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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

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296
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THE PHILOSOPHY
OF DON

HASDAJ

CRESCAS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ORIENTAL STUDIES

VOL. XVII

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF DON HASDAI CRESCAS
BY

MEYER WAXMAN

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, IN THE
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Qltu

Pork

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
1920
All rights reserved

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IN ENGLAND
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PRESS

NOTE
A PECULIAR interest attaches to Hasdai Crescas. He
swam against the current of the philosophical exposition
of his day.

He was bold enough to oppose the speculative
reasoning of Aristotle, the man who held nearly all the
philosophers in his grip during so many centuries; and,
above all, he dared to criticize the introduction of Aristotelian
views into the religious philosophy of his own people, even
though these views were dressed in Jewish garb by the
master hand of Maimonides. The current passed him by;
it could not overwhelm him.
In the following pages Dr. Meyer Waxman has given
us a detailed and a very interesting exposition of Crescas's
philosophic system; and he has added to this a comparison
of Crescas's views, not only with those of Maimonides, but
also with those of Spinoza. We have thus lined up for us
the three greatest minds that speculative Jewish theology
produced during the Middle Ages; and the means are
afforded us to estimate the value of their dip into the
Unknown.
RICHARD

March 24, 1919.

GOTTHEIL.

TO MY WIFE
SARAH V. WAXMAN

PREFATORY NOTE
THE bulk of this study forming the body of the book,
chapters i to vii inclusive, appeared originally in the yewisk
Quarterly Review, New Series, Volumes VIII, Nos. 3, 4,
IX, Nos. i, 2, X, Nos. 1, 2, 3To the editor and publishers of the Quarterly my thanks
are due for their kindness in granting me the permission
to reprint the articles in book form. The introductory
chapter, dealing with the views held by the pre-Maimonidean
philosophers on the problems discussed in Part I, was added
for the purpose of supplying the reader with the necessary
historical background. For the same reason it was deemed
advisable to include in the introductory chapter a short
account of Aristotle's theology, inasmuch as it forms the
centre around which Jewish philosophic theology revolves.
NEW YORK,
JMarch 21, 1920.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Hasdai (or Chasdai) Crescas, the subject of this study,
was born in Barcelona, Spain, in the year 1340. His family
was one of the noblest and wealthiest among the Catalonian
Jews, and supplied many a leader in communal affairs as
well as in scholarship to Spanish Jewry. Hasdai, despite
his great Talmudic scholarship, never occupied any official
Rabbinical position; his wealth made him completely
independent. Yet the fact that he was a layman did not
diminish his prestige.
His fame spread far and wide
throughout the diaspora, and his word was law to many
Jewish communities.
Even the gentile world thought
highly of him, for he stood in some degree of relationship
to the court of James I of Aragon, and was often consulted
on matters of state.
Crescas's life, however, was not all bright, but had its
dark shadows as well. As the result of a conspiracy,
Crescas was accused before the court and was thrown into
prison, together with some of the notables of Catalonian
Jewry, among whom were some of his friends and also his
teacher. After a long term of imprisonment he was
eventually released on bail. The persecution of 1391, which
swept through Spain like a tornado, leaving behind desolation and ruin in most of the Jewish communities, failed not
to include Crescas among its victims. In the massacre of
Barcelona his only son was killed. Thereupon he removed
to Saragossa, where the rest of his life was spent in philosophic study. He died in 1410.
ix

x

BIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

Besides his work Or Adonai, which contains his philosophico-theological speculations, Crescas wrote a polemical
treatise against Christianity in which the fundamental
doctrines of the church are analysed. The latter was
written in Spanish and later translated into Hebrew. The
Or Adonai was originally written in Hebrew.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

PREFATORY NOTE

.

.

..

.

.

Viii

.

.

.

iX

.

.

.

I

I. General Characteristics of Jewish Philosophy .

.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
INTRODUCTORY

.

CHAPTER.

.

II. Arabic Philosophy

.

.

4

III. Historical Survey of the Treatment of the Problems
relative to the Existence of God and His Attributes
in Pre-Maimonidian Jewish Philosophy
.
.
IV. The Theology of Aristotle
.
.
.
.
.

8

.

PART I.

.

.

.

7

GOD

NOTE ON CRESCAS'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

.

.

25

CHAPTER I
CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION
AND
i.

OF THE

THEIR CRITICISM

MAIMONIDIAN

.

.

THEORIES

.

.

.

.

The Maimonidian Aristotelian Proposition

.

29
29

Logical Consequences of the Propositions
.
.
3. The Proofs of the Propositions
.
.
4. Crescas's Refutation of the Aristotelian Arguments.
5. The Refutation of the Proofs of Maimonides .
2.

33
37
40
54

CHAPTER II
CRESCAS'S

TREATMENT

OF THE PROBLEMS

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND
I.

HIS

RELATING

Crescas's Proofs of the Existence of God.
to Spinoza

.

.

.

TO
.

ATTRIBUTES

59

Relation

.

.

.

.

.

59

.

.

.

.

.

62

3. Attributes and Unity. Spinoza's View on the Subject
compared with that of Crescas
.
.
.
.

64

2. Essence and Existence.

Xi

xii

CONTENTS

GOD AND THE WORLD

PART II.

CHAPTER III
PAGE
PROBLEMS

OF

FREEDOM

THE

OF

THE

WILL

IN

.

.

JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

AND

PROVIDENCE,

OMNISCIENCE,

PRE-MAIMONIDIAN
.

.

83

.

CHAPTER IV
MAIMONIDES' VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

.

94

i. Maimonides' Treatment of the Problems of Pre.
.
science, Providence, and Freedom
2. Crescas
on Prescience-Spinoza's View compared

ON IT

94
98

CHAPTER V
PROVIDENCE, POTENCE, AND FREE WILL
i.

Providence

.

.

.

.

I16

.

.

.

I r6

.

.

.

121

Spinoza on Free Will.
.
.
.
.
.

r124

.

2. Potence-Spinoza on Potence

3. Crescas on Free Will.
Views compared
.

.

.

.

.

CHAPTER VI
CRESCAS'S

TELEOLOGY

.

.
.

139
139

..

*

151

AND ETHICS

Spinoza on Teleology

.

.

CHAPTER VII
DIVINE

WILL AND

CREATION

.

Crescas's. Conception-Spinoza's Remarks.
SI57I

BIBLIOGRAPHY .
INDEX

•

I57
159

THE PHILOSOPHY
OF DON HASDAI CRESCAS
INTRODUCTORY
I.

CHAPTER

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JEWISH
PHILOSOPHY.

JEWISH philosophy owes its birth to two great factors

that stimulated thought and intellectual pursuits in the
early mediaeval world in general, but more particularly
in the Arabic world of which the Jews formed a part.
the necessity arising among

These two factors were (x)

theologians to defend their doctrines of faith from heresies 1
which had their origin in the writings of the ancients,
portions of which were newly brought to light and widely
circulated during that period:

(,) the rise of learning at

the dawn of the Middle Ages, which came as a reaction
against the ignorance that reigned in the preceding period
known as the Dark Ages.
Of these two factors, the latter preceded in point of
time, but the former was by far the more important.

It is

a rather difficult task, however, to draw hard and fast lines
and fix the priority of one factor over another, for they
very often overlapped.

The search for weapons of defence

1 Cf. StOckler, Geschichte der Philosophie des Milttelalters, p. 8.

W.

B

2

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF

DON HASDAI

CRESCAS

gave new impetus to the study of ancient writings.

This,

in turn, brought to light a multitude of new problems,
which again opened up new fields for speculation.

The

apologetic tendency, however (though it never disappeared
from mediaeval speculation), changed its form somewhat
and expressed itself in a desire to rationalize religion-to
found the principles of belief on a speculative basis.

The

famous maxim of Anselm, ' Credo ut intelligam ' is the formal
expression of that striving.2

The purpose was not, as some

think, to determine the nature of reason, and thus limit the
field of philosophy, but, on the contrary, to set before
the theologian a speculative end. 3

This desire is manifest

throughout mediaeval philosophic speculation, wherever it
made its appearance, whether in the East or the West,
and especially so in Jewish philosophy, where it assumed
the leading motive, the apologetic tendency being relegated
to the background.
The character of Jewish philosophy is thus already
determined by the conditions of its birth as well as by the
general trend of thought characteristic

of that era.

retains conspicuously all the peculiarities of the age.
receptive in content as well as in form.

It
It is

Authority pre-

dominates; personality and individual opinion fall to the
background before a general abstract tone.

The harmo-

nistic or synthetic tendency to reconcile the conflicting
opinions of various authorities holds a prominent place.
Above all, it is theological and metaphysical.
As a result of its character, the problems with which
Jewish philosophy concerns itself are limited.

God occupies

the central place around which the discussion turns.
2 Baeumker in Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 297.

3 Ibid.

His

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

3

existence, the proofs of His essence, unity, and attributes
are extensively discussed and commented upon. Next in
importance to God is man, but this worthy object of
thought is only viewed relatively, in the light of his relation
to the Supreme Being. This situation gives rise to a
discussion of human actions and involves the question of
free will and determinism, Providence, and the problem
of immortality. The latter includes the definition of the
nature and essence of the soul, and presupposes a study
of psychology in so far as it affects the nature and the
position of the soul in the hierarchy of spiritual beings,
and its participation in the activity of the intelligibles.
A deeper insight into consciousness was unknown in that
age. Logic occupied a worthy place as an instrumental
means by which proofs were established and theories
tested. The theory of knowledge was of little consequence
in those days; everything was revelation. Man was created
for the purpose of knowing. On the other hand, certain
metaphysico-physical problems, such as time and space
attracted great attention. Their importance lay in the
fact that they were involved in the discussion of the proofs
of the existence of God as well as in the question, allimportant for theological purposes, of creatio ex nikilo.
Inasmuch as in the treatment of these problems Jewish
thinkers were greatly influenced by Arabic philosophy,
and borrowed most of their material from it (in fact,
Jewish philosophy can be said to be a child of the latter),
a short survey of Arabic philosophy will help to make
clear the degree of relationship between them and, at
the same time, bring out the exact character of Jewish
philosophy.
B 2

4

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DON HASDAI CRESCAS

II.

ARABIC PHILOSOPHY.

Arabic philosophy owes its birth to a combination of
circumstances which made possible the continuation of
Greek speculation in a modified form in the East after
its exile from the West. 4 As Greek was hardly intelligible
at this period in that part of the East, translations into
Syriac, the vernacular, became a necessity. When the
Arabs later conquered the country, learning received a
fresh impetus. New series of translations were undertaken
from Syriac into Arabic, as well as from Greek into
Arabic.5 The works translated were of a curious blend
and included portions of Plato's Dialogues (especially
Timaeus),6 many of Aristotle's genuine works and many
Pseudo-Aristotelian, Commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Themistius, Porphyry's Isagoge, a few excerpts
from the pre-Platonic philosophers, mostly of a pseudo
character, and, finally, some of the Stoic works. The
character of the works translated became an important
factor in the development of Arabic philosophy. The
whole field of this philosophy was permeated with the
spirit of Neo-Platonism, and even Aristotle's works were
viewed through the same glasses. Because of this factor,
the strain of Neo-Platonism was never removed from
Arabic philosophy, and that, too, in its most Aristotelian
period. As a result of this, the centre of gravity in philosophic discussion shifted from purely Aristotelian problems
to those which occupy an important place in the NeoPlatonic school such as the NOUS, the world-soul, &c.,
4 In the time of Justinian, 529 A.D.

5 De Boer, History of Philosophy in Islam, pp. 15-17.
6 Stein, C. G. Ph., p. 323 and note 31.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

which are rather of secondary consideration in Aristotle
proper.7
Three tendencies are to be distinguished in the course
of development of Arabic thought: (a) the Calamitic,
including its various forms such as the Mutakallimin, the
M6tazilites, and the Asherites; (b) the Neo-Platonic; and
(c) the Aristotelian. The first is characterized by its predominant theological stamp and by its curious physical
conceptions. Oddly enough, these theologians turned to
Democritus rather than to Aristotle. They taught that
things are composed of invisible atoms movingin the roid
and time is similarly composed of indivisible 'nows'.
They combined this physical view with a queer theology.
The atom is formless and attains perfection by receiving
accidents which are momentarily created by God, and
which alternately perish and are recreated. Some of the
radical sects denied that there is continual creation, and
declared the existence of stability in nature. The atomic
theory was also applied to the soul. The soul was conceived to be a composition of fine atoms endowed with
special accidents.
They also held a peculiar view of
reality. The senses are not reliable, and whatever is
thinkable or even imaginable is possible, even if it be not
in agreement with sensible reality.8 The greatest objection
to Aristotle was his contention as regards the eternity
of the world, and because of this they turned to Democritus.
The problem of the creation of the world occupied the
most important place in their philosophic system and even
became a means for proving the existence of God.
The second current of thought, the Neo-Platonic, found
7

Stein, ibid.

8 Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, vol. I, ch. 73.

6

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF DON HASDAI

CRESCAS

its exponents in the Society of the Brothers, who flourished
in the Tenth Century and left behind a cyclopedia in
which their ideas are preserved. This line of thought, as
its origin testifies, is mystical in character.
The theory
of emanation, the development of the soul through lower
forms into the human, its return to its source after purification by means of the knowledge of truth, are some of its
teachings. 9
The third tendency in Arabic philosophy, the Aristotelian, is the most important. Its chief exponents, Al-Kindi
(87o), Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (1037), and Ibn Roshd (1198),

have attained renown. However, even here, Neo-Platonism
is not banished; Al-Farabi still teaches it; the NOUS
7rolrTLK6S-another name for the world-soul-is all-important. Another doctrine of great value was the Averroistic
' unitas intellectus', which taught that there is no individual
intellect but rather a universal one, the active reason, and
it is individual only in so far as any one personal mind
participates in the general. The question of the eternity
of the world was another difficult and keenly perplexing
problem which Averroes was finally compelled to admit
and as a result, to limit creation to the forms.' °
All these movements, currents, and undercurrents of
thought agitating the Arabic world have their counterpart
in Jewish philosophy, which may also be divided into three
similar periods in which the above-mentioned tendencies
prevailed, viz. (a) the Mutakallimin, of which many Karaite
writers and principally the Rabbinist Saadia (940) are the
exponents; (b) the Neo-Platonic, represented by Ibn Gabirol
and partly by Bahya; and (c) the
whose

"Aristotelian,

9 Goldziher in Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 53.

10xo
Goldziher, 58-64.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

spokesmen are Abraham Ibn Daud, Maimonides, and
Gersonides.
Crescas stands apart from all these and
resembles more closely the Arabic philosopher Al-Gazali,
who, in his book Destructio Philosophorumn, likewise attacked
the philosophic doctrines of his age and attempted to show
their fallibility. These divisions, however, are to be
regarded as rough landmarks rather than as fixed boundaries. Jewish philosophy is not entirely a shadow of
Arabic philosophy. It can lay claim to individuality and
initiative. Its exponents never followed blindly any one
Arabic school, but rather chose various theories from each
school, especially those that stood a rigid test of criticism.

III.

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE TREATMENT OF THE
PROBLEMS RELATIVE TO THE EXISTENCE
AND

His

ATTRIBUTES

BY

THE

CHIEF

OF GOD
JEWISH

PHILOSOPHERS.

Saadia (892-942), the first Rabbinic philosopher, followed
the indirect method of the Mutakallimin in his philosophic
proofs of the existence of God. To them, the question of
creatio ex nikilo was an all-important one, and to it they
devoted all their energies. The existence of God was
a necessary corollary to this question; for, granted that the
world is created, the existence of a creator must be posited.
Saadia, however, followed the Mutakallimin more in method
than in content. Of his eight proofs only a few agree with
those of the Mutakallimin as quoted by Maimonides.
The proofs for the existence of God are arranged by Saadia
in the following order:
I. The world is finite-a fact, demonstrated according
to the knowledge of his times. This is also one of the

8

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF DON HASDAI CRESCAS

fundamental principles of Aristotle. Again, a finite body
must necessarily possess a finite moving power (this is
likewise one of Aristotle's propositions and was used
repeatedly in his proofs of the existence of God). Like
every finite thing, the world, therefore, must have a beginning,
and hence was created. The corollary of the existence
of a creator is more implied than expressed. The proof,
however, is not absolutely convincing ; for, one may argue,
granted that the world has a beginning, it still may not
have a creator. It may have arisen by chance. Saadia
himself argues later against the theory of chance.
II. The world-matter is composite and, as every
composed thing, it is possible of existence; for the elements
per se have no natural tendency to stay apart or to be
united. If such a tendency existed, either the elements
would stay apart for ever or would never decompose. The
case, however, is not so. It follows, therefore, that there
must be some external source affecting their composition;
and as cause follows cause, there is of necessity some final
creator. This last agrees with the third proof used by the
Mutakallimin as quoted by Maimonides (Guide of the
Perplexed, I, 74). It is also similar to the cosmological
proof formulated by Leibnitz, although somewhat differently
expressed.
III. We observe in the world of things that accidents
are continually generated and destroyed. But accidents
are inseparably inherent in substance; it, therefore, follows
that if accidents have a beginning matter must have as
well, and hence must have a creator. This proof agrees
entirely with the fourth of the Mutakillimin cited by
Maimonides, and is directly connected with the Calamitic

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

9

theory of matter which assumes" that the atom becomes
matter only through its accidents. But this is untenable
according to the Aristotelian notion of primal matter, which
is said to be a substance devoid of accidents and is known
as ether.
IV. Time must be finite. For, assuming that time is
infinite and, as is usual, is conveniently divided into past,
present, and future, the present' now' which has no magnitude may, for the sake of argument, be taken as a startingpoint. If we then try in our imagination to reach upward
from that point, the human reason is unable to grasp the
fact that time is infinite. This being the case, how couild
existence ever reach us, since an infinity never ends ? We,
however, do exist.
It follows, therefore, that time is
finite; and accordingly the world which is in time had
a beginning and a creator.
This proof is Calamitic in
form, especially the emphasis laid upon unthinkability of
the infinite with a view to its unreality.-Aristotle produces
a similar argument as regards the infinite.-The dictum
that whatever is unthinkable is also non-existent was
a fundamental principle with this school. The proof itself,
however, survived long in philosophic literature, and is
repeated by Kant in his thesis of the first antinomy, where
almost the exact argument is reproduced with the omission
of the part played by unthinkability.
Saadia brings forth three more proofs of a direct
character: (I) Things could not create themselves. It is
evident that the state of being is more perfect than that
of becoming. But we see that if in the state of being
a thing happens to be imperfect it cannot become more
11 See above, section 2.

10

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF DON

HASDAI

CRESCAS

perfect by its own means, but needs the help of an external
agent; how then could it become at all by itself? 12 A
similar argument is quoted by Albertus Magnus. (2) It is
impossible for things to create themselves on account of
the peculiar nature of time. Time is only conventionally
divided into three parts; while in reality there are only
two; for, the present has no duration. The question thereupon arises when could things create themselves? In the
time previous to their origin they were not in existence;
then how could a non-existing thing create itself? And
to say that they created themselves after their coming into
existence is highly absurd. To speak of their creating
themselves at the particular moment of coming into existence is meaningless, for that moment of time cannot be
isolated since it is a 'now' and therefore has no duration.
(3) If we endow things with the ability to create themselves, we must also concede them the power of not entering
into existence, for otherwise things would always exist.
We posit then two contraries at one and the same time.
In order to fortify himself against every form of attack,
Saadia reproduces the famous Aristotelian proposition
which demonstrates the impossibility of an infinite causal
series.13 He employs it, however, to disprove the eternity
of matter and not to prove that there is a final moving
cause, as the philosophers do. By this he wishes to imply
that material causes could not go on infinitely but must
have had a beginning..
After the proofs for the existence of God had been
12 Ffirst's interpretation

of this passage has been used.

It is true that

the passage lends itself to a more strict interpretation, but for philosophical
clearness of thought a full interpretation seems more advisable.
13 Metaphysics, a 2.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

IT

satisfactorily disposed of, Saadia proceeds to prove that
there is only one God.

He brings forward the following

arguments: (i) Since it was proved that God is the cause
for every

of all being, it follows that he is incorporeal;

form of being is composite, and a composite thing cannot
be an ultimate cause, since it needs some other external
cause to effect its composition.

Were there more gods

than one, the conception of God would fall under the
category of number, and whatever is in the category of
number is corporeal.
is one.14

It is evident, therefore, that God

(2) There cannot be two gods; for, if there were

two, we must assume that in the act of creation they
cannot act independently but need mutual help.

In such

case they are determined and one is the cause of the
other-an assumption directly in contradiction to the conception of God as the sole ultimate cause.

On the other

hand, should we assume their absolute independence, the
act of creation is hardly conceivable; for a conflict would
of necessity ensue.' 5

The strength of this proof is best

comprehended on comparing it with the fifth proof of the
Mutakallimin as quoted by Maimonides,' 6 where the reasoning is improved in logical strength by the supply of a link in
the chain of argument, viz. ' If, on assuming that the two
gods are independent, we must also assume that each one is
potent enough to create the world, then the other is entirely
(3) The third proof is very logical, and is

superfluous.'
the strongest.

How shall we conceive these two gods?

Are they exactly alike in substance without the least
difference?

If so, they are one and not two.

Wherefore,

14 Cf. Maimonides, Guide. Proposition 16 quoted from Aristotle.
15 Cf. infra, Chapter I, and the objection of Crescas to such proof.

1e

G. P., Ch. 75.

Cf. D. Kaufmann, Attributenlehre.

:2

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF DON

HASDAI

CRESCAS

we must assume that they are different, but not entirely
different; they must be similar at least in as far as both are
gods. Each one of them will accordingly have points of
difference and points of similarity, and will, as a result,
be composite-a fact contrary to the conception of God.
The fact that to Saadia the creation of the world is an
all-important principle affected his theory of attributes.
He derives them solely from the concept creator. They
are very few in number, living, potent, and wise. Willing
is left out, for it is not strictly inherent in the concept
creator. It implies the notion of striving to an end and so
necessarily involves a limitation.' 7 Besides, potent really
includes willing.' s These attributes do not imply any
change in his essence, they denote really one thing. The
attributes are not separated from his being but exist
through his being.- In God, existence and essence are
one. God is beyond any categories, even that of quality.
The emotional qualities often ascribed to Him, such as
loving or hating, are to be understood in a rather figurative
way. God commanded certain precepts and those who
follow them are said to be loved, on the contrary those
who disobey them are described as being hated. 19 When
speaking of God as being an agent, we must conceive it in
a different sense than the agency of man, for contrary to
0
man He is not moved while acting and is always active.2
The many adjectives of God which are often mentioned in
the Bible, whether emotional or active, are all relative,
describing His relation in reference to His creatures.
17 Cf. Spinoza.

Appendix to v. i, Ethics.

18 Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 27, N. 54.

19 Emunoth ve Deoth, ed. Kitower, Jusefof, 1885, p. 50 a.
20 Ibid, p. 51a.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

'3

Saadia really laid the philosophic basis of the theory of
attributes. His followers improved upon the form of the
theory, but hardly added anything to the contents.
Bahya, the next representative Jewish philosopher after
Saadia, is a little less complicated in his proofs, but bears
such a resemblance to Saadia, that to quote his proofs in
full would be mere repetition. He, like Saadia, employs
the indirect method in establishing the existence of God,
namely, by proving that this world has a creator. Bahya
posits three principles: (I) A thing does not create itself.
(2) The series of beings is finite, and as such had a beginning. (3) Every composite thing is generated. He proves
the first in exactly the same way as Saadia did,21 showing
the impossibility of locating the moment of self-creation,
but fails to mention the division of time which really forms
the basis of the proof. The second 'is proved through the
demonstration of the finitude of time employed by Saadia,
and supported by the famous Aristotelian argument against
the infinite of ' the part and the whole'.22 The third is
proved by observation. These physical proofs are fortified
by a beautiful exposition of the argument from design.
It is rather curious that the argument from design,
which is frequently mentioned in Rabbinic literature (cf.
Bereshit Rabba, Chapter 39) and even hinted at in the Bible
(cf. Ps. 8) should be so little employed in Jewish philosophy.
It is only in Bahya and Halevi that we find it mentioned.
It is probably because these two pay more attention to the
ethical side of religion than to the dogmatic theological.
Bahya's proofs of unity are interesting. Some of them
are reproductions of the proofs offered by Saadia, but some
21 Cf. above, p.

o.
22 Cf. ch. i, p. 38.

THE PHILOSOPHY

14

OF DON HASDAI

CRESCAS

He adduces seven proofs of which the third,

are original.

fourth, and seventh agree with the second, third, and fourth
of Saadia. The others are stated in the following manner:
(1) In observing the world of things, we notice an ascending
scale of causes.

Their number is always less than that

of the things caused, 23 and the higher we ascend in the
scale of being, the fewer the causes become.

It follows,

then, that on reaching the top of the ladder, there must be
only one cause.

(2) Design testifies not only to a creator

but also to one, for the world is so beautifully harmonious
that we must involuntarily conclude that it is the plan of
one creator.

(3) One is the fundamental basis of number

and measure.

Before there is plurality there must be

unity, for plural means only so many times one.

It is

evident, therefore, that there must be only one ultimate
cause, for if we agree that there is more than one creator,
there must by necessity be one preceding, and then he is
the God.

(4) Plurality must have accidents, for it is sub-

sumed under the category of quantity, and this is contrary
to the conception of God.

This last proof is analogous to

Saadia's first proof, but expressed in a different form.
In the theory of attributes, Bahya diverges greatly from
Saadia in naming such attributes as are entirely omitted
by the former.

The difference arises through the variance

of the method of derivation.

Bahya divides the attributes

into two classes, essential and active.

Saadia also uses the

same names indirectly for various classes of attributes, but
the name essential has a different meaning with Saadia.
Saadia viewed the attributes sub specie creationis, since they
are all derived from the notion creator.

B3ahya, on the

2 e. g. the genera are less than the species, the categories less than the
genera.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

15

other hand, views them sub specie speculationis, and they
are, therefore, according to him, existent, one, and eternal,
such as have been proven to belong to God by philosophical
demonstration. That these attributes are sublime, pure,
and abstract in character, and approach the highest philosophic conception of God, is self-evident. The term essential, by which Bahya describes the foregoing attributes,
signifies that these attributes are to be predicated of God
independently of the fact that he is the creator of the
world. These attributes, though in relation to God are
named essential, yet, as far as the human mind is concerned, express only a negative meaning. The second
class, the active, describe the relations of God to the world
and men through actions. They are of course figurative in
24
sense, and resorted to only by force of necessity.
Jehuda Halevi (1140) is more of an ethical philosopher
than a metaphysical one. His book, the Kuzari, is so
religiously inspired that it can hardly be expected of its
author to endeavour to prove the existence of God, when
such a thing is self-evident. The fact that all humanity
believes in the existence of God is sufficient for him. This
kind of proof is indirectly inferred from the whole tenor of
the book, and especially from the fact that in his arguments
about the truth of the Jewish tradition he lays great
2
emphasis upon the consensus omnniurm. 5 He makes also
occasional and indirect mention of the argument from
design.2 6
His theory of attributes, however, is quite interesting
24 Passages used in exposition of Bahya's doctrine are found in Hobot
ha-Lebbabot, ed. Wilna Tractat, r, pp. 66-92.
25 The same proof was extensively used among the Christian Philosophers.
28 Kuzari, ed. Isaac Metz, Ii, p.

27.

i6

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF DON

HASDAI

CRESCAS

for its method of division. Halevi divides the attributes
into three kinds: active, relative, and negative. The active
are derived through the description of God's actions, and
include the emotional. The relative are such that men
bestow upon Him, as praised, holy, sublime, &c. They
are, therefore, entirely subjective, and are related to the
human state of mind.
The most important attributes,
the essential as Bahya would call them, are the negative.
They are living, one, and first and last. These connote
nothing else but the denial of the opposite. In reality, we
hardly conceive the kind of life we attribute to God, and
it is surely absolutely different from our conception of life,
but we express it in the positive form in order to ward off
the popular conception that he who is not alive is dead.
The same is to be said about the rest. It is to be noticed
that although Bahya mentions that his essential attributes
have a negative meaning, he does not name them negative;
and, on the contrary, his naming shows that they really
have positive contents. Halevi was the first philosopher
who introduced the term negative (in Rabbinic), and used
it in accordance with its logical meaning. He also names
will an attribute, a thing which his predecessors avoided
and which philosophy always shrank from. He uses as his
defence the argument from design which shows that not
27
only is there a creator but also a wilful one.
Abraham Ibn Daud (died I16o), the last of the Jewish
philosophers of the Pre-Maimonidian period, shows himself
a follower of Aristotle, and accordingly his arguments and
proofs are more philosophic in contents as well as in form.
Of the proofs for the existence of God, he adduces two,
which are really one under two forms. The first is the
27 Kuzari, ed. Isaac Metz, II, p. 27.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

I7

famous Aristotelian used over and over, and even mentioned
by Saadia and Bahya, but never as yet produced in its
pure philosophic form till Ibn Daud.

It runs as follows:

There is no infinite body, there is also no infinite power in
a finite body, but the first sphere moves eternally; there
must, therefore, be a prime mover.

This prime mover is

incorporeal, for since it does not move itself it is not in
time.

(The premisses, as well as the conclusions, of this

proof will be discussed in full later.)

If it is not in time,

it is infinite; again, since it is infinite it is not body, for
body is finite.2 8

The second proof is analogous to one

mentioned by Saadia, but it is expressed in better logical
form, and therefore more convincing.

The world of things

presents to us continual possibility.

There must be one

thing necessary of existence, for the possible of existence
requires a cause, and so we would have an infinite causal
regressus, but that is impossible.

Out of the fundamental

conception of God being necessary of existence, Ibn Daud
deduces the unity of God.

The fact that God is necessary

of existence implies that He is absolutely simple, for every
composite thing is possible.
plicity.

This, however, proves sim-

As for the numerical unity, he adduces the famous

Saadianic-Bahyan arguments of the impossibility of the
existence of two Gods.

Unity, according to him, belongs

to the essence of God, and has therefore a negative ring.
His theory of attributes shows rather a concession to
popular demand than to philosophy.
largest number of attributes
philosopher.

ever

He enumerates the
stated

by a Jewish

There are eight attributes according to him;

they are, one, existent, true,
willing, and potent.

eternal,

living, knowing,

He could not help but realize that

28 Cf. with this conclusion that of Aristotle in Metaphysics, book K. x.

w.

C

18

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DON HASDAI

CRESCAS

there are several superfluities in his list. Let us take the
attribute, living; since we continue counting knowing,
willing, it is already evident that God is living. But, says
Ibn Daud in his defence, when speaking of attributes, we
should not leave too much to logical reasoning, but rather
be popular. Truthful is an interesting.attribute. Ibn Daud
is the only one that employs it. It is according to him
connected with existent. What do we mean by truth and
error, except the real and the unreal, says Ibn Daud.2 9
God is always real, therefore he is the source of truth.
Yet in spite of the fact that Ibn Daud is not very accurate
in his enumeration of the attributes, he is as zealous in his
interpretation of them as any other philosopher to remove
even a probable shadow of corporeality from God. He,
therefore, insists that whatever the attributes express per se,
to us they have only a negative meaning.30
IV.

THE THEOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

In order to elucidate the philosophical ground of the
theology of the Jewish philosophers, the Pre-Maimonidean,
as well as Maimonides, and the Post-Maimonidean, including Crescas, a brief outline of Aristotle's theological view
is necessary. Aristotle proves the existence of a first
cause in several ways; though they may be ultimately
reduced to one, yet differ in form. In the Metaphysics,
Aristotle proves the existence of God in the following
manner: There must exist an eternal immovable substance.
It must be eternal, for since substance is the first of existing
things, it must be indestructible, in order that things should
not all be destructible. Again, movement is eternal, for
29 Cf. P. W. Montague in his essay 'Truth and Error', New Realism.
80 Eimuna Romahi, Exalted Faith, ed. Wilna, p. 51-6.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

'9

time is, and movement is connected with it. That which is
causing movement must be something necessary of existence,
for it is constantly active, and if the cause were not necessary
of existence, movement would not be eternal. The first
heaven is eternally moved, but everything which is moved
must have a mover. There is, therefore, an eternal mover.
This mover is unmoved, for a thing that moves and is
moved is only a secondary, never a first cause; and since
there must be a first cause for there is no infinite causal
3
regressus, the first mover is immovable. 31 In the Physics, 2
the same proof from motion is produced but more emphasis
is laid on the non-existence of an infinite, and the impossibility of an infinite causal regressus. The metaphysical
argument that there must be one necessary cause in this
world, for all possible is only potential, but not constantly
active,-its ground is really the supposition that there
cannot be any infinite causal series,-was very often used
by early scholastic philosophers as well as by PreMaimonidean Jewish philosophers in various modified
forms, though the basal proposition was frequently omitted.
33
Again, in the Fragments, Aristotle proves the existence
of God by the arrangement of the series of beings in the
world order. We note that there is a variety of beings,
and that this variety is arranged in an ascending scale,
there must be then one being who is the highest in that
ascending series, or, to express it differently, the last link in
that chain. This proof was also utilized by various Christian
34
and Jewish philosophers.
As regards the attributes of that first cause, or God,
3'

Metaphysics, XII, C. 6-7.

32
Physics, VIII,

C. 8-io.

33 Fragments, 15.

4 Cf. above, section III, in the exposition of Bahya's views.

C2

20

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF

DON HASDAI

CRESCAS

they follow mostly from the nature of the proofs. God
exists, and his existence is necessary, as has been shown,
and not only necessary but eternal. All this follows
directly from the conception of a first mover. Further,
since God is necessary, He is also excellent or good; 35 for
the necessary, without which things cannot be, is also good
by its own definition.3 6 Life is also an attribute of God,
for according to the Aristotelian conception the highest
activity is thought, and the actuality of thought is life, and
since God possesses the highest activity, it follows that He
possesses life. Moreover, that life is a beatific one. This
follows from the same conception, since the best enjoyments
that we humans have in life are those of mental activities;
God, whose activity eo ipso is thought, must necessarily be
happy. God is also without any magnitude, for He cannot
be a finite magnitude, since He produces motion in infinite
time, and no finite body can possess an infinite power. 37
Again, He cannot be of infinite magnitude, since there are
no such magnitudes. He must, therefore, be without any
parts and indivisible. There is only one first cause, for
there is only one heaven. Would there be many, there
would be several movers who would be one in principle,
and several in number. This supposition would imply the
materiality of the Gods, for that which imparts individuality
to a member of a species is the matter since the form is
one; but we proved that the first cause is incorporeal and
therefore one.38
The foregoing proved the existence of a God and
endeavoured to describe, though abstractly, His nature and
essence. The question still remains, and a very important
35 Metaphysics, XII, 7.

7 Ibid., XII,

7; Physics, VIII.

36 Ibid.
38

Ibid., XII, C. 8.

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER

21

one, what is the relation of this God to the world of which
He is the first cause and principle? This is a very difficult
problem, and was left rather unexplained by Aristotle.
The essential activity of God is thought, but what is the
nature of His thought? To this Aristotle answers explicitly,
that since the thoughts must be of the best kind, the object
of His thinking is He himself.39 Such an answer made the
question more difficult, for if all that He does is to think of
Himself, how is He to be considered a first cause of the
world? True, the first of Aristotle must be understood not
as first in time, since movement is eternal, and, therefore.
contemporaneous with the mover, but a kind of logical
priority; 40 but still how is the causality effected ? Aristotle
explains that He moves the spheres by desire. There is
a kind of Divine love which prompts the beings to seek
Him. However, it does not remove the difficulty, for this
desire is located in the world and not in Him; and the
question how this world with its multiple changes and
striking order came about, and how and why that desire
exists, is still an open one. The God of Aristotle is not an
efficient cause, and exercises no influence upon the world of
which He is supposed to be the principle. It is true,
Aristotle sees a unity in nature, and even quotes the line
from Homer,' The rule of many is not good, one is the
ruler '.41 But how is his 'One', as conceived by him, the
ruler? The later philosophers, especially the disciples of
the Alexandrian school, saw in Aristotle's God an efficient
cause and attributed to him providence. 42 A number of
39 Ibid., XII, 9.
40 Cf. Caird, Evolution of Theology in Greek Thought, V, II, p. 15.
41 Metaphysics, XII, o.
42 Quoted

by Jules
o.

d'Aristote, p. 9g

Simon

in Etude sur la Thcodicee de Platon et

THE PHILOSOPHY

22

OF DON

HASDAI

CRESCAS

mediaeval theologians assumed the same view, among
them Thomas Aquinas. 43 They tried to overcome the
difficulty by positing that the thoughts of God include
a kind of ideal principles or intelligibles which are realized
in the world. Thomas Aquinas says,' Since God is the
cause of things the effects are contained in Him, and thus it
44
follows that God in knowing Himself knows the world.
To this Jules Simon 44 rightly objects that St. Thomas
confounds the conception of a cause with a logical priority,
for God, as understood by Aristotle, is only the latter and
not a preceding cause. A similar conclusion to that of
Thomas is reached also by Caird in his quoted work.
However, the whole conception of the realization of ideal
principles is entirely extraneous to the Aristotelian philosophy and it is rather Platonic.
It is evident that such a theology, no matter how
scientific it might have been, could hardly be accepted by
men to whom religion was not a mere matter of speculation,
but of tradition and dogma, to whom God was not only
a logical principle but an active force in life. It had to be
modified by them and opposed in part. It elucidated the
fact why most of the Pre-Maimonidean Jewish philosophers
insisted so strenuously on the creation of the world, and
why they endeavoured to prove it before the existence of
God. They felt that unless God is proved to be an active
creative force, His existence is valueless for religious purposes. It is only in Maimonides, who followed Aristotle
closely, that creation loses its force. It also illustrates to
a certain degree the opposition of Crescas to Maimonides.
4a l.c, p. Too.
"44
'Patet quod Deus cognoscendo
p. 462.

se ipsum omnia cognoscit opera',

PART I

GO0D

NOTE ON CRESCAS'S PHILOSOPHICAL
POSITION
WITh. Hasdai Crescas, the list of Jewish mediaeval
thinkers, worthy of the name, closes; but his importance
lies rather in his own originality than in his chronological
position. He is among the few Jewish philosophers who
exhibited originality of thought, critical acumen, and logical
sequence, combined with a profound religious feeling. It is
rather the irony of fate that this philosopher, who surpasses
in depth and power of analysis even Maimonides, should
have received rather slight attention at the hands of the
historians of Jewish thought. The books and articles
dealing with Crescas are few in number. The book by

M. Joel, Chasdai Crescas, is perhaps the largest and best
of them; but, with all its merits, it fails to present a comprehensive view of Crescas's thought.

It is therefore the

hope of the present writer that the attempt in the following
pages to present a systematic treatment of the philosophical
conceptions of Crescas will be welcomed by students of the
history of Jewish thought in particular, and of philosophy
in general.
The method adopted in treating the subject is the
problematic one; chiefly because it is the most elucidating
in dealing with a subject of a philosophico-theological
character

such as ours, and also because the work of

Crescas, Or Adonai, 'The Light of God,' lends itself to
such treatment, since it is primarily a book on dogmatics

26

CRESCAS'S PHILOSOPHICAL

POSITION

and follows the usual division into dogmas. As the main
interest of this study lies in the philosophic aspect of
Crescas's thinking, only such problems have been included
as have a philosophic bearing, while all purely theological
questions have been excluded. For this reason, all detailed
discussion concerning creatio ex nikilo, wherein Crescas
opposes Gersonides with great critical ability, are omitted.
Broadly speaking, the study is divided into two parts corresponding to the two central ideas around which the problems
group themselves, viz. (a) God, (b) God and the worldthe problems themselves being treated in the various
chapters and subdivisions.
The theses laid down in this study are the following:
§ i. Crescas holds a prominent place as a critical
examiner of some of the important Aristotelian conceptions
such as space, time, and the infinite.
His criticism is
decidedly modern in spirit, and some of his anticipations
and theories were later fully corroborated by the founders
of modern philosophy and cosmology. These anticipations,
together with his revolt against Aristotelianism in an age
when it was all-dominating, prove the high character of his
work. Moreover, his thoughts on this subject were not
entirely restricted to a small circle of readers of Hebrew,
but also found their way to the external world. It follows,
therefore, that the seeds sown by Crescas are not only
valuable in themselves, but have borne fruit, though how
this was accomplished is not known.
It is extremely
difficult to trace the path over which thought travels.
§ 2. The study intends to point out the mental proximity
between Crescas and that great Jewish thinker Spinoza.
An attempt has been made to-draw a sketch of Crescas's
positive philosophy, which has been compared at each step

CRESCAS'S PHILOSOPHICAL

POSITION

27

with that of Spinoza's system. Great care was observed
in avoiding final decisions in regard to the influence of the
former upon the latter. Unfortunately, the term influence
is often misunderstood to mean either a direct borrowing
If influence is to be
or at least a kind of imitation.
and is to imply the existence
interpreted in a broad sense,
of a number of points of contact, and the supply of a certain
motive power or impulse in a definite direction by one
system upon another, such an influence of Crescas upon
Spinoza probably exists. The word probably is used
advisedly, for the evidence at hand only justifies us in
using the term influence with this qualification.
Crescas, however, is only an indirect critic of Aristotle
through his attack on Maimonides' proof of the existence
of God and theory of attributes which embody the
Hence it is that in order to
Aristotelian principles.
elucidate Crescas's contribution to Jewish and general
philosophy we have to turn to Maimonides first.
Maimonides collected twenty-six propositions, which are
found scattered through the Physics, Metaphysics, and
De Caelo, and on these as a basis he reared his philosophical theology. Crescas reproduces these propositions
in full, and even quotes at length their proofs which were
omitted by Maimonides, and then launches his criticism
not only against Maimonides but against Aristotle himself.
It was rather a bold attempt for those times (end of the
fourteenth century) to dare to criticize Aristotle, but he
pursued it with unflinching persistency. It is necessary,
in order to have a full comprehension of Don Hasdai's
philosophy, to follow him in all the intricate mazes of
Aristotelian physics. We will, therefore, quote the propositions verbatim.

CHAPTER I
MAIMONIDES'

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

CRITICISM AND OBJECTION OF CRESCAS.

I. Infinite magnitude does not exist.' This proposition
is a fourfold one, and the most important of all. It will be
discussed in its four aspects, together with the proofs and
Crescas's objections. II. The simultaneous existence of an
infinite number of bodies of finite magnitude is impossible. 2
This proposition is simply a corollary of the first, for if the
existence of such a number of bodies would be possible,
the sum of all would give us an infinite magnitude, and this
has been proved unreal. III. There is no infinite causal
regressus, that is, the series of causes that lead up to the
present world of things is not infinite, but must have had
a beginning.3 IV. Change is found in four categories, that
of substance, quantity, quality, and that of place; corresponding respectively to the categories, we have generation
and corruption (y&V-eTLs Kai bOopd), growth and decay,
qualitative change, and locomotion or spatial. 4 V. Motion
is a change from the potential to the actual. 5 VI. Movement
1 1p7V 15
h'm-ri "W
(
fl
m
i N'yn,
Moreh Nebukim,
Wilna,
1904. II, first hakdamah; Guide of the Perplexed, Eng. tr. by Friedlinder,
Part II,

1;

Physics, III, 5, 7, ed. Prantl, Greek and German, Leipzig,

Metaph., XI, 10.
2 Guide, ibid., p.

2a;

Physics, ibid.

1:3 11 n)V fl
f b'

'5S'1

?t

43P1,

Guide, ibid.; Physics, III, i ; Metaph. XII,
Physics, III,

I;

1854;

Metaph. XI, 9.

Guide, ibid.; Metaph., II.
2.

CRESCASS EXPOSITION

30

OF THE

6
is of four kinds, essential, accidental, forced, and partial.
Essential movement means the movement of a body
according to its nature and essence. Accidental pertains
to the movement of an accident, such as the movement
of blackness in a body from one place to another, blackness
being only an accident. By the partial is meant the movement of a part of a body when the whole is moved, but
with reference to that part, such as the movement of a nail
in a ship, which is moved by the movement of the ship as

a whole. Partial movement, as different from accidental,
refers to such things as are bodies for themselves, but are
attached by artificial means to another body. Forced
movement includes all kinds of movement which are
unnatural. According to Aristotle, each of the elements
has a natural place whither it tends. A movement in that
direction is natural; thus the natural movement of fire
is upwards and of earth downwards; but a movement
in the opposite direction is unnatural. The movement
of a stone upwards is contrary to nature, and can be
accomplished only by the force exerted by the thrower.
VII. Whatever changes is divisible, and whatever is not
7
divisible does not move and is no body. Aristotle proves
this by explaining that every change is an intermediary
8
state between two opposites, or between a terminus a quo
and a terminus ad quem; therefore, a body in the state
of change must necessarily be divisible, and since movement
is a kind of change, it follows that whatever is moved is
divisible, and also the converse. VIII. Whatever moves
6 pispr

S'I

nivsi

~

n

;r

p n, Moreh, II, 3; Physics, VIII, 4.
dviyicy Isaper"v
Ns praId4AAov arrav

7T

s Metaph. Io69 b.

~

rnvurwi.

EVvaL,Physics, VI, 4.

Y10

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

31

accidentally will ultimately rest of necessity. 9 This is based
on Aristotle's conception of the accidental which identifies
it with the possible. Whatever is possible must of necessity
become actual in infinite time.

Every possible has two

phases, e. g. possible of existence, it is possible for it to
exist, and possible not to exist.

Both of these two possi-

bilities must be realized in an infinite time, for if not, the
thing is either necessarily existing
existing.

or necessarily non-

Likewise, the possible of movement when it does

move will ultimately rest, for the opposite must necessarily
be realized.

IX. A body moving another body is itself

moved at the same time.10

This, however, does not include

such things as move others by being an end to which things
strive.

It was on account of this fact that Aristotle made

the unmoved mover the end of existence, for otherwise
he could not be a first cause.

The mediaeval philosophers,

however, had some difficulty with this proposition.

The

magnet attracting iron and moving it towards itself seemed
to form an exception to the rule laid down in the proposiVarious answers were given but are too absurd to

tion.

reproduce.

X. Whatever pertains to body, either the body

is the stay of it, e. g. accidents, or it is the stay of the body,
as form.12

XI. Some things that have their stay in the

body are divided when the body is divided, as accidents
Some things that are the stay of the body, e. g. soul,

are.

are not divided. 13
"

X II. Every force pertaining to body is

Physics, V, 3.

Or Adonai, ed. Vienna, p. 9 b.

]I]I1 11'1

011
91,

10to
Ibid., VIII, 5.

Moreh, II, 5; Physics, VIII, io.

13 Ibid.

32

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION

OF THE

finite, since body is finite.14 XIII. All kinds of changes
are not continuous, except spatial motion, and of it only the
circular.1
XIV. Spatial motion is the first of movements
both in nature and in time.l 6 XV. Time is an accident of
motion, and both are so related that they exist simultaneously. There is no movement but in time, and whatever
has no movement is not in time.17 XVI. Whatever is not
a body does not fall under the category of number.' s
XVII. Whatever is moved has a mover, either as an
external force or as an internal tendency which is the cause
of the movement.' 9 XVIII. Whatever is being realized
in passing from the potential to the actual, the cause of
the realization is external by necessity.20 It could not be
inherent in the thing itself, for in that case the thing would
never be possible, but always existing. XIX. Whatever
has a cause for its existence is possible of existence.
XX. The converse, what is necessary of existence has no
cause. XXI. Whatever is composite, the composition is
its cause of existence, and therefore possible, as evidenced
from above. XXII. Body is composed of matter and form
by necessity, and is the bearer of some accidents by
necessity.
XXIII. Whatever is possible, even if the
possibility is internal, and the thing does not need any
external force for realization, yet it is possible that it
should not exist. 21 XXIV. Whatever is potential is material.
14 Ibid.

15 Physics, VIII, 8.

16 Ibid., VIII, 7.
18

%'31:1

17 Ibid., IV, 12.

N

t

, literally,

in

whatever is

not

a body enumeration cannot be conceived, Metaph., XII, 8.

II, 9; Physics, VII, I.
20 Metaph. XII, 2.

2 In the translation of this proposition I have followed Hasdai Crescas's

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

33

XXV. The elements of a composite body are matter and
form, and therefore a body is in need of an agent to unite
22
them. XXVI. Time and motion are eternal.

THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSITIONS.
In basing his proofs of the existence of God and the
theory of attributes, Maimonides does not start from the first
proposition, but on the contrary from the twenty-fifth.
This proposition, which is in turn based on the twenty-second
which states that a body is composite by necessity, and on
the fifth which defines the nature of motion as the process
of realization, says:

Every composite body in order to

become needs a mover.

Since all bodies in the perceptible

world are composite, it is necessary to look for their causes
or movers.

This series of causes cannot go on to infinity,

as has been demonstrated in the third proposition.

Again,

in regard to movements, we found in proposition IV that
there are four kinds, and of these locomotion is the earliest,
as shown in proposition XIV, and the circular the most
perfect. The movement of the first sphere is then the
cause of all movement in this world.

However, by the same

force of reasoning we are compelled to search for the mover
of this sphere.

We have seen in proposition XVII that
a body may be moved either by an external cause or an
interpretation in '1

1

1,i2

b, where he says:

22 Physics, VIII, i.

W.

D

ntt"111N'33

11

1'

'I01

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION OF THE

34

internal one. The cause of movement of the first sphere
cannot be inherent in itself, since by proposition XXVI we
know that movement is eternal, and thus it is infinite;
the moving force of the first sphere then would have to be
infinite, but this is impossible. It was shown in proposition I
that no infinite body exists; the first sphere then is a finite
body. But as such it cannot have any infinite force, for
it was proved in proposition XII that no finite body can
have an infinite force inherent in it. It follows that the
cause of movement of the first sphere is an external one.23
We have, then, established the proof of the existence of
a prime mover. It must be the prime, for otherwise we
shall have an infinite causal series.
The nature and character of the mover can also be
deduced from the same propositions. The external prime
mover cannot be corporeal, for then, according to the ninth
proposition, it would be moved while moving, and necessarily it would require another body as its mover, and thus
ad infinitum, but this is impossible (prop. III).
Again,
since it is incorporeal it is also unmoved, for movements
are either essential to bodies or accidental, and the prime
mover not being a body does not move either essentially
or accidentally. Further, since it is unmoved it is also indivisible and unchangeable, for, according to proposition VII,
whatever is not divisible does not move and is not a body,
the converse of it being equally true. From the force of
the same conclusions follows also the unity of the prime

'p

1nn
nn1r'

' in7ai

n ts
1

not only external but incorporeal.

n

"1.

The word

)::
here means

But for the sake of clearness of thought

we prefer to treat of the incorporeality in the next paragraph.
3 b ; Guide, p. 16.

Moreh, II,

MAIMONIDIAN THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

mover.

35

There is only one, for in accordance with proposi-

tion XVI, whatever is neither a body nor a force inherent
in a body does not fall under the category of number. We
have then established the existence

of God, His incor24
immutability, and unity.
poreality, indivisibility,
Maimonides quotes also several other proofs borrowed
from Aristotle's works, one from the Metaphysics.
the one mentioned above.

It is

There must be an unmoved

mover, for since we find a moved mover, and we also find
a thing moved and not moving, it follows that there must
be an unmoved mover; as it is proved that when we find
a thing composed of two elements, and then we find one
element alone, it follows that the other element must also
be found alone.

The nature of the first cause is deduced

from the fact that it is unmoved, in the same way as
above. 25

In his third proof, Maimonides follows closely the

Aristotelian found in Metapkysics, book XII, ch. vi. There
must be one substance necessary of existence, otherwise
the world of things would be destructible.2 6

The third

proposition is again utilized, for there cannot be an infinite
regressus of possibles.

Since it is necessary of existence

through itself it is incorporeal, for according to proposition
XXI, the composition of a body is the cause of its existence.
The rest of the qualities follow necessarily.

Maimonides

quotes also a fourth proof which adds nothing new, but
repeats the same argument in a different form. Maimonides
24

Moreh, II, p. 13 b; Guide, II, p.

16.

25 Moreh, II, p. 14 a; Guide, II, pp. 17 sq.

SSN

, Moreh, II, 15 a.

D2

36

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION

OF THE

produces two more proofs for the oneness of God. Of
these two, one is mentioned by Saadia and Bahia. Suppose
there were two Gods, there would have to be at least one
point of difference between them and some points of
similarity in as far as both are Gods. This would involve
the existence of two elements in- the nature of the Gods,
and thus they would be composite. The second proof is
from the harmony and uniformity of the sum total of
existence. This bears evidence to the oneness of God.
If there were two Gods, there ought to be either a division
of labour or collaboration, for the interdependence testifies
to one plan.
But the first is impossible, for then God
would not be all-potent, and, consequently, there would be
a cause restraining the Divine power; but this is contrary
to the concept of God. This argument is also brought
by Saadia, but Maimonides gives it a more Aristotelian
2
form.
In comparing Maimonides' proofs with the proofs of
those who went before him, we see that, while he did not
contribute much origiriality to the problem, he at the same
time systematized and arranged the proofs in complete
logical order, which made them convincing. Most of the
antecedent philosophers either omitted some links in the
logical chain, such as the impossibility of an infinite causal
regressus, or hinted at it without making their thoughts
clear. Maimonides, as a careful builder, included everything.
In regard to Aristotle, he exhibits himself a faithful
follower, without accepting the conclusion at which he
arrives.
27

Moreh, II,

16 a-b;

Guide, p. 23.

MAIMONIDIAN THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

PROOFS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN

37

PROPOSITIONS.

Aristotle proves that the infinite does not exist either
as a separate independent thing, or as a sensible thing, or
as a movable.

The infinite, says Aristotle, may be of

several kinds, either such that it is not in its nature to be
measured or passed through, as the voice is invisible, 28 or such
29
one that cannot be passed through on account of its extent.
It is the last kind of infinite that the discussion turns on,
for the first kind of infinite cannot be a principle nor an
element.

There cannot be a separate independent infinite

as a thing by itself, for it must be either divisible or indivisible.

If it is indivisible, it cannot be infinite except in

the same way as the voice is indivisible, which is a quality
that does not belong to it by nature; but we speak of an
impassable infinite, which implies extent, and thus it is
coupled with magnitude.

But if it is divisible, it is a

quantity and cannot exist by itself. Again, if it is divisible
and exists as a substance, every part of it will be infinite,
and this is absurd, for there cannot be many infinities in
one.

It must, therefore, be indivisible, but it is magnitude,

and magnitude does not exist by itself. It must, therefore,
be an accident,
3
separate. o

but then it is not a principle, nor a

There cannot be an infinite body: first, it is impossible
by the mere definition of a body which describes it to be
a thing that has superficies bounded by planes, and this
28 Physics, III, 5; Metaph., book K, ch. x.

29 Spinoza, in his Epistola XII, Opera, ed. Van Vloten and Land, Hague,
1882, makes a similar distinction, calling the first infinite, the second
indefinite.
0so
Physics, III, 5; Metaph., book K, ch. x.

38

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION OF THE

already implies finitude. There are, however, more concrete arguments. An infinite body could be neither simple
nor composite, for if the elements are finite, one at least
must be infinite, and then the others will be destroyed
since the infinite element must surely have most potency.
If all the elements were infinite, the infinite body would
be composed of many infinities, which is absurd. Simple
it cannot be, for it is not of the four elements, since they
are all finite and there are no other elements beside them.
Again, how could anything be created, for becoming
implies change from one contrary to another, and infinite
has no contraries.
It is evident, therefore, that there
cannot be a simple infinite body.
Further, if there is an infinite body, it must have weight,
whether light or heavy, but this is impossible, for the light
moves upwards and the heavy downwards, but the infinite
has neither an 'up' nor a 'down'. Again, since every body
is in place, infinite body must have infinite place, but there
is not any infinite place, since there are six kinds of place,
the up and the down, &c. Finally, since body must be in
place, and the latter by definition is the limit of the surrounding body, body must be finite. 3x
It is also impossible that there should exist a moving
infinite, whether moving in rectilinear fashion or circular.
Every body has a definite place, and the place of the part
and the whole is the same. Consequently, an infinite body
cannot move rectilinearly, as it is composed either of like
parts or unlike parts. If of like parts, no part can move,
for the place of the part is the place of the whole and it is
infinite. If of unlike parts, the parts must be either finite
or infinite; if finite, then at least one is infinite in magnitude,

1t
Physics, III, 5 ;

Metaph., book K, ch. x.

MAIMONIDIAN THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

and this is impossible. 32

39

If they are infinite in number,

then there are an infinite number of places, but this is
impossible.33

Again, an infinite body must have infinite

weight, and because of it its moving is unthinkable.
heavier a body is the less the time in which it moves.

The
It

follows that an infinite body must either move in no time
or the 'now', which is the same, or that if we posit for it
some time we will find a finite body moving in the same
time.

The relation of time and weight is a reverse one.

Now if we posit some time for the infinite, it is possible
to find a finite body of whatever weight moving in the
same time. We have then a finite and infinite body moving
in the same ratio of time: this is contrary to the principles
of motion.

Still more, if we multiply the body of finite

weight, it will move in less time than the body of infinite
weight, but such a supposition is absurd.
Likewise, the circular movement of an infinite body is impossible, for if the circle is infinite, the radii are also infinite
and the distance infinite; the circle then would never be
completed and

the distance

never

measured

through.

Again, the time of the revolution of a circle is finite, but
the distance in this case is infinite; how then can infinite
distance

be traversed

in finite

time ?34

Finally, it is

impossible for the infinite to be either an active agent
or a patient.

The

relation

between

two

bodies,

affecting and the other affected, is the following:

one
Two

bodies equally large will both be affected in an equal time;
if one is smaller, it is affected in less time.

The relation

also varies according to the power of the agent, and the
82 Cp. above, this section.
33 De Coelo, ed. Prantl, I, ch. 7; Physics, III, 5; Metaph., book K, ch. x.
4 De Coelo, I, ch. 5.

4o

CRESCAE'S

EXPOSITION

OF THE

affection must be accomplished in a certain limited time.
It follows, therefore, that the infinite can neither affect nor
be affected, for since we must posit for it a certain time,
as it cannot be affected nor affect in no time, we can always
find a certain finite body that is either affected or affects
in a similar amount of time.

Moreover, if the finite body

is increased in size, it will be affected or affect in a longer
But

or a shorter time respectively than the infinite body.
this is contrary to the principle of action and passion.

35

These, in short, are the arguments of Aristotle against
the infinite,, which
Crescas.

are very accurately

shows

He

extensive

an

reproduced by

acquaintance

with

Aristotle's works hardly displayed before by any Jewish
philosopher.

He now launches his criticism against each

of the arguments, examining it in detail.

CRESCAS'S REFUTATIONS OF ARISTOTELIAN
ARGUMENTS.
Crescas, in

attacking

Aristotle, follows

arguments in logical order.

the latter's

First, Aristotle argues that

there is no separate infinite as a thing in itself, for if it
does exist and is divisible, its parts would have to be
infinite (cp. above).
sarily follow.

This, replies Crescas, does not neces-

Since the infinite we are speaking of is

a separable, not a corporeal one, why should it be divisible
or its parts infinite?

Is the mathematical line divisible,

and are its parts points?
indivisible infinite ? 36
" Ibid., p. 273.

Why can there not be an

But the main force of the Aris-

MAIMONIDIAN

totelian argument

THEORIES AND THEIR

against the

CRITICISM

41

existence of a separate

infinite, as Crescas rightly observes, consists in the impossibility of the existence of a separate magnitude not
connected with a body (cp. above).
exist

separately,

for then space

A magnitude cannot
would have

to exist

separately of the body, but according to the Aristotelian
conception of space it is impossible.

Outside of the world

nothing exists; there is no vacuum stretching beyond its
boundaries, and, since whatever is in the world is body,
it follows that if we do conceive any magnitude, we must
conceive it in bodily form;

hence there is no separate

magnitude, and, consequently, no separate infinite.
But, says Crescas, this line of reasoning is a petitio
principii, as the conclusion is still to be established; for
should we prove the existence
possibility for an infinite to exist.

of a vacuum there is a
Crescas then proceeds

to refute Aristotle's contention of the non-existence of the
infinite, attacking the basic principle.

There is no vacuum,

argues Aristotle, for if there were, movement in it would
be impossible.

Movement

in space

is caused by the

difference in the natural inclination of things to strive
towards certain points, some tending upwards, some downwards; the vacuum has no such places.

A body in it

would either never move, for why should it move in one
direction rather than in the other, or never stop, since

r
it

S1t1
11
13V
N9A mmfl
1V
w
1"zlr,
Or Adonai, p. r4 a.
Spinoza, in his Epistola XII, in discussing the infinite, produces the same

argument:

' Quare omnis illa farrago argumentorum quibus substantiam

extensam finitam esse, philosophi vulgo moliuntur sua sponte ruit. Omnia
illa substantia corpoream ex partibus conflatam supponunt ad eundem etiam
modum alii qui postquam sibi persuaserunt, lineam punctis componi multa
invenire potuerunt argumenta
infinitam divisibilem.'

quibus ostenderunt

Opera, II, p. 42.

lineam non

esse in

42

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION

OF THE

there is no tendency to a certain place.37

Again, not only

could there not be natural motion, but not even violent
motion.

Projectiles thrown by a person or instrument

continue their motion after the motor ceased to have
contact with them, because the particles of the air are
moved, and they impart the motion continually to the
projectile.

But in a vacuum the motion cannot be con-

veyed; the projectile must therefore stop of necessity.
Further, the rate of motion varies according to the
power of the motor and according to the media and their
power of resistance.

The thinner the medium, the more

accelerated is the motion.

If a vacuum

in it would have to take place in no time.

exists, motion
Two bodies,

A and B, move in different media, C and D. If the motors
are equal, the rate of time and motion of A and B will vary
according to C and D.

But if D is a vacuum, there is no

ratio, for what comparison

could there be between the

motion of B which is not offered any resistance whatever,
and that of A which has to overcome it in a degree?
The movement of B, therefore, will be in no time.

But

movement must be in time; a vacuum, therefore, does not
exist.

Finally, if a vacuum exists, it is possible for two

bodies to occupy one place.

When anything is thrown

into water, an amount of water equal to the body is displaced, and a similar process takes place in air. What then
will happen to a body in a vacuum?

If the vacuum merely

recedes then it is nothing; it is just this that we endeavoured
to prove.

But if the vacuum is something, it must per-

meate the body ;38 why then should not any body permeate
" Physics, IV, 7$ Physics, IV, 8.

See also Simplicius's commentary to that chapter,
translated by Thomas Taylor in his translation of the Physics of Aristotle.
London, I8o6, p. 228.

MAIMONIDIAN

another body?

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

43

The reason that body does not permeate

body is not because of its substance or colour but because
of its distance or intervals.
vacuum

may

permeate

Now if the intervals of the

a body,

why

not

any

other

intervals ?
These arguments Crescas attempts to disprove in the
following manner.

It does not follow, says he, that the

existence of a vacuum should prevent motion.

It is true

that a vacuum does not possess any differences of a spatial
nature such as upwards and downwards, but still, as long
as the points of natural tendency exist and the elements
possess that tendency, they will go on moving though the
medium of movement is a vacuum.

As for violent motion,

it seems that the moment a body is set in motion, it
acquires by virtue of its elements

and

their tendency

towards their natural place a propensity to move without
any assistance on the part of the medium.

Further, argues

Crescas, granted that rectilinear motion cannot be in a
vacuum, still what is there to prevent the existence of an
extra-mundane

vacuum, wherein

a body

can

move in

a circular fashion, a movement which does not necessitate
the possession of the termini a quo and ad quem. 39

In

regard to the second argument of Aristotle, Crescas contends that it is based on a false premise.

The argument

assumes that the ratio of the motion of one body to
the motion of the other is as medium to medium, when

rnri

9

Wa

+11n

I

305 1+511Vmnn)
nniY20
.15rn

nn

n~~s1

fl
nT3n

f~~yN,

Or Adonai,

P.

1
4

b.

,mur

ir

44

CRESCAS S EXPOSITION OF THE

media are different in density, but this is untrue. We,
asserts Crescas, must grant to every moving body an
original motion which was imparted to it by the motor
varying according to the strength of the motor. The
medium only retards the motion by its resistance, but it
cannot accelerate it. The formula, therefore, ought to be:
the ratio of retardation of one body to the retardation of
another body varies as the media. In a vacuum, therefore,
resistance is reduced to zero, but the original motion is
preserved, and the body is still moved in a certain time.
Finally, the argument of the impenetrability of matter
(cp. above) is objected to by Crescas. Aristotle's dictum
that body cannot penetrate body on account of its distances
and dimensions cannot be true, for a body is impenetrable
not on account of its possessing mere distances, but because
of the matter filling those distances. Immaterial distances,
such as the interval which is called a vacuum, may permeate
a body. It is evident, therefore, that a vacuum may exist.
Further evidence of its existence is the fact that it is
quantitatively conceived, as, for instance, if the air in a
vessel is partly pumped out, we say that the vacuum is
large or small according to the amount of air pumped out.
It is then necessarily a magnitude, and though granting
that there is not an infinite body, the existence of a
separable infinite magnitude is still more necessitated.
Beyond the world there is no body, the vacuum cannot
be limited by body, but it surely cannot be limited by
40
a vacuum; it must be infinite.
While these objections hardly have any value in the
light of modern science, yet according to the spirit of
the times they are valid, and greatly testify to the critical
40 Or Adonai, ibid., 15 a.

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

ability and analytic acumen of Crescas.

45

They surely form

a step in the formation of the right scientific cosmogony.
The conceptions of the infinity of the world and of the
existence of infinite space were necessary conditions in
the generation

of the Copernican system and the new

cosmological view.

Surely, Crescas as well as Aristotle

was ignorant of the real laws of motion.

It is remarkable

that Aristotle, who had a notion of the law of inertia as
seen from his arguments against the existence of a vacuum,
namely, that if a vacuum exists perpetual

motion were

possible, for in vacuo a body may move on for ever, and
who also recognized the resistance of air as evidenced from
his second argument against the existence of a vacuum,
should not have discovered the law of inertia and have
considered the particles of air as helping motion rather
than impeding it, yet in Crescas's refutation we perceive
a glimpse of the law of gravitation.

It

is not known

whether Crescas ever exerted any influence upon Giordano
Bruno or not, though another Italian, Franz Pico, quotes
his anti-Aristotelian arguments in full,41 but whatever be
the case, it is interesting to observe the similar pulsations
of mental activity in different ages, periods, and lands.
Crescas next proceeds to refute Aristotle's arguments
against the existence

of an infinite body.

The latter's

general argument from the definition (cp. above) of body
as a thing that has limited superficies, says Crescas, is only
a

petitioprinciii.

42

to establish.

It is just this limitation that we seek

The one who asserts the existence of an

infinite body denies the assumed definition.

But, says he

further, his other arguments are also not proved.
41

M. Joel in his Chasdai Crescas, note iv, Anhang.

42 In Crescas's words it is termed

1'l1 ;tII

tl.

The

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION

46

OF THE

infinite, says Aristotle, cannot be a composite, for if it is,
the elements would have to be infinite, and this is impossible.
Crescas rejoins, The impossibility of the existence of infinite
elements

is not

established;

the reason, according

to

Aristotle, for the non-existence is that the infinite cannot
be conceived; but, asks Crescas, must they be conceived
in order to exist

?43

The elements qua elements may have

existence though not exactly known.

This objection marks

a departure from the dominant Aristotelian system which
ascribed existence only to such things that were supported
by the evidence of the senses and logical reasoning.

Such

a conception could hardly be grasped by an Aristotelian.
That a thing in itself, to use the Kantian terminology, may
exist without being either perceived or logically analysed
44
or described, was an impossibility to them.
Further, says Crescas, the objection that if the infinite
is composite, one element at least must be infinite and then
it would destroy the rest, can be answered in this way,
that the infinite may be devoid of qualities just as the
heavenly spheres are.

However, here Crescas seems not

to understand Aristotle. Aristotle, in Metaphysics, book K,
ch. x, states distinctly that one element must not fall short
in potency, and whatever is in potency must sometimes be
45
realized, so that finally it will destroy the other element.
Crescas probably thought that it meant the infinite element
would have stronger actual qualities.
argument

for the impossibility of the

2S "

Again, Aristotle's
existence

of an

2z, Or Adonai, p. 15.
Or Adonai, p. 15 a.
41 Cp. Brandis, in his Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-R6mnischen

44

Philosophie, II, p.

727;

Physics, IV, 5.

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

47

infinite body on account of its weight and its tending to
its natural places (cp. above) is not unimpeachable. Why,
asks Crescas, must it have weight ? Is it not because all
sensible bodies in the sublunar sphere have it? But suppose
the infinite is different, is not the matter of the heavenly
spheres, according to Aristotle, devoid of weight ?46 This
is another indictment against the following of the chain
of evidence of the senses and logical reasoning.
Finally, Crescas directs his main attack against the
arguments from the nature of space. Aristotle defines
space as the limit of the containing body,47 and consequently by its very definition and nature it must be finite
and inherently connected with body. Where there is no
body there is no space, and, therefore, the world as a whole
is not in space though its parts are. This theory, says
Crescas, is untenable. The whole conceptual structure of
Aristotle of natural places, of upwards and downwards,
and the tendency of various elements thereto, is built on
false premises. How, asks he, can we assert that air has
a natural place, the 'up', near the fiery sphere? What
happens then to the middle layers of air? Are they in their
natural place? but it was asserted that their natural place
is the 'up'. If they are not in their natural place, we have
then a phenomenon of variance of places, the place of the
part differing from the place of the whole. 4 s Again,
0DDN1
47

n3)l,,

0n91

t n1~~ 1

D44

Physics, IV, 3.

Or Adonai, p.

is

f.

XN,

Or Adonai, p. 15 a.

48

CRESCAS S EXPOSITION OF THE

the place of the element of earth is the'
the absolute down is only a point,
place.50

49

down'.

But

and a point is not in

Crescas, therefore, proposes a different definition

of place.

It is, we should say, a receptacle of things,
as

qualityless, immovable, and indescribable.

It is infinite,

for by its very nature it cannot be finite.51

In the world

of things it is occupied, but beyond the world it exists as
empty space.

The fact that place is immovable answers

Aristotle's arguments against defining place as an interval.
Such a definition, says Aristotle, would compel us to admit
the existence of a place to place, for if we move a vessel
full of water, the interval of the vessel is transferred into
another interval, and so on.

But if we assume with Crescas

that place is immovable, the difficulty disappears, for the
vessel simply passes from one part of the universal vacuum
to another.

As for the water in the vessel, it is moved

accidentally by the movement of the vessel.
Aristotle
52
explains the movement of the water in the same way.
The refutation of Aristotle's assertion of the impossibility for an infinite body to move either in a rectilinear
or circular fashion runs in the following manner: Aristotle's
first argument that the infinite cannot move rectilinearly,
for this movement requires an 'up' and a ' down', and is
therefore a limited movement, can be obviated by replying
that though kinds of places may be conceptually limited
in genus, yet they are not so in species.
49 De Coelo.

In other words,

50 Or Adonai, p. 15 b.

Or Adonai, p.

14b;

qppTn r1N'n,

ibid., p. 15 b.

again,

'

"

N

pN"ii

N inn

~1r

bipinr

Cp. above Crescas's arguments about the

vacuum.
52 Simplicius ad locum, quoted by Thomas Taylor, The Philosophy of

Aristotle.

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

49

there is no absolute point where we may say that this is
the 'up', but there may be a series of' ups' ad infinitum;
the term 'up'

being only our subjective designation.

His

second argument (cp. above) that if there exists an infinite
body it would have infinite weight, and then would move
in the ' now' is irrelevant, says Crescas.

Since movement

of a body must be in time, we shall have to posit a certain
minimum for an infinite body.

It is true that a finite body

may be found that will move in the same time.
of it?

But what

The law of relations of movement to movement,

according to the weight, extends only down to a certain
3
point.1

Of course, Crescas shows here a poor conception

of law, but a more accurate conception could hardly be
expected in his time.
Crescas

also attempts

to disprove

the Aristotelian

arguments against the possibility of an infinite body moving
in a circular fashion.

Aristotle says that there can be no

circular movement, because the distance between two radii
would be infinite, and it is impossible to traverse an infinite
distance.

To this Crescas rejoins that, though the lines

may be infinite, yet the distance between them may be
finite.

The arguments, however, are

too

obscure

and

abstruse to reproduce here, and as they affect the subject
very little we may omit them.

He seems to imply that

there is a possibility of an infinite body moving in an
incomplete circle, so that parts of it may move a finite
distance.

But how he could at all conceive of the move-

ment of an infinite body is difficult to see, for granted that
there is an infinite space, the infinite body occupies it all
by virtue of its own definition.

And what meaning has

movement, unless we assume the modern
5s Or Adonal, p. 16 a.

W.

E

conception of

50

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION OF THE

a growing infinite, but this is hardly what Crescas means.
However, Crescas wrote

many things for the

sake of

argument, simply to show that what Aristotle said can be
refuted, just as Aristotle himself multiplied unnecessary
arguments.

What is important for us is the establishment

of the theory of infinite space, and the possibility of an
infinitude of magnitudes. This leads, as Crescas well saw,5 4
to the possibility of the existence of other worlds besides
this one, a conjecture which was later well established.
Especially important

is his remark against Aristotle's
arguments, that if there were many worlds the elements
would move from one to the other. Why should they?
asks Crescas.
Is it not possible that the elements we
know exist only in this world, and the other worlds have
different elements and different tendencies?
We notice
here the beginning of the fall of the Aristotelian cosmology,
based on the evidence of senses only, an event which was
delayed for some time but accomplished in full by such
masters as Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo.
The second proposition, that it is impossible for an
infinite number of finite magnitudes to exist, stands and
falls with the first.

The criticism of the third proposition,

the impossibility of an infinite causal regressus is interesting.
Crescas does not refute it entirely, it being necessary for
his proof of the existence of God, as will be shown. He
does give it a different interpretation.

Why, asks Crescas,
can there not be an ipfinite number of effects which are at
the same time causes to each other? It is true that we
must posit one prior cause, but that should not prevent

"q

n'D1n'
O
DthW, Or Adonai, p. 17 a.

MAIMONIDIAN

the

posterior

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

causes

from

being

infinite.

51

Aristotle's

argument that every intermediate term must be preceded

5
by a first,5 would be well applicable if the causal series

were a timely one, namely, that each event in the series
must precede the other in time.

But the relation of cause

and effect is really one of logical priority. Aristotle himself
argues for the eternity of the world, and is therefore forced
to admit that the first cause is only prior in a logical sense
and not in time, as the first sphere is also eternal.

Why

can we not say that out of the first cause there emanated
an infinite number of effects which exist simultaneously,
instead of one effect as Aristotle wants us to believe?
And since an infinite number of effects is possible, what
prevents us from assuming that the effects are also causes
to one another, since causal priority does not posit temporal
precedence ?56

Of course, in spite of Crescas's criticism,

the necessity of a first cause, first in necessity, is well
established ; but the form is changed, and has an important
bearing upon the whole conception of infinity. The manner
in which Crescas utilized this proposition for the proof of
the existence of God, so very different from the customary
peripatetic way, was commended by Spinoza.5 7

Aristotle

was not entirely ignorant of the weakness of his assertion,

and in Metaphysics, book XII, ch. vi, he mentions a similar
interpretation to that of Crescas, but in his main discussions
in Metaphysics his language shows the contrary.
The eighth proposition stating that whatever moves
accidentally will eventually rest of necessity, which forms
'5 Metaphysics, I a or II.

~~

Or'

X

57Opera, V,

1;O, p. 17 b.
DN
iI; Epistola XII.

52 .

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION OF THE

a link in the proof of the existence of God, is severely
scrutinized by Crescas.
Is it not possible, asks he, that
accidents exist as long as the substance itself; now if the
substance is eternally moved, why not the accidents? Do
not the lower spheres move eternally, because of the
essential movement of the first sphere, though their own
movement is accidental?
The crucial point of the
Aristotelian argument is, that since a mover while moving
another body is moved itself, a power in a body while
it moves the body is also moved accidentally, and consequently it will have to rest of necessity. Crescas says,
It does not follow necessarily, for as long as the body can
be moved eternally, why should the movement of the force
ever have to stop since it is connected with the essential
movement of the body ? 58
His criticism of the tenth proposition is interesting
though of little importance for the subject. It relates to
the famous Aristotelian theory that form is the stay of body.
Crescas, after quoting Ibn Roshd, who asserts that body by
evidence of sense is really one but logic forces us to admit
composition because of its corruptibility, asks, Why can
we not conceive matter as having a certain form by itself,
the corporeality, for instance, consisting in a kind of general
quality such as occupying space ? Of course, when we
contemplate a particular piece of matter we find it to have
a particular form, but this is only the individual form, and
while essential yet is not the stay of the body, for the
material form is always in existence and is really the bearer
of the individual form. 59 This remark, though short, is
very suggestive. It reminds us of the Cartesian principle
that all matter is extension.

5 Or Adonai, 18 a.

59 Ibid.,

I8 b.

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

Crescas, in his

53

refutations, attacks also the twelfth

proposition, which is of great importance in the Maimonidian proof of the existence of God. The proposition asserts
It is based on

that every force in a finite body is finite.

the assumed relation of motion to force. The rate and time
of a moved body varies inversely to the force moving it.
If there exists

The greater the force, the less the time.

an infinite force in a finite body, that body will either be
moved in the 'now'

or a finite force will be

moving power to an infinite.

equal in

(Cp. above, Aristotle's proof

of the impossibility of an actual

infinite.)

Crescas first

refers to his refutation of the above-mentioned argument in
regard to the infinite moving in 'now', where he contends
that since movement must be in time there is a minimum
which is necessary even for an infinite.

The law of the

relation of time to force will be valid only above that
minimum.c0

In addition, says Crescas, granted that the

relation holds true as regards the strength or celerity of
the motion, still since there can be an infinite movement
in time, why cannot the force of a finite body, having a
definite and limited rate of motion, move a body infinitely,
when there is no cause for its ceasing, and no resistance
impeding it?

Especially

such bodies

as the heavenly

spheres which are of an ethereal substance, and consequently
offer no resistance, could be moved eternally even by a
finite force.

This critical remark displays a quite advanced

conception of motion and resistance, more penetrating than
that of Aristotle, who related the continuity of motion
to the force and employed the assumed

relation as a

cardinal proof of the existence of a first mover.

Y01

N , Or Adonai, p. 18 b.

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION OF THE

54

Finally, the Aristotelian conception of time is attacked.
(This forms proposition XV.) Time, says the Stagyrite,
is an accident of motion, and cannot be conceived without
it. This statement comprises four premisses. i. Time is
an accident joined to movement; 2. either is not found
without the other; 3. and is not conceived without the
other; 4. and, finally, whatever has no movement is not
in time. But, rejoins Crescas, is not time a measure of
rest as well? Do we not measure the state of rest of a
body in time, whether it is long or short ? The first two
premisses then fall. The third, however, may be justified
if we define rest as the privation of motion. The conception
of time is joined to motion and not conceived without it,

though not always found together with motion. Crescas,
therefore, proposes a new definition of time. Time is the
concept of continuity of a certain state of a body, whether
it is movement or rest. It is true that time is an
accident, but an accident relating to the soul and
not to anything else."' This conception of time is
quite a modern one, and reminds one of the Kantian
concept.

THE PROOFS OF MAIMONIDES

REFUTED.

After attacking the individual links which make up
the Maimonidian proofs of the existence of God, Crescas
proceeds to demonstrate the results of the refutations
bearing on the proofs. The first proof of Maimonides
(cp. above) makes essential use of the first proposition in
61 ti

r12,3

In

ir
1Z 1n12:1r~~,

I1

~1
Or Adonai, r9 a.

i

tt

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND THEIR CRITICISM

55

connexion with the twelfth, for if there exists an infinite
body it has infinite force, and so it can be self-moved, and
there is no need of a first mover.

Again, propositions II

and III are necessary, for if there is an infinite causal
regressus there is no first cause.

In the same way, several

more propositions are needed.

Since these propositions

were refuted by Crescas (though proposition III, which is
really the

basic one, was

not refuted,

but given

an

entirely different interpretation), it follows that the proof
as a whole is refuted.

But, adds Crescas, even granting

the truth of all these propositions, yet Maimonides has
not established his case.

The twelfth proposition stating

that a finite body must have a finite force, which
a cardinal

point in the proof, does not

is

establish the

impossibility of a force in a finite body moving in an
infinite time where there is no resistance; though we may
grant that the strength of the force is finite (cp. above).
This objection alone is sufficient to overthrow the whole
structure of the proof.

There is no necessity for a first

unmoved mover, for the sphere can be moved by its own
force infinitely.
Again, Maimonides has not established the unity of
God.

He proves it by the sixteenth proposition, which

asserts that whatever is neither a body nor a force in a body
cannot be conceived under number unless it is a cause,
and since there can be only one cause of that character
to this world, the oneness of this cause follows.

But, says

Crescas, this argument would be sufficient if we assume
that there is only one world.

But since it was demonstrated

(cp. above) that the existence of several worlds is possible,
it is also possible that there should be several Gods, each
one being a different cause of a different world in a different

56

CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION

OF THE

Thus,

relation, and as such the Gods may be counted.
62
the numerical unity is not proved.

The second proof of Maimonides is based on Aristotle's
assertion that if we find a thing composed of two elements,
and then one

element alone, it follows that the other

element must also exist by itself (cp. above for the conclusion).

The conclusion is attacked by Crescas, who says

that logically it follows only that the separate existence
of the other element is possible, but not that it is absolutely
necessary.

He supports his contention by an illustration

drawn from physiology as it was understood in his time.
We know that all living beings are also vegetative as far as
growth is concerned.

We find, though, vegetation without

life, but we never find living beings not having the vegetative quality.

(It

is absurd, of course, from the modern

point of view, that vegetation is a living organism.)

We

see, therefore, that it is not absolutely necessary for the
two elements that compose a thing to exist separately,
especially if one may act as a perfecting agent.
63
of the Maimonidian argument is then broken.
The third argument of Maimonides,

The force

based

on

the

assertion that all being cannot be perishable, since time
and movement are eternal, is answered by Crescas in the
following manner: The imperishability of all being does
not follow from the eternity of time and movement, for
if we supposed that they would all perish at once, the
argument would be valid; but why can there not be a
continual series of perishable beings, one following another?
The premiss, therefore, has not been established.6 4

He

advances also another argument against the proof, but it
62 Or Adonai, 20 a.
and in chapter II.
*6Ibid., ao b.

This subject will be discussed again in this chapter
64 Ibid.

MAIMONIDIAN

THEORIES AND

really has little force.

THEIR CRITICISM

57

In general, his refutation of the third

proof is more for the sake of argumentation and logical
casuistry than for the sake of serious discussion.

Crescas

himself, as will be evidenced in the second chapter, proves
the existence of God through a similar chain of argumentation, though with a different interpretation.
the

last arguments

of Maimonides

arguments centre about unity.

Finally,

are assailed.

The

Crescas has already shown

that Maimonides did not succeed in proving the oneness
of the first cause.

He now elaborates the subject, and

analyses the other arguments

of Maimonides.

These

arguments have often been quoted in Jewish as well as in
scholastic philosophy, and run as follows (cp. Introduction):
The existence of two Gods is impossible for several reasons:
i. If there were two, there would be a difference between
them as well as a similarity; they would, therefore, be
composite.

2. The harmony of the world and the inter-

dependence of beings testify to the existence of one God.
3. If there were two Gods, we should have to conclude that
either one God created a part of the world and the other
another, or that one worked for a certain time and the
other for another period, or that they co-operated.
these results are absurd.

All

It would follow that God is

a composite, is in time and possible, which consequences
are untenable (cp. Introduction, as well as above in the
exposition

of the Maimonidian

theory for elucidation).

But, rejoins Crescas, the conclusion, namely, the oneness
of God, is not warranted.

First, the Gods must not be

composite, for the difference between them need not be
material;

nh

~
v'K)

it may be only a causal one

65

Adonat p.

20

si~n''1=Or

Second, since

b.

58 CRESCAS'S EXPOSITION OF THE MAIMONIDIAN THEORIES

we may posit several worlds, we may also posit several
Gods, each one having his world.66
This answers also
the other arguments; for besides that the interdependence
of this world of things does not prove anything, as there
may be a pre-established harmony of plan between the Gods,
it vanishes entirely with the assumption of the existence
of several worlds, as it is evident. There are also other
arguments quoted by Saadia and Bahia that are not affected
by this assumption, but these arguments will be discussed
in the second chapter together with the Spinozistic view
on the subject.
We have reached a boundary line in Crescas's philosophy,
namely, the end of his critical exposition of the proofs
of the existence of God. The point of view of Crescas
has been mentioned before. It will suffice to remark in
passing that his endeavour is to show the invalidity of
many philosophic arguments concerning theological dogmas,
so that necessarily we have to rely upon tradition. However, what has happened to many others has happened
to him, that while their aim has not been reached, the very
negative side is valuable. He displayed in his criticisms
a keen sense of philosophic acumen and originality, and
were this book more widely known, its influence on general
thought would undoubtedly be greater. His anticipations
of modern conceptions have already been noticed. Yet
Crescas has value, not only in his negative criticisms but
also in his positive conceptions. It will be evident in the
future chapters. We thus pass on to the second chapter.
66 Ibid., p. 21 a.

CHAPTER II
CRESCAS'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES.
THE existence of God is proved by Crescas in a very
simple manner.

The proof runs in the following way:

Whether there is a finite or an infinite number of effects,
or whether an infinite series of causes is given, but as long
as the series is infinite and all things are caused, we do
not find in nature a thing that is absolutely necessary of
existence.

But to conclude thus is impossible, for if all

beings are possible there must be some power that calls
forth existence, so as to overbalance privation.
that there is a being necessary of existence.67

It follows
In this proof

the force of the argument, as Spinoza well remarks, is not
in the impossibility of an infinite act or an infinite causal
regressus, but the stress is laid on the absurdity of positing
a world of possibles. 68
67 ,

n~z
"

3 '

i' n"sz

u nr,ire

ri.r

nim

.

n

y

INn"Z
N-z

,
si

,,
,,

, ,I

wzvvinv

fl
, Or Adonai, Tr. I, sect. 3, ch. 2, p. 22 a.
~, i N1 7
n3D
l'
68 It will be best to quote Spinoza's own words on the subject: ' Verum

hic obiter adhuc notari velim quod peripatetici recentiores ut quidem puto,
male intellexerint demonstrationem veterum qua ostendere nitebantur dei
existentiam. Nam ut ipsam apud Iudaeum quendam Rab Ghasdai vocatim
reperio, sic sonat, si dantur progressus causarum in infinitum, erunt omnia
quae sunt, etiam causata.

Atque nulli quod causatum est competit, vi suae

60

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE

PROBLEMS RELATING

Here may be considered the proper place to say a few
words about the relation of Crescas to Spinoza. That the
latter knew writings of the former and studied them, we
know from the passage quoted, where Spinoza mentions
Crescas by name, and very accurately explains the latter's
proof of the existence of God. The question is whether
Crescas really exerted any marked influence upon the
formation of Spinoza's system. Joel endeavoured in several
of his writings to establish that Spinoza was under the
influence of Crescas, and attempted to trace the influence
in some of Spinoza's important theories.

It will be neces-

sary for us to discuss these points of similarity as they

come along. Kuno Fischer (in his Geschichte der neueren
Philosophie,V, II, Spinoza) attempts to refute all arguments
put forth in favour of influence, and concludes that there
is nothing in common between them."
Fischer's arguments, however, do not seem conclusive.
I wish to call attention to the first point in Spinoza's
system, namely, the existence of substance or God. The
way Spinoza, in his Ethics, conceives the existence of
a first cause is strikingly similar to that of Crescas. It is
true that in the Tractatus Brevis, his first philosophical
essay, Spinoza proves that God must exist, in the famous
Cartesian way through the conception of the idea of God.
But in the Ethics the basic conception of the whole system is
that, in looking upon nature, we must come to the conclusion
naturae necessarie

existere, ergo nihil est in natura ad cuius essentiam

pertinet necessario existere.

Sed hoc est absurdum; ergo et illud.

Quare

vis argumenti non in ea sita est, quod impossibile sit dari actu infinitum aut
progressus causarum in infinitum; sed tantum in ea quod supponatur res
quae sua natura non necessario existunt non determinari ad existendum
a re sua natura necessario existent'.

Epistola XII, ed. Van Vloten, II, 45.
9 Geschichte der neueren Philosophic, II, pp. 265-73.

TO THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

6I

that there must be a cause which is necessary of existence
by itself. ' This conception', says Kuno Fischer, ' which is
put at the beginning of his philosophy, supports the whole
system.'

70

Taking his first definition, 'By that which is

self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves
existence', and his axiom, 'That which exists, exists either
in itself or in something else': again, axiom three,' If no
definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can
follow', as well as his proofs of proposition X I, we see
clearly the underlying thought that in the world of things
where there is a multitude of effects there must be something which is a causa sui. Placing the words of Crescas,
'Whether there be causes and effects finite or infinite, there
is one thing clear, that there must be one cause for all, for
if all are effects there would not be anything which is its
own cause of existence;' besides this conception, one
cannot help feeling the similarity between the initial points
of these two philosophers, and the influence of the earlier
upon the latter is not improbable. The fact that Crescas
and Spinoza are two opposite poles, the one religious to
the extreme, the other irreligious, should not deter us.
In spite of the fact mentioned, God is the very centre of
things to both, and though, according to the latter, God
acts in a mathematical way with absolute mechanical
necessity, and, according to the former, in a personal way,
yet the basic quality of God in both systems is the same,
namely, absolute limitlessness; consequently, the philosophers concur in a goodly number of questions.
For this divergence in regard to religion really has
nothing to do with the first conception of the existence
of God. The conception itself is independent of religion,
70 Ibid., p. 358.

62

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE PROBLEMS

RELATING

and might as well be taken by Spinoza as the basis of his
system.

Fischer, as if feeling that in quoting Spinoza's

letter where Crescas's proof is cited in such a way as to
resemble Spinoza's own, he weakens his case, attempts to
strengthen

his arguments by alluding to the manner in

which Spinoza speaks of Crescas.
Rab Ghasdai'.

He names him' quendam

Fischer infers that this proves sufficiently

that Spinoza hardly knew Crescas and his teachings, and
winds up by saying, 'Descartes was not a "quendam"
Spinoza.' 71

Such

an

argument

is

hardly

to

conclusive.

Spinoza wrote to Lewis Meyer, who surely hardly knew
of Crescas, and to whom he was a' certain'.

But if Fischer

were acquainted with the difficulty of Crescas's style and
its remarkable brevity, he would know that Spinoza could
hardly give such a lucid

and

penetrating summary of

Crescas's proof by mere hearsay without having studied his
works carefully.

Again, his additional remark (in Ep. XII,

quoted above), 'non in ea sita est quod impossibile sit dari
actu infinitum', shows that he read Crescas's whole refutation of the Aristotelian doctrine.
calls

him a peripatetic,

Aristotelian

doctrines,

while

The fact that Spinoza
Crescas

combated

the

is not sufficient evidence of his

ignorance of Crescas's work.

There was still left in Crescas

enough of the philosophy of his time to entitle him to that
name.

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.

It was an old debatable question with the mediaeval
philosophers, whether existence is identical with the essence
of a thing or is something separate.

Ibn Sina taught that

71 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, II, p. 273.

TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND

HIS ATTRIBUTES

existence is an accident of essence. 72

63

Ibn Roshd, on the

other hand, claimed that existence can be nothing else
but identical with essence.

According to Ibn Roshd and

his followers then, in regard to God, since His essence is
absolutely different from the essence of the rest of beings,
it follows that His existence will also be different in kind,
and in positing existence to both God and other beings
we do so in an absolutely homonymous way, not denoting
any common relation but the name. 73 But also the followers
of Ibn Sina agree to this conception, for they concede
necessarily that with God existence is not an accident,
but identical with essence.

And since with other beings

it is only accidental, it follows that the name existence in
applying it to God and to man is employed in an absolute
homonymous way.
Crescas does not agree with either view.
Ibn Roshd's view, he points
involved in its assumption.

out

In criticizing

the logical

difficulty

If existence is identical with

essence, what then does it add as a predicate?

In stating

that God exists, the predicate does not add anything;
it amounts to saying, God is God: the same is true of any
other proposition of the same kind.

Again, if, as Ibn Sina

says, existence is only an accident, it needs then a subject;
but the subject must also exist, hence another subject must
precede it, and so on to infinity.

Again, since existence

is the real form and stay of th- subject, for without it it
would be not-being, how could we call it accident?
view must necessarily be abandoned.
is untenable also.
S72

w'M
1p

'

This

But the other view

It must, therefore, be concluded that
t": p

Commentary); Guide, p. 204.
73 Or Adonaa, p. 21 b.

~"1,

Moreh, LVII (see also Crescas's

64

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE PROBLEMS

RELATING

existence, while not identical with essence, is essential to
a being.74

In this way, existence can be predicated of

everything, of the essence as well as of accidents, though
there will be a difference of degree. The general conception,
however, must be understood in a negative way. The thing
we predicate existence of is to be understood
existing.

not non-

As a result, when we speak of the existence of

God, and the existence of other beings, it must not be
absolutely homonymous, but there may be a certain relation,
namely, that the negation-for existing equals not nonexisting-has a difference of degree.

The not non-existence

of God is due to himself, while of the other beings to their
cause. 75

What Crescas wants to prove by his

naming

existence essential is that it is one of the expressions of
essence, implying that there are more.
Spinoza seems to believe that existence and essence
are different in the case of other beings, for essence depends
on natural law, but existence on the order of the causal
series.

In God, however, existence is not distinguished

from essence, for by definition, existence belongs to his
nature.

76

ATTRIBUTES AND UNITY.

Maimonides' theory of Attributes, which is criticized by
Crescas, resembles in its entirety the other theories of the
preceding Jewish philosophers, with a strong emphasis on
the negativity of their conception. A thing can be described,
says he, in four ways; either according to its definition or

Ilb
75 Ibid.

id.
1Zoi~'Y"mtaMI

vphslia, Or Adonai, p. 22 a.
76 Cogitata Metaphysica, Part I, chs.

2, 3.

TO THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

6

5

a part thereof, or by one of its essential qualities, or by
relation to some other things, either to time, place, or another
body.77 In regard to God, attributes describing in any of
the above-mentioned ways are inapplicable, for since we
posit Him simple, and one, and above all categories, it is
evident that He cannot be defined, nor can we speak of
a part of Him nor of any essential quality in Him. As for
relation, there is no relation between Him and place or time,
or any other being, for they are all possible of existence
and He is necessary. There remains, therefore, a fifth way
of describing, namely, according to the actions. Such kind
of attributes it is not impossible to apply to God, for they
do not imply any plurality, change, or division. This form
of attributes is paronymic, after the actions we perceive.
There are, however, essential attributes, that is, such as
appertain to the essence without having any bearing on
the actions. Such by the consensus of religious leaders
and philosophers are existent, living, knowing, wise, potent,
and willing. It is to be noticed that Maimonides includes
will as an attribute just as his peripatetic predecessor
Ibn Daud has done, while Saadia and Bahia do not count
it (cp. Introduction). How then shall we understand these
essential attributes? Of course, it is evident that in applying
them to both God and man we employ them in an absolute
homonymic manner, for there is no possible relation between
God and other beings. These attributes have to be conceived purely negatively, and yet, says Maimonides, they
convey to us some positive notion. He proceeds to explain
his assertion. The statement that God is existent implies
only that He is not non-existing, or the denial of privation;
7

W.

". p l

'

p5 R"1t , Moreh, I, 52 (p.
F

72 a); Guide, p. 178.

66

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING

and when we say that God is living, we only assert that
His existence is not like the existence of dead matter.
In a similar way, the more difficult attributes are explained;
potent means the denial of weakness; wise, the privation
of foolishness; willing, the absence of disorder.
short, is the Maimonidian theory of attributes.

This, in

78

Gersonides, the immediate predecessor of Crescas, had
already objected to such a theory.

He argued against the

assumption of absolute homonymity in applying the attributes to both God and man.

It is impossible, he says,

to assume that there is only a likeness of name in the two
applications of the attribute, if it is construed to have a
negative meaning. Take, for example, the negative concept
of existing, can we say that the denial of non-existence
which the concept implies has two absolutely different
meanings? We are forced, then, to admit that the difference
is only in degree; why then can we not hold the same
conception in regard to positive attributes, namely, that
they are applied to God and to man in different degrees
of perfection ?"

We have noticed

a similar argument

advanced by Crescas in regard to existence.

We shall

now pass on to Crescas's criticism of Maimonides' theory.
Maimonides is loath, says Crescas, to ascribe to God any
attributes that will bring Him in relation with something
else, for fear that it may imply a privation in His nature,

b
0INa1 110 5
p.

1. 51VTn

f%

fn, Moreh, p. 86 b; Guide, P. L.,
l

O210.
7

The Battles of the Lord, II, p. 134 (Milhamot, ed. Leipzig, 1866).

TO THE

EXISTENCE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

67

and yet he allows himself to describe Him with active
attributes. But, asks Crescas, does the application of such
attributes not imply any defect in God's perfection? When
we say, God created or made, does it not mean that before
the act His power was potential and only later became
active? Such an implication suggests change in God's
nature. 80
Again, Maimonides' assertion that there is
absolutely no relation between God and created beings or
time is false. Is not God the cause of all existing being ?
But if He is, there is already a relation established, or if
we assume that time is eternal, there is a relation of likeness
between God and time. But Crescas sees as well as
Maimonides the danger involved in ascribing to God positive attributes and at the same time asserting that He is
simple and one. Yet, he says, there is really no contradiction. The fact that we humans may conceive plurality
through attributes does not mean real plurality.
His
infinite goodness which is His essence unites them. Goodness here should be understood to mean perfection, or in
other words, God is infinitely perfect-what Spinoza calls
s
in his writings the absolute perfect, 8x not perfect after its
'
kind. Again, since God is indivisible and simple, and
perfection is essential, then why cannot existence or any
of the other attributes, as potence or wisdom, be posited
as a positive attribute in just the same relation as light

1~nto

svnun{1
5z,

1JVn

INru

nos non

Or Adona;s, p.

r

vs11VY'nrti

:.ir"1

1IN nyn

23 a.

s81Epistola XXXI, Opera, V,

ir.

F2

5 ):
'

2-7ri+

ri

I 015 Dflp'
n
n~i

1

iuyr

68

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING

is posited of a luminous body?

Let us, following up the

analogy, suppose that the first cause is a luminous body;
it is consequently necessary of existence. Is its light,
though not identical with the essence of the body, less
necessary of existence, or can the body not be described
by it? The light is not a separate thing, but is an essential
quality through which the body may be described. In a
similar manner, we can call the attributes of God positive,
especially such as eternity, existence, and unity, and yet
they do not imply plurality.8 2 It is true that so far as our
conception is concerned we cannot give them a positive
content, for that would determine God, and we must use
the negative, e. g. as existent, not non-existerit, &c., but in
regard to God himself they are surely positive, and He
83
can be described by them.
Especially precarious is Maimonides' position, says
Crescas, when we consider the other attributes such as
wisdom and potence. What does he mean by saying that
potence means absence of weakness, or knowing, privation
of ignorance? He does not remove the positive content
from the attribute. There is no tertium quid between
knowing and not knowing, if not not-knowing; hence it
necessarily follows that God is knowing. But if the attribute of knowing has a positive content, what then is that
content? It is not identical with essence, for the essence
of God is inconceivable in its totality; and surely it cannot

"'I 1X'J'
N:

t4v

83Ibid.

1 1

1.

" 1

'*w,Or Adonai, p.

24

b.

TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

69

be an accident, for that is excluded from the conception.
It follows, therefore, that positive attributes are essential.
Again, he says, if we assume the Maimonidian view, it
follows that God will be absolutely qualityless, almost
equal to nothing; for, he says, if we deny any essential
attributes, it is not that we deny our knowledge of them,
but the having itself. God will be then entirely negative,
neither potent nor impotent, nor anything, and this is
absurd. It is evident, therefore, that positive attributes
must be posited of God though we cannot determine
their content, and for human purposes may be described
negatively. 84
As for unity, Crescas thinks that in a similar manner
to existence it is not essence, but essential. If we shall
say that it is essence, we shall encounter the same difficulty
in predication as in existence. When we say that man is
one, we do not state anything new about man, but merely
repeat that man is man. It follows, therefore, as has been
mentioned, that unity is an essential attribute and a
rational mode of conception. It follows also, since unity
is really a mode of differentiation, that God who is the most
differentiated of all other beings, is one par excellence.85
Crescas makes here a keen observation, namely, that
unity has a double meaning. It means simplicity, that the
object is not composite; and it is also to be understood
in a numerical sense, that there is only one God. Spinoza
84 Or Adonai, p. 25 a-b.

*ywo

1t

nKmN

1n~i
i~wiav14nn

nb.
ir

i1

m
Adona4 m),vOr
p.

n li X1t, Or Adonai,

p.

22

b.

70

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING

expresses the latter by unicum.S6

As for the first, it was

well established, for God is necessary of existence, and
everything necessary of existence cannot be composite,
as has been discussed.8 7 The question remains in regard
to the second. Is there only one God? We have shown
above that Crescas always considered the arguments substantiating the oneness as insufficient. The interdependence
of the world and the harmony of action are counterbalanced
by his supposition of the possible existence of two worlds
(cp. above). There is, however, one more argument, which
says that since we posit the infinite potence of God, the
existence of another God is impossible, for they would
constrain each other. Yet, says Crescas, these arguments
are not convincing, for it is still possible that the other one
is not active. He, therefore, concludes that the numerical
unity of God is only a subject of revelation.8 8
It must be admitted that Crescas in this point is not
only weak, but prejudiced. His polemical nature overmastered the philosophical. What does he mean by a
passive God ? Does it not contradict his own conception
of God? If God possesses infinite potence, what then
is that other being? It is neither active nor potential.
It is evident that this absurd argument was only advanced
just as a shot at the philosophers, though it fell short of
the mark, and Crescas well conceived it.
It is necessary, in conclusion of this part of Crescas's
theory, to say a few words concerning his influence on
Spinoza, regarding which there is some difference of opinion.
Dr. Joel, in his book Zur Genesis der Lekre Spinozas, 9
86 Cogitata Metaph., II, 2.

87 The same proof has been quoted by Spinoza.
8

OrAdonai, p. 26 a.

89

Pp. 19-24.

TO THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

asserts that Spinoza was greatly influenced
in the formation of his theory of attributes.
Crescas makes

between

a distinction

71

by Crescas

He says that

attributes

of an

essential nature and such as are rational modes of conception.

Again, that this is the same distinction that

Spinoza makes between attributes and propria,9 ° namely,
such qualities which are a part of God's own essence,
though they do not affect His simplicity or immutability.
It is difficult to agree with Joel, both that such a distinction
is made by Crescas and that it is identical with Spinoza's.
Crescas calls both kinds of attributes, such as eternity,
existence, and unity (rather simplicity), those that Joel would
include in the second class, and knowledge or potency,
which are, according to Joel, in the first class, by one name,
y D xws 9
In,

namely,

which means essential attributes.

It is true that Crescas says that the first-named attributes
are less apt to affect the simplicity of God, for their content
is only a rational mode with a negative form, as existence,
not non-being, &c. 92

But no real distinction is found.

He

says distinctly, 'It is clear from the foregoing that existent
and unity (simplicity), which are predicated of Him, His
name be praised, are essential attributes ',9

or as Dr. Joel

would express himself, 'wesenhafter Art'.

Where then

Again, Spinoza bases his

does Joel get his distinction?

distinction on the definition that the attributes, according
to him, are identical with the essence of God which is
o90 Adonai, p. 25 a.
Or
9x

Korte Verhandeling, Opera, p. 274.

.r

1rimi
m~
92Ibid., p.
;ri~Y1
n

nnz
a."n5

j.l1:1

.

Nu

MN

'

m r7r i

i)

lrwwbcm

IM

r

s

1:1,Or

ri

Nis-I

Adonai, p. 24 b.

72

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

conceived

through

OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING

them; of such we know only two,

thought and extension. The Propria are such as belong
to God, but do not express His essence. 94 Of such a
distinction there is no mention in Crescas. On the contrary,
Crescas asserts that the essence of God is inconceivable.
This is really a fundamental difference between Crescas
and Spinoza. Again, we find many of those Propria of
Spinoza among the essential attributes, as, for instance,
knowledge.95 How, then, can we say that it is the same
distinction? We can nevertheless admit that the idea found
in Crescas that there are some attributes which, though
predicated of God, do not by all means express His essence,
is also found in Spinoza. But to consider it as a source of
influence is exaggerating.
I want to direct attention to another point of contact
between Crescas and Spinoza, which brings the possible
influence into a more favourable light. It is the relation
of the attributes to the essence of God. Crescas teaches
the infinite perfection of God, and the absolute unity of
His essence, in spite of the fact that we predicate essential
attributes of Him, for in His infinite essence they are all
one. It is true that he does not make clear in what way
these essential attributes are to be understood; they do not
express His essence, for His essence cannot be conceived
by us, but nevertheless are positive and essential. It may
be that in his insisting that the essence of God is not conceived by us, he means to say that, while these attributes
are essential, yet they are not to be understood as final;
but our conception of them is incomplete. For instance,
we predicate knowledge as an attribute, but we do not know
what kind or what degree of knowledge He possesses.
Korte Verhandeling, pp. 274-92.
15 Ibid., p. 292.
°4

TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

73

Similarly, Spinoza teaches the infinite perfection of God,96
and that He possesses infinite attributes,9 7 all of which
constitute one being. What Spinoza means by attributes
was a matter of great controversy, but the interpretation
of Fischer 98 is the correct one. According to it, the infinite
attributes are infinite forces of God and not different
substances. Since the attributes are infinite, it follows that
the human mind will never know all of them, and so the
essence of God is not conceived fully. The attributes
known by us are thought and extension. We see, therefore,
that in spite of the widely separating gulf between the two
systems, there is still a marked similarity in the basic
conception of the attributes. Both teach infinite perfection,
infinite unity in spite of the positive content of the attributes, and the incomplete knowledge of the essence. Of
course, I am not blind to the differences of their teachings.
Spinoza emphasizes that the attributes of extension and
thought express the essence of God as forces, and as such
are fully conceived by man. Crescas, on the other hand,
would shrink in horror from such a conception. But such
differences are due to the different nature of Spinoza's
system, which is wholly divergent from that of Crescas, as
far as the God of a religious man is from the God of a
philosopher. Yet they afford points of similarity, especially
at the base of their systems where the variance is at its
minimum. It can almost be said that Spinoza's system
is only a result of carrying out Crescas's principles to their
extreme logical conclusion. It will be best illustrated in
the chapters on the relation of God and the world, for it is
there that the real divergence is evident.
96 Epistola XL.

98 K. Fischer, Spinoza, pp. 380-92.

9 Def. 6; Ethics, I.

74

OF THE

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

PROBLEMS RELATING

We see, then, that in spite of Fischer's contention
against any possible influence of Crescas on Spinoza there
are to be found traces of marked likeness between them.
We must not forget that when we say influence we do not
mean that the latter actually followed

the former,

or

anything to that effect; what it signifies is a thought
impulse and a pointing
Spinoza

read

Crescas

in

a certain

carefully,

and

direction.
not, as

That
Fischer

maintains, was only imperfectly acquainted with him, we
have shown above.

I wish to remark that Fischer is not

entirely just to Crescas by saying of him,' Denn selbst die
Einheit Gottes ist bei ihm kein Object der Erkenntnis,
sondern

der Offenbarung',

and

using

this fact

as

an

argument to disprove the influence of Crescas on Spinoza.
I presume that Fischer means by the words ' die Einheit
Gottes' the numerical unity of God, for the essential unity
was demonstrated by Crescas as clearly as by Spinoza.
But even in regard to the former, it was already mentioned
(cp. above) that Crescas's remark in that regard should be
taken with reserve, and that it is only a polemic expression.
In reality, numerical unity of God is established according
to Crescas, since he posits the infinite potence of God.
Of course, Spinoza deduces unity with great accuracy from
the mere definition of God; but the difference of deduction
in the two systems in regard to a certain point does not
prove that it is impossible for one system to have influenced
the other.

It is only religious sufficiency that prevented

Crescas from following up his own definition and reaching
the same conclusion.
In concluding his theory of attributes Crescas discusses
a few emotional qualities which are to be attributed to God.
The discussion is interesting, both by the novelty of the

TO THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

75

conception, as well as by the interpretations of the emotions.
Aristotle teaches the happiness of God, and deduces it in
the following manner. We must attribute to God the
highest activity which is no higher thing than contemplation,
and since we humans feel pleasure and happiness in thought,
it follows that God who is eternally active, namely contemplative, and the quality of His contemplation being of
the highest and purest kind, must necessarily be always
happy.99 Such a conception, says Crescas, is untenable,
and is based on a false theory of emotions. Joy and sorrow,
or pleasure and pain, are contraries, and consequently fall
under the category of action. They really do not depend
on knowledge, but on will. Pleasure is only the gratification
we derive from the carrying out of our will. Pain, on the
other hand, is the feeling we experience when our will is
00
obstructed. 1
If we do experience joy in our knowing,
it is because there is a will to know, and by attaining
knowledge we overcome the obstacle to our will. It will
be evident, therefore, that as far as God is concerned we
cannot attribute any happiness to Him. His knowledge
has no limitations, and there are no obstructions to His
will. When we humans experience any pleasure at conceiving a certain thing, it is because that conception was
not known to us,. and in overcoming the obstacle we
experience a sense of pleasure. But in regard to God
such a mode is inapplicable: whence, then, His happiness
at knowing? Crescas asserts, therefore, that if we do
99

Metaph., XII, 7; Ethics, X.

;1Y
100

: ftlr

1

Tri

3l'11 pt

rfrl
T 1v

rn

v oin

0
1, Or Adonai, p. 27 a. Just to know how modern this
N1V!
rVV C
theory of emotions is, we have but to compare the views on pleasure and
pain of the English psychologist, E. G. Stout, in his Manual of Psychology,

chapter on Pain and Pleasure.

76

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING

attribute happiness to God it is because of His love.

God

is voluntarily the cause of all being, and since we know
that existence is goodness, it follows that in so far as God
is voluntarily the cause of being, He is voluntarily good.
The continuation of the existence of beings is then the
continual emanation of His goodness.

It is evident, then,

that in so far as God continually emanates His goodness
and perfection voluntarily, in so far He loves the emanation
of goodness necessarily, and it is this action of emanating
permeated with love that is described as joy or happiness.10 '
This happiness or joy is essential to God, for, as we have
seen, it is inherently connected with His being the cause
of things and the continual emanation of His goodness
and perfection.

We cannot help but express our admira-

tion for such a high ethical conception of the happiness
of God, in comparison with which the Aristotelian as well
as the Spinozistic (as will be shown) pales as regards the
glow of ethical warmth.
In regard to the relations of Crescas and Spinoza on
this point of Amor Dei, Joel lays great stress on the
influence exerted by the former on the latter. The Amor
Dei intellectualis has two meanings:

the love of man

towards God, and that of God towards man; but we have
to defer the former to a later discussion, where the relation
of God and man will be discussed, and occupy ourselves
at present with the latter.

Joel contends that Crescas's

love of God is not far from the teaching of Spinoza that
102
God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love.
101

N17

Z"N

,1-1=

1

¥'

Or Adonai, I, 27 a-b.
o102
Ethics, V, XXXV, Proposition.

n:l
r

T

:IL7

r

T '

nn:l ,,

TO THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

77

It seems to me that Joel exaggerates a little. There is,
no doubt, a similarity in language, but the content is quite
different. That of Crescas is voluntaristic, that of Spinoza
is intellectual in essence. Pleasure, according to Spinoza,
is a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection,103 and
since pleasure is a self-conscious feeling, knowledge
necessarily accompanies it. Again, perfection itself is only
knowledge, for, according to the whole Spinozistic system,
true ideas have an adequate object, and whatever is false
can surely not be perfection. Love is pleasure accompanied
by the idea of an external cause.' 04 The external is only
necessary as far as human beings are concerned, the idea
It follows,
of cause is the main necessary condition.
then, that since God is absolutely infinite and necessarily
possesses infinite perfection, for reality and perfection are
synonymous, 10 5 He rejoices in that perfection. Furthermore,
this rejoicing is accompanied by the idea of Himself, for
God possesses that idea,106 which is the idea of His own
being as a cause, and this is what is meant by intellectual
love. We say, therefore, that God loves Himself. But
since in God there is not only the idea of His essence, but
°7
also of that which follows necessarily from His essence,'
and under this all beings, and men especially, are meant,
1°8
0
it follows that in so far God loves Himself He loves man.
We have seen the principal features of this Spinozistic
love of God, and it is evident that its content is materially
different from that of Crescas. On its emotional and
10s Ethics, Part III, Definition of Emotions II.

104 Ibid., Definition of Emotions II.
105 Ethics, II, Definition VI.
o107
Ibid., Proposition III.
1o8Ethics, V, Proposition XXXV, Corollary.

1o0

Ibid., Proposition III.

78

CRESCAS'S TREATMENT

OF THE

PROBLEMS RELATING

formal side it approaches Aristotle's view, which also makes
the happiness of God consist in thinking, and Himself the
subject of His thoughts. But there is essential difference,
this is the idea of cause. It is not the act of thought that
makes up the rejoicing, but the being a cause and ground
of all being. This is the fundamental difference that widely
separates the two conceptions. On the other hand, it is
this same idea of cause that forms a point of contact with
Crescas's view. The latter states that in so far as God
is a cause of existence He loves the good, for existence
is a continual emanation of good and perfection.
But,
again, there is a fundamental difference; Crescas excludes
all knowledge from that love. On the other hand, according
to Crescas's theory of emotions, which by the way is a very
true one, pleasure is not connected with knowledge, but
with will. And also in regard to God's love or happiness
he insists on will. With Spinoza, however, will is entirely
omitted; the mechanical or necessary conception takes
the ascendancy; knowledge and reality are the principal
ingredients in the teaching of Spinoza.
We may, therefore, conclude that while the Crescasian
and Spinozistic views on the love of God have a basic
point of contact, yet they are totally different in their
content; the first is an emotional-voluntaristic, the other
a strongly intellectual. There is a possibility that the term
love of God, if not directly borrowed from Crescas, is at
least influenced by his use of it, as the term love does not
precisely describe the idea which Spinoza wishes to convey
by it. There are some critics who score Spinoza severely
for his introducing the conception of Amor Dei, and
point to the difficulty involved in speaking of God as
self-loving, as if He were composed of subject and object.

TO THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

79

They assert that the conception is contradictory to the

10
fundamental Spinozistic doctrines. 9
is beyond our point of interest.
of that question

But this discussion

The real point of gravity

is the Amor Dei of man, but this is

reserved for the next chapters.

In general, I wish to say

that I do not intend to minimize the influence of Crescas
upon Spinoza.

On the contrary, I believe that both systems

afford many points of contact, and, furthermore, that their
source is really one, except that they run in divergent lines.
It is possible to find a goodly number of likenesses, but
they are never commensurable.

To this point more space

will be devoted in the coming chapters.
109 See K. Fischer in his Spinoza, p. 573.

PART I I

GOD AND THE WORLD

w.

CHAPTER III.
OPINIONS

HELD

BY

INTRODUCTORY.

THE PRE-MAIMONIDIAN

JEWISH

PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS OF
OMNISCIENCE, PROVIDENCE, AND FREEDOM
OF THE WILL.
THE problem of the freedom of the will presents one
of the most interesting aspects in the history of human
thought.

Its roots lie far back in antiquity.

It arose out

of the peculiar position that man holds in the domain of
nature, and at the moment that self-consciousness appeared
in man and enabled him to reflect upon the surrounding
world, and

his own personality as related to it.

represents a puzzling riddle unto himself.

Man

On the one

hand, he feels himself to be the master of things, the lord
of being;

on the other, contemplation teaches him that

he is only a part of that great mysterious environment
called nature.

Furthermore, this nature is not a haphazard

conglomeration of things and events, but there is a kind
of succession and sequence, law and order, and to which
even he, nolens volens, must submit himself.

The develop-

ment of religion simply changed the aspect of the problem.
It placed man in conflict with the will of the gods, instead
of with the blind natural force.

With polytheism, however,

the gods were not strong enough to replace entirely the
G2

84 OMNISCIENCE, PROVIDENCE, AND FREEDOM OF WILL

old something that rules over the destiny of man, now
known by the name of fate, and were even themselves
supposed to be dominated by it. Homer says,' When
the hour of fate comes for man, even a god is helpless, no
matter how much he loves him'.11o Herodotus goes farther,

and asserts that a God is not able to avoid it. nx Thus
the problem becomes a much discussed subject in ancient
thought; and it can really be said that out of this dual
character of a man's position there developed Greek ethics
with its special emphasis upon contemplation and thought.
With the rise of monotheism, positing a being allpowerful, all-wise, and all-knowing, the problem became
more acute. How in the face of such a being, in comparison
with which man dwindles into insignificance, can man save
his personal freedom?
It ought by the nature of the
conception of God to be given up. Yet peculiarly enough,
the first monotheistic religion not only did not reject the
freedom of the will, but incorporated it as a dogma. 112
The story of the receiving of the ten commandments as
described in the Bible, 113 as well as the term covenant used
innumerable times to designate the process of receiving
the Law, implies plainly that man is free and that the
Israelites were entirely at liberty to reject the Law of God.
The idea of freedom is repeated many times in the Bible." 4
One may argue that the monotheistic conception was
probably loose with the Hebrews in the early times, yet
none can accuse the Hebrew prophets, especially the later
ones, of a lack of pure monotheism, and in spite of it the
freedom of the will is asserted by them with the same
110o

Iliad, XVII, 446.

112 Dr. D. Neumark,
113s Exod. 19.

ro.

111 Herodotus I, 97.
1.

~l~,r0

11

l, I, pp. 81-6.

214Deut.

30. 19.

IN PRE-MAIMONIDIAN

JEWISH

vigour as the unity of God.115

PHILOSOPHY

85

It is rather a curious fact

that the problem of the compatibility of the freedom of
the will with that of God's omniscience and providence
is never found in prophetic writings.

There are some

allusions-in

the Psalms-to the problem of injustice,
namely, why the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper,l1
"
1
and quite a discussion of it in Rabbinic literature," 7 but the
problem as a whole was never touched upon.
However, it was bound to crop up.

With the rise

of scientific philosophic reflection in

Judaism, and the
manifestation of the desire to base religious dogmas on
philosophic principles, the monotheistic conception had
to be carried to its logical conclusion, and as a result
the problem of the relation of man and God appeared
in its full vigour, and demanded a solution.

A similar

process was going on in the Mohammedan world.

The

Koran, preaching the purest and most abstract monotheism,
and carrying it to logical conclusions, presents a decided
predestinarian

aspect, though

11
vestiges of free will in it.
'

some
But

endeavour to
human

reason

find
and

philosophic speculation felt indignant at such a conception,
and revolted against it.

This brought about the rise of

115 Cp. Micah 6. 8.
116 Ps. 37. 25, 26, as well as the contents of the whole chapter, which
seems to be intended as an answer to the problem of injustice. The problem
itself is stated by Jeremiah in a rather bold way when he 'asks (Jer. 12. i),
irm:l
'y

1

ti3:

problem,

N11

I

and cries

NID

out,

)Ib " "V'
fit1i
N7

N

; also Job grapples with the
i+t
fl'.

V11
301
V '3)0

u1l .I i"N

'Nthe earth is given into the hands of the wicked: he covereth

the face of the judges: if not, where and who is he?' (Job 9. 24).
117 Berakot 7 a.
118 Prof. Guyard in his book on 'Abd-er Razzaquu et son traitd de la
predestination et du libre arbitre', quoted by L. Stein in his Willensfreiheit,
P. 3.

86 OMNISCIENCE, PROVIDENCE, AND FREEDOM OF WILL

the sects and various doctrines, attempting the solution
119
of the problem in one way or another.

The first who dealt with the problem in Jewish philosophy was, as might be expected, Saadia.

Saadia says,

Man is free in his actions, and there is no intervention
on the part of God.

This fact is proved by the evidence

of sense, of reason, and of tradition.

We see in daily life

that man is master of himself; he speaks or is silent at will,
does a number of other things or refrains from doing them,
and never conceives that anybody can restrain him in acting
This evidence, though it may seem

according to his wish.

superficial to us, carried a certain amount of conviction
to Saadia, who, following the Mutazilites, attached great
importance to conception, for whatever can be conceived
is real, and the contrary, whatever is not conceived does
not possess any reality.120

Hence the emphasis laid by

Saadia on the fact that man conceives and that accordingly
he is free.

Reason testifies to freedom.

First, it is proved

that it is impossible for one act to be produced by two
agents.

If God interfered in human actions, it would be

the effect of two agents, God and man.

Secondly, if God

forces man to do a certain act, what reason would there
for his punishment or reward?

The

believer and

"

be

As for the

the atheist would be on an equal footing. '

16spnn1

1nn71=

01

Di

101

1

"~11,

Emunoth

Wedeoth,

ed.

Josefow, 1885, p. 64 b.
120 Cp. Introduction, sect. 3.
Emunoth Wedeoth, p. 65 a. Aristotle offers similar arguments to prove

121

his assertion that man is the originator of things. He says: 'Testimony
seems to be borne both by private individuals and by lawgivers, too, in that
they chastise and punish those that do wrong, while they honour those who

IN PRE-MAIMONIDIAN

JEWISH

PHILOSOPHY

87

objection on traditional grounds, he quotes a number of
verses to that effect.
The problem arises then, How is it possible to conceive
freedom of human action and at the same time prescience
of God? If God knows beforehand that man will rebel
against His will, does it not follow eo ipso that man must
act in this fashion, for otherwise God's knowledge is not
perfect?
Saadia replies that, in reality, the supposed
conclusion does not follow. God's knowledge is not the
cause of human actions. Were it the cause, we should
have to grant that man's actions are predestined, for God's
knowledge is eternal, and necessarily the effects would be
determined, but the case is not so. It is true that He
knows beforehand the events that are going to happen,
but He knows them in their true light. God knows whichever way man is going to select, yet His knowledge does
not have any causal relation to the things which are going
to happen. It is pure knowledge without any active force.
The fact that the things happen in the future and He knows
them beforehand does not bear on the subject, for His
knowledge is above temporal accidents. There is only one
time existing in regard to God, and that is the present.
If one will ask, How is it possible that, if God knows
a man is going to speak, yet he could have chosen to be
silent? to this the reply is made, that had he kept silent
God's knowledge would have taken cognizance of the fact,
for God knows the way man will choose after deliberation. 122
By way of illustration, we may compare the prescience
act rightly'.

Of course, here the reference is not to theological authority,
but political; however, the force of the argument is the same. Nic. Ethwcs,
III, V.
122Enmunoth Wedeoth, p. 65 a-b.

88 OMNISCIENCE, PROVIDENCE, AND FREEDOM OF WILL

of God, as Saadia conceived it, to a man standing on a very
high mountain, and from this exalted position he views an
exceptionally long row of men passing by; some have
passed, some are passing, and some will pass. He sees
them all, for his position is very elevated, but his seeing
is not the cause of their passing. 123 However, we cannot
help admitting that a shrinkage in God's prescience has
been assumed by Saadia. As a result, objections to his
24
theory have been raised by later religious philosophers.1
But Saadia was very zealous to save human freedom, and
some sacrifice had to be made. 125 The problem of the
compatibility of the providence of God with the freedom
of the will is not treated by Saadia definitely. It seems,
nevertheless, from the whole tenor of his book, that he
believes in the existence of such a providence, for how
could he not believe it? It is found in the Bible. There
are, however, some passages bearing on the subject. In
one of them it is stated that the events that happen to man
are through Divine causality, but at the same time they
are partly caused by man himself, namely, that some come
as a punishment for his previous choice. 126 The question
still remains open. Are the events predestined to happen
simultaneously with God's prescience of them, or is it that
God causes them to happen after the human actions have
taken place? But no such discussion is found.
Bahia, as an ethical philosopher, and a man imbued
128 Commentary to Emunoth Wedeoth, ad locum.
124 Albo says that Saadia's view is almost tantamount to the opinion that
denies God any knowledge of possibles.
125 The early Christian fathers encountered a similar difficulty,

and

followed the same path. So did Origen allow a kind of narrowing of God's
prescience. Fischer, History of Christian Dogma, io6.
126 Emunoth Wedeoth, 66b.

IN PRE-MAIMONIDIAN

JEWISH

89

PHILOSOPHY

with religious feeling, does not devote much discussion
to this difficult problem in its philosophical aspect. The
conflict between freedom and prescience, and the logical
contradiction resulting from the full conception of the
former, are hardly brought to light. The problem is rather
viewed from the aspect of Providence. He does not call
it the problem of freedom and necessity, but of necessity
and justice. The point of gravity is, How can we conceive
Divine justice in distributing reward and punishment when
human actions are pre-ordained ? Bahia puts forth several
solutions to the problem.
Some, he says, have denied
Providence in regard to human actions, and asserted that
man is entirely free, thus saving the justice of God. Some,
on the other hand, have given up freedom, but as for justice
they denied the possibility of the human understanding
to grasp it. Some admit Providence in human actions,
excepting such as pertain to right and wrong. In such
acts choice is left to man. This is really the traditional
view expounded in the Talmud. 1'27 It is also the one that
Bahia follows. He feels, however, that the problem is not
solved yet, that there are points which demand a solution,
especially prescience; this last is not even mentioned by
name, but it is surely meant by the following explanation.
Just to cover all difficulties, Bahia adds that the ways of
God are hidden from man, and human understanding cannot
conceive the way God's justice works in the universe. 128
It must be admitted that this solution of the problem is
hardly a philosophical one. Bahia's distinction between

ZlD

1iN"

ri

itW

'

1

Berakot 33 b.
12sRobot ha-Lebabot, pp. 131-32.

w,

.,...

,1

N

Niddah

16 b;

also

90 OMNISCIENCE, PROVIDENCE, AND FREEDOM OF WILL

human and Divine knowledge does not carry with it the
speculative characteristics which attend that of Maimonides,
who offered a similar suggestion (cp. infra). It is simply
a blind resignation of a believer to the dogmas of belief.
Halevi treats the problem of freedom in an accurate
and philosophical manner. He asserts that human actions
are possible and not necessary, and proves it from the
general belief of man.129 Halevi always laid great emphasis
on the generality of an idea and the consensus omnium.
As for the conflict of freedom with God's providence,
Halevi evades it by asserting that there are two kinds of
Divine causality, direct and indirect. As examples of the
first kind may serve such things as the order of the universe,
the way and manner of the composition of all living being,
the genera of the vegetable kingdom, and all such phenomena that eo ipso testify to the plan of a wise maker.
As an instance of the second kind, we may quote the
burning of a log of wood by fire. The immediate cause
of this phenomenon is easily explained; but this cause has
another cause, and so on until we finally reach the first
cause, still the connexion is not a direct one. We have
then a fourfold division of events, divine, natural, chancea
wise, and elective or choice-wise.130 The Divine are those
that must be referred immediately to Divine attention,
such as have been mentioned. The natural arise through
mediate causes (n3)t s nV), but with an end in view.
The chance-wise arise also through mediate causes, but
with no particular order or design. The elective are those
129 Kuzari, ed. Isaac Metz, Hamburg, 1838 , p. 119.
130 (Corrected by Zifrinowitsch in his edition, p. 120, "InnI

Ivinn3

DN.)

yn1p

K. Cp. for a similar division the Physics of Aristotle, II, 5-6.

IN PRE-MAIMONIDIAN

JEWISH

PHILOSOPHY

91

of which the human will is the cause. Freedom is one of
the mediate causes. We have then a twofold system
of Divine causality, the immediate and the mediate. The
mediate through the causal nexus returns to God, but
the connexion is a loose one, no force is exerted and man
a
is free to choose. 31 Divine providence is thus saved, for
all events revert to Him indirectly.
Halevi goes on
polemizing against those that deny the possible. He argues,
If man has no choice in acting, but is forced to perform
the act by the sequence of events, why then do men display
greater anger at the one who injures them willingly than
at the one who does so unwillingly? Are not all human
actions involuntary? 132
In regard to the problem of the compatibility of the
prescience of God with freedom, Halevi does not add
a
anything original, but follows Saadia and the Mutazilites, 13
in asserting that the knowledge of an event beforehand
is not the cause of the realization of that event. Halevi
lays a great deal of stress on the middle causes (cp. above).
His ethics thus receives a contemplative aspect. The middle
causes are powerful influences, and it is necessary to know
which to choose and which to obviate.134 The natural
causes are necessary, but yet there is a possibility by
a knowledge of facts to obstruct their results and avoid
them.
Halevi admits a special kind of Providence, for
in his division of events there is one class of Divine action;
and there is nothing preventing God from interfering at
131 Kuzari, p. 120o.
antiquity by the Stoics.
s132
Kuzari, p. 120o.

The idea

of the mediate

causes was known

Cp. L. Stein in his Willensfreiheit, p. Iro, note

13s Halevi alludes directly to the Muta'ziliah in that.
134Kuzari, p. I22.

in

175.

92

OMNISCIENCE, PROVIDENCE,

AND FREEDOM OF WILL

certain occasions, and effecting something immediately
even in a world of mediate causes. He evades, however,
the problem of injustice. It is possible, he says, that if we
were able to penetrate and follow up the long series of
causes, we might discover the reasons why the righteous
suffer and the wicked prosper, but this is really beyond
human intelligence. We must, therefore, rely on the
knowledge of God and His justice, and admit our own
a
35
shortcomings.
Abraham Ibn Daud, the first Aristotelian in Jewish
philosophy, is a strong supporter of the freedom of the
human will. In fact, it is his principal ethical foundation.
He says, Man possesses the possibility to do evil, and the
stronger the inclination is in a certain man, the harder
the struggle to overcome that inclination, the higher the
3
value which is attached to the virtuous act.1 0 He utilizes
the doctrine of the twofold Divine causality, but it is hardly
possible that he borrowed it from Halevi, as he evidently
'
did not know him. 13 7 Most likely both derived it from
a common source.' 38 In regard to the problem of prescience
and freedom, Ibn Daud solves it in a very simple manner.
He concedes that God's foreknowledge is undecided in
regard to the exact way man will act. He knows beforehand that certain actions will be presented to human choice,
183

1P1y1,

(Zifrinowitsch

p.

jNpY'w)

'11D1

:1

1:3114

n

r

t'.

e,

vr1

125.

186 Emunah Ramah, ed. Weil, Frankfurt a M., p. 97.
In the introduction to the Emunah Ramah, p. 2, Ibn Daud mentions

137

that he read Saadia's book as well as Ibn Gabirol, but makes no mention
of the Kuzari. This goes to prove that he was unacquainted with it, for
otherwise he certainly would have mentioned it.
138 On this subject there is a difference of opinion between D. Kaufmann.
Attributenlehre, p. 279, and Stein in his Willensfreiheit, p. 20, note 43.

IN PRE-MAIMONIDIAN

JEWISH

PHILOSOPHY

93

but not which way he will choose. 3a9 Ibn Daud is also
radical in his theory of Providence. According to him
it extends only to the universals, namely, as far as things
are connected with the order of the universe, but not to
the particulars. He, however, excepts the human genus,
an exception which we find later in Maimonides. He
introduces also an ascending scale of Providence, even in
regard to this genus. Those that strive more in the
knowledge of God and the principles of reason are especially
looked after. 40 The question of the existence of evil in
the world is answered by Ibn Daud by negating its reality.
There is no evil in the world; God is the cause of good
only. The answer is often repeated in Jewish as well as in
general philosophy. We shall meet it in a modified form
also in Spinoza.
189 Emunah Ramah, p. 96.

N

inIr,

Ibid., p. 97.

CHAPTER IV
MAIMONIDES' VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS.
MAIMONIDES, the chief conciliator between

theology

and philosophy in Jewish thought, devotes much space
to the elucidation of the problem discussed in the previous
chapter, as well as to its solution in all its aspects.
Maimonides, as his predecessors, distinguishes between
the first cause of events and the proximate ones. The
proximate ones he divides, as those before him, into natural,
chance-wise, and choice-wise. 41 Choice, however, is the
exclusive gift of man who is endowed with a special faculty.
Maimonides introduces a distinction, already made by
Aristotle,142 between instinctive willing which is only
a result of desire, and human choice. 143 He, however,
does not connect choice with reason as much as Aristotle
does. Maimonides, as a theologian, attributes it to a direct
act of the will of God. Just as God willed that fire should
tend upwards and earth downwards, so did He institute
that man should be master of himself, and his actions
He, like Ibn Daud,
should be in his own hands.' 44
141Moreh, II, ch. 48; Guide, p.

222.

142 Moral choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not coextensive,
voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all
other animals share in voluntary action, but not in moral choice. Ethics,
JII, 2.
143

13 b.

141Dmm

rr

non:

v

Vrnl * 4 "NnI

"

1

distinction between Dlmi 1l2n
144

Code, Div.

I,

'innri rS

in
t
T

i,,

and

Drn
4

riorn

rim

n

Moreh, II, ch. 48.

5Y'-1

Notice the

h1i.

Teshubah (Penitence , ch. 5, 4; Guide, III, 8.

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

95

recognizes the inclination in man to do evil, and therefore
assumes freedom as a standard of actions; the more the
struggle, the higher the worth of the ethical action.

Since

free will was instituted in man by the will of God, it may
on special occasion be taken away from man, such as we
find in the case of Pharaoh. 145

This case is well known to

all theological philosophers, Christian as well as Jewish.

46

Of course, such a possible limitation will not be pleasing
to the upholder of absolute free will.
In regard to the Divine knowledge, Maimonides, after
polemizing against some of the philosophers who wanted
to limit it, asserts that God is omniscient and nothing is
hidden

from Him. 147

In

this

connexion, Maimonides

remarks that great philosophers of the pre-Aristotelian
period accepted the doctrine of omniscience.

He refers

to the book De Regimine, by Alexander of Aphrodisias,
where their opinions are quoted.
opinion we

find

a distinct

The only one to whose

reference

is Socrates.

In

Xenophon's Memorabilia he is quoted as preaching that
the gods know all things, what is said, what is done, and
48
what is meditated in silence. a Maimonides further asserts

that this knowledge is eternal.

The problem then appears

in full vigour, How are we to reconcile the freedom of
man with this prescience? The answer to this problem
149
Maimonides finds in his Theory of Attributes (cp. above).
Maimonides conceives the Divine attributes in a negative
way, and says that when applying the same attributes to
God and man, we use them in an absolute homonymous
116 Chapters of Maimonides, ch. 8, ref. to Exod. 7. 3.
Origen, De Principiis,III, r, grapples with this problem.
147 Guide, III, 16.
148 Memorabilia, I, I. 19.

146

149 Chapter 2.

96

MAIMONIDES'

way.

This theory contends that it is absolutely impossible

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

for the human mind to grasp the meaning of the attributes
applied to God.

Since the attribute of prescience forms

no exception, the difficulty is solved.

The problem arises

only when we conceive knowledge in the human sense.
With man, knowledge is correlative with fact.

Applying

the same conception by analogy to that of God, it follows
that God's prescience ought to agree with the fact, otherwise
it contradicts itself. But since we do away with that
analogy and assert that His knowledge is different in kind,
the difficulty disappears.

God knows things beforehand,

yet the possible still remains. 150
merely a concession

This teaching

of ignorance,

but, as

grounded in the theory of attributes.

is not

mentioned,

God's knowledge

is not a separate thing from His essence but connected
with it, and just as the essence, it is unknown.

In the act

vtr ~V' vy1', the
knower, the known, and the knowledge itself, but with God
151
He is all three in one.
of human knowledge we distinguish the

As for the question of Providence, Maimonides treats
it in detail. He quotes four different opinions, and then
adds his.

The first is the Epicurean, denying Providence

entirely.

The second is the Aristotelian, in the garb of

Alexander of Aphrodisias, 152 namely, that Divine providence
ceases at the sublunar world.

But as Providence, even
in regard to the spheres, consists mainly in their preserva150oGuide, III, ch. 20o.
1-8. A similar use of the homonymous theory is made by

151 Chapters

Spinoza, Cogitata Metaph., VI, 9. It is interesting to compare with the last
Fischer's note 24 in his Anhang to Spinoza.
152 As for Aristotle himself, it is doubtful whether he ever expressed any
opinion on the subject. See Jules Le Simon in his Etude de la The'odicee de
Platon et Aristote, p. Ioo f.

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

97

tion, it filtrates also to a certain degree to the sublunar

world, in so far as the genera are endowed with perpetual
preservation. The third is that of the Ash'aria-extremists
on the orthodox side of the Kalamitic movement-assuming
perfect subjection of the universe and its beings to the
Divine will, denying chance and choice. The fourth is
that of the Mutazilites, positing freedom, and Divine
justice and Providence at the same time. They went so
far in their conception of justice, according to Maimonides,
that they extended reward even to animals for their being
killed. 153 The fifth is his own, which according to him
agrees with the Jewish tradition. Divine providence
extends in the sublunar world to the human species only.
The other beings are subjected to chance or natural law.
However, he admits that the genera of other beings have
a kind of providence in so far as the natural law originates
from God.154 As it is evident, the Maimonidian theory
differs from the so-called Aristotelian only in attributing
Providence to the human species. The reason for the
exception is found in the possession by the human genus
of the mind, which is a means of conveyance for Divine
emanation. It follows, therefore, as we noticed in Ibn Daud,
that the one who is more intellectually perfect should
receive more attention from Providence. 155
Note.-Objections to this last assertion have been raised
by many religious thinkers, and with justice. Among the
thinkers is also the Karaite Aaron Ben Elijah in Es IHayim.

17.

nn
Y'", Moreh, ch.
For a certain inadequateness in his exposition of
the Mutazilistic teaching see Stein, Die Willensfreiheit, p. 86.

1.4

25

W.

i

n
i1n

'rt

Guide, III, ch.

Guide, III, 17,

rrni

17.

18.
H

98

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

The chief critic, however, is Crescas himself. This question
will be discussed in detail.
I have also omitted for the
present the Maimonidian theory of origin of evil, as well
as some philosophic arguments for the denial of prescience
and Providence quoted by Maimonides. These are discussed at length by Crescas, and should be taken in
connexion with his own solutions as they form a part
of his theory.
CRESCAS ON PRESCIENCE.

Crescas, as a foundation to his discourse on the subject,
posits three principles, which, according to him, agree with
and are necessitated by tradition. These are (a) the infinite
science of God, (b) His prescience, (c) that His foreknowledge of the possible event does not change the nature of it.
He proceeds then to analyse the philosophical doubts that
arise in connexion with such conceptions, and, as usual,
reproduces them first. First, if God knows the events
happening in this world, it follows that God is being
perfected by this knowledge, for it has been established
that knowledge is a kind of perfection; but such conclusion
is'absurd, for how can the absolute Perfect be perfected
through the knowledge of inferior things? Second, since
it is known that the mind in conceiving things becomes
identified with the concepts and assimilates them to its
essence, it follows that there will result a multiplicity in
God's essence, for the things are many. The third and
fourth arguments attack God's assumed knowledge of
particulars. There were two current philosophical opinions
in regard to the Aristotelian conception of the matter.
The first denied entirely God's knowledge of anything
external to Himself. (This seems to be the right one,

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

99

cf. above, Introduction, IV.) The other, following Alexander,
admitted the knowledge of universals.16 Particular things
can be conceived only through their matter and passive
intellect, but God has no matter; it follows that He cannot
7
conceive the particular things. 1- Again, particulars are
temporal, and whatever relates to time is an accident of
motion; but God is above motion and time, He therefore
does not know of the particulars. Finally, the positing
of Divine science of the world's affairs is untenable, as the
disorder in the natural sphere and the existence of evil
in human affairs testify.158s
These are the objections to the general principle of
positing God's knowledge of the world's affairs. There
are several objections especially to several of the specific
principles, namely, the infinite science of God and His prescience. How, asks the opponent, can God's knowledge be
infinite? Is not knowledge a comprehensive and determining
thing? How, then, can the infinite be comprehended or
determined ? There is then a contradiction in terms. Again,
prescience seems to be impossible. Real knowledge of a thing
implies that the object known exists, for in what consists
156 Gersonides, Milamot, III, i, p. 12o.

157 All these objections are also found arranged in a similar order in
Gersonides, Milizamot, III, 2.

However, we notice in Crescas a more logical
It is not necessary that he borrowed them directly from
Gersonides, though the contents and form are similar. These objections
were current in the thought of the age. Some of them are also mentioned
arrangement.

by Maimonides.

In the third objection there is a digression by Crescas
which deserves some notice. It is the first with Gersonides. He says that
the particular is conceived through the hylean power such as sense and
imagination. Crescas substitutes matter instead of sense. That would agree
with the Aristotelian conception of individuality which consists in matter,
for it is this that gives the uniqueness since form is general to genus.
Metaph., XII, 8.
15s Or Adonai, p. 29 a.

100

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S

COMMENTS

the truthfulness of a conception of things if not in the fact
that the mental conception of a thing agrees with the object
existing outside of the mind ? 159 Furthermore, if we grant
that God does know things before their occurrence, a change
in His knowledge is necessitated. Before they occur He
knows them as future happenings, after that as past. And
since the mind essence changes with the concepts, there
will then be a change in His essence, but this is impossible.
The assumption that the existence of possible future events
is compatible with the prescience of God is also assailed.
If we posit that God knows before the realization of one
of the two possible aspects of a future event, and at the
same time we assert that the opposite aspect is possible
of occurrence; then while in His prescience the opposite
is still conceived as possible, after the action occurs the
possibility is removed and a change in the Divine knowledge
necessarily effected. Moreover, the assumption that God
knows whichever aspect is going to occur proves to be
untenable, for with a possible event, in as far as it is
Suppose, then,
possible, either side may be assumed.
that we assume the opposite side of that of which God is
prescient, existing, if so absurdities would result, (a) a change
in His knowledge, (b) a falsity in it. If that cannot be the
case, the possible is done away with and God's prescience
1 °
6
involves the necessity of human actions.
After reproducing at length all the objections, which,
as remarked, are identical with those quoted by Gersonides
in his book Milhkamot (The Battles of the Lord), Crescas
quotes also the Gersonidian solution, though not mentioning
159 Cp. Locke's definition of knowledge in Essay on Human Understanding,

Bk. 4, ch. i.
16o Or Adonai, Tr. II, p. 29 a.

MAIMONIDES'

him by name.

VIEW AND

101

CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

The objection may be answered

in the

following manner: The first which involves the question
of God's perfection disappears when we consider that the
existence of other beings arises through God's existence,
His

and also conceived through His own conceptions.

knowing other beings would not mean then an additional
perfection, for He knows them through the general order
of things (

1, 1o),

-"
the principle of which is in Himself.

'

The second, raising the objection of multiplicity, is solved
by the same conception.

Since God knows the general

order which emanates from Himself, and this order unites
all the different things (for though things are different in
certain respects they are also connected in a certain aspect
and perfect each other), He then knows the particulars from
their side of unity.
is refuted.

In the same manner the third doubt

It is founded on the principle that in order

to know the particulars God must possess hylic powers,
but though we grant the validity of the principle it does
not follow that God should not know the particular things
through their general conceived order wherein their unity
is manifested.

The doctrine of the inherence of things in

the general order also meets the fourth objection, basing
itself on the fact that particulars are in time, while God
is above time, for God's conception of the general order
does not depend upon time.

The fifth, the question of

evil, is deferred for future discussion.
doubts, named by Crescas

Again, the other

partial, are also met.

The

difficulty of knowledge being infinite (cp. above), it is done
away with by removing the infinite.

Things are infinite

in their differentiation but not in their unity.'1 2
161 Milh amot, III, 4; Or Adonai, p. 2 9 b.

e162 words in the text, both in Gersonides and Crescas, are 5
The

The

0

1

I,

IO2

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

general order preconceived by God is finite. In the same
way the two objections raised against prescience (cp. above)
are righted. Since God knows things through their general
order which emanates directly from Him, the things are
already existing, and surely there is no change in the
knowledge itself. If God knew the particulars in as far as
they are particulars, that is from the point cf their differentiation, that change would be implied, but He knows
them from their general order, and this is not changed.
Finally, the most difficult question is solved; this is the
question of the existence of the possible in spite of
prescience.

Possible events have two aspects, and may

be preordained in one way, and possible in the other.
From the aspect of general order of events they are
determined, but from the aspect of human choice they
are indeterminate. God knows these things only so far
as they are possible, but He does not know which side
of the possibility will be realized. It is evident, therefore,
that when Gersonides speaks of possible things as being
determined by the general order, he means that only their
possibility is determined but not their realization. 63
Crescas, in resuming the foregoing discussion, points
out that the reasoning of those philosophers-still not
mentioning any name-compel us to posit two principles:
(i) God knows the particulars only through their general
order; (2) God knows only that certain things are possible,
but not the manner of their realization. From these two
conceptions there follows necessarily a third one. God
does not know of the happenings of one of the possible
which means literally conceived arrangement, i. e. division into genera.
But the concept of genus implies always the notion of unity.
16 Milhamot, IIJI, 4; Or Adonai, pp. 29b-so a.

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

164
sides, even a fosteriori.

103

Were He to know of the fact,

a change in His knowledge would be implied.

Before the

occurrence of the event He knew of it only as a possible,
and after it as actual.

Crescas sees in such an assumption

a shrinkage of God's science, a dangerous doctrine, and sets
out in his acute manner to refute it.

These philosophers,

he says, have not solved the doubts at all.

In spite of

their insisting on unity by positing that God knows things
through the unified aspect, namely, the general order, these
philosophers, according to Crescas, have not succeeded in
removing multiplicity. True knowledge consists in knowing
things through

all their causes, mediate or immediate.

Knowledge of composed things then would be perfect only
when the elements of which they are composed would be
conceived by the knower, for the elements

are causes

of things, but the elements are many, there follows then
that the knower must conceive the manifold.

Again, even

if we grant that existing things form a kind of unified order
of perfection, this will be true only of the broadest genera,
such as the division of the kingdoms, e. g. the vegetative,
animal, &c., but considering the narrower genera or the
species, we find that one does not perfect the other, e. g.
the horse has no relation of perfection

to the donkey.

If we posit, then, of God a knowledge of genera, He cannot
escape conceiving multiplicity.

Thirdly, even if we assume

that God's knowledge is limited to the spheres and intelligibles, the difficulty is not solved, for though they
present a certain unity they also exhibit differentiation;
the knowledge of the differentiating aspect would then

-

12

161

13PI

N

l

1?14N

, Or Adonai, p.

s

a.

Or Adonai, p. 30 a..

fo

104

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

imply multiplicity. 165 Lastly, there is an astrological
argument directed chiefly against Gersonides, who attributes great influence to the spheres and constellations.
The knowledge of particulars by God arises, according to
him, out of the order of the heavenly spheres, which order
is due to the various combinations of the constellations.
But the combinations may be infinite; for the great circle
in the sphere is a quantity, and it is infinitely divisible.
It follows, then, that the arrangements can be infinite, and
so God's science does not escape multiplicity.
It is evident, then, that the principal object in removing
the manifold from Divine knowledge has not been obtained.
But there is still a greater error. The followers of the
foregoing theory, in their endeavours to put forth an exalted
conception of God, have attributed to Him imperfections,
namely, finiteness. If, as they say, God does not know
the particulars as particulars, it follows, since the number
of particular things is infinite, that He possesses ignorance
in regard to the infinite, and that the relation of God's
knowledge to His ignorance is as the finite to the infinite,
for the number of things that He does know is finite.
Again, if God does not know beforehand which of the two
possible sides of an event will be realized, it appears, since
the possible events are incomparably greater than the
necessary ones, that God is ignorant of most of the happenings of the world. Lastly, those philosophers, in order
to avoid the assumption of the possibility of a change in
God's knowledge, asserted that God does not know of the

0I1

4121 24n1

123 JIM,

Or Adonai, p. 30 b.

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

105

result of a possible happening, even as a past occurrence.
If this is the case, we must evidently assume that God is
ignorant of the greatest part of human history, for in the
long row of centuries thousands of possible actions, events,
and occurrences were realized, and all these things escaped
His knowledge; such an assertion is certainly absurd."'6
To meet all these doubts and objections, Maimonides
put up his theory of the homonymity of the Divine attributes.

(See above in the exposition of the Maimonidian

theory.)

This theory was severely attacked by Gersonides.

He argues that it is impossible to speak
homonymity in regard to Divine attributes.

of absolute
In attributing

to God certain qualities, and speaking of them as belonging
to Him, we inevitably borrow human conceptions.
case

in question

furnishes

an

example.

We

The

conceive

knowledge as a perfection, we attribute it also to God.
But in this case no absolute homonymy is possible, for
when one attribute is predicated of two things, it is impossible to be used in an homonymous way, as it does not
then convey the same idea. Again, when we negate certain
attributes in regard to God, we do not negate them in an
homonymous way.

When we say, God is not movable,

we do not mean that His not being moved and the not
being moved of a certain thing are absolutely homonymous,
for in this case the idea that we wish to convey is not at all
proved.

He may be moved, and yet the movement has

no association with what we call being moved.
go on negating.

Still we

Again, if all attributes are employed

in an homonymous way, why shall we not say, God is
a body, conceiving it in an absolute homonymous way with
no relation to what we call body?

Gersonides, therefore,

168 Or Adonai, p. 31 a.

io6

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

assumes that all attributes and knowledge included are
said to differ in their application to God and man only
in degree, but not in kind. The Maimonidian solution
of the problem of prescience and the possible falls then,
167
the foundation being undermined
Against the assailment of Gersonides, Crescas steps
forth as a defender of Maimonides. Knowledge attributed
to God and man must be in an absolute homonymous way.
It cannot be said that it differs only in degree, for the content
of any attribute predicated of things and differing in degree,
is the same, no matter how widely the degrees it may
connote in various applications may differ, as, for instance,
the content of existence, which is predicated of substance
as well as of other things. 68s The contents in both predications are the same, namely being, but the degrees are
various; substance exists through itself, while the other
things exist through the substance. But in speaking of
the knowledge of God, since His knowledge is a kind of
essential thing, and His essence is different from ours in
kind, it follows that the same will be said of His knowledge.
It is true that negatively, when conceiving the attributes
under a negative aspect, namely knowledge, denoting not
ignorant, existent, not non-existent, the contents are one
when employed of God and man. But when applying
these attributes in a positive way, we must admit that the
application is homonymous. It is evident from the exposition, and more so on reading the original, that Crescas
finds himself in his defence in a rather difficult position.
167 Milhamot, III, 3.

The word
168s in

the text is 111

OND,

which means literally Categories,

but to one who is not acquainted with the Aristotelian conception of
Categories the word here would be confusing.

MAIMONIDES' VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

107

He apparently contradicts himself in defending Maimonides,
and in assuming the homonymy theory he changes his own
attitude which he expressed in his first section, 169 where he
distinctly states that existence, when applied to God and
man, is not used absolutely homonymously, but in a kind
of non-essential likeness, 170 and he speaks definitely of
a difference in degree. However, the contradiction is
removed by his insisting on the distinction between a
negative proposition and a positive, and claiming that
while the negative content may have a likeness, the positive
which we are going to assume may differ absolutely. Still,
Crescas admits that it is only defensive, but he himself
probably holds a different view. Towards the end of the
argument he remarks: 'Be it whichever way, whether
following the master (Maimonides) that knowledge is
applied homonymously or that there is only a difference
of degree as we say, and denotes an essential attribute
as we showed in the third section of the first tractate,
it remains for us to solve the question in a different way.'

17

Crescas then proceeds to state his own view. The real
and special distinction between the knowledge of God and
ours is that His knowledge is active and causal, and ours
derivative. Through His knowledge and true plan of His
will, the known existing things have acquired their
existence. Our knowledge is derived from the existing
169See Or Adonal, I, sect. iii, p. 22 a, and supra, ch. II, 2.
170 The Hebrew word is
which is to be translated by the whole
phrase; cp. Maimonides,
, p. 43.

piD,

14ii1flI

1)l'

, Or Adonai, p. 32 b.

MAIMONIDES'

1o8

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

things by means of the senses and imagination. 172
fundamental difference will remove all objections.

This
First,

in regard to God it cannot be said that knowledge of
external things adds perfection, for it is this knowledge that
causes the existence of other things.

It is evident, there-

fore, that the things themselves cannot add anything to their
cause since they are dependent upon it.

The difference

between Crescas's point of view and that of Gersonides
must be made clear at the outset, as the solution of the
first objection
language.'

73

by Gersonides

seems

to be similar

in

Gersonides also speaks of the fact that the

existence of other things is dependent upon the existence
of God, and that God's conception of other things is derived
through the conception of His self. The difference consists
in this, that Gersonides left out the voluntary element; the
God of Gersonides, as well as of some others of the Peripatetic followers, was to a certain
personality.

degree an imperfect

God, they say, is the cause of existence, but

not directly, only through a kind of emanation by means
of certain

emanative

causality.

He knows the beings by knowing Himself, but

beings which

form a channel

of

He knows them only by means of the general order;
the details were left to the other emanated beings.

It is

this loophole that enabled Crescas to overthrow the whole
Gersonidian

structure, and show its logical unsoundness

(see his argument above).

The great failure of the Peri-

patetic philosophical theologians was that they stopped
midway between an absolute personality of God and an
17 1n'

01,

Jl

1Y
:

1 y'l

....

r

ls

Or Adonal, p. 32 b.
2, and exposition above.

1;3 Mil.amot, III,

lr ' 7

"1mi1v

i

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

IO

9

Spinoza followed the last path,
absolute impersonality.
and arrived at his system where God is not only the cause
of the world but also the ground; Crescas the first; and
both of them succeeded in a certain way. Moreover, several
of their conclusions are strikingly similar, for the principle
is really one, a certain wholeness, but of this further.
Crescas conceives the beings as arising not through
emanation, but through the will and plan of God, and
as every plan requires preceding knowledge; God's knowledge of things therefore is causal, nay, it is creative. He
knows things, not because He knows Himself, but eo ipso;
it is through His knowledge that they exist. This knowledge and will are not to be construed in any gross form,
but, as has been discussed, they are essential attributes.
The second objection disappears also, for there is no multiplicity implied on account of the fact that the known
things are many and the mind assimilates and identifies
itself with the things known. This objection may be true
of a derivative mind, but not of God who is the cause
of the existence of things, and thus knows them whether
one or many.
In this way, God also knows the particulars without
using the senses and imagination as a means of conception,
for the particular also acquires its existence through His
knowledge. The question of time, which is raised by the
fourth objection, namely, that particulars are in time, is
removed, for even time derives its existence from Him.
Besides, Crescas has already shown (above, chapter I) that
time is not an accident of motion but a mental concept.
The argument from the existence of evil in this world
174
is deferred for a later chapter.
174 Or Adonai, p. 32 b.

IiO

MAIMONIDES' VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

Crescas then proceeds to discuss the objections which
he terms partial. The question, How can knowledge comprehend an infinite number of things? is answered by
maintaining that the objection would be valid if the knowledge were of a finite kind such as the human is, but since
it is itself infinite there is no difficulty. The contention
that God's knowledge may be infinite is strictly connected
with the possibility of the existence of an infinite number
of effects, and this is maintained by Crescas (cp. above,
chapter I of this work). The second argument insisting
that foreknowledge of a thing implies already the existence
of the thing known, for it is this that constitutes true
knowledge, is met by Crescas in the following manner.
The assertion, he says, is true of human knowledge which
is derivative, but not of God's; His prescience of a thing
that it will exist is real and true, for it is that which assures
the thing its existence. The other difficulty connected
with the question of prescience, the one of change, namely,
that there is a change in the status of the thing from being
a future happening to a past occurrence, and therefore also
a change in the knowledge of it, does not affect the knowledge of God, for He knows beforehand that at a certain
time the event will happen. He finally arrives at the most
difficult part of the problem, the compatibility of the
existence of the possible with God's prescience. How can
we call a thing possible when God knows beforehand
whichever way it is going to happen? Here Crescas gives
us a glimpse of his theory of an apparent or nominal
possible.
His consistency in refusing to admit any
shrinkage in God's prescience forces him to abandon
a great part of the freedom of the will. A thing, he says,

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

III

may be necessary in one way and possible in another.' 7 5
As an example he cites the knowledge which a man has
of certain things that are possible of existence, as most
things are. The knowledge that we have of them necessitates their existing, for knowledge is an agreement of the
mental ideas with the things existing. Yet this knowledge
does not change their nature of being possible of existence.
In a similar way, the knowledge of God knowing the way
which man will elect does not change the nature of the
possibility. It must be admitted that the example is not
happily chosen, for human knowledge of things is a posteriori,
the possibility of the existence is already a past thing,
while the knowledge of God which we speak of is a
and the possibility is still existing. In addition, human
knowledge is not causal, while that of God is, and His
prescience must affect the future occurrence, unless we
assume with Saadia that God's knowledge is not the cause
of things; but Crescas really argued the contrary. However, the question is taken up again in connexion with
freedom of the will, and he solves it quite dexterously.
It is a mooted question whether Spinoza's reputed
impersonality of God is so complete as many of his interpreters want to attribute to him.' 76 There are others who
assert that in spite of some passages which lend themselves
to such an interpretation, the God of Spinoza is not entirely
robbed of consciousness. 177 The question what Spinoza
meant by God's knowledge or intellect is dependent on
the previous conception. The language is confusing, and

priori,

175 nnT
Th
hM

1n

02
y01V

=1

4x11

79,
110 r3 nr
z
Or Adonai, p. 33 a.
76 Cp. K. Fischer, Spinoza, p. 366.
177 Joel, Zur Genesis det Lehlre Spinozas, p. 16.

t;

itr

112

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

the passages often ambiguous.

It

seems, however, that

a certain discrepancy exists between his earlier remarks
on the subject of Divine knowledge in the Cogitata Metaphysica and that of the Ethics. In the former, his language
is more in accord with the philosophico-theological terms.
He attributes omniscience to God, and of singulars more
than of universals. In his polemics against those that want
to exclude singulars from God's science, he reminds us of
Maimonides in denying any existence to universals.' 7 8

He

further speaks of God being the object of His own thoughts.
In the Ethics, on the other hand, in the famous scholium
to proposition XVII in the first book of Ethics, Spinoza
remarks, 'that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
nature', yet again, in

the same scholium he describes

the way he attributes intellect and will to God in quite
Maimonidian fashion, insisting on absolute homonymy in
applying these attributes to God.

Again, in a corollary

to proposition XXXII, in the first book, Spinoza says:
'Will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature
of God as do motion and rest and absolutely all natural
phenomena.'

This last passage shows Spinoza's view of

God to be impersonal;

yet he goes on to say in the

scholium to proposition VII, book II, that 'whatsoever can
be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the
essence of substance belongs altogether to one substance'.
What the word 'perceived'

means here is difficult to tell.

Joel concludes that all that Spinoza means to say in the
scholium is that there is no relation between the human

178s Maimonides,
Cp.

Guide, III, 18, and Cogitata Metaph., pt. II, ch.

7:

deinde res realiter existentes Deum ignorare statuunt universalium autem,
quae non sunt nec ullam habent praeter singularium essentiam, cognitionemn
Deo affingunt'.

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

113

conception of these attributes and their real nature as they
exist in God.1 79 His conclusion, however, may be unjustified, but the discussion is beyond the range of our
work.
What interests us most are two points, which bear a
decided resemblance to the theory of Crescas. Spinoza
speaks of the intellect of God as the cause of things both
8
in regard to their essence and their existence. x s0 Things
arise because they exist by representation as such in the
intellect of God. It is not clear what Spinoza may mean
by 'representation'.
To take it literally would mean
a too great concession to personality, but whatever it
intended to convey, even if we grant that it may connote
the necessity of the unfolding of the attribute of thought,
the formal side of it is almost identical with the teaching
of Crescas, which, as was shown, emphasizes the point
that the knowledge of God is the cause of things not
only through the general order, but of the essence of
all things. Again, Spinoza repeats continually that the
x
intellect and the will of God are identical. "s It is exactly
the same teaching that we find in Crescas when he says
that 'through His knowledge and representation of His
s
will the things acquired existence '.182 Such a conception
is necessitated when knowledge is conceived as an efficient
cause, not merely contemplation as Aristotle conceives
the Divine thought to be. It is true that there may be
a difference of contents in these two conceptions, that of
Crescas having a voluntaristic ring, while that of Spinoza

'

179 Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas, p. 18.
180soEthics, Bk. I, Prop.
scholium.

17,

181 Ethics, Prop.

17,

scholium, p. 32.
182ss Adonai, p. 32 b.
Or

W.

I

MAIMONIDES'

I14

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

a ground of causal necessity, but still the kinship of the
teachings cannot be denied.

It is not definitely known

whom Spinoza had in mind when he makes the statement
in connexion with the intellect of God in the foregoing
passage, This seems to have been recognized by those who
have asserted that God's intellect, God's will, and God's
power are one and the same'; but that in Crescas this idea
is expressed clearly is evident.

However, we shall return

to this subject later in the discussion on will and creation.
I wish, nevertheless, to say a few words concerning
K. Fischer's stand on the subject.

Spinoza, in scholium

to proposition VII, book II of his Ethics, in discussing
the unity of thinking and extended substance, remarks:
'This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those
Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things

understood

by God are

quoting this passage,

183

identical'.

Fischer, in

does not attach much importance

to any influence which it may possibly indicate, but in
note 34 in his Ankang he says: 'Derartige Vorahnungen
einer Identitatsphilosophie

finden

sich

nicht wie

man

gemeint hat bei Maimonides, sondern bei Ibn Esra, so in
dessen bertihmtem Satz (Exod. 24), tM'3 v171r4 7

N

(He alone

is knower, knowledge, and

known)'.

7

Why

Fischer should see in this dictum the foreshadowing of the
Spinozistic identity of substances is difficult to see, as well
as his discovery of it in Ibn Ezra alone.

This identical

dictum is quoted also by Maimonides in the eighth chapter
of his treatise known as 'The Eight Chapters', where he
says: 'It has been explained that He, blessed be His name,
is His attributes, and His attributes are He, so that it is
said of Him that He is the knowledge, the knower, and the
183 Spinoza, p. 273.

MAIMONIDES'

VIEW AND CRESCAS'S COMMENTS

115

known; He is life, living, and the cause of His own life'.
It was also quoted quite often by the Arabic philosophers.
This dictum does not contain any other idea than the
Aristotelian conception that God is the object of His own
thought, and it is quoted by Maimonides in this sense to
show the difference between God's knowledge and that
of man, which is something separate from the subject,
the knower. The later commentators of Aristotle interpreted Aristotle to mean that God in thinking of His own
subject conceives ideas which are realized in the world
as general principles, and so He knows the universals.
It is in this sense that it was used by Ibn Ezra, following
the Arabic philosophers who maintained that God's science
is only limited to general order, but no foreshadowing of
Spinoza can be seen in that dictum. If any claim to
foreshadowing is admitted on that basis alone, Maimonides
surely cannot be excluded from being a forerunner of
Spinoza, as has been shown. That the origin of the dictum
is to be found in the Aristotelian conception of God's
thinking quoted in Metaphysics, XII, 7 and 9, has been
pointed out by L. Stein. 184 Vestiges of a Spinozistic
identity conception can be found only in Crescas, but of
that later.
184 Willensfreilheit, pp. 7o

I

i z6.

CHAPTER V
PROVIDENCE, POTENCE, AND FREE WILL.
CRESCAS posits that the providence of God extends

also to particulars, yet it is not entirely uniform.
presents rather a kind of graded scale.

It

It

is in some

aspects generic and universal, and in some way individual.
The general is again subdivided into a more general order
where the system is natural law without any particular
attention to the perfection of the species or individual
included, and into a special kind where
of the unit is in some way taken

the perfection

into consideration.

Again, the individual providence, though not in the form
of natural law and a kind of special, yet admits of division.
There is some kind in which the perfection of the provided
individuals is completely taken into view, and some kind
in which the relation of Providence to the provided is not
so absolute in regard to their perfection.
on to exemplify his division.

Crescas goes

The general Providence is

seen in every existing being, in its composition, natural
tendencies, organic functions, mental powers, and so forth.
Although these forces vary according to the genus and the
species, they are alike in every individual of the species;
we see, therefore, that natural laws are taken in as a part
of Providence. The human species is an example of general

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE,

II7

AND FREE WILL

and special Providence, since it is endowed with reason.
It is general, for every individual participates in it alike,
but special at the same time as it is only for that species
alone.

Thus he goes

on to unnecessary

details.

The

particular Providence, in his conception, consists in the
spiritual reward and punishment, for the following of an
ethical and religious life or the opposite.

This kind of

Providence is in complete relation to the degrees of perfection of the various individuals, and it is arranged and
determined by God's eternal will. 185

We

observe

here

already a departure

from the theories of the Jewish
Aristotelians who emphasized the intellect as a means for
s
special providence, 86 and asserted that the higher man

ascends in the scale of intelligence the greater claim he
has upon God's special interest.
Crescas, on the other
hand, asserts the practical
intellectual.

and

ethical value

over the

187

The problem of injustice in this world is taken up next
It was always a stumbling-block to religious

by Crescas.

thinkers, and various solutions have been offered for its
removal. Of these Crescas quotes several. The first is the
Maimonidian, which denies the existence of the problem
either by doubting the subject, namely,whether the righteous
is really righteous or only apparently so, or by questioning
the predicate, saying that the evil of the righteous is for
the purpose of the good, and the good of the wicked for
88
the purpose of evil.1
Both possibilities are objected to
185 bre

l1

Tys
Dl

1

X?1

inr'rWT

flr

NIO

i 11

Or Adonai, p. 35 a.
destined.

blip here is to be taken rather as eternal than preCrescas uses the word often in the sense of eternal.

186 See above, chapter III.
point.
187 Or Adonai, p. 35 a.

Ibn Daud, and cp. also Maimonides on this
188Ibid., p. 35 b.

I18

PROVIDENCE, POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

by Crescas.

The fact is that we observe at times that
evil befalls a man when he acts righteously, and again when
the same man turns to the wrong path he succeeds.

turn of events

This

gives the case a problematic status, for

whatever the man really is, not apparently, the results
ought at least to follow in opposite directions.

On the

other hand, the denial of the predicate is contravened by
fact, for we find many evils that befall the righteous with
no purpose for the good, and the opposite.
Again, the solution of the quasi-Aristotelians, which
is rather Neo-Platonic, that evil has its origin in matter
and has little to do with God, is not satisfactory, for that
simply leads
Gersonides
manner.

89

to

tried

admit a

shrinkage

to

this question

solve

of

God's
in

power.

a peculiar

Providence follows the intellectual scale.

Man

through his reason and potential unity with the active
reason stands in a certain relation to God. The more man
develops his mental powers the nearer he comes to God,
and so is said to be under special Providence.
other

hand,

the intellect
Providence

the one

that neglects

is forsaken.

the

The purpose

On the

cultivation
of the

is to provide the deserving with

causes to obtain the good.

of

special

adequate

However, exceptions to the

rule occur very often, and the cause of these exceptions
is the influence of the spheres.

The wicked sometimes

prosper because of a certain sidereal arrangement.

Again,

the suffering of the righteous may be explained through
other causes also.

As for the influence of the spheres,

though in particular cases it may be unjust, yet taken as
a whole it tends for the good, preservation of the existence,
189 Crescas refers to Gersonides by the term 170Dl TtI
sages', Or Adonai, p. 35 b.

D

'some of our

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

II 9

and general good. In this way they tried to solve the
problem of injustice as well as the question of evil, how
they can be related to God. The evil is severed from the
direct connexion with God.
to the

natural

influence.

It befalls man when forsaken

order, caused

by sidereal

or spherical

90

This confused theory is justly rejected, for according
to it the main emphasis is laid upon contemplation, and
a man can be as wicked as possible, yet by virtue of his
philosophical attainments be entitled to special Providence,
which is contrary to every religious principle. Again, the
undue influence of the spheres causes shrinkage in Divine
providence.

Crescas, therefore, propounds his own solution.

It is actuated by a deep religious motive, but at the same
time by an exalted feeling which may compare in depth to
the Kantian theory of ethical autonomy.

The real good is

not the material good, nor is the real bad the material evil,
but the spiritual. It has been evidenced by experience that
practice of virtue brings about the acquisition by the soul
of a tendency and inclination to virtue, and surely this
tendency is strengthened if it was there before. The more
a man practises virtue under adverse circumstances the
greater his perfection.

It follows then that when the
righteous suffer it is really for their own good, for by this
their perfection increases, and their inclination is deepened,
1
which is the real good.99

Crescas does not exclude other

190oo
Milhamot, IV, 6; Or Adonai, p. 36 a.

1

4 '

, 1Z

, Or Adonav,
1

p. 37 b.

f~, Or Adunai, p.

37b.

PROVIDENCE,

120

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

possibilities such as have been

put forth

by previous

thinkers, as evil occurring to the righteous through ancestral wrongs 192 or other causes.

He, however, does not

succeed with the other part of the problem, why the wicked
prosper.

He resorts to the usual methods employed by

his predecessors.

He remarks,

nevertheless, that it is

possible that the good of the wicked is for the purpose
of spiritual badness, but it does not work out so well as
in the first case.
The question of the existence of evil in this world is
answered by him, that there is not such a thing in the
world.

We must observe here that all these philosophers

have never reflected upon the natural evil which abounds
so much in the external world; they concentrate their
discussions upon human

events, and though these may

arise through natural agencies, yet the question of the
wherefore of such agencies of destruction has never been
taken up, otherwise they would form a better conception
of natural law.

Maimonides makes some remarks on the

subject attributing evil to the imperfection of matter, but
does not treat the problem sufficiently.

The bad things

that befall the righteous have been shown to be for the
purpose of the good, and as for the sufferings of the wicked
such a phenomenon from the point of justice cannot be
called but good.

Crescas here takes up a third question.

It has been asked, How can we say that God's providence
extends to man?

Is it not a belittling of God to speak of

Him as being interested in man?

In answer to this,

192 Such a solution of the question was not unknown to the ancient
Greeks.

The whole trilogy of Oedipus Rex and Antigone by Sophocles is

interwoven with that idea.

Oedipus and his children suffer through no

wrong of their own, but because of the ancient curse on the house of Laius.

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND

FREE WILL

121

Crescas brings out an interesting point in his theory. We
have seen, he says, that God through His will is the cause
of the existing things and their continual creation. But
there is no will in regard to a certain thing unless there
is a certain desire or love for the things created by that
will. It follows, then, that since there is a love of God
for the created things, that those things should be provided
no matter what the actual causal relation is, whether
mediate or immediate, for the love of God which is strictly
connected with His creative will permeates them all, and
there is no belittling in saying that God takes interest
in man. This love of God to His created things does not
lay any special emphasis upon the degree of contemplation
the being possesses. 193 This remark is intended against
the Jewish Peripatetics who, as remarked, made speculation
an important step in the ladder of Providence. The
difference between this kind of love of God, which is ethical,
and that of Spinoza's, which is strictly intellectual, has been
remarked above.'94 The interesting Spinozistic discussion
of evil, which resembles in some point that of Crescas, will
be discussed with the question of determinism.
POTENCE.

Since it is evidenced by experience and reason that
incapacity is a defect in God, it follows that God's potence
is infinite in all respects, in whatever way reason may
conceive its existence, though experience may not corroborate it. He is omnipotent, for would He be limited
in one way, then beyond that boundary He would be
incapable, and this is contrary to the conception we have
193

Or

Adonai,

p.

38

a.

194Chapter II.

122

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE,

AND FREE WILL

of God. When saying 'infinite in all respects', Crescas
explains that he means by it the inclusion of several kinds
of infinite.1 95 There may be, he says, an infinite in time
and an infinite in strength, and he emphasizes that God
is said to be infinite in both ways. He, however, expresses
himself against a blind and extreme conception of omnipotence. As it was mentioned, this infinity of potence is
bounded by reason. We cannot, therefore, attribute to God
the accomplishment of a logical impossibility, such as the
existence of two contraries in one thing at the same time.
Such a limitation is really no contradiction to the concept
of omnipotent, for the ability to bring about the existence
of a thing which cannot be conceived by reason is not
included at all by the word potence, and therefore the lack
of such potence is not a defect. Likewise, we can affirm
that God cannot contradict the first axioms, ni~9'n
m1' n, for their annulment would imply a concentration
of the contraries and such things. He is, however, not
bounded by experience; we cannot assert that God cannot
do such things as are impossible according to our experience, for as long as reason can possibly conceive it,
19 6
it is within His sphere of potency.
In connexion with his discussion on potence, Crescas
makes a few remarks on Aristotle's proof of the existence
of God and the conception of it. Aristotle, he says,
has only proved through the eternity of movements the
existence of an infinite separate force in time but not in
In other words, the God of Aristotle is not
strength.
perfect. It is true that the force moving the sphere is
ptn:

n"33

196 Ibid.

=v"2

jt? in"3,

Or Adonai, p.

4 o b.

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

12

3

eternal or infinite, but it does not follow that it can move
the daily sphere in less than twenty-four hours, and it may
be limited

by impotency.

But the right conception is,

he says, that there is no relation between God and the
things

acted

upon, for all determination arises from a

certain relation, but when doing away with that relation
He is necessarily omnipotent.

Crescas goes on to say

that the infinite potence in time and strength is not only
potential but actual.

The attribute of potence is inde-

termined, for the foundation is only will, and it is this that
is meant by infinite, namely, the impossibility of being
determined.

197

In comparing the Spinozistic theory of potence with
that of Crescas, we notice a striking resemblance not only
in conception but also in language.

Spinoza, as well as

Crescas, conceives God to be omnipotent, and understands
by it, at least in formal language, the same thing as Crescas,
that 'He

decreed things through and purely from

liberty of His will'.198s
sentences

of the

the

It reminds us directly of the closing

preceding

paragraph,

where

Crescas

emphasizes the relation of potence to will and defines
God's infinity to consist in the lack of determination, which
is exactly what Spinoza means by the liberty of His will.199
Spinoza also quotes in several places the fact that true
things cannot become false by God's potence. 20°
It is true
that the contents of the later (especially in the Ethics)
197 Or Adonai, pp. 40 b, 41 a.
198 ' Nos vero qui iam ostendimus omnia a decreto Dei absolute dependere,
dicimus deum esse omnipotentem; at postquam intelleximus cum quaedam
decrevit ex mera libertate sue voluntatis, ac deinde eumn esse immutabilem,'
Cogitata Metaph., Part II, 9.
199 Ethics, Proposition XVII.
200 Cogitata Metaph., ibid , p. 493; Epistola XLIII.

124

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE,

AND FREE WILL

Spinozistic conception of omnipotence is considerably
different from that of Crescas. The impersonality of it
and the mechanical interpretation are too patent to ignore,
while Crescas's view is surely a personal one. Crescas
has not discussed the question whether God could create
another world or a better one than the present, a question
which is discussed by Spinoza at great length in scholia to
propositions XVII and XXXII in his first book of Ethics,
and to which he gives a negative answer; but from the
trend of Crescas's thought it can be inferred that he would
be forced, following the logic of his reasoning, to assume
a similar view. If, as he insists, God is indeterminate and
infinitely perfect, what then prevented Him from creating
that other world unless we should attribute to Him
imperfection. But Crescas really never followed the logical
conclusions to the extreme, but always turned off at an
angle (as has been remarked above in Chapter II concerning
the unity of God). The same occurred here; he uses his
definition of infinite potence rather to prove the possibility
of miracles and creatio ex nihilo, which really do not follow
logically. We shall return to this subject once again.

FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM.

Crescas, in discussing the very important question of
free will and determinism, follows his usual method in
analysing all the points pro and contra. The possible
('i
t,) exists, for we observe that things have a number
of causes, and some of them are cognizable, others are
wanting, and it is possible that all the causes exist and
possible that some do not exist, and since the causes are only
possible then the things themselves are also only possible.

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

I25

Again, many things are dependent on the human will,
and it seems that man is master of himself, he can will
them or not. Further, in the Physics of Aristotle, there
is a classification of events, and in it are included such
things as happen by chance and by accident. If there
is no existence of the possible, how can we speak of chance
and accident?
Finally, if the possible does not exist,
wherefore all the endeavour and diligence that man
displays in his daily occupations, of what avail all the
preparations and studies and the expenditure of energy
in seeking the right way to his welfare? All these things
seem so natural and common to the human nature that
a denial of the possible would contradict the fundamental
20 1
principle of feeling and perception.
On the other side, there are many arguments against
the existence of the possible. It was established in the
Physics that all things which are corruptible come into
existence only through four causes. It follows then that,
since their immediate causes exist, they must exist by
necessity. Again, when we say that a thing is possible
of existence, we mean by it that it needs a cause to overbalance the non-existent element. The existence of any
possible, then, is necessitated by a preceding cause, and
this cause was necessitated by another one, and so on,
until we arrive at the first cause. The possible, therefore,
does not exist. The subject may be viewed yet from
another aspect. It is accepted that whatever is being
realized from the potential to the actual needs some
external cause to produce it from the state of potentiality
to actuality.
It follows that, when the human will acts
upon something, the will has changed its state from the
201

Or Adonai, p. 45 b.

PROVIDENCE,

126

POTENCE, AND

FREE W1LL

potential to the actual. The cause of this change must
be external, such as the agreement between the desire
and the imagination which is the cause of the will. It is
evident, therefore, that when the particular agreement
exists the will is necessitated, and if we go on searching
we shall discover causes for the arrangement, and so
further. On the other hand, we cannot assume that the
mover of the will is the will itself; first, that would contradict the principle that a thing being realized from the
potential to the actual needs an external cause; secondly,
the will would require a preceding will as its cause, and
so on to infinity.20 2 Finally, the possible does not exist
on religious ground, for it was accepted that God's science
extends to particulars; and if events are possible it
would contradict the concept of prescience, for we can
hardly call it knowledge when the contrary to it may
occur. It follows, then, that there exists a kind of necessity
in the order of the world. These are the arguments
0
2 3
pro and contra.
Crescas, after reviewing these arguments, comes to the
conclusion that the possible exists in some aspects and in
some it does not exist. He is, however, more inclined to
the deterministic side. He asserts that the possible exists
only in regard to itself. In Spinozistic language it means
that when attended to itself as an isolated phenomenon
it is a possible event, but that when attended to its
202

in

M1

1n~v
rm

n"

V

11

m7m

11

v

1:, Or Adonal, p. 46 a.
203 Ibid., p. 47 a-b.

n

bn

nw

DX

101"I1V1"I
=aY'n 'ink

=

=

rs7:

rm a=nn

n

PROVIDENCE,

I27

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

causes and viewed in the long chain of causality the event
He proceeds then to refute the arguments

is necessary.

produced on behalf of the possible, even in regard to its
causes. The first argument saying that with some things it
is possible that all their causes are found, and possible that
some do not exist, is simply a petitio principii. It is just
the possibility of their causes that we seek to establish.

The

second one that appeals to common sense and for which
the fact is adduced that man wills one thing or another,
partakes of the same defect, for the theory of necessity
asserts that the will must have a cause, and it is one cause
that makes him choose one way, and another cause that
makes him choose another way, and yet will remains will
without strict mechanism, for the will per se would probably
choose either of the possibilities, but the cause pushes
it in one direction; still the will itself does not feel any
necessity.

The

other argument, appealing to everyday

facts of endeavour and expenditure of energy, which testify
to the existence of the possible, proves only the existence
of the possible per se, but not in respect to the causes.
Nay, even these very endeavours and exertions of energy
are causes in the long chain of events that bring about
the state of prosperity of the man who displays them;
for the causes are not determined or fixed, but can be
increased or diminished.

2 4
0

Similarly, the theory of causal necessity does not find
any objection

from

the religious

point

of view.

The

question of the superfluity of precepts and commandments
if the events are necessitated, is answered in a manner
204

Or Adonai, pp. 47 b, 48 a. Crescas sums up his theory in the following
words 111yn
YTl'vP'viI

1Yv

t11.VOM

zz

4N

N111-16

' rN
7

128

PROVIDENCE, POTENCE,

AND FREE WILL

resembling the refutation of the last speculative argument.
The precepts and commandments are causes in the long
20
chain of events that lead up to a certain action. 5 Reward
and punishment, however, seem to form quite an obstacle
to the theory, for is it reasonable to speak of being
punished or rewarded when there is a kind of necessity
pervading human action? Crescas nevertheless is not
dismayed, and advances a peculiar hypothesis (we shall
find its counterpart in Spinoza): If we look upon reward
and punishment as the effects of observing the precepts
and their transgressions there is no injustice, just as there
is no injustice in the fact that a man is scorched on
touching fire, even when that touching is accomplished
without any wilful inclination. In short, there is a strict
cause and effect necessity which brings about that punishment should follow from one or reward from the other with
the same force as any natural phenomenon follows from
0
2 6
its cause.
The view of Crescas on the question of determinism
and free will is already apparent though presented in an
indirect way. To sum up, events are possible per se but
necessary through their causes, and the one does not
conflict with the other. The potentiality of the primal
matter, according to the Aristotelian conception, serves
205141

n

mns

nrrn

in M=

fl7c

DN

4v:

206 5in1,nrm

mmnnznr

71"1
0'

p. 48 a.

i11
j"

'

an'T

~,Ibid.

Di
innn

i(perhaps fl1n
0iNDX1

Dnncm
K

14

n

'+

n1nllp
:
OZJ

nn

irmmnv

y1~~ll 1ivn

r

Y17

?7
fl0 VT
1f1390 1JI0'

t'

vn m+1
c

1 and further in the page

1' ' 1

~1, Or Adonai,

PROVIDENCE, POTENCE, AND

as an excellent example for Crescas.

12 9

FREE WILL

Matter is potential

in assuming various forms in succession, but, in regard
to the causes of each form being realized, that form is
necessary especially after it was realized.

Similarly, in

human actions, each action per se might have occurred
or not, but in regard to the causes that brought about
its occurrence it is necessary.

However, the publication

of such a theory would be a rather dangerous weapon
in the hands of the wicked who could not see the necessary
consequences entailed by the evil acts.

God, therefore,

revealed His precepts and prohibitions in order that they
should become causes and directors

of human

actions

towards the way leading to human happiness. The foundation of free will (for this is not denied entirely), according
to Crescas, lies in the fact that man is ignorant of the real
situation or at least does not feel the force of the causal
chain.

It

is because

of this that the human will and

determination become a factor in the long causal nexus.
On the other hand, when man is self-conscious that he has
done a certain act against his will, such as when a man
is compelled by external forces to commit a certain crime,
it follows that no punishment should be meted out to him,
at least by legislators, for the self-consciousness of freedom
which is a factor in the action, was absent. 207

A similar

theory of freedom as relating to human consciousness is
08
2
advanced by Kant.
As for the relation of future events to prescience, we
must admit, says Crescas, that events are not possible in
regard to their being known beforehand
to themselves.

but in regard

The science of God is beyond time, His

"07 Or Adonai, p. 48 a-b.
208os
Metaphysical Foundationsof Ethics, p. 67 and note ad locum.

W.

K

130

PROVIDENCE, POTENCE,

AND FREE WILL

knowledge of the future is like His knowledge of things
existing which does not impart an essential necessity to
them, for there is still some room for the possible in so far
as endeavours and attempts are factors in the decision.
But that does not affect the knowledge

of God, for in

whichever way the event may result He would have known
it beforehand.20 9

We have seen above

that

this same

remark of God's science being above time was as well
as the last assertions already advanced by Saadia.
originality in Crescas

consists

The

in his conception of the

nature of events, and in admitting

only a partial kind

of freedom, an anticipation which was followed by great
philosophers.
Spinoza's view on the question of determinism resembles
that of Crescas in a good many ways, especially in its first
stage, for in his view there is to be noticed a kind of
gradation which is apparent when we compare his earlier
writings,

the

Cogitata Metaphysica, with

his

Ethics.

Spinoza, more than Crescas, must, by the virtue of his
whole system, viewing things in a strictly causalistic chain,
be a determinist, yet in his early work he attempts a
reconciliation between necessity and liberty which looks
almost Crescasian, even in language.

In Cogitata Meta-

physica he says :210 'If we attend to our nature, we are free
in our actions and deliberate about many things for the
sole reason because we wish to.

On the other hand, if

we attend to the Divine nature we perceive clearly and
2o Or Adonai, p. 48 b.
210o
Cogitata Metaph., Pars I, ch. 3 ' Si ad nostram naturam attendamus,
nos in nostris actionibus esse liberos, et de multis deliberare propter id solum
quod volumus, si etiam ad dei naturam attendamus ut modo ostendimus clare
et distincte percipimus, omnia ab ipso pendere, nihilque existere nisi quod

ab aeterno a Deo decretum est ut existat.'

PROVIDENCE, POTENCE, AND

FREE WILL

'3z

distinctly that everything depends upon Him, and nothing
exists except that which was eternally decreed by God
that it should exist'.

He expresses, however, his ignorance

to conceive how both necessity and liberty are compatible,
and simply says that there are many things that escape
human comprehension.

Again, in the same work in the

second part, Spinoza asserts once more the liberty of man,
in spite of his taking cognizance of the causal force which
impels the mind to affirm or negate. 1

He does not explain

how the thing is accomplished, but in a previous section
Spinoza again declares his ignorance.212

We see, there-

fore, that Spinoza grapples with the problem in the same
manner as Crescas does, and like him assumes that actions
are possible per se, and necessary through the causal chain.
But we must admit that Spinoza does

not carry that

principle out with the same consistency as Crescas, and
later abandons human freedom entirely, and then again
speaks in its name trying to save it at least in a shadowy
form.
Fischer insists that even in CogitataMetaphysicaSpinoza
is already an avowed and thorough determinist, and construes his confession of ignorance in respect to the way
human liberty exists in spite of necessity to mean that
we conceive

that human liberty does not exist.213

He

quotes a number of passages to substantiate his view, but
in reality these passages do not add more to what is said
in the passage quoted where Spinoza makes his confession.
All that they show is that Spinoza recognizes the chain
of necessity, and that man is a part of nature, but this
is also contained in the passage quoted above.

On the

211 Cogitata Metaph., Pars II, ch. I2, p. 503.

212 Ibid., ch. Ii, p. Soo.

213 Spinoza, p. 308.

K2

132

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

other hand, Fischer fails to explain a fact which decidedly
shows that there are two stages in Spinoza's conception
of freedom. This is the famous example of Buridan's ass.
In his earlier work (Cogitata Metakphysica) Spinoza asserts
that were a man placed in such an equilibrium of forces
to die of hunger, he would not be considered a man but
the most stupid donkey. 21 4 On the other hand, in the
Etkics, the same example is quoted, and Spinoza remarks:
'I am quite ready to admit that a man placed in the equilibrium described would die of hunger and thirst. If I am
asked whether such a one should not rather be considered an
ass than a man, I answer that I do not know'.215

Spinoza

agrees with Crescas in the theological question of punishment. The wicked, he says, are punished by a decree
of God, and if you ask why they should be punished
since they are acting from their own nature, we may reply,
Why should poisonous snakes be exterminated ?216 In his
letter to Oldenburg, 217 a more striking example is given:
'He who goes mad from the bite of a dog is excusable,
yet he is rightly suffocated.'
This is exactly the same
as the saying by Crescas that whoever touches fire must
be burned.
In the Etkics, Spinoza becomes an absolute determinist.
214 Cogitata Metaph., Pars II, ch. Ii

'Quod autem anima tantem potentiam

habeat quamvis a nullis rebus externis determinetur commodissime explicari
potest exemplo asinae Buridiani. Si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus
in tali aequilibrio positum, homo non pro re cogitante sed pro turpissimo
asino erit habendus, si fame et site pereat'.
215 Ethics, scholium to proposition XLIX.
216 Cogitata Metaph., Pars II, ch. 8 ' At respondeo etiam ex decreto divino

esse ut puniatur et si tantum illi quos non nisi ex libertate fingimus peccare
essent puniendi, cur homines serpentes venonosos exterminare conantur, ex
natura enim propria tantum peccant nec aliud possunt'.
217 Epist. XLL

PROVIDENCE,

133

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

Man is viewed as a part of nature subject to its laws and
regulations,218 and free will is openly denied.

The mind

is determined to wish this or that by a cause which has
also been determined by another cause, and
infinity'.219

so on to

Yet in spite of all this, Spinoza

does not

want to give up freedom, and tries to maintain it by all
means. The way Spinoza reaches freedom, though different
from that of Crescas who makes man's consciousness of
freedom a factor in determining human action (a way which
was followed by Kant, as indicated above), yet retains the
basic Crescasian principle, namely, that human endeavour
is a cause in the determination of human act.

Spinoza

arrives at the conception of freedom mainly through his
principle of self-preservation.

Everything in so far as it is
220
itself endeavours to persist in its own being, says Spinoza,
but the principle itself would not be fruitful

unless we

emphasize the' own', namely, the principle of individuality.
It is true that man is a part of nature, but a higher part
or at least a different part than that of the animal, and as
such his essence or his nature must be different in degree
from that of the animal or the stone.

The persistence

of man in his own being will also be different from the
persistence of the animal, and this is to be called virtue
according to the definition: ' Virtue in so far as it is referred
to man is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the
power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws
of that nature. ' 221

'This

effort for self-preservation

is

nothing else but the essence of the thing in question',
writes Spinoza, 'which in so far as it exists such as it is,
218

Ethics, IV, p. 4.

220o
Ibid., III, I.

219

Ibid., II, 48.

221x
Def. VIII, Book III.

134

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE,

AND FREE WILL

is conceived to have force for continuing in existence.' 222
It is clear from the foregoing that man does possess a kind
of determination and is not merely mechanically acted
upon. The idea of self-preservation carries in itself already
the conception of a struggle, there is something external
which tends to destroy the individual or to pervert it
from developing according to its own laws; it is against
this external force that the power of self-preservation
battles. This is well recognized by Spinoza when he says:
'The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited,
and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
causes.' 223 The term 'infinitely' may probably refer to
physical existence, but not to existence according to its
own laws, for otherwise it is impossible to conceive how
man can ever become free even in the Spinozistic fashion.
Hence follows the bondage of man, which means his subjection to emotions and passions the causes of which are
external, and do not follow from the laws of his nature.
Where then is the way to freedom? This consists
simply in positing against a lower emotion which intends
to enslave the activities of man 224 another one, for an
emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another
one contrary thereto and with more power. 225 It is here
that knowledge comes in as a potent factor, for by means
of it man can discern what is useful to him, and so perceive
his own being."26 Ascending in the scale of knowledge,
we find that the highest point is to know God, which in
other words means to know true nature and its unfoldings,
man's own powers included. It follows then that when
man reaches that state or is on the path to it that he is
222 Ethics, IV, 26, demon.

228 Ibid., III.

225 Ibid., 6.

226 Ibid., 2o.

224 Ibid., IV, 5.

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

135

said to be free, for viewing things under the species of
reason, 227 he must necessarily follow the laws of his own
nature and avoid things which tend to sway him from that
or subject him to bondage. Spinoza goes on to show in
detail the way man frees himself; and his ethical conception is evolved through that notion of freedom. But
that does not concern us here. What we wish to show
is the generation of that freedom, and what it is. To sum
up, Spinoza's freedom is not a free-willist's freedom, but
a reasonable intrinsic necessity, subject to immutable laws,
as against a slavish irrational necessity subject to external
causes the results of which tend toward destruction. This
human freedom corresponds exactly to that Divine freedom
of which Spinoza speaks in his first book, where the main
element consists in the absence of external forces coercing
it. What interests us mainly in the theory is the recognition of the struggle, and the consideration of the human
power as a factor in bringing about the result, the same
steps which were taken by Crescas to liberate man and
restore to him a part of his lost freedom.
As regards the question of evil, Spinoza gives on that
point a clear and more comprehensive explanation than
that of Crescas. His view is analogous to that of the
Peripatetics who saw in evil a kind of imperfection which
cannot be attributed to God but to matter. Spinoza denies
entirely the positive existence of evil and error,228 for in so
far as any act of evil expresses reality it is not evil, the
badness of it comes only in comparison with another act
of more perfection, 229 and so the whole conception of it is
only human.230
227 Ethics, IV, 67.

229 Epist. XIX.

Epist. XXIII, ed. Vloten.
230 CogitataMetaph., II, ch. 8.
228

136

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE, AND

FREE WILL

To return to Crescas, he feels that the question of
conciliating Divine justice with that of necessity ought
to be discussed more thoroughly. He endeavoured to
establish the difference between necessity without man
being conscious of it, and that where the subject is conscious. It seems, nevertheless, that since reward and
punishment are evolved from good and bad acts as effects
from causes, there is really no reason for this distinction,
for the cause is a cause just the same whether accompanied
by consciousness or not. But then the whole foundation
of punishment, whether Divine or human, is undermined,
for both assume this distinction as their basis. 231 Another
difficulty is raised by the question of dogmas. Religion
requires its adherents to believe in certain dogmas, but
what connexion has will with dogma? Crescas produces
three arguments against the possibility that will may be
a necessary element in belief. First, if will is pre-requisite
to belief, then belief does not possess that kind of truth
which it claims to possess, for the nature of will carries
the possible with it, either man wills to believe or not,
and he may also will contrarily in succession; where then
is the truth? Secondly, belief implies that a certain thing
exists outside of the mind as well as in the mind, and if so
what dependence can it have on the will, especially if
a certain kind of dogma is necessitated by proofs? It is
impossible not to believe it. What foundations have, then,
the punitive measures attached to dogmas ?232
In answer to these questions, Crescas reiterates his
doctrine that God's precepts act as causes in determining
human actions. Divine righteousness aims at the good
231 Or Adonai, p. 49 b.

232
Ibid.

PROVIDENCE,

POTENCE,

AND FREE WILL

I37

and the perfection of man. The precepts are instituted
by God as incitements for good actions, and the rewards
and punishments really are evolved from them as effects
from causes. But as for the question, why is consciousness
necessary in order to receive reward or punishment for the
committing of a certain act, it will be answered if we look
upon actions in the light of their intensity. The most
important ethical quality in doing good is the joy and
intensity of pleasure experienced while carrying out the
will to do good. God possesses absolute love and intensity
of doing good; the human intensity would therefore form
a link in the human relation to God. It is evident, therefore, that when this will and intensity are absent, such
as when things are committed from conscious necessity,
the actions do not entail either reward when they are good
or punishment when wrong; for there is also a kind of
intensity in doing evil as it is the love and intensity that
form important ingredients in the causing of reward and
2 3
3
punishment.
In the same light we may solve the question of dogmas.
It is true that essentially dogmas are not related to will,
but they may be connected in some way. It is not the
belief in the dogmas that counts, but the intensity and
pleasure which a religious man feels at the believing, or in
the endeavour to follow up to the root of the matter.
This intensity and pleasure is a matter of will and choice,
for a thing may be true and man may conceive it as such

=n11=2

. n sn
4Iw i

1nJ

nntitrrr r nz~vn
rirnr

n riv
m

m

nn n,:nn

"I nsr5iv6 jinn nts' yn ettnnan ::
s
s 1

Iv"1M1I

n

)*
m

n

,

Or Adonai,

p. 47 b.

wr
n

138

PROVIDENCE, POTENCE, AND FREE WILL

without experiencing any particular emotion, as, for
instance, the fact that the three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles; but the knowledge of certain
dogmas may be accompanied by the emotion if there is the
corresponding exertion.
It is from this point of view
234
that reward and punishment are attached to dogmas.
234 Or Adonai, p. 5o a.

CHAPTER VI
TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS.

THERE are four possible ends which may be the goal

of human life, (a) either the practical-ethical, that is, the
perfection of morals, (b) or contemplation, or happiness,
which may be (c) material, or (d) spiritual. The object
is, then, to determine which of these is the final end, for
while all may be mediate ends, there must be a final one
which is the highest of all.
Crescas proceeds then to
eliminate some. Material happiness cannot be thought
of as a final end in view of the fact that we posited as
a possible end also spiritual happiness. A final end must
eo ipso be the highest; but material happiness, no matter
how great, is only temporal, while spiritual, meaning the
happiness of the soul, may be eternal.
It follows that
the balance is on the side of soul happiness. As for the
perfection of morals, though it is undoubtedly a great end,
it cannot be viewed as a final end. It is the means to
purify the soul and overcome the passions that prevent
the soul from reaching the desired perfection. It also helps
to bring out the latent qualities and develop the powers
of the soul, and as such it is a subsidiary one. It is rather
curious to hear such an opinion from Crescas, who showed
himself several times endowed with a true ethical spirit,
139

140

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

and giving an autonomous basis to good deeds, to speak of
morality as preparatory to development of contemplative
235
power, the very idea which he immediately combats.
It may be explained that even Crescas had to pay his toll
to the spirit of the age.
Crescas devotes some attention to the discussion of the
perfection of thought and contemplation as a final end.
Some (most likely he refers to Gersonides), he says, have
developed such a theory. It is known that the mind
becomes assimilated with the conceptions it perceives.
In other words, the substance of the mind increases by
means of the conceptions, and so we have finally an
') which is to a certain degree
acquired mind (nplnr
different from the potential mind, or, as Aristotle called it,
the passive mind.23 6 Since this acquired mind is different
from the potential in so far as the last is only potence,
Gersonides as well as Crescas in exposition calls that
It is
hiiulian, after analogy of TAh\, matter, potential.
eternal in spite of being generated, for it has no cause
of destruction since it does not contain anything material.
Eternal happiness will therefore consist in contemplation
23 7
and reason, for it is this only that gives immortality.
The higher the conception, the greater the degree of

11? 7D
1

1Vn'x

I

mn)r1
11v

''1

(perhaps

nrn6 rim
n

lvil

)

1nApi niI

, Or Adonai, p. 52 a-b.

236This idea of an acquired 'nous' was already taught by Alexander,
from whom the mediaeval philosophers borrowed it. See Zeller, Greek
Philosophy, p. 296; also Mil.zamot by Gersonides, sect. I, chs. I, 2.

OW~ ~n~D'

1

~I11,

Or Adonai, p. 52 b; also Mil.amot, sect.

i,

chs. 7-14.

TELEOLOGY

AND ETHICS

I4I

eternity and that of happiness. Even during life we
experience pleasure from thinking, and so much more
after death, when, freed from hindrances, the acquired
reason unites with the active reason (7roup-TIK0

vows) and

the range of conception is increased, and in the same
degree also that of the intellectual pleasure. In that
theory there are to be distinguished two tendencies,
a more rationalistic and a religious. The first says that
happiness increases with the number of ideas, of whatever
character these ideas may be, whether of the physical or
the spiritual world, for the active reason contains in itself
the order of all existing things, and so the larger the scope
of ideas the nearer the approach to the active reason on
The second emphasizes the
the part of the acquired.
necessity of acquiring true ideas of God and the spiritual
world.
Against this theory Crescas directs his criticism. If,
the intellectualistic theory asserts, the acquired reason
a separate thing, and remains eternal while the body
well as the soul, that is the perceptive one, perishes, it
impossible that this perfection should be the end of life.
Otherwise, we should have the anomalous phenomenon
of a being striving for an end which is really not its own
perfection, but of another being which is quite distinguished
from itself. It does not agree with reason nor with Divine
justice that the reward and punishment should be meted
out to a being which really has very little to do with the
238
one who followed the precepts or transgressed them.
as
is
as
is

Besides, the theory per se is full of contradictions, since
the acquired reason is something different from the hiiulian,
that is the ordinary perceptive, mind, then it has no subject
288 Or Adonai, p. 53 a.

142

TELEOLOGY AND

ETHICS

out of which it is generated; it follows, then, that it is
generated out of nothing, which is contradictory to all
principles. Again, there is a contradiction in terms in the
dictum that reason acquires its essence through the conceptions. Which reason is meant here? Shall we say
the hiiulian ? But its essence is not acquired, it is given;
and the essence acquired through conceptions is something
different. It must then be the acquired reason; but it is
impossible to speak of it as reason since it does not exist
as yet.239 It is evident from the foregoing that the intellectualistic theory is untenable. It remains for us to
find a tertium quid which shall serve as the final end
leading to spiritual happiness and eternity. This Crescas
finds in the love of God.240 It is not an intellectual concept
by all means, and widely different from the Peripatetic
notion as well as the Spinozistic, though the intellect may
be a useful ingredient in it. It is best understood and
conceived after the consideration of three propositions.
First, that the human soul which is the form of the body
is a spiritual being and potential in regard to conception.
The second, that the perfect being loves the good and
perfection, and that desire for it as well as its intensity
is proportional to the degree of perfection the said being
possesses. Third, that love and intensity of desire for
a thing are not related to the intellectual vigour employed
in conceiving that thing.24 1 The establishment of these
three propositions is very interesting, for the first proposi-

13o

bd., p. 53 b.

240

Ibid., P. 53 b.

Inv

ty=11-7
x"17

=

'.

inV

Ibid., 54 a.

:1
2i

Or Adonai, P. 53 a.

241 Ibid., 54 a.

TELEOLOGY AND

ETHICS

143

tion contains in a short form the psychology of Crescas,
while the other two relate to the foundation of his ethical
theory. The soul is the form of the body, for we see that
on its departure the body becomes corrupted just as do
things without form. Again, it is spiritual, for it possesses
powers which are not dependent on the senses, such as
imagination, memory, and reason. It is potential of conception or reasoning, for it is evident that it is the subject
of the reasoning power, since that one is related to the
body by means of the soul. Crescas then endeavours
to prove his statement that the soul is the subject of the
potentiality. But as it is objected that since the soul
is a form it cannot be a subject, for forms are not subjects
for other forms, we must therefore suppose that this is
done through the medium of the body. 242 This theory
is primarily Aristotelean in its main concepts, except that
it differs in the concept of immortality.
The second proposition treating of perfection and the love
of good is evidenced from the following: God, who is the
source and fountain of all perfection, loves the good, for this
can be seen through his causing general existence of beings
and the continual creation-here we see already the origin
of the dictum, 'reality is good', which will play an important part later-and since the causality is all through
His will, it is necessitated that the love of the good is an
essential conception of His perfection.
It follows, then,
that the higher the perfection the stronger the love and
the intensity of the desire to do good, for God possesses
the highest perfection and at the same time the strongest
will to do good as evidenced from creation. 243 The third
242 It is all Aristotelean.

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

144

one, asserting that intensity of desire is independent of
reasoning, is proved by definition of the terms. Will is
a relation between the appetitive and the imaginative
powers, and according to the degree of relation will be
Reason, on the other hand,

the intensity of the desire.

depends on concepts and principles, both of which reside
in the reasoning faculty, and that faculty is different from
the imaginative and appetitive.

It is evident that intensity

of desire is independent of reason. After establishing these
three propositions, Crescas formulates his theory of immortality and purpose, which follow as a result of the
premises. Since it has been proved in the first proposition
that the soul is a spiritual being, it may be immortal
after its departure from the body, for it has no factors of
The second proposition showed us that the
love of the good is proportional to the degree of the percorruption.

fection of the soul; the converse follows that the higher
It is evident,
the good loved, the higher the perfection.
therefore, that the love of God, who is infinitely good,
is necessary for the perfection of the soul. As for the
independence of this love of contemplation and intellectual
2 44
exercise, it was established by the third proposition.
It is seen, then, that the essential thing for the perfection
of the soul is something independent of contemplation,
and that is the love of God. Since we have seen that
there is nothing lasting about man except his soul, and

Or Adonai, p. 54 b.

1444N'y1
cr u11

5:'

r

n&rn

mvvrn

on

asir

'4j

TELEOLOGY AND

145

ETHICS

that the perfection of the soul consists in the love of God
and the intensity of that love, it follows that this is the end
and purpose of human life.
In positing the love of God as an end of human life
Crescas laid the foundation of a high ethical system, for
the love of God is urged not on religious mystical grouno
as the Neo-Platonists used to speak of a longing of the soul
to return to its source, but mainly because the love of God
is really the love of good. The centre of ethical virtue
is transferred from the mind to the heart, from the cold
logical syllogisms to the warm feeling of man. It is not
the contemplative side that is emphasized, as has been
done continually from Aristotle down, but the practical
side. This part, however, would not speak so much for
Crescas's originality, for it simply keeps in line with the
pure Jewish ethics, but what is interesting in Crescas is
that he raises the ethical principle to a cosmic one, since
he sees in it the basis of creation, as follows.
There are two final ends; though this statement seems
contradictory at first, yet it can be made consistent. The
word ' final' must be viewed under two different aspects,
in respect to human life and action, and in respect to
God. 245 As for the first, we have already seen what that
end is. As regards the Divine purpose, it must be the
distribution of good. The final end spoken of does not
refer only to the human genus, but to the universe as
a whole. There is a manifest purpose in it, in spite of
the prevailing necessity of natural law, and the purpose

245nv:
1,n

W.

n

nsz

n

rpn i
an

n T1-vn10M ,nn
,
n

xrn nn

'sn1

,:n ,nnl

n 4b:nn man,Or Adonai, p. 56 b.
L

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

146
is really one
universe.

in genus

in

regard to man and the

4
8

But in order to conceive this 'purpose'

clearly, a little

more discussion as regards the becoming of the world is
necessary.

It is accepted that the universe in its manifold-

ness presents a certain unity and an interdependence of its
parts.

This unity would lead us to accept the unity of

purpose, but here a problem presents itself to us.

It is

known that from the simple arises the simple, and since
God is the absolute
multitude

simplest being, whence

of composite

beings?

proposed to that problem

The various

are insufficient.

then the
answers

The theory

of emanations, which sees in existence a gradual descending scale from pure spirituality to materiality, is inadequate,
for the problem is still there. Whence the matter? Another
explanation, saying that the caused beings by being caused,
that is, by being possible of existence, acquire compositeness, and the lower the being in the scale of emanations
the greater the compositeness, for the cause of it is also
possible, since it is the third or fourth emanation, is also
weak.

A thing may be composite in regard to its exist-

ence, but simple in regard to essence.
therefore, his solution.

Crescas offers,

It is true that if the process of

causation were a mechanical one there would be no place
for composition, but the fact is that it is a voluntary one.
It is the will of God that is the cause of all beings, and
it is through it that they arise.

But here the question

arises, How can a simple being have more than one will?
for in the positing of the manifold, we shall have to see

246

nrr3

n4a 3n

3lonN M0

IM

nviam
I

11IM

yO
c

Ni

p. 59 b

Or Adona:, p.

59 b.

m,
idoni

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

147

a manifold expression of the will. To this Crescas replies
that the unity of the will consists in goodness. The will
to do good and distributing it is the predominant featureX47
(the real question of will as creative cause will be discussed
later in chapter VII, it is only brought in here casually).
It is already manifest that the purpose in the universe
is one. It is creative, not as an end to be realized, but as
a cause. The conception of it, according to Crescas, is
best put in syllogistic form. The will of God is the will
to do good. Existence or reality is goodness. Hence the
existing universe carries its own purpose within it.
In comparing the Spinozistic conception of the love
of God (of = for) with that of Crescas, we cannot help
noticing the striking similarity in form, yet there is a vast
difference as to contents. There is much discussion on
the subject, by those who assert that Spinoza in this
important teaching of his was greatly influenced by
Maimonides and Crescas, his predecessors, and those who
deny such influence. Of the first, the most vigorous is
Joel, who ventured to go as far as to assert that Spinoza's
expression, 'The intellectual love of God', is borrowed
from two sources, the'love' from Crescas, and 'intellectual'
from Maimonides. 248 That Joel went too far in his assertion, and that his conclusions are unjustifiable, is evident
from a strict comparison. However, a thorough investigation of the theory and that of Maimonides would be
beyond the limits of our work; we shall, therefore, limit
ourselves to Crescas.
247

j

n

U1V

b

1m

wpi

mv ,o

1

mrt14-124Miv

ro- w

n,1, Or Adonai, p. 6o a.

248*
Joel, Spinoza's Theologisch-PolitischerTractat, Vorwort, X.

L2

l

148

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

The conception of the love of God in Spinoza forms
an integral part of his system, as any of his fundamental
ideas. It is strictly connected with his conception of
freedom, as well as with his psychology. The freedom
of Spinoza, as seen, 249 is freedom from emotions, and doing
such things as follow from the very essence of man and
tend to self-preservation. This freedom can be obtained
by inculcating in the mind a kind of controlling idea or
power. But in proportion as a mental image is referred
to more objects, so it is more frequent or more often vivid,
and occupies the mind more.250 It follows, then, that the
idea of God, which really means the comprehension of
the exact order of the universe, and through which man
conceives himself clearly and distinctly, 51 is such an idea
which may control the mind,252 and therefore occupy the
chief place in it. This endeavour to reach the heights
of understanding is termed love, for love is by definition 253
pleasure accompanied with the idea of an external cause.
In this conception of God we have pleasure, for pleasure
is defined as a transition from lesser to greater perfection,
and in conceiving the idea of God we are acquiring greater
perfection, that is, more of reality and truth. Again, we
conceive the causality in its fullest aspect. It is also the
highest virtue of the mind, for virtue in the Spinozistic
conception is power or man's essence. 254 This love arises
only through the third kind of knowledge, or intuition, 255
namely, the possession of an adequate idea of the absolute
essence of God which is eternal, for God is eternal, hence
249 Cp. above, chapter VI.

Ethics, V, proposition XI.
252 Ibid., proposition XVI.
253 Definition of Emotions, 6, II.
254 Ethics, III, def. VIII, 4, p. 28.
255 Scholium to proposition XLI, Book II, p. 32.
251 Ibid., proposition XV.

250

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

149

also the knowledge of Him; it follows also that the love
which arises through it is eternal.

It is the quality of
eternity which Spinoza connects with the love of God,
that supplies a basis to the doctrine of immortality. There
is something eternal in the human mind, for in God there
is something that expresses the essence of the body and
the mind, that essence must therefore be eternal. 256
eternity

increases the more

The

the mind conceives things

under the form of eternity, 257 and this is accomplished
by the knowledge of God.

It follows therefore that the

mind which possesses the love of God is blessed, for it
attains to a.cquiescence of mind, 258 and perfect, since it is
more of reality that it conceives, and eternal. 259

Such

is Spinoza's conception of the love of God.
From the foregoing it is evident that there is very little
in common between the Crescasian and the Spinozistic
love of God as far as the contents are concerned, and that
Joel can hardly be justified in saying that Spinoza borrowed
a part of it from Crescas.

The

first

is voluntaristic,

emotional, and special emphasis is laid upon the degree
and intensity of the love.
and causal.

The second is intellectualistic

Yet, as we remarked on previous occasions,

in spite of their divergence there are some points of contact.
Both systems have perfection for their basis. Crescas as
well as Spinoza asserts that the love of God is intimately
connected with perfection, and the more perfect a man
is the higher the love of God; and, moreover, perfection
in both systems has a background

of reality.

Again,

according to both of them, the love of God is a means
to obtain immortality, the first reaching it by a religious
256 V, p.

23.

257'

V, p. 39.

258 p. 28.

259 39*
P*

150

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

ethical yearning, the second by a kind of thought
absorption.
Looking upon those two kinds of the love of God from
an ethical point of view, namely, valuing them as ethical
factors in human life, the preference ought to be given
to that of Crescas. His love of God is a glowing emotional
force. It is a strong desire to do good for the sake of
God, for this is the way to perfection, while that of Spinoza,
though serene and sublime, yet breathes cold; there is the
fate of necessity hanging over it, and while it may endow
a man with a brave stoicism and a kind of asceticism, yet
it can hardly arouse emotions of altruism and self-sacrifice,
for it is more of a negative than positive character.
That there is no purpose in nature follows from the
whole system of Spinoza. He who sees everything sub
specie necessitatis and eternal law, must perforce be a
stringent antagonist of teleology. Spinoza accordingly
expresses himself in his scholium to the First Book of
Ethics deploringly of those who posit final causes in the
world, or that God works for a certain end. Such a conception, according to him, is a lowering of the notion of
God, and he says that it arose merely through human
imagination. He is, therefore, at the first glance, wholly
contradictory to Crescas, for the latter speaks of a purpose
on the part of God in creating the world, yet, as has been
already pointed out, the purpose of Crescas is merely an
ethical one, and is not an end but a cause of beginning.
As such all Spinozistic arguments against teleology fall
short of it. Crescas, strengthened by the theory of purpose,
makes his ethical view, the will to do good, a cosmic principle. The 'purpose' of Crescas, if examined thoroughly,
amounts almost to the necessity of Spinoza, but this will
be brought out in the next chapter.

TELEOLOGY

AND ETHICS

151

CHAPTER VII
DIVINE WILL AND CREATION.

CRESCAS, in basing his theory of creation, begins with

a long polemical essay against those who maintain the
eternity of the world, as well as against Maimonides and
Gersonides, examining the physical arguments of the former,
and proving the insufficiency of the defence of creation by
the latter. We thought it necessary to omit all these
arguments, as most of them are based on a false and
antique view of nature. We shall limit ourselves to
Crescas's own view, and select those points which have
philosophical value.
In introducing his view, Crescas produces a general
argument against those who posited the co-eternity of
matter-the Peripatetics - Gentile as well as Jewish,
Gersonides representing the latter. If, he says, as we have
proved, God is to be conceived as the only being who is
necessary of existence, it follows that all other beings,
whether spiritual or material, are possible of existence and
related to God as a fact to cause in some way. We cannot
speak, therefore, of matter as co-existing, but as sub-existing.
It is brought about by God, and it does not matter whether
that bringing about is by necessity or free will. Crescas
here makes a peculiar use of the term creation. He does
not endeavour to prove the novelty as against the eternity
of the world in the Maimonidian sense, but creatio ex nikilo
to him means that everything was caused by God, and

152

TELEOLOGY AND

outside Him nothing exists. 260

ETHICS

There is, however, a great

difference whether we assume the world eternal or novel,
for in the first case we assume the potence of God infinite,
in the other finite.

Moreover, since God's potence is also

eternal, it follows that existence is produced by God always
and necessarily.

261

However, existence may be caused by God in a two-fold
way, either through emanation, where the effect flows from
the cause in a natural way, or through will.

Crescas

assumes that although the existence of the universe may
be necessary, yet it is not through emanation but through
will.

Since we conceive God as a thinking being, it follows

that together with the bringing about of existing things
there ought to be a conception or presentation of that
existence.

Again, a thinking principle wills what it desires,

we therefore conceive creation as through will.

Moreover,

the theory of emanation will always have to grapple with
the problem of the manifold and the one.

Since we have

established that God is the sole principle of existence, the
question of the existence of the composite is a menacing
one.

We must therefore have recourse to the theory of

the will.

Existence as a whole is good, and from this side

as far as it is good it is simple.

It is true that viewing

it from a different angle it is manifold, but the goodness
and perfection of existence consist in the manifold being
one.

It is evident, therefore, that since reality is good and

one, God in so far as He is good must necessarily create,
26 2
hence the necessity of existence through will.
260
jt=

1,

Further

n waln

t snfp KIM
261 Ibid.
262

Or Adonai, p. 69a.
'In11 ...

own

r

b

K11v

mm
n:m

TELEOLOGY

AND ETHICS

153

It must be admitted that Crescas has not made philosophically clear how matter was created,
relation it stands to God.

and in what

While he combats vigorously

the co-existence of matter and makes it dependent upon
God, he does not point out in what way it was brought
about.

To all difficulties arising from the manifold and

one, or the generation of matter from form, he answers
that the fact that creation was through will meets the
2
difficulty. 63

But how and in what way the will expressed

itself so as to produce a world of matter is not explained.
To one form of the problem which expresses itself in the
objection that since like produces like, how then could God
who is form produce matter which is unlike, he answers
that since existence arose through the goodness of God the
rule holds true: God is good, reality is good, so the like
produced a like result.
the question, for the
remains.

This, however, does not answer
difficulty

how matter

arose

still

He seems to fall back evidently on the religious

conception that God as omnipotent can do everything.
A stronger relapse from his strictly logical principles into
the upholding of a religious doctrine, which is absolutely
contradictory to Crecas's whole trend of thought, is noticed
in his asserting the novelty of the world.

According to his

remarks, in refuting some arguments, it follows, since God
stands in no relation to time, and all times are the same
to Him; and the more, since the world is dependent on His
will and that will is eternal, that the creation is eternal.
Yet he seems to be frightened at his own conclusions, and

71Ys

-I

yl

ei

'1

263 Or Adonai, p. 70 a.

' 'nn
'

r

Zwnt, Or Adonai, p. 69a.

I54

TELEOLOGY AND ETHICS

turns around and says: 'After all, the real truth is as it is
handed over in tradition, that the world was created at
a certain time.'

He hesitates, however, at accepting it

at its surface value, and attempts to say that it is possible
that there are series of worlds continually being created
and destroyed, and that the novelty expressed in tradition
At any rate, he does not

refers only to the present world.

Crescas here, like all such

consider it a dogma of faith.

theological thinkers, pays the price of stopping short of his
4
26
own logical conclusions by being inconsistent.
In comparing Spinoza's view of creation with that of
Crescas, we see, as usual, points of likeness and disagreement.

Spinoza defines creation as an operation in which

there are no other causes but the efficient one, or that
created things are such to whose existence nothing is
2
presupposed but God., 6

What Spinoza intends by this

definition is to exclude not only a material cause but also
266
a final, as he himself explains in the same chapter.
It

is exactly in the same spirit that Crescas conceives

creation, as has been shown.
though named 'Concerning

Crescas's whole tractate,

the Novelty of the World',

tries only to prove that the world was created ex nihilo,
and, as

has

been

shown,

in

the

sense

that

nothing

exists outside God and that matter is not co-existing.
Spinoza says that he omitted the words ex nikilo because
those who use it construe it as if the nikil is a subject out
of which things were created. 267

In the same strain writes

264 Ibid.
26se5
'Creationem esse operationem in qua nullae causae praeter efficientem

concurrant, sive res creata est illa quae ad existendum nihil praeter Deum
praesupponit, dicimus igitur' Cogitata Metaph., Pars II, X.
266 Ibid., p. 495.
267 Ibid., p. 494 'Quin illi r6 nihil non ut negationem omnes realitates
consideraverunt, sed aliquid reale esse finxerunt aut imaginale fuerunt'.

TELEOLOGY AND

ETHICS

155

Crescas, that his ex nikilo does not mean that nikil is a
subject, but simply that there was no other outside subject
co-existing with God. The fact that Crescas sees an end in
the creation of the world, while Spinoza's definition aims to
exclude it, does not destroy the similarity, for the end that
Spinoza combats is an external one, but that of Crescas
is in the essence of God, as has been shown, and differs but
little from Spinoza's necessity according to his nature.
Spinoza, like Crescas, comes to the conclusion that the
basis for an eternal world is the conception of the infinite
potence of God. 2 68 Spinoza, in his first attempts, was not
so eager to establish the eternity of the world as much as
the continuity of creation, for since the will of God is
eternal, creation is eternal. 269 The same thought is found
in Crescas, as was shown above. Again, a similarity is
also found in the conception of the will and intelligence
of God as a creative power. It has been already remarked
above 270 that such a similarity exists, yet to reiterate in
passing, Spinoza as well as Crescas sees in creation a kind
of reasonable act. In his scholium to proposition XXXII
in the First Book of Ethics, Spinoza definitely says that
God necessarily understands what He wishes, and so things
could not be different from what they are, for then God's
understanding ought to be different.
As for the divergences, very little ought to be said, for
they are patent. Spinoza's term of creation conveys an entirely different meaning from that of Crescas. It is only a
convenient word, but in reality it carries with it a necessity,
such a necessity as Crescas sought to escape, namely, an
268 ' Nos illam durationem non ex sola contemplatione creatarum rerum

sed ex contemplatione infinitae Dei potentiae ad creandum intellegere.'
" 9 Epist. L VIII.
s270Chapter IV.

156

TELEOLOGY

AND ETHICS

immanent one. God acts according to His nature, but whatever that nature is there is only one thingclear, that theie is
no room in it for voluntary actions in the usual sense.

It is

just this element that Crescas introduces by his voluntary
creations.

It is true that Crescas proves the necessity of

creation by asserting that God is essentially good, and that he
does not conceive of the will of God in the way that we speak
of that of man's, but there is the personal element attached
to it, from which Spinoza tries to escape.

The fact is that

the immutability of things, which forms a very important
part in Spinoza's system, for it is intimately connected
with his principle that things flow from God in the same
way as the equality of the three angles of the triangle to
two right angles, was wholly missed by Crescas.

He, like

Spinoza, speaks of continual creation but with an entirely
different

meaning, for he makes use of it to prove the

possibility of miracles.

Up to a certain pohint these two

thinkers go together, but later they part company.
It is difficult to describe definitely the extent of influence
an earlier thinker may exert upon a latter, especially when
the latter does not name the first, but comparing the ideas
expressed in CogitataMetaphysica, chapter X,' De Creatione',
and those of Crescas, we find them decidedly similar, and
it is a possibility that the latter took his cue from the
former.

157

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaron ben Elijah
Abrah am Ibn Daud
Aristo tle
Baeumnker, Clement

Sben

Bahya
Pekuda
Beer, T. de
Brand is, Christian A.
Caird, Edward

Etz Chaym, ed. Franz Delitzsch, Leipzig, 1841.
Ha-Emumah ha-Ramah, Frankfurt am Main, x852.
Works, ed. Prantl Greek and German, Leipzig, 1854.
Die PhilosophiedesMittelalters,in Allgemeine Geschichte
der Philosophie, Berlin, 1909, quoted as All. G.
der Ph.
Hobot ha-Lebbabot, ed. Wilna, 1858.
History of Philosophy in Islam, London, 1903.
Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-R6mischen
Philosophie, Vols. I, II, Berlin, 1835.
Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophers, Glasgow, 1904.

Caird, John
Delitz:sch, Franz
Dieter ici, Friedrich H.
,,
Fisher , George Park
Fische r, Kuno

Spinoza, Edinburgh, 1888.
Introduction to Etz Chaym.
Philosophie der Araber, Vol. V, Leipzig, 1876.
Die Theologie des Aristoteles, Leipzig, 1882.
History of ChristianDoctrine, New York, 1896.
Geschichte der Neuern Philosophse, Vol. II, Heidelberg, 1901.
Mildhamot, ed. Leipzig, 1866.
Gersoi nides, Levi
Goldzi her, Ignaz
Islamnische und jiidischePhilosophie, in All. Geschichte
der Philosophie.
Willensproblem in derfjdischen Philosophie.
eld, A.
Griinf4
Don Hasdae Crescas' religionsphilosophische Lehren
Joel, 1Manuel
in
ihrem geschichtlichen Einflusse dargestellt,
Breslau, 1866.
Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas, Breslau, 1871.
~
Judah ha-Levi
Kuzari, ed. Metz, Hamburg, 1838.
Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der fjiidischen ReliKaufm
Ian, David
gionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadja his
Maimuni, Gotha, 1877.
Lewess, George Henry Aristotle, A Chapter from the History of Science,
London, 1864.
Maimc)nides, Moses
More Nebuchim, English translation, Guide of the
Perplexed, by M. Friedlinder, 3 volumes, Londcn,
1864.
Code, Part I.
,,
,,
,,
,,
Eight chapters.
Munk, Salomon
Mdlanges de Philosophiejuive et arabe, Paris, 1859.
Dogmas (Ikarim Heb.), Odessa.
Neum[ ark, David
Emunot ve Deoth, Jusefof, 1885.
Saadia , Gaon
Etude de la Thdodicie de Platon et Aristote.
Simon , Jules

x58
Spinoza, Benedict
Stein, Ludwig

Taylor, Thomas

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works, ed. Van Vloten and Land, Hague, 1882-3.
Die Continuitdt der griechischen Philosophie in der
Gedankenwelt de Araber, quoted as C. der Gr.
Ph. der Ar.
Die Willensfreiheit und ihr Verhdltniss zur gOttlichen Prdscienz und Providenz bei den fiidischen
Philosophen des Mittelalters, Berlin, 1862.
Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle, London,
1812.

Wallace, Edwin
Zeller, Eduard

Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1908.
Greek Philosophy, Eng. trans., New York, 189go.

INDEX
A
Aaron ben Ilijah, Karaite philosopher, 97
Abraham Ibn Daud, 16
proofs of the existence of God, 17
view of divine attributes, 17 sq.
view of freedom of the will, 92, 93
Albertus Magnus, o10
Alexandrian school, disciples of, 21
Alexander of Aphaodesias's commentaries, translations of, 4
De regimine, book of, 95
view on Providence, 96
Al-Farabi, 6
Al-Gazali, 7
Al-Kindi, 6
Amor Dei, see Love of God
Anselm, maxim of, 6
Aquinas, Thomas, view on God's
knowledge of things, 22
Arabic philosophy, influence on
Jewish philosophy, 3
birth of, 4
tendencies of, 5 sq.
Aristotle, works translated into
Arabic, 4
objections to his theories in early
Arabic philosophy, 5
Arabic followers of, 6
theology of, 18 sq.
Jewish followers, Saadia, 7 sq.
Abraham Ibn Daud, 16 sq.
Maimonides, 27 sq.
view on place of elements, 30
conception of the accidental, 31
proofs of the twenty-six propositions, 37 sq.
refutation of Aristotelian arguments by Crescas, 40 sq.
view on Providence, 97
on God's knowledge of things,
22, 98

view on attributes, 20
Asherites, 5
Attributes of God, Saadia's view of,
12

Bahyia's view of, 14
Halevi's view of, i6

Attributes of GodAbraham Ibn Daud's

view

of,

17 sq.

Maimonides' view of, 64 sq.
Crescas's view of, 68 sq.
Spinoza's theory of, 71
relation between attributes
essence, 72, 73 sq.
emotional attributes, 75 sq.

and

Spinoza on, 72, 112, 114

Averroes, 6
B
Baeumker, Clement, 2, note 2
Bahya, Jewish philosopher, 13
proofs ot the existence of God, 13
proofs of the unity of God, 14
view on attributes, 14, 15
on freedom and prescience, 89
Bereshith, Rabba, passage of, 13
Body, definition of, 37
not infinite, 37 sq.
relation of, to change and movement, 30
relation of, to force, 3I
relation of, to number, 32
composition of, 32
C
Caird, E., view on Aristotle's theology, 22
Calamitic system, in Arabic philosophy, 5
theory of matter of, 9
Categories, not applicable to God, 12
and genera, 14, note 23
and change, 39
Cause, first, proof for existence of,
in Bahya, 14
in Aristotle, o20
Aristotle's conception of, 22
Cause, external and internal, 34
Causes, mediate, 90
scale oft; 14
natural, 91
Causal regresses, not infinite, 29
Change, nature of, 30
and categories, 29
and divisibility, 30

16o

INDEX

Crescas, Hasdai,position of, in Jewish
philosophy, 7
books on Jewish philosophy, 25
philosophical aspect of Crescas's
thinking, 24
refutation of Aristotle, arguments
against infinite, 40 sq.
refutation of Maimonides' proofs
of existence of God, 54 sq.
own proof of the existence of
God, 59
view on essence and existence,
63 sq.
on attributes and unity, 67, 69
on emotional attributes, 75
relation of Crescas to Spinoza's
proof of the existence of God,
6o sq.
of view on essence and existence,
64
of view of attributes, 7I sq.
view of love of God, 76 sq
on prescience, 98 sq.
against Maimonides' view on
prescience, iloo
on providence, Ii6
on potence, I2I1, 122 sq.

on freedom, 127

Existence of Godproved by Saadia, 8 sq.
by Babya, 13 sq.
by Halevi, 15 sq.
by Ibn Daud, 17
by Aristotle, I8, 19
by Maimonides, 29 sq.
by Crescas, 59
by Spinoza, 6o
relation of existence of God to
essence, 63 sq.
Evil in the world, problem of, solved
by Ibn Daud, 93
by Maimonides,
by Crescas, 120
by Spinoza, 135
F
Finitude, of time, see Time
of force in a body, 32
of space, see Space
Fisher Kuno, view on relation between Crescas and Spinoza,
60 sq., 74
interpretation of Spinoza's meaning of attributes, 73
Form, relation to matter, 33
stay of body according to Aristotle,

117

31

D
Defence of religion, cause of rise of
Jewish philosophy, 2
Democratus, theory of atoms adopted
in Arabic philosophy, 5
Design, argument from. in Bahya,

13
in Halevi, I5
Dialogues of Plato, translation of, 4
Divine love, moving the spheres, 21
two meanings of, 76
for man, 77
E
Emanation, theory of, 6
Emotional attributes, see Attributes.
Emunah Ramah, book of, 18, note.
Essence, relation to existence, 63
Ibn Roshd's view of, 63
lbn Sina's view of, 63
Crescas's view on, 64
Spinoza on, 64
and attributes, 65 sq., 71
Eternity of the world, admitted by
Averroes, 6
taught by Aristotle, 51I
Existence of God, proof of, occupies
important place in Jewish philosophy, 3

Crescas's view of, 52
Franz Pico, Italian philosopher, 45
Freedom of the will, problem of,
discussed in antiquity, 84 sq.
by Saadia, 86
by Bahya, 89
by Halevi, 90 sq.
by Abraham Ibn Daud, 92 sq.
by Maimonides, 94 sq.
by Crescas, 127 sq.
by Spinoza, 131 sq., 133 sq., 135
G
Gersonides, criticism of Maimonides'
theory of attributes, 6o
Giordano Bruno, 45
God, place of, in Jewish philosophy, 2
cause of being, Ix
relation to the world in Aristotle, 21
as agent, 12
His existence and essence, 12
Greek speculation, continuation of,
in the East, 4
Greek books, translation of, 4
H
Halevi, see Judah Halevi
Happiness, divine, essential to God,76
Herodotus, 84
Homer, on fate, 84

INDEX
I

M

Maimonides, follower of Aristotle, 22
proofs of the existence of God,

Ibn Daud, see Abraham Ibn Daud
Ibn Gabirol, Jewish philosopher, 6
Ibn Roshd, view on existence and
essence, 63
on composition of body, 52
lbn Sina, view on existence and
essence, 62
Inertia, law of, 45
Infinite, Aristotle's view of nonexistence ofmagnitude, 29
causal regresses, 29
space, 41
proofs of non-existence of, 37 sq.
Crescas's proof of existence ofmagnitude, 44
body, 46
space, 48
Injustice, problem of, Maimonides
on, 117
Gersonides on, I18
Crescas on, o120

29 sq.

view on unity of God, 34, 36, 55
proofs of; criticized by Crescas, 55
view of unity refuted by Crescas,
57 sq.
view on attributes, 6o sq.
criticized by Gersonides, 66
by Crescas, 67 sq.
on freedom, 94
on prescience, 95, 96
on Providence, 97
Matter, element of body, 33
Motion, nature of, 29
rate of, 42, 44
Movement, kinds of, 30
of the infinite impossible, 39
circular, 49
Mutakallimin,
form
of Arabic
thought, 5
in Jewish philosophy, 6
Mutalzilites, system of. in Arabic
philosophy, 5

Spinoza on, 135

J

N

Jehuda Halevi, proofs for the existence of God, 15
theory of attributes of, 16
Joel, M., book of, 23
view on Crescas's influence
Spinoza, 6o, 71, 76

Neo-platonism, 4
in Arabic philosophy, 5 sqq.
Nous, discussed in Arabic philosophy, 4
'Now', the, no isolated element of
time, io
no movement in, possible, 39

on

K
Kant, Emanuel, proof of
time of, 9
on freedom of the will,
Knowledge, an attribute
Ibn Daud, 17
Koran, predestination in,
Kuzari, book of, 15

0O

finitude of

Omniscience of God, Saadia on, 87
Bahya on, 89
Halevi on, 91
Ibn Daud on, 93
Maimonides on, 95 sq.
Crescas on, 99 sq.
Gersonides on, ioi, o2
Spinoza on, 112
Once, on attribute of God in Bahya,
15
in Halevi, 16
in Ibn Daud,
Or Adonai, book of, 23, and in many
notes

133
of God in
85

L
Leibnitz, cosmological proof of, 8
Lewis Meyer, correspondent of
Spinoza, 62
Life, as an attribute of God, 20
Logic, place of, in Jewish philosophv, 3
Love of God, 144
basis of Crescas's ethical system,

17

P
Place, natural, 30
infinite, not existent, 38
definition of, 38
Plato, dialogues of, 4

145 sq.

Spinoza's view of, 148
See also Divine Love

W.

M

162

INDEX

Pleasure and pain, Crescas's definition of, 75
defined by Spinoza, 77
Porphyry, 4
Possible, the, existence of, o102
sq.,
125
Potence, an attribute of God, Saadia
on, 12
Ibn Daud on, 17
Maimonides on, 64
Crescas on, 121-2 sq.
Spinoza on, 123
Prescience, divine, and freedom,
Saadia on, 87
Bahia on, 89
Halevi on, 91
lbn Daud on, 92 sq.
Maimonides on, 96
Crescas on, 98 sq., o107,
129
Gersonides on, or
Providence, problem of, place in
Jewish philosophy, 3
Saadia on, 88
Bahia on, 89
Halevi on, 90, 91
Maimonides on, 97
Crescas on, Io
Psalms, problem of, injustice referred
to in, 85
Psychology, place in Jewish philosophy, 3
of Crescas, 142
R
Reward and punishment, problem
of, in Crescas, 136, 137
Resistance, determining factor in
motion, 48, 53

Spinoza, Baruch-proof of existence of God, 60
influence of Crescas on, 61 sq.
correspondence with Lewis Meyer,
62

on essence and existence, 64

theory of attributes, 7 t, 73
influenced by Crescas, 71, 73

view on love of God, 77
on
on
on
on

112,

114
God's omniscience,
potence, 123
freedom, 130 sq., 133 sq.
love of God, 148, 149 sq., 177

on divine will and creation, 155
Substance, necessary for existence,
view of Aristotle, 18-I9
of Maimonides, 35

T
Teleology, discussion of, by Crescas,
139

sq.

Thought, activity of God, 2r
attribute of, 73
Time, finitude of, according
Saadia, 9
division of, to

to

Bahya on, 13
and motion, 32

eternity of, 33
Crescas's definition of, 254
Truth, a divine attribute, 18
U
Unity of God, taught by Saadia, ii
by Bahya,

14

by Ibn Daud, I7
by Aristotle, o20
by Maimonides, 35, 36
criticism of Maimonides' view, by
* Crescas, 56, 57

S
Saadia ben Joseph, Jewish philosopher, 7
proofs for the existence of God,
8 sq.
on unity of God, II
on attributes, 12
on freedom, 86
on prescience, 87
Space, movement in, Aristotle's view
of, 41 sq.
infinite, 45
definition of, by Aristotle, 47
Crescas's definition, 48
Spinoza, Baruch, commends Cres
cas's proof of existence of God,
59

double meaning of, 70
V
Vacuum, not existing, according to
Aristotle, 41I sq.

existence of, taught by Crescas,
43 sq.
W
Will, divine attribute, 18
Spinoza's view on, 112, I1I 4

definition of, by Crescas, 147
will and creation, 152
Spinoza on, 155

Wisdom, a divine attribute, 68
X
Xenophon, book of, 95

163

VITA
THE author of the book was born in the town of Slutzk,
province of Minsk, Russia, in the year 1884. He received
the usual Jewish education imparted to Jewish children in
Hebrew schools and Talmudical academies. In 1905 he
arrived in the United States, and settled in the city of
New York. After preparation he entered the New York
University, whence he graduated with the degree of A.B.
He then took up post-graduate work in Columbia University, where he received the degree of A.M. in 1912, and
was a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. till 1916. Simultaneously with his study at the University he also attended
the Jewish Theological Seminary at New York, whence he
graduated with honors as Rabbi.
Prior to the publication of this book the author published a number of essays of considerable length, the most
important of which are-' Civil and Criminal Procedure of
the Jewish Courts' and' The Ethnic Character of the
Jews'. He also translated into English, with introduction
and notes, the famous book of Moses Hess,' Rome and
Jerusalem '.

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