Hl I LLINOI S UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN PRODUCTION NOTE University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library Brittle Books Project, 2012. COPYRIGHT NOTIFICATION In Public Domain. Published prior to 1923. This digital copy was made from the printed version held by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. It was made in compliance with copyright law. Prepared for the Brittle Books Project, Main Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign by Northern Micrographics Brookhaven Bindery La Crosse, Wisconsin 2012 _ _ i J I I! I I I THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 95f z L rnl W ---.. THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS L 1111411(11111~111 4f 5" 77 ' I ' 9 f t j]i fi} E "; 1" E Ba I ,: Y 'trot .d~ MEMORIALS OF AFFGHANISTAN: BEING STATE PAPERS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, DISPATCHES, AUTHENTIC NARRATIVES, ILLUSTRATIVE ETC. OF TRE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO, AND OCCUPATION OF, ffgauan istan anb Scitb tc, BETWEEN THE YEARS 1838 AND 1842. BY J. H. STOCQUELER,' Editor of the Calcutta " Englishman," author of" Fifteen Months PilgrimaSge through Persia, Russia, Germany, etc." Editor of the " WELLINGTON MANUAL,' etC. etc. Hotspur, Mess. Who leads his power ? Under whose government come they along t His letters, bear his mind : Not I, my lord -SHAKSPEARE. Who so shall telle a tale after a man, He must reherse, as neighe as ever he can, Everich word, if it be in his charge, All spekehe never so rudely and so large; Or elles moste tellen his tale untrewe, he Or feinin thinges, a finden wordes newe.--CHAcER. CALCUTTA: MESSRS. OSTELL AND LEPAGE. M.DCCCXLIII. BISHOP'S COLLEGE PRESS, 958 6' VJK2 1~ IV > Allen, W. J. Esq. B. C. S., Armstrong, Captain G. C., Chiabassa. Bird, The Hon'ble W. W., Deputy Governor. Bird, W. W. Esq. Junior, Private Secretary. Blackall, Lieut.-Col. R., 50th B. N. 1. Brooke, Lieut.-Col. George, Bengal Artillery. Brown, Major Lewis, 5th Bombay Light Infantry. Belli, W. H., Esq. B. C. S. Barwell, A. C., Esq. B. C. S. Bannerman, R. A., Esq. Madras C. S. Buckle, Captain E., Bengal Artillery. Briggs, Captain S. C., Brigade Major, Nizam's Army. Bedwell, Dr. E. G., 50th Madras N. I. Brind, Captain F., Bengal Artillery. Brooke, Captain G. P., 68th Regt. B. N. I. Battersby, A., Esq. Damoodhia. Boileau, H. Esq. Calcutta. rrow, J. Esq. Ditto. ogle, Captain Archibald, Commissioner, Arracan. Blair, Brigadier James, Nizam's Army. Book Club, 24th Regt. B. N. I. per Capt. G. W. Hamilton. ----, 28th ,, B. N. I. ,, Capt. Ralph Smith. --- , 9th ,, B. N. I. ,, Capt. W. Beckett. ------- , 65th ,, B. N. I. ,, Lieut. F. J. Nelson. , 31st ,, 71st ,, ,, B. N. I. ,, Lieut. W. P. Hampton. -- B. N. I. ,, Lieut. Henry Dinning. --- , 68th ,, B. N. I. ,, Capt. G. P. Brooke. ---- ,27th ,, Madras N.I. ,, Lieut. A. Howlett. -- B. N. I. , 51st ,, -, H. M's. 62nd ...... ,, ,, Lieut. John Turner. Capt. G. I. Clarke. --- - LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. Book Club, 23rd Regt. B. N. I. per Lieut. James Fagan. , 67th ,, B. N. I. ,, Lieut. Fredk. Rainsford. 1st ,, B. N. I. ,, Lieut. G. P. Goad. , -- , 58th ,, , 11th ,, B. N. I. B. N. I. ,, Capt. C. J. H. Perreau. ,, Dr. Wm. McLeay Rose. , 22nd ,, B. N. I. ,, Dr. G. G. Spilsbury. --- , 49th ,, B. N. I. ,, Ensign W. E. Sandys. , 46th ,, B. N. I. ,, Capt. J. M. Drake. ,57th ,, B. N. I. --- , 17th ,, B. N. I. --- , H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry per Capt. P. R. Jennings. --- --- , Purneah, per G. L. Martin, Esq. Bishop, Ensign W. D., 30th Regt. B. N. I. (2 copies.) Cartwright, Major General Edmund, Campbell, Lieut.-Col. A., Commanding 9th Queen's Royal Lancers. Cadell, W. M., Esq. Madras C. S. (2 copies.) Carter, Lieut. H. J. W., 66th B. N. I. Carter, Lieut. W. J., 16th B. N. I. Crawford, A., Esq. Bongong. Campbell, R. J. R., Esq. Campbell, Ensign J. R., 43rd M. N. I. Coventry, Lieut.-Col. Charles, 32nd B. N. I. Cooke, L. A., Esq. Tirhoot. Campbell, J. W. H., Esq. B. C. S. Cornfoot, Dr. James, 49th Regt. M. N. I. Cock, Major General, Bengal Army. Caddell, Captain Walter, Nizam's Army. Durand, Captain H. M., Private Secretary to the Governor General. (2 copies.) Douglas, Major J. F., 49th B. N. I. Dunbar, Dr. W., 5th IrregularCavalry, (Bhopawar.) Dubois de Saran, Monsieur F., Chandernagore. Devereux, Lieut. W. P., 37th M. N. I. Dawson, Ensign John, 1st B. N. I. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. Dunlop, Ensign John, 12th B. N. I. D'Oyly, Ensign Charles W., 58th B. N. I. Dodd, - Esq. Calcutta. Dewar, Captain A. C., 37th B. N. I. Dick, A. T., Esq. B. C. S. Downing, W. P., Esq. Calcutta. Daubeny, Major C. B., H. M.'s 55th Regt. Elliott, J. B., Esq. B. C. S. (4 copies.) Elliott, H. M., Esq. B. C. S. Eyre, Lieut. Vincent, Bengal Horse Artillery. Eden, Lieut. W. F., 1st Madras N. I. Edmonstone, Geo. Junior, Esq. B. C. S. Edmonstone, Cornet F. M., 5th Irregular Cavalry, (Bhopawar.) Evans, Lieut. H. L., Malwa Bheel Corps. Elliott, Lieut. W. Russell, 8th B. N. I. Frith, Brigadier W. H. L., Bengal Artillery. Fiddes, Lieut. Col. Thomas, Bengal Army. Fisher, Rev. Henry, Calcutta. Fergusson, Lieut. J. A. D., 6th Regt. Light Cavalry. Faddy, Lieut. S. B., 36th B. N. I. Grant, W. P., Esq. Master in Equity. Grant, J. W., Esq. B. C. S. Griffiths, Hollier, Esq. Mauritius, (2 copies.) Gorton, W., Esq. Simla. Gray, Major J. C. C., Commanding 1st Oude Local Infantry. Godby, Lieut.-Col., 36th B. N. I. Gordon, Capt. J. T., 15th B. N. I. Giberne, Capt. H., Bombay Artillery. Grindall, Lieut. R. F., 8th B. N. I. Gordon, Lieut. Theodore, 65th B. N. I. Gill, Lieut. Charles, 17th M. N. I. Glasfurd, Captain John, Bengal Engineers. Gowan, Ensign Jas. Young, 18th B. N. I. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. Griffin, Thomas, Esq. Buxar. Gordon, Evelyn M., Esq. B. C. S. Grant, Mr. W. H., Calcutta. Goldney, Captain Philip, 4th B. N. I. Greenlaw, C. B., Esq. Calcutta. Garden, Lieut.-Col. Quarter-Master G'eneral of the Bengal Army. Garden, Dr. Alexander, Bengal Medical Service. Grant, Dr. John, Bengal Medical Service. Griffiths, Lieut. H. C., 3rd B. N. I. Hampton, Robert, Esq., B. C. S. Hodgson, B. H., Esq. B. C. S. Hathorn, H. N., Esq. B. C. S. Houstoun, Robert, Esq. B. C. S. Hawkins, W. B., Esq. Madras C. S. Hewett, K. H., Esq, Chuprah. Hough, Major William, Calcutta. Hamilton, Rev. R. K., Madras. Hart, Dr. Henry, H. M.'s 31st Hungerford, Lieut. T. J. W., Bengal Artillery. Havelock, Major Henry, C. B., H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry. Hayes, Captain Fletcher, Bundelkund Legion. Harington, Captain T. L., 5th Light Cavalry. Howorth, Captain Humphrey, Nizam's Army. Hopkinson, Lieut. Henry, 70th B. N. I. Harris, Lieut. James T., 17th B. N. I., Hannyngton, Captain J. C. 24th B. N. I. Hall, Lieut. John F. D'E. W., 22nd B. N. I. Hobbes, Mr. R. G., Meerut. (2 copies.) Haines, Lieut. Edward, Bengal Engineers. Hunter, Captain William, 15th B. N. I. Harley F. Esq., Calcutta. Irwin, Henry, Esq. Assistant Surgeon, 30th B. N. I. James, Lieut. Hugh Rees, 44th B. N. I. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. Konson, George, Esq. Azimghur. Knox, Thos. J., Esq. Lowther, R., Esq., B. C. S. Low, Lieut. Col. J., late Resident at Lucknow. Littler, Major Genl. J. H., Bengal Army. Luard, Lieut.-Col. John, H. M.'s 21st Regiment. Lysaght Captain Thomas, Nizam's Army. Lyons, Captain E. R., 37th B. N. I. Lyell, Captain Henry, 43rd B. N. I. (2 copies.) Laughton, Captain John, Bengal Engineers. Lewes, Captain C. J., 50th B. N. I. Leishman, R., Esq. Calcutta. Liptrap, Captain John, 42nd B. N. I. Larkins Lieut. Colin R., 20th B. N. I. Leech, Major Robert, Bombay Engineers. Loch Dr. W. J., 43rd B. N. I. (2 copies.) Millett, Frederick, Esq. B. C. S. Martin, G. L., Esq. B. C. S. Mackintosh, E., Esq. Purneak. McSherry, Major Thomas, 30th B. N. I. Master, Captain G. W., 4th Light Cavalry. Milner, Captain F. C., 36th B. N. I. Melville, Lieut. H. B., 54th Regt. N. I. Melville, David, Esq. Standard Hall, (England.) Metcalfe, Lieut. James, 3rd B. N. I. Mayne, Lieut. H. O., 4th Nizam's Horse. Mayne, C. 0., Esq. Stanmore, Middlesex. Mayne, Lieut. William, Governor General's Body Guard. Mayne, H. B., Esq. Brighton, (England) 2 copies. Master, Mrs., Barrow Green House, Azted, (England.) Mackenzie, Ensign F., 26th B. N. I. McAndrew, Ensign G., 47th B. N 1. Murray, Adam, Esq. Calcutta. Morrell, J. G., Esq. Ditto. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. McCausland, Captain John K., 70th B. N. I. Martin, Captain Wm., Deputy Judge Advocate General. Moseley, Lieut. Col. G. W., Commanding 64th B. N. I. McCann, Mr. J. J., Calcutta. Macpherson, Captain A. F., 43rd B. N. I. (2 copies.) Moonshee, Mohun Lall. McGrath, Captain F. N., 62nd B. N. I. Marshman, J. C., Esq. Serampore. Morrell, T. P., Esq. Calcutta. Nicolls, Sir Jasper, K. C. B., Commander-in-Chief, Norton, Sir J. D., Chief Justice, Madras. (2 copies.) Norton, Lieut.-Col. H., 69th Regt. B. N. I. Neave, Robert, Esq. B. C. S. Nicoll, J., Esq., Bombay Times, (2 copies.) Neemuch, Station Library, per Dr. Winm. Dolland. Nash, Major Joseph, 43rd B. N. I. Officers of H. M.'s 84th Regt., per Capt. D. Russell Officers of the 36th B. N. I., per Capt. T. F. Flemyng. Ouseley, Lieut. Colonel J. R., Agent to the Gov. Genl. S. W. Frontier. Officers of H. M.'s 50th Regt., per Captain R. Waddy. Powney, Lieut.-Col. R., Bengal Artillery. Parsons, Lieut.-Col. James, 70th B. N. I. Prowett, N. H. E., Esq. B. C. S. Pettingal, Major E., Commanding 5th Irregular Cavalry. Pennyngton, Lieut. R. C., 11th B. N. I. Phayre, Lieut. A. P. 7th B. N. I. Paterson, J., Esq. H. C. S. Amherst. Powle, G. P., Esq. Calcutta. Public Library, Calcutta. Pereira, F., Esq. Calcutta. Pearson, Dr. J. T. Medical Charge Gov. Genl's, Household. Phillipson, Dr. R., Bengal Medical Service. Paterson, Captain F. S., 54th B. N. I. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. Roberts, Colonel A. c. B., 72nd B. N. I. Reid, H. M., Esq. B. C. S. Rattray, R. H., Esq. B. C. S. Ruttledge, Major F., Ballygunge. Roebuck, Captain J., Commanding 8th Nizam's Infantry. Ramsay, Captain George, Assistant Resident Nagpore. Richards, Lieut. C. J., 25th B. N. I. Ross, Ensign John, 71st B. N. I. Rideout, Ensign Henry F., 47th B. N. I. Ridsdale, W., Esq. Bishop's College. Reed, Charles, Esq. Rose, R. J., Esq. Ramgopaul Ghose Baboo, Riddell, Captain Thomas, 60th B. N. I. Sutherland, Lieut.-Col. J., Agent Rajpootana. Smith, Dr. John C., Civil Surgeon. Smith, Captain Thomas, Assistant Resident, Nepaul, Swatman, Captain Wm. 65th B. N. I. Skinner, Lieut. James, 1st Irregular Cavalry. Stevens, Ensign H. B., 41st B. N. I. Storm, William, Esq., Calcutta. Swindon, Mr. T. G., Calcutta Strickland, R. J., Esq., Calcutta. Stedman, Lieut.-Col. 7th Light Cavalry. Sutherland, Major Eric, Presidency Hyderabad. Tombs, Major General John, Comdg. the Saugor Division. Tayler, W. T. Esq., B. C. S. Tennant, Lieut.-Col. James, Bengal Artillery. Thoresby, Major Charles, Pol. Agent Jeypore. Todd, Captain, E. D'Arcy, Bengal Artillery. Turner, C. H., Esq. Gadstone, (England.) Taylor, Captain Meadows, Nizam's Army. Tucker, Dr. H. J., 21st B. N. I. Todd, Lieut. James Henry, H. M.'s 40th Regt. (2 copies) LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS. Tandy, Edward, Esq. Allyghur. Thomson, T. E. Esq, Calcutta. Tanner, Lieut. W. H. 42nd Madras N. I. Tucker, Lieut. T. T., 8th Light Cavalry. Trotter, Lieut. R. A., 43rd B. N. I. (2 copies.) Trevelyan, Capt. W. H. Political Agent in Bhopal. Vansittart Wm., Esq. B. C. S. Vigors, MajorH. N., H. M's. 13th Light Infantry Vallancey, Captain G. P., 36th Madras N. I. (4 copies.) Vibart, Captain Edward, 11th Light Cavalry. Wade, Lieut.-Col. Sir Claude M. c. B., Resident Indore. Wyatt, Thomas, Esq. B. C. S. Wilton, Major Geo. R. 4th B. N. I. Watt, Captain Alexander, 27th B. N. [. Williams, Captain Stephen, 8th B. N. I. Wake, Major Wm. Henry, 44th B. N. I. Warden, Captain W. E., 23rd B. N. I. Woodhouse, Lieut. C. R., 63rd B. N. I. Wilson, Lieut. Wm. John, 43rd M. N. I. Whish, Lieut. C. W. F., 43rd M. N. I. Wollaston, Lieut. E. O., 62nd B. N. I. Wilson, James, Esq. Tirhoot Wilkinson, E. Esq., Calcutta. (2 copies.) Walker, Lieut. Arthur de Noe, 6th M. N. 1. Weston, Ensign, C. S. 36th B. N. I. Wilson, H. Esq. Budaon. Ward, J. B., Esq. Balighat. Wheler, Captain T. Trevor, Comdt. of Malwa Contingent. Warren, Captain C. H., 25th Madras N. I. Warner Capt. J. H. Dinagepore. Yule, Lieut. Henry, Bengal Engineers. E nti Page. .. 92 ... Affghan corps, defection of an, ... 278 Affghanistan, evacuation of, ... 12 .. ... Akbar Khan's defeat, ... 8 ..... Army of the Indus,--Its assembly, March of, down the Ditto, 19 Sutledge, ......... Detached to Hydrabad Ditto, 20 and return,......... 21 Its disposition altered, Ditto, March to Candahar, ... 23 Ditto, Reaches Candahar, ... 24 Ditto, 28 Storms Ghuzni, ...... Ditto, March to Cabul, ... ... 43 Ditto, Partly returns to India, 54 Ditto, Army of Retribution,--Its composition, ... 187 Ditto, Geneial Pollock joins, and takes command, 202 ... 63 ... Arrival of the Detachment, ... ..... 196 Baba Wullee-action at,... ... ... ... 61 and 62 ... Bameean, the Valley, of, ... ... 72 ... Bameean the Winter, at, 60 .......... Bameean-Expedition to, ... 117 Beloochees, operations against the, affair with, and attack on Beloochees, 98 to 104 ................ Quetta, Bengal Cavalry--Disgraceful conduct of the 133 ..................... 2nd, .... Ditto, the 2d Regiment expunged from 139 .................. the Army List, ... 163 ... ... ... Blind Security, 21 ...... Bridge of Boats across the Indus, ... .... 258 Brigadier Monteath Report of Broadfoot, Captain-His report of the de224 fences of Jellalabad, .............. Brookes, Major General, called to India, ... 144 20 Bukkur--Its cession to the British, ...... 172 Burnes, Sir Alexander--murdered, ...... Ditto, (See Appendix No. XII.) ......... ... ... Cabul and Ghuzni, Advance to, Cabul-the Army arrives with Shah Soojah, ...... Ditto, invested by the Affghans, Ditto, advance upon, of the armies under General's Pollock and Nott, ...... Ditto, arrival at, of General Pollock,.. ... ...... ... Campaign, result of the, ............ .. Candahar--March to, Ditto, Shah Soojah's arrival and entry, ... ...... .. ... Ditto, Halt at, ... ... ...... Ditto, Affairs at,. ...... ... Ditto, Action near, ... Ditto, Evacuated by the British Force, . ... ...... Candahar, operations at, ... Captain Broadfoot's, report, ...... 249 45 172 242 267 140 24 25 28 190 235 243 193 248 eX. Page. ... .. 284 Captain Bygrave's Release, ... ... ... ... 81 Captives, Release of the, Charekhar-the Ghoorkas cut up at (and Appendix No. VI.) ... 173 ... 222 ... Colonel Monteath's Testimony, ... 260 & 275 Colonel Richmond's report, ... ... 152 Colonel Wymer's order, ...... 9 Commander-in-Chief, Orders by the,..... Cotton, Sir Willoughby-Resigns the command of the Army of the Indus to Sir ... 22 J. Keane,... ............ .... ... 139 ... Ditto, returns to India, ... ... ... Demonstration at Bajgah, ... ... ... ...... Disturbances, ... ... Division order of Sir Robert Sale, Dooranee Order, conferred, ... ....... ... Dost Mahomed, Surrender of, ...... Dost Mahomed, Unsuccessful pursuit of, ... Dost Mahomed at Bameean, defeat of, Dost Mahomed, Pursued by Capt. Outram, ... Proceeds to Bokhara, Ditto, Surrenders to Sir W. Ditto, ... Macnaghten, ... ... Ditto, Release of, ........ 91 145 135 47 138 129 93 43 75 138 300 Elphinstone, Major General, relieves Sir W. ... ... 139 Cotton, ....... Ditto, Died a captive in the hands 239 ...... of Akbar Khan, 1 Encroachments of the French and Russians England, Major General, Marches from Scinde, ....... ... 198 Repulsed at Hykulzie, ... 199 Ditto, 230 Success at ditto, ...... Ditto, 297 Ditto, Reaches Scinde, ...... 25 and 26 ....... Envoy's Report, the,.... ... 7 and 8 ... ... ... Envoy's Staff, Fane, Sir Henry-His General Order reducing the force, ... 9 and 10 Ditto, His farewell of the Army, 21 Fort Bajgah, occupation of ... ,...... 86 Fouladi, the Valley of, ... ... ... 78 General General General Ditto, Ghirisk, Brooke's complimentary order, ... 120 Nott's Dispatches,-192, 234, and 255, England's Dispatches, ... ... 231 ditto, Reaches Scinde, ... ... 295 Defeat of the Ghilzies by Captain Woodburn, at ... ... ... ... 153 Ghuznee--Storming and Capture of by the Army of the Indus, ... 23 to 42 Ghuznee, Attack on Destruction of ... ...269 Ghuznee, Casualty return, ... ... ... 265 INDEX. Page. Ghuznee-Invested by the Ghazees, ......... 173 Ditto, Surrendered by Colonel Palmer, ... 174 Ditto, Occupation of, by Major General Nott,... ... ... ... ... ... ... 261 ... 249 & 261 Governor General's Orders, Hadjee Khan Kakur, joins Shah Soojah at Deh Hadjee,... ............... ... Hazarehs succumb, the, . ... ... ... ... ... Hazarehs, Affair with the, ... ... Hazarehs, quarrel with the, .... Ditto, Arrested for treason, ............ Herat-Seige of, raised, ................ Hindoo Khoosh-The British on the, ..... Honors conferred on the returning Army,... Hyder Khan-His capture, ............. ............ Hykulzie-Retreat from, ... Hykulzie, second affair at, ....... 24 83 82 79 47 10 60 303 42 201 230 Insurrection at Cabul, ............... Istalif, attack on, .................. 175 285 Jellalabad,-Occupation of by Sir R. Sale, ............ Ditto, Sortie from,...... Ditto, Relieved by Sir R. Sale, ...... Ditto, History of the Blockade,... ... Jugdulluck,-the Affghans defeated by Sir ... R. Sale. ... ... ....... Ditto, Pass, storming of, ......... .... ... ... Julga, attack on, .... 188 89 210 215 169 251 124 McNaghten, Page. Sir William, murder of, (see also Appendix No. XVI.) Nazian Valley-Operations in, ......... Notification of the raising the siege Herat, . ......... .. Nuffoosk Pass, storming the, ... ... Nusseer Khan, defeat of, ... ... 112 87 89 130 253 22 159 160 53 105 149 232 56 7? 84 169 55 184 44 203 121 137 Letter to the Princes, Chiefs, and People in honor conferred in the returning army, ... ... Lieut. Pottinger, appointment of, ... ... 303 & 304 ... 11 Major General McCaskill's, Reports, 247 & 257 Major Lane, dispatch of ... ... ... 194 Major Skinner, Reports of 240, 259, & 274 Major Sanders, Memorandum by, ... ... 26 ... 177 145 of ... 10 ... 113 ... 119 Origin of the Expedition to Affghanistan in 1838, ... ... ... ... ... . ... 1 to 7 Pesh Bolak-Flight from (and Appendix,)... 137 Pollock, Major General, joins the large force placed under his command, .......... 201 Poolagee, retreat to, .... .... ... ... 115 Prisoners, arrival of some, in General Pollock's camp, ............ 267 Ditto, Release of the whole, A narrative from one of the captives, .... ... 279 Proclamation, Governor General's, ... ... 278 Proclamation, Lord Auckland's, stating causes of Expedition,... ...... ...... to 7 Purwan Durrah, affair at, ....... ... 132 Pushoot, affair at, ..................... 57 Pushoot, attack on, ....... ... 58 and 59 Quetta, March from, Kahun, March of Convoy to, ... ... ... ... ... Kamurd, the valley of, Kamurd, Movement on, ... ... ... Kardurrah-Affairat, ................ Kareez Oosman Khan, General Nott at, ... Keane, Sir John,-takes the command of the Army of the Indus at Quetta, ...... Kharootoo-Defeat of the Ghilzies by Col. Chambers, .................. ... Khawund-Defeat of the Ghilzies by Capt. Griffin, ... ... ... ... ...... .. ... Khelat,-Storm and capture of, by Sir Thos. Willshire, ......... ... 47 to Ditto, Fall of, .................. Khelat-i-Ghilzie-Defeat of the Ghilzies at, ... ... ... ... Ditto, Successful defence of, against a large force of Affghans, .. ... Khiva,-Lieuts. Abbottand Shakspeare dispatched thither, .................. Kholoom, the Wallee of, .... ... ... Kooloom, the Nuwaub of, ....... ... Khoord Cabul-The Pass forced by Sir Robt. Sale,... ... ... ... ... ......... ... Khyberries,-Invest Alee Musjid and disturb the Passes, ................... Khyber Pass, action in the ... ... ... Khyber Pass, forced by Col. Wade, ...... Ditto, ditto, Genl. Pollock, ... Kohistan, operations in, ....... ... Kohistan-Campaign in, ......... 129 to ... Mamoo Khall, General Pollock at, ... 245 & 250 Moseley, Lieut..Col. his order at Kawalser, ... ... ... ............. ...... 185 ... ... ... ... 3..... Reinforcement from Scinde, ....... ... 198 Report, Colonel Taylor's, ... ... ... $72 Retributive, force the, .... ... ... 18 Return of the Armies to India, ......... 288 Revolt of the Affghans at Khoord Cabul, ... 164 Ditto, at Cabul, .......... ... 172 Rising Hostility, ... ....... ... 88 Runjeet Sing, Great meeting with, at Ferozepore, ... ................ 12 to 18 Sar-i-Sung, ....... ... ....... 73 Scinde, Risings in, ......... ......... 97 Scinde Affair, at Sebee in, ... ....... 114 Seebee, Action with the Kujjak tribes, ... 143 Shah Soojah-Moves in advance of the Bengal force down the Sutledge,... 19 Ditto, Enters Candahar, ....... 24 Ditto, Arrives at Cabul.... ......... 45 Ditto, His false notions of security, ... 163 Shinwarree Valley, operations in, ... ... 237 Shumshoodeen, Defeat of, ... ... ... 254 Sir J. Kean's, approving order, ... ... Sir John Kean, Report of, .... ... ... 46 Somnauth Gates, removed from the tomb of Sultan Mahomed of Ghuznee, 301 Ditto, The insult of 800 years at last avenged, .. ... ... ...... 302 Sootumdurra, action at, .... .... ... 12 Summary of the results of the two first years' Campaign, .................... 139 Survey Trip, ... ....... ... ... 85 Syghan, advance to, ... ... ... ... 95 $7 Tazee, Battle at, ... ...... ......... 96 Tezeen Valley, The Insurgents defeated by Sir R. Sale, ... .... 167 Ditto, Pass, victory, ... ............ 296 Todd, Major D'Arcy, quits Herat, ...... 144 Ukhbar Khan-Defeated by Sir R. Sale, ... 211 INDEX. Page. Page. Wade, Colonel, Forces the Khyber Pass en Wymer, Colonel-His dispatch from Baba route to Cabul, ... ... ... ... 44 Wallee, ...... .... 196 Wild, Brigadier-His order at Kawalser, ... 186 Ditto, From Khelat-i-Ghilzie, ... 150 Woodburn, Capt., defeats the Ghilzies at ... ... 141 Ghirisk, ... ... ... 153 Zemindwaur, operations in, ... Ditto, Killed, ... ... ... 173 Zemindwaur-Campaign in, ... ... ... 141 Fortress of Attock to face Title. Page. Map of part of Upper Scinde, shewing the Routes from Sukkur on the Indus, through the prin* cipal Passes into Affghanistan,... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... 1 Plan of the Battle of Tazee, ....... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . 96 Ditto of the Battle fought at Jellalabad, ...... ... ... . ... ... ... ... 210 Ditto of Caubul British Cantonments, ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (Appendix) 60 PREFACE. The professional duties of the editor of this work imposed upon him, some four years ago, the agreeable necessity of perusing the twelve volumes of the " Wellington Dispatches," published by Colonel Gurwood. He found so much practical wisdom scattered through their pages that he assigned to himself the task of collecting the fragments, and presenting them to the Indian Army in the form of a Manual. He also found, that, though arranged in the order of their dates, the Dispatches did not so completely tell the date of the various campaigns in which the Duke of Wellington was engaged, as they would have done if they had been strung together by a narrative of the events which led 11 to the movements and actions described. He therefore resolved that should the occasion ever offer, he would present a volume of Dispatches in the form which he considered necessary to the completeness of its value as a work of reference. The occasion has presented itself in the campaigns in Affghanistan. The editor will be happy to find that his attempt to connect the Proclamations, Official Dispatches, Orders and Notifications, written and published during the eventful period which these campaigns embrace-eventful, by reason of the campaigns-has not been altogether abortive; but that, on the contrary, he has been able to facilitate the references, and render light the investigations, of the Soldier, the Politician, and the Student. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. Although the stirring events recorded in the following pages will have induced almost all who have been interested in them to study the maps of Affghanistan and Scinde, and look a little into the history of those countries, it may not be amiss to briefly recapitulate in this place such circumstances as may aid the general reader in rightly understanding the causes, the course, and the locale of the occurrences described. Affghanistan, in Central Asia, is bounded on the north by the Hindoo Koosh; on the south by sandy plains which separate it from Beloochistan ; on the east by the Indus river; and on the west by the deserts skirting the kingdom of Persia. It contains five great towns : Cabul, Candahar, Ghuzni, Istaliff, and Jellalabad, whose united population was computed before the war at about 220,000 men, women and children, of whom about 90,000 were residents of Cabul, and the same number of Candahar. But there is a large population, independently of the in- habitants of towns; namely, the Nomade tribes, or Ooloos, who, under the various denominations of Ghilzies, Dooranees, Khyberries, and Euzoofzyes, live in tents or small houses of unburnt bricks in the deserts to the west, and in the Paropamisan and Soliman ranges of mountain, subsisting by their flocks and herds, or by rendering military service, and plundering caravans. In person, the male Affghans are tall and robust, though rather bony and mascular than otherwise. Their faces are long but handsome ; their hair and beards black or brown. In manners they are simple and unostentatious, frank, open and manly; hardy, brave, iv INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. and industrious; but, as we have seen them when the worst passions of man are called into action, we may add, with Mr. Elphinstone, that they are revengeful, cruel, treacherous, rapacious, avaricious, envious and obstinate. The Affghan women are fair and handsome, those of the upper classes are kept within the purdah; but the lower, who perform the menial offices of the household, are exposed. The religion of the Affghans is Mahometanism, but they are more tolerant, than any people of the same persuasion, of the religion of others. The Armenians, for example, live amongst them free from the persecution which they experience from the Persians and Turks. The commerce of Affghanistan has never been very extensive. The imports, chiefly from India, consisted of cottons, muslins, ivory, indigo, tin, wax, sugar and spices ; and after the first year of Shah Soojah's restoration, considerable quantities of European manufactured goods found their way into the country. In return for these, Affghanistan exports horses, furs, shawls, tobacco, and fruits. It is not necessary to inflict upon the reader the history of the early part of the monarchy of Affghanistan; but it may be as well, in order to a right understanding of the policy and proceedings of the British Indian Government, to give a brief account of the fall and dismemberment of the empire after the throne had passed from the possession of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. The Dooranees, to which tribe Shah Soojah belonged, had been, between the ninth and the early part of the eighteenth century, alternately dependent and independent ; sometimes acknowledging allegiance to Persia, sometimes to Hindoostan, and occasionally recognizing no superior, while holding temporary possession, fraudulently acquired, of Candahar. In 1709, we find them in sovereign possession of the latter province. After innumerable fluctuations of fortune, through the chances INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. of war, or the operations of treachery, their power centred in Shah Zemaun Khan, who, in 1793, had become, by the death of his father, the sovereign of Affghanistan, from Peshawur in the north-east, to Herat in the west. This Prince's elder brothers viewing his elevation with jealousy revolted on his accession, and while one of them (Humayoon) seized upon Candahar, another (Mahomed) assumed the sovereignty of Herat. These both took arms to assert the right of primogeniture, but the Shah defeated them, and in 1794 had undisputed possession of the Affghan crown. In the year 1800, however, his brother Ma- homed, who had betaken himself to Persia on his discomfiture, reappeared with an army and took Candahar. Shah Zemaun advanced against him, but he was betrayed on his march, seized, and handed over to the rebels, who put out his eyes, and sent him prisoner to Cabul. Shah Soojah, then but twenty years of age, immediately as- sumed the royal titles, and after numerous actions with rebels in all quarters, lost his kingdom by piece-meal, and was obliged to take refuge in the Seikh territories. He subsequently made several unsuc- cessful efforts with armies of mercenaries, to regain it, and finally, after being detained by Runjeet Sing at Lahore, made his way to Loodianah, and claimed the protection of the British Government, which was promptly and generously afforded him. Shah Soojah was succeeded by his brother Mahmood, who chiefly owed his elevation to the arms and intrigues of the chief of the house of Barukzye, Futteh Khan. Mah- mood, out of gratitude, made Futteh Khan his vizier, and we have it on Burnes' authority, that the influence which this latter personage was permitted to exercise, added to the dissolute conduct of Mahmood himself, caused dissatisfaction in the bosom of Prince Kamran, Mahmood's son. Mahmood's first object was to capture Cashmere, which he had no difficulty in accomplishing. He had previously secured the co-operation vi INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. of Runjeet Sing, but upon terms to which, after the conquest, he (Mahmood) felt no inclination to adhere. This caused a breach between the Seikhs and the Affghans; the former seized Attock, then held by the brother of the ex-Governor of Cashmere, and were immediately assailed by the Affghans under Dost Mahomed Khan. The Affghans were routed with great loss, and driven across the Indus; they losing all the territory which they had previously held to the east of that river. Mahmood continued to reign by his vizier; he held Cashmere; he exacted homage from the Ameers of Scinde, and drove the Persians from Herat, where they had assembled to demand a tribute from Affghanistan. Futteh Khan, the vizier, rewarded himself for his instrumentality in bringing about all these matters, by distributing all the important offices of state among his brothers. This still further irritated the Crown Prince Kamran, who took an opportunity of putting out Futteh Khan's eyes, and of afterwards arraigning him in open Durbar between Cabul and Candahar, where he was set upon and assassinated. Mah- mood, who passed his life in debauchery, feeling himself incapable of governing without the aid of Futteh Khan, betook himself to Herat, while his army was in the field against some rebels. This flight "involved a virtual resignation of his power, for though he retained Herat and the title of King, he became literally a mere vassal of Persia." died in a few years, and his son Kamran succeeded him at Herat. He On the death of Futteh Khan, the vizier, Azeem Khan, his brother, then Governor of Cashmere, took arms against Mahmood and advanced The flight of the King had left the throne vacant, which the Barukzye chieftain seized, and was therein supported by his brothers. upon Cabul. He first resolved on recalling Shah Soojah, and placing him on the throne, and that unfortunate refugee, had actually proceeded a considerable distance on his way from Loodianah, when some display of weak INTRODUCTORY Vi VII CHAPTER. vanity on his part, some idle attempt to enforce a severe etiquette, offended Azeem Khan, who thereupon put Eyoob, a brother of Soojahool-Moolk's upon the throne, leaving the ex-Shah to retrace his steps. Shah Soojah now went to Scinde, and accepted for a time the hospitality of the Ameers. He afterwards returned to Loodianah. Meanwhile, the Seiks recovered Cashmere, and some other provinces, from the Affghans, and by a successful action on the Indus, rendered Peshawur tributary. This last battle, in which the Affghans were led by Azeem Khan, so affected the latter chieftain, that he soon sickened and died. His death was the signal of feuds among his brothers, Dost Mahomed, Shere Dil, Poordil, Rahim Dil and others, who had been placed in offices of state by Futteh Khan; they all, however, united to rob Azeem Khan's son of his wealth, and to deprive the puppet Eyoob of his throne, after which Shere Dil went with half a million sterling, and erected an independent chiefship at Candahar, while Dost Mahomed Khan took possession of Cabul. This happened in 1826. Dost Mahomed ruled Cabul with mildness and sagacity, and but that he seemed more anxious to preserve peace at home than to extend his power abroad, would no doubt have acquired, without much difficulty the entire sovereignty of Affghanistan. He was held in much respect, and some degree of fear by surrounding tribes, and as he never shewed any disposition to restrain their lawless proceedings beyond the vicinage of his own Khanate, so did they rarely trouble themselves to invade his possessions, or aid in any intrigues to dislodge him. But there was a chief beyond the Indus, with whom he had a feud of the most deadly nature; a chief who not only held a faith offensive to true Mussulmans, but had stained the Affghans' flag by routing them in war, and wresting from them provinces to the west of the Indus. implacable foe of Dost Mahomed. Runjeet Sing was the He held Peshawur and Attock, in INTRODUCTORY V111 CHAPTER. defiance of the repeated efforts of the Affghans to regain them; and Runjeet Sing was the ally of the British, and his quarrel, of course, became theirs. But natives and governments seldom want pretexts for withholding assistance from each other, as Dost Mahomed had in his time experienced, when he sought the aid of the King of Bokhara and the Wullee of Kooloom. It is possible, therefore, that the British authorities would have pleaded their favorite doctrine of non-interference, but for an accident which induced them not only to espouse his cause, but at the same time to revive the claims to the Dooranee throne, of the exiled Shah Soojah. Russia had sent emissaries to Cabul, with the view of cultivating a good understanding with Dost Mahomed Khan. The Governor General of India, Iord Auckland, naturally solicitous for the tranquillity of British India--a tranquillity that ran the risk of being disturbed in proportion as the influence of Russia over the gate of that empire increased-endeavoured to establish a counter-influence, and to require the dissolution of the Russian connexion. Failing in this, it became expedient and necessary to replace Dost Mahomed by a ruler who should be favorable to the creation of a barrier against foreign approaches to India by the North-west, and whose friendship should be secured by the presence of a British Army. in the following pages. Hence the events recorded MAP0 Iprqh KwE T' or SaugLwosovukrnnitoUpJ QWCTTA A F H AN FC adflu &trolt rt ad otte STN l~Lde fw tom & uz JJX4i-M-9t-rnmid rasuisokI4&k NPO H D 1 EYR A ' f P ,t 169k fNN JU wIwd V DcKye-A K-C GOTE Mileu 4 Ovg*.wv S 5j*ar& ar w So MEMORIALS OF AFFGHANIST AN. THE jealousy with which the two most powerful states in the Continent of Europe have regarded the dominion of Great Britain in India, has, at various times, during the past half century, developed itself in the form of intrigues, encroachments upon our nearest neighbours, or open attempts at invasion and the subversion of our power. The French, under Napoleon, menaced us from Egypt, and endeavoured to gain a footing in India, by forming alliances with powerful native chieftains, and assisting them in their quarrel with the British Indian Government. Russia, more crafty in her policy, slowly and silently moved her forces, and extended her territory and influence in a southerly direction. The progress of her arms was not stayed until she had become mistress of Georgia, and the Northern provinces of Persia to the right bank of the Araxes. The sagacity and foresight of the Marquis of Wellesley, seconded by the disciplined armies and fleets under his control, baffled the schemes of the French, who never revived the insane project of establishing themselves in India after their reverses in Egypt, the loss of the Isle of France, and the destruction of Tippoo Saib's power in Mysore ; while the remonstrances of the Home Ministry, and the protests of the public press, checked the aggressive spirit of successive Autocrats. For the twenty years, therefore, preceding 1837, little was heard of any intention, in even the most formidable quarter, to disturb the supreme authority maintained by the English over the vast expanse of territory lying between Cape Comorin and the Himalaya range. It is true, that speculations upon the feasibility of an invasion of India by ORIGIN OF THE CAMPAIGN. Russia were rife ; but these rather originated in the desire of sundry writers to establish theories of defence, than in any well-grounded apprehension that encroachments were meditated. Some professed to shew, that the movement was impracticable ;-others demonstrated its feasibility, as far as the overthrow of natural obstacles was concerned, and suggested the political arrangements and military dispositions calculated to frustrate the ambitious attempt. About the middle of the year 1837, however, the late Sir Alexander (then Lieutenant) Burnes, being upon a commercial mission to the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, then de facto ruler of Cabul, and omnipotent in Northern Affghanistan, discovered certain agents actively engaged in an endeavour to extend the influence of Russia, but avowedly only that of her instrument, Persia, to the banks of the Indus; to which end, at the same time, a Persian army, likewise assisted by Russian officers and agents, was laying siege to Herat. Sir Alexander Burnes used his best efforts to counteract these intrigues and operations, but, failing to do so, he returned to India, and apprised Lord Auckland, the then Governor General, of the result of his observations, suggesting at the same time, the course of policy which appeared to him adapted to counteract the schemes agitating in Affghanistan. The Government was not long in determining upon the measures now rendered advisable, particularly as the correspondence which the British Ministry had thought proper to open with the Russian government upon the subject of the suspicious agencies at Cabul and Herat, and the aggressive operations against the latter state, had brought matters to a pass, when a grand movement in India had become necessary to avert a serious rupture in Europe. Accordingly, about the middle of the year 1838, preparations began to be made for the assembly of a large force upon the left bank of the Sutledge, whose destination was understood to be Affghanistan and Herat, and a preparatory mission under the late Sir W. Macnaghten, was deputed to Maharajah Runjeet Singh, with the view of obtaining his co-operation in the purposes of the expedition. A considerable body of Bombay troops under the command of Sir John Keane, was at the same time ordered to proceed from Bombay up the Indus, with the triple purpose of arranging with the Ameers for the free navigation of the river, keeping up the communication with Bombay during the campaign that might ensue, and forming a junction with the Bengal force; and simultaneously with these measures a detachment of troops, supported by a ship of war, was sent to occupy the island of Karrack in the Persian Gulf, to keep the Persians in check and interrupt their commerce. ORIGIN OF THE CAMPAIGN. The close of the rainy monsoon was the moment chosen for throwing off all reserve, and disclosing to the world the plans which the Government had been organizing, and the manner in which it was intended to carry them into operation. Policy perhaps suggested in the following proclamation the suppression of all direct allusion to Russian intrigue; but it required very little sagacity to discover, that the references to Persian proceedings pointed to the party behind the scenes, who directed the movements of the Iranee puppet. vroclamat.ion, 1. The Right Hon'ble the Govr. Genl. of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, His Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure. 2. It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the British Govt. in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sinde, the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and Maharajah Runjeet Singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British Nation, in Central Asia, that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce. 3. With a view to invite the aid of the deffacto rulers of Affghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those Treaties, Capt. Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the Chief of Cabul. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. 4. Whilst Capt. Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabul, information was received by the Govr. Genl. that the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient Ally, Maharajah Runjeet Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that His Highness the Maharajah would not be slow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Govt. would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Govr. Genl. resolved on authorizing Capt. Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, His Lordship would exert his good offices with His High- 4 PROCLAMATION. ness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British Nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Govr. Genl., to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended. 5. It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Govr. Genl., that a Persian Army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Affghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of Her Majesty's mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain. 6. After much time spent by Capt. Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Cabul, it appeared, that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in using the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Govr. Genl. could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of His Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Affghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprized, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Govt., compelled Capt. Burnes to leave Cabul without having effected any of the objects of his mission. 7. It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Govt. to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh Ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latter Chief showed too plainly that, so long as Cabul remained under his Govt., we could never hopefthat the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate. 8. The Govr. Genl. deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of the city has now been carried on by the Persian Army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, PROCLA MATION. perpetrated and continued notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause, and the Govr. Genl. would yet indulge the hope, that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Govt. have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Govr. Genl. has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. McNeill, Her Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Govt., to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Govts. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian Arms into Affghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty's Govt. 9. The Chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian Policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British Nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operations against Herat. 10. In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Cabul, the Govr. Genl. felt the importance of taking immediate measures, for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories. 11. His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British Govt., and who, on his empire being usurped by its present Rulers, had found an honorable asylum in the British Dominions. 12. It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who have visited Affghanistan, that the Barukzye Chiefs, from disunion and unpopularity, were ill fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful Allies to the British Govt., and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interest and security, the 6 PROCLAMATION. British Govt. acknowledged and respected their authority. But a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensible to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our Western Frontier, an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement. 13. After a serious and mature deliberation, the Govr. Genl.' was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Soojahool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Affghanistan had been proved to His Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Govr. Genl. was further of opinion, that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that His Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations. Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a Tripartite Treaty by the British Government, the Maharajah, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whereby His Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties, have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all. Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects of discussion between the British Govt. and His Highness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interests with those of the Hon'ble Company, has now been made apparent to all the surrounding states. A guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Sinde; and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted ; that the name and just influence of the British Govt. will gain their proper footing among the natives of Central Asia, that tranquility will be established upon the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting barrier will be raised against intrigue and encroachment. 14. His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, will enter Affghanistan THE COURT OF SHAH SOOJAH. surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference, and factious opposition, by a British Army. The Govr. Genl. confidently hopes, that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents, and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established, the British Army will be withdrawn. The Govr. Genl. has been led to these measures, by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the possessions of the British crown; but he rejoices that, in the discharge of this duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Affghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit; to reconcile differences; to secure oblivion of injuries; and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Affghans have been impaired. Even to the Chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Govt., it will seek to secure liberal and honorable treatment, on their tendering early submission ; and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures, which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country. By Order of the Right Hon'ble the Govr. Genl. of India, (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN, Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl. Notification. With reference to the preceding declaration, the following appointments are made :Mr. W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to Govt., will assume the functions of Envoy and Minister on the part of the Government of India at the court of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. Mr. Macnaghten will be assisted by the following officers :Capt. Alexander Burnes, of the Bombay Establishment, who will be employed under Mr. Macnaghten's directions as Envoy to the Chief of Kelat, or other states. Lieut. E. D'Arcy Todd, of the Bengal Artillery, to be Political Assistant and Military Secretary to the Envoy and Minister. Lieut. Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery; Lieut. R. Leech, of the Bombay Engineers; Mr. P. B. Lord, of the Bombay Medical Establishment, to be Political Assistants to the Envoy and Minister. ASSEMBLY OF THE ARMY OF THE INDUS. Lieut. E. B. Conolly, of the 6th Regt. Bengal Cavalry, to command the Escort of the Envoy and Minister, and to be Military Assistant to the Envoy and Minister. Mr. G. J. Berwick, of the Bengal Medical Establishment, to be Surgeon to the Envoy and Minister. (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN, Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl. Oct. 1st, 1838. On the 29th of November, 1838, the Bengal Division of the Army alluded to in the first passage of the above PROCLAMATION, assembled at Ferozepore, on the left bank of the Sutledge, and consisted of the following troops :FIRST DIVISION. MAJOR GENERAL SIR WILLOUHBY COTTON, K.C.B. H. M's. 13th Lancers, " 1st Cavalry Brigade, Colonel R. Arnold, C. B., 2nd Light Cavalry, H. M.'s 16th Lancers. 3rd Light Cavalry, 1st Local Horse, 4th Local Horse, 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Colonel J. Skinner, C. B. H. M's. 13th Lt. Infy. 48th Native Infantry, 16th Native Infantry, 1st Infantry Brigade, Colonel R. Sale, C. B. H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry. 31st Native Infantry, j 2nd Infantry Brigade, Major General Nott. 43rd Native Infantry, 42nd Native Infantry, 27th Native Infantry, H. M.'s 3rd Buffs, 27thnd Native Infantry, 2nd Native Infantry,J 3rd Infantry Brigade, Colonel Dennis, H. M.'s 3rd Buffs. MAJOR GENERAL DUNCAN'S DIVISION. 35th Native Infantry, Bengal EuropeanRegt. 37th Native Infantry,J 5th Native Infantry, 20th Native Infantry, 53rd Native Infantry, 4th Infantry Brigade, Colonel A. Roberts, European Regiment. 5th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Paul, 20th N. I. ORDERS BY THE COMIMANDER-IN-CHIEF. Several Batteries of Horse and Foot and Camel Artillery, commanded by Colonel Graham, C. B., and a large detachment of Sappers under Captain Thomson of the Engineers. In addition to these, though not forming a part of the force, there were a Regiment of Cavalry and two Regiments of Infantry, with the Body Guard, and a Battery of Horse Artillery, all composing the Escort of the Right Honorable the Governor General. A levy of six thousand men, armed, equipped, officered, and drilled after the manner of European troops, and called the regiments of Shah Soojah, was a few miles a head, with His Majesty, in pursuance of the arrangement of his entering "Affghanistan surrounded by his own troops." On the arrival of the army at its encamping ground, it was greeted by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane, G. C. B., with the following Order:ORDERS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-INCHIEF. T.O THE ARMY OF THE INDUS. Head-Quarters, Camp, Ferozepore, 27th Nov., 1838. 1. Circumstances in the countries west of the Indus have so greatly changed since the assembly of this army for service, that the Right Honorable the Governor General has deemed that it is not requisite to send forward the whole force; but that a part only will be equal to effecting the future objects in view. 2. His Lordship has therefore been pleased to instruct His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as follows:The whole of the cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, one battery of 9 prs., and the artillery of the park, the sappers and miners, and three brigades of infantry, shall go forward; and the remainder of the troops will await farther orders at Ferozepore. 3. The lot to go forward has fallen on the troops enumerated as follows : The 2d troop, 2d brigade of horse artillery. The camel battery of 9 prs. The 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades of infantry. The division of infantry to be commanded by Major-General Sir W. Cotton, being the senior Major-General. 4. The troops to go forward, and those to remain in Hindoostan, may make their arrangements accordingly. The head of the column 10 RELINQUISHMENT OF THE MARCH ON HERAT. will move on as soon as possible after the army shall have been reviewed by the Right Honorable the Governor General, and the Maharaja Runjeet Sing. 5. Whatever alterations may be requisite in the details of the Staff, will be communicated in a future order. 6. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief deems this a fitting opportunity for expressing the great gratification which he has received from witnessing the alacrity evinced by all ranks of the army to serve their country on the present occasion, and from their excellent conduct on their march from the Jumna to the Sutlej. He assures them that had their services been still required in advance, and had he had the pleasure of leading them forward, he would have met any troops which might have been opposed to them with a full confidence of success, founded on their courage and excellent discipline, and on the zeal of the officers he has had the honor to command. By Order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, P. CRAIGIE, Major, Depy. Adjt. Genl. of the Army. The 'circumstances' which caused the change in the intentions of Government, are explained in the following Notification, which was issued on the 8th November, soon after the army had quitted Kurnaul, on its march to Ferozepore:- Notification. ORDERS BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA. SECRET DEPARTMENT. Camp at Buddee, the 8th November, 1838. The Right Honorable the Governor General of India is pleased to publish, for general information, the subjoined Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart, dated Herat, the 10th of September, 1838, and addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India:" I have the honor, by direction, of Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and the Honorable East India Company's Envoy at the Court of Persia, to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of APPOINTMENT OF LIEUT. POTTINGER. 11 India in Council, that His Majesty, the Shah of Persia yesterday raised the siege of this city, and with the whole of the Royal camp marched to Sangbust, about twelve miles, on his return to his own dominions. His Majesty proceeds without delay by Toorbut, Shekhi Jaum, and Meshid, to Teheran. " This is in fulfilment of His Majesty's compliance with the demands of the British Government, which I had the honor of delivering on the 12th instant, and of the whole of which His Majesty announced his acceptance on the 14th August. "His Majesty Shah Kamran, and his Vuzeer Yar Mahomed Khan, and the whole city, feel sensible of the sincerity of the friendship of the British Government, and Mr. Pottinger and myself fully participate in their gratitude to Providence, for the happy event I have now the honor to report." In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the Governor General deems it proper, at the same time, to notify that, while he regards the relinquishment by the Shah of Persia of his hostile designs upon Herat, as a just cause of congratulation to the Government of British India, and its allies, he will continue to prosecute with vigour, the measures which have been announced with a view to the substitution of a friendly, for a hostile power, in the Eastern Provinces of Affghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our North-West Frontier. The Right Hon'ble the Governor General is pleased to appoint Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery, to be Political Agent of Herat, subject to the orders of the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Sooja 0ol Moolk. This appointment is to have effect from the 9th of September last, the date on which the siege of Herat was raised by the Shah of Persia. In conferring the above appointment upon Lieutenant Pottinger, the Governor General is glad of the opportunity afforded him of bestowing the high applause which is due to the signal merits of that officer, who was present in Herat during the whole period of its protracted siege, and who, under circumstances of peculiar danger and difficulty, has by his fortitude, ability, and judgment, honorably sustained the reputation and interests of his country. By Order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, W. H. MACNAGHTEN, Secy. to- the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl. 12 MEETING BETWEEN LORD AUCKLAND It may naturally be supposed that the alteration in the posture of affairs occasioned by the retreat from Herat, caused a great deal of annoyance to the Army. Every man was so fully possessed with the belief that he was destined to cross swords with the Persians, that the intelligence of their ' discretion' gave le plomb to his zeal. The lustre which the very idea of encountering a large force, said to be led and instigated by Russian emissaries and officers, had spread around the armament, was now entirely dissipated, and no fairer prospect presented itself than that of a long march through an uninteresting country, and the final occupation of a comparative desert. Very little time, however, was given to the Army, to ruminate on these, and other more rational, causes of discontent. The arrival of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the Ruler of the Punjaub, simultaneously with that of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General, who had arranged to meet him on the banks of the Sutledge, was the signal for a series of pomps and displays, which gave ample occupation to every man in camp. As part of the history of the armament-at least as connected with its political objects-a description may here be given of the meeting between the Right Hon'ble Lord Auckland, Governor General of India, and his Highness Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the Lord of the Five Rivers; it is derived from the Calcutta Englishman, the Editor of which paper personally attended the ceremonials, and reported them. FIRST DAY. Ferozepore, November 29.-The interview between Lord Auckland and the Maharajah, those ' two suns of glory,' came off this morning, realizing in its pomp and glittering variety, all the anticipations of the uninitiated. At daybreak, the guard of honor, consisting of a squadron of Her Majesty's 16th lancers, a squadron of the 4th light cavalry, the camel battery, a troop of horse artillery, Her Majesty's 3d buffs, the 43d, 31st, 2d, and 42d regiments native infantry, the body guard, and the flank companies of the European regiment, got under arms, and proceeded to form a street, leading to the durbar tents of the Governor General, which were enclosed in an extensive area formed of Kunauts. Soon afterwards, Major Wade, Mr. W. H. McNaghten, Mr. J. R. Colvin, Mr. H. Torrens, Sir Willoughby Cotton, and Brigadier Arnold, proceeded (accompanied by a detachment of the 4th cavalry, and a number of officers) to the encampment AND RUNJEET SINGH. 13 of Runjeet Sing, across the river,* to escort His Highness to the Governor General's camp. And now were seen numerous cavaliers and gentlemen, hurrying, some on elephants, some on horseback, some on camels, to rendezvous at the durbar tent, and witness the imposing ceremony of the visit; and it is no exaggeration to say that this congregation of the gay and gallant was, in itself, a sight worth travelling a great distance to behold. There were some two or three hundred officers of different regiments off duty, and these, with a great number of staff and general officers, many of whom bore the orders of the Bath, of Hanover, of the Lion and the Sun, and of the Bright Star of the East, presented a picture of military splendor rarely exhibited in India. At about half-past eight o'clock, Lord Auckland came into the area, and was received by the flank companies of the European regiment, who did duty at the tents, with presented arms. About half-past nine, the distant clangor of a band of indescribable musicians announced the approach of the Maharajah. Now was ' mounting in hot haste;' down went the assembled elephants to receive the Governor General, Sir H. Fane, and their cortege; off went horsemen and chobdars, a goodly troop, to precede the procession, and in three minutes the whole body, forming two lines of elephants, marched up the street of regiments to meet the Maharajah. And now the guns of the camel battery spat forth their salutation, and horses reared, and troops presented arms, and bands struck up our ' National anthem;' Seiks galloped in and out in wild disorder, and dust arose even to the point of enveloping the proud procession. At the end of the street, (so happily was the whole thing timed and arranged,) the Maharajah appeared in the centre of a line of elephants, and met the Governor General and his gorgeous suite, just as his Lordship had reached its termination. The Maharajah, simply clothed in a red tunic and trowsers, and a turban of the same description-without one single trinket to adorn a person which, 'not to speak it profanely,' would be very little the better, or the worse, of such adorning; the Maharajah, be it known, was now received into Lord Auckland's howdah, and the whole pageant wheeled about to proceed to the durbar. To describe the rush that was made to reach the audience tent, and secure a good position while the formal interview took place, is utterly beyond the compass of a feeble historian. As the time advanced, Seik chieftains ' all clinquant, all in gold,' or clothed in every diversity of color, and every imaginable variety of picturesque * The Maharajah was there encamped with some 20,000 followers, regular and irregular. 14 MEETING BETWEEN LORD AUCKLAND costume, armed to the teeth with spear, sabre, shield, and lighted matchlock-scrambled onwards, competing with the British red coats for a ' peep at the tumasha.' Arrived at the tents, which were already nearly crammed to suffocation, the Maharajah (giving precedence to Lord Auckland) alighted, and leaning upon the arm of His Lordship and Sir Henry Fane, made his way into the tent. But such was the density of the mob of militaires, and uncouth Punjaubees composing Runjeet's guard of honor; and so utterly dark was the whole apartment, from the crowd that blocked up the entrance, that it was with the greatest difficulty His Highness reached one of the couches to the right of the tent, where the Miss Edens, with Mrs. Churchill, Mrs. Sale, Mrs. W. H. McNaghten, and several other ladies, sat to receive him. Indeed, if he had not had the luck to be helped through by the good stout arm of ' stalwart Fane,' who is accustomed to force passages, it is doubtful if the Maharajah could have reached the couch at all. Here Major Wade came up, and did dragoman for Lord Auckland and the ladies for a few minutes. After this, the Governor General, aided as 'before by Sir Henry, took the Maharajah into an inner tent, where chairs of state were arranged, and the o 7roXXot excluded. About thirty gentlemen, and the ladies alone, with Runjeet's prime minister, his son, and some of the principal sirdars, were permitted to assist at this part of the business; and the more effectually to preserve this exclusiveness, the companies of the European regiment were called in, and with a few troopers of the body guard formed a lane for the passage of the party to and fro. Within this tent, the portable presents were produced, and exhibited a goodly selection from the choicest articles to be found in the boutiques of the gunsmiths and jewellers of Calcutta. But the gift of gifts, that, before which the Maharajah bent with the devotion of a preuz chevalier, and the affection of a faithful and ' ancient' ally, was a full length portrait of our gracious little Queen, painted by Miss Eden for the occasion, and encompassed by a fitting frame of solid gold and jewelled cornices. On receiving this present, which was brought in by Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, (while the camel battery fired a royal salute,) the Maharajah, through Major Wade's interpretation, signified his intention to hang it up in his tent, and fire a salute in its honor ! A good deal of edifying conversation now passed between the Governor General and his royal visitor. When all had been said that it was thought requisite to say on the occasion, the Maharajah escorted as before, proceeded to another tent, to see the howitzers, the caparisoned elephants, and the magni. AND RUNJEET SINGH. 15 ficent horses which had been prepared for his acceptance. The howitzers were extolled, the elephants praised, and the horses admired, though His Highness's taste, in the latter article, differs from that of the English, inasmuch as he was most taken with that which our countrymen deemed the least entitled to approbation. The interview and its attendant ceremonies having now ceased, the Maharajah was attended to his elephant, which he duly mounted, and amidst compliments, hurrahs, the discharge of cannon, and the discourse of hautboys, returned to the place from whence he came, preceded and followed, as before, by a horde of retainers, and accompanied by Sir W. Cotton and some political officers. The troops were then marched off the ground, and the crowds of spectators returned at mid-day to their homes and their breakfast. SECOND DAY. November 30.-This day was devoted to a return of the visit attempted to be described above; and most truly may it be said, that to-day was the master of yesterday. The Seiks fairly ' shone down the English.' At break of day, the 16th lancers and the 2d cavalry sprung into their saddles, and went ahead, under the command of Colonel Arnold, to occupy the opposite or right bank of the Sutledge, at the foot of the bridge of boats, and await the coming of the Governor General. His Lordship was not long in his preparations for a start. Before sunrise, the body guard were paraded outside the enclosure, and very soon afterwards Lord Auckland, with his Secretariat, Sir W. Casement, Sir W. Cotton, Colonel Skinner, Major Wade, and several Staff Officers and Brigadiers, to the number of about thirty, left the tents as before, on elephants, in two close columns, the movement being announced by a salute from the guns of the horse artillery attached to the escort. Scarcely any regimental officer was permitted to accompany the procession, as the apprehension of a crush had induced the Maharajah to limit his invitation to some fifty or sixty gentlemen of the highest rank, or immediately about the person of the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief. When the procession had gone a few hundred yards, a deputation, consisting of Shere Sing, the Maharajah's second son, and Dhihan Sing, his Prime Minister, with several other Rajahs and Sirdars similarly mounted, and escorted by some two or three hundred irregu- 16 MEETING BETWEEN LORD AUCKLAND lar cavalry, and a company of regular infantry, met His Lordship, and turned about to accompany him to the camp of the Maharajah. The march, over a space of about three miles, now became extremely picturesque and interesting. The pace of the elephants kept the horde of Seiks at a hard gallop, thereby affording them an excellent opportunity of displaying to advantage their equitation and martial bearing. The costume of the cavaliers was of course of a very motley complexion, and their arms, appointments, horses, and equipments, were not, perhaps, of an order to challenge close inspection; but the tout ensemble of the pageant was so extremely unlike anything that one sees anywhere else ;-there was such a pleasant dash of poetry and romance in the congregation of daring horsemen bearing lance, targe, and matchlock, and flaunting in all varieties of colors, and diversities of uniform, that criticism was entirely disarmed. On reaching the bridge of boats the party proceeded across the Sutledge singly, as there was no room for two elephants abreast. At the opposite side, the Governor General was met by Sir Henry Fane, Generals Torrens and Churchill, and the rest of the Staff and visitors from His Excellency's camp. These joined the first body of elephants, and the whole then moved forwards up a spacious street, formed by Her Majesty's 16th lancers and the 2nd light cavalry. The appearance of the lancers, under arms, was beyond all praise. They presented a spectacle which no Englishman could contemplate without some degree of pride.. At the extremity of the street in question, the Governor General and his cortdge came up on a small winding stream, over which a sort of road had been constructed of rushes, earth, and planks; and beyond this, His Lordship entered upon an avenue formed by some thousands of the picked troops of the Maharajah. Proceeding up the avenue, two lines of camel artillery, (Zumboors,) stretching to the right and left of a rising ground, fired an irregular salute, while the allde of regular cavalry flourished trumpets and kettle-drums, and presented arms. On went the pageant, while every step unfolded to the view some fresh spectacle on which the eye might rest with pleasure. After passing two regiments, a dicharge of distant artillery announced that the Maharajah had left his tents, and in a few minutes afterwards, His Highness might be seen coming down to meet his noble visitors in all the pomp and circumstance peculiar to an oriental procession. The scene which now presented itself, is utterly beyond description. All that the imagination can conceive of human grandeur- AND 17 RUNJEET SING. all that the most exuberant fancy can devise in its endeavour to pourtray the acme of royal splendour, was here bodied forth. Adown the avenue, formed by the serried ranks of hundreds of steady horsemen, whose steel casques and gay appointments glittered in the sun, moved two masses of elephants, bearing on their lofty backs the mightiest potentates of the Orient, seated in their gorgeous howdahs, and attended by the chief officers of their respective courts, sumptuously attired. Beyond were seen columns upon columns of scarlet-clad and helmetted troops, ' all furnished, all in arms,' arrayed with a precision, and preserving a steadiness, worthy of the best European discipline, while behind and about their ranks, stretching to the east and to the west, was an extensive encampment, in the centre of which were numerous tents of crimson and gold, indicating the Crowded together, chosen abode of a powerful military chieftain. at viewing distance from the legions, thousands of spectators of the humblest classes stood in ranks, preserving a silence, a decorum, and an immobility, which proved the existence of a severe military discipline even in the walks of civil life. No shouts rent the air,-save the licensed clamors of some rude faqueer : no vociferous cheers manifested the exuberant joyousness of a happy population. The admiration of the people-if admiration it were-was only depicted in their silent awe and breathless astonishment; or kept in check by the apprehension of high displeasure. Not many minutes elapsed before the transient view, here attempted to be described, was interrupted by the rencontre of the two stately processions. It was not difficult to distinguish the Maharajah from his proud and gallant Sirdars : seated on a ponderous elephant in the centre of the line, and habited, as on the day before, in his dark crimson shawl cloth tunic, trowsers, and turban, without any tinsel or trinkets-in short, without any other relief to the uniformity of his exterior than that presented by a flowing white beard -the sagacious old man came out in strong contrast with his richlyclosing with the Governor General, clad attendants and chieftains. the Maharajah saluted His Lordship, and received him into his howdah, upon which the cannon again ' spoke to the trumpet', and the columns of elephants, now united, proceeded to the Durbar tents. The arrival at their destination, was the signal for another salute from the batteries of Runjeet's horse artillery, while bands of music, uncommonly well trained, played our National anthem, and loud clarions proclaimed the glory of the Maharajah. The tents were enclosed within a vast area of crimson cloth walls, about nine feet high, and decorated ,On D 18 THE MEETING AT FEROZEPORE. with yellow lace. Within the enclosure, in well arranged ranks, forming numerous alle'es and guards of honor, stood some two or three thousand of the household troops of the Maharajah, clad, for the most part, in crimson silk or elegant kincaub, and armed with highly polished matchlocks and shields. The most perfect order,-the most profound silence prevailed,-broken only by the royal band, (formerly in the service of the Begum Sumroo,) and the murmurs of approbation proceeding from European lips. Alighting within this splendid enclosure the Maharajah conducted Lord Auckland, the Commander-in-Chief, and their suite to the Durbar tent, which consisted of a splendidly carpetted floor, provided with numerous gold and silver chairs, and covered in by a spacious sumeeana, lined with shawl cloth, placed in front of the Maharajah's principal pavilion. Here the whole assembly took their seats, and the ceremony of the introductions took place; Major Wade and Mr. W. H. McNaghten, who sat on Lord Auckland's right, acting as interpreter on behalf of the English visitors. As the British officers were severally introduced to Runjeet Singh, he addressed a few words to them, and rallied Colonel Skinner upon their old acquaintanceship. The principal Sirdars then presented themselves, and severally did homage to their Chief, receiving a few complimentary salaams, and now and then an expression of good will. When the presentations were over, a band of nautch girls, bedizened with jewellery, and beautified after their fashion with missee, silver dust, etc., were called in, and formed a little circle, while the most celebrated bayaderes treated the company to a few of those singular movements which here pass for dancing. The shawls, trinkets, cloths, etc., which constituted the presents on these occasions, were now brought in, exhibited, and then appropriated by the officers of the Governor General's suite after the ordinary system. The horses, etc., were then inspected, and here terminated the ceremonials of the meeting on the modern ' Field of the Cloth of Gold.' Some little time was passed in visiting the different tents, inspecting the furniture, and other paraphernalia, and conversing with the chief Sirdars; and the Governor General then offered his adieus to the Maharajah, resumed his seat in the howdah, and departed in the order of his coming; the horse artillery, as before, honoring the event by a royal salute." -0- THE MARCH FROM FEROZEPORE. 19 The ceremonies having terminated, the force destined for operations beyond the Indus, commenced its march, while the Governor General proceeded to pay a complimentary visit to the ruler of the Punjaub. The altered posture of affairs at Herat, as we have already shewn, caused a material reduction in the portion of the army contributed by the Bengal presidency, which now consisted of the following troops only :Her Majesty's 16th Regiment of Lancers and 13th Light Infantry, Bengal European Regiment, 2nd and 3rd Regiments of Light Cavalry, the Camel Battery, a proportion of Horse and Foot Artillery, Engineers, Skinner's Horse, the 16th, 31st, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 43rd, and 48th Regiments. N. I. Shah Soojah's force continued still in advance, mustering 6000 strong; and it was arranged, that after Lord Auckland had quitted Lahore, another body of 4800 men should move with Timour Shah, (Shah Soojah's son,) to Peshawur, under the command of Lieut. Col. Wade, for the purpose of marching upon Cabool by the Khyber Pass, simultaneously with the movement upward from Sinde. On the 10th December 1838, the Bengal force,-we borrow from Major Hough's minute and accurate description,-" marched in five columns preceded by the Engineers, Sappers and Miners in advance. The Head Quarters, (Major General Sir W. Cotton, commanding,) Horse Artillery and Cavalry Brigade moved on the 10th. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Infantry Brigades; and the park of Artillery and 4th Local Horse and the Commissariat supplies and stores in separate columns in succession, keeping a march between each column; and this was the order of march till the Army reached Rohree (Bukkur) in Sinde. The Commissariat supplies which accompanied the army, (amounting to about 9500 and about 38,000, including the camp followers,) were as follow: 30 days' supplies of all kinds, slaughter cattle for 2; months; additional quantities of grain were sent down by water to Rohree, and depots were formed at Bawulpoor, Shikarpore, etc. A reserve depot was established at Ferozepore, containing 50,000 maunds, and two months' supplies of other grain. 14,235 camels were employed (for supplies only) with the Army on leaving Ferozepore. Each column carried a certain quantity of supplies with it. The sick and principal hospital stores were sent down by water. It was intended, had it been practicable, to have sent the ordnance stores, etc. by water, but boats 20 NEGOCIATIONS WITH THE AMEERS OF SINDE. could not be procured in sufficient numbers. Indeed boats were required to be sent down to Bukkur on the Indus, to form the bridge of boats, for which purpose timbers were floated down. It would have been desirable to transport all heavy stores by water, and thus have saved the cattle. The march of the Army from Ferozepore to Rohree, on the Indus, never being above twenty, and often within a few miles of the river, (which assumes the names of the Sutluj, Gharra, and Punjnud, till it falls into the Indus), enabled the troops to have communications with the fleet of boats." Simultaneously with this movement, the Bombay Army, under Sir John Keane, having landed in Sinde, marched towards Hyderabad, where Colonel (now Sir Henry) Pottinger was endeavouring to effect a treaty with the Ameers, to insure for us an uninterrupted march through their territories, the temporary occupation of Fort Bukkur on the Indus, assistance in the prosecution of our plans (to the extent of obtaining provisions for the troops,) the payment of twenty-eight lacs of rupees, and occupation of a part of the country by a reserve force. The march down the left bank of the Sutledge was not distinguished by any particular events. It was evident, that there was a deficiency of public carriage, and the needlessly vast number of followers caused much expense and inconvenience, for their consumption was great, and the country was, with the exception of a few patches, extremely poor and barren; but nothing else occurred which was considered worthy of record. Sir Henry Fane, who accompanied the force in his boats on the Sutledge, retained the command until its arrival at Rohree, where a halt took place, owing to some difficulty about the cession of Bukkur, and the refusal of the Ameers to conclude the treaty with Colonel Pottinger. After a brief delay, a proportion of the Bengal force under Sir Willoughby Cotton was detached to Hydrabad to co-operate with Sir John Keane; but it had not proceeded many marches from Rohree, when it was ascertained that the Ameers had signed the treaty. A countermarch was immediately ordered. Meanwhile, the Shah's force under Major General Simpson, had marched down the right bank of the Indus, and took Larkhana, a place belonging to the Ameers; a measure which doubtless had its due effect in procuring the conclusion of the treaty. On the return of the troops to Rohree, Sir Henry Fane took his farewell of them in the following General Order, and the command of the Bengal column thence devolved on Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton. " His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief being about to leave the CROSSING THE INDUS. 21 Bengal Column of the Army of the Indus in his progress where his duty calls him, feels it due to the troops, previous to his departure, to record what he has witnessed of their conduct during their march from Ferozepore into Sinde, to hold it up as an example for their brother-soldiers on all occasions. " The excellent discipline and good behaviour of the Troops, have conciliated the inhabitants of the country wherever they have passed, and he is glad to be able to point out the consequences. These have been not only the exaltation of their fame and character as soldiers, but these circumstances have greatly conduced to their personal advantage; because the confidence of the inhabitants which such good conduct has produced, has led to their freely resorting to our camp with the produce of their villages, by which means we have been free from all wants and privations. His Excellency desires, that the Officers of all ranks and departments will accept the expression of his approbation of their zeal, and of the good example they have set." To facilitate the crossing of the Indus by the large Army now assembled on its banks, a bridge of boats, most ingeniously constructed by Captain Thomson of the Engineers, was thrown from Rohree, on the left bank, to the island on which Fort Bukkur stands, and from Sukkur on the right bank to the other side of the island, leaving a space of ground 300 yards in length between the two bridges. The passage across these bridges, was the first interesting event in a campaign destined to be more fraught with varied interest than any in which British troops in India had been engaged. A correspondent of the Englishman writing at the time, says, (and it is here quoted as bearing reference to the annexed plate,) " It was truly a beautiful sight to see the different corps with their bands playing, followed by long strings of camels and camp followers, wending their way over the bridge. The glittering of their arms in the sun, the Fort of Bukkur with its picturesque battlements frowning over the bridge, the ancient towns of Rohree and Sukkur overhanging the mighty stream, formed altogether a delightful picture." On the arrival of the force at Shikarpoor, it was deemed prudent to alter the order of march, as it was apprehended, that, if the Shah's troops received a check on entering the Bolan Pass, the effect might be extremely mischievous. The disciplined forces were therefore placed in the van, and the celebrated Bolan Pass was entered on the 16th March 1839, without any obstruction. The Beloochees and Kakurs had carried on a system of plundering during the march, and several of 22 JUNCTION OF THE BOMBAY AND BENGAL FORCES. the camp followers were killed in defending property, and endeavouring to prevent the abstraction of camels by the freebooters, who hung upon the skirts and rear of the advancing column; but no symptoms of an organized opposition manifested themselves. The march through the Pass was similarly free from the molestation of any other enemy than these, banditti; but many hardships and privations, arising out of the impossibility of obtaining a single article of supply, and the intense cold which killed many camels and crippled the camp followers, were endured by the troops. One officer, Captain Barstow, of the 37th N. I., was wounded by a shot from a Beloochee's matchlock. On the 26th March 1839, the troops reached Quetta in the valley of Shawl. Here a halt of some days took place to allow Sir John Keane with Shah Soojah, the Envoy and Minister, Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Macnaghten, and the Bombay troops to come up. In the interval of their arrival, Sir Willoughby Cotton placed the column under his command on half rations ; parties were sent out in every direction to procure grain, and means were adopted to induce the people in the neighbouring country to bring in sheep, flour, and forage for sale to the Commissariat. During the encampment, the troops were exposed to continual annoyance from the Beloochees, and a great number of camels were stolen from time to time. On the 6th of April, Lieutenant General Sir John Keane reached Quetta, and assumed command of the whole of the Army of the Indus, issuing the following Order upon the occasion:" His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having arrived in Camp and assumed command, in person, of the Army, and having directed Major General Sir W. Cotton to resume command of the Bengal. Infantry of the 1st Division, he (Sir W. C.) cannot give up charge of the Bengal column without expressing in the strongest and warmest terms his thanks to Major Generals Thackwell and Nott, Brigadiers Sale, Arnold and Roberts, to Officers commanding Corps, and to the Officers and Men generally, and to Major Craigie, D. A. G., Major Garden, D. Q. M. G. and Major Parsons, D. C. G. and to the Officers of the several departments, for the admirable manner in which their duties have been conducted, and for the good conduct and soldier-like behaviour of the Troops during a march of more than 1100 miles." This Order was followed up by another, in which Sir John Keane expressed his thanks to Sir Willoughby Cotton, for "the able and judicious manner in which he had copducted the march of the Bengal column." MARCH FROM QUETTA. 23 While the troops were in Sinde, they had been joined by Captain (afterwards Sir Alexander) Burnes, Assistant to the Envoy, who was thence dispatched to Khelat to persuade Mehrab Khan, the chief of that place, to assist our troops with supplies of grain, to stay the marauding practices of the Beloochees, and to tender submission to Shah Soojah, the future ruler of Affghanistan. Sir John Keane had scarcely assumed the command of the Army at Quetta, when Captain Burnes returned from Khelat, announcing, that he had failed in the objects of his mission. The reader will note this occurrence, because it formed the grounds for a movement upon Khelat, which will be found described in a later part of this work. Arrangements were now made for the march of the assembled forces to Candahar; and to keep open the communication with India, and to assist the transport of stores, and the movements of regiments, depots were established at Shikarpore, Dadur, and Quetta. At the latter place, Major General Nott was left, with the Head Quarters of the second Infantry Brigade ;* and a general superintendence and military controul within the province of Shawl was vested in him. On the morning of the 7th April, 1839, the troops broke ground. Some idea of the state to which they had been reduced may be formed from the fact of sixty horses having been shot as too weak to proceed, while numbers of camp-followers were subsisting upon the fried skins of sheep, the congealed blood of animals, and such roots as they could pick up in the neighbourhood of the encampment ! The route chosen by Sir John Keane, lay in a North-westerly direction, and promised, from the fertile character of the country through which it lay, to provide the means of recruiting the strength of the force. The only great difficulty which the army had to contend with, was the fearful Kojuck Pass; bu even this was surmounted by perseverance, good management, and discipline. Though, in some places, the road was so narrow, that only one camel could pass at a time; though the rocks were here and there so steep, that it was dangerous to ride up, or down, the only practicable thoroughfares; though all the guns, tumbrils and waggons of the force were necessarily dismounted and handed across, still, the patience and resolution of the troops overcame every obstacle. The passage was accomplished after a great loss in ammunition, baggage, camels, tents, etc. etc. It had been reported, and was * The 43rd Native Infantry was ordered, with a Ressalah of Horse and a Regiment of Infantry from Shah Soojah's force, to stand fast at Quetta. 24 ARRIVAL AT CANDAHAR. confidently believed, that the chiefs of Candahar had resolved to oppose the further progress of Shah Soojah, and, in effect, the Kakur tribe, who were in their interest, did to a certain extent make a shew of guerilla warfare, much after the manner of the Beloochees. But whatever scheme of resistance may have been organized was entirely frustrated by the defection, from the cause of the chiefs, of one Hadjee Khan, the chief of the Kakur tribe. The Candaharees had advanced, some thousands strong, as far as the village of Deh Hadjee, north of the Kojuck Pass, with the purpose of confronting our troops. Here, according to Captain Outram, dissensions broke out among them. Hadjee Khan then pretended, that he would proceed forward to reconnoitre the British force and position; but experience of his treacherous character had taught them to understand the object of his movement, and they accordingly, on the 23rd April, retired upon Candahar, and thence fled to the fortress of Ghirisk, while Hadjee Khan, who had been in secret communication with Shah Soojah before the expedition started from India, came with 200 followers into the Shah's camp, and tendered his aid and submission. From the Pass to Candahar, the Army moved on without obstruction of any kind, suffering, however, most acutely from the want of water, the half rations which it had been upon for six weeks, the intense heat, ° (the thermometer in the day ranging from 96 to 1020,) and the absence of forage of a nourishing kind. On the 25th of April, His Majesty Shah Soojah reached Candahar, the ancient capital of the Dooranee empire, and the troops encamped in the neighbourhood. The following extract from the despatches of the Envoy, Mr. Macnaghten, then forwarded to the Supreme Government of British India, describes the feeling with which the King was received by his subjects. "Yesterday the Shah with his disciplined troops made a march of twenty-two miles to Deh Hadjee, where we had the satisfaction of learning, that the Sirdars were about to decamp. We have since ascertained, that they actually set out about 3 o'clock yesterday evening, attended by about 200 followers. Their conduct to the last, was marked by meanness and rapacity. Whilst with one hand they were selling their stores of grain to the merchants of the city, they were practising every species of extortion and violence towards the peaceable inhabitants, and they departed amidst the execrations of all classes. This morning we reached upon Candahar, a distance of about eighteen miles, and we are now encamped within two miles of the city. The spectacle which presented itself THE ENVOY'S 25 REPORT. to us on the road, was the most interesting one it ever fell to my lot to witness. His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir J. Keane with the army of the Indus, was one march in our rear, our advance having been made on an erroneous calculation of the distance, which, owing to the heat of the weather, was too great to be performed by the European troops. The Shah's disciplined troops were behind us, and His Majesty advanced, attended only by the officers of the mission and his own immediate retainers. At every 100 yards of our progress, we were met by bands of well-mounted and well-armed men, all tendering their allegiance to His Majesty, whilst the peaceable inhabitants of the country assembled in crowds, and manifested their joy at the Shah's restoration in the most unqualified terms. " Tranquillity is restored, the people flock to our camp with the greatest confidence. There is no longer any apprehension of scarcity, and even the confidential servants of the Sirdars, several of whom have visited me, declare their satisfaction at the change of Government, and state, that they would sooner have joined the Shah, but for the dread that some evil would have been inflicted on their families whom they must have left in the city. " His Majesty proposed to send out a party in the hope of overtaking the fugitive Sirdars, and they certainly appear deserving of little consideration, after the wickedness and folly which they have displayed, in spite of repeated and solemn warnings. It would doubtless be useless and dangerous to allow them to remain at large, and excite disturbances in the country; but I was apprehensive that in the present excited state of men's minds, they might be seized by the Shah's party, and be subjected to unnecessary cruelty! I therefore prevailed upon His Majesty to permit me to make the Sirdars one more offer, which, if accepted, will enable them to retire to our territories in safety. Any provision which his Lordship the Governor General may please to assign to them, will of course fall far short of what they would have received, had they at once come into our terms, and I am of opinion that 500 Rs. per mensem for each of them would be an ample provision. "It is my intention, therefore, to write to the Sirdars through Moolla Misseo, their confidential adviser, and I am not without hope, that they will come into my terms, deserted as they are by nearly all the followers who left the city with them, and surrounded as they must be, by dangers and difficulties of all descriptions. " I now proceed to detail the progress of events, from the date of my last communication. " Since the despatch of my letter to your address, dated the 12th instant, giving the substance of my communication with the Sirdars, nothing of sufficient importance has occurred to require a separate report. " In the Kojuck Pass, we found a natural obstacle of a much more formidable nature than we anticipated; it was speedily surmounted by the energy of the British troops. Brigadier Arnold, who went to reconnoitre E 26 THE ENVOY'S REPORT. the Pass, suddenly came upon a small party detached by the Sirdars, and was fired upon; the party, however, made a precipitate retreat, and it was evident that the Sirdars had been surprised by the rapidity of our advance. In the same Pass, letters were intercepted from the Sirdars addressed to the authorities in Sevee and the Eastern provinces, stating, that they intended to advance and oppose us in Pesheen, and calling upon all true Mahomedans to join in a religious warfare against the invading infidels. We further learnt, that the Sirdars were still unremitting in their endeavours to excite the same feelings of animosity against us at Candahar. "It subsequently came to our knowledge, that Rahim Dil Khan, with a number of other chiefs, and a body of between 2 and 3,000 cavalry had quitted Candahar, with a view of annoying us in every possible way, leaving Rahim Dil Khan to guard their interests in the city. The main body advanced as far as Killa Futtoollah, whence they detached parties to the vicinity of Dunda Goolaree. These parties succeeded in killing several of our followers, who had incautiously strayed, and in carrying off two of my elephants which had been, against orders, taken for the purpose of procuring fodder to a great distance from the camp. They also put us to considerable inconvenience for a short time, by diverting the stream which supplied our camp with water. On the morning of the 20th instant, Hajee Khan Kakur, who had accompanied the Sirdars from Candahar, and who is decidedly the most powerful chief in these parts, reported his arrival with about 200 horsemen to pay his respects to the Shah. He was escorted into camp, and received with all honour both by His Majesty and myself. This defection, it was obvious, would at once prove fatal to the hopes of the Sirdars. "On the same day, two other persons of considerable influence came in ; namely, Abdool Mujeed Khan, the son of Shah Pussund Khan, Governor of Lash, and Gholam Akhoondzada, a Moollah, who I have good grounds for believing, was one of those who were most violent in stirring up the population to oppose us. "The secession of these individuals, and the near approach of our troops filled the Sirdars with consternation, and they fell back rapidly on Candahar. " The ancient nobles of the land have been nearly exterminated by the rapacious tyranny of the Barukzye usurpers; but it was gratifying to find, that the advent of the Shah was cordially welcomed in every stage of his progress by every man of respectability who has been left in the country : and His Majesty's reception at Candahar, as above detailed, has fully justified the opinions that have been announced as to his popularity with all classes of his subjects." The Commander-in-Chief, when the whole of the force had reached Candahar, issued the following Order on the 4th of May. SIR J. KEANE 'S APPROVING ORDER. 27 "The combined forces of Bengal and Bombay being now assembled at Candahar, the Commander-in-Chief congratulates all ranks on the triumphant though arduous march which they have accomplished from distant and distinct parts of India, with a regularity and discipline which is much appreciated by him, and reflects upon themselves the highest credit. The difficulties which have been surmounted have been of no ordinary nature, and the recollection of what has been overcome, must hereafter be a pleasing reflection to those concerned, who have so zealously, and in so soldierlike a manner, contributed to effect them, so as to arrive at the desired end. The Engineers had to make roads, and occasionally in some extraordinary steep mountain Passes, over which no wheeled carriage had ever passed. This was a work requiring science and much severe labour; but so well has it been done, that the progress of the army was in no manner impeded. The heavy and light ordnance were alike taken over in safety by the exertions and good spirit of the Artillery, in which they were most cheerfully and ably assisted by the troops, both European and Native, and in a manner which gave the whole proceeding the appearance, that each man was working for a favorite object of his own. " His Excellency shares in the satisfaction which those troops must feel, (after the difficult task they had accomplished, and the trying circumstances under which they have been placed, the nature of which is well known to themselves, and therefore unnecessary for him to detail,) at knowing the enthusiasm with which the population of Candahar have received and welcomed the return of their lawful Sovereign, Shah SoojahSir J. Keane ool-Moolk, to the throne of his ancestors in Affghanistan. will not fail to report to the Right Honorable Lord Auckland, Governor General of India, his admiration of the conduct and discipline of the troops, by which means it has been easy to effect, and to fulfil, the plans of His Lordship in the operations of the campaign hitherto. The Commander-in-Chief has already in a General Order, dated the 6th ultimo, expressed his acknowledgment to Major General Sir W. Cotton, for the creditable and judicious manner in which he conducted the Bengal Column to the valley of Shawl. His Excellency has now a pleasing duty to perform in requesting Major General Wiltshire, commanding the Bombay column, to accept his best thanks for his successful exertions in bringing the troops of that Presidency to this ground in the most efficient and soldierlike state. The Commander-in-Chief entertains a confident expectation, that the same orderly conduct which has gained for the troops the good will of the inhabitants of the states and countries through which they have passed, will continue to be observed by them during their advance upon Cabool, when the proper time for the adoption of that step shall have been decided upon by His Excellency, in concert with H. M. Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, and the Envoy and Minister, W. H. MacNaghten, Esq., representing British interests at the Court of the King of Affghanistan." 28 CAPTURE OF GHUZNI. On the 8th of May, Shah Soojah received the homage of his subjects on a musnud erected in the middle of an extensive plain, close to the city of Candahar. The whole of the Army of the Indus marched past the throne; a hundred pieces of Artillery discharged salvos, in honor of the Shah's restoration, and the people illuminated the town. From this period until the end of June 1839, the Army halted at Candahar. The interval was occupied in an endeavour to bring the Sirdars, who had fled on the approach of the Army, to some reasonable terms of concession, failing which, a detachment of troops was sent against them to Girisk; but they had fled, before its arrival, to the frontiers of Persia. The sufferings of the Army were still great, owing to the backward state of the grain crops, the non-arrival of a large convoy expected from Shikarpore, the impossibility of raising money on loan, and the hostility of the Ghilzies, who hovered about the skirts of the camp, stealing camels, horses, and baggage, and murdering camp followers. On the 27th of June, the advance column of the Head Quarters of the Army marched from Candahar to Ghuzni. Large parties of Ghilzies hung upon the flanks of the Army; but excepting two or three slight skirmishes, in which the enemy were invariably driven off, nothing occurred to interrupt the advance. On the 21st July, the force reached Ghuzni, and immediately made preparations for assailing that fortress, which was held by a large body of Affghans and Ghilzies under Hyder Khan, one of the sons of Dost Mahomed Khan. The manner in which the fortress was attacked, and the result of the storm, is told in the following dispatch from Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief, to the Governor General of India. Head Quarters, Camp Ghuznee, 24th July, 1839. "My Lord,-I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that the Army under my command have succeeded in performing one of the most brilliant acts it has ever been my lot to witness, during my service of 45 years in the four quarters of the globe, in the capture by storm of the strong and important Fortress and Citadel of Ghuznee yesterday. " It is not only, that the Affghan nation, and I understand Asia generally, have looked upon it as impregnable, but it is in reality a place of great strength, both by nature and art; far more so than I had reason to suppose, from any descriptions that I had received of it, although some are from officers in our own service, who had seen it in their travels. "I was surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound, about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded CAPTURE OF GHUZNI. 29 by a fausse braye and a wet ditch, whilst the height of the Citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the Hills from the North, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this screen, walls had been built before the gates, the ditch was filled with water and unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it. " It is, therefore, the more honorable to the troops, and must appear to the enemy out of all calculation extraordinary, that a Fortress and a Citadel to the strength of which, for the last 30 years, they had been adding something each year, and which had a Garrison of 3500 Affghan soldiers, commanded by Prince Mahomed Hyder, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, the ruler of the country, with a commanding number of Guns and abundance of Ammunition, and other Stores, Provisions, &c. for a regular siege, should have been taken by British science and British valor, in less than two hours from the time the attack was made, and the whole, including the Governor and Garrison, should fall into our hands. " My despatch of the 20th instant from Nanee, will have made known to your Lordship, that the camps of His Majesty Shah Sooja-ool-Moolk and of Major General Wiltshire, with the Bombay Troops, had there joined me in accordance with my desire, and the following morning we made our march of 12 miles to Ghuznee, the line of march being over a fine plain. The Troops were disposed in a manner that would have enabled me at any moment, had we been attacked, as was probable from the large bodies of Troops moving on each side of us, to have placed them in position to receive the enemy. They did not, however, appear, but on our coming within range of the guns of the Citadel and Fortress of Ghuznee, a sharp cannonade was opened on our leading Column, together with a heavy fire of musquetry from behind garden walls, and temporary field-works thrown up, as well as the strong out-work I have already alluded to, which commanded the bed of the river. From all but the out-work, the enemy were driven in under the walls of the Fort, in a spirited manner, by parties, thrown forward by Major General Sir W. Cotton, of the 16th and 48th Bengal Native Infantry, and Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Brigadier Sale. I ordered forward three Troops of Horse Artillery, the Camel Battery, and one Foot Battery to open upon the Citadel and Fortress by throwing shrapnell shells, which was done in a masterly style under the direction of Brigadier Stevenson. My object in this was to make the enemy shew their strength in guns, and in other respects which completely succeeded, and our shells must have done great execution, and occasioned great consternation. Being perfectly satisfied on the point of their strength, in the course of half an hour I ordered the fire to cease, and placed the Troops in bivouac. A close reconnoissance of the place all round was then undertaken by Captain Thomson, the Chief 30 CAPTURE OF GHUZNI. Engineer, and Captain Peat, of the Bombay Engineers, accompanied by Major Garden, the Deputy Quarter Master General of the Bengal Army, supported by a strong party of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, and one from Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry. On this party a steady fire was kept up, and some casualties occurred. Captain Thomson's report was very clear, (he found the fortification equally strong all round,) and as my own opinion coincided with his, I did not hesitate a moment as to the manner in which our approach and attack upon the place should be made. Notwithstanding the march the Troops had performed in the morning, and their having been a considerable time engaged with the enemy, I ordered the whole to move across the river which runs close under the Fort walls, in columns to the right and left of the town, and they were placed in position on the North side, on more commanding ground, and securing the Cabool road. I had information that a night attack upon the Camp was intended from without. Mahomed Ufzul Khan, the eldest son of Dost Mahomed Khan, had been sent by his father with a strong body of troops from Cabool to the brother's assistance at Ghuznee, and was encamped outside the walls, but abandoned his position on our approach, keeping however at the distance of a few miles from us. The two rebel chiefs of the Ghilzie tribe, men of great influence; viz. Abdool Ruhman and Gool Mahomed Khan had joined him with 1500 Horse, and also a body of about 3000 Ghazees from Zeinat, under a mixture of chiefs and moollahs carrying banners, and who had been assembled on the cry of a religious These war. In short, we were in all directions surrounded by enemies. last actually came down the hills on the 22d, and attacked the part of the Camp occupied by His Majesty Shah Shooja and his own troops, but were driven back with considerable loss, and banners taken. " At day-light on the 22d, I reconnoitered Ghuznee in company with the Chief Engineer and the Brigadier Commanding the Artillery, with the Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the Bengal Army, for the purpose of making all arrangements for carrying the place by Storm, and these were completed in the course of the day.-Instead of the tedious process of breaching, for which we were ill prepared, Captain Thomson undertook, with the assistance of Captain Peat of the Bombay Engineers, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod of the Bengal Engineers, and other officers under him, (Captain Thomson,) to blow in the Cabool Gate, (the weakest point) with gunpowder, and so much faith did I place in the success of this operation, that my plans for the Assault were immediately laid down, and the orders given. "The different troops of Horse Artillery, the Camel and Foot Batteries moved off their ground at 12 o'clock that night, without the slightest noise, as had been directed, and in the most correct manner took up the position assigned them, about 250 yards from the walls. In like manner, and with the same silence, the Infantry soon after moved from their CAPTURE OF GHUZNI. 31 ground, and all were at their post at the proper time. A few minutes before 3 o'clock in the morning the explosion took place, and proved completely successful. Captain Peat of the Bombay Engineers was thrown down and stunned by it, but shortly after recovered his senses and feeling. On hearing the advance sounded by the bugle, (being the signal for the Gate having been blown in,) the Artillery, under the able directions of Brigadier Stevenson, consisting of Captain Grant's Troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, the Camel Battery under Captain Abbot, both superintended by Major Pew, Captains Martin and Cotgrave's Troops of Bombay Horse Artillery, and Captain Lloyd's Battery of Bombay Foot Artillery, all opened a terrific fire upon the citadel and ramparts of the Fort, and in a certain degree paralyzed the enemy. "Under the guidance of Captain Thomson of the Bengal Engineers, the Chief of the Department, Colonel Dennie, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, commanding the advance, consisting of the Light Companies of Her Majesty's 2d and 17th Foot, and of the Bengal European Regiment, with one company of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, proceeded to the gate, and, with great difficulty from the rubbish thrown down, and the determined opposition offered by the enemy, effected an entrance and established themselves [within] the gateway, closely followed by the Main Column, led in a spirit of great gallantry by Brigadier Sale, to whom I had entrusted the important post of commanding the Storming Party, consisting (with the advance above mentioned) of Her Majesty's 2d Foot under Major Carruthers, the Bengal European Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Orchard, followed by Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry under Major Tronson, and Her Majesty's 17th Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Croker. The struggle within the Fort was desperate for a considerable time. In addition to the heavy fire kept up, our troops were assailed by the enemy sword in hand, and with dagger, pistols, etc., but British courage, perseverance and fortitude, overcame all opposition, and the fire of the enemy in the lower area of the Fort being nearly silenced, Brigadier Sale turned towards the Citadel, from which could now be seen men abandoning the guns, running in all directions, throwing themselves down from immense heights, endeavoring to make their escape, and on reaching the gate with Her Majesty's 17th under Lieutenant Colonel Croker, followed by the 13th, forced it open; at 5 o'clock in the morning the Colours of Her Majesty's 13th and 17th were planted on the Citadel of Ghuznee amidst the cheers of all ranks. Instant protection was granted to the women found in the Citadel, (among whom were those of Mahomed Hyder, the Governor,) and sentries placed over the Magazine for its security. Brigadier Sale reports having received much assistance from Captain Kershaw of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry throughout the whole of the service of the storming. " Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton executed, in a manner much to 32 CAPTURE OF GHUZNI. my satisfaction, the orders he had received. The Major General followed closely the Assaulting Party into the Fort with the Reserve, namely, Brigadier Roberts with the only available Regiment of his Brigade, the 35th Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, part of Brigadier Sale's Brigade, the 16th Native Infantry under Major MacLaren, and 48th Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler, and they immediately occupied the ramparts, putting down opposition whenever they met any, and making prisoners until the place was completely in our possession. A desultory fire was kept up in the town long after the Citadel was in our hands, from those who had taken shelter in houses, and in desperation kept firing on all that approached them. In this way several of our men were wounded and some killed, but the aggressors paid dearly for their bad conduct in not surrendering when the place was completely ours. I must not omit to mention, that three companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Hay, ordered to the South side of the Fort to begin with a false attack, to attract attention to that side, performed that service at the proper time, and greatly to my satisfaction. " As we were threatened with an attack, for the relief of the garrison I ordered the 19th Bombay Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stalker, to guard the Cabool road, and to be in support of the Cavalry Division. This might have proved an important position to occupy, but as it was, no enemy appeared. " The Cavalry Division under Major General Thackwell, in addition to watching the approach of an enemy, had directions to surround Ghuznee, and to sweep the plain, preventing the escape of runaways from the garrison. Brigadier Arnold's Brigade, (the Brigadier himself, I deeply regret to say, was laboring under very severe illness, having shortly before burst a blood vessel internally, which rendered it wholly impossible for him to mount a horse that day,) consisting of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers under Lieutenant Colonel Persse, (momentarily commanding the Brigade, and Major MacDowell, the Junior Major of the Regiment, the Senior Major of the 16th Lancers, Major Cureton, an officer of great merit, being actively engaged in the execution of his duties as Assistant Adjutant General to the Cavalry Division,) the 2d Cavalry under Major Salter, and the 3d under Lieutenant Colonel Smyth, were ordered to watch the south and west sides. Brigadier Scott's Brigade was placed on the Cabool road, consisting of H. M.'s 4th Light Dragoons under Major Daly, and of the 1st Bombay Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Sandwith, to watch the north and east sides. This duty was performed in a manner greatly to my satisfaction. After the storming and that quiet was in some degree restored within, I conducted His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, and the British Envoy and Minister Mr. Macnaghten round the Citadel, and a great part of the Fortress. The King was perfectly astonished at our having made ourselves master of a 33 STORMING OF GHUZNI. place conceived to be impregnable when defended, in the short space of two hours, and in less than forty-eight hours after we came before it. His Majesty was of course greatly delighted at the result. When I afterwards, in the course of the day, took Mahomed Hyder Khan, the Governor, first to the British Minister and then to the King to make his submission, I informed His Majesty, that I had made a promise that his life should not be touched, and the King in very handsome terms assented, and informed Mahomed Hyder in my presence, that although he and his family had been rebels, yet he was willing to forget and forgive all. Prince Mahomed Hyder, the Governor of Ghuznee, is a prisoner of war in my camp, and under the surveillance of Sir Alexander Bdrnes, an arrangement very agreeable to the former. From Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton, commanding the 1st Infantry Division (of the Bengal Army,) I have invariably received the strongest support, and on this occasion his exertions were manifest in support of the honor of the profession and of our country. I have likewise at all times received able assistance from Major General Willshire, commanding the 2d Infantry Division (of the Bombay Army,) which it was found expedient on that day to break up, some for the storming party and some for other duties; the Major General, as directed, was in attendance upon myself. To Brigadier Sale, I feel deeply indebted for the gallant and soldierlike manner in which he conducted the responsible and arduous duty entrusted to him in command of the storming party, and for the arrangements he made in the Citadel, immediately after taking possession of it; the sabre wound which he received in the face, did not prevent his continuing to direct his column, until every thing was secure; and I am happy in the opportunity of bringing to your Lordship's notice, the excellent conduct of Brigadier Sale on this occasion. Brigadier Stevenson, in the command of the Artillery, was all I could wish, and he reports that Brigade Majors Backhouse and Coghlan ably assisted him; his arrangements were good, and the execution done by the arm he commands, was such as cannot be forgotten by those of the enemy, who have witnessed and survived it. To Brigadier Roberts, to Colonel Dennie (who commanded the Advance,) and to the different Officers Commanding Regiments already mentioned, as well to the other officers and gallant soldiers under them, who so nobly maintained the honor and reputation of our country, my best acknowledgments are due. To Captain Thomson of the Bengal Engineers, the chief of the Department with me, much of the credit of the success of this brilliant coupde-main is due-a place of the same strength, and by such simple means as this highly talented and scientific Officer recommended to be tried, has perhaps never before been taken; and I feel I cannot do sufficient justice F 34 STORMING OF GHUZNI. to Captain Thomson's merits for his conduct throughout. In the execution, he was ably supported by the Officers already mentioned, and so eager were the other Officers of the Engineers of both Presidencies for the honor of carrying the Powder Bags, that the point could only be decided by seniority, which shews the fine feeling by which they are animated. I must now inform your Lordship, that since I joined the Bengal Column in the Valley of Shawl, I have continued my march with it in the Advance, and it has been my good fortune to have had the assistance of two most efficient Staff Officers, in Major Craigie, Deputy Adjutant General, and Major Garden, Deputy Quarter Master General. It is but justite to those Officers, that I should state to your Lordship, the high satisfaction I have derived from the manner in which all their duties have been performed up to this day, and that I look upon them as promising Officers, to fill the higher ranks. To the other Officers of both Departments I am also much indebted for the correct performance of all duties appertaining to their situations. To Major Keith, the Deputy Adjutant General, and Major Campbell, the Deputy Quarter Master General of the Bombay Army, and to all the other Officers of both Departments under them, my acknowledgments are also due, for the manner in which their duties have been performed during this campaign. Captain Alexander, commanding the 4th Bengal Local Horse, and Major Cunningham, commanding the Poona Auxiliary Horse, with the men under their orders, have been of essential service to the Army in this campaign. The arrangement made by Superintending Surgeons Kennedy and Atkinson previous to the Storming, for affording assistance and comfort to the wounded, met with my approval. Major Parsons, the Deputy Commissary General, in charge of the Department in the Field, has been unremitting in his attention to keep the Troops supplied, although much difficulty is experienced, and he is occasionally thwarted by the nature of the country and its inhabitants. I have throughout this Service, received the utmost assistance I could desire from Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald, my Officiating Military Secretary, and Deputy Adjutant General of Her Majesty's Forces, Bombay; from Captain Powell, my Persian Interpreter, and the other Officers of my Personal Staff. The nature of the country in which we are serving prevents the possibility of my sending a single Staff Officer to deliver this to your Lordship, otherwise, I should have asked my Aid-de-camp Lieutenant Keane, to proceed to Simla to deliver this Dispatch into your hands, and to have afforded any further information that your Lordship could have desired. The brilliant triumph we have obtained, the cool courage displayed, and the gallant bearing of the Troops I have the honor to command, will STORMING OF GHUZNI. 35 have taught such a lesson to our enemies in the Afghan nation, as will make them hereafter respect the name of a British Soldier. Our loss is wonderfully small, considering the occasion; the casualties in killed and wounded, amount to about 200. The loss of the enemy is immense-we have already buried of their dead nearly 500, together with an immense number of horses. I enclose a list of the killed, wounded and missing. I am happy to say, that, although the wounds of some of the Officers are severe, they are all doing well. It is my intention, after selecting a Garrison for this place, and establishing a General Hospital, to continue my march to Cabool forthwith. I have, &c. JOHN KEANE, Lieut. General. No. I. List of Killed, Wounded and Missing in the Army, under the Command of Lieutenant General Sir John Keane, K. C. B., and G. C. H., in the assault and capture of the Fortress and Citadel of Ghuznee, on the 23d July, 1839. General Staff,-1 Colonel, 1 Major wounded. 3d Troop Bombay Horse Artillery,-1 Rank and File wounded. 4th ditto ditto,-1 Rank and File and 1 Horse wounded. Bengal Engineers-3 Rank and File killed, 2 Rank and File wounded, 1 Rank and File missing. Bombay Engineers,-1 Lieutenant, 1 Rank and File wounded. 2d Bengal Light Infantry,-1 Rank and File wounded. 1st Bombay Light Cavalry,--1 Havildar killed, 5 Rank and File and 7 Horses wounded. Her Majesty's 2d Foot (or Queen's Royals),-4 Rank and File killed, 2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant and 26 Rank and File wounded. Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry,-1 Rank and File killed, 3 Sergeants, and 27 Rank and File wounded. Her Majesty's 17th Foot,-6 Rank and File wounded. Bengal European Regiment,-1 Rank and File killed, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 1 Serjeant, 51 Rank and File wounded. 16th Bengal Native Infantry,-1 Havildar, 6 Rank and File wounded. 35th ditto ditto,-5 Rank and File killed, 1 Havildar, 8 Rank and File wounded. 48th ditto ditto,-2 Havildars killed, 5 Rank and File wounded. Total Killed.-3 Sergeants or Havildars, 14 Rank and File. Total Wounded.-1 Colonel, I Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Majors, 4 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 7 Serjcants or Havildars, 140 Rank and File, 8 Horses. 36 STORMING OF GHUZNI. Total Missing,-1 Rank and File. Grand Total-on the 21st and 23d of July killed, wounded and missing -'-191 Officers and Men, and 16 Horses. R. MACDONALD, Lieut. Col. Military Secretary, and Deputy Adjutant General Her Majesty's Forces, Bombay. WOUNDED. Names of Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing. General Staff,--Brigadier Sale, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, slightly; Major Parsons, Deputy Commissary General, ditto. Bombay Engineers,-2d Lieut. Marriott, slightly. Her Majesty's 2d (or Queen's Royals),-Captain Raitt, slightly; Captain Robinson, severely; Lieutenant Yonge, ditto; Lieutenant Stisted, slightly; Adjutant Simmons, ditto; Quarter Master Hadley, ditto. Bengal European Regiment,-Lieutenant Colonel Orchard, slightly; Major Warren, severely; Captain Hay, slightly; Captain Taylor, ditto; Lieutenant Broadfoot, ditto; Lieutenant Haslewood, severely; Lieutenant Fagan, slightly, Lieutenant Magnay, ditto; Ensign Jacob, ditto. R. MACDONALD, Lieut. Col. Military Secretary, and Deputy Adjutant General, H. M. Forces, Bombay. No 2. List of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Army under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Keane before Ghuznee, on the 21st July 1839. 2d Troop Bengal Horse Artillery,-3 Horses wounded. 3d ditto Bombay ditto ditto,-2 Rank and File, 2 Horses wounded. 4th ditto ditto ditto ditto,-1 Horse killed. 2d Regiment Bengal Cavalry,-1 Horse killed, 1 Rank and File wounded. 4th Bengal Local Horse,--1 Rank and File, and I Horse missing. Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry,--1 Rank and File killed. 16th Bengal Native Infantry,-1 Captain wounded. 48th ditto ditto ditto,-1 Lieutenant, and 2 Rank and File wounded. Total killed, 1 Rank and File and 2 Horses. Total wounded, 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 5 Rank and File, and 6 Horses. Total missing, 1 Rank and File and I Horse. Names of Officers Wounded. Captain Graves, 16th Bengal Native Infantry, severely. Lieutenant Vanhomrigh, 48th Bengal Native Infantry, slightly. R. MACDONALD, Lieut. Col. Military Secretary, and Deputy Adjutant General H. M. Forces, Bombay. THE ENGINEERS' REPORT. 37 The foregoing description of the storming of Ghuzni would not be perfect unaccompanied by the Reports of the Engineer officers employed on the primary operations. They are therefore subjoined, and will be found, by the professional reader, serviceable and instructive. MEMORANDA of the Engineers' operations before Ghuznee, in July 1839, by Cap- tains Thomson and Peat. "The accounts of the Fortress of Ghuznee, received from those who had seen it, were such as to induce His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to leave in Kandahar the very small battering train then with the Army, there being a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was described as very weak, and completely commanded from a range of hills to the north. "When we came before it on the morning of the 21st July, we were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a fausse-braye and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the " enceinte" gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had been enlarged, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it. "The Garrison was variously stated from 3 to 4000 strong, including 500 Cavalry, and from subsequent information, we found that it had not been overrated. " On the approach of the Army, a fire of Artillery was opened from the body of the place, and of musketry from the neighbouring gardens. A detachment of Infantry cleared the latter, and the former was silenced for a short time by shrapnells from the Horse Artillery, but the fire from the new outwork on the bank of the river was in no way checked. A nearer view of the works was, however, obtained from the gardens which had been cleared. This was not at all satisfactory. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our Army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no battering train, and to besiege Ghuznee in form, a much larger one would be required than the Army ever possessed. The great command of the parapets, from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were unsurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading. " It therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole "contour" of the place, to discover if any other mode of attack could be adopted. The Engineers with an escort went round the works, approaching as near as they could find cover. The Garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire upon the officers, whenever they were obliged 38 THE ENGINEERS' REPORT. to shew themselves. However, by keeping the Infantry beyond musket range, and the Cavalry at a still greater distance, only one man was killed, and another wounded; the former being hit by men sent out of the place to drive off the reconnoitring party. " The fortifications were found equally strong all round, the only tangible point observed being the Cabool gateway, which offered the following advantages for a 'coup-de-main.' The road to the gate was clear, the bridge over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions for the Artillery within 300 yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from Cabool being expected. "The result of this reconnoissance, was a report to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that if he decided upon the immediate attack of Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was a dash at the Cabool gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder. " His Excellency decided upon the attempt; the camp was moved that evening to the Cabool road, and the next morning, the 22d, Sir John Keane, in person reconnoitred the proposed point of attack, approved of the plan, and gave orders for its execution. Preparations were made accordingly, positions for the Artillery were carefully examined, which excited the jealousy of the Garrison, who opened a smart fire upon the party. " It was arranged that an explosion party, consisting of three officers of Engineers, Captain Peat, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, 3 Serjeants, and 18 men of the Sappers in working dresses, carrying 300 lbs. of powder in 12 sand bags, with a hose 72 feet long, should be ready to move down to the gateway at day-break. " At midnight the first Battery left Camp, followed by the other four, at intervals of half an hour. Those to the right of the road were conducted to their positions by Lieutenant Sturt, those to the left by Lieutenant Anderson. The ground for the guns was prepared by the Sappers and Pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground to the right, and of some old garden walls to the left. " The Artillery was all in position, and ready by 3 A. M.of the 23d, and shortly after, at the first dawn, the Party under Captain Peat moved down to the gateway, accompanied by six men of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same Regiment, which extended to the right and left of the road, when they arrived at the ditch, taking advantage of what cover they could find, and endeavouring to keep down the fire from the ramparts, which became heavy on the approach of the party, though it had been remarkably slack during the previous operations. Blue lights were shewn, which rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible, but luckily they were burned on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below. THE ENGINEERS REPORT. 39 " The explosion party marched steadily on, headed by Lieutenant Durand; the powder was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover in less than two minutes. The Artillery opened when the blue lights appeared, and the musketry from the covering party at the same time. So quickly was the operation performed, and so little was the enemy aware of the nature of it, that not a man of the party was hurt. "As soon as the explosion took place, Captain Peat, although hurt by the concussion, his anxiety preventing him from keeping sufficiently under cover, ran up to the gate accompanied by a small party of H. M. 13th L. I., and ascertained that it was completely destroyed. There was some delay in getting a bugler to sound the advance, the signal agreed on for the assaulting column to push on, and this was the only mistake in the operation. "The assaulting column, consisting of 4 European Regiments (H. M. 2nd Regiment, Bengal European Regiment, H. M. 13th L. I. and H. M. 17th Regiment,) commanded by Brigadier Sale, the advance under Lieut. Col. Dennie, accompanied by Lieut. Sturt, Engineers, moved steadily through the gateway, through a passage inside the gateway, in a domed building, which opening on one side, rendered every thing very obscure, and rendered it difficult to find the outlet into the town. They met with little opposition ; but a party of the enemy seeing a break in the column, owing to the difficulty in scrambling over the rubbish in the gateway, made a rush, sword in hand, and cut down a good many men, wounding the Brigadier and several other officers. These swordsmen were repulsed, and there was no more regular opposition; the surprise and alarm of the Governor and Sirdars being so great when they saw the column occupying the open space inside the gate and firing upon them, that they fled, accompanied by their men, even the Garrison of the citadel following their example. Parties of the Affghans took refuge in the houses, firing on the column as it made its way through the streets, and a good deal of desultory fighting took place in consequence, by which some loss was sustained. The citadel was occupied as soon as day-light shewed that it had been abandoned by the enemy, and the whole of the works were in our possession before 5 A. M. " We lost 17 men, 6 Europeans and 11 Natives, killed ;-18 Officers and 117 Europeans and 30 Natives wounded, total 182. Of the Affghans more than 514 were killed in the town, that number of bodies having been buried, and about 100 outside by the Cavalry; 1600 prisoners were taken, but I have no means of estimating the number of wounded. " There were nine guns of different calibres found in the place, a large quantity of good powder, considerable stores of shot, lead, &c. &c. and a GEO. THOMSON, Capt. Engrs. large supply of atta and other provisions." Chief Engr. Army of the Indus. 40 THE ENGINEERS' REPORT. " During the reconnoissance the wall pieces were particularly troublesome. This weapon is almost unknown in our service, but it is a very efficient one, especially in the defence of works, and its use should not be neglected. Every fortified post should be supplied with a proportion of them, and a certain number of men in every Regiment practised in firing them. " The charge recommended by Col. Pasley for blowing open gates, is from 60 to 120 lbs. and this is doubtless sufficient in ordinary cases; but in this instance we were apprehensive that the enemy might have taken alarm at our being so much on that side of the place, and in consequence partially or wholly built up the gateway. It was afterwards found that some attempts of the kind had been made by propping up the gate with beams. " The charge was so heavy, that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the roof of the square building in which it was placed, which proved a very considerable obstacle to the assaulting column, and the concussion acted as far as the tower under which an officer's party of H. M. 13th Regiment were standing at the time, but without occasioning any casualties. In cases of this nature, it is of course the first object to guard against any chance of failure, and it is impossible even now to say, how much the charge might have been reduced with safety. " The enemy appeared so much on the alert, and the fausse-braye was so much in advance of the gate, that we never contemplated being able to effect our object by surprise. The only question was, whether it ought to be done by day or night. It was argued in favor of the former, that the Artillery would be able to make so much more correct practice, that the defences would be in a considerable degree destroyed, and the fire so completely.kept under, as to enable the explosion party to advance with but little loss, and with the advantage of being able to see exactly what they were about. Captain Thomson, however, adhered to the latter, and we were afterwards convinced it was the most judicious plan; for although the fire of the Artillery was necessarily more general than it would have been in daylight, still it was so well directed as to take up a good deal of the attention of the besieged, and draw upon their batteries a portion of the fire which in daylight would have been thrown upon the explosion party and assaulting columns. It would also even in daylight have been difficult with our light Artillery to have kept down the fire so completely, but that a few matchlock men might have kept their position near the gateway, and in that narrow space a smart fire from a few pieces might have obliged the party to retire. The obscurity of the night, to say nothing of the confusion which it must occasion among undisciplined troops, is certainly the best protection to a body of men engaged in an enterprise of this nature. Blue lights certainly render objects distinctly visible, but their light is glaring and uncertain, especially to men firing through loopholes. THE ENGINEERS' REPORT. 41 "The party of H. M. 13th consisted of 18 Officers; 28 Serjeants; 7 Buglers; and 276 Rank and File. " It was made of this strength not only to keep up a heavy fire upon the parapets, and thereby divert attention from the party at the gateway, but also because we were not aware whether the fausse-braye was occupied or not, and as it extends so much in advance as to take the gate completely in reverse, it would have been necessary, had a fire opened from it, to have carried it by assault before the party with the bags could have advanced. The party with Lieutenant Durand was accompanied by 6 men of the 13th without their belts, the better to secure them from observation and to protect them from any sortie that might be made from the postern of the faussebraye on the right, or even from the gate itself, while another party under an officer, Lieutenant Jennings, accompanied me as far as the tower so as to check any attempts that might have been made from the fausse-braye on the left, and at the same time keeping up a fire on such of the enemy as shewed their heads above the parapet; of this party one man was killed and a few wounded. " Nothing could have been more gallant than the conduct of Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, and the men under their command, or more efficient than the manner in which they executed their duty. " The powder being in sand bags, of a very coarse open texture, a long hose and port fire was thought to be the safest method of firing it. The end of the hose fortunately just reached the small postern. The casualties during this operation were much fewer than was expected, being in all I private killed, 2 Serjeants, and 23 Rank and File wounded. "The heaviest fire was certainly outside the bridge, for the enemy near the gateway being marked whenever they attempted to shew their heads above the parapet, were obliged to confine themselves to the loop-holes, the range from which is very uncertain and limited against men moving about. A high loop-holed wall, although imposing in appearance, is a profile but ill adapted to resist attacks of this nature. "The enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to have no idea of the nature of our operations. Had they been so, they might easily have rendered it impossible to place the powder bags by throwing over blue lights, of which they had a large quantity in store. The powder pots and other fire-works so much used by the natives of Hindoostan, would certainly have rendered the confined space leading to the gate much too hot for such an operation, but the ignorance of the besieged was known and calculated upon,-the result shews how justly. "Their attempts at resistance were confined to the fire from the loopholes, and throwing over large pieces of earth, some of which appeared to be intended to knock off the port fire. " I on this occasion received an excellent lesson on the necessity of not allowing preconceived opinions to lead to any carelessness, in accurately as- 42 HYDER KHAN'S CAPTURE. certaining the result of any operation of this nature. The gateway appeared, from what I had seen from the hills to the north, to lead straight into the town, and on running in to examine it after the explosion, I was sp much impressed with this idea, and so much convinced of the probability of the gateway having been blocked up during the day, that I was led to believe that it had actually been done from seeing in front of the gate that had been destroyed the outline of an arch filled up with brick masonry. The true entrance turned to the right and would have been discovered by advancing a few paces, and that in perfect safety, for the interior was secure from all fire. Lieutenant Durand, on first going up, saw through the chinks of the gate, that there was a light and a guard immediately behind it, and from that circumstance was convinced, that no interior obstacles of importance existed. " My mistake therefore was luckily immediately corrected without any bad consequence resulting. " A party of Sappers with felling axes, and commanded by Lieutenant Wemyss, and two scaling ladders in charge of Lieutenant Pigou accompanied the assaulting column. " Of 10 Engineer Officers engaged in this attack, only one, Lieutenant Marriot, was slightly wounded. Captain Thomson, however, had a very narrow escape, having been thrown down by a rush of some swordsmen into the gateway, and nearly sabred while upon the ground." (Signed) A. G. PEAT, Captain, Bombay Engineers. It is not the purpose of this work to discuss the merits of the many personal and political questions which arose out of the suppressions in despatches, or the course of minor proceedings following important operations, or much might here be said in reprobation of the manner in which the names of Colonel Dennie and Brigadier Roberts were slurred over by Sir John Keane. The former officer led the storming party, and most gallantly maintained his ground in the midst of darkness and surrounded by numberless desperate foes, until the column under Brigadier Sale could force an entrance. To Brigadier Roberts is due the credit of having captured Hyder Khan, the Governor of the fortress and son of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, an event of great importance, but which has never yet, as far as the writer of this has seen, been described with the It appears that after Brigadier Sale, who had minuteness it deserves. been wounded at the gate of Ghuzni, had retired to his tent, the command of the fortress devolved on Brigadier Roberts. When the Brigadier had placed guards on the numerous prisoners taken in the conflict, (some fifteen or sixteen hundred,) and arranged for the protection of MARCH TOWARDS CABUL. 43 the women and children, he directed his attention to the means of securing the chief. The prisoners had declared that Hyder Khan had escaped, and that his capture was now impossible. Brigadier Roberts, however, soon after assuming the command of the fort, had seen a very fine looking horse, richly caparisoned, with a handsome brace of pistols in the holsters, which he was requested to allow to be sent out of the fort, the request being accompanied by the assurance that all should be brought before the Prize Committee. The request was refused, although preferred by an officer who wished to purchase the lot, and the Brigadier suspecting that the horse was the property of the Governor of the fort, directed Captain A. Tayler of the European Regt., his Major of Brigade, to take a company of Infantry to the house where the horse had been found, and to search it. Captain Tayler, accompanied by Captain George Macgregor, assistant to the Envoy, did so, and the result was that Hyder Khan surrendered, after the officers had sworn in the name of It should the Saviour that the lives of the prisoners would be spared. be added, that the oath was exacted by Hyder Khan, who would otherwise, with his party, have died sword in hand. The Commander-inChief was delighted with the success of Brigadier Roberts's scheme; but, as shewn above, he had not the grace to make any especial acknowledgment of his services in the matter. Leaving the 16th Regt. N. I., a small proportion of Artillery, and some Irregular Cavalry to garrison Ghuzni, the Army moved on towards Cabul; the Nuwab Jubbul Khan, brother of Dost Mahomed, having previously visited the fortress with overtures from Dost Mahomed, which however ended in nothing. The Army had not proceeded more than three marches from Ghuzni, when authentic accounts reached the Camp, that Dost Mahomed, finding it impossible to rely upon his troops, had hastily abandoned his guns, which were in position at Arghundee, and fled towards Bameean. His capture being a matter of great importance, it was resolved to immediately despatch a small body in pursuit of him. To Captain Outram, was entrusted the execution of this difficult task, and the better to ensure success, Hadjee Khan Kakur, the chieftain who had joined Shah Soojah's camp near Candahar, was appointed to accompany him with The history of the pursuit is related 2000 of the Shah's Affghans. with great spirit and fidelity in Captain Outram's narrative, which will be found in the Appendix to this volume, (No. I.) Its failure evidently arose from the treasonous part played by the Hadjee, who either feared 44 FORCING THE KHYBER PASS. to encounter Dost Mahomed, or was still secretly in the interest of the Ameer. Following the chronological order of events, we must now turn to the operations of Colonel Wade, who with Shah Soojah's son, had, as before mentioned, proceeded to Peshawur to march towards Cabul, when intelligence should reach him of the advance of the British force from Candahar. Colonel Wade had advanced as far as Jumrood upon the 20th of July, when he received advices of the movement of the force. He accordingly commenced preparations for making his way through the Khyber Pass, a formidable series of defiles overhung by lofty, rocky hills, from which an opposing enemy can offer the most formidable obstructions to an advance. But we will let Major Hough describe it :"The Khyber Pass is about twenty-eight miles in extent. From the entrance on the Peshawur side it is seven miles to Ali Musjid, from which it is two miles to Lalabeg Ghurree, a valley which is about six miles long and one and a quarter broad; hence is the Pass of Lundeekhana; in fact, excepting the valley, the rest of the Pass, or for twenty-two miles, can be commanded by jingals (wall pieces) or even by the mountain rifle (juszail) fired with a rest, and in many places by the common musket. The road being stony, the movements of troops with guns is necessarily slow. The first four miles, after the entrance to the Pass, the road is contracted, and the hills on each side, are nearly perpendicular; to the left, two miles up the Pass, there is a road which leads up to the top of the hills. It widens after the third mile, but still the road is exposed to a fire from either side. At about five and a half miles is the town of Jaghir on the right, which could fire on any enemy moving by either road. From the town, Ali Musjid is one and a half mile; on the left is the range of hills by which you move up to the fort; on the right is the hill which runs parallel to, and which is commanded by, the fort. "The range of hills to the left leads to the cantonment of the Khyberees; that of Choorah is about eight miles from the fort; that of Teerah seven or eight marches off. The town of Jaghir was filled with the enemy. The fort contained a considerable garrison. There were breastworks thrown up on the hills, so that it was necessary to move on slowly, and at each halt to stockade the troops, as well as to protect the position; and the left was the point which required the utmost vigilance." Colonel Wade had taken the precaution to buy over the Khyberees between Peshawur and the entrance to the main roads leading through the Pass, while Shah Soojah's emissaries had secured the neutrality, if not the aid, of the tribes beyond Alee Musjeed. But for the seven ARRIVAL AT CABTL. 45 miles between his position and that fortress, Colonel Wade knew that he would have to encounter the opposition of the Khyberees, supported by Mahomed Ukhbar Khan, Dost Mahomed's son, who with 2500 men and 14 guns, occupied a post near the head of the Khyber Pass, contiguous to Jellallabad. On the 22d July, the Colonel moved forward, stockading as he went. Every inch of his route was disputed by the enemy, but the gallantry and steadiness of the troops enabled him to make good his way to Alee Musjeed, of which, on the 27th July, he was enabled to take possession, the enemy having evacuated it and fled. Beyond this point, no opposition was encountered. Colonel Wade made a halt, to give time for the troops under Sir John Keane to push upward from Ghuzni, and for himself to arrange with the Khyber chiefs for the permanent opening of the Pass to travellers, convoys, caravans, and the dawk (letter post) to and from India. He then resumed his march, and on the 3d September 1839, reached Cabul with the Shahzada. On the 6th of August the Army reached Cabul, and on the 7th, the Shah made his triumphal entry into the capital. The event is described in the annexed extract of a letter from Sir John Keane to Lord Auckland : Extract of a Letter from His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir John Keane, K. C. B. and G. C. H., dated Head Quarters, Camp Cabool, 8th August, 1839. " It gives me infinite pleasure to be able to address my despatch to your Lordship from the capital, the vicinity of which, His Majesty Shah Shoojaool-Moolk and the Army under my command, reached the day before yesterday. The King entered his capital yesterday afternoon, accompanied by the British Envoy and Minister and the gentlemen of the mission, and by myself, the Generals and Staff Officers of this Army, and escorted by a squadron of Her Majesty's 4th Light Dragoons, and one of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, with Captain Martin's Troop of Horse Artillery. His Majesty had expressed a wish that British troops should be present on the occasion, and a very small party only of his own Hindostanee and Affghan troops. After the animating scene of traversing the streets and reaching the palace in the Balla Hissar, a royal salute was fired, and an additional salvo in the Affghan style, from small guns resembling wall pieces, named jingalls, and carried on camels. We heartily congratulated His Majesty on being in possession of the throne and kingdom of his ancestors, and upon the overthrow of his enemies, and after taking leave of His Majesty, we returned to our camp. 46 REPORT OF SIR JOHN KEANE. "I trust we have thus accomplished all the objects which your Lordship had in contemplation, when you planned and formed the Army of the Indus, and the expedition into Affghanistan. " The conduct of the Army, both European and Native, which your Lordship did me the honor to place under my orders, has been admirable throughout, and notwithstanding the severe marching and privations they have gone through, their appearance and discipline have suffered nothing, and the opportunity afforded them at Ghuznee, of meeting and conquering their enemy, has added greatly to their good spirits. " The joint despatch addressed by Mr. Macnaghten and myself to your Lordship on the 3d instant from Shikarbad, will have informed you, that at the moment we had made every preparation to attack (on the following day) Dost Mahommed Khan, in his position at Urghundee, where, after his son Mahommed Akhbar had joined him from Jellalabad, he had an army amounting to 13,000 men, well armed and appointed, and 30 pieces of artillery, we suddenly learnt that he abandoned them all, and fled with a party of horsemen on the road to Bameean, leaving his guns in position as he had placed them to receive our attack. " It appears, that a great part of his army, which was hourly becoming disorganized, refused to stand by him in the position, to receive our attack, and that it soon became in a state of dissolution. The great bulk immediately came over to Shah Shooja, tendering their allegiance, and I believe His Majesty will take most of them into his pay. " It seems that the news of the quick and determined manner in which we took their stronghold, Ghuznee, had such an effect upon the population of Cabool, and perhaps also upon the enemy's army, that Dost Mahommed, from that moment began to lose hope of retaining his rule for even a short time longer, and sent off his family and valuable property towards Bameean, but marched out of Cabool with his army and artillery, keeping a bold front towards us until the evening of the 2d, when all his hopes were at an end by a division in his own camp, and one part of his army abandoning him. So precipitate was his flight, that he left in position his guns, with their ammunition and waggons, and the greater part of their cattle by which they were drawn. Major Cureton, of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, with his party of 200 men, pushed forward on the 3d, and took possession of those guns, etc. There were twentythree brass guns in position and loaded, two more at a little distance which they attempted to take away, and since then, three more abandoned still further off on the Bameean road-thus, leaving in our possession twenty-eight pieces of cannon, with all the material belonging to them, which are now handed over to Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk." The King took up his residence in the Balla Hissar, or Citadel of the capital; the troops were disposed in the neighbourhood, and prepara- OPERATIONS AGAINST 47 THE GHILZIES. tions were immediately made for consolidating the authority which had thus been re-acquired. One of the first measures was to despatch Captain Outram, after his return from the unsuccessful pursuit of Dost Mahomed Khan* to the Ghilzie country, lying between Ghuzni and Candahar, in order to tranquillize the disaffected, and induce their submission to the King. This duty Captain Outram performed successfully and satisfactorily. He captured many of the refractory,t destroyed their fortresses, displaced chieftains, substituting persons in the interest of Shah Soojah, and recovered a quantity of the property in camels, etc., abstracted from the British troops during their march from Candahar. The next measure of the King's was, to hold a Durbar, and to confer the Dooranee order of Knighthood on all those officers who had distinguished themselves on the march from India. The third was, to depute Major General (now Sir Thomas) Willshire, with the returning Bombay Column, to punish the chief of Khelat, who while professing friendship for the British Government, and negociating a treaty with its representatives, had instigated the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Bolan Pass, to plunder the Army of the Indus during its march. The manner in which this service was performed, is set forth in the following dispatch from General Willshire, written on the 14th December 1839:- To THE RIGHT HoN. LORD AUCKLAND, G. C. B. Governor General of India, c. c. c. "MY LORD,--In obedience to the joint instructions furnished me by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Indus, and the Envoy and Minister to His Majesty Shah Shooja, under date Cabool, the 17th September 1839, deputing to me the duty of deposing Mebrab Khan of Khelat, in consequence of the avowed hostility of that Chief to the British nation, during the present campaign, I have the honor to report that on my arrival at Quetta on the 31st ultimo, I communicated with Captain Bean, the Political Agent in Shawl, and arranged with him the best means of giving effect to the orders I had received. * Hadjee Khan Kakur was rewarded for his double treason, by being placed in close confinement with a strong guard over him. t Amongst these, were a party who had murdered Colonel Herring of the 37th Bengal Native Infantry, on his way from Candahar with a treasure party. 48 STORMING OF KHELAT. " In consequence of the want of public carriage, and the limited quantity of Commissariat supplies at Quetta, as well as the Four Guns Shah's reported want of forage on the route to Khelat, I was Two Guns Bombay Horse Artillery, Artillery. Two Ressalas Local Horse. nyals obliged to despatch to Cutch Gundava the whole of the Cavalry and the greater portion of the Artillery, taking with me only the Troops noted in the margin, leaving Bombay Engineers. Quetta on the 3rd instant. "During the march the communications received from Mehrab Khan were so far from acceding to the terms offered, that he threatened resistance if the Troops approached his capital. I therefore proceeded and arrived at the village of Giranee, within 8 miles of Khelat, on the 12th instant. "Marching from hence the following morning, a body of horse were perceived on the right of the road, which commenced firing on the advanced guard, commanded by Major Pennycuick H. M.'s 17th Regiment, as the column advanced; and skirmishing between them continued until we came in sight of Khelat, rather less than a mile distant. " I now discovered that three heights on the N. W. face of the fort, and parallel to the North were covered with Infantry, with five guns in position, protected by small parapet walls. " Captain Peat, Chief Engineer, immediately reconnoitred, and having reported that nothing could be done until those heights were in our possession, I decided at once on storming them simultaneously, and if practicable, entering the fort with the fugitives, as the gate in the Northern face was occasionally opened to keep up the communication between the fort and the heights. " To effect this object, I detached a Company from each of the European Regiments from the advanced guard, with Major Pennycuick, H. M. 17th Regiment, for the purpose of occupying the gardens and enclosures to the North-East of the town, and two more Companies in the plain, midway between them and the column; at the same time I ordered three columns of attack to be formed, composed of four Companies from each Corps, under their respective Commanding Officers, Major Carruthers of the Queen's, Lieut. Colonel Croker H. M. 17th Regiment, and Major Western 31st Bengal N. [., the whole under the command of Brigadier Baumgardt; the remainder of the Regiments forming three columns of reserve under my own direction to move in support. "A hill being allotted to each column, Brigadier Stevenson commanding the Artillery, moved quickly forward in front, towards the base of the heights, and when, within the required range, opened a fire upon the Infantry and guns, under cover of which the columns moved steadily on, and commenced the ascent for the purpose of carrying the heights exposed to the fire of the enemy's guns, which had commenced while the columns of attack were forming. "Before the columns reached their respective summits of the hills, the H. M.'s 17th Regt. 81st Bengal N. I. 49 STORMING OF KHELAT. enemy overpowered by the superior and well-directed fire of our Artillery, had abandoned them, attempting to carry off their guns, but which they were unable to do; at this moment it appearing to me the opportunity offered for the troops to get in with the fugitives, and if possible, gain possession of the gate of the fortress, I despatched orders to the Queen's Royals and HI. 17th Regiment to make a rush from the heights for that M. purpose, following myself to the summit of the nearest to observe the result; at this moment, the four Companies on my left, which had been detached to the gardens and plains, seeing the chance that offered of entering the fort, moved rapidly forward from their respective points towards the gateway, under a heavy and well-directed fire from the walls of the fort and citadel, which were thronged by the enemy. "The gate having been closed before the troops moving towards it could effect the desired object, and the Garrison strengthened by the enemy driven from the heights, they were compelled to cover themselves as far as practicable behind some walls and ruined buildings to the right and left of it, while Brigadier Stevenson, having ascended the heights with the Artillery, opened two guns under the command of Lieut. Foster, Bombay Horse Artillery, upon the defences above its gates and vicinity, while the fire of two others commanded by Lieutenant Cooper, Shah's Artillery, was directed against the gate itself, the remaining two with Lieutenant Creed being sent round to the road on the left, leading direct up to the gate, and when within two hundred yards, commenced a fire, for the purpose of blowing it open, and after a few rounds they succeeded in knocking in one-half of it; on observing this I rode down the hill towards the gate, pointing to it, thereby announcing to the troops it was open; they instantly rose from their cover, and rushed in; those under the command of Major Pennycuick being the nearest were the first to gain the gate, headed by that Officer; the whole of the storming column from the three Regiments rapidly following and gaining an entrance as quickly as it was possible to do so, under a heavy fire from the works and from the interior, the enemy making a most gallant and determined resistance, disputing every inch of ground up to the walls of the inner citadel. "At this time, I directed the reserve columns to be brought near the gate, and detached one company of the 17th Regiment under Captain Darby, to the Western side of the fort, followed by a portion of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, commanded by Major Weston, conducted by Captain Outram, acting as my extra Aide-de-Camp, for the purpose of securing the heights under which the Southern angle is situated, and intercepting any of the Garrison escaping from that side. Having driven off the enemy from the heights above, the united detachments then descended to the gate of the fort below, and forced it open before the Garrison (who closed it as they saw the troops approach) had time to secure it. " When the party was detached by the Western face, I also sent two comH 50 STORMING OF KHELAT. panies from the reserve of the 17th under Major Deshon, and two guns of the Shah's Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Creed, Bombay Artillery, by the Eastern to the Southern face, for the purpose of blowing open the gate above alluded to, had it been necessary, as well as the gate of the inner citadel, the Infantry joining the other detachments making their way through the town in the direction of the citadel. " After some delay, the troops that held possession of the town, at length succeeded in forcing an entrance into the citadel, where a desperate resistance was made by Mehrab Khan at the head of his people, he himself with many of his Chiefs being killed sword in hand; several others, however, kept up a fire upon our troops from detached buildings difficult of access, and it was not until late in the afternoon, that those who survived were induced to give themselves up on a promise of their lives being spared. " From every account, I have reason to believe, the Garrison consisted of upwards of 2000 fighting men, and that the son of Mehrab Khan had been expected to join him from Nowsky with a further reinforcement. The enclosed return will shew the strength of the force under my command present at the capture. " The defences of the fort, as in the case of Ghuznee, far exceeded in strength, what I had been led to suppose from previous report; and the towering height of the inner citadel was most formidable, both in appearance and reality. " I lament to say, that the loss of killed and, wounded on our side has been severe, as will be seen by the accompanying return; that on the part of the enemy must have been great, but the exact number I have not been able to ascertain. Several hundreds of prisoners were taken, from whom the Political Agent has selected those he considers it necessary for the present to retain in confinement; the remainder have been liberated. " It is, quite impossible for me sufficiently to express my admiration of the gallant and steady conduct of the Officers and men upon this occasion, but the fact of less than an hour having elapsed from the formation of the columns for the attack, to the period of the troops being within the fort, and that performed in the open day and in the face of an enemy, so very superior in number and so perfectly prepared for resistance, will, I trust, convince your Lordship, how deserving the Officers and troops are of my warmest thanks, and of the highest praise that can be bestowed. " To Brigadier Baumgardt, commanding the storming column, my best thanks are due, and he reports that Captain Wyllie, Acting Asst. Adjt. General and Captain Gilland, his Aides-de-Camp, ably assisted him, and zealously performed their duties; also to Brigadier Stevenson, commanding the Artillery, and Lieutenants Forster and Cowper respectively in charge of the Bombay and Shah's Artillery, I feel greatly indebted for the steady and scientific manner in which the service of dislodging the enemy from the heights, and afterwards effecting an entrance into the fort was perform- STORMING OF KHELAT. 51 ed. The Brigadier has brought to my notice the assistance he received from Captain Coghlan, his Brigade Major, Lieutenant Woosnam, his Aidde-Camp, and Lieutenant Creed when in battery yesterday. "To Lieutenant-Colonel Croker, commanding H. M. 17th Regiment, Major Carruthers, commanding the Queen's Royals, Major Weston, commanding the Bengal 31st N. I., I feel highly indebted for the manner in which they conducted their respective columns to the attack of the heights, and afterwards to the assault of the fort, as well as to Major Pennycuick of the 17th, who led the advanced guard companies to the same point. "To Captain Peat, Chief Engineer, and to the Officers and men of the Engineer Corps, my acknowledgments are due-to Major Neil Campbell, Acting Quarter Master General of the Bombay Army, to Captain Hagart, Acting Deputy Adjutant General, and to Lieutenant Ramsay, Acting Assistant Quarter Master General, my best thanks are due for the able assistance afforded me by their services. " It is with much pleasure I take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to Major Campbell, for relieving me from the necessity of returning by the route by which the Army advanced to Cabool, which being entirely exhausted, must have subjected the troops to great privations-and the horses to absolute starvation; the Quarter Master General took upon himself the responsibility of leading my column through the heart of the Ghiljee and Koohul countries, never hitherto traversed by Europeans, by which our route was considerably shortened, a sufficiency obtained, and great additions made to our geographical knowledge of the country, besides great political advantages obtained in peaceably settling those districts. "From my Aides-de-Camp, Captain Robinson and Lieutenant Halkett, as well as to Captain Outram, who volunteered his services on my personal Staff, I received the utmost assistance, and to the latter officer I feel greatly indebted for the zeal and ability with which he has performed various duties that I have required of him, upon other occasions as well as the present. "It is with much satisfaction I am able to state, that the utmost cordiality has existed between the Political Authorities and myself, and to acknowledge the great assistance I have derived from Captain Bean in obtaining supplies. " After allowing time to make the necessary arrangements for continuing my march, I shall descend into Cutch Gundava by the Moona Pass, having received a favourable report of the practicability of taking guns that way. " I have deputed Captain Outram to take a duplicate of the despatch to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay by the direct route from hence to Sonmeanee Bunder, the practicability or otherwise of which for the passage of troops, I consider it an object of importance to ascertain." I have, &c. T. WILLSHIRE, Major General, Commanding Bombay Column, Army of the Indus. 52 STORMING OF KHELAT. Return of Casualties in the Army under the Command of Major General Willshire, C. B. employed at the storming of Kelat, on the 13th, November, 1839. CoRPs. Detachment 3d Troop Horse Artillery, ... 1st Troop Cabool Artillery, ........... Gun Lascars attached to ditto, ......... H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal Regiment,... H. M.'s 17th Regiment,.. ........... 31st Regiment Bengal N. I.... ......... Sappers, Miners and Pioneers, ......... 2 Ressallahs of the 4th Bengal Local Horse, Total, ... ... ... .... .. Missing, None. Names of Officers Killed and Wounded. KILLED. REMARKS. Corps. H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal Regimeent, 1 Corporal, since dead, Rank and Names. Lieut. P. Gravatt. WOUNDED. ent, H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal RegimE ditto ...... ditto ...... ditto .. .... ditto ...... ditto ...... ditto . ..... ditto ...... ditto ...... ditto .. .... ditto ...... ditto ...... ditto . ..... H. M.'s 17th Regiment,................. ..... 31st Regiment Bengal N. I............. .... ditto ...... ditto.................... .... Capt. W. M. Lyster, severely. Capt. T. Sealey, ditto. Lt. T. W. E. Holdsworth, ditto. Lt. D. J. Dickinson, slightly. Adjt. J. E. Simmons, severely. Capt. L. C. Bourchier, ditto. Capt. Lawrin, slightly, Ensign Hopper, severely. C. HAGART, Captain, Acting Deputy Adjutant General B. C. 53 STORMING OF KHELAT. State of the Corps engaged at the Storming of Kelat on the 13th November, 1839, under the Command of Major General Willshire, C. B. Camp at Kelat, 14th November, 1839. ... ... ... ... ... I Staff, Detachment 3d Troop Horse ...... 0 Artillery, ... ... 1st Troop of Cabool Artillery, 0 H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal 0 Regiment, ... ......... H. M.'s 17th Regiment, ... 0 31st Regiment Bengal Native ... O Infantry, .... Total, ... ... 1 NoTE.-2 Ressallahs of the Bengal Local Horse remained in charge of the Baggage during the attack. C. HAGART, Captain, Acting Deputy Adjutant General Bombay Column Army of the Indus. List of Beloochee Sirdars killed in the Assault of Khelat, on the 13th November, 1839. NAMES. Meer Mehrab Khan, ......... Meer Wullee Mahomed,... ... Abdool Kurreem, ......... Dan Kurreem, ............. Mahomed Ruza, ......... Khysur Khan,.... ......... Dewan Bechah Mull, ...... Noor Mahomed and TajooMahomed............. REMARKS. Chief of Kelat. The Muengal Sirdar.of Wudd. Ruhsanee Sirdar. Shuhwanee Sirdar. Nephew of the Vuzeer, Mahomed Hossain. Ahsehiee Sirdar. Financial Minister. Shahgassee Sirdars. Prisoners. Wuzzeer. Mahomed Hussain, ......... Moolah Ruheem Dad, ... ... Ex-Naib of Shawl. With several others of inferior rank. J. D. D. BEAN, Political Agent. 54 ARRANGEMENTS AT CABUL. To return to Cabul. Reports having reached the Envoy, that Dost Mahomed was at Bameean, a small force was detached thither, and another small body was sent to Ghuzni to bring up the prisoners, (including the Governor, Hyder Khan,) preparatory to their being conveyed to India. The Army gradually recovered the effect of its long march from India, both men and cattle deriving much benefit from the climate, the food procured in the abundant markets, and the repose of cantonments. The casualties, from the fatigue which the troops had undergone, were however by no means few, and amongst them the Government had to lament the loss of some valuable officers. Besides Colonel Thomson of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry who died of fever, from exposure in the Bolan Pass, and Colonel Herring who was murdered by the Ghilzies, the service lost Colonel (then Brigadier) Arnold of the 16th Lancers, Captain Fothergill of the 13th Light Infantry, Captain Timings of the Horse Artillery, and Captain John Hay of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry. Scarcely any disastrous consequences resulted from the antipathy of the Affghans to the Europeans and Hindoos, owing, in a great measure, to the precautions used by the commanding officers against the too frequent resort of the soldiery to the town of Cabul. By the middle of October 1839, it had been ascertained by the British Envoy at the Court of Shah Soojah, that the country around was, to all appearance, sufficiently reconciled to the new order of things to justify the partial fulfilment of the engagement contained in Lord Auckland's proclamation, that the British troops should be withdrawn when the Shah was once " secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established." Accordingly, orders were issued for the return to India, by the route of the Khyber Pass and the Punjaub, of the whole of the force, with the exception of the 1st (Bengal) Division of Infantry, the 2nd Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry, a Light Field Battery, and a detachment of Sappers under an Engineer Officer. These were disposed in the following manner :Cabul.-Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, the 35th Native Infantry, and three guns. The Head Quarters of the Shah's 1st Cavalry and some of his Artillery. Jellallabad.--The 48th Native Infantry, the 4th Brigade, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, some Sappers and Miners, and a Ressallah of Skinner's Horse. Ghuzni.-The 16th Native Infantry, a Ressallah of Skinner's Horse, a proportion of Shah Soojah's troops. RETURN OF PART OF TIHE ARMY. 55 Candahar.-The 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, a Company of Artillery, a Ressallah of Local Horse, and some details of the Shah's troops. Major General Nott (now Sir William) was placed in command of the troops at Candahar, while Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded the whole force in Affghanistan. On the 15th October, the retiring troops commenced their march, Sir John (afterwards Lord) Keane accompanying the first column.* Mahomed Hyder Khan, late Governor of Ghuzni, and Hadjee Khan Kakur, the arch-traitor, proceeded in the custody of Major McSherry, of the 30th Native Infantry, with the second column.t After Colonel Wade had forced the Khyber Pass, on his way to Cabul with the Shahzadah Timor Shah, he stationed small detachments at different points,' with the view of keeping open the communication with the Punjaub, and watching the operations of the Khyberies. These detachments, consisting of Sikh troops under British officers, were attacked by the Khyberies, generally with success, but on the approach of the returning columns, they partially suspended their hostility. After these columns, however, had reached Peshawur, and it was deemed advisable to send detachments to reinforce the garrison of Alee Musjid, and supply it with provisions, stores, and ammunition, the Khyberies assailed the returning parties, killing and wounding several men and officers. The columns therefore halted until Colonel Wheeler should reach Alee Musjid, from Jellallabad, with the 37th and 48th Regiments of Native Infantry, a force sufficient, it was believed, to relieve Alee Musjid effectually, and to support the negociations set on foot with the Khyberies by Lieutenant Mackeson,§ the Political Agent at Peshawur. Colonel Wheeler succeeded after a sharp action with large bodies of the mountaineers in restoring tranquillity, and the columns continued their route. Sir John Keane, with the Head Quarters, reached India without any other accident befalling the force which accompanied him, beyond a disaster on the Jheelun river in the Punjaub, where a few men and an officer (Captain Hilton) of Her Majesty's * Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, 2 Companies of the 21st Bengal Native Infantry, and a Ressallah of the 4th Local Horse. t A troop of Horse Artillery, the 3d Light Cavalry, the 4th Local Horse; 2 Companies of the 27th Native Infantry; Invalids of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and the 2d European Regiment. $ Jumrood, Alee Boghan, Alee Musjid, and Jellallabad. § The hostility of the Khyberies to Shah Soojah and his supporters, originated in the reduction by the King of the allowance for which the Hill Chiefs had stipulated, as the condition on which the Pass should be kept open. 56 POLITICAL AGENCIES-KHIVA-PUSHOOT. 16th Lancers were drowned. Sir John visited Maharajah Kurruck Sing at Lahore, and reached Ferozepore early in January 1840. Here he embarked for Bombay, and proceeded to England, where the honours of the peerage, and a pension of 2,0001. per annum were conferred upon him and his successors for two generations, as a reward for his services. Although it had not been considered necessary to retain the whole of the troops at Cabul, it was still evident that there was much to be done before Shah Soojah could be considered in a perfectly secure position. Dost Mahomed had taken refuge in the territories of the Usbegs, and was endeavouring to move the chiefs of Khooloom and Koondooz to make a demonstration in his favour. Meanwhile, Russia, on the pretext of avenging herself upon the Khivans for the capture of some hundreds of her subjects, who had likewise been reduced to a state of slavery, threatened to march an army upon Khiva, and did, in effect, put her threat into execution to the extent of sending a large body of troops from Orenberg.* To check this movement, which was obviously intended to bring a corps of observation to the Affghan frontier, Lieutenant Abbott of the Artillery, was deputed to Khiva, and subsequently to Russia. He was followed by Lieutenant (now Sir Richmond) Shakspeare, who succeeded in rescuing a great number of Russian slaves, escorting them to their own territory. Russia could have no pretence for moving upon Khiva, if her professed objects were attained by the intervention and negociations of the British Government. To conciliate the chiefs in the more immediate neighbourhood of Shah Soojah's territories, several young officers, with the title of "Political Assistants," were deputed with offers which were, in most cases, accepted.t But some chiefs still held out, and amongst those was Sayud Hossein, the Padsha of Kooner, an extensive valley about forty-five miles from Jellallabad in an E. N. E. direction. A force under Colonel Orchard, of the Bengal European Regiment, was therefore dispatched to Pushoot, the principal stronghold of this petty sovereign, to dethrone him, and place on the musnud a chieftain more favorably disposed towards the interests of Shah Soojah. The military operation, as will be seen by the following dispatches, was not successful; but the disaffected chief nevertheless fled from The troops were unable to penetrate far into the desert. Climate, and the harassing attacks of Khivans and free-booters compelled them to retreat, and the expedition was abandoned. t It should have been mentioned, that Captain (now Major) D'Arcy Todd, had long previously been sent to Herat on a pacific mission. ATTACK ON PUSHOOT. 57 the country, which was immediately occupied by the protege of the Shah. To THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD AUCKLAND, Governor General of India. " I had the honor to acquaint your Lordship in my despatch of the 10th instant, that in consequence of a requisition from the Envoy and Minister, 3 9-Pounders. 1 Wing 39th avalry. nd 80 European Regiment. I had detached Lieut. Col. Orchard, c. B., of the European Regiment, with the force named in the margi, to reduce the fortress of Pushoot, distant 20 Sappers. A Regiment fantry. Shah's In- about 50 miles from hence N. N. East, and endea- 1 Regiment Shah's Ca- your to capture or dislodge a refractory chief, valry under C. N. who had, with a body of armed followers, esChristie. tablished himself therein. " I beg leave to forward for your Lordship's perusal a despatch I yesterday received from Lieut. Col. Orchard, by which I am sorry to observe, that notwithstanding a long and steady attack upon the gateway, which was represented to the Lieut. Col. as the only assailable point, yet owing to the inclemency of the weather, (though the outer gate was demolished by the fire of the nine pounders, and the bags of powder were twice laid against the inner one,) yet from the heavy rain they totally failed in the object required, and the troops were obliged to be recalled by the Lieut. Col., who, I regret to state, suffered a severe loss, having, as the accompanying return exhibits, had 65 killed and wounded; and amongst the latter Lieut. Collinson of the 37th, and Hicks, European Regt. The arrangements, as reported to me, that were made by the Lieut. Col. appear to have been judicious, and in my opinion would have been entirely successful, had it not been for the heavy rain which prevented the powder from having had its proper effect against the second gateway. " The Lieut. Col. speaks, I am happy to say, in the highest terms of the conduct of the officers and men on this trying occasion, and their gallantry and steadiness appear to me to deserve the highest commendation. " Although the attack was unfortunately not successful against the gate, yet the effect shewed itself, by the enemy evacuating the Fort of Pushoot, and also that of Kelake on the other side of the river, a short time after the troops had retired." Camp Pushoot, 19th January, 1840. To CAPTAIN DOUGLAS, Assist. Adj. Gen. Army of the Indus. SIR,-" I have the honor to report for the information of the Major General Commanding in Afghanistan, that on the afternoon of the 17th, the rain having ceased, and with every expectation of favourable weather for commencing operations, I issued the necessary orders to the detachment 58 ATTACK ON PUSHOOT. for attacking, on the following morning, the Fort of Pushoot, and as it was advisable that Captain Abbott should have his guns into battery and the infantry be in the best position they could occupy before daybreak, we left camp at half-past 4 A. M. As soon as Captain Abbott could distinguish the gate, he opened the battery against it, and after firing for nearly two hours, succeeded in making a practicable breach on each side of the gate; when Lieut. Pigou, with a party of 15 men of the European detachment and 25 Sepoys of the 37th advanced, pushed down the gate, and proceeded to examine the inner one. "The Bugler with the party observing them going forward sounded the advance, (without order,) which caused the storming party and column to immediately move down towards the breach, but Lieut. Pigou having ascertained that the inner gateway was closed, ran back, and directed them to get under cover from the enemy's fire, which was easily accomplished among the numerous ravines close to the Fort. "Lieut. Pigou then returned and applied the powder to blow open the gate, but as ithad rained without intermission from about half an hour after commencing the attack, from the damp state it was in, the very inferior quality of it, being powder of this country, it, unfortunately, failed. "As from the situation of the gate, and from the nature of the ground surrounding the Fort, it was found impracticable to bring a gun to bear on it, Lieut. Pigou suggested that another trial should be made to blow it open, and a sufficient quantity of powder, nearly 1001bs., having been procured from Capt. Abbott, the attempt was made, but I regret to say it also failed. " As it still continued to rain heavily, the troops had been exposed to a severe fire for several hours, Captain Abbott having expended nearly the whole of his ammunition, and every possible means adopted towards gaining an entrance into the Fort having failed of success, I determined at half-past 11 A. M. on withdrawing the troops from before the Fort until the weather cleared up, and certain measures could be taken to ensure success. " Our failure, however, I am happy to say, has proved as good as having gained possession of the Fort; for a short time after we retired, the enemy evacuated the fort of Pushoot, as well as that of Khatake on the opposite bank of the river, both of which are now in our possession; but I am sorry to say, there is nothing in either fort but a small quantity of grain, and about 1001bs. of powder. " I lament to say our loss has been rather severe, (a return of which is enclosed,) which was mainly caused by want of means to reduce a place of such strength. " To Lieut. Pigou the highest praise is due for the gallant and meritorious manner in which he three times advanced to the inner gate under a heavy fire from the enemy, and laid the powder to blow it open, the failure of which can only be attributed to the causes already explained-to the party ATTACK ON 59 PUSHOOT. who accompanied him, under the command of Ensign Pattule, the greatest credit is also due for the manner in which they kept in check the enemy's side. "To Capt. Abbott the highest praise is also due for the manner in which he has conducted the arduous duties devolving upon him, as well as the great service rendered by him yesterday. I also beg to bring to the notice of the Major General, the conspicuous gallantry of Lieut. Tytler, who accompanied Lieut. Pigou on both occasions of bringing the powder, and throughout the day rendered me every assistance; I am also highly indebted to him for the manner in which he has conducted every duty required of him as Assist. Quarter Master General since leaving Jellalabad. " I have much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the Major General, the great assistance I have on all occasions received from Lieut. Pond, whom I appointed as detachment staff. "The highest praise is also due to every officer and man composing the detachment, who have cheerfully borne up against every privation and hardship; and the coolness, gallantry, and ambition of each individual displayed yesterday morning, elicits my warmest thanks and approbation. " In noticing the names of officers to whom I am indebted for assistance during this expedition, I have omitted to mention that of Lieut. Dallas, of the Commissariat Department, who has on all occasions proved himself a most zealous officer in procuring supplies whenever there was any possibility of obtaining them, and also rendering me every assistance during the attack yesterday. Return of Killed and Wounded of a Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Orchard, C. B., before the Fort of Pushoot, on Saturday 18th January, 1840. Camp Pushoot, 18th January, 1840. Artillery, ... ...... Sappers and Miners, 0 Sepoys, 1 Serjeant,- 1 Privates, - 3 1 6 Havildar,Naick, - 1 1 Drummer, Sepoys, - 1 5 Jemadar, 1 Sepoys, 9 Havildars, Sepos, - 2 0 Sepoys, epoys, - 7 7 ... ... Sepoy, - 1 Private, 1 f 7th N. I....1 avildar, Sepoys, H. M.'s Shah Shoojah's .. ... 3d Regt.. - - Sepoyaick, ... 0 ... 1st European Regiment,... Slightly Wounded. Severely Detail. Kill Wounded. Killed. Detail. Lieut. - 2 J. ORCHARD, Lieut. Col. Comdy. Detachment. J. R. POND, Lieut. Detachment Staf. P. S. The Trooper of Captain Christie's horse wounded. Seven horses drowned in crossing the Forts. 60 THE HINDOO KOOSH. Nominal Roll of Officers Killed and Wounded. Lieutenant Collinson, 37th Regt., severely wounded.' Ensign Hicks, 1st Eur. Regt., ditto ditto. Jemadar Gunace Tewary, H. M. Shah Soojah 3d Regiment, killed." J. ORCHARD, Lt.-Col., Commg. Detachment. After the affair at Pushoot, the winter began to set in, and Shah Soojah with the Envoy, and a proportion of the troops, took up winter quarters at Jellalabad. Operations against Dost Mahomed, who was now ascertained to be under the protection of the Usbegs, were therefore in a measure suspended, and the political officers stationed throughout the country from Khelat to Cabul, employed themselves in testing the feeling of the country towards the restored dynasty, in assuring the adherence of those who voluntarily yielded submission, and in devising measures of hostility against those who still refused to recognise the new power. It was only at Bameean, on the Hindoo Koosh, that activity was rendered necessary, by the importance of securing the post, and of counteracting the intrigues of the Ex-Ameer, Dost Mahomed, with the tribes in the neighbourhood. The series of operations arising out of this policy extended over so long a period of time, and were in themselves of so interesting and important a nature, that the history of British proceedings in Affghanistan would be imperfect, if they were not described with the utmost minuteness, compatible with the dimensions of this volume. No apology therefore is necessary for the following copious reprint from an admirable paper, which appeared in successive numbers of the Bengal Hurkaru, descriptive of the proceedings of our political officers, and the small body of troops placed at their disposal. The details have never been contradicted, and may therefore be relied upon; and though it is foreign from the purpose of this work to give the opinions of the authorities from whom facts are quoted, it is but common justice to say of the author of " The British on the Hindoo Koosh," that his presages were generally justified by results-his opinions borne out by later events. " The valley of Bameean, from Zohauk to Scorunkhdhurr,t its western termination, is about 14 miles in length, and varies in breadth from half a * This officer afterwards died of his wounds. t " The red gate," so called from the colour of the hills and rocks around. THE VALLEY OF BAMEEAN. 61 mile to 80 paces. Between Topshee and the eastern extremity it is about 4 or 500 yards in width, and but little cultivated, there being a considerable quantity of bush jungul on the banks of the stream, particularly in the neighbourhood of Zohauk. Above Topshee the valley is exceedingly tortuous, and is scarcely wider than the stream, which, in fact, at some periods of the year, when swollen by the melting snow, does entirely fill the narrow opening between the hills; but at about four miles from Bameean the hills recede considerably, and the valley assumes a more pleasing appearance, being highly cultivated, and occasionally enlivened by a few trees, chiefly willows and poplars. Zohauk, however, is a pretty spot, as well as Topshee and Ahinghur, a small fort about a mile higher up than the former place. Generally speaking, wherever there is a fort there are a few trees, and this gives a pleasing aspect to a place which otherwise would present but little attraction. The valley opens near the fort of Moolla Meer Mahomed, situated on a somewhat high bank, at the entrance of a narrow gorge leading to the north. Thence following the course of the stream up its left bank, the traveller passes two forts, one of which, called Lalla Khall, is of a considerable size, and perched upon a lofty cliff overhanging, and on the opposite side of, the river which separates the two forts. About half a mile beyond Lalla Khall, the valley again contracts, and the narrow pathway* usually followed, skirts the side of the rocky hills on the right, the base of which is washed by the river, which here, impeded in its course by rocks and stones, flows turbulently on. But after pursuing this straggling path for a distance of scarce a hundred yards, you again enter a more open space, in which, at about a mile and a half from the jutting rock, and close under the northern hills, our camp was pitched. The valley was here about half a mile in breadth: close in our front was a group of four forts, three of which were on the further or Southern bank of the stream: around them were a few trees of a goodly size, and beyond them, and close where the Fouladi valley forms a junction with that of Bameean, rose a dense clump of trees (somewhat resembling the poplar in their uniform straightness) situated in a spacious Zyarut or burial ground. On our right, and on a slope, in front of the big image, were the ruins of a village surrounded by a battlemented, but now dilapidated, wall. Beyond was to be seen the fort, also in ruins, where Yazdanbuksh, the Hazareh chief, had been some few years before treacherously slain by Hadji Khan Kakur. There are several other ruins in the neighbourhood, some of which are on a table land, which rises about 200 feet above the valley, to the South of it, and East of that of Fouladi; and which extends to the base of the lower hills of the Koh-i* The old road through the valley is a mere pathway, and uniformly keeps the Northern side of the valley, except at Zohaqk, where it necessarily crosses the stream to reach that place. The guns were obliged to follow a different line, frequently crossing the river and passing through the fields. 62 THE VALLEY OF BAMEEAN. baba range. These old forts appear to have been of a superior structure to those which are now met with in the valley: one of them, 'in particular, is admirably situated for defence, being placed immediately overhanging the junction of the two valleys, and separated from the table land to the East of it by a small dhurrah, while to the South the only communication with it, is by a narrow natural causeway. At the base of the eminence on which the ruins stand, flows the Fouladi stream, access to which is effectually secured by a small tower at the base of the rock. " There are several streams, which, flowing from the neighbouring ranges, pour their waters into the river of Bameean. Of these the principal one is that of Fouladi, which, taking its rise among the rocky hills, which bound the southern view, flows from the south west, for about six miles, through a rich valley, nearly equal in breadth and productiveness to that in which we were located; the stream, after washing, as before mentioned, the foot of the eminence surmounted by the ruined fort, forms a junction 1,200 yards lower down, with the Bameean river. Still half a mile lower there is another stream, which waters a narrow, but well cultivated valley, lying at the foot of the eastern slope of the table land, and confined on the other side by more lofty hills. Near Ahinghur or Tifonchee, there are two other streams, also issuing from the southern hills, and at Topshees there is a considerable rivulet, along the banks of which is the principal road leading to the Ghaut of Shutur Gurdun* at Kaloo. Besides these there are several stony defiles leading into the mountains on either side, but these are for the most part dry, except at certain seasons after sudden melting of the snow. " The view in the valley is at all times much circumscribed. From Bameean itself, barely two miles of the valley can be seen, and that principally to the eastward, for immediately at the foot of the big image the ground, on the northern bank, rises, and as the river bends to the southern side of the valley, the view in that direction is closed by the slope, above which, however, are to be seen the red hills enclosing the defile of Soorukdhurrah. To the south, looking from Bameean, rise a chain of rocky hills, rearing on high their dark, naked peaks; in recesses and clefts among these mountains where the rays of the sun can seldom penetrate, large patches of snow remain during the entire year. The hills, however, which enclose the valley on the north, are insignificant in height, and very different in appearance from those opposite to them; being invariably of a reddish hue, and of indurated clay, interspersed occasionally with huge rocks of red granite. Eastward the valley extends as far as the jutting rock before mentioned, while beyond, the spectator observes the rocks which bound the narrow valley below Jalla Khail, and towering above them the rounded summits of the hills, branching off from Kaloo and * * * * * Irak. * " Shutur Gurdun"-camel's neck. ARRIVAL OF THE DETACHMENT. 63 " As the detachment entered the valley of Bameean, everything denoted the rapid advent of winter. Snow fell upon our tents, on the 6th of October, when encamped at Zohauk, and again on the morning of the 7th, we observed it snowing fast in the northern hills, while a few flakes fell in the valley. The tall trees of the Zyarut had been stript of their leaves by the cold wintry blast, and the corn, already cut, lay in heaps on the ground, where it was trod out by the " unmuzzled oxen." The approach of this rigorous season, is, amongst the Koosh mountains, at all times sudden, and occasionally it has been known to come on so rapidly as to cause the destruction of standing crops by premature falls of snow. It was intensely cold when we first arrived, and in a few days after, the thermometer fell in the morning to 14 or 16 above zero. The husbandmen hastened the gathering in of their corn, and we, on our part, began to consider the best means by which we might shelter men and cattle from the rigors of a mountain winter. " Dr. Lord arrived a few days after the detachment, and in a short time, a bargain was struck with the owners, for the use of three of the neighbouring forts. These edifices are usually constructed of sun-baked mud; they are enclosed by a high wall about 30 yards square, and from 20 to 30 feet in height, flanked by round towers, placed at each angle, the summits of them being sometimes on a level with the top of the wall, but more generally about ten feet higher. In the interior are the rude huts which constitute the dwelling places of the inhabitants. The predatory habits of the natives of Central Asia have led to the construction of such forts throughout the whole country. Against bands of marauders they form excellent places of defence: the walls being of sufficient height to prevent their being easily surmounted, and being, as well as the towers, pierced for matchlock fire to bear on all the ground surrounding. Yet have they been often captured by both Affghans and Usbegs; often treachery, at other times the extraordinary negligence of the garrison is the cause. In the latter case, the capture is effected at night, and generally by one of these two plans. The first method is by introducing a single man into the Fort, who climbs over the wall, and, opening the gateway from the inside, admits his comrades. Another plan is, by quietly boring through the wall, to force an entrance into one of the huts inside, and thus carry the place by surprise. I have been credibly informed, that by such simple means as these, the Affghans have often captured forts, which might have resisted an open display of force for a considerable time; but great, indeed, must be the apathy and carelessness of the defenders to allow their forts to fall through such stratagems as these. " The forts which were selected for the troops, were of that group which I have mentioned as being situated immediately in front of our camp, and were all on the further or Southern bank of the river. Together they formed an irregular triangle, the forts themselves marking the angles. 64 THE INHABITANTS OF THE VALLEY. Two of them were allotted to the Infantry, and were of the construction above described; but the third, that of the Artillery, was of a large and superior build. It consisted of two compartments, each about 32 yards square-the fort lay North and South-the Northern. compartment had lofty walls and towers surmounted with battlements, and provided with machicoulis. The other part of the fort was not so well constructed; in it, eventually, stables were erected for the horses. This was not, however, accomplished without much difficulty, on account of the great scarcity of wood adapted for building purposes. " The Bameeanchis, or inhabitants of the valley of Bemeean, are Tajicks, while the dwellers among the hills around are principally Hazarehs. These two races, though perfectly distinct in origin and religion, bear to each other a striking resemblance. In either tribe is to be remarked the broad, flat face, with high cheek bones, and small eyes, which would best proclaim a Tartar descent: the Tajicks are, however, supposed to be the aborigines of the country, while the Hazarehs have a better claim to Tartar origin, as they, I believe, first made their appearance among the mountains of Affghanistan, with the army of Jenghis-Khan. Both the Bameeanchis and Hazarehs are extremely fair, with frequently light hair and eyes; their forms are robust and athletic; but their air is ungainly, and their countenances present more signs of stupidity than intelligence. They are simple, good-natured men, perfectly free from the blustering insolence and murder-loving propensities of the other tribes of the country. I do not mean, however, that the Hazarehs have not their blood feuds (which can only be ended by the murder of the hostile party) like the Affghans, but their behaviour towards us was peaceable and friendly. Officers could ride in the neighbourhood, unarmed and unattended, to a distance of upwards of thirty miles, while in other parts of Affghanistan, a man's life was scarcely safe beyond the precincts of the camp. The natives of Bameean and its neighbourhood have long been a suffering race, being subject to the oppressive inroads of both Affghan and Usbeg, the former exacting heavy contributions, while the latter were wont to make sudden dashes into the valley and carry off a few unfortunate prisoners, who were thenceforth condemned to a life of slavery in Toorkistan. But there are some tribes of the Hazarehs, who, trusting in the great strength of their mountain fastnesses have long defied, both the Affghan and the Toork; among these are the Deh Zangee, Yehalung, and Sheik Ali Hazarehs. The two former tribes are located westward of Bameean, while the latter, I have before mentioned, as dwelling near the passes eastward of Irak. These tribes are predatory, and are a source of terror to merchants with cafilas, on which they levy duties as they pass through or near their districts. The Deh Zangees held, for years before our arrival, a post on a hill immediately above the hills of the Soonik Dharraho defile, from whence they were wont to await the arrival of the numerous caravans, THE 65 HAZAREHS-SYGHAN. which annually pass by that route. These tribes, occasionally make forages on less warlike districts, and the Sheik Ali Hazarehs have even visited and levied black mail in the valley of Bameean. The Hazarehs, in their own mountain land, are brave and resolute, and it is related, (though I cannot vouch for the truth of the story,) that thirteen men stopped the whole army of Morad Beg. That monarch, some years ago, invaded the countries south of his dominions, and after capturing Syghan and destroying some villages, he reached Bameean. But on attempting to penetrate by the Kaloo defile, it is said, that thirteen Hazarehs, posted in the rocks around, opposed his progress, and after slaying several of his men, so intimidated the Usbeg Army, that the Meer of Koondooz was forced to retrace his steps. " Enough of these mountaineers-to return to my narrative. On the 15th, the snow fell heavily in the valley, and on the following day, those of the troops, for whom huts were ready, took possession of their posts; in a few days, the barracks were completed, and the remainder were put into winter quarters. But there was a part of the detachment, which, it was This was soon found it would be impossible to retain during the winter. the cavalry, consisting of about 100 of Christie's horse, and 800 Affghan horse, under Abdoolla Khan Atchekzye, Abdool Ruheem Khan, and Guddo Khan. There was neither stabling, nor a sufficiency of forage for so many horses, indeed we had some fear that we should scarcely find the supply of the latter article adequate for the keep of the gun horses. " Under these circumstances, it became necessary to send this arm of our force back to Cabul. With regard to the Affghans, independent of the reasons above mentioned, we had others still more weighty for desiring the absence of those gentry; for Dr. Lord, soon after his arrival, discovered that the Sirdars were in active correspondence with Dost Mahomed Khan! So much for the fidelity of Affghan friends; yet, Guddo Khan, the elephant stealer, has since done service to the state in two engagements in the Zemindeawer and Ghilzie districts. "But we did not long remain quiescent in our forts; for before the month had closed, intelligence reached us from northward, warning us that the time for action had commenced. " The valley of Syghan runs parallel to that of Bameean, and is separated from it by a range of hills, 10,000 feet in height. In the palmy days of the Affghan empire, Syghan was subject to the Dooranee monarchs, whose rule extended to the banks of the Oxus; but during the civil dissensions which occurred in the commencement of the present century, the countries north of the Hindoo Khoosh were lost to the crown of Cabul. Within the last ten years, the chief of Syghan had been in the habit of paying tribute to both Moorad Beg of Koondooz, and to the Ameer of Cabul, or rather to whichever of the two states might have the immediK 66 THE VALLEY OF SYGHAN. ate power to enforce such payment. But when the power of Koondooz fell, and Kooloom became independent, Dost Mahomed Khan asserted his supremacy north of the Koosh. At the time that Mr. Masson visited these mountains, H aji Khan Kakur, the Governor of Bameean, exercised absolute power as far as the Dundan Shikun Pass; and only a year before our invasion, Meer Akrum Khan, (one of the Ameer's sons,) marched even as far as Kooloom, capturing Syghan, Kamurd, and other places on his route. It would appear from this that these transmontane chiefs never acknowledged the supremacy of their more powerful neighbours, until compelled by the presence of a force. At the period to which my narrative has arrived, the valley of Syghan was torn by internal dissensions. There were two chiefs in the valley, either of whom claimed superiority and the possession of the principal fort. Of the two, Mahomed Ali Beg was the actual holder of the fort of Sar-i-Sung, but his adversary, (a young Usbeg, by name Khilich Beg,) asserted that his father and uncle had been foully dispossessed and murdered by his rival. The consequence was, that the valley of Syghan became nearly a desert; the fields lay waste, for the one would not sow, lest it might eventually be the lot of the other to reap the corn. Neither chief durst move through the valley, unless followed by a numerous retinue, with mounted scouts in advance, to see that no enemy lay in ambush. The paltry squabbles of these Usbeg Montagus and Capulets, at length brought the British and Toorkistan forces into collision. Khilich Beg applied to the Wallee of Kooloom for assistance against his more powerful and successful rival; and that monarch immediately seized the opportunity thus offered, for extending his powers so far beyond his actual possessions. But there was other influence at work. Dost Mahomed Khan was residing, and in high favour, at the court of the Meer Wallee, and the expedition was probably entered upon more with a view to benefit him, by giving him possession of a stronghold on the very borders of the empire, from which he had just been expelled. " About six or seven hundred Usbeg horse were accordingly despatched from Kooloom, under the command of Gholaum Beg, the eldest son of the chief of that place, and having joined the party of Khilich Beg, together they encamped beneath the walls of Sar-i-Sung, and laid siege to that fort, I should rather say, blockaded it, for they took no active measures for its reduction. A confidential follower of the ex-Ameer was in the camp of the besiegers, and, it was generally supposed, that in the event of the capture of the place, this man was to have been nominated Governor in the name of Dost Mahomed Khan. " Khilich Beg having called in the Kooloom power, it was natural that Mahomed Ali Beg should turn his attention towards us; for he felt, of course, that he could not resist, unsupported, the power of Kooloom. He had before been subject to Cabul, and he determined on returning to his allegiance : he accordingly sent a messenger to the Political Agent, FORAY ON THE USBEGS. 67 acknowledging the supremacy of Shah Soojah, and in return requesting our aid against his enemies. He did not ask in vain. " Had there been no other reason for our interference, this surely was sufficient; that a chieftain, who had long paid tribute to Cabul, (for Mahomed Ali Beg is a very old man,) and who had given his allegiance to the monarch of our choice, claimed our help against the ruler, who had received, with open arms, the known enemy of Shah Soojah. But there were other and far more urgent incentives to action. Our own safety was involved in that of Sar-i-Sung. It was essential to our well-being that that fort should remain in the hands of a friend. It would have been madness to have sat tamely, while our enemy was securing to himself the possession of a stronghold beneath our very eyes. The petty Usbeg chief could not have successfully resisted, for any length of time; the fort must have fallen into the hands of Dost Mahomed and his Usbeg friends; it would become a sort of rallying point to our enemies, from whence they could have harassed and annoyed our small detachment during the winter. It was of the utmost importance, moreover, to impress our neighbours with a due idea of our power, vigour, and daring. Had we, on the other hand, remained quiet spectators of the doings at Syghan, so manifestly hostile to our interests, such forbearance would have been attributed to fear and a knowledge of our own weakness. Fortunately, Dr. Lord was a man of a vigorous mind, quick and accurate in judgment, and decisive in action. Our small detachment was entirely thrown upon its own resources, and it became absolutely necessary to conceal our real weakness and insufficiency to cope with the dangers with which we were surrounded: at this period, a shew of irresolution or timidity would have greatly embarrassed our situation ; but one bold stroke insured to us tranquillity and safety during the ensuing winter. '" Lord's plans were soon formed : he communicated with the military superior, and a detachment was immediately prepared for secret service, while the Political Agent despatched a messenger to Gholaum Beg, desiring him to quit Syghan immediately, and warning him, that should he remain there after sunset on the 30th, he might expect a visit from the Feringees. Lord's design was to make a foray or chupao on the camp of the besiegers; and the country between Syghan and Bameean being of a very difficult nature, and the great object of the expedition being celerity of movement, so as to effect a surprise on the enemy,-no ordnance accompanied the detachment, which was ordered to be composed as follows : sixty-five non-commissioned officers and troopers from the Native Horse Artillery, under Lieut. Mackenzie; one hundred and twenty bayonets from the Shah's Goorkah corps, under Lieut. Broadfoot, and a detachment of Christie's horse,* under a native officer; the whole party being com* A small detail of this corps had been left at Bameean, for the purpose of escorting camels to Cabul. 68 THIE CHUPPAO. manded by Captain Hay. In addition to these troops, about thirty or forty Affghan horse, belonging to the Agency, accompanied the detachment, under the command of Lieut. Rattray ; and the Hakim* of Bameean supplied his quota of one hundred Affghan horse. " The destination of the detachment was not known until the 30th, and at sunset of that day, before which time it was calculated that Gholaum Beg must have received Dr. Lord's message, the party set out from Bameean. " It was a long and weary march, and the nights were then intensely cold. At first they wound by a straggling path through dark and narrow glens, rendered still more dreary and dismal by the dim and uncertain light of the stars; then mounting the almost perpendicular face of the mountain, by a steep winding road, they traversed, for many miles, the undulating summits of the hills, until they reached the small fort of Akrobat, situated about midway between Bameean and Syghan. Here the detachment was obliged to halt awhile, as many were still behind, the cavalry portion having far outstripped the infantry, who were, however, mounted on tattoos; but there were many of them of but inferior description, while others had to carry double weight, so they did not progress very rapidly. As soon as the stragglers had been collected, the party again set forward, and, after crossing the Kotul of Akrobat, plunged into a series of the most tremendous and gloomy defiles. Here, through the darkness and the roughness of the pathway which they followed, they were necessarily obliged to travel with caution, so that the sun had already gilded the summits of the hills, when they reached the small valley and solitary fort at Iliatoo. Here the little party was formed, in order to be in readiness for the coming attack; and they marched on, expecting every moment, as they rounded some projecting rock, to come in sight of the Tartar camp; but it was not until they had journeyed some six miles beyond Iliatoo, that the fort of Sar-i-Sung, perched on the summit of a lofty rock, burst upon their view. As the leading files entered the valley, the defenders hailed the approach of the Feringees with loud and exulting cheers. These cries seem to have given the enemy the first notice of the approach of our troops, for when the cavalry debouched from some orchards which surround the rock on which the fort stands, the Usbegs were seen rapidly flocking to the centre of their camp, and mounting their horses, which were there picketed in rows. " At first it was supposed that the Usbegs were forming line to receive our attack; and, the word being given, the native troopers and Affghan horse, led by their respective officers, dashed forward to the charge, while the infantry followed in support. But the idea of resistance never entered the minds of those composing the valorous host opposed to us; each man * " Hakim"-Governor. THE FLIGHT OF THE USBEGS. 69 mounted his horse, and they fled separately, each seeking his own individual safety; some pursuing their rapid course down the valley, while others mounted the steep hills, inclosing it on the north. The troopers and Rattray's horse galloped past the enemy's camp, which remained standing, and continued the pursuit some distance down the valley; but I am sorry to say, that the greater number of the men composing the Hakim's quota, considered the Usbeg tents as the proper termination to the chase; for they pulled up, and immediately commenced serious work in what is in their eyes the main object of every expedition-plunder. This appears to be the invariable custom of the Affghan soldier; he never dreams of pursuing, but as soon as the enemy is driven off, he turns to reap what harvest may have been left on the field. It is thus that they have frequently met with complete overthrows, after having first gained the day; the enemy returning and pouncing on them when in confusion, and unprepared for a fresh attack. " The fields around Syghan are, many of them, marshy, and the valley is much intersected by ditches, so that our men, not being accustomed to steeple chases, met with many awkward, but, fortunately, harmless, accidents. Fear lent wings to the Usbegs, and but few of them were overtaken. The chase was, however, continued some miles down the valley, before the troops were recalled from the fruitless pursuit. As for Gholaum Beg, though the greatest efforts were made to capture him, he got clear off, and did not draw bridle till he reached Kamurd. Khilich Beg, being hard pressed, shut himself up, with a few followers, in a small fort belonging to Murad Beg, about a mile and a half below Syghan. The pursuit was continued beyond this, and when returning, our people were fired on by the men inside; but, luckily, no further damage was done than wounding two horses. The detachment had not left Bameean totally unprepared for such an emergency, but two bags of powder had been provided for the purpose of blowing open a gate, should such a step be necessary. However, on being summoned by Doctor Lord, Khilich Beg agreed to come in and submit, a promise which he fulfilled a few days afterwards. " Meantime, the Infantry had climbed the hills in pursuit of those who had fled in that direction; but they met with as little success as the Cavalry. The Goorkahs are famed for their activity, and the facility with which they climb the mountain side; but the Usbegs had the start, and kept it. They are not in general well mounted, but it is surprising to see the ease and safety with which their small horses gallop along the narrow, dizzy pathways among hills, which appear nearly inaccessible. So our men only got a few long shots at them, which did not, I imagine, cause much slaughter. However, it was not our object to destroy them, but more to instil a little fear; in order to insure our own safety. Their loss must have been slight, not above 7 or 8 killed or wounded: I 70 DEFECTION OF DOST MAHOMED'S FOLLOWERS. should consider that the utmost. Of our party, one Affghan was mortally wounded. " This little affair, although so bloodless, no doubt created a favorable impression among both friends and enemies. About one hundred horsemen and the same number of infantry, put to flight a far superior body of Usbegs. Native accounts, if I remember aright, numbered the latter at six or seven hundred; but I fancy their strength would be more correctly stated at three hundred and fifty, or four hundred fighting men, with grooms and other followers. Of our own party, I have before mentioned, that the Hakim's men, mostly, stopt to plunder; the detachment of Irregular horse did not come up until the affair had been concluded. "' The Usbegs were completely surprised, and left their camp and baggage on the ground. It is said that when Gholaum Beg received Lord's message, he laughed, and said, " the Feringhees are elephants, and cannot move quick; it will be time to go, when we hear of their starting." He afterwards complained that we were down upon him too soon; for that he had intended to start at ten o'clock that morning. Poor man ! he not only lost all his camp equipage, but his breakfast to boot; his pillau was found smoking on the fire. " The detachment returned to Bameean immediately after having raised the siege of Sar-i-Sang; and the beneficial effects of the measure soon shewed themselves. Dost Mahomed's star, which had for a time shone forth, was again dimmed by a cloud; his fortunes waned, and the natural consequence was, that of those who had followed the unfortunate monarch into exile, many now deserted him in his utmost need; his funds failed fast, and the ex-Ameer was forced to grant a discharge to those of his followers, who demanded it. During the month of November, many of these, with their wives and families, passed through Bameean on their way to Cabul. It truly seemed an act of baseness to forsake the fallen man, whose favours they had enjoyed during the hour of prosperity ; yet some excuse may be offered. They were reduced to the most lamentable plight, if the accounts which we received may be relied on. The Ameer had no money, and could not support so many dependents; they were therefore, obliged to resort to the sale of horses and other property, to procure the means of subsistence for themselves and families. They remained with him for some time, hoping that fortune would wear a more favorable aspect; but Gholaum Beg's unsuccessful expedition to Syghan, dissipated any bright visions which might have been conjured up, and Dost Mahomed himself, now lachar and dispirited, gave to many a written discharge, under his own seal, and bade them seek their livelihood elsewhere. " During November and the early part of the following month, but little occurred to interrupt the monotony of our existence. The winter gradually increased in severity, but we were now able to bid defiance to the RETURN TO BAMEEAN. 71 frosts and snows of this dreary region. The troops were all established in winter quarters as comfortably as we could expect. "The expulsion of the Wallee's troops from the valley of Syghan, had the effect of opening our communications with Toorkistan; and various diplomatic efforts were now made, which had for their object the capture or surrender of the Ameer; but unfortunately, these negociations were unattended by success. It is certain, that the natives of Central Asia, have on some points very strict notions of honour; for though Dost Mahomed has been at different periods in the power of the Affghan, the Usbeg, and the Hazareh, and though large sums have been always offered for possession of his person, yet no one has been found base enough to betray the fugitive monarch, though he has trusted himself among those who were at one time his open enemies. " Our immediate neighbours, the inhabitants of Bameean and its vicinity, appeared to be a quiet and orderly race of people. The lower ordersespecially were friendly and inoffensive towards us, professedly preferring the presence of our orderly troops, to that of the rude Affghan soldiers, who had formerly been quartered in the valley, and who were wont to oppress and lord it over the less warlike cultivators of the soil. They shewed a decided partiality towards British arbitration, for they almost invariably appealed to the justice of the Agent, instead of to that of the Affghan Governor. Such I believe also, to be the case in various other parts of the country, for these native superintendents are not much famed for even-handed justice; the longest purse carries more weighty arguments than the clearest evidence; and the principal object with these gentry appears to be the screwing as much money as possible, out of the unfortunate ryots. The Hakim, whom we found established at Bameean, on our arrival, was recalled, on the representation of Dr. Lord, before the close of the year. But there was one class of people to whom our coming was by no means agreeable ; they considered us as interlopers, and industriously endeavoured to create a party against us; these were the chiefs, influential men of the valley, who, albeit they had no particular fault to find with us, felt their power was weakened, and independence threatened by our presence: no doubt, too, they yet retained some attachment towards the old regime, under which they had often enjoyed an immunity from taxes through the inability of the Governors to coerce them. These men, a short time after our arrival, united and formed a conspiracy against us : but, fortunately, their plans were timely discovered, and frustrated by the Political Agent, Dr. Lord. "But little snow fell in the valley in the month of December, but the lofty hills encircling us were clothed in one sheet of white, save where rose some dark sharp ridges, which presented no resting place for the flakes. Before the 15th, the Passes over the Hindoo Koosh were closed against 72 THE WINTER AT BAMEEAN. all but footmen, and consequently our communication with Cabul became less frequent, and more difficult. But the roads leading to the northward were still open, and it was about this time, or rather earlier in the month, that we received reports from Toorkistan, which again interrupted the quiet tenor of our lives. In the course of the preceding month, we heard that the Dost had been meditating a flight towards Persia, notwithstanding several urgent solicitations or commands from the King of Bokhara to repair to his Court. On the 9th December, intelligence reached us, that the Ameer had quitted Kooloom, en route to Persia; but that he had been compelled to relinquish his projected journey, and to betake himself to Bokhara; and soon afterwards we heard that the Wallee was bent upon attacking Kamurd; and that the Ameer-ool-Moomuneen, (His Majesty of Bokhara,) had offered his daughter in marriage to the ex-chief of Cabul, with the Province of Balk as a dowry; and that, at the same -time, he promised to aid the fugitive monarch towards the recovery of his dominions, by despatching forthwith an army of 12,000 men to overwhelm the garrison of Bameean. Now, although much credence was not due to such a report, yet it was not altogether unworthy of consideration. Prudence is by no means a bad quality, when it is not allied to fear; all of our little society at Bameean agreed that, though the march of an army from Bokhara to our valley was by no means a probable event, it would be advisable to take such precautions as lay in our power, and to strengthen our position as much as possible. " The time had now come, when our little detachment of scarce 700 bayonets, was entirely thrown upon its own resources; we knew that no aid could come to us; grim winter with his frosts and snows had barred all access to our valley from the Cabul side, we were alone, and exposed to the attacks of all the hordes of Tartary. It was on a consideration of these peculiar circumstances of our situation, that it was determined to construct intrenchments, capable of resisting any attacks of an enemy unprovided with artillery. Our position was not a particularly good one, in a military point of view, being overlooked and commanded by hills on either side, at distances respectively of about 600 and 350 yards; yet no more favorable spot could be found in the valley, the distance between the hills being there at its utmost extent, and our three forts being so placed as to afford mutual defence, (forming as it were, the three angles of a triangle,) and to command access to either river. The table land above would have afforded a much stronger position; but the idea of forming intrenchments there could not, for a moment, be entertained at that period of the year, as there was no shelter for our troops. Dr. Lord, although he fully concurred in the advisability of erecting the proposed breastworks, was dissatisfied with the position, on account of the defects noted above; and it was partly with a view to reconnoitre the neighbouring valley of Syghan, in hopes of finding there a more favorable spot, and partly SAR-I-SUNG. 73 on account of the moral influence which he expected a forward movement would create, that he determined on proceeding in person to Sar-i-Sung, accompanied by a detachment, eventually destined to garrison that fortress. * " The party (consisting of two Companies of Infantry and 25 troopers as Cavalry, with two mortars and a 3-pounder gun) left Bameean on the 17th of December; and about the same time the intrenchments were commenced under the direction of Lieutenants Broadfoot and Mac- kenzie. " Immediately on debouching from the defile, the traveller, turning his eyes to the right, beholds the grey battlements of Sar-i-Sung, while, immediately in front, and but a few paces distant, is the Mehman-Khaneh, by which name is dignified a row of dome-roofed huts, enclosed by a square wall; the accommodation which these afford, would not exactly accord with our notions of hospitality ; yet, nevertheless, their dirty walls have, I doubt not, often yielded most welcome shelter from the wintry winds to the way-worn and benumbed traveller. " The fort ist perched on the summit of an isolated rock, about 120 feet high, and but a short distance from the hills bounding the valley on the southern side; its shape is oblong, the greatest length being east and west,-and the walls are of brick, and, though far from substantial except on one side, are stronger than those of the generality of forts to be met with. The rock on two sides (the western and southern) is completely perpendicular, and on the other sides, only sufficiently sloping to admit of the narrow winding pathways, which lead to the gateway in the eastern face; this latter side is the strongest portion of the fort, and is flanked by two well built towers. The interior space is much contracted, and subdivided by a second gateway, over which, as well as above the outer gate, is one of the balakhanehs or principal rooms of the fort. At the foot of the rock on the northern side are the ruins of a village, which was destroyed, I believe, by Morad Beg, and beyond these, and also on the eastern and western sides, there are some orchards of apricot trees. The valley here is about the same breadth as that of Bameean, and it is watered by a small stream, which, immediately after washing the base of the southern hills, flows close under the water of the Mehman-khaneh, and then, bending outwards, skirts the orchards, and continues its course towards the east. Eventually it forms a junction with the rivulets of Bameean and Kamurd, and passing Goree and Koondooz, empties itself into the Oxus. The agent sent an application to Cabal for a reinforcement of four Companies of Infantry ; but, as expected, the supply was refused. t " Sar-i-Sung" means literally the " top of the rock." I have said " is perched," but more correctly I should have written in the past tense, as the building is now no longer. 74 SAR-I- SUNG. " From causes already mentioned, this valley of Syghan is far less productive than that of Bameean. Immediately in front of the fort, and between it and the northern hills, there are several cultivated fields; but towards the west, stony, undulating ground succeeds, and east of the fort, stretch for a considerable distance, some waste lands, green and marshy, entirely neglected by the inhabitants. The hills around are insignificant when compared with those visible from Bameean, as they do not form a portion of the great snowy range; their hue is generally of a reddish brown, their outline rugged, and though low, they are exceedingly difficult to surmount. The most striking feature of the valley is, as may be supposed, the rock and fortress of Sar-i-Sung. The former, viewed from the north or west, rises majestically from the centre of the orchards, which belt its base; and the old grey walls, diversified with tower and keep, frowning over the valley stretched below, remind the traveller of those relics of the feudal ages, which are still frequently to be seen in our own land. But this lordly fortress, in its towering grandeur, presents to the eye an idea of strength, far greater than that which it actually possesses, for immediately to the south, and within easy musket range, is a hill which entirely commands it, and which looks into the interior space, taking the northern battlements in reverse. " The inhabitants of Syghan, Kamurd, and the neighbouring parts, are of several different tribes; even in the same fort, Tajicks, Hazarehs, and Usbegs may be found. Mahomed Ali Beg calls himself a Toork, while Khilich Beg, whose fort is about five miles down the valley, is an Usbeg ; Kudum Shah Beg, again, who lives higher up and nearer the Dundan-iShisun, is an Hazareh. Izit-oollah Khan, of Kamurd, is a Tajick; Sirdar Syud Mahomed, of the Dusht-i-Sufaid, near the Nal-i-Ferish pass, boasts himself a Tartar; Pursund Shah, of Dooab, is of the Hazareh race, and Baba Beg, of Banuck, near Kamurd, is chief of a tribe called Ajuree. Among people of such various races, it is not to be wondered at, that there should be as many interests as clans. Dissensions are, of course, frequent, and it is only when all are equally assailed, threatened by some external foe equally the object of fear or hatred to all, that the Usbeg and Hazareh, the Tartar and the Ajuree, will unite. Most of these were for a time our professed friends. Khilich Beg, however, was at all times an object of suspicion, and Baba Beg Ajuree never joined us ; but he was one of the few. " One of Lord's objects in visiting Syghan was, as I before mentioned, to see whether a better military position might not be there found than that which we occupied at Bameean. But it did not require great examination to shew us, that the fort itself was unfitted for that purpose, both from its size, (it not being capable of holding more than two companies,) and from its situation, being commanded at musket shot distance. The ground, however, occupied by the orchards and between the rock and the river, could have been formed into an exceedingly defensible post by the addition of some field works, as it had the advantage THE DOST PROCEEDS TO BOKHARA. 75 of being screened from fire from the hill by the fort, which might have been held as a citadel, by a few men. The advanced state of the season, and the want of cover for the troops, however, prevented our entertaining any idea of a present change of quarters. There was no event of any consequence occurred during our stay in the valley. Lord's time was principally occupied in receiving the native chiefs, of whom several paid him visits of ceremony, Khilich Beg being among the number. It was curious to observe with what care this last named chief avoided collision with his rival; no doubt, too, he felt considerable satisfaction at seeing his old enemy obliged to yield possession of his stronghold into other hands, and to betake himself to one of his other forts, of a far less ostentatious description; for Mahomed All Beg held several either in his own name, or in that of his son or brother. Most of the neighbouring chiefs, either in person visited the Political Agent, or sent messengers to him; but the man of Banuck seemed to be of a stubborn disposition, and did neither, appearing to be not so fully impressed, as were the others, with our powers and greatness; on the contrary, while we were at Sar-i-Sung, a report came to us, that he actually meditated a chupao on our detachment. [The party return to Bameean, and the author describes the march. He then proceeds.] " Meanwhile Dost Mahomed Khan was an inmate of a prison at Bokhara. " I have said, that the hopes of a brighter fortune, which this unhappy Prince at one time nourished, were rudely frustrated by the intelligence of Gholaum Beg's disaster; and the beneficial working of Lord's vigorous policy was fully developed. It is true, that the evil was merely averted; but as he could not possibly have foreseen the events, which afterwards rendered all the advantage, previously gained, nugatory, the praise due to him for having succeeded in driving the Ameer from the Southern banks of the Oxus, should not be withheld. Despair was largely infused among the followers of the fugitive monarch, and he himself, too, on whom care had laid its heavy hand, no doubt shared in this feeling, and suffered some anxiety to steal upon him, when he heard of the sudden blow struck by the Feringees, and knew not what more might follow. He no longer felt himself secure, and almost immediately prepared for flight towards Persia, where he felt sure of a favourable reception, his mother being a native of that country; but day by day he delayed his departure, perhaps with a lingering hope, that something advantageous might yet occur to prevent the necessity of so long a journey,-perhaps, through financial difficulties; but at length he set out, accompanied by his sons and his brother, the Nuwaub Jubbur Khan: his journey, poor man, did not end in the way which he had anticipated. I never heard the exact route by which he was proceeding, but he must have passed within a short distance of Balkh; for the Governor of that place, which is subject to the rule of Bokhara, sent him 76 THE WINTER AT BAMEEAN. a message, requesting him to give him a meeting, as he had some proposals to make to him on the part of the Ameer-ool-Moomumeen. Dost Mahomed sent his brother the Nuwaub to him, to hear what these proposals might be; but the Governor of Balkh laid hold upon the envoy, and declared that he would not free him until the Ameer in person came. Accordingly the ex-chief went to procure the liberation of his brother, and when arrived at that once famous, but now insignificant city, he found himself little less than a prisoner. Jubbur Khan was released, but the dethroned monarch was informed, that the king of Bokhara desired his presence. Perfectly helpless, he could not but accede, and, perhaps, at the time he entertained hopes of a friendly reception. The Nuwaub returned to Kooloom with his own and the Dost's family, while the other, accompanied by the young Khans, Akbar and Afzul, repaired to Bokhara. There, instead of meeting with the reception, which first reports led us to believe awaited him, the whole party were thrown into dungeons, and thus did Dost Mahomed, in fleeing from the British, who would have proved then, as now, kind hosts rather than enemies, become dependent on the caprices of a tyrant. " The full force of winter set in at Bameean, about the middle of January. Before that time the party had returned from Syghan, with the exception of the Infantry, who had been left there under the command of Lieut. Golding. I must pass briefly over the next few months, for there was nothing worthy of mention occurred during them. We had frequent falls of snow early in the new year, and the frost increased much in intensity, the thermometer, during January, frequently falling to 100 and 120 below Zero; the rivers, both of Fouladi and Bameean were frozen over to a considerable thickness, and springs issuing from the hill side froze, as they trickled down, before they could reach the stream. Our houses admitted the cold air in a very unpleasant manner, and it was seldom that we could keep our rooms sufficiently warm, to raise the quicksilver above the freezing point. Fuel, too, was unfortunately both scarce and expensive, and long before the necessity for fires passed away, we were compelled to burn bushes and shrubs, even assafoetida plant, and dried cow dung. This severe weather was found rather favorable to our European constitutions, but our men suffered severely from the cold. We reduced our number of night sentries as much as possible, on this account, and, fortunately, they had all been well provided with warm clothing, Government having issued poshteens (sheep-skin coats and cloaks) and warm gloves and stockings; still, the Shah's regiment lost several men from affection of the chest and lungs. " The construction of the defensive works, commenced in December, was prosecuted with but little intermission, except at times, when the snow compelled us to desist during the winter months. The soldiers of the garrison, divided into several working parties, as well as about 200 Hazarehs, who were most happy to be hired, were employed in this use- THE WALLEE OF KIIOLOOM. 77 ful labour. But the work did not progress very rapidly; the days were very short, and the mornings and evenings too cold for such employment; the frozen ground too was almost impervious to our pickaxes, and in some places it was so hard, and so thickly interspersed with stone or fragments of rock, that we were obliged to have recourse to blasting. But our supply of powder was too small to allow of our expending it thus, except when absolutely obliged, otherwise we should have completed the lines much quicker. All idea of their necessity had soon passed away, yet we still thought our time well employed in their formation. After events fully proved their utility, for although not actually reduced to defend them against an enemy; still there is but little doubt that the knowledge of their existence alone prevented the more rapid advance of the Ameer and the allied forces ; and thus, time was given us to augment our strength and resume the offensive. " From time to time we received accounts of the progress of the Russian army towards Khiva, but this gave us no cause of anxiety, as the failure of the expedition was generally expected; our attention was more particularly directed towards the prisoner of Bokhara and the Nuwaub of Kooloom. The former had been deprived by his arbitrary master of nearly all his dependents, only five or six men besides his sons being allowed to remain with him; the remainder were sent back to Tush Koorghan. Jubber Khan, now left alone, seemed much inclined to accept the offer of the British, but he wavered yet for a long time. The Wallee had, very generously, yielded to him for his maintenance, the transit duties on merchandize passing through his dominion: so he was now better able to support his still somewhat numerous party. The principal cause of the Nuwaub's indecision seems to have been a threat, which, it is reported, the king of Bokhara held out, that the news of Jubbar Khan's surrender to us, would be the signal for the decapitation of his brother. Whether this was the case or not, I cannot, say: but there is no doubt that the family long time feared that such a result would attend their departure from Kooloom. On the 20th of February, the eldest son of the Nuwaub, a lad of about eighteen years of age, named Abdool Ghunnie Khan, attended by a small sowarrie, arrived in our lines, having been sent by his father, with friendly messages to Lord. The Khan, a sharp, intelligent youth, was of course received and treated with the utmost kindness, and he in a short time, declared himself so pleased with his changed circumstances, that he would not willingly return to Kooloom, except for the express purpose of bringing the Nuwaub with him to Bameean. He looked upon the Dost's situation in a very philosophical manner, considering him already a dead man, and therefore the fate which might await him, in case the Nuwaub came in, a matter of but small consequence. Some months after, the Ameer made use of similar expressions; for, when he was engaged with the Wallee, in his campaign against the Kaffers, being reminded that his wife and family were in our power, he merely answered, " I have no family, I have buried my wife and children." 78 THE VALLEY OF FOULADI. " In the month of March, though the winter had not actually passed away, a considerable change in the weather took place. The snow had entirely disappeared from the valley, and the ice had been broken up and washed away by the swelling waters of the rivers; the days became warmer, though it still froze hard at night, (but no longer with such intensity,) and snow occasionally fell. It was in this month that there occurred in the neighbourhood of Bameean, one of those events, which so often happen in a country conquered, but not subdued; and which, however much they are to be deplored, yet cannot be avoided without injury to the interests of the state, or disgrace to its arms. "The circumstance to which I allude was an affair which took place on the 14th of the month, between us and some Hazarehs of the neighbourhood. It was a very unfortunate event, and at the time led to much censure being heaped on Lord's head, through a total ignorance of the circumstances of the case on the part of those who blamed him. The contumacy of a few obstinate men obliged us to proceed to vigorous measures, which, however, I am glad to say, were unattended with gross tyranny and wanton barbarity. " The valley of Fouladi from its embouchure leads towards the Southwest, penetrating the Kohi Baba range. For a distance of some six miles, it is of considerable breadth, but at that point, it branches into several narrow dharrahs, each watered by a small stream, all of which unite at nearly the same point, forming the larger rivulet which flows into the Bameean river. These dharrahs run into the very heart of the mountains, the streams rising at the foot of the dark rocky clefts which contain the perpetual snows. Above the point of separation, there are but few forts, and these are perched above the valley's terreplein, usually on some level ledge in the hill side, or in a sheltered nook of the mountains : but the spaces between the forks formed by three of these dells, are occupied by table-lands, raised above the bottom below about 150 feet, and of triangular shapes; upon these there are upwards of twenty forts, grouped in different places, but never at any great distance apart. Over these, there were two chieftains, Mir Moheb and Shah Nusser, who were indeed the heads of all the Hazareh tribes, dwelling between Bameean and the Kohi Baba : it was with the inhabitants of some of these forts, the subjects of the last named potentate, that our quarrel commenced. " I have before casually adverted to the difficulty we experienced in providing forage for the horses belonging to our detachment. Before the winter set in, we were in the habit of sending men to a considerable distance, to a spot amid the hills near Akrobat, where there was a quantity of the long dry chummun grass. This was of a bad quality, very far from nutritious, but as a pis aller we collected as much as possible, until the snows and frosts drove our people to seek shelter in the valley, and thenceforward, we were obliged to depend on the supplies of dried lucerne and straw, which the neighbouring forts and caves contained. The natives sold willingly, though at heavy prices, as long as their stock lasted ; but day by day, as time wore on, we were obliged to QUARREL WITH THE HAZAREHS. 79 extend our forage circle, although on the representation of the commissary, the officer in charge of the artillery had considerably reduced the daily feeds of the gun-horses. The commissariat agent travelled sometimes to a considerable distance in search of forage, even to Shibr and Kaloo. In March he succeeded in purchasing a large supply of boosah (at exorbitant charge*) at one of Shah Nusser's forts on the table-land. From this he was in the habit of taking away and bringing into the lines, a certain quantity daily, not having carriage sufficient to remove all at one time. But on the 13th, while he was thus engaged, a quarrel arose at the fort; it apparently originated between the Hazarehs and some Affghan sowars, who had gone thither to purchase grain for the use of Abdool Ghunnie Khan. The cause of the disturbance was never satisfactorily ascertained, but it ended in, not only the Affghans, but our own people also, being driven off and pelted. On this, one of our people, naturally provoked by such unmerited (for such it appeared to be, as far as we could learn,) treatment, uttered some threats which the Hazarehs received contemptuously. " This incident we learned about midday on the 13th, and messengers were immediately despatched by the Political Agent, to learn from Shah Nusser the cause of the outbreak; but no answer was returned, further than, that he declined our interference in toto. Mir Moheb denied any participation in the other man's doings, and, as he was a superior chief to Shah Nusser, he was deputed by Lord to use his endeavours towards an amicable adjustment. He, however, met with no more success than our own messenger; all the answer was, that the chief was 'yagi,' or insurgent. Several other men of considerable influence in the valley, among them Moollah Meer Mahomed and Alladah Khan (ool Syudabad) were sent as envoys to the implacable Hazarehs; but the negociations were all fruitless. The wishes which Lord conveyed to him, were certainly not such as he could have found any difficulty or hardship in complying with. The Political Agent asked him to explain the cause of the quarrel, in order that the offenders, on which ever side they should prove to be, might be punished. He further said, "If you wish to be our friend, you will submit to this arbitration ; if I find our people to blame, you may rest assured that I will punish them; if you will not agree to make some explanation, I cannot but consider you as an enemy." Such, or to such effect, were Lord's messages; but Shah Nusser persisted in a dogged silence with regard to the quarrel; merely declining our interference, refusing to acknowledge Lord's authority; furthermore, he abused us as Kaffirs, and swore we might bring our guns as soon as we chose. Every means were used in vain to conciliate him. The urbabs,t whom we employed as our ambassadors, were the most respectable men of the neighbourhood, and if any one could have persuaded him, they could. There is no doubt that the promptness of the proceedings, which * About this time, straw sold for a rupee a maund; and dried lucerne about 25 or 30 seers the rupee. * The principal man in a fort is usually thus designated. 80 AFFAIR WITH THE HAZAREHS. followed the Hazareh's contemptuous defiance, alone prevented the insurrection from becoming more general. In such matters, the greatest difficulty is in commencing, and the Hazarehs having thus thrown down the gauntlet, I think it highly probable that the others were glad to perceive the first steps taken ; but that, with their usual caution, they waited to see what the result might be. " All negociation having failed; the Hazarehs prepared for our coming. The revolt of one solitary chieftain was certainly a matter of but little importance, although he possessed some ten forts, strongly placed. But Lord did not view the affair in that light; it was to be considered not what Shah Nusser himself could effect, but what results might follow the contumacy of one man, if allowed to pass unnoticed. Lord was by no means a careless observer, and he saw at once that such a spirit, if left unchecked, might rapidly increase to an alarming extent; that the spark if not extinguished might become a flame. He acted wisely and promptly: when he found his advances towards conciliation rudely repulsed, he marched troops against him; and this took place at noon the next day. Let it not be said that this was too hasty; it shewed decision, but not precipitation. As Shah Nusser dwelt only half an hour's ride from Bameean, 24 hours gave plenty of time for negociation; it was clear enough, that if he conceded not within that period he would not yield at all. As soon as it was found that we must have recourse to force, expedition was advisable, both for example sake and to prevent the Hazarehs from having time to prepare, or to gain fresh adherents to their cause, by calling on the neighbouring tribes for their assistance; every day we delayed would have given them fresh courage. And so, next day at noon, four companies of infantry, two guns and about sixty horse marched against him; not because he refused to give us grass for our horses, but because he refused to acknowledge the authority of the then Governor of Bameean. " Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat." Verily they were madmen, the inhabitants of that small fort, who shut their gates against us, and appeared on the towers, with their matchlocks, evidently prepared to assail us. We had just come within sight of the table-lands before mentioned; they were immediately in our front, about 400 yards, distant. On the nearest point of one on our right front, we observed a considerable crowd of armed men, but on the left hand one, no enemy was visible: the forts on it were said to belong to Mir Moheb, while those on the one occupied, were the property of Shah Nusser. Up this hill we were to have ascended, as above was our object; but the foolish conduct of the fort below saved us the trouble. It belonged to the refractory Hazareh chieftain, and was situated in the valley close to the road, and about 450 yards from the position which the enemy had taken up. We were much surprised, when we reached it, to see the warlike attitude assumed by those within, for we did not expect to meet with any opposition below. The column was accordingly halted; and Rattray, the Political Assistant, rode to the gate of the fort, and commenced a AFFAIR WITH 81 TIIE HAZAREHS. parley with them. They refused to open their gate; neither would they send a man down to confer with our party. After some time wasted thus, Rattray returned and reported his failure in inducing them to yield; but Lord requested him to try again. Accordingly, taking Ali Usker, a Persian attendant with him, he again presented himself below the turret, although by this time, the garrison of the fort were making signals to those occupying the hill, apparently to induce them to come down to the attack. Lord and all our party looked anxiously on, for we were not without some fear lest the Hazarehs should fire on the parleyers, while Rattray and the Persian used all their eloquence in vain. The people were assured by them that they should suffer no harm in person or property: that we did not wish to take their fort from them, but merely desired that one man should come down, and open the gate, giving us some assurance that they would not molest us: in that case they were told that we should leave them and pass on; but, whether from fear, obstinacy, or orders from their chieftain, I know not, they would not comply with such reasonable demands.* When Rattray announced the failure of his attempts, which had altogether occupied about half an hour, Lord turned to the Commanding Officer, who stood by, and said, " I can do no more, Captain Garbett ; the affair is now in your hands." " The party was then moved up, and the guns were placed in position; one against the gate of the fort, and about 30 paces from it, the other directed against the body occupying the hill at about 400 yards distance. The gate fronted the table-land, so that the guns fired in contrary directions. Attached to the one opposed to the fort was a covering party, consisting of about 80 Infantry of the Shah's 4th Regiment. " As soon as this position had been taken up, and before we had commenced hostilities, a single shot was fired from the hill, and immediately followed by a sharp fire from both parties of the enemy. This at once frustrated the hopes still entertained, that the deluded people in the fort would surrender, when they perceived our intention to enforce submission. On account of the inequality of the ground, we could not run a gun up to the gate to blow it in; so round shot were used, which at first went crashing through, without doing much injury to the gate, as from being so close, the shot made a clean hole through the planks; but on changing the aim to the side-posts or stanchions, the whole frame yielded, after a few rounds. For a short time, the fire was rather severe, the matchlocks of the men on the hill reached us easily; and soon after the work had commenced, a skirmishing fire was opened, from the brow of the hill on the left, but we could distinguish no one, except when for an instant, the * It is not true, as has been asserted, that we demanded the delivery of some disputed forage--our It was really too much to expect that, without any assurance request was simply as stated above. of their non-interference, we should pass on, and leave a hostile fort in our rear, the men in which might have annoyed us greatly, when ascending the table-land. M 82 AFFAIR WITH THE HAZAREHS. upper part of a man's body might be seen just appearing above the brow, now here, now there; and instantly followed by the flash of a matchlock. Just then our men were dropping fast, but the fire did not continue so general, but for 15 or 20 minutes; for after a shot or two had tried and found the distance, a few rounds of shrapnel from the other gun, drove the enemy from the hill in front; and about the same time, Rattray, with his Affghan horse, followed by a party of Infantry, galloped up the other eminence, and drove the skirmishers from their position, killing and wounding a few of them; but the majority took refuge in the fort, Mir Moheb's. Rattray rode after them to the gates, and, on expostulating with that chief, the latter declared, that his people had gone out in defiance of his orders, and that he would prevent all further interference. This was a rather gratuitous promise on his part, as the affair bad now nearly terminated. The frame-work of the gate being thrown down, the company, which had hitherto been employed as a covering party, entered the fort, the garrison of which, with the exception of one man, taken prisoner, and some shot in the entrance, still held out in the tower. Several ineffectual attempts were made to reach them, but they had ascended through a trap door to the upper story, and then pulled the ladder up. Their resolute courage, poor men, was worthy of a better fate ; but, what could be done ? soldiers don't like standing still to be shot at, especially when their adversaries being behind a stout wall, they cannot effectually answer the fire ;-so, not being able to get the Hazarehs out by any other means, some straw on the ground floor was fired, with a view to smoke them out; and a few rounds from the guns were fired into the upper part of the turret. But even this had no effect; they would not come forth, though the fire did not burn so fiercely at first as to prevent them from doing so. The straw smouldered, emitting volumes of smoke, but very little flame. It was a sad business; every man perished. When the firing ceased, we sent a Hazareh to speak to them, and then we learnt that none but women and children remained, who at the same time made their appearance on the summit of the tower. These, after some time, and with considerable difficulty, we succeeded in getting down from their perilous situation; this we were obliged to effect from the outside, as all the floors except the upper roof had fallen in. We cut down a young tree, and rearing it against the wall, a man was thus enabled to convey a rope to the summit, by which the unfortunates were lowered. The fate of the men was melancholy in the extreme; but I do not think they could have been destroyed by the fire, as they might have escaped to the roof, by the same means as the women did. Most probably some of the last shots from the guns killed or wounded all who remained. " We did not continue hostilities any further, considering that having driven the Hazarehs from their positions, together with the capture of the fort, would, most probably, have produced a sufficient example. Had we, at that time, advanced against the more distant forts, it is probable that the Hazarehs, as if driven into a corner, would have fought desperately. It was not our.object to shed blood, but to reduce them THE HAZAREHS SUCCUMB. 83 to submission, by persuasion rather than by the sword; and it was hoped, that by giving them time to cool, and to reflect on the results which might attend any further insubordination, that desirable end might be attained. We all commiserated the dreadful fate of the poor men, who had just perished, and regretted the necessity which had compelled us to inflict such a dreadful punishment. The fort contained only about twelve or fifteen men, of whom only one escaped with his life, but no one can justly be blamed for this,-the men courted death, they brought it down on their own heads. " It having been determined to cease hostilities for the present, the detachment returned to the lines at Bamian, to await the result of fresh negociations. Our loss amounted to one killed and 17 wounded, of whom four or five died. We had upwards of 300 men present, but scarcely 200 were actually engaged; and all our loss was sustained in something less than half an hour. Of the enemy's number, no accurate information could be obtained, but there could not have been more than 200 men on the hills. Some accounts stated, that they had lost 46 men, including 10 killed in the fort; another version gave the total amount at 53; but, knowing how much these matters are generally exaggerated, I am inclined to doubt that they suffered so severely. Mir Moheb's brother, a moollah, was killed by the cavalry on the hill, and some others, also fell, or were wounded by the sabre. Several, too, were afterwards known to be lying in the forts, suffering from shrapnel or round-shot wounds. " Lord's overtures, after this severe lesson had been read to them, were happily attended with more success than before. Mir Moheb, who, notwithstanding his own tribe had suffered in the conflict, declared himself our friend, and that his brother merited his fate, reported that Shah Nusser was now more fearful than haughty, and that the Hazarehs were prepared rather to run than fight. It was deemed advisable under these circumstances to allow them time to get over their fear, which we anticipated, would be succeeded by submission. And so it happened; shortly the refractory chief, now humble enough, surrendered to the Political Agent, and was, of course, pardoned. One condition was, however, insisted on, that he should provide the heir of the fort, (who, fortunately for himself happened to be absent at the time,) with means to recommence his business as husbandman. In a few days, our relations with the Hazarehs, were on as amicable a footing as before. "April shewed some signs of spring; a very heavy fall of snow had occurred near the end of the preceding month, which lasted two days, and was immediately succeeded by a quick thaw. After this there was a gradual, but perceptible change in the weather, and soon the earth became sufficiently soft to admit the ploughshare. " But the snow still remained deep on the higher parts of the range, so that the Passes were scarcely practicable between us and Cabul, and our communication continued uncertain and difficult. Not so with 84 THE NUWAUB OF KOOLOOM. regard to the road leading northwards; Kafilas came in frequently from Toorkistan, bringing us the products of Bokhara, China, and Russia; the travelling merchants owning these were mostly compelled to remain with us for a time on account of the state of the roads in advance not permitting camels or laden ponies to pass; but some proceeded on their journey, hiring Hazarehs to carry their merchandize over the snowy Passes; and thus their yaboos, freed from their burdens, were enabled to accomplish the toilsome march. Dealers, too, with long strings of horses, some of superior breed, constantly arrived. Many of these were eagerly purchased for the use of the artillery, to fill their thinned stable, or to replace those, which, worn down by toil or the severity of the winter, were no longer fit for service. And camels also were about this time procurable in considerable numbers, but the greater proportion were sent on to Cabul instead of being retained for the use of the Shah's infantry. This, caused much inconvenience, and loss, both of public and private property. " Other and more important arrivals took place during the month of May, envoys from different powers of Toorkistan. Among these were a messenger from the Khan of Mazar, and another from Moorad Beg; the latter of these was Atmaran, an influential Hindoo, who had long held the post of Dewan Begee at the court of Koondooz. After remaining some time with Lord, he passed on to Cabul. " The proceedings of the Nuwaub of Kooloom were exceedingly perplexing : about the middle of the month, a letter came from Baba Beg, informing us that he had positively started; but a few days after, he changed his intention, if indeed he had at that time really determined on coming in; several times pitched his camp outside the town, and as often struck it again; once he even sent his advance tents as far as Guzneegul, the first stage from Tash Koorghans; and it was on this occasion that our friend of Heibuck wrote to us. However, our hopes were again frustrated. Other members of the family, however, possessing less indecision or less zeal in the cause of the Ameer, made their appearance during the month. One detachment consisted of some of his women-kind, a few sisters and an old lady mother, I believe, of the chief, and some nephews. These last were some of the youngest of the family shoots, young lads of 16 or 17, whose swords had not yet left the scabbard in the field, or black-eyed, rosy cheeked boys. Soon after these came Mahomed Uzim Khan, one of the ex-chief's sons, a fine, well-built young man, and a splendid specimen of the Affghan gentleman and soldier. At the same time too there arrived in our lines our old adversary, now our friend, Gholaum Beg, the son of the Wallee, he who had fled so quickly from before Syghan, in November of the past year. This man presented certainly a striking contrast to the young Affghan: fat and unwieldy in appearance, uncouth in manners, with apparently as few mental as personal endowments, he looked neither the prince nor the warrior. All three in due course of time proceeded on their way to Cabul. There was another individual, too, SURVEY TRIP. 85 who passed through Bamian, the precise time of whose arrival, I now forget, and this was the crafty Vuzeer of Kooloom, the Moola Wallee Shah, who afterwards played a somewhat conspicuous part in the game of diplomacy. " It was about the end of May or beginning of June that a small party, consisting principally of cavalry, left Bamian and proceeded on a tour of reconnoissance towards the northward. The principal object of this movement was to examine the Pass beyond Kamurd, the Kara Kotul, the last intervening ghaut between our post and the defile which leads down upon Kooloom. The natives of the country immediately supposed, that the expedition was planned for the purpose of chupa'oing some unknown delinquent, and some surmised that the party was about to effect a forcible seizure of the Nuwaub. However, Captains Garbett and Rattray (who were of the party) went with no such warlike intentions, though, I believe, some hopes were entertained, that the movement might have a quickening effect upon Jubbar Khan's proceedings. His arrival now was the only one required to render the political negociations completely successful; and so every possible means was put in force, in order to bring about the desirable event, and even the old report of our projected advance was renewed. " The party proceeded by way of Syghan and Kamurd. After passing the latter place they turned down the narrow valley, in which it is situate, and after a short stage reached Bajgah, a solitary fort, placed immediately opposite the embouchure of the narrow defile, which leads off the base of the Kara Kotul. Considerably to their surprise they found the fort vacated, and still more were they astonished when Sirdar Syud Mahomed, to whom it belonged, said, that he had purposely cleared it in order to present it to them as a post for troops, or for any other purpose that might be desired. At first sight the position seemed an exceedingly favorable one, strong in defence, and having a full command over the road leading to the Pass. Under these circumstances, it was thought advisable to take advantage of the Sirdar's obliging offer; a small party of infantry, who were with the detachment, was left in the fort, and a favorable report of the place as a military post was sent into Bamian. As soon as Lord heard of the fort having been given up to us, he wrote in to Cabul, both to Sir W. McNaghten and to Major-General Sir W. Cotton, who then commanded in Affganistan, strongly recommending the permanent occupation of the place. " His arguments prevailed, and permission was granted to despatch the Shah's 4th regiment to occupy the fort, retaining at Bamian such portion as might be considered necessary to protect that place. "Meanwhile the reconnoitering party had crossed the Kara Kotul, and descended to the village of Dooab. This last Pass is, if possible, more difficult than that of the Dundun-i-Shikun; it is of considerable extent, and the path generally leads over huge masses of rock, placed in layers one above the other, like regular steps; beyond the Kotul the road in the defile is still worse. At Dooab, as elsewhere, the travellers met with 86 OCCUPATION OF FORT BAJGAH. the utmost hospitality; and having accomplished the object of their trip, they retraced their steps to Bamian, towards which place, the Nuwaub was now (the latter part of June) at length journeying by easy marches. " By this time the garrison of Bamian had been increased by the arrival of a party from Cabul, consisting of 300 rank and file, detached from Captain Hopkins' (Affghan) regiment of infantry, and on the 29th of June, Captain Hay's regiment, leaving one company at Bamian, marched in progress to their new station; but this movement was not effected without some difficulty ; for, as I before mentioned, no carriage had been provided for the corps; the march was entirely unexpected, until a very short time before the day of departure, and the hiring of baggage-cattle in the valley, was by no means easy of accomplishment. Fortunately, the artillery was better off in this department; so by borrowing a few camels, and hiring donkeys, sufficient carriage was obtained to enable the regiment to move to Syghan. The corps met, on the 1st July, the Nuwaub Jubbar Khan, with his numerous cortege, and thence, in two marches, reached their destination, without meeting with any obstacle, or any opposition from the inhabitants. But their troubles soon commenced. There were only five companies and one officer with the head quarters, and these totally unprovided with cattle, for those which had carried their equipage to Bajgah immediately returned: two companies were at Syghan under Lieut. Golding, and the 8th remained at Bamian, in the neighbourhood of which place Lieut. Broadfoot was encamped, being at that time detached from the regiment and employed in raising a corps of pioneers recruiting from among the Hazarehs and other tribes of the neighbourhood. Shortly after Captain Hay had reached Bajgah, there came thither one, who having been some short time in the neighbourhood, should have been consulted ere the place had been fixed on as a military post-I allude to Lieut. Sturt, of the Engineers, who had been sent from Cabul for the express purpose of surveying and reporting on the mountain Passes, and who arrived at Bamian about the 18th or 20th of June. It would have been well had the measure been resolved upon with less precipitation, and had this officer's opinion on the fitness of the place been first asked; but, as it was, he saw it after Hay was located there, and condemned it in toto. "The Nuwaub reached Bamian on the 3d of July; bringing with him all the family and followers of the Ameer, except those few who were still in captivity at Bokhara. Among the former were two of his son's sons, Akrum Khan and Shere Jan, besides several others, mere boys. Of his other adult sons, one had previously passed through, and two others, Mahomed Azul and Akbar, were with their father. Jubbar Khan's retinue was still a very considerable one, notwithstanding the great diminution in its numbers, which had taken place at the close of 1839; there could not have been less than 300 male followers, nearly all of whom were armed and mounted. "Hay arrived at Bajgah at the beginning of July; but before entering upon a narrative of the events that took place in that quarter, I will THE VALLEY OF KAMURD. 87 endeavour to give some faint description of the valley of Kamurd and the neighbouring localities. " It was scarcely worthy of the name of valley, but rather should be called a deep, dreary glen, so narrow was it and so vast the rocks which bounded it; through it there flowed, as in the more southern vallies, a narrow rivulet, but this, like the dell which it watered, was deep, far deeper than the streams of Bamian and Syghan, with steep banks, and seldom fordable. The valley (for I still shall use the term commonly applied, though it gives, but little idea of what the place really resembled) was approachable by two principal roads from the northward, the one by the Dundan-i-Shikun, and the other by the Nal-i-Ferish; besides these there was a small difficult pathway leading by a less devious route across the hills immediately in front of the Syghan fort. The nearest fort to the northern base of the first named Pass, was that of Izit-ool-lah Khan, a friendly Tajick; near this, the river (commonly called Soorukab, from the red colour of its waters) was fordable, though with difficulty, from the rapidities of the current; a short distance lower down the stream, there were two other forts, belonging to one Sula Beg; these were admirably situated for the purposes of mutual defence; they were on opposite banks of the river, connected by a small wooden bridge completely screened by the forts on either side. Of one fort the gateway opened upon the river, while that of the other was placed in the eastern face, or that looking towards Bajgah. In front of this entrance there was a small mud-wall, forming a species of rude redoubt; moreover, this front was flanked by a fire from the other fort, which projected about one-third of its length further to the east, so as completely to guard the approaches to its neighbour; both of these forts were of better construction than the generality of such edifices. At this point, too, the valley was so narrow that if the neighbouring hills were occupied, a party attacking the forts would be exposed to a close, plunging fire from either side. On the Bajgah side, reaching nearly to the very walls and extending for some few miles down, lay a dense tract of orchards, the trees being generally the apricot and walnut. These lands were enclosed and intersected by numerous mud-walls, adding considerably to the strength of the locality, if held by an enemy. Through these orchards led the narrow road to Bajgah. Further down the valley, was a fourth fort, also the property of Sula Beg. This was called Pyeen Bagh, and was situate, as the name implies, at the extremity of as " below the gardens" or orchards; it was a very inferior structure to the other two, and at the time of my narrative, in a somewhat dilapidated condition. The whole extent of the glen from Kamurd to Hay's post (a distance of 10 or 12 miles) presented much the same appearance, with the exception of the change from orchard to field; but every where it was narrow, generally under 150 paces in width, and always enclosed by stupendous rocks rising above 1,000 feet above the bottom; tortuous too in the extreme, and at every bend you appeared to enter a dungeon, 88 RISING HOSTILITY. no outlet being visible till you approached it closely, and the gloomy precipices rising on all sides like walls. The fort of Bajgah was on the northern bank of the river, and at this point the hills were even higher than at Kamurd itself, at a rough calculation upwards of 1,500 feet, or at any rate, I think not under that elevation. They rose for the greater part of their height nearly perpendicular, but above sloped off. In front of the northern face of the fort was the entrance to the narrow defile, leading to the foot of the Kara Kotul Pass. The other road to Syghan led eastward from Bajgah, down the valley; and, crossing the deep and rapid river by a narrow bridge passed through a small village, and entered the Dusht-i-Sufaid, where was situated the fort of Sirdar Syud Mahomed. Thence the road passed across the mountain belt by the long and arduous Pass, so aptly termed by the natives, " the carpet of horse shoes;" descending into the valley of Syghan, some five or six miles below Sir-i-Sung, and but a short distance from the strong-hold of Khilich Beg. " But a short time elapsed after the occupation of the post, before it became manifest that the inhabitants around looked upon the new comers with a jealous eye. The friendly feeling which had, in such a marked degree, existed at Bamian between the peasants and the soldiers, did not shew itself at Bajgah; but, on the contrary, from the very first, distrust seemed engendered in the hearts of the countrymen. Captain Hay endeavoured to place the intercourse between them on a more friendly footing, and to encourage the natives to establish some market or bazar in the vicinity of his fort; but his effects failed, and he found the utmost difficulty in purchasing even small quantities of forage or grain. But though this sullen determination on the part of the inhabitants to keep aloof from the intruding Feringhees, was soon perceptible, yet it was not until near the close of the month that more decided signs of hostilities exhibited themselves. About that time, the first rumours came of the gathering of armed men in the vicinity, and of the frequent passing and repassing of small bodies of sowars in the direction of the neighbouring Kotul. Nor was it long before Hay had ocular proof that such was the case, for, on the extreme summits of the northern hills overlooking Bajgah, were frequently seen groups of horsemen, apparently watching the movements of our people in the deep glen below them. These horsemen did not, however, remain long at any one time, but rather appeared to come and go repeatedly, or, as if there were different parties all passing from the Kotul towards Kamurd by the mountain, instead of by the valley route. Whether such was the case, I have no direct means of ascertaining; but think it highly probable, from the fact of a body of Usbeg horse being shortly afterwards known to be in the neighbourhood of Kamurd. "The plot soon thickened, and in a few days, there were several different bodies of armed men, principally of the Ajur tribe, posted between Kamurd and the Goorkah corps. Unfortunately Hay himself was at this time suffering from sickness, so much so as frequently to be MOVEMENT ON KAMURD. 89 confined to his bed. He had, as I mentioned before, no officer with him; under these circumstances, he wrote to Golding and Rattray, (who had on hearing of these matters, proceeded to Syghan) to request that the former should be despatched with one company from the Sar-i-Sung garrison, to reinforce the Bajgah fort, which he did not consider sufficiently strong to clear the valley : at the same time, he recommended that the company should take the eastern road, as he understood that Baba Beg Ajuree had occupied the Dundan-i-Shikun Pass. But the garrison of Syghan being under the command of Captain Garbett, this requisition could not be complied with, until reference had first been made to the last named officer: this was done, and Rattray received discretionary powers to detach the company, if necessary ; Garbett himself too followed closely on the heels of his messenger, and joined the party at Sar-iSung. Ere this, however, the Ajurees had withdrawn from the lower part of the valley, and immediately after Rattray had written to Hay, informing him that he had received authority to send Golding to join him, if he should think fit to do so, information was received that the Pass was again open. Under this altered state of affairs, the immediate necessity for the movement had ceased, and a letter to that effect was accordingly despatched to Hay; but it would appear, that this unfortunately did not reach him until after he had sent off a party to meet Lieutenant Golding, whom he supposed to be on his way to join by the Kamurd route; though such, in fact, was not the case, Rattray, having at the time, no immediate intention of detaching the company. But, unfortunately, Hay was misled by some expression contained in one of the letters received by him, though they were not intended to convey such a meaning. " On the 1st of August then, Hay, being himself still suffering from indisposition, detached a serjeant (the only one with the corps) in command of two companies of the regiment, with instructions to repair to Kamurd, for the purpose of meeting and escorting to Bajgah, Lieutenant Golding, who, he expected, would reach the former place on the 2nd. Accordingly, the little party proceeded up the valley, and their march was accomplished without interruption. With the permission of Sula Beg, who appeared amicably disposed towards them, they formed their bivouac for the night close under the walls of one of his forts; but little did the poor soldiers, many of whom there took their last rest on earth, dream, when at night they lay down to repose, that the faithless chief was then plotting a foul conspiracy against them. But so it was; Sula Beg met them with smiles upon his lip, but with treachery in his heart: he wanted either the power or the courage to carry his own machination into effect; and so, upon the arrival of the detachment, he wrote, or, perhaps more probably, sent a verbal message to the chief of Ajur, saying, "See, I have the Feringhees in a dheg ;* they are * "Dheg" : literally a pot or cauldron: meaning that the party were in a situation, whence they could not escape. The term is rather an expressive one, applied to any part of the glen; but probably Sula Beg did not refer to the localities, but meant that he had them " in a fix." 90 ACTION AT KAMURD. ready to your hand ; come, lose not the opportunity; but if you are not here by noontide to-morrow, I will yield up my fort to them." He was not reduced to that alternative; Baba Beg did come. "The morning came, but with it came not the party they had been sent to meet, and the serjeant supposed that the march of the other company had been deferred, and accordingly, after the lapse of a few hours, prepared to return to Bajgah. The detachment, however, was not destined to quit the place in peace: suddenly, without the slightest suspicion of danger, having been up to that moment entertained, a matchlock fire was opened upon them from several directions, both from the walls of the fort and from the neighbouring orchards. They quickly prepared to resist their aggressors, and it was well they did so, for a body of Usbeg horse now made its appearance, and charged down upon the little band, which, however, stood firm and quickly repulsed them. But not so with the Ajuree footmen; these were posted in such positions, as to be screened either by walls or trees, nearly entirely, both from shot and sight; and from behind their cover, their long jezails played with deadly execution. At length, but unwillingly, Douglas, (worthy of his name and of a better fate*) was compelled to withdraw his men from the forts. " Step by step, inch by inch, firmly, with a bold front, the little band retreated through the dense orchards and the wilderness of gardens, exposed to the galling fire of their scarce-seen enemies; but ever and anon, wherever he could catch a glimpse of his foemen, the serjeant fronted his party and returned their fire. The contest was a very unequal one ; the Ajurees had both the advantage of the situation, much aided by their knowledge of the ground, and of a superiority of numbers. Moreover, they were accompanied by a body of horse, which, although they did not again attempt close quarters, was of material service; for the sowars frequently took up some footmen behind them, and then galloping off, would place them in some convenient position whence they could better annoy the retreating party. Thus the fight continued for some miles; our men were dropping fast under the fire of the Ajurees; the wounded were assisted on by their comrades, but the dead lay on the ground where they fell, the serjeant, however, taking the precaution of stripping them of their arms and ammunition ; the disabled were also relieved of their burdens; and to avoid encumbering too much the remnant of the party, and at the same time to prevent such implements of war from falling into the hands of the enemy, many of the muskets were thrown into the deep river which ran by the road side. " The party had still some considerable length of road before them, and nearly utter destruction seemed inevitable, for their numbers were already much diminished, and their ammunition nearly expended; but H*e afterwards rejoined the European regiment at his own request, and was accidentally drowned at Noushern in the river of Cabnul. DEMONSTRATION AT BAJGAH. 91 fortunately, succour was at hand. Tidings of this lamentable affair had early reached Bajgah, and, fortunately, about the same time Sturt had arrived on his return from Kooloom. This officer volunteered his services to Captain Hay, and was immediately despatched with two companies to the assistance of the serjeant, and the joy of the little party may be imagined, when, at the very time at which their situation appeared hopeless in the extreme, they beheld advancing towards them the serried ranks and glancing arms of those whose well-known uniform proclaimed them to be friends. At the sight, the Ajurees, till then triumphant, turned and fled quickly towards Kamurd, and the two parties united, returned now unmolested to the British fort. " And such was the inauspicious commencement of the campaign which at length terminated in signal victory."Here the narrative breaks off, but we gather the sequel from other sources. Encouraged by the success of the stratagem in the Kamurd valley, and by the small number and divided positions of the force at Dr. Lord's disposal, the Usbegs acting in Dost Mahomed's interest took courage, and gathering their forces together, attacked the little fort of Bajgah on the 30th. Previous to this act of hostility, there had been some shew of negociation with Dr. Lord and Lieut. Rattray, the Political Agents, but, as the pacific protestations of the Usbegs were not sincere, they ended just where they began. On the morning of the 30th August, the hills around Bajgah were crowded by some 300 footmen, and about 500 Usbeg horse went down into the valley, among whom were Mahomed Afzal Khan, (the son of Dost Mahomed), Goolam Beg, and Moolah Wallee Shah. The Goorkahs mounted the hills, and drove back the footmen, while Lieut. Rattray charged the Usbegs with 200 Affghan horse. The Usbegs fled, with the loss of 16 prisoners, three men killed and 12 wounded. Thus far well, but an attack having been made by the Usbegs, about the same time upon the fortress of Heibuck, held by a friendly chief, and that post having fallen, the chief fled to Sarbagh. The position of the British was thus greatly weakened, for neither Sarbagh nor Bajgah held garrisons strong enough to resist the advance of Dost Mahomed, who was now understood to be approaching with the Mir Wullee's forces. It was therefore resolved by Lieut. Rattray to evacuate Bajgah, and fall back upon Syghan, while such a movement could be effected with safety. The march was accomplished with little molesta- 92 DEFECTION OF AN AFFGHAN CORPS. tion from the enemy, as far as the vicinity of Sar-i.Sung, where the Goorkahs bivouacked. On the 31st August, Captain Hopkins arrived at Sar-i-Sung with his Regiment of Dooranees, a corps of Jaunbaz under Capt. Hart, two-six pounders, and some Bameean horse. With this force and the Goorkah Regiment, it was resolved to cross the Durdan-i-Shukan (mountain,) and attack Kamurd before the arrival of the two chieftains from the north. On reaching the foot of the mountain, however, on the 2nd September, intelligence was received, that Moorad Beg had joined Dost Mahomed. This rendered all prospect of success in the Kamurd valley quite hopeless, and a return to Syghan consequently became a measure of prudence. In retiring, the Affghan Regiment under Captain Hopkins abandoned their colors and deserted, taking advantage of the deficiency of carriage with the force to plunder even the property of their own commandant wherever they found it unguarded. A part of the regiment was induced to return to its allegiance: the remainder joined Dost Mahomed. The fortress of Sar-i-Sung having been made over to a chief in our interest, and Syghan being considered untenable against a large force, the troops fell back upon Bameean. Here they were soon joined by the 35th N. I., and 200 horse under Colonel Dennie of the 13th Regiment, who had been dispatched to their relief. In the meanwhile, the Ex-Ameer, Dost Mahomed, was rapidly advancing at the head of a large body Colonel (Brigadier) Dennie immediately advanced to meet of Usbegs. him, and on the morning of the 18th September, had the good fortune to encounter and completely defeat him. The Brigadier's despatch relates the manner of the action. To Major General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G.C.B. and K.C.H. Commanding the Troops in Afghanistan, Camp Bameean, 18th September, 1840. SIR,-" My last communication will have apprised you of our having crossed the Irak Mountain. "At the urgent representations of Dr. Lord, Political Agent, of the proximity of the enemy to Bameean, I continued to press on to its relief by forced marches, and arrived here on the 14th instant. That same evening having drawn out the Goorkah Regiment, I disarmed Captain Hopkins' Corps of Affghans, who although loaded, offered no re- DEFEAT OF DOST MAHOMED AT BAMEEAN. 93 sistance, and this essential duty, I am happy to say, was performed without difficulty. Finding no enemy in the neighbourhood, I proceeded to make arrangements for an advance on Syghan, where it appeared the enemy really was in force. These measures were, however, rendered unnecessary by his actual, but unexpected presence. " Allow me to congratulate you on our having obtained a complete and decisive victory over the conjoint Army of Dost Mahomed Khan and his Usbeg Allies, under the Wallee of Koolloom. Last evening I received information from my advanced posts, that bodies of Cavalry were entering the valley from the great defile in our front, six miles from hence. Wishing to draw them well on, I did not discourage their approach, but learning this morning that they had attacked a fortified village that was friendly to us, and as these people had claims on our protection, it became necessary to drive off their assailants. " From the reports brought in I was led to conclude, that only a few hundred had entered the valley, and therefore took with me only onethird of our force, with a 6-pounder gun and howitzer. " I confess I was taken by surprize, after driving in what proved to be only their advanced party, to find an Army in my front. To have sent back for reinforcements would have caused delay, and given confidence to the enemy. It would have checked the forward feeling that animated the party with me, and gave assurance of success. " The enemy had got possession of the chain of forts before us, reaching to the mouth of the defile. They drew up, and attempted to make a stand at each, with the main body, while their wings crowned the heights on either side. In dislodging them from the latter, I am sorry to say the Goorkahs suffered. After four or five vollies, seeing our steady and rapid advance, the whole force appeared to us to lose heart, and fled in a confused mass to the gorge of the Pass. I now ordered the whole of the Cavalry in pursuit, who drove them four miles up the defile, cutting down great numbers, and scattering them in all directions, many throwing away their arms, and escaping up the hills. " Of the deserters from Captain Hopkins' Corps, not a few have paid the penalty of their treachery, and their muskets and accoutrements were found in all directions. "The Dost, and his son Mahomed Uzyl Khan, and the Wallee, owed their escape to the fleetness of their horses, and were last seen with not more than 200 followers around them. " The prisoners report, that the ex-Chief was wounded early in the day. His only gun, his kettle drums, with his camp, ammunition and provisions, have fallen into our hands. " The number of the enemy was at least 6,000, and those chiefly Usbegs. " I can form no accurate estimate of their killed and wounded, but their loss must have been considerable. "" 94 DEFEAT OF DOST MAHOMED. " I enclose a list of our Casualties and my Order of the day, in which I have endeavoured to express my sense of the conduct of the Officers and men in this brilliant affair." I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obdt. servant, W. H. DENNIE, Brigr. Comg. N. Frontier. Return of the Force employed against the Enemy, under the orders of Brigadier W. H. DENNIE, C. B., at Bameean, 18th Sept. 1840. " 2 Pieces of Horse Artillery, with detail-1 Lieutenant; 1 Staff Serjeant; 2 Havildars; 1 Bugler and Drummer; 23 Rank and File, and 7 Gun Lascars. 4 Companies 35th Regiment-1 Captain ; I Lieutenant; 2 Ensigns; 2 Subadars; 3 Jemadars; 16 Havildars; 6 Buglers and Drummers, and 219 Rank and File. 4 Companies Goorkah Battalion -2 Lieutenants; 1 Staff Serjeant; 5 Subadars; 4 Jemadars; 17 Havildars; 4 Buglers and Drummers, and 252 Rank and File. Detachment Anderson's Horse-1 Lieutenant, and 100 Rank and File, including Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers. Detachment Hart's Janbauz-- Captain, and 200 Rank and File. Total-2 Captains ; 5 Lieutenants; 2 Ensigns; 2 Staff Serjeants : 7 Subadars; 7 Jemadars; 35 Havildars; 11 Buglers and Drummers; 804 Rank and File, and 7 Gun Lascars." W. H. DENNIE, Brigadier. Return of the Casualties sustained by the Force employed against the Enemy under the orders of BrigadierDENNIE, C. B., at Bameean, 18th tember, 1840. " Artillery-Killed and Wounded none. Detachment 35th Regiment -Killed none. Wounded 2 Sepoys, one man dangerously. Detachment Goorkah Battalion-Killed 3 Sepoys, and 1 Horse; Wounded 1 Subadar; 2 Havildars; 1 Naick and 9 Sepoys. Lieutenant Golding's Detachment Horse shot under him-all the men severely wounded. Anderson's Horse-Killed 6 Horses; Wounded 1 Lieutenant; 3 Sepoys and 5 Horses: Lieutenant Le Geyt severely wounded--1 man dangerously. Detachment Jaunbauz--Killed 1 Sepoy; Wounded 2 Sepoys; one dangerously wounded. Detachment Jaunbauz-Killed 1 Sepoy; Wounded 2 Sepoys: one dangerously wounded." W. H. DENNIE, Brigdr. ADVANCE 95 TO SYGHAN. ORDERS BY BRIGADIER DENNIE, C. B.--Camp Bameean, 19th Septem- ber, 1840. " Brigadier Dennie has pride and pleasure in recording his sense of the conduct of the Troops employed against the Enemy yesterday, and congratulating them on the success which rewarded their efforts. " The Brigadier begs to offer his particular thanks to Lieutenant McKenzie, commanding the two pieces of Horse Artillery, to whose admirable practice the result of the day was mainly attributable. He requests that Captains Younghusband and Codrington will receive for themselves, and convey to the Officers and men under their orders, his sense of their merits. Lieutenant Golding, with the Flankers on the heights, deserve by their coolness and steadiness, every commendation. Anderson's Horse, led by Lieutenant LeGeyt, severely wounded in the pursuit, distinguished themselves. " The Janbauzes, headed by Captain Hart, proved themselves faithful and forward. To Captain Shortreed the Brigadier offers his best acknowledgments for the valuable assistance he afforded, as also to Lieut. Broadfoot of the Engineers, who gave him his personal attendance. " Captain Arthur Connolly and Lieutenant Rattray, volunteers on this occasion, will be pleased to accept this mark of their zealous exertions being fully appreciated." W. SHORTREED, Capt. Major of Brigade. Immediately after this affair, the Political Agent sent to the Ameer, Dost Mahomed, offering terms, should he be inclined to surrender. The Dost replied, that it was his determination to conquer or fall in the attempt. Brigadier Dennie therefore advanced towards Syghan with four guns, six companies of the 35th N. I., and six companies of the Goorkahs; but he had not gone further than Akrobat, when the Ameer and his Usbeg allies retreated from Syghan, after leaving garrisons in On the 24th September, Brigadier Dennie Iliatoo and Sar-i-Sung. entered the valley of Syghan, and immediately destroyed the last named fortress, in order to put it beyond the power of any future enemy to annoy the detachment it might be deemed advisable to retain at Bameean. On the 25th of September, a messenger arrived from the Mir Wullee of Kholoom, intimating his readiness to treat with us. Lieut. Rattray was therefore dispatched to him, and a treaty was concluded, by the terms of which the armies retrograded; Syghan was ceded to 96 THE BATTLE AT TAZEE. the British; Heibuck to the Wullee and Baba Beg, the late chief; and the Wullee engaged, that he would not harbour Dost Mahomed or any of his family. After this treaty had been effected, Dost Mahomed fled to Nidjrow, and at the beginning of October, Colonel Dennie returned with his force to Cabul. Having pursued the course of events in the Hindoo Koosh to their termination, it is now proper to glance at the occurrences which took place south of Cabul from Ghuzni to Upper Scinde in the year 1840. The country remained tolerably tranquil during the winter months of 1839-40; convoys, detachments, Government messengers, and even solitary travellers passed to and fro by the Khyber, or the Bolan Passes, without much molestation from the tribes; and attempts were successfully made to organise corps of hill men, whose business it should be to ensure permanent protection to parties proceeding from Scinde, the Punjaub, and India. At Quetta, a corps of Bolan Rangers was raised, while bodies of Juzzailchies and Jaun Baz horse were equipped in the Khyber, and placed under the command of officers distinguished for their gallantry and intelligence. About the middle of April 1840, however, the Ghilzies, who, it was supposed, had been subdued by Capt. Outram, again raised the standard of rebellion, and it became necessary to send out strong parties of troops against them. The first detachment, under Captain Anderson of the Horse Artillery, marched to Tazee, between Ghuzni and Candahar, where the enemy were understood to be in great force. Captain Anderson was joined by Captain Taylor of the Bengal Europeans at Naoruck. They had with them four guns, 800 infantry and 360 cavalry. The infantry and guns marched direct upon Tazee, under Captain Anderson, while the cavalry, divided into two parties, took circuitous routes for the pur. pose of surprising the enemy; but scarcely had Captain Anderson proceeded five miles, when he found the hills over which he had to pass crowded with Ghilzies to the number of 2,500 men. A smart action immediately took place, which is thus briefly described by an eye. witness :" Captain Anderson formed on a neighbouring eminence, with Lieut. Spence supporting him on'the left, but before Capt. Woodburn, who had orders to form on the right, could get into position, the ravines in that SI E T TAZEE. A' ' <. ""' ' , ) .-. "-S Y4 4 r}(( RISINGS IN SCINDE. 97 direction were filled with men, from whom he suffered much, and who were only to be dislodged by a shower of grape and a smart attack from the rear. The guns opened in fine style upon the horsemen, who twice crossed to attack Spence's flank, and suffered severely from the guns in passing. The enemy then charged, and were met gallantly at the point of the bayonet by Spence's men, which sadly discomfited them, and they presently fled. In the mean time, Captain Taylor, hearing the report of the guns, changed the direction of his march, and took the enemy in flank. Lieut. Walker, who had made a greater detour, did not come up until the afternoon. He had, however, fallen in with some of the fugitives, very little to their advantage, and reported that there was not a man of them left in the neighbourhood of Ghondee. The loss of the enemy was about 200 killed, and several prisoners were taken. Our loss is not stated positively; but it is said that Captain Woodburn's men on the left suffered severely." Immediately after Captain Anderson's departure from Cabul, a small force was sent out under Colonel Wallace, with instructions to proceed to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, destroying en route all the enemy's forts or fortified places capable of defence. Meanwhile, Major General Nott moved up from Candahar to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, to join and take command of the various detachments destined to act against the refractory. These prompt measures speedily put an end to the insurrection. The forts were suffered to be destroyed without resistance, and the Ghilzies retired to their hills and homes, within six weeks from the date of their taking the field. Attention was now directed to the state of affairs in Upper Scinde. The attack on Khelat, and the death of Mehrab Khan, were events not readily to be obliterated from the recollections of a people in whom revenge was a powerful principle, and independence almost a condition of existence. Receiving but a paltry compensation, in their estimation at least, for a forced abstinence from predatory habits, and impatient under the control of foreigners, with whom they had not one single attribute in common, and for whose habits, religion, and political objects they entertained neither sympathy nor respect, it is not to be wondered at that they should avail themselves of the earliest opportunity, after the troops in the occupation of the country had been reduced by gradual retirements to small garrisons and isolated posts, to re-establish themselves in their ancient independence. The Brahoe chieftain, Shah Nawaz Khan, who had been placed on the musnud at Khelat, as the 98 AFFAIR WITH THE BELOOCHEES. most favorable to the views of the British Government, (with Lieut. Loveday as Political Agent,) exercised but small influence over the tribes to the west and south of the Bolan Pass; they had espoused the cause of the youthful son of the former Khan, and only awaited a fitting time for the demonstration of their views and feelings. In the hills to the east of Dadur, and north of Shikarpore, the Murrees and other countless tribes of Beloochees panted for the unrestrained licence to which they had ever been accustomed, watching the occupied forts with extreme jealousy, and pouncing upon convoys and travellers whenever their unprotected state afforded the temptation to plunder. It is difficult, if not impossible, at this date, and with the imperfect information at our command, to trace any connection between events occurring in different parts of Upper Scinde, within a short period of ejch other. Without therefore insisting upon the existence of concert, the circumstances which took place in that hostile territory will be described in the order of their dates; and, though politically considered, it will be seen that they all proved unfortunate, we have the consolation of knowing that the opportunities which were afforded in their progress for the display of the prowess and fidelity of the British Sepoy, were never in a single instance lost. The first serious instance of the continued hostility of the Beloochees occurred on the 7th May. Lieut. Clarke of the 2nd Bombay Grena. dier Regt. N. I., commanding a detachment of Scinde Irregular Horse, had proceeded to fort Kahun, in the Boogtie hills, in company with Captain Lewis Brown of the 5th Regt. N. I., who had been ordered to occupy and hold the fort with 300 bayonets and 2 howitzers. The duty of Lieut. Clarke was merely to take charge of the 600 camels which accompanied the little garrison, and to return with them after they had discharged their loads. He had reached Kahun, and was returning to Poolajee, a post situated in the level country south of Kahun, when at the Surtoff Pass, distant about 20 miles from Kahun, he and his party consisting of 50 horse and 150 infantry, were encountered by 2,000 Murrees. The hostility of their purpose being apparent, Lieutenant Clarke proceeded to arrange his men for an attack. His first care was, to provide, as he believed, for the safety of the camels by placing them under charge of the sowars; he then stationed small parties of about 12 sepoys each on neighbouring hillocks, and marched the rest of his men towards AFFAIR WITH THE BELOOCHEES. 99 the Beloochees, now collected to the number of about 2,000 on a height, a mile probably from the party. After the firing had lasted about two hours, a bugler returned for the ammunition camel, from which it may be inferred, that the stock in the men's pouches was by that time totally expended, and before he could return, the sepoys were seen flying before the Beloochees. The small parties on the hills witnessing the disorder of their companions left their posts, and endeavoured to join the camels and sowars, in some cases throwing away their accoutrements, to accelerate their speed. All were overtaken either on the spot, or before the unhappy fugitives could reach a village at a short distance on the road, and cut to pieces by the enemy. The sowars, witnessing the complete route of the sepoys, immediately fled, and made the best of their way to the post of Poolajee, and related the particulars of this cruel catastrophe. The camels were taken, and many of the camel-men killed. The Beloochees, who fought like maddened devils, had about 300 killed and wounded. The guide, Gunnah Khan, who witnessed the attack on the sepoys, gave the following account of the death of Lieut. Clarke. The sepoys, it appears, under his command, advanced some distance up the hill on which the Beloochees had made their stand, and opened fire, but the Murrees who had ensconced themselves behind the rocks, were comparatively safe from its effects. Lieut. Clarke, after killing three of the enemy with his own hand, and two having fallen by the sword of his orderly (a young sowar) was seen to stagger from a wound; at this moment a Beloochee seized him by the waist, and bore him to the ground, when his throat was immediately cut.* The Murrees then proceeded to invest fort Kahun, with the view of either drawing out Capt. Brown's detachment and cutting it to pieces, or reducing the garrison to starvation. Soon after this disastrous occurrence, the Brahoes having organized their measures for the restoration of Mehrab Khan's son, revolted at Moostung, and mustering forces from all quarters commenced a series of hostilities, which terminated in the loss of Khelat to the party placed * In the narrative of Captain L. Brown, No. 2 of the Appendix, further reference is made to this young officer. 100 BELOOCHEE ATTACK ON QUETTA. in authority there by the British Government. Their earliest step was to invest, in June 1840, the little fort of Mirree at Quetta, where Captain Bean, the Political Agent, was shut up with a small detachment consisting of 230 men of the Shah's infantry and a few Beloochee artillery-men. But formidable as the Brahoes (chiefly of the Kakur tribe) were in numbers, they could not daunt this little band, which, as will be seen in the annexed letters from an officer of the garrison, successfully repelled the first assault, and attacked the enemy so vigorously beyond the wall in the following month, as to prevent a renewal of hostile operations in that quarter. " Juttee Mirree at Quetta, 27th June, 1840.-Since the 21st we have been on the qui vive. The first cause of all this was the assemblage of a considerable body of Kakurs, chiefly Panizyes, Laranzyes, and Bozyes, under a Yagee Panizye chief, named Guffoor. These had taken up their quarters in a deep and narrow gorge, 9 or 10 miles to the north-east of our camp, but their numbers had not increased sufficiently, to warrant, in their opinion, an attack on even our small force, which consisted of about 230 of the Shah's 1st Infantry and our Belochee gunners, in all 250 untried men. The night of the 21st was passed in watching by all, the ladies not even excepted, for they, poor creatures, were too much frightened to take rest. At 2 A. M. all being quiet, Hammersley* started with four sowars to examine the gorge, and to ascertain the strength of the party in it, of which we were rather uncertain. He reached the Kakur camp at dawn of day, and having satisfied himself of the presence of about 400 men, he turned towards home to acquaint Bean with what he had seen. Some of the fellows who observed us, rode up the side of the hill, and took a few long and harmless shots at us. The 22d brought intelligence of a division amongst the Kakur sirdars, and of the Panizye chief having withdrawn his Ooloos, and returned to his home. It was also positively stated, that those sirdars who had disagreed with Guffoor, would come in to us, were we to send for them. This all sounded very well, but our suspicions were not so easily lulledit looked too much like a plot, and we were doing our best to fathom it. In the evening, whilst we were all down at the lines, another spy came in and corroborated the statement of Guffoor's departure somewhere or other, but where he knew not. Our sowars too who had been scouring all around, saw no signs of an enemy, but still all were on the alert, as on the preceding evening. The following morning some of the headmen who were supposed to have quarrelled with Guffoor, offered to come in, if sent for, and about 2 P.M. they arrived at Bean's house, having left their followers (80 men) at our Bolan Ranger camp. Shah Buzoory, a * Lieut. Hammersley of the 41st Bengal N. I, a gallant young soldier, who had raised the corps of Bolan Rangers. ATTACK ON QUETTA. 101 Doomur Kakur, who bears the rank of a Soobadar in the Rangers, on hearing of the arrival of these men in his camp, advised us to send for the headmen and to keep them safe till all was over, as it would prevent their men from acting against us in the attack, which was sure to take place that night, and that he would watch the motions of the others, and let us know if any thing suspicious should occur during the night. As our adviser had always behaved well, we determined upon following his instructions by confining the sirdars. When these men came to Bean's house for the ostensible purpose of making their salaam and entering our service, we requested the pleasure of their society till all should be arranged; but at the same time they were informed that they should be well treated and well rewarded in the event of their establishing proofs of their honesty. Well, night came on, and with it positive information from divers quarters of the advance of the Kakurs, to the number of 1000: sowars were posted at the different points, at which we expected the lushkur to enter the plain. Piquets were planted all round, with instructions to fire on the approach of any large body, and then to retire on the magazine and quarter guard, which adjoin one another, and which we made our standing point in the Sand bags were arranged event of our piquets being obliged to retire. to the height of two feet in front, the treasure was placed within these, and the two ladies and children within the magazine. The 9-pounder was placed at the right front angle and 6-pounder at the left front angle, supported by all the available Infantry. Unfortunately there was a bazar about 100 yards in front, and several other buildings all around, which would serve to shelter an enemy; still our position was the best we could find, as all the magazine was there, and we could not possibly remove the stores under three days, neither could we divide our small force between it and any more eligible situations. From dusk till midnight nothing more occurred to lead us to suppose the enemy were near, and we were beginning to think that they had repented of their designs, when a sowar galloped in and informed us of the move of the lushkur. This man was followed by another and another, till at last each had only to ride a little in front of the piquet to satisfy himself of the approach of a large body of men. On they came, as quietly as possible, till they reached or nearly reached the right of the lines, where the Horse Artillery stables stand; there they set up a most fiendish shout, which they kept up till they arrived within grape range from the 6-pounder; the first round missed the main body, but the second did great execution, and I am sure it must have told well, for it completely stopped the yelling, and sent the vocalists flying into and behind the bazar for shelter ; some passed through the bazar, but were soon driven back by the 9-pounder and the musketry. " It now became necessary to detach a few men to the top of the bazar, for the purpose of driving them out; a few rounds accomplished this, and gave Bean, who stood to the 9-pounder, a few capital shots, which once more drove the cowardly rascals back to shelter; but they were not allowed to remain there long, for Griffin with a party of 102 ATTACK ON QUETTA. sepoys, walked up to the opposite end of the bazar from that to which the first party proceeded; a volley did the business, and drove the Kakurs right in front of my gun (the 6-pounder.) We gave them a few rounds as they made off, and if we did not kill many, we did our best, depend upon it. This was the finale : a few straggling shots were fired on us as the enemy retreated, but with no effect. The first gun was fired about 1 past 2 or * before 3 A. M., and all the Kakurs had fled by dawn. A few were cut up during the retreat, by half a dozen sowars, and had we had but a few good cavalry or sowars, many more would have been disposed of ere they could have reached the hills. The accounts of the number of Kakurs who actually came down vary much: some say that the main body consisted of 1000 men, and others that they were only 800 in the larger body, but that there were other parties to the amount of 600 men ready to fall on our rear and flanks, had they an opportunity of doing so. I forgot to mention to you that the 10 men we confined in the afternoon, all declared that no attack was intended, but on their being brought out and lodged in front of the magazine, and assured that they should be liberated in the event of their words coming true, but that on the contrary, all should die, the moment a shot was fired at us, the hearts of some failed, and they confessed that an attack was to take place just before day-light, and at the very point where we were best prepared. One of these prisoners declared, that he would prevent the attack being made if allowed to go away, but this was not what we wished, and we told him so. I must tell you of a circumstance which will give you some idea of the barbarous tribes we have to deal with. They have an idea that certain men have the power of rendering the sword and bullets of their adversaries harmless-the Murrees are supposed to possess this spell, and are said to have executed it on that unfortunate occasion; when Lieut. Clarke's party was cut up in Cutchee, and, I myself, have heard many of the Kakurs declare most solemnly, that they had seen the bullets strike the Murrees with a force that would have killed any other men, but that they always fell harmless, as if they had struck a statue. Well, it seems that they have an idea here that we too can deal in charms of this kind, for on the morning of the attack, just as the Kakurs reached a spot where the shooting commenced, it halted for a moment to work a counter-spell which 'would completely defeat our witchcraft. This counter-spell consisted in sacrificing a dog by cutting off its head, tail and legs, but I don't think they will trust to this on another occasion. The 9-pounders fired 16 rounds of grape, the 6-pounders Our loss was trifling, only two fired 6 of grape and 3 of round shot. Beloochee gunners and one of the 1st Regiment of sepoys wounded. Of the enemy 16 were found shot dead by grape and small shot, six were cut up by the few sowars who followed in pursuit, and three were taken prisoners; but the number carried off wounded is reported to have been an enormous proportion; 100 wounded, 60 of them mortally and 40 slightly. There are also 80 missing, and supposed to have died of their wounds whilst endeavouring to escape through the hills. This may be, in some measure, an exaggeration; but judging from the traces of blood ATTACK ON QUETTA. 103 visible in all directions, and knowing that it is usual for these savages to carry off their wounded and dead too, if possible, I should say that the number of wounded cannot fall far short of what has been reported. "The ladies, on whose account we are most anxious, have hitherto behaved most nobly, and when shut up in a close and dirty magazine, their coolness and passive courage could not have been surpassed." " QUETTA.--" Quetta, 10th July, 1840.-My last letter to you despatched from this, was dated the 8th, and since that I have scarcely been in bed. Every succeeding hour was bringing us fresh rumours of an advancing foe, and we have been incessantly under arms day and night. Yesterday morning the enemy hove in sight with swarms of cavalry and infantry round the slope of a hill to the westward. Their number was estimated at 5000, and they took up a long line of encampment, partially investing the town. The previous evening I went through the ceremony of erecting on the citadel the Union jack, Shah Soojah's flag, and the regimental colour, which were placed upon the highest bastions amidst a general salute and three hearty cheers. The enemy in the morning sent a party of cavalry to cut lucerne in a field, some distance from their camp, and within range of our guns. Lieut. Bosanquet went out with 30 of his suwars to drive them off, but a body of their Infantry advanced and commenced a fire, while a slight skirmish took place with the enemy's suwars, and several casualties occurred, among which Bosanquet received a slight sabre cut on his bridle hand; one of his suwars was cut down, and two horses wounded. Our guns then opened with round shot and skivered a few men and horses. At 4 P. M. they again advanced in detached parties, but were soon scared with the 9-pounder round shot. It was determined among them to scale our walls, or dig them down by night, and they had brought for the latter purpose all the spades and shovels of Mustoong. At 1 A. M. as the moon went down, we heard their ' nukarus' beating, and the walls and bastions of the fort were immediately manned, but after 3 hours' impatient suspense, day-break discoverd to us their camp in 'statu quo.' They very soon, however, appeared moving in masses, for the purpose of plundering the villages in the distance, and from the firing we heard, there must have been a great deal of resistance made. A little after sunrise they advanced in bodies of cavalry towards the town, but our guns opened upon them with grape and round shot with fearful effect, falling slap into their masses and rolling over men and horses in splendid style. It remains now to be seen whether they will dare a reconnoitre with our small arms from the walls. We have 600 men on the walls. Bosanquet's troopers are all supplied with muskets from my spare arms, and take the Northern wall, acting as foot soldiers. " The 42d, 4 guns and 300 cavalry had received orders to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice to our assistance, and may be'expected here in a few days. 104 ATTACK ON QUETY'A. " Quetta, 19th and 20th July.-The enemy raised the siege of Quetta on the morning of the 17th, suddenly breaking up their Camp and retreating on Mustoong after having kept us in expectation of a storm for seven days and nights, during which time, scarcely a man had off his accoutrements. We had some pretty Cavalry skirmishes outside the walls, without very many severe casualties. " The enemy left behind all their scaling ladders, by which they had intended mounting the walls by six abreast. " You have no idea what a period of anxiety it has been to us, surrounded as we were by such a faithless race. " Two of Captain Bean's own chuprasees had actually volunteered to lead and place the ladders at the weakest points; another personal attendant, decked with presents and riding one of Bean's own horses, (as a conceived valuable servant,) went over to the enemy. They appear to have made certain of taking the town, and certainly their numbers were in their favor, (6000 at least) and the walls of the town are low, broken and extensive. " The Chiefs quarrelled among themselves on the night of the 16th, and the several parties in a couple of hours more (had they remained) would have themselves been engaged in a bloody feud. All my men (500) were on the walls, and would gallantly have defended them to the last, but all things considered, it is as well that the attempt was never made. The Kakur tribe joined the enemy and swelled their ranks much. The people of the town itself, I always feared, and between two fires, what could our utmost exertions have effected? In such a case, not one amongst us could have survived. On the morning of the 16th, an advance was made by the enemy, amidst clouds of dust, firing and smoke. The walls were manned and all ready to receive the attack, when their plans were disconcerted by the sudden arrival of 150 Affghan horse under Lieutenant Jackson, by an unsuspected route on their flank. He had several casualties, and the enemy amidst the dust and confusion, fancying it a larger body, retreated to their camp. On such trifling events depend the fate of thousands, for thousands must have fallen that day, under the galling fire of guns and musketry. The enemy were all mad to take Bean's life. Mahomed Hoossein Khan, the Chief, a son of the late Khan of Khelat calls him the murderer of his father. From the 23d of last month until this time, I have slept in my clothes every night-my mind has been constantly on the rack for the safety of Quetta. I knew that while the British flag floated on the Citadel, no British arm would fail to defend its honor, and I knew that should it fall, not one European would live to witness it, but then the very idea that it should fall to such a set of villains was enough to harrow up the very soul ! All now, I hope, is right, and the people of the country have seen the folly of their ways, and may they renounce them." Immediately after these affairs, considerable reinforcements reached Quetta from Candahar, and the enemy gradually drew off and did not THE FALL OF KHELAT. 105 renew their attack. Operations, however, against Khelat next occupied the attention of these Beloochees, and accordingly we find them before the fort about the middle of August 1840. For the particulars of the manner in which they assailed this stronghold, and ultimately became its possessors, we are indebted to the journal kept by Mr. Masson, a traveller, who happened, during the siege, to be with Lieut. Loveday, the political officer in charge. Stripping it of its purely personal details, we are presented with the following :" Associated with Lieut. Loveday and his fortunes, I naturally enquired as to what measures had been taken for the defence of the town. It was too plain, that Shah Nawaz Khan had been too much occupied in the management of his unruly Brahoes, or too oppressed by natural carelessness, to take any, and no attention had been given to Neither had Lieut. the repairs of the walls, or to any thing else. Loveday at all interested himself, although he had been recommended by some, and wisely too, I think, to take charge of the defence. I had heard much of the works with which he had strengthened his own residence; they however were trifling, and the house was not tenable under attack for a quarter of an hour even to Brahoe assailants. I endeavoured to put a little spirit into the affair, and caused some of the most glaring defects in the town walls to be obviated, and had some of the dead walls which might afford shelter to a foe, without the walls, pulled down; but there was not time to do much. I saw also that the people of the Khan were set about the casting of the bullets, as if it was meant to fight, there must be something to fight with. Shah Nawaz Khan was pleased to see me at Lieut. Loveday's house. On the day following my location at Lieut. Loveday's house, Shah Nawaz Khan withdrew his men into the town, and told them off to the walls. To Kamal Khan, Ettars Zai of Baghwan, and Khan Mahomed Khan, son of Isa Khan of Wadd, he confided the southern gate called Gil Khan, with an outwork at that point called the Sangar. The eastern gate, or Dil Dar, he entrusted to the son of Rashed Khan's party,-between whom and Kamal Khan's men, Mir Boher was stationed with his boy; the Mir on account of Rashed Khan's son being a child, was actually the head of the Zehri contingent, which being numerous, had nearly the The northern or Mustung whole eastern front of the town to defend. gate being adjoining to Lieut. Loveday's residence was considered under his charge, but Omar Khan Kakshani was fixed, subject in it to Lieut. Loveday's order. From the Derwaza Mustung the line along the western front to the Miri, was made over to the men of Shalkoh, Mehara, Sandaran, etc. villages near Kelat, and the party of Khair Mahomed Shahghassi. From the Miri to the Sangar, the walls were defended by Lutianis, Kamfararis, etc. The Miri was in charge of Mir Fatti Khan, brother to Shah Nawaz Khan, and the duty taken by the latter, whose 106 THE FALL OF KHELAT. couch was placed by night under the Derwaza Dil Dar, was to be on the alert, to patrol the ramparts, and to be ready to give assistance to any point attacked. On the succeeding morn the enemy appeared, and halting awhile on the low hills near Kelat, filed round by the dry bed of a water-course, and entered the gardens east of the city. Immediately, or as soon as they had alighted from their cattle, they rushed to the Babi suburb south of the town, and attacked Kamal Khan's position. The attack in time spread to the Derwaza Dil Dar, comprising the intermediate post of Mir Boher. It was clear our assailants intended to have got over their business speedily, or it may be they had supposed the gates would have been opened to them. It is not unlikely that most of Shah Nawaz Khan's chiefs had written very dutiful letters to the rebel camp, neither it is impossible that had they been less unceremoniously attacked, they might, saving appearances, have yielded the town; but the brusque besit, or summons of the Sahawanis put them on their mettle, and they fired ball in return. Much firing took place until the afternoon, when the assailants retired. Blood was shed on this occasion, a great point in Brahoe warfare, as it authorized the hope that accommodation was out of the question, and that the hostile parties must fight in earnest. We considered the chances of holding the town as now ten to one in our favor, as we naturally looked to the result of the first onset with some interest, not only as it would shew the kind of opponents we had to deal with, but what was of more moment, as it would test the fidelity of our friends. Our Brahoe levies subsisted on an allowance of flour; I succeeded in procuring from Lieutenant Loveday a supply of dates for the combatants. The enemy, I should have noted, were not above 1000 to 1200 men of all descriptions, and many of these were unarmed, and many more armed only with sword and shield : the chance is, that in the number of firelocks we were equal to them, supposing we had within the walls 500 to 600 men. Throughout the night, a firing was maintained from Kamal Khan's post, and also during the next day and night, but no regular attack was made, the rebels having determined to attempt an escalade, and being occupied in the preparation of ladders. The third night came, and we were aware of the design, although not so of the point of intended attack. Shah Nawaz Khan had taken the native precaution of distributing torches along the ramparts, which, as long as they were unconsumed and replenished with oil illumined the space for some distance around them. He was also, as customary with him, active in patrolling the place, retiring occasionally to his couch in the Derwaza Dil Dar. About two or three o'clock in the morning, the torches extinct or burning very dimly, an increased firing announced the attack, and the point seriously menaced we found was not far from us, being the quarter between the Mustung gate and Miri occupied by the Skalkohis, Nicharis, Sandaranis, Jettaks, etc. Nasrulah, a Kelat servant of Lieutenant Loveday, brought the news that ladders were fixed, and implored that a party of Sipahis should be sent. Lieutenant Loveday permitted his havildar, Allabuksh, to select eight men. These were accompanied by two or three others THE FALL OF KHELAT. 107 as amateurs and by Nasrulah. They opportunely reached as a number of the enemy had entered the town, and their companions were being assisted over the walls by those who ought to have defended them. The attack, of course, had been made on understanding with part of the garrison, who it seemed fired wadding only, while they lowered their lunghis to help the enemy up the ladders. The sipahis performed their duty admirably, and compelled the assailants to flight, cutting off from retreat those who had entered the town, about thirty in number, under Jelal Khan: these men fell in with Shah Newaz Khan on his rounds. They fired at him, and killed two or three of his men, while the rest, with a few exceptions, fled. Shah Nawaz Khan cut a man down, but being nearly alone, was compelled to fly. Jelal Khan and his party finding themselves unsupported, made the best of their way to Kamal Khan, and besought his protection. The men were disarmed, and with their leader, who was allowed to retain his arms, were kept prisoners. While the party of sipahis was engaged on the walls, a kalassi sent with ammunition was intercepted by the men of the garrison, who took his supply of cartridges as well as his sword. Nusrulah coming on the same errand, conveyed a second supply. The same man also brought the welcome news of the repulse of the escalade. The victorious sipahis now wished that a guard should remain over the slain on the walls, till morning should enable them to see and to despoil them. The restitution of their arms was the first demand made by the rebels after they entered the town. In the grey of the morning, Lieut. Loveday went from his house to the spot of the night's achievement. We had scarcely reached it, and cast our eyes on the corpses strewed around, and the broken ladders under the walls, when a brisk fire re-opened on the side of Kamal Khan. We returned to our house, and learned that the enemy had renewed the attack, as it proved, under the idea that Jelal Khan and his party, (who they were not aware had surrendered,) would open the gates to them. This attack was sharp and continued for about two hours, when the enemy again withdrew. "We might now have congratulated ourselves upon the events of the past night, but were not allowed long to do so, for symptoms of a general panic soon manifested themselves. They communicated even to our own people. It was true that the party of sipahis who had so gallantly behaved, had, in the heat of battle, slain and wounded also some of the traitors of the garrison, and there was reason to apprehend, unless measures of precaution were adopted, that in another attack they would side openly with the enemy. Throughout the day our sipahis were constantly exclaiming that there was treachery, inferring so from the guns at the Miri, occasionally fired, being loaded with blank cartridges, as they supposed. In the evening we were visited by Shah Nawaz Khan, who was low spirited. I proposed to eject the traitors with or without their arms. This step the Khan did not think advisable. I next proposed to give every man of the garrison a small sum of money, and to promise as much more, every time they repulsed the foe. This mode was not approved of. From this day the casting of bullets 108 THE FALL OF KHELAT. was suspended, and all idea of continuing the defence seemed to be abandoned. " Kamal Khan, upon whom Shah Nawaz Khan almost entirely depended, declared the place untenable, that arrangements were indispensable, and all had affirmed he would fight no more. It seems the enemy, enraged at Kamal Khan's opposition, had threatened to send to Baghwana for his wives and children, with the view of placing them in their front as they marched to the walls, and thereby to compel him to open Whether affected by this menace, or that he had the gates to them. previously inclined to play a double part, he now wavered, and Shah Nawaz Khan found he could no longer reckon on him. About sunset, a Saiyad, as vakeel, came to the town on the part of the enemy, either in pursuance of a concerted plan, or that finding force was ineffectual, it was deemed necessary to have recourse to fraud. The Khan next sent an Elchi, I forget who, to the camp of the enemy, observing, it behoved him to do so, as an Elchi had been sent to him. It was easy to divine what would be the end of the negociation. On the next day Kamal Khan met the Sirdars of Saharawan in a garden without the town. What passed is not known, but the result of the conference was an Ekrar Nameh, or engagement between the Sirdars of Jehalawan and Saharawan, giving the takht or musnud of Khelat to the son of the late Mehrab Khan, and Baghana Zodi and Khozdar to Shah Nawaz Khan, the latter vacating Khelat on the third day. Lieut. Loveday with his sipahis, people, and property was to be escorted to the Shah. A copy of the document sealed by Kamal Khan on behalf of the Sirdars of Jehalawan, and by the Saharawan Sirdars, was given to Lieut. Loveday. "As soon as the Ekrar Nama had been concluded, intercourse was free between the town and rebel camp, and Nasrulah, Lieut. Loveday's Khelat servant, began the work of deception by producing a letter, which he said the Darogah, his ancient master, had sent to him when he and the young Khan started from Kharan, desiring him to tell Lieutenant Loveday how much the Darogah esteemed him. Nasrulah was now, in consequence, sent to the Darogah, and returned bringing back the kindest assurances, either never made by that crafty old man, or made only to deceive. " Lieut. Loveday had on the first mention of negociation been taken by Shah Nawaz Khan to the Miri, and had seen the Khan's mother, who with her son thought at the time there was no alternative but treaty. Now, however, better acquainted with the state of the rebel camp, Shah Nawaz Khan and Mir Boher of Zehri wished to break off the treaty. Mir Boher had been suspected, and perhaps with justice; but events had changed him, and he was now willing to continue the defence; indeed, since the investment he had fought with sincerity. He came twice or thrice to Lieut. Loveday, with and without Shah Nawaz Khan, but the fatal influence of Haji Osman, Nasrulah, and the rest paralyzed every thing. These men made the grossest misrepresentations as to the number of the rebels, their abundance of THE FALL OF KHELAT. 109 provisions and of other necessaries, which were believed; whereas they were without food and ammunition, and if kept at bay for two or three days more, must have dispersed. Mir Boher proposed to have provided against treachery within by removing the parties who had manifested it, to other points, and placing in their stead Khan Mahomed Khan, an approved good man, and his party. He was also averse to ejection from the town. Mir Boher spoke with real anguish to Shah Nawaz Khan of the disgrace about to fall on them, saying it was binbureda, or cutting off their horses, and that Kamal Khan had spoiled all. " To counteract the efforts of Shah Nawaz Khan to get up resistance, or to persuade Lieut. Loveday to accompany him, Haji Osman and Nasrulah set on foot a variety of missions to the rebel camp. Had not the consequence been so fatal, the zeal for negociation at this period would have been amusing. It is obvious how important it was to the enemy that Lieut. Loveday should remain at Khelat in their power, whether they intended to gratify their revenge and cupidity at his expence, or whether they hoped by the possession of his person to secure terms. Nasrulah was sent to the camp a second time with Morad Khan, a Naik, and Imam Buksh, a drummer. The two latter made their salam to the young Khan, who spoke very courteously to them, and sent them to the Shah Ghassi to report in secret the object of their mission. Nasrulah was privately closeted with the Darogah. Haji Osman introduced on the scene his uncle Atta Mahomed Khan, brother of the notorious Akhund Mahomed Sitlik, and this man with Rais Pir Mahomed of Khelat were sent privately by night. On the next day, Atta Mahomed Khan went publicly with a retinue of forty or fifty persons he had collected. Yet this was not all; the Hindus came to ask Lieut. Loveday if they might go to make their salam : they were told, yes; and moved from the town in a body to the rebel camp. While such things were in progress, Lieut. Loveday, on Shah Nawaz Khan coming to call on him, with his accustomed familiarity of friendship would place his arm around him, affecting to coincide with his views and plans, while at the time his agents were negociating (if such a term may be used) with the Khan's enemies, and frustrating his intentions. Shah Nawaz Khan, however, reproached Lieut. Loveday with the fact of his man Nasrulah being in secret conference with the Darogah, and at another time rebuked Haji Osman, and used high language. Kamul Khan moreover complained to Lieut. Loveday, that Shah Nawaz Khan had even presumed to accuse him of playing falsely. Yet Lieut. Loveday's envoys always brought back the same unqualified assurances of kind treatment and protection-the young Khan, the Darogah, and Bibi Gunjani were all inspired by the best and kindest feelings, and the Sirdars of Saharawan were determined to adhere with fidelity to their engagements; Lieut. Loveday might do entirely as he pleased, return to Shall or remain at Kelat; if he went to Shall, the Bibi Gunjani was to accompany him; if he remained, his every wish was to be gratified; another and handsome house was to be built for him in place of the one pulled down by the Brahoes, and whose timbers had been converted into escalading 110 THE FALL OF KHELAT. ladders. Nasrulah particularly certified to the good intentions of his old master, the Darogah, and Atta Mahomed Khan, who professed to have great influence with Bibi Gunjani, assured Lieut. Loveday of that lady's good will, and that she looked upon him as her son. A letter was brought by Atta Mahomed Khan, said to be from the Bibi; but in the place of her seal, her name was scrawled within a circle. Lieut. Loveday seemed satisfied with all that was done, and to place belief in all he heard. I think he was very angry with me for cautioning him, or presuming to suggest that he was deceived. Yet I knew it was so, and with bitter disgust I heard Rais Pir Mahomed, on return from his nocturnal mission, and after he had reported to Lieut. Loveday what had passed, repeat, sitting with Nasrulah, a Persian couplet ending with the words "sag dowan," and intimating that his victim had fallen into the snare laid for him. Besides the people here named, Gholam and Fatti, brothers, and Babi, merchants, Wal-Mahomed, a tailor, Buta Sing, a Sipahi, and others whom I cannot remember, were sent on missions of one kind or other. Elchis were raked up from all quarters, and the aid of no one was refused. " Shah Nawaz Khan finding his wishes to continue the defence baffled, urged Lieut. Loveday to accompany him, taking all his effects with him. He assured him that he should be conducted in safety to Zehri or Baghwana, where, as he pleased, the struggle might be renewed, or he could retire, The Khan preferred Zehri, being supported by Mir Boher, and that the Malloh route would be kept open, while Shikarpur was near. *He honestly and truly confessed, that he could not undertake the responsibility of the Shall route. Lieut. Loveday seemed to acquiesce, but only seemed: his advisers were ready with their insinuations against the motives of the Khan and of Mir Boher, and were not willing that their victim should escape. Lieut. Loveday urged he had not a sufficient number of camels, and the Khan offered to supply any number he wanted. Some faint attempts were made to pack up, but were soon abandoned. " The third day had now arrived, when the young Khan and rebel host were to enter the town. Shah Nawaz Khan was early in the morning with Lieut. Loveday, entreating him even then to accompany him with his party, taking only his valuables, for it was too late to think of moving the bulk of the property. Lieut. Loveday was fixed, as if by enchantment to Khelat, and lent a deaf ear to all that was said. Shah Nawaz Khan had before asked him if all the Feringhees were as laghor, or unmanly, as he was, and now prophesied to him all the indignities and perils to which he exposed himself by remaining. " It was not until this period that Shah Nawaz Khan thought of abdication. The time was very critical. He had not deserted Lieut. Loveday, but had been deserted by him, when he decided to take the decisive step of repairing to the camp of Mehrab Khan's son, and of investing He had scarcely left the town when Nasrulah and him with a khelat. Haji Osman, who had been sent betimes to the camp, returned, and with singular impudence implored Lieut. Loveday, when he had it no THE FALL OF KHELAT. 111 longer in his power, to accompany Shah Nawaz Khan, saying there was evil in his stay at Kelat. " When Shah Nawaz Khan left Lieut. Loveday, his brother Mir Fatti Khan came. He requested a paper, which Lieut. Loveday gave him, noting that he had been solicited to depart, but had determined to remain and negotiate for the safety of himself and his party. Fatti Khan went and returned, when Lieut. Loveday took the paper from him, and wrote another in which the reason for remaining was stated to be his determination to die at his post. Shah Nawaz Khan had behaved throughout the siege most creditably. Whatever other motives may have dictated the step of his abdication, he made it still a means of contributing, as far as in his power, to the good treatment, by the opposite party, of Lieut. Loveday, and of facilitating arrangements with it, which that officer had commenced. Nothing was more evident than the anxiety manifested by Shah Nawaz Khan, to shew his sense of obligation to the Government that had placed him in authority, by protecting the officer appointed to act with him, and certainly it was not his fault that the officer refused to be protected by him. Shah Nawaz Khan on arraying the son of Mehrab Khan with a khelat, explained to him and the assembled chiefs, that the khelat had not been given to him by Lieut. Loveday, but by the Sirkar Company; that he had a friend at Kelat, whose kind treatment he should expect in return for the resignation of his station. That friend was Lieut. Loveday. He said in the figurative style of the Brahoes, that Lieut. Loveday was his beard : when the son of Mehrab Khan replied, that the gentleman had now become his beard, and that he should be treated as a brother, etc. The two Khans next moved in procession to the town, and as the cavalcade advanced, we had the mortification to witness to what a contemptible rabble we had surrendered the town. "After having attended the son of Mehrab Khan to the Miri, Shah Nawaz Khan, in the act of leaving the town, called on Lieut. Loveday. The Khan called me to witness he had not failed in his duty to the Sirkar Company, or to Lieut. Loveday. " A little time afterwards, Haji Osman had the audacity to tell Lieut. Loveday, when repeating what he had heard had passed when the Khan arrayed Mehrab Khan's son with a lshelat, that the Khan offered to be the first to lay hands on Lieut. Loveday, and that Kamal Khan and Mir Boher had spoken to the same purpose. To so infamous a scoundrel did Lieut. Loveday trust for information, and by such informations were his opinions formed, and his conduct determined. "The son of Mehrab Khan seated in the place of his father, received during the day the congratulations and offerings of the people. Lieut. Loveday sent also his Mabaraki, or salutation of welcome, with offerings of fifty rupees each to be presented respectively to the young Khan and to Bibi Gunjani, and they sent in return four men to attend at Lieut. Loveday's gates, avowedly to keep the turbulent Brahoes from intrusion, but in like manner to watch over intercourse with the house, and to take care that no one left it. Bibi Gunjani also sent in a message to 112 MARCH OF CONVOY TO KAHUN. Lieut. Loveday to beware, a hundred times to beware, that he gave no money to any one ; or at least such a message was brought in the Bibi's name.". These various occurrences-at Quetta, Khelat, and in the Surtoff Pass-naturally aroused the attention of the political authority, (Mr. Ross Bell,) in Scinde, and reinforcements, with the view of strengthening the different posts already occupied, recapturing ground that had been lost, and putting down the insurrection in the Moostung, were immediately called for. The situation of Captain Brown at Kahun, surrounded and closely watched as he was by hordes of Beloochees,to keep whom in check was the original purpose of the occupation of Kahun-was the first object of solicitude. Reports from that officer announced that his provisions were fast failing him, but that he was determined on holding his post until reduced to the last extremity. It was therefore resolved to throw supplies into the fort without delay, and with this view a convoy of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks was placed under the charge of Major Clibborn of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, who with a force of 464 bayonets, 34 rank and file of Bombay The artillery, and three 12-pound howitzers marched for Kahun. as they did the most serious misadventures of this force-constituting calamity that had befallen our arms--are thus narrated by one of the officers engaged, and is borne out in all essential particulars by Major Clibborn's own despatch. "In spite of the intense heat of the weather, the convoy started on the 12th August, and by marching at night, accomplished the distance to Poolagee, of one hundred and ten miles, across the burning and desert plains of Scinde, with less distress to the men than could have been anticipated. At Poolagee, Major Clibborn's force was increased by 200 Poona and Scinde irregular horse, under Lieutenants Lock and Malcolm ; and entered the hills by the southern Pass on the 24th. In five marches they reached the Surtoff mountain. It took thirteen or fourteen hours, namely from 2 A. M. to 3 or 4 P. M., to get the convoy and guns up the mountain; the latter had to be dragged up by manual labour, the road running up the steep face of the mountain, in many places nearly perpendicular, and which is said by those who have seen both to exceed in difficulty the famed Khojuk Pass. The suffering of the sepoys employed in this service, and indeed of all, exposed as they were to the burning heat of an August sun, was distressing in the extreme, but it was borne cheerfully and without a complaint. The night was passed on the table-land on the sum- STORMING THE NUFFOOSK PASS. 113 mit, with no water nearer than the foot of the Ghaut. The men had little rest; they were under arms the greater part of the night, the Beloochees keeping up a fire on the piquets and camp from the other side of an impassable ravine. At 2 A. M. on the morning of the 31st August, the march was continued to the foot of the second range The road lying along the of mountains, distant six or seven miles. foot of the mountain was so cut up by ravines and nullahs, that one of the guns upset, occasioning considerable delay in righting and repairing it, the men being all the while exposed to a galling fire from the Beloochees, which wounded several. Moving on again, we soon came in sight of the Pass of Nuffoosk, and here all our difficulties became apparent. The road which had been reported practicable for guns and camels, rose before our wearied and exhausted troops in a zigzag course up the side of a precipitous mountain; the crest crowded with the enemy, screened under shelter of the rocks, who, on our appearance, set fire to a beacon light. It was now 10 A. M., and the heat fearfully oppressive. A letter from Captain Brown, in Kahun, of the 27th, reported that abundance of rain had fallen, and that no doubt we should find a sufficiency of water at our ground. The reports of the guides on arrival were that there was no water ! and the little remaining in the wretched Paukauls from the last halting ground, on the top of the Surtoff Pass, (where neither water nor forage exists), was dried up. Under these circumstances, it was evident that the whole force and cattle must perish from thirst, unless the Pass of Nuffoosk were carried, beyond which, water was said to be procurable, and the fort of Kahun distant about six miles. We waited anxiously till half-past one for the arrival of the rear-guard, consisting of the 1st and 2nd companies of the 1st Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Poonah Horse under Lieut. Lock. At two, the dispositions for attacking the Pass were made, and the left flank companies of the 1st and 2nd Grenadiers and fifty volunteers, Poonah Auxiliary Horse, under Lieut. Lock, were led on with admirable coolness and order by Capt. Raitt, followed by a strong support of the Grenadiers. An effective flanking party was posted at the foot of the Ghaut, on the right, who kept up a heavy fire on the crest of the hill. The guns were placed so as to throw shrapnel shells to clear the head of the Pass, while the storming party advanced up the steep face of the mountain. The remainder of the escort with the colours were drawn up on the plain, facing the Pass and protecting the guns. With the greatest anxiety we watched the progress of the storming party, as they steadily wound up, under a heavy fire from the enemy ; in some parts they were only able to advance in single file. The road at all times barely practicable for guns, had been altogether destroyed; and they found breast-works, topped with thorny bushes, built across the road, in three places most exposed to the fire from the ridge. These they surmounted; the ledge of the head of the Pass was gained, and the party ready to rush on; one sepoy was seen to reach the gap and fire through, when from every side they were assailed by a tremendous fire from the enemy, and rocks and stones were The Beloochees, with a wild shout, rushed hurled from the summit. 114 STORMING THE NUFFOOSK PASS. down sword in hand. Hundreds and hundreds poured over the ridges of the mountains, and leaping into the midst of the men, bore all before them. Sepoys and Beloochees were mingled on the hill. Seeing the attack completely repulsed, and that to make any stand on the steep face of the hill was impossible, the supporting and flanking parties retreated to the colours. The enemy rushed down the mountain, and although the guns were sweeping the plain with grape, advanced with such determined gallantry and impetuosity, that there was barely time to form the men, a task rendered but the more difficult by the number of recruits necessarily placed in the ranks for the present service. The Beloochees pouring round in all directions, attacked sword in hand, and throwing in showers of the heavy stones with which the plain abounded, advanced to the very muzzles of the guns. The men, however, behaved admirably, and kept up so brisk a fire, that with well applied rounds of grape from Capt. Stamford's howitzers, the enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, dispersing in all directions, numbers falling in the flight. Our loss on the mountain was now found to be very severe. Nearly half the storming party had fallen, and we had lost four officers. Raitt was shot through the thigh about half way up the mountain, when he turned round and asked Franklin to lead the advance, but seeing him supporting poor Williams, who had just been shot through the heart, he bound his handkerchief round the wound, and again took his place at the head of his company, where he fell nobly when the rush took place, at which time also Franklin was killed. Little Moore received two shot wounds, and was afterwards cut down by a Beloochee in passing. Lock, who led the dismounted Sowars, was severely wounded, receiving a sword cut, and several severe bruises from stones on the head; but was forced down the hill by his orderly, and reached one of the guns in a fainting state. Out of the hundred dismounted Sowars alone, fiftythree were killed." " The enemy had been repulsed with great slaughter, and most of their influential men were lying dead around us; but the Pass remained in their possession, and their numbers were still very great, the combined tribes of the Beloochees, amounting in fact to several thousands. To follow up our success was impossible; the.heat was dreadfully intense, and the sufferings of the men and cattle, from exhaustion and thirst, became painfully apparent. The men grew clamorous for drink, and the cries of the wounded and dying, for water ! water ! were increasing. The few bottles of beer among the officers' baggage, given to allay the wants of the greatest sufferers, gave rise to scenes of frenzy and despair. Men of all castes rushed and struggled for it, and many a miserable wretch, on getting hold of a bottle and finding it empty, dropped lifeless on the ground. The scene was agonizing to behold. Parties were sent to search for water; and Meer Hussain, one of the guides, having reported that they had discovered some in a nullah, about half a coss off, the whole of the Puckaul Bheesties, and camel Puckauls, under the escort of the irregular horse, were despatched to procure a supply. The gun-horses were sent with the party, being quite unfit, in their RETREAT TO POOLAGEE. 115 exhausted state, to take the guns back, and many of the officers' horses The evening was spent in collecting and also accompanied them. bringing off the wounded, and occasionally firing shells into the hills, from which the enemy still kept up a fire on the skirmishers in the plain. Party after party returned, reporting that no water was to be found; and, about sunset, some stragglers from Meer Hussain's party came in, reporting that the whole had been surrounded in a nullah, the " Under these greater part cut to pieces, and the horses carried off. circumstances (Major Clibborn states in his official despatch), it became necessary to determine what should be done. I had already lost about 150 men of my small force (small, when the nature of the country and the size of the convoy are considered,) the remainder being enfeebled with thirst, and the exertions of the two previous days; and, to add to our different difficulties, most of the camel men, dooly bearers, etc. had absconded during the action, after plundering the commissariat. The gun-horses were gone; and the men of the Golundauze, so prostrated from fatigue and thirst, that latterly they could scarcely rise to fire a gun. In this state, I found it impossible, allowing that I made a successful attack on the Pass, to convey either the stores or guns over it, particularly as the road had been destroyed; and, after mature deliberation, I found that it would be impracticable to carry out the object of the convoy to throw provisions into Kahun; and further, that unless the water-party, horses, etc. returned soon, my whole force, cattle and followers, must perish of thirst. The sad alternative devolved on me of deciding on the abandonment of the unfortunate garrison of Kahun, the stores and materials of the detachment; and the chance presented itself by a rapid retreat to the water at Surtoff, of saving the remainder of my men and the numerous followers, with such carriage and stores as their enfeebled state would permit me to carry off. I therefore resolved, unless the gun-horses and water arrived by 10 P. M. to move off quietly with my troops. Such continuing to be the case at that hour, I directed Capt. Stamford to spike his guns, and at eleven o'clock we moved with as much quietness as the frantic state of the men would permit. I am grieved to add, that we were obliged to abandon nearly every thing--guns, stores, camp equipage, etc.; the desertion of the camel-drivers having put it out of my power to remove them." The wounded were carried on the few camels we could manage to take with us. We reached the top of the Surtoff fortunately without obstruction from the enemy, for the Here all discipline was at an end; men were completely knocked up. the men, rushing down the hill, leaped into the pools of water like madmen. The rear-guard was attacked by a large body of Beloochees, and the slaughter among the followers was very great. As soon as the men could be got from the water they were formed into square, as the Beloochees were reported to have shewn themselves on all sides, and we waited for day-break, when it was found that the whole of the convoy and baggage we had been able to remove, had been carried off in the confusion and darkness of the night. The sepoys at Nuffoosk, had been ordered in the evening to put three or four day's supply of flour in their 116 RETREAT TO POOLAGEE. havresacks, but most of the men had been too much exhausted to do so; and we now found ourselves absolutely without food. Not a single tent was saved, either for officers or men; and nothing remained but to make a forced march on Poolagee, distant more than fifty miles. Fortunately we had still a few empty camels, and were joined by others on the road, on which we brought on the wounded. Lock had a narrow escape; he was carried to Surtoff, bound to the back of a Sowar, and afterwards brought on lashed to the back of a camel, The sufferings of all on the march to Poolagee, from the intense heat of the weather, rendered more insupportable by the reflection of the sand and sandstone rocks, is not to be described. Poor Capt. Heighington, of the 1st Grenadiers, died the day after we reached Poolagee, from the effects of the sun and fatigue, and many of the men died on the march. Major Clibborn, whose exertions were untiring, and whose courage and self-possession through these trying scenes were most conspicuous and the admiration of all, would have probably shared the same fate had not oneof the sepoys, observing a change in his countenance on the march, begged of him to wrap a muslin sash (which he gave him) round his head in place of his chakoe. This, no doubt, saved his life. In his official despatch he deservedly notices the gallant bravery of Lieutenant Lock of the Poonah Irregular Horse, and Lieutenant Malcolm of the Scinde Horse. The great number of their men who fell, shews how nobly they did their duty; indeed, the conduct of all the men, many of the 1st Grenadiers raw recruits, who never before had been under fire, was exemplary. Officers killed in the disastrous attack on the Pass : 1st Grenadiers, Capt. Raitt and Lieut. Moore. Jemadar Jewrakeen Sing. 2nd Grenadiers, Captain Franklin and Ensign Williams. Subadar Gooroo Bux. Statement of killed and wounded. KILLED. Artillery, ........ Pioneers, .. .. ...... 1st Grenadiers, ........ 2d Ditto, .......... Poonah Auxiliary Horse, Scinde, 1st Horse, ...... WOUNDED. .. .. 7 4 86 26 36 20 179 1st Grenadiers,.. ....... 2d Ditto, ...... Poonah Auxiliary Horse, Scinde, 1st Horse, .. .. .. . 62 10 t..).. 10 10 92 out of a force of about six hundred and fifty men. " This does not include the loss of life on the return march. When, in the month of March, Captain Brown alluded to the excessive heat, and stated that the thermometer on the second day's march ranged as high as 116°; what must it have been in the month of August, that fatal season of heat ?"* * A Military Commission was appointed to investigate the conduct of Major Clibborn, and the causes of the disaster on the Nuffoosk Pass. The Commission condemned Major Clibborn and all the superior Officers who had ordered and provided for his expedition. The Government subsequently removed the two senior Members of the Commission for giving an honest verdict. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BELOOCHEES. 117 The condition of Captain Brown during these disastrous occurrences, and for some time subsequently was, as may be conceived, most deplorable. The Journal which he kept, from the period of his first occupation of the Fort of Kahan, down to the hour when he evacuated it under highly honorable terms, will be found in the Appendix to this volume (No. II). It discloses a history of patience, cheerfulness, resolution, discipline, and bravery, under circumstances of the most trying nature, and redounding so much to Captain Brown's honour, that the Bombay Commander-in-Chief gave him a staff appointment, the Government transferred him to a lucrative Political office, and his Sovereign conferred upon him a Brevet Majority. Lord Ellenborough afterwards created him an Honorary A. D. C. The Beloochees having now committed themselves irretrievably, of course anticipated a severe visitation as soon as the arrival of reinforcements should enable the British troops to take the field. They therefore proceeded to strengthen the works of Khelat, and to add large numbers to the garrison, while Nusseer Khan, the son of Mehrab Khan, was urged to place himself at the head of the revolted tribes, and to drive the British from the country they occupied between Quetta and Shikarpore. Several attacks were made by them upon Lehree, Dadur, and other small posts, and upon detachments of troops marching across the desert to Gundava, and the Bolan Pass; but the determined gallantry of the 5th and 25th Bombay N. I. assisted by Skinner's horse and the Scinde and Poona irregulars, and now reinforced by a portion of Her Majesty's 40th Regt. under Major Boscawen and the 38th Bengal N. I., rendered their defeats frequent, and their advantages slight and temporary.* It was not, however, until the beginning of November 1840, that troops had arrived from the opposite points of Candahar and Lower Scinde in sufficient force to strike a decisive blow at the resuscitated power of the Beloochees. On the 3rd of that month, Major General Nott had reached Khelat with the 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Bengal N. I. some guns under Captain Anderson, a part of Shah Soojah's Cavalry under Capt. Walker, and Infantry under Capt. Macan; but the * In one of these affairs, our troops fell in with the body of Lieut. Loveday, who had been carried about in fetters by the people with whom he had entrusted himself, and who murdered him to prevent his release. The body was yet warm and bleeding when found by the 40th Foot under Major Boscawen at Dadur. 118 DEFEAT OF NUSSEER KHANI. garrison had fled upon his approach, and he found the fortress completely evacuated. He therefore returned to Quetta, leaving Colonel Stacy as Political Agent in charge of Khelat, supported by a regiment of infantry. Nusseer Khan, however, still remained in arms in the hills, occasionally descending by the Bolan Pass to give battle to the detached forces, and on one occasion actually besieging and plundering Dadur. To crush this chieftain, and to restore tranquillity to the whole of Upper Scinde, engaged the attention of the field force which had now assembled under Major General Brookes of the Bombay Army, and it was not long before an opportunity appeared for striking an effective blow at the rebel power. General Brookes having received information to the effect that Nusseer Khan, with about 4000 men, had taken up his position in the neighbourhood of Kotrah, where he was expecting a large reinforcement, despatched one of his A. D. C.s to Colonel Marshall, directing him (Colonel M.) to attack the Khan's camp, with the greatest possible promptitude. Colonel Marshall's detachment consisted of about 500 of the 25th N. I., 150 of the 2nd Grenadier Regiment, 180 of the 21st N. I. and two guns, with details from the 5th company of the Golundauze Battalion, under Lieutenant Pruen-in all 842 fighting men. With this force, Colonel Marshall having received the General's Orders on the morning of the 30th Nov., immediately made his preparations to attack the Khan's position at day-break on the 1st Dec. This he did, with signal success. The surprize was most complete-Nusseer Khan himself fled in consternation, at the first appearance of our troops ; but his chiefs held out most desperately against us, and not before nearly 500 were slain, was the enemy put to flight. Then Meer Bohur Zehree, who commanded the Khan's army, and seven other chief leaders, including the Bohur's son, with 132 of their bravest followers, surren. dered themselves, and were made prisoners. On our side the loss was comparatively small-one officer, Lieut. Lodge of the 25th, killed-and in all, 11 killed and 30 wounded. The defence was most desperate, and the position occupied by the enemy so strong, that the Bombay troops must have fought with the utmost steadiness, and the most persevering gallantry, to have achieved a victory against such advantages. Lieut. Wallace, the Assistant Political Agent, who went with the detachment, reports, that " the hill, to DEFEAT OF NUSSEER KHAN. 119 which the enemy retreated, was a perfect natural fortress, and the daring, steady, and persevering manner, in which each position was attacked and carried, reflects the highest credit on the troops, whose behaviour throughout an arduous day's work was admirable ;" and General Brookes, in a Field Order, which will be found below, congratulates in a warm, but not undue, strain of eulogium, the brilliant service performed by the detachment. Lieut. Smith of the Bengal Native Infantry, (an extra A. D. C. to General Brookes,) who much distinguished himself in this affair, escorted Meer Bohur and his son to Sukkur. Among the killed, on the enemy's side, were four chiefsTubzul Khan, Shere Khan, Hydur Khan, and Shuffee Mahomed. The escape of Nusseer Khan was inevitable; his position appears to have been more than a mile to rearward of his camp, and, as he moved off at once, and the Passes leading to his encampment were strongly guarded, it was impossible to overtake him. He fled with only two followers, having been from the first unwilling to oppose us. After their defeat, the enemy gathered together, in great force, between Kundah and Colonel Marshall's camp (round which an entrenchment had been made) the whole number being mounted, but they appeared to exhibit every inclination to keep at a respectful distance. An officer in Captain Teasdale's detachment of the 25th N. I., thus describes, in a letter, the forcing of the first Pass :" In consequence of the guide with us having lost his road, a consi. derable delay unavoidably occurred, and we did not get well into the mountains until day-break. " At half past 6 o'clock in the morning of the first instant, our detach. ment arrived at the gorge of a deep defile in a very strong country, which was pointed out to us by the guide as the entrance into the camp of the insurgent chief Nusseer Khan. Seeing the heights on each flank crowned with Brahoes, Captain Teasdale detached two strong parties under Lieut. Lockley and Ensign Oliphant, of the 2nd Grenadier Regiment, to dislodge them. " The enemy immediately opened their fire, and kept it up with great briskness, wounding several of our men. As soon as Capt. Teasdale perceived that his flanking parties had gained the summits of the hills, and commenced their fire, he advanced with the main body, and forced the Pass, killing and wounding a great number of the enemy, and driv. ing them over the hills. " We found the Khan's camp evacuated, but his person was. pointed out to us at the distance of upwards of two miles in full retreat up a 120 GENERAL BROOKES' COMPLIMENTARY ORDER. precipitous mountain. We pushed forward detachments after them, who, as well as the main body found the whole country strewed with cattle and bags of grain. One of these parties succeeded in reaching a body of the Brahoes, three of whom they killed, and secured ten camels laden with household furniture and the chief's kettle drums. " Finding that the chief had escaped, we pushed on with all despatch to co-operate with Colonel Marshall. Captain Teasdale had previously detached Ensign Bourdillon, 25th Regt. N. I. with a party to drive down a body of the enemy, whom he saw on a hill on the left of our position. " The loss of the enemy in disputing the first Pass was between 30 and 40 killed. I do not think that more than 10 escaped wounded, as the action was very close during the whole period." " Field Army Orders by Major General BROOKES, Sukkur, 6th December, 1840. " Major General Brookes has much satisfaction in notifying to the troops composing the Field Army, the signal success which has attended that portion of it stationed at Kotrah, under Lieut. Colonel Marshall. "The Major General having received authentic intelligence that Nusseer Khan, with the garrison of Khelat, about 4000 men, had been encamped in a strong position in the hills, within eight miles of Kotrah, and that reinforcements to the extent of many thousands were on the road from Thall to join him, directed Lieut. Smith, 15th Bengal Infantry and acting A. D. C. to the Major General, to proceed express to Lieut.-Col. Marshall's camp, with orders to the Lieut.-Col. to attack the Khan in his position. Lieut. Smith left this at 2 o'clock on the 28th, and although his progress was greatly impeded by falling in with a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who followed and fired on him several miles, he succeeded in reaching Lieut. Col. Marshall's camp on the morning of the 30th ultimo, completing a march of 150 miles in 38 hours. The attack was made the following morning at daylight, by Lieut. Col. Marshall, at the head of 900 infantry of the 2nd Grenadiers, 21st and 25th Regiments, commanded by Captains Boyd, Innes, and Teasdale, with 60 irregular horse under Lieut. Smith, and 2 guns under Lieut. Pruen. The enemy were completely surprised. Nusseer Khan, and two followers, escaped on foot at the first alarm, but his chiefs and followers made a long and desperate defence. At length when four chiefs and upwards of 500 men were left dead on the field, and nearly the whole of the rest put to flight, the enemy's chief commander Meer Bohur, with his son, six other chiefs and 132 of their bravest followers surrendered themselves prisoners. The whole of the enemy's baggage, and a large quantity of arms, fell into our hands. OPERATIONS IN KOHISTAN. 121 " The loss on our side, considering the obstinate nature of the conflict, was wonderfully small. Lieut. Lodge, 25th Regiment, 1 Havildar and 9 Rank and File killed, and 2 Havildars and 28 Rank and File wounded. " The Major General returns his best thanks, and sincerely congratulates Lieut. Col. Marshall, the European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Privates on this brilliant achievement. " The services of Captain Boyd, 2nd Grenadiers, Captain Innes, 21st Regiment, Captain Teasdale, 25th Regiment, and Lieutenant Pruen of the Artillery, deserve particular praise; and will be brought to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The services also of Lieut. Smith deserve the Major General's warmest praise, not only for his gallantry in the field, which was conspicuous, but for the determined perseverance and courage which he displayed in pressing on, despite of fatigue and the dangers which he had to surmount in a country occupied by the enemy, so as to deliver his despatches to Lieutenant Colonel Marshall in time to ensure the instructions they contained being carried into effect, before the arrival of the reinforcements expected by the enemy, which would have rendered the attempt impracticable. G. H. BROOKES, Major-General, Commanding Field Army." After this affair, the Brahoes and Murrees retreated to their hills, placing themselves under the Beebee Gunjan, the principal wife of Mehrab Khan, who had been residing at Dadur, a pensioner of the British Government, until the capitulation of Shah Newaz, and the occupation of Khelat by Nusseer Khan, induced her to fly and join the adherents of her husband's family. Leaving affairs in Scinde, we now retrace our steps to Cabul, where the Envoy was deeply engaged in devising schemes for the settlement of the country. The stand made by Dost Mahomed in the Hindoo Koosh, had inspired many of the chieftains in Kohistan with hopes of his ultimate success, and of their own consequent restoration to power and influence. In the Ghilzie country also disaffection revived, and it became very evident that vigorous measures were indispensable to crush the Hydra which now assailed the security of Shah Soojah's dominions. On the 24th September, (1840,) a strong force was dispatched, under Brigadier Sale, to Charekar in the Kohistan, where a large party of rebels had assembled, and whither, it was supposed, 122 ACTION AT TOOTUMDURRA. Dost Mahomed would betake himself, on his way to Cabul, after his repulse at Bameean, and the conclusion of the treaty with the Wullee of Kholoom. Colonel Wheeler, C. B., was sent to Kudjah to attack and punish the refractory Wuzzerees.* Another detachment was dispatched to assist Colonel Orchard's return from Kudjur (Korner) with the European Regiment, he being then surrounded by the enemy. At Ghuzni the garrison was put upon its mettle, the Artillery sleeping at their guns, for the disaffection had become strongly marked, and Dost Mahomed's two sons had escaped from confinement there. Brigadier Sale, guided and assisted by Sir Alexander Burnes, moved in the first instance against the town and forts of Ali Khan and Rujub Khan, two chiefs who had been most active in their communications with Dost Mahomed. He invested them on the 29th September. The enemy occupied a strong position, but fled after a brief shew of resistance, across an unfordable river. The engagements which took place on these occasions were nearly bloodless, the only casualties being Captain Edward Conolly, an Assistant to the Political Envoy at Cabul, who acted as Aid-de-Camp to Brigadier Sale, two men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and two Grenadiers of the 37th N. I. The operations are described in the annexed despatch addressed to Sir Willoughby Cotton. To Major Genl. Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G. C. B. and K. C. H. &c. Sc. Cabul. Camp Tootumdurra, 29th September, 1840. " SIR,-At day light this morning I quitted my encampment at Rohat, and was joined at Charekar, 5 miles in advance, by the Detachment under the command of Captain Fraser of the 2d Light Cavalry. " At Charekar I learned from Sir Alexander Burnes, that no alteration had taken place in his views, with reference to the expediency of an attack on the Forts at the entrance of the Ghorbund Pass, belonging to Aly Khan, and known by the name of Tootumdurra. I therefore determined to attempt their capture immediately, and moved forward from Charekar at 8 A. M., having the Cavalry in advance. " On arriving in front of Tootumdurra, I found the enemy posted in a very strong position : a village surrounded by garden walls, defended by a small fort and several detached towers, commanded the undulating ground below the high and steep hills which bound the Ghorbund * The dispatches of Colonel Wheeler, relative to these operations, not being at hand while this sheet is passing through the Press, will be found in the Appendix. ACTION AT TOOTUMDURRA. 123 Pass to the south, and a chain of their detached forts within musket range respectively of the village and each other, extends to the Eastward of the village; one of these forts, a hexagonal structure, with towers at the angles is of considerable strength. The rear, or north of the position was defended by a deep canal carried along the high ground above the Ghorebund River, the vale below is entirely covered with gardens, beyond which again rise the rocky hills to the north of the Pass. " A party of the enemy was drawn up in front of the village protected by a mound, a second occupied the face of the hill to the west of the village, and the towers and forts were garrisoned by matchlock-men, who opened a brisk fire on the party of Cavalry sent in advance to reconnoitre. " The Grenadier Company of the 37th N. I., a party of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Shah Shooja's 2d Cavalry, and two of Her Majesty's guns, 6-pounders, under Lieut. Warburton, was directed to clear the hill to our left, and then to take the position of the enemy in flank, and co-operate with the other parties engaged in clearing the village. " Two Companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Lieut. Holkham, were detached to the right to take possession of two of the small detached forts, in which operation they were supported by three 9-pounder guns, under Captain Abbott. The fire from these guns was also, as opportunity offered, directed on the towers and other defences of the village, with the view of dislodging the enemy from their advantageous position, and facilitating the advance of the Infantry. "These operations were crowned with complete success. " The principal column of attack, consisting of the remainder of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, two Companies of the 27th N. I., and the Light Company of the 37th N. I. was then ordered to advance, and moved on the village at a rapid pace. The enemy continued their fire till the heads of the Companies were within 50 paces of the walls, when they fled with precipitation across the river, and over ground where they could not be followed by the Cavalry. " The garrison of the large fort seeing the position both to their right and left thus in the possession of our troops, and Captain Abbott's guns in battery opposite the gate, abandoned the post, and escaped through a wicket, which, opening to the south, was covered from the fire of the detachment. " Parties of Infantry were sent in pursuit across the valley, and another small fort on the low ground temporarily occupied, but finding the enemy completely broken and dispersed, these parties were recalled, and I encamped in the vicinity of the forts, the whole of which were in our possession by 11 A. M. "The accompanying Casualty Return will shew that this advantage has been attended by little loss, a fact which I in a great measure attribute to the dread inspired by the excellent practice of Artillery under 124 ATTACK ON JULGA. the able direction of Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and Warburton; but I have to lament the loss of Captain Edward Conolly of the 6th Light Cavalry, who joined me in the morning as a volunteer. He was shot through the heart on our advance against the village. " It is my gratifying duty to express my entire satisfaction with the conduct of the Troops it has fallen to my lot on this occasion to command. The rapid flight of the enemy prevented their sustaining or inflicting much loss, but the steadiness and gallantry with which the Troops advanced was such as to warrant my entertaining the most sanguine hopes of success, even had the really formidable position we attacked been defended to the last. " I am now, at the request of Sir Alexander Burnes, (who accompanied me throughout the operations I have detailed,) taking steps for the destruction of the forts that have fallen into our hands. "'To Captain Sanders of the Engineers, I was much indebted for his judicious and scientific observations, both during and previous to the commencement of the operations. " Captain Wade of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, gave me every assistance in seeing my orders carried into effect. " Though not in the Army, Mr. Wheeler accompanied me as a volunteer to carry orders, and I had several times occasion to employ him thus." I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obdt. Servant, R. SALE, M. G. Comg. Detachment. On the 3d of October the Brigadier attacked a fort named Julga, said to be the principal stronghold of the rebels. The walls were found too thick to be effectively breached by the 9-pounder guns which he had The aswith him, and too high to be reached by the scaling ladders. sailing column, which had advanced in the belief that the breach was practicable, and which behaved with conspicuous gallantry, was in consequence, compelled to retire, leaving 11 men of Her Majesty's 13th The viand 1 of the 37th N. I. killed, and having 12 men wounded. gour of the attack had, however, so intimidated the garrison, who must have also suffered severely from our fire, that they immediately afterwards fled, and possession was obtained of the place, which was destroyed. It was regretted that the rebel chiefs had by this means escaped, but there appeared not to be likelihood of any necessity for further protracted operations. The Dooranee Horse behaved well. The Brigadier thus describes the occurrence in his despatch dated 5th October. The despatch, together with all others from the same quar- REPULSE AT JULGA. 125 ter, was forwarded in one from Sir W. Cotton, but as the communications of the latter officer were, from his position, mere matters of form, it is unnecessary to give them. From Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B., Commanding Field Force in Kohistan, to Major General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G. C. B. and K. C. H., Commanding the Troops in Afghanistan, dated Camp Julga, October 5th, 1840. " SIm,-The Political Agent having informed me, that several of the Rebel Chieftains had fled to a fort within 16 miles of my camp at Charekar, I determined on attempting to secure them, and with this view directed Captain Anderson with two Squadrons of His Majesty Shah Soojah's Cavalry, the Jan Bazees under Lieutenant Dowson, and about 500 Dooranee Horse, who were placed at my disposal by the Shahzada Timoor, the whole under the direction of Captain Sanders of the Engineers, to proceed to Julga, and endeavour to surround the fort before any of the garrison could effect their escape, till such time as I could bring up the Infantry and Artillery to attack the place. " This detachment marched before 1 A. M. on the morning of yesterday, the 3rd instant, and by sunrise succeeded in completely investing the fort, and placing parties in secure positions in every direction by which the garrison could effect their escape. " I have to express my obligations to the Officers and Men of His Majesty Shah Soojah's service by whom this service was effected, and am particularly indebted to Captain Anderson for the promptness and rapidity with which his Corps took up their position, and I trust His Majesty will be pleased to make known to his Troops the satisfaction I have expressed at their spirit and good conduct on this occasion. " By 10 A. M. I arrived before the fort with Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry and the two Squadrons of 2d Cavalry; before 11 o'clock 3 9-pounders and a 24-pounder Howitzer under Captain Abbott, came up; about 12, two of His Majesty's 6-pounders under Lieut. Warburton also arrived, but the badness of the road unfortunately delayed the Mortars till late in the afternoon, and it was not till 4 P.M. that one of them was brought into play. It was desirable to bring our operations in the attack of this Fort to a close as soon as possible, as from the numerous ravines in its vicinity it would have been extremely difficult to prevent the escape of the rebels after nightfall, and a fire from the 9-pounders was immediately opened on the South-East tower of the fort, which by 1 P.M. was greatly dilapidated, when a cessation of their fire was rendered necessary, all the ammunition in the field having been expended. " At 2 P.M. the fire recommenced, and at 3, the tower and adjacent curtain to the East were breached, and the breach to all appearance being exceedingly easy, I resolved on assaulting it without delay. 126 REPULSE AT JULGA. " A storming party, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tronson, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, consisting of 5 Companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry under Brevet Major Kershaw of that Corps, and of Detachments of the 27th and 37th Regiments of Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Rind of the latter Regiment, were formed for the purpose, in a ravine near the South-East angle, which afforded good cover for the troops within 150 yards of the fort, and on the signal being given, the column advanced to the breach with the greatest steadiness and gallantry. They were met however by the enemy on the crest of the breach with most determined resistance; a close fire from a numerous body of matchlockmen was opened on the Powderhead of the column from the houses within the fort. bags were thrown in great numbers among the men ascending the breach: many of the leading men were shot dead on the breach; and after a desperate struggle to force an entrance into the fort, they were with great judgment withdrawn by the Officer commanding the party to the cover afforded by the adjacent ravine, where they remained till I issued orders for their recall, intending to renew the attack when it might be made by a combined movement against the breach, gateway, and wicket, with better success. " The enemy, notwithstanding every precaution was taken to intercept them, succeeded in escaping from the fort before 7 P. M., and at that I am now taking measures for hour our troops took possession of it. its destruction. " It is with feelings of the deepest regret that I record the loss sustained in our unsuccessful attack. The address and spirit displayed by the Officers and Men of the storming party demand my warmest thanks, and I cannot express the mortification I experienced in seeing their noble exertions baffled when on the point of being crowned with success. " To Lieutenant Colonel Tronson, commanding the Storming Party, I am greatly indebted for his gallant execution of the important duty He was nobly seconded by Brevet Major Kershaw committed to him. of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, whose exertions to surmount the numerous obstacles which impeded the advance were conspicuous. The crest of the breach was at one time attained by four Officers of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry-Brevet Major Kershaw, Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenants Edward King and George Wade, and I beg to express my high admiration of their zeal and gallantry: " Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Warburton distinguished themselves in the service of the Artillery, and their performance of the duty on which they were engaged merited my warmest approbation. " I beg also to bring to your favorable notice, the assistance I derived from Captain Wade of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, for the efficiency and attention displayed by him in carrying my wishes into effect throughout the service. "Captain Raban, 48th Native Infantry, Commissariat Officer, also gave me high satisfaction in officiating as my Aid-de-Camp during the day; and Mr. Wheeler, whose services I have already had occasion to REPULSE AT JULGA. 127 bring to your notice, on this occasion was conspicuous for the steadiness and promptness with which he conveyed my orders under a harassing fire. " I have again to bring to your favorable consideration the able and valuable assistance rendered me by Captain Sanders, Chief Engineer, with the force." I have, &c. R. SALE, Major General, Commanding Field Force in Kohistan. From Lieutenant-Colonel TRoNsoN, Commanding Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, to Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B. dated Camp October 3d, 1840, 8. P. M. " SIR,--I have the honour to report, that having been placed in command of the storming party this day, consisting of five Companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry under Brevet Major Kershaw, and of Detachments of the 27th and 37th Native Infantry, commanded by Captain Rind, of the 37th, the party proceeded with great regularity and spirit towards the fort. On nearing the breach, we were assailed by a quick and destructive fire, through which, gallantly led by their Officers, the party rushed up the breach, which was crowded by Officers and Men in the face of a close and deadly fire; the crest of the breach was gallantly held under this destructive fire, for a considerable time by Brevet Major Kershaw, Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenant Edward King, and Lieutenant G. Wade, with Sergeant Major Airey ; the gallantry of those Officers with their Men called forth at the moment the admiration and cheers of all their comrades. Finding the breach totally impracticable, I placed the party under immediate cover, and subsequently withdrew them to a ravine, awaiting the orders of the Major General. "The best consolation and reward of all who were engaged will be the innate conviction of each individual having to the utmost gallantly done his duty, but as the Commander of this party, I feel bound to render my warmest eulogium and thanks to the Men and Officers engaged, more particularly to Major Kershaw, whose exertions and gallantry I have great pleasure in acknowthroughout were most conspicuous. ledging the exertions of Captain Rind and his Adjutant Ensign Mayne, 37th Native Infantry, with their detachments of the 27th and 37th. "I enclose a list of killed and wounded, which I very deeply regret to find so serious; among them we have lost our most respected and gallant Sergeant Major, who nobly fell at the summit of the breach." I have, &c. E. J. TRONSON, Lieut. Colonel, and Major 13th Light Infantry. 128 REPULSE AT JULGA. NUMERICAL RETURN Of the Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Troops on Field Service under the Command of Major General Sir R. H. Sale, K. C. B, at the Storm of the Fort of Julga, on the morning of the 3d October, 1840; also of the Ammunition expended on that day. Camp Julga, 3d Oct. 1840. " Engineers Wounded 1 Private; Artillery-Wounded 1 Private; Cattle, 1 Horse and 1 Yaboo ; Rounds of Ammunition expended, 9 Shrapnel 9-Pounders; 1 shell 24-Pounder Howitzer; 33 8-inch Shell Mortars; 452 Shot round 9-Pounders, and 8 Shrapnel 24-Pounders Howitzers. H. M. 13th Light Infantry-Killed 1 Serjeant and 13 Privates; Wounded 1 Staff, 3 Serjeants, 2 Corporals and 12 Privates; Lieut. and Adjt. Wood slightly; Missing none. Rounds of Am27th Regt. N. munition expended, 1388 Musket Ammunition. I.-Wounded 1 Bugler and Drummer and 1 Private. 37th Regt. N. I.-Killed 2 Privates; Wounded 1 Serjeant, 2 Corporals and 7 Privates; Missing none.-Rounds of Ammunition expended, 1635 Musket Ammunition. Shah's Artillery-Wounded 1 Soobadar; Rounds of Ammunition expended, 3 8-inch Shell Mortars and 114 Round Shot 6-pounders. Shah's Cavalry-Killed, Wounded, and Missing none." The bastions of the fort having been destroyed by Brigadier Sale's orders, the force moved to the valley of the Ghorbund river, a short distance westward of the site of the ancient city of Bighram. Here the Brigadier remained until the 8th, receiving the submisson of some influential Barakzye chiefs, who had until then refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Shah Soojah. On the 8th, the troops marched to Charekar, expecting to meet Dost Mahomed; but hearing that he had reached Nijrow, the camp was moved to Kara Bhag, where a better opportunity presented itself for watching the ex-Ameer's movements towards Cabul. On the morning of the 13th, intelligence was brought into camp, that Dost Mahomed had come through the Ghorbund Pass at Tootan Durrah early that morning, and that he had taken up his quarters in a fort some 15 miles distant. The spy reported that the Dost's cattle were very much exhausted and knocked up, and that if a strong party of Cavalry was immediately dispatched, the chances were in favor of his being intercepted, and that he had not more than a hundred followers with him. On this, Lieut. Dowson, with 200 Jan Bazes, and 300 of the Shazadah's Populzies set out. However, they were unsuccessful UNSUCCESSFUL PURSUIT OF DOST MAHOMED. 129 When the party arrived at the fort, they found that Dost Mahomed had left it about 10 the same morning for Nijrow, some twenty miles almost due East of Charekar. Lieut. Dowson, with the prey almost Two of the in his power, had to right about and return to Charekar. Ex-ruler's horses, which were completely knocked up, were brought into camp. Desertion still continued; on the morning of the 14th October a whole company of Lieut. Maule's regiment of Khoistanees went off to their Old Ruler, and it was feared that another company would take the first opportunity of following their example. The company, which deserted, could have been relied upon above the others. On the morning of the 15th October, the camp was pitched near Kura Bhag, after a long march over a heavy country, and preparations were made for the attack of a fort in the neighbourhood, which it was supposed would give our people some trouble, as it was of a much stronger kind than any yet assaulted, or met with in the valley. It was represented as having a high rampart wall, very thick, strong bastions at the angles, and a double gate. The Chief who was in possession of it, was written to, to come into our terms, but returned an answer to this effect :-" You were all day long battering the fort of Julgah, and did not get in after all; besides, you let Meer Musjidee escape. Now, my fort is a stronger one than his; I have sent my family and property away, and you may come when it best suits your convenience; but I must distinctly tell you, that I can never bow to a Kafir King, and I'll fight to the last." The Field force however moved in battle array at 10 A. M.on the 17th October with every prospect of meeting most strenuous opposition. The fort of Baboo Khoosh Ghur was supposed, from report, to be a very strong place, and its approach lined with high garden walls for miles around. Shortly before the column moved off, Captain Sanders of Engineers, accompanied by a strong reconnoitring party, consisting of a squadron of the 2d Light Cavalry, two companies of the 27th Regt. N. I., and two 6-pounder guns, the whole under Captain James Fraser, marched. The road lay over ravines, water-courses, wheat fields etc. On the reconnoitring party nearing the fort, the garrison took fright and fled, and the troops took peaceable possession. 130 AFFAIR AT KARDURRAIf. Captain Sanders destroyed the fort of Baboo Koosh Ghur; after that, the force moved to Ak Sarai, and took up a position for the purpose of watching the Dost's movements. On the afternoon of the 18th October, some officers looking towards the village of Kardurrah, about 3$ miles west of camp, espied a large body of armed men collected, apparently for some enterprize. They were in number between 800 to 1000, and one party displayed a banner. The Cavalry was immediately formed in a line, facing towards Kardurrah, and messengers were sent to enquire the object of the assemblage. The reply was quite pacific, and suspicions were lulled, though proper precautions were taken to prevent any chance of surprise. At a little before 9. ,. M., the night being dark, our troops were attacked in front and rear at the same moment by about 500 men, who were completely covered by the ravines and walls which approached close to our camp. The fire continued bravely until past 11 o'clock, but fortunately was directed so .high, that very little damage was sustained by our party. One russuldar of the Shah's Regular Cavalry was killed, together with one sepoy of the 37th N. I., a few men and horses were wounded, and nothing was missing. The assailants having expended all their ammunition, retired in disgust, carrying off one man killed and one badly wounded by the few shots that were fired by our .men. On the 19th, the force was joined by the six companies 37th and by the 2 nine-pounders from Cabul, and on the 20th it advanced four miles, and encamped near the garden ground of Kardurrah, and the adjacent village .f Beyduck. It was determined to attack the place next morning, and the enemy seemed very confident in the strength of their position, and resolute to defend it. The night.passed quietly, and our men rose on the morning of the 21st October, fresh and ready for action. The Cavalry, with a wing of the 37th and 2 six-pounders were sent against the eastern front of the enemy's position, while the main body of Infantry with the nine-pounder and mortar batteries took the road to Beyduck, beyond which was said to be a position attainable by guns, and from which Kardurrah might be cannonaded. They had not moved a mile when villagers came to say, that the whole of the enemy had taken to flight, and that the village of Kardurrah was without an inhabitant. The advanced guard leaving its KARDURRAII. 131 guns, went forward to destroy the village, and the remainder of the troops returned to camp. On examining the position which the enemy (800 or 1000 in number) had not ventured to defend, it became immediately apparent that their want of courage had spared us the loss of probably one-half of our men, to say nothing of the possibility of an unqualified defeat: the difficulties presented by the ground to an enemy assailing the village, cannot be adequately described; vineyards and gardens forming a succession of terraces, one above the other, on the steep hill side, garden walls without number, and trees of all sorts, closely planted, were obstacles to be surmounted ere the village itself could be attained; and the village was of considerable extent, containing about 800 flat roofed houses, the streets so narrow that only one horseman could pass through the best of them, and only two or three lanes giving entrance from beyond the walls of the place, which was built on a steep ascent, house rising above house like a series of irregular steps. Had the enemy defended this ground with resolution, it was the opinion of some officers that it would have been scarcely possible for us to have carried the village. The road proved to be impracticable for guns, and that one could have given but little assistance to the assailants from any position which it could have attained in the course of the morning. The village having been partially destroyed, and the vineyards relieved of an immense quantity of beautiful grapes, the force marched on the 22d October, and encamped on an open plain between Ak Serai and Kambagh. From this date, for an entire week, little of any importance occurred, but on the 29th of October, the campaign was brought to a crisis by an action which, though it must be remembered as displaying the gal. lantry of certain British officers in the most brilliant colours, and as con. stituting the last blow which Dost Mahomed struck in his feeble endeavour to regain his throne, will likewise disfigure the annals of British warfare, as recording the cowardice of a regiment of cavalry at a. moment the most anxious and critical. Although the despatches detailing this affair are, in conformity with the plan of this volume, given below, the history of an action so remarkable as that which took place at Purwan Durrah, will scarcely be complete without the details furnish- 132 AFFAIR AT PURWAN DURRAH. ed in the following newspaper account sent from Charekar, and published at the time. " On the morning of the 29th ultimo, an express arrived from Lieutenant Maule, commanding the corps of " Kohistanees," requesting a party of regular Infantry, as all his Kohistanees were preparing to start for Dost Mahomed's camp. Lieut. Lang was instantly despatched with.a company of the 27th Regt. to garrison the small fort, where Lieut. Maule was, and who is still there. At noon of the 29th, the whole force, under Major General Sir R. Sale, marched to a fort called ' Bhag-alum.' Here intelligence was received that the Dost had left Nijrow, and come down into the Kohistan Valley. On the 30th and 31st, the force halted, and a strong reconnoitring party, accompanied by Capt. Sanders and Lieut. Broadfoot of Engineers, moved out to survey the country. On the 1st instant, all marched to Meer Musjidee fort. Here intelligence reached them of the Dost having moved to Purwan Durrah, a small valley, through which runs a clear rapid stream, and several small forts scattered amongst the orchards. It was now determined to march on Purwan Durrah the following morning, and the troops were directed to move as follows : " The advance guard, consisting of four companies of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, under Major Kershaw, two six-pounder guns under Lieut. Warburton, the two flank companies of the 37th Regt. N. I. and one company of the 27th Regt. N. I. under Lieut. Rind of the 37th Regt; the two Squadrons of the 2nd Light Cavalry and the Shah's 2nd Horse, the whole being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Salter. The remainder of the force followed in rear. " About day-break the advance guard moved off, and one of our correspondents says, such a country as we traversed, I shall not forget in a hurry ; the morning was a heavenly one, and the whole country, adorned as it is with yellow foliage, with a bright autumn sun shining on its face, appeared as it were a shining mass of gold-but our road was difficult in the extreme; immense canals, ravines, deep water cuts and every possible obstacle that could present itself to our Army. We reached the Ghorbund river between 8 and 9 A. M.; here we had considerable difficulty in crossing the guns. This surmounted, we ascended the high land under the Hills, and finding a fort occupied, and which had commenced firing on us, we formed into line and moved in this position a short distance, when the river issuing through the Purwan Pass, obliged us to re-form column. By this time, the villagers were flocking towards us calling loudly for mercy, and intreating us to move on quickly, and save their property from the hands of Dost Mahomed's Army, which was plundering them, and preparing to decamp. Our Cavalry advanced, crossed the river, and ascended the bank on the opposite side; Doctor Lord and Lieut. Broadfoot accompanied them. After considerable difficulty we crossed the guns, which again stuck on the opposite bank, which was exceedingly steep. On DISGRACEFUL CONDUCT OF THE CAVALRY. 133 our Cavalry reaching the top of the opposite bank, Dost Mahomed Khan, and an Army of some 4000 Horse and Foot, were seen breaking cover from the town and forts, and making the best of their way to some heights on the right, which lay at the base of a high mountain. The scene now became most exciting. Dr. Lord proposed moving on the Cavalry, and taking up a position on the enemy's flank; his request was acceded to, and Captain Anderson's Horse were ordered round to the left, to prevent the enemy turning our flank. The guns were now got up, and had joined the front part of the advance. We then moved on, and orders were sent to recall the Cavalry; before however the order reached, the enemy had began descending on them. Captain Fraser, who commanded the Regiment, gave front, and ordered the men to draw swords and advance to the charge. The 1st troop wavered, and the men began to fall back by eights and tens. The enemy were now close on them, and the Officers so completely occupied with the enemy, who were moving on them at a slow and determined pace, never anticipating being left to fight the Dost's army themselves, merely called out ' Come on ! Charge ! Come on !' Will it be believed, that the men, led as they were in this gallant, this noble manner, by such officers as the 2nd are blessed with, went threes about, and cut like a flock of sheep, from a force far inferior to them in numbers ? The 2nd troop did stand better, but they never advanced, and the left squadron, though not the first to run, never attempted, nor made the slightest effort to support their gallant commanders, who they saw surrounded and engaged hand to hand with the enemy. The Affghan Cavalry were now fairly in our ranks cutting and slashing in all directions. Dost Mahomed led his men down the hill-was seen to take off his Loongee from his head, and stand calling out to his brave followers--" In the name of God and the Prophet, fight; drive those Feringee Kaffihs out of the country, or I am a gone man." The Cavalry were now seen coming towards the column in full retreat, as hard as the horses could lay legs to the ground, loose horses flying in all directions, and the Dost's Cavalry pursuing them. Captain Fraser arrived on his horse, covered with blood; he had received a deep cut down his back, and his right hand hanging to a bit of skin, detailed the disaster in a firm and collected manner, and was then taken to the rear. Captain Ponsonby was brought in, he had received a ball through his left arm, the top of his left thumb cut off, and a very severe sabre cut across the face-cutting his right cheek bone, dividing his nose and extending across the left cheek. His sword, (a superb Prosser, made to order for Captain Fraser,) nearly cut in two, and hacked considerably. The enemy had cut his reins, which rendered his horse quite unmanageable; and one blow which was aimed at his loins, cut his jacket and the cantle of his saddle. His charger was shot through the neck, and both ears taken off. Nearly all the killed and wounded, including the three Officers, were left on the field. Till within a few minutes of Captain Fraser's arrival, we were congratulating 134 DISGRACEFUL CONDUCT OF THE CAVALRY. ourselves on the pluck of the enemy coming down; and seeing all the charging and flashing of sabres, concluded that our Cavalry had it all their own way. But, alas, the enemy's high red banner seen flying in our ranks, soon opened our eyes to expect another tale. The advanced guard now formed into line, and our guns were drawn up in position to receive the enemy ; but they passed in front of us at too great a distance, even for our guns to touch. After some delay, the General ordered two companies of the 37th and the Cavalry to move round to the right, and search for the missing officers; and directed two of Abbott's guns under Lieut. Dawes, and the three companies under Lieut. Rind, to move to the left and attack the enemy, who were accumulating on a rocky hill on the flank. Both detachments moved off, Lieutenant Dawes opened fire on the enemy with most admirable precision. The high red Standard of the enemy was now carried up and planted on the top of the hill; this the General thought rather too much of a good thing, and sent orders to Lieut. Rind to move up with his detachment and take the hill from the enemy. The companies moved off covered by the guns. The ascent was near to being impracticable, and they were exposed to a heavy fire; but fortunately most of the shot passed over their heads, and in a short time the companies were up and in possession of one of the ugliest looking places I ever saw in my life. A grenadier of the 37th was saved by his After driving breast plate. A havildar and three men were wounded. off the enemy and holding the hill for half an hour, the companies were withdrawn. Lieut.-Colonel Salter returned with the bodies of his late Adjutant and Dr. Lord-the former without its head; both bodies were naked, and much cut. Lieutenant Broadfoot's was not found till night, when it has brought in, also with a head. "The troops were now withdrawn, camp pitched, and we retired to rest, all fully accoutred, with the full prospect of having a precious warm night's work. "Day-break came without a shot being fired from our side. The enemy had decamped, and were said to have gone in the direction of Charekar. " The Bugle sounded to arms-and orders were given to strike camp and march. We reached this by half past 1 P. M. well tired and fatigued. " Dost Mahomed was only seen in the early part of the morning; he wore a large white turban and light coloured dress ; and was always attended by a sky-blue Banner. " The Affghans, though exceedingly fine men, were badly mounted; had our Cavalry charged, without any exertion on the men's part, they must have overthrown them. The two wounded Officers testify to having left their mark on several Sirdars. All the enemy who came down were well dressed, and appeared to carry with them the air of chieftains. The loss sustained by the enemy is not known; ours is pretty considerable." qIVISION ORDER OF SIR ROBERT SALE. 135 Extract of Division Orders by Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B. Commanding the " Kohistan" Field Force, Camp, Charekar, 3d November, 1840. " 1st-The Major General Commanding the Field Force congratulates the Troops under his command on the complete dispersion of the enemy yesterday, and which has been confirmed by reports received this day of the dispersion, and retreat of Dost Mahomed Khan into " Nijrow." " 2d-The Major General remarked with much pleasure the handsome manner and spirited style in which the two flank companies of the 37th Regiment, one company of the 27th Regiment N. I. some Jaun Bauzes supported by two Guns under Lieutenant Dawes, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Rind of the 37th Regiment N. I. carried and cleared the heights in front of the " Purwan Pass." " 3d-Major General Sir Robert Sale cannot help expressing his unqualified approbation of the gallant manner in which Captains Fraser, Ponsonby, and the Officers of the 2d Light Cavalry led their Squadrons against the enemy, and he deeply regrets that such gallantry on the part of their Officers was not appreciated by the troops under their command. " 4th-The Major General has to deplore on this melancholy occasion the loss of three (3) valuable Officers, Doctor Lord, Political Agent; Lieutenant Crispin 2d Light Cavalry, and Lieut. Broadfoot of Engineers, as also the services of Captains Fraser and Ponsonby of the 2d Light Cavalry, who, he regrets to say, have been severely wounded." HAMILTON WADE, M. B. Another letter from the late scene of action says :" When Captain Ponsonby's reins were cut, his horse became quite unmanageable, and galloped off after the flying troops; a ravine was in the way, and the horse being unable to clear it, tumbled into it and threw the Captain; Mr. Bolton, the riding master, who happened to be coming up in rear, he being one of the abandoned left to fight for himself, by some chance followed Captain Ponsonby's track, and observed his officer just in time to save his horse jumping on him. Mr. Bolton succeeded in laying hold of Captain P.'s charger, tied the cut reins together, helped his officer up, and brought him into camp. " Mr. McDermot, the Veterinary Surgeon, had also a most providential escape; an Affghan cut at him, missed his aim, but knocked the little Vet., off his horse. The small man on finding himself in this mess, took to his scrapers, and fortunately overtook the Farrier-Major, on the back of whose saddle he mounted, and reached the column 136 DISPATCH OF SIR ROBERT SALE. in safety. Captain Ponsonby states, that he owes his life to his charger, a fine large powerful Ghuznee horse; the beast on being surrounded became very violent, and lashed out behind in such a manner as precluded the possibility of any horse coming near his heels. He kicked three of the Affghans over, horses and all. " The excuse the Cavalry make for not fighting is, that they object to the English sabres; this is not the first instance of the kind." The following is the official account of the action :To Major General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G. C. B. and K. C. H. 4c. &c. &c., Cabul. " SIu,-Having received intelligence that Dost Mahomed Khan, with a number of armed followers, had taken possession of some forts in this direction, from which he proposed moving to-day towards the Ghorebund Pass, with the view of effecting a junction with his son Mahomed Afzul Khan, I determined on endeavouring to frustrate the attempt. " Accordingly at 6 A. M. I broke up my Camp at Bamian, the fort of Meer Musjidee, and moved on this position. " An advanced column, consisting of four companies of H. M. 13th light infantry, the two flank companies of the 37th N. I., one company of the 27th N. I., two 6-pounders of the Shah's, two squadrons of the 2d light cavalry, and 200 of Anderson's horse, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Salter, preceded the main body which was commanded by myself. " On approaching Purwan, the forts and villages were rapidly evacuated by the enemy, who were seen flying to the hills in great numbers; I cannot compute them at lower than 500 horse and 3500 foot; the native reports received swell their numbers to a much higher amount. " Dr. Lord, who accompanied Col. Salter to procure information, sent word that he believed if the cavalry proceeded in advance, they would be able to cut off some of the fugitives, and in compliance with his request, the 2d Cavalry were ordered to skirt the hill to the right, while the Shah's horse, under Captain Anderson, took post on the left of the Pass to prevent any of the enemy attempting to escape in the direction of Ghorbund. The infantry followed, but their movements were greatly retarded by the guns, the progress of which was much impeded by the numerous water-courses that intersected the road. " The 2d cavalry had preceded the column about a mile, when a body of the enemy's horse, about 200 in number, supposed to be headed by Dost Mahomed in person, came down the hill to attack them. The cavalry was formed into a line, and led on to the charge by Captains Fraser and Ponsonby, commanding the two squadrons. It is my pain. DISPATCH OF SIR ROBERT SALE. 137 ful duty to record, that the gallant bearing of these officers was but ill seconded by their men; they both found themselves in the midst of the enemy unsupported by their troops, and after being most severely wounded, extricated themselves with difficulty, and found their men flying before the enemy. I deeply regret to state that Lieutenant Crispin, the Adjutant of the regiment, was cut down and killed, leading his men into action; Dr. Lord was also most unfortunately killed in this affair, and Lieut. Broadfoot, of the Engineers, who was also in advance, is missing. " Of the gallantry of Captain Fraser and the other officers of the 2d cavalry, who led the squadrons of the regiment on the occasion, I cannot speak too highly, and I regret that their noble example, and the opportunity offered to the 2nd Cavalry of adding to its laurels, have been thus neglected by them. " The flank companies of the 37th Regiment and one company of the 27th Regiment, supported by two guns from Captain Abbott's Battery, and followed by some of the Jaun Bazes, now ascended the hill overlooking the Pass and Valley of Purwan, which was crowded by the enemy's Infantry, and cleared it in brilliant style, the enemy deserting their positions one after the other, and flying in the direction of the Punjshere Valley, where they still cover the hill side in great numbers. " The enemy, however, are at too great a distance to admit of my following up the advantages I have obtained this evening; the whole of the troops having been under arms for nine hours; I have therefore encamped on the ground, taking every precaution to guard against a night attack. "I beg to enclose the accompanying casualty return, from which you will perceive, that excepting the serious disaster sustained in the affair of the 2d Cavalry, but little loss has resulted from the day's operations. Camp Purwan, 2d Nov. 1840. I have, &c. R. SALE, Major Genl. Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of a Detachment on field service, under the command of Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B., on the 2d November 1840, Camp Purwan, 2d November, 1840. " Engineers.-Missing, 1 Lieutenant.* 2d Light Cavalry,-killed 1, Adjutant ;t 1 Subadar, 1 Jemadar, and 2 Sepoys; Wounded, 2 Captains ;+ 1 Subadar, 1 Havildar, 22 Sepoys, 2 Syces, and 16 Horses. Missing, 3 Havildars, 1 Naick, 7 Sepoys, 1 Syce, and 12 Horses. 27th 37th Native InfantryNative Infantry-Wounded, 1 Havildar. R. SALE, Major General, Wounded 3 Sepoys." Comdg. Fd. Force, Kohistan. " I beg to recommend that Dr. Thompson of the 2d Cavalry, be sent out to take charge of the wounded of that Regiment." t Cornet and Adjutant Crispin killed. Lieutenant Broadfoot. Captains Fraser and Ponsonby severely wounded. 1 138 SURRENDER OF DOST MAHOMED. On the day following this action, and a few hours after the Envoy had received official intimation of its results, the unfortunate Ex-Ameer rode to Cabul, and most unexpectedly delivered himself up a prisoner. The occurrence was described in a letter from Sir W. Macnaghten, to Lord Auckland, the Governor General. "I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that Dost Mahomed Khan, the ex-chief, surrendered himself to me yesterday evening. " I was returning from my evening ride, and within a few yards of my own residence in the citadel, when a single horseman galloped up to me, and having satisfied himself that I was the Envoy and Minister, told me that Dost Mahomed Khan was arrived, and sought my protection. " Dost Mahomed Khan rode up to me, and alighted from his horse. After the usual salutations, I begged him to mount again, and we proceeded together to my residence, in the compound of which I have pitched a tent for the ex-chief, and have provided him with every thing necessary to his comfort. He assured me that he had not been off his horse for twenty-four hours, yet, he shewed but little symptom of fatigue, and his self-possession was very remarkable. He put his sword into my hand as a token of submission, but I at once returned it to him, and he seemed gratified for this mark of confidence. He asked me about his family, and, at his own suggestion, and in my presence, he wrote letters to his son Mahomed Afzul and to his two other sons, whose escape from Ghuznee was recently reported, desiring them to come in immediately, as he himself had confided in my protection, and been honorably received. " Dost Mahorned Khan must have come into Cabul direct from the field of battle, without the knowledge of any of his adherents in the field. " I have to lament the loss of my assistant Mr. P. B. Lord, who was unfortunately killed in this affair. His Lordship in Council is too well acquainted with the zeal and abilities of the deceased officer to require any eulogium from me." Immediately after Dost Mahomed's surrender, it was resolved to send him to India with his sons, under the care of Captain P. Nicolson of the Shah's Cavalry, assigning to him a handsome pension, and leaving his place of residence to be arranged by the Governor General in Council. The troops were recalled from the Kohistan, with the exception of a detachment of Goorkhas left at Chareekar; and as a Brigade was on its way to Cabul, (escorting a convoy), through the Punjab, it was now judged advisable to send back the European Regiment with Dost Ma- DOST MAHOMED SENT TO INDIA. 139 homed, and two Companies of the 27th Native Infantry, (which had previously come to Cabul with a convoy of stores,) as an escort to Sir Willoughby Cotton, whose command had expired. Major General Elphinstone succeeded Sir Willoughby Cotton in the Affghanistan command, and H. M. 44th Regiment, under Colonel Shelton, replaced the Bengal Europeans. The 2d Regt. of Light Cavalry was struck out of the Army List, as a punishment for the poltroonery of the troops in the hour of trial, and the dastards were dispersed with ignominy. A new corps, denominated the 11th, was raised to supply the place of the 2d, and to preserve to the gallant surviving officers of the latter corps, the advantages derivable from their position, in the service. The surrender of Dost Mahomed would, it was supposed, have conduced to the final settlement of Affghanistan. The disaffected, it was imagined, had lost their rallying point, and nothing remained but to place a sufficient force in the neighbourhood of the Ghilzies,-who, under any circumstances maintained a sort of wild independence,-and to put the hill tribes upon ample allowances, to ensure a permanent and tranquil occupation of the country. There can be little doubt that this policy carried out, in the fullest and most liberal sense, would have given to Shah Soojah a much larger tenure of his authority, even if it did not ensure a life-possession of the throne with succession to his progeny. But a sufficiency of troops was not retained, nor was good faith kept with the mountaineers who forsook their wonted lawless pursuits for a stipulated consideration. The sequel exhibits the consequences of too much confidence in Shah Soojah's hold upon the affections of his subjects, while unawed by the presence of a large army, and vigilant political agents; and too strong an assurance of the impunity of dishonesty. Two years had now elapsed since the British forces marched from Ferozepore, to carry out the purposes of the Proclamation of 1st October 1838. During that interval, Runjeet Sing, and his successor, Kurruck Sing, had died. The heir apparent, Nao Nehal Sing had been killed by the fall of the archway of a gate under which he was passing, while forming part of the funeral procession after the death of Kurruck Sing; and Shere Sing, another son of Runjeet's, was now contesting the possession of the throne with the widow of Nao Nehal Sing, who pretended 140 RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN. that she was enceinte at the time of her husband's demise. The commotion in the Punjab arising out of this contest, led the Government of India to assemble a considerable force upon the Sutledge, to act as circumstances might render necessary, either as a support to the party whose succession was of the most importance to British interests, to guard against frontier aggressions, or to keep open the communication with Affghanistan. A very few weeks, however, sufficed to settle the question in favour of Shere Sing, whose supremacy was assured by the adhesion of the disciplined portion of the army, and the support of Dhyan Sing, the Minister. The force which was assembled at Ferozepore, was therefore counter-ordered. It has probably been remarked in the dispatches of the latest dates, in the foregoing pages, that the titles and rank of many of the Officers named, differ from those borne by them at the commencement of the campaign. It is due to them, and to the Government which they served, to take the occasion of this division of the four years' history to mention that honors and distinctions had been freely, if not lavishly, bestowed upon all who had distinguished themselves, either by political services, or military skill and gallantry. Lord Auckland was himself created an Earl, Mr. Macnaghten a Baronet, Sir John Keane, as already stated, was raised to the Peerage; Captain Burnes was Knighted, and permitted to hold the rank of Lieut.-Colonel in Affghanistan; Lieut. Colonel Wade was likewise Knighted; Brigadier Sale was created a Major General, and honored with the decoration of a Knight Commander of the Bath; Lieut. Col. Thackwell was Knighted; a large Queen's Brevet advanced many Majors to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel, and numerous Captains to the rank of Major in the Army, while Companionships of the Bath, and the different classes of the Dooranee order were distributed to all who had been foremost in the race for distinction. The political and commercial consequences of the two years' campaign were in the highest degree satisfactory. The Nepaulese drew in their horns; conspiracies in the Deccan and the Southern Mahratta country were discovered and crushed. The Burmese withdrew all manifestations of hostility. The Persians totally abandoned their design upon Herat and Affghanistan, and the Khivans yielded readily to our representations of the importance of conceding the demands of Russia. Large quantities of British Indian produce and manufactures, to the value of thirty-eight OPERATIONS IN ZEMINDWAUR. 141 lacs of rupees, found their way into Affghanistan by the Indus and the Punjaub, and there appeared to be every reasonable prospect of a considerable extension of the trade under increased protection and security of transit. The opening of the year 1841 found Affghanistan tranquil, with the exception of the province of Zemindwaur, where the Ghilzies, under a chieftain named Uctar Khan, were still in a state of insurrection. To disperse these rebels, a small detachment was sent under Captain Farrington of the Bengal Army, whose success in executing the task confided to him is described below : To CAPTAIN POLWHELE, Major of Brigade, Candahar. Six,--" I have the honor to report as follows for the information of Major General Nott, Commanding. " You are already aware that the detachment under my command reached Koosh-Kina-Kood on the 28th ultimo, where we halted on the following day, to enableLieut. Elliot to complete his arrangements. On the morning of the 30th, we moved on Sungboor, 16 miles in the direction of Saerwan Killah, where the force under Mahomed Allum Khan had been completely worsted the evening before by the rebels, his guns taken from him, etc. etc. The unfortunate defeat had been the means of enabling the rebel chief to gain many adherents, and his force from all accounts was beginning to assume a formidable appearance. It was therefore deemed advisable to make our movements as rapidly and secretly as possible. For this purpose, the detachment moved on Girisk on the morning of the 31st, distant 25 miles, crossing the river Hellmond. The rebels imagining we were moving on their position at Saerwan Killah, had arranged to make a chupawah on the Girisk fort, and had crossed the river for that purpose. " On the 1st January we continued our march to Kareegha, 22 miles, and by so doing, the rebels, uncertain of our actual position, were in a manner outwitted ; for at one time they thought there was another force in their rear. On the 2d, a halt was indispensable, to refresh men and cattle, but the information received having led us to suppose that the enemy were in our vicinity, a reconnoitring party, consisting of Guddo Khan's horse, and some of the 1st Cavalry, with Lieutenants Patterson and Hawkins, H. A. proceeded in the direction of Lundie Nowah. This party proved to be of the most essential service, for it was ascertained by them, that the enemy had actually taken up a position near the village of that name. " Accordingly, on the morning of the 3rd, the force moved soon after sun-rise, and about 10 A. M. reached the heights, in front of the village 142 OPERATIONS IN ZEMINDWAUR. of Lundie Nowah, where the rebels had taken up a strong position amongst Sand Hills, with a canal along their rear: Guddo Khan's Resallah with Lieutenant Patterson, having succeeded in driving in their advance posts, gave time for the guns, under Lieut. Hawkins, supported by the 2nd Regt. N. I., to get into position. A well-directed fire of shrapnel and grape having been opened on the rebels, amounting to 12 or 1500 horse and foot, were prevented crossing the rest of the heights behind which they were ensconced. The Infantry followed up the advantage thus gained by the Artillery, and under a heavy fire of matchlocks, drove the enemy completely from their position. The rebels had been drawn up in four divisions, two of which attempted to turn our left, but unsuccessfully, the Cavalry having charged and defeated their object in that quarter. By this time the flight was pretty general, and the party of the 1st Cavalry with Guddo Khan's Resallah, pursued and completed the route. One Standard was taken. The killed and That of the enemy amounted to wounded on our side are as annexed. sixty left dead on the field, amongst which a Chief, Fuegbolah Alizza. The wounded were proportionally great, but as the enemy carried them all away, their numbers cannot be estimated correctly. Having refreshed my men at Lundie Nowah by half an hour's halt, the detachment continued its march on Shornek, the stronghold of the rebel chieftain, where the guns lost by Mahomed Allum Khan were recaptured. " I also beg to mention, that since Lieut. Elliot, the Political Agent, first joined me at Koosh-Kina-Kood, I have found his information with regard to the country and the movements of the rebels to have been most accurate, and his arrangements for the supplies and forage of the troops most admirable. " In conclusion, where all have done their duty, it would be invidious to name individuals: but from the circumstances of Guddo Khan's Resallah not being a component part of the regular force, I may be excused in bringing to the notice of the Major-General, the conspicuous gallantry of the leader and his men; his loss has been most severe, as you will see from the return. " I have the honor to enclose an extract of detachment orders on the I have, &c. occasion for the Major-General's information." H. W. FARRINGTON, Capt. Comg. Detach. on Field Service. Extract of Detachment Orders by Capt. FARRINGTON, Commanding, Camp Sharack, 3rd January, 1841. " The Commanding Officer has to congratulate the troops under his command upon the short and decisive victory gained by them this morning, over the rebel troops under Auctar Khan, and returns his best thanks to all, both officers and men, for the cool and gallant conduct they evinced. OPERATIONS 143 IN ZEMINDWAUR. " To Lieut. Hawkins, commanding the Artillery, the Commanding Officer's best thanks are due for the quick and able manner in which he brought his guns into action. " The Commanding Officer also begs that Lieut. Maclean, 2nd Regt. N. I., will accept his best thanks for the able and judicious manner in which he moved and disposed of the regiment, for the time under his command." T. F. PATTERSON, Lieut. Detachment Staff. Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachment, commanded by Captain FARRINGTON on the 3rd instant, at Loodenamow, Camp Shahrae, 4th Jan. 1841. 2d Regt. N. I.--One Lieut. and one Sepoy severely, and one Lieut. and two Sepoys slightly wounded. H. Arty. S. F.-One Horse killed and one severely wounded. Ressalah 1st Regt. Light. Cav.-One Havildar and one Horse killed; three Sepoys and three Horses severely, and five Sepoys and one Horse slightly wounded. Ressala Affghan Horse.-Two Sepoys and four Horses killed; seven Horses severely, and one Sepoy and five Horses slightly wounded. This, for a short time, checked the spirit of rebellion, but did not effectually crush it. In Scinde, Mr. Ross Bell, the Political Agent, and Colonel Stacy, continued to exert themselves to bring the Brahoes to terms, while Capt. Lewis Brown employed his influence with the Murrees to reconcile them to the new order of things. Their efforts were tolerably successful. It was not found so easy, however, to induce the Kujjuk tribe to recognise their obligation to the Government. They refused to pay the previous year's tribute, and shutting themselves up in the fort of Sebee, about 40 miles N. E. of Dadur, bid defiance to the Political Agent. Upon this, Major General Brookes sent a detachment under Col. Wilson of the Bombay Cavalry to coerce them. The detachment consisted of a wing from the 2d Bombay Cavalry, one from the 2d Grenadiers, one from the 20th N. I., a troop of European Artillery, and the whole of Lieutenant Curtis' Irregular Horse. Colonel Wilson immediately attacked the fort, but, after three hours' and a half most desperate fighting was obliged to retreat. Lieutenant Creed of the Artillery, and Lieutenant Falconer of the 2nd Grenadier Guards, were 144 AFFAIR AT SEBEE IN SCINDE. killed. Colonel Wilson, commanding, was shot through both thighs, and Lieut. Shaw of the Commissariat, severely wounded. Nine noncommissioned officers and men killed, and forty wounded. General Brookes, immediately on receiving this very unfortunate intelligence, moved up from Bagh with the 40th Queen's and all the disposable force; but on arrival he found the place evacuated, though every thing was left behind in confusion. It appears that there was much mismanagement in the attack. The troops were most injudiciously marched into the body of a town without any precautions taken to gain possession of each successive house, to right and left, as it was neared, and consequently their loss was enormous; for the enemy abstained from all demonstrations of their presence, until our troops were (so to speak) well into the middle of the town; and then they poured into them a fire so steady, and so galling-a fire too, directed chiefly against the British officers, that numbers of our gallant fellows were mown down without the power of resistance-without even seeing the enemy. Colonel Wilson soon after died of his wounds. The loss of the enemy was ascertained to be 200 men, among whom were some influential chiefs. Soon after this disaster, Major General Brookes moved towards the Bolan Pass with the troops under his orders, to join the force at Quetta. Before he had proceeded half the distance, the General with his second in command, Brigadier Valiant, (Her Majesty's 40th Foot,) were recalled,the Government having thought proper to degrade them in this manner for their conscientious discharge of their duties as Members of the Commission for investigating the causes of Major Clibborn's disaster in the Nufoosk Pass. But though the General and the Brigadier were withdrawn, the troops of Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 38th Bengal N. I., the 25th Bombay N. I., &c. continued their march, and it was during the progress of the Battering Train, escorted by a detachment of Skinner's horse, that a serious accident occurred by the sudden rising of a torrent, of which an account will be found in the Appendix No. 3. Immediately after the Sebee affair, rumours became rife throughout the country, that the Persians were again gathering on the frontier in the neighbourhood of Ghorian, meditating a fresh attack on Herat, and these rumours gained color, from the circumstance of Major Todd, the 145 DISTURBANCES. Envoy at Herat, having quitted that city on receiving an unsatisfactory reply to his enquiries from Yar Mahomed, the'minister of Shah Kamran, the occupant of the Herat guddhee. Whether the Persians were, or were not, sincere in their hostile purposes, or whether the whole was the result of an intrigue, having for its object the expulsion of the British Envoy, is uncertain ; but it is at all events matter of fact, that emissaries from Herat spread themselves from Cabul to Scinde, encouraging revolt, and promising aid. The effect of these insidious efforts was unfavorable to the peace of the empire, the more especially as it was supposed that disturbances were not altogether disagreeable to Shah Soojah, who, it was generally alleged, now began to feel the presence of his English supporters and allies rather irksome; still, there was no appearance of the existence of a combination amongst the tribes, who had in a manner been brought under our sway. The revolts were isolated-at one time the country contiguous to the Khyber being in arms,-at another the south of the Ghilzie country being in a state of hostility. To put down the former insurrection, Brigadier Shelton moved out of Jellallabad, the winter head quarters of the Shah and the Envoy, and his course of operations is narrated in the annexed dispatches. To Major General ELPHINSTONE, Camp in Afghanistan, on his march to- wards Cabool via Peshawur, Camp Nazian Valley, 24th February, 1841. SIR,-" I have the honor to report to you that at the requisition of the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolkh, for a force to coerce a refractory tribe called the Sungho Khell, inhabiting the Nazian Valley, I marched from Jellalabad on the morning of the 21st in- stant, with the Troops noted in the margin, in progress to Beshboolaq. I arrived there on the 23d, and was joined by Captain Ferris's Corps of Jazilchees, and the 3d Regiment of Jaun Bauz. I with 4 Guns. H. M.'s 44th Regiment left Beshboolaq with the force under my comand 27th Regiment N.I. mand, at 4 o'clock this morning, and entered the 'Troops of H. M.'s Shah Sarobi Pass, leading into the Nazian Valley, soon Soojah-ool-Moolkh. Detachment of Moun- after day-break, according to the following disposition. Two hundred of the Jazilchees under ron 2d Cavalryin. tain 3d Infantry Regiment. Hyder Alli, Native Commandant on the left 1st Corps of Jaun Bauz. flank, to move along the high ground closing Detachment of Sappers and Miners. Ditto 1 Troop 1st Brigade of Horse Artillery Cav. the Valley on the East side, the remainder of the Corps under the command of Captain Ferris on my extreme right, to take the enemy on the left flank, two Companies of H. M.'s 44th Regiment and two Companies of the 27th Regt. N. I., supported by two U 146 BRIGADIER SHELTON IN THE NAZIAN VALLEY. Companies of the former Corps and one of the latter, with two sixpounders, the former under the command of Capt. Scott, and the latter of Capt. Swayne, of H. M.'s 44th Regt. to crown and move along the heights to the right on the west side of the Valley. I myself, with the main body, composed of the remaining Companies of H. M.'s 44th under Lieut. Col. Mackrell, and of the 27th Regt. N. I. under Lieutenant Colonel Palmer, with two guns under Captain Nicholl of the Horse Artillery, supported by the 1st Regiment of Jaun Bauz under Lieut. Golding, and a Squadron of Shah's 2d Cavalry under Lieut. Mayne, proceeded up the centre of the Valley. Captain Craigie, with the Shah's 3d Infantry Regiment, the Mountain Train under Captain Backhouse, 3d Jaun Bauz under Lieutenant Dowson, and a numerous body of Ooloos or Moolkeahs, made a considerable detour and entered the valley of the Eastern Pass. " The more fortunate position of Capt. Ferris with his Corps on the extreme right brought him in immediate contact with the enemy as they were driving off their herds and flocks, and retiring with their women and children; and as these were inclining over to the left side of the valley to get out of his reach, the party of two hundred under Hyder Alli, Native Commandant, very opportunely met them from that side, when most of the cattle fell into our hands, and several men were killed and wounded on both sides; a party of Jaun Bauz under Lieut. Golding, made a successful charge amongst the fugitives and killed several. "The conduct of Captain Ferris and the men of his Corps was conspicuous throughout the day; they attacked the enemy with great gallantry, and pursued them with determined bravery over almost inaccessible heights, driving the enemy before them under a galling fire, as did also the parties under Captains Scott and Swayne. I much regret that Captain Ferris's Corps have suffered some loss. Several Companies of H. M.'s 44th Regt. and 27th Regt. N. I. were out during the day on skirmishing parties, and on every occasion displayed a conspicuous bravery that ensured success. " A few men held out in two forts, and obliged me to blow open the gates, which was effectually accomplished by Lieut. Pigou of the Engineers, supported by the Light Company of H. M.'s 44th Regt. under Capt. Robinson. It is to me a source of deep regret to have to report, that the second occasion proved fatal to Lieut. Pigou, who was blown up and killed on the spot, and the body thrown a distance of eighty yards by the sudden explosion of the powder bags-the cool intrepidity with which he performed this trying duty does credit to his memory; in him the service has lost a talented and promising young Officer. "The Nazian Valley, which is about eight miles in length, is studded with forts from one extremity to the other, some of them are formidable positions. The advance of the Troops was one continued course of success, and by one o'clock nearly the whole of this formidable valley and all the forts, too numerous to enumerate, were in our possession. " Lieut. Colonel Mackrell, commanding H. M.'s 44th Regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Palmer, commanding the 27th Regiment N. I., are enuJ BRIGADIER SHELTON IN THE NAZIAN VALLEY. 147 titled to my best thanks for the steady support they afforded while advancing. " I am greatly indebted to my Major of Brigade, Captain Grant, and to Captain Bellew, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, for the zeal and attention they displayed, and the able assistance they rendered me throughout the day. "I have to acknowledge the important services of Captain Paton, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who accompanied me as Field Engineer, and who conducted the right column of attack under Captain Scott, with a skill and judgment highly creditable to that Officer. " I am indebted to Captain Douglas, Assistant Adjutant General, who volunteered to accompany the column, for his able assistance. "Captain Balderson, of the 16th Regiment N. I., who also volunteered his services, made himself generally useful. " I should not do justice to Captain Hopkins, of the Shah's Service, did I not notice the zeal evinced by this Officer in volunteering to accompany his own Corps, the 27th Regiment N. I., and who did good service with the right column of attack. Lieut. Towgood, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, is entitled to my best thanks for the excellent arrangements adopted for the necessary supplies. "The useful information and able assistance afforded by Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, greatly facilitated our success. " I have not yet received the returns of casualties, but which to the best of my information, amount to about eight killed and twenty-five wounded; the loss on the part of the enemy has not been ascertained, but it is calculated they must have had from forty to fifty killed and wounded. "I propose advancing again to-morrow, with a view to get possession of the southern extremity of the valley." I have the honor, &c. J. SHELTON, Brigadier, Comdg. Force in the Nazian Valley. To Major General ELPHINSTONE, C. B., Commanding in Afghanistan, on his march towards Cabool via Peshawur, Camp Nazian Valley, 25th February, 1841. SIR,--" I have the honor to report that I left my Camp this morning at 6 o'clock and proceeded with a part of the force up the Valley which contracts into a narrow defile lined with forts, in many parts confined to the bed of the Nullah, with precipitous rocky sides: the enemy appeared in small numbers on the tops of the hills to the right and left, but retired as we advanced. After proceeding about three miles from the place where I had left the 3d Shah's Infantry Regiment yesterday, we came to an open cultivated space studded with forts, apparently forming the Southern extremity of the Nazian Valley. From this point another valley winds round to the South-west, lined with forts: and to the left a narrow defile with perpendicular sides, 148 ATTACK IN THE NAZIAN VALLEY. the width of the bed of the Nullah leads into an uninhabited valley running South-east, in which only one dilapidated tower is visible. " The absence of all information with regard to the nature of the valley, its extent or difficulties, tended to render an advance through such The skill displayed by the formidable defiles somewhat appalling. flanking parties in surmounting and crowning almost inaccessible heights removed every obstacle by thus taking the forts in reverse, and deterring the enemy from retaining possession from the certainty of being surrounded without hope of escape by having their retreat cut off. "The number of forts now in our possession amount to eighty-four. It is my painful duty to report the death of Captain Douglas, Assistant Adjutant General; a party of the enemy fired upon us while advancing, and unfortunately shot him dead by my side. Captain Douglas was a talented officer, of much experience, and is a real loss to the service. I the more deplore the death of this excellent officer, as it was the only casualty that occurred this day. "My present advanced position is about twelve miles from the entrance of the valley. " Herewith I beg to enclose a Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing on the 24th instant." I have, &c., J. SHELTON, Brigadier. Comming. the Force in the Nazian Valley. Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force under the Command of Brigadier J. SHELTON, in the attack on the Nazian Valley on the 24th Feb. 1841, Camp Nazian Valley, 24th Feb. 1841. Wounded. Killed. 0 Cors. ac s; .I 0 a CI . i+M .4 . . -cot Q) <5 0 0;V . Ce ; C3 1.4 g L P- cs C1 -- *1 Engineers, ...... ... H. M.'s 44th Regiment, 3dInf. Regt. H. M. S. S. F. Jazeelchie Regiment, .. ... 1st Regt. ofJan Baz, .. Total, .. 1 O 0 O 0 00 9 0 0 0 0 1 0. O 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 01 7 21 1 91Q 7 7 2 0 0 01 00 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 18 0 1 0 3 19 1 3 23 19 0 0 5 O 5 Name of Officer Killed.--Lieuit. Pigou, of Engineers. J. SHELTON, Brigdr. Comdg. the Force in the Nazian Valley. ATTACK IN THE NAZIAN VALLEY. 149 About six weeks subsequent to this, it was found necessary to send a party against a fort in the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzie. There is no official communication extant descriptive of the attack, but in the newspapers of the day it is stated, that " a force, consisting of Captains Macan's and Griffin's corps, some of Captain Christie's cavalry, and a few guns, had moved towards Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and Macan on arrival, moved at once to capture one of the forts in their neighbourhood. Lieutenant Hoppe led on a storming party supported by Captain Macan with another company, and on the arrival of the party at the gate of the fort, about 11 o'clock r. M., Captain Sanders of the Engineers placed the bag of powder, and succeeded in blowing down the gate. Hoppe then rushed forward with his company, but was felled to the earth by a stone hurled at him by the defenders. Macan and Sanders were more fortunate, and getting into the fort, aided by Hoppe, who presently recovered, went to work in first rate style. The chief and fifteen men were killed, five were wounded, and a few prisoners were captured, the other part of the garrison having escaped over the walls. Captain Macan and Lieutenant Hoppe were both wounded, slightly, but Captain Sanders, we regret to say severely, having carried away three wounds. Macan is said to have brought down three, Sanders two men." The continued risings of the Ghilzies requiring the permanent presence of troops, it was deemed expedient by the Government to cause a strong fortress at Khelat-i-Ghilzie to be placed in such a state of defence as would admit of its being occupied by a garrison, which could keep the surrounding country in check, and effectually resist a siege or other attack. This measure was of course extremely distasteful to the Ghilzies, who attempted to interrupt the works by surrounding the small body of troops. Upon intelligence of this demonstration on the part of the Ghilzies reaching Candahar, Colonel Wymer, with 400 of the 38th, and the remainder of Christie's horse, commanded by Captain Leeson, and four Horse Artillery guns, moved with stores towards the fort, but when within two or three marches of their destination, the Ghilzies hastened from Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and made for the approaching troops. Captain Macan, ' eager for the fray,' immediately gave chase with a portion of his force, but not coming up with them, nor being able to gain any intelligence of their movements, the Captain suspecting a feint, and that, perhaps, the Ghilzies had returned by another 150 COLONEL WYMER AT KHELAT-I-GHILZIE. route to surprize the garrison, halted for the night. The Ghilzies moved on, and coming upon Col. Wymer's force in the night and in camp, they, fully three thousand in number, immediately attacked our troops, who had formed, in front, rushing down to the bayonets. They were repulsed, but again and again made the attempt in very gallant style; this failing, they tried the flank and turned it, but got well drubbed for their pains. They exhibited a most determined spirit, only exceeded by the truly loyal and gallant behaviour of the sepoys, who, when solicited by the Ghilzies to give up their charge, under promises of reward and protection, replied by discharges of musketry. Their bravery repulsed every attack, and at length drove the Ghilizies off the field. Next morning seventy of the enemy were found to have fallen. It is impossible to say what the number of wounded may be, as the Ghilzies ran every risk in carrying them away; but it was, no doubt, considerable. Colonel Wymer's force was too small to pursue them. Our disasters were, 38th N. I., one Sepoy killed and 10 slightly wounded, Leeson's horse, 3 killed and 5 wounded. The Artillery a horse or two killed. Total 4 killed and 15 wounded. Colonel Wymer's coolness and arrangements, when surprized, are said to have been admirable, and both officers and men behaved as gallantly as the Bengal Infantry usually do. Subjoined is Colonel Wymer's own account of the affair, addressed to the Assistant Adjutant General at Candahar. Kelat-i-Ghilzie, May 31, 1841. " Sa,--I have the honor to report for the information of Major GeDetail. neral Nott, commanding at Candahar, that shortly 2 guns Horse Artillery, after the arrival of the detachment under my comA wing of Shah's Ist Cavalry. mand, as noted per margin, at Eelmee on the 19th 4 companies 38th Regi- instant, information was brought me that a large 21 men, Sappers and bodyof Gilzie rebelswere in motion,with the supposed Miners. intention of attacking my detachment, and capturing the convoy under my charge, and a few hours after the report, stated that they had dispersed. At 5 P.M. my scout again returned with intelligence, that the whole of the rebel force, headed by the Gooroo and Sultan Khan, Gilzie chiefs, were in full march for the purpose of attacking my detachment, which was also confirmed by the return of Captain Leeson, who had gone with a large reconnoitring party. Orders were immediately given for the troops to get under arms, and I proceeded to COLONEL WYMER AT KHELAT-I-GHILZIE. 151 select the most favorable spot for a position to receive the enemy, a short time prior to which some low hills in the distance were observed through telescopes to be covered with troops, both horse and foot, distant about three miles. I immediately placed the detachment in the chosen position, and then awaited the arrival of the enemy, it being quite out of my power, from the small party of troops and magnitude of the convoy, for me to act otherwise than on the defensive. "About half-past five r. M. the enemy were observed to form and advance to the attack in one dense mass-when about nine hundred yards distant, the two six-pounders opened upon them with beautiful precision and effect, on which the enemy separated into three distinct columns, and advanced in the most cool and deliberate manner, with the evident intention of making a simultaneous attack upon both my flanks and centre, which was met with the greatest coolness and gallantry by the small detachment, in which they were assisted by a small party of horse under Guddoo Khan, who had taken up a position on a slight eminence for the protection of my left. The enemy were permitted to approach to within a very short distance, when a cool and destructive fire was poured into them from the infantry line, which, after some continuance, caused their troops, from the right and centre, to unite with those on their left, resting upon and limiting the steep banks of the Turnuck river. This caused a corresponding change in my position to be necessary, which, although under a galling fire, was effected with the greatest steadiness, in proof of which I may state, that during the execution of the movement, the left of the 38th was attacked in the most determined manner by a large body of infantry armed with drawn swords, who seeing our men in motion, must have thought they were retreating, and uttering a loud shout rushed in upon them, and the rapidity with which the men reformed and repulsed the attack, elicited my warmest approbation. " From this time the combined efforts of the enemy were directed to all points until about 10 P. x., without their gaining one single advantage, (to which time from the commencement of the attack, an incessant fire was thrown in upon my detachment,) when they were finally and completely dispersed. " On the commencement of the attack, the enemy were said to number 2590 horse and foot, and during the engagement, they were joined by two strong reinforcements when, from the information I subsequently gained, the numbers cannot be estimated at less than five thousand men. " The loss on the part of the enemy must have been very considerable, and sixty-four bodies and six or seven horses were left dead on the field; and I have every reason to suppose, that from the time of their retreat till a little before day-break they were employed in removing their killed and wounded, who did not fall in the immediate vicinity of my position. I am led to this conclusion, from the circumstance of numerous moving lights having been seen throughout the night, and also from the reports of the inhabitants of the country. On being repulsed, the enemy withdrew to the left bank of the Turnuck, and moved 152 COLONEL WYMER'S ORDER. off about day-break on the morning of the 30th, since which I have been unable to gain any information relative to their movements, except that it is currently reported that they have all dispersed. "I cannot omit to mention the ready obedience yielded by the wing of the 38th, when ordered to cease firing at a time when they were exposed to a heavy fire, a measure which was rendered temporarily necessary : after the order was given, not a shot was heard until again ordered to commence, thus affording the most convincing proof of their steadiness and attention to the commands of their officers. " I have much pleasure in expressing my entire approbation of the conduct of the European and Native commissioned, non-commissioned officers and men of the detachment, and in order that you may be in full possession of my sentiments on this point, I beg to subjoin an extract of an order which I deemed it proper to issue on the subject."' It now becomes the most agreeable part of Lieutenant Colonel Wymer's duty to express in detachment orders the very high sense he entertains of the gallantry of the different European officers he had the honor to command in the unequal contest of yesterday-and to request their acceptance of his best and most cordial thanks for the support they so willingly yielded him on the occasion above referred to. Too much cannot be said of the scientific and destructive manner in which the artillery practice was conducted by Lieutenant Hawkins commanding, which created awful havock in the ranks of the enemy, to the admiration of the troops present. "' The broken nature of the ground on which the action took place, was too unfavourable to admit of any extensive display of cavalry movements; they had however one opportunity of charging the enemy, which charge was perfectly successful, and prevented any renewal of the attack in that quarter. One hundred and fifty of the cavalry also were distributed about the camp, and their good conduct drew forth the praise of the officers under whose command they were placed, and all that could be done by that branch of the service, was most ably executed by Captain Leeson in command, assisted by Lieutenant Moorcroft of the Madras Army, who volunteered his services. To Captain Leeson great praise is due for the expert manner in which' the arduous duty of patroling the hills, right and left of the road, from the period of the convoy's marching from Candahar was conducted. "' To Captain Scott, in immediate command of the wing of the 38th Regiment, Lieut. Colonel Wymer feels much indebted for the valuable assistance he received from him, and for which he thus publicly tenders his unfeigned thanks, and the same are not less due to Lieutenants Pocklington, Tytler, and Farquharson, for the very attentive manner in which they conducted the duties of the posts assigned to their charge, each of which had its due effect in repelling the furious and repeated charges of the enemy for a period of nearly four hours. " ' To Lieut. Waterfield, Acting Adjutant to the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wymer also feels himself much indebted for the various aids DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENTS AT GIRISHK. 153 afforded by him, and the expeditious manner in which the sudden calls for reinforcements were so readily obeyed. " ' Lieutenant Jeremie, Staff Officer to the detachment, has, during this affair, proved of the greatest use to the Lieutenant Colonel from his knowledge of the Persian language, and the duties pertaining to his office. Doctor Jacob's professional skill and attention to the wounded in hospital on both sides, need no encomiums from the commanding officer's pen; they have been all that he could wish. "' To the whole of the commissioned, non-commissioned, European and Native officers and soldiers, Lieutenant Colonel Wymer offers his most sincere praise and thanks, for the great exertions manifested by them in this trying contest.' " I have, &c. G. P. WYMER, Lieut. Col. In charge of Detachment. The next proof on record that the disaffection in the neighbourhood of the Helmund had not been suppressed, is furnished in the following General Order by the Supreme Government, and the dispatch which it publishes:-" Notification, Fort William, Secret Department, the 9th August, 1841.-The Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council has much pleasure in publishing for general information, the following copy of a dispatch, reporting the signal defeat of a large body of insurgents, by a detachment of His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, serving under British Officers, and His Lordship in Council is glad to express his approbation of the conduct of Captain Woodburn, commanding the Detachment, and cordially concurs with him in his praise of the Officers and Men, by whom, under circumstances of difficulty, he was gallantly supported. By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, T. H. MADDOCK, Secy. to the Govt. of India." " Camp Girishk, 5th July, 1841. with the instructions conveyed in Captain RipSin,--" Conformably ley's (Fort Adjutant) letter to my address, under date the 27th ultimo, I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding, the operations of the detachment under my command since leaving Candahar. " On reaching Kaash-kee-na-kood on the morning of the 1st instant, the Assistant Political Agent with my detachment (Lieut. Pattenson) intimated to me that he had received information of Ukhtar Khan being still before Girishk with a body of 3,000 men, but thought it probable he would move in the direction of Sharuck, on learning the near approach x 154 DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENTS. of my detachment. I therefore determined to march next morning to Sungboor, instead of proceeding by the usual route to Girishk, in order that I might be nearer the enemy in case they should move up the river, and still be able to reach the ford opposite Girishk by the same number of marches. "On arrival at Sungboor, on the morning of the 2nd instant, I was informed by Lieut. Pattenson, that Ukhtar Khan had not left Girishk, and that from every account received, he was determined to meet my detachment before the place, and oppose my crossing the Helmund. I consequently marched at 8 o'clock in the evening, and reached the ford opposite Girishk a little before day-break on the 3rd instant, when Lieut. Pattenson (who preceded the detachment) acquainted me that all the fords were in possession of the enemy, and that the one at which I had halted was not practicable for either cavalry or infantry, but that at Sumboolee, about three miles further up the river, cavalry could cross, and that the infantry ford was a mile further down. I accordingly directed Captain Hart to ford at Sumboolee with the 2nd Regt. of Janbaz, and to move down upon the enemy while I was crossing the remainder of the detachment at the ford described by the Assistant Political Agent, as only 'knee deep.' In July 1839, I had frequently crossed the river at this ford, and had therefore no reason to doubt the accuracy of Lieut. Pattenson's information, but on reaching the place, was greatly disappointed to find that, owing to the depth and rapidity of the current, the ford was totally impracticable. " From the high grounds at this place, I could distinctly see the rebel force drawn up on the opposite bank, about half a mile from the river ; the Infantry were formed on the open plain, and appeared to number 3000, but the gardens near the fort were swarming with men, who commenced moving out on my detachment coming in sight. I now discovered that Captain Hart had crossed the river, and was moving down the right bank in excellent order, agreeably to the instructions I had given him; and finding that it was impossible for me to cross the river at any of the fords below, I was apprehensive that he might be surprised by the enemy, and be hard pressed before he could regain the ford at which he had crossed. Fortunately, however, he observed that I had not been able to effect a passage, and immediately returned to the left bank of the river at Sumboolee, where I joined him at 8 A.M., and found that the rebels had moved up to the ford, and taken up their position on the opposite bank, but as my men were suffering from extreme heat, and the long march during the night, I contented myself by giving them a few rounds of round shot, which caused them to move off to some gardens and villages two miles further up, when I immediately pitched my camp close to and fronting the ford, determining to suspend further operations till the afternoon, as the ford was not practicable for Infantry, and at the same time I crowned the hills which ran in my rear (from the village of Sumboolee for about a mile up the river) with horsemen, to watch the rebels, and bring instant intelligence of any movement that might take place. DEFEAT OF TIlE INSURGENTS. 155 " About 4} ,P. a stir was perceptible in the rebel camp, and they M., seemed preparing for a move. I accordingly struck mine, and detached Lieut. Golding with his Janbaz regt. to watch their movements and oppose their crossing the river, should such prove to be their object. About 6 o'clock I received intelligence from this officer, that the enemy had succeeded in crossing the ford (some three miles distant from my position) before he could reach it, and were moving down in large bodies. I immediately changed my front, and took ground a little to the left, which I considered the best position attainable under all circumstances. The guns were placed between the 4th and 5th companies of the 5th Infantry, and the two Janbaz regts. were formed on either flank, and 200 Suwars were posted in rear to protect the baggage and watch the neighbouring ford, in case any portion of the enemy should attempt a passage by it also: in this order I remained until I could discover their point of attack, which was soon unmasked by a large body of Infantry moving towards my left, when I forthwith changed position of the light company of the 5th Infantry, throwing back Lieut. Golding's Janbaz regt., and forward the guns and remaining companies of the 5th Regt. with Captain Hart's Janbaz corps thrown back at a right angle with the Grenadier company of the 5th Regt. to protect the right of the position. " The attack on the left was made with great boldness, but was repulsed by the well-directed fire from the guns and the three companies on their left. Failing in this, the enemy moved off towards the right, but were again met by a'most destructive fire from the guns and the five companies of infantry on their right. "Large bodies of horse and foot were now seen crowding along the heights to the right of the infantry, and shortly after they moved down on Capt. Hart's Janbaz corps, forcing it back on the baggage in the rear, and a portion of them even succeeded in getting close up to the rear of the three companies of the 5th Infantry on the left of the guns, but were driven back by Lieutenant Clark's facing the rear rank of these companies to the right about and firing a volley. The Janbaz regiments having now got into confusion, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of their officers, and the rear being still threatened, I moved back one of the guns with the Grenadier company of the 5th Regiment to protect it, which was scarcely effected before they were beset by large bodies of horse and foot crowding in on the rear, and who were not driven back and dispersed until three rounds of grape and a volley from the Grenadiers had been delivered, at less than 50 paces distant. " I then ordered Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding to move out with their Janbaz corps, and scour the country to the right, which they most ably performed, though in justice to these officers I am compelled to add, but feebly supported by a large portion of their men, who lagged behind, crowded in upon the baggage and rear of the infantry, and could not be induced by any means to behave as soldiers, in following their officers. 156 DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENTS. " Under these circumstances, I determined to occupy the whole of a melon bed enclosure in which a portion of the 5th Infantry was posted, and to get as much of the baggage within it as possible. This arrangement was soon perfected, and the infantry being secured behind a low wall, which ran round this enclosure, were able, in comparative safety, to repel any fresh attack that might be made, of which there were several, but in every instance, steadily repulsed by the fire from the artillery and infantry. " At 11 o'clock the heights were again crowded with bodies of horse and foot, and it was now obvious that the rebels were moving off, though they kept up a desultory and useless fire upon the position for hours after, apparently with the object'of distracting our attention, and enabling them to carry off their dead, which they did until nearly daybreak on the morning of the 4th instant. "At sunrise on the 4th instant I detached Lieutenant Golding to ascertain the direction in which the enemy had gone, and he reported on his return, that they were posted in considerable strength about two miles up the river, but it was soon ascertained that they had re-forded it, and in a few hours after, information was received of their having reached Hydrabad en route to Zemindawur, when I made immediate arrangements for crossing the grain (carried upon asses) upon camels, and at 3 o'clock P.M. commenced fording the detachment and baggage, an operation which lasted nearly seven hours, notwithstanding the aid received from the Janbaz regiments by carrying the infantry across on their horses. The detachment reached Girishk this morning at two o'clock, and encamped on the high ground to the west of the fort. " In both a military and political point of view, it would be of the greatest importance to follow up, and disperse the rebels; but with reference to their numbers, and the notoriously disaffected state of the country, I do not consider that I should be justified in moving after them, with a weak regiment of infantry, two guns, and with cavalry, in which every confidence cannot be placed. However, if the Major General is of opinion that a small increase of cavalry and infantry to my detachment will suffice, no time shall be lost by me in pursuing the rebels, and engaging them in Zemindawur. " All accounts agree in computing the force of the enemy to have amounted to 6000, of which two-thirds were infantry, and from information yesterday received, they had upwards of 300 killed, and the villages up the river are stated to be filled with wounded men. " It is a pleasing duty for me to bring to the Major General's notice, the excellent conduct of the European officers of the detachment, as I am much indebted to them for the coolness and energy they displayed in executing my orders and wishes. "Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding repeatedly charged the enemy successfully during the night, with such portion of their men as could be induced to follow them; and I only regret that their noble example should have been so partially seconded-the former officer was wounded DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENTS. 157 slightly on the head and right wrist, but will, I trust, be inconvenienced therefrom, only for a few days. " Lieutenant Cooper deserves my best acknowledgments for the rapidity and admirable manner in which he brought his guns to play upon the enemy ; and I had frequent opportunity of noticing the precision of his practice. His guns are never in difficulty, and he manages to move with less assistance from infantry than most officers I have met with. " Lieutenant Ross commanded the 5th Infantry on the night of the 3rd instant, and displayed both courage and ability in the trying situations in which he was frequently placed, and the order in which he kept the men was extremely creditable to him. " Lieutenant Clark commanded the three left companies of the 5th Regiment, and exhibited much coolness in repulsing the frequent attacks made both on front and rear of his position. "From Mr. Assistant Surgeon Colquhoun, I also derived much assistance during the action, in a variety of ways, and his activity and zeal could not have been exceeded. "Lieut. Pattenson, Assistant Political Agent, volunteered his services, and throughout the night was most active in conveying such orders as circumstances required, and was consequently of much assistance to me. I regret to state that this officer, while walking over the field towards morning, was suddenly attacked by one of the wounded of the enemy, and severely stabbed in the right side. At first the wound was considered mortal, but I am happy to say, that he has since been declared out of danger. " It is also my duty to bring most prominently to the Major General's notice, the admirable conduct of the Artillery and 5th Infantry throughout the night of the 3d instant, and to state my conviction, that no troops could have displayed greater coolness and bravery than they did on every occasion. They moved from one position to another, not only without confusion, but with nearly as much precision and regularity, as if they had been going through an ordinary parade. "Three standards were captured from the enemy, one by Captain Hart's men, another by Lieut. Golding's, and the third by the three companies of the 5th Infantry under Lieut. Clark. " I have the honor to annex hereto, a list of killed and wounded, and in conclusion to state, that I shall be careful to keep the Major General fully acquainted with all my operations." I have, &c. J. WOODBURN, Captain, Comg. Field Detachment on the Helmund. To Captain POLWHELE, Major of Brigade, Candahar. 158 KILLED-WOUNDED. Return of Casualties in a Detachment under the Command of Captain WOODBURN, engaged in a night attack on the bank of the Helmund by Ukhtar Khan, on the 3d of July, 1841. LL _ ~I_ Horse. Corps. .0 1 0 C,) E0 Detachment Detachment Detachment 5th Infantry ist Troop H. A ........ 1st Jaun Bauz H......... 2d Jaun Bauz H......... S. S. Force, .......... O O0 0 10 10 2 2 Grand Total, 12 ........ 0 0 1 0 12 1 0 0 U U 1 0 U 1 6 15 3 2 6 17 3 2 6 27 5 0 4 9 0 0 11 20 0 26 28 40 13 31 2 J.WooDBULN, Captain, Comg. Detachment Shah Soojah's Force. List of European Oficers attached to a Detachment, under the Command of Captain WOODBURN. No. Rank and Names. How employed. Remarks. CAPTAINS. 1 J. Woodburn, .......... Commg. Detachment and 5th Infantry. 2 L. Hart................. Commg. 2d Jaun Bauz. LIEUTENANTS. I G. L. Cooper, .......... 2 G. W. G. Golding....... 3 A. H. Ross, ............. 4 T. Clark, ............ ASSIST. ;Commg. Detachment Horse Artillery. Ditto ditto Ist Jaun Bauz. Actg. Adjt. and 2d in command. Actg. Quarter Master. SURGEON. I A. Coiquhoun.......... In Medical Charge of Detachment. Officer Wounded. Captain Hart, 2d Jaun Baz Regiment, slightly. J. WOOBUReN, Captain. ommg. Detachment on Helmund. SCINDE.--UKIITAR KHAN. 159 In the same month (July) intelligence reached Cabul, that the Zemindars and Sirdars of Charekar had refused to pay the revenue due to the Government of Shah Soojah. A corps of Affghan levies under Lieut. Maule was sent to coerce them, and appears to have had little trouble in doing so, although an influential chieftain, named Meer Musjeedee, was still harboured by the people of Nidjrow, and openly threatened to raise the whole of Kohistan, if at any time he should hear of the defeat of our troops elsewhere. In Scinde, during the month of July, affairs had gone on steadily. After a long period passed in wearisome negociation, Nusseer Khan came down from the hills and surrendered to Colonel Stacy, tempted by the pacific overtures made on behalf of the British Government, and the hope of being placed on the guddee under British influence, which hope was afterwards fulfilled. The death of Mr. Ross Bell, which took place in July, induced the Government to place Major Outram in charge of the Political Agency, and there is no doubt that the judgment and energy of that officer contributed to the maintenance of the peace and order, which for some time subsequently distinguished the whole of Upper Scinde. The inability of Captain Woodburn to follow up his success in Zemindawaur with the small force at his command, (as mentioned in his dispatch given above,) induced Major General Nott to dispatch from Candahar a body of troops, sufficiently large to pursue Ukhtar Khan, and effectually to suppress the rebellion headed by that chieftain. One of these detachments was placed under the command of Colonel Chambers of the 5th Bengal Cavalry, and the other under Captain John Griffin of the 24th Bengal N. I. They proceeded to different parts of the country, but each was soon engaged with the enemy with good effect. The dispatches of the respective commandants are given below :Colonel CHAMBEBS' Dispatch to Captain GRANT, Ofg. Asst. Adjt. Genl., Cabool. Camp Karootoo, 5th August, 1841. SIR,-" For the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B., commanding the Troops in Affghanistan, I have the honor to report that about 8 o'clock this morning, several shots were heard on the left of the valley where our grass-cutters were known to have gone. I immediately ordered a Troop to be saddled. 160 ACTION AT KAROOTOO. " Soon after one of Captain Walker's Sowars of the 4th Irregulars came to me with a message, that the enemy were coming down the Sheea Kotil Pass in force, and that he had only a few men with him. " Lieut. Bazett's Troop being by this time ready, it went off to his assistance with as many of the 4th Ressallah as could be sent, to hold the enemy in check. I followed immediately with five Companies of the 16th Regiment N. I. under Lieut. Colonel Maclaren, and another Troop of the 5th Light Cavalry. " On passing the Syeeghan Ghaut, I observed a few horse and foot in it, and directed Captain Oldfield to halt at a distance, merely to watch and hold them in check until our return, but after the column had passed, they appear to have increased in numbers and boldness, until they afforded him an opportunity of charging them, of which he appears most ably to have availed himself. " As my column approached the scene of action, we could distinctly see Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazett with their parties dashing boldly over the hills after the enemy, and driving them off in all directions, in short leaving nothing for me to do. " I regret exceedingly to state, that Lieut. Bazett is very severely, though I hope not dangerously, wounded." I have, &c. R. E. CHAMBERS, Lieut. Col. Commdg. Detachment. Return of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment under the command of Lieut. Colonel CHAMBERS, 5th Light Cavalry, on the morning of the 5th August 1841. Camp Karootoo, 5th August, 1841, " 5th Regiment Light Cavalry.-Killed, 1 Grass-cutter; Wounded severely, one Lieutenant, one Quarter Master Serjeant, four Horses; Ditto, slightly, one Trooper, three Horses. " 43d Regiment Native Infantry.-Wounded, severely, one Havildar ; Ditto, slightly, one Sipahee. " 3d Ressallah 4th Irregular Cavalry.-Killed, one Horse; Wounded, severely, two Sowars, one Grass-cutter, ten Horses; Ditto, slightly, one Sowar, one Horse. Officers Wounded. "Lieutenant Bazett, 5th Light Cavalry, severely. " Captain Walker's Charger killed under him. R. E. CHAMBERS, Lieut. Col. Commanding Detachment. Captain GRIFFIN'S Dispatch to Captain POLWHELE, Major of Brigade, Candahar, Camp Khawind, 17th August, 1841. For the information of Major General Nott, Commanding the District, I have the highest satisfaction in reporting that the combined SIR.-" ACTION AT 161 KAROOTOO. Rebel Force, headed by Akram Khan and Ukhtar Khan, amounting to upwards of five thousand Horse and Foot, was 4 Six Pounders. this morning totally routed and dispersed by the 800 Sabres. 350 Bayonets. Detachment under my command, as noted in the margin. " 2. The loss of the enemy on this occasion is estimated at six hundred killed and wounded. Sixty prisoners were brought into Camp, and among them three Chiefs of note; viz. Khyroollah Khan of Teyna, (since dead,) a brother of Lallo Khan of Bhagran, and Moolah Shurreef of Bhagran. " 3. The accurate information furnished by the Assistant Political Agent on the afternoon of the 16th, enabled me immediately to comply with his requisition for the dispersion of the Rebels, then within ten miles of my Camp. " 4. At 4 A. M. I broke ground, and at 7 came up with the enemy, strongly posted in my front, occupying a succession of walled gardens and small forts, under cover of which they immediately opened a fire of juzels and matchlocks, on the advancing columns. " 5. After a few rounds skilfully delivered by Lieutenant Cooper, commanding the Guns, parties were detached from the 2d Bengal Native Infantry, and 1st Regiment Shah Shoojah's force, to clear and take possession of these enclosures; whilst the 5th Regiment Shah Shoojah's force, posted on the extreme left (flanked by a wing of H. M.'s 1st Cavalry,) deployed into line, advanced at the double, and drove back a body of the enemy's skirmishers, who were for the most part concealed behind a range of broken walls, and whose fire was becoming destructive. " 6. At the same time, the enclosures in front of the column to the right were speedily and gallantly carried under a heavy fire of matchlocks, by two Companies of the 2d Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Cooke and Travers, supported by a party of the 1st Infantry S. S. force under Lieutenant Gardiner, in effecting which, numbers of the enemy were shot and bayoneted. " 7. This object having been accomplished, the whole advanced with the view of attacking the main body of the enemy, who were observed " en masse," in rear of the gardens; but before this could be effected, they appeared to be getting into confusion, when Captain Hart's Regiment of Jaun Bauz Cavalry and the wing of H. M.'s 1st Cavalry, charged, broke, and pursued them with fearful vengeance several miles, headed, moreover, by His Royal Highness Prince Suftur Jung in person. I then permitted Lieutenant Golding with his Jaun Baz Regiment, who had been on Rear Guard duty (the baggage being well up and in safety) to join in the pursuit at the request of this officer, whose men were most eager to take a part in the action. " 8. The Jaun Bauz Cavalry have, in my opinion, fully established, on this occasion by their behaviour, a reputation for gallantry, and every claim to the confidence of His Majesty. " 9. Our loss has been rather severe, I regret to remark, as will be seen Y 162 OPERATIONS IN ZEMINDAWMAUR. by the accompanying Return; particularly in the two companies of the 2d Bengal Native Infantry, who were exposed to a very heavy fire. " 10. It affords me much satisfaction to record the gallantry with which the Jan Baz Cavalry were headed by Captain Hart, afterwards ably supported by Lieutenant Golding, and the judgment displayed by the former Officer, in seizing the most favourable opportunity to charge and rout the enemy. " 11. I have a most pleasing duty to perform in bearing testimony to the zeal and ability with which all the Officers under my command conducted their respective duties; and here I must especially notice, that Captain Woodburn, though at the time suffering from the effects of severe illness, and scarcely able, owing to weakness, to sit on horseback, exhibited an instance of zealous and honourable devotion to his military duties in leaving his dooley, mounting his horse, and remaining in command of the 5th Regiment S. S. force till the close of the action. " 12. To Captains McDowell and McLean, and Lieutenants Cooper and Crawford in command of Corps and Detachments, I am deeply indebted for assistance rendered to me ; and a similar expression of thanks is due to the other Officers under and associated with them: while I cannot omit to particularize the just tribute of praise due to Lieutenant Ross, 5th Infantry S. S. force, Detachment Staff, from whom on this, as on all other occasions, since assuming Command of this Detachment, I have received much assistance. " 13. The Medical Staff; viz. Assistant Surgeons Colquhoun and Rae, have entitled themselves to the highest commendation for their humane and unceasing attention to the wounded men. " 14. The steady and excellent conduct of the Native Commissioned, European and Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, entitle them to my highest praise. " 15. A Casualty Roll herewith accompanies, and I have, &c. JOHN GRIFFIN, Captain, Commanding a Field Detachment in Zemindawaur." Return of Casualties in a Field Detachment, under the Command of Captain GRIFFIN, H. M. Shah Shoojah's Force, engaged in Action with a combined Rebel Force in Zeemeendawur, on the 17th August, 1841. "Detachment 1st troop Horse Artillery S. S. F. wounded-1 rank and file, 1 horse killed and 1 wounded-Wing of 1st Cavalry, do. killed 1 rank and file ; wounded 1 lieutenant, 3 duffadars, dubashies and havildars, and 14 rank and file, 6 horses killed and 18 wounded-1st Regiment of Jan Bauz, ditto, 3 rank and file killed and wounded, 1 Pinjah bashie, 4 daffadars, dubashies and havildars, and 9 rank and file, and 15 horses wounded-2d Regiment of Jan Baz, ditto, 1 rank and file killed; wounded 2 duffadars, dubashies and havildars and 11 rank and file, and 9 horses killed and 14 wounded-Detachment of 2d Regiment of Bengal Native BLIND 163 SECURITY. Infantry, killed 7 rank and file; wounded 1 duffadar, dubashies and havildars, and 29 rank and file-1st Regiment of Infantry Shah Shoojah's Force, wounded 1 duffadar, dubashies and havildars, and 10 rank and file--5th Regiment of Infantry, ditto, wounded 1 duffadar, dubashies and havildars, and 14 rank and file. Name of Officer Wounded. Lieutenant Crawford, 1st Cavalry, S. S. F. slightly. Remarks.-2 Sowars missing. J. GRIFFIN, Captain, Commanding Detachment." The Ghilzie These two victories produced a very happy effect. been broken by them. Ukhtar Khan power was considered to have fled to the Hindoo Khosh, and from thirty to forty chieftains tendered their allegiance through Major Leech, the Political Agent at Candahar. Nevertheless, it was deemed necessary by that officer to require, that a large force be sent to the Tezeen valley through difficult Passes, under Colonel Wymer of the 38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, who was afterwards joined by Major General Nott himself, on whom the command then devolved. While matters were thus progressing in the South of Affghanistan towards a settlement of the country, Shah Soojah and the British Envoy felt so secure that the whole of the North had been brought under subjection, that it was broadly given out, that in a few months there would be no further occasion for the presence of a British force. It is quite true that the people of Charekar had but recently refused to pay kist to the Government; that the inhabitants of Cabul and Candahar exhibited their antipathy to the Europeans by continual insults and occasional murders; that Shah Soojah was alienating his subjects by his hauteur, his cruel punishments and oppressions; that one of Dost Mahomed's sons was still in the North; and that not a single month had passed, since the occupation of the country, in which it had not been found necessary to employ troops for purposes of vengeance or coercion; all this was perfectly true, yet such was the infatuation of the authorities named above; such their singular insensibility to the real posture of affairs, that in one fatal moment they concluded they might safely commence a reduction of the sums annually agreed to be paid to the Eastern Ghilzies, and other tribes inhabiting the hills between 164 THE KHOORD CABUL PASS CLOSED. Peshawur and Cabul, for the sake of keeping the Passes open, and putting a stop to plunder. The resolution having been come to, the reduction was immediately carried into effect. The consequences were, as might have been expected, most serious. The mountaineers rose as one man-occupied the Passes in great force, and at once cut off the communication between Cabul and India.* It is not easy to say whether this was the designed precursor of the subsequent blockade of Cabul; but there can be little doubt that the Ghilzies, having once committed themselves to an earnest opposition, felt the necessity for organizing a combination with all the disaffected chieftains far and near, a combination which ultimately destroyed our power in Affghanistan, and led to the most disastrous and horrible results. On the intelligence reaching Cabul, that the Khoord Cabul Passes were occupied by the enemy, Sir Robert Sale was despatched with an adequate force to drive them thence, and re-open the communication. It proved a severer task than had been anticipated; but the troops accomplished it successfully under their distinguished leader, and the following dispatches relate the manner of the achievement:From Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B. to Captain GRANT, Offg. Assistant Adjutant General, Cabool, dated Camp Bootkhak, 12th October, 1841. " Sia,--I have the honor to state to you, for the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B. that the task of forcing the Pass of Khoord Cabool, and defeating the rebels posted wvithin it, has this morning been accomplished. " After fully weighing the whole of the information brought to me at various periods in the course of yesterday, I came to the conclusion, that the main body of the insurgents was posted behind a breastwork near the middle of the Pass, and that they would defend it, as well as the almost inaccessible heights on either flank of it. " My plan of attack was therefore arranged as follows : I determined to employ two hundred Juyzailchees, under the well known Sirdar Jan Fishun Khan, to create a diversion by assaulting, in flank and rear, the * For a proof of the indifference of the Political Officers to, or their ignorance of, the mustering of these Chiefs, the reader is referred to Appendix, No. IV. Capt. Gray's Narrative. The editor of these memorials might also cite the remonstrances of Mohen Lal, Sir A. Burnes' Moonshee, and Col. A. Roberts, who lost the command of the Shah's troops, from too freely speaking his mind to the Envoy. Sir W. McNaghten and Sir A. Burnes would not believe that a mine was beneath them ready to explode. THE PASS FORCED. 165 precipitous ridge which forms the Southern side of the Durra, whilst the troops under my command entered its gorge, and attacked the enemy in front. The force left camp at 6 A. M. The advanced guard consisted of the two guns of Foot Artillery, under Lieutenant Dawes, two companies of the 13th Light Infantry under Captain Fenwick and Lieutenant George King, the flank companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Younghusband, and a detachment of Pioneers under Captain Broadfoot, the whole being in charge of Captain Seaton, 35th regiment Native Infantry. The remainder of the 13th and 35th, formed our main body. As we approached the insurgents' position, we found that all the reports of our spies had been substantially correct, but that the enemy were withdrawing from behind their breastwork in the valley, and occupying the rocky ridges of the mountains on either side. They opened upon us a well-directed fire, and at the very commencement of the affair, I received a wound from a ball above the ancle, which ultimately compelled me to leave the field. Whilst I remained on it, however, I directed two companies of the 13th, and one of the 35th to ascend the precipices on either hand in face of the enemy, and I must in justice to them mention the gallantry, activity, and perseverance with which this duty was performed, and the enemy driven by our skirmishers from point to point of eminences almost perpendicular. When compelled to retire, I resigned the command into the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, C. B., and have the pleasure to forward his report, detailing the further progress and completion of the affair. " I beg to add, that whilst I remained at the head of the Force, the conduct of both Officers and men afforded me the highest satisfaction, and I am greatly pleased with the spirited and judicious manner in which Lieutenant Colonel Dennie brought the matter to a close. " The exertions of my Brigade Major, Captain Wade, and of Captain Havelock, and Lieut. Airey, of Major General Elphinstone's personal Staff, who attached themselves to me as Volunteers on this service, demand my amplest acknowledgments. The last mentioned of these Officers had a horse shot under him. I beg to forward the casualty return of the 13th: that of the Artillery, Sappers, and 35th N. I. shall follow. " A memorandum of the Ammunition expended, is also annexed. I am thankful for the promised reinforcement of two Guns; and if the 37th Regt. N. I. can also be promptly sent out, it will relieve the Troops from a part of very harassing out-post duty, in an exposed plain, in the vicinity of mountains. " P. S.-I ought not to have forgotten to mention, that Captain Bellew, Assistant Quarter Master General, who had previously, under General Elphinstone's instructions, reconnoitred the Passes occupied by the enemy, accompanied me during my march from Cabool, and ably aided me, until the moment of my being wounded, upon which he continued to render valuable assistance to Lieut. Col. Dennie. To Brevet Captain Trevor, 3d Light Cavalry, politically employed on this occasion, I was -indebted for the information obtained at Bootkhak; 166 THE PASS FORCED. upon it my plan of attack was based, and it proved correct in every particular; and he was personally active and conspicuous throughout the engagement." From Lieut. Col. W. H. DENNIE, C. B., Commanding 13th Light Infantry, to Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B. Commanding, dated Camp Bootkhak, 12th Oct. 1841. " SIm,-I beg, on my return to camp, to report the details of the progress and completion of the affair with the rebels, in the Khoord Cabool Pass, begun in so spirited a manner under your personal command this morning. " On receiving over charge of the troops, in consequence of your wound compelling you to leave the valley, I pursued your plan of operations by pressing the enemy as much as the nature of the ground would admit on both flanks, and rapidly moving on the main column and guns, with the intention of dislodging them from their breastwork, if still occupied, but this the insurgents had evacuated, though they ventured to dispute the possession of the precipitous heights, and to direct a well-aimed fire against our main force. Disconcerted, however, by the bold manner in which they were met by our skirmishers, as they scaled the mountain sides, and by the steady progress of the advance, they gradually abandoned their first position, and retired to the highest ridges and pinnacles of the Durra. " I had resolved from the first not to allow any lateral opposition to divert me from the main purpose of clearing the Valley, and a little after 7 A. M., I had the satisfaction of reaching the southern gorge of the Pass, and establishing there the 35th N. I. and the Guns, in an excellent post, constituted by the walls of a strong and capacious, though deserted, fort. By this time our skirmishers had every where got possession of the heights, and the Affghan Force under Jan Fishun Khan, had also crowned the mountains, and displayed their banners on its summit. " You are aware, that it was part of your original plan, that the 13th Light Infantry should return to their encampment at Bootkhak-as the columns marched back, the enemy again shewed themselves on several points of the defile, and opened a fire, and some loss was sustained in repelling these attacks, and in withdrawing our flanking parties. "The Troops finally arrived at Bootkhak about 2 r. M., a good deal harrassed by the exertions of the morning. You will see by the Returns that the Casualties have not been few, which arose from the great advantage afforded by the ground to an enemy trained to mountain warfare. "Permit me to add the expression of my admiration of the fearless manner in which the men of the 13th, chiefly young Soldiers, ascended heights nearly perpendicular, under the sharp fire of the insurgents. The Sepoys of the 35th rivalled and equalled them in steadiness, activity, and intrepidity. I am happy to say, that no loss whatever of the AFFAIR IN THE TEZEEN VALLEY. 167 Baggage of the Native Infantry was sustained in traversing this valley of plunderers. " I have not yet received the Casualty Return of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, but have reason to believe, that it is in amount about equal to that of the 13th, and am informed they have one Officer, Captain Younghusband, severely wounded." Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., in forcing the Pass of Khoord Cabool, on the 12th October, 1841. Killed. Wounded. -a a C. Regiments. " .. Rank and awounded. 0 , S, Names of Officers . 0 2d Company 6th Battallion Artillery, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, ....... 35th Regiment N. I., Sappers and Miners, O0 0 0 0 o 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 6 12 2 2 General Staff. 1 Major General Sir I. Sale, K. C. B. Commanding, severely. 16 Capt. Wade, Major of Brigade, 8 slightly. 2 13th Light Infantry. Lieut. Mein, severely. Ensign Oakes, slightly. 35thRegiment N. I. Capt. Younghusband, severely. Total, ........ I 1 27j H. WA DE, Captain, Major of Brigade. From Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B. Commanding 1st Brigade of British Troops serving in Afghanistan, to Captain GRANT, Cabool, Camp in the Valley near Teezeen, October 23d, 1841. Si,--" I beg to acquaint you for the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B., that the force united under my command, consisting of the 1st Brigade of Infantry, No 6, Light Field Battery, the Mountain Train, the Corps of Sappers and Miners, a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, and a ressallah of the Shah's 2d Cavalry, marched from Khoord Cabool towards Teezeen yesterday morning. Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, 35th, commanded the advance guard, Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, 13th, the main column, and Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, the rear guard, in each of which troops of the several arms were appointed according to the best of my judgment. The force felt its way cautiously through the defiles of the Huft Kotul, occupying with skirmishers the hills on either flank, and leaving parties for the protection of our baggage and rear on selected points. Nothing was seen of the enemy until the advance and main body had halted in the 168 AFFAIR IN THE TRZEEN VALLEY. valley of Teezeen. From this low ground, another vale stretches out towards the south-east, and on the sides and summits of the mountains which enclose the latter, were posted in every quarter bodies of the insurgents, whilst another portion of their force, consisting of foot, led on by sirdars on horseback and their mounted followers, shewed a determination to dispute with us the possession of a conical hill, which partially closes the entrance of the branching valley, and barred our approach to Moohummud Ufzal's fort, a large work backed by gardens, which the rebels still garrisoned. From this eminence, the advance guard under Colonel Monteath drove them by a combined attack, and I then directed the 13th Light Infantry, and a portion of Capt. Abbott's battery to advance under Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, and assault the fort itself. The insurgents, however, abandoned it after directing from it a feeble fire. " I immediately determined to establish in it a dep6t for my sick and wounded, and to take it as a point of support for ulterior operations, and an appui to my Camp, to be fixed under its walls; but as the enemy continued to occupy in force a nearly circular range of heights, and even boldly to skirmish in a lower part of the valley, it became necessary to drive them from such segments of the mountain as would, if remaining in their hands, have given the power to command our position, and fire upon the troops with advantage at night. This led to a succession of skirmishes which were maintained with great coolness and spirit by several Companies of the 13th and one of the 35th, aided by the Guns of Captain Abbott's Battery and the Mountain Train, and supported by the Cavalry. The combat was prolonged until after dusk, and the ammunition of one of the Companies of the 13th having been expended, it was compelled temporarily to retire, and a very promising Officer, Lieutenant Edward King, was killed at its head. A supply of cartridges and a reinforcement were promptly sent up, and the affair ended by the rebels being pushed off every part of the steep mountains which we designed to retain. The Returns will shew, that our loss has been slight, and I have no doubt that the enemy suffered severely from the fire of our skirmishers and the shot of our batteries. The force bivouacked in position without an attempt being made upon our line. Morning shewed us the heights every where deserted by the rebels, and if a negociation which they have opened in very humble terms, should not end in their entire submission, I purpose to attack their principal fort to-morrow. " I regret to have to add, that though every precaution was adopted for the security of our line of communication, a large interval was created between our main body and rear guard, by the circumstance of the latter having to await at Khoord Cabool, the arrival of carriage from the capital for part of the public baggage. A light armed enemy, well acquainted with the country, did not fail to take advantage of this, and I fear that some ammunition and valuable stores have fallen into their hands. I beg to forward the report of Captain Oldfield, detailing every occurrence whilst he commanded the rear guard, also the Returns of killed and wounded, and of ammunition expended. 169 ACTION IN THR TEEZEEN VALLEY. Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B. in the attack on the Enemy's position in the Valley of Teezeen, on the 22d October, 1841. Killed. a * Regiments. Wounded. 4 Rank and Names ofOfficers Killed and Wounded. f - • a Ki c5 a~ Lt d K 24 Company 6th Battalion Artillery, .. 0 0 0 0 1 0 9 1 0 Killed--Lt. Edw. King, Squadron, 5th Light .0 Cavalry... 0 10 0 0 1 00 H. M.'s 13th Lt. Infy. Wounded--Lieut. Frere, 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 O 00 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 15 1 H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, .. .. I Sappers and Miners, .. Mountain Train, 0 Total, .... 11 4 1 2 0 0Z H. M.'s 13th Lt. Infy., slightly. WoundedLt. Orr, Sap pers and Miners, severely. H. WADE, Captain, Major of Brigade. From Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., Commanding the 1st Brigade of British Troops serving in Afghanistan, to Captain GRANT, Oficiating Assistant Adjutant General, Cabool. Dated Camp Jugdulluk, October 28th 1841. " SIR,-I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B., that the Force under my Command, reached this place to-day : last night passed over without the slightest insult to our outposts at Kuttah Sung, but during the morning's march we descried small parties at a distance on both flanks, especially near the outlet of the Puree Durree, which afterwards united in a combined attack on our rear guard. Our loss has been small, and the enemy was every where baffled, and held in check by the fire from our Guns and Skirmishers. Owing, however, to the jaded state of our camels, it became necessary to destroy a good deal of Camp Equipage to prevent its falling into the rebels' hands. " The daily repetition of these attacks has given rise to suspicions of the sincerity of the Chiefs in the mind of the Political Assistant, in which I am compelled to participate, though I shall be happy to find that their submission at Teezeen was made in good faith, and that these petty hostilities are the acts of men not under their control." 170 AFFAIR NEAR JUGDULLUCK. From Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., Commanding the 1st Brigade of British Troops serving in Afghanistan, to Captain Dated Camp GRANT, Ofg. Assistant Adjutant General, Cabool. Gundamuk, 30th October, 1841. "SIR,-Yesterday the Force under my command was again engaged with the Insurgents of these mountains, and the affair was the sharpest which we have had since penetrating the Pass of Khoord Cabool. I experienced little molestation in my Camp at Jugdulluk, but observed, towards sunset and by moonlight, evident indications of the enemy which had attacked our rear guard earlier in the day, being in the act of moving off over the hills, with a view of concentrating between my force and Sookhab. Major-General Elphinstone is acquainted with the localities, and will not have forgotten that the only entrance to the valley of Jugdulluk from the Eastward is by a long and winding Kotul, overlooked and commanded by a lofty range of mountains, partially clothed with bushes and dwarf trees. Of these really terrific eminences, the rebels had, as I had anticipated, taken possession, in more considerable numbers than we have been opposed to since leaving Teezeen. Holding all the salient points of the hills, and secured by breastworks, they shewed a determination to dispute, with the utmost obstinacy, the progress of our flanking parties, and to endeavour to prevent the debouche of our advance and main column. To enable us to effect this, I had to detach Companies from every corps in the force to the right and left, which, aided by the Artillery, won their way inch by inch up the lofty heights : much however remained to be done, and the fire of the mountaineers from several of the tallest summits was unabated, and success was every where doubtful; when a single Company of the 13th, under Captain Wilkinson, was directed to advance up the defile itself. It pressed forward at a rapid pace, supported by all the reserves which remained available, and to the surprise of the whole force, found that the This vanguard thereenemy had neglected to guard the main outlet. fore it supports, and the guns were quickly established on the narrow table land, from which they had it in their power to take the whole of the defences of the rebels in reverse. Our troops commanded the route to Sookhab, and the enemy seemed to decline all further opposition. The march was resumed, but as the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountain, the insurgents again appearing from beyond the most distant ridges, renewed the contest with increased numbers, and the most savage fury. Our rear guard made the best dispositions for defence, and rescue ; but the suddenness of the onset caused some confusion, during which, notwithstanding the efforts of the troops, some baggage and camp equipage fell into the hands of their opponents. Captain Wyndham, of the 35th, was killed at this crisis of the affair; and several brave men of all the corps, fell or were wounded. Soon, however, by the praiseworthy exertions, and cool and soldier-like order and example of Captains Backhouse and Broadfoot of the Shah's service, AFFAIR AT JUGDULLUCK. 171 and Fenwick, of the 13th, confidence was restored, the aspect of the affair changed, and the rear guard extricated from the defile. It continued in the best order to retreat, and to repel the enemy who had followed it up to the point at which the loftier hills wear away. Our casualties of yesterday and the day before, amount to one hundred and thirty; amongst whom are one Officer killed and four wounded. This loss will not be considered heavy, by those who have seen the heights from which the rebels were driven, and are acquainted with the habits and character of the mountaineers to whom we were opposed. I have to-day marched to this place, without any interruption worthy of mention. " From the details of this despatch, the Major General Commanding in Affghanistan, will be enabled to draw his own inferences as to the actual state of our relations with the refractory Chiefs who were admitted at Teezeen, into a treaty of reconciliation with the Government against which they had rebelled. But it belongs more peculiarly to my vocation, in the field, now that there is a prospect of brief repose in the vicinity of this Cantonment, to report with much satisfaction the cheerfulness, steadiness, and perseverance with which the troops have performed every duty required of them; since leaving Cabool they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Teezeen, they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labor, and throwing up intrenchments, and very severe out-post duty ; whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affair, with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with juzails, which have enabled them to annoy us, at a range, at which they could only be reached by our Artillery. Though compelled by the effects of my late wound to witness these conflicts from a doolie, I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gallantry of officers and men, on every occasion of contact with the enemy, and especially in scaling the tremendous heights above Jugdulluk. I enclose Casualty Return. " I beg to express my sense of the highly able assistance which I have received in all our attacks and skirmishes, and throughout the operations, from Lieutenant Colonels Dennie and Monteath, C. B. I have been much pleased with the address and able arrangements of Captain Abbott of the Artillery, who has twice commanded the advance guard; and the exertions of Captain Wade, my Brigade Major, and of Captain Havelock, Persian Interpreter to General Elphinstone, (temporarily attached to me,) in conveying my orders from point to point, and aiding in the dispositions,--deserve my warmest commendations." 172 INSURRECTION AT CABUL. Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major GeneralSir ROBERT H. SALE, K. C. B., on the Advance to, and Storming of, the Pass of Jugdulluk, on the 28th and 29th of October, 1841. Killed. Wounded. S, Rank & Names of Z 2d Company 6th Battalion Artillery,.... 0000 5th Regiment Lt. Cavalry, Squadron, ... 0 H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, .......... 0 0 35th Regiment N.I. 1 2 Sappers and Miners,. 0 0 2d Regt. Shah Soojalh's Cavalry,........ 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 o 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 4 12 6 0 0 1 23 ,-'4 ..... 0 0 0 0 Total........... 2 . .. ed and Wounded... "- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 03 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 4 0 1 1 30 05 13 0 0 0 ----------------24 1 2 8 2 74 0 0 0 0 5 Killed. 2 CaptainWindham, 35thRegimentN.I. 2 Wounded. Lieut. Jennings, 0 13th Lt. Infan0 try, severely. 0Lieut. Holcombe, 13th Lt. Infan1 try, severely. Lieut. Rattray, 13th Lt. Infantry, severely. Lieut. Coombs, 35th N.I. severely. 5 Four days after the conflict described in the latest dispatch, the fearful truth disclosed itself. The Affghans rose at Cabul en masse, murdered Sir Alexander Burnes and others, burnt and destroyed their property, and surrounding the British Cantonments, and the Bala Hissar, where Shah Soojah resided, commenced a blockade which the British were unable to raise, and which was only terminated by the Affghans, when starvation, the rigors of a winter, and the weakened state of the beleaguered, had rendered them ripe for the wholesale massacre which ultimately became their portion ! Great was the consternation which the intelligence of their being thus hemmed in, spread throughout the parts of Affghanistan and Scinde occupied by the British; and indeed throughout the whole Indian empire. Sir Robert Sale, meditated retracing his steps, with his Brigade, and raising the blockade by a coup de main, but the re-occupation of the Passes by myriads of determined Ghilzies, and the failure of his provisions, forced him to abandon the idea, and to march instantly to Jellallabad. General Nott, at Candahar, anticipating that the disaffection would extend to the South, prepared to fortify himself and recalled the Infantry Brigade under Col. Maclaren, (consisting of the INSURRECTION AT CABUL. 173 16th, 42d, and 43d Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry,) which had commenced its march to Hindostan. Reinforcements were hurried up from Ferozepore, through the Punjab, and from Scinde through the Bolan Pass, and a requisition for additional European troops was addressed to the Home Government. Every where it was prognosticated, that the sun of Shah Soojah and his British allies had set-that, in a word, Affghanistan was lost to us, if the troops could not hold their respective positions through the winter. In the mean while, the Affghans, alive to the importance of their position, and aware of the retribution which would follow the revolt, lost not a moment in strengthening their hands, and improving the advantage they had gained. A large body of Ghazies was sent immediately to invest Ghuzni, then garrisoned by the 27th N. I. under Colonel Thos. Palmer. The Kohistanees rose in Charekar, and, assailing the Ghoorka Battalion,* cut it up nearly to a man, Major Eldred Pottinger and Lieut. Haughton alone escaping to Cabul. The tribes in the Khyber and the Kojuck Passes-the Ghilzies in every direction,-made common cause with the rebels, for their co-operation was invoked on the grounds of a common religion and the universal hatred of the Feringhee. At Pesh Bolak, in the neighbourhood of the Khyber Pass, Captain Ferris, of the Shah's service, with his little detachment, was attacked by the Ooloos, and, after exhausting his ammunition, was forced to effect an escape to Lalpoorah, with the remnant of his garrison, under cover of night.t A body of 100 men under Capt. Woodburn, marching from Candahar to Ghuzni, was set upon and annihilated, the undaunted Woodburn himself falling covered with wounds. The garrison of Alee Musjeed, occupied by Mr. Mackeson, (brother of the Agent at Peshawur,) and 150 Euzofzyes, was assailed by 2000 insurgent Afredees, and with difficulty held the place. Jellallabad was invested by large bodies of Affghans and Hill Tribes, and the Sirdars in the South similarly surrounded Candahar. Cut off as were all our posts by distance and by climate from every hope of immediate succour, their retention was entirely dependent upon the sagacity of their respective commanders, and the means at their disposal for a prolonged resistance. Ghuzni fell-and Cabul fell-the former, because its garrison had neither provisions nor ammunition * See Appendix, No. VI. t See Appendix, No. V. 174 FALL OF GHIUZNI. enough to enable it to withstand a siege, nor to cut its way to Candahar in the face of an overwhelming and well found force ; the latter, because the Political authorities were at first averse to evacuate the country at the bidding of a rebel host, and afterwards, when negociation had stretched into the heart of a severe winter, were driven to such extremities, as to be left to the alternative of dying of starvation, or of marching out, with all the honors of war, and trusting to the mercies of a treacherous foe. Col. Palmer reported his surrender of Ghuzni in the laconic despatch given below. To the Officer Commanding at Jellalabad. "SIR,--It is with much concern I acquaint you, that from want of water, and by an overpowering force under cover, and within 50 yards of us in the City, I have been compelled to enter into terms to evacuate the Citadel and Fort, within six days. The Garrison is to occupy the N. E. corner of the Town. The Garrison is exhausted by fatigue and constant duty, and the men have suffered greatly from cold, the thermo° meter having been 14 below Zero. The terms are honorable treatment and safety whilst here and on the march to Cabool, solemnly sworn to by the Chiefs. In capitulating, I have only acted up to the orders of Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone, who directed me, in an official letter, to evacuate the Citadel and City on the arrival of Roohilla Khan, son of Ameenoolah Khan, Sirdar of Logur. This Chief arrived, and promised to escort us in safety to Cabool. Amoun Shumsoodeen Khan, nephew of Dost Mahomed Khan, has also arrived as Governor of Ghuzni, and as Political Agent. I received instructions to march, immediately on his arrival, for Cabool, from the late Sir W. Macnaghten, Bart. Abandoned as this Garrison has been in the very centre of the enemy's country, cut off from all communication with any quarter, and without a sufficiency of water even at this season, with 200 men detached to hold an outpost which is destitute of water, and must have fallen in 48 hours, nothing but capitulation remained. From the outpost falling into the hands of the enemy, they would command our only Well, and commanding the Fort, the whole Garrison would have been destroyed in a few days. The bearer has received only subsistence on the road, and is to receive a handsome reward on delivering this letter. We have upwards of 100 sick and wounded, and 137 casualties. The Officers, including Captain Burnett, 54th, and Lieutenant Crawford, S. S. Force, are all well. I have, &c. T. PALMER Lt. Col. Pol. Agent, Commg. at Ghuzni. "P. S.-There is great reason to fear for our safety, as there are some thousands of Ghazis in the city, whom the Chiefs cannot disperse. The snow is still deep. No tidings from the Southward, but report says, the Troops hold the city of Kandahar, and are daily fighting." THE INSURRECTION AT CABUL. 175 But a fuller account of the beleaguerment will be found in the Appendix described by Lieut. Crawford. The course of events at Cabul, which terminated in the total annihilation of the British force is also narrated, at great length, in the Appendix No. VII. derived from the Calcutta Englishman. The Narrative is written by one of the Officers who took an active share in the military operations, and who afterwards became a prisoner to the Affghans, with whom he remained until relieved by the troops sent for that purpose in September, 1842. Other narratives, more or less voluminous, have been published, but the one that has been selected for the purposes of this record has, by the common consent of the Indian Press, been pronounced preferable to the others. It may be proper however in this place to give a brief account of the events which are detailed more at large in the document to which we refer. The insurrection broke out in the city on the 2d November, and the Envoy immediately dispatched an officer to the King in the Bala Hissar. To reach His Majesty, he had to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire, and resisted several attempts of an inflamed populace to cut him down ; he, however, succeeded in his purpose, and persuaded the King to allow Brigadier Shelton, with nearly two regiments and Capt. Nicoll's troop, to take possession of the Bala Hissar, whence the shelling of the town took place. The following day the insurgents got possession of the Commissariat Fort, in which were stored all the provisions of the force. This was a most dreadful contre-temps, and it appeared completely to paralize all in Cantonments, where there were only two days' atta remaining. The effect was that of a panic; and the madness of not having their supplies in cantonments, as also the folly of having constructed their defences upon so very extensive a scale as to require all the troops to defend them, now became fearfully apparent. On the previous day, Sir Alexander Burnes, Captain Burnes, and Captain Broadfoot, of the European regiment, were killed ;* Sir Alexander's house was completely sacked and then burned, and Captain Johnston's treasury also fell a prey to the flames. He, himself, had fortunately slept in cantonments, whilst Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup, who lived in the same quarter, were out riding, and also escaped. An attack was made by the enemy upon another fort, which was also used as a Commissariat dep6t, but Captain Mackenzie most gallantly defended it, with a * See Appendix for detailed account of the murder of Sir A. Barnes. 176 THE INSURRECTION AT CABUL. 'handful of men, for three days, till all his ammunition was expended, and then brought off his party into Cantonments during the night. Captain Trevor remained in the city, with his wife and children, two days, protected by the Hazarbash, who afterwards escorted them all safely into the Cantonments. Capt. Skinner and Drummond were concealed by friends in the city for some days. Now followed various reverses and success on both sides; two forts close to the camp were taken by us, at the earnest request of the Envoy, as they contained a small quantity of grain; in fact, without adverting to particulars, it does seem to us, that the only energetic measures that were taken, originated with the Envoy, who, when his eyes were once open, was on all occasions strongly in favour of offensive measures, whilst General Elphinstone, from circumstances connected with the force, among whom there seems to have been much vacillation and despondency, appears to have been desirous of entirely keeping upon the defensive. The fighting still continued, and many officers were killed; whilst the news in the mean time arrived of the cutting up of Codrington's corps at Charekar. After some days (our accounts are rather deficient in dates) it was deemed necessary to recall Brigadier Shelton from the Bala Hissar to the aid of the Cantonment force ; he came, and brought one Regiment with him; but still the measures recommended by the Envoy, of acting on the offensive, were not adopted; the General is said to have considered any vigorous attack upon the enemy as futile; the minds of the soldiers became imbued with despondency, and but one idea seemed to pervade those whose duty it was, at least, to have made one push previous to securing a safe retreat by a treaty. Matters went on, from day to day, occasionally enlivened by skirmishes with the enemy, which did no good, but weakened and dispirited our troops, who, sent out in small numbers, could not be expected to withstand the immense forces opposed to them, and who were actually driven back on one occasion into camp, by the enemy whom they attempted to dislodge from a hill, after being exposed to a galling fire for several hours; and were only saved from being totally destroyed by the Chief, Osman Khan, withdrawingshis troops. The force was again reduced to a prospect of starvation, there being only six days' provisions in camp, and it was now feared that the bribes and promises which had hitherto procured sufficient supplies of atta for the men, would no longer be of avail. One party 177 MURDER OF SIR W. MACNAGHTEN. then suggested the propriety of an attempt to retire into the Bala Hissar, which Captain Conolly, who was with the King, strongly advocated, and to which the Envoy was quite willing to accede, till informed by the Military Authorities it was impossible, as the dispirited troops were no longer to be depended upon ! The last regiment in the Bala Hissar (the 54th N. I.) was then withdrawn, and the King was left to his own resources for several days. The Envoy still remained firm as to the advocated negotiations, and it was not until he heard that the Brigade he had written for from Candahar, had retraced its steps and that there were no hopes of getting General Sale's Brigade from Jellalabad, nor of any assistance from Peshawur, that he, most reluctantly, complied with the wishes of the General and other Commanding Officers, and entered into overtures for a treaty with the enemy. Several conferences took place between the Envoy, attended by Capts. G. Lawrence and Trevor, and all the Chiefs, outside cantonments, and eventually some twenty articles, drawn up by the Envoy in Persian, were read and approved of. On these occasions, Mahomed Ackbar took the most prominent part; other meetings followed subsequently, at which the Chiefs expressed an earnest desire to bring matters at once to a conclusion, and a message to this effect was brought on the evening of the 22d December, by a cousin of Akbar Khan, accompanied by Captain Skinner, who it appears was still in his power, and on the morning of the 23d Sir Wm. Macnaghten, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie and Trevor, proceeded to the supposed conference; the party had scarcely been seated five minutes. when, at a signal, all were seized. Mackenzie, Lawrence and Trevor were bound to horses, and mounted behind Affghans; the latter, who is represented to have fallen off, was cut to pieces by the Gazees. The Envoy refused to mount a horse and shared the same fate.* The other * Sir W. MeNaghten, for his political services, had been appointed Governor of Bombay, and was on the point of proceeding to India when the insurrection broke out. The Bombay Government on hearing of his death issued the following Notification. GENERAL ORDERS BY THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT. General Department, Bombay Castle, 21st Jan.-It is with the most unfeigned sorrow that the Honorable the Governor in Councilannounces that authentic intelligence has been received of the assassination of His Excellency Sir William Hay McNaghten, Baronet, Envoy and Minister at the Court of H. M. Shah lioojah-Ool-Moolk, and the Governor elect of this Presidency. " This atrocious crime was perpetrated at Cabool on the 25th December last, during a conference to which his Excellency had been invited by the leaders of the insurrection at that place, under the pretence of arranging terms of accommodation with H. M. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. 2A 178 INSURRECTION AT CABUL. two officers were most wonderfully preserved, though a whole host of fanatics cut at them as they -were carried off, but being mounted behind Affghans, the mob was afraid to use fire-arms; they were imprisoned for some days, but after some interviews with Akbar Khan, were returned on the 28th December to cantonments.* The negotiations during this time were taken up by Major Pottinger, and on the 6th January the force marched from cantonments with a foot of snow on the ground, and reached Beegroma unmolested, except the rear guard, which was attacked, and Hardyman of the 5th Light Cavalry, and some men were killed. On the 7th the force moved to Bareekhur, the rear guard being on the defensive the whole way; here the three mountain guns were carried off. It now became clear they would have to fight their way onwards. The following morning they found the camp nearly surrounded with enemies, and on Captain Skinner going to Mahomed Akbar, who was on a hill close to our troops, he told him, it was their own fault for leaving cantonments before the troops appointed to escort them were ready, and that the Chiefs had not (save himself) the power to prevent their being attacked; that he was willing still to do this on their giving six hostages, for our not moving beyond Tazeen till Sale's Brigade had left Jellalabad. Major Pottinger, " Higher authority will pronounce the eulogium so justly due to the eminent talents and distinguished services of this lamented public functionary. But whilst this Government abstains from trespassing on this ground, it cannot refrain, amidst the most unfeigned grief, from recording almost the last public act of Sir William Hay McNaghten's life. When terms dishonorable to the British arms were proposed by the leaders of the Insurrection at Cabool, His Excellency heroically replied, ' That death was preferable to dishonour, that we put our trust in the God of battles, and in his name we defy our Enemies.' " In consequence of this melancholy event, the flag at the castle is to be hoisted half staff high to-morrow morning at Sunrise, continuing so until sunset; and minute guns to the number of seventeen, the number appointed for the rank of the deceased, to be fired from Hornby's Battery on the Flag being hoisted ; the same ceremony being observed by the Hon'ble Company's Vessels of War in the harbour, under such arrangement as the Superintendent of the Indian Navy may direct. " Similar marks of respect will be paid to the memory of Sir William Hay McNaghten, at all the principal military stations subordinate to the government, on the receipt of these orders. " The Governor in Council is further pleased to direct, that mourning be worn by the Officers of Her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Civil, Military and Naval Services of this Presidency, for a period of three weeks from this date ; an example which government confidently expects will be generally followed by all other portions of the co nmunity." By order of the Honourable the Governor in Council, J. P. WILLOUGHBY. Ofg. Chief Secy. to Government. * An authentic account of the manner of the murder of Sir W. McNaghten and Captain Trevor will be found in the Appendix, in the leiters of Captain Lawrence and Mackenzie, derived from a work lately published by Lieutenant Vincent Eyre. INSURRECTION AT CABUL. 179 who was still lame from his wound, offered to go for one, and, at the particular request of Mahomed Akbar, Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie were added; with these, the Khan appeared satisfied, and the troops marched to the Khoord Cabul, but, notwithstanding all the Sirdar's endeavours, he could not restrain the Gazees, who attacked the column at all points. Mahomed Akbar and the hostages followed a few hours after, and witnessed a scene of slaughter so fearful as to render all description impossible; the remaining gun was deserted. Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Boyd had each a child carried off; Mrs. Mainwaring was nearly so, but was saved, and Mrs. Boyd's child, a European woman, and a wounded soldier, were also brought back by Mahomed Akbar. The next day the Sirdar said, after lamenting his inability to restrain his people, that the only safety for the ladies would be in their putting themselves under his charge, which they all did, and were received by him with every attention. They halted the ladies, hostages, etc., a day or two, and then proceeded towards Jugdulluck, finding the road covered with the dead and dying of the Army; the poor fellows seemed to have fallen victims to the severity of the weather, as much as, or more than, from the fire of the enemy. At Jugdulluck it was said that the Troops had endeavoured to make a stand at an old ruined fort, and did so until only thirty rounds of ammunition remained for each man. They tried to negotiate with the Ghilzies, and Mahomed Akbar assisted them, and asked for General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson to be sent to him; this was agreed to, but towards the evening of the next day the Troops, unable any longer to contend against the severities they were exposed to, and maddened by the loss, as they supposed, of the two Chiefs, rushed during the night on to the road towards Jellalabad, at which place only one Officer arrived. The whole of the officers, the ladies, private soldiers, clerks, soldiers' wives, etc. who escaped the Massacre on the march, or who had given themselves up at Mahomed Akbar's command, were conveyed as prisoners to a fort in the hills between Jellalabad and Cabul, and retained there, under great hardships and privations, for many months. The first impulse of Lord Auckland's government on receiving certain intelligence of the disasters at Cabul, was to proclaim, in the annexed Government Notification, a determination to dispatch troops to maintain " the honor and interests of the British Government." 180 ATTEMPTED RELIEF OF JELLALABAD. " Fort William, Secret Department, 31st Jan. 1842-Intelligence having been received which leaves no room to doubt that, after the British force at Cabool had maintained its position against overpowering numbers of Insurgents for more than six weeks, the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a failure of provisions, to agree to a convention with the enemy, and to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards Jellalabad, when the troops exposed to the worst rigors of cold and privation in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous attacks, suffered extreme disaster,-the Governor General in Council deems it proper to notify, that the most active measures have been adopted, and will be steadfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Affghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter, for the maintenance of the honor and interests of the British Government. " The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations, and to ensure efficient protection to its subjects and allies. "A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, through a failure of supplies followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of the British troops, in a country removed, by distance and difficulties of season, from possibility of succour. But the Governor General in Council, while he most deeply laments the loss of brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigor of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valor of the British Indian army. " By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India in Council, T. H. MADDOCK, Secy. to the Govt. of India." The intentions of the Government were not rendered very apparent in the foregoing document :--it was not declared that the lost ground in Affghanistan was to be re-occupied, or that signal vengeance would be taken upon those by whose hands so many thousand British troops and followers had fallen; but the excited state of the public mind afforded no time for enquiry, and the Proclamation was therefore taken as at least an earnest of the Government not to remain quiescent under the indignity. The first step taken by the Political Officers in close proximity to Jellalabad, was to attempt to dispatch a force to relieve, or strengthen, the garrison of that fortress. A Brigade of Infantry under Colonel Wild had recently arrived at Peshawur, convoying provisions and stores, and Captain Mackeson, the Agent there, considered it might be rendered available for the duty. As a preliminary measure, therefore, COLONEL WILD'S REPULSE. 181 and with the view of keeping open the Khyber Pass, Lieut. Colonel Moseley was dispatched with the 53rd and 64th Regts. N. I., a part of the brigade, to occupy the fort of Alee Musjeed. He marched on the night of the 15th January, and reached the place with little opposition the next morning. Through some mismanagement however-mismanagement incidental to haste-only a proportionof the provisions requisite for the two regiments accompanied them. It became necessary, therefore, to forward the residue without delay, and to this end, and with the purpose of afterwards moving upon Jellalabad, Brigadier Wild advanced from Jumrood, (between Peshawur and the Khyber Pass,) with the remaining two regiments, (the 60th and 30th N. I.,) and four Sikh guns. But the appearance of Colonel Moseley's detachment had alarmed the Afreedies, who now rose, and, closing the Pass, prepared to resist Brigadier Wild's entrance. The Brigadier nevertheless pushed onwards on the 19th January, and encountered the enemy at the mouth of the Pass; but owing to the uselessness of the Sikh guns, and the inadequacy of his force, with so powerful a body of the enemy advantageously placed in his front, his attempt to reach Alee Musjeed totally failed. He was beaten back, with heavy loss,* himself receiving a wound in the face. The following Order was issued by him on the occasion, when the regiments had retraced their steps to Jumrood :" Camp Jumrood, Friday, 21st January 1842, Brigade After Orders.Words cannot express the deep grief felt by Brigadier Wild, at the lamentable result of the engagement of the day before yesterday, at the entrance of the Khyber Pass, whether it have reference to the failure in conveying to the Garrison of Alee Musjid the supplies and Camp Equipage it so much needs, or to the deplorable number of killed and wounded -or, lastly, to the hesitation evinced at the head of the column, to obey the urgent call to advance and follow, addressed to it by the Brigadier and his Staff (as they took the lead) but on the contrary exposing itself to greater danger by crowding together and standing still-firing without orders, in every direction, and generally without aim, and eventually leaving the broken-down gun behind to be spiked-merely because a sufficient number of men would not go forward to drag it away. " The consequence was, that the enemy, who was previously seen running away from any small party sent to dislodge those that were posted on the lesser hills to the right and left of the column, now gained confidence, and redoubled his destructive fire. * Amongst the officers wounded, besides the Brigadier himself, were Capt. Loftie of the 80th Regt., Lieuts. Gwatkin, Phillips, and Montgomery of the 60th N. I., Lieut. Alexander of the Engineers, and Ensign Halhed of the 5th N. I. Lieut. Loch of the 5th N. I. was killed in the conflict. 182 COLONEL MOSELEY'S WITHDRAWAL. " The object of the above remarks is less to upbraid, than to call the attention of both officers and men to the indispensable necessity of preserving order and regularity in their ranks; and thus to ensure that steadiness, without which no success can ever be expected; and in the hope that the sad experience of the day before yesterday may not be without its salutary use, and will induce them, hereafter, to observe a strict obedience to orders and regularity in the ranks, incite them to exertions, which at the earliest opportunity afforded may entirely remove the obloquy, which cannot otherwise but attach to the late deplorable failure. " The Brigadier commanding is willing to make every reasonable allowance for the inexperience of a young regiment, with a large proportion of very young men, but from that very circumstance it becomes the more requisite to point out how necessary steadiness, good order, obedience, and extreme care of their precious ammunition are to ensure success, and by doing so cheer them into a confidence of a better result hereafter." The situation of Lieut. Colonel Moseley, shut up as he was in Alee Musjeed, with scarcely any provisions, now became desperate. He was not long, however, in deciding upon the course which it became a Commanding Officer to take under circumstances of so serious a nature. He determined to cut his way back to Jumrood; but he tells his own story in his dispatch to Brigadier Wild of the 26th January. From Lieut. Colonel G. W. MOSELEY, Commanding a Detachment, to Captain HART, Ofciating Major of Brigade, Camp Kawulsur, 26th January, 1842. " SIR,-In obedience to instructions communicated in your letter bearing date the 15th instant, placing me in command of the 53d and 64th Regiments, for secret service, I began my march at 10 r. M.of the same day, in progress to Allee Musjid, and reached that place with little opposition at eight o'clock next morning. " As we approached Allee Musjid, the enemy appeared in considerable numbers to the front and on either flank, and here a few of our men were wounded. " Detachments were immediately sent off to dislodge the enemy from the heights, a duty which was effected in good style, and without further casualty on our side. " I now proceeded with the main column round the base of the isolated hill on which the fortress stands, in order to make myself acquainted with its localities. " Allee Musjid consists of two small forts, which are connected by a weak and dilapidated wall. The low oblong rock on which it stands is commanded by two hills of considerable eminence, of which one is to its South, the other to its West. ACTION IN THE KHYBER PASS. 183 " These positions I found to be occupied by small parties of the Jussailchee garrison, but I lost no time in detaching, for their more secure retention, a complete company under an European Officer to each of them. I at the same time strengthened, with the assistance of the Sappers and Miners, the breastworks that had already been erected on them. " On the morning of the 17th, the enemy appeared in strength on all sides of the fort, and apparently designed to cut off our water, and to drive us from the two heights. " To frustrate the first of these designs, a party was sent down to the side of the stream, which supplied the garrison,* and assisted by some Jussailchees of the original garrison, whose large rifles carry twice as far as our muskets, it succeeded in maintaining a safe communication between the water and the fort. " Meantime the companies on the Southern and Western points were actively engaged in repelling the attacks of the enemy, who, (without themselves incurring much exposure,) fired on our men from a distance, and with a precision of aim, which neither the weapon, nor the skill of our Sepoys could equal. In these affairs, many of Captain Mackeson's Jussailchees behaved admirably, and using as they did, with equal aptitude, the same weapons employed by the enemy, their services were of much assistance to us on the present and on all similar occasions. "I regret to say, that Ensign Swinton of the 53d Regiment was on that day (the 17th) severely wounded, while heading his men in charging a party of the enemy from the immediate neighbourhood of the Southern height, where this is united with a ridge of table-land. " Other casualties also occurred on that day, as will be seen by the enclosed letters from Major Hoggan, commanding the 53d Regiment, and the late Captain Wilson, commanding the 64th Regiment. "From this date the enemy, attracted (no doubt) to the mouth of the Pass by Brigadier Wild's demonstrations in that quarter, gradually" diminished in force; and we were for some days almost wholly unmolested, and were busily employed in completing the defences of the fort ; but on the morning of the 23d, they again appeared in considerable numbers, and we were again engaged all day in checking them. " The continued occupation of the fortress would however have been a work of no difficulty, and we might have defied the efforts of any number of such an enemy as were opposed to us, had we been adequately supplied with provisions. "But through some mismanagement, only eighty bullock loads of grain had been brought up by the Rear Guard from Jumrood, on the night of the 15th, whereas I had been led to expect that three hundred would have accompanied me. " On the morning of the 23d, finding the remnant of our stores to be only five maunds of attah for the subsistence of two thousand and five hundred men,-men who had already been five or six days on half * This Water Guard was afterwards relieved daily. 184 ACTION IN THE KIIYBER PASS. rations, and who had been exposed for eight days without bedding and without tents to an inclement climate, and who were daily thronging into hospital,--I reluctantly obeyed an inevitable necessity, and arranged for evacuating the fort, and cutting my way to Jumrood. "The importance of retaining possession of the post of Allee Musjid was, however, so strongly impressed upon me by Captain Mackeson, the Political Agent, that when about this time, my Detachment Staff, Brevet Captain Thomas, gallantly came forward and volunteered to hold it (with only four or five days' scanty provision,) with one hundred and fifty of the original Jussailchee garrison, I felt it my duty not to oppose the proposition, dangerous as the experiment doubtless would have been, and on the night of the 23d, arrangements were completed by the Political Agent, for making over the command of the higher and smaller of the forts, to Captain Thomas. " But on the morning of the 24th, Captain Mackeson represented to me, that his Jussailchees had changed their minds, and had resolved not to remain after the departure of the two regiments under my command. The evacuation of the fortress had now become inevitable, and the collective force marched on the morning of the 24th, about daybreak. " Our return was accomplished in the face of a wary and active foe, whose numbers, always considerable, were invariably found to be greatest above the narrower and more difficult defiles. " Among the precipitous heights that skirt the Shadee Bugeear and Kafir Tungee Passes, they were especially numerous; and here, in spite of our best exertions in crowning the heights and checking their attacks on the Rear Guard, they directed against us, from beneath the shelter of their steep and scarcely perceptible " sungas," a galling fire, which inflicted on us heavy loss in killed and wounded. It was here that that able and gallant officer, Captain Alexander Wilson, fell at the head of the 64th Regiment. "About this time, finding that the cattle, from having been almost starved during the preceding six days, were too feeble to carry their burdens, I sent orders to Lieutenant Corsar, the officer commanding the Rear Guard, to relinquish all such cattle as had a tendency to delay his movements; and to come up and join the main body. This he accordingly did, and after four hours' hard fighting, we succeeded in reaching Jumrood. "I have deeply to deplore the numerous casualties that have befallen the Detachment under my command; although it is some satisfaction to know, that the loss on the part of the enemy was likewise considerable. " Enclosed is a copy of my order on the occasion, in which are enumerated the names of those Officers, who particularly attracted my attention during the engagement. I also enclose a list of killed and wounded. Finally, I cannot abstain from an expression of my regret, that I should have been unaccompanied by either cavalry or guns. A detachment of the former arm would have been most useful in cutting up the enemy between Allee Musjid and the Kafir Tungee Pass, where the baggage 185 COLONEL MOSELEY S ORDER. was chiefly plundered, and where the ground was good for cavalry to I have, &c. &c. act upon. G. W. MOSELEY, Lieut.-Col. Commanding the Detachment. Extract of Detachment Orders by Lieutenant Colonel MOSELEY, Commanding. Camp Kawulsur, 25th Jan. 1842. " Lieut. Colonel Moseley feels much gratification in conveying to the Officers and Men composing the Detachment under his command, his sentiments on the happy issue of their exertions of yesterday morning, and on the success that crowned their efforts to cut their way through the strongly defended and difficult Passes of the Khyber, from the fortress of Allee Musjid back to Jumrood. "For these happy results, the Commanding Officer takes to himself no credit. They were mainly attributable to the gallantry and intelligence of those Officers who were engaged in the important duties of crowning the heights, and bringing up the Rear Guard, duties which the nature of the country rendered of no common difficulty and danger. " The Commanding Officer congratulates the Officers and Men on the courage and endurance evinced by all under his command, and he has no hesitation in declaring his opinion that, nothing would have surmounted the difficulties offered to the passage of the column, short of the determined bearing which was thus displayed. " Though the brunt of the action fell upon the 64th Regiment, yet both the 53rd and 64th Regiments behaved with equal intrepidity. "For the valuable assistance afforded him by Major Hoggan, commanding the 53rd Regiment, the Commanding Officer feels most grateful, as also for that afforded him by the late Captain Wilson, who fell gallantly at the head of the 64th Regiment, while opposed to the enemy in the Kafir Tungee Pass. By the death of this able and exemplary officer, the state sustains a severe loss. " It may not be irrelevant here to state, that the Commanding Officer had the satisfaction personally to express his thanks to Captain Wilson a few minutes before his death, on the steady gallantry displayed by himself and his regiment throughout the morning. "To Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, and Captain Ferris of the Jussailchee corps, the Commanding Officer feels much indebted for the valuable information they afforded him as to the nature of the country to be traversed, and by which the arrangements for crowning the heights were mainly regulated; as also to Lieut. Becher, commanding the Engineers, for the able assistance he on every occasion rendered. " Where all behaved with gallantry, it is difficult to draw distinctions, but the Commanding Officer cannot pass unnoticed, the intrepid conduct of Captains Tylee and Campbell of the Grenadier and Light Companies 53rd Regiment, and Captain Prior and Lieutenant Rattray of the Light Company and Grenadiers 64th Regiment, (all of which divisions were 2B 186 COLONEL WILD S ORDER. employed in crowning the heights,) and of Lieutenants Corsar and Young, who brought up the Rear Guard without confusion, though not without heavy loss in killed and wounded. " The Commandant has received with much satisfaction from Major Hoggan, and also from the late Captain Wilson, (just before his death,) assurances of their high estimation of the zealous aid afforded them throughout the whole affair by Lieutenants Hunter and Flyter, their respective Adjutants. " To Brevet Captain Thomas, 64th Regiment, his Detachment Staff, the Commanding Officer's best thanks are due for his untiring exertions throughout the day, and for the ability, coolness, and celerity with which, whilst constantly exposed on horseback under a heavy fire, he delivered the Commandant's orders, or conveyed intelligence from distant points. " In conclusion, Lieutenant Colonel Moseley begs to offer his warmest congratulations to the Officers and Men of the Detachment collectively, on their gallant and successful passage through, probably, the strongest fastnesses ever forced by troops, and through which they had to overcome the determined opposition of an enemy, well skilled in the warfare peculiarly adapted to the country. G. P. THOMAS, Brevet Captain, Detachment Staf." Extract of Brigade Orders by BrigadierWILD, Commanding the Brigades. Camp Kawulsur, 29th January, 1842. " To Lieutenant Colonel Moseley, who in the first instance so successfully relieved the garrison of Allee Musjid by a night march, and afterwards ably conducted the retreat of the 53rd and 64th Regiments, the Brigadier's warm thanks are due, as also to all the Officers and Men under his command, who have so cheerfully endured the hardships that have befallen them." List of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment,-53d. Regiment. Killed. Wounded. Corps. " 53d Regiment N. I. .. Total, Grand Total, .. 2 1 7 0 0 .... 2 1 7 0 0I2 .... 10 2 2 0 7 4 21 2 0 7 4 21 36 Names of Oficers. 53d Regiment, N. I.. Z c t -1 a W25-- - Ensign J. M. Swinton, wounded severely. Ditto B. F. A. Von Meyern, ditto ditto. THE 187 RETRIBUTIVE FORCE. List of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment,-64th Regt. Killed. Wounded. Corps. 64th Regiment .. N. I., .. Total, .. .... Grand Total, .. 0 0 0 01 .. 1 .... 1190 1 0 1 2 9 7101 11 19 0 1 0 1 2 9 7101 i0 00 22 121 Names of Officers. A. I..Captain N. Regiment, Wilson Killed. 64th Regiment, N.I.. 64th Lieutenant T. Rattray, wounded severely. After this affair, it became obvious that nothing could be done to succour the garrison of Jellalabad until the force under Major General Pollock, ordered by the Government to proceed to Affghanistan, should reach Peshawur. This force was fully adapted to every service that could be required of it under the circumstances. It consisted of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, the 1st and the 10th Regts. of Bengal Light Cavalry, the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, a troop of Horse Artillery, two light Field Batteries, Her Majesty's 9th and 31st Regts. of Foot ; the 6th, 26th, 30th, 33d, 53d, 60th and 64th, Regts. of Bengal Native Infantry. One division was placed under the command of Major General McCaskill of the 9th Foot, and Colonel White of the 3d Light Dragoons was made a Brigadier. While this force, and a large body of Sikh Allies was assembling, Generals Nott and Sale continued to hold their respective positions at Candahar and Jellalabad, in spite of the orders for their abandonment from Major Pottingex and General Elphinstone. The following is a copy of the order addressed to the Political Agent at Candahar :-- 188 OCCUPATION OF JELLALABAD. " Caubul, 25th December, 1841.--SIR,--It having been found necessary to conclude an agreement, founded on that of the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Affghanistan by our troops, we have the honor to request, that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Candahar, our wish that the troops now at that place and at Khelati-Ghilzie, together with the British authorities and troops within your jurisdiction, should return to India at the earliest convenient season. Nawab Jubbur Khan, who is the bearer of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been appointed Governor of Candahar on the part of the existing Government. E. POTTINGER, W. ELPHINSTONE, M. G." " P. S.-If you require two or three days to make your preparations, you must not remain in the city, but proceed to your cantonment. Whatever you are obliged to leave behind, you will make over to the Nubwab Jubbur Khan. E. POTTINGER, W. ELPINSTONE, M. G." Sir Robert Sale found Jellalabad in a very dilapidated condition, but he was compelled to occupy it, as his position at Gundamuck was untenable, and there is no doubt, that if he had not been precipitate in his movement, the enemy would have anticipated him. The town was found to be without defences which could be of any avail. There was cover for the assailants within range of the dilapidated parapet, and there was but one day's provisions in store. But these difficulties served only to stimulate the officers and men to exertion. They collected provisions from the neighbouring villages, which gave them half rations. They set to work on the defences, repelling every attack of the enemy, and on two occasions, sallying forth, and completely defeating them. The walls rose gradually under their hands, and were soon mounted with nine guns, and their position was rendered impregnable to any Affghan assault. From the 12th of November to the 24th of December, the men had cheerfully worked seven hours a day on the defences; and their holiday was on Christmaseday. Their conduct was throughout exemplary. There was no rum nor spirits in the encampment, and no money. Not ten Rupees was to be found either in the soldier's kit, or the General's chest. At length, on the 27th December, twenty-five horsemen rode into the town from Peshawur, each with 1000 Rupees in his saddle-bags. They had been sent on by Capt. Mackeson, and were folloWed by others, with the like precious charge. SORTIE FROM JELLALABAD. 189 Several forays were subsequently made, and generally with good effect; from 100 to 700 head of cattle being occasionally driven in when found grazing near the fort. The enemy remained in the neighborhood, but did not molest the occupants of the fortress during the months of January and February, though they carefully prevented any communication (excepting by single cossids or messengers) between them and their friends at Peshawur. Early in March, however, Mahomed Akhbar Khan having arranged affairs to his satisfaction at Cabul, and lodged his English prisoners in the forts of Buddiahbad at Lughman, came to Jellalabad, and took personal command of the rebels who had invested the place. His presence was the signal for active operations, and it was apprehended that amongst other methods of attack, he meditated undermining the garrison. This supposition led to the measures described below in Sir Robert Sale's despatch:To Captain PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, Jellalabad, 12th March, 1842. "SIa,--Do me the favor to acquaint Major General Pollock, C. B., that since I last addressed you, the enemy have, in furtherance of their plan of establishing a vigorous blockade, daily insulted the place by throwing swarms of skirmishers into the ravines and hollows round the walls, and behind the remains of mud forts, which are so extensive, that no industry has enabled us wholly to clear them away. It has been their practice to plant their standards in conspicuous points of the circumference thus occupied, and to keep up a constant fire of musquetry upon our parapets. I have resisted these attempts, by the fire from Batteries, and the occasional aim from our best marksmen. We have sustained few casualties, and those of the enemy have, I suspect, been uniformly serious. On the 10th instant, the covert advance of the Affghans was particularly persevering against our Northern face; towards evening our spies brought us information, that the enemy were driving a mine in this direction, and though I entertained great doubts of the correctness of this statement, I thought it prudent to ascertain the truth by a sortie. On the morning of the 11th, I placed under the orders of Lieut. Col. Dennie, 300 men of the 13th, 300 of the 35th, and 200 of the Corps of Sappers; having at the same time directed Captain Oldfield to move on with the Cavalry into the plain to the southward, and endeavour to fix the attention of the enemy in that direction. The Lieut. Col. sallied out by the Peshawur gate a little after day-break, and his column swept steadily round into the low ground to the northward. Contrary to expectation, this was found to be abandoned; but a strong picquet of the enemy's foot occupied a salient point on a rising ground, which commanded it; from this they were 190 AFFAIR AT CANDAHAR. driven in a most spirited manner by Captain Broadfoot, at the head of the detachment of Sappers and Miners, and he pursued the retreating enemy into and beyond a tower and garden wall, of which he took and kept possession. The 35th, under Captain Seaton, and Captain Wilkinson's Company of the 13th, were then established as skirmishers around the ruins of old forts, whilst the remainder of the 13th were held in reserve. The Cavalry appeared at the same moment, and supported the left flank of our line of occupation: an examination of the ground proved that neither shaft nor gallery had been commenced, and I therefore directed the troops to withdraw. The whole camp of Mahomed Akbar was, by this time, in full alert, and heavy masses of Cavalry, and a cloud of Foot were pressing forward towards our skirmishers. Our detachment, however, retired in the most perfect order, under their fire, and our guns and mortars from the walls, kept the Affghans in check in the most satisfactory manner. On our extreme right, their Horse made an attempt to ride in upon Captain Broadfoot's party, but a volley from the Sappers and Miners brought them to a halt in evident discomfiture. Our loss in wounded was very trifling." I have, &c., R. SALE, Major General. While these events were passing at Jellalabad, General Nott was preparing to receive the enemy at Candahar. The return of Colonel Maclaren's Brigade, after an ineffectual endeavour to reach Cabul, whither it had been dispatched for the purpose of attempting a relief, rendered the force at Candahar strong enough to resist all imaginable opposition as long as provisions held out. The force consisted of Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43d Regts. Bengal N. I., the 25th Bombay N. I., a large detail of Artillery, and some of Shah Soojah's troops of both arms. Nevertheless, it was deemed necessary to take precautions against surprise and treachery. The detachment at Killa Abdoolla, half way between Quetta and Candahar, was sent back to the former place-a movement which, though rapid, was attended by some loss. The people of Candahar were closely watched, and the guards at the city gates doubled. The detachment at Khelat-i-Ghilzie was considered safe, or its premature withdrawal, at any rate, impolitic. Dur. ing the month of November and the early part of December, every thing remained quiet at Candahar; but at the end of December, the Jaun bauz Cavalry corps, under Captain Golding, mutinied, murdered their commandant, and fled with the whole of their baggage. They were pursued and overtaken by Captain Leeson's Horse and another Jaun DEFEAT OF THE AFFGHANS AT CANDAHAA. 191 bauz Regiment, under Captain Wilson. The latter, however, hung back at a critical moment, leaving the battle to be fought by Capt. Leeson's party only. The traitorous Jaun bauzees fled after a short conflict (with the loss of 40 killed and wounded) and joined the standard of the Barukzye Chief at Dahla, forty miles from Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the nucleus of the rebellion in the South. Here too the Dooranee tribes assembled ; and not long afterwards the Ghilzie chief, Ucktar Khan, heading some thousands of the thirsty mountaineers, presented himself, to share in the battles and the spoils of the rebellion. Nothing more was wanting to render the insurrection formidable than the presence of Prince Suftur Jung, who was then, and for some time previously had been, on friendly terms with the British at Candahar,-and of this the rebels had soon to boast. His Highness fled in the course of December, and early in the following month advanced to Candahar with a large force to attack General Nott. The General did not wait for the enemy, but went out to meet them, and on the 12th of January 1842, dispersed them with little loss. From this time, and for some weeks subsequently, the city suffered no molestation, but towards the close of February the enemy reappeared in considerable numbers, headed as before. General Nott now determined to read them a severe lesson, driving them to a great distance from his vicinage to ensure to the Candaharies who remained faithful to British interests a long continuance of tranquillity, while he satisfied the disaffected parties within the walls that the rebel chieftains were powerless against a well disciplined army. General Nott's dispatches briefly recite his proceedings on these several occasions :To Lieutenant Colonel STUART, Military Secretary to the Government of India. Kandahar, 12th January, 1842. " SIR,--I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, that the rebel Army, under the command of Prince Suftur Jung, Attah Mahomed, and other Chieftains, having approached to within fifteen miles of Kandahar, I this morning moved out of the City with five and a half Regiments of Infantry, Shah's 1st Cavalry, a party of Skinner's Horse, and sixteen guns. After a march of four hours over a very difficult country, I came in sight of the rebel army, from fifteen to twenty thousand men, drawn up in a strong position on the right bank of the Urghundab. I immediately crossed the river, the troops 192 GENERAL NOTT'S DISPATCH. marched to the attack, and in twenty minutes carried their position, and dispersed their whole army. The Cavalry with a troop of Horse Artillery were instantly sent in pursuit, and followed the fugitives about eight miles. The Enemy's loss was severe; their fire was high and wild, and our loss has been very trifling. I enclose a list of killed and wounded. " I beg to bring to the favourable notice of Government the following Officers who commanded Corps and Detachments : " Lieutenant Colonel Wymer, 38th Regiment N. I. "Lieutenant Colonel McLaren, 16th Native Infantry. "' Major Lane, 2d Native Infantry. " Major Hibbert, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment. "Captain Dalzell, in charge of a Wing of the 42d N. I. " Captain MacDonell, Shah's 5th Infantry. " Captain Anderson, Bengal Artillery. " Captain Leeson, Shah's 1st Cavalry, and " Captain Haldane, Skinner's Horse. " My thanks are due to Captains Polwhele and Scott, Brigade Majors -to Major Sanders, Bengal Engineers, for his constant zeal and exertions-to Lieutenant North, Bombay Engineers, and to Lieutenant, Tytler, Assistant Quarter Master General. " Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, was in the field, and kindly acted as one of my Staff. " The Troops, both European and Native, behaved with their usual I am, &c. gallantry. W. NoTT, Major Genl. Commanding Kandahar." Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing in the Force under the command of Major General NoTT, in the engagement with the Enemy, near Kandahar, on the 12th January 1842. Kandahar, 12th January, 1842. " Horse Artillery, S. S. F.-Wounded 1 private and 4 horses; missing 1 syce and 2 horses. " Bombay Artillery, 3d Company 1st Battalion.-Wounded 1 private. " Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.-Wounded 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, and 7 privates. " 38th Regiment Native Infantry.--Killed 1 naick and 1 private; wounded 1 corporal, 13 privates and 1 bhisty. " Shah's 5th Regiment of Infantry.-Wounded 1 captain. " Shah's 1st Cavalry.-Killed 1 private and 5 horses; wounded 1 ensign, 6 corporals, 7 privates and 12 horses. " Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry.-Killed 1 private; missing 4 horses. " Grand total of killed, wounded and missing, 47 officers and men, and 27 horses. OPERATIONS AT CANDAHAR. 193 Oficers Wounded. " Shah's 5th Regt.--Capt. Macdonell, slightly. " H. M.'s 40th Regt. Lieut. E. Lee, severely. " 16th N. I. doing duty 1st Cavalry S. S. F., Ensign Chamberlain, severely. W. NOTT, Major Genl. To T. H. MADDOCK, Ese. Secretary to the Govt. of India, Calcutta. Candahar, 12th March, 1842. " SIRa,-I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, that during the month of February, considerable numbers of the rebel forces, under the command of Prince Suftur Jung and other Afghan Chiefs, assembledin the vicinity of Candahar, plundering the villages, and by every possible means urging the inhabitants to join in an attack upon the British troops. In the beginning of the present month, the enemy approached close to the city of Candahar. " I made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and leaving a garrison of about 2600 men in it, I on the 7th instant, moved with the remainder of my force against the enemy. They retired as I advanced; they were driven first across the river Turnuk, and then across the Urghundab. They would not allow out Infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th, we got near enough to open our guns upon them with great effect; they were soon broken and fled; my want of good Cavalry saved them from being totally destroyed; they were dispersed in every direction. " During a march of five days, opposed to 12,000 of the enemy, who had upwards of 6000 well-mounted Cavalry, continually moving round our column, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The troops marched without tents, both officers and men, and the conduct of my Artillery and Infantry was excellent. " I think this dispersion of the rebel force will have the best effect, as it will convince the inhabitants that the chiefs cannot face us in the field with any chance of success. I am now doing all in my power to conciliate the villagers, and to induce them to return to the cultivation of their lands, and to live in peace under the assurance of protection. " During my absence, a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed with great loss by the gallantry of the troops in garrison, under the command of Major Lane, of the 2d Regiment N. I., whose report shall be forwarded for the information of Government by the first opportunity. I am, &c. W. NOTT, Major General, Comdg. at Candahar." 2c 194 MAJOR LANE S DISPATCH. The report of Major Lane, referred to in the concluding passage of General Nott's letter, is here given. It should be stated, by way of preface, that the garrison left with Major Lane, consisted only of some details of Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 2d Regt. Bengal N. I., some of the Shah's Infantry, and a small proportion of Artillery. From Major C. R. W. LANE, Comdg. Candahar Garrison, to Captain SCOTT, Major of Brigade, Candahar, 12th March, 1842. " SIR,--For the information of Major General Nott, commanding, I have the honor to report the following particulars of an attack made upon Candahar on the night of the 10th instant. "During the forenoon of the above date, large bodies of the enemy, horse and foot, were observed assembling from all quarters, taking up a position near old Candahar and the adjoining villages; and in the course of the day their number rapidly increased, parties from the main body moving round and establishing themselves in front of the Shikarpore gate. As their object was evidently to attack the garrison, the Political Agent directed the inhabitants to shut their shops and remain within their houses, and precautions were taken to secure the gates by piling bags of grain inside. " About 8 o'clock r. M., a desperate attack was made upon the Herat gate, and owing to the darkness of the night, some combustibles were placed near it and ignited unperceived, and in a few minutes the gate was in flames. I immediately ordered a party of 100 rank and file from the 2d Regiment, and a company from the Shah's 1st Infantry, to support the guard at the gate, and two guns were also placed in position commanding the entrance. " Dense masses of the enemy had now collected at this point, keeping up an incessant and heavy fire, which was returned with great effect from the ramparts, but so reckless and daring were the assailants, that notwithstanding the fearful havoc among them, eight or ten men actually forced their way, by tearing down the burning fragments of the gate, and scrambling over the bags of grain ; these were instantly shot, and their fate, together with the galling fire from the walls, dismayed the attacking party, who retired about midnight, after four hours' resolute fighting. M., and " Another attack took place at the Shikarpore gate about 9 a similar attempt was made to fire it, which, however, failed, and the assailants were driven back; a small party also approached the Cabool gate, but the garrison being every where on the alert, the enemy was compelled to retire about 1 o'clock A. M. of the 11th, and when the day broke, not a soul was visible. " The guards over the several gates were so completely sheltered, that not a single casualty occurred, whilst the well-directed and destructive fire which was maintained for nearly four hours, must have done P. EXPEDITION UNDER 195 COLONEL WYMER. great execution. Upwards of fifty dead bodies were found in and near the Herat gate, and from the determined assault of the enemy who came close up to the walls, their loss must have been immense; report estimates it at 1000 killed and wounded, and I am informed by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, that Prince Sufter Jung, Meerza Ahmed, and other Sirdars were present, encouraging the assailants. " A considerable quantity of grain was unavoidably destroyed at the Herat gate, but as it presented a strong barrier, I trust the sacrifice will be considered unimportant. This gate has been built up, and the others have been temporarily barricaded with grain bags. " Before concluding my report, I would beg to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me on this occasion by Major Rawlinson, The exertions of Political Agent, and Captain Ripley, Fort Adjutant. every officer and soldier in garrison were unremitting, and it affords me infinite pleasure to bear testimony to the admirable conduct of all parties during the attack. I have, &c. CHAs. R. W. LANE, Major, Comdg. CandaharGarrison." As stated by Major Lane, the enemy broke up their encampment in the night, and immediately sent, from their place of retreat, to the Political Agent, proposing terms. These were not accepted. The rebels did not, however, return to the attack on Candahar, but contented themselves with plundering the well-disposed villagers in the neighbourhood. To put an end to these attacks upon the defenceless, General Nott sent out Colonel Wymer, with an adequate force, and had shortly the satisfaction of receiving from that officer, a report of his movements. This report is subjoined, preceded by the commendatory dispatch which the General addressed to the Government on the occasion of announcing Colonel Wymer's successes:From Major General W. NOTT, Commanding at Candahar, to T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Calcutta. Candahar, 28th March, 1842. " SIR,-Having deemed it desirable to detach a Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wymer, for the double purpose of foraging, and giving protection to the numerous villages on the left bank of the Urghundab river, against the marauding system adopted by the rebel army, commanded by Prince Suftur Jung and other Affghan chiefs; I have now the honor to forward to you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India, a report from that officer of an attack made on his detachment, and of the 196 COLONEL WYMER'S DISPATCH. complete defeat of the enemy. I have ascertained that their loss was great, and that several of their chiefs were killed and wounded, while our loss was comparatively trifling. " On my arrival on the field, I was pleased with the judicious arrangements made by Lieutenant Colonel Wymer; and the cool and determined manner in which he opposed the enemy and protected his convoy did credit to our arms, and I beg leave to bring him under the favorable notice of Government. " The enemy was finally driven across the Urghundab in the greatest confusion, and with very considerable loss. The Artillery and Infantry distinguished themselves. I have, &c. W. NOTT, Major- General, Commanding at Candahar." From Lieutenant Colonel G. P. WYMER, Commanding Detachment, to Capt. ScorrTT, Major of Brigade, Candahar. Camp, Baba Wullee, 27th March, 1842. " SIa,-I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding at Candahar, that in obedience to his instructions, I marched from that place with I Troop Shah's H. Arty. the force noted in the margin on the morning 1 Haldane's Horse. SLeeson's Horse. 16th Regt. Bengal N. I. 38th Regt. ditto. 2nd Shah's Regt. of the 25th instant, with the intention of foraging for the Cavalry and cattle at the village of Seikhchulah; but on receiving a report from Captain Dallas, that the country there- abouts had recently been foraged over, and the water turned off by the enemy, he suggested the advantage to be derived by a move upon Baba Wullee, which was adopted. On reaching that place, I sighted the rebel camp on the opposite side of the Urghundab, distant about four miles, and large bodies of Cavalry grazing I continued my march to their horses between it and the river. the spot selected for my encampment, and shortly after reaching it at half-past 10 or 11, a large body of the enemy's Cavalry was observed, forming and occupying the Pass in my rear; on which I reinforced the rear guard with two guns and a wing of the 38th N. I., placing the convoy under the hills in the rear, and protecting its front and flanks with the force at my disposal, which had hardly been effected, when finding the force above mentioned fast increasing, I deemed it highly necessary to move back for their dispersion, taking with me two Horse Artillery guns under Lieut. Turner, the 38th Regiment, and a party of Skinner's Horse under Lieut. Travers, detaching two Companies 38th Regiment to drive the enemy from the tops of some low hills they had crowned with horsemen on my left, which was speedily done, and the well-directed fire from Lieutenant Turner's guns soon drove in the body of the enemy collected on the Pass, commanded, I am told, COLONEL 197 WYMER'S DISPATCH. by Salloo Khan and Taj Mahomed, who moved round to join the party On this I retraced my then threatening the right flank of the convoy. steps, and rejoined the convoy, which had been left under Lieut. Col. McLaren's charge during my absence, and who had dislodged a third body of the enemy from the enclosed gardens and villages in his front On my reaching the convoy, I with a part of the ,16th Regiment. directed Captain Macan, commanding the Shah's 2d Regiment, to move his corps, supported by two guns and the half of Leeson's Horse under Ensign Chamberlain, against the party on the right flank, which movement had been partly executed, when the force under the Major General's personal command arrived to my support, at the time when the party of Cavalry under Ensign Chamberlain received a partial check from an overpowering body of the enemy, and that officer was severely wounded, and Lieut. Travers slightly, who acted in concert with him. " Enclosed I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded on the occasion, and to express my entire approbation of the conduct of all officers and men engaged in the action. " I trust I may be permitted to bring to the Major General's notice, the admirable practice of the Artillery under Lieut. Turner's guidance, every shot from which told with beautiful effect upon the dense masses of the enemy. " To Lieut. Waterfield, Adjutant 38th Regiment, who acted as my Personal Staff on the occasion, I am much indebted for the very able manner in which he conducted the various duties assigned him. I have, &c. G. P. WYMER, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Detachment." Return 111)1 1j 1 sly . r SS 4« J. JLLALABA>DI ari4 the Bates#oug k 9 7tLprlb2 S an TlAl dy 6 Or ri . LdA. :?ressuCA1c 4 I Pip rs id wji r .01C M k, OWalls IRoaad from T'eehawet if 0; ___ CA-~ burnt down, bylen-JJ wy on,~1A TA'pr4s, I ELL A AI5BAD L caA tIaiN - ON -- ~ Ifa&t.^rGai ~ ~~7~ ~rdtre,6I 01"E AMt.-i-en/' ita6sA t er 0 L . a, ueWLU Jcd~l~va Cdcd YaieLn f\J .ZZ4L vtspeGrseotwtk AGardz- J n-ad Fcrt DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN. 211 Pollock, C. B., had met with a reverse in the Khyber, retraced its steps towards Peshawur, and about 10 A. M. on the 6th, a feu de joie and salute of artillery were fired by Mahomed Akbar, which were said to be in honor of the same event. It was on the same day, and through similar channels announced to me, that the Affghans were sending additional reinforcements to aid in defending their frontier Passes. Although I could not wholly depend on these statements which were improbable in themselves, and accompanied by counter-reports of a new revolution at Cabool, which was assigned by some as the cause of the rejoicing and of the defeat of the Ghazees in Khyber, and by an account of the intended and even actual retreat of the Sirdar into Lughman, I adopted, on a full consideration of the various circumstances and rumours, the resolution of anticipating the last mentioned event, if it had not come to pass, by a general attack on the Affghan Camp, in the hope of relieving this place from blockade, and faciliating General Pollock's advance to our succour. I accordingly gave directions to form three columns of Infantry, the centre consisting of H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, mustering 500 bayonets, under Colonel Dennie; the left one also 500 strong, under Lieut. Col. Monteath, C. B., and the right composed of one Company 13th L. I., and one of the 35th N. I., and the detachment of Sappers under Lieutenant. Orr, (the severity of Captain Broadfoot's wound still rendering him non-effective,) the whole amounting to 360 men, commanded by Capt. Havelock, H. M.'s 13th L. I. These were to be supported by the fire of the guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery under Capt. Abbott, to which Capt. Backhouse, S. S. Artillery, was attached, and by the whole of my small cavalry force under Capt. Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne. The troops issued from the Cabool and Peshawur gates at day-light this morning. So far from the Sirdar having made any dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force, not falling short in all of six thousand men, was formed in order of battle for the defence of his Camp, its right resting on a fort, and its left on the Cabool river, and even the ruined works within eight hundred yards of the place, recently repaired, were filled with Ghilzie marksmen, evidently prepared for a stout resistance. The attack was led by the Skirmishers and column under Capt. Havelock, which drove the enemy, in a most satisfactory manner, from the extreme left of his advanced line of works which it pierced, and proceeded to advance into the plain, whilst the central column directed its efforts against a square fort on the same base, the defence of which was obstinately maintained. With the deepest regret I have to record that, whilst nobly leading his Regiment to the assault, Colonel Dennie received a shot through the body, which shortly after proved fatal. The rear of the work having been finally carried by passing to its left, I gave orders for a combined attack on the enemy's camp; it was in every way brilliant and successful. The Artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire upon the Affghan centre, whilst two of the columns of Infantry penetrated the line near the same point, and the third forced back its left from its support on the river, into the 212 DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN. stream of which some of his horse and foot were driven. The Affghans made repeated attempts to check our advance by a smart fire of musquetry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice threatened the detachments of foot under Capt. Havelock, and by opening upon us three guns from a battery screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of the Sirdar. But in a short time, they were dislodged from every point of their position, their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by about 7 A. M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, recaptured 4 guns lost by the Cabool and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our Government is matter of much honest exultation amongst our troops, seized and destroyed a great quantity of materiel and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents. In short, the defeat of Mahomed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal. " The fall of an officer, so distinguished as Col. Dennie, will be felt as a public calamity. Lamenting it on every account, I must yet share with his country, his regiment, and his friends, in the consolation afforded by the reflection, that he was killed whilst most gallantly performing his duty. I have to express my entire satisfaction with the conduct in this action of Lieut. Col. Monteath, C. B., commanding one of the two infantry columns under my own eye, and of Capt. Wilkinson, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, on whom the charge of the other devolved on the death of his Lieut. Colonel, of Capt. Oldfield and Lieut. Mayne who led the cavalry, and of Capts. Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieut. Dawes, artillery. The able and judicious manner in which Capt. Havelock, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, moved the force under his command, which acted on a line sufficiently distant to render its manoeuvres independent of my immediate control, demands my particular and especial commendation. " My acknowledgments are also due to my Brigade Major, Capt. Hamlet Wade, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, whose exertions were on this day, as they have ever been, most meritorious; to Major Frazer, light cavalry, who acted as my aid-de-camp, and to Capt. Mainwaring, commissariat officer with the force, who was present on and active in the field; Capt. Macgregor, Political Agent, handsomely offered his services with No. 6 light field battery, and was most useful in serving the guns. I enclose returns of killed and wounded, and of ordnance and stores captured. Lieut. and Adjutant Wood, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, made a dash at one of the enemy, and in cutting him down, his charger was so severely injured, as to have since been destroyed. Capt. Havelock reports in the most favourable manner the gallant conduct thoughout the day of Lieut. Cox, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, and he was the first of the party which captured two of the enemy's cannon. " It will be seen from the preceding details that the force employed in this successful enterprize, amounted to about eighteen hundred men DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN. 213 of all arms. The safety of the place was entrusted during the action to the ordinary guards of its gates and our provincial battalion of followers of every description, armed with pikes and various other weapons, who manned the curtains, and made a respectable shew of defence, as they had done on all occasions of attack on the walls. Capt. Pattison, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, was left in charge of this diminished garrison. A sally was made from the Cabool gate towards the conclusion of the engagement, by Lieut. Wade of H. M.'s 13th light infantry into the fort, before which Col. Dennie had fallen, and which the enemy were observed to be abandoning. All that it contained was set on fire, and some of its defenders intercepted and killed. " The enemy's loss during the day must have been severe. The field of battle was strewed with the bodies of men and horses, and the richness of the trappings of some of the latter, seemed to attest, that persons of distinction had been among the casualties. " Lieut. Col. Monteath has noticed to me in high terms, the gallant behaviour of Capt. Seaton, 35th N. I., when in command of the skirmishers of that corps, and informed me of the fact of his having been the captor of a howitzer from the enemy. " We have information to the fact, that the following chiefs were present, and took part in the action, etc. " Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan in person, Umeer Khan, Chief of Bajour, Uzeez Khan, Ghool Mahomed Khan, Mahomed Shaw Khan, Burukut Khan, Azad Khan and Shookoor Khan, principal men amongst the Eastern Ghilzies; Mayan Abdool Rahman of Kama, Meer Ufzul Khan of Ghundaghur, Syud Oosman, and Oosmah Khan, Mohmunds, Syud Mahomed, son of the King of Kooner, Syud Hashim, the deposed ruler of the same place, Myah Hyder, Chief of Kivat, Mahomed Jan Khan, head of the Sungo Serai, Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, Achokzye, nephew of Abdoollah Khan of the same tribe, and Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, Barukzye. Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Force, under the command of Major General Sir R. SALE, K. C. B., Jellalabad, April 7th, 1842. " No. 6, Lt. Fd. Battery.-Wounded, one N. officer, two serjeants or havildars, one corporal or naick, two privates or sepoys, one naick and four drivers. " Mountain Train.-Wounded, one serjeant and two privates. " H. M. 13th Lt. Infantry.-Killed, one officer and eight privates. Wounded, one officer, two corporals and twenty-nine privates. " 35th N. I.-Killed, two privates. Wounded, one officer, one N. officer, one serjeant, two corporals, and eleven privates. "Sappers and Miners-Wounded, two serjeants, one corporal, one bugler and five privates. 214 RELIEF OF JELLALABAD. OFFICERS. "Killed.--Col. Dennie, C. B., H. M. 13th Light Infantry. " Wounded.-Captain. Moorhouse, 35th N. I. severely; Lieut. Jennings, H. M. 13th Light Infantry, slightly; 5 Horses Wounded; Asst. Surg. Barnes, M. D., H. M. 13th Light Infantry, slightly Wounded. " One Tindal and one Bearer 35th N. I. Wounded. HAMLET WADE, Captain, Major of Brigade. Return of Ordnance captured by the Force under Major General Sir R. SALE, K. C. B., April 7th, 1842. " 1 6-Pr. and 1 12-Pr. Howitzer that belonged to the 1st Brigade Horse Artillery. " 1 Howitzer that belonged to the Mountain Train. " 1 6-Pr. dismounted, that was left at Gundamuck by the Khyber Corps. " An inconsiderable quantity of Ammunition was found with this Ordnance, also some half-wrought materials. A. ABBOTT, Capt. Comg. Arty. Jellalabad. The successes of Generals Pollock and Sale on either side of the Passes led, of course, to the immediate junction of their forces. Great were the rejoicings at the release of the noble little garrison after so long a period of confinement and comparative privation. The regiments of General Pollock's force vied with each other in attentions to those who had for so many months been objects of anxious solicitude, while the corps composing the garrison experienced pleasure in demonstrating to their brethren from India, that the labor they were obliged to undergo, and the temperance they were compelled to practice during the blockade, had not impaired their health, nor had the successes of their forays upon the enemy's cattle left them any reason to complain of inability to reciprocate hospitalities. In fact, as was jocosely, but truly, observed at the time, the relieving troops looked more like men who had been suffering from confinement and scarcity than the parties they went to succour. The defeat of Akbar Khan diffused great joy throughout India, nor was it abated when the publication of the following history of the blockade made people acquainted with all that the " Illustrious Garrison" had undergone from the date of its enforced occupation of the town of Jellalabad. THE BLOCKADE OF JELLALABAD. 215 To T. H. MADDOCK, EsQ. Secy. to Govt. Pol. Dept. Dated Camp, Jellalabad, April 19th, 1842. " SIR,-I have the honor to forward a letter from Major General Sir Robert Sale, K. C. B., detailing the progress of events during the long and perilous siege sustained by the force under his command. " 2nd. The gallantry of the Major General and his small force are too well known to Government to require any commendation from me; but it is very pleasing to me to be the channel through which their many trials are brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council. " I have had an opportunity of inspecting the works thrown up for their protection, by the indefatigable exertions of Sir R. Sale's force, and my surprise at their strength and extent, has been only equalled by my admiration of the excellent arrangements which must have pervaded all Departments, since after a siege (by greatly superior numbers) of upwards of five months' duration, I find the garrison in excellent health and spirits, and in an admirable state of discipline, with a good supply of ammunition, ready and anxious to take the field, and most willing to advance on Cabool. I have the honor to be, &c. GEo. POLLOCK, Major General, Comdg. Troops West of Indus. Camp near Jellalabad, April 19th, 1842. To T. H. MADDOCK, EsQ. Secy. to Govt. Pol. Dept. Dated Jellalabad, April 16th, 1842. " SIR,--The relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the Passes of the Khyber, of the army under Major Genl. Pollock, C. B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here to address to you a report, which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has been made known to Government, that I reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October 1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabool, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrific insurrection at the Affghan capital on the 2nd November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of 300 sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in dep6t with the treasonable Irregulars at Gundamuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position 216 TIE BLOCKADE AT JELLALABAD. which I occupied, I could not absolutely command a day's provisions, or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to 30 or 40 thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no I therefore alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point on which the force at Cabool might retire if hardly pressed, and restoring a link in the chain of communication with our Provinces. Two marches brought me after a successful contest at Futtiahabad to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the Irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have The enceinte justified despair as to the possibility of defending them. was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme; it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which, there, was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of 400 yards together on which none of the garrison could shew themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole enceinte was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders at 20 or 30 yards. " The garrison took full possession of the town in such a state on the morning of the 15th of November, and in the course of the day, the plain and detached hills by which on one side it is commanded, were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than 5000 Insurgents. A general attack on the 14th of November ridded us of these enemies, and a similar array brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our Magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means in the way of treasure to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, Shah Soojah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. McGregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures our ddk communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected, whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbott made the Artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to and economise our resources in the way of gun and musquet ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in THE BLOCKADE 217 OF JELLALABAD. and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to 200 rounds per man. It is to be remarked, that I might in the second week of November have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Jazailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabool, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally if they met with reverse. " On the 9th of January, I was summoned by the leaders of the Afghan Rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a Convention entered into by the Political and Military Authorities at Cabool, but as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this, and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our Troops from the capital, and their annihilation in the Ghilzie defiles by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time it became known to us, that the Brigade of four Regiments marched to my succour from Hindoostan had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur : my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabool, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across the Khyber; but I resolved at all hazards on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the Valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Afghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our Government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe, their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the Corps of Khyber Rangers, and next of the detachment of Jezailchees, and a few of the Afghan Sappers and a body of Hindoostanee Gunners, who had formerly been in the employ of Dost Mahomed Khan. Works had in the mean time been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens, cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width round the whole of the walls; the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy, not provided with siege artillery. " But it pleased Providence, on the 19th February, to remove in an in2F 218 THB BLOCKADE OF JBLLALABAD. stant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature. " The Troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, Barukzye, the assassin of the late Envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabool force, having collected a body of Troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of Horse on the 21st and 22d of February, and soon after establishing his Head-quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward about one mile distant, invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in Horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the Cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding detachment Shah Soojah's 2nd Cavalry, and Jamadar Deena Singh, 5th Light Cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C. B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot, (who was severely wounded,) and Captain Fenwick, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne on the 30th and 31st of January, and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's Army by a force of Infantry under Captain Pattison, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, and of Cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar on the 7th instant. " I have to notice as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a Provisional Battalion a large body of our camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a shew upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend to Government, they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of Native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Soojah's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal Army. " From the time that the Brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the Native Troops have been on one-half, and the followers on quarter rations, THE BLOCKADE OF JELLALABAD. 219 and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention as a privation the European Troops from the same period having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance, and their constant employment, have contributed to keep them in the highest health, and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown amongst them, but they have felt severely, although they never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee, and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read of them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard working and fighting soldier in Asia. The Troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The Troops, Officers, and men, British and Hindoostanee, of every arm, remained fully accoutred on their alarm posts every night from the 1st March to the 7th of April. The losses of Officers and men in carriage cattle, camp equipage, and baggage, between Cabool and Jellalabad, were heavy, and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant. " I feel assured that Major General Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty to bring the series of labours, privations, and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the Supreme Government in India, and through his Lordship, to that of the Court of Directors and of our Sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward. "The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of Garrison Engineer, will meet with attentive perusal. I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal, and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The Corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Afghan, Huzaree, and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two Infantry Regiments under the lamented Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that arm; and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the Squadron of 5th Light Cavalry under Captain Oldfield, and the Resallah 2d Shah Soojah's Cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne; Lieutenant Plowden of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. Tihe Artillery practice of No. 6 Light Field Battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott dhd Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves excellent Officers of Ordnance. I have more than once brought to notice that Captain MacGregor, Political Agent, has cheerfully rendered very able assistance in serving the 220 THE BLOCKADE OF JELLALABAD. guns in every crisis of pressing danger. Of his labours in his own department, 1 ought not perhaps to attempt to constitute myself a judge ; but I know that they have been unremitting, and their result in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabool, and securing for us Afghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government. " The medical duties of the Garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Soojah's Force, and Assistant Surgeons Robertson and Barnes, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, Hare, 35th Regiment, and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars. " Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter Master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant. " It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, C. B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of the 13th Light Infantry, of which Corps I am proud of being a member. I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses, and hope the distinctions which he recommends for the Officers of his own Corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the Native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and hand-barrow, were as surprising, as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous. " I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet Major Frazer, Light Cavalry, Brevet Captain Gerrard of the Corps of Jezailchees, Captain Burn and Lieutenant Hillersden of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Janbazes, when their services could no longer be available with their Corps, volunteered to do duty with any Regiment in which they could be useful. " I must finally express my gratitude to Providence, for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave in the strongest manner to solicit the interposition of Major General Pollock, C. B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favor of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, and, through him, of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign. " I ask permission specially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinctions or Brevet rank, or both; viz. Lieut. Col. Monteath, C. B., commanding 35th Regiment Native Infantry, now second in command; Brevet Major Fraser, Light Cavalry, who acted as my Aide-de-camp on the 7th instant; Captain Abbott, commandant of Artillery and Cormmissary of Ordnance; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train and Senior Officer of the Shah's Troops with THE BLOCKADE OF JELLALABAD. 221 my force; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers and Garrison Engineer; Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, Senior Officer of that arm; Captain Seaton, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant by Lieut. Colonel Monteath; Captain Younghusband of the same Regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabool Pass, and there severely wounded; Captain Burn, late commandant of the Khyber Rangers and doing duty with the 35th Regiment N. I.; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th Light Infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C. B.; Captain Fenwick, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jugdulluk was noticed then in my dispatch; Captain Have. lock, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, Persian Interpreter to Major Gene. rals Elphinstone and Pollock and attached to me as Staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mahomed Akbar's Camp; and Captain Hamlet Wade, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, whose exertions in the action of the 7th, I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter Officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The Officers of all ranks, and Soldiers of all arms, European and Native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that the Government will sanction my calling upon Commandants of Corps and Detachments to send in rolls of such Native Officers as they may deem worthy of the Insignia of the Order of' Merit and of British India.' I have the honor to be, &c. R. SALE, Major General, Commanding Jellalabad." Officers Wounded. " Artillery, Captain Abbott, slightly wounded. " Sappers and Miners, Captain Broadfoot, severely'wounded. "H. M. 18th L. I., Lieut. and Adjutant Wood, and Ensign Oakes, slightly wounded." Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Troops under the command of Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B.,from 22d February, 1842 to April 6th 1842, Jellalabad, 19th April, 1842. "No. 6 Light Field Battery.-Killed 1 corporal or naick; wounded 1 European Officer; ditto 1 gunner. " Detachment 5th L. C.-Killed 1 serjeant or havildar; ditto 2 sowars; wounded 4 sowars; killed 1 horse; wounded 12 ditto; 1 syce killed, 2 syces wounded, 1 grass-cutter killed. 222 COLONEL MONTEATH S TESTIMONY. "H. M.'s 13th L. I.--Killed 4 privates; wounded 2 European officers ; ditto I corporal; ditto 11 privates. " 35th N. I.-Killed 1 sepoy; wounded 1 naick; ditto 10 sepoys. " Detachment 2d Cavalry, S. S. F.-Killed 1 trooper; wounded 4 troopers; killed 9 horses; wounded 3 ditto. " Sappers and Miners.-Killed 4 privates, etc.; wounded 1 European officer; ditto 30 privates, &c. R. SALE, Major General, Commanding the Force." Return of Camp Followers, enlisted on the 15th January, 1842, by order of Major General Sir It. SALE, K. C. B., as a Provisional Garrison, Jellalabad, April 1, 1842. Mustered Fol- Not Mustered lowers. Followers. 4 Remarks. No. 6. Light Field Battery,.. 36 Squadron 5th Light Cavalry, 7 Resallah Anderson's Horse, 4 H. M's. 13th Light Infantry, 124 35th Regt. Native Infantry, 77 Sappers and Miners, ......... 69 Commissariat, ............. 103 Total,......... 420 0 69 11 238 46 19 0 61 6 0 100 55 40 0 0 19 57 0 110 61 0 383 262 247 8038 509 97 101 72 462 238 189 103 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 TheseFollowersthat were unarmed were told off to the ramparts, for the purpose of throwing large stones, a great quantity of which were collected; the & whole of the camp render- 9 -6 9 and spades. 6 farwahs I__ed - 13121 - much assistance in the conveyance material,and of building working with R. SALE, MajorGeneral, Comdg. Garrison, Jellalabad. From Lieutenant Colonel J. MONTEATH, Commanding 35th Regiment, to Major GeneralSir R. SALE, K. C.'B., Commanding Garrison of Jellalabad, dated Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842. " SIR,--The exertions of the garrison of Jellalabad beyond ordinary routine, having ceased since the decisive victory obtained over the enemy on the 7th instant, and now finally terminated by the arrival of the British Army under Major General Pollock, C. B., I trust I may not be considered as going beyond the limits of my proper duty in addressing you to state as follows :"As doing but due justice on this occasion to Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, might be looked upon as a highly colored record of the COLONEL MONTEATH'S TESTIMONY. 223 merits of your own Regiment, and seeing that no such partial bias can possibly be supposed to guide my feelings in the estimate I have formed of their deserts, I have the pleasure in sincerely declaring, that their conduct, throughout the painful perilous position in which they have so long been placed, has been such as fully to deserve the applause and admiration of their country, and the confidence and best consideration of our well-beloved Sovereign. " You yourself will doubtless detail the work performed by the Regiment; let it then be only my province, who have witnessed their exertions almost hourly during a period of five months, to record that their devoted perseverance and cheerfulness amidst all the gloom that surrounded them, after the destruction of their comrades of the Cabool Force, could not have been surpassed by any troops in the world; and that after months of extreme toil, when an earthquake, such as man is not often in the habit of experiencing, in a moment left scarcely a vestige of their labour standing, their flying, as they did, with redoubled zeal to the work, and completing it in ten days, (so that on the arrival of the enemy before Jellalabad, they declared that the calamity which had befallen the valley arose from nothing but English witchcraft; it being the only place that had escaped uninjured,) was what none but British Soldiers could have performed, and what no price could have purchased, for it was the labour of the heart, work of all others most deserving of distinction and reward. " In regard to the Native Troops of all arms, I shall refrain from saying much, for a reason which has in a measure induced me to address this letter to you; but as you have yourself been a daily witness of their conduct under every description of circumstance, you have it fully within your own power to say all, of which the Government they serve may very justly feel proud, and it may serve to shew, as an example for imitation, what noble enthusiasm and zeal may be lighted up in their breasts by the high bearing and considerate conduct of determined British Officers. " I shall conclude by observing, that we can now, Sir, proudly march forth from this garrison with the enemy's standards in our hands, and their captured cannon to fire a salute, on delivering over the 'care of the honor of the British name, which we have had within our keeping for the last five months, pure and unspotted, and without a single circumstance existing to cast a breath upon its lustre. "The conduct of the Officers of the 35th Regiment generally, as well as those doing duty with it throughout the siege, I am proud to say, has been such as well to deserve any reward or distinction that can be conferred upon them. " On those holding the rank of Captain and above it, which enables Her Majesty to advance them a step, I could strongly recommend Captain Seaton, 35th Regiment; Captain Younghusband, 35th Regiment, (severely wounded); Brevet Major Fraser, late 2nd Light Cavalry; and Captain Burn, 1st Regiment Native Infantry, both doing duty with the 35th Regiment. 224 CAPTAIN BROADFOOT'S REPORT. " Of the Native Officers of the 35th Regiment, I would also strongly recommend, that six should, as a compliment to the Regiment for its gallant and meritorious conduct, receive the Order of 'Merit' and of 'British India ;' viz. Sahib Ram, Subadar, Manick Sing, Subadar, Derriou Sing, Jemadar, Rambuccus Tewarry, Jemadar, Hoolass Ram, Subadar, and Hurram Sing, Jemadar. I have the honor to be, &c. J. MONTEATH, Lieut. Colonel, Comdg. 35th Regiment." Capt. BROADFOOT'S Report. Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842. " On the 12th of November, the Major General Commanding having resolved to occupy Jellalabad, directed me with a Committee of Officers to examine and report on the works of the place. " The Committee reported unanimously, that they were then not defensible against a vigorous assault. " As will be seen by the accompanying plan, the town is an irregular quadrilateral, having half of the western side salient, and the southern side broken by a deep re-entering angle. It was surrounded on every side with gardens and houses, enclosed fields, mosques, and ruined forts, affording strong cover to an enemy; these were every where close to the walls, and in many places connected with them. Beyond these on three sides (N. E. and W.) at from 400 to 500 yards run the ruins of the wall of the .ancient city, on which the sand has accumulated so as to form a line of low heights, giving cover to the largest bodies of men. Opposite the south-west angle a range of heights, composed of bare gneiss rocks, commences at 330 yards from the works, and extends about 460 yards from N. N. E. to S. S. W.; these completely overlook the town, and, from the vicious tracing of the works, enfilade some of the longest curtains. Parallel to the north side, at 170 yards, runs a steep bank 20 feet high; it extends a considerable way to the west, and several miles to the east, affording a secure and unseen approach to any number of men ; it is probably an old bank of the river. From it numerous ravines run up towards the walls, affording the enemy a covered passage into the buildings and enclosures adjoining the works. " Two very solid walls, 300 yards apart, run from the glacis to this bank, thus enclosing on three sides a space probably occupied originally by the Mogul Emperor's palace, but found by us to contain a large mosque and numerous gardens and houses occupied by fakeers; one of the gates of the town opens into it, and it was traversed by a watercourse about ten feet wide, which entered the town by a tunnel under the rampart, large enough to admit several men abreast; a similar tunnel allowed it to pass out of the town on the eastern side. CAPTAIN BROADFOOT'S 225 REPORT. " The walls of the town extended about 2,100 yards, without reckoning the bastions, of which there were thirty-three. The works were of earth, and in the usual style of the country, viz., a high thin rampart, but in a state of ruin, without parapets, and without ditch, covered way, or outworks of any kind. " On our throwing ourselves, on the 12th of November last, into the old and ruined town of Jellalabad without money, without food, and almost without protection, with a nation of highly excited and barbarous enemies in arms against us, our situation seemed as hopeless a one as British Troops were ever called upon to confront: notwithstanding which the enemy was twice within twenty days attacked, and on both occasions defeated with signal success. " The bastions were full, but in some places lower than the adjoining curtains, very confined, without parapets, and sloping downwards from the gorge to the salient, so that the terreplein was completely exposed. "There were four gates and a postern, all of the usual vicious native construction, and, except that on the northern side, in a ruinous state. " To give some idea of the state of the works, I may mention that, of the Committee sent to inspect them on the 13th November, not one except myself succeeded in making the circuit: large gaps cut off the communication, or insecure footing compelled the Officers to descend among the adjoining enclosures, from which it was difficult to find the way, while on the south side the rampart was so imbedded in houses and surmounted by them, that its course could only be traced by laboriously threading the lanes of the native town. " On the north side, the wall rose to a very great height towards the town, but sloped down to the exterior in a heap of ruins almost every where accessible; while at the foot were houses and gardens so strongly occupied by the enemy, that during the night of the 13th November, our troops were unable to maintain their posts, and with the exception of the gateway, a line of 400 yards on the northern face was without a man on the works. Had the enemy then attacked us, we must have been reduced to a street combat. " On the following morning (14th November,) the Major General ordered a sortie in force, which drove the enemy from his positions with such loss, that it was some time before he ventured near enough to disturb our works, which were now as vigorously prosecuted as our scanty supply of tools, and the difficulty of procuring material allowed. We had only the tools, (as With other tools in proportion; per margin) brought from Cabool with the ls, &. Sappers, for the operations expected in the here. have been maolsde 330 pickaxes. Tezeen valley, and we were without wood or iron. Wood was obtained from the ruins of the cantonment, and from houses demolished in the town. Iron was collected in small quantities, from the neighbourhood, but it was that of the country; good in quality, but imperfectly smelted, and requiring about ten times as much labour and time as English iron. By the persevering labour of the troops, however, much was done, and when the enemy 2G 226 CAPTAIN BROADFOOT'S REPORT. next attacked us, (1st December,) ramparts had been made, and the guns mounted on the bastions for which they were destined. The watercourses and other passages through the walls blocked up, the foot of the scarps cleared from rubbish, and parapets built in all the bastions and many of the curtains, while much of the external cover was destroyed. " On the 1st December, the enemy were again routed, and the works proceeded with little or no interruption. " By the middle of January, (the commencement of the rainy season,) a parapet no where less than six feet high, with a banquette as wide as the nature of the rampart allowed, was completed entirely round the place. The gates were repaired and strengthened by buttresses ; two of them were retrenched, and a ditch carried round the north-west angle, while some of the most dangerous ravines were laid open to our fire, and roads were opened into the low ground on the north side. " By the middle of February, the ditch was carried round the place with as good a covered way as the size of the ditch and supply of earth allowed, while the mosques, forts, gardens, and cover of every description had been destroyed for several hundred yards round the place. " At this time Mahomed Akbar Khan moved into the valley in order to attack the place : but they were unable to effect more than a distant investment; they frequently occupied the rocks on the south-west, but the parapets and traverses rendered their fire harmless. " On the 19th February, an earthquake, which nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of our parapets, the Cabool gate with the two adjoining bastions, the north-west bastion, and a part of the new bastion, which flanked it. Three other bastions also were nearly destroyed, while several large breaches were made in the curtains; one on the Peshawur side, 80 feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch being filled and the ascent easy. Thus in one moment the labors of three months were in a great measure destroyed. " No time, however, was lost: the shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night, the breaches were scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches before them being cut, while the great one on the Peshawur side, was surmounted by a good gabion parapet. " A parapet was erected on the remains of the north-west bastion, with an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the approach of the ruined Cabool gate; the parapet of the new bastion was restored, so as to give a flanking fire to the north-west bastion, while the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by a trench in front of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary parapet was raised. " From the following day all the troops off duty were continually at work, and such was their energy and perseverance, that by the end of the month, the parapets were entirely restored, the Cabool gate again serviceable, the bastions either restored, or the curtain filled in when restoration was impracticable, and every battery re-established. " The breaches have been built up with the rampart, doubled in thickness, and the whole of the gates retrenched. CAPTAIN BROADFOOT'S REPORT. 227 " It is not easy to give an adequate idea of the extent of the labour performed by the troops. "The parapets, banquettes, etc., were built of the ruins of the buildings thrown down, cemented with clay mixed with straw and bound together, when requisite, by bond timbers; of this masonry aboutl04.500 cubic feet had been built before the earthquake, and since then (including new works) about 103.900 cubic feet have been erected, making in all above 208.000 cubic feet of masonry. But the material had to be procured from a distance by the laborious process of demolition, and the ruinous wall had to be scarped, cleared at the base, and prepared for the work. " It will be seen that the largest parties were furnished by H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, and I know not how adequately to express my sense of the services of this admirable body of men; though having little more than every other night in bed, they laboured for months, day after day, officers and men, with a cheerfulness and energy not to be surpassed. To enumerate all whose zeal and intelligence were conspicuous, would almost require me to go over the list of the Officers, and to mention even many of the valuable Non-Commissioned Officers; but I cannot deny myself the pleasure of naming those whose more extended professional education gave their aid additional value, namely, Captain Fenwick, Lieutenant Frere and Ensign Parker. Separate portions of the works were also entrusted at various times to other Officers, especially Lieutenants G. King and G. Wade, and Ensign Scott, and I had every reason to be satisfied with their execution. " The 35th N. I. were much employed in destroying the forts and other cover around the place, and it is due to Captain Seaton to mention his great activity and the skill with which, by directing the watercourses used for irrigation on the most massive ruins, he effected a quantity of demolition, which, with our short supply of gunpowder, would have otherwise been impracticable. " With the exception of a few of the larger bastions, the whole of the batteries were prepared by the Artillery themselves, (both Captain Abbott's battery and Captain Backhouse's Mountain train) under the superintendence of their own Officers. Besides this, a party of Captain Abbott's Artillery-men was always ready to assist in the works generally, and they were most ably superintended by Lieutenant Dawes, to whom I am indebted for aid as constant as it was valuable and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men and detachment of the 6th Infantry Shah Soojah's force, not only prepared the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the damages done to them by the earthquake, but he undertook and completed several of the most useful and laborious operations executed; among others a large and widely branching series of ravines giving cover to many hundred men within pistol shot of a very weak part of the works, was filled up, or entirely laid open to fire, and that with a number of men, which, without his untiring zeal and personal exertion, would have been inadequate. " The camp followers were distributed to assist the troops, and they followed the example set them and were extremely useful. 228 CAPTAIN BROADFOOT'S REPORT. " Appended are two plans and some sheets of sections. The first plan shews, in some measure, the way in which the space round the fort was originally encumbered by buildings and enclosures. The second gives an outline of the place as it now stands, while the sections will give some idea of the profile of the works as we found them, and as we leave them. " The gates have been retrenched inwardly, because from the fall of the ground outside and its conformation, no adequate work could have been raised without a labour we could not at the time spare, and without occupying more time than we could ever reckon on for unmolested work. " The narrowness and shallowness of the ditch are owing to our want of tools, which limited the strength of our working parties so much, that any thing stronger could not have been carried round in time to accomplish our object-that of interposing an obstacle to a sudden assault and escalade on every side, while the enemy were still numerous and elated by the Cabool disasters. " The breadth of the berme was necessary from the nature of the soil, a loose sand; and it varies as the necessity of including previous excavations, etc., obliged us to alter the tracing. " In conclusion, I have to solicit the Major General's indulgence for this Report, which has been prepared while suffering from a wound. If I have been diffuse in noticing the assistance received from the officers and troops, it must be ascribed to the admiration with which I daily, for many months, witnessed their labours, under circumstances of extraordinary discouragement, on short allowance of provisions, with heavy duties of other kinds to perform, and for a considerable time harassed by incessant conflicts with the enemy; during all this time there was not only no murmuring, but the utmost cheerfulness and zeal prevailed. It was not once necessary to resort to punishment, and I never had to make a single report other than commendatory." GEORGE BROADFOOT, Captain, Garrison Engineer, Jellallabad. On receiving the foregoing reports, the Governor General issued the following appropriate anrd gratifying Order :General Order by the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, Head-quarters, Allahabad, April 30th, 1842. " Political Department.--The Governor General has received a report from Major General Pollock, C. B., dated the 16th instant, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad. " The Major General has thus carried into effect the orders of the Government, in a manner which entitles him to the highest approbation. " Receiving the command of the army at Peshawur under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, he has, in the midst of new and unforeseen embarrassments and disappointments, preserved a firm mind, and justly GOVERNOR GENERAL'S ORDER. 229 relying upon his own judgment he has at last, with equal discretion and decision, accomplished the object he was directed to effect. " The Governor General requests Major General Pollock to accept his acknowledgments of the good service he has thus rendered to the Government of India, and begs he will communicate to the gallant Officers and troops under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their conduct has been regarded on this occasion. " The Governor General has already, in communicating the despatch from Major General Sir Robert Sale, K. C. B., dated 7th instant, expressed his high sense of the services of that Officer and of the Garrison of Jellalabad, terminating on that day by a decisive victory, which would have left nothing to desire had Colonel Dennie survived to enjoy it. " The garrison of Jellalabad having on that day achieved its safety by its own prowess, and being now reunited to the army by the movements of the force under the command of Major General Pollock, C. B., it remains only for the Governor General to testify his opinion of the just claims of that garrison to the gratitude of the Government and of their country. " The Governor General is pleased to direct that the second company of the sixth battalion of Artillery shall bear upon its appointments, and the fifth regiment of Light Cavalry upon its standards and appointments, and the thirty-fifth regiment of Native Infantry upon its colors and appointments, a mural crown superscribed ' Jellalabad,' as a memorial of the fortitude, perseverance, and enterprize evinced by those several corps during the blockade of Jellalabad. " The Governor General is likewise pleased, in conformity with the recommendation of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to direct that ' in order to give additional and lasting honors to the 35th Native Infantry, whilst it benefits the service generally, that corps shall hereafter be made a light infantry regiment,' the duties of which it is already so well acquainted with, and has performed with so much zeal and spirit. " The Governor General is further pleased to direct, that a silver medal be made for every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, who belonged to the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842, such medals to be all similar, and to bear on one side a mural crown superscribed ' Jellalabad,' and on the other side the words 'April 7th, 1842.' "The Government of India will present such medal to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, belonging to their service, and will request the home authorities to lay before Her Majesty their most humble prayer, that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to permit the Major General Commanding, and the officers, and privates in Her Majesty's service, who formed part of the garrison of Jellalabad, to receive, and wear a medal similar to that which will be so presented to their brothers in arms. "' The Governor General, taking into consideration the many great privations to which the troops composing the garrison of Jellalabad were exposed during the blockade of that place, an4 the noble fortitude 230 SECOND AFFAIR AT HYKULZIE. with which all such privations were borne, as well as the various losses the troops sustained, is pleased to direct that a donation of six months' batta be made to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, European and Native, who composed the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842. " The Governor General will request his Excellency the Commanderin-Chief of the Army to give instruction in due time that the several corps composing the garrison of Jellalabad may, on their return to India, be received at all the stations on their route to their cantonments, by all the troops at such stations, in review order with presented arms. "By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, T. H. MADDOCK, Secretary to the Govt. of India, with the Governor General." For the next military movement on record as connected with the advance, we return to Quetta, where Major General England was awaiting instructions to join the force at Candahar. Receiving the necessary orders, he moved forward towards the end of April, accompanied by the detachment under Major Simmons, which had since joined him from Dadur. He was attacked, however, on the 28th April, (exactly one month from the date of the previous conflict,) upon the very same ground, the heights at Hykulzie, but with a very different result. The force employed consisted of one troop H. Artillery, one Compy. Bengal Foot Artillery, 3d Bombay Cavalry, Poonah Horse, Her Majesty's 41st Regt. the Light Battalion, and 25th N. I., and the following appears to have been the plan of attack :-The heights on the left were first carried by three companies of H. M.'s 41st, and three of the Light Battalion gallantly led on by Major Simmons. The advance was covered by a brisk shelling from four pieces of Artillery. The higher of the two eminences, near which the former check was experienced, having been gained, the column in the hollow lower down dashed up the hill on which the breast-work from which the 41st suffered so severely on the 28th March, was placed. The enemy were instantly dispersed, and pursued from the ground by 100 troopers under Captain Delamain. The Affghans, on being overtaken, jumped from their horses, and furiously rushed on foot at our men, cutting about them desperately on every side. About 300 of the enemy were killed: our casualties were light. On this occasion, the position of the enemy was turned; our troops crowned one of the hills which commanded the stockaded post, and rendered it at once untenable. The enemy fled, and suffered severely. GENERAL ENGLAND S DISPATCH. 231 The remains of those who fell in the action of the 28th March, were collected together and interred. General England's dispatch briefly records the action :From Major General R. ENGLAND, to the Assistant Adjutant General Candahar, Head-quarters, Scinde Field Force, Camp at Lora River, 29th April, 1842. " SIR,--I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the I Troop Horse Artillery. Bengal Artillery. 3rd Lt. Cavy. Poona Horse. H. M. 41st Regt. Lt. Battn. 25th Regiment N. I. Major General commanding the troops in Lower Affghanistan and Scinde, that I yesterday attacked the enemy's strong position in front of the village of Hykulzie, with the troops mentioned in the margin, and dispersed them in all directions. 2. " The three columns of attack were well led by Major Simmons, H. M. 41st Regiment; Captain Woodburn, 25th Bombay N. I., and Major Cochran, H. M. 41st; the latter being accompanied by a wing of the 25th Bombay N. I., under Captain Teasdale, commanding that corps. 3. " The reserve was in the hands of Major Browne, commanding H. M. 41st Regiment. 4. " Nothing could be more successful than the combinations, and the insurgents, after a short resistance, fled into the rugged mountains in their rear, leaving their standards, and being closely and gallantly pursued by the 3rd Light Cavalry under Captain Delamain. 5. " The practice of Captain Leslie's Horse Artillery Battery was, as usual, most effective, and the conduct of the troops excellent. 6. " I beg to annex a list of the casualties which have occurred I have, &c. in this affair. R. ENGLAND, Major General, Commanding Scinde Field Force." SCINDE FIELD FORCE. Return of Casualties in action with the enemy near Hykulzie, Camp, 28th April, 1842. 41st Regt.--Wounded, 2 Rank and File.-3d Light Caval" H. M. ry.-Wounded, 1 Lieut. 1 Havildar, and 3 Rank and File-Horses, 7 Wounded and 1 Missing.-Light Battalion.-Wounded, 2 Rank and File.-General Staff.-Wounded, 1 Captain. Oficers Wounded. " Lieut. W. Ashburner, 3d Cavalry, severely, and Captain Deere, A. D. C. slightly. Remarks-Rank and File. 4 f Severely. .............. Wounded 4 Slightly,. ................ R. ENGLAND, Major General, Commanding Scinde Field Force." 232 SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE OF KHELAT-I-GHILZIE. From Hykulzie to Candahar, the General pursued his march unopposed, reaching the latter town on the 9th of May. This accession of strength to General Nott's division was most opportune, for within a week after its arrival information was received, that the fort of Khelat-iGhilzie was closely invested by six thousand Ghilzies, for whom, it was apprehended, the garrison of 950, under Captain Craigie, would scarcely be a match. General Nott immediately despatched Colonel Wymer, with Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 2nd, 16th and 38th Regt. Bengal Native Infantry, Captain Blood's and Captain Leslie's guns, nearly all the Bombay Cavalry, and Capt. Haldane's and a part of Captain Christie's horse. This force had not however proceeded beyond Teer-undaz, when intelligence arrived that the enemy had been driven from the walls by the brave little garrison* with very considerable loss. In giving the official account of the defence, it is due to the 43d Bengal Native Infantry, to preface it by the commendatory Notification of the Governor General. " Notifcation.-Secret Department, Allahabad, 2d July.-The Governor General has great satisfaction in making public, the following report from Captain Craigie, commanding the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, of the gallant and successful defence made by that garrison against a large force of Affghans by which it was assaulted. On this occasion, the late Shah Soojah's 3d Regiment of Infantry and the detachment of the Bengal 43d Regiment Native Infantry, displayed that decided superiority over their enemies, which has been uniformly manifested by the several Corps composing Major General Nott's army. "By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, T. H. MADDOCK, Secy. to the Government of India, with the Governor General." From Captain J. H. CRAIGIE, Commanding Kelat-i-Ghilzie, to Captain THos. POLWHELE, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General. " SIR,--I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding in Lower Affghanistan and Scinde, that Kelati-.Ghilzie was attacked at 4 before 4 o'clock this morning, in two places ; viz. at the long neck to the north-east, and at an outwork constructed last winter by the Sepoys to give a raking fire in rear of the barracks. " The enemy advanced to the assault in the most determined manner, each column consisting of upwards of two thousand men, provided with * Of the sufferings of this garrison some idea may be formed, from the extract from a letter which will be found in Appendix VIII. DESTRUCTION 233 OF KHELAT-I-GILZIE. thirty scaling ladders; but after an hour's fighting, were repulsed and driven down the hill, losing five standards, (one of which was planted three times in one of the embrasures,) and the whole of which are now in our possession. " Of the enemy's loss I am unable to give any correct account, as their killed and wounded, during the greater part of the attack, were immediately taken to the rear; but 104 dead bodies were left on the slope of the hill, and from 6 A. M. till 3 P. M. the enemy were employed in carrying off such of their dead and wounded as had been taken to the rear. " The greatest gallantry and coolness were displayed by every Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officer and Private, (both European and Native,) engaged in meeting the attack of the enemy, several of whom were bayonetted on the top of the sand bags, forming our parapets. On our side, I am happy to say, only six Sepoys were wounded; viz. two of the detachment 43d N. I., and four of the 3d Infantry. " A body of about 300 of the enemy, when driven back, took shelter under the rocks below the outwork, but were immediately dislodged by a company of the 3d Infantry, which I detached for that purpose. I have, &c. Kelat-i-Ghilzie, 21st May, 1842. J. HALKET CRAIGIE, Captain, Comdg. Kelat-i-Ghilzie. On the arrival of Colonel Wymer at Khelat-i-Gilzie, he proceeded, in fulfilment of the orders that had been given him, to destroy the works, and to withdraw the garrison. He then marched to Ghirisk to relieve the detachment of Irregulars which held the place, and after razing a number of forts to the ground in the Ghilzie country, as far as Dalla up the Urgandab, returned to Candahar. Meanwhile, the rebels had not been idle :-aware of the diminution which the force at Candahar had sustained by the departure of Colonel Wymer, Prince Sufter Jung and Atta Mahomed re-appeared in the neighbourhood of Candahar; but General Nott's despatch shall recount the manner of their reception. To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq. Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General. Head-quarters, Candahar, 29th May, 1842. " SiR,--Aktar Khan, chief of Zamindawur, having assembled three thousand men, crossed the Helmund and joined the rebel force under Prince Suftur Jung and Atta Mahomed, on the right bank of the Urghundab, taking advantage of the absence of Brigadier Wymer, who had been detached into the Ghilzie province with a large portion of my force, and nearly the whole of my cavalry. The enemy, under an impression that we had not a sufficient number of men to hold the city, and at the same time to attack them in the field, took possession of 2 234 GENERAL NOTT'S DISPATCH. some steep rocky hills within a mile of the city walls. I instantly moved out with the troops noted in the accompanying Field return. leaving Major General England, K. H., in command of the city. The Ghazees had about 8000 in position, and 2000 men guarding the Babawullee Pass and roads leading to their camp. Our troops carried all their positions in gallant style, and drove them in confusion, and with great loss across the Urghundab river. " I was ably assisted by Brigadier Stacy and every Officer present. " Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, with his accustomed zeal was in the field, and gallantly led a small body of Persian and Afghan Horse to the charge. " I enclose a list of killed and wounded." I am, &c. W. NOTT, Major General, Commanding Lower Afghanistan and Scinde. Return of Killed and Wounded of the Troops, engaged with the enemy near Candahar, on the 29th May, 1842. " Horse Artillery, S. S. F.-Wounded one Havildar, three Privates and one Syce. " H. M.'s 41st Regt.-Wounded 11 Privates. " 42d Bengal N. I.-Wounded 1 Lieut. and 6 Privates. " 43d ditto.-Wounded 1 Havildar, 18 Privates, and 1 Bheesty. "Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.-Killed 1 Private and I Horse,Wounded, 1 Ensign, 1 Jemadar, 1 Naick, 5 Privates and 11 Horses. " Grand Total of killed and Wounded, 52 Officers and men, and 12 Horses. Ofcers Wounded. " Lieutenant J. J. Mainwaring, 42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly. " Doing duty with Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry, Ensign N. B. Chamberlain, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, severely. " Manour Khan, Naib Ressaldar, Shah's 1st Cavalry." W. NOTT, Major General, Comdg. Lower Afghanistan and Scinde. The troops engaged in the affair reported in this dispatch were Twelve 6-pounders Shah Soojah's Artillery. H. M.'s 41st Regt. 42d Regt. Bengal N. I. A portion of the 43d N. I. Small Detachments from the Poonah Horse, the Bombay Light Battalion, 25th Regt. Bombay N. I., and 200 of the Shah's 1st Calvalry. The following more graphic account of the action, than that given in the dispatch, will gratify the general reader. " On the 29th, a Dooranee Army under Aktur Khan, mustering, Horse and Foot, some 6000, crossed the Urghandab, and came down ACTION NEAR CANDAHAR. 235 close to Candahar. Their position was good, and some of their points strong, but they had no reserve, and were somewhat scattered. General Nott sent the 42d and 43rd Regiments with 4 guns, under Col. Stacey, to reconnoitre, who were followed by H. M.'s 41st and Anderson's light guns. At one o'clock the force was in action. The Dooranees crowned the rocks above the city, and on them our force marched,-the light companies as a storming party, supported by the 43rd and the Artillery, who kept up a continual fire. From the position of the enemy, and the character of the ground, some loss followed, about 30 killed and wounded, with some seven or eight Europeans. Nothing could have been better done, it seems; and Chamberlain of the 16th, distinguished himself highly by getting up to the enemy, breaking their ranks with his men, and driving them from the hills. Matters, however, did not end here: but, after this, the hills on the opposite side were covered by large masses of the Dooranees; who however, soon gave way, and in great disorder all fled, striving to gain the Bahawullee Pass. A horrible scene however ensued here. Thinking to entrap us, the Ghazees had barricaded the Pass, and the Dooranees, Horse and Foot, unable to make way, rushed round the base of the hills. Here chase was given by Chamberlain and the guns in splendid style, but unhappily he was here severely wounded by a dagger-thrust in the thigh. Mahomed Atta was at the head of a large number of the enemy, and fought desperately; he is now missing, and was reported killed. The Dooranees were driven completely from their position, and fled to their camp beyond the Urghandab. Here, on the 30th, they were followed by a fresh body of troops, under Col. Stacey, on whose appearance they broke up their Camp, and fled to the Northern hills; the enemy's loss is about 400 killed and wounded. This was a desperate struggle of Aktur Khan's, and our conquest was too complete to leave him any hope of having another fight for his own interest. " Lieut. Chamberlain of the 16th, and Capt. Mainwaring of the 43rd, only are spoken of as wounded. " General Nott was delayed at Candahar, and has received orders to destroy the fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, which he seems to feel some reluctance at. " Our Infantry and guns, with the energy of their attack, seem to have astonished the Dooranees. The Parseewan Horse, under their brave leader Agha Mahomed, also did great execution, and were very instrumental in destroying the positions of, and following up, the enemy; much more would have been done at the Bahawullee Pass, but for the winded condition of the horses." Prince Sufter Jung, soon after this last defeat, surrendered himself unconditionally to Major General Nott, and the confederacy in the Candahar province broke up. During these operations in Lower Affghanistan, Major General Pollock's force had remained idle, as much from the want of authority as 236 ACTION NEAR CANDAHAR. of means to move towards Cabul. That city had, meanwhile, become again the scene of desperate feuds. Shah Soojah had fallen by the hands of assassins, and the succession of his son, Futteh Jung, was disputed by the Affghans in the interest of Mahomed Akbar Khan.* The latter chieftain triumphed, but to suit his own purposes placed Futteh Jung upon the Musnud, contenting himself with the office of Vizier. Dreading the further advance of the British forces, Akbar Khan had previous to this sent in two of the prisoners, first Captain Mackenzie and afterwards Captain Troup, to treat with General Pollock for the release of the whole of the captives, but the uncertainty of Lord Ellenborough as to whether it would be more expedient, under any circumstances, to push the troops on to Affghanistan, put it out of General Pollock's power to bring negociations to a satisfactory close. Three months were passed in a state of complete inaction. The intense heat of the weather, the uncertainty of their movements, the scarcity of provisions, the crowded state of the encampment, induced much sickness among the troops and the cattle, and caused the loss of the lives of several valuable officers. During this halt also, the unfortunate Major General Elphinstone died a captive in the hands of Akbar Khan, who sent in the body to the British camp, that it might be buried with all the honours due to the remains of a brave but incompetent soldier. Captain John Conolly, another prisoner, likewise died in this interval. At length, when the patience of the army had been fairly worn out, and a feeling of sorrow and disgust had been created by a conviction, that it was the intention of Lord Ellenborough's Government to withdraw the forces without marching to Cabul and rescuing the prisoners,t an authority reached General Pollock to employ the period which might elapse before the season would allow of the Army's retracing its steps through the Punjab in destroying the forts and other strongholds of the Affghans in the neighborhood of Jellalabad. The refusal of the chiefs in the Shinwarree valley to pay their revenue to the legitimate authority at Cabul, whose interest the British were still supposed to represent, * For the authentic particulars of the Shah's murder, see Appendix. No. X. t The partisans of His Lordship have endeavored to make it appear, that no such withdrawal was contemplated, but unfortunately for them, there are official documents on record in the office of the Adjutant General, which puts the matter beyond dispute. OPERATIONS IN THE SHINWARREE VALLEY. 237 constituted a fair pretext for the operations, which were accordingly entrusted to Brigadier Monteath of the 35th Bengal N. I., who performed the duty and returned to Camp, sending in the following report of his proceedings :To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secy. to Govt., Political Department, dated Jellalabad,29th July, 1842. " SIR,--I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of my letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army of this date, forwarding copies of letters and other documents from Brigadier Monteath, reporting the result of an attack on the enemy in the Shinwarree valley. " The loss sustained by the enemy must have been considerable, for in a letter which one of the Chiefs addressed to Captain Macgregor on the 28th instant, he states, that they were still burying their dead. The effect in the whole valley by such a complete defeat of the Shinwarrees, and the destruction of so many of their forts, will be productive of the I have, &c. most beneficial effects." GEO. POLLOCK, Maj.- Genl., Comg. Troops West of the Indus. To Major-General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, Head-Quarters Simla. Camp Jellalabad, 29th July, 1842. " SIR,-I have the honor to forward for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, copy of a letterdatedCamp Mazeena, 27th instant, from Brigadier Monteath, C. B., commanding the Troops in the Shinwarree valley, together with copies of the documents to which it refers. Although the loss of the enemy on this occasion has not been stated by Brigadier Monteath, I have every reason to believe from authentic sources it has been considerable. One of the Chiefs, ' Shadoo,' had a nephew and a first cousin killed in the action, and another Chief ' Hossein,' also lost a son. " The enemy were busily employed during the afternoon of the 26th, in burying their dead, and on the day subsequent to the engagement, the Shinwarree Chiefs sent into Camp to express their willingness to pay the I have, &c. revenue. G. POLLOCK, Maj.-Gent. Comg. Troops West of the Indus. From Brigadier MONTEATH, C. B. Commanding Field Force, to Captain PoNsoNBY, Asst. Adjt. Gen. dated Camp Mazeena, 27th July, 1842. " SxR,--I have the honor of addressing you to state for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that in accordance with the inten- 238 OPERATIONS IN THE SHINWARREE VALLEY. tion expressed by me in my letter of the 24th instant, I marched out yesterday morning at daylight to attack the enemy with the following troops and guns:Five 9-pounders. One 24-pound howitzer. Fifty Sappers and Miners. One Squadron 1st Light Cavalry. Seven Companies H. M. 31st Regiment. Seven ditto 33d N. Infantry. Seven ditto 53d N. Infantry. Ferris' Corps of Jezailchies. " As the road into the enemy's country was nearly impracticable for loaded animals, and we must have lost a great many Camels, had I attempted to move with our baggage, I resolved on returning to my present position after the operation I had in view had been concluded, therefore having compressed the Camp as much as possible by striking a portion of it, and collecting the tents and baggage on one spot, I left it in charge of Major Hewitt, 33d Regiment, with the following troops:2 Companies H. M.'s 31st Regiment. 2 Ditto 33d Native Infantry. 2 Ditto 53d Native Infantry. 2 Squadrons 1st Light Cavalry. 50 Jezailchies and 100 of Torabaz Khan's men. " On the troops gaining the left ridge of the Shinwarree valley, which was the most practicable, the enemy retired out of their forts, and I detached Lieut. Beecher of the Engineers, with Sappers and Miners to set fire to them, which he did in succession up to the fort of Sekunder Khan, at the head of the valley, the force moving parallel Thus at one time the along the ridge for the protection of the party. interiors of five and thirty forts were in a blaze along the valley, the enemy contemplating the scene from the heights in the vicinity of Sekunder Khan's fort, where they had taken up positions, and from whence they were driven in gallant style by the advance, consisting of the Light and two battalion Companies H. M.'s 31st Regiment, the Light Companies 33d and 53d Regiments, and the corps of Jezailchies under Major Skinner, H. M.'s 31st Regiment. " At this moment the guns having been brought into position by Captain Abbott, opened a fire of sharpnell shells upon them, which did considerable execution, and so disconcerted them, that parties left the field altogether, and never returned. S" Having effected every thing in the way of destruction, I caused two companies of the 53d Regiment to be extended along a ridge below that from whence the advance had driven the enemy, of which it remained in possession. In rear of the companies of the 53d, a company of the 33d was extended along the top of another ridge, and in rear of that company on a higher ridge two guns were placed in position to aid in covering the retirement of the advance from the enemy, who were all ready to attack them as soon as they should commence their descent OPERATIONS IN THE SHINWARREE VALLEY. 239 from the heights. On these arrangements being completed, the recall was sounded to the advance, and, I am happy to say, that the whole joined the main body without a single casualty occurring. " Major Skinner's party having been exceedingly fatigued, for the heat had been excessive and their labour great, I directed them to fall in with the main column, and ordered out two companies from each of the three Regiments to cover our retrogression homewards. These were formed into two parties, and extended across the ridge in two lines of skirmishers. In rear of the second line, I placed two guns with the company of H. M.'s 31st Regiment flanking each of them, also a party of forty Cavalry, and a line of skirmishers was thrown out along the whole right flank of the column to the edge of the ridge, (where the ground from its broken character was most favourable to the enemy,) and which communicated with the rear line of the covering force placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, H. M.'s 31st Regt,. at his own solicitation. " In this order we retired seven miles and a half over as bad a road as can well be supposed, and, although I had anticipated loss and great annoyance from the enemy throughout the march, yet it seemed as if they had enough, as their attacks were languid and remarkably cautious throughout, and I am rejoiced to say, that at half past 3 P. M., we arrived in camp without loss or injury of any kind. " It gives me great pleasure to record the zealous conduct of the troops generally, and the cheerful and praiseworthy manner in which the soldiers of H. M.'s 31st Regiment laboured to drag the guns up such places as the horses, notwithstanding their unequalled qualities, were incapable of doing. "Herewith I beg to enclose Major Skinner's report, and I can myself bear ample testimony to the gallant conduct of himself and those under his command; and I should be unjust were I not to say, that the conduct of Captain Ferris, his native commandant, Hyder Ali, and the whole corps of Jezailchies, was highly distinguished. " My thanks are very justly due to Lieut. Colonel Bolton, H. M.'s 31st Regt., for the able manner in which he conducted the duties of covering the retirement of the force, and particularly so to Major Skinner, for the zealous and gallant manner in which he led the advance against the enemy. To Capt. Ferris, for the gallant manner in which, with his corps of Jezailchies, he drove the enemy from their position on the heights. To Capt. Abbott and Lieutenant Dawes, for the very successful practice of the guns. To Lieutenant Beecher, for the zealous and satisfactory manner in which he, with the detachment of Sappers and Miners, constructed a road for the guns and fired the enemy's forts in the valley. And to Lieutenant Lugard, H. M's 31st Regiment, Major of Brigade, Lieut. Mayne, Assistant Quarter Master General, Captain Lloyd, Sub-Assistant Commissary General, and Captain Robertson, Field Engineer, for the assistance afforded me by them in the field. " I have also to express my thanks to Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, who, when the opportunity offered itself, served with the guns. 240 MAJOR SKINNER'S REPORT. " Enclosed is a sketch of the Shinwarree valley, and the ridge over which the troops passed; a return of killed and wounded; one of the strength of the force employed, and one of ammunition expended. I have, &c. T. MONTEATH, Brigadier, Commanding the Field Force. From Major SKINNER, H. M.'s 31st Regiment, to BrigadierMONTEATH, C. B., Commanding the Field Force. " SIR,--I have the honour to report to you, that when the advance guard, composed of the following details, viz. the three Light Companies of the Brigade with two Battalion Companies of H. M.'s 31st Regiment, and the corps of Jezailchies reached the crest of the ridge over which the main column was moving, about 8 o'clock A. M., I observed the enemy posted in small bodies upon the different heights and ridges in my front, while several parties occupied gardens and broken walls at the foot of the line of hills I was upon, above the valley on the right hand. " A sharp fire was opened upon the line of skirmishers, who quickly advanced and drove the enemy off, the corps of Jezailchies swept the front, the left hills were cleared by the light company of the 31st Foot, and the light company of the 33d N. I. on the right skirmished through that part of the valley nearest the ridge, the remaining companies were in support. We advanced to Sekunder Khan's fort of ' Muraiz,' over very broken and difficult country, with frequent descents and ascents; the enemy sometimes keeping up a good fire, but always abandoning the line of heights as we ascended, and falling back to others. I halted at Sekunder Khan's fort, from which a few shots were fired as we advanced, when it was evacuated. " This fort hangs over a narrow valley on the right hand, fields of rice in many parts of it are now under water. A narrow stony ridge in the midst of the valley was occupied by the enemy, and commanded the post among trees at the foot of the fort which I wished to hold; the enemy was soon driven off the first part of the ridge, and fell back to a higher peak, from which it became also necessary to drive them; this was done by the Jezailchies under Capt. Ferris in very good style, who held it till withdrawn. At the head of the valley in which we now were, there stands a high hill, with a fort upon its summit, a considerable distance off. All the ridges from which the enemy had been driven appeared to draw to a point at this fort, and their retreat was always towards it. " Many men were collected there, and large parties were sent out to my right; this induced me to draw the companies of the 31st Foot on the left near to me. The enemy soon appearing on the summit of a hill above my left, however, I sent one company of the 31st Regiment MAJOR SKINNER'S 241 REPORT. to drive him away, and occupy the hill. This duty was remarkably well performed by Captain Marshall, H. M.'s 31st Regiment, whose company was employed upon it. The enemy retreated with some loss, and took up another position under cover of a Sungah or breastwork of stone within shot. He was driven from it with great gallantry by Lieut. McIlveen of the 31st Regiment, and a party of No. 7 company of the corps. Lieutenant Mcllveen,* a very promising young Officer indeed, was, I regret to say killed in the assault upon the Sungah. "A narrow valley of rice fields, completely swamped, separated the ridge, on which my right was, from two small forts, a garden at one end of the rice valley below the ridge towards the first of the two forts was held by the light company of the 33rd Native Infantry, the enemy descended from a high line of sand hills, and occupying these two forts, annoyed my position a good deal. He was driven from them by the light company and part of No. 6 of the 31st Regiment, who had no other ground to advance on but the narrow ridges that divide the terraces of rice. They moved along these under a sharp fire, and drove the enemy from his position. I occupied these forts, and leaving Brevet Major Urmston, of the 31st Regiment, in command of the post, ceased from further operations. None of the forts I have mentioned were tenable by the enemy; the walls were breached in many places by the earthquake in February last. When I was ordered to fall back on the main body, about half-past 1 r. M., Major Urmston retired in good order, (followed at a distance by the enemy, who had fired constantly into the forts when we occupied them,) over the difficult ground behind him, having set fire to the villages within the two forts before he left them. " The advance guard being collected together above Sekunder Khan's fort joined the main column. I have great pleasure in assuring you, that during several hours of most active operations, over the difficult country we were in, every officer and man under my command behaved admirably." I have, &c. T. SKINNER, Major, H. M's. 31st Regiment. A correspondent of the Delhi Gazette thus described the death of this officer :" The forts nearest to us were instantly abandoned, but as their wives and children had taken shelter in those more distant, the Affghans disputed the ground stiffly to protect them ; but at last, about 10 o'clock, our troops finally drove them out of the valley, and pursued them up the heights beyond, where they made a stand in a stockade for a little while, but yielded to the gallantry of the Light company of the 31st Foot, who drove them from it and kept possession. Here Lieutenant Mcllveen of the 31st was shot near the heart, leading on his men : five Affghans seeing him fall, rushed down, knives drawn ready to cut him,- but his Light Bobs close by fired and dropped all five, which enabled them to bring off their Officer, who only lived long enough to say to his men : ' If you cannot carry me off, at least take away my sword.' His body was brought back to our camp, and interred here this morning." 2i 242 ADVANCE TO CABUL AND GHUZNI. Return of Killed and Wounded in action under the command of Brigadier MONTEATH, C. B., on the 26th July, 1842. Camp Mazeena, 27th July, 1842. STRENGTH. " Capt. Abbott's Battery, 2 Officers E. and N., 2 Serjeants, of N. 6 Light Field Battery. " Squadron 1st Light Cavalry, 11 Officers E. and N., 10 Serjeants, 129 rank and file.--H. M.'s 31st Regt. 24 Officers E. and N., 34 Serjeants, 500 rank and file.--33d Regt. N. I., 26 Officers E. and N., 32 Serjeants, 494 rank and file.--53d Regt. N. I., 25 Officers E. and N., 42 Serjeants, 542 rank and file.-Jezailchies, 15 Officers E. and N., 32 Serjeants, 343 rank and file -- Grand Total-103 Officers, 152 Serjeants and 2008 rank and file. Casualties. " H. M. 31st Foot.-1 Officer killed, 7 rank and file wounded. " 33d N. I.-1 Serjeant and 8 rank and file wounded. " 53d N. 1.-5 rank and file wounded. " Jezailchies.-2 rank and file killed ; 2 ditto wounded. " Total.-1 Officer killed, 2 rank and file ditto; 1 Sergeant and 22 rank and file wounded." T. MONTEATH, Brigadier, Commanding Field Force. Return of Ammunition expended in action under the command of Brigadier Monteath, on the 26th instant. " Capt. Abbott's Battery--expended 37 rounds-shells, shrapnel 24-pounders, 6; ditto 9-pounders, 23; and round shot 9-pounders 8. " Squadron 1st Light Cavalry. " Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, 4,889 rounds, ,, " 33rd Regt. Native Infantry, 2,892 ,, " 53rd Regt. Native Infantry, 4,954 ,, 6,678 " Jezailchies . ............. T. MONTEATH, Total, .................. 19,450 Comdg. Field Force." Soon after these operations had been concluded, it became suddenly known, that Lord Ellenborough had resolved upon advancing the armies of Generals Pollock and Nott simultaneously upon Cabul and Ghuzni; and the joy which this intelligence diffused was in no slight degree enhanced by the arrival of the orders for the movement. The army under General Nott had for some time been impressed with the belief, that it was to return to India by way of Deyrah Ishmael Khan, or the Bolan Pass, and the dismay and grief which this idea spread throughout the force was not less weighty or acute than that which had affected EVACUATION OF CANDAHAR. 243 General Pollock's army when its retrogression was considered certain. As at Jellalabad, so now at Candahar, the troops were elated at the prospect of again encountering the enemy, and of taking full vengeance for the cruel treachery by which so many thousand soldiers and camp followers had fallen. The instructions of the Government to General Nott were to take Ghuzni en route to Cabul, where he was to meet and co-operate with General Pollock. Whether it was intended that General Nott should reach Cabul first, and enjoy the renown of its capture as the reward of his excellent management in Lower Affghanistan, the editor of this work is not prepared to say; but it is certain that he used all imaginable expedition to be foremost in the race, though General Pollock succeeded in outstripping him. The reader is now presented with the details of the operations of the two generals, preparatory to the evacuation of Affghanistan. Major General England, it should be first stated, had, on the departure of General Nott from Affghanistan moved (accompanied by Prince Timoor Shah) with the 25th Bombay N. I., the late Shah's troops, some Artillery, etc. escorting the women, children, baggage, stores, etc. towards India, by way of the Kojuck and Bolan Passes. The result of this march is given below as the first in point of date :To T. H. MADDOCK, EsQ., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General, Dated Camp, near Killa Abdoolla, 19th August, 1842. "SIR,--I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that 1 Troops late Shah's Horse SArunsdrawn by Buocks. the British force at Candahar having evacuated that city on the 7th and 8th, I moved from 2 Rissallahs Irregular Horse. my encampment near its walls on the 10th, 1 Rissallah Poonah ditto. 25 Bombay N. I. late Light pursuant to instructions with the detachment Battalion ditto. mentioned in margin en route to Quetta, and 2 Regiments late Shah's In- that I arrived on the ground yesterday. 5} fantry. 2. " It was communicated to me on the 9th, and subsequently, that the Insurgents were preparing to attack the column and convoy under my charge in its passage, and especially, that they would make efforts to intercept it in the strong country of the Kojuck range, at the northern extremity of which I arrived with little molestation on the morning of the 16th. 2-14 GENERAL ENGLAND REACHES KILLA ABDOOLLA. 3. " Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, it was ascertained by reconnoitring, that the highest points of mountain were not yet occupied by them, and I thought it right therefore, notwithstanding that the troops had just completed a night's march of 24 miles, to push forward a light column to seize the summit at once. 4. "This operation was perfected by three Battalions, and the most important ridge and all the peaks commanding the principal Passes were gained by the troops before dark. 5. " On the following morning, the Insurgents began to appear in small bodies on different hills, but the route being flanked, they did little mischief, and the baggage, artillery, and immense retinue under the protection of this camp, including nine or ten thousand beasts of burthen, began the ascent covered by a rear guard of two Battalions and the Cavalry ; and I was soon made aware of our good fortune in having seized the heights on the previous evening, for the number of the enemy gradually increased, but all their efforts to capture the baggage, or indeed to interrupt us to any serious extent were frustrated, and the passage across the Kojuck mountains may be said to have been perfected by noon on the 18th. 6. " I have had the highest reason to be gratified with the exertions of all the officers and troops on this occasion, and it is entirely owing to their incessant efforts in duties of great fatigue, under a privation of water, both in climbing up the extreme points of the range, to drive off the enemy whenever they appeared, and in dragging thirteen pieces of Artillery over the ridge, that this service has been accomplished with so little loss on our side, of life or of convoy. 7. " I beg to enclose a list of the casualties in killed and wounded of this column, which have occurred since I left the immediate vicinity of Candahar. 8. " My last accounts of Major General Nott, were of the 13th, three marches north of Candahar. 9. " His Highness Prince Timoor is now in my camp, and every possible attention paid to his comfort and safety. 10. "The Right Hon'ble the Governor General will have been informed, that the chief, Saloo Khan, who had taken service with us after the affair with the enemy of the 18th April, near Hykulzie, suddenly absconded from the military post held by us at this place on hearing 9f our abandonment of Candahar, and it was presumed, therefore, that he was at the head of the Insurgents in the Kojuck hills; but I am not inclined to believe that he was thus employed, and I think it more probable, that he may have proceeded to join Prince Suftur Jung, who had placed himself at the head of affairs at Candahar. 11. " I have no information to warrant the expectation of any serious opposition between this and Quetta, especially as the Brahoe connection with the Affghans seems severed for the present, and I hope to be enabled to report my arrival at Quetta to his Lordship on the 27th or 28th instant. 12. " Pursuant to the instructions of Government of the 19th of GENERAL POLLOCK AT MAMMOO KHAIL. 245 March, I have assumed the political responsibilities, as well as military command, vacated by the casualty therein contemplated in the departure from those countries, of Major General Nott. I have, &c. &c. R. ENGLAND, Major General, Commanding Scinde Forces. Dispatches of Major General POLLOCK and NOTT, descriptive of the operations attending the capture of Ghuzni and Cabul, immediately preceding the final evacuation of Afghanistan. To Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, Head-Quarters, Simla. Camp, Mammoo Khail, August 25th, 1842. "SIR,--I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I reach- 1 Squadron 5th Light Cavalry. Head-quarters and one Squadron 10th Light Cavalry. No. 6 Light Field Battery. 5 Companies Sappers and Miners. H. M.'s 9th Foot. 60th Native Infantry. ed Gundamuck on the morning of the 23d instant, with the troops as per margin. " On approaching the ground a few horsemen appeared, but retired as we advanced. I soon learnt that the enemy, under the Chiefs Hadji Ali and Khyrollah Khan, occupied the village and fort of Mammoo Khail, about two miles from Gundamuck, and I determined upon attacking them the following morning. " I ordered up a Squadron of the 3rd Dragoons and Captain Broadfoot's Corps of Sappers from General Sale's Camp, and they joined before daylight the following morning. " At 4 A. M. yesterday morning I moved towards the enemy with the Troops as per margin. On clearing the broken 1Squadron 5th Light Cavalry. No. 6 Light Field Battery 1 Ditto 10th ditto. 5 Companies Sappers and Miners. Her Majesty's 9th Foot. 26th Native Infantry. 60th Native Infantry. ground in front, I divided the Infantry into two columns with a Wing of H. M. 9th Foot at the head of each, and Skirmishers in front. I directed Captain Broadfoot with his Corps to go to the right. The Cavalry also advanced on the right to cut off the retreat. "Captain Abbott's Battery accompanied the Columns, and as we advanced occasionally opened on the enemy who continued in position so long, we hoped they would oppose us with their whole force, but they retired on our approach, and we entered the village. " The fields in front of the village were purposely flooded to prevent our advance. The left Column then went towards the fort of Mammoo Khail, and the right Column proceeded to Koodee Khail; the ground was impracticable for Cavalry nearly the whole distance, but on one or two occasions an opportunity did offer, and the enemy suffered Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, with some Companies of the accordingly. 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry, occupied part of the heights in front of the village of Koodee Khail, while Captain Broadfoot and some of the 26th N. I. cleared the hills to the left of Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's position. As Koodee Khail is about two miles from Mam- 246 AFFGHANS DEFEATED AT MAMMOO KHAIL. moo Khail, and as a position there might have been attended with risk unless very strongly supported, I directed Major General McCaskill to retire on Mammoo Khail. As I considered it of importance to hold Mammoo Khail, which was the enemy's position, I wrote for the whole Camp to be brought here, and it arrived in safety yesterday afternoon. "I left the Camp standing, and selected Major Davis, of H. M.'s 9th Foot, to command the party as per mar3 Companies 26th Native Infantry, gin, for its protection; the duty was one 3 Companies 60th Native Infantry, and 50 Sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry. of considerable importance, as it was by no means improbable that the enemy would take advantage of our advance to send a party to the Camp. The Squadron of Dragoons having arrived just as I was starting, their horses would not have been equal to a day's hard work, which induced me to leave them in camp. The overthrow of this party of the enemy must, I conclude, have been very unexpected, as the whole of their camp equipage with its carriage cattle, was captured by Captain Broadfoot's Corps and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry. " I have much gratification in reporting that the troops, both European and Native, of each branch and department, well supported the character of British Soldiers. " Where all were equally zealous in the cause, and devoted to their duty, my thanks are equally due to all; but I may be permitted to mention the names of Corps and Departments employed-Major General McCaskill, K. H., commanding the right column-Brigadier Tulloch, commanding the left column-Captain Abbott, commanding Light Field battery-Lieut. Col. Taylor, K. H., commanding H. M. 9th FootMajor Huish, commanding 26th N. I.-Captain Napleton, commanding 60th N. I.--Major Blair, commanding 10th Light Cavalry-Captain Oldfield, commanding squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry-Captain Tait, commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry-Captain Abbott, Field EngineerLieut. Becher, commanding Sappers and Miners, and Superintending Surgeon Stiven, and Captain Nugent, officiating Sub-assistant Commissary General. The officers of the staff who conveyed my orders to the different columns and otherwise aided in the movements of the day were Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General-Captain Smith, Major of Brigade-Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant General -Captain MacAdam, Deputy Judge Advocate General-Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance-Lieut. Sir Richmond Shakespear, Military Secretary-Captain Codrington, Asst. Quarter Master General-Lieut. Mayne, Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who was most active throughout the day-Lieut. Tytler, Baggage Master-Lieut. Pollock, A. D. C., and Captain Macgregor, A. D. C.-to the last mentioned officer I am not only indebted for services in the field, but for valuable information, and for constant exertions to obtain supplies for the force, which his local knowledge and personal acquaintance with the Mallicks enables him to do. " I have this morning heard from several quarters that the two Chiefs, Hadjee Ali and Khyroolah Khan, have gone to Cabool, attended by about MAJOR GENERAL M'CASKILL S REPORT. 247 sixty men. If I had removed my camp to Gundamuck yesterday, there can be little doubt that the enemy would have re-occupied this place, and he would have announced to the Cabool authorities he had beaten us back. Koodee Khail has been destroyed by fire-the fort and village of Mammoo Khail have also been destroyed by fire, and before I quit this place, the trees, to which much value and importance are attached, will be cut down. " I have the honor to enclose a return of casualties. I regret I shall be deprived of the services of Major Huish, 26th N. I., and Captain Edmond, H. M. 9th Foot, for some time, though I hope not long. Lieut. Robertson, of the 37th Regt. of Native Infantry, doing duty with the 26th N. I., is slightly wounded, but will, I trust, soon return to his duty. " I have the pleasure to enclose Reports from Major General McCaskill, K. H., and Captain Broadfoot. I have, &c. G. POLLOCK, Major General, Comdg. in Afghanistan." From Major General John McCAsKILL, K. H., Commanding Infantry Division, to Captain PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp Mammoo Khail, 25th August, 1842. " SIR,-I beg to detail to you, for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., the operations of the right Column in the affair of yesterday, after it had become separated from that of the left, on the complete success of the combined attack on the enemy's position in advance at Mammoo Khail. " You are aware that this force consisted of four Companies of H. M. 9th Foot and six of the 26th Regiment N. I., under the immediate command of Lieut. Colonel Taylor, K. H., of the former Corps. The enemy had fled before our troops, and abandoned the village of Koodee Khail, but reinforced strongly by the fugitives driven back by Brigadier Tulloch's Column, he assumed a menacing attitude, and occupied in force a range of heights and detached summits in the Soofaid Koh. The most salient of these was a spur of the mountain within long musket range of the buildings of Koodee Khail. From this and from other eminences of the most precipitous character, the Ooloos were dislodged with the utmost spirit and gallantry by the details under Lieut. Colonel Taylor, aided in the most effective manner by a part of Captain Broadfoot's Corps of Sappers and Miners. The enemy were reinforced from time to time, and made many bold attacks, and kept up a sharp fire of Jezails from the loftiest peaks of the mountain ; but our troops, though so much pressed as to be compelled to recede from ground which they had gained in our direction, maintained an advance position among the hills until withdrawn by order of Major General Pollock, first into the plateau in front of the village of Koodee Khail, which they burnt down, and then In retiring over the plain back upon the present site of encampment. 248 CAPTAIN BROADFOOT'S REPORT. between the two principal villages, the movement was covered by a Squadron of the 5th and another of the 10th Light Cavalry, but the attempts of the Ooloos to annoy were timid and feeble in the extreme, and our troops did not sustain a single casualty from their effects. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor speaks in high terms of the support which he received from Major Huish, commanding the 26th Regiment N. I., who was wounded, and afterwards from Captain Handicomb of the same corps, and from Captain Ogle, commanding H. M.'s 9th Foot; and I beg to be permitted to bear my testimony to the merits of the Lieut. Colonel's own exertions on this occasion, as well as to express my sense of the gallantry of all the troops engaged, and to acknowledge the able assistance which I received from Captain Havelock, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant Mayne, 37th Regiment N. I., Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and Lieutenant Bethune, H. M.'s 9th Foot, my A. D. C. The intrepidity also with which Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners aided in the attack on one of the advanced heights, deserves my marked comI have, &c. mendation. JOHN MCCASKILL, Major General, Commg. Ify. Division." From Captain J. BROADFOOT, Sappers and Miners, Commanding, to Captain G. PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp, Mammoo Khail, 25th August, 1842. " SIR,-Agreeably to order, I have the honor to report the proceedings of the column entrusted to me by the Major General commanding in the action yesterday. " I moved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the 3d Irregular Cavalry (250) across the Ravine on the right of the force. We found the enemy strongly posted in an orchard with some enclosures; and the usual field works of loose stones in their front were also occupied. This position flanked the approach of the main body. " Having formed an attacking party in front, I sent the rest of the Sappers in column, under Lieut. Orr, to turn the enemy's left flank, and Captain Tait's horse still more to the right and in advance, to cut off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the force, the enemy reinforced the orchard and moved out to attack us. I was therefore obliged to advance before the force arrived; the enemy's positions were quickly carriedinsuccession. One party was driven towards the 3d Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the remainder fled to the village of Mammoo Khail, into which the main body of the enemy were at this moment driven by the force of our Artillery. They opened a fire on us, ill directed, but so heavy, that we were obliged to attack the village; they fled when we reached it, and the Sappers pursued to the fort, but were so exhausted by the march from Futteeabad and the previous operations, that the enemy was able to enter and barricade the GOVERNOR GENERAL'S ORDER. 249 gate; their fire was kept down by one party of Sappers, while the rest climbed on each other's shoulders over a half repaired bastion, about eight feet high and covered with thorns; the enemy fled over the walls on the other side, leaving the rear gate barricaded. This, and descending from the walls lost so much time, that pursuit was nearly hopeless as far as our now exhausted men were concerned; we pressed on with the least fatigue, however, and keeping up to the hills forced the enemy into level ground; our Cavalry was approaching, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the Cavalry overtake and attack them. " Parties were now directed to destroy the forts abandoned on the Cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last village near the hills ; where we surprised the enemy, whose Head Quarters were there, driving them out of the village and adjoining camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ammunition, and a good quantity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Jezailchies from Cabool) fled to the hills, the fire from which swept the village. " I was now directed to take a party of H. M.'s 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills; the first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet, and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it when the main force arrived, and our further progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with the Sappers to Head Quarters. " The conduct of the Troops, Officers and men, European and Native, was admirable, and it is due to the 26th N. I. to mention, that in storming the second height with a party of H. M.'s 9th Foot, a party of the former Corps joined us, and behaved with the same spirit as the rest. " I have, &c. G. BROADFOOT, Captain, Commanding Right Column." Head-quarters, Simla, 21st September, 1842. " Political Department.-The Governor General has this day received the reports of three victories obtained, on the 30th of August, by Major General Nott, over twelve thousand Affghans, 38 miles south-west of Ghuzni; on the 8th of September, by Major General Pollock, over the troops of Mahomed Akbar Khan; and the Ghilzie Chiefs at Jugdulluck. " On the 3d of September, Major General Nott had advanced to Nanee, a short march off Ghuzni. " On the 9th September, Major General Pollock had advanced to Kutta Sung, and had experienced no opposition. " Formed as the troops under Major General Nott have mostly been by four years of constant service, and habituated as they have been to victory under their able Commander, the Governor General had anticipated their success against any force which could be brought against them. It is to the Governor General a subject of sincere satisfaction, that the events of the campaign should have opened a.more extensive field to e 250 GENERAL POLLOCK S DISPATCH. that brave army on which it may make manifest to the world, the high qualities he has long known it to possess. "Major General Pollock has through the prudence of his arrangements, and the correctness of the movements directed by him, had the gratification of affording to his troops the opportunity of proving their superiority to the Affghans on the very scene of the last disaster on the retreat from Cabool; and Major General Sir R. Sale, at the head of the garrison of Jellalabad, worthily supported by the re-inforcements from India, has had the glory of leading the army on its triumphant return to the capital of Affghanistan. " The Governor General regards with the highest admiration the noble ardour which has, in these several operations, been manifested, equally by the officers and soldiers of both nations and of all arms. He sees, in the successes already obtained, the certain promise of other more decisive victories calculated to impress upon all the enemies of the British Government, a conviction of the futility of resistance to the force under his direction, and tending, under the continued favor of Providence, to effect the first object of his desire, the restoration of peace to Asia. " By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, T. H. MADDOCK, Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl." Copy of a Letter from Major General G. POLLOCK, C. B. Commanding Troops in Afghanistan, to Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, dated Camp Kutta Sung, 9th September, 1842. " Sir,--I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I left Soorkhab 1st division, under the command on the morning of the 8th instant, in proof Major General Sit R . Sale, G. Her Majesty's 13th L. I. gress to Jugdulluck with the troops detailed in the margin. p On approaching the hills which command the road through the Pass, I perceived their summits were occupied by a considerable number of men, and a nearer view enabled 26th N.. me to ascertain the nature of their position, 5th company Sappers. Broadoot'siSappers. which was one of singular strength and difficulty of approach. The enemy were as- c. B. 2 guns 3d troop 1st brigade H. A. 6 ditto N. 6 light F. B. 3 ditto Mountain Train. Her Majesty's 3dL. D. 3 ressallahs 3d L. C. Her Majesty's 9th Foot. sembled in bodies, apparently under different Chieftains, each having a distinguishing standard. " The hills they occupied formed an amphitheatre inclining towards the left of the road on which the troops were halted, while the guns opened, and the enemy were thus enabled on this point to fire into the column, a deep ravine preventing any contact with them. The practice of the guns was excellent, yet the enemy appeared so determined on making a stand, that the bursting of the shells among them on the right hill, which was of a conical shape and difficult ascent, had not the effect of STORMING OF THE JUGDULLUCK PASS. 251 making them relinquish it, or of slackening their fire, which now became heavy from all parts of their position, causing several casualties. " It is with deepest feeling of regret I have to deplore the loss of Captain Nugent, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, who was shot here, and died almost immediately. I had lately received the most important and valuable assistance from him; the service has lost a promising officer, and the department to which he belonged, a most efficient member. "As the guns appeared to have little effect in forcing the enemy to quit the heights, I resolved upon attacking them; for this purpose Captain Broadfoot was detached to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending a steep hill, on the top of which the enemy were entrenched in a sungah. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, under Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, were directed to cross a deep ravine and assault the hills on the opposite side, where the enemy held a ruined fort, and were with their Chiefs and cavalry in considerable numbers. Her Majesty's 13th light infantry, led by Captain Wilkinson, commanding the regiment, attacked the hill, which may be considered the key of the position. The 9th, accompanied by two companies of the 35th Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Boileau and Trench; the 13th by 130 men of the 26th, led by Captain Gahan, (Major Huish, who although present in the field, was prevented by his wound received at Mammoo Khail from assuming the command,) rushed up the height simultaneously, and the animated and enthusiastic cheer they gave, seemed to strike a panic in the enemy; for they dared not wait the collision, but fled down the hills, and were enabled to escape chastisement by the nature of the ground which was so well calculated to favor their retreat. At this moment Major Lockwood,with Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons, galloped up, and had very nearly succeeded in overtaking the enemy's Cavalry, but I am sorry to say, they also effected their safety by flight. " Capt. Broadfoot had completely succeeded in the attack he made, and the enemy were dispersed in every direction, a large body of them retiring to the summit of a high mountain. On this apparently inaccessible height they planted their standards, and shewed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain, I decided upon dislodging H. M's 13th L. . One company 26th N. I. One ditto 35th L.under Lieut.. Becher. them. The troops named in the margin advanced under cover of Captain Abbott's guns, and those of Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train. Seldom have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution; these lofty heights were assaulted in two columns, led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot, the discomfited Ghilzies not relishing an encounter, betook themselves to flight, carrying away their standards, and leaving our troops in quiet possession of their last and least assailable stronghold. " It gratifies me to be enabled to state, that we have thus signally defeated with one division of the troops the most powerful tribes and the under Broadfoot's Sappers. ieut. 252 STORMING OF THE JUGDULLUCK PASS. most inveterate of our enemies, the original instigators, and principal actors in those disturbances, which entailed such disasters on our troops last winter. The following are the Chiefs who were present in the action :" Uzeez Khan, Gool Mahomed Khan, and Saudut Meen Khan, Jubber Kheil, Ghilzies. " Khoda Buksh Khan, Azul Khan, and Khojeh Mahomed Shah Khan, Chiefs of Tezeen, Babukkur Kheil Ghilzies. " Sirdar Khyroolla Khan Barukzye, Shah Gazee Khan, Gool Ghilzie, and Hajee Ali Tajick, sent by Mahommed Akhbar Khan from Cabool, to co-operate with the Ghilzies. " Ibrahim Khan and Mullick Suddoo, Lughman Chiefs. "The petty Chiefs of Hissaruk were also engaged, and indeed the whole strength of the Ghilzie force may be considered to have been brought against us, numbering on this occasion, from four to five thousand men. " Let me now express how much I owe to the brave officers and soldiers who have thus gallantly asserted their superiority in arms. Were I to name all who merit eulogy, I should feel obliged to enumerate every officer who was present. "I feel considerable diffidence in mentioning the name of Major General Sir R. Sale, G. C. B., whose heroic conduct in the field stands so little in need of my commendation. On this occasion, I was an eye-witness to the personal intrepidity of this highly distinguished officer, as he led up the heights in advance of his own regiment under a very hot fire. "To the officers in command of regiments and detachments, and to the heads of departments, also to the officers of my personal and the general staff, I feel especially indebted for the zealous and efficient manner in which they performed their respective duties; and I trust His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will bring to the notice of His Lordship, the Governor General, that every individual engaged has exerted himself to the utmost to serve his country. " I have the honor to enclose a rough sketch of the scene of operations, and return of killed and wounded. "I have, &c. GEORGE POLLOCK, Major General, Commanding in Afghanistan." Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops of the 1st Division of the advance under the Command of Major GeneralSir R. SALE, G. C. B. at the storming of the heights of Jugdulluck, on the 8th Sept. 1842. " General Staff-Killed 1 Officer, Wounded 1 Officer,-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 2-Captain Nugent, Sub-assistant Commissary General, Killed, and Major General Sir R. Sale, G. C. B. slightly Wounded. No. 6, Light Field Battery,-Wounded 1 Native Officer and 2 Privates.--Total of all rank Killed and Wounded 3. Mountain Train GENERAL NOTT AT KAREEZ OOSMAN KHAN. 253 -Wounded 1 Sergeant, 1 Bugler, and 1 Private.-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 3, Killed 1 Mule. Her Majesty's 3d L. D.Killed 1 Horse. Head-quarters and detachment 3d I. C.-Killed 1 Private-Wounded 2 Privates,-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 3-Horses-1 Killed and 3 Wounded. 5th Company Sappers.-Wounded 1 Sapper.-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 1. Her Majesty's 9th Regt.-Killed 1 Sergeant and 2 Privates.-Wounded 1 Sergeant and 16 Privates.-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 25. Her Majesty's 13th L. I:-Killed 1 Private.-Wounded 2 Sergeants, 12 Privates.-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 15-1 Dooly bearer Killed and 1 Wounded. 26th N. I.--Wounded 1 Corporal, and 4 Privates-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 5-1 Camp Follower Wounded. 35th L. I.-Wounded 4 Privates.-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 4. Capt. Broadfoot's Sappers-Wounded 1 Sergeant and 5 Privates.-Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 6. G. PONSONBY, Assist. Adjt. Genl. British Troops in Afghanistan." From Major General W. NOTT, Commanding Field Force, Afghanistan, to T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General. Head-quarters,dated Camp Kareez Oosman Khan, August 29th, 1842. " Sin,-I have the honour to acquaint you, that on the morning of the 28th instant, a body of the enemy attacked our rear guard, I directed the Officer in command of the Cavalry to detach a party to assist in dispersing it. "The accompanying letter from Captain Christie details the result. "I have, &c. W. NOTT, Major General, Commanding Field Force, Afghanistan." From Captain J. CHRISTIE, Commanding the Detachment, to Captain DELAMAIN, Senior Officer of Cavalry, dated Camp Kareez Oosman Khan, 28th August, 1842. " SIa,-Agreeably to the instructions conveyed to me through Lieut. Forbes, Adjutant, 3rd Light Cavalry, I proceeded to the rear with two ressallahs of the 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry and three ressallahs of my own Regiment, and now do myself the honor to report the result as follows, for the information of Major General Nott:-" I proceeded at a trot for about a mile and a half, when we were closing well with the enemy, all of a sudden we came on a ravine with steep sides, which for a time completely brought us up; however, we managed to file down and form again on the opposite side. This delay allowed the enemy to move a long way ahead, but getting the detachment into a smart gallop, we succeeded in coming up with them just as the foremost of them had reached the bottom of the hills. We cut up 254 DEFEAT OF SHUMSHOODEEN. about 50 of them. Lieutenant Chamberlain's party from the other flank destroyed 12 more. " The enemy, I should think, amounted to about 300 horse and foot. " Every man did his duty, so it is impossible to offer any remark on individuals, and I shall only add, that I was quite satisfied with the conduct of all. " I beg to return lists of the killed and wounded. "I have, &c, J. CHRISTIE, Captain, Commanding the Detachment." To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Governor General, Head-quarters, dated Camp Gonine, 38 miles South West of Ghuznee, 31st August, 1842. " SIR,-I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, that Shumshoodeen, the Affghan Governor of the fortress of Ghuznee, brought nearly the whole of his army, about twelve thousand men, into the vicinity of my camp yesterday, at 3 o'clock P.M. " I moved out with one-half of my force; the enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position, their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge until their flank rested on a fort filled with men; they opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse artillery guns, which were admirably served; our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, etc. etc., and dispersing them in every direction. One hour's more day-light would have enabled me to destroy the whole of their infantry. "Shumshoodeen fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen. " I enclose a list of killed and wounded on the 28th and 30th instant, also a return of ordnance, ammunition, etc. etc. taken from the enemy. " The behaviour of the troops, both European and Native, was such as I anticipated, and afforded me complete satisfaction. " I beg leave to bring to the favorable notice of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, the undermentioned officers; many of them have served under my command for the last three years, and have been conspicuous for their zeal and gallantry in the various affairs which have occurred with the enemy during that period, and especially in the action of the 12th of January last, and have invariably upheld the reputation of our arms and the honour of our country. Brigadier Wymer, commanding the first infantry brigade, Lieutenant Colonel McLaren, commanding 16th regiment native infantry, Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th regiment, Captain Burney, GENERAL NOTT'S DISPATCH 255 commanding 38th regiment Native Infantry, Captains Christie and Haldane, commanding corps of Bengal irregular cavalry, Major Sotheby, commanding the artillery, Captain Blood, commanding Bombay foot artillery, Major Sanders, Bengal Engineers, Lieutenants North and Stoddart, Bombay Engineers; Majors Leech and Rawlinson, of the Political Department, attended me in the field, and rendered me great assistance in conveying my orders. " My best thanks are due to my Staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Captain Waterfield, Aide-de-Camp, and Lieutenant Tytler, Deputy Quarter Master General. " Annexed is a letter from Brigadier Wymer, speaking in the highest terms of his Brigade Major, Captain T. H. Scott, of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry. I fully appreciate this excellent officer's merits, he has been with me in four actions; I trust I shall not be thought presumptuous in expressing a hope that he will receive some mark of the favor of Government by Brevet or otherwise. " I cannot close this despatch without expressing my admiration of the dashing and gallant conduct, rapid movement, and correct practice of Captain Anderson's troop of Bengal horse artillery; nothing could exceed it, and I beg leave to bring this officer and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop, to the particular notice of His Lordship, as officers who have on many occasions rendered me most essential service. "I have, &c. W. NoTr, Major General, Commanding Field Force, Afghanistan." From Brigadier G. P. WYlMER, Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, to Major General NOTT, Commanding Field Force, dated Camp Chuppakhana, 1st September, 1842. " SIR,-Adverting to division orders of yesterday, expressive of your praise and thanks to the troops employed under your command in action with the enemy on the afternoon of the 30th instant, I hope you will not consider it ill judged on my part bringing to your favorable notice, the valuable assistance I derived from the active services of Captain Scott, Major of Brigade to the 1st infantry brigade under my command, whose exertions during the fight on that day demand and merit my best praise and acknowledgments. This being the second time of the display of Captain Scott's abilities when in action with the enemy as my personal Staff, will I hope plead my apology for recommending him to your notice, and the favorable consideration of Government, in any way you may have it in your power to mention him as a meritorious and deserving officer. "I have, &c. G. P. WYMER, Brigadier, Comg. 1st Infantry Brigade." 256 GENERAL NOTT'S DISPATCH. Return of Ordnance, Ammunition,