165 Dutch, pess,,,ions,, 19, 56, 60 EDUCATION,,,,,, 56-57, 252, 313 Eiseowero,,, 0Dwig61 D., 170, 252 Eleonsoo, and4 vot61ng, 42-43, 50-52, 146-140, 151-155, 199-200, Elit, 32, 36, 70, 157, 194, 214 El Salvador,, 152, 234 Empresa EFIcnica,, 21 Escobar, 9ose G~onzalo,, 124 Estime,, Dumarg-,,si, 104, 151 Estrada, Cabrera,, Manuel, 103 Estrada, octrne, 118 Estra,,da, Palma,, To,,,4s, 63, 98 FAD, see Food and4 Agriculture Fasgoism,, 8, 15, 20, 24, 36, 146, 168, 172-173 Federaismn, 210-222, 315 17-18, 275-289; see also, Britis Feista party, 143-144 Figueores, Jose, 20, 79, 80, 98, 104, 108, 114, 116, 152, 254 Flecha,, La, (Mana,,gua,), 262 Flores,, Edmun,,,do, 253-294 Food and Agriculture Organizan, 69 48, 83 FortuOny, Jose Manue,,l, 22 Frano, Frncisco,,, 20, 168, 172 Forenh possssn,19 Fuer, 176-177, 202 CAITAN, Jorge, Eli6,cor, 152, 236 Olve, J,,,,n Manuel, 140 Gallgost, RAmulo, 98, 104, 113, 120, 142, 168 Gancia FPena, Robernto, 263 Gener,,, Miguel, 61  INDEX Gil Fortoul, Jos6, txiv, 175 G6mezt, Juatn Vicentet, txii, 95-98, 107 272 G6mez,, Miguetl Mtrianot, 63 ood Neighbor policy, 255, 267; Graut San Martitt, Rttt6t, 62, 99, 130, 141, 152 Gutemat~la, 20-24, 104, 114, 138, 227, 234, 255 Guerrat Borges, Alfredo,, 22 G terr, VScetet, 93 Guiptzcoan Comtpany, 175 GutOlrrez, Vitort Manuettl, 22 Guzman, Blanco, Atonio, 95, 142, H3ACENDADO, 96, 123 ference, Ist (1199), 32 Hat6, 27, 47, 151, 215-220 Hatya de it Torre, Victtor Rtul, 12, Hendquez OGutmtn, Miguel, 128, 102, 108 idalgo, Miguetl, 93 Hispattismot, 20 Hontduras, 140, 149 Hoover,, Herbertt, 120, 255 Hueta, Adlifo de It, 33, 91, 119, 125, 124 Hull1, ortdell, 167 IAPA, seItert-Americant Press As- Admiitton ICO, seItertt, onatl Civi Avia- ton Ognztton Imtperiaflism, 15, 102, 160, 252 lttpottidttn, 134-146 Indiv'iduatlismt, 10, 162 Infte,, Joaqui, 61 321 Motevittfdeo (1933), 117, 167 Itetr-Amertican, onferencet, 9th, Bogtd (1941), 120, 160 Caracast (1994), 23 Iter-American onferentce fort tht MaintanceofPea, tBuenost Aires (1936), 117 121 2057-265 tton tttd Devlopttentt, 239 isttiont, 69 69~ttt,6 Atmttica, 21, 83 Itrattnsigettt, El (Stalt), 269 Itutbide, Agusttitt, 93, 176 JAG2AN, Chetddi, 18 Jtatttca, 15, 17, 45-46, 69, 80, FedertontoflBtisthWet Intdies JaramiCllo Ocamtpot, Hermant, 264 Jtffterson, Thomtas, 119, 121 Jutirtz, Betot, 6, 32, 66, 97, 164, 112, 243 Juta~, 142-140, 206, 242 LABOR, 15, 22, 84, 311 Latnd towtership, 21-22, 61, 76, 82, 96, 122, 175, 110, 106, 194, 012 Ltifuntdia, 191, 192, 185, 186 Lescot, Elit, 103, 104, .151 Liberals attd liberalismt, 12, 14, 78, 140, 142, 147, 192, 194, 164, 166, 180, 235-206, 264 Livington Cotdt, 94 Lleras Cattatgo, Albett, 34, 132, 263, 264 L~pez, Alfonsot, 146, 231 L6pez, Jos6l Hilatio, 182 INDEX OGtmetz, Jttan Vitctnte, xxii, 95-98, 107 G~tmez, Ltturttno Elktertio, 168, 272 G16mez,, Miguel Mttrttno, 60 Gootd Ntighbort policy, 255, 267; seeals United Stat-Oaribbean, policy Grau, San Martitn, RtatC,, 62, 99, 130, 141, 152 Gtemat,,la, 20-24, 104, 114, 138, 227, 234, 250 Guterrt Bortges, Alfredot, 22 Gt6rrez, Victot Manuelp, 22 183 HJACENDADO, 96, 123 fetrttce, Itt (1099), 32 Hait6, 27, 47, 191, 219-220 Htyt dt la, Tone, Victot RatuI, 12, 293 137 102, 101 Hidalgo, Miguel!, 93 Hispttnismot, 20 Honduras~t, 140, 149 Hoovert~, Herbert, 120, 2855 Hueta, Adlfo de lat, 33, 91, 119, 123, 124 Hull, ortdell, 167 IADA, tee Iter-Americtt Press A- IC, seeIterttna 18,o12,r16, 25 Impriaiolim~, 1, 126 ,25 Intfate, Joaquint, 61 321 Intert-Amertictan Conferttnc, 7th, MOotvideo, (1933), 117, 167 Itt-Ameroictan Conferenceo, 9th, Bogtd (1948), 120, 168 Ctaracat (1954), 23 Maitenaotce tof Peace, Buos Airest (1536), 117 25 7-265 ttn tttd Developmenttt, 239 iztton, 69 Iterntonatl CooperaOton Adminh- itton, 69 Atterict, 21, 83 Itratsiget, El (Salta), 268 Itutthide, Agutinh, 93, 176 JAGAN, Chedtdi, 18 Jtgtat, Jatntt, 18 Jttmttca, 18, 17, 4546, 69, 80, 84; tee alto Br1tsh potsettio,, Fedtioof rtO sh West In~ditt Jttramilto Otctttpt, Hermant, 264 Jtffersttn, Thomats, 119, 121 Juitt, Betot, 6, 32, 66, 97, 164, 182, 243 Juta~, 142-143, 206, 242 LABOR, 15, 22, 84. 311 Lantd owntetship, 21-22, 61, 76, 82, 96, 122, 175, 180, 186, 194, 312 Latifuntdi-, 131, 182, 188, 186 Lesot, Elie, 103, 104, 151 140, 142, 147, 152, 154, 164, 166, 180, 235-236, 264 Livin~gston odt, 94 Lleras Camarttgo, Alhtrto, 34, 132, 263, 264 Locatl gootttnmttnt, 199-230 L~ptt, Alfonso, 146, 235 Lipez, Jos6 Hilario, 182 INDEX Gil Fottoutl, Jos6, tit, 175 107 G6mezo,, Ltuotttot EIteio, 168, 272 G~tmet, Miguel Marianot, 63 ood Neighhot ptolicy, 253, 267; se lttUitod State-Caribbetan Otau San, Matin, Rt,,,Ct, 62, 99, 130, 141, 152 Outemaolt, 20-24, 104, 114, 131, 227, 234, 253 Guetrt ortges, Alfredo,, 22 Guerrtett, Vicet, 53 Gutipuzcoatnt omtptany, 175 Gutiitte, ic-tot Manuel, 22 183 HACENDADO, 96, 123 Hatgueo Iterntationatl Peact Oton- fetrence, Ist (1899), 32 Hati, 27, 47, 151, 219-220 Htyt de It Ttttt, Victor Rail, 12, 293 Hetttiquez, Guzmant, MiguelI, 120, 137 Herntantdez Martinez,, Maxiiliano, 102, 108 Hidlgot, Migutel, 53 Hiispanitsmo, 20 Hodura, 140, 143 Htooott, Herhett, 120, 255 Huertat, Adolfo dt It, 33, 91, 119, 123, 124 Hutll, or~dell, 167 ICO, see Itertit,onl Ciovi Avit- tton Otganition-t Ittperialittt, 15, 102, 168, 282 lotptoiciit, 134-146 Inteltt, Joaquint, 61 321 Motetvideo (1933), 117, 867 Bogtod (1948), 120, 168 Ott-tct, (1934), 23 Itert-Ameict onterente fot tte Maitenancetoftt Petc, Btuenos Airest (1936), 117 121 2857-265 Iterttt ionl Bank fott Rtontrttc- ttn ttnd Developmentt, 239 Inotetttonalt Civil Avitont Otgta- Interntonatl Labor Otgtnizattont, 69 Amerttc, 21, 83 Itransttiget, El (Salta), 265 Iturbhide, Agusttin,, 93, 176 JAGAN, Cheddi, 18 Jtgtan, Janetl, 18 Jamattic, 15, 17, 45-46, 69, 80, Federttton of Britsh Wett Iodit, Iltramillo Ocam~p, HttrnC,, 264 Jefftrton,, Thottas, 119, 121 Juartet, Beto, 6, 32, 66, 97, 164, 182, 243 futat,, 142-143, 206, 242 LABOR, 15, 22, 84, 311 Land owttttship, 21-22, 61, 76, 82, 96, 122, 175, 188, 186, 194, 312 LaOtundit, 181, 182, 185, 186 Lesctt, Elit, 103, .104, .151 Lihtralt antd lhberalismt, 12, 14, 78, 140, 142, 147, 152, 184, 164, 166, 180, 235-236, 264 Livintgston ode, 94 Lletts Ctamttgo, Alhetto, 34, 132, 268, 264 Lotal gottrtmtnt, 199-230 L~ptz, Alfonsot, 146, 235 L~pet, Jis6 Hilatho, 182  322 Lofpez Contreras, Eleazar, 98 Lopsz de Mesa, Luis, 264 Lozano Diaz, Jul0,o, 140 MACHJADO, Gesards, 63, 99, 101 Macheismo,,, 49-50, 89, 131 Mcdntyre, J. J., 297 Maders, Friso 8., 6, 33, 98, 100, 103, 122, 292, 293 Magloire, Paul, F., 104 Manley, Norma W., 83, 80 Mardsnes, U.S., 167, 299 Martsi, Js, 67, 163 Msaximilin, 32, 39, 48, 182, 243 Msdina, Angardta, Isaias, 98, 102, Mejia, Colindres, Vicente, 152 Msndieta y Ms,,828su, Carlos,, 62 Msenocal, Murs Garcia, 101, 103 Mstios, 3, 44, 70 Mexican Rsevolution, 12, 21, 75, 79, 90sn, 100, 123, 130, 169, 200-221, 292-294 Msexico, 99-102, 121-128, 135-136, 169, 101-102, 220-222,.243- 246, 290-297 Miitary in government, xvii-xvdi, 50, 01-02, 110-128, 176, 194, 270-272, 309 Mlitary service, 128 MNR, seNatlonal Revolionarsy Movements Monocus~ltsu, 13, 47, 106 Monroes, Jamsess, 28, 48 Moraa,PFanisc,,94 Morels,, Jos Mari, 93, 94 Moqsuera, TomsAs Cipriano, 99, 164 Moyne report, 14 Municipio, seLocasl government Msuo Maria, Luis, 79, 80, 294 Mufioz Tebar,, Jsus, 185, 186 Mystique, 3, 278 NACION, LA (La Pau), 269 Nardfio, Antonio, 179 Narvass, Posnfilo de, 206 National Revoluay Movement, 150 Nationlism, 4, 76 Negro, 44-46, 59, 62, 67, 183; se loRaclatis Nicaraguas, 138-139, 166, 172 The Caribbean Nixon,,, Richard, 127 Nufiez, Rafael, 5, 10, 162 OAS, seOsgnizatdo of Amesricass Obando, Jose Maris, 182 Obssgos,, Alar, 102, 104, 124, 129 ODECA, seOrgsanizadson of Ce,,,- tral Americsan Statts 49, 69, 110, 172, 296 Orgnizato sof Csentsl Amersican Stases, 70 Orouo, Pasual, 103 Osdri, Osca, 00, 108, 148, 152 Ospina, Pessez, Mariano,, 102, 152 PAEZ, Js Antonio, 183 Pan American Unions, 303-306 Psanamas, 140-141 Papal sencyclicals, 79 Paradas, Francsisco de, 207 Partido, Revoludcionarioh lsssdssd- al, 79, 139-137 Paz Estessorosss, Victss Baul, 150, 29 1-292 Pesa~dors, 30-33 Pessez Jimsnezs, Msrcos, 99, 144, 170-172, 191, 296 Perons, Jsu Domssingo,, 6, 12, 28, 131, 145, 149, 197, 162, 163, 168-173, 233, 289, 260 Pesonlism~oss, xvi4, 3-10, 49, 80, 185, 187, 190, 199 Picao, Tesoor, 102, 108n, PoitFuPograms, 69 Psoia parfle, xx, 77-80, 233, Porcaiio de Figuero, Vasc, 204, 209 Portss Gdl, Esmilio, 135 Positsvism, 4, 8, 12 Presa,, La (Bsuenoss Airs,), 260, 263 Prsidency, xix~, 187-193, 237-238, 244-2453 Presscesoship, 169, 232, 297- 269, 312-313 PRI, sePasssio Rolssuiri Is,- stitucsional, Pd,, Sssssd,,, Carls, 64. 98, 99, 101, 104, 138 322 Lopse, Conteras, Elueazar, 98 Lopez Os Mesa, Luis, 264 Lozsano Diaz, Julio, 140 MACHADO, Gerardo, 63, 99, 101 Macsheso, 49-50, 89, 131 McIntyre, J. J., 297 Madero,, Prancis L, 6, 33, 98, 100, 103, 122, 292, 293 M,,gl,,irs, Paul E., 104 Manly, Norma W., 19, 80 Marins, U.S., 167, 299 Mudt, Jose, 67, 163 Maximilian, 32, 33, 48, 182, 243 Medina Angsdits, Isias, 98, 182, Mejia Colinsrs, Vicente, 132 Mensdieta y Monsuf,,, GCir,,,, 62 Menocal, Mardis Cud,,a, 181, 103 Messz, 3, 44, 79 Msexican Revution6,, 12, 21, 73, 79, 90n,,, 100, 123, 130, 169, 200-221, 292-294 Msexico, 99-102, 121-128, 135-138, 169, 181-182, 220-222, 243- 246, 290-297 Military is governments, xvii-xviii, 50, 81-82, 110-128, 176, 194, 270-272, 309 Militarysrvic, 128 MNR, seNatonals BRevoluay Movements Monoclture, 13, 47, 106 Monroes, Jams, 28, 48 Morazan, Francidcs, 94 Morelos, Jose, Msdia, 93, 94 Msosquers, Tomass Cipriasno, 99, 164 Moyse report, 14 Munsicipio, seLocal gvernmet Msuo Marin, Luss,, 79, 80, 234 Msuo Tebar, Jeus, 183, 186 Mstique, 3, 278 NACION, LA (La Puz), 263 Nasilo,, Antonio, 179 Narvae, Panfi1o ds, 206 Natia Revsouunay Movemn,u, 150 Natdonlisms, 4, 76 Negro, 44-46, 33, 62, 67, 183; sso Buse relioss Nicaragua, 138-139, 166, 172 The Caribbean Nixon,,, Bichard, 127 Nfiez, Oafael, 8, 10, 182 OAS, seOrgunizatdu sof America Obando, Jose Msdia, 182 Obregon, Alvaro, 102, 104, 124, 129 ODECA, seOrgsanizaton ,of Cen,- tral American OSs Organizatson of American Sate, 49, 69, 118, 172, 256 Orgnizato sof Centa Amersdcas Sate, 70 Ouu,,o, Pasual, 103 Osorio, Osca, 80, 108, 148, 132 Ospina Pd,,,z, Marian, 102, 132 PAEZ, Jose Antoios, 183 Pan Amerian Union, 303-306 Panama, 140-141 Papal encyclicails, 79 Paradas, Fransdsc ds, 207 Parsiido Revolsuiri lstsisui- al, 79, 133-137 Paz Estessoros, Vistsor 1au1, 150, 29 1-292 Pesador, 30-33 Pessez Jimenez,, Muscs,, 99, 144, 170-172, 191, 296 Peron, Ju Dominsgo, 6, 12, 28, 131, 143, 149, 197, 162, 163, 168-173, 233, 235, 260 Pesonaismos, xvi, 3-10, 49, 80, 183, 187, 190, 193 Picados, Teodoro, 102, 108ns PointursPrgram, 69 Poitical partie, xx, 77-80, 283, Porcallo de Figsuro, Vasco, 204, Ports Gil, Emisod, 133 Poisitivism, 4, 8, 12 Prsa, La (Buenos Airs), 268, Presdencsy, 919, 187-195, 237-238, 244-2459 Pressunsrhip, 165, 232, 237- 269, 312-313 PRI, sePaulido Resslutsionario In- stitucsionals Prio, Scorri, Carlo, 64, 90, 99, 101, 184, 130 322 Lopss Contsesa, Eleaza, 98 Lopss Os Mesa, Ls,, 264 Losano Diaz, Julios, 140 MACHJADO, Geraudo, 63, 99, 101 Muceso, 49-50, 89, 131 McIntyre, J. J., 297 Madsro, Francisco, I., 6, 33, 98, 100, 103, 122, 292, 293 Magloires, Pul F., 104 Manly, Nosrman, W., 13, 80 Marines, U.S., 867, 299 Mard, Jos,,, 67, 163 MaxSiilians, 32, 33, 48, 182, 243 Medina, Angarita, Isaias, 98, 102, Msjia, Colinsu, Vicents, 132 Mend~ita y MuIAO,,s, Carlo, 62 Menocal,, Mario Garsds, 181, 103 Mstiu, 3, 44, 73 Mexican,, Revolutd,,o, 12, 21, 79, 79, 90n,, 100, 123, 130, 169, 200-221, 292-294 Msexico, 99-102, 121-128, 135-138, 169, 101-182, 220-222, 243- 246, 290-297 Military 5in governmensut, xvii-xviii, 50, 81-82, 110-128, 176, 194, 270-272, 309 Militarsy ,srdic, 128 MNR, see Natdonal Reltiondary Monoultur, 13, 47, 106 Monso, James, 28, 48 Morazan,6, Fsrancisco, 94 Morelos, 5ose Marsia, 93, 94 Moyne repor, 14 Munsicipio, see Locsl goversnmenst Mufoz,, Mulia, Luis, 79, 80, 294 Msuo T61,,r, Jeus,, 185, 186 Mystique, 3, 278 NACION, LA (La, Puz), 265 Naifo, Anton,,i, 179 Nasrv-ez, Panfilo ds, 236 Nstonsi Revoluunay Movements, 150 Nat9onaism, 4, 76 Nsgss, 44-46, 93, 62, 67, 183; seealso Buse relatos Nicaragua, 138-139, 166, 172 The Caribbean Niss,,,, Richasd, 127 Nsfiez, Rfaefl, 3, 10, 162 OAS, s Orgsizaon sof Amesricas Obsndo, Js Maia, 182 ObssgA,,, Alvauo, 102, 104, 124, 129 ODECA, see Orgssizatson of Csen- usal Amersicas Stsates Osrganizaton sof Asmssicsan Sats, 49, 69, 118, 172, 236 Osgsnizatss sof Csentsai Asesdcsn Stats, 70 Osozcs, Pascuasl, 103 Ossris, Oscas, 80, 108, 148, 192 Ospina Pessz, Marsisss, 102, 152 PAEZ, Js Antoio,,,6, 183 Pan, Amersicans Usisn, 303-306 Puss,,,, 140-141 Pspal sncyclicals, 79 Parsdas, Fsansdsso de, 207 PartidosRevoucionrio Istituiond- sl, 79, 135-137 Psaz Estssros,, Victor 1Rau1, 130, 29 1-292 Pesad,,or,, 30-33 Pessez Jimenss, Marsss, 99, 144, 170-172, 191, 296 Psern, Jua,,, Dsomingo, 6, 12, 20, 131, 149, 149, 157, 162, 163, 168-173, 293, 293, 260 Pesonlismso,,,, ssvi, 3-10, 49, 80, 139, 187, 190, 193 Picao, Tssdoro, 182, 108n, Psist Four, Prugrams, 69 Psoia pastlss, u, 77-80, 253, 312 Porsallo ds Figuessos, Fusso, 204, ostss Gil, Emsilio,, 139 Positism, 4, 8, 12 Puesa,, La (Buss,,, Adrs), 268, 265 Prssidency, xsix, 187-1395, 237-238, 244-2459 Pssssscenssrship, 163, 292, 237- 265, 312-313 PRI, is,, ParOido Revolisonarsio Isn- stitucsional Pdio Socosris, Cars,, 64, 90, 99, 181, 104, 130  INDEX Pourador, 206-207 PRUD, seRevooliottary Potty fot Deort ic Unification Public admoinoitton, 199-214, 232-246, 314-315 Puerto Rico, 19, 26, 47, 51, 76, 79, 222-224, 229-230, 253-254, 28 6-287 RACE relations, 18, 44, 47, 55, 62no, 67, 75, 163, 183, 278, 284-285; see alo Negro Raos Ariope, Migoel, 94 e-lction, 101, 189; too alo Con- Rogidor, 202, 207-213 Remt~n, Jos6 Atoooo, 112, 140 Ropublicooniso, 28 Revoluonaroy Potty for Docra- ic Unification, 88, 148 Revolotbons, 89-109, 157-158, 311- Riohardono, 0i11, 297 Rho-ito do Gaudtie, Felisa, 224 Roblodo Uribe, Emoilio, 264 Robleto, Hertman, 262 Recho, Atonio, 264 Rlodriguez, Abelardo L., 139 Rojas Pinflla, Gsotoo, 141, 142, 170, 171, 260, 269 Roiz Cotoes, Adolfo, 33, 66, 135- 137, 269 Romano Catholic Church, seChurcho andtt stte Rooevelt, Frankllint D., 117, 127 Roosevelt, Thooret, 169 SACASA, Juant Badtot, 167 Saillant, Louis, 22 St. KiDt, 69 St. Locia, 69 Satm, Gudllattttt, 50 Sanbiay Marinez, VicttoMattuel, 86 Sitoohot do Bustonte y Oiooilt, Atootio, 94 Sata Annat, Atotntto Li6pto do, 176, 181 Satotder Omtafia, Fraotot dt Paola, 180 Satos, Eduaordo, 142, 260, 264 Sero yDominu, Francisco, 61 323 INDEX Social totcurity, 314, 316 Pocurao-dor, 206-207 Sociablism, 6, 8, 19, 20, 78, 244 PRUD, tee Reoluitionary Party for Sottoza, Antasiooo, 99, 138, 166, Deocrtotic Untificaiono 167, 172, 190, 253, 296 Public adminirtiono, 199-214, Sotndaod Prudt Comtpanoy, 83 232-246, 314-319 Sttmono, Hentoy L., 120 Pueto Rico, 19, 26, 47, 51, 76, Suoffrago, 59-71, 288, 310 79, 222-224, 229-230, 283-294, 286-28 7 TAFT, Williamt Hottard, 166RAEtoito 184,479, Tiemtpo, El (Bogota), 142, 260, 62nt, 67, 79, 163, 183, 278, 263-264 284-285; tee also, Nego Tiemtpost, too (Cochobamtba), 268, Raosto Arispo, Miguel, 94 262, 269 Re-blecto, 101, 189; tee alto Cot.- Torrot Bodot, Jaimeo, tiuso34Reir,2,20-1 Tootlitiaism, , 236, 266,2 281 Rogido, 202, 207-2o,12 4 Trade-uttiotnt, 6, 13, 21, 84-86, Ropubioito , 2o8Aottio 12 4 288; see oalso Laoro Revolutionaory Ponty lot Deoratt- Trinidad, 80; tee also British pot- it Uiiaion, 80, 148 settiotnt, Fodoration of Boito6 Revoluflooo, 89-109, 157-158, 311- Woot Iodios 312 Trujillo, Rafaol Loiloidot, 187, 199, Richardoo, Bill, 297 166, 170, 171, 190, 296 RioohoodeoGauiert,Flis, 224 Trouoon, Booty 6., 118, 120 Roblodo Uribe, Emoilio, 264 Torbay, Gobtiel, 192 Robloto, Heorndo, 262 UBICO, J orge, 20, 102 Rocba, Aotooio, 264 Ulato, Otilio, 188 Rodrigooo, Aboloodo L., 199 UNESCO, too Unoited Notloos Edo- Rlota Pioniloa, Gostovo, 141, 142, ooioool, Soieotiflo anod Colturoal 170, 171, 260, 263 Orgaoization Roiz Cootines, Adolfo, 39, 66, 199- UNICEF, soo Utnited Nadtos Itt- 197, 269 ternationalChtildren'sEmoegency Roomat Cathollo Churcho, too Church Fond oandostote Utoidt Ropublicata Deotooootioca, Rootovolt, Franolin D., 117, 127 143-144 Roosovolt, Thetodoro, 169 Utnitod Frtuit Comtpanoy, 21, 48, 83, SACASA, Juao Botisoo, 167 103n Sailloot, Loolt, 22 Uoited Natioot, 04, 69, 172 St. Kitts, 69 Utoitod Nations Edooaioo, Soieo- So. Luoia, 69 tifb oood Coltotal Organiiaiont, Soot, Goillouoe, 58 69 Sanabria yMatnez, VictorManul, Uoited Notdoot Introtionaool Chil- 86 dren'sEmertgency Fund, 69 Sinchezode Busotmateoy iolo, Uoitod States-Coribbeano polioy, Atoooo, 94 118-121, 165-172, 254-256; to- Sooto Aooo, Anonio Lilpoz do, lodoots, 28-29 176, 181 UJRD, too Uoidt Repobliocaon Doeo- Saotaoder Omaofio, Ftaoisoo de ocr~ticaPaola, 180 Ur-rodista ponty, too Lltido Roepob- Saotot, Edotodo, 142, 269, 264 looano Deottctd~t SerranooyDtominguezo,Franiso, 61 323 INDEX Sotial totority, 314, 916 Ptoocurado, 206-207 Sotialitot, 6, 8, 19, 20, 79, 244 PRUD, too Reoltionooy Potty lot Soozo, Aoatasoio, 95, 138, 166, Deocototit Unifictoion 167, 172, 190, 290, 286 Poblic odotiniotrotioo, 199-214, Stoodard Froit Cooopooy, 83 232-236, 314-319 Stimon, Heoory L., 128 Poooto Rico, 19, 26, 47, 91, 76, Soffoago, 33-71, 288, 310 79, 222-224, 229-230, 299-294, 286-28 7 TAFT, Willitot Howarod, 166RAEooit,184,4759 Tioempo, El (BogotA), 142, 260, 62o, 67, 79, 163, 183, 278, 263-264 284-285; too aloo Nogro Tioempot, Lot (Cothoabotob), 260, Roooam ooMgo,9 262, 6 Ro-olooiono, 101, 189; too alto Coot- Toott Bdolbit, ~Rogidot, 202, 207-213 Totaliltiaoisot, 296,6, ,25Roottn, Jose Antooio, 112, 140 Toodo-onioos, 6, 2213, 21, 84 5-86, Ropoblioconoot, 28 288; ott alsot Labor Reolutionoaoy Paoty lot Deoorot- Tojoidod, 80; too also Brtisth pos- it Unifioofioo, 80, 148 totsioot, Fodototion of British evolotioot, 89-109, 157-158, 311- Wot Indios 312 Toojillo, Rofool Lotidot, 187, 139, Rithrdon, BiB, 297 166, 170, 171, 190, 256 Riottit do Gaotior, Polito, 224 Trootoo, Harty S., 118, 120 Roblodo Uoibo, Eotilio, 264 Tooboy, Gobriol, 152 Robloto, Hermoit, 262 UBICO, Jorgo, 20, 102 Rooho, Antooio, 264 Ulote, DRIli, 100 Rodoigooo, Aholardo L., 135 UNESCO, too Uoitod Notdoos Edo- Rojas Pioillo, Gootavo, 141, 142, ootiooal, Sciootifio tond Colltrl 170, 171, 260, 263 Ogaooizton Roiz Cortoos, Adolfo, 99, 66, 199- UNICEF, too Unoitod Naonsoo Io- 137, 265 loton otia Childrenot Emerogoocy Romant Cotholio Churob, tee Chorch Food aod stoto Uttin Repoblicoona Deoodtioo, Roosevtlt, Fraoklio D., 117, 127 143-144 Rototevolt, Thoodoto, 165 Uoitod Fruit Cooopooy, 21, 48, 89, SACASA, Juoan Botisto, 167 103o Soiloont, Looio, 22 Uoited Notdoos, 34, 69, 172 St. Kitts, 69 Uoitod Notioos Edoootioo, Soito- St. Luoi, 69 htc anod Cuoltooal Orgaoizatioo, Soot, Goillaumot, 5B 69 Sanabiay Matinez,VictooManul, Uted Naono Iontoorotol Chil- 86 dtoots Eomergoooy Food, 69 Saochoz do Buotooatote y Sirtino, Uoitod Stotos-Caribbeao polity, Atoioi, 34 115-121, 165-172, 294-256; to- Sata Annat, Attooio FLipoz do, lotioot, 28-29 176, 181 URD, too Utoido Bopubliocana Doot- Sootoodet Otooflo, PFraocitto do otodtito Paolo, 180 Urre-dista patty, too Utoldo Ropob- Sootot, Edoaodo, 142, 263, 264 liocana Deoticat SerranooyDominguez,PFranisco, 61 323 Sotiol tocotity, 314, 386 Sotiolitot, 6, 8, 15, 20, 78, 244 Sooa, Antastoio, 95, 138, 166, 167, 172, 190, 293, 256 Stondord Frut Cotopaoy, 83 Simotn, Booty L., 128 Soffrogo, 53-71, 288, 310 TAFT, Wilioto FHowtard, 166 Toooo, 97 Tioempo, El (BogotA), 142, 268, 263-264 Tiotopot, Lot (Cothabootbo), 280, 262, 265 Tootot Bodot, Joimoe, 94 Totolitoarooniot, 236, 266, 285 Toado-ooioos, 6, 13, 21, 84-86, 288; too olto Lobor Trioidod, SO; too alto Boitith pot- soessoono, Fodoratioo of Brtish Woot Iodios Toojillo, Rofaol Looloidot, 107, 139, 166, 170, 171, 190, 256 Truotao, Booty S., 118, 120 Torboy, Gobtiol, 152 UBICO, bog, 20, 102 Uloto, Otiio, 108 UNESCO, too Uoited Notdoot Edo- catioool, Stientific ood Colturol Organzion~o UNICEF, seo Unitod Notioot Io- ltoonatooalChildre's Emegny Food Utido Ropulicaont Deoerodttica, 14 3-144 United Froit Comopany, 21, 48, 83, 103n Uoitod Notdoot, 34, 69, 172 Uoitod Natdoot Edooton, Stieo- tifit ood Coltorol Oganozotion, 69 Uoitod Notioot Ionteonatoonal Chl- dreo's Eomtrgoocy Food, 69 Uoitod Stt-Cotibbeoto polioy, 115-121, 165-172, 254-256; to- lotions, 28-29 URD, too Loll0 Ropolicaoa Otto- ocrdtica Utoteisto potty, too Utido Repob- litcao Dootit  324 VARGCAS, C,,t333,, 6, 8, 150, 154, Veaquz Diego, 205 Venezuela,1.,, 98-99, 113-114, 142- 144, 168, 170-172, 218 Virgin Islands of0 the U.S., 19 WALLACE, Henry, 127 War of, te Reform, 122 The Caribbean WHO, Wee World Hea.lth Organi- World War, I, 76, 117 World War, II, 15-16, 18, 20, 77, 112, 114-116, 110, 267 ZAPATA, Emiiano,, 100, 107 Zaas Alfredo, 63 Zeaa Jos,6 Santos, 101, 103 Zuloaga, F6iE, 182 Ziig, H,,,,1,, Angel, 192 324 VARGAS, 0,8811,,, 6, 8, 110, 154, 272 Velazquez~, Antonio6, 102 Vdeazquez, Diego, 205 Venezuela,1, 98-99, 113-114, 142- 144, 160, 170-172, 210 Victori,, Gudalupe (Manuel,, F6iE Fenadez,), 93 Villa, Franiso,,, 91, 102, 107 Villeda Morales, Raoo6,,, 140 Virgin Islandsof the16 U.S., 19 WALLACE, Henry, 127 War ,othe Castes, 48 Waof t, he, eform,,, 122 The Caribbean WHO, seeo World Health Organi- Williams, Calder6n,, Abraham,, 140 Wilon,, Woodowo,, 119-120 World War I, 76, 117 World Wor II, 15-16, 10, 20, 77, 112, 114-116, 118, 267 ZAPATA, F,,iliaoo,, 100, 107 Zayas, Alfreddo, 63 Zelaya,, Joi Santos, 101, 103 Zuloaga, FiE, 182 Zoliig,, H,,,,o,, Angel, 132 324 VARCAS, O,,tulio, 6, 0, 150, 134, 272 Velazquez,, Anono,, 102. Velazquezo, Dieo, 203 Venezuela,,1, 38-99, 113-114, 142- 144, 160, 170-172, 218 Victora4, Guadaloupe (Manueol F6iE Fernandez), 93 Villa, Franio, 91, 102, 107 Villeda, Moraleso, IRoooi,, 140 Virgin, Islandsof t, he U.S., 19 WALLACE, Henroy, 127 Waof t,0he, Castes,, 48 War of theo Reform,, 122 The Caribbean WHO, seWorld Healob Orgaoni- zation Williams, Calderoin, Abraham,, 140 Wilson,, Woodow, 119-120 Wold Helth OganOiaton, 69 World Woo 0, 76, 117 World Woo II, 15-16, 18, 20, 77, 112, 114-116, 118, 267 ZAPATA, Eo,,Oiao,, 100, 107 Zoyoo, Alfopedo, 63 Zelaya, Joi Santos, 101, 103 Zuloaga, FeiE, 182 Zuiiigo Hoeteo, Angel, 152