Cambridge Historical Series
EDITED BY G. W. P R O T H E R O , LlTT.D.
HONORARY FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND
LATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN T H E UNIVERSITY OF E D I N B U R G H .

THE

REVOLUTIONARY
NAPOLEONIC

ERA.

AND

london:

C. J. CLAY AND SONS,

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
AVE MARIA

PRESS

WAREHOUSE,

LANE.

(glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.

Leipzig:
New York:

F. A. BROCKHAUS.
T H E MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

[All Rights reserved."]

THE

REVOLUTIONARY
AND

NAPOLEONIC

ERA

1789—1815

BY

J. H. R O S E , LlTT.D.
LATE SCHOLAR OF CHRIST'S COLLEGE,

CAMBRIDGE,

UNIVERSITY EXTENSION LECTURER IN MODERN

HISTORY.

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1904

GENERAL

PREFACE.

The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern
Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about
the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one
or two cases the story commences at an earlier date: in the case
of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the
different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is
believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution
and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better tinderstood and the conti?iuity of historical development more clearly
displayed.
The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to
understand the nature of existing political conditions. uThe roots
of the f resent lie deep in the past"; and the real sig?iificance of
contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes
which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes
it possible to treat the history of the last four ce?ituries in
considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of
modern research. . / / is hoped therefore that the series will
be useful not only to beginners but to stude?its who have already
acquired some general knowledge of European History.
For
those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography
appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources
of information and works ??iore detailed and authoritative.
Considerable attention is paid to political geography, and
each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may
he requisite for the illustration of the text.
G. W. P R O T H E R O .
First Edition 1894
Revised Edition 1895. Reprinted 1898,
1901, 1904.

PREFACE.
T H E dramatic intensity of many phases of the French Revolution has, until recently, so absorbed the attention of students
as to obscure its relation to the European Revolution. It is the
chief aim of this little work to show this inter-dependence, and
to explain the influence of French ideas and policy on Europe.
Though this plan somewhat restricts the arena of personal
achievement and romance, it will, I trust, ensure a corresponding
gain in historical interest; for the European nations were then
first brought into close contact, not merely by dynastic interests,
but by their own conscious aspirations or antipathies. My
object has been to exhibit the influences in France and
Europe tending to overthrow the old systems of government
and society, to trace, even amidst the apparent chaos of the
French Revolution, the growth of forces which, tended towards
a strongly centralised government and autocracy, to describe
Napoleon's work of destruction and reconstruction, and finally
to analyse the character of the new national impulses which
overthrew his domination. Passing over unimportant details,
I have everywhere endeavoured to concentrate attention on
those events and crises which exercised most influence on
the formation of the European system, and to show the connection, too often ignored, between the earlier and later phases
of the French Revolution. To study the intricate strifes of
French parties in 1789—1795, a P a r t from the reorganisation
effected by Bonaparte, appears to me as unprofitable as to master
the enunciation and construction of a geometrical problem
without proceeding to its solution.
. The present time is singularly favourable to an attempt at
reviewing the features of this momentous era. The researches

Preface,

VI

of MM. Sorel, Aulard, Vandal and others have added largely
to our knowledge of the epoch, especially that portion of it in
which Napoleon is the principal figure. The general tendency
of recent French enquiries has been to some extent to redress
the balance in favour of the great conqueror. The historian
must, however, duly discount the brilliant romancings of
Marbot, the trustful confidences of Meneval, and the quaint
attempts of M. L£vy to depict his hero as a good-natured
bourgeois in private life. Fortunately, the other side of
the picture has been set forth in the sober and authentic
narratives of Chaptal, Macdonald and Pasquier. Besides
working through these and many other French Memoirs, I have
endeavoured to enter into the general spirit of the age by
studying the chief histories, memoirs and biographies relating
to other European lands, especially Germany. The perusal of
our Foreign Office records has also convinced me that much
more may be urged in defence of British policy than has
hitherto been conceded.
My best thanks are due to the Rev. Dr Marchand, of Angers,
and Signor Lumbroso, of Rome, for information respecting
French and Italian affairs respectively; also to Mr A. J.
Grant, and Mr J. W. Headlam, both of King's College,
Cambridge, for several valuable suggestions; but, most of
all, to the Editor of the series, Dr Prothero, for the care
which he has bestowed alike on multifarious details and on
questions involving a wide historical survey.
J. H. R.
August\ 1894.

For the second edition the suggestions of critics have been
carefully considered and in some cases adopted.
J. H. R. *
June, 1895.

TABLE O F CONTENTS.
Chapter I.

T H E POLITICAL AND SOCIAL WEAKNESS OF
EUROPE

„

II.

LOUIS XVI,

.

.

.

.

T H E PARLEMENTS,

STATES GENERAL

.

AND T H E

.

3°

III.

T H E CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

IV.

T H E GIRONDINS AND EUROPE

V.

T H E JACOBINS AND T H E F I R S T COALITION

VI.

T H E DIRECTORY AND BUONAPARTE

VII.

43
59
78
92
119
148
184
238
293

T H E CONSULATE

VIII. NAPOLEON AND T H E OLD GOVERNMENTS
IX.

T H E NATIONALIST REACTION

X.

T H E WARS OF LIBERATION .

XI.

T H E RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

APPENDIX.
I. List of authorities .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
II. List of the chief dignities and appointments conferred by
Napoleon .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

373
379

MAPS AND PLANS.
Plan of the Partitions of Poland
The Peace of Basle

.

.

76
.

.

.

to face page

91

The Peace of Luneville and the Secularisations

to face page

126

The Treaty of Tilsit

to face page

175

Napoleon's Empire at its height (1812) .

.

to face page

217

Plan of the Waterloo Campaign

.

.

349

.

.

.

.

THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC
ERA, OR, FRANCE AND EUROPE,
1789—1815.

C H A P T E R I.
T H E POLITICAL AND SOCIAL WEAKNESS OF EUROPE.
"The corruption of each form of government commences with that of
its principles."—MONTESQUIEU.

T H E French Revolution was a conquest in the spheres of
thought, society, and politics, effected by a people over the old
systems of authority, class privilege, and absolute rule. In its
course it came almost inevitably into collision with governments
founded on the old ideas and customs; and the shock of arms
favoured the rise of a military dictatorship, which curbed the
revolution in France while extending it over the Continent.
The conflict with monarchical Europe is therefore the central
fact of the revolution, determining not only the trend of events
in France, but also the extension of French influence over
Europe, and the formation of the chief Continental States.
What was the old Europe which the revolutionary ideas
were to permeate and transform ? How came it that the
revolution organised itself in France so effectively as to overthrow States which had defied the power of Louis X I V ? In
F. R.

I

2

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

brief, what was the potential strength of the new ideas; whence
came the weakness inherent in the Continental States? A
survey of the chief tendencies in pre-revolutionary Europe will
serve as an answer to these questions and an introduction to
the momentous events of 1789.
The Holy Roman Empire is the nebulous material from
which most of the Continental States have been evolved. Central, Western, and Southern Europe with few exceptions acknowledged the sway of Karl the Great (Charlemagne) as "the
Emperor," crowned by the Pope, and wielding the temporal
power of Christendom, while the successor of Peter embodied
the spiritual authority of the Church. Though many peoples
never belonged to " T h e Empire," yet the underlying conception had been that of a central predominant State, not belonging to any one ruling house, or people. It was Catholic in a
political, as well as in a religious sense. The great religious
and political strife of the Thirty Years' War (1618—1648)
shook old Europe to its base. The cosmopolitan Empire was
divided by a perpetuation of the religious schism. NorthGermany became definitely Protestant; South-Germany remained Roman Catholic and under the influence of the House
of Hapsburg. By the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the Empire
not only lost the Dutch Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation, but also relinquished the control of the foreign policy of
the chief German States. The Thirty Years' War undermined
the power of the Emperor, just as the Reformation had impaired the authority of the Pope. The European system was
left without any dominant principle of government, and Central
Europe became an ever-shifting mosaic of States tending to
group themselves around Vienna or Berlin, around the House
of Hapsburg-Lorraine, or the House of Hohenzollern. Even if
Germany had not been open to the intervention of other
powers, as Sweden and France, her history would have been
ever distracted by this dualism of interests.

I.]

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe.

3

The House of Hapsburg had long made use of its tenure
of the Imperial throne to aggrandise its hereditary States,
Bohemia, Moravia, the Duchy of Austria, Styria, Carinthia,
Tyrol, and scattered lands on the Upper Danube and Rhine;
for though the Imperial crown was in theory elective, yet the
reigning Hapsburg was nearly always chosen by the princely
Electors to be ' Emperor.' Now, when the Imperial power
decayed, the Hapsburgs redoubled their attempts to make Germany an appanage of Austria; but the diversity of peoples and
constitutions of the Hapsburg States would have made this all
but impossible, even if a vigorous purely German State had
not opposed it.
The rise of Brandenburg-Prussia was due to the skill and
foresight by which the early Electors of Brandenburg used their
central position in North Germany to champion national
interests against the Poles and the Swedes, or the encroachments of Hapsburgs and Bourbons. Prussia has always
increased most in power and territory, when her policy has
been truly German. She has fallen back, when, as in 1795—
1806, or 1849—1851, her government has been subservient to
France or Austria.
The policy of Frederick the Great had the result of
making Prussia the first of purely German States, and one
of the Great Powers of Europe. Frederick determined to
unite his scattered dominions of Brandenburg-Prussia, and add
to them whatever lands could be welded on to his realm.
Thus, when the Hapsburg possessions were weakened by
the contested succession of Maria Theresa, Frederick seized
the opportunity to invade and conquer Silesia (1740). The
revival of some old claims on this province formed an insufficient excuse for so glaring a violation of dynastic rights;
but, if the end can justify the means, the seizure of Silesia
may be palliated. Community with the Protestant North in
race, physical conditions and commercial interests, seemed to
1—2

4

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

declare for a union of Silesia with Brandenburg, and its separation from the Slavonic and Roman Catholic states of the
House of Austria 3 and Silesia has ever since remained Prussian.
It wras in Silesia and Prussia (proper) that the national rising
of 1813 was most general and enthusiastic. The seizure of
Silesia, however, was a signal instance of the spirit which since
the Thirty Years' War had begun to undermine the European
system. That respect for dynastic rights arid treaty obligations
which generally held sway when Christendom was more than a
name, now gave place to a state policy which avowedly aimed
at little else but gain of territory or markets.
The same incisive assertion of natural and national claims
at the expense of governmental rights, is observable in
Frederick's policy with regard to Poland. There seems to be
an inherent antipathy between the Poles and Germans. For
ages the two races have striven for supremacy on the banks of
the Wartha, the Vistula, and the Niemen. In the 16th and
17th centuries, when the Polish nobles were public-spirited
enough to prefer the public interest to personal gains, their
martial spirit gained the victory; but while the Electors of Brandenburg were slowly consolidating the North-German power,
the Polish and Lithuanian realms were disintegrated by faction.
The Polish nobles succeeded in making the Crown elective, in
curtailing the political rights of the towns, and in reducing the
peasants to abject serfdom. While in Western Europe aristocracy was yielding ground to the Crown or to the people, the
reverse had been the case in Poland. The absorption of the
governing powers by the Polish nobles was as fatal to the
effective action of the government as to the liberties of the
lower orders; for in the General Diet, consisting of the nobles,
the laws must be passed unanimously; the veto of a single noble
could reduce the State to a deadlock. Montesquieu censured
its government as being the worst of aristocracies, "where the
part of the people which obeys is in civil slavery to that which

I.]

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe.

5

holds sway." In Prussia the iron will of the great Frederick
linked closely together the different provinces and distinct
orders of his people; and, though the Prussian Government
and society had little of the unity which the Revolution was to
impart in 1807—1812, yet Frederick's ability and energy
ensured a strength far greater than that of the more extensive
Polish State.
In 1772 came the first of the three partitions of Poland,
which by 1795 ended its existence as an independent Power.
Frederick, in planning with the Czarina Catherine I I and
Maria Theresa the spoliation of Poland, could urge no legal
claims. The restoration to Germans in West-Prussia and Ermeland of German rule, and their liberation from the rule of factious
nobles who sought to impose the Roman Catholic creed, will
now, however, be generally considered a valid excuse for Prussia's
share in the first partition. By it Frederick gained West-Prussia
(except Danzig and Thorn) and Ermeland, thus securing a
continuous German territory from the Niemen to the Middle
Elbe; and North Germans were now freed from the danger resulting from the increase of Russian influence over the Polish
Government. Frederick was no revolutionist, by theory or
design. His aim was to consolidate his monarchy by all the
means in his power, relying on his own vast faculties of organisation to control his ministers and officials, on the devotion
of his nobles to officer his army, and on the subservience of
the peasant-serfs to furnish the sinews of war, and the rank and
file of the army. His public works aimed at making Prussia
rich in herself, and as far as possible self-sufficing. Frederick's
foreign policy was, however, distinctly fatal to the old order of
things in Central and Eastern Europe. The seizure of Silesia
and the first partition of Poland showed how a State might grow
in size and strength, which furthered natural and national claims
against treaty obligations. It will be seen how largely the power
of Prussia at the death of Frederick (1786) was due to his

6

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

forceful will and intelligence. Her territories were still
straggling; and parts, as Anspach, Baireuth, Cleves. and EastFriesland, were widely detached: her administration was
cumbrous: her people were rigidly divided in the old orders:
her power and prestige were due to an abnormally large army
vigorously led.
In sharp contrast with the prudent boldness of Frederick
stands the well-meaning but reckless policy of the reigning
Hapsburg, Joseph II (1780—1790). H e had noticed the
power of Prussia, vigorously wielded by the able and ambitious
Frederick, and determined to concentrate the government of
his diverse territories at Vienna. His task was far more
difficult than that of Frederick, for his States had their own
constitutions, governments, and laws, which the House of
Hapsburg-Lorraine had sworn to observe; and these differences were by no means artificial, but represented deep-rooted
national distinctions : in fact, the golden link of the Crown
had been hitherto almost the only bond of union. He now
issued edicts cancelling the most cherished laws, customs, and
privileges of his kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, though
these were kingdoms when Austria was not yet a duchy. So
far did he push his innovations as to remove to Vienna the
sacred crown, sent by the Pope in the year 1000 A.D. as a gift
to the first Hungarian king, St Stephen. This was rank
sacrilege in the eyes of all true Hungarians, who thenceforth
looked on Joseph as the " hatted king," not duly crowned. It
is possible that he might have succeeded if he had introduced
his revolutionary policy piecemeal in time of profound peace,
and with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The
national feelings were still well-nigh dormant. It was Joseph II
who first aroused them to active hostility by seeking to
centralise all power at Vienna, and to make German the
official language for his Hungarian and Slavonic States. At
the same time he irritated the Roman Catholic Church at

I.]

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe,

7

home, and created troubles abroad by his meddlesome foreign
policy. As long as the Hapsburgs supported the power
and privileges of the Roman Catholic clergy, these had oiled
the complex wheels of the Hapsburg Governments; but,
when Joseph abolished the exceptional privileges of nobles
and clergy alike, closed and confiscated the funds of most
of the monasteries, and interfered with religious worship, he
met with opposition everywhere, especially in his Austrian
Netherlands.
As if it was not enough to provoke the privileged classes,
as well as the religious and national sentiments, in his diverse
States, Joseph I I pursued an aggressive foreign policy which
finally banded half Europe against him. Thus, he violated
treaty engagements with the Dutch by declaring (1784) the
navigation of the lower Scheldt completely open, even to his
warships; and only the opposition of England and Holland,
backed by the remonstrance of his ally France, led him to withdraw a claim which the French revolutionists were to revive in
1792. Despising the unreal glamour of his Imperial dignity, he
sought the aggrandisement of his hereditary States, which then included numerous scattered lands along the upper Danube and
Rhine. He desired to connect these with Austria by acquiring
the Electorate of Bavaria, either by conquest or in exchange for
his distant and troublesome Netherlands. This plan, which
would have made Austria definitely the mistress of Southern
and Central Germany, aroused the opposition of the German
princes thus threatened; and one of the last acts of Frederick's
policy was to form the Fiirstenbund, or League of German
Princes, joined by the spiritual Electors of Mainz and Treves,
against the encroachments of the Emperor himself.
The next Prussian King, Frederick William I I (1786—
1797) for the first few years of his reign maintained a strongly
anti-Austrian and anti-Russian policy. The identity of English
and Prussian interests in maintaining the authority of the

8

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

House of Orange in the Stadtholdership of the Dutch Netherlands and in checking the democratic party which was supported
by France, led to a Prussian invasion of Holland, and the
formation of the important Triple Alliance between England,
Prussia and Holland (1788). This aimed at maintaining the
balance of power in Europe against the attempts of France in
the Netherlands and the encroachments of Russia and Austria
on Poland and Turkey. Some of the most important results of
this conservative alliance must here be noticed. In the second
article of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of defensive alliance (April,
1788) the allies "guarantee each other mutually in the possession
of all their Dominions, Territories, Towns, Places, Franchises,
and Liberties." The two last designations of course included
the rights of the Dutch Government over the lower part of the
Scheldt, which, by the treaty of 1785 between the Emperor and
the States General of Holland, were to belong to the latter and
be "kept shut by them." The fact that the French Government gave a formal guarantee of the last-named treaty should
also be noticed; for the abolition of the Dutch rights over the
lower Scheldt by the French Convention in 1792, together with
other menaces to our Dutch allies, was the chief cause of the outbreak of war between England and France which had so lamentable an influence on the French revolution and determined
the general trend of European affairs throughout the whole era.
Though the influence of the Triple Alliance on the west of
Europe was distinctly conservative, yet in Eastern affairs its
interests were complicated by the need of checking or outwitting those two restless and aggressive potentates, Catherine
I I and Joseph II. Knowing that they were planning the partition of Turkey, and were striving to obtain the aid of Poland,
the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herzberg, had already
endeavoured to stir up war between Sweden and Russia, to
encourage the Polish patriots to resist the Russophil policy of
their King Stanislaus, to paralyse the Hapsburg States by

I.]

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe.

g

fomenting the discontent everywhere prevalent, and to strengthen
Turkey's power of resistance. H e was for a time completely
successful. Gustavus I I I of Sweden, after consolidating the
royal power by a successful coup d'etat, longed to recover parts
of Finland from Russia, and marched his troops towards St.
Petersburg (July 1788), which they would probably have taken
but for the defection of some of their Finnish troops and an
attack of the Danes on their western frontier. The troops of
Catherine and Joseph encountered unexpectedly vigorous resistance from the Turks; and the Polish patriots seemed about
to seize the opportunity to cast off the Czarina's influence,
expel her troops from their land, and rehabilitate their distracted State. The Polish Diet, which met in Oct. 1788,
proclaimed its intention of abolishing the liberum veto and of
declaring the right of the majority to carry any measure; while
Catherine as clearly showed her determination to perpetuate
the anarchy of that unhappy land, by proclaiming that she
would regard the least change in the Polish Constitution of
1775 a s a violation of treaties. Prussia, feeling sure of the
ultimate support of England, promised to help the Poles to
recover their former Lithuanian lands, secretly stipulating for
the cession of Thorn and Danzig as the price of her aid; and
Frederick William in 1789 was only deterred from making war
on the two Imperial Governments by the pacific advice of Pitt
and the possibility of France and Spain joining them. But the
projected Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Russia, France and
Spain could not be formed owing to Louis XVTs dislike of
Russian plans against Poland \ besides which the impending
troubles in France forbade the adoption of an energetic foreign
policy. Even so, however, the prowess of Russian and Austrian
troops later in the campaign gained some important victories
over the Turks. Sweden was soon compelled to desist from
her invasion of Russia by the invasion of the Danes and a conspiracy of the Swedish nobles against the Crown; and though

10

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Gustavus I I I drove out the Danes, and in the Swedish States
General succeeded in reducing his nobles to submission (Feb.
—May 1789), yet Sweden was for the time reduced to the
defensive. The influence of the Triple Alliance saved her from
any severe pressure by Russia, and further prevented the two
Imperial Powers from reaping the fruits of their victories over
the Turks. The ferment in Poland still distracted the attention of Russia, while the discontent in Hungary and Belgium,
which threatened to subvert the Hapsburg throne, was openly
fomented by Prussia.
Joseph IPs difficulties were vastly augmented, when the
Belgian discontent against his sweeping reforms burst into
open revolt (Dec. 1789). The student must, however, carefully distinguish between this Belgian or Brabant insurrection,
headed by nobles and clergy, and the essentially democratic
and social revolution which was swiftly transforming France
into a modern State. In Hungary and in the Austrian
Netherlands it was the ruler who was the revolutionist; and
the discontent arose solely from his abolition of local privileges
and charters, and his infraction of the historic rights and
privileges of the nobles and clergy. In the Belgic provinces
especially the revolt was strongly conservative and religious.
Its leader, Van der Noot, appealed in his manifesto to the
" primitive and imprescriptible rights" of the Belgian people
and declared Joseph II deposed from the sovereignty for his
violation of the fundamental charter of the land. On the
overthrow of the Imperial troops by the patriots, Van der Noot
entered Brussels in triumph, and with the nobles and u their
mightinesses the Estates of Brabant," marched to the cathedral,
where a Te Deum was sung to celebrate the restoration of the
old religious and civic customs so heedlessly abolished by the
Imperial innovator. In Jan. 1790 the Estates of the provinces assembled at Brussels and decreed the establishment of
the United States of Belgium with a loose form of federal

I.]

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe.

11

union similar to that connecting the provinces of the Dutch
Netherlands. ' I n its essential features this Belgian revolution
resembles the revolts of the Vendeans in 1793 and the
Tyrolese in 1809. The three risings were protests against the
heedless application of a cast-iron Liberalism. The Brabant
revolution, therefore, faintly foreshadows the beginnings of
that national reaction which was finally to roll back the eastward rush of French democracy. Its immediate influence on
the political situation in 1789—1790 was fatal to the sovereign
who sought to reform and revolutionise by royal prerogative.
Overwhelmed by this last of many bitter disappointments
and failures, the well-meaning but unfortunate Hapsburg ruler
came to an untimely end (Feb. 1790); and his policy was soon
reversed by his cautious and diplomatic brother Leopold II.
Joseph I I was the last and by far the most reckless of
those great eighteenth century rulers who sought to remodel
their realms according to the precepts of philosophy but who
in effect only strengthened the central power at the expense of
local liberties. So obviously was this the case that it is
questionable whether even the most enlightened of these
crowned reformers, Frederick the Great, Joseph II, and the
statesmen Turgot in France and Pombal in Portugal, would
in the least degree have sympathised with Rousseau's doctrine
of the sovereignty of the general will. As for the reforms of
Catherine I I in Russia and the expulsion of the Jesuits from
all the Bourbon realms, France, Spain, Naples and Parma, as
well as from Portugal, they were certainly inspired mainly by
the desire of strengthening the central power.
However
diverse were their motives, the crowned innovators of the
latter half of the eighteenth century began that process of
simplification and centralisation of governing powers which is
so prominent a characteristic of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era. The sequel of this narrative will reveal the strange
paradox that the revolutionary doctrines, and the dictatorship

12

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

which a warlike policy necessitated, were soon to end in a far
more sternly centralised rule than that for which Joseph I I
had vainly striven.
Instead of leaving the Hapsburg States strong and united
from the upper Danube to its mouth, with Vienna as the political
centre of the Continent, Joseph I I left them no larger than at
his accession, and eager to throw off his innovations. His
policy, foreign and domestic, was essentially revolutionary, and
bears some striking resemblances to that of Napoleon. Imbued
with the new ideas, both sought to level privileges and distinctions of rank, religion, and nationality: both sought to centralise their power by subordinating the Church to the State,
and the State to the ruler; while their rash or premature
attempt at a cosmopolitan sway, complicated by a grandiose
and ill-proportioned policy, was overthrown by a strongly
national reaction championed by the conservative Powers.
There is however this sharp distinction between the careers
of Joseph II and Napoleon, that whereas the latter, as "heir
to the Revolution," only completed the work of social reconstruction marked out by the French Convention, Joseph I I
sought to force on his States a social revolution, for which there
had been little or no intellectual preparation. Consequently,
while the Hapsburg ruler had to lament the miscarriage of all
his schemes, Napoleon's measures of social reconstruction form
the basis of the France of to-day.
Even in many of the smaller European States there was a
division of interests and sympathy between the rulers and
ruled. Thus in the Bishopric of Liege the Prince-Bishop
endeavoured to encroach on the constitutional rights of his
subjects. In the neighbouring Republic of the Dutch Netherlands, the House of Orange, which had long held the Stadtholdership, had for some time attempted to change this
precarious dignity into an hereditary monarchy; and civil
strifes ensued, in which France supported the democrats or

I.J

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe.

13

" patriots." Finally England by diplomatic pressure on France,
and Prussia by armed intervention in the Netherlands restored
the Stadtholder to more than his old powers (1787). This
victory of the two Northern Powers marked the recovery by
England of her former place in Europe, and by revealing the
financial and political weakness of France, dealt a fatal blow to
the prestige of the Bourbons. In the Austrian Netherlands and
Liege, however, Prussia helped the people to resist the innovations of Joseph II and the Bishop respectively. Indeed,
there was nowhere any consistent support of political principles.
Thus, Louis XVI, yielding to his courtiers and his army, supported the American colonists in their struggle against the
English monarchy; but none the less did he help to crush the
Swiss democrats.
The succession of Leopold to the Hapsburg dominions
soon effected a change in the policy of those distracted States
and in the general diplomatic situation. In order to hold
Prussia in check and regain his power over the Austrian
Netherlands, Leopold made friendly overtures to England
with the hope of dissolving the Triple Alliance. They were
well received; for Pitt now distrusted the ambitious designs
of the Prussian Court which threatened to lead to a general
conflagration. Moreover, it was a cardinal principle of English
policy to keep the Belgic provinces in the hand of a strong
friendly government as a barrier against French encroachments
on the north. English influence was therefore used to aid in
the restoration of Austria's power in her Netherlands, provided
that she would guarantee to the patriots their ancient rights
and customs. Thus began the bieach between England and
Prussia which was eventually to paralyse the First Coalition
and lead to open hostility in 1800—1805. An Anglo-Austrian
alliance now supplanted the entente cordiale between Paris and
Vienna; and Pitt was able to take a high tone in the Nootka
Sound dispute with Spain, in which Louis XVI by virtue of

14

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[CHAP.

the Bourbon Family Compact for a time seemed about to take
vigorous action against us. In spite of the beginnings of an
Anglo-Austrian alliance, the Prussian Court persisted in its
warlike policy against that of Vienna, though the policy of the
latter had lost its aggressive character. An alliance with the
Polish Government (March 1790) promised to strengthen
Frederick William's hands, and he massed a large army on the
Bohemian frontier. At once the prudent Hapsburg ruler made
an armistice with the Turks (gaining Orsova), and turned to
face Prussia. This Power suddenly found herself isolated;
for the Poles energetically refused to promise the cession of
Thorn and Danzig to Prussia as the price of her aid. Frederick
William II, a blase sentimentalist, was disgusted at suddenly
finding himself involved by Herzberg's ambitious policy in
a single-handed contest with Austria, at a time when the
principles of the French Revolution were beginning to sap the
foundations of the old governments. Now that the prospect
of humbling Austria and of gaining two important fortresses
from Poland had completely vanished, the Prussian king
remembered that his duty as a German sovereign forbade an
almost fratricidal war. H e therefore favourably received overtures of peace which Leopold made at Reichenbach with a
view to an alliance based on monarchical principles and the
maintenance of the status quo. The Austrian Government
deftly insinuated that the French Revolution was the foe to be
faced; and the Prussian envoy at Paris also hinted to his
master that one or two eastern districts of France might
become the prize of an Austro-Prussian war against the revolution. The more pressing reason, however, for the peace
finally agreed on at Reichenbach (July 27, 1790) was that
both the Central Powers were in military or diplomatic difficulties. Leopold desired to pacify the discontent in Hungary
and Brabant, and to secure his election as Emperor; while
Prussia was not loth to extricate herself from the false position

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15

in which Herzberg's diplomacy had involved her. Indeed,
while appearing to dictate the following terms of peace, she
really accepted them. Austria was to negotiate peace with
Turkey on the basis of the status quo, Prussia agreed not
to intervene in Belgian affairs save with the accord of England
and Holland, and would recognise the restoration of Austrian
authority there if an amnesty were granted to the Belgian
patriots.
The consequences of this peace were most important.
Austria speedily regained her authority in the Netherlands and
her prestige in Europe; while Prussia, which had appeared
about to dictate terms to her, withdrew baffled and disconcerted. The Poles, annoyed at the insidious policy of Berlin,
turned to Austria as a more trustworthy ally; and Sweden, left
without support, had to conclude a disadvantageous peace at
Werela with Russia (Aug. 1790). Catherine II was thus able
to push on the war against Turkey; and until a definite settlement had been arrived at on the Danube it was impossible for
the Eastern Powers to act vigorously elsewhere. The tardiness
with which a definite peace was finally arranged between
Austria and Turkey at Sistova (Aug. 5, 1791), proved the hollowness of the pretended European concert against revolutionary France. Austria, in fact, could not spare a great army
to maich on Paris while Catherine was still successfully
pursuing the war against Turkey; and it was not till the
Czarina signed (Aug. n , 1791) the preliminaries of peace at
Galatz and the definitive Treaty of Jassy five months later,
whereby she gained the Turkish lands east of the Dniester,
that there was any possibility of united and vigorous action by
the other Continental Powers against the French Revolution.
After peace was restored on the Pruth and Danube, the
Polish question threatened war on the Vistula. At the close
of 1791 Catherine massed 130,000 men on the borders of
Poland, intending to subject that land to her authority, and if

16

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[CHAP.

Austria and Prussia opposed her by force, to buy off their hostility by offering them a share in the partition, or "compensation" elsewhere. In the hope of diverting all their energies
westwards, the ambitious and unscrupulous Czarina affected
great indignation against the French revolutionists and ostensibly prepared to take part in a monarchical crusade, the better
to conceal her design of subjugating the whole of Poland.
I have judged it advisable to preface this little work by a
brief sketch of the very complicated struggles in eastern and
central Europe, in order to correct a prevalent misconception
that the French Revolution was the only question then occupying the attention of statesmen. On the contrary, the aggressive designs of Joseph II and the Czarina Catherine on Turkey
and Poland riveted their gaze almost exclusively on the East;
and the troubles in France were, down to the Midsummer of
1791, regarded as important, only because they reduced her to
a passive role in the European embroglio, leaving the Eastern
Powers free for their designs on the Danube and the Vistula
and throwing on England the chief burden of maintaining the
position of the States there threatened. The democrats of
Paris were therefore left free for fully two years to make or
mar the destinies of France; while the Central and Eastern
Powers, released from all fears of French intervention, proceeded with their designs, and reluctantly paused in their plans
for the overthrow of the weaker States, only when it appeared
necessary to save the cause of monarchy at Paris. The tardiness with which in 1791—1792 they turned to uphold monarchical principles in the West, and yet ever cast backward glances
on the plunder obtainable in the East, revealed the inner weakness of the European system, if that can be called a system
which rested on no principle of action and set no limits
to aggression on the weak except those dictated by the fears
or jealousies of neighbours and rivals.
The whole spirit of European politics was such as to further

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1$

the destructive aims of the French revolutionists. To strengthen
and unite probable friends: to weaken and divide actual and
possible foes, especially in neighbouring States—these were the
marks of a successful ruler or statesman. Hence came the
kaleidoscopic changes in continental diplomacy,—all finally
ending in the general crash of the Revolution.
The Decay of the old Society.
In its best and truest form the old feudal relation between
lord and vassal was a rough and ready means of organising
local defence and government, of gaining some security from
universal rapine. The lord gave protection. In return, the
vassal owned his complete dependence on the lord for life
and land, rendered him stated service in labour or in kind,
paid dues for the use of his bridge, ferry, mill, wine-press, or
oven, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the seigneurial
law-court. As the feudal barons defended and governed their
domains at their own charges, and brought their vassals to
swell the royal army, they were free from king's taxes; for
they gave what was in those troublous times more needed—
military aid.
The security for property which the mail-clad baron won
by prowess, the priest and the monk gained by their sanctity.
Reverence felt by ambitious kings and lawless barons for
mother Church, or the intrigues of clerics in the royal Council,
dowered the clergy with rich and broad domains, which in
France before the Revolution probably comprised nearly onefifth of all the land; and the clergy formed a privileged Order,
exempt from nearly all taxes.
The lack of any effective central power in Germany had
allowed the bishops and feudal nobles to build up States which
were almost independent of the Emperor. In France the
ability and energy of the kings brought all the bishops and
great nobles under the authority of the Crown, and by the time
F. K.
2

IS

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

of Louis XIV, France was politically united; yet in both
countries, and almost everywhere on the Continent, the nobles
and clergy formed two powerful privileged Orders, distinct
from the mass of the people. In Germany they retained their
old governing functions; but in France the nobles now served
merely as officers in the royal standing army. The old feudal
forces, the ban and the arriere ban, were not called out after
1674: and Richelieu transferred to the intendants, or controllers of administrative districts, the remains of the old
governing powers of the French nobles. Yet these remained
almost exempt from taxes, as if they were still governing their
fiefs, and helping in the defence of the realm, at their own
expense. They formed no longer an aristocracy but a noblesse.
Even a supporter of the old social system, like Chateaubriand, could see whither this was tending:—" Aristocracy has
three ages, first the age of force, from which it degenerates into
the age of privilege, and is finally extinguished in the age of
vanity." The age of privilege was then merging in the age of
vanity, as was seen in the haughty disdain with which the
old nobles regarded the relatively small, though increasing
middle-class. Lawyers and jurists who distinguished themselves in the French provincial 'Parlements' often gained
titles of nobility, whence they were called noblesse de robe:
though they were looked down upon as parvenus, yet they
gained exemption from taxation. So that by one means or
another most of the wealthy classes escaped the burdens of
the State taxes.
Consequently the King had to press hard on the lower
orders for money to support the vast expenses of the new
centralised State engaged in frequent and prolonged wars.
Nearly all the costs of the wars, the magnificent palaces, and
the gorgeous ceremonial of Louis XIV were borne by the
middle and lower classes of France. These last were often reduced to piteous misery by the threefold burden of the feudal

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dues paid to the nobles, the tithes paid to the clergy, and
the taxes paid to the State. The differences between the
privileges of different provinces in the matter of taxation make
a general computation difficult \ but Taine has reckoned that
a peasant, out of every 100 francs of income, would have to
pay 53 in taxes to the State, 14 to his lord, 14 for tithes,
and out of the remaining 19 to satisfy the exciseman and
support life!
The French peasant was, however, far freer socially than
the serfs of Germany, Italy, and Spain; and in Prussia, where
the burdens of a vigorous and aggressive monarchy were added
to those of feudalism, the peasants had to bear heavier loads
even than those of central France. In Brandenburg it appears
that for 30 acres of land yielding 9f crowns, the peasant often
had to pay to the State 8 crowns, without counting what he
owed to the lord and to the clergy. Prussia under Frederick
the Great was, however, in a far healthier state than was France
under Louis X V ; the Prussian administration was as vigorous
as that of France was corrupt. Frederick made his nobles
work for the State not only as officers but as administrators
of the law, and as governors of towns. He desired them
to reside on their estates, and look after the interests of
their peasants; and if the latter made any complaint against
their lords, Frederick carefully investigated it. Thus the feudal
system retained its vitality in Prussia longer than in France,
where the old feudal privileges outlived the duties which had
gone hand in hand with them. In the small states of Central
and Southern Europe feudalism had not lost all its governing
powers, and in the Hapsburg dominions the nobles had
successfully resisted the hasty attempts of Joseph I I to merge
their governing functions in the central power. In all these
countries feudalism was still a stern reality. The feudal
government by the German, Italian, or Spanish nobles pressed
harder on their dependents or serfs than was the case in
2—2

20

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Bra,

[CHAP.

Fiance, where serfdom still existed only in the provinces
recently acquired from the Empire,—Alsace, Franche Comte,
and Lorraine. The German or Italian peasant was still tied to
the soil, and might be brought back by force if he escaped.
Still, in Prussia feudalism involved a beneficial protection of
the weak by the strong. There is much to be said, especially
in a rigorous climate, for complete feudal dependence, or
serfdom, if it be humanely exercised. But in France there
was no such dependence on a present protector; only a number
of complex dues survived, payable to a lord rarely seen on
his estates. Absenteeism converted the tenure into the most
irritating form of copyhold. From the time of Louis XIV
onwards the feudal relation between lord and vassal was an
anachronism, cramping the peasant at every turn. The feudal
dues were irritating from their number and uncertainty, rather
than burdensome from their weight. Corn, fowls, wine, etc.
had to be paid when the farm changed hands, at stated seasons,
or when the lord died, when his eldest son or daughter came
of age, or was married. The peasant in many parts must bake
his bread only in the lord's oven, press his grapes in the lord's
wine-press and use only the seigneurial mill; and, worst of
all, he must for a certain number of days give his labour gratuitously to mend the roads of the lord, or of the commune,
and gather in the lord's harvest Endless friction arose about
other exclusive rights (banalites\ the minute quit-rents (cens),
and the damage caused by the lord's game. The game-laws
were very oppressive. In most parts of Europe the farmer
must not hoe or weed his crops, nor mow his hay and plough
in his stubble before a certain time, lest the partridges should be
disturbed; and the only legal way of protecting his crops from
the deer or boars, was to sit up all night, and scare them away
by shouting. These grievances, terrible everywhere, were at
their worst in the capitaineries', or districts reserved for hunting
to the princes of France.

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In brief, while feudalism was socially or politically more
oppressive elsewhere on the Continent, it was financially most
burdensome in France, owing to absenteeism. Few French
nobles resided among their dependents, save in the West and
North-West of France; and it was in these very parts that the
peasants rose in defence of their priests and nobles, when the
patriarchal life was threatened by the innovations of the revolutionists. Even around Nantes, however, there were the same
glaring contrasts between the splendour of the city and the
misery of the country, which were so painfully evident in
entering Versailles, Paris, Lyons, Bordeaux, and a few other
chief provincial centres. "What a miracle (wrote Arthur Young
at Nantes) that all this splendour and wealth of the cities of
France should be so unconnected with the country. There
are no gentle transitions from ease to comfort, from comfort
to wealth: you pass at once from beggary to profusion."
"The country deserted, or if a gentleman in it, you find him
in some wretched hole, to save that money which is lavished
with profusion in the luxuries of a capital."
In no other part of Europe was there so perilous a concentration of wealth in a few centres. Elsewhere on the
Continent, the feudal nobles as a rule still lived among their
dependents; and wealth was not drawn away from the
districts where it was produced. In France it was drained
away from the country to a f^w of the chief centres of fashion;
and to these pleasure resorts the toilers followed the spenders
in any time of exceptional distress, as in the winter of 1789.
The extremes of misery and luxury form an explosive combination. It was these contrasts which fired with indignation
Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau.
The Intellectual Revolution.
The 'elan of French thought, its lucidity of expression, its
concentration around a brilliant Court, an august Academy, or

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[CHAP.

in salons where conversation became a fine art, conspired to
make Paris at once the Athens as well as the Rome of the
modern world. The first of the French thinkers on politics
and society whose works made any lasting impression was
Montesquieu, whose Esprit des Lois (1748) aimed at discovering
the laws which govern the action of men in political societies.
There is nothing revolutionary in his spirit or conclusions.
With philosophic impartiality he examines each form of government, pointing out its excellences and defects, the causes of its
rise, duration, and decay. As Aristotle considered virtue the
mean between opposing extremes, so Montesquieu abhors all
political extremes, especially an arbitrary despotism, and shows
a bias in favour of the English constitution, as combining the
excellences of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. " It is
sometimes necessary to change certain laws (he says); but the
case is rare; and when it comes, they ought to be touched
only with a trembling hand." His true greatness is that he
first illustrated on a grand scale the relations of cause and
effect in human affairs; and his influence is traceable in the
general and repeated efforts " to make war on absolutism."
Next there arose a school of thinkers, the Physiocrats, who
sought to find the Natural Order which permeated the whole
of society, and the economic conditions which formed the basis
of its prosperity. The most important writers and speculators
of this school were Quesnay, author of La Fhysiocratie, OIL Constitution naturelle des Gouvernements (1768), and Turgot, who
was soon to apply his theories in the Limousin, and for two
years to all France. Looking around them at the actual state
of France, where trade was shackled on all sides by privileges
of classes, towns, districts, and trade gilds, while commerce
was strangled by provincial customs' barriers, they proclaimed
the famous maxim laissez faire et laissez passer as the cure for
these economic evils. They assumed that wages and profits were
fixed by natural laws, and that the natural value of things was

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23

the result. Though their reasoning was generally founded -on
theories rather than on observed facts, yet any inquiry was fatal
to the old social and political order of things, which rested on
nothing but custom. Adam Smith, visiting Paris in 1763, was
much stimulated by intercourse with these fathers of Political
Economy; and his great work The Wealth of Nations (1776)
paved the way in England, as did the Economists in France,
for the commercial treaty between the two countries (1786—7)
which was the first and premature approximation to Free Trade.
In the sphere of philosophy and speculation the revolt
against authority and tradition had the most important influence on the trend of events. It originated in England with
the materialistic philosophy of Locke, who maintained that the
human mind was in itself a blank, with no innate ideas: these
were solely the result, either of external sensation falling on the
camera obscura of the mind, or of internal reflection. The
materialist side of this theory was developed by Hume in
Scotland, and by Condillac and others in France, viz. that
ideas were solely due to external sensation and all knowledge
was derived from experience : men were therefore perfect
.animals, and animals were imperfect men. This materialism
was pushed still further by Helvetius, who, in his treatise de
VEsprit (1758) asserted that self-love and self-interest are the
source of all human action: morality must therefore be
avowedly based on animal feeling, on pleasure and pain.
Following the leads thus given, a whole cohort of ' philosophers ' began to assail existing beliefs and customs; and in
that long reign of Louis XV, when the monarchy was at the
lowest ebb of disaster and disgrace, when the king's mistress
influenced foreign politics and jobbed appointments at Court
and in the Church, there could be no sincere and successful
defence of the threatened institutions and beliefs. Never was
a more brilliant attack made on a life so hollow and artificial;
and if the peasantry had not been completely isolated by

24

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

ignorance and unceasing toil, the revolution would probably
have burst forth before the death of Louis XV (1774).
Prominent among the assailants was Voltaire, famous for
his work as an historian, play-wright, versifier, man of science,
and philosopher. Devoid of any decided originality, he yet
possessed a marvellous faculty for adapting the results of
research, and setting them forth in a limpid style sparkling
with wit and sarcasm. For these reasons, and because he
was the completest mirror of the French thought of his
age, with its eager inquiries and lack of any fixed convictions, but winsome grace of style, his reputation far transcended the bounds of France. Frederick the Great's one
weakness was Voltaire; he delighted to bandy verses with
him, quarrel with him, scorn German men-of-letters—even
the great Lessing—and declare that the German language
must be reformed before it could be a fit vehicle for poetry!
In his scientific, ethical, and historical work, Voltaire followed
the general trend of thought, viz. to find the universal laws
which undeilie and govern all things. "All beings without
exception are subject to invariable laws" : it is the aim of the
thinker to discover them, of the statesman and practical man
to apply them; and only by obedience to these universal laws
will the human race progress. He waged ceaseless war on
ecclesiastical authority and tradition, and placed his hopes
only on the discoveries of the human intellect. So far from
being hostile to monarchy, Voltaire favoured reform by royal
decrees as the simplest and most expeditious method. Thus,
when Louis XV, on the advice of his minister Maupeou, suppressed the powers of the French Parlements (1771), Voltaire
defended the act as a blow at provincialism and class privilege:
" Have not these Parlements been often barbarous and persecuting?... Since one must obey, I had rather obey a lion of good
family, whom nature has made much my superior, than 200 rats
of my own species." Indeed, most of the ' philosophers' of

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France would have consistently supported the monarchy if it
had firmly suppressed all the social and economic abuses of the
realm. It was against these that they declaimed, and only
against the monarchy when allied with them. But though
Voltaire did not attack the political forms of the ancie?i regime,
he yet began to undermine its base, by bringing disci edit on
the ideas of authority, tradition, and custom, on which it rested.
If prudence kept Voltaire from scattering broadcast the
new theories, because, as he once said, he did not wish to be
murdered by his own valet, no such scruples or fears held back
the two most outspoken champions of the intellectual revolution, Diderot and d'Alembert. Morality is only relative to
the senses of the individual: " Pain and pleasure are the only
springs of the moral universe." " Would you see man free and
happy, do not meddle with his affairs." " Man is wicked, not
because he is wicked, but because he has been made so."
Such are some of their assertions, implying that the
individual is the supreme judge of his own conduct—a
teaching which naturally led to moral, social, and political
anarchy. All the old institutions and beliefs were vehemently
assailed; and Diderot's destructive aims find their most
ferocious expression in the wish that the last king might be
strangled with the entrails of the last priest. These two men,
aided by many other 'philosophers,' compiled the famous
Encyclopedie (1766), a complete circle of education framed
on the basis of the new scientific and philosophic research.
It was designed to combat or tacitly exclude the older system
of thought resting on authority or tradition. The Encyclopaedists, as they were called, systematized the intellectual
revolution,—the effort to emancipate and perfect mankind
by means of human reason and knowledge.
This aim was not one which could speedily arouse the
masses, sunk in ignorance or despair. Enthusiasm was aroused,
not by the new philosophy, but by one who appealed to the

26

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

heart rather than the head, who pointed to a blissful social
past, and not to a future intellectual peifectibility.
Jean
Jacques Rousseau was the first to fire mankind with hopes
of a social millennium easily to be attained. In his pages the
return to a golden age of social equality, from which men had
foolishly strayed, seemed so simple as to be within the reach of
all. It was hope which made the Revolution, beckoning on
those disciples of the new gospel, St Just and Robespierre,
far into the Reign of Terror. It was despair which finally laid
France at the feet of Bonaparte.
In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Rousseau
fantastically traces social evil to its source, the growth of civilisation :—" From the time when one man needed the help of
another, and it was seen to be useful for one man to have
provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, toil became necessary, and the vast forests changed into
smiling fields watered by the sweat of man, wherein slavery and
misery soon took root and grew ripe with the crops." Agriculture and the working of metals helped on the fall of man, since
completed by reason and reflection :—" It is philosophy which
isolates man, and inspires the thought, at the sight of a sufferer,
' Die, if you will; I am safe.'" How, then, is mankind to be
regenerated? By going back—answers Rousseau in his Social
Contract (1762)—as near as may be to the primitive compact
which first brought men together free and equal. The problem
is, " t o find a form of association which defends and protects
with all the common force the person and the goods of each
member; and by which each, uniting with all, yet only obeys
himself, and remains as free as before." The solution of this
difficult problem is reached with surprising ease:—" Each of
us places in common his person and all his power under the
supreme direction of the general will; and we further receive
each member as an indivisible part of the whole." As men enter
the new social contract freely and on equal terms, there hence

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ensue the ideas of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—the
watchwords of the French Revolution. Rousseau, however,
proceeds to exalt equality at the expense of liberty, by asserting
that the general will must be right, and must tend to the public
advantage ; that the State, being the collective will of its members, "must have a universal and compulsory power to move
and dispose each part in the way most suitable for the whole."
Rousseau's return to nature therefore favoured the growth of a
State despotism necessarily hostile to *all institutions seeming
to conflict with it; and the fallacious ease and rigidity of his
reasoning—due to its being based on theory, carried out by
verbal proofs, and rarely checked by observance of facts,—impelled the French revolutionists to many of the outrageous acts
which brought them into collision with the rest of Europe.
If Voltaire charmed by his wit and the lucidity of his reasoning, Rousseau was as widely read throughout Europe for his
many tender appeals to the emotions. A wave of sentimentalism
was then spreading over Europe, of which Richardson's novels
in England, those of Rousseau in France, and Goethe's
Sorrows of Werther in Germany, were the chief expression.
Courtiers, affecting weariness of the artificial splendours of
Versailles, discovered new charms in rustic life, even in the
occupations of the field and dairy; and literary people, tired of
pure reason, turned to the emotions as an undeveloped side of
human nature.
In France the emotional school had no such lasting effect
on literature as it had on politics; but in Germany the revolt
against the past was at the outset rather literary than political,
as in the dramas of Lessing and Goethe. The separation of the
national life in a mosaic of petty States limited the social and
political horizon of Germans, and at first diverted their attention to individual achievement in literature or science; but the
younger poet Schiller, coming under the spell of Rousseau's
influence, revolted not only against the severely classical style,

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[CHAP.

with its unities of time and place, but also against the narrow
tyranny of nearly all the petty princes of Germany. In Schiller's youthful play The Robbers we have (to use his own
words) " an example of the offspring which Genius in its unnatural union with Thraldom may give to the world." It is indeed
the poetry of revolt, fiercer than any of Byron's. " Put me at
the head of a troop of fellows like myself (exclaims his hero),
and Germany shall become a republic, by the side of which
Sparta and Rome shall seem like nunneries"; and he recommended the now famous prescription of "blood and iron" as
the only cure for a corrupt world. For less daring utterances
the Duke of Wiirtemberg had imprisoned the patriotic poet
Schubart, and Schiller had to flee from Stuttgart. The influence of Rousseau's social teachings inspired many more of the
younger German poets, e.g. the Gottingen Brotherhood, headed
by Klopstock, which desired to enthrone naturalism in literature as in politics. These ideas were undermining the Germanic system of States—"a chaos upheld by Providence."
The German savants meanwhile were compiling an Encyclopaedia with the same destructive aims as that of Diderot;
and a secret club or order, the ' Illuminati,' founded in 1776 in
Swabia, rapidly spread the revolutionary doctrines of the age all
over Southern and Western Germany. Though suppressed in
Bavaria and some other States, it had a powerful hold on educated
people, especially in the important fortress and cathedral city
of Mainz, where the Prince-bishop, though Chancellor of the
Empire, patronised it. Priding himself on his enlightenment,
he favoured the spread of an education inspired by Rousseau's
Emile. His coadjutor and successor, Dalberg, was a member of the society; and the forms of religion and morality were
barely respected in the Archbishop's Court. In the other lay
and spiritual States of W. Germany there was no loyalty or
respect for the effete goverments; and the learned Forster of
Mainz wrote (1782)—"Europe seems to me on the brink of a

I.]

Political

and Social

Weakness

of Europe.

29

terrible revolution : the mass is so corrupt that a bleeding
seems necessary."
The same revolutionary ferment was beginning to spread in
the Dutch and Austrian Netherlands, in oligarchical Switzerland
and in oppressed and divided Italy. Everywhere thought con
flicted with fact, the ideal with the real, the head with the
body; and the events of 1789—1815 were to show that it is
ideas which mould the destinies of nations.

CHAPTER
Louis XVI,

II.

THE PARLEMENTS, AND THE STATES GENERAL.

"The States General were like a bridge made for passing from the old to
the new order of things."—(THIERRY.)

FOR generations thinking men had seen that France could
not long endure the double strain of an ambitious monarchical
policy and the cramping results of the old feudal social
system. One or other must go. Few, however, expected
that the conflict would lead up to a Revolution in which both
would vanish.
The death of the vicious and despicable Louis XV (1774)
brought to the French throne his amiable grandson, Louis
XVI, who had lately espoused Marie Antoinette, the daughter
of the great Empress Queen, Maria Theresa. Never has a
heavier burden rested on shoulders so young and inexperienced. Louis XV had lost to England nearly all the French
possessions in North America and India; and though he had
added most of Lorraine to the French Crown, yet his reign
was disgraced by failures abroad, distress at home, and his
own cynical immorality. His successor had all the good
qualities fitted to adorn a private station, but none of the foresight, determination, resource, and brilliance needed to retrieve the fortunes of the Bourbon House. His queen had

CHAP, II.] Loins X VI, the Parlements

and States General. 31

more than all the attractive qualities, but none of the tact,
prudence, and quiet tenacity of her mother. The jealousy of
French statesmen and courtiers would not allow " the Austrian "
to interfere with affairs of state. Hence she could not, save
by fits and starts, bring her powers of exciting enthusiasm to
supplement the kindly but phlegmatic temperament of her
consort.
But in 1774 all seemed bright. Morality was no longer
outraged at Court. Reforms were undertaken; and the revolt
of the American colonists soon gave France the opportunity of
humbling her rival in the race for empire. The philosophers
and economists now hoped that the golden age had come
when society would be reformed by royal decrees; for
Turgot, famed not only by his writings, but by his splendid
achievements as 'intendant/ or royal administrator, of the
Limousin, was appointed to the most important office in the
Council of Ministers, the Control of the Finances. In the
Limousin he had mitigated the hardships of compulsory
enrolment in the militia, had freed trade from some of its
many shackles, and had commuted the corvee, or forced
labour of the peasants on the public roads, for a small tax,
which, however, he could not exact from the privileged classes;
and his enlightened policy had finally been as much resisted
by the ignorant peasants as by the privileged orders. The
same stupidity and selfishness was to foil his efforts to restore
the prosperity of France by royal decrees. H e said to the
king, "Sire, you ought to govern by general laws, as God."
Unfortunately the-king and his diplomatic minister, Maurepas,
had restored the powers of the old ' Parlements/ without any
due restrictions to prevent their abuse. These 'Parlements'
were the supreme judicial bodies at Paris and the twelve chief
provincial capitals—Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon,
Rouen, Aix, Rennes, Pau, Metz, Douai, Besancon, and Nancy.
Their members were strictly mere jurists, who constituted an

32

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

hereditary magistracy. The tenure of their offices had up to
1771 been, and now again was, saleable. Their functions were
properly judicial; but they had long interfered in purely political
matters, had even issued decrees in their several provinces, and
severely punished any contravention of them. Their action
as law courts was dilatory and venal; and, being composed
mainly of the privileged orders, they now resisted reforms
which assailed their privileges. The king could, however,
overbear their opposition by bringing his personal authority
into play, and, by holding what was called a lit de justice,
compel them to register his edicts.
Turgot now freed the internal trade in corn and flour from
all the old provincial customs dues, and abolished not only
the exclusive' right of many a seigneur to own a corn-mill on
his domain, but also the privileges of bakers in towns. Riots
caused by greed, or by fear that the corn would all leave the
district, were promptly suppressed. The economies which he
urged at Court and in the army aroused bitter hatred; and
when in March 1776 he sent six edicts, suppressing various
privileges, especially the old trade-gilds and corvees on the
roads, for registration by the Paris Parlement, this body refused, until compelled to do so by a " b e d of justice/ 5 which
Voltaire hailed as a "bed of beneficence." It was now open
war between the privileged orders and the reforming monarch
and statesman. The Parlements objected above all to the
substitution of a tax on all landed property for the corvee
hitherto rendered by the peasants. In appearance the king
and Turgot won their point; but cabals at Court and in the
Ministry increased; and though the great minister liberated
traders, especially vine-growers, from many shackles, freed the
serfs on the royal domains, and curtailed the immunities of the
nobles, yet he was unable to carry out his other beneficent
plans. He tried in vain to consolidate the public debt, reform
the collection of the gabelle> or salt-duties, and other taxes and

II.]

Lotiis XVI,

the Parlements

and States

General.

33

tolls {octrois), foini a fund to aid peasants in the redemption of
the feudal services, and give local self-government not only to
the commune or parish, but also to the arrondisse7nent (a larger
area), to the province, and to the whole realm. These reforms, which would have peacefully revolutionised France,
were never carried out. Turgot's somewhat rigid and arbitrary
methods of reform caused unnecessary friction; and the queen,
annoyed by an act which injured one of her favourites, persuaded Louis to dismiss him (1776). This victory of the
privileged orders over the monarchy made a democratic
revolution almost inevitable; but so unpractical were Frenchmen then, that they even rejoiced at this and subsequent
successes of the Parlements over the royal power, as if " to
make war on absolutism" were more important than to abolish
antiquated privileges. Turgot's reforms were soon nearly all
reversed.
His successor, Necker, a skilful banker rather than a farseeing statesman, did his best to promote economy, establish
the credit of the State, and postpone burning social questions.
He warned Louis that bankruptcy would follow an open
alliance with the American colonists against England. Yet
such was his financial skill and personal credit with bankers
that he was able to raise loans and tide over the financial
strain of. that war; but success in borrowing enhances financial
difficulties in the future. Moreover, Lafayette and the French
soldiers returned from the United States inflamed with a love
of libertv and self-government. " The American revolution
(wrote Young) has laid the foundation of another in France, if
Government does not take care of itself." Yet at the time
when the proposed American Constitution was the general
topic of conversation in the salons of Paris, Louis was weak
enough to decree that only those whose families had been
noble for four generations could attain high offices in the
French army. Necker was brought by the financial needs of
F. R.
3

34

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

the State to demand that the privileged classes should be
taxed. Feeling his fall to be near, he published (Jan. 1781)
his "Account of the finances/' laying bare for the first time the
expenses of the Court, which were nearly one-third of .the cost
of maintaining the whole army.
Bankruptcy was soon brought nearer by the spendthrift
policy of the frivolous Calonne—" Whoever wishes for credit
must cultivate luxury"; and when in his much ridiculed
Assembly of Notables he ventured to suggest the equalisation
of taxation as the inevitable cure, he was dismissed (1787).
His successor, Lomenie de Brienne, the Archbishop of Toulouse,
sought to carry out the aims of the Encyclopaedists by the
methods of Richelieu, to establish liberty and equality by royal
decree. H e extended to all the provinces the plan, conceived
by Turgot, and commenced by Necker in Berri arid Guienne,
of provincial and parochial assemblies. H e also permitted the
redemption of the corvee by a money payment, abolished the
provincial customs dues, and sought to impose a general land
tax and a stamp tax. These last were resisted by the Paris
Parlement, which declared itself incapable of registering a perpetual tax; but the king overbore their opposition by a lit de
justice and for a time exiled them from Paris. Finally, Brienne
in May 1788 suppressed nearly all the powers of the Parlements, and tried to substitute a Plenary Court, composed of
dignitaries nominated for life by the king, as the sole authority
for registering laws for all France. This coup diktat enraged all
classes and interests—the privileged orders, who saw themselves thenceforth taxable at the will of the sovereign; the
provincial patriots, menaced with a complete subjection to
the capital; and the democrats, who longed for a complete
representation of the nation. All rallied round the Parlements
as the chief barriers against a central despotism : Mirabeau
expressed the ideas of all friends of freedom when he wrote,
" I will never make war on the Parlements save in presence of

II.] Louis XVI,

the Parlements

and States

General.

35

the nation." The people of Rennes and Grenoble rose in defence of their Pailements. Louis bowed before the storm,
dismissed the Minister who had raised it, recalled Necker, and
finally convoked for 1789 the States General of France, representing the three orders —Nobles, Clergy, and Commons.
Lafayette, who had gained immense popularity in the
Ameiican War, had already expressed the wishes of democrats
that the States General should be called; and the Paris Parlement had also taken up this suggestion from a clerical councillor, because it would benefit the commonwealth, embarrass
the king, or add to its' own popularity. After Brienne's
utter failure there seemed to be no other course open, unless
Louis took the prudently daring advice of his former minister,
Malesherbes, and frankly substituted a National Assembly
in place of the cumbrous States General which had not met
since 1614. But Louis could not take occasion by the forelock.
He desired to meet the deficit and remove some of the most
glaring abuses; while most Frenchmen now wished to govern
themselves and have social equality. A dignitary of the Paris
Parlement, the Counsellor Pasquier, had truly said, " Sirs, this
is not child's play: the first time that France sees the States
General, she will see also a terrible revolution."
The States General formed three Chambers, consisting of
deputies of the Nobles, Clergy, and Tiers Etat (Commons) of
France, the last being chosen by ' secondary election ? ; that
is, all the commoners of each town, bailiwick or senechaussee,
could vote for 'electors,' who in their turn chose representatives
of their Order in the States General. The cahiers, or instructions
drawn up for each representative, evince no desire for a political
revolution. They show the general wish that the sovereign
should control the executive, but share the legislative powers
with an Assembly meeting at stated times and representing
the nation, to which the king's ministers should be responsible. The cahiers of the Commons all demand that they
3—2

36

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

should have as many representatives as those of the nobles and
clergy, and that the Orders should meet as one Chamber, not
as three distinct Estates: those of the clergy and nobles vary
on this point. The recollection of the English parliamentary
struggles against Charles I inspired the recommendation in some
cahiers that no taxes should be voted until this constitutional
question were settled. All the cahiers of the Commons demand
equal taxation, which some of those of the privileged Orders
also admit, with the proviso, however, in several of the clerical
cahiers^ that in return the State should take over their special
debt or liabilities. There is a like approach to unanimity as to
the redemption of the feudal dues, with infinite variety as to the
means of effecting this complicated change. Local privileges
of towns, corporations, districts, and provinces are to be sacrificed, whether from conviction, generosity, or despair of keeping
them. Liberty of the press, personal liberty, inviolability of
the deputies, abolition of lettres de cachet (sealed letters by
which a minister could secretly order imprisonment), control
of the finances by the States General, reduction of pensions
and sinecures,—on all these points there is complete accoid;
as well as on the question of improving the lot of the hardworked cures by redistributing the revenues and rewards of the
Church. These cahiers refute the prevalent error that the
privileged Orders would renounce nothing, and that the Tiers
6tat alone was desirous of reform. The king, quite half the
clergy, and an influential minority of the deputies of the nobles,
desired nearly all the leforms which would have placed France
on a level with England as a constitutional State.
How came it then that the deputies who met at Versailles
in May 1789 did not peacefully regenerate France, but set in
motion the revolution? There was at the outset a great
constitutional question, which also served as a test for a deep
underlying principle,—Should the three Orders sit separately,
or as one Chamber ; i.e. should they vote par ordre, or par

II.] Louis XVI,

the Parlements

and States

General,

37

tefe? If the former, then France was still divided in three
distinct Orders, and the Commons would be outvoted on any
question on which nobles and clergy were opposed to them; if
the latter, then equality was not a mere name, and the reformers would certainly carry the day in the Assembly. Great
blame must attach to Louis and still more to Necker, for first
raising the expectations of the Tiers Etat, and then leaving
this initial question to be fought out in wordy war by the
Orders. In the new provincial Assemblies the Orders sat
together. The principle of the * double representation' of
the Third Estate in the Provincial Assemblies had been insisted on by the Notables two years before; and Necker had
lately conceded the same principle for the States General.
Why grant this, if they were to be kept distinct from the other
Orders ? France was in a ferment of excitement. The commercial treaty with England (1786—7), allowing the import of
English goods at moderate duties, subjected French manufactures to sharp competition from our more advanced industrial system, and was causing much distress in the north of
France. A protracted drought in the summer of 1788, closing
with a terrible hail-storm, had ruined the crops in northern and
central France; and the winter of 1788—9 was one of the
severest ever known. Crowds of starving wretches flocked to
the relief works foolishly opened m Paris and the large towns.
The distress embittered the whole course of the elections in
the early spring of 1789; and while philosophers and sentimentalists were dreaming of human perfectibility, universal
brotherhood and the abolition of armies, the fortunes of
France were more and more at the mercy of the Paris mob,
now swelled by thousands of ignorant and desperate peasants.
The revolution prepared by the savants was to be carried out
by the men of the slums. The social and political danger was
seen in the Reveillon riot at Paris; while the determination of
the nobles and titled clergy of Brittany to adhere to the

38

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

ancient constitution of their provincial estates and sit separately from the lower clergy and commoners, provoked bloodshed at Rennes. Everything showed that it was on this social
and constitutional question that discord would break out.
Nevertheless on the meeting of the States General the
600 deputies of the Commons were kept rigidly distinct
from the 300 deputies of the clergy, and the 300 of the
nobles; and. at _the opening ceremony (May 5) their enthusiasm was quenched by a long dissertation from Necker
on the deficit. The Tiers Etat when left alone, following
the instructions of many of its cahiers, refused to do anything to recognise the separate existence of the other two
Orders. This policy lasted six weeks, during which time
Necker's suggestion, that the nobles and titled clergy should
form an Upper Chamber, was shelved. Oru the repeated
refusals of the two other Orders to join them, the Tiers Etat
finally declared itself (June 17) to be the National Assembly of
France—a bold declaration of sovereign power by the very
body which Louis had looked forward to as an ally in his
contest with the privileged Orders. The Assembly at once
asserted its new claim by declaring the present taxes legal
only during its existence, by taking under its protection the
creditors of the State, and by naming a committee on foodsupply.
The king, puzzled at these events, was now persuaded by
his queen and his youngest brother the Comte d'Artois to
reject these bold innovations, as inroads on his prerogatives.
Three courses were open to Louis, (1) to surrender to the
Tiers Etat: (2) to expel them by force, which would bring on
a civil war: (3) to forestall their actions by royal reforms.
Louis resolved to try the last, and have troops at hand to
overawe the people. Necker had drawn up a list of royal
reforms : these were to be read out at a " royal session"
before the three Orders; but owing to the influence of his

II.] Louis X VI, the Parlements

and States General.

39

queen and youngest brother, the reforms were so reduced that
Necker would have no more to do with this policy. The hall
at Versailles where the Tiers Etat met was closed to prepare
for the royal session; but the deputies at once flocked to the
Tennis Court, and, electing Bailly the astronomer as their
first President..Jhey swore the famous oath—that they would
in no case separate,_ but would meet in all ^places, under all
circumstances, till they had made the Constitution (June 20).
Fortified by the adhesion of 149 deputies of the clergy and
2 nobles, they were ready for the royal session (June 23).
Louis annulled their decrees, and imposed reforms in 35
articles: if the three Orders (voting as such) cannot agree on
these reforms, " I alone will effect the welfare of my people."
To impose political reforms, while reviving the old system
of three distinct Orders, showed a complete disregard of those
passionate longings for social equality and self-government
which were fusing provinces and Orders into a united nation..
Louis' unfortunate attempt to solve the difficulty aroused more,
opposition than ever. At the end of the session the Orders'1
were bidden to retire. The Tiers Etat and their new adherents
did not stir. When the master of ceremonies repeated the
king's command, the national consciousness flashed forth in a
withering retort from Mirabeau, " We are assembled by the
national will: force alone shall disperse us."
The royal session has been as much misunderstood as
Mirabeau's actual words have been improved upon. It was
not a mere exhibition of arbitrary power, but a spasmodic
attempt to recur, when too late, to the policy of imposing
reforms by royal decrees, always till then followed by continental rulers and statesmen. It was the policy of Frederick
the Great, of Pombal in Portugal, of Maria Theresa, of Joseph
II, and of Turgot. The Tennis Court oath, the retort of Mirabeau, and the collapse of Joseph IPs reforms, mark the end of
that era, and the commencement of a new age, inaugurated

40

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

by Rousseau and the American patriots, when the people insist
that reforms shall be effected not only for them, but by them.
If the king's unskilful policy had for the time confused
the cause of royal reform with that of the privileged orders,
yet on the other hand the attitude of the Tiers Etat in resisting all compromise must be held partly responsible for the
first rupture. Jefferson, the American patriot, had strongly
urged them to accept the reforms which Louis would at once
have granted, viz. a representative legislature meeting every
year with the right of originating laws and the control of taxation,
responsibility of the king's ministers to the Legislature,, trial by
jury, fieedom of conscience and of the press: "with these
powers they could obtain in the future whatever else was
necessary to perfect their Constitution. They thought otherwise, and events have proved their lamentable error; for
after 30 years of foreign and domestic war, and the loss
of millions of lives, they have in the end obtained no more,
nor even that securely." The defiant attitude of the National
Assembly and the adhesion of forty-seven reforming nobles
with the Duke of Orleans at their head, disconcerted
the Court; and the king, after the "timid violence,"—as
Malouet phrased it—of the royal session, now desired the rest
of the noble and clerical deputies to join the Assembly
(June 27), and requested Necker not to resign.
The Court retired only to take a better spring. Disorders in Paris in the privileged regiment of the Gardes
Frangaises served as a pretext for massing between Versailles
and the capital a large force of troops, among whom were
several mercenary German and Swiss regiments. Everything
was thought to be ready for the coup d'etat. Necker was dismissed, and quietly withdrew to Brussels. On July 12 this
news was brought to the excitable crowd always thronging
the gardens of the Palais Royal, by the ardent young journalist
Camille Desmoulins; and all Paiis rushed to arms and demon-

II.] Louis XVI,

the Parlenients

and States

General

41

strations. After a brush with the ' Royal Germans' in the
Champs Elysees, the crowd, always helped by the Gardes
Frangaises, plundered the 'Invalides' of 28,000 muskets, and
then rushed to the famous Bastille (July 14). This fortress,
built three centuries before to command the St Antoine gate
and suburb, had been often used as a prison for political
offenders; but under the mildei rule of Louis XVI it now
held only seven prisoners, and these not for political offences.
Yet its eight lofty towers still seemed to threaten Paris; and
an excited crowd, on Delaunay's firm refusal to surrender,
rushed at the outer drawbridge, which soon fell under the
blows of two old soldiers. The arrival of the Gardes Frangaises with their cannon finally dispirited the little garrison of
114 men, and they compelled Delaunay to surrender. The
mob massacred four of the soldiers and five officers, including
Delaunay; and de Flesselles, Provost of the Merchants of
Paris, soon after fell a victim to their suspicions of his treachery
at the Hotel de Ville. Sensation-mongers have added almost
a cycle of legends to the so-called ' Storming of the Bastille.'
The prosaic truth is thus declared by an eye-witness, the
Counsellor Pasquier:—"What has been called the fight was
not serious : resistance there was none. In the Bastille there
were neither provisions, nor munitions of war: there was no
need to invest it
It did not for a moment terrify the
many spectators who flocked to see the result. Among these
were several elegant ladies, who, to approach nearer, had left
their carriages at some distance."
Paris could now defy the royal troops. As disaffection was
rife among them (for reasons stated in the last chapter), they
were withdrawn to Versailles; and the Comte d'Artois, with
many reactionary nobles, quitted France, in what was called
the 'joyous emigration.' The surrender of the Bastille marks
the commencement of outbreaks of violence, which culminated
in 1793. The news aroused wide-spread Jacqueries, or risings

42

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP. II.

of the peasants, especially in the east of France, from Dauphine
to Alsace. The sky was red with the flare of burning castles;
but in many parts the peasants only burned the hated feudal
deeds enumerating their services and dues. There were riots
in the autumn of 1789 at Strassburg, Troyes, Rouen, Caen,
and other towns, generally arising from the dearness of bread
or the poverty of the ouvriers. In nearly every case order
was ultimately restored by the National Guard, mainly composed of bourgeois. Power was everywhere passing from the
royal intmdants to the new citizen force; and it was soon seen
that the revolution advanced as quickly in the provinces as
at the capital. In the manufacturing districts of the north,
where the recent commercial treaty with England had ruined
many manufacturers, the outbreaks were directed against the
machinery which would have helped them in the competition
with English goods. The industrial revolution, then peacefully
proceeding in England, was soon to be checked in France, by
the internal disorders and by a desire to completely exclude
English goods. In Paris the trades which depended on the
luxury of the few were at once paralysed by the flight of the
wealthy. " I saw (says Bailly in his memoirs) mercers, jewellers, and other tradesmen implore the favour of being employed
at 20 sous the day"—on public relief works.
But even amid these disorders, social and political reconstruction was vigorously begun. The king, in a memorable
visit to Paris (July 17), donned the new tricolour cockade;
and on the balcony of the Hotel cle Ville recognised two new
creations of the popular will, the Paris Municipality wkh
Bailly as first Mayor, and the National Guard commanded by
Lafayette. These institutions spread through Fiance. Popular
municipalities everywhere replaced the old corporations of
royal nominees, as the National Guard replaced the militia.
Every citizen was expected to serve as a National Guard—the
commencement of the great citizen armies of our day.

CHAPTER

III.

T H E CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
" A people so badly prepaied to act by itself, could not set about lefoiming
eveiything at once, without destroying everything."—DE TOCQUEVILLE.

MEANWHILE at Versailles the National Assembly (which on
July 9 had taken the special title of ' Constituent/ as having to
frame the Constitution) was beginning to organise itself and
France. Not till after its removal to Paris did its members sit
in a semi-circle, facing the fortnightly President; but the names
Right, Left, &c. were beginning to be used to denote its
political -groups. Those close by the President's right were
the ultra royalists, reactionary nobles, titled clergy led by the
clever Abbe Maury, or factious defenders of the privileged
Orders in the Parlements—as d'Espremenil. In the Right
Centre were the reforming nobles and other partisans of a Constitution like that of England, as Mounier and Lally Tollendal,
who soon found themselves left high and dry by the rush of
events. The Left Centre included more pronounced reformers,
such as Mirabeau, destroyer of a worn-out social order, but
champion of monarchy in its hour of need; Rabaut de St Etienne,
leader of the Protestants; the Jansenist Camus; Gre'goire, the
leader of the country priests in their onset on clerical abuses;

44

'MM

Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

the versatile Talleyrand, soon to become the chief diplomatist
of the age; and the Abbe Sieyes, with his clear-cut face and
incisive phrases, whose constitution-mongering was finally to
help Bonaparte to power and himself to inglorious ease. Farther
round the Chamber to the President's left sat the professed
revolutionists, organised by Duport, Barnave, and Lameth, who
desired at the outset a reconstruction of the State on democratic principles; while on the extreme left was a party, called
the ' trente voix,' desirous of a complete social revolution, as
sketched by Rousseau. This small group, led by Petion,
Buzot, and Robespierre, was to swallow the fat kine of the
Assembly and of France.
For the present these groups were only beginning to crystallize into parties, and generally voted on the sentiment of the
moment. There was no more sequence in the speeches read from
the tribune than there was order in the procedure. When
Mirabeau laid on the table a translation of Romilly's little work
on English parliamentary procedure, it was rejected; for "we
are not English, and we want nothing English." The lack of
political experience, the interference of the public in the
galleries, and the weakness of the fortnightly Presidents, often
reduced the Assembly to a mere Bedlam; yet, when emotion
stilled its strifes, it could act with spasmodic energy. Thus,
^vhen the report on the Jacqueries thrilled the deputies, there
arose a generous rivalry in self-sacrifice (Aug. A) The members of the privileged Orders kept thronging to the table to give
up their immunities. Nobles, clergy, towns, districts, and
corporations, alike gave up all their immunities from taxation:
serfs were liberated, and all degrading forms of servitude were
swept away without compensation : slaves in the colonies were
declared to be free, though the slave-owners disputed the
validity of this decree : nobles consented to modify the harsher
provisions of the game laws, as well as to give up their right
of administering justice in their own seigneurial law-courts:

ill.]

The Constituent

Assembly.

45

the clergy saw their tithes abolished without definite compensation, on a motion of the sceptical Bishop Talleyrand : the
suppression of plurality of benefices, the abolition of the old
exclusive trade-gilds, the sacrifice of the droit de colombier, or
sole right of keeping a dove-cote, and the admissibility of all
classes to all civil and military appointments, completed the
fusion of the Orders in one nation; and the Assembly broke
up at dawn with fervent cries of "Vive le roi."
In a single sitting it had carried what the royal authority
had been unable to gain from the Parlements in fifteen years;
but, in spite of this feverish haste, the concessions now came
too late to calm the people. They seemed like a jettison of
cargo to lighten the ship in the storm now raging around. The
peasants and liberated serfs, realising their power, acted as
though the Assembly had swept away all the game laws and all
the feudal dues. In all parts, but especially in the east, they
killed the game, and, instead of redeeming the ordinary feudal
dues, refused to pay them one and all. It was in vain for the
Assembly to proclaim the law on these points. The royal
intendants had no power to enforce order, or even payment of
taxes. Necker was ever bewailing the increase of the deficit;
and when the Assembly jealously refused to strengthen the
executive for the collection of taxes, he proposed (Sept.) that a
"patriotic contribution" should be made by every citizen of
one fourth of his income to rescue the State from bankruptcy.
The Assembly was wavering, when Mirabeau's eloquent support
carried the measure: " Bankruptcy, hideous bankruptcy is
there : it threatens to consume you, your honour, your fortunes
—and you deliberate!" Even after this appeal, the patriotic
contribution was a dismal failure; and the first year of the
revolution was to close with a deficit of over ^7,000,000.
Both the Assembly and the populace were less concerned about
the payment of taxes than the correct phrasing of the Rights of
Man. After long deliberation these were accepted; but a

46

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

proposal that the duties of the citizen should also be defined
was lost by a small majority. To insist on rights, and shirk
disagreeable duties, was the radical defect of the new civic life,
fatal to the solvency, order, and stability of the State.
Still longer and more animated- were the debates on the
bases of the new Constitution; and it was soon apparent that
the theories of Rousseau, as to the complete sovereignty and
indivisibility of the nation, would triumph over results of experience gained in English and American parliamentary life.
Sieyes showed most logically that logic forbade the existence
of a Senate, or of the royal veto; and the Assembly decided
that the legislative power should remain with one Assembly,
having the sole right of initiating laws, and controlling all the
legislative functions of the State. Though the three National
Assemblies successively proclaimed the need of a "distinction
of powers," i.e. between the legislative and executive functions
of government, they were brought by a curious irony of events
to encroach more and more on the latter. Distrust of the
king's ministers and officials, rumours of plots against the
Assembly and the nation, finally the strain and stress of civil
strifes and war against the combined States of Europe, gradually
led to an almost complete absorption of the executive by the
legislative.
The beginnings of this process were at once
observable. Distracted by its many difficulties, the Assembly
even at the close of July 1789 empowered a Committee of its
members, renewable every month, to procure information leading to the conviction of persons suspected of plotting the
overthrow of the Assembly. This Committee of Inquiry was
finally to become the terrible Committee of General Security
of 1793.
Passion rose high in the debates on the royal veto, i.e. the
right of the king to stop the passing of a law; and when
Mirabeau defended the veto, people in Paris begged him to
desist: " If the king has the veto, there will be no occasion for

III.]

The ConstiUient

Assembly.

47

a National Assembly. We shall all be slaves again." Threats
were uttered against the Assembly if it should admit the veto;
but it was strong enough then to despise them, while the Paris
municipality for a time suppressed seditious gatherings in the
Palais Royal. In the Assembly the democrats all followed
Sieyes' argument that the "division of powers" required the
king's authority to be solely executive :—"The Assembly is the
head, the king is the arm; and the head never admits the arm
to deliberate with it." Mirabeau defended the veto by showing
the need of some check on the acts of a single Assembly, and
proved that the division of powers, if ligorously followed out,
would place the legislative and executive as rivals with no links
of connection. Necker's ministry ended these disputes by declaring in favour of a compromise called the suspensive veto,
by which the king's refusal to pass any measure was to hold
good only throughout two sessions, but must lapse if the
measure was passed in a third session. The new Constitution
was, however, not to be subject to any exercise of the veto. "
The balance of political power was finally upset by the
events of Oct. 5. The loss of trade caused by the disorders, and
the dearth caused by a poor harvest, increased popular excitement. No tale in the new journals or pamphlets was too wild
for belief. " The aristocrats destroyed corn before it was ripe,
paid the bakers not to work, suspended trade, and threw flour
into the rivers." The arrival of a new regiment at Versailles,
and the effervescence of its loyalty to the king and queen in a
banquet held there on Oct. 1, appeared a real cause for alarm;
and the report that the national tricolour had been insulted
seemed to foreshadow a new Court conspiracy. Seeing that
the men had lately been strictly controlled by the Paris
authorities, the women assembled, pillaged the Hotel de Ville,
and began their weird march to the Assembly and Palace at
Versailles. After invading the Assembly "to hear our little
mother Mirabeau speak," and to get the Rights of Man finally

48

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

accepted, and the price of bread fixed, they and the riff-raff
following them encamped opposite the great Chateau, which
Lafayette undertook to protect with the Paris National Guard.
At dawn of Oct. 6 a few of the mob burst in by an unguarded
side-door, and the royal family barely escaped massacre by the
devotion of a garde die corps and the arrival of Lafayette's men;
but, to make sure that bread would be cheap, the mob
clamoured in the courtyard for the king to go to Paris. Thither
the royal family of France had to go, amidst a crowd of
National Guards, repentant body-guards, and fish-wives dancing
around cart-loads of corn,—the funeral march of the old
monarchy.
The Assembly soon followed, though 56 members were
afraid to trust themselves in Paris. It had prevailed over the
privileged Orders and clipped the wings of monarchy; but
Oct. 6 was the victory of the Paris mob, which henceforth
exercised a predominant and fatal influence on the National
Assembly and its successors. Camille Desmoulins thought the
revolution was now finished; but the events of Oct. 5—6 really
inaugurated an era of mob rule, culminating in the supremacy
of the Clubs and the Paris Commune.
It is thought that the factious Duke of Orleans had instigated the march on Versailles. Mirabeau, who then had
some secret connection with him, said of that event, " Instead
of a glass of brandy, a bottle was given"; and he seems to have
desired that a sharp lesson should be given to the Court, to
make reaction impossible. Lafayette, who was now for a time
almost dictator, insisted that the Duke should leave France;
and, if a close understanding had been formed between Necker,
representing the Ministry, Mirabeau, whose eloquence nearly
always carried the Assembly with him, and Lafayette at the
head of the Paris National Guards, a party of order might still
have rallied around this triumvirate, strong enough to prevent
the political clubs from becoming supreme; but the vanity or

in.]

The Constituent

Assembly.

49

folly of Lafayette and Necker hindered any co-operation with a
man of so doubtful a character as Mirabeau. The cause of
order was weakened by the withdrawal from the Assembly of
Mounier and some other supporters of a monarchy like that of
England. Parties began to separate more clearly, the gain
being decidedly to the democratic Left; and the Assembly
soon showed its jealousy of the executive, which Mirabeau now
desired to strengthen, by decreeing (Nov. 7) that none of its
members could join the king's Ministry, nor for six months
after resignation. By this rigid division of powers the Assembly
weakened the executive, which alone could legally put into
force its decrees. So the cause of order was weakened, while
what was most dreaded by Mirabeau came to pass—" Anarchy
organised itself" in the political clubs.
The most famous of these was the Jacobins, s_o called from
the disused monastery where it met. At first it comprised
men of all parties; but revolutionary ardour disowned first the
moderates, then Mirabeau, and, after the flight to Varennes,
Duport, Barnave, and the Lameths, until Robespierre, the
inflexible exponent of Rousseau's ideas, was there omnipotent.
The power of the club lay in its network °f branches spreading
over all France, so that a rnoHon carried by the Jacobins
was soon better executed than any decrees of the National
Assembly. An early offshoot from the Jacobins was the Cordeliers' Club, representing the extremists of Pans : such as the
witty Desmoulins, the obscene Hebejrt, the brazen-lunged
Danton, half demagogue, half statesman; and that queer compound, part man of science, part social martyr, part homicidal
lunatic, Marat. These men by their newspapers or mob-oratory
had great hold on Paris; and in the dynamics of the revolution
they may be named the prime motors, influencing the Jacobins,
who then pulled the strings all over France.
The intense interest in the debates of the Assembly and
the Clubs may be measured by the mushroom growth of
F. R.
4

50

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

pamphlets and newspapers, the names of some of which still
survive—as the Journal des Debats and Moniteur ; and French
journalism still retains the strongly individual tone which
marked its beginnings; for in 1789 every prominent politician,
or group of deputies, strove to carry on a journal; Desmoulins,
Marat, and, in 1793, Hebert, gained more power by the pen
than by their speeches. Posters (affiches) and cheap pamphlets
spread the revolutionary notions far and wide, carrying along
France in the wake of Paris.
Mounier and some other seceders were trying to stir up
against the Assembly the old provincial spirit, so fatal to
Louis XVI's reforming efforts; but the change of political
power was seen in the ease with which the Assembly overthrew
the Parlements and the provincial system. Lameth's proposal
(Nov. 3), that the Parlements should be left in vacation, was
carried, and scarcely an arm was raised in their defence.
The provinces with their immunities and, in some cases, their
separate constitutions, were swept away; as well as the administrative areas of the intendants, or royal controllers. By
the early spring of 1790 all France was politically unified, as it
hjd been socially unified by the decrees of Aug. 4. Sieves
desired to see France divided into eighty squares designated
by numbers! But as her boundaries conflicted with a chessboard pattern, the remodelling took the form of 83 Departments named after natural features. The provincial system
had represented the differences derived from the great fiefs of
old France: the new system symbolized the natural unity
of the French people, first united by the monarchy and now
indivisibly welded together by the Revolution. Each Department was divided into districts or arrondissements, each of
these into cantons; while the smallest unit was the rural
municipality or commune, which through its mayor and council
had at the outset very wide powers of self-government. The
canton was the electoral district, where the 'electors' were

in.]

The Constituent

Assembly.

51

chosen by the ' active ' citizens, i.e. by those who paid in direct
taxes a sum equal to three days' earnings: the ' electoral
colleges' were then to choose the representatives for each
Department in the National Assembly. The new Departmental System thus sought the expression of the.nation's will
from each commune or parish, by secondary election, through
the medium of the canton and Department. It not only
secured self-government to the communes and Departments,
but also local defence; for each ' active citizen' was to serve
as a National Guard. Moreover, as the jury system and
election of magistrates and judges subjected the law courts
to the control of the Department and of the nation, the
Departmental System quietly took the place of the feudal and
monarchical governing powers in the spheres of local government, defence, and justice. This system, admirable in the
symmetry of its outlines, yet had the great defect of subjecting
all the functions of government to oft-recurring elections by
men who had no experience of public duties; and power fell
more and more into the hands of the local Jacobin clubs.
In its policy towards the Church of France the Assembly
had the double aim of asseiting the sovereignty of the nation
over every institution, and of re-establishing the finances.
Despite the protest of Sieyes—"They would be free, and
know not how to be just"—it had already abolished all
tithes, thereby transferring about ^3,000,000 a year from the
clergy to the landowners. Talleyrand in Oct. 1789 had proposed that the nation should take over all the Church property,
assuring to the clergy two-thirds of its rentals; but Mirabeau
brought forward a much more extreme motion, that the nation
should hold this property, bear the costs of public worship,
and should pay to every cure not less than ^ 4 8 a year,
exclusive of lodging. The desire to redress the scandalous
inequalities of income, and to reduce the clergy to salaried
officers of the State, secured the success of this motion (Nov,
4—2

52

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

1789). The Church lands were forthwith used as security for
an issue of paper notes, or assignats, for small amounts. The
design of Claviere and Mirabeau, who proposed this scheme,
was that only 400,000,000 francs' worth should at first be
issued; though in Sept. 1790 they were compelled to a second
issue of double this amount, with the proviso—also soon disregarded—that there should never be more than 1,200,000,000
francs' worth in circulation. Assignats alone were to be
received in payment for the purchase of the new national
domains sold by the municipalities; but the fatal facility with
which the credit of the State seemed to be thus restored, soon
lured the financiers who succeeded Necker deeper and deeper
into debt. The Church lands were wastefully sold, and little
financial benefit resulted from the confiscation, though it somewhat increased the number of peasant proprietors.
The Assembly, after decreeing complete liberty for all
religious beliefs, and suppressing and confiscating the property
of religious orders, completed the subjection of the Church to
the State by its 'Civil Constitution of the Clergy' (June 1790),
by which the Jansenists, Camus, Gregoire, and Lanjuinais,
hoped to restore the simplicity of the early Christian Church.
By this important measure bishop and priests were to be chosen
by the electors of the Department and the district respectively, and were not to apply to the Pope for confirmation of
their election nor for canonical investiture, but must take an oath
of obedience to the civil authorities and to the new constitution.
The fairer apportionment of stipends which accompanied this
decree does not redeem it from the charge of persecution. Orthodox Roman Catholics could not recognise the supremacy
of the State in place of that of the Pope; and though Bishop
Talleyrand and others began to institute the new ' constitutional' priests, yet about two-thirds of the clergy of France
(called orthodox or * non-jurors') refused to obey the decree.
This was the beginning of a schism in the Church of France,

in.]

The Constituent

Assembly.

53

which embittered the whole course of events and was only
healed by Bonaparte's * Concordat' in 1801. Ultimately it was
seen that the State, in subjecting the clergy, only bound .them
the more closely to the Papal .See.
All through the spring of 1700 the general rejoicings at
the new civic life inaugurated by the Departmental System
took the form of i federations' of towns and districts that they
would keep the law and see it respected by aristocrats, forestallers of corn, and all other traitors. After a great federation
at Lyons of the centre and south of France, a federation of
the entire nation was held in the Champ de Mars at Paris
(July 14, 1790), when King, Queen, National Assembly,
representatives of every Department, and a vast concourse of
people, took an oath to obey the laws and the Constitution.
In the words of an eye-witness, M. Ferrieres—"The soul felt
oppressed beneath the weight of a delicious intoxication, at
sight of a people actuated by the gentle emotions of a
primitive fraternity."
This imposing demonstration of national unity could not
heal the disorders. There had been many a riot to seize corn
or prevent it leaving the district: the anti-clerical policy of the
Assembly fanned the slumbering embers of the old religious
feuds into fierce flame at Montauban and Nimes: troops at
Nancy, enraged at arrears of pay, mutinied, and were crushed
only after a fearful fight (Aug. 31, 1790): tolls and taxes
were generally left unpaid, and Necker in despair fled to
Geneva.
There was only one man who seemed able to breast the
revolutionary torrent—Mirabeau; and he was losing his control
over the people. This had been seen in the debates on the
right of the king to declare war (May, 1790). The question
might have been all-important, if England and Spain had gone
to war over a dispute about Nootka Sound in California; for
by the Bourbon Family compact of 1761 France and Spain

54

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

would have made common cause; and as Austria was annoyed
at our preventing the partition of Turkey between her and
Russia, it seemed for a time that a war of France, Austria,
and Spain against England and Holland might alter the whole
aspect of Europe. Lafayette with the French moderates strove
for this, that he might become dictator, and stay the course of
the revolution. But this was just what the Jacobins feared;
and it needed all Mirabeau's passionate eloquence to convince
the Assembly that the king, as head of the executive, should
have, conjointly with the Legislature, the right of declaring war.
The first article of the law ran thus—"The right of peace and
war belongs to the nation. War can be decided only by a
decree of the National Assembly, which shall be passed on the
formal and necessary proposal of the king, and which shall be
sanctioned by him "—a Pyrrhic victory for the monarchy, and
for Mirabeau. The foreign complications were somewhat
lessened by the treaty of Reichenbach which, as previously
explained on page 14, brought Prussia and Austria to accord,
and tended to the maintenance of the status quo (July, 1790);
but the danger of a war against England over the Spanish
difficulty did not vanish until the mutiny at Nancy and the
general insubordination in army and navy convinced even the
French royalists that war was impossible.
Not only was Mirabeau by conviction a monarchist, as
seeing no stability in one almost irresponsible Assembly, but
he had been brought into close communications with the king
and queen by means of Lamarck and the Austrian ambassador.
H e urged the passive king to play a vigorous part, to denounce
the emigrant nobles, and control the revolution by putting
himself at its head. He accepted a large sum from the king
to pay his debts, and ^ 2 4 0 a month besides. His childish
love of display revealed the secret; and during the war debates
he was denounced by the Jacobins as "the traitor." On the
other side the Court utterly distrusted the man who had done

in.]

The Constituent

Assembly.

55

so much in 1789 to overthrow the king's old powers; and
it regarded him merely as the arch-demagogue, now at last
bought over. Both charges were equally beside the mark;
for Mirabeau's conduct and policy was from first to last an
attempt to found a democratic monarchy, strong enough in
the support of the people to act as a check on the Assembly;
but his policy of statesmanlike compromise was impossible,
with an inert king, a jealous Assembly torn by conflicting
extremes, and a populace leavened by Rousseau's doctrines.
Not till political experiments had been tried and had failed,
was a compromise between authority and democracy likely
to succeed. Mirabeau's efforts may be regarded as Titanic
struggles for the impossible. In 1791 even Buonaparte must
have failed. No one could have made Louis XVI a leader,
or endowed Assembly and people with the spirit of reasonable
compromise. "It is clear that we are perishing, royalty, authority,
the whole nation. The Assembly is killing itself and us with
it." Such are his words in one of his last notes to the king;
but even so, his fertility of resource kept weaving plans of
propping up the monarchy by discrediting the Assembly, buying
over deputies or demagogues, luring it into unpopular acts
(especially against the clergy, in which he himself took the
lead), and setting the Departments against Paris. Mirabeau's
Machiavellian policy cut both ways. The king could not
understand him : the Court feared and hated the Tribune of
the people : the^ democrats distrusted or despised him as the
bribed ally of the monarchy. Not even Mirabeau's energy
and eloquence could overcome the mutual distrust of Court
and people; and, worn out by ceaseless toil and frequent debaucheries, he ended his many-sided career with the prophecy
— " I carry in my heart the death dirge of the monarchy: the
dead remains of it will now be the spoil of the factions" (April 2,
1791).

Mirabeau had often advised the king to retire to Rouen or

56

The Revolutionary

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Era.

[CHAP.

Compiegne. The events of the spring of 1791—especially his
forcible detention at the Tuileries at and after Easter—decided
Louis to fly to Metz or Montmedy, where Bouille* still held
together some faithful regulars to guard the frontiers. , The
flight was on the point of success, when at Sainte Menehould
the village postmaster Dronet recognised Louis beneath his
disguise, and, galloping on, secured the_ bridge at Varennes;
while Bouille's troopers, wearied at the delay of the royal
coach (caused by a breakdown), were not at hand in time for
a rescue (June 21, 1791).
Gloomy silence greeted the king on his return to Paris.
It is surprising that the Assembly did not dethrone him at
once; for he had left behind a declaration revoking his assent
to every decree passed by the Assembly since the royal session
of June 23, 1789; but the prospect of a civil war appalled the
Assembly, which was also desirous of ending its constitutional
labours. It even sanctioned the rigorous dispersion by Mayor
Bailly of the 'clubbists' who were petitioning on the Champ
de Mars for the dethronement (July 17); and a show of
energy on the part of the Feuillants, or Constitutionalists (now
joined by Barnave and the Lameths), temporarily checked the
anarchic forces at work in Paris and the Departments.
The acceptance by Louis of the new Constitution for a
time seemed to still foreign and domestic complications (Sept.
1791). Reared on the bases described above (see pages 46
•—51), it transferred the chief power from the sovereign to a
National Assembly elected every two years, which alone was
to initiate laws, and could not be dissolved by the king.
Under the ancient regime there had been a perfect chaos
of intersecting governing powers, seigneurial, provincial, and
royal, the latter having gradually absorbed most of the two
former in the King's Council and in the administration by
royal £ intendants.' The revolution, ever tending towards
Rousseau's sovereignty and indivisibility of the national will,

in.]

The Constituent

Assembly.

57

at once simplified and unified the functions of government;
and many a loyal courtier reflected with secret joy that when
the king recovered his authority, he would not be hampered
by factious Parlements. The work of the Constituent Assembly
cleared the way for Buonaparte, and the modern centralised
State. The radical defect of the Constitution was the jealous
isolation in which it placed the king's Ministry, nominally entrusted with the execution of the laws, but practically powerless.
So, only those laws were observed which were approved by the
people, especially by the political clubs; and France when
face to face with invaders, and groping for a vigorous executive,
was to find it in secret and finally irresponsible committees.
The first encroachment of the legislative on the executive
functions in July, 1789, has been already noticed. The king's
flight to Varennes enabled the Assembly to seize still more of
the executive power Its decrees, though unsigned by Louis,
had for a time the force of laws, and it sent commissioners to
secure the public safety and maintain order in the frontier
Departments. These steps were provisional and temporary;
but, in general, the effective work and influence of the Assembly
was mostly due to the vigorous action of its twenty committees,
which supervised or sought to control, not only the preparation
of laws and of the Constitution, but even purely executive
business, such as diplomacy, war, the navy, food supply, and
plots against its own authority. In these committees, most
of which were permanent, lay the germ of that tyranny under
which France was to groan in 1793—4; and the sequel will
show that this same dominant aim of controlling the executive
by a permanent commission selected from the Legislature, led
to the installation of the Directory in 1795, and inspired Sieves
with his scheme of that perfect Constitution of 1799, which
helped Buonaparte to power.
In sharp contrast to the imprudence of the Constituent
Assembly in constitutional efforts, is its swift, unerring, and

58

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP. HI.

irreveisible action in social questions. The fusion of the three
Orders, the abolition of Feudalism, and the recognition of
individual liberty and civic equality, laid the foundations broad
and deep, not only of the French State, but of every country
lirectly influenced by the revolution.

CHAPTER

IV.

T H E GIRONDINS AND EUROPE.
" Divided into a number of different governments, Europe has no bases
for a general resistance; and the first great continental nation which changes
the face of society, has only disunited members to fear."
M A L L E T DU PAN,

1792.

T H E flight to Varennes, and the ludicrous spectacle of a
king held on his throne lest he should run away, seemed to call
for the intervention of absolute monarchs. They had hitherto
politely ignored the clamorous requests of French emigrant
nobles, once headed by the Comte d'Artois, and now by
the Comte de Provence; but after Varennes the Emperor
Leopold II, alarmed for the safety of his sister Marie
Antoinette, drew closer to Prussia, in order to assert the cause
of monarchy against the Paris Jacobins.
Another influence was secretly urging the two central
Powers to a rupture with France. The ambitious Czarina,
Catherine II, was anxious to keep them busy in the west, so
that she might have a free hand to intervene in the Polish crisis.
The Polish patriots, fired by the success of the French Assembly
in sweeping away old abuses, desired to regenerate their unhappy realm.
Having gained the support of their king,
Stanislaus, they carried through their Diet decrees which transformed their aristocratic government into a constitutional
monarchy (May, 1791). The Hberum veto was suppressed, the

60

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Diet was divided into two Chambers, in which the balance of
power lay with the Chamber of Nuncios or Deputies, and the
monarchy, instead of being elective, was to be hereditary in the
line of the Electors of Saxony. This admirable Constitution,
which followed the aims of Voltaire and Turgot rather than
those of Rousseau's " Gouvernement de Pologne," would have
founded a strong executive on a democratic basis. Art. V
declared: " All power in civil society should be derived from
the wall of the people, its end and object being the preservation
and integrity of the State, the civil liberty, and the good order
of society, on an equal scale, and on a lasting foundation."
As this Constitution closed the door to Russian intrigues, which
had used the election of the Polish king and the liberwn veto
to foment disorders, Catherine II plotted its overthrow. Relieved from the pressure of wars with Sweden and Turkey, she
strove to gain a free hand in Poland, by encouraging Austria
and Prussia to intervene in French affairs, and we shall see that
the outbreak of war with France in 1792, and still more its
expansion in 1793, were to be fatal to the nascent liberties of
Poland.
These hidden reasons smoothed the way for the Austrian
and Prussian sovereigns, and enabled them to come to a close
understanding; while Gustavus III, the chivalrous ruler of
Sweden, tried to form a league of kings against the French
Revolution. Austria and Prussia, improving on the policy of
Reichenbach, now guaranteed to each other the possession of
their States. But though they affected great concern at the
position of Louis XVI, they had only temporarily laid aside their
mutual jealousy, their designs on Poland, and their dread of
Russia's aggression in that quarter; and they were above all
disgusted at the presumption of the Comte d'Artois in asking
that they should invade France to re-establish the ancient regime
and place the Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII) on the throne.
The conferences at Pillnitz, near Dresden (Aug. 1791), led to

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe,

61

their declaration that they considered the re-establishment of
order and monarchy in France an object of interest to all the
sovereigns of Europe; "they will not refuse to employ conjointly with them the most efficacious means" to strengthen the
French monarchy. " Then and in that case " they " are resolved to act promptly.'' As all well-informed persons knew
that England would remain neutral, the words which required
the action of all the sovereigns showed that the Declaration of
Pillnitz was only meant to intimidate the French revolutionists.
It had the opposite effect.
A conflict between the disciples of Rousseau and the
upholders in old Europe of the complicated feudal and dynastic
claims was perhaps inevitable,
eager enthusiasm of the
French reformers had brought them into collision with the
German princes, when on Aug. 4, 1789, the abolition of all
feudal dues and services swept away some of their claims on
parts of Alsace. The princes had declined the money compensation offered as inadequate; so this question opened a dispute
with the Empire, which was intensified when the Constituent
Assembly decreed the annexation, of tli£ . Papal XZouxxty^oL
Avignon, though by the new constitution France was to renounce
all conquest or aggrandisement. French patriots, on their side,
were enraged at the gatherings of bands of the French emigrant
nobles near the frontier; and now the Declaration of Pillnitz
aroused a martial feeling among the inexperienced members of
the Second National Assembly—known as the 'Legislative'—
which met in Paris on Oct. 1, 1791.
Members of the Constituent Assembly were by its own act
excluded from the Legislative, which was much more hasty and
revolutionary than its predecessor. More than half of its
members were under thirty years of age. The ardent monarchists numbered scarcely 100; the supporters of the Constitution
—generally known as FeuiHants from the name of the Constitutionalist club—could muster 164 votes, while the professed

62

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

foes of the Constitution were about 236—including Girondins
and Jacobins. The balance of power at first rested with a
' Centre' of some 245 members, as yet pledged to no definite
programme, but soon destined to join the extreme party. Yet
the partisans of the Constitution might have held their ground
if they had been as determined and as well organised as the
Jacobins; but their right hand, Lafayette, resigned his command
of the Paris National Guard, which was thenceforth commanded
for a month by each colonel in turn: so power fell more and
more into the hands of the sansculottes. The troubles of the
time also fomented discontent; thus serving to discredit the
Constitution of 1791 at the outset. A terrible massacre at
Avignon, a revolt of the slaves in the French West Indies in
assertion of their equality, and continued Jacqueries through
France—all these events in the autumn of 1791 and winter of
1791—2 increased the financial embarrassment; and yet assignats were being issued with reckless rapidity to meet the everincreasing deficit. The consequent distress and stoppage of
trade appeared to the excited imagination of Frenchmen as the
work of aristocrats, and the completion of the revolution as the
only hope for France. The whole state of affairs, therefore,
vastly increased the difficulties of the quickly changing Feuillant
Ministries in their attempts to govern by a Constitution which
was designed to hamper the executive power. Augustus Miles,
writing from Paris in the last days of 1791, gives the following
description, and ventures on a remarkable conjecture about the
future.—"The assignats have fallen to above 40 per cent,
discount, and the explosion—temporary bankruptcy, and all
the evils attendant on the guilt and folly of these sorry legislators in Paris—cannot long be deferred. Yet, mark my words,
France will recover from her present delirium : the fulness of
her crimes will be the measure of her debility and weakness,
and, acquiring a wise and free Government, she will overawe
the imperial eagle and threaten the liberties of Europe."

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe.

63

Foremost in the Legislative Assembly was a group of ardent
young orators, known as the Girondins, because three of their
prominent members—Vergniaud, Gensonne, and Guadet—
came from the Department of the Gironde. Other members of
this interesting group were Petion, now Mayor of Paris in place
of the more moderate Bailly; the philosophic Condorcet, timid
in action, yet gifted with so lofty a spirit as to complete his
work on " The Human Mind ,; while he was being hounded to
death; the ambitious journalist and wire-puller Brissot, eager
for war with feudal Europe; the handsome young advocate
Barbaroux, once leader of the Marseilles rabble; the novelist
Louvet, bold in attack; the impetuous Isnard, of hot southern
blood; the stoical, methodical Roland; and the conscientious
and talented Buzot, secretly loving and beloved by Madame
Roland, whose beauty and enthusiasm marked her out as the
inspiring genius of the party. Her keen instinct detected the
weak points of each and all: she admired the orations of
Vergniaud, " strong in logic, burning with passion, sparkling
with beauties, sustained by a noble elocution'':—"and yet I do
not like Vergniaud: what a pity that genius such as his is not
animated by love of the commonwealth, and by tenacity of
purpose." This last defect she saw to be the defect of the
party, and with masculine force of will she strove to push them
on from words to sustained action.
At the outset the political views of the Girondins were as
advanced as those of the 'Mountain' (so called because they
filled the highest benches of the Assembly); but, as the
Girondins were men of culture, antique Romans in the loftiness
of their views, the distinction soon came to be one of methods
and morality. As Sainte Beuve finely says—" The Girondins
drew back with a cry of horror from the river of blood." This
did not stop the men of the Paris clubs, and of the * Mountain.'
Girondins and Jacobins alike desired to absorb the few

64

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[CHAP.

functions left to the king and his ministry, and finally to overturn the monarchy. A committee of deputies sat to control
even the Minister for Foreign Affairs; he and other ministers
were often threatened with impeachment, and the Assembly
soon reduced them to the position of chief clerks. It determined to override even the suspensive veto granted to the king,
when he vetoed their decrees declaring non-juring piiests to be
suspects, and confiscating the lands of emigrant nobles who did
not return.
Af.sr the efforts of the Feuillants (or Constitutionalists) to
bolster up their ever-shifting ministries had failed, Louis had to
accept a Girondin ministry (March, 1792). It desired war, so
ao to complete the revolution—as Brissot afterwards said, " t o
set traps for the king, to expose his bad faith, and his relations
with the emigrant nobles"; while many of the Constitutionalists,
especially Lafayette, thought that war would strengthen the
Constitution by diveiting men's minds from home troubles !
Crusading zeal for liberty carried all before it, even though the
clear-sighted Robespierre foretold the danger of a war managed
by "aristocrats who could not be trusted"; but Robespierre,
Dan ton, and some others of the extreme Left were unable, even
at the Jacobins' Club, to restrain the war party, headed by
Brissot. The war craze was kept at fever heat by armed bands
of the emigrant nobles at Coblentz and Treves, threatening to
reimpose the hated ancient regime on France; and one of the
few imprudences of the Emperor Leopold I I was to send a
despatch (Feb. 17), urging the French people to deliver themselves from the war party. His sudden death (March 1)
placed over the Hapsburg dominions, and on the Imperial
throne, the young Francis II, who was not averse from war;
and when the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dumouriez,
demanded that the Austrian alliance with Prussia should be
suspended, he replied that this should be done when France
compensated the German' princes for the loss of their rights in

iv.]

The Girondins

and Etirope.

65

Alsace, and the Pope for the loss of Avignon. On April 20,
1792, the Girondin ministers brought Louis to propose a
declaration of war against the King of Bohemia and Hungary,
which the Assembly passed almost unanimously; as also, a
I month later, against the kingdom of Sardinia. Thus inconsiderjately was begun the most tremendous series of wars known to
^civilised nations—wars which, though propagating the revolution throughout Central and Southern Europe, were to bring
back France to a military despotism wielded first by a secret
Committee, then by the Directory, and finally by the great
soldier of the revolution, Buonaparte.
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dumouriez, sprung
like Mirabeau from the new noblesse of Provence, resembled
him also in his wide range of talents, his quick perception, and
his secret desire to found a stiong monarchy on a democratic
basis. Foreseeing that this war would be one against old
Europe, his plan was a defensive campaign where France had
definite or defensible frontiers—as the Pyrenees, and upper
Rhine,—but a vigorous offensive where—as in the Austrian
Netherlands and Savoy—no natural obstacles opposed her
advance. Thus grew up the idea of the ' natural frontiers/—•
ocean, Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine—which has played so great
a part in French politics.
Though the Belgians welcomed the French invaders, yet
these were so undisciplined that two columns fled at the first
skirmish, scarcely firing a shot. At Paris also difficulties
thickened. The State had to meet its expenses by partly
repudiating its debts, and by issuing more assignats; but the
Girondin Ministry (except Dumouriez) plotted to turn these
disorders against the monarchy. It deprived the king of his
royal guard, and proposed that a camp of ' federates' from
the Departments should be formed outside Paris; but Louis
firmly forbade this. H e also vetoed a bill for banishing nonjuring priests, and dismissed the Girondin Ministry (June 13).
F. R.
5

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[CHAP.

The revolutionists of the Paris faubourgs, seeing their chance,
organised a demonstration against the king. A vast crowd
burst into the Tuiieries, and vainly demanded the withdrawal
of his veto. Louis remained calm and inflexible, when,'
conscience was at stake; and Petion finally persuaded the
mob to withdraw (June 20). Lafayette, realising too late the
fatal trend of events, came from his army to crush anarchy at
its source, the Jacobins' and Cordeliers' clubs; but the Cour'/
disowned his effort, orderly citizens kept timidly in their
homes, the National Guard was now full of sansculottes; and
the last chance of maintaining order was lost.
A month later came the Prussian declaration of war,
followed by a foolish manifesto issued on July 27, against his
better judgment, by the commander of the Prussian forces,
the Duke of Brunswick, that Paris should suffer condign
vengeance if it injured its king and queen. These unhappy
sovereigns were now distracted between hope of Prussian
succour, and despair at the menaces of the Paris revolutionists;
but while Brunswick set about a methodical plan of campaign,
the revolutionists rushed on their prey. They were reinforced
by 500 men of Marseilles, who, at the call of Barbaroux,
marched through France chanting the ' Marseillaise,' to strike
down the " t y r a n t " ; and in Paris a new revolutionary power—
the Paris Commune—was formed by members from the 48
' sections/ which began to usurp the powers of the legal
municipality.
At dawn on Aug. 10, vast crowds, headed by the Marseillais,
the men of Brest, and other ' federates/ closed around the
Tuiieries palace, defended by about 1000 Swiss Guards, and
a larger number of National Guards. Many of these were
disaffected, and when their commander Mandat, a Constitutionalist, was ensnared and slain by the new Commune,
resistance seemed hopeless. Urgently pressed to seek refuge
with the National Assembly, Louis at last consented, hoping,

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe.

67

as ever, to avoid bloodshed by surrender; but his hope that
violence would be avoided was vain. H e had left no orders
for his gallant Swiss. They patiently held their ground under
many provocations. Two shots fired by the mob at last drew
from them a volley and a successful charge: but in the midst
of a splendid resistance they received an order from the luckless king to retire to their barracks. Breaking up under the
hot fusillade, they were relentlessly pursued, and all who stood
their ground at the Tuileries were cut down by the infuriated
mob, which then sacked the palace, killing every man found
there. Meanwhile the Assembly (or rather the 284 members
who dared to show themselves) provisionally dethroned the
king, and restored three Girondins to office, with Danton as
Minister of Justice. Another National Assembly—the " Convention"—was to be elected by all men of over 25 years of
age, to decide on the form of government for the future. The
royal family was soon lodged in the 'Temple' and guarded by
the all-powerful Paris Commune.
That the 10th of August was the victory, not of the
Girondin idealists, but of the desperadoes of the Commune,
was soon sh >wn by the terrible September massacres. The
new revolutionary Commune seized the control over the police
of Paris, over its prisons, and its barriers: it dictated its will
to the moribund Assembly, and sent commissioners to the
armies. These were in dire disorder; for Lafayette, after
failing in an attempt to turn his army and the north-eastern
districts against Paris, now fled over the frontier, with Lameth
and many other officers. The Prussians, accompanied by a
force of French emigrant nobles, took Longwy, and on Sept. 2
the fortress of Verdun surrendered to them; while in the west
the peasants of La Vendee began to rise in arms for their
king and their faith. It seemed that France, without any
real government or well organised armies, must fall beneath
the invasion, and that too though crowds of volunteers enlisted
5—2

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[CHAP.

to die for the country. This distracting news was the excuse
for, though not the cause of, the September massacres in Paris.
The records of the Commune show a careful preparation
for this event. Its executive committee established a tribunal
to decree summary justice, ordered suspects to be kept in its
prisons as "hostages," hired a band of desperadoes, ordered
the barriers of Paris to be closed, made a house to house
search for suspects; while everywhere the rumour ran that,
after the patriots had departed to fight the invaders, the
aristocrats with their bands of brigands would hold another
St Bartholomew. All was now ready. On Sept. 2—.6 the
paid agents of the Commune methodically " purged the
prisons" of all who were thought to be aristocrats, though
a few suspects were released by order of the tribunal. The
National Guard and the police " h a d no orders" to stop these
orgies; the National Assembly and one or two of the Ministers
(not Danton, Minister of Justice) feebly protested.
France
shuddered, but turned to face her invaders.
" Oil and vinegar, fire and water, Prussians and Austrians,
are united to carry war among 26 millions of m e n " : so wrote
Young in 1792. The Duke of Brunswick was equally apprehensive: he thought it unsafe to attempt in 1792 anything
more than the reduction of the fortresses on the Meuse; but
the Prussian king, Frederick William II, ardent in the cause
of monarchy, desired to press on to Paris, though he knew
that his troops might soon be needed for more profitable work
in Poland. This division of opinion at Prussian headquarters
gave time for a genius to infuse a new spirit into the illorganised French troops. Dumouriez, rallying the fragments
of the armies on the Belgian frontier, marched, as ordered by
the War Minister, Servan, to seize the position of the Argonne,
a low range of clay hills then clad with forests. The invaders
seized one of the five forest defiles, and Brunswick, by disregarding the raw levies in his rear, and pressing on for Paris,

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe.

6g

might have diawn them into the open. H e shrank from such
a departure from rules, faced round, and attacked the greater
part of the French forces on the hill of Valmy. These,
animated by their leader, Kellermann, firmly kept their ground,
and Brunswick, afraid of losing too many men, called off his
troops. It was a cannonade rather than a battle: the troops
never came to close quarters, but the moral effect was immense.
Goethe, who was with the Prussian army, truly said "From this
day and this hour dates a new epoch in the history of the world."
The results of Valmy would not have been so decisive,
if the action of Russia in Polish affairs had not called for
Prussian intervention there : so Brunswick soon led his troops,
enfeebled by dysentery, back towards the Rhine, after coming
to a secret understanding with Dumouriez to suspend hostilities.
The French general was also anxious to keep his army intact,
so as to carry out his pet scheme of invading the Austrian
Netherlands. The Austrians, always weakened by the disaffection of their subjects there, had been foiled by the
obstinate resistance of Lille and Thionville; and now, on
Dumouriez' advance with superior forces, they fell back on
the villages of Jemmappes and Cuesmes, in front of Mons.
After desperate charges on both sides, the French troops,
advancing to the strains of the Marseillaise, drove the Austrians
out (Nov. 6). This great victory laid the Austrian Netherlands
and Liege at their feet,—the inhabitants everywhere welcoming
them, until fraternity was found to be a mask for spoliation by
the French commissioners.
Nice and Savoy were in that autumn overrun by the
French almost without striking a blow. The Savoyards were
almost entirely French: their land is cut off from the rest
of the kingdom of Sardinia by the huge barrier of the Alps.
The kings of the House of Savoy rarely visited the cradle
of their race. The writings of Rousseau, the sight of Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity in France, the hatred of the old feudal

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[CHAP.

dues, the gabelles, the corvees, in a word, of Piedmontese
supremacy—these had made Savoy French, before Montesquiou's troops occupied it (Nov., 1792). At that same time
the Italians in the county of Nice made no resistance. Italian
nationality still slumbered.
German patriotism seemed equally dead, when the dashing
French general Custine, pressing on to the Rhine, seized the
strong fortress of Mainz (Oct. 21), and for a time occupied the
free city of Frankfurt. The Illuminati everywhere welcomed
them; and it seemed that the policy "peace to peoples: war
to governments" would easily overthiow the old Empire.
Dumouriez' statesmanlike plan of seizing the "natural frontiers,"
and surrounding France by friendly democratic republics,
might possibly have prevented the extension of the war; but
unfortunately power at Paris was passing into the hands of
the extreme party, to whom all compromise was treachery.
The National Convention which met at Paris (Sept. 21,
1792) at once proclaimed the Republic, and from that autumnal
equinox a new revolutionary calendar was soon to be dated, in
which the decade replaced the week, while terms conceived in
a naturalistic spirit dethroned the old Roman names of the
months. Everywhere we see the influence of Rousseau in the
abolition of the chaotic social arrangements based on custom,
and the foundation of simple uniform methods on a natural
basis : thus, in place of the old weights and measures, varying
in many districts, came the metric system based on the metre,
with ten as the sole multiple. Amidst all the strifes of its
parties, committees of the Convention quietly laid the basis of
the new social order by a splendid scheme of National Education (drawn up by Condorcet on Rousseau's ideas) in primary
schools, central schools, and a normal school for the instruction
of teachers. Another committee worked at the Civil Code
(afterwards methodized, under Napoleon's orders), which aimed
at founding the whole social life on the principle of equality:

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe.

Ji

thus, it decreed compulsory equality of inheritance by all the
children of a family, a law which—though since slightly modified—has diffused wealth but restricted population in France.
The general aims of the Convention may indeed be summed
up in Camille Desmoulins' fine phrase—"to make the people";
but in their application of Rousseau's theories by methods fully
as rigid, and almost as faulty, as his reasoning, the revolutionists aroused strife at home and abroad which wrecked their
hopes, and led France back, not to a social millennium, but to a
military despotism. The Girondins, who at first generally had
a majority in the Convention, soon showed their powqrlessness
- in face of the more determined Mountain and the Clubs. They
failed to drag the September murderers to justice, and to carry
out the enrolment of a Departmental Guard for the Convention.
Useless attacks on Robespierre and Dan ton only brought back
the charge that they were plotting to divide the republic "one
and indivisible," a charge which was to be their ruin. Even
their culture and talents made them suspected by sansadoites,
to whom Marat's sordid rags and Hebert's obscenity seemed
the signs of a true patiiot. Every incident was skilfully used
against their ministers: thus, when Roland neglected to verify
in presence of witnesses the papers found in Louis' " iron
chest," he was charged with tampering with them.
These documents fatally compromised Louis XVI, and
the Mountain saw that his trial would further embarrass the
Girondins, who had some regard for justice and mercy. An
enthusiastic follower of Robespierre, the young St Just, thus
expressed the views of the extreme Left: "The death of the
tyrant is necessary to reassure those who fear that one day they
will be punished for their daring, and also to terrify those who
have not yet renounced the monarchy. A people cannot found
liberty when it respects the memory of its chains.'7 Robespierre, as usual, spoke in the spirit of Rousseau—"When a
nation has been forced into insurrection, it returns to a state of

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[CHAP.

nature with regard to the tyrant. There is no longer any law
but the safety of the people." The Convention nevertheless
decided that Louis should be tried before it. The Jacobins
packed the galleries, to intimidate those deputies who leaned
towards mercy. In vain Thomas Paine asked that Louis should
be banished to America. In vain did several Girondins propose to refer sentence to the primary assemblies of voters.
Their party was too disunited to maintain this motion. Though
it was once carried, it was soon rescinded, as likely to spread
discord in France. The Jacobins, small in numbers, but clear
in their views and unscrupulous in their methods, pressed
for the king's death with the double aim of discrediting the
undecided Girondin party and hurrying on the revolution to
further extremes. * They succeeded. The last of the Girondin
attempts to save'the life of Louis, viz. to postpone the execution, fell through, owing to the divisions of their party; and
Danton's whispered comment—"Your party is ruined"—reflected the opinion of all France. Finally the Convention
voted openly, member by member; and most of the Girondins,
from fear of the galleries, voted for death. Even so it was
carried only by a majority of one. The silence of horror which
speedily followed the execution (Jan. 21, 1793) showed that it
outraged the feelings even of Paris. Men knew that the
mutterings of La Vendee presaged a civil war. " W e have
burnt our ships behind u s " exultantly cried Marat after the
deed; and Danton defied the Powers of Europe to fight—
" Let us fling down to the kings the head of a king as gage of
battle."
I t is a mistake as serious as it is wide-spread to suppose
that the war proclaimed by France against England (Feb. 1)
was solely a war of principles between a republic and a
monarchy. To a large extent it was a question affecting
material interests—whether French influence should or should
not be paramount in the whole of the Netherlands, Dutch as

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe.

73

well as Austrian. It is true that general provocations had a
considerable effect in embittering the controversy. Thus, in
the exultation caused by the conquest of Savoy, Nice, and the
Austrian Netherlands, the Convention abandoned the proclamation of the Constituent Assembly, which forbade wars of
aggrandisement.
It further passed a decree (Nov. 1792)
offering assistance to peoples who rose against their governments ; and a month later declared that: " Wherever French
armies shall come, all taxes, tithes, and privileges of rank are to
be abolished, all existing authorities annulled, and provisional
administrators elected by universal suffrage. The property of
the fallen government, of the privileged classes and their
adherents, is to be placed under French protection...." But a
special challenge was also given to England by a decree
(Nov. 16) throwing open the navigation of the Scheldt to
all nations. By the Triple Alliance of 1788 we had guaranteed
to the House of Orange the Dutch Netherlands with all
their rights; among these was the control of the lower Scheldt
in Dutch territory. This was not a mere abstract question of
natural versus treaty rights; but the French, then besieging
Antwerp citadel, wished to make that port a station for their
navy; and French warships sailed up the Scheldt to bombard
the citadel.
Hitherto, every principle of sound policy, domestic and
foreign, had prescribed to England a pacific policy; and Pitt
had maintained a strict neutrality, unmoved by all the diatribes
of Burke against the revolution. In the spring of 1792 he
had reduced our army and navy; and his great desire was to
reduce our national debt, foster trade with France, and uphold
Turkey and Poland by diplomatic means against the attempts
of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Armed with a secret understanding with Prussia, Catherine II, in the autumn of 1792, was
arranging a second partition of Poland. As for the Emperor
Francis II, lie might, as a set-off to his neighbours' gains,

74

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[CHAP.

acquire Bavaria instead of his Netherlands—if he could now
recover these, so as to offer them in exchange to the Elector of
Bavaria. Now, both the partition and the exchange were
strongly objected to by Great Britain, it being a cardinal
principle of English foreign policy to support a weak State like
Poland against powerful and aggressive neighbours, and also to
keep the Netherlands in the hands of a generally friendly Power
such as Austria, as a firm barrier against French encroachments.
Pitt therefore desired peace, so as to leave England free
to resist these revolutionary schemes of the monarchs. At the
end of November, he was still desirous of recognising the
young French Republic if it would desist from opening the
Scheldt; but Chauvelin, the French agent in London, in order
to enhance his reputation as an ardent republican, irritated our
government by intriguing with the clubs of English malcontents,
by striving to stir up revolt in Ireland, and by the assertion
that we could not trust our militia. It was in answer to this
that our government speedily enrolled the militia and increased
the regular forces to 27,000 sailors and 17,000 soldiers. Efforts
were made by some persons on both sides, however, to arrive
at a pacific settlement. Miles, who had consistently striven to
form an Anglo-French alliance, warned an assistant agent who
had just been sent from Paris, Maret, that "if the Executive
Power in Paris thinks of meddling with our internal affairs or
seeks to sow dissension in England, this alliance, so much
desired by all sensible people, will never be realised"; but
Maret sorrowfully informed him that though orders were sent
to Dumouriez not to invade Holland, yet war with England
was inevitable not for any reason of external politics, but " i n
order to get rid of 300,000 armed brigands, who ought not to
be allowed to re-enter France." Other evidence points in the
same direction, viz. that Pitt desired to biing about a general
peace, and, if possible, an Anglo-French alliance, while the
French Convention and people, flushed with the brilliant

iv.]

The Girondins

and Europe.

75

victories of Dumouriez and Custine, saw less danger in war
than in the return of their armies. A member of the French
Convention wrote to Miles Dec. 9, 1792 in this sense.—"I tell
you again that war is inevitable, and that if we had no cause of
complaint against the Cabinet of St James, it would be necessary
from policy and for our internal security to break with it,
rather than consent to a general peace, which, I conceive, is the
principal object of your minister. I am not insensible to the
difficulties and dangers of a general war, and that whenever
England declares against us, we shall have to contend with all
Europe; but you seem to have a very imperfect idea of our
resources, and of the wonderful enthusiasm which prevails
throughout France. ...It is Mdme Roland's opinion, as well as
mine, that we cannot make peace with the Emperor without
danger to the Republic, and that it would be hazardous to
recall an army, flushed with victory and impatient to gather
fresh laurels, into the heart of a country whose commerce and
manufactures have lost their activity, and which would leave
the disbanded multitude without resources or employment."
We notice here the extension of that policy which was to
turn Europe into a gigantic battle-field and blast the efforts
of the friends of liberty. Seeing that past dangers had only
goaded on the revolutionists to fiercer energy at Paris and on
the frontiers, and believing that the British Government was as
ripe for overthrow as that of the Hapsburgs, both Girondins and
Jacobins drifted into a policy which promised further conquests
abroad and temporary respite from internal strife. Thus, long
before the advent of Buonaparte, the revolution took that bias
towards militarism which was to propagate its principles abroad
even while they were being curbed or abrogated in France
itself.
On the last day of 1792, the French Minister for the Navy
sent a letter to the French sea-ports, urging a descent on England to help their brother republicans: " We will hurl thither

J6

lite

Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

50,000 caps of liberty, we will plant there the sacred tree of
liberty." The menacing attitude of the French Convention
led to a dignified protest from the British Government. " I f
France really desires peace and friendship (wrote Grenville to
Chauvelin, Dec. 31) she must show herself disposed to renounce
her views of aggression and aggrandizement, and confine herself
within her own territory, without insulting other governments,
without disturbing their tranquillity, and violating their rights."
The Executive Council of the Convention held to its point, and
by the middle of Jan. 1793 was bent on war. The execution

Stanford's Geog1. Ustab*. London..
PLAN OF " P A R T I T I O N S OF

POLAND."

iv.]

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77

of Louis made it certain. Chauvelin was ordered to leave
England; and the irrevocable step was taken when the Convention unanimously declared war on England and Holland
(Feb. 1, 1793).
These events were to react fatally on Poland. England,
instead of resisting the further partition of that unhappy State,
had thenceforth to support the central Powers against France:
to defend the Dutch Netherlands was now her first thought.
In May, 1792, a Russian army under Suv6rorT had entered
Poland. Overpowered by superior force, the Diet abrogated
the Constitution of 1791, and soon afterwards the second
Partition was carried out. Austria took no part, but Prussian
troops co-operated with the Russians, and these two Powers
divided the spoils, Prussia receiving Posen, Thorn, and the
districts along the Wartha, while Catharine I I seized nearly all
the land between the upper Dwina and Moldavia. The overthrow of the Polish Constitution of 1791 dealt as fatal a blow
to ordered liberty, as the downfall of the sister Constitution of
France. Regenerated Poland might have been a solid barrier
between Prussia, Russia and Austria. The European system,
strengthened by the events of 1791, now fast crumbled away
beneath the unscrupulous intrigues of autocrats in the East,
and revolutionary violence in the West.

C H A P T E R V.
T H E JACOBINS AND THE FIRST COALITION.
"Solon's weak confidence threw Athens into fresh slavery, while the
severity of Lycurgus founded the republic of Spaita on an immovable
basis."—[Decree of the Committee of Public Safety).

" WITHOUT war the republic would not have existed": such
were Louvet's words in his attack on Robespierre.
The
republic was now to be strengthened by a war against kings.
When Spain and the Empire joined the Coalition in March,
1793, France was at war with more than half Europe.
The connection between panic on the frontiers and excesses
at Paris had been shown in the preceding summer: it is even
more closely traceable in 1793. The Austrians, now making a
great effort to regain their Netherlands, decisively defeated
Dumouriez at Neerwinden (March 18), and drove out the
French as quickly as these had overrun the land. There was,
in truth, little similarity between the Belgian revolution of
1789—90 and that of France. The former was a strongly
national and conservative reaction against the philosophic innovations of Joseph I I ; and the Belgians soon evinced as little
desire for the fraternal embraces of Danton and other French
Commissioners as for confiscation of Church lands, and imposition of worthless assignats as payment. The change from the
rule of Francis II to that of their ' liberators' was speedily found

CHAP, V.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition.

jg

to yield no immediate benefits T h e statesmanlike Dumouriez
had not only protested against the mad decrees of the Convention and the spoliation of the Belgians, but he had vainly
attempted to save Louis. The War Minister, Pache, now sent
him bitter recriminations and no supplies. Determined to
overthrow the regicides, and if possible to place the young
Louis Philippe on the throne, he entered into secret negotiations with the enemy, imprisoned the Commissioners sent from
Paris to arrest him, and failing to gain over his troops, fled
to the Austrians with Louis Philippe and some 800 men
(April 3).
Had space permitted, the connection between an increase
of national danger and the need of a stronger control over the
executive powers might have been fully detailed. Suffice it to
say that the Legislative Assembly had composed from its 20
committees a Commission to supervise the Feuillant Ministries,
and aid in overthrowing the monarchy. The Convention also,
at the close of 1792, had formed a central Committee of
General Defence of 25 members ; but after Neerwinden a small
secret body was needed for vigorous action. " Secrecy is the
soul of government," said Bareie. " W e must establish the
despotism of liberty" cried Marat " t o crush the despotism of
kings." Appalled by the news from Belgium, the Convention
now established (April 6) a secret Committee, at first of nine
members, to control the acts of the Girondin Ministry. This
Committee, known as the Committee of Public Safety, was
also to keep a tight hold on each army by sending one
or more Commissioners to stimulate the devotion of the
soldiers to the republic, to examine and report on the conduct
of the commander, and thereby to secure the dependence of
the military on the civil power. St Just once expressed to the
Committee his fear that some ambitious general would be fatal
to the republic; whereupon Barere replied that this would be
impossible while the Committee existed. The apparatus of

8o

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era,

[CHAP.

despotism was now nearly perfected, and on the collapse of the
Committee it would pass into the hands of any future government.
For the present these powers, and the disposal of a secret
fund, enabled the Committee of Public Safety to absorb the
functions of the twenty special committees. A weekly report to
the Convention placed it under nominal control; but the later
Committees, consisting of ten or twelve members, were able
to carry out their policy when acting in concert; and the
Convention soon became the slave of the Committee. As
for the Ministry, it was left with a mere shadow of authority.
There was also a secret Committee of General Security,
dating from Aug. 1789, which now enjoyed greatly increased
powers. It controlled the police, received the reports of
informers, ordered the arrest of conspirators or ' suspects,'
and drew up the lists of those who were to be tried by the
Revolutionary Tribunal. As its powers threatened to conflict
with those of the sister Committee, Danton proposed and
carried a decree (Sept. 13, 1793) that its members, as well as
those of all the committees, should be named by the Committee of Public Safety, which thus ultimately controlled all
the executive functions of the State. For all serious cases the
two Committees met together; and they soon found plenty
of work for the new Revolutionary Tribunal and its engine.
According to a mot of the day—The French became republican
" a coups de guillotine."
The breach between the Girondins and the Mountain
yawned wider every day. The former had lost ground during
the trial of the king. Dumouriez' treason was their deathblow ; for he had been one of them. In vain did they charge
Danton with Orleanism and complicity with the traitor. It
added one more powerful voice to their enemies; for Danton and
his friends formed the majority in the first Committee of Public
Safety. Again, when the extraordinary 'maximum' law aimed

v.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition.

81

at rigorously limiting the price of provisions, the opposition of
the Girondists (who knew some political economy) roused the
fury of the hungry mob. After a last vain attempt to quell the
disorders, the Convention was surrounded by the Paris National
Guards, and was compelled to give up the 22 Girondin leaders.
Madame Roland was also arrested. Some of them escaped to
arouse the Departments against the mob-rule in Paris; but the
national instinct, except in the royalist west and north, forbade
a rising against the new vigorous central power. Unity alone
could save France from the invaders. A Girondin and royalist
rising at Caen was a sorry failure; and the only result of this
last flicker of Girondin idealism was that it inspired a beautiful
Norman girl, Charlotte Corday, to go to Paris and stab Marat
to the heart. This deed, again, reacted fatally on the Girondins
and Moderates. Guadet, Barbaroux, Petion, and Buzot were
hunted down as traitors in the Gironde Department. The
Girondin party fell because it strove after revolutionary aims
while rejecting any resort to mob violence. It could not cope
with the storm which its war policy and overthrow of the
monarchy had laised the year before.
In revolutions things tend to extremes. This same month
of July 1793, so fatal to the cause of the ideal republic, saw the
Dantontsts or ' indulgents' lose their hold on the Committee of
Public Safety, the majority of which now became Robespierrist;
but, while at Paiis power was being seized by the extreme
faction, the royalist reaction was gaining strength in the south
and west. At Marseilles and Lyons the citizens, indignant at
the violence of the Jacobins who had just seized power, rose in
arms, and after sharp fights restored order. T/yons became the
centre of resistance to the Paris committees; but a decree,
offering it as plunder to its captors, drew a great revolutionary
force, which reduced it (Oct.), decimated its inhabitants, and
renamed it " Commune affranchie." By the autumn the Jacobin triumph, checked in the spring, was complete, except in the
F. R.
6

82

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

west of France. There the simple peasants of La Vendee,
attached to the monarchy, the Church, and to the nobles who
lived among them, rose in arms (March, 1793) against the
regicide republic, which was banishing the orthodox priests, and
striving to enrol their own sons in its armies. If they had to
fight, they would fight against it, not for it. Luring column after
column of the blue National Guards into the depths of the
Bocage forest south of Nantes, they defeated them with immense loss. They took Saumur, attacked Nantes and Angers,
and tried unsuccessfully to spread the revolt into Brittany and
Maine. Even so, it was not till the autumn that they were
checked by Kleber with his brave troops, who had had to
surrender Mainz to the allies. The want of a thorough and
intelligent organisation ever paralysed the royalist efforts. It
was not till after decisive defeats of the Vendean royalists that
Brittany and Maine began to rise against the republic in
isolated revolts, which soon degenerated into mere brigandage
or chouannerie.
K"Checks in the spring and summer, followed by triumphs in
the autumn and winter, also marked the course of the war on
the frontiers. If the troops of the fifteen States then at war
with France had been vigorously led, they might have achieved
as much as the half-armed Vendean peasants; but Poland still
interested the Eastern Powers more than France; and after
Neerwinden the only important successes of the allies were the
capture of Conde, Valenciennes and Mainz. Corsica, under
the patriot Paoli, had thrown off the French yoke, Piedmontese
and Spaniards were passing the Alps and Pyrenees, and the
royalists of Toulon admitted Admiral Hood and an English
fleet to hold that great arsenal for Louis XVII (Aug.). These
reverses only incited the Jacobins to fiercer energy. Arms,
organisation, commanders, ammunition—everything was wanting, except zeal. "Better that 25,000,000 beings should peiish,
than the republic one and indivisible": such were the words of

CENTRAL E U R O P E TO ILLUSTRATE THE PEACE OF BASEL (1795
AND OF CAMPO FORMIO (1797) •

O

20

40 SO SO 100

BOO STATUTE MILES

Stanford's GeogfEftab* London

v.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition.

83

one of the commissioners of the Convention, whose "powers
had no limit save that of the public activity/' Arms were
forged.
Saltpetre works were organised by the chemist,
Chaptal. Military camps were formed by the great Carnot,
who had signalised his entry into the Committee of Public
Safety (Aug.) by calling for a levee en masse; and soon 13
armies, of 750,000 men in all, began to press back the disunited
allies. The French, having the advantage of a central position,
first forced the English and Hanoverians to raise the siege of
Dunkirk : in October the Austrians were defeated at Waltignies
by General Jourdan; and, at the close of the year T793, the
young St Just, breathing his own fanaticism into the half-clad
levies of the republic, headed the charges which drove the
Austrians from Weissenburg in the north of Alsace. In the
south fortune also favoured the revolutionists, who recaptured
Toulon from the English and royalist forces (Dec. 17). There
the young Napoleon Buonaparte was virtually in command of
the besiegers' artillery, and gave proof of that skill and determination which changed the face of the world; and yet in the
official report his name appears only side by side with officers
of small note. The close of 1793 saw France freed from
foreign foes—an astonishing change which foreshadowed the
triumphs of French revolutionary fanaticism, wielded by a
vigorous dictatorship, over the disunited governments of
Europe.
Meanwhile at Paris the Terror had been ever increasing.
Along with the collapse of public credit the assignats fell in
actual value, and prices of goods rose in proportion. It was in
vain for the Convention to order a more stringent tariff of
maximum prices. Specie was hidden, or steadily flowed out of
the country; for forced loans on the wealthy and progressive
taxation scared it away. Speculators and forestallers were
denounced, and often guillotined, for causing a scarcity of ready
money and dearness of food; but owing to the collapse of
6—2

84

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

public credit and the persistent fall in the exchange, money
continued to leave the country; and the economic situation
was not improved when the Convention made the French
tariff more and more stringent, and finally adopted the heroic
remedy of prohibiting all foreign commerce (Oct.—Dec. 1793).
The appalling dangers from domestic treason and the
triumphs of the invaders in August had but served to rekindle Jacobin fanaticism and reinforce its despotic power.
When, in the early days of September, the Committee of Public
Safety was blamed for its want of vigour, the accusers, BillaudVarenne and Collot d'Herbois, were promptly added "to its
number. The entry of these sombre blood-thirsty fanatics
conciliated the Paris Commune and redoubled the Terror.
Chaumette, another man of this faction now predominant in
the Commune, proposed and carried through the Convention
the infamous Law of Suspects (Sept. 17), subjecting to arrest
all courtiers and members of the old privileged classes or the
Parlements, all speculators in corn or in assignats, and (later
on) those who spoke of the misfortunes of the republic and
the shortcomings of its authorities. Finally, on the motion of
St Just (Oct, 10), the government of France was declared to be
"revolutionary" until the general peace. The Revolutionary
Tribunal was divided into two sections, to double its speed;
and as the property of victims was confiscated to the State, the
deficit was partly met—for a time. As Barere, the versatile
reporter to the Committee, remarked—"We coin money by the
guillotine." Its first notable victim was the widowed Marie
Antoinette, her hair blanched ever since the agonies of the
flight to Varennes. She nobly repelled the insults of Hebert at
the trial, and died calmly, leaving the charge to her son never
to revenge the wrongs of his parents. The boy was slowly
done to death by the brutalities of his keepers at the Temple.
The remaining Girondin chiefs were next put on their trial, and
when Vergniaud's noble oratory made the issue doubtful, the

v.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition,

85

trial was closed, and they were condemned, Oct. 29. Philippe
Egalite, Madame Roland, Bailly, Lavoisier, Barnave, the
generals Custine and Houchard, Manuel, Jourdan coufte-tete, the
du Barry, mistress of Louis XV, and Madame Elisabeth, sister
of Louis XVI, these names of victims will suffice to show the
impartiality of Jacobin vengeance on royalists, Feuillants and
republicans alike, on vice and virtue, on men of thought and
men of blood. To have done something worthy of death if
the royalists ever regained power,—this was the only sure passport to safety before the Tribunal. On the news of the capture
of Toulon, all citizens were held to be suspects who did not
show decided joy. And yet a royalist who passed through
many dangers noted that as they increased, so did the faculty
of disregarding them. Certain it is, that throughout the Reign
of Terror the theatres of Paris were full.
Amidst these horrors, the Committee of Public Safety had
profited by its victories to definitely constitute the new government, which its emissaries, the omnipotent Representatives on
mission,' had already enforced in all parts of France. In Nov.
1793, the Convention, on its recommendation, had sternly repressed the almost unlimited powers of local self-government
which the Constituent Assembly had given to the Communes and
Departments. That excessive devolution of power having led
to widespread anarchy, there was now a sharp rebound towards
centralisation. Henceforth the communes or municipalities
were on every tenth day to report to a larger area, the district,
how they had executed the revolutionary laws or measures
enacted at Paris by the Convention or the two secret Committees 'y and in place of the elected procureurs-syndics of each
district, executive authority was to be wielded by a national
agent, appointed by the central power at Paris. Except the
apportioning of taxes, no important duty was left to the larger
areas, the Departments. In a word, local self-government was
succeeded by an almost complete centralisation of power at

86

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Paris ; and the publication of a decree in the new official
i
Bulletin des Lois' sufficed to render its execution valid.
France was, in fact, ruled by the two secret Committees sitting
at the Tuileries.
But while the government was fast becoming an almost
irresponsible despotism, France seemed on the verge of moral
dissolution.
The revolution passed to its lowest circle of horrors when
Hebert and Chaumette—all-powerful in the Paris Commune—
installed atheism by dances and the hymn of Reason in Notre
Dame. Their followers outraged the tombs of the kings at
St Denis, and steeples were ordered to be demolished as an
insult to equality! Robespierre, seeking to save the revolution from disgrace, with Danton's aid finally sent these men
to the guillotine (March 24).
Danton himself fell next. H e was not in the secret Committees, and had for a time retired in disgust. The astute
Robespierre now carried with him the Committees and the
Jacobins, and, on an insidious charge of complicity with the
Orleanists and Dumouriez, crushed his burly rival who had
breasted his way to the front by sheer strength, and was now
desirous of retiring to rest on his laurels. With Danton fell
the witty Desmoulins, and several other ' indulgents? guilty of
pity or remorse (April 5).
The unwearied labours of M. Robinet and M. Aulard have
recently proved that the charges of peculation showered on
Danton by Mdme Roland and others are devoid of foundation
and that his property did not increase during the revolution.
M. Aulard has also discovered the copies of his accounts submitted to the Executive Council, which seem clear and satisfactory. The secret funds which he administered to stimulate
the national resistance seem to have been so effectively used as
to leave little room for malversation. The efforts to clear
Danton of complicity with the September massacres are less

v.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition.

%J

successful; but it may be freely granted that he was a straightforward zealot who knew that the ardent revolutionists were in
a minority, and believed it necessary to strike terror into the
royalists. With his fall France lost a statesman who could
possibly have dominated the course of events. To the very
end he protested against needless severity in France and the
reckless policy which banded Europe against her. It was he
who inspired the decree of April 13, 1793, by which the Convention declared that it would not interfere with the affairs of
other peoples.
Robespierre and his Committee were now supreme. The
Council of Ministers was replaced by twelve Commissions
dependent on the all-powerful Committee of Public Safety,
in which Robespierre, Couthon, and St Just formed the dominant 'triumvirate.' Never had there been seen so complete
a concentration of power in modern Europe. An order from
the Committee sufficed to stop the brutal oigies at Nantes
and Lyons; but it was only so as to methodize the Terror
at Paris. Rousseau had declared that atheists ought to be
banished, as devoid of virtue and the social instincts; so now,
his high priest caused the Convention to decree that the idea
of a Supreme Being and of the immortality of the soul was a
continual appeal to justice. This return to deism was celebrated in a festival, at which Robespierre appeared in ecstasy
as the saviour of humanity. The social millennium was surely
now at hand!
Murmurs arose at his dictatorial pretensions. To allay
them, he redoubled the Terror by the Law of Prairial (June,
1794), framed by him and Couthon alone to render justice
more expeditious by suppressing witnesses, and giving to the
Committee of Public Safety the right of sending suspects before
the Tribunal. The Mountain and most of the members of the
Committees felt themselves threatened. Many of the Terrorists,
led by Tallien, finally combined to oppose Robespierre, roused

88

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era,

[CHAP.

the ' sections/ and, victorious in a street fight, sent him and
his followers, St Just, Couthon, and many others, to the
guillotine (July 28, or 10th Thermidor, 1794). From the law
of Prairial up to this Thermidorian reaction, i.e. from June 10
to July 28, as many as 2085 victims fell at Paris.
Robespierre's career exhibits a singular mixture of philosophic fervour with mean intrigue. Puny in person, and
uninspiring in speech, he yet had the power which an honest
and intense conviction gives to a small nature, even over abler
men like Danton, who had less definite principles. Efforts
have been made, and with some success, to show that he was
at last helplessly pushed along by violent men, who wrenched
from his hands the law of Prairial, the weapon which he aimed
at them ; but a comparison of his rise to power with the
number of victims seems to show that his inflexible fanaticism
was the mainspring of the Terror. Though his general aim
to found a republic of the virtues resembled that of- the Girondins, yet his methods were diametrically opposed. If their
fall was due to reliance on moral suasion and inability to cope
with facts, Robespierre's overthrow resulted as naturally from
the very nature of his attempt, to secure liberty by terrorism.
" I n peace" (he wrote) " the strengrii of popular government
is Virtue. Amidst revolution it is both Virtue and Terror—
virtue, without which terror is fatal, terror, without which
virtue is powerless." Hence his policy was to methodize the
Terror by crushing the factions whose clemency might ruin,
or whose excesses might degrade, the republic. It is, moreover, certain that the last excesses of the Terror at Paris were
regarded by all as the work of Robespierre. Though his
disposition and his methods showed more of feline than of
human nature, yet his sincerity of conviction and incorruptibility in the midst of bribers and bribed, must ever raise him
above the mere wolves of the clubs and the hyenas of the
Commune. The young St Just, even more than Robespierre

v.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition.

89

and Couthon, is a striking instance of fanaticism steeling an
estimable nature. Firmly believing that the immorality of the
old regime could only be stamped out in blood, he shared
with them the hope that the youth of France would be regenerated by a severely Spartan training in the schools of the
nation, and by the extirpation of all luxury. Unfortunately
for these men, their social experiment broke down towards
the end of the guillotine stage, and at the time when they
were trying to muzzle the bloodhounds whom they had urged
on. Hence their supremacy remains a frightful example of
the tyranny of tyrannicides, and the despotism of fanatics in
the cause of liberty and equality.
There is one other character in the Committee of Public
Safety who merits attention—the great Carnot. Though
M. Aulard's researches have recently established Carnot's
direct responsibility for its sanguinary deeds, yet it is true
that his special task was to organise victory, by drilling and
equipping the vast masses of men who rushed to arms.
The successes of 1793 were repeated. In June, 1794,
the French forced the Austrians to retire from the field of
Fleurus; and as the English and Prussians gave little help to
their allies, they had even before the defeat determined to
evacuate their Netherlands \ for Thugut, the Austrian Chancellor, looked to Poland as a near and easy prize. Jourdan's
troops soon entered Coblentz, and occupied the whole left
bank of the Rhine, where two years before the emigrant nobles
had gaily prepared to reduce France. " Eight pitched battles
gained, 116 towns and 230 forts taken, 90,000 prisoners and
3,800 cannons captured"-—such were the results of the campaigns of 1794, as stated in the Convention (Oct. 21). At the
close of the year the French, under Pichegru and Macdonald,
easily overran the whole of Holland, a severe frost now
rendering untenable fortresses which had defied the might
of Louis XIV. In Jan. 1795, Pichegru occupied Amsterdam.

90

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

The Dutch patriots everywhere welcomed the French; and
the new government of the Batavian Republic at once surrendered its ships to the French, without the intervention of
the legendary squadron of French cavalry on the ice. The
flight of the Stadtholder to England, and the pursuit of the
Prussians by Macdonald as far as the Ems (April), dissolved
Pitt's Triple Alliance between England, Prussia, and Holland,
and secured French supremacy in Holland—a brilliant contrast
to the collapse of Louis XVI's Dutch policy in 1787 before
Prussian arms and English menaces. Almost equally decisive
were the French successes in the south, where the revolutionists
now drove Spaniards and Piedmontese back across the Pyrenees
and Alps.
The sequel will show how fatal was the contrast between
the patriotism and devotion of the French armies, and the
cruelties of the civilians who disgraced the revolution at
Paris, Lyons, and Nantes. France was to be found in her
armies rather than in the factions struggling for power at
Paris. The great commanders—Hoche, Jourdan, Marceau,
Kleber, Macdonald, Murat, Davoust, Bernadotte, Massena,
Moreau, and Buonaparte,—began to rise from the ranks.
" Victory or the guillotine" : such was the alternative which
brought the best men to the front, though it sent to the block
some good generals, as Houchard and Custine. In the first
three years of the war as many as 373 French generals
resigned, or were cashiered. In striking contrast to this revolutionary rigour, was the favouritism which placed the fortunes
of the allies in the hands of the incompetent Duke of
Vork, or of pedants like Brunswick and Clerfait. Energy,
enthusiasm, the weight of numbers, absolute unity of plan,
promptness to take the offensive, the advantage of a central
position,—these were the main causes of the French triumphs
over foes disunited alike in methods and in general policy.
Poland was now, as ever, the ulcer which ate into the

v.]

The Jacobins

and the First

Coalition.

91

vitals of the First Coalition. In May, 1794, the Poles, inspired
by the patriot Kosciusko, rose against the Russian garrison,
and soon drove the Prussian forces almost out of the lands
which remained to Poland; but the terrible Suv6roff was
now at hand with Russian troops whom he had always led
to conquest. Kosciusko was badly wounded: the Russians
stormed Praga, a suburb opposite Warsaw, with fearful
slaughter; and the surrender of the capital was the end of
Poland (Nov. 1794)- Early in the next year the last partition
of this unhappy land was arranged. Catherine I I seized all
the land between the lower Dwina and Galicia 1 . Austria
gained a large tract to the east and south of Warsaw, while
Prussia had to be content with Warsaw and the land between
the Bug and Niemen. This favour shown to Francis II, who
had not fought, was due to his complaisance towards Russian
schemes on Turkey, which Prussia had resisted.
The latter Power showed her resentment by deserting the
First Coalition and coming to terms with France in the Treaty
of Basel (April 5, 1795). The republic evacuated some
Prussian land which it had conquered on the right bank
(i.e. east) of the Rhine, but retained Cleves and Obergeldern,
on its left bank : it accorded peace to those States of the
Empire for which Prussia interceded, viz. Saxony, Mainz, the
Bavarian Palatinate and the two Hesses. In secret articles of
the treaty, France promised, if she gained the Rhine frontier,
to help Prussia to compensation on its right bank y while
French troops were not to operate north of a demarcation
line separating the neutral States of Germany from those
which, following the lead of Austria, remained at war with
France.
This peace was a terrible blow to the First Coalition.
The monarchical crusade broke down owing to the scramble
1

See Plan of the Partitions of Poland, page 76".

92

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP. V.

for the remains of Poland, and the ceaseless rivalry of Austria
and Prussia in German affairs. Prussia now enticed away
most of the north and central German States to follow her
jackal policy of subservience to France, which finally met
with due chastisement in 1806. Catherine II, now near the
end of her intrigues and aggrandisements, had not moved
a soldier in the crusade which she had ostensibly favoured.
Gustavus I I I had been assassinated by an agent of his
turbulent nobles. Spain made peace with France, yielding
up her part of Hayti (July, 1795). England, Austria, and
Sardinia alone actively persevered with the war. These diplomatic triumphs were the last work of the Committee of Public
Safety in its first phase. After crushing foreign and domestic
foes, it had virtually gained for France the boundaries desired
by Richelieu and Louis XIV—the Rhine, the Alps, the
Pyrenees and the Ocean. Its organising energy, aided by
Jacobin patriotism, had revealed to the astonished world
the weakness inherent in the imposing fabric of the First
Coalition.

4^

C H A P T E R VL
THE

DIRECTORY AND BUONAPARTE,

"Despotism is there, watching for the moment of our exhaustion to
offer us peace and bread, along with chains I"—BUZOT.

EVENTS in France had shown how short could be the steps
from anarchy to despotism. Indeed, if Robespierre had been
a less sincere republican and a man of greater powers, he could
probably have seized the dictatorship which St Just proposed
for him. By his fall the tendencies towards despotism were
temporarily checked % but France had learnt that only a strongly
centralised power could save the republic in time of danger*
and the attempts at a royalist reaction were now to favour the
rise of a far abler man than the pedant of Arras.
We have seen that the Thermidorian reaction was begun by
a few terrorists from personal fear. Its main strength, however, was in the support of the many, who were weary of
bloodshed. The long terrorised Convention now regained its
powers from the two secret committees, which for a time sank
to the level of the other 14 committees of the Convention
supervising the special executive departments.
It further
abolished the payment of citizens who attended the meetings
of the ' sections' of Paris,—a premium on sedition : it closed
the Jacobins' Club for a time, and the Paris Commune entirely,
and recalled to its midst the wrecks of the Girondin party;

94

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

while nearly all the most prominent teirorists—except Carnot,
Tallien, and Fouche—were guillotined or banished. The suppression of forced loans, of the ridiculous ' maximum' law, of
the persecuting decrees against priests and emigrant nobles, as
well as the abolition of revolutionary names, marked a still
further return to ordinary government. In vain were two
attempts made by the mob to overawe the Convention. The
National Guards freed the deputies, though not till one had
lost his life (May 20). The disarming of the revolutionary
suburb, St Antoine, and the presence of regular troops, at last
ensured some rest to Paris.
The Convention was equally determined to prevent a recoil
towards monarchy, and three events in 1795 dashed the royalist
hopes. The little Louis XVII, as he was called, at last
succumbed in June to the brutal attempts of his keepers to
wear out his frail life; so now the succession passed to the
Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII), hated by Frenchmen as
being at the head of the emigrant nobles. An equal misfortune
was the disastrous failure of these emigres to make a descent
at Quiberon in Brittany and rekindle the embers of revolt.
Though supported by an English fleet, they were shut in by the
able young General Hoche; and by the orders of Tallien, who
wished to clear himself of charges of royalism, some 700 nobles
were shot in cold blood. Hoche succeeded in pacifying the
north-west of France, where the genuine royalism of the peasants
had proved to be as serious a danger to the republic as all the
armies of the coalition. Still the royalist reaction gathered
strength in other parts of France; and the Convention, afraid
of trusting to the voice of the nation at the forthcoming elections, decreed, as an appendix to its new Constitution (Aug.
1795), that two-thirds of the next Legislature must be chosen
from the members of the Convention itself. This unheard of
violation of electoral freedom exasperated all malcontents,
whether royalists or constitutionalists; and 40,000 National

vi.]

The Directory

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95

Guards of Paris, mainly royalist after the purging of pikemen
and sans-culottes from their ranks, openly menaced the Convention. Barras, entrusted with its defence, bethought him of the
young artillery officer Buonaparte, then in Paris. He, who had
helped to regain Toulon, was now to defend the republic at
its very heart. Murat seized cannons from the Sablons camp.
These Buonaparte planted so as to sweep the approaches to
the Tuileries, where the Convention sat. For the first time in
the revolution was seen the effect of cannon in a street fight.
The royalists were swept from the riverside quays; and Buonaparte brought his guns to bear on the church of St Roch, and
then along the Rue Honore (Oct. 5). The republic was saved
•—by the man who was to overthrow it, and by the means
which have always been fatal to constitutional liberty.
The importance of Buonaparte's service at Paris can hardly
be over-estimated. It enabled the Convention to impose on
\ France a republican Legislature, and its new Constitution.
That of 1793 having been set aside at Thermidor, France was
subjected to a new experiment, which, avoiding the defects of
that of 1791 and the despotism of the Committees, was yet
strongly republican. Every citizen who had lived a year in
one place and paid a tax could vote for ' electors/ who in
their turn voted for the 750 deputies. These were to form two
Chambers : the 500 younger members (none under 30 years
were eligible) were, in three * readings/ to propose decrees,
which then came before the 250 older members in the Council
of Ancients,—a democratic form of Senate. The executive
powers were to be controlled by a Directory of five, who supervised the execution of decrees by Ministers named by them
and individually responsible to them. The Directory therefore
inherited the chief functions of the Committee of Public Safety:
both derived their powers from the Legislature, deliberated
secretly, controlled the action of the Ministers, and, in fact,
aimed at securing unity of action in the legislative and execu-

g6

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

tive powers. The two fatal defects in the present ingenious
arrangement were that the Directors had no legal means of
opposing a law passed by the two Councils ; and that, as one
Director in five was to retire each year, while one third of the
Councils was submitted to annual re-election, the latter would
change their political complexion more quickly than the former.
Hence, in any time of reaction or disaffection, conflicts were
sure to break out between Directory and Councils, which
would wreck the Constitution and leave the ground clear for
any skilful intriguer.
The Convention, quietly finishing the most stormy career
known to any representative Assembly, now handed on its
powers to the Councils and the Directors named by them:
these were Barras, Carnot, La Re'veillere, Letourneur, and
Rewbell (Oct. 1795). For the first two years all worked well.
A firm national government began to quell the brigandage rife
in many parts of the west. To quote Mdme de Stael: " The'
old landlords lived quietly side by side with buyers of land
confiscated by the nation : the roads in the country became
safe: the armies were only too victorious: liberty of the press
was restored; and one could have called France a free country,
if the two classes of nobles and priests had enjoyed the same
guarantees as other citizens." In brief, the government was
Girondin in spirit, but Jacobin in energy ; and in May 1796 it
promptly suppressed a communistic plot, headed by Babeuf
and some members of the old Hebertist faction, who desired
to overthrow the Directory and abolish property, " the greatest
scourge of society, a veritable public crime." Events, however, were tending not towards Communism, but were even now
favouring the rise of the greatest autocrat of modern times.
The young Napoleon Buonaparte, born at Ajaccio in 1769,
united the Florentine skill and suppleness of his father's family
with the Corsican pride and stubbornness of his mother's race;
and his early life, spent amidst family feuds and civil strifes,

vi.]

The Directory

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97

inured him to habits of intrigue and violence. Sent by his
father to the military schools at Brienne and Paris, he there
evinced a versatility of genius and a masterful temper, which
startled his comrades. The first year of the Revolution found
him with poor health and prospects, working hard in his spare
time at a History of Corsica, and sympathising with the abolition
of privileges; but the mob violence in June 1792 aroused his
disgust. " One must confess (he wrote) when one sees all this
close at hand, that the people are little worth the trouble that
one takes to deserve their favour." A little later, on returning
to Corsica, he even for a time thought of offering his services to
the British East India Company, for they " made more account
of a good artillery officer than the French did." And yet,
though admiring Paoli's Corsican patriotism as much as he
probably detested the Jacobinical terrorists then devastating
Fiance, he would not hear of the separation of Corsica from
France; and when the islanders, led by Paoli, definitely threw
off the foreign yoke (April, 1793), the Buonapartes took the
side of the French, and were forced to flee to Marseilles.
There they espoused the cause of the dominant Jacobin
faction; and Napoleon talked and wrote the revolutionary
jargon with such success as to be called the "little Robespierre." His services at Toulon availed to save his head after
the fall of the Robespierrists, and procured his liberty. After
varying fortunes, he entered the topographical bureau of the
Committee of Public Safety, taking Carnot's place for a time
(Aug. 1795). The strange whirl of events drew from him these
strange reflections in a letter—"Everything makes me brave
death and destiny. My reason is sometimes startled at this;
but it is the effect which the moral spectacle of France, and the
custom of running risks, have produced in me." He even
applied for leave to go to Constantinople to organise the
Sultan's artillery; but, fortunately for himself, was refused leave,
owing to the critical state of France; and at the same time,
F. R.
J

98

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[CHAP.

after resigning his post in the topogiaphical committee, he was
cashiered by an order of the Committee of Public Safety for
not having proceeded to a post assigned him in the army
campaigning in La Vendee. In September all careers seemed
closed to the thin yellow-cheeked ex-officer. In October he
was hailed as the saviour of the Republic for dispersing the
Paris malcontents; and the grateful Barras now smoothed the
way for his marriage with a charming widow, Josephine de
Beauharnais. The story that Barras also gave him the command of the army of Italy as a dowry for Josephine is disproved
by the evidence of two other Directors, Carnot and La
Reveillere. It was Carnot's discernment of Buonaparte's great
abilities which most availed to gain him this command ; for the
"organizer of victory" desired to replace the incompetent
General Scherer by one who had shown his powers of energetic
action, and had also sent in a remarkable plan of campaign for
the war in Italy. Buonaparte owed little or nothing to favour:
he forced his way to the front by sheer power and ability. " I
am terrified" (wrote Josephine) u at the empire which he seems
to exercise on all'who come near him. His keen gaze has
something uncanny and inexplicable in it wThich imposes even
on the Directors.... i My brothers in arms will all be only too
happy some day to have my protection (he said to me) : my
sword is at my side, and with it I will go far.J" Such were the
influences which moulded a character naturally proud, ambitious,
profoundly able and far-seeing. The Italian blood of his father
is seen in his appreciation of the arts and his far-reaching powers
of intrigue and civil organisation. As a Corsican chieftain
(' caporal') he ever at heart despised the Jacobin rabble, and
sought the aggrandizement of his family; and his masterful
personality was to completely dominate a generation enervated
by the sentimentalism of Rousseau and well-nigh paralysed by
the fever of revolution. Events brought him to the front when
France was saddled with a third impracticable Constitution,

vi.]

The Directory

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99

when the energy of her armies had all but broken the First
Coalition; and fortune sent him against that part of Europe
which offered the most splendid field for conquest.
The revolutionists, after beating back all the attempts of
the Austiians and Piedmontese to regain Nice and Savoy, had
already conquered the Italian Riviera as far as Savona. North
of this seaport there is a depression which marks off the
Maritime Alps from the Apennines. There the Piedmontese
and Austrian forces were posted—in all about 52,000 men.
Bonaparte (so he spelt his name from this time) inspired his
49,000 men, badly equipped, but inured to war, by his
trenchant words—" Soldiers, I am to lead you into the most
fertile plains in the world. There you will find honour, glory,
and riches." He at once put in force his four maxims—
" Divide for finding provisions : concentrate to fight: unity of
command is necessary for success : time is everything."
His first aim was to strike at the joint connecting the
allied armies; and by five successful battles in and beyond the
pass (April 12—25, 1796) he forced them back on divergent
lines of retreat, the aims of the Austrians being to protect
Milan, that of the Piedmontese to cover their capital Turin.
Seeing his exhausted little State open to the incursions of a
powerful foe, the King of Sardinia at Cherasco concluded an
armistice, definitely ceding to France Savoy and Nice, and
allowing Bonaparte to occupy the fortresses of Coni, Tortona,
and Alessandria (April 28). In 16 days he had detached
Sardinia from the Coalition.
It now remained to drive the Austrians out of their
Milanese province, of which the only great stronghold was
Mantua. The Austrian general Beaulieu had lined the banks of
the swiftly flowing Ticino; but Bonaparte outflanked this strong
position by a secret and speedy march along the south bank of
the Po, and by the seizure of Piacenza. Crossing the Po at this
city, he was now almost in the rear of the Austrians: these
7—2

ioo

The Revolutionary

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Napoleonic

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[CHAP.

hastily fell back on the Adda, another northern affluent of the
Po, trusting to 10,000 men and 20 cannons to render the long
narrow bridge of Lodi impregnable. Bonaparte at the head
of a column of 6000 picked men charged over the bridge:
a storm of shot tore through its ranks. Again the young
general with Lannes, Berthier, and Massena cheered on his
men; while French cavalry, fording the river higher up, turned
the scale in favour of the French. Bonaparte's daring won
him the title of " l e petit caporal" from his soldiers. " I t
was a strange sight (says Bourrienne) to see him on the bridge
of Lodi: mixed up with his tall grenadiers he looked a mere
boy." Lodi cleared Lombardy of the Austrians: and the
French, amidst popular rejoicings, entered Milan fifteen days
after the second part of the campaign began.
Twenty-nine days sufficed to hurl back the remains of the
Austrian forces beyond the Mincio into Mantua, or up the
valley of the Adige; also to make a rapid incursion into the
northern part of the Papal States (the Legations) and to
confiscate English merchandize at Leghorn (June).
The next events bear even more strongly the impress of a
master mind. The French were besieging Mantua, when they
learnt that a new Austrian army of some 47,000 men, under
General Wiirmser, was marching to its relief in two parts, one
west, the other east, of L. Garda. There was only one hope
of safety for Bonaparte's 42,000 men—to raise the siege of
Mantua, and fall on the two parts before they re-united. H e
crushed the western army at Lonato (Aug. 3), and by skilful
manoeuvres at Castiglione cut in half Wurmser's main force,
pressed it back into Tyrol, again defeating it at Bassano.
The gallant old Austrian finally reached Mantua; but in a
fortnight he had lost 27,000 men to a force less than his own.
The effect of concentrated vigorous action against superior,
but disunited forces, has never been more strikingly shown 1 .
1
The figures given above are from official sources and therefore differ
from the estimates given by Thiers. See my articles on Col. Graham's
Reports on the Italian Campaign in the Eng. Hist. Rev. of 1899.

vi.]

The Directory

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101

Another Austrian army under Allvintzi descended the
Adige, and checked the French at Caldiero ; but Bonaparte's
skill and persistence at Areola compelled the foe to retire
outflanked after three days of desperate fight (Nov.). The
crowning victories of Rivoli and La Favorita (Jan. 1797)
reduced the Austrians to despair, and Mantua to surrender
(Feb. 2).
A fortnight's campaign against the Papal States next
showed the utter weakness of the Pope's temporal power.
The Papal troops hardly awaited the onset of the French;
and by the Treaty of Tolentino (Feb. 1797) the Pope gave
up all claims to Avignon, paid a war indemnity and yielded up
many precious manuscripts, pictures and statues, beside ceding
the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and the Romagna.
These districts -soon formed, with Austrian Lombardy and
Modena (whose Duke had been deposed by Bonaparte), a
compact State called the Cisalpine Republic,—the nucleus
of the future Kingdom of Italy. From the outset the new
State was completely under French control. As Bonaparte
frankly said to Melzi—" Italy contains still fewer elements
of republicanism than France: but we must temporize with
the fever of the moment, and we are going to have one or two
republics here of our own particular kind." The kind was to
be that which would admit of changes responsive to changes
in France. For the present, however, the summoning of a
representative Assembly, the abolition of feudal dues, and a
decree of civic equality, seemed the dawn of a new political
and social life for Italy.
In the spring of 1797, Bonaparte resumed hostilities
against the Austrians, drove them across the Carnic and Noric
Alps, and dictated preliminaries of peace at Leoben, within
two days' march of Vienna. He thus snatched the laurels
of victory from the French forces on the Rhine. These under
the command of Jourdan and Moreau had been about to effect

102

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[CHAP.

a junction near the upper Danube, when the Austrian Archduke Charles completely defeated the former near Wiirzburg.
Jourdan's retreat behind the Rhine was fatal to Moreau's plans;
and the latter only by great skill and determination withdrew
his troops into Alsace (Oct. 1796). The Directory had, therefore, to support these beaten troops; while Bonaparte's forces
were living on Italy and were even sending to Paris contributions levied on the liberated people, to fill up the yawning
gulf of the French exchequer. In the spring of 1797, Hoche,
replacing Jourdan, crossed the Rhine and gained a success;
yet Moreau could not cross that river for want of pontoons,
before the news came of the armistice with Austria. The army
of the Rhine seemed doomed to misfortune. In September
following, the death of its able commander, the sincere
republican Hoche, removed a possible rival from Bonaparte's
path.
Another motive, beside that of winning the sole glory of
the campaign, urged Bonaparte to arrange matters with
Austria. The Venetians had been enraged at the exactions of
the French and at the protracted violation of their neutral
territory. At Eastertide, 1797, the people of Verona rose and
massacred several of the French wounded left in hospital;
and elsewhere risings against the ' liberators' provoked severe
reprisals. Other excuses for disputes with the Venetian
Republic led to menaces from Bonaparte which frightened
the timid oligarchs into resignation; and under pretence of
coming to terms with their democratic successors, he gained
control of Venice, its fleet, and even its Ionian Isles. While
on May 26, 1797, he assured the new municipality of Venice
that a i t s people alone were worthy of liberty," on the very
next day he wrote to the Directory:—" Venice, which has
been decaying ever since the discovery of the Cape of Good
Hope, and the rise of Trieste and Ancona, can hardly survive
the blows we have just struck. With a cowardly and helpless

vi.]

The Directory

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103

population, in no way fit for liberty, without territory and
without rivers, it seems natural that she should be left to
those to whom we give the mainland territory." As for her
Ionian Isles, he wrote later on, France must take them; for
"the time is not far distant when we shall feel that, to destroy
England, we must make Egypt ours."
This explains the favourable terms of peace finally granted
by him to Austria in the Treaty of Campo Formio (Oct. 17,
1797). Francis I I , though ready to give up all claim to his
Netherlands, firmly demanded all Venetia as far as the R.
Oglio; and Bonaparte, desirous of isolating England, finally
acceded (sorely against the wishes of the Directory) to his
acquisition of Venetia east of the Adige, and all the possessions
of Venice along the Adriatic, viz. Istria and Dalmatia. France
was to keep the Austrian Netherlands, the Ionian Isles and
the Venetian fleet. Austria recognized the Cisalpine Republic,
which was to include Lombardy, the western part of Venetia,
the Legations, Romagna, and Modena; and she was to give
the Breisgau to the deposed Duke of Modena. In secret
articles she promised to recognize the extension of the French
frontier as far east as the Rhine. As a set-off to her losses she
received most of the Venetian lands, and she soon gained Salzburg for one of her Arch-Dukes. (See Map opposite page 126.)
It remains to sum up the results of this brilliant campaign
on the combatants, on Italy, and on the relations of Bonaparte
to the Directory.
'The Treaty of Campo Formio shattered the remains of the
once great First Coalition. England alone was left to struggle
against the ever increasing power of France; for the Directors
had curtly repulsed attempts made by Pitt to come to an understanding. France now definitively gained what Louis XIV
had vainly striven for, the Rhine frontier down to the border
of the Batavian Republic, which was virtually subject to her.
She had gained her " natural frontiers" on the south-east by

104

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

the definitive acquisition of Savoy and Nice; and now by the
formation of her dependent Cisalpine Republic, she held the
balance of power in Italy \ while her Ionian Isles were so
many stepping stones towards Egypt. On the other hand,
Austria, after terrible disasters in Italy, still held a commanding
position there, and by the acquisition of Venice and Dalmatia
became a sea-power. If she had lost her outlying possessions
such as the Netherlands, Breisgau, and Milan, she had consolidated her territory; and had the prospect of doing so still
more in the disputes for German lands soon to begin at
Rastadt.
Italy had just received a shock comparable to that dealt
by the French King Charles V I I I in 1494, so fatal to the
older order of things in Italy as in Europe. The once vigorous
kingdom of Sardinia had lost its transalpine provinces; and in
1798 the king fled to Sardinia when his capital was menaced
by French troops. The Republic of Venice, on the most
frivolous pretext, was made a victim to Bonaparte's policy,
and partitioned with Austria, even against the protests of the
Directory. Its sister Republic of Genoa was encouraged to
overthrow its oligarchs, and under- the new name of the
Ligurian Republic, became nominally democratic, but really
French. The most important State of the peninsula, the
Cisalpine Republic, accepted a French form of government,
was occupied by French troops, and sent frequent subsidies to
Paris. Lucca, Tuscany, and Naples were left alone for a
time. The Pope's temporal power, already crumbling away,
was early in the next year replaced by a Roman Republic
proclaimed by a French general.
The Directors had hoped to be free from Bonaparte's
dictation during the Italian campaign; but wThen they proposed to send him Kellermann as his equal in command,
his retort "one bad commander is better than two good
commanders " showed not only his sounder judgment but his

vi.]

The Directory

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105

complete independence. Throughout the campaign he accustomed his officers and soldiers alike to look to him alone
for advancement and wealth; and while conducting the
negotiations with Austria, in defiance of the Directors' orders,
he had an opportunity of rendering them also subservient to
him. The royalist reaction in France brought to a crisis the
inevitable conflict between the Directory and the Councils.
As has been pointed out, the Councils were renewed by onethird every year ; while only one of the five Directors was subject
to annual re-election by the Councils. Thus, by the middle
of 1797, while four of the five Directors were Jacobins, there
was a royalist majority in the Councils and the country. At
Marseilles, Lyons and elsewhere the old Jacobin party had
met with its deserts from royalist vengeance in the "white
terror " ; and the royalist club at Clichy on the outskirts of the
capital aimed at overthrowing the Directory. Two reasons
impelled Bonaparte to crush this reaction. Not only would
the return of Louis XVIII be fatal to his hopes, but also
the French armies still retained much of their revolutionary
fervour.
They were fighting against feudal Europe and
knew little of Jacobin cruelty and the meanness of the new
despotism at Paris. " The soldiers are asking (wrote Bonaparte) whether they are to be rewarded by assassination on
their return home:...I see that the Clichy Club means to
pass over my corpse to the destruction of the Republic."
He therefore sent his General Augereau, a blustering Jacobin,
with a strong body of troops to Paris. These in the early
morning of 18th Fructidor (Sept. 4, 1797) surrounded the
Tuileries, where the Councils were sitting, and arrested 53
deputies; while three Directors caused their royalist colleague
Barthelemy to be arrested; even the great Carnot, who now
desired peace and moderation, only saved himself by flight.
As a sequel to this Pride's Purge, liberty of the press was
suspended, the elections in more than half the Departments

io6

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP,

were annulled, many deputies, including the now royalist
General Pichegru, were banished to Cayenne, and the old
persecuting laws against non-juring priests and nobles were
re-enacted. In fact, there was a recrudescence of the Terror,
"into which (as the Due de Broglie wrote) France plunged
without consolation and without hope."
This coup d'etat of Fructidor 1797 was followed by a
national bankruptcy. The Directory had in vain replaced the
worthless assignats by mandats territoriaux, directly exchangeable for the national lands. The expedient only enriched stockjobbers and swelled the vulgar ostentation of the nouveaux
riches at Paris, which showed itself in fetes resplendent with
Greek costumes, and in a life depraved by worse than Greek
immorality. In fact, now that the old bonds of society were
broken, there remained no other ideal of conduct than the
Rights of Man, and a fantastic Deism, into which La Reveillere
tried hard to breathe some life. It was in vain. The feverish
gaiety was only a proof of the despair and utter unrest of the
times. Men shut their eyes to the future; for the past five
years had seen the revolution reverse most of the aims of
1789. Instead of liberty and equality there was an equality in
servitude to a vulgar despotism propped up by bayonets; and
the crusade to liberate Humanity had ended in wars of conquest
and plunder. A careful study of the inner significance of events
shows that the fundamental cause of this degradation was the
absence of any inspiring principle of social and political duty.
What wonder then, that in the cruel disenchantment which
followed on the roseate hopes of 1789, France, weary of being
tossed from one extreme to another, turned her gaze more and
more away from the moral and political chaos at Paris, to the
discipline, devotion, brilliance and glory of the army of Italy
and its young leader ?
The victor of eighteen pitched battles, who in a year had
changed the face of Italy and Europe, was received with

vi.]

The Directory

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107

boundless enthusiasm at Paris; and Barras, clasping the
conqueror to his breast, exclaimed—" Go, capture the giant
corsair that infests the seas: go, punish in London outrages
that have been too long unpunished." Under the guise of
admiration for his genius, the Directors nourished a secret
fear of his domination, and desired above all his absence from
Paris; and for other reasons of State, the time seemed favourable for the reduction of England's power. Our economic
troubles were scarcely less than those of France; for in the
spring of 1797 the Bank of England stopped cash payments,
and for 22 years we subsisted on what was virtually a paper
currency. In 1795—6 t n e price of wheat was for some time
over ^ 5 the quarter; and there had been bread riots in
London. If the naval victories of St Vincent and Camperdown
(1797) restored to us the supremacy of the high seas, yet the
mutinies at the Nore and Spithead in that very year had
threatened our ruin. The alliance between France, Holland,
and Spain gave the Directory a fleet numerically stronger than
ours. The Mediterranean was fast becoming a French lake; for
we had lost our hold on Corsica, and then held only Gibraltar,
while France was now mistress of Northern Italy and the
Ionian Isles, and secretly bought over the Commander of the
Knights of St John at Malta. In India, Tippoo Sahib, helped
by the French, was contesting our supremacy. The Cape
route to India was in the hands of the Dutch, now allied to
France. If France seized Egypt, could she not cut off our
Eastern commerce, and so compel us to surrender? " L e t us
concentrate all our activity on our fleet (wrote Bonaparte to
Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs) and destroy England.
That done, Europe is at our feet." The Directors were equally
anxious to send away their imperious deliverer on a distant
enterprise; and Bonaparte, though it realised a dream of his
youth, fostered the impression that he was being banished by
the jealous Government.

io8

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

Two other events in the early part of 1798 increased the
responsibilities of the Directory, when they were losing their
best support. The murder of a French general at Rome
gave the excuse for French troops to march in and proclaim
the Roman Republic (Feb. 1798). The Pope was removed in
honourable captivity, which he survived for only a year; and
the Eternal City furnished rich plunder in jewels and still more
precious objects of art. The latter were sent to adorn the
Paris museums: the former went towards the expenses of the
Toulon armada.
The invasion of Switzerland had a similar result. There
had been risings in Valais and in the subject district of Vaud,
against the oligarchic rule of the old governing cantons or
towns. The unionists, who desired a closer union of the 13
cantons on the basis of complete political equality, received
the help of the French. The forces of oligarchic Berne and
of the democratic ' forest cantons' were overpowered by
the invaders; and though the mountain districts bravely held
out, yet by 1799 t n e v w e r e reduced. Cantonal and municipal
privileges and exceptional governing powers were at once
abolished. Vaud was freed from the rule of Berne, and the
vale of the upper Ticino from the control of Uri. What had
previously been a league of cantons with sovereign powers,
now became, at the order of the Paris Directory (April, 1798),
" the one, indivisible, democratic and representative Helvetic
Republic," the cantons being subdivided so as to form mere
administrative Departments. Fortunately this new centralised
Government, imposed from Paris, did not permanently replace
the primaeval democracy of the forest cantons, where the
citizens had hitherto always met in a Champ de Mai for the
adoption of laws and the election of their magistrates. The
old federal system was partly restored by Bonaparte in his Act
of Mediation of 1803; and Switzerland ultimately gained by the
abolition of municipal bureaucracy and cantonal inequalities.

vi.]

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109

The immediate results of the French invasion were the
annexation of Geneva, Biel and Miihlhausen by France, and
the plunder of the treasuries at Berne, Zurich, Lucerne,
Fribourg, &c, for the benefit of Bonaparte's expedition. The
ex-Director Carnot thus vigorously characterised the whole
affair: " T h e Directory has sought where it could find most
free men to immolate, and so has flung itself on Switzerland;'
In May, 1798, the French armada was ready to sail.
Bonaparte was ordered to seize Malta and Egypt, with which
France was at peace, to cut through the isthmus of Suez, and
to drive the English from India. The first detail was easily
accomplished. The Grand Master of the Knights of St John
had been bought over by the French; only a pretence of
resistance was made; and Valetta passed into the hands of the
French. After remaining there a week to organize his new
conquest, and showing his splendid powers of administration,
Bonaparte sailed for Alexandria. Fortunately for him, Nelson,
in his eager search for the French, had left that port the day
before. The French hurriedly disembarked and captured the
city by a rush. Then ensued a weary march across the desert
to the Nile and Cairo. Loud were the complaints of his men—this then was the land where they were to gain enough money
to buy six arpents of land apiece on their return 1 A brilliant
victory near the Pyramids, over the splendid Mameluke cavalry,
and the plunder of this governing caste, reconciled the French
to Egypt. Bonaparte occupied Cairo, and was organizing his
new colony, when news of a disaster came.
Nelson, after twice narrowly missing Bonaparte's armada,
had at last found the French men-of-war drawn up near the
shoals of Aboukir Bay. " Where theie is room for ships to
swing, there is room for my ships to run alongside between
them and the shoal," was Nelson's reasoning; and, near sunset
though it was, he placed the French line, as it lay at anchor,

no

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

between two fires. After three hours' desperate conflict, the
French flagship, 1'Orient, caught fire and blew u p ; and by
morning, out of the French squadron of 16 ships only four had
escaped (Aug. i—2).
" We are condemned to do something great" was the
resolve of the indomitable Bonaparte, on hearing of this
disaster. He laboured to assure his position by developing the
resources of Egypt, and by a public profession of Mohammedanism. "Do you not think that the Empire of the East was
worth a turban and a pair of loose trousers ? ,; was his subsequent
comment on this burlesque. After crushing a revolt at Cairo,
and inspecting the traces of the old canal cut across the
isthmus, he resolved to strike at Turkey by an invasion of
Syria. After defeating the Turks at Jaffa and massacring some
2,500 prisoners who encumbered his march, he attacked Acre;
but his siege artillery had been captured by Sir Sidney Smith,
while on its way from Alexandria, and was now used against
the French. Assault after assault was beaten back with heavy
loss; and though the French routed near Mt Tabor a Turkish
relieving force, yet all Bonaparte's efforts (March—May, 1799)
failed against Acre—" that miserable hole which came between
me and my destiny." With some 8,000 men, many afflicted by
the plague, he retreated to Egypt, to show his and their prowess
by driving a Turkish foice into the sea at Aboukir. During the
exchange of prisoners which followed, Sidney Smith sent him
a packet of French newspapers. In them Bonaparte eagerly
read news of France threatened by the Second Coalition, of
Italy lost to her, of the Directory once again threatened by the
royalist reaction. If ever he was to seize power, it must be
now. Casting aside his dreams of an Eastern Empire stretching
from the Ganges to the Danube, he bequeathed his " exhausted
enterprise " to Kleber; and taking with him Berthier, Lannes,
Marmont, Murat, and a few other generals, he secretly sailed
for France, which by maivellous good fortune he reached in

vi.]

The Directory

and Buonaparte.

111

time to be rapturously received as the conqueror of the East
(Oct. 1799).
His expectations with regard to the failures of the Directory
had been more than realised. Its foreign and domestic policy
was at once exasperating and weak. Only a firm conciliatory
government could have made its new conquests a source of
strength. Instead of that, the Germans of its Rhineland were
irritated by the appointment of Frenchmen to every paid post;
and even the Illuminati lost their enthusiasm for France when
the four new Rhenish Departments were seen to be mere
pashalics for the favourites of the Directory. It is true that
many changes, such as social equality, trial by jury, and the
abolition of tithes and feudal dues, were generally welcomed;
but the laws which abolished the old German education, from
the school to the University, in favour of the new French
system, and other decrees which compelled the observance of
the decadi in place of Sunday, and handed over all monastic
and Church property to the administration of French officials,
soon provoked a return of German feeling.
This reaction of sentiment encouraged Austria and the dispossessed German princes ; and French demands met with
increasing resistance at the Congress of Rastadt, which from
Sept. 1797 to April 1799 w a s settling the affairs of Germany.
The weakness of the Germanic system was glaringly shown at
this Congress, State quarrelling with State, while the German
princes, dispossessed of their domains west of the Rhine,
clamoured for " compensation " at the expense of the ecclesiastical lands. A great ruler might even then have banded
most of Germany together against France; but when the
dissolute and hapless Frederick William II of Prussia died in
1797, his successor, of the same name, continued the spiritless
policy of alliance with France, which long cleft Germany in
twain. Austria, however, felt herself threatened by the French
occupation of Switzerland and by the dictatorial treatment of

112

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[CHAR

the Cisalpine Republic by the Directory and its generals. The
excitable Czar Paul, who had succeeded Catherine in 1796,
imagined himself insulted by the seizure of Malta, of which he
desired to be the protector; and the Bourbons of Naples,
alarmed at the creation of the new Roman Republic and the
spread of French principles, were openly meditating war.
Nelson on his return from Egypt was rapturously welcomed by
the Neapolitan Court, and developed a plan for the restoration
of Italy to its old rulers.
The Directory, after passing the first law of universal conscription (Sept. 1798), sent armies to occupy Naples and Turin,
whence the kings fled to their insular possessions, Sicily and
Sardinia respectively, and the south of Italy was now reorganized by the French as the Parthenopaean Republic; while
the occupation of Lucca and Tuscany completed their domination in Italy.
A slight acquaintance with facts suffices to dispel the error
that the Coalitions were " built up by Pitt's gold." To the
French this has seemed a sufficient cause for events which
really resulted quite naturally from their own aggressions.
This Second Coalition was an attempt made by Russia, which
took the initiative, England, Austria, Naples, Portugal and
Turkey, to set some limits to French domination, which had
now spread from the mouth of the Adige to that of the Rhine.
At first the allies gained some signal successes. The young
French conscripts were not ready to take the field; and only
about 100,000 trained troops were ready to defend this
immense line. Bonaparte and many of the best generals and
troops were in the sands of Syria. Jourdan was badly beaten
at Stockach, near Lake Constance (March, 1799); and even
the brilliant and tenacious Massena could make no headway
against the superior numbers of the Austrians, who began to
invade the central bastion of the French line—Switzerland.
The struggle entered on a bitterer phase when the French

vi.]

The Directory

and Buonaparte.

113

envoys to the Congress of Rastadt were after its close (April)
assassinated by Austrian hussars, who carried off their papers.
In Italy the arrival of a great Russo-Austrian force under
Suvoroff and Melas drove back the French from the Adige
and even from Milan, which the Russians entered in triumph.
Moreau withdrew his shattered forces behind the strongholds of
Alessandria and Genoa, there to await the arrival of Macdonald
from the south. This able general had long held southern Italy
against vastly greater forces of insurgents. Brushing these
aside, he now tried by a skilful march across the Apennines
and along the River Po to join hands with Moreau. After
some successes he was overwhelmed by the Russians at the
Trebbia (June); and the two French armies in Italy, passing
the Apennines, had much difficulty in uniting near Genoa
(Juiie). Except the Genoese coast line, Italy was lost to the
French; and, as they retired, the artificial character of their
rule was shown by wide-spread insurrections. A defeat at
Novi (Aug.) completed their disasters in the very land which
Bonaparte had associated with victory.
In September the folly of the allies and the genius of
Massena somewhat turned the scale. Owing to the complaints
of Austrian generals at Suvdroff's arrogance, he was finally
required to cross the Alps, join the Russian forces under
Korsakoff, and drive the French out of Switzerland. The
power of jealousy to wreck a whole campaign has rarely been
more signally shown. After toiling for five days over the S t
Gothard pass, against a skilful resistance, he arrived at the
southern end of the Lake of Lucerne (Sept. 26) to find no help
from Russians or Austrians; for Massena on that very day
seized the opportunity offered by the withdrawal of the Archduke Charles northwards, to crush Korsakoff's Russians at
Zurich, capturing all their cannons, stores, treasure, and nearly
one-fourth of their men. Korsakoff led the wreck of his forces
towards the Rhine, while Suvdroffs weary men had to traverse
F.R.
8

114

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[CHAP.

frightful mountains and defiles, harassed by the foe, until with
the loss of half their men, and all their horses and stores, they
reached the Upper Rhine valley. In Holland the AngloRussian forces were scarcely more fortunate; and the Duke of
York, by the capitulation of Alkmaar (Oct. 18), withdrew his
troops, sore stricken with marsh-fever.
Thus, before Bonaparte's arrival in France, Massena in
Switzerland and Brune in Holland had restored victory to the
French arms, and cleared these dependent republics of the
allied forces. There was now little danger of an invasion,
except from the Austrians, who threatened Nice and Alsace.
The Czar Paul, indignant at the treatment of his brave troops
by the allies, soon came to terms with France.
And yet the Directory was in great danger. If victory had
finally returned to the tricolour flag everywhere except in Italy,
the policy of violent repression had brought France to the
verge of revolt and royalism. Far from putting an end to the
civil strifes, the coup d'etat of Fructidor was repeated on a
small scale in June 1798, when the Directory annulled the
elections of sixty members, on the plea of excluding from the
Councils those who had declared against the Constitution.
General Jourdan and other Jacobins protested against the new
tyranny as reducing the Councils to a mere registration court;
and the defeats of the spring and summer raised a storm of
execrations at these civilian Directors ("lawyers" they were
dubbed) whose temerity was jeopardising France. In the
elections of the spring of 1799 the Jacobins gained ground
against the directorial party. Sieyes was chosen Director in
place of the unpopular Rewbell, and a change of constitution
was therefore imminent. The Councils repealed the exceptional laws passed at Fructidor, compelled three Directors to
resign, and declared the national representation to be inviolable
(June 1799). This coup d'etat of the Councils was a reversal
of that of the Directors and the troops in Fructidor 1797 ; but

vi.1

The Directory

and Biwnaparte.

115

forced loans, progressive taxation, and the exaction of hostages
from Breton villages where royalisni lurked under the guise of
brigandage, showed that the new Councils and Directory were
as little royalist as the men of Fructidor. Sieyes determined
to prevent any revival of the Terror, by closing the Jacobin
Club, which had for a time re-assembled, and by making over
500 arrests at Paris; but even his reputation and skill could
hardly bear up against Jacobins in Paris and royalists in the
country.
! Such, then, was the political situation on Bonaparte's
arrival from Egypt—the executive and legislative powers at
open variance, the Directory hated for its tyranny and despised
for its failures, a general desire for any government which would
secure the safety and order of the State. Sieyes had said that
Iprance only needed a head and a sword. H e himself of course
vtas the head; but would the trenchant sword now returned
from Egypt be an obedient tool in his hands ? Bonaparte
(bautiously looked around. He was too young to be chosen as
ja Director; and he hated the Jacobins as much as the royallists j but he skilfully made use of all parties who were dis/ satisfied with the Directory or with the Constitution of 1795;
/ and among the latter class were three Directors, Sieyes, Ducos,
I and Barras. After combining these diverse elements of oppo.' sition for the work of overthrow, they could be left to fall
asunder afterwards. At the outset Bonaparte declared that he
would save France from the red as well as from the white terror.
An understanding with Sieyes assured him the support of the
moderates who desired a firm rule undisturbed by yearly revolutions ; and Sieyes, after making a ladder for Bonaparte to
seize power, was a man who could easily be shelved. A committee was secretly formed by Sieyes, Bonaparte and his brother
Lucien, Talleyrand, and a few others, to arrange the coup d'etat.
The threats of the Jacobins furnished an excuse for removing
the Councils to St, Cloud. Bonaparte commanded the armed
8—2

n6

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

forces, and had the support of the generals, except Jouidau
and Bern ado tte. The Directors, Sieves, Ducos, and Barras,
connived at the coup d'etat, and the two others, Gohier and
Moulins, who refused to recognise the dissolution of the
Directory, were guarded by troops at the Luxemburg Palace.
It remained to coerce the Councils. Of these the Council of
Ancients desired a change in the constitution of 1795 while
the Council of Five Hundred began its memorable sitting at
St. Cloud (19th Brumaire, or Nov. 11) with an oath of obedience to that Constitution, in which even Lucien and other
conspirators joined. So strong was the Jacobin enthusiasm
which swayed the Five Hundred, that when Bonaparte entered
their Chamber he could gain no hearing and was hurried out
half fainting by his friends. Their cause seemed lost; but
Lucien, then President of this chamber, refused to put the
vote of outlawry against his brother, and leaving the hall
harangued the soldiers against the deputies in the pay cf
England, armed with daggers which they had lifted against th e
general. The lies took effect. The charge was sounded; and
the representatives of France fled before the levelled bayonets.
Representative government, which had survived the Reign of
Terror, succumbed to the attacks of a victorious general; and
the power of the Jacobins, who desired to perpetuate the
policy of the Convention, was now decisively overthrown by
the very means to which they had appealed in 1795 and 1797
—military force.
The Council of Ancients, with a few young deputies, at
once decreed the creation of a provisional executive committee
of three; and Lucien, re-assembling a handful of his adherents
of the Council of Five Hundred, proposed that these three
should be Sieyes, Ducos, and Bonaparte, with the title of
Consuls; and a Commission representing the Five Hundred
was to help the Consuls in modifying the Constitution of 1795,
and in preparing a new Civil Code.

vi.]

The Directory

and Buonaparte.

117

Thus ended that Constitution:—"turn by turn invoked by
all the factions, incessantly violated by all, it had ceased to be
a means of safety for the Republic. It was necessary to prevent the principles on which it rested perishing with it." So
ran the official justification of the events of Brumaire. Its
defects had led to constant friction between the executive and
legislative powers, and in 1797—1799 to a revival of the Terror.
France longed for peace and quietness wherein the civil and
social conquests of the Revolution might be consolidated. The
strifes between the Directors and the Councils had rendered
imminent a relapse into the Jacobin tyranny of 1793 or the
royalism of the old r'egime. It was the aim of the 'men of
Brumaire' to combine order with liberty by a new constitution
which Sieves was known to have long been perfecting. Even
in 1789 he had said—"The science of politics is one in
which I think I am perfect." The fortunes of France in 1799
rested apparently on Sieves and Bonaparte—its brain and its
sword!
The interest of this epoch of the Directory centres in
Bonaparte's achievements and those of the French armies. In
France the work of pacification and consolidation, begun in
1795—1797, had been largely undone in the two troublous
years which followed; and the only great constructive effort
of this period was the famous law of conscription (Sept. 5,
1798) which rendered permanent the great levies en masse of
the earlier years of the Revolution. The battalions of volunteers had in 1794 been amalgamated with the regular forces;
and the work'which Carnot had begun was now completed by
another great organising genius, the former terrorist DuboisCrance, to whom is due the formation of armies in divisions,
brigades and half-brigades. The whole war organisation was
carried out under the three heads—personnel, materiel, and
secretariat. Thus the vast masses oi men raised by the
conscription soon became parts of a powerful and smoothly

n8

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era. [CHAP. vi.

working machine destined to overthrow the disjointed forces
of the Coalition.
Conscious of its potential military strength, the Directory had
adopted a policy of provocation and aggrandisement against
all neighbouring States. Its conduct towards Switzerland and
the Pope has already been described, as also the recklessly
revolutionary and Gallicising policy of its commissioner Rudler
towards its new subjects in the Rhineland. In Holland the
Directory had aided the democratic party, or "patriots," in overthrowing the Stadtholder's or federal party and had in March
1798 imposed a constitution closely resembling that of France.
After the Duke of York had in Oct. 1799 evacuated Holland,
that unhappy land fell a prey to the exactions of the victorious
French general Brune. The Cisalpine Republic in noithern Italy
had in the previous year felt the weight of Brune's hand, and a
constitution like that of the French Directory had been im
posed. Dumouriez' design of surrounding France with a ring
of friendly republics had ended in a policy of imperious dictation and pillage by the French in the Batavian, Helvetian and
Cisalpine Republics; and the same militarism which repressed
these vassal States, was even now building up a despotism at
Paris.

C H A P T E R VII.
T H E CONSULATE.

"France did not hesitate to sacrifice political liberty, of which she as
yet knew only the abuse, in oider to preserve the civil conquests of the
Revolution." {Lebon.)

T H E three provisional consuls thus described their aims—
"to organise order in all parts of the administration, re-establish
tranquillity at home, and procure an honourable and solid
peace." They thus gained the support of all who had been
oppressed and harassed by the Directory. Political prisoners
—especially the non-juring priests—were released. Forced
loans^and progressive taxation were discontinued; and 37
terrorists and prominent Jacobins were exiled (Nov. 1799).
The appointment of Talleyrand to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (he held it from Nov. 1799 to Aug. 1807) ensured the
conduct of negotiations with more skill and suavity than had
been shown during the last years of the Directory.
Sieves soon had to yield to a more commanding will. He
had gained his chief reputation in 1789 and again in 1798—9
—years when there was no one of commanding powers,
prestige and experience. The theorist was now at once outdistanced in the race for power, by a nature profoundly able,
far-seeing, and determined, endowed with a subtlety in intrigue
more than Italian, and with the elemental strength of a race

120

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[CHAP.

unexhausted by sentimentalism and anarchy. Full of scorn
for the ' idealogues' who by their theories had brought France
to her present desperate straits, he, the descendant of Corsican
chieftains, resolved to bring her back to order and prosperity
by what he regarded as the sole effective means of rule,
personal authority. France, he declared, had had but one
real government since 1789, the Committee of Public Safety.
H e was now to improve on its methods, even while discarding
the passionate beliefs which alone had made its tyranny
excusable. Against theories he pitted facts. Instead of the
perfectibility of the human race by means of watchwords and
constitutions, he recognised only the weakness and credulity
of the average man. A Jacobin when Robespierre was
supreme, and the saviour of the Directory in 1795, he had
now overthrown the latter, and exiled the chief Jacobins.
His opportunism is as conspicuous in his actions as in his
political professions. In reality he consistently opposed only
those who hindered his advancement or menaced his security.
His wide-sweeping ambition only served to stimulate that
scrupulous care about details which ensures a brilliant triumph.
— " I f (he wrote to Talleyrand in 1797) we take as the basis
for all operations true policy, which is nothing else than the
calculation of combinations and chances, we shall long remain
la grande nation', the arbiter of Europe. I say more. If
destiny decrees it, I do not see why we should not attain
in a few years, those splendid results, of which the heated
and enthusiastic imagination catches a glimpse, but which
the extremely cool, persevering, and positive man alone can
grasp."
The first question in which Sieves, the man of words and
phrases, was worsted by the man of keen insight and practical
sense, was that of the new constitution, devised by the former
on two chief principles—"confidence coming from below:
power coming from above." Its basis was universal suffrage,

VII.]

The

Consulate.

121

carefully filtered by three decimal divisions. The five millions
of French voters were to choose one-tenth of their number;
and from these 500,000—called notabilities of the communes—the central executive at Paris was to select the
authorities for the communes or parishes. The 500,000 in
their turn chose one-tenth of their number, from whom the
authorities for the Department were to be selected by the
central executive power. The 50,000 also were to choose
one-tenth of their number; and from these 5,000 the Consuls
or Senate wrere to select members of the Council of State,
Tribunate, Corps Legislatif Judges of the Supreme Court,
and Ministers of State. Of these bodies the right of initiating
legislation lay with the Council of State; that of criticism
of the proposed measures lay with the Tribunate named by
the Senate; while the Corps Zegislatif, chosen by the Senate,
after listening to the arguments for and against the measure,
silently accepted or rejected it. Not content with safeguarding
his constitution by these elaborate checks and balances, Sieyes
placed above them an august Senate of 80 members, chosen
partly by the Consuls, partly by co-optation, to veto any
unconstitutional proposal or action. At the apex of his
pyramid were to be two Consuls, subordinate to a Grand
Elector; and the Senate was to safeguard liberty against any
coup cP'etat by having power to absorb into its ranks any
functionary—even the Grand Elector himself. It was against
this last part of the scheme that Bonaparte furiously and
successfully protested in the sub-commission which at the
close of 1799 w a s secretly disposing of the destinies of France.
The Grand Elector, he said, would be a "fatted hog, or the
chained-up ghost of a rot faineant"
Sieyes had to yield.
The Senate lost its powers of deposition and 'absorption';
and, for the name ' Grand Elector,' was to be substituted that
of First Consul, who wielded considerably greater powers than
Sieyes had intended.
As finally amended at Bonaparte's

122

The Revolutionary

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Era.

[CHAP.

instance, the new Constitution gave to the First Consul the
rights of nominating the members of the Council of State
(and hence of initiating legislation), all the chief military,
naval, diplomatic, and judicial officials and functionaries,
of deciding the questions of war or peace, foreign policy and
the conduct of military and naval affairs. He named his own
Ministers, who were individually responsible to him for their
own departments of affairs, but not collectively responsible.
The two subordinate Consuls were mere ciphers who might
be consulted or not, as the First Consul chose. In fact, he
wielded more than all the powers enjoyed by the Directors;
and through them he became the lineal descendant of the
Committee of Public Safety, nearly all of whose functions were
now concentrated in him alone.
This new Constitution, promulgated Dec. 15, 1799, was
offered to the French people for acceptance or rejection with
the famous phrase—" Citizens, the revolution is fixed to the
principles which commenced it. It is finished." The fear
of renewed disorder, and the magic of Bonaparte's name as
a pledge of glory and order, led to more than three million
affirmative votes being given in the plebiscite, against a minority
of 1567 negatives. Thus France passed rapidly and almost
unwittingly from a distinctively republican constitution to one
which was more autocratic than she had ever known. The
power of Louis XIV had been limited by the provincial laws
and customs. The Revolution had swept these away; and
Garat truly said of the new rule—" The limits of the executive
power would henceforth be not in a charter, but in the heart
and in the very passions of a great man." The provisional
Consuls now made way for three Consuls—Bonaparte, Cambaceres, and Lebrun. Sieves was thus shelved. The empty
honour of presiding over the Senate marked his retirement
from active public life and his " absorption" by his own
creation; while his acceptance from the First Consul of a fine

VII.]

The

Consulate.

123

estate at Crosne served as a token of the services which his
constitution had rendered to Bonaparte, and as a pledge for
his own nullity in the future. In the words of a contemporary
epigram :
"Sieyes a Bonaparte a fait piesent du hone
Sous un pompeux debris croyant l'ensevelir.
Bonaparte a Sieyes a fait present de Crosne
Pour le payer et l'avilir!"

The Consuls, or rather the First Consul, used their extensive
powers of selection to name men of moderate opinions to the
Legislature and capable men as Ministers to carry out the
laws. He proclaimed an amnesty for most political offenders,
especially for the victims of the Jacobin triumph of Fructidor,
1797 : he allowed all but the most obnoxious emigrant nobles
to return to France, if they would; and, reversing the policy
of Fructidor, he permitted religious worship to be publicly
celebiated by all priests who took a formula of obedience to
the government. These acts tended to reassure the royalists,
who with their Chouan followers had kept Normandy, Brittany
and la Vendee in a ferment of revolt; and the withdrawal of
the cruel law of hostages, latterly imposed by the Directory,
together with the promise of liberty of public worship, pacified
(Jan. 1800) these districts, which had enjoyed barely a year
of peace since 1792. Bonaparte began to build up his power
by healing the internal discords and conciliating the important
interests, which the zeal or folly of the revolutionists had
provoked in 1792—1795, and again in 1797—1799. His rule
was at once a pledge for order, and a guarantee against a
return of the social and financial abuses of the old regime,
though he at once aimed at restoring all, and more than all,
its absolutism in government.
— The local self-government which the Constitution of 1791
had so fully extended to the Departments, districts, cantons,
and communes, had at once fallen into disrepute owing to the

124

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[CHAP.

total inexperience of those who worked it. Centralisation was.
therefore the tendency under the rule of the secret Committees,
and the Directory (see page 85). Bonaparte emphasized this
reaction towards the old governmental system of ' intendants,'
by a law (1800) which imposed a Prefect and Sub-Prefects on
every Department. These officials, appointed by the central
executive power at Paris, were to control all the local affairs of
their several Departments, and act as "little First Consuls";
while the mayors of the communes, also appointed from Paris,
were to regulate the affairs of the parishes. The elective rural
municipalities, and Directories of Departments, which had
played so important a part in 1790—1793, now became mere
consultative bodies. The principle of election by the people
was now completely subordinated to that of selection by the
Pans Executive, i.e. by Bonaparte.
It is very doubtful whether Bonaparte was sincere in the
informal requests for peace which he sent to George I I I and
the Emperor Francis II. The forces of Austria and Southern
Germany had held their own on the Rhine, and had driven the
French from all Italy except Genoa and its coast-line; while
British squadrons had taken Minorca, were on the point of reducing Malta by blockade, and kept a French army imprisoned
in the sands of Egypt. Peace under such conditions could
only have been damaging to the prestige of Bonaparte's new
rule; but the sending of these overtures for peace—and
again to Francis II after Marengo,—enabled him to pose as
the would-be pacifier of a world weary of strife, while their
rejection speedily rallied around him the warlike enthusiasm
of France.
The Austrians opened the campaign of 1800 by cutting in
twain the French forces which sought to hold the Italian Riviera.
Massena with 18,000 French was shut up in the fortress of
Genoa, which he held with splendid tenacity (April—June).
The victorious Austrian general Melas began to press back the

VII.]

The

Consulate.

125

other French forces on Nice and the line of the R. Var. These'
losses were partly balanced by the victories of Moreau and
Lecourbe over the Austrian and South German forces on the
Rhine and Upper Danube. The military situation in Italy therefore called for all Bonaparte's energies. Echeloning his troops
between Dijon and Geneva so as to leave it doubtful whether
he intended to march to the Upper Danube, or against Melas,
he secretly made his plans for leading his forces over the Great
St Bernard Pass, so as to cut the communications both of the
troops of Melas and of the Austrians besieging Genoa. With
the help of Carnot, now again Minister of War, Bonaparte
organised his army for this dramatic enterprise, which bears the
impress of a spirit at once daring in conception and patient in
the execution of myriads of details. He overcame the gigantic
difficulties of transporting 35,000 men with artillery and
baggage across the Alps, and at the end of May 1800 the
French army, reinforced by 15,000 men who crossed the St.
Gothard, were in the rear of the Austrians. These reduced
Masse'na to surrender Genoa (June 4) ; but their main body now
had to fight to keep open their communications with Mantua
and Tyrol. Concentrating his available forces at and around
Alessandria, Melas began the Battle of Marengo (June 14) by
pushing aside the scattered French divisions which barred his
way. The battle seemed lost to Bonaparte, when Desaix,
coming up with 6,000 men, renewed the fight, and a brilliant
cavalry chaige by Kellermann cut in pieces an Austrian column,
which then laid down its arms. A panic seized the other
Austrian forces, and they rushed wildly for the bridges in their
rear. Melas, with perhaps needless despair, on the next
day ceded to Bonaparte all Italy west of the Mincio, on condition that the Austrian troops should go free to Mantua.
Marengo thus reversed all the successes gained in Italy by
Austria in the war of the Second Coalition, and reduced her to
the limits imposed by the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797.

126

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAR

Bonaparte re-established the Cisalpine Republic, and garrisoned
Piedmont with French troops.
The French arms were equally successful north of the Alps.
Five days after Marengo, Moreau turned the strong defensive
positions held by the Austrians in and around Ulm, and by the
far more important victory of Hohenlinden (Dec. 3) he finally
compelled the Emperor to sue for peace. The Treaty of
Luneville (Feb. 1801), which dissolved the Second Coalition,
was in its main outlines a repetition of that of Campio Formio;
but the independence of the Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian
Republics was guaranteed; and, by secret arrangements with
the Courts of Spain and Vienna, the Hapsburg Grand Duke of
Tuscany was to receive the Archbishopric of Salzburg, while
Tuscany, re-named the Kingdom of Etruria, was to be transferred to the young Duke of Parma. As this young duke was
a scion of the Spanish Bourbon House, Bonaparte received a
secret promise from Madrid that on the completion of this
exchange France should regain from Spain the vast district of
Louisiana, comprising most of the basin of the Mississippi.
By these politic schemes Bonaparte hoped to regain part of the
colonial empire lost by Louis XV. The loss in these exchanges
fell ultimately on Austria and Germany. Central Europe was
again distracted by the question of indemnities for the German
princes, who now lost all hope of their old domains west of the
Rhine. The Duke of Modena was to receive the Breisgau
from the House of Hapsburg. The King of Naples and
Pope Pius VII were left by Bonaparte in the possession of their
States, on condition that they closed them against English
goods.
If Bonaparte had failed in the Marengo campaign, his power
in France would probably have been overthrown by malcontent
Jacobins or royalists. Even as it was, a desperate attempt was
made to take his life by an infernal machine, as he was driving
to the Opera in Paris (Dec. 24 or 3rd Nivose, 1800). Profiting

ll

CENTRAL EUROPE TO ILLUSTRATE THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE (1801)
AND THE SECULARISATIONS (1803)

The, States of The 'Empire,
coloured, irv Hat tints
The, smaller States areleft "wlijtei.
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6 E.af GE.
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Stanford's Geoal Estab!London.

VII.]

The

Consulate,

127

by the general indignation against the Jacobins, who were
hastily supposed to be the authors of this outrage, Bonaparte
demanded a law which should " purge France and also reassure
her." When the police inquiry was beginning to make it clear
that the Jacobins had no hand in the outrage, the servile
Senate, in its capacity of guardian of the constitution, passed a
"senatus-consultum" conferring on Bonaparte summary powers,
by which he at once exiled 130 of the Jacobin leaders to
Cayenne or to the Isle of Oleron; nor were they released
when it was absolutely proved that the attempt on the First
Consul's life was the work of some Breton Chouans, six of
whom were caught and executed.
Not only did Bonaparte disregard the protests of some
members of the Senate, Corps Legislatif and Tribunate against
this gross illegality, but in the early months of 1801 he began
to restrict the already limited powers of the two latter bodies.
Thus, on the pretext of reasons of State, he withheld from them
the details of the national expenditure; and from this time on
to 1814 Bonaparte and his Ministers alone regulated the public
expenditure. The peace with Austria, however, gave him an
opportunity of re-establishing the credit of France, which had
fallen very low since the State bankruptcy of 1797. The duty
of levying the national taxes was now taken from local bodies,
which had little interest in careful collection, and was given to
840 controllers of taxation appointed by the Executive at Paris.
After Luneville new stocks could be issued on favourable terms
on the security of confiscated lands which were as yet unsold;
and these stocks were used to indemnify the State creditors for
what they had lost in the " bankruptcy of the two-thirds" of
1797. The money gain was to the many an ample compensation for the loss of political liberty; and while the bourgeoisie
regarded Bonaparte's rule as a pledge of order and prosperity,
the peasants hailed it as the only security against the return of
feudalism, and the restoration of confiscated lands to their

128

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

former owners. In no sphere of action was Bonaparte so
emphatically the "heir of the 1 evolution" as in that of material
interests; and his keen sense-of the share which hunger had
had in the Revolution is shown by his efforts in time of dearth
to keep the price of bread in Paris artificially cheap, at the
expense of the bakers.
It is an unquestionable though humiliating fact that the
ideal aims of the early revolutionists had never permeated
more than a small minority of the people; and though the
fiery zeal of Mdme. Roland, Condorcet, and Robespierre had
for a time dominated the inert mass, yet, when the enthusiasts
fell a prey to their own dissensions, the less pronounced zealots
were gradually re-absorbed by the apathetic multitude; and
the revolution, which to the many had always been merely a
struggle for individual rights and a higher standard of comfort,
entered on its second chief phase—the endeavour to retain
and consolidate the newly-won privileges and possessions
against the real or fancied hostility of monarchical Europe.
While Bonaparte was consolidating his power in France,
Great Britain had to face a new and formidable maritime
league, at the time when she was losing the support of her chief
ally, and the guidance of her one great statesman, William
Pitt. The same month of Feb. 1801 which saw Austria sign
the Treaty of Luneville with France, was marked by the resignation of Pitt, owing to George I l l ' s vehement opposition to
Catholic Emancipation, and by our preparations for war against
the Armed Neutrality League. This League was formed by
Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and was reluctantly joined by Prussia,
to maintain the rights of neutrals as asserted in the previous
Armed Neutrality League of 1780. Great Britain now again
contended that (1) an enemy's goods might be seized on neutral
merchantmen, (2) that these might be seized when sailing for a
port the blockade of which was merely nominal, (3) that iron,
hemp, timber, pitch, and corn were contraband of war, and

The

VII.]

Consulate.

129

might be seized on a neutral ship under any circumstances,
(4) that a neutral ship might be searched even when convoyed
by a man-of-war. The neutral powers denied these claims, one
and all.
Personal disputes with the Czar Paul tended to embitter
these questions; for while we had relaxed the stringency of our
claims in 1794 and 1798, so far as to allow neutral ships to
trade direct between their country and French colonies, yet we
had given great offence to the Czar Paul by our capture of Malta
(Sept. 1800) which Bonaparte, shortly before its expected
surrender, had presented to him. The Czar had at once seized
some British ships in Russian ports, and almost compelled
Prussia to join the Armed Neutrality League (Dec. 1800).
Our Government, treating its declarations as equivalent to war,
determined to overpower the Danes before their allies could
come up, and so close the entrance to the Baltic. Admirals
Parker and Nelson set sail from Yarmouth Roads, and, aided
by the severe frost which held the northern fleets ice-bound in
their harbours and prevented the construction of batteries on
the Swedish side of the Sound, arrived before Copenhagen
without opposition. Nelson, with twelve sail of the line and a
few frigates, determined, on April 2, 1801, to repeat the tactics
which had been so effective at Aboukir Bay, viz. to crush in
detail the line of 20 heavily-armed anchored hulks which protected the Danish capital. The swift current carried three of
his large ships aground; but, undaunted by this and by " the
most terrible fire of all the battles in which he had been
present," Nelson's ships silenced most of the hulks, though the
forts defied all their efforts. Persisting in his attack, in spite
of Parker's signal to desist, Nelson, by a generous appeal to the
Danes for an armistice, finally put an end to the carnage. The
Danish regent had received private news of the assassination of
the Czar Paul, and gladly accepted an armistice for fourteen
weeks.
F. R.

9

130

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

The caprice, fury, and almost proved insanity of this Czar
had led to the formation of a palace plot for his deposition
in favour of his son Alexander. The conspirators on the night
of March 23, 1801, strove in vain to extort his abdication;
and, fearing the arrival of his guards, they strangled him.
Alexander I, though full of remorse at an end to the plot never
contemplated by him, did not hesitate to reverse the antiEnglish policy of his father; and when our Government yielded
its claims (2), (3), (4) given above, the famous League of the
Neutrals was dissolved (June, 1801). Alexander also surrendered his father's claim to Malta, accepting, however, the
title of Protector of the Knights of St John.
Our maritime supremacy also gained us a signal success in
the Mediterranean. A British force, landing at Aboukir, drove
the French from their entrenchments, though with the loss of
the gallant Abercrombie's life. Aided by Turkish forces, and
by the landing of some sepoys at Suez, our forces compelled
the French to surrender at Alexandria (Aug. 1801), on condition that they should be taken back to France on British
ships. The collections of Egyptian antiquities, made by the
French savants for their government, went to enrich the British
Museum. Another practical result of Bonaparte's Egyptian
Expedition was that our efforts to thwart it had secured our
supremacy in India by the storming of Seringapatam (1799)
and in the Mediterranean by the capture of Malta (1800).
The failure of Nelson's attack on the (first) flotilla at Boulogne
(Aug. 1801), and the pressure successfully put by France and
Spain on our ally Portugal to close her ports to us, showed
that the land power of France was as invulnerable as was our
maritime supremacy. To prolong such a struggle was futile.
Negotiations for peace, were opened at London with the peaceloving Addington Cabinet; the preliminaries were signed Oct. 1,
I8OI_, but five months passed before the Treaty of Amiens was
signed.
Shortly before, or during, this interval several events showed

VII.]

The

Consulate.

T3*

that Bonaparte intended to respect the terms of the Treaty of
Luneville no further than it suited him. Though that Tieaty
stipulated for the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic,
Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics, yet Bonaparte imposed a
new Constitution on the Dutch or Batavian Republic (Sept.
1801) and kept 10,000 French troops in its chief fortresses at
the expense of the Dutch.
Shortly after the assassination of the Czar Paul, who had
championed the interests of the King of Sardinia, Bonaparte
virtually annexed Piedmont. H e also prepared for the Cisalpine Republic a Constitution, which, like that of France, should
unite the form of democracy with an almost unbridled autocracy; and 452 notables of that Republic, invited by Bonaparte
to meet him at Lyons, not only accepted the Constitution, but,
adopting the suggestion given by Talleyrand, offered to Bonaparte the Presidency of their State, now renamed the Italian
Republic (Jan. 25, 1802). Similar changes were soon brought
about in the Ligurian Republic, of which Bonaparte became
the doge; so that he was now master of North Italy.
The Addington Ministry, in its supreme desire for the
conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, did not offer any
firm protest against these interventions of Bonaparte; and
the Treaty of Amiens was signed March 27, 1802, by which
(1) Great Britain retained Ceylon, taken from the Dutch, and
Trinidad, taken from Spain, but restored her other conquests,
the Cape, &c.: (2) France evacuated Naples, and the Roman
territory, and restored Egypt to Turkey: (3) the independence
of the Ionian Isles was acknowledged : (4) Portugal surrendered
a strip of Guiana to France : (5) Great Britain was to restore
Malta and Gozo to the Knights of St John, subject to thirteen
conditions, the chief of which were that the Order should
be reconstituted so as to be independent and for ever neutral
under the guarantee of all the Great Powers, that the British
forces should leave the island within three months, and that it
9—2

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The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era,

[CHAP.

should be garrisoned for one year at least by 2000 troops of
Southern Italy.
These terms were evidently favourable to France; for, in
spite of her losses at sea and in Egypt, she retained all her old
colonies, with a slight addition, while her dependent allies,
Spain and Holland, were made to suffer for her maritime
reverses. The Treaty contained no reference to the state of
the Continent, except that the House of Nassau should receive
adequate compensation for its losses in Holland. This added
one more dispossessed prince as a competitor for German
lands, with the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena and the host of
German nobles driven by the French over the Rhine.
These complicated interests were to be re-adjusted in a
special deputation from the States of the Empire, which from
Aug. 1802 to Feb. 1803 largely altered the map of Central
Europe. The Germanic system, resting on a perfect network
of traditional rights, was revolutionised by the law of the
survival of the fittest and strongest. The example set by the
Eastern Powers with regard to Poland, and improved upon
by Bonaparte at Campo Formio, was now followed in Central
Europe, where the small weak States began to be transformed
or absorbed. The ecclesiastical States, the less important Free
Cities, and even some of the small domains of the Imperial
Free Knights now furnished the ' indemnities' for the losses
sustained by the larger States in the wars against France.
As the extensive territories of the Church in Germany were
now transferred to secular princes, these spoliations were known
by the euphemistic term ' secularisations.' Thus, (1) Austria
consolidated Tyrol by gaining the bishoprics of Trient and
Brixen, while the scions of the Hapsburg House, ousted from
Tuscany and Modena, received respectively the Electorate of
Salzburg with other smaller territories, and the Breisgau.
(2) Prussia, by the acquisition of the sees of Paderborn and
Hildesheim, parts of Miinster and Mainz, & c , in place of

VII.]

The

Cojisulate.

133

Geldern, part of Cleves, and other smaller districts, gained
nearly 400,000 inhabitants in lands nearly contiguous.
(3) Bavaria was more than compensated for her heavy losses
of the Rhenish Palatinate, Julich and other Rhine lands, by
gaining the bishoprics of Wiirzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, and
several Free Cities. (4) Wiirtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Cassel
extended and consolidated their domains at the expense of their
neighbours, and became Electorates of the Empire. (5) The
Princes of Nassau received various ecclesiastical lands opposite
Goblenz and Mainz instead of their once important domains—
the head of the Nassau-Orange branch receiving Fulda and
other church lands in place of his rights in the Netherlands.
The lesser potentates received scant satisfaction, the general
tendency being to strengthen the strong at the expense of the
weak. The Illuminati further gained a striking victory in the
decision of this (Reichs-deputation'
that the property of all
sees, abbeys, and convents was at the full and free disposal of
the secular power for defraying the expenses of public worship,
education, useful institutions, as well as for the relief of the
finances! Nowhere was this policy carried out so fully and
ruthlessly as in that abode of clericalism, Jacobinism, and
bankruptcy, the Electorate of Bavaria, where the ' Illuminat'
Minister Montgelas in 1802—1810 effected almost as complete
a revolution as that of the French National Assemblies. The
new Germanic system of States thus began to rise on the ruins
of free municipal rule and of the temporal power of the Church
in Central and South Germany; and the Emperor shared in
spoliations which tended to strengthen the States of moderate
size, and to emphasize their independence of the Empire and
of Austria. The result was to be seen in the campaign of
Austerlitz and in Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine.
While in Germany the dissolution of the old Imperial
power was accelerated by these revolutionary methods of the
rulers, Bonaparte consolidated his power in France by reducing

134

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

anarchy to order in nearly every department of the national
life. In gratitude to him for having given peace to the world,
the Senate was desirous of prolonging his Consulate for a
second term of ten years after the first term of ten years should
have transpired; but when Bonaparte showed his displeasure
at this paltry gift, Cambaceres suggested to the subservient
Council of State that it should propose to the people by
plebiscite, whether Bonaparte should be Consul for life. Some
three and a half million votes in the affirmative, against about
8000 negatives, showed that France was indifferent to the form
of her government, provided that she gained order at home
and glory abroad (May, 1802); and the Senate—the guardian
of the Republican Constitution—proclaimed him Consul for
life and shortly after gave him power to name his successor.
He thenceforth used his Christian name Napoleon, and began
to restrict those governmental powers which Sieves had
intended to be safeguards for liberty. Thus, in place of the
decimal system of the c lists of notabilities' (see page 121)
there were now to be 'electoral colleges' consisting of electors
appointed for life. The Senate was now (June—Aug. 1802) to
have power to dissolve the Corps Legislatif and the Tribunate;
and the new Senators were to be chosen by Napoleon and
not by co-optation. The Tribunate, which had occasionally
ventured to criticise the government, was now reduced to fifty
members, deliberating secretly and in five separate sections;
while Napoleon withheld from these so-called representative
bodies the yearly budgets and treaties with foreign powers.
A comparison of the Constitutions of 1791, 1793, 1795,
1799, and 1802 will show how rapidly France passed from
rule by one all-poweiful Assembly to a monarchy absolute in
all but name—from a complete control of the Executive by
the Legislature to as absolute a supremacy of the former.
The thoughtful student will observe the fundamental and irresistible force in this extraordinary reaction to be the supreme

VII.]

The

Consulate.

135

need for a strong Executive in any great military State. In
fact, the means, which in 1799 and 1802 ensured the supremacy
of the Executive over the Legislature, may be summed up in
the phrase ' divide et impera*
It will be convenient to consider here the civil institutions
of the years 1801—1804, which form the most solid and
lasting tribute to Napoleon's genius. The means by which
he curbed local government and restored the national finances
have been noted above. It was equally important to heal the
religious schism which had been caused by the iconoclastic
zeal of the revolutionists, and by their desire to completely
subject the Church to the State. Bonaparte had annulled
the persecuting policy revived in Fructidor (1797); but public
worship was as yet only tolerated, not recognised; the 'constitutional' clergy were looked upon by the orthodox or * nonjuring' clergy as renegades from the Roman Catholic Church;
and the schism rent French society in twain. Bonaparte felt
the need of religious peace, and foresaw the prestige which
he would gain as 'restorer of the altars' and nominator of
the bishops. After long discussions with the Papal See and
its envoy, the famous compromise called the Concordat was
finally signed (July, 1801). By it the Papacy resigned all
claims to the Church lands confiscated during the revolution,
even to those few which were still unsold. In return the
Government of the Republic recognised that " t h e Catholic
Apostolic and Roman faith is the religion of the great majority
of French citizens "—as well as of the Consuls : all the French
bishops were to resign, or to be deposed if they refused; and
Bonaparte, as Chief of the State, was to nominate the bishops
fairly from both parties; the 'constitutionals' were to be
received back into the Church by canonic rites, those who
had married having first put away their wives: the new bishops
were then to similarly re-instate the curis or parish priests.
Church discipline was to be regulated by the State, which

136

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

promised to pay bishops and cures nearly the same stipends
as those proposed by Mirabeau in 1789. These promises
were not strictly kept by Bonaparte; but, by healing the
schism, he soon made the clergy his interested and docile
supporters; and many of the clerics prominent during the
revolution had to give their countenance to the new Imperial catechism which taught children that " t o honour our
Emperor and to serve him is therefore to honour and serve
God Himself." At Easter, 1802, Bonaparte and the chief
officials attended mass at Notre Dame, and a Te Deum was
sung to celebrate the return of religious peace and order—
" t h e most brilliant victory which could possibly be gained
over the revolutionary spirit."
An equally politic and more generous measure was that
which cancelled (April, 1802) all decrees and laws which kept
very many suspects out of France as emigres. Most of these
were of noble or wealthy families; and with some few exceptions they were now, in spite of some qualms of conscience
in the Senate, to be allowed to return to France^though their
estates were not restored. As Mdme de Stael said, the
"priests and nobles were to be the caryatides of Napoleon's
future throne." These two measures cut the ground from under
the Bourbon princes, who now began to despair of ever reigning
in France. Bonaparte's success equally enraged the older
revolutionary generals, twelve of whom (so he said to Chaptal)
made a secret treaty " to divide France into twelve provinces,
generously leaving me Paris and its vicinity. Massena was
named to bring it to me. He refused, saying that he would
in that case come out from the Tuileries, only to be shot by
my guard. H e knew me well!" Whether this be true or false,
it is certain that Bonaparte ever distrusted his chief generals
except Berthier, Duroc, and Junot.
The keen mind of the First Consul discerned in education
a potent means for attaching the youth oi France to his rule.

VII.]

The

Consulate.

137

The splendid scheme of national education, drawn up by the
Convention during the Reign of Terror, had never taken deep
hold on France. The primary or elementary schools were now
very few in number: there were only 102 ecoles centrales, where
more advanced instruction was given; and the ecoles snperieures,
for higher education, were doing little work. Grand as had been
the aims of Condorcet and his co-workers, they had really
effected little more than the destruction of the old clerical
education. Bonaparte had, therefore, a vast field for his
energies in re-organising (1802) the education of France. The
expense of elementary instruction was now made the reason
for delegating it to the local authorities, who had also to supervise and control all the private schools in their districts. Practically, very little was done for , elementary education; but
secondary education received a very characteristic development.
The 30 most successful ecoles centrales were now re-organised
as fycees, where the pupils were to be drilled and trained in
semi-military fashion, the lessons beginning and ending with
the roll of drums; and, to bind these new schools as closely as
possible to the State, 6000 pupils, called "pupils of the nation,"
were to receive their education free, most of these being sons
of deserving soldiers and officials selected by Bonaparte himself. Technical and special schools were also soon founded;
and we may notice here that later on Bonaparte completed
his autocratic system of education by founding (1806) the
University of France, organised in 17 Academies—one at Paris,
the others at large provincial centres—to control all the public
education of France in accord with his own will. Education,
which had been up to 1790 in the hands of the clergy, became
a powerful tool of the new State.
Another creation of the year 1802 revealed Bonaparte's
ulterior aims. By the Legion of Honour he began to construct
a new aristocracy as a reward for services rendered to the State,
classed in various grades of merit, and comprising in all some

138

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

6800 members named for life. The sharp opposition to this
departure from social equality, offered by the Tribunate, led to
the curtailment of its functions, as above described.
The most lasting work of this period was the Civil Code
(1800—1804), which reduced to order and harmony the best
of the laws and social customs established by the revolution.
In place of the complex tangle of Frankish or Roman, royal,
provincial, and seigneurial laws and customs, a committee of
the Convention had begun to construct one legal system for
all France, based on principles of personal liberty and social
equality, as far as these could be harmonised. A perfect mania
for legislation had characterised the first three National Assemblies. Bonaparte, after stilling the clamorous and often useless
debates, now, with his usual stern common sense, summed up
their chief results by means of a small committee of experts.
In 1800 he commissioned four jurists to complete the gigantic
work, and often brought his own powers of incisive thought and
trenchant expression to emphasize or simplify their phraseology.
With a few subsequent additions in 1807, it was then renamed
the Code Napoleon, and forms the basis of present French law.
In 2281 articles it regulated French life in its legal aspect—civil
rights and duties, marriage, divorce (wherein it restricted the
facilities granted by revolutionary customs), the mutual duties
and rights of parents and children, guardians and wards, & c :
it also continued the law of compulsory equal division of
property among the.children of a family, which has tended to
equalise wealth but check the growth of population in France.
Other codes of civil procedure, commerce, criminal instruction,
and penal laws, soon followed; and very many of these laws
extended to the whole of Italy, southern and central Germany,
and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It is in the domain of law
that the principles of the revolution—as modified by these
codes—have gained their most lasting conquests over the
chaotic systems of nearly half of the Continent; for Switzerland,

VII.]

The

Constitute.

139

Prussia, and Spain followed the lead of France. (See Chap.
IX.)

Napoleon's name will always be associated with many great
public works in France. The construction of canals joining
her chief river systems, and of good roads on the left bank of
the Rhine, along the Riviera, and over the Simplon and other
Alpine passes, served to promote commerce and to protect the
new boundaries of France; while the commencement of the
great breakwater at Cherbourg, planned by Vauban, served as
a menace to England. The previous abolition of the monasteries and convents had made it possible almost to rebuild
many parts of Paris and other large towns. The Rue de Rivoli,
the conversion of the old palace of the Louvre into a great
museum and art-gallery, and (later on) the construction of
several bridges over the Seine, and of the Arc de Triomphe,
gave a new splendour to the French capital. After the sordid
misery of 1793—1795 and 1797—1799, the new policy of
panem et circenses was completely successful.
Bonaparte determined to revive the French colonial Empire
not only by the acquisition of Louisiana from Spain, but also by
the re-conquest of Hayti or San Domingo, which a French
expedition effected in May 1802. The gifted negro ruler,
Toussaint l'Ouverture, was sent to perish in a cold dungeon
in France; but in Dec. 1803 the negroes regained their independence. The First Consul also sent out men-of-war to
survey the south coast of Australia for a settlement; and an
old French map gives to that land and its chief inlet the names
1
Terre Napoteon' and 'Gotfe Josephine?
Such was Napoleon's success in healing the wounds left
by the revolution, and in stilling the strifes of the factions,
that the year 1793 seemed (wrote Chaptal) to have faded into
the past as completely as the events of Greece and Rome.
In all this many-sided activity, only one parallel to which can
be found in all history, the First Consul figured not only as

140

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

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[CHAP.

the "heir to the revolution," but the restorer of autocracy.
Though the social basis of France remained revolutionary, yet
the new centralisation of rule, the restriction of political liberty,
the vigorous impulse given to useful and splendid public
works, and the restoration of the colonial empire lost by
Louis XV, all marked a return to the methods of Louis XIV
and Colbert. Nay more ! France, after having thrown off
the feudalism imposed by the Franks, was now ripe for a far
vaster experiment—a return to the Romano-Gallic ideal of
equal citizenship in one great State controlled and safeguarded
by an enlightened Csesarism. To the duties of Rousseau's
ideal dictator Napoleon was now adding the functions of a
Caesar restrained by no scruples from assuming the crown.
As there is a wide-spread belief that Napoleon was entirely
occupied by these pacific undertakings, and was only forced
into war by ' perfidious Albion,' it will be well to examine
carefully the causes of the renewal of war in 1803. It has
been noted above (pages 130—131) that the Peace of Amiens
was due chiefly to the facts that both combatants were wearied
by the long fight, that neither could now materially injure the
other, and that the pacific Addington Cabinet was- disposed to
overlook the interventions of the First Consul in the affairs of
Holland and northern Italy. But when, after the signature
of the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon kept his troops in Holland
and in the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, in violation of
the Treaty of Luneville, the British Government in Nov.
1802 charged its ambassador at Paris, Lord Whitworth, to
protest against these acts, as also against the definitive incorporation of Piedmont in France (Sept. 1802) and the
renunciation of the Duchy of Parma in favour of France,
which last had been kept secret at the time of signing the
Peace of Amiens. Moreover, Napoleon's refusal to make any
treaty of commerce with England kept English goods out of
every land subject to his will, such as Holland and NorLh
i

VII.]

The Const date.

141

and Central Italy; and British manufactures and commerce
suffered as much as during the war from a policy which foreshadowed the Continental System \
Civil strifes in Switzerland, perhaps fomented by French
influence, gave Bonaparte an excuse for sending an army there
and imposing his will as ' Mediator.' In a speech which
startled the Swiss deputies by its vigour of thought and intimate
knowledge of their affairs, Bonaparte proved that the associations of the past and the physical conditions traced by nature
herself, declared against the rigorous centralisation decreed by
the French Directory in 1798 and called for a return to the old
government by the cantons. The Act of Mediation (March,
1803) restored to the cantons, now 19 in number, most of their
old powers; but Napoleon as 'Mediator' was careful to gain
the upper hand in the central government; and the seigniories
and suzerainties of the old governing families were not revived.
Here again, then, we find the principle of divide et imfiera
successfully applied; and the cantons had to furnish levies
of troops to their ' Mediator' for his wars. A short time
previously, canton Valais had been detached from the federation, ostensibly to form an ' independent republic,'but really
to secure a completer control to France of the Simplon road
into Northern Italy. Austria and Germany were too much
engaged in the scramble for the 'ecclesiastical lands' to join
England in her protest agamst this perpetuation of French
influence in Switzerland; and Napoleon proudly said, " It is
recognised in Europe that Italy, Holland, and Switzerland, are
at the disposal of France."
When angry newspaper articles were appearing on both
sides of the Channel on these and other questions, the
French Moniteur published (Jan. 30, 1803) the official report
1
I have discussed the importance of commercial affairs at that time and
Bonaparte's plan for the invasion of England in an article entitled "Napoleon and British Commerce" in the English Historical Review for Oct. 1893.

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[CHAP.

of Colonel Sebastiani's 'commercial mission' to the East.
It stated that the Ionian Isles would willingly receive the
French again, and that 6000 French troops could easily reconquer Egypt. By the beginning of March, British troops
had evacuated the Cape and also Egypt; but, as war seemed
imminent, they were retained at Malta. The technical excuse
for this was that the guarantee for the neutrality of Malta had
not as yet been given by Prussia and Russia; but the real
reason for our clinging to Malta was that, after evacuating
the Cape and Egypt, we should have no hold on either route
to India, if the threatening war-cloud burst; and the British
Government declared that it could not entertain the idea of
abandoning Malta unless it received a satisfactory explanation
about the threats contained in Sebastiani's report. That
Sebastiani's mission and report were regarded in well-informed
circles in Paris as the chief cause of war, is clear from a
vehement expression of Joseph Bonaparte to Miot de Melito:
— " Let him (Napoleon) once more drench Europe with blood
in a war which he could have avoided, and which, but for the
outrageous mission on which he sent his Sebastiani, would
never have occurred." After our army and navy had been
strengthened by votes in Parliament (March 8—9), Napoleon
had a ' scene' with Lord Whitworth, the importance of which
has been much exaggerated. Insults to ambassadors are very
rarely the sole cause of war. The casus belli arose out of the
need of safeguarding one of our routes to the East. The
Addington Cabinet, on April 26, demanded as a set-off to
French interventions and annexations [a) the occupation of
Malta by our troops for ten years: (b) the evacuation of
Holland and Switzerland by the French troops: (c) an indemnity to the king of Sardinia for the loss of Piedmont:
(d) our acquisition of the Isle of Lampedusa; whereupon (e)
England would recognise the Kingdom of Etruria and the
new Italian Republic, &c. Though these claims may appear

VII.]

The

Consulate.

143

excessive, yet they were really small compared with the gains
effected by Napoleon since the peace, and he had recently
admitted the right of our government to some ' compensation.'
Besides this, the Addington Ministry had seen its previous
mistake in being too pliable, and was now determined not to
yield all the stepping-stones to the East. The Cape and
nearly all Italy were virtually in the hands of the French;
and there was no doubt that the policy of 1798 would be
renewed if England gave up Malta, the key of the Mediterranean. A review of all the evidence shows that, while after
April 1803 we were technically guilty of violating the Treaty
of Amiens by holding Malta, yet the policy of Napoleon
compelled us to do so, if we were not to see both routes to
India fall into his hands. Both sides were inexorable on the
chief points at issue; and Lord Whitworth left Calais May 17,
1803, at the same time that the French ambassador left
England. Napoleon showed his rancour by ordering some
8000 or 10,000 English travellers in France to be kept
prisoners; and most of them were detained until 1814.
Thus began the mighty struggle which was to extend to
all the Continent, revolutionise its social systems, and, after
arraying the land power against the sea power, finally end in
the victory of Great Britain and the rising nationalities of
Europe. On the renewal of war, England was in a far worse
position relatively to Napoleon than in 1801. We had restored
all our maritime conquests except Ceylon, Trinidad and Malta;
while Napoleon now had control over the French and Dutch
colonies restored by us at the peace, as also over Holland,
Switzerland, Elba, and most of Italy. The sale of Louisiana
to the United States for ^3,200,000, the annual revenue from
North Italy, and subsidies which Spain and even Portugal were
secretly compelled to pay, relieved Napoleon from entire
dependence on French taxation; and two French armies were
at once sent to seize and occupy the chief positions in Naples

144

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[CHAP.

and Hanover, at the expense of those territories. Prussia was
too much occupied in profitable exchanges of German land
to forcibly resent this violation of North German neutrality,
which closed the Elbe and the Weser to British trade; and
Napoleon ere long made skilful use of his seizure of Hanover
to separate Prussia from England. Russia and Austria were
deeply incensed at the French violation of the neutrality of
northern Germany and southern Italy; but for the present
they awaited an opportunity for effective intervention. The
payment of a subsidy by Spain to France having become
known to our Government, it ordered Spanish treasure ships
to be seized on their way to Spain; and this high-handed
action on our part led to the active hostility of Spain from
Dec. 1804 on to the middle of 1808. Thus skilfully did
Napoleon use his supremacy on land, not only to save his own
revenue, but to separate us from our old allies in the previous
wars against France. By these beginnings of the Continental
System, our goods were soon shut out from nearly all central
and southern Europe; and the doom of the ' nation of shopkeepers ' seemed assured.
This commercial war could not by itself satisfy the ardent
nature of the First Consul. H e must, if possible, strike at
England's heart. In a progress, made with regal pomp, in
Belgium and the north of France he ordered the construction
of a great port and arsenal at Antwerp, the assembly of a host
of some 120,000 men near the north coast of France, and the
building of more than 1200 large flat-bottomed boats, to transport his men from Boulogne and neighbouring ports to the
coast of Kent. But though the resources of Holland, Belgium
and North France were pressed into his service, yet the progress
was slow; for the type of boat and the size of the cannon had
to be altered to secure stability in a sea way. Indeed, in spite
of constant practice, it was found that the embarkation of the
troops could not be managed in one t i d e ; and the currents

The

VII.]

Consulate.

145

of the Strait drove the heavy boats far out of their direct
course. The Ameiican inventor, Fulton, whose steamboat
was three years later to be a practical success, came to
Boulogne to offer his as yet untried invention for the flotilla,
but was "peremptorily repulsed." How different might have
been the course of history if the invention had come a few
years earlier and had been used by Napoleon!
Even as it was, the menace of invasion served to put
England to ruinous expense in preparing a national defence;
but our people, not trusting alone to the increase of the regular
forces, thronged to join the volunteer regiments, everywhere
being raised as in the years 1794—1798.
" N o parleying now! In Britain is one breath:
We all are with you now fiom shore to shore.
Ye men of Kent, 'tis victory or death."

These lines of Wordsworth written in Oct. 1803 expressed the
growth of a larger British feeling, in which Whigs and Tories,
Scots and English, all joined. It was felt that the Addington
Ministry was unequal to the strain of responsibility.
Pitt
returned to power (May, 1804), and only George I l l ' s prejudice
against Fox prevented his inclusion in what would then have
been a broadly national and non-partisan Ministry. Even so,
the British Ministries up to 1807 were coalition rather than
party Ministries.
On the other side of the Channel this same month of May,
1804, showed the influence of a great war in stilling party
strifes and in raising to supreme power the one necessary man.
Napoleon had already gained immense prestige as the champion
of injured French honour and virtue against 'perfidious Albion';
and a further incident enabled him now to don the imperial
purple. That evil genius of the Bourbon House, the Comte
d'Artois, had, with other reactionary French nobles in London,
concocted a plot by which Georges Cadoudal, the Breton leader,
and the royalist General Pichegru were to proceed secretly to
F. R.

10

146

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Paris and take the life of the First Consul. But too many
were in the secret. One of the Chouan suspects, when arrested
and threatened with execution, revealed the details of the plot.
Pichegru, Cadoudal, and others were seized; and on the
information of some of these that Moreau had had several
interviews with Pichegru and one at least with Cadoudal, he
too was arrested. At the beginning of the trial Pichegru was
found strangled in prison, probably by his own hand. The
complete frustration of the plot was far from satisfying
Napoleon. Unable to catch the Comte d'Artois, he now
resolved to strike terror into all his foes by an exhibition of
the Corsican vendetta against some Bourbon prince. French
horsemen, crossing the Rhine by night, kidnapped the young
Due d'Enghien, then residing in Baden, and hurried him to
Vincennes, there to be tried by a commission of French
colonels. On their request that the duke's prayer for an interview with the First Consul should be granted, Savary, who
was in Napoleon's confidence and had received special orders
through Murat, forced on the execution; and the last scion
of the great Conde was shot four hours before any sentence
was officially passed by the commission (March 21). The
indignation which this brutal murder aroused throughout
Europe, found little open expression in France. Indeed, the
old revolutionists welcomed the deed as for ever cutting off
Napoleon from the royalist party, and the holders of confiscated
lands felt his rule to be more than ever a guarantee against
retrocession to their former owners. It must be distinctly
noticed that the hereditary principle was most strongly supported
by the old revolutionists as well as by all who dreaded the
return of Louis X V I I I as likely to endanger their lives or their
property. The recent danger to the First Consul's life was
used by prefects and servile officials as a pretext for sending
up addresses and petitions that he would establish a dynasty,
and so "guarantee France for the future." The Senate—the

VII.]

The

Consulate.

H7

guardian of the Republican Constitution—accordingly passed
a Senatus-consultum decreeing to Napoleon the title of Emperor
of the French (May 18, 1804).
The two other Consuls now became arch-chancellor and
arch-treasurer; all Napoleon's relatives became grand dignitaries
of the Empire, the succession devolving upon Joseph in default
of a direct heir; the term hitherto used in address, ' citizen/
was discontinued, as harmonising ill with the new imperial
pomp, and the revolutionary calendar was quietly dropped on
Jan. 1, 1806. The most serviceable or pliable generals were
rewarded with the title of marshals, though brusque or ardently
republican soldiers, as Macdonald and St Cyr, did not as yet
share this honour. There was another contrast still more
glaring. In spite of the want of any definite proof, Moreau
was soon found guilty of conniving at the royalist plot; but
by Napoleon's imperial clemency he was allowed to retire
to America. The careers of Moreau and Napoleon illustrate
the superiority in revolutionary crises of keen foresight and
Macchiavellian intrigue over military genius alone.
In accordance with the policy of the ' Concordat/ the Pope,
Pius VII, was invited to assist at Napoleon's coronation at
Notre Dame, Dec. 2, 1804; but when he was about to crown
the Emperor, the latter, gently repelling him, placed the crown
on his own head, and then on that of Josephine. Incidents
like this and the murder of the Due d'Enghien enabled many
of his subjects to believe that they were still ' revolutionary/
but only one prominent Frenchman, Carnot, accepted voluntary
exile rather than recognise the Empire.

IO—2

CHAPTER VIII.
NAPOLEON AND THE OLD GOVERNMENTS.
" I t was chiefly in the dilatoriness and blunders of the other Governments
that Napoleon found his greatest strength."—FOUCHE.

T H E history of Napoleon now becomes, for twelve momen-.
tous years, the history of mankind. His arms, directly or indirectly, revolutionise the political and social systems of central
and southern Europe. By consummate military genius and
organising power, he seeks to weld the Continent into one vast
State and humble the mistress of the seas; but he is finally
baffled by British persistence and industrial skill, by Spanish
pride, and by Russian immobility. In the struggle the States and
social systems of modern Europe are evolved. Across the seas
the English race is left free to extend westward across the
Mississippi, to occupy the best parts of Australia, and to consolidate its supremacy in India; while the immunity of Great
Britain from internal war and revolution enables her to carry
on the new mechanical inventions of Watt, Arkwright, Cartwright, and others, to become the workshop of the world, and
the only cheap source of supply for the devastated Continent.
Napoleon's violation of the neutrality of Baden in order to
wreak his vengeance on the due d'Enghien had an effect on
the European situation similar to that which the execution of
Louis XVI had exercised in 1793. Both events hastened the
formation of coalitions which would otherwise have been

CHAP, VIII.] Napoleon

and

the old Governments.

149

formed more tardily to resist the encroachments of France.
Both coalitions suffered in their inception and finally fell to
pieces mainly owing to the aggrandising schemes of some of
their chief members. In 1804 the fear of Napoleon so paralysed
the rulers of Central and Southern Europe, that there was
some disposition to condone his late outrage and to overlook
his military occupation of Switzerland, Northern Italy, Holland
and Hanover. Events soon showed that only distant Powers,
Russia and Sweden, dared to stand forth as the champions of
the law of nations. Russian and Swedish notes to the old
Imperial Diet at Ratisbon, protesting against the violation of
German territory, met with the most timid response from
that effete body. Prussia soon recognised Napoleon's Imperial
title; and diplomatic pressure from Paris drew from Francis I I
a similar recognition, subject to the condition that an Imperial title should be for ever held by the House of Hapsburg in
its hereditary States. The House of Hapsburg, still the possessor of the elective Imperial dignity, which it felt to be little
more than honorary, now showed its desire to consolidate its
motley States in one hereditary Empire, the name of which
should indicate the connection of the House of Hapsburg with
the old Holy Roman Empire, and with the Archduchy of Austria.
Francis therefore took (Aug. 1804) the title of Francis I,
Hereditary Emperor of Austria, an innovation fatal to the traditions of the old Empire, which had been undermined in the
previous year by the revolutionary policy of the Hapsburgs
and Hohenzollerns. The Courts of Vienna and Berlin were,
indeed, far more desirous of consolidating their newly-won
States, than of risking them in conflicts with the prodigious
power of Napoleon. The cause of European independence
therefore passed to a worthier champion, the young Czar.
Alexander I, suddenly raised at the age of twenty-four to
the throne by the plot which ended with the murder of his
father Paul I (March, 1801), was desirous of carrying out the

150

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

reforming ideas imparted by his Swiss tutor, Laharpe. Ardent,
impressionable, and full of enthusiasm for the principles of the
French Revolution, he had hailed with joy the advent of
Bonaparte to power, as consolidating the new French State;
and, while making peace with England in 1801, he had sought
the alliance of France and the personal friendship of the First
Consul. The events of 1802—3, however, soon showed him
that Bonaparte was no sincere friend of liberty. The persistent
maintenance of French influence in Holland and Switzerland,
the annexation of Parma and Piedmont, and the assumption
by Bonaparte of the Consulate for life, severed their friendship; and a slight to the Russian ambassador at Paris nearly
led to an open rupture in the autumn of 1803. The seizure
and murder of the due d'Enghien drew from the Russian
Embassy a spirited protest against this "gratuitous and manifest violation of the rights of nations," and the Court of St
Petersburg went into mourning to mark the Czar's indignation
at the outrage.
Laharpe, and another loved and trusty friend, the Polish
Prince Czartoryski, now the Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs (1803—1806), concurred in urging on Alexander the
duty and the wisdom of championing the principles of 1789
against Napoleon. Alexander's chief aims were set forth in the
instructions (Sept. 11, 1804) to the Russian envoy sent to
London for a preliminary understanding with our Government.
The coalescing States, "in order to restrain the French power
within just limits," must snatch from France her most effective
weapon—"the idea that her cause is that of liberty and the
prosperity of the peoples." The first object of the league
should be " t o deliver from Napoleon's yoke the peoples whom
he oppressed"; the next "to free France from the despotism
under which she groaned, to leave her the free choice of the
government which she would choose." All European Governments should aim at nothing but "the greatest welfare of their

vin.]

Napoleon

and the old Governments.

151

subjects"; and after the war, a Congress should arrange the basis
for a new European Federation. In these ideas of the young
Czar, the Swiss idealist, and the Polish nationalist we see the
chief aims of Alexander's policy in the Third and Fourth Coalitions and in his unfortunate Holy Alliance formed in 1815. It
is needless to remark that the practical statesmen at Vienna
and London never shared the Czar's generous enthusiasm for
constitutional principles, while they secretly distrusted him for
the fickleness and love of finesse which marred an otherwise
noble character. Furthermore, Czartoryski's secret intention
of crowning Alexander king of a constitutional Polish State
became known to Prussia, which then held all the Polish lands
between Silesia and the R. Niemen. Indeed, the Russian
State papers reveal his design of extending the Russo-Polish
frontier to the Vistula, with compensations for Austria and
Prussia in West and North-west Germany respectively, even
Holland being named for the latter Power! Moreover, Russian forces were holding the Ionian Isles and some positions
on the Albanian coast; and in the distracted state of the
Turkish Empire it would be easy to gain the support of the
Greek Christians and commence a partition of Turkey with
Austrian aid, which was soon offered by the Court of Vienna.
It was thus a strange mixture of generous and ambitious motives
which impelled Alexander to take the initiative in forming a
new Coalition.
As there is a prevalent misconception that the Third Coalition
was "built up by Pitt's gold," attention must be called to the
fact that definite overtures for an Anglo-Russian alliance were
handed in at London on June 26, 1804, when the English
Ministry was framing its proposals for a league with Russia
and Sweden. Indeed, the Swedish King, Gustavus IV, in a
prolonged tour through Germany, so openly endeavoured to
form a league of the old Governments, that a plot, which nearly
succeeded, was laid by the French police to carry him offfiom

152

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Munich. The negotiations between the three northern Powers
progressed very slowly. Russia desired us to waive our claims
respecting neutral commerce, and to give up Malta, both of
which we refused. The Swedish king wished the restoration
of the Bourbons to be the avowed aim of the Coalition, to
which Russia and England equally demurred. The rumour of
an Austro-Russian scheme for partitioning Turkey aroused
English suspicions; and before satisfying the exorbitant claims
of our future allies for British subsidies, we desired to know full
details of Russo-Austrian policy. A preliminary agreement
between those Powers (Nov. 1804) merely offered the Czar's
help if Austria should be attacked by Napoleon, but did not
commit that timid Government to any definite alliance. The
Anglo-Swedish and the Russo-Swedish Conventions remained a
dead-letter until the autumn of 1805, owing to Gustavus' desire
for a crusade on behalf of the Bourbons, and his extravagant
claim for an English subsidy. The Anglo-Russian negotiations
were interrupted by the Czar's indignation at our treatment of
Spain (see p. 144), while Pitt objected to some of the Russian
plans for the future of Europe. Finally, without the knowledge
of Austria, an Anglo-Russian Convention was signed at St
Petersburg (April 11, 1805), aiming at the formation of a general
league of the European States to compel Napoleon to withdraw
his troops from Italy, North Germany, Holland and Switzerland,
restore full liberty of action to the two last-named republics,
and reinstate the king of Sardinia in his continental possessions.
' Barrier States' were to be formed between France and her
weaker neighbours; but France was not to be compelled to
change her form of government. Any towns or districts occupied by the allies were to be held in the name of the country
to which they rightfully belonged; and at the end of the war a
Congress of the Powers was to endeavour to form a European
Federal System based on the rights of nations. As to means,
it was hoped that Russia and Austria would raise at least

VIII.]

Napoleon

and the old Governments.

153

400,000 men; and England engaged to support the continental
struggle by yearly subsidies of ; £ i , 250,000 for every 100,000
troops actively engaged.
Differences of opinion between
England and Russia as to the reconstruction of Europe, and
still more the Czar's demand that we should restore Malta to
the Knights of St John and mitigate our maritime code, delayed
for three months the ratification of this agreement as a definite
treaty, Alexander finally waiving these claims, with a formal
protest.
The chief obstacle, however, to the formation of the Coalition was the ambiguous policy of the Berlin Court. Distracted
between annoyance at the French occupation of Hanover, and
the alluring offers from Paris of its cession to Prussia, Frederick
William I I I finally decided on a policy of neutrality in the
impending strife. H e and his Gallophil Ministers foresaw a
balance of profit to Prussia from that policy of friendly
neutrality towards France which had brought so many gains
since 1795. Moreover, English treatment of neutral ships caused
constant friction between London and Berlin; and the Prussian
Court rightly distrusted the Polish schemes of the Russian
Minister, Czartoryski. From Paris came the friendliest overtures; for Napoleon then desired a Franco-Prussian alliance as
a set-off to the impending Coalition. The French party would
probably have prevailed in the councils of Berlin had not
Prussian supremacy in Northern Germany been insulted by the
seizure of the British envoy, Sir G. Rumbold, in Hamburg by
French gensdarmes (Oct. 1804). Frederick William at once
wrote to Napoleon asking for his release as a proof of the
French Emperor's "friendship and high consideration...a seal
on the past, and a pledge for the future." Though Napoleon
grudgingly released Sir G. Rumbold and renewed the offer of
Hanover, yet Frederick William now remained neutral.—" He
will declare for the side which offers the most chances of safety
with the least exertion"—was the comment of Metternich, then

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and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Austrian ambassador at Berlin; and all the efforts and menaces
of the Czar failed to draw Prussia from a neutrality fatal first
to the allies, and a year later to herself.
It remained to draw Austria into the Anglo-Russian
alliance. Though her ablest general, the Archduke Charles,
declared it madness to undertake a war before the spring of
1806, yet pressure from Russia, and the offer of four months'
preliminary subsidy from England, caused her to hurry on her
military reorganisation under the incompetent and self-satisfied
General Mack. Finally the provocations which she received
from Napoleon in Italy decided Austria to join the AngloRussian alliance.
It is indisputable that the French Emperor took no step to
avert the war of the Third Coalition, and many steps to provoke it. In March, 1805, he made the constitution of the
Batavian Republic more autocratic; and while Alexander's
envoy was journeying to Paris with the final demands of the
allies for the independence of Holland and Italy, Napoleon
crowned himself King of Italy in Milan Cathedral with the
iron crown of the old Lombard kings (May 26, 1805), and
annexed the Genoese Republic to his Empire. French
memoirs agree with the records of diplomacy in attributing to
Napoleon's aggressions the tremendous wars which followed.
At a meeting of the Council of State (Jan. 1805), at which the
memoir-writer Miot de Melito was present, Napoleon justified
the expense of the Boulogne forces as giving him "fully twenty
days' start over all enemies."—"A pretext had to be found
for raising them and bringing them together without alarming
the Continental Powers; and that pretext was afforded me
by the intended descent on England." Fouche, Minister of
Police, also states that on the Council protesting against
his projected title of King of Italy, Napoleon replied—
" I must have battles and triumphs...I shall be able to strike
the blow before the old coalition machines are ready." Indeed,

VIII.]

Napoleon and the old Governments.

155

the French Emperor desired a diversion from the struggle
against England 'nullos habitura triumphos.'
Sure of the
support of Baden, Wiirtemberg and Bavaria, and of the neutrality of Prussia, he could also rely on troops accustomed to
victory, and fully equal in number to the allied forces. France
was throbbing with the vigour of life renewed, while Central
Europe had but just passed through a political revolution. No
time was better for a conflict which he professed to regard as
inevitable; for "old dynasties put up with new ones only as
long as they fear them."
This brief recital will suffice to show that the tremendous
war begun in 1805 cannot be called a war of political principles. Indeed, the cant about a crusade for liberty, which had
figured largely even in the later revolutionary wars, was now
dropped at Paris. On the other hand, the aims of Alexander and
Czartoryski were far from being disinterested; yet the success of
the allies might perhaps have led to a reconstruction of Europe
more favourable to popular desires than that of 1815, when
compensation for the fearful losses of warfare overrode more
generous considerations. A study of the formation of the
Third Coalition also reveals the hollowness of the agreement:
eight years of disunion and disaster were needed to bring the
allies to any practicable compromise of their interests. The
possible alternatives before Europe in 1805 were a federation
of the old Governments, with some approach to constitutional
principles, or the overthrow of those Governments by Napoleon
applying abroad the revolutionary methods which he had suppressed in France. The victory of the Coalition could have
led to little more than a political readjustment of Europe
carried out in the spirit of Frederick the Great; whereas Napoleon's triumphs at Austerlitz and Jena were destined, not
merely to change the map of Central Europe, but also to
revolutionise the structure of its society.
The plan of campaign drawn up at St Petersburg aimed at

156

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

attacking Napoleon with " a t least 400,000 men," mainly
through Bavaria. A Russo-Swedish force acting from Stralsund with " a t least 10,000 British troops," was to drive the
French from northern Germany; while an Anglo-Russian force
was to free southern and central Italy. These schemes were
marred by the obstinate neutrality of Prussia, by the inability
of the English War Office to send troops until the need for
them was past, and most of all by the nervous precipitation
with which Austria rushed alone into the fray. The war began
with the invasion of Bavaria by 80,000 Austrians under General
Mack (Sept. 8, 1805). The Court of Vienna, ever desirous of
uniting its scattered Swabian lands by that annexation of
Bavaria which the combined Powers secretly contemplated, now
hoped to overpower the Elector's army—since Aug. 24 allied
to the French—before the latter could come to its succour.
Mack therefore hastily led his troops up the Danube valley,
but failed to surround the Bavarians, who retreated north to join
the French columns marching southward from Hanover. Foiled
in his first attempt, Mack encamped most of his troops around
Ulm, from which fortress as his base of operations he proposed
to set about the invasion of France, as soon as Napoleon
should have crossed the Straits of Dover. The French
Emperor, however, was not concerned only with his schemes
against England. Without relying too much on his later assertion to Metternich—" the army at Boulogne was always an
army against Austria"—it is obvious that persistence in a
scheme for the invasion of England, when half Europe was
arming in his rear, would have been to court a disaster far
worse than that which threatened France when his army wras
imprisoned in the sands of Egypt. It is quite probable that
Napoleon never seriously intended to "jump the ditch," unless
(as he said) " a revolution broke out in England"; and that he
aimed rather at ruining our commerce by the extension of his
'coast system.' Many of the best informed men in London

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and Paris believed that the Boulogne flotilla was an empty
threat; and it is certain that French funds fell sharply on every
report of an intended embarkation at Boulogne. Napoleon's plan
of a grand naval combination, by which French squadrons
from Toulon and Rochefort, and Spanish ships from Cadiz,
should assemble at a rendezvous in the West Indies, probably
aimed at the destruction of our commerce there quite as much
as the assembly of a considerable naval force. If the latter
only had been desired, the Azores would have served equally
well as a rendezvous.
After cruising off Toulon for 21 months to blockade the
French squadron there, Nelson had been driven away by storms;
but now, learning that the French and Spanish fleets were
making for the West Indies, he gave chase to them across the
Atlantic. Fie was in time not only to save our commerce
from serious damage, but also to divine their second aim
—a speedy return to liberate the French squadrons blockaded
at Rochefort and Brest, so as to sweep the English Channel
and convoy the Boulogne flotilla across to Kent. As Villeneuve,
the French admiral, had some days' start in the return race for
the Channel, Nelson sent two of his swiftest ships to warn our
Admiralty. Fortunately, Sir Robert Calder's squadrons off the
Bay of Biscay were strengthened in time to oppose a stout
resistance off Cape Finisterre to Villeneuve's return (July 22);
and the French admiral, worsted in the fight and discouraged
by the bad working of his ships, put back to Ferrol, and later on
retired to Cadiz. It is thought by naval writers that Villeneuve
ought to have pushed on from Ferrol to Brest, even against a
fleet superior in efficiency, so as to liberate the French ships
blockaded there. Certainly, his prudence did not save his
fleet from destruction; for Nelson, after a brief rest, soon took
command of the English fleet blockading Cadiz; and when
Villeneuve put out to sea, his 33 ships of the line were met off
Cape Trafalgar by 27 British ships. Nelson's two attacking

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columns, in spite of a terrible raking fire on his leading ships,
broke and completely disordered the enemy's crescent-like
formation; but the capture of 18 French and Spanish ships
was poor consolation to the British people for the loss of their
great naval hero, who survived a mortal wound just long
enough to know that England would thenceforth be undisputed
mistress of the seas (Oct. 21).
On the day before Nelson's last and greatest achievement,
Napoleon had still more signally asserted his supremacy on
land. Furious at Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz, he had at once
determined on carrying out his alternative plan, namely to
turn his splendid Boulogne army against the Austrians on the
Upper Danube; and the precision of his orders shows that
he had been carefully preparing to deal his foes a blow as terrible and as well prepared as Marengo. The position was somewhat similar to that of 1800. As Melas had then advanced
far from his base of supplies in his invasion of the French
riviera^ so now Mack had ventured into the heart of Bavaria,
with the plan of invading France while Napoleon was attempting the invasion of England. The Austrian success in the
occupation of the Upper Danube valley blinded them to the
danger of being far away from their Russian allies, who, unable
to advance in force while Prussia maintained a suspicious
neutrality, were vainly endeavouring to compel her to join the
Coalition by an armed demonstration on her frontiers. The
temerity of General Mack's advance gave Napoleon the longwished-for opportunity. Marching his troops at the average
rate of 15 miles a day from Boulogne and the Low Countries
towards the valleys of the Main and Neckar, he thus turned
the Black Forest, on which Mack relied as his screen of defence
from a front attack. Bernadotte was ordered to march southward from Hanover with the French troops quartered there,
though he violated Prussia's neutrality by passing across her
Principality of Anspach. The French columns began to con-

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verge on Mack's rear, while that presumptuous commander
persisted in regarding their march merely as a menace to the
Bohemian frontier. Awaking when too late to their real danger,
two divisions of the Austrians strove in vain to break through
to Bohemia and Tyrol. Only a few hundred men finally
succeeded; while the main body, weakened by these spasmodic
efforts, had to surrender to the French at Ulm (Oct. 18—20).
As Marengo had strengthened Bonaparte's position in
France as First Consul, so his even more impoitant victory at
Ulm consolidated his prestige as Emperor. The wearisome
and inglorious sea war against England had aroused much discontent in France, which was aggravated by a financial crisis;
but now, discontent gave way to admiration for a genius who
could decide a campaign by rapid marching. " Our Emperor
(said the soldiers) has found a new way of making war: he
makes it not with our arms, but with our legs."
The loss of a great army with all its cannons and stores
paralysed Austria for the rest of the campaign; and the victorious French pressed on to Vienna, which they occupied.
The Austrian Archduke Charles, though successful in Venetia,
had hastily retreated north to protect the capital. Arriving too
late for this, he retired into Hungary. Napoleon's pursuit of
the Russians, who fjll back into Moravia, was facilitated by a
perfidious ruse whereby Marshals Murat and Lannes gained
possession of the bridge over the Danube north of Vienna
without the loss of a single man. Four years later this passage
of the Danube was to cost the French more than 30,000 men*
Even now, if Prussian policy had been as clear and decisive
as it was confused and vacillating, the French forces might
have been placed in great danger by an onset of the splendid
Prussian army on their communications. Frederick William
I I I had ample cause for such action; for while he was successfully maintaining against the Czar the neutrality of Prussian
territory in the east, Napoleon's troops were marching through

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his Principality of Anspach on the Upper Main. This insult
for a time decided the Prussian monarch to offer his armed
mediation on behalf of the allies against Napoleon; and a conditional treaty of alliance between Austria, Russia and Prussia,
was signed at Potsdam (Nov. 3). In case France did not
accede to the demands of the three Powers,—almost similar to
those of the Anglo-Russian treaty,—Prussia was to declare war,
four weeks after the departure of the envoy charged with these
terms to Napoleon. England was to be invited to join this
compact, paying the Prussian and North-German forces at the
yearly rate of £12. 10s. per man; but Alexander, on the insistence of the Berlin Court, promised, in a secret article, to
use his good offices with the British Government for the cession
of Hanover to Prussia at the end of the war. Pitt indignantly
refused even to mention these insulting terms to his aged
sovereign, lest they should occasion a return of his mental
disease; and the English refusal enabled Haugwitz and the
French party at Berlin to nullify the effect of the Potsdam
Convention, and seal the doom of old Europe. He himself
was to be the envoy to Napoleon, with the message that
Prussia would unite her forces with those of the two Imperial
Courts, if the French did not stay their victorious career.
Purposely delaying his journey as long as possible, Haugwitz
found that Napoleon had set out from Vienna, and followed
him to Brunn in Moravia—only to be referred back by the
French Emperor to his astute Minister Talleyrand at Vienna.
During these delays the 240,000 Prussian and North-German
forces, which were marching to threaten the French flank and
communications, did nothing while the fate of Europe was
trembling in the balance.
Knowing that the Czar was desirous of changing the inglorious but successful policy of retreat for a bold offensive,
Napoleon fell back on an admirable position between Austerlitz
and Biunn. By concealing his own forces and by affecting

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discouragement at the dangers gathering around, he encouraged
the impatient Alexander to attempt to cut off the French communications with Vienna. Such an attack had to be delivered
in front of frozen marshes and a small lake; and when the
Russian left was lured into this position by a feigned withdrawal
of Napoleon's right wing, it was by a vigorous offensive move
of the dense masses of French hurled back on the lake, the
ice of which gave way under a plunging fire from French
cannons. " W e saw"—says General de Marbot in his memoirs
—"thousands of Russians, with their horses, guns, and waggons,
slowly settle down into the depths. It was a horribly majestic
spectacle which I shall never forget." The loss to the allies
of 15,000 killed and wounded, 18,000 prisoners, and 150
cannon, ended not only the campaign, but the war. With,
ordinary prudence and skill, the forces of Russia and Austria,
if aided by those of Prussia, should have overpowered the
French army. If the old Governments could have acted in
concert, the Battle of Leipzig would have been ante-dated by
six years: but concerted action was impossible in 1805. Just
as Prussia's armed neutrality had ruined the early part of the
campaign by detaining the Russians on her frontiers, so too
her delays after joining the Coalition wrecked its chances in
December. Dismayed by the disaster of Austeilitz, and disgusted at the self-seeking policy of his allies, the Czar withdrew
his shattered forces under cover of a truce.
It remained to dispose of Austria and Prussia. The latter
had (as we have seen) made an offensive and defensive alliance with the Powers; but Alexander's signature of the truce
with Napoleon furnished Haugwitz with an excuse for evading
obligations, from which he had, even before Austerlitz, striven
to escape; but how should he now face the conqueror? To
his surprise and joy, Napoleon again offered Hanover as the
price of Prussia's alliance, though she was to cede Anspach to
Bavaria, and Cleves and Neufchatel to France. The magnitude
F. R.

II

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of the gain decided Haugwitz to sign at once the conditional
Treaty of Schonbrunn (Dec. 15); and the Prussian monarch,
preferring a profitable though ignominious peace to a struggle
with the victors of Austerlitz, gave his general assent to its
terms, in spite of the entreaties of his spirited queen and
the indignation of his soldiers. By skilfully working on the
fear and cupidity of the allies, Napoleon was thus able to deal
singly with Austria, and, ten months later, with Prussia.
Austria was forthwith constrained by the Treaty of Presburg
(Dec. 26, 1805) to surrender Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia—
her spoils of the old Republic of Venice—to the kingdom of
Italy: to cede Tyrol to Bavaria, as well as to recognise the new
kingdoms of Bavaria and Wlirtemberg, and the Grand-Duchy
of Baden. As a slight set-off to these losses she acquired
Salzburg, for the loss of which the Archduke Ferdinand
received Wurzburg as compensation.
The campaign of 1805 will ever be memorable not only for
the inconsiderate rashness of the allied leaders, the imbecility
of Prussian policy, and the skill with which Napoleon shattered
their armies and dissolved their alliances, but also for its
abiding results on the social and political systems of Central
Europe. Before Napoleon began to march his legions towards
the Upper Danube, it seemed possible that the helpless rule
of the elective ' Emperor' of the Holy Roman Empire might
give way to the supremacy in Southern Germany of the hereditary
Emperor of Austria, and that Central and Southern Europe
might be reconstructed according to the chivalrous aims of the
young Czar. After Ulm and Austerlitz the impulse, which
was to temporarily transform Central Europe, could come only
from Paris, not from St Petersburg or Vienna. It was to be
no mere merging of Bavaria in the Austrian Empire, no mere
readjustment of frontiers according to 'natural equilibrium/
but a social and political revolution welding Germans into a
great federation under the supremacy of Napoleon, Though

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163

warmly attached to liberty, Alexander could never have imposed his will on Central Europe with the power which the
French Emperor wielded by right of conquest.
The throne of France had never been the ultimate aim of
the young Corsican's ambition. To found an Empire in the
East and then " take Europe in the rear," was his mental postscript to the instructions of the Directory before the Egyptian
expedition; but Ulm and Austerlitz had shown that Europe
might be easily overthrown by a front attack; and, just as the
Italian campaign was but a prelude to his rise to power in
France, so now his triumphs over Austria and Russia heralded
the far vaster aim—to found the United States of Europe
under his supremacy. The time was ripe for some such
attempt. When the old order of things was being sapped by
the intellectual revolution, the rulers of Central and Eastern
Europe weakened its political structure by their rapacious
designs on Bavaria and Poland; and these two weak places in
the European system were now to be effectively used by
Napoleon against the old Governments. Furthermore, the
ease with which in 1803 scores of petty German States had
been absorbed by their more vigorous neighbours, showed the
possibility of some yet wider union. Nowhere had feudalism
brought itself to so complete a reductio ad absurdum ; nowhere
was there more yearning for a fraternity based on liberty and
equality. But the Germans, separated for centuries from each
other and from public life, needed a man of action to destroy
the old barriers and complete the work of fusion. " Our journalists" (wrote the German patriot Perthes in Aug. 1805)
" take up the cause of the tyrant and the grande nation, either
from meanness, stupidity, fear, or for gold....but has not every
people, until consolidated by unity, been ready to receive a
leader, a deliverer ? There is Jiere a universal panting, longing, grasping after some point dappui"
What firm nucleus could be found on which these chaotic
II—2

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States could build up a new Federation adapted to the needs
of the times ? Napoleon seemed marked out by destiny for
this vast work; for an old prophecy foretold that when everything was falling to ruin, a second Frankish ruler should arise
to heal and renovate. Amidst all their divisions and discords,
Germans looked back to the dim past when the Frank, Karl
the Great (Charlemagne), had ruled over Teutons and Italians,
levying his tribute from the Ebro to the Elbe.
Rarely, indeed, have fact and fiction so favoured the designs
of a conqueror. Germany presented to Napoleon as vast a
sphere for beneficent re-organisation as France in 1799. Both
lands were passing through a political and social revolution,
which seemed likely to end in mere chaos, unless some able
man, by retaining the essential and rejecting the chimerical,
could found law and order on the half-formed desires of the
many. Napoleon's skill in satisfying the need of France for
social equality and political stability, seemed to mark him out
as the new Charlemagne, the re-organiser, not of Germany
alone, but also of Southern Europe. Napoleon did all in his
power to complete the parallel with the mediaeval Frankish
hero. The insignia of Charlemagne had been brought from
Aix-la-Chapelle to Paris for Napoleon's coronation; and a little
later the Emperor remarked to Bourrienne—"I have succeeded,
not to the throne of Louis XIV but to that of Charlemagne."
Even in April, 1805, before his triumphs, he said—"I have
formed some projects about Germany. It is there I will give
a mortal blow to England. I will deprive her of the Continent : besides I have some ideas, not yet matured, which
extend much further. European society must be regenerated—a superior Power must control the other Powers, and
compel them to live at peace with each other; and France is
well situated for that purpose."
We here approach the second mighty effort of Napoleon's
career. His first great sphere of activity, the reconstruction of

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France, had been in many respects an extraordinary, and in
in the main a beneficent, success. We must now recount the
salient features of the second and vaster enterprise, with its
startling though temporary success, and its momentous failure.
The exclusion of Austria from Germany and Italy by the
Peace of Presburg gave Napoleon a free hand in the affairs of
those countries; and the day after the signature of the peace,
the victor declared, in a proclamation to his soldiers at Vienna,
that the King of Naples had ceased to reign. His crime was
that after promising in Sept 1805 strict neutrality, he had two
months later joined the Coalition and admitted Russian and
English forces. For this * perfidy' he was to yield up his
throne to Napoleon's brother Joseph. French troops under
Massena and St Cyr overthrew the Bourbon dynasty at Naples,
the Russian and English forces retiring to Corfu and Sicily
respectively.
The utter failure of the Coalition at all points, added to
troubles in his Ministry, sapped Pitt's vital force. " The pilot
who weathered the storm " sank under the blow of Austerlitz,
and bequeathed to his rival Fox the helm of State; but the
generous Whig statesman, on making overtures for peace to
Napoleon, found himself duped, and he also was soon to
succumb to the cruel disappointment of his long cherished
hopes. No twelve months in our annals have been more
fatal than those which took from us Nelson, Pitt, and Fox.
Master of all the mainland of Italy except the Papal
States, Napoleon now disregarded the protests of Pius VII
against the occupation of Ancona by French troops. "Tell
him (he wrote to his uncle, Cardinal Fesch) that I am Charlemagne, the Emperor, and must be treated as such"; and the
Papal States continued to be occupied by French troops.
The Emperor of the French also imposed his will on
France and Europe by reviving titles of nobility, generally at
the expense of the lands lately ceded or appropriated. Thus

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Talleyrand became Prince of Benevento and Bernadotte Prince
of Ponte Corvo, Papal fiefs in South-Italy; Marshal Berthier
became Prince de Neufchatel; Murat, Grand Duke of Cleves
and Berg, &c.*; and to mark his supremacy in the Netherlands,
Napoleon made his brother Louis King of Holland (June,
1806). In place of that early aim of the French revolutionists
—a ring of friendly republics around the borders of France—
Napoleon had begun to encircle her with vassal States, held by
his relatives or paladins, which were to buttress the Empire
as Vauban's fortresses had girdled the realm of Louis XIV.
Such were the aims of the conqueror of Austerlitz. In place
of Rousseau's vision of a federation of small republics, Europe
was fast being merged in a vast military Empire.
Equally high-handed was Napoleon's policy in Germany,
especially towards Prussia. The statesmen at Berlin, endeavouring to get more favourable terms than those of the
conditional treaty with France, had the inconceivable folly to
demobilise their forces before the definite settlement of the
treaty. At once the French demands rose: Prussia was to
close all her coast line, including that of Hanover, to English
commerce, make common cause with France in every war, and
hand over three small domains to Murat, Grand Duke of Berg
(Feb. 1806). Helpless under French threats of immediate
war, Prussia agreed to these much severer terms, the first of
which, together with the occupation of Hanover by Prussia,
led to a commercial and maritime war with England. " A l l
that is contemptible in slavery "—said Fox of Prussia's action
— " is now united with all that is hateful in robbery"; and more
than 300 Prussian ships were forthwith seized and confiscated in English harbours (April, 1806). Not satisfied with
his successful use of the bait of Hanover, first to separate
Prussia from her allies, and next to embroil her with England,
Napoleon now used it to hasten the rupture with that unfor1

For a list of these dignities, see Appendix II., at the end.

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167

tunate Power. In the course of negotiations for peace, which
the Fox-Grenville Ministry opened in the spring of 1806,
Napoleon let it be known that the restoration of Hanover byPrussia to George I I I would make no difficulty:—" Hanover
for the honour of the British crown, Malta for that of the
navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for that of British commerce" (June 19). The fact that the first of these terms was
allowed to become generally known, and that the whole
negotiations soon broke down owing to a change of front of
the French Government as to Sicily and our recent colonial
conquests, seems to indicate Napoleon's desire for a rupture
with Prussia before she could form a firm alliance with Russia.
The treaty of peace, which the Russian charge d'affaires had
been induced to sign at Paris (July 20), was soon disavowed
by the Czar, who even now did not despair of arraying Europe
against Napoleon; and with this chief aim Alexander signed
with Prussia a secret treaty (July 1) binding the two Powers in
a defensive league against the French Emperor. Their compact was soon to be tested; for Napoleon, believing himself
sure of a definite peace with Russia, and of the dependence of
Prussia, perhaps even hoping for a cessation of hostilities on
the part of the Fox-Grenville Ministry, ventured on the final
overthrow of the old Germanic system.
In this month of July, 1806, so fruitful in negotiations and
treaties, the French Government signed a compact with sixteen
princes of Southern and Western Germany, who, renouncing
their allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire, formed under
Napoleon's Protectorate the CONFEDERATION OF THE R H I N E .

This new Germanic federation, consisting of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and several smaller
States, bound itself to entire union with Napoleon in foreign
policy, thus placing 63,000 German troops under his orders.
In return for this surrender of foreign policy the federated
princes were to enjoy full sovereign rights in their own

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States, their disputes being adjusted before a Federal Diet,
which was to sit at Frankfurt. All the smaller princes, barons,
and Imperial Knights, within the limits of the Confederation, were mediatised? i.e. they were deprived of their governing rights by the State within which their domains la}'.
Similarly, the old Free City of Nuremberg was acquired by
Bavaria, while Frankfurt went to the Archchancellor Dalberg.
The same policy was to be extended to all States which might
in future join the Confederation. We notice here the same
tendency towards consolidation of powers as had recently
occurred in France, Italy, and elsewhere; for the mediatised
princes were deprived of governmental rights by their more
powerful neighbours, who in their turn acknowledged the
supremacy of the new Charlemagne in military affairs and
foreign policy; while the fact that the proposed Frankfurt Diet
never assembled, shows that the capital of the new Confederation was really Paris. The resources of all lands from the North
Sea to the Adiiatic, from the Pyrenees to the Bohmer Wald,
were now at the disposal of Napoleon. A brief message from
the envoys of the newly federated princes to the Diet of the
Holy Roman Empire at Ratisbon, announced that its authority
was now at an end; and Francis II, recognising accomplished
facts, resigned his title as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire,
and thenceforth used only the title Francis I, Emperor of Austria.
As to Prussia, equally threatened by the creation of this
powerful Confederation, she was ostensibly encouraged to
form a North German Confederation with Hesse-Cassel,
Saxony, & c ; while her indignation at the proposed restoration
of Hanover to George I I I (a proposal which Talleyrand
dangled before the British Ministry up to the end of Sept.
1806) was met by the insidious suggestion that Prussia should
receive or take some neighbouring territory with 400,000 inhabitants as ' compensation/ The Berlin Government also
found French intrigues at work in Saxony and Hesse-Cassel, to

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prevent those States joining any North-German Confederation.
These repeated insults cut Frederick William to the quick.
Even Haugwitz advised him to place his army on a war
footing; and the rejection by Alexander of the treaty which
his Minister had signed at Paris, showed to Europe the Third
Coalition of the Powers in its second phase, viz. Russia,
Prussia, England and Sweden.
The execution by Napoleon's orders of the Nuremberg
bookseller Palm for selling patriotic German pamphlets, gave
to the opening war something of the appearance of a national
crusade. The philosopher Fichte, hitherto the devotee of a
cosmopolitan creed which contemplated the rise and fall of
States with indifference, now felt that Prussia was the champion
of all that was dear. ' In his " Speeches to the German warriors" he wrote:—"This war is to decide whether all that
Humanity has from the first by a thousand sacrifices gained
for order and skill, morality, art, science, and pious entreaties
to Heaven, shall continue and grow according to the laws of
human development—or whether all that poets have sung,
wise men have thought, and heroes have accomplished, is to
sink in the bottomless abyss of one arbitrary will." Unfortunately this academic address could have no effect on the
uneducated serfs who formed the great mass of the Prussian
army. There was less community of interest between the
soldiers and their officers, nearly all nobles, than in the old
royal army of France; for the social chasm was widened by
the harsh Prussian discipline which enacted corporal punishment for the slightest fault. According to the common
saying, "they reckoned one cane to every seven men." In
many cases the company, or troop, was the property of its
captain; and, as promotion generally went by seniority, most
of the officers were old and worn out. The Prussian General
Gneisenau later on thus reviewed the causes of Prussia's
disasters: " The inability of the Duke of Brunswick to form a

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sound plan of campaign, his bad fortune in 1792, the army's
distrust of him, and its want of practice in war; ... the bad
quality of our weapons, the incapacity of most of our generals,
and, to sum up, our conceit, which did not allow us to advance
with the times."
Relying on the prestige of Frederick the Great's time,
Prussia now rushed into war, as if desirous of effacing the
memory of her late halting diplomacy. The inconsiderate
strategy of Brunswick was now to complete the ruin begun by
the delays of the pacific king. The Prussian and North-German
forces, by advancing to occupy the valley which the R. Saale has
worn through the Thuringian mountains, committed a strategic
blunder similar to that of General Mack eleven months before.
Their troops were far away from their Russian allies, and exposed to a sudden attack from a more powerful foe. Napoleon,
with 170,000 French and Rhenish Confederation troops, was
about to cut the communications of the 128,000 Prussians and
Saxons, when Brunswick evaded Mack's fate by a retreat down
the Saale valley. The campaign was decided by two great
battles fought simultaneously at Jena and Auerstadt (Oct. 14).
At Jena 50,000 Prussians under Prince Hohenlohe faced
double their number of French, who, guided by a Saxon
clergyman, had secretly made their way up a height dominating
the Prussian position.
Hopelessly outnumbered and outmanoeuvred, Hohenlohe's troops were broken after a brave
resistance. This was a disaster. Near Auerstadt there was
disaster and disgrace; for there Brunswick's greatly superior
force failed to cut their way through Davoust's 30,000 French
who were seeking to circumvent the whole Prussian and Saxon
forces. Brunswick was mortally wounded. The Prussian
charges were made piecemeal against strong positions obstinately held; 18,000 men of their reserves never joined in the
fight; and finally outflanked, the main Prussian army retreated,
to join the wreck of Hohenlohe's forces. Relentlessly chased

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ijl

by Murat's squadrons, Hohenlohe surrendered near Stettin,
and the gallant Blucher was overpowered at Lubeck. Fortress
after fortress tamely capitulated to the French. Never in
modern times was there so complete a collapse of a great
military Power. A fortnight after Jena, Napoleon made his
triumphal entry into Berlin, most of the Prussian l Guard of
Nobles' marching as prisoners past the French Embassy, on
the steps of which they had ostentatiously sharpened their
swords two months before !
We have already seen that Napoleon had determined to
strike a mortal blow at England in Germany. " England is
everywhere" (he remarked to Bourrienne) " and the struggle
is between her and me. The whole of Europe will be our
instruments, sometimes serving one, sometimes the other."
However exaggerated his estimate of England's power to
' build u p ' Coalitions, he now had the means of excluding her
from nearly all the Continent; and on Nov. 21,1806, appeared
his Berlin Decrees. These declared the British Isles in a state
of blockade, enjoined the seizure of all English subjects, goods
and letters in any land held by French or allied troops, and
excluded from the ports of France and her allies all ships
coming from Great Britain or her colonies. Half of the confiscated British goods were to serve as indemnity to French
or allied merchants for their losses in the maritime war.
The British Government took up the gauntlet. Two
months later appeared the first of our Orders in Council, which,
" i n order to retort upon our foes the evils of their own injustice," forbade neutral ships, under pain of seizure, to
trade between ports from which British vessels and merchandise were excluded. To Napoleon's empty threat of blockading the British Isles, the English Ministry replied by measures
which soon excluded colonial produce from the Napoleonic
States.
Napoleon's decrees, as applied to French and allied lands,

172

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

formed the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, which aimed at compelling
England to surrender, by cutting off her commerce. Our war
with France thus became more and more a gigantic mercantile
struggle which soon embraced the whole world. To Napoleon's Continental System we retorted by a blockade of the
Continent; and our policy became more and more commercial,
leading to expeditions against French, Dutch, and Spanish
colonies, and the occupation of vantage posts such as Sicily,
Heligoland, & c , whence our goods could be smuggled into
the Napoleonic States. Except for trifling subsidies to our
few allies, and our participation in the Peninsular War, the
struggle between France and England was, up to 1814, one of
Land-Power against Sea-Power.
Every extension of Napoleon's dominion on land widened
the application of his commercial policy, until by 1808 it embraced all the Continental States except Turkey and Sweden.
We must now consider first the events which enabled Napoleon
to impose this system on Russia, and, later on, how it involved
him in his Spanish policy, in the Russian expedition, and the
Wars of Liberation of 1813.
The Czar's troops had no more share in the disasters of
Jena-Auerstadt than in Mack's catastrophe at Ulm in the previous autumn. In both cases they were many days' march
behind their too venturesome allies. Amidst the break-up of
the Prussian military system and the surrender of the Oder
fortresses to the French, Frederick William and his gallant
queen still hoped to retain all their Prussian and Polish lands
east of the Vistula, which then formed quite one-fourth of their
possessions. At first Napoleon's troops gained some decisive
successes over the Russian troops in Poland; and the news of
a rising in Warsaw led to the defection of the Polish troops
from the Prussian colours, leaving only 13,000 for field-service.
But the campaign entered on a new phase with the desperate
and successful resistance of the Russians and Prussians at

VIII.]

Napoleon

and the old Governments*

173

Eylau (Feb. 8, 1807). " What a massacre, and without result!"
was Ney's description of the square league of carnage. Reduced for a time almost to inactivity, Napoleon vainly tried to
detach Frederick William from the Russian alliance. The
Prusso-Russian compact was strengthened by a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance at Bartenstein (April), which
England and Sweden soon joined, and to which Austria was
urged to adhere; but that unfortunate Power, courted also by
France, could not be induced to move; and the English
Ministry—on Prussia's renunciation of Hanover to George I I I
—sent money and arms, only when it was too late. The
neglect of the English Government to send sufficient money,
or to despatch at once an army to Stralsund for the help
of the hard-pressed Swedish forces, was Alexander's chief
excuse for the change of front which soon astonished the
world.
The campaign was ended by a fatal blunder of the Russian
General Bennigsen. In order to save Konigsberg from the
French, who were marching northwards nearly parallel with his
army, he crossed the R. Alle at Friedland, believing that only
Lannes' division of io,oco men would resist his advance; but
Napoleon, probably expecting this step, had a large force near
at hand. A daring charge of Marshal Ney drove the Russians
back on the bridges of Friedland, which were broken by the
fire of the French cannons; and, swinging round his left wing,
Napoleon captured or drove into the river nearly all the
Russian centre and right (June 14). The loss of nearly
25,000 men killed, wounded, or prisoners, and 80 cannons
decided Alexander to ask for a truce. Both in its military and
political aspects, Friedland corresponds to Austerlitz. Before
both battles Napoleon could have been overpowered by
prompt and united action of all the States threatened by his
domination; but their mutual jealousies, the tardy action of
their Governments, and the culpable rashness of the Russian

174

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP.

commanders, gave the victory to the one Power, whose diplomatic and military tactics were unerring.
Disgusted at the continued neutrality of Austria and at the
dilatoriness of England, which sent arms only to be captured by
the French at Konigsberg, the Czar now met his great foe at
Tilsit with the words:—" I hate the English as much as you
do." " I n that case"—replied Napoleon—"peace is made."
Yielding to the charm of the French Emperor's conversation,
and captivated by the prospect of sharing as an equal in his
Continental domination, Alexander gladly accepted a peace
which promised gains of territory at the expense of Turkey. It
is true that Napoleon had recently encouraged the Sultan to
declare war on Russia and had helped him to withstand the
menaces of an English fleet at the Dardanelles; but the deposition of this Sultan by a palace revolution (May, 1807) helped
Napoleon to the excuse that his friendship had been merely
personal, and did not extend to his successor. Never did tidings
come more opportunely; and never have they been more
astutely used. "It is a decree of Providence"—exclaimed
Napoleon to the Czar—"which tells me that the Turkish
Empire can no longer exist." Dazzled by the prospect of the
lion's share in an approaching partition of Turkey, Alexander
abandoned as quixotic his earlier schemes for the liberation of
Europe, and fell back on Russia's traditional policy, the southward march towards Constantinople. Such was the policy
underlying the Treaties of Tilsit. On his side of the bargain,
Napoleon was to extend his influence at the expense of
Prussia, by cutting her off from western Germany, and by forming
her Polish provinces into a State dependent on France, called
the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. Sure of the alliance of Saxony
—thenceforth to be a kingdom—Napoleon would thus control
a line of States from the Rhine to the Niemen, save for the
narrow neck of Lower Silesia. On her seabord Prussia was to
be crippled by Danzig becoming a 'free town,' under a

Ill

CENTRAL EUROPE 1807 - 1809.

VIII.]

Napoleon

and the old Governments.

175

French commander. In fact, the fourth clause of the Treaty
affirmed that only out of consideration for the Czar, did
Napoleon restore to the King of Prussia any of his States. It
was in vain that the lovely Queen Louisa came twice to beg
that at least Napoleon would give her Magdeburg. After
some empty compliments, he bade Talleyrand get the treaties
signed as soon as possible.
The Treaties of Tilsit (July 7, 1807) may be thus summarised :—Prussia lost nearly all the lands gained in the three
partitions of Poland. These territories, except the district of
Bialystok, were to form the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the
protection of the King of Saxony. A military road across
Lower Silesia was to keep open the communications between
Saxony and the Duchy, while complete freedom of navigation
on the Vistula served to connect Warsaw with the new ' free
town' of Danzig. Prussia also surrendered all her lands west
of the Elbe, parts going to swell Murat's Duchy of" Berg, other
territories, with Hesse-Cassel, forming the new kingdom of
Westphalia for Napoleon's brother Jerome; while his brother
Louis received from Prussia East Frisia as an addition to
Holland. France gained three fortresses and one district on
the right bank of the Rhine, and the fortress of Erfurt as a
stronghold in the midst of the Confederation of the Rhine.
Hanover, Baireuth, and a few other German States were also
to be occupied ' provisionally' by the French. The Czar
reluctantly received (on Napoleon's insistence) the frontier
district of Bialystok from the hapless Prussian monarch whose
lands he had two months before solemnly promised to defend.
The Russian troops were to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia,
but these provinces were not to be re-occupied by Turkish
troops until the conclusion of peace between Russia and
Turkey under the mediation of France. Similarly, Napoleon
accepted the mediation of the Czar to bring about peace
between France and England, if the latter accepted it within a

176

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

month. Russia also recognised the Napoleonic States in
Germany and Italy.
In a separate and secret Treaty of Alliance of the same date
(the full details of which have only quite recently become
known), the Czar agreed to join Napoleon against England, if
she did not before Nov. 1, 1807, abate her maritime claims,
and consent to restore the conquests made since 1805 to
France and her allies. If England did not by Dec. 1 assent to
these terms, the two Emperors would "summon the three
Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their
ports to the English, and declare war on England. That one
of the three Courts which refuses shall be treated as an
enemy; and in the case of Sweden refusing, Denmark shall be
compelled to declare war on her." Similar compulsion was to
be used to compel Austria to join the Continental System. If,
however, England agreed to the French terms, she was to
receive Hanover as compensation for the French, Spanish, and
Dutch colonies restored by her. Similarly, if Turkey refused
the French mediation or the Russian terms, then the Empeiors
would make war on her " t o withdraw from the burdensome
yoke of the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire
in Europe, the city of Constantinople and the province of
Roumelia only excepted." Other secret articles provided for
the cession to the French of the Cattaro district of Dalmatia
as also of the Ionian Isles, both of which had been occupied
by Russian troops; also that if, at the future peace with
England, Hanover should be added to Jerome's Kingdom of
Westphalia, Prussia should then recover some of her lands
west of the Elbe with about 400,000 inhabitants.
The Treaty with Prussia to a similar effect was signed two
days later, Napoleon declaring that his words to Queen
Louisa were merely "amiable words which bound him to
nothing," and that but for the intercession of the Czar, the
whole of Prussia would have been given to Jerome Bonaparte.

VIII.]

Napoleon and the old Governments.

1JJ

Talleyrand inwardly revolted at "the barbarity with which
Napoleon treated Prussia at Tilsit"; but worse was to follow.
The Convention of Konigsberg provided that the lands left
to Prussia should be evacuated by French troops only in proportion as the war indemnity (as yet not specified), or securities
to its amount, should be forthcoming; and Prussian taxes were
to be set apart for the satisfaction of French claims. Much
of Napoleon's popularity in France was due to his policy that
" war must support war," whereby France gained the glory of
victory without any exceptional financial burdens. Prussia
was now to support the Grand Army; and the financial
exactions were so prolonged that Berlin was not completely
freed from the French till the War of Liberation in 1813. As if
the loss of half her subjects and all her foreign commerce, the
incubus of a huge debt and a rapacious army of occupation,
had not sufficiently humbled Prussia, she was ordered a year
later to limit her army to 42,000 men.
Never has the European system sustained such a shock as
at Tilsit. The Czar, who at Bartenstein had solemnly pledged
his word to preserve the "natural equilibrium" of Europe, now
at Tilsit made a profitable alliance with its destroyer, and
Russian policy reverted to the aims of Peter the Great and
Catherine,—conquests over Sweden and Turkey. Finland and
the Danubian Provinces were to be the ultimate prizes gained
by alliance with France; while Alexander joined hands with
Napoleon to hold down the centre of Europe. Nay more ! The
Land Power was to form an irresistible league for the ruin of
the Sea Power. Our sole remaining ally, Sweden, could not
resist the onset of 40,000 French who, marching into her province of Pomerania, compelled the surrender of Stralsund
(Aug.). Russia and Prussia not only excluded English commerce, but the former Power joined Napoleon in trying to
force on us a ruinous peace.
Was the English Ministry justified in rejecting the mediaF. R.

12

lyS

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

tion projected by the Czar, but ultimately proposed by the
Austrian Emperor ? In the first place, it must be remembered
that alone of all the allies, England had suffered no disasters,
but had made considerable conquests. Nearly all the French,
Dutch, and Spanish colonies had fallen, or were likely to fall,
into our hands. Our position in India was securer than ever
before. Napoleon's Berlin decrees had as yet only served to
exhibit his impotence at sea; for while his blockade of the
British Isles remained a mere threat, our blockade of the
Napoleonic States was so far effective that the neutral commerce of the world was passing into our hands. There was
therefore no urgent reason for making peace. Secondly, the
British Government knew from the terms of the (published)
Treaty of Tilsit with what seventy Napoleon pressed on a
vanquished foe; and it further had heard that a secret treaty
had been signed between Napoleon and Alexander. When,
therefore, the Czar proposed to offer his mediation between
England and France, the British Government requested (Aug.
29) to be informed what were " t h e just and equitable principles on which France intended to negotiate," as also what
were the terms of the secret Treaty of Tilsit. No answer came;
but our Government had already heard—Fouche's memoirs
hint that Talleyrand was the informer—of the policy secretly
arranged at Tilsit to compel Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal
to join the continental league against England; and that Denmark would be occupied by the French troops already on the
borders of Holstein. Canning, English Secretary for Foreign
Affairs in the new Portland Ministry, at once decided " to do
by Napoleon what he has so long been doing by others." A
great fleet under Admiral Gambier sailed for the Sound, there
to be joined by a British force tardily sent to aid the Swedes
in Pomerania. Our envoy offered to the Prince Royal an
Anglo-Danish alliance, or strict neutrality in the impending
struggle. In either case the Danish fleet was to join ours as

VIIL]

Napoleon

and the old Governments,

179

'deposit/ partly for our own protection, partly to remove the
reason for French demands of an alliance with Denmark. Not
even the display of an imposing force of more than 80 British
ships could overcome the indignation of the Danish Prince at
this high-handed policy. The British land-forces under Lord
Cathcart accordingly disembarked near Copenhagen; and after
the investment of its walls, a last offer was made of receiving
the Danish fleet in deposit. On its rejection the works and
the city were bombarded for the greater part of four days until
(Sept. 5) it agreed to surrender the fleet unconditionally; six
weeks' armistice were allowed to equip the 16 ships of the line,
13 frigates and 30 smaller vessels, which formed the sole prize
of this expedition. The archives of our Foreign Office show
that Canning desired far more, viz. an Anglo-Scandinavian
league which might preserve the North of Europe from Napoleon's grasp. But the Danish Prince refused all overtures for
an alliance which would have drawn on him the armies of
Napoleon; while a French alliance promised a share in the
spoils of the Swedish monarchy. The result of the Copenhagen expedition was, on the whole, disastrous for Great
Britain. Denmark became the most trusty of all Napoleon's
allies; and the Czar, casting aside his first scruples, soon
declared war on England (Nov. 7, 1807). Our ally Sweden,
menaced by the Danes on the side of Norway (then under the
Danish crown), and threatened with the loss of Finland by an
invasion of the Russians, maintained the unequal struggle for
two years; but after the deposition of her quixotic monarch
Gustavus IV, by his uncle, who succeeded as Charles XIII,
she ceded Finland and the Aland Isles to Russia (Sept. 1809)
and soon after agreed to exclude all British goods.
At the opposite end of Europe the results of the secret
compact between Napoleon and Alexander were seen far more
immediately. Exasperated by our conduct at Copenhagen,
Napoleon, at a meeting of the diplomatic circle, thus addressed
j 2—2

180

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

the Portuguese ambassador: " I will no longer tolerate an
English ambassador in Europe. I will declare war against
any Power that receives one, after two months from this time.
...The English no longer respect neutrals at sea. I will no
longer recognise neutrals on the land." The Court of Lisbon,
summoned to close its ports to us and seize English goods,
refused to confiscate the property of a Power so closely allied
for a century past; but even before the refusal of the Portuguese Regent had reached Napoleon, the latter had signed
with his Spanish allies the secret treaty of Fontainebleau (Oct.
1807) for the partition of Portugal and its colonies between
France and Spain. In pursuance of this scheme, French
troops under Junot marched through Spain to overthrow the
rule of the House of Braganza. The Portuguese Regent, unable to offer any resistance, set sail (Nov. 30) from Lisbon for
Brazil, thus fulfilling a boast in the Paris Moniteur—" The fall
of the House of Braganza will be a new proof how inevitable
is the ruin of all who attach themselves to the English."
Rendered desperate by these extensions of Napoleon's
system to all Europe—for after Austria joined the Continental
System, Oct. 1807, only Sweden and Turkey remained friendly
to us, or neutral—the British Ministry issued its second series
of Orders in Council (Nov. 1807). These declared that every
neutral ship trading between ports, from which our vessels were
excluded, was "good prize of war"; and neutrals trading to or
from a port hostile to us, must acknowledge our maritime code
by putting in at a British harbour and paying a tonnage duty.
Enraged at these pretensions to a maritime monopoly, Napoleon at once retorted by his Milan Decrees (Nov. and Dec.):—
that all neutral ships submitting to the British maritime code
were thereby denationalised, and became good and lawful
prize. Between belligerents so exasperated, neutrality on sea
was almost as impossible as on land; and the disastrous year
1807 closed with the imposition by the United States of a

VIII.]

Napoleon

and the old Governments.

i8r

general embargo on European vessels. Cut off from direct
trade with the Continent and the United States, our position
seemed gloomy indeed. Our policy had apparently resulted
in a victory for Napoleon all along the line. The help to our
allies had always been sent too late; while our high-handed
actions against Spain and Denmark had driven these Powers
into his arms. Our great enemy, on the other hand, had
shown all the qualities which ensure success in diplomacy and
war. The bait of Hanover adroitly used to secure Prussia's
neutrality until her allies were crushed, specious generosity to
the Czar after Austerlitz and Friedland, crushing terms to
Austria and Prussia when isolated and helpless, the skilful
diversion of Alexander's ambition from the West towards the
East—these main features of the Napoleonic policy secured as
brilliant a success in state-craft as his swift and hitherto unerring strategy had won on the field. " A n union which the
world never before saw, of irresistible force with the most consummate art (wrote Mr A. Baring, M.P., in Feb. 1808), is
employed to rear his gigantic fabric; while the total lack of
energy and genius on the other side appears to exhibit the
hand of Providence in this extraordinary revolution."
Every brilliant military and diplomatic triumph of Napoleon
was marked by the increase of his power in France itself.
Rivoli and Campo Formio had raised him far above all French
generals. Marengo and Luneville consolidated his power as
First Consul. The Peace of Amiens gained him the Consulate for life with almost unbounded power. The overthrow of the Third Coalition now enabled him to suppress the
one public body in France which occasionally ventured to
timidly criticise his acts. The Tribunate, designed by Sieves
as the criticising organ of the body politic, had been already
shorn of some of its powers, and divided into sections which
debated secretly (see p. 134). The Emperor now announced
that he was about to "simplify and perfect French institu-

182

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

tions": the Tribunate had preserved something of " t h e disquieted and democratic spirit which had long agitated
Fiance." This reason sufficed for its total suppression (Aug.
1807) and the transference of its few remaining functions to
the more submissive Corps Legislatif. Commissioners in this
body were now to draw up drafts for laws.; but in reality most
laws emanated from Napoleon or his obsequious Ministers, the
thin disguise of calling them Senatus Consulta being often
dispensed with.
Never, perhaps, have all the activities of government been
so concentrated in one all-absorbing personality. Amidst the
dearth of really able men in the later years of the French
Revolution, Napoleon's genius had shone forth with dazzling
splendour; and the contrast was even more marked when he
measured his strength with the rulers, diplomatists, and generals
of Europe. Nothing, indeed, is more surprising in his career
than the swift expansion of his faculties and ambition along
with extended power. After his most brilliant successes his
behaviour ever denoted that he had done nothing as yet.
Keen foresight in developing the resources of democratic
France and diverting them into the path of military glory,
Macchiavellian skill in dividing his foes and attacking them
when severed and disheartened, political tact in welding the
shattered fragments of old Europe into his own system of
States—these were powers which paralysed or fascinated a
Mack, a Haugwitz, or an Alexander. Add to this the fear
caused by his terrifying personality, his invincible strength of
mind and body, his long and furious rides which wore out
all his suite, his machine-like power of endurance in long
conferences which left his Ministers prostrate Avith fatigue, his
correspondence, often ranging far into the night, on all matters
from the conduct of a campaign to the repair of a road or the
chit-chat of the royalist salons in the Faubourg St Germain—
and the almost superstitious awe with which he inspired

VIII.]

Napoleon

and the old Governments.

183

{dialogues and men of action alike, may perhaps be imagined.
" The gigantic (wrote one of his Councillors of State) entered
into our very habits of thought."
But the student who has realised the social and political
weakness of the old European system, will find nothing supernatural even in the extraordinary career of the young Corsican
who now swayed the destinies of the Continent. H e himself,
in words remarkable for their candour and perspicacity, once
revealed the causes of his success—" Nothing has been simpler
than my elevation. It was owing to the peculiarity of the
times....I have always marched with the opinion of great
masses and with events."

C H A P T E R IX.
T H E NATIONALIST REACTION.
-"At first the great man had enlisted his high intelligence and poweiful
will in the service of the general sentiments and desires. He now seeks to
employ the public force in the service of his individual ideas and desires.
He attempts things which he alone wishes or understands. Hence general
disquietude and uneasiness."—GUIZOT.

T H E latter part of 1807 may be regarded in many respects
as the zenith of Napoleon's career. In ten months he had
humbled Prussia to the dust. His will reigned supreme from
Lisbon to Warsaw, from Copenhagen to Naples. There was
as yet no discord in his relations with the Czar. Sweden was
struggling hopelessly against her foes; and England seemed to
be slowly succumbing to the commercial strangulation of the
Continental System. Everywhere he had encountered a halfhearted or ill-organised resistance from armies and Governments weakened by mutual jealousies or by want of hearty
support from the nations which they claimed to represent.
But after 1807 the struggle enters on a new phase. The
resistance to Napoleon slowly deepens, as defeated rulers and
statesmen begin to enlist on their side the forces which France
had so triumphantly wielded.
The State which suffered the most disastrous overthrow
was the first to profit by the lessons of adversity. Two months
after the loss of half his dominions at Tilsit, Frederick William

CHAP, IX.]

The Nationalist

Reaction,

185

I I I entrusted the regeneration of Prussia to that able and
determined reformer, Baron vom Stein. This great man, whose
influence on Prussia is comparable to that of Napoleon on
France, was by birth an Imperial Knight of the old Holy
Roman Empire; but, attracted by the reforming zeal of Frederick the Great, he had in 1780 entered the Prussian service,
with the ultimate hope of furthering the unification of Germany.
In all his early organising work,—whether road-making, canalisation of the R. Ruhr, or the incorporation of Miinster in the
Prussian dominions—there appeared a passion for thoroughness,
and for vigorous government in the interests of the people. An
earnest student of Turgot and Adam Smith, he strove to carry
out in Cleves and Miinster what the great French reformer had
planned for the Limousin; for he saw clearly the defects in the
social and political life of Germany. Arthur Young's description of the solitudes around the mansion of a French seigneur
is not more vigorous than Stein's comment on the results of
feudalism in N. Germany:—"The abode of the Mecklenburg
noble, who, instead of helping his peasants, hunts them, seems
to me like the lair of some beast of prey which devastates all
around and encircles itself with the stillness of the grave."
Equally spirited, after he entered the Finance Ministry at
Berlin, was his protest against the Cabal, or secret irresponsible Cabinet, which intervened so disastrously between the
king and his Ministers; and in Jan. 1807 Frederick William
dismissed him as a "scornful, obstinate and disobedient
official." But after Tilsit, all was changed. The Prussia of
Frederick the Great had utterly collapsed. The unhappy land
lay under the heel of a conqueror whose exactions had no limit
except the inability of his victim to pay any more. Indeed,
nothing but fear of arousing the Czar's jealousy kept Napoleon
from annexing the whole land, which his army continued to
occupy. In a crisis so desperate a complete break with the
past was inevitable. The king accordingly urged Stein to take

186

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

office with almost unlimited powers; and he as frankly accepted
(Oct. 4, 1807) the Herculean task of reforming the social and
political systems of Prussia by royal decrees. His successful
inauguration of this policy not only saved Prussia from the
social convulsions which followed the fall of feudalism in
France, but indissolubly connected the fortunes of the Hohenzollern House with the cause of social equality. Alone of the
old reigning families it found the great man, " t h e demi-god,
who," according to Rousseau, "was fit to give new laws to
men." Whereas the failure of Louis XVI and his Ministers
to overcome the resistance of the Parlements had sealed the
doom of the Bourbons, the legislation of Stein and Hardenberg
secured the continuity of monarchy in Central Europe. The
contrast is reflected in the national characteristics of to-day.
While Paris represents the cause of militant democracy, Berlin
is as distinctly the symbol of an enlightened and vigorous
personal rule.
If the French, after nine years of revolution, had needed a
master mind to consolidate its results, how much more necessary was "reform from above" in Prussia, where the people at
large had no share in public life? Stein's predecessors, Hardenberg and others, had recommended that the nobles should
surrender their exclusive rights and their immunities from taxation, also that the serfs must be freed in Prussia Proper. Five
days after Stein received his great powers, the Edict (Oct. 9,
3807) for the emancipation of the serfs throughout the whole
Prussian monarchy appeared at Mem el. It was to take effect
from Martinmas, 1810. The same edict swept away the ancient
restrictions on the possession of land, whereby only 'noble land'
could be owned by nobles, only land belonging to towns could
be held by men of the citizen class, and only 'peasant land'
by peasants. Henceforth there was to be free trade in land,
while nobles might follow 'citizen occupations 7 ; the sharp lines
marking off the callings of the citizen from those of the peasant

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

187

were also obliterated. Precautions were, however, taken to
prevent unlimited competition for land leading to the extinction
of the peasant proprietors and land-holders who had formed,
and were still to form, the backbone of the Prussian army.
The edict of emancipation was an almost despairing effort
of the Prussian monarchy to retrieve the fortunes of its overburdened States by allowing for the first time free play to all
faculties and callings. The watchword of the revolution, " la
carrilre ouverte anx talents" was now proclaimed in Prussia,
yet with a characteristic difference in the method of enunciation.
Quietly and from the remotest corner of Prussia came the royal
edict which reformed the basis of her society almost as completely
as the spasmodic decrees of Aug. 4, 1789, had revolutionised the
life of France. Another contrast must also be noticed, namely
that in the Prussian edict the methods of confiscation were
avoided,—except in the extinction of the status of serfdom or
villainage. The former serfs were declared to be still " subject
to all the obligations which bind them as free persons by virtue
of the possession of an estate or by a special contract"; and it
was not till Hardenberg's agrarian law of 1811 that the
peasants became freeholders of two-thirds of their holdings,
ceding one-third to their former lords in lieu of the feudal
services which then were abolished. The two Prussian edicts,
therefore, by transforming the serf into the peasant proprietor,
quietly effected no less a change than that of the French copyholder into the freeholder brought about partly by the decrees
of the Constituent Assembly and partly by force. About the
same time serfdom was abolished in Swedish Pomerania, the
Grand-Duchy of Warsaw, and the States forming the Confederation of the Rhine.
These new rights were to be closely associated with a vast
extension of the sphere of civic duties, especially in connection
with national defence. In the Prussian army the officers and
the rank and file had been drawn almost exclusively from the

188

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP.

two extremes of society, nobles and serfs respectively. That
system had achieved wonders when worked by Frederick the
Great against armies similarly composed; but even at Valmy
it was seen that the Prussian army was a lifeless mechanism,
and at the shock of Jena it collapsed helplessly before Napoleon's forces. If enfeebled Prussia was now to renew her
strength, she must evidently have recourse to that system of
universal conscription by which France had vanquished the
Second and Third Coalitions. Frederick William himself urged
on a great scheme of army reform; and the military commission suggested that whereas the army "had been hated and in
some degree despised by the other classes, it ought to be the
union of all the moral and physical energies of the nation."
As the citizen class was now to be called to arms, there must
be an end of the degrading punishments so prejudicial to the
spirit of the men, though it had been often necessary in the past
when foreign adventurers formed no small portion of the army.
Further, as Prussia was overwhelmed by the increasing French
demands for a war indemnity, and could not keep up a large
force on active service, the famous organiser Scharnhorst proposed (1807) to drill men, and, after service in the standing
army, to pass them into a provincial militia, " an internal supplementary police." This unambitious project would save the
Prussian exchequer and perhaps allay Napoleon's jealous suspicions. In Sept. 1808, however, came a demand from Paris
that the Prussian army should not exceed 42,000 men. Compliance was inevitable. Thus the conditions of the time almost
compelled Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and other army reformers
to form a secret reserve which in three years gave Prussia
150,000 trained troops; but it was not till 1813 that the
Landwehr and Landsturm were actually formed as second and
third lines of reserve. In the meantime officers received a
new and skilful training, arms and uniforms were adapted to
the swifter movements required in the Napoleonic wars, and

ix.]

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189

new cannons were cast for the eight fortresses which remained
free from the French army of occupation.
We saw that in the early days of the French Departmental
System the terms citizen and National Guard were almost coextensive, though the municipalities had to surrender nearly all
their liberties to the central government after Nov. 1793.
While a similar travesty of local self-government was being
extended by the French in the Confederation of the Rhine, a
desire was expressed by a few Prussian towns for some such
self-government as had flourished in the mediaeval Free Cities
of Germany. Accordingly, with the help of his colleagues and
the entire approval of the king, Stein promulgated his famous
Municipal Reform of Nov. 19, 1808, which freed Prussian
towns from their irksome control by the central government
or the lord of the manor, and from government by half-pay
officers. All towns, even those subject to manorial lords, were
placed in the same relation to the State and were divided only
according to population into great towns (those above 10,000),
middle towns (above 3500) and small towns (above 800 souls).
The old distinctions between 'great' and 'small' citizens now
ceased, and all Prussian civilians who owned land in the town
or followed town occupations were henceforth during good
conduct to enjoy the rights and fulfil the duties of citizenship;
all others were merely 'residents/ who must pay rates but
were without the franchise. The citizens were to elect an
executive magistrate and a representative council, exercising a
general supervision of all town affairs: only those councillors and
other officials were to be paid who gave their whole time to
public duties; and nearly all citizens were when elected bound
to serve even in unpaid offices. The frequent appeals to civic
spirit, and the use of German terms (e.g. ' Gemeinde' instead
of'Commune'), mark the desire of the Government to foster
local patriotism as the first approach to a future national
patriotism. The success of the measure may be seen in the

190

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[CHAP.

superhuman efforts made by all parts of Prussia in 1813; while
the practical nature of its details is shown by its continuing
unchanged down to 1831—a striking contrast to the hasty and
unfortunate French scheme of 1789—90.
Stein unquestionably designed this measure as a steppingstone towards a national Parliament; but he barely had time
before his resignation to draft a measure (which, in a modified
form, became law in Dec. 1808) for unifying and strengthening
the cumbrous administration of the State. In Prussia the
responsible Ministers had formed no collective Cabinet but
had consulted individually with the king, whose decisions were
often warped by the secret advice of irresponsible 'cabinet
secretaiies' forming a sort of ' cabal.' Another cause of weakness and confusion was the local division of the departments
of government, viz. that according to the separate and very
diverse States or provinces of the monarchy. Indeed, nothing
but Frederick the Great's genius and energy could have imparted clearness and energy to this * cross division'—to use a
logical term—of powers and functions called the Prussian
Government. To put an end to this confusion, a Ministry
of State, comprising only the responsible Ministers, was now
to form the supreme legislative and executive Council presided
over by the king or one of the Ministers. The local division of
ministerial functions was abolished. The provinces were subdivided for administrative purposes into distiicts {Bezirke)\
and judicial tribunals were completely separated from the old
governmental Chambers.
Stein was also able to abolish various trade monopolies of
the old gilds, along with the exclusive rights of erecting mills
in East Prussia. In fine, his thirteen months of office effected
well-nigh as much for Prussia as the Constituent Assembly had
done for France, that is, it transformed an almost mediaeval
social and political structure into a modern State. The parallel
would have been still more complete if he had been able to

ix.]

The Nationalist

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191

crown his work by founding self-governing institutions for the
parish and the circle (Kreis), and parliamentary representation
for the nation. That he had prepared the way for this last
innovation was clear by the king's ready assent to the convocation of the Provisional Parliaments which met in 1811 and
again in 1812—1815; but this was to be the work of his
scarcely less able successor, Hardenberg. The reforms actually
promulgated by Stein had aroused a storm of opposition from
the Prussian nobles and from what was known as the French
party at Berlin; but the immediate cause of his dismissal was
the seizure by the French (Aug. 1808) of an indiscreet letter
in which the patriot Minister described the rapid growth of
exasperation against Napoleon, the sensation caused by the
Spanish rising, and the imminence of a Franco-Austrian war.
This discovery gave Napoleon a pretext for pressing heavier
terms on Prussia (Sept. 1808) and led to Stein's resignation of
office. After the French had occupied Madrid the Emperor
launched a decree of proscription against Stein (Dec. 1808),
who fled for his life to Austria.
A change in laws and institutions writes itself but tardily in
the national life, unless the nation itself has been quickened to
a new and vitalising receptivity. If the work of the legislator
is to yield plenteous fruit, the impulses which come from the
poet and the thinker, or which spring unconsciously from the
people itself, must first have played their part. The enthusiasm
for Rousseau's teachings and the Rights of Man had aroused
through Central Europe a wide-spread desire for some connection with democratic France; but the invasions of the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies began to dispel the dreams even
of German Jacobins. Instead of forming a federation of free
States, Germany was becoming the parade-ground and commissariat department of French armies, and groaned under the
ever-increasing pressure of the Continental System. The most
phlegmatic temperament was moved by the French domination

192

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[CHAP.

to think more kindly of the cumbrous old empire; while an
ardent nature like that of the historian and poet Arndt revolted
at the sight of "the old German splendour overthrown and
trodden underfoot by these insolent French....When Austria
and Prussia had fallen, then first I began to love Germany
truly, and to hate the foreigner with an utter hatred." Schiller's
last drama, Wilhelm Tell (1804), describing the rising of
the Swiss mountaineers against Hapsburg usurpations, seems
designed to unite Germans by the claims of brotherhood, patriotism and love of freedom to repel all French aggressions
on the Fatherland. Unfortunately, the greatest of German
poets, Goethe, after his Herma?in und Dorothea (1797), remained deaf to the new patriotic movement and belittled
himself by accepting from Napoleon the Cross of the Legion
of Honour (Oct. 1808). But a school of young patriotic poets
was rising, which shook off the indifference of the 18th century
poets to the claims of country, and soon gave forth many a
patriotic song to inspire their brethren on the battle-field.
The new spirit of the age invaded the domains of philosophy and education. The first man on the Continent to utter
a public protest against the Napoleonic domination was the
great thinker Fichte, who up to 1805 had professed complete
indifference about the rise and fall of States; but in the days of
Prussia's humiliation, patriotism dethroned his cosmopolitan
philosophy, and in the early part of 1808 inspired those glowing appeals to national sentiment, the Addresses to the German Nation. As Germany had perished owing to the selfishness of its members, so now it could be restored only by a new
ideal, the self-surrender of the individual for the good of the
community. Every noble nature, he insists, will value life not
for its own sake, but for the work which it can accomplish;
and the perpetuity of that work can be assured only by the
survival of the nation which values and protects it. Seeing
that the old education had done nothing to curb individual

ix,]

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193

selfishness, there must be a new national education which may
"fashion the German people to a unity throbbing through all
its limbs." Fortifying his idealist appeals by a reference to the
days of Arminius, he shows that a nation which "fastens its
gaze on that vision from the spiritual world, Liberty, will
certainly prevail over a people which is used only as a tool for
lust of foreign sway." These inspiriting calls, uttered at the
risk of his life while the French garrisoned Berlin, sank deep into
the consciousness of the people, and helped on the formation
(1808) of a non-political association, the "Tugendbund," for the
"revival of morality, religion, serious taste and public spirit."
Fichte's influence also powerfully aided the impulse towards
national education. William von Humboldt, the great classical
scholar, was in April, 1809, appointed Minister of Education;
and in a year he extended and reformed the system of public
training in the public schools (Gymnasia). To compensate
for the loss of the University of Halle, and to bring culture and
practical life into close contact, two new Universities were
founded, at Berlin and Breslau, for the former of which the king
gave a royal palace. Just as Napoleon had desired by his
lycees and the University of France to enlist an army of
teachers in his service, so now Prussia in a wiser and less
autocratic spirit relied on the strength which a State gains from
the support of enlightened and devoted citizens. The result
was to be seen in the ardour with which professors and
students rushed to arms in the War of Liberation of
1813
" T h e Spaniards were the refrain to everything, and we
always returned to them": such is Varnhagen von Ense's summary of an interview with that humorous genius, Jean Paul
Richter, in Oct. 1808. The momentous influence of the
Spanish rising on German and European affairs now claims
our attention.
We have already seen that in pursuance of the policy of
F.K.
13

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[CHAP.

Tilsit, Portugal had been occupied by French troops, while by
the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau (Oct. 1807) her lands were
to be divided between Napoleon and the Court of Madrid.
Accordingly Spanish troops helped General Junot in the occupation of Portugal. Spain was thus almost denuded of regular
troops; for after a foolish proclamation of the Spanish Court on
Oct. 4, 1806, calling the people to arms, Napoleon had required
that 4000 Spanish horse and 10,000 foot should be sent to
assist him in defending the mouth of the Elbe against England.
Even more favourable for his plans against Spain was the open
discord between Ferdinand, heir to the Spanish throne, and
his parents. The queen's favourite, Godoy, was bent on ruining Ferdinand and excluding him from the succession; and
when the prince attempted to overthrow Godoy on a hasty
charge of treason, he himself was placed under arrest by his
father Charles IV and was pardoned (Nov. 5) only on Napoleon's demands. It is generally assumed by historians hostile
to the French Emperor, that he all along intended to have the
crown of Spain at his disposal, in revenge for the ambiguous
and threatening call to arms issued by Godoy and Charles IV
just before Jena. There is, however, very little evidence for
this view except that the French ambassador at Madrid had
intrigued with Prince Ferdinand against the king. Mollien
even asserts that Napoleon's first intention in attacking Portugal
was merely to lure the English on to the mainland and
so decisively defeat them. But the unguarded state of Spain,
the apparent lethargy of its people, and the discords in the
royal palace, seem to have tempted him on to the perfidious
policy which culminated at Bayonne. The first sign of this
was his confidential order to Junot to send him a description
of the roads and resources of Spain, and drawings of its fortresses carefully made by his engineers. At first no suspicions
were aroused. Indeed, the march of 49,000 French troops
towards Valladolid caused no less joy to Ferdinand and the

ix.]

The Nationalist

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195

great mass of the people than alarm to Godoy and Charles IV.
They were at first welcomed as deliverers from the yoke of the
insolent favourite who was seizing the chief emoluments of the
State; but this feeling changed to alarm and indignation when
all the chief strongholds of north Spain were by ruse or force
occupied by the French (Feb.—March, 1808). Threatened
by the French invaders, and hated by their people, the despicable king and queen prepared for flight to the New World, the
very step to which Napoleon wished to drive them. The news
of this cowardly intention aroused a storm of indignation; and
a popular outbreak against Godoy brought about not only his
resignation but the voluntary abdication of Charles IV.in favour
of "his very dear son Ferdinand" (March 19). Enraged at her
ignominious fall, the queen besought the aid of Murat, commanding the French troops, to restore Charles IV to the position
of which mob violence had deprived him.
The ambitious marshal, hoping that the crown of Spain
would be his own, secretly promised to forward to Napoleon a
protest against Ferdinand VII's accession; while the young
king, hoping for Napoleon's continued support, facilitated the
entry of Murat's troops into Madrid. Everything seemed to
favour Napoleon's plans; and his clever agent Savary was now
sent to induce Ferdinand to meet the Emperor in the north of
Spain, with the assurance that his title as king would be recognised and his promised marriage with Napoleon's niece would
be arranged. On this understanding the young king set out
for Vittoria, where secret preparations were made by Savary
to carry him off by force, if he refused to go further. Surrounded by French troops, he departed for Bayonne. The
arrival there of his parents and Godoy increased his difficulties;
for Charles IV demanded his abdication and yet disclaimed
any intention of ruling again himself or even 01 returning to
Spain. The news of a fierce popular rising in Madrid against
the French and its ruthless repression by Murat (May 2)
13—2

ig6

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP.

enabled the parents to heap on Ferdinand their bitterest taunts
and Napoleon to threaten him with execution as a rebel. The
young king's spirit at last was broken. On May 5th he resigned
the crown to Charles IV, who in his ignoble desire for revenge
on his people surrendered all his claims to Napoleon. Pensions
and estates in France sufficed for these degraded descendants
of a long line of kings; and Napoleon boasted to Talleyrand
that he was "master of the situation in Spain as in the rest of
Europe."
In reality he had compassed his own destruction both in
Spain and throughout Europe. Instead of securing complete
possession of Spain, this infamous treachery at Bayonne aroused
a passion for vengeance in the Spanish people, nerving them
to desperate struggles which even Napoleon's power could not
crush. It was in vain that the dethroned princes and some
official bodies counselled submission to overwhelming force, in
vain that Napoleon promised to become "the regenerator of
Spain." Without waiting to count the odds, the Spaniards
rushed to arms, formed popular Juntas in their chief cities and
a central one at Seville; and Europe saw the rise of a new
and potent influence when the little province of Asturias with
sublime audacity declared war against Napoleon and sent a
request for English aid. Putting aside the consideration that
we were nominally at war with Spain, Canning at once declared
(June 15) that any nation opposing Napoleon "became instantly our essential ally"; and soon an English force was sent
to assist in freeing the Peninsula. Meanwhile, though the
patriots were in many places routed, they achieved two important successes, beating back the French from the streets of
Saragossa and compelling the surrender of General Dupont's
20,000 troops at Baylen in Andalusia (July 21),—events which
broke the spell of French invincibility. Joseph Bonaparte,
named King of Spain by his brother—Murat had to accept with
disgust the throne of Naples vacated by Joseph—after a nine

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

197

days' sojourn at Madrid had to retreat with the French forces
to the line of the Ebro. The fortunes of the patriots were
advanced still further by the landing in Mondego Bay of 18,000
British troops under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and their victory
over Junot's forces at Vimiero (Aug. 21); but the arrival of the
senior commanding officers Burrard and Dalrymple led to the
much censured Convention of Cintra, by which the French
troops in Portugal were to be conveyed on British ships to
France. The commencement of the Peninsular War was thus
marked by two considerable successes, one gained by the
numbers and enthusiasm of the Spanish levies, the other by
the tenacity of British regulars and the skill of a military
genius, Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose patience, powers of organisation, and unerring judgment supplied just those qualities in
which our allies were most deficient. A further gain to Spain
was the escape on British ships of the Spanish troops compelled in 1806 to serve Napoleon in Denmark. The annexation of the Papal States to the French Empire (May, 1808)
and the arrest of the Pope a year later gave the Spanish Rising
the aspect of a crusade against infidels; and every able-bodied
man who did not serve against the French was looked upon as
a traitor to his country and his faith.
This explosion of popular fury, from what had long been
considered an extinct volcano, thrilled Europe with astonishment and Napoleon's foes with hope. The French funds
which after Tilsit rose to 94 now sank to 70; and the Emperor,
after ante-dating the conscription of 1809 so as to replenish
his armies, turned to assure himself of the Czar's support before
crushing the Spanish patriots. The change in policy was
significant. Before Tilsit Napoleon had posed as the champion
of democracy against the old Governments. Henceforth he
relied on dynastic alliances, while his foes could for the first
time appeal to a potent principle, that of nationality. The
moral force, which he himself measured even in warfare as three

198

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[CHAP.

times the effect of the physical force, now began to pass over
to the side of his enemies.
Outwardly, however, the fabric of his power was more
imposing than ever. The meeting of the Emperors of the
West and East at Erfurt was graced by an assemblage of German kings and princes, who were clearly made to perceive their
dependence on the conqueror. But there was another object
more pressing than that of parading the humiliation of Germany,
namely to renew the Franco-Russian alliance. The policy
of Tilsit had aroused, but not satisfied, Alexander's ambition
for conquests on the lower Danube. The conquest of Finland
from Sweden, agreed upon between the Emperors at Tilsit, had
been virtually accomplished; but Alexander desired above all
to revive the Eastern Empire by extending his Empire to the
Bosphorus. He had accordingly heard with great chagrin (Jan.
1808) that Napoleon disapproved of any partition of Turkey
and demanded Silesia for France if Russia kept Moldavia and
Wallachia. The Spanish question, however, led to Napoleon's
renunciation of this claim, and to the revival of the partition
scheme; for Alexander insisted that the expulsion of the Tuiks
from Europe was required by the enlightenment of the age
even more than by sound policy. But for the Spanish rising,
it is certain that the interest of the world would have turned to
the East; for Napoleon in the early part of 1808 often said
that Constantinople was the centre of his policy. Indeed, his
correspondence of May, 1808, shows that after settling Joseph
in Spain, he desired to ruin English commerce by a FrancoRussian expedition overland to Egypt, Persia, and India,
while French and Spanish squadrons despatched to the Cape
and other parts were to distract and humble the mistress of
the seas.
The Spanish rising changed all that. An immediate breach
with Turkey was now most undesirable. Alexander's support
was also more than ever necessary to hold in check Central

ix ]

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Europe, now aroused by French reverses beyond the Pyrenees;
for the Hapsbuigs feared that after the fall of the last
Bourbons their turn would come next. Austria accordingly
began to arm. From his dreams of eastern conquests, the
French Emperor was thus suddenly brought to the need of
renewing that agieement with the Czar, on which rested his
domination in Central Europe. Relying, however, on his
ascendancy over Alexander, he determined to win a diplomatic
triumph such as he had gained at Tilsit. He thus summed up
his desires to Talleyrand, whom he charged with the negotiations at the Erfurt interview:—"I want to come back from Erfurt
free to do what I like in Spain: I want to be sure that Austria's
uneasiness will be held in check; and I don't want to be definitely engaged with Russia in eastern affairs." This was virtually the result of the famous interview. The Czar agreed to
postpone the joint expedition against Turkey and the East; but
he firmly refused to join in a demand for Austrian disarmament. Vainly did Napoleon resort by turn to blandishments
and exhibitions of temper. "From me"—retorted Alexander
—"anger gains nothing. Let us reason, or I depart." Sumptuous festivities, appropriate dramas acted by the Comedie
Franfaise, interviews with Goethe and other German savants,
hid from the world these inner dissensions; and at the end of
a fortnight of unexampled splendour, Napoleon gained the
substance of his demands in a secret Convention (Oct. 13,
1808). It renewed the Franco-Russian alliance formed at
Tilsit, and offered peace to England, with the retention of conquests by each belligerent, if she would recognise Joseph
Bonaparte as King of Spain, and the cession of Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia. Napoleon also, under the
strictest secrecy, consented to the Czar's acquisition of the
Danubian Provinces. If Turkey renewed the war with Russia,
France was to remain neutral, unless Austria helped the Sultan.
In that case Austria was to be attacked by France; and if she

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Erat

[CHAP.

made war on Napoleon, the Czar promised to give active aid to
his ally. Finally, Denmark was to receive an indemnity for the
losses sustained in 1807. The diplomatic victory here rested
with Napoleon as decisively as at Tilsit. His new engagements
to the Czar involved him in no immediate breach with Turkey;
and in secretly assenting to the Russian acquisition of the
Danubian Provinces and Finland, he only acknowledged what
then seemed definite conquests. Alexander, on the other
hand, promised to keep Austria quiet while Napoleon finished
with Spain. An envoy sent by the Emperor Francis to Erfurt
failed, notwithstanding Talleyrand's private assistance, to avert
this understanding, though Talleyrand's secret preliminary advice to the Czar, that Austria was necessary to the equilibrium
of Europe, led to his rejection of the joint proposal for her
instant disarmament. Furthermore, a hint dropped by Napoleon to Alexander, and developed by Talleyrand, that the
interests of France required Josephine's divorce and that one
of the Czar's sisters was of a suitable age, met with an evasive
though not unfriendly reply. Thus opened that rift within the
lute, which somewhat marred the majestic harmonies of Erfurt.
Without waiting for the "diplomatic mummery"—as
Fouchd termed it—of proposing peace to England on condition
that she would desert the cause of the Spanish patriots, Napoleon set out for the Ebro to end "this war of peasants and
monks," scattered their ill-organised forces and on Dec. 2
received the capitulation of Madrid. There he at once ordered
the abolition of the Inquisition and sequestration of its property, the reduction of monasteries and convents by two-thirds
(the property of the suppressed houses being also confiscated),
the abolition of all feudal rights over rivers &c, the banalites of
mills, all seigneurial courts of justice, and provincial Customs'
barriers; but these sweeping social reforms made little impression on a people whose feeling he had so deeply outraged.
For the present Napoleon turned to crush Sir John Moore's

ix.]

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Reaction.

201

army, which, relying on the promises of the Spaniards, had
marched from Portugal towards Burgos in the vain hope of
rallying the Spaniards, or at least of diverting the French
march from Madrid. The English force of about 24,000 men
was now exposed to Napoleon's victorious armies, which when
united numbered over 80,000; but Moore by a skilful retreat
amidst terrible hardships withdrew his troops to Corunna.
There, armed with new muskets, his men beat back Soult's
superior forces (Jan. 16, 1809) and embarked for England,
leaving their gallant leader buried in the citadel of the fortress.
This ill-fated expedition did not alter the current of English
public opinion; for two days before the Battle of Corunna
a treaty of alliance had been signed at London between Great
Britain, * Ferdinand VII,' and the Central Junta of Seville,
binding the contracting parties to a close alliance against
France. The return of Napoleon to Paris, to extirpate the
germs of discontent and confront Austria, scarcely lessened the
pressure on the Spanish patriots. Everywhere they were defeated. The determined men of Aragon, after the most desperate defence of modern times, were compelled to surrender to
Marshal Lannes the ruins of their capital, Saragossa (Feb. 21).
Yet, though all parts of Spain except the most mountainous
districts were in a military sense conquered, the peasantry still
flocked to arms with a dogged perseverance which defied the
efforts of over 300,000 French; and when some 40,000 of
Napoleon's troops were withdrawn to confront the war preparations of Austria, and Sir Arthur Wellesley landed at Lisbon,
the Peninsular War entered on another phase.
In Prussia, as we have seen, Stein had striven to excite a
war a outrance against Napoleon; but Frederick William refused
to stir without the aid of the Czar, which was not to be obtained.
The war party in Austria had however gained the upper hand
in the autumn of 1807, seeing in the Spanish rising as powerful a help as that offered by the regular armies of Russia and

202

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[CHAP.

Prussia before Friedland. In truth, the position of Austria
since the Treaties of Presburg and Tilsit had become insupportable. Shut out from her traditional influence in Germany
and Italy, threatened by Napoleon's troops in Prussia, Saxony,
Bavaria, and Venetia, she saw her foreign commerce decaying
under the influence of the Continental System, and heard with
anguish the groans of her faithful Tyrolese under the cast-iron
liberalism of Franco-Bavarian policy. Five centuries of Hapsburg rule in accord with Tyrolese traditions had been cut short
by the cession of Tyrol to Bavaria in Dec. 1805, but with a
promise from the newly-styled King of Bavaria that the rights
of that ancient county would be respected. No sooner, however, was Tyrol fully occupied by his troops than he and his
Minister Montgelas began to force on innovations like those
recently introduced at Munich. The property of Tyrolese
bishoprics was confiscated, religious rites and customs were
interfered with, in May 1808 the Estates were dissolved, and
the name of South Bavaria was imposed. As this happened at
the time of Napoleon's usurpation in Spain, the annexation of
half the Papal States to the kingdom of Italy, and the proposed
Franco-Russian scheme for a partition of Turkey, it seemed
part of a project for assuring universal dominion to Napoleon
and his allies. The result of the Erfurt Conference was by no
means reassuring to the Emperor Francis, except to show that
Alexander desired to maintain Austria as a bulwark between
Russia and the Napoleonic States. The belief that the Czar
was secretly jealous of French domination, that England would
help her by an expedition to the Low Countries, the certainty
that the Tyrolese would revolt against the Bavarian rule, and
that Napoleon must keep fully 250,000 men in Spain, decided
Austria to prefer the risks of war to an intolerable peace. So
far from her action being an aristocratic plot for the overthrow
of French democracy, Austria's conduct in the spring of 1809
showed a greater reliance on popular sentiment and support

ix.]

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203

than ever before. In June, 1808, Francis had ordered the
enrolment of a defensive militia, to act also as a reserve for the
regular army; and the Archduke Charles, by improving not only
the military organisation but also the condition of the soldiery,
greatly increased the efficiency and tenacity of his forces. The
Chancellor, Count Stadion, talked of inaugurating reforms like
those of Stein in Prussia; and Austria stood forth as the champion of German nationality. "Soldiers"—so ran the proclamation of the Archduke Charles, April 6, 1809—"the freedom
of Europe has sought refuge under your colours. Your
triumphs will loose her fetters, and your German brethren still
in the enemy's ranks await deliverance from you 1 ." The last
wish was to be falsified. Fear of Austrian conquest or of
Napoleon's vengeance kept on his side the troops of the
Rhenish Confederation, but as soon as an Austrian corps
entered Tyrol, the whole country arose : 6000 Franco-Bavarian
troops were compelled to surrender, and in five days Tyrol was
freed by these brave peasants under the lead of Hofer and
Hormayer.
Space will admit only the briefest account of the chief campaign—that on the Danube. The Archduke Charles, leading
a force of about 120,000 men up to Ratisbon, for a time placed
the French and confederate troops in great danger; but Napoleon, hurrying from Paris, at once massed his forces and by
vigorous blows at Hausen, Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmiihl,
and Ratisbon (April 19—23) defeated the Austrian forces and
drove them down the opposite sides of the Danube. By the
side of these terrible reverses, temporary Austrian successes in
1

Some writers call this the war of the Fifth Coalition, reckoning the
Fourth as being inaugurated by the Treaties in the spring of 1807. It is
preferable, I think, to reckon the struggle of April—June, 1807, a s the
Third Coalition in its second phase. That of 1809 was not a Coalition,
there being no treaty between Austria and England, or between Austria
and the Spanish patriots.

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[CHAP.

Venetia, Tyrol and at Warsaw were of little avail; for the
defeats on the upper Danube precluded the hope of that
general rising of Germany, for which Stein and all patriots had
hoped and worked. A hopeless attempt was indeed made
near Cassel; and the brave Colonel Schill, leading his cavalry
regiment out of Berlin, strove to excite a national war against
the French; but, meeting with little support, he marched northwards to Stralsund, there to be overpowered and slain by
Dutch troops in Napoleon's service (May 31). The young
Duke of Brunswick also began a daring raid from Bohemia
into Saxony, gaining some signal successes over Jerome Bonaparte's troops; but the issue of this and other isolated efforts,
even of the far more important and sustained Tyrolese rising,
depended on the main campaign on the Danube.
Meanwhile Napoleon had entered Vienna; but in his
attempt to drive the Austrian army from the north bank of the
Danube, he met with his first great repulse at Aspem-Essling
(May 21—22), finally having to draw back his shattered troops
into the great island of Lobau, with a total loss of about 27,000
men. A thrill of expectation ran through Europe at this unexpected change of fortune. " In Prussia" (wrote Varnhagen
von Ense) "the enthusiasm is general. The spell is broken.
Napoleon is no longer invincible....His downfall may well be
expected." If Schill's and Brunswick's attempts had been
made conjointly after the news of Aspern, and England had
made her projected diversion on the North Sea coast in time,
it is probable that Germany would have been aroused, and
Napoleon's overthrow assured; but again he was to be saved
by the maladroitness of his foes and his own surprising energy.
Marmont, Marbot, and other French commanders, admit that
a vigorous attack on their rear immediately after Aspern
would have placed their army in the greatest danger; but the
Archduke Charles, dismayed by his own heavy losses, remained
strictly on the defensive, and allowed Eugene's army from Italy

ix.]

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205

to strengthen the French communications. After six weeks of
quiet preparation and concentration of all available forces,
about 170,000 French crossed the Danube at night, far below
the Austrian batteries, thus compelling the enemy to fall back
on another strong position at Wagram. There a long and
most obstinate conflict (July 6) was finally lost by the 140,000 defenders, mainly owing to the non-arrival of the Archduke John,
who was to support their left wing, and by the skill and persistence of Macdonald's attack on their centre; but this Marshal
—he received the title on the field of battle—himself wondered
why the Austrians, after an orderly retreat, should have sought
an armistice (July 15) from victors who were in almost equally
great straits owing to want of ammunition. The despondency
of the Austrian Government was deepened by Wellesley's
retreat on Portugal after Talavera and by the failure of England
to make any timely and effective diversion on the North Sea
coast.
The surrender of the Hapsburgs was fatal to the daring
attempt of the Duke of Brunswick, as well as to the Tyrolese
patriots. After defeating Jerome's troops and occupying
Brunswick, the brave leader had to retreat to the North Sea
coast, where he was saved by an English squadron (Aug. 10).
The Tyrolese resistance was harder to break. After the first
defeats of the Archduke Charles on the upper Danube, the
Franco-Bavarian forces again occupied Innsbruck (May 19),
only to be driven out of Tyrol at the close of that month so
disastrous for Napoleon's arms; and after Aspern the Emperor
Francis promised that he would sign no peace which would
sunder Tyrol and Vorarlberg from his Empire. The men of
the latter province made successful raids into Baden, and even
captured Constance; and Tyrol enjoyed two months' rest
under Hofer. Once an inn-keeper near Meran, Hofer now
resided at the castle of Innsbruck with the title of Imperial
Commander-in-chief, levied taxes, issued a coinage, organised

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[CHAP.

a militia, and restored the old system of government. After
Wagram, Lefebvre led 25,000 troops up the Inn valley and
occupied Innsbruck; but at Hofer's summons the brave Tyrolese
again rose. In a deep valley near Oberau their sharp-shooters
harassed another invading column. The mountaineers crushed
the Saxons with rocks and trees, and the invaders were rolled
back on the capital, where another reverse decided the French
marshal to evacuate the county (Aug. 14). All the devotion of
the Tyrolese, however, was futile, if unaided by some show of
energy on the part of the British Government and by determination in the councils of the Emperor Francis. H e and his
new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Metternich, foreseeing no
effective help from any quarter against Napoleon's superior
forces, finally agreed to conditions of peace. These the French
Emperor, by a discreditable ruse, considerably aggravated, and
hurried on to the final stage of the Treaty of Schonbrunn
(Vienna), Oct. 14,—"a treaty (Metternich declares) full of unworthy artifices, having no foundation in international rights."
By it Austria recognised the Bavarian rule over Tyrol and
Vorarlberg, besides ceding to Bavaria Salzburg and a strip of
Upper Austria as far as the R. Inn. To the French Empire
she yielded up Croatia, Carniola, with Trieste and the greater
part of Carihthia—all of which were reorganised by Napoleon
as the Ulyrian Provinces. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw
received from the Hapsburgs all West and New Galicia (their
share of the spoils of 1795) together with a district around
Cracow \ while the Czar received a strip of land from East
Galicia. Beside these losses of 4,500,000 subjects and of her
maritime provinces, Austria agreed to pay a war indemnity of
^3,400,000, bound herself closely to the Continental System,
and secretly agreed to limit her army to 150,000 men, as well
as to dismantle some of her fortresses, including Vienna. After
the least disastrous of her four wars against Napoleon she now
suffered the severest losses ever sustained by the Hapsburgs;

ix.]

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207

and worse than their cessions of territory was the abandonment
of the reforming policy which had recently promised to yield
to them the moral as well as political hegemony of Germany.
Even so, the patriotism of the Viennese, clinging ever more
firmly to the Hapsburgs amid the storms of adversity, gave to
the return of their Emperor Francis the appearance of a triumphal entry. Indeed, it is significant that the most stubborn and
successful resistance to Napoleon in 1809 was offered by the
rank and file or by armed peasants, while timidity still paralysed
the councils of commanders and diplomatists. A keen eye
could discern, even amidst disasters, that the reaction against
Napoleon was deepening in intensity.
After having by their own gallantry three times freed their
land from foreign troops, the Tyrolese refused to accept as
final the terms of the Treaty of Schonbrunn which abandoned
them to Bavaria. Towards the end of October 50,000 invaders began to press up the three chief Tyrolese valleys, the
Pusterthal and those of the Inn and Adige. On the advice of
the Archduke John, even Hofer leaned towards surrender
until the fiery zeal of a few fanatics rekindled the embers of
revolt. But the enemy held the main valleys, and the snows
of winter gradually drove the Tyrolese from their fastnesses.
Hofer, betrayed by an acquaintance, was taken to Mantua
and there shot as a rebel (Feb. 20, 1810). To stamp out
Tyrolese feeling the famous county was divided, part of the
south-eastern districts going to the Illyrian Provinces, and
most of the Adige valley being annexed to Eugene's kingdom
of Italy; but readjustments of boundaries were powerless to
efface the memory of the Tyrolese exploits against the might
of Napoleon.
The student will probably have noticed that in many of
the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (especially in the campaigns of 1792—4, 1799—1800, 1803—1807) fortune favoured
the allies in the spring and early summer, only to return more

2o8

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

decisively to the tricolour standards in the latter part of the
year. It was so in 1809 both in Central Europe and in the
Spanish Peninsula. The withdrawal of 40,000 French from the
Tagus to the Danube gave little relief to the Spanish patriots,
until the advent of a military genius altered the whole character
of the struggle. The French, numbering about 270,000 men
under the lead of Soult, Ney, Victor, and St Cyr, were pressing back the Portuguese and Spanish levies, when Sir Arthur
Wellesley took command of some 25,000 allied troops at
Lisbon. Marching swiftly northwards, by a skilful and daring
move he crossed the Douro above Oporto and compelled
Soult with the loss of 58 cannons to evacuate Portugal. The
rapidity with which the English commander organised the
defence of Lisbon, marched 200 miles through rugged country,
and, striking at the communications of a powerful foe, forced
him to retreat with the loss of all his cannons and stores, may
well challenge comparison with those masterly moves of
Napoleon a month earlier, which, changing a weak defensive
into a crushing offensive, drove the Archduke Charles from
Bavaria. Could Wellesley have changed commands with the
Austrian prince, the liberation of Europe might have occurred
in 1809. The English general further showed his powers of
quick insight and rapid action in a campaign against Victor on
the Tagus. Deprived of necessary reinforcements by the
British Ministry, neglected and almost starved by their Spanish
allies, his troops yet penetrated to Talavera, where King Joseph
and Victor assailed them. The English infantry stood mm,
and though the centre was at one time broken, an opportune
infantry charge of the 48th regiment gained the day (July 28);
but the southward march of Soult's army compelled Wellesley
to beat a speedy retreat on Portugal, indignant at the conduct
of the Spanish forces. " W e are here worse off than in a
hostile country (he wrote to the English Government): never
was an army so ill-used. The common dictates of humanity

ix.]

The Nationalist

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209

have been disregarded by them." H e determined henceforth
to dispense with Spanish aid and to act for the present on the
frontier of Portugal, where he soon was able effectively to
control the military organization. The complete rout of
52,000 Spaniards at Ocana (Nov. 1809) by about half the
number of French, with the loss of 26,000 prisoners, seemed
to promise the speedy subjection of Spain. But the Central
Junta of the patriots at Seville still breathed defiance to the
French, and Miot de Melito, Joseph's adviser at Madrid, after
all the French triumphs in Catalonia, Aragon and Castile,
wrote despondingly—" We have conquered but not convinced. "
This expression aptly characterises the whole European
situation at the close of 1809. The new national impulses in
Germany and Spain were as yet ill-organized, and had produced only one leader worthy of entering the lists against
Napoleon; and Wellesley was at the head of only 20,000
British troops, while double that number were being sacrificed
at Walcheren by the incapacity of Chatham. This splendid
expedition, which might have aroused North-Germany and
effected a most important relief for Austria, did not set sail till
a month after she had been crushed at Wagram. It was then
aimed against Antwerp; but time was wasted in reducing
Flushing until the former could no longer be carried by a coup
de main. Our forces retired into Walcheren, whence after the
loss of nearly half their number by disease they were withdrawn
before Christmas, 1809. In this year of disjointed efforts the
Walcheren failure was by far the most disgraceful; yet the
Danube campaign shattered a reputation which had hitherto
been second only to that of Napoleon. The Archduke
Charles, skilful tactician though he was, so lost his power of
initiative when opposed to the French Emperor as to paralyse
the arm of Austria in April and July; while born leaders of
men like Schill and the Duke of Brunswick were condemned
F. R.

14

210

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[CHAP.

to a merely guerrilla warfare in the level plains of Germany
where such methods were hopeless. Nevertheless this disastrous year had shown that Napoleon's domination rested only
on force, fear, and the incapacity of the governments opposed
to him. That he recognised the merely personal character
of his supremacy was shown by a remarkable event at its
close.
As soon as Napoleon gained the Consulate for life some
members of his family had urged him to divorce Josephine,
who had borne him no child. Amidst the glories of Tilsit and
Erfurt the need of an heir to consolidate his dynasty was
more patent than ever. So persistent were the rumours of
a divorce after Erfurt, that Fouche undertook to plead with
Josephine to promote the interests of France by agreeing to
a separation from Napoleon, as " t h e most sublime and also
the most inevitable of sacrifices." An affecting interview
between Napoleon and Josephine led to a disavowal of
Fouche's act. It was certainly premature, for at that time
a bride was still to be found. The elder of Alexander's
surviving sisters had been engaged to the Duke of Oldenburg,
immediately after the Erfurt interview; and the present tension
in Franco-Russian relations promised no better success to a
request for the hand of the younger sister. The extreme
reluctance with wmich the Czar drew the sword against Austria
(May, 1809), as he was bound to do by the Erfurt Convention,
and the ostentatious inactivity of his troops, exposed him to
the charge of perfidy; but after the somewhat doubtful issue
of the Danube campaign, and amidst the discontent of all
Roman Catholics at the imprisonment of the Pope (July, 1809),
the French Emperor could not break with the autocrat of the
East. The Czar's annoyance at the Treaty of Schonbrunn
was, however, partly appeased by a promise from Napoleon
that Poland should not be re-established. This act of complaisance was accompanied closely by a formal request (Dec.

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

211

1809) for a matrimonial alliance. A few days previously
the Emperor had announced his intentions to Josephine, who
flung herself dowrn in a transport of grief with the words " No :
I will never survive it." H e tenderly aided one of his chamberlains to carry her to her apartments; and the agitation which
shook his frame shouM prove to all but his bitterest enemies
that he had retained much of his early devotion for her; while
the friendship which in her retirement at Malmaison she to
the end of her days preserved for him, may well prove the
sincerity of his alleged reasons for the divorce.
This sinister event took place (Dec. 15); but the proposal
for a marriage with the Czar's younger sister met (Jan. 1810)
with the same reply as the Erfurt proposal, namely that these
matters were entirely in the hands of the Czar's mother, who
was known to be bitterly opposed to the French. Foreseeing
the possibility of such a reply, and keenly impressed with the
need of gaining as soon as possible a direct heir to his throne,
Napoleon had already caused his envoy at Vienna to meet
half-way some cautious advances which Metternich, the new
Austrian Foreign Minister, had made (Nov. 30, 1809) on the
subject of an Austrian princess. It was in pursuance of the
policy which this skilful statesman had recommended to his
master on his assumption of the heavy cares of office:—" We
must confine our system to tacking, and turning, and flattering.
—There remains but one expedient, to increase our strength
for better days, and to work out our preservation by gentle
means." At Paris it is certain that Josephine herself, her son
Eugene, Talleyrand, and many others urged on the Austrian
marriage alliance as having a more lasting effect, as tending to
preserve the equilibrium of Europe in favour of France, and as
"absolving France from a crime not her own, but only the
work of a faction." The skilful pleading of Talleyrand at the
Privy Council meetings at Paris (Jan. 29 and Feb. 6) would
perhaps have availed little but for Napoleon's knowledge of
14—2

212

The Revolutionary

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Era.

[CHAP.

the first evasive answers from St Petersburg. The Council
meetings gave him the appearance of choosing between a
Russian and an Austrian bride; and, before the final refusal
of the Czar's mother was made known, a courier set out from
Paris for Vienna, asking for the hand of the Archduchess
Marie Louise. Napoleon's amour profile was thus saved from
a public slight, but only at the expense of Alexander's feelings;
and the mutual annoyance at the whole proceeding was evinced
and accentuated by the French Emperor's immediate refusal
to ratify in treaty form his promise that he would never reestablish Poland. Alexander on his side took this as a thinlyveiled threat that the French Emperor meant to use the Poles
in a war against Russia, and soon remarked to his friend and
former minister, Czartoryski, that he expected war in 1811.
The marriage of Napoleon (April 1, 181 o) with the niece
of the ill-fated Marie Antoinette was something more than a
visible sign of the repentance of France for the crime of 1793.
It effected far more than the admission of the Corsican caporal
and heir to the revolution, into the proudest of reigning families.
It was an event of far-reaching importance. Napoleon had
long ago remarked that his position could only be secured by
an alliance with Russia or Austria. After Wagram he had
reduced the latter almost to a second-rate Power, and seemed
to desire a partition of the world between the Empires of the
West and the East. The policy of Tilsit and Erfurt was now
undermined by the Austrian marriage. Henceforth he began
to support the Hapsburg Empire, to isolate Russia, and while
holding her fast to his commercial system, to push her out
of Europe in matters political and military. The marriage
with Marie Louise further marks a recurrence to the Charlemagne ideal, somewhat discarded in 1807—1809 for what may
be called the Romano-Byzantine policy of Tilsit and Erfurt.
As the old Frankish hero's failure to gain the hand of the
Eastern Empress Irene had limited his aims to central and

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

213

southern Europe, so too Napoleon after 1809 reverted to a
more Frankish or Germanic policy. His correspondence and
his conduct to Goethe and Wieland at Erfurt show his desire
of propitiating the nascent sentiment of German nationality
which so nearly caused his overthrow in May—June 1809.
The alliance with the Hapsburgs now marks the final effort
of Napoleon to reconcile Central Europe to the increasing
hardships which his Continental System imposed.
Outwardly the Austrian marriage consolidated the Napoleonic
supremacy in Central Europe; and the birth of a son, the
* King of Rome/ seemed to place the keystone on the arch
whereby he sought to span the gulf hitherto separating the old
dynasties from the French Revolution. One other result of
this momentous event must be observed. It emphasized the
abandonment by Austria of her reforming projects and of
her championship of German nationality from which Stein
had hoped so much; and the tortuous time-serving policy
necessitated by this ignoble alliance was to yield to Prussia, in
the decisive struggle of 1813, the moral and political leadership
of Germany.
Long diverted from his efforts against England by the
Spanish Rising and the Austrian War, Napoleon now desired
to end the Peninsular War and complete the ruin of England
by hermetically sealing the Continent against her goods. This
cause or pretext for the annexation of maritime districts to his
Empire—e.g. that of Etruria in 1808 and the Papal States in
1809—now began to operate with renewed vigour. Sweden
was compelled (June, 1810) to adhere rigidly to his Continental System, and renounce the exceptions in favour of salt
and colonial produce which she had for nine months striven to
maintain. Louis Napoleon was overwhelmed with reproaches
from Paris for his neglect to apply that system with full rigour
to his kingdom of Holland, which lived by its foreign and
carrying trades. When, afcer numerous quarrels, Louis saw

214

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Era.

[CHAP.

himself menaced by Napoleon's troops, he abdicated in favour
of his son (July i ) ; but this act was promptly set aside, and
Holland was annexed to the French Empire (July 9).
Hitherto the Continental System had been more or less
evaded in Holland and even in the French Empire; for while
both the English and French Governments nominally forbade
all intercourse, they secretly issued licences to merchants for
trading even with a prohibited State in goods which were
greatly needed. Indeed, the chief aim of our Orders in
Council, the monopoly of the ocean commerce of the world,
had been so far attained that Europe had to procure colonial
produce directly or indirectly through our shippers, or submit
to the privation of coffee, sugar, cotton, indigo, and the many
products required in manufacture. Even where the license
system failed, smuggling effected much the same result. From
our ports of vantage in Malta and Sicily, from many ports of the
Spanish Peninsula, the Channel Islands, and Heligoland, our
goods secretly found their way into Europe, or even by way of
Salonica and the Balkan passes into Austria and Germany.
A French decree of October 1809, forbidding the importation
of all colonial produce into Hamburg, proves that Napoleon
even at that time regarded all such wares as being of British
origin. It also states incidentally that about six hundred women
had been engaged in smuggling coffee and other colonial
produce into that city, though it was then garrisoned by French
troops. In this connection we may quote the testimony of
Bourrienne, who was then the French agent at Hamburg.
"Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, whilst
the French Government carried it on extensively....Licences
for the sale of English goods were procured at a high price by
anyone who was rich enough to pay for them. The speculation
in licences was carried to a scandalous extent only to enrich a
few, and to satisfy the short-sighted views of the contrivers of
the system. I informed Napoleon that, notwithstanding his

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

215

precautions, every prohibited article was smuggled in, because
the profits on the sale in Germany, Poland, Italy, and even in
France, were too considerable to deter persons from running
any risks whatsoever to obtain them....This profound ignorance
of the maxims of political economy caused general privation
and misery, which in their turn occasioned general hostility.
The system could only succeed in the impossible event of all
the Powers of Europe honestly endeavouring to carry it into
effect. A single free port would have destroyed it. In order
to ensure its complete success, it was necessary to conquer and
occupy all countries, and never to evacuate them....It is necessary to have witnessed, as I have, the numberless vexations and
miseries occasioned by this baneful system, in order to undeistand the mischief which it effected in Europe, and how much
that mischief contributed to Napoleon's fall."—This interesting
extract will seive to justify a statement which I shall often have
to emphasize, that Napoleon's wars after 1807 had a vital
connection with his Continental System \ and it incidentally
refutes the prevalent belief that his later wars were solely the
result of an unbridled ambition. On the contrary, they sprang
almost necessarily from the adoption of a system which aimed
at hermetically sealing the Continent against England, at
securing a lasting peace and the undisputed supremacy of
France. We must now return to consider the underlying causes
of his failure and ultimate overthrow.
The Continent, oppressed by conscription or devastated by
war, was never so dependent on England for cheap and good
manufactures as at this time. Napoleon's system and the
English Orders in Council ruined neutral commerce, thereby
compelling Europe to exist on its own resources, or buy
through English merchants at prices enormously enhanced by
the risks encountered or the devious routes adopted. Knowing
that practically all colonial produce was bought through
English traders, Napoleon now endeavoured by the decrees of

216

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Aug. and Oct. 1810 to raise a large revenue on colonial wares
and yet destroy English goods. By the former he imposed
duties aveiaging 40 or 50 per cent, on the value of colonial
produce, because that was assumed to be the profit made by
the merchant or smuggler. By the latter decree he ordered
thai; all British manufactured goods should be seized and
publicly burnt not only in his Empire, but in dependent
States as Switzerland, the Rhenish Confederation, and the
Hanse Towns. By these tyrannical orders the Emperor hoped
finally to assure England's surrender; but the means adopted
pressed more heavily on his own States than on his foes.
The confiscation and destruction of English goods brought
present ruin on multitudes of his subjects in order to exclude
those products in the future; while the 50 per cent, tax was
of course paid by the consumer in the enhanced prices of
all colonial wares. The result of Napoleon's determination
to "make commerce manoeuvre like a regiment"—to use
ChaptaPs phrase—was seen in the enormous increase of
prices. Dyes, cotton, and other necessaries for manufactures
now rose to twice, and sugar and coffee to five times, their
natural values; and while the English manufacturer gained his
raw materials as cheaply as before and economised in production by the use of the power-loom, his continental rivals
enjoyed scarcely any of the new inventions, and were further
handicapped by the very system which claimed to protect
them from English competition.
"When stripped of all
political prestige (wrote Mollien) this system was seen to be
the most mistaken and disastrous of fiscal inventions." It is,
indeed, a remarkable fact that, when the economic blunders of
the earlier revolutionists had so aggravated the miseries of
France in 1793—5, the heir to the revolution should have
assured his own overthrow by persisting in a policy, the
results of which his own Finance Minister clearly foresaw. A
few industries, it is true, were thereby started in his Empire;

CENTRAL
AND

EUROPE

CAMPAIGNS OF

IN

1812

IV.

1792 - 18IO

° .LoTUfitiute East, of Greenwich.'
Stardbrds GeoifniphiaiLEstab*

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

217

and interested monopolists were loud in the praise of his
system as the " perfection of the prohibitive system " adopted
by the Mountain in 1793. Beetroot sugar began to be made;
the growth of cotton was attempted in Italy; and a few callings—especially that of the smuggler—received an artificial
stimulus from the high prices; but that France gained little
real benefit was proved by the growing discontent and by the
use of State credit to stave off a severe crisis in 1 8 n .
That year was the crisis of the commercial struggle
between England and France. Our commerce, relieved in
1808—9 by its admission into the Spanish colonies, suffered
severely in 1810—1811 from the collapse of rash speculation
there, as also from the civil strife following their separation from
Spain; while the interruption of intercourse with the United
States, the increasing stringency of Napoleon's decrees, and the
failure of our harvest in 181 o, threatened our industrial classes
with ruin and starvation. Trade was at a standstill in the
manufacturing districts; and the Luddite riots of 1811 threatened
a social revolution, had not relief come at the end of that
terrible year through the Czar's secession from the Continental
System. The depreciation of our paper currency, then almost
the only medium for our internal trade, and the alarming fall
in the exchange value with other lands, seemed to presage the
speedy collapse of our credit; but this very fall in the exchange tempted Continental traders to deal secretly with the
land where their money would go furthest. For these and
other reasons English trade survived the strain which was so
terrible to Continental industries.
In Germany the distress was felt more keenly than anywhere. The necessity of complete control of the North Sea coast
brought Napoleon to decree the annexation (Dec. 13, 1810) to
his Empire of all the lands between the Lower Rhine and the
Free City of Llibeck, including the Duchy of Oldenburg, ruled
by a relative of the Czar; and a fortnight later Canton Valais

218

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

was incorporated into the Empire so as to gain complete
control over the great Simplon road into Italy. The results
of complete subjection to the Continental System were thus
described by F. Perthes, then dwelling at Hamburg.—" Of
the 422 sugar-boiling houses at Hamburg, few now stood
open: the printing of cottons had ceased entirely: the tobaccodressers were driven away by the government. The imposition of innumerable taxes, door and window, capitation and
land taxes, drove the inhabitants to despair."—The extension
of the conscription to these new Departments of the Empire
filled to the brim the measure of hatred against the tyrant of
the Continent. It was indeed the height of folly for the new
Charlemagne to nullify the undeniable benefits of his rule by
measures which emptied every purse and every larder. To
sweep away all relics of feudalism, to abolish serfdom throughout his Empire and dependent States, to decree religious
liberty and civic equality, was futile when prosperous cities
were ruined by his military exactions and commercial decrees.
It was indeed the strangest contradiction to his earlier policy
of healing the wounds and satisfying the material interests
of France. In trusting to the proclamation of social equality
to keep ruined communities in a state of idyllic content, the
Emperor was now committing the very blunder of the revolutionary idealogues whom he despised.
Whether Napoleon was sincere in the offers of peace which
he made to the British Government after Marengo, to Fox in
1806, again just after Erfurt, or in 1809 before the annexation
of Holland, is too large and complex a question to be discussed
here. Those who believe in his desire for peace have to
explain how it was that during the Peace of Amiens he proceeded with annexations as if in time of war, how far his
designs in Jan.—March 1808 for the partition of Turkey and
the East were consonant with a pacific policy, and whether his
tentative proposal (March, 181 o) of evacuating Holland and the

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction,

219

Hanse Towns if England would withdraw the Orders in Council,
had any other aim than that of weakening our alliance with the
Spanish patriots. Further official advances (apart from those
made by Louis Napoleon and Fouche', for which the latter was
disgraced) had been met by the reply from London that
Napoleon must give up all claim to Spain, Sicily and Malta.
The crushing terms imposed by him on Prussia and Austria
were an ominous warning that peace might be worse than open
war; and the British Government decided to remain true to its
treaty of Jan. 1809 with the Spanish Central Junta.
It is more within our limits to point out that the weight of
his government, the fearful drain in men and money, had long
been producing discontent in France itself. The extension of
his power, as a guarantee against a Bourbon restoration with
the retrocession of the confiscated lands to their former owners
(for therein lay the strength of Napoleon's position), was felt to
be purchased at too high a cost when French blood was poured
forth every year in quarrels which concerned French interests
hardly at all. Farseeing Frenchmen—according to the testimony of Mollien—had long been dreading that his severity
to the conquered States would "nationalise the resentment"
against France; but after the disgrace of Talleyrand and
Fouche his Ministers were little more than passive tools, as
completely subject to his will as were the Ministries of 1793—4
to that Committee of Public Safety whose functions he inherited and developed. Remonstrances only served to bring
disgrace on the very few who were so indiscreet as to offer
them; while, by the. strange irony characteristic of the years
1794—1814, those who at the earlier date had been the most
ardent republicans were now foremost among the servile
officials who desired to strengthen Napoleon's rule and to robe
the new Empire with all the trappings of an ancient monarchy.
The ceremonial of Louis XIV's Court was revived with all
its splendour, and with far more ennui to the courtiers than

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was possible in that age of wit and intellectual brilliance; for
though Napoleon in private possessed great charm of manner,
and generally unbent in a tete-a-tete with a Minister, his conduct in public always inspired a certain uneasiness or dread.
Brilliant causeur though he was, the incisiveness of his questions, the sharp military ring of his sentences, generally recalled
the associations of the parade ground. The effect of the smile
which played about his cheeks and lips was marred by the ever
fixed aquiline gaze of the eyes; and the general impression
left on the beholder was one of ill-defined fear. "After the
Emperor's departure"—wrote a foreign attache—"we all
breathed freely again as if a heavy weight had been taken
off. The conversation became loud and general as before his
entry; and the loudest of all were the hangers-on of the French
court, who made amends for their previous silent dread by loud
hilarity." Napoleon's dislike of "political women"—witness
his exile of Mdme de Stael—allowed none of those witticisms
at the expense of government which had often tempered its
rigour under Louis XIV. Even in the royalist salons of the
Faubourg St Germain criticisms on the imperial rule were
uttered with bated breath, Jest they should find a place in the
weekly or daily letters sent to him by informers who reported
the state of public opinion. As for the Emperor's Court, it is
succinctly characteiised by his Minister, Chaptal, as " a slavegalley where each courtier pulled the oar to the word of command."
Far more oppressive was the strain on the material resources of France. Vastly as these had been developed by the
splendid activity of the First Consul, they were soon unequal
to the demands of an aggressive Imperialism. Though Mollien
had succeeded in balancing revenue and expenditure for 1808,
yet the Budget was hopelessly deranged by the Spanish War,
and the year 1811 closed with a deficit of 47,000,000 francs.
For the first time Napoleon's adage that "war must support

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war " was completely falsified. The pay of Joseph Bonaparte's
armies was generally a year in arrears, and the most pressing
needs of his government could not be met from the scanty
taxes of a land where revolt was general. Though Napoleon
sent to Madrid part of the sums which he wrung from helpless
Prussia, yet Spain continued to be so heavy a drain on French
finance that he threatened to annex the land between the
Pyrenees and the Ebro as a recompense. Talleyrand's quiet
but firm disapproval of Napoleon's Spanish policy reflected
the general sentiment of France. That whole struggle, envenomed by the perfidy which commenced it, disgusted France,
and wearied troops accustomed to the short and dramatic
campaigns in Italy or Germany. " It was the war in Spain
(wrote Marbot) which brought about Napoleon's fall."
There were many reasons for the military failure in Spain.
The Emperor, intent on supervising the myriad details of his
administration and on maintaining his domination in Germany,
could not control in person all the operations beyond the
Pyrenees, and so ensure that unity of action which the
jealousies of his generals compromised at many critical
junctures. The hatred of the Spaniards for a government
thrust upon them by treachery, nerved them to struggle on,
even when in a military sense they were vanquished, as at
the close of 1808 and 1809. Further, all the skill of the
French commissariat, and the experience of their troops in
foraging and plundering, failed sometimes to solve the problem
expressed in Henri IV's phrase—" In Spain large armies will
starve, and small armies will be beaten.'' Finally the vast
extent of the peninsula, divided by five great mountain chains,
the risks in the communications with France through rugged
provinces inhabited by the tenacious Basques and Catalans,
the difficulty of holding down the fertile south, so as to ensure
a revenue, while making head against the English in the west
and the guerrillas everywhere,—these obstacles and problems

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alone would have retarded a permanent conquest, even in the
face of a commander of ordinary talents; and Wellington
possessed a combination of gifts—political tact in dealing with
his allies, prudence in husbanding resources, and discernment
when to strike quick and hard-—possessed by no one of the
French Marshals, except perhaps Soult.
At the opening of the Peninsular campaign of 1810 the
position was, in brief, as follows. Suchet's bold and skilful
attacks were reducing most of the rugged province of Catalonia,
which a British force might have easily kept from his grasp.
Soult with 65,000 French had overrun the fertile province
of Andalusia and driven the Spanish Junta with its army into
the island which protects Cadiz (Feb. 1810). This great seaport remained the national capital as long as Madrid was
held by King Joseph's forces. In the north the French were
investing Astorga and Ciudad Rodrigo, when Massena, Prince
of Essling, took command of an army of 86,000 men largely
composed of troops victorious in Germany, with orders to "drive
the leopards into the sea." The speedy success of Soult in
Andalusia and the formidable invasion of Portugal threatened by
Massena quickly reduced Wellington to the defensive. In the
opinion of our allies and foes alike, he was guilty of deserting
the Spanish general who attempted a brave but unavailing
defence of Ciudad Rodrigo. Its surrender (July, 18to) and
the explosion of a powder magazine at Almeida, laid open the
northern road into Portugal, and the allies retired down the
valley of the Mondego. The slowness of Massena's pursuit
gave Wellington the opportunity of massing some 50,000
Anglo-Portuguese troops on the heights of Busaco. The
French commander, though informed by Marbot that there
was a road which turned that strong position, yet persisted in
the front attack which Ney had first advised. His rashness
led to a severe defeat. Three brave attempts by about 60,000
French veterans to storm the heights were repulsed with the

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loss of 4,500 men (Sept. 27, 1810). The moral effect of this
battle was most important: the inexperienced Portuguese
troops gained confidence: the British Ministry, long wavering
before the attacks of a strong peace party, was encouraged to
persevere with the war; and the disputes between Massena
and his generals were so envenomed by disaster as to paralyse
French efforts at Torres Vedras. In a strategic sense the
battle of Busaco was useless. Wellington's chief aim was to
collect the allied resources within those famous lines; while
Massena's true course of action was shown by the ease with
which he turned Wellington's position at Busaco by the flank
march previously urged on him. The French now occupied
Coimbra, but allowed Wellington to retire unmolested within
the lines of Torres Vedras, taking with him or destroying the
supplies of the country north of these defences. They consisted of an external and weaker line of works nearly 30 miles
long from the sea to the Tagus, following the course of the
mountains; a stronger inner line roughly parallel to the first;
and a third at the mouth of the Tagus merely designed to
cover a forced embarkation if the second line were pierced:
150 redoubts with 600 cannons crowned the most important
positions; a flotilla on the Tagus protected the allied right;
and the presence of 70,000 regular troops and 50,000 irregulars,
under Wellington's supreme command, promised a desperate
resistance of this the chief refuge of the cause of national
independence. The peninsula of Lisbon, the island on which
Cadiz stands, and the fortresses of Badajoz, Elvas, Gibraltar,
and Tarragona, were the only strongholds on the Continent
which defied Napoleon's domination. Considering the excellence of the French spy system, it is extraordinary that
Massena should only have heard of the existence of Wellington's lines of defence five days before he came in sight of
them. His numerous delays had enabled the defenders to
strengthen the outer line with walls and abatis of trees; and

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Ney and Reynier now flatly refused to move their corps
against positions stronger than that of Busaco. Rains of
tropical violence and the difficulty of gaining food from districts which Wellington had cleared of its resources, decided
Massena after a few vain attempts to retire to Santarem.
There he exhausted the country without gaining the reinforcements which he requested; for Soult, though ordered to
reinforce him from Andalusia, stopped to reduce Badajoz, an
act of disobedience which brought the severe censure from
Napoleon—" Souit gained me a town and lost me a kingdom."
Unable to gain a hold on the left bank of the Tagus, Massena's army was at last forced (March, 1811) to retreat The
most pertinacious of Napoleon's marshals was foiled by the
skilful defence of Wellington, whose firmness had infused vigour
into the wavering councils of Westminster, and had silenced
the factious opposition of the Portuguese Regency at Lisbon.
His tactics had, it is true, entailed terrible sufferings on the
Portuguese people and vast expense to the British treasury to
feed the multitudes of civilians within the lines; but few will
now deny that the cause of European independence was worthy
of these sacrifices. Portugal, the very ground on to which
Napoleon had once hoped to lure the English in order to
defeat them, was freed from the French with a loss of 30,000
to their effective strength. Ney had been removed from
his command for disobedience, and Massena's reputation
gained at Ziirich, Genoa and Essling, was clouded over by a
final and well-deserved disgrace for his failure at Busaco and
Torres Vedras. This signal reverse, the first unretrieved
disaster to Napoleon's arms, aroused secret feelings of hope
among German patriots. After the gloom cast over Germany
by the death of the heroic Prussian Queen Louisa (July, 1810)
came the news of Wellington's successful resistance. " In my
intercourse with the farmers of North Germany (wrote Arndt)
I awoke such romantic interest in the great Englishman and in

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225

the Spanish leaders, that whoever possessed a flock of merino
sheep named the finest wether after one of them."
The events of 1810—1811 indeed proved that Napoleon's
endeavour to control from Paris the actions of King Joseph
and his marshals in Spain only hampered their movements and
embittered their disputes. The French Emperor grumbled at
the expense of the war in Spain, where the scanty resources
had long been exhausted by plunder and requisitions. He
often threatened to annex to his Empire all the land between
the Pyrenees and the Ebro in compensation for the subsidies
which he had frequently to send to Madrid; and he sometimes
even menaced his brother with the annexation of the whole of
Spain, offering to give to him the still more precarious dignity
of King of Portugal. On his side Joseph had numerous causes
of bitter complaint against Napoleon. He rightly argued that
no king could gain the confidence and respect of so proud a
people as the Spaniards, who was not invested with all the
attributes of royal power. His letters contain frequent protests against the entire subservience to which he was subjected
by the Emperor, who seemed intentionally to degrade him in
the eyes of his new subjects. H e complained bitterly that the
almost unlimited powers of the French Marshals in their respective provinces reduced his authority to a mere shadow;
that they intercepted his revenues, and ravaged the country to
support their troops. Hence the prospects of reconciliation
were indefinitely postponed, the treasury at Madrid was depleted and the administration was crippled at its source. In
March, 1811, Joseph sent the following pathetic letter to
Berthier:—" The troops in my service have neither been
clothed nor paid for eight months. The contractors have just
taken all the objects of value which still remained in the palace
at Madrid, and I have been obliged to strip the chapel.
Two of my Ministers have been reduced to asking me for
rations for their families. This I was obliged to refuse, as all
F. R.

IS

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the other civil servants would have made the same demand.
My ambassador in Russia is a bankrupt: the one in Paris
died in the greatest poverty, and I live here in the ruins of a
great monarchy."
Joseph's trusty adviser, Miot de Melito, had several times
urged him to resign his crown as a final protest against the
dictatorial pretensions of his brother; and now, oppressed by
defeats and the imminence of bankruptcy, he hurried to Paris
to gain better conditions or to abdicate (April, 1811). Both
efforts failed; and with a monthly subsidy of ^ 2 0 , 0 0 0 and the
promise that the army of the centre should be under his
immediate control, he was cajoled back to the unreal splendours
of Madrid. The annexation of Catalonia to the French Empire
in the spring of next year showed how little the king's plea
for the appearance of independence was respected by his
brother; and the Cadiz Cortes mocked at Joseph as being
a
m o r e than ever a puppet."
The campaigns of 1811—1812 in Spain must be briefly
summarised here. An attempt by Graham to turn the French
lines menacing Cadiz led to the brilliant but fruitless victory
at Barosa (March 1811). The French still kept their strong
positions opposite Cadiz. After the bloody battle of Fuentes
d'Onoro (May, 1811) had been lost by the French entirely
owing to the jealousies of their marshals, they retired on Salamanca; and the interest centred in the operations around
Badajoz. Soult, advancing to raise the British siege of that
fortress, was confronted by Beresford at Albuera, and the most
desperate battle of the whole war was finally decided by the
stubborn valour of the British infantry (June, 1811); but all
Wellington's skill failed to reduce Badajoz, the siege of which
was soon raised by Soult and Marmont. The same month saw
Suchet's capture of the Catalonian fortress of Tarragona; and
that intrepid general by the end of the year conquered most of
Valencia. " H a d Wellington then retaken Badajoz and Ciudad

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Rodrigo (wrote Napier of this campaign) he would have
gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of the war;
but, being baffled partly by skill partly by fortune, factiously
opposed by the Portuguese Regency, thwarted by the Spanish
Government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and
pestered by the follies of all three, he was reduced to seeming
inactivity, while the French added Tarragona and the rich
kingdom of Valencia to their conquests." That the spirit of the
north, however, was unbroken by defeat, was shown by the
Spaniards seizing the fortress of Figueras, and by their incessantly
harassing French communications. " The enemy (wrote Macdonald) were ubiquitous, and yet I could find them nowhere,
though I scoured the whole of Catalonia." The famous guerrilla
chief Mina was especially famed for his daring exploits, in one
of which he liberated 1,100 Spanish prisoners near Vittoria,
capturing their French escort. The general trend of events
in Spain, however, distinctly favoured the French until many
of their seasoned troops were withdrawn for the Russian campaign, their place being taken by younger soldiers. Even then,
so vast were Napoleon's resources that when he was preparing
to humble the Czar, nearly 300,000 French troops maintained
his authority beyond the Pyrenees; and Joseph was able to
enlist several thousand Spanish levies from the docile inhabitants of the south. The futility, however, of his efforts to stamp
out resistance in the north and centre is strikingly illustrated
by some incidents narrated by the young Due de Broglie in his
Memoirs. H e was attached to the staff of Marshal Bessieres,
who had full military authority in Leon and Old Castille, and
wielded it less harshly than some other French Marshals. Yet,
because the town of Valladolid had not furnished the supplies
requisitioned for his army, the marshal imposed a fine of
1,000,000 reals (about ^10,400). Towns and villages which
were suspected of reinforcing the guerrillas were closely watched;
persons who were absent from home without leave for more
.

IS—2

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[CHAP.

than three days suffered confiscation of their property; and the
relatives of guerrillas were held responsible for their acts. In
spite of all this severity, or perhaps because of it, the French
could not, except in large numbers, venture far beyond the
walls of Valladolid with impunity; and Broglie compares Bessieres' whole position with that of a "terrorist on mission."
Wellington began the operations of 1812 by a successful
dash on Ciudad Rodrigo (Jan.); and the southern road into
Spain was laid open in April by the storming of Badajoz with
a desperate courage, sullied by the ferocity of the British
soldiers in their hour of triumph. But Wellington was recalled
to the north by a move of Marmont into the Mondego valley,
whence that marshal had promptly to retire on Salamanca, and
finally beyond the Douro. After receiving reinforcements, the
French commander suddenly crossed the river, thereby menacing Wellington's communications; and a race ensued over the
open plains of Leon to seize or save the important position at
Salamanca. Eager to press his advantage by intercepting the
British retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo, Marmont swung round his
left wing far away from his main force posted near the Arapeiles
hills. Wellington saw his chance. The French left was crushed
by Pakenham's brilliant charge. Marmont was badly wounded,
the French centre after a desperate resistance was driven from
one of the Arapeiles, and only the approach of darkness, the
skill of their General Clausel and the abandonment of Alba
Castle by the Spaniards saved them from complete disaster
(July 22). As it was, this battle cost the French about 7,000
killed and wounded with as many prisoners, and led to their
temporary abandonment of nearly half of Spain; for Wellington, after pursuing Clausel's shattered forces through Valladolid,
turned south to overthrow a smaller army under King Joseph
which was to have reinforced his presumptuous marshal. The
king at once retreated through Madrid towards Valencia,
ordering Soult's army to join him there to effect the recovery

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of his capital, which had enthusiastically welcomed the English
deliverers. Soult reluctantly abandoned the twenty lines of
entrenchments opposite Cadiz, the arsenal of Seville, and the
other fruits of his splendid conquest of Andalusia which for two
years had been Joseph's chief support. In the opinion of the
French historian Thibaudeau, the disaster at Salamanca was the
chief cause of the ultimate loss of Spain to Napoleon. Certain
it is that the drooping spirits of the Spanish patriots were
everywhere revived; while the British Government, just then
distracted by the war lately declared by the United States, was
encouraged not to relax its efforts in the Peninsula. Wellington's laurels were, however, to be dashed by an important
check. His deficiency in artillery occasioned the failure of five
assaults on the castle of Burgos, gallantly held by the French;
and the concentration of their armies of the south and centre
compelled him to withdraw his forces from Burgos and Madrid
towards Ciudad Rodrigo, where his wearied troops went into
winter quarters (Dec. 1812)—an opportune and skilful retreat,
offering a signal contrast to that of the Grand Army from
Moscow.
The influence of this sanguinary struggle on the political
life of Spain presents some features of interest. The Spanish
Cortes, or Parliament, which,met at Cadiz (1810), not far
beyond the range of the French cannons, was mainly elected
by refugees who claimed to represent towns or districts of
Spain occupied by the invaders; and its tone was that of the
tumultuous democracy of Cadiz. While its blustering incompetence paralysed military operations and aroused Wellington's
anger and contempt, the Cortes also confirmed the colonists in
their desire for independence from the old oppressive colonial
system, and alienated the sympathies of the royalists and
clericals, who had the support of nearly all the Spanish
peasantry. In its anxiety to obliterate the memory of Napoleon's programme of social reforms proclaimed at Madrid in

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Dec. 1808, the Cortes proceeded to an hysterical imitation of
the French Constituent Assembly of 1789. It proclaimed
freedom of the press, forbade its members to receive any office,
pension or reward, abolished the Inquisition, and began to
encroach on the executive powers of the Regency which was
striving to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII. Quickly
developing its democratic ardour, the Cortes gained as signal
a triumph over the more moderate party of Spanish reformers,
as the French National Assemblies had won over the Left
Centre in 1789—1792. The leader of what may be called
the Spanish Feuillant party was the able and statesmanlike
Jovellanos, whose position in Spanish politics was somewhat
analogous to that previously occupied by Pombal in Portugal
and by Turgot in France. He was a reforming statesman, sincerely attached to the philosophical doctrines of the eighteenth
century, which he had long sought to carry into effect by royal
decrees. Thus, when he was appointed Councillor of State by
Charles I I I in 1794, he endeavoured to avert the bankruptcy
which threatened to overwhelm Spain, by proposing that the
property of the titled clergy should no longer be exempt from
taxation; and though he was disgraced and was banished to
the mountains of his native province of Asturias for making so
sacrilegious a proposal, yet through the pressure of events the
tax was imposed somewhat later. In 1799 his services were
again required and he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice,
soon to be banished again owing to the persistence with which
he urged reforming projects on the Court. After the fall of
Godoy in 1808, he became a member of the Central Junta,
which, two years later, had to give way to the Cortes. In the
Junta, Jovellanos and the party of moderate reform had carried
their point that nobles and titled clergy should form a higher
Chamber, while deputies of the untitled clergy and Commons
should form a second Chamber. But this compromise, which
had been -vainly urged by Necker, Mounier and others at

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Versailles in 1789, was now equally distasteful to the democrats
of Cadiz. For at this time everything English was abhorrent
to the fervent patriots in the Cortes and in the political clubs
of Cadiz; and the term Inglesimo was the height of opprobrium. To the excitable Spanish imagination, chafed by
frequent disputes with the English commanders whom they
ever suspected of treachery, and fanned to fever heat by
intemperate newspapers and pamphlets, the moderation of
Jovellanos seemed akin to treason; and in a popular rising
of November 1811 he was put to death by the so-called
patriots. Had his advice been followed, first by reactionary
rulers and now by headstrong revolutionists, the course of
Spanish politics might have been far more tranquil. As it was
the Spaniards rushed from one political extreme to another so
inconsiderately as to postpone to our own days any approach
to orderly constitutional government.
In 1811 the Cortes decided to apply to military hospitals
the funds of religious orders, abolished torture, as well as all
the old feudal and seigneurial rights or banalites over ovens,
mills, forests, fishing, & c , together with every sign x>f vassalage.
Declaring that "sovereignty resided essentially in the nation,"
it next proceeded to draw up a Constitution, modelled on that
of France in 1791. Legislative power was to reside in the Cortes
along with the king, who was left nominally with the control of
the executive; but his functions were as carefully restricted by one
omnipotent Assembly as those of Louis XVI after 1791. The
Cortes was to be elected every two years by universal suffrage
for equal electoral districts; it could not be dissolved by the
king and his veto was merely suspensive, being valid only
through two sessions and lapsing if the measure was carried in
a third. The king was to name his Ministers, but they
remained responsible to the Assembly, which also fixed his
civil list every year. The provincial and parochial administrations were to be modelled on the French Departmental System,

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[CHAP.

with the addition of a plan for public education; and yet the
Roman Catholic faith was to be the only one tolerated by the
State. Improving on Robespierre's motion of 1791, the Cortes
declared that deputies of one Assembly were ineligible for the
next; and crowned its work with the order that no alteration
in this Constitution of 1812 was to be made within eight years.
The victory of Salamanca released the dreamers of Cadiz,
and, bringing them into contact with central and northern
Spain, produced sharp conflicts between Jacobins and 'serviles/
Galicia and the Basque provinces at once rejected this centralising constitution. Indeed the strifes between the Cortes and
the clerical party nearly led to a civil war, and brought Wellington almost to despair. Placed by the Assembly in supreme
command of all the Spanish troops (Oct. 1812), he was more
than once on the point of overthrowing it, and wrote to the
British Government to ask whether it would approve of such a
step being taken as a last resort. So narrow was the balance
between success and failure in the Peninsula. Certainly nothing
but his "long enduring blood" and his military genius could
have snatched victory from defeat in every one of the years
1809—1812.

It is, however, a task as profitless as it is easy to criticise
the false steps in the first wild rush for political freedom where
the very idea was a novelty. A less superficial view of the
Tyrolese and Spanish struggles against foreign usurpation, and
of the legislative efforts of Stein and the Cadiz Cortes, reveals
the fact that the spirit and the principles of 1789 were now
being effectively used by two great peoples to sap the foundations of the Napoleonic domination.
The position of Italy in the European system of States
was throughout this era almost entirely one of passivity.
Napoleon's conquests had given to the long-divided Italians
some approach to social equality and political unity; and
though the French domination eventually aroused much dis-

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233

content, yet the benefits conferred by Napoleon's sway partly
counterbalanced the sacrifices entailed by the conscription
and by his commercial system. With the exception of France,
no land benefited so much as Italy by his splendid activity
in organisation. Hence, the nationalist reaction, which was
to have so potent an influence on the history of Spain and
Germany, acquired no very decisive activity in Italy, at least
until the year 1814. The sentiment of Italian nationality was
not at first unfavourable to the great warrior, whose vigorous
blows awakened it from the torpor of centuries.
As has been incidentally mentioned, Napoleon had in 1808
annexed the eastern and northern parts of the Papal States
to the kingdom of Italy. At the same time Rome was
occupied by a French force, and the Pope was kept almost
a prisoner in the Castle of St Angelo, while the cardinals were
either arrested or dispersed throughout their dioceses, and the
papal troops were enrolled in the French army. In May
1809, when Napoleon seemed compassed with difficulties
in Germany and when French supremacy in southern Italy
was menaced by the landing of an Anglo-Sicilian force, the
Pope appeared to sympathise with the Emperor's foes. This
was sufficient to precipitate the long impending catastrophe.
An Imperial decree proclaimed the deposition of the Pope
from his temporal power in the following words—" Charlemagne,
my august predecessor, in conceding certain domains to the
bishops of Rome only assigned them as fiefs, and Rome did
not cease to form part of his Empire." Under this flimsy
pretext, which is devoid of any historical justification—for
Karl the Great was not master of Rome, when he accepted the
Imperial crown at Leo I l l ' s hands—the temporal power of the
Papacy was abolished, and the last independent State in Italy
ceased to exist. It was in vain that Napoleon sought to
disguise this act of spoliation by a misleading reference to a
dim and distant past. Men saw that in this extinction of the

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[CHAP.

temporal power and of the sole surviving ecclesiastical State,
he was recurring to the policy of the Directory in its most
aggressive phase. Against the proclamation that Rome was
henceforth a free and imperial city, Pius VII was preparing
to protest by a bull of excommunication against the Emperor,
when he was arrested by the French general Miollis and hurried
northwards, to be long kept under restraint at Savona. When
the negotiations for the Austrian marriage seemed to assure
Napoleon's domination in Europe, the conqueror ventured
on the final step by definitively incorporating Rome and its
environs in the French Empire (Feb. 1810). The Eternal City
was declared to be the second city in Napoleon's dominions;
and the Charlemagne legend was further kept up by the
bestowal of the traditional title, King of Rome, on the
Emperor's son and heir.
French rule at Rome soon bore witness to the vigorous and
enlightened policy of the Emperor, which did so much to
palliate the violence of his methods of acquisition. At Rome
as elsewhere we remark Napoleon's determination to effect a
beneficent blending of the new and the old, or, as he himself
once happily phrased it, to endeavour to harmonise Gothic
institutions with the spirit of the nineteenth century. This was
observable both in the intellectual, material and political
spheres. The ruins of old Rome were to some extent cleared
of the accumulations of rubbish which obscured their grandeur,
and every care was taken there and elsewhere in Italy to
preserve those monuments of the arts and the relics of antiquity
which the rapacity of the French had left in their historic
surroundings. The material prosperity of Italy was furthered
by the institution of funds for the encouragement of agriculture
and the industrial arts. A canal was cut to facilitate transport
between Lake Como and the Adriatic Sea, the ports of
Venice and Genoa were enlarged and fortified, and highroads were improved. Napoleon also laboured hard to uproot

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235

clericalism from the former Papal States. The number of
bishoprics was stringently reduced, and ecclesiastical discipline
was to a large extent assimilated to the system then established
in France. The administration of the Cardinals, almost
mediaeval in its character, gave place to the vigorous organisation of a modern State; and central and southern Italy, even
under the blighting reaction which followed the overthrow
of Napoleon's sway, never quite lost the effects of the
beneficent impulse which his master-mind imparted.
In spite of these undeniable benefits, Italy was by no
means contented under the French supremacy. In the south,
despite the benefits of Murat's rule, there were many attempts
at insurrection, which were fomented by the emissaries of the
former Bourbon rulers. Owing to the presence of an English
force under Lord Bentinck and the protection of English cruisers,
the Bourbons not only maintained themselves in the fertile
island of Sicily but frequently threatened descents on the
mainland. The republicans of southern Italy were dissatisfied
with Murat's autocratic rule; and many of them, withdrawing
to the fastnesses of the Abruzzi, founded or greatly extended
the activity of the secret associations of the Carbonari. The
Bourbons intrigued with them so as to increase the difficulties
of the Neapolitan Government; but, down to 1813, Murat
succeeded in repressing most of the attempts against his
authority. By completing the abolition of feudal customs
and introducing modern methods of administration, he effected
much for the social and material welfare of his kingdom.
It was in the more commercial and industrial north,
however, that the pressure of Napoleon's Continental System
began to be felt most seriously; and the discontent arising from
material need was there augmented by the attachment to the
traditions of municipal freedom which have always distinguished
the northern parts of Italy from the more docile and backward
south. The men of Venice, Genoa^ Milan, Turin and Brescia

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[CHAP.

could look back on a splendid past, rich in memories of local
freedom and industrial supremacy. It was little to them that
Napoleon promised to renew these ancient glories, when their
industries were ruined by the decrees dated from Milan and
Fontainebleau, and when their harbours were almost deserted
owing to the operation of the Continental blockade. In reading the usually prosaic records of commercial transactions,
one is startled by finding such incidents as the following.
Owing to the prohibition of all intercourse with England,
two parcels of silk sent from Bergamo to London were smuggled, one by way of Smyrna, the other by way of Archangel,
to their destination: the former took one year, the latter
two years, in the wanderings necessitated by Napoleon's
decrees.
Though Eugene Beauharnais endeavoured as far as possible
to mitigate the hardships of such a r'egime, and honestly strove
to promote the welfare of his subjects, yet the material pressure
caused by Napoleon's great commercial experiment and by the
constant drain of men to fill the ranks of his armies, naturally
sowed broadcast the seeds of discontent. The promise of
political liberty and representative government which had
been made in 1797 to the Cisalpine Republic, had soon
been found to be illusory; and the system of rule which after
1808 prevailed throughout Italy, was an autocracy concealed
under the thinnest of disguises.—" Such was the state of Italy
(wrote Bourrienne concerning the year 1809), that I have
been informed by an individual worthy of credence, that
if the army of the viceroy Eugene, instead of being victorious, had been beaten on the Piave, a deeply organised
revolution would have broken out in Piedmont, and even
in Italy, where, nevertheless, the majority of the people
fully appreciated the excellent qualities of Eugene. I have
been also credibly informed that lists were in readiness,
designating those of the French who were to be put to death,

ix.]

The Nationalist

Reaction.

237

as well as those by whom the severe orders of the Imperial
Government had been mitigated, and who were only to be
banished."—If this was the state of public feeling in a realm
which had reaped many benefits from the French supremacy, and where the viceroy was beloved, the exasperation
against Napoleon in Spain and Geimany may be faintly conceived.

C H A P T E R X.
T H E WARS OF LIBERATION.
" The life of peoples cannot be summarised in the lives of a few
individuals; for the bond uniting them to peoples has never been discovered."—COUNT TOLSTOI.

THAT Napoleon must ultimately have succeeded in subduing the Spanish Peninsula, if he could have bent all his vast
resources to that struggle, can only be denied by those who
believe that one British soldier was worth some indefinitely
large number of French. If the Emperor's policy had been such
as to admit the evacuation of all central Europe and northern
Italy by his troops, even the mythical British infantryman
would probably have been outnumbered. With Napoleon in
command the ridge of Busaco would have been turned, and the
lines of Torres Vedras pierced. Considering the enormous
difficulties of Wellington's position, it is no slur on his genius
to assert that he must have succumbed to the Grand Army, if
led by Napoleon in person, and not enfeebled by the mistakes
and jealousies of his marshals.
But the fundamental blunder of the Emperor's policy was
that he aroused the irreconcilable hatred of the Spaniards at
the very time when he was already burdened with the vast
problem of shutting out from the Continent the manufactures
of Great Britain and the colonial products of which she had
the monopoly. His Continental System could only succeed

CHAP, X.]

The

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239

by being enforced on the whole of the Continent. A puncture
at any one point must produce a general collapse of his
commercial experiment. The connection between his economic system and his seizure of Portugal, which in its turn lured
him on into the policy of Bayonne, has been already explained;
and it is also obvious that his annexation of Holland, the North
Sea coast and Liibeck had no other motive than that of ensuring the complete control of those important centres of commerce. The Spanish War, even after Torres Vedras, was
indeed only one of his many Herculean efforts against the
many-headed hydra of British commerce; and he felt himself
unable to leave Paris, where he could best supervise the whole
course of the general struggle. Not only in Germany but also
in France itself there were ominous signs of discontent. To a
deputation of merchants, who came in the summer of 1811 to
ask for relief from the many grievances under which they
groaned, Napoleon replied as follows: "Commercial relations
with England must cease, I tell you plainly, gentlemen.
Merchants who have business to wind up, or capital to withdraw, should do so as soon as possible....I shall remain armed
in order to carry out my decrees and resist the attempts of the
English in the Baltic. Some fraud exists still, but it shall be
completely crushed."—The distress caused by the recent
sharp rise of prices in France (the cause of which has been
explained in the preceding chapter), was intensified by the
increase of taxes necessitated by the warlike preparations which
occupied the latter half of the year 1811, and by the heaviest
drain of all, the blood tax. It had become customary for the
conscription to be levied one year in advance of the legal age;
and owing to this illegality, to the annexation of the North Sea
coast, and also to the detestation of military service in Spain,
the number of refractory conscripts was ever on the increase,
rising in 1811 to the enormous total of 40,000. Light columns
were organised to chase deserters and—as General Foy re-

240

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[CHAP.

marked—"to compel the French to become conquerors." The
religious discords with the Pope had the further effect of reopening the wounds temporarily healed by the Concordat; and
the uneasiness in France was so general that a new war of
conquest might well have seemed desirable to divert attention
from internal and economic difficulties and rekindle the warlike
ardour of her people.
As has been already remarked, Napoleon cherished the
belief that an alliance either with Russia or Austria was a
sufficient guarantee to his supremacy on the Continent. The
irritation caused by the marriage negotiations has also been
described. At the close of 1810 came a far more serious
affront Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg, to whose Duke
Alexander's elder sister had been so promptly betrothed after
Erfurt, warned the world of the probability of a rupture between
the allies of Tilsit. That treaty (as the Czar reminded the
Courts of Europe in a circular despatch of March, 1811)
guaranteed the possession of Oldenburg to its lawful sovereign.
"What value,"—continued the Russian note—"could alliances
have, if the treaties which cemented them did not hold good?"
It is true that offers were made to give compensation to the
dispossessed duke; but that could only be in Germany, which
was equally at the mercy of Napoleon's statecraft; and the
incident revived all the Czar's indignation at encroachments
which promised to thrust Russia from all participation in
European affairs.
Recurring to* his early friendship with the Polish Prince
Czartoryski, who when in office had always extolled the good
faith of England as contrasted with the unscrupulous aggressions of Napoleon, the Czar at once wrote asking him to sound
the feelings of the Poles in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and to
ascertain the possibility of enlisting them on the side of Russia,
if they were assured of the "certainty of their regeneration."
With a rising of the Poles and the Prussians against Napoleon,

x.]

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241

the Czar hoped to meet him at least on equal terms. Czartoryski's reply was discouraging. The Poles felt gratitude to
Napoleon for what he had done for them; their 20,000 troops
serving in Spain were so many hostages in his hands, and his
constant success fascinated their ardent imaginations; finally
they would be satisfied with nothing less than the complete
reunion of their ancient dominions, with outlets for trade
(Danzig here is hinted at), and the restoration of the constitution of 1791. To this Alexander rejoined (Jan. 31, 1811) that
he proposed to reconstitute the whole of Poland with the rivers
Dvvina, Beresina and Dnieper as frontiers, and a liberal constitution; Austria was to be provisionally offered Wallachia and
Moldavia as far as the Sereth in compensation for her retrocession of Galicia to the Polish realm. " I t is beyond a doubt"
(continued the Czar's letter) "that Napoleon is striving to provoke Russia to a rupture, hoping that I shall make the mistake
of being the aggressor. This would be a great blunder in
present circumstances; but if the Poles would join me, that
would put an entirely new face on the matter. Being reinforced
by their 50,000 men, by the 50,000 Prussians who could then
also join me without risk, and by the moral revolution which
would infallibly result in Europe, I could advance to the Oder
without striking a blow." But these secret overtures which the
Czar urged his friend to make at Warsaw, were unsuccessful.
The Poles adhered to Napoleon's fortunes,—a resolve as
disastrous as the trust reposed in him by his other faithful allies,
the rulers of Denmark and Saxony.
The fundamental cause of the war of 1812 still remains to be
noted. It was the Czar's refusal to adhere to the later and
more stringent developments of the Continental System. Not
content with insisting on the exclusion of British ships and
wares from Russia, Napoleon in a letter of Oct. 16, 1810 had
requested Alexander to seize in Russian harbours the neutral
ships—they were mostly American—which brought colonial
F. R.
16

242

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

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[CHAP.

produce, inasmuch as this was undoubtedly of British origin.
"The blow to England (wrote Napoleon) will be terrible; for
all these goods are to the account of the English. It depends
on your Majesty to secure peace or to lengthen out the war.
Peace is, and must be, your desire. Your Majesty is certain
that we shall attain it, if you confiscate these 600 ships with
their consignments. Whatever papers they carry, and under
whatever names they disguise themselves—French, German,
Spanish, Danish, Russian, or Swedish—your Majesty may be
sure that they are English." The Czar, however, refused to go
beyond the terms of the treaty of Tilsit and, by confiscating
ships which were undoubtedly neutral, to violate the principle
that the flag covers the goods, for which Russia had contended
against England in the Armed Neutrality Leagues of 1780 and
1800. In his anxiety to strangle English trade, Napoleon was
requiring his ally to adopt measures as arbitrary as those ever
asserted by the mistress of the seas. Annoyance at the Czar's
refusal was undoubtedly a secondary cause of the annexation of
Oldenburg to the French Empire. Even before hearing of that
sinister event, Alexander had shown his concern for the dearness of colonial wares in his own Empire, by issuing a ukase
(Dec. 31, 1810) which facilitated the entry of those much
needed goods; while it virtually excluded wines and other
expensive products of France, the entry of which was thought
to be injurious to the ' balance of trade' and the chief cause
of the alarming depreciation of Russian paper money.
From this time a breach between these potentates was
almost inevitable. In fact, during a conversation with Metternich
in the previous September Napoleon had said—"I shall have
war with Russia on grounds which lie beyond human possibilities, because they are rooted in the case itself"; and on the
same occasion he confidentially offered in case of a war to give
up to Austria her Illyrian provinces in exchange for Galicia,
the addition of which to a regenerated Poland would gain him

x.]

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243

the enthusiastic support of that unhappy people. Napoleon,
however, did not carry out this statesmanlike project, and
wThen once embarked in the war he could not afford to
alienate Prussia and Austria in return for Polish support.
Thus on both sides the question of Poland was left in abeyance, each Emperor desiring to gain its support, and yet
dreading to precipitate a conflict by pronouncing irrevocably
for its re-establishment. The question thus turned on the
Continental System, as to which the two potentates could not
come to any accord. Napoleon desired to impose it in all its
rigour on Russia and Sweden, in order to bring England on
her knees; whereas these Powers, urgently needing colonial
produce, refused to deny themselves the comforts of life, when
Napoleon by his secret licences infringed his commercial
edicts whenever the needs of his Government demanded it.
In this momentous dispute Great Britain had been a most
interested but still a passive spectator. " N o indication,"
says M. Vandal, "permits us to suppose that this conspiracy
(i.e. of Alexander against Napoleon) had been formed by connivance with England." But so far from having conspired
against Napoleon, the Czar had endeavoured to observe the
Treaty of Tilsit; and there is distinct evidence to prove that
both potentates entered the arena reluctantly and only under
what they conceived to be the pressure of events. Napoleon
felt confident that by sealing up the Baltic against British goods,
he would assure our ruin, which he thought to be imminent,
and so bring about a general peace; while Alexander was not
loth to decide a contest which he considered inevitable, while
300,000 of Napoleon's troops were still engaged in the Peninsular War.
The diplomatic and military preparations for the war
occupied the greater part of 1811 and the spring of 1812 ; and
in the endeavours to form coalitions the balance of success
was on Napoleon's side. The Poles, as we have seen, refused
16—2

244

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[CHAP.

Alexander's secret overtures and remained true to the French
alliance. Austria at first declared for armed neutrality; but
Napoleon had no wish to leave an armed neutral in his rear;
and the marriage alliance was found to entail its responsibilities, when he lequired and obtained the assistance of
30,000 Austrians to protect his right flank in Volhynia. Still
more important, however, for the success of his preparations,
was the concurrence of Prussia; for Danzig, with its French
garrison and governor, was to be the chief base of supplies, his
" Paris in the East." His troops still occupied the Prussian
fortresses on the Oder as well as Berlin. Even that did not
seem sufficient guarantee against a desperate national rising;
and in Sept. 1811 he wrote to Davoust, who was marshalling
some 100,000 troops on the Elbe, to be ready to seize the
fortress of Spandau if necessary. But Frederick William I I I
was not cast in that heroic mould which could do and dare
everything for national independence even against hopeless
odds; and he refused to stir without far stronger succours than
Alexander could promise. As for help from England, the
utmost that the patriotic Hanoverian Louis Ompteda had been
able to obtain was a consignment of arms now on shipboard in
the Baltic, with the offer of the English fleet as a last refuge
for the king. In such desperate straits Frederick William was
justified in rejecting Gneisenau's plan of a people's war against
Napoleon, which he returned with the written comment—
"very good as poetry." Finally Napoleon brought the Berlin
Court to a treaty (Feb. 24, 1812), which marked the surrender
of Prussia's resources into Napoleon's hands for all his wars
except those in the south of Europe: 20,000 of her troops
were to aid him in the coming war beyond the Niemen: the
Grand Army was to traverse Prussia at her expense; and no
levy of Prussian troops was to be made in its rear. This
treaty seemed the death blow to the hopes of German patriots.
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and von Boyen resigned their offices

x.]

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of Liberation.

245

rather than serve under Napoleon. Gneisenau departed to
join the Germans who with Stein were striving to strengthen
the Czar's resistance. An envoy was secretly sent from Berlin
to St Petersburg to explain that Prussia's action against the
Czar was due solely to compulsion from Paris, and that by
enticing Napoleon into the heart of Russia his ruin might be
ensured, if a skilful defensive campaign were persevered in by
Alexander's generals. A somewhat similar explanation was
given by Austria of her ostensible hostility.
Napoleon's important diplomatic successes placed virtually
the whole resources of Europe from the Pyrenees to the
Carpathians, from Naples to Konigsberg, at his disposal; and
yet, by enabling him to begin his campaign at the Niemen,
and impelling him into the heart of Russia, they ultimately
served but to magnify his disaster.
His endeavours to secure the neutrality of Sweden and the
active assistance of the Turks were unavailing. The Porte
remembered his sudden change of front at Tilsit, and turned
a deaf ear to his promise that the recovery of the Crimea
should be the reward of an offensive alliance against the Czar.
English and Russian diplomatists also persuaded the Turks
that the union of all the Continent under Napoleon's sway
was now more to be dreaded than Muscovite ambition, that
Turkey existed only owing to the divisions and jealousies of
the Powers; that, finally, it was her best policy to make peace
with Russia, retaining Moldavia and Wallachia, which the
Czar's troops had virtually conquered. By the politic Treaty
of Bucharest (May 28, 1812), which gained for him the rich
land of Bessarabia, Alexander now restored to the Porte two
provinces which he could not have retained in face of the
French invasion, and soon set free his army on the Danube for
the defence of the Ukraine.
The conclusion of a Russo-Swedish alliance was still more
advantageous for Alexander. The Court of Stockholm had

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[CHAP.

in 1810 favoured the choice of Napoleon's Marshal Bernadotte
for the eventual succession to its throne, as cementing
anew the old friendship between France and Sweden, and
on his side Napoleon was not altogether loth to see this
strange event; for—as he said to Metternich—"A French
marshal on the throne of Gustavus Adolphus is one of the
finest tricks anyone could have played upon England." Alarm
and indignation were loudly expressed both at London and
St Petersburg. It was groundless. The Swedish choice had
fallen upon that one of all the French marshals who was
on the worst terms with the Emperor. Able in command,
skilful in intrigue, and far more ambitious than Moreau,
Bernadotte after his opposition to the coup d'etat of Brumaire
had been saved from disgrace only by his marriage to a sister
of Joseph Bonaparte's wife. Many causes of irritation had
embittered his relations to the Emperor; and the somewhat
grudging consent of the latter to his acceptance of the reversion to the crown of Sweden gave this ambitious man a
personal reason for resisting Napoleon's overbearing policy
towards his adopted land. On his way to Stockholm he had
been warned by Bourrienne at Hamburg that the Continental
System would entail ruin on Sweden, and that his best
policy would be to trade with England and brave the
Emperor's wrath. He followed the advice. Napoleon had
in the early part of 1810 given back Swedish Pomerania and
Riigen to the Court of Stockholm as the price of its accession
to his commercial system; but when it steadfastly refused to
submit to an entire exclusion of colonial goods, he in Jan.
1812 invaded that province, as a pledge for the execution
of his decrees. Whether from personal hostility to Napoleon,
or from a desire to secure his position in Sweden by an independent and patriotic policy, Bernadotte accepted the
challenge thus thrown down; and on March 24, 1812 a treaty
of alliance was signed between Sweden and Russia, by which

x.]

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247

the former Power took for the third time a -prominent part
in the struggle against revolutionary France, on the understanding that it should gain Norway.
The events in Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the exhaustion
of France by a commercial crisis and a severe dearth weighed
for a time on Napoleon's spirits. He finally decided, however,
that the war was an inevitable part of his system for the
acquisition of a general peace, and that his new dynasty, the
outcome of a revolution, could never be secure while any of
the old reigning families held a position of such power as that
of the House of Romanoff. It was in vain that his Ministers,
except the obsequious Maret, Due de Bassano, who nominally
controlled the Department of Foreign Affairs, protested against
a war which violated all the principles of sound policy. They
ineffectually urged on him the imprudence of engulfing half a
million of men in the wastes of Lithuania, while at least half
that number must be kept amidst the mountains of Spain, and
they pointed out that a disaster beyond the Niemen would
certainly entail a rising of Central Europe in his rear. Mollien
reminded him of the embarrassment of his finances, only to be
crushed by the characteristic reply—"Because they are embarrassed, they need war"; and the Emperor proceeded to
amuse his Minister with an estimate of the rich gains which
he would reap by requisitions in Russia, and by the sale of her
timber and salt. The remonstrances of his advisers were
unavailing, though they probably contributed to strengthen his
desire to save appearances by sending pacific overtures to the
Courts of London and St Petersburg. The negotiations at the
former capital broke down as speedily as those in 1810 which
they resembled in their general tenor. Napoleon offered to
England proposals for peace on the basis of ' uti possidetis]
which the English Government refused, unless Ferdinand VII
were restored to the throne of Spain. At St Petersburg also
the French overtures were no better received, Alexander finally

248

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[CHAP.

requiring the entire evacuation of Prussia and Swedish Pomerania by Napoleon's troops, and a reduction of the French
garrison at Danzig. He consented, however, to accept an
indemnity for his brother-in-law, the dethroned Duke of Oldenburg, and even to renew commercial relations with France, but
not so far as to exclude English goods so thoroughly as Napoleon's economic experiment demanded. It is, therefore, evident
that though personal grievances and rivalry entered into the
dispute, its main cause was the secession of Russia from the
Continental System.
The march eastwards was begun without any formal declaration of war. At Dresden Napoleon held a reception (May,
1812) of the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and his
other German allies, in the hope that this display of his vast
resources would intimidate his foe; but neither there nor at
Wilna nor Smolensk did he receive the expected submission.
At Dresden he incidentally remarked to Metternich that he
would not venture further than Smolensk in that campaign,
but would re-organise Poland and Lithuania, and if necessary
advance in 1813 quite to the centre of Russia. " M y enterprise is one of those of which the solution is to be found in
patience."
On June 24, amidst strains of music and with shouts of
martial ardour, three immense columns rolled towards the
Niemen, which they crossed near Grodno and Tilsit; and by
the end of the month 325,000 men had entered the Czar's
dominions. Other forces, following as rear-guard and reserves,
raised the total numbers to nearly 600,000 men. The composition of this host reflected the cosmopolitan character of the
Emperor's sway. About 200,000 were French, 147,000 were
Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine, 80,000 Italians,
led by Eugene and Murat, 60,000 Poles, besides Illyrians,
Swiss, Dutch, and even a few Spaniards and Portuguese, while
Prussians on its left and Austrians on its right were to guard its

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flanks. The army had not therefore that homogeneity which
rendered the campaigns of Austerlitz and Jena so decisive.
Its first columns found no enemies but the almost tropical
heat of a Russian midsummer, a violent thunderstorm and
torrents of rain. The rough tracks were at once cut up by
the passage of the artillery and vast convoys of stores; and
it soon became apparent that the most perfect organisation
could not keep the Grand Army supplied with food. In vain
had East Prussia and parts of Poland been swept clear of carts
and horses. • The horses began to die from the excessive toil
and from diseases caused by rank grass, some 10,000 succumbing between the Nienien and Wilna, so that a French general
coming up with reserves declared that the track of the Grand
Army resembled that of a defeated foe. The desire of surprising the Russians while they were scattered over a front of
eighty leagues spurred forward Napoleon, and only by speedy
retreat were the defenders saved from a military disaster; but
the haste of the invaders entailed serious consequences. The
regular commissariat system broke down from the outset. The
vast supplies collected at Danzig and Thorn could never be
hurried up in time to relieve the wants of the main army, which
therefore maintained itself almost entirely by plunder and
requisitions. So customary had this become as to lead up to a
calculation that the invading army should not exceed one tenth
of the invaded population, if it were to subsist in comfort on
the fruits of their toil. Such methods, highly serviceable in the
campaigns of Marengo, Ulm and Jena, were less practicable
in Spain, and now broke down hopelessly in the wastes of
Lithuania, where the resources had been already depleted by
the retreating Russians. Halting for a few days at Wilna to
rest his wearied troops, Napoleon endeavoured to enlist the
inhabitants of the old Lithuanian capital in his service by
cautious half promises which would not alienate Prussia and
Austria.

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[CHAP.

We have seen throughout this work how divulsive an
influence the partitions of Poland exerted on the solidarity
of the Eastern Powers.
The Valmy campaign had been
decided by the fears and cupidity of Vienna and Berlin as to
a second partition, quite as much as by the bravery of Kellermann's levies. Poland, Bavaria, or Hanover had hitherto
dissolved every compact of the Powers and left Central Europe
a prey to Napoleon's concentrated strength. By reviving the
ancient kingdom of Poland it was now possible for him to gain
an ally in the East, and to thrust back the Czar's rule beyond
the Dnieper and the Dwina; but, hampered as he now was by
a dynastic alliance, he could not, as after Jena, boldly appeal
to Polish sentiment. Now he could only deal in half promises
which were nullified by the devastations of his troops. To a
deputation of Poles and Lithuanians who came to Wilna to
request the restoration of the old Polish realm, he replied, " If
your efforts be unanimous, you may cherish the hope of compelling your enemies to recognise your rights....To this it is
my duty to add, that I have guaranteed to the Emperor of
Austria the integrity of his dominions, and that I cannot sanction any movement tending to disturb his peaceable possession
of the Polish provinces which remain to him." This diplomatic
reply chilled the ardour of the Poles and Lithuanians; and the
nomination of seven grandees to form a provisional government
under French supervision was his sole encouragement to the
Polish patriots who in the Diet at Warsaw had lately declared
for the restoration of their realm in all its extent. His appeal
for a national rising to throw off the Russian yoke met with a
timid response when it was known that a Lithuanian noble
coming at the head of his vassals had been maltreated and
robbed of everything by Napoleon's South-German troops.
There is, indeed, no sure proof that the restoration of Poland,
which some historians assert to have been the real aim of Napoleon's expedition, was ever seriously entertained by him after the

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Austrian alliance became the keystone of his policy. Passing
from his utterances on this subject to the far safer testimony of
his actual preparations, it appears certain that Napoleon had
neither expected nor desired a general levy of these oppressed
people. "What proved (says Marbot) that the Emperor's only
aim in invading Russia was to re-establish the continental
blockade was/ that he had made no provision for arming and
equipping the troops which the Poles were to raise." He
trusted to his enormous superiority in regular troops, among
whom were already some 60,000 Polish regulars. It is further
pointed out by the young Due de Broglie, who was then serving
in the French Embassy at Warsaw, that Napoleon in his brief
stay there had " drenched with cold water " the deputies of the
enthusiastic Polish Diet; that he had chosen as his ambassador
the Abbe de Pradt, who had been one of the butts of the
French Court; that finally the Polish contingents in the Grand
Army were kept separate and were not massed together under
the command of that able and brilliant soldier, Prince Poniatowski, as would have been the case if Napoleon had desired to
revive their national feeling.
The general plan of campaign was to separate by a rapid
incursion the Russian forces which had been stationed north
and south of Wilna. The former had been thrown back on
the Dwina, along which river several engagements took place,
generally in favour of the French. The southern portion under
Bagration was to be kept severed from the northern by a vigorous
march of Davoust and Jerome Bonaparte on Minsk. With
superior numbers and the advantage of the central position
Napoleon trusted to end the campaign by a few vigorous blows
on the upper Dwina and Dnieper. Davoust nearly succeeded in
intercepting Bagration and his 40,000 Russians in the marshes
west of the R. Beresina; and he asserts that only the disobedience of Jerome Bonaparte to his orders saved the SouthRussian force from a disaster. Napoleon dismissed his brother

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and allowed him to return to his amusements in Cassel; and
Bagration by a wide detour finally succeeded in joining the
main body of Russians. Meanwhile their northern army under
General Barclay de Tolly, a general who nobly sustained the
bravery and prudence of his Scottish ancestry, had retreated
towards Smolensk, leaving a corps to oppose the advance of
St Cyr and Macdonald north of the Dwina. Pursuing Barclay
as far as Witepsk, Napoleon was there forced, by the fatigue of
his men and the utter exhaustion of his horses, to call a halt,
exclaiming—"Here I must stop, refresh my army and organise
Poland. The campaign of 1812 is finished: that of 1813 will
do the rest." Had he now confined himself to his original
intention of consolidating his conquest of Poland and Lithuania,
the history of the world would have been different; but the
prospect of maintaining for nine months a cautious defensive
chafed his ardent spirit; and the difficulty of feeding and
keeping under control his murmuring allies seemed greater
than that of snatching the flower safety out of the nettle
danger.
Massing his columns for a vigorous offensive, he pushed
on swiftly for Smolensk, the fortress on the Upper Dnieper
which barred the entry to Russia Proper. The news that
Bagration and Barclay were there effecting a junction promised
the decisive engagement which he had long been seeking.
His troops sustained heavy loss in an attack on the holy
city. The Russian resistance was, however, only intended to
gain time for a retreat and the destruction of shelter and all
possible supplies. In the night Barclay fired the city in several
parts and protected by the flames withdrew his rear-guard
(Aug. 18). Vainly did Napoleon seek to hide his chagrin
under a violent tirade against Russian cowardice. His trustiest
advisers, seeing the true position of affairs, counselled a halt
within the charred ramparts of Smolensk, and pointed out the
danger of engulfing himself amongst the fanatically hostile

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people of Russia. Outwardly Napoleon appeared to yield;
but the news of St Cyr's victory at Polotsk over the Russians
on the Dwina, and of a victory of the Muscovite horse over
some of his own cavalry brigades, again seemed to promise a
more enterprising spirit among his foes. By his acts he belied
his words. He placed his two most daring chiefs, Murat and
Ney, in command of the advanced guard; and they, rightly
construing the Emperor's inclination, brought on an engagement on the Moscow road, ending in another barren victory
for the invaders. But where was this campaign to cease?
So far from availing anything in that vast land, each triumph
increased the difficulties and distress of the victors by drawing
them further than ever from their base, amidst a people impalpable and invincible as the air. The recent ratification of the
treaty between Alexander and the Sultan had set free another
Russian force to menace Napoleon's rear; but, measuring
events only by the success of the Grand Army, he trusted to
his ever increasing reserves and to .his Austrian and Prussian
allies temporarily to guard the rear, while he sought peace by
the overthrow of the host in his front. To those who at
Smolensk had reminded him of the pitiful state of his army, he
had replied—"It is dreadful, I know: at Wilna half of it
were stragglers; now they form two-thirds: there is therefore
no time to be lost: we must extort peace: it is at Moscow."
The Emperor had indeed observed that only the prospect of a
great battle held together the weary ranks and kept them from
the dissolution which a long halt ever produced.
The Russians on their side beheld his rapid advance with
dismay. Unable to see the wisdom of Barclay's Fabian policy,
they were enraged at the surrender of Lithuania, and of holy
Smolensk, to a foe whom they detested as Antichrist; and
since the junction of Bagration's force with that of Barclay
the dissensions in their councils had risen to such a pitch that
the cautious leader was at last accused of treason by his head-

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strong colleague. The strife was assuaged by the appointment
of the old fighting general Kutusoff, reared in Suv6roiFs school,
as generalissimo; and near the R. Moskwa and the village of
Borodino the Russians prepared to contest the approach to
Moscow. Their forces crowned a semicircle of hills, the right
of which was protected by a ravine. Near their centre rose a
hill which they strengthened by a formidable redoubt; and earthworks defended their more accessible left. The presence of
about 130,000 men and 400 cannon on each side foreboded
a contest more sanguinary even than that at Wagram. On his
part Napoleon did not allow his joy at the prospect of the
pitched battle which he had been chasing from the Niemen to
the Moskwa, to outweigh his prudence; and owing to an
internal ailment, increased by his chagrin at the news of Salamanca, and inflamed by the first chills of autumn, he even
displayed a degree of caution which lost a great opportunity at
the end of the day (Sept. 7). By noon the divisions of
Murat, Davoust, and Ney had pierced the Russian left and
taken two of the redoubts; but the second Russian line twice
restored the balance of the fight, and only the havoc wrought
by the French artillery among the dense masses on the ridge
checked their advance. In this critical position Napoleon
refused repeated requests that his famous Old Guard should
move forward to threaten in its rear the shattered Russian left;
and the chance of rolling in the enemies' line on the ravine
on its right had to be abandoned by his incensed marshals.
Meanwhile the Russian right and centre had long maintained
a desperate fight, finally decided by a dashing charge of the
French cavalry into the rear of the great redoubt; and when
beaten from these heights, the defenders stoutly rallied
on a second ridge, thereby covering their retreat from the
bloodiest day's fight of all the Napoleonic wars. The battle of
Borodino or the Moskwa must indeed be called rather a
disaster than a victory for the Emperor; for it reduced his

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force by 30,000 and depleted his ammunition, while the losses
of the defenders were not much greater.
It cannot be proved that Moscow was the goal at which
Napoleon had all along aimed, though secret advice from
Berlin had reached the Czar that Napoleon would strike at the
old Muscovite capital. Indeed, he was too great an adept in
the complex and ever shifting game of war, to bind himself
rigidly to plans, subservience to which has often led to great
disasters. His great art, in which he excelled all the captains
of ancient and modern times, consisted in his fertility of conception, his eagle glance which divined the weak point of his
enemies' position, and the astonishing energy with which he
compelled all circumstances to give effect to his fundamental
maxim—"at the critical time and place to bring an overwhelming force to bear on the foe." These qualities, seen at their
best in his Italian and German campaigns, had impelled him
on his disastrously victorious career to Smolensk and Borodino.
He had at the outset burst through the too extended line of
defence and, pushing on his main army between their severed
forces, had compelled these to converge at an acute angle if
they were to reunite at all. Their junction at Smolensk and
retreat along the Moscow road led him to pursue the victory
which ever eluded his grasp, until it was seized amidst the
slaughter of Borodino. It was the desire to destroy or capture
the main Russian army which chiefly dictated the advance
towards Moscow, though he also hoped that the occupation of
that holy city would overawe the impressionable Czat and his
superstitious subjects. But, that he was led on more by
military than by political considerations is proved by his
hesitations at Wilna, Witepsk, and Smolensk, as also by the
frequency of his earlier assertions that he would not emulate
the fortunes of Charles XII. And yet now his successful
strategy had lured him on to an enterprise which yielded up
as hostages to fortune far vaster forces than were embarked in

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the adventurous campaign of Pultowa. Strange examples of
the Nemesis which overtakes great warriors when they cease
to be statesmen ! The valour of his veterans, wielded by his
own genius, had at last yielded Napoleon the coveted victory,
with Moscow and peace and plenty as the expected reward.
Such were the feelings which inspired Napoleon's weary
troops as they gazed on the gilded cupolas of Moscow. Some
of the veterans had heard his inspiring reminder that forty
centuries looked down on them from the heights of the Pyramids. The ancient Muscovite capital, so they were now
assured, was to be the goal of their wanderings, and its capture
the prelude to a general and enduring peace. Great was their
leader's chagrin when no request for an armistice, no deputation of obsequious citizens came forth to entreat his
clemency: greater still the dismay of his troops at finding its
streets nearly deserted. The policy of removing supplies and
population before the advance of the foe, so successfully
adopted by Wellington before Torres Vedras, had been carried
out by Barclay and Kutusoff on Napoleon's line of march
through Russia Proper. Moscow was to be the crowning
example of this mode of warfare. Hatred and fear of the
French as infidels and ruthless plunderers, had aided the
governor, Count Rostopchin, in depopulating the capital and
preparing for a general conflagration. Whether this terrible
act was entirely the work of Russian incendiaries, or whether,
as some of their writers aver, it was caused by French and
Polish pillagers, it is at any rate certain that flames burst
forth at several places on the night of Sept. 14, and, fanned by
the equinoctial gales, raged for five days. That this event had
less effect on his fortunes than has been commonly believed,
is evident from the fact that the Grand Army remained in
Moscow for a whole month afterwards, in spite of some
further isolated fires, and that at the final council of war at
Moscow one of his advisers strongly urged the advisability of

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wintering at Moscow. The chief difficulty was not the lack of
shelter but the increasing scarcity of food for men and horses.
The arrival of stragglers and considerable reinforcements
almost made up the gaps caused by the Battle of Borodino;
but how were the 110,000 combatants, 20,000 sick and
wounded, and the horses for 550 cannons and 2000 waggons,
to be fed from an almost desolated district? In vain did
Napoleon offer personal security and high prices to all peasants
who would bring corn and hay. Their fanatical animosity
against the French would have forbidden intercourse, even if
the few who ventured had not been despoiled by pillagers;
and distant forays were often attended with losses. Kutusoff,
after abandoning Moscow, had occupied the south road to
Kaluga, guarding thereby the more fertile south and the arsenal
of Toula, and giving time for recruits and volunteers to throng
to his ranks. His threatening attitude sufficed to deter Napoleon from a march on St Petersburg, against which all his
marshals protested. By a tacit agreement there seemed for a
time to be a suspension of arms between the Russians and the
outposts of Murat; and it is said that the imposing presence
and headlong courage of this great cavalry chief so impressed
the Cossacks, that some of them even expressed a wish to
have him as their hetman. Among the many strange lesults
of the revolutionary wars none is more remarkable than the
bewildering eminence to which many soldiers of fortune had
risen. A Corsican cafioral seemed about to reduce Russia to
her limits under Peter the Great: the son of a lawyer at Pau
was assuring his accession to the throne of Sweden: and the
son of an inn-keeper at Cahors had sabred his way to that of
Naples, and was now for a brief space eclipsing the Czar's
lustre in the eyes of the Cossacks of the Don.
For a month the army remained in and around Moscow,
its leader still clinging to the hope that Alexander would give
way as he had done after Austerlitz and Friedland; but that
F.R.

17

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monarch, surrounded by a devoted people who detested the
principles of the French Revolution, now rejected overtures,
the acceptance of which would have cost him his throne. The
successes of Wellington in Spain, intercourse with the rugged
personality of the German exile Stein, and the impression
caused by deepened religious convictions, concurred to fortify
a will which had been gaining in solidity since the days of
Tilsit; and the mental instability on which Napoleon chiefly
reckoned had now been replaced by a fixed determination to
effect that liberation of Europe which had been the Czar's
youthful dream in 1804. Just as Napoleon's military genius
had led him into his present dilemma, so now his presuming
on Alexander's lack of determination sealed his own doom.
H e was also outmatched in cunning. Kutusoff feigned the
utmost concern at the results of the war, and a belief that his
master would lend a ready ear to overtures for peace which
Napoleon proposed to send to St Petersburg (Oct. 6). A
reply could not be expected for a fortnight; and before that
time elapsed, the informal armistice between Kutusoff and
Murat was broken by a sharp conflict in which the French
advanced guard lost severely (Oct. 17). The Emperor saw
that he had been duped; and, to make the most of the open
autumn weather, he two days later moved his army secretly by
the new road to Kaluga, hoping to avoid KutusofPs forces.
But the march was encumbered by a barbaric profusion of
plunder; the Russian scouts were active, and Kutusoff seized
a strong post at the town of Malo-Jaloslawitz. By the gallantry
of the viceroy Eugene and his Italian troops this position was
carried, only to disclose the foe drawn up in forest passes
which Bessieres, the Commander of the Guard, declared to
be impregnable. In an agony of distress Napoleon saw his
progress by the southern route to Smolensk completely
blocked, and the devastated line of his advajnce alone available. With hearts foreboding disaster, and hard pressed by

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elated foes, his men turned northwards, and skirted the
ghastly field of Borodino. Not all the skill and tenacity of
Eugene and Davoust could avert heavy losses from the rearguard at Wiasma (Nov. 3 ) ; and the miseries of the retreat
were infinitely increased by the tardy advent of sharp wintry
weather. " Up to Nov. 6 "—says General Gourgaud, a more
trustworthy historian of the campaign than the melodramatic
Segur—"the weather was fine, and the cold much less than it
was for some months in the Prussian and Polish campaigns of
1806—1807." As it is stated by Napier (to say nothing of less
accurate panegyrists of Napoleon) that the Emperor's enterprise, " the grandest and most provident, the most beneficial
ever attempted by a warrior statesman," was foiled by " t h e
fires and snows of Moscow," and that he was " vanquished by
the elements/' the following official record of the numbers of
his main army, apart from the reserves and the forces on the
Dwina and in Volhynia, should be carefully noted. The
number of effectives after the hardships and desultory fighting
in Lithuania had shrunk to 182,000, and before the battle of
Borodino to 133,000; on the departure from Moscow, inclusive of reinforcements, it stood at 107,000; and after the
affair at Wiasma, but before any snow or severe cold set in, only
55,000 men and 12,000 horses were fit for active service.
Now was seen the horrible truth of the warnings given at
Moscow by Russian prisoners—" In a fortnight your nails will
drop off, and your weapons will fall from your benumbed and
half-dead fingers." Henceforth man's attacks were feeble compared with the ceaseless rigour of Nature. Kutusoff, in very
pity for his own men as well as for the foes, desired to leave
the rest to winter; but his ardent lieutenants desired to
destroy the whole of the Grand Army, and their Cossacks
completed its miseries. The pitiful pretext that the retreat
was a move to join St Cyr's army on the Dwina and threaten
St Petersburg was no more heard at Napoleon's head-quarters;
I/—2

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and the hope that cantonments at Smolensk and Witepsk
would afford shelter was soon to vanish. The standards were
generally abandoned by Illyrians, Germans, and Italians—in
fact by all who had no interest in a war the motives of which
had ever seemed mysterious. The Poles, brave in fight but
addicted to marauding, had ceased to hope for the restoration of their country and gave themselves up to despair or to
plunder. The advanced columns swept the country of supplies
and fuel, thereby increasing the miseries of the rear-guard,
which was already sufficiently harassed by the Cossack lances.
For in the horrors of a rout the fierce passions aroused by war
are seen in all their hideousness, unveiled by the glamour
which disguises them in a victorious advance. In place of
regiments there were now generally seen bands of stragglers,
kept together only by self-interest or skill in foraging; and
these thrust back into the cold outsiders who sought to share
the scanty meal or fire. But amidst this unarmed, half-clothed
and frost-bitten rabble the heroism and fertility of resource
of the French veterans stood out in brilliant relief. When
Davoust's and Eugene's corps were exhausted by service as
rear-guard, they were reinforced by that of Ney, " the bravest
of the brave." The stores at Smolensk were of little service,
for they were pillaged by the first comers; and the retreat was
nearly intercepted by a sharp attack of the Russians at
Krasnoe which completely cut off the rear; but Ney, after
blowing up part of the ramparts of Smolensk, fought his way
through throngs of Russians, crossed the Dnieper on insecure
ice, and with the loss of his cannons and stores rejoined the
main force (Nov. 20).
It was of little avail that the remains of what had been
the Grand Army were now succoured by the reserves under
Victor, and by St Cyr's troops which had been successfully
repelling attacks of the Russian army of the Dwina; for the
Austrians under Schwarzenberg had suffered, or rather, had been

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powerless to prevent, 60,000 Russians from the south passing
northwards, taking up a position on the R. Beresina, and so
threatening to cut off the survivors of the Grand Army. To
secure the passage of that river General de Marbot's dismounted
troopers vainly strove to seize and hold the only bridge against
the Russian batteries. With the destruction of the bridge the
last hope of the French seemed to have vanished; for owing
to a partial thaw the ice would not bear the passage of an
army. Napoleon, however, lured the enemy down the stream
by a feigned march, while his brave engineers toiled for six
or seven hours to construct three light bridges higher up, over
which Napoleon and most of his effectives passed unmolested;
but such was the confusion that few timely efforts were made
to get the waggons and stragglers over while the enemy was
absent. Finding out their mistake, Tchichakoff and Wittgenstein now advanced up both banks, and though stoutly repulsed
at most points, their fire finally told with fearful effect on
Victor's rear-guard and the crowd of stragglers who now rushed
for the two bridges still remaining (Nov. 28). The breaking
of one of these under the cannons, the agonised struggles of
camp-followers and regulars, horse and foot, to gain or to keep
a foothold on the few frail planks, under a hail of grape-shot
that continued far into the night, presented an accumulation
of horrors under which the stoutest hearts gave way to wild
panic \ and the final burning of the bridge to cover the retreat
left a crowd of stragglers to the mercy of the pursuers.
Still, the elite of the army maintained a bold front, while the
few remaining squadrons protected the Emperor in hollow square
whenever the line was threatened by Cossacks. Thus in comparative safety the retreat dragged on its weary course; for the
Russian regulars were too exhausted by cold and hunger to
venture on serious attacks. On Dec. 5 Napoleon suddenly
left the relics of the Grand Army, with orders to rally and
resume the campaign at Wilna; while he secretly hurried on to

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[CHAP.

Paris to organise new forces and intimidate Prussia and
Austria. Meanwhile the survivors, paralysed by a return of
the intense cold, when halting at Wilna for rest and supplies,
were menaced by a small force of Cossacks under the adventurous leaders Platoff and Tettenborn. Storming the gates at
dawn, the latter struck such terror into his foes that they fled
instantly, leaving 6,000 prisoners, 24,000 wounded in their
hospitals, and nearly all the remaining cannons and stores
(Dec. 9). This was the last blow. Five days later the rearguard of 1,000 armed men under the dauntless Ney protected the miserable remnant of 20,000 stragglers who tottered
across the Niemen, over which five months before more than
half a million of men had passed to gain for the Emperor his
final triumph. And yet so vast were his resources, so transcendent his genius, that after a disaster which completely
eclipses all others in the history of civilised nations, he was
still able to bring up half a million of soldiers and fiercely
assert his domination from the Oder to the Ebro 1 .
Macdonald, with 20,000 Prussians and a few South Germans and Poles, had been hastily recalled from the siege of
Riga by the news of the catastrophe. H a d these Prussians
and Schwarzenberg's Austrians in Podolia been aware of the
completeness of the disaster, the relics of the Grand Army
would have been as completely in their power as Darius was
in that of the Greek mercenaries at the bridge over the Danube
when he fled before the Scythian horsemen. But in the modern
instance the decisive news came barely in time, even if there
had been any leader bold enough to paralyse the brain of
Napoleon's military system by the capture of his marshals.
Their sole danger therefore was from PlatofFs Cossacks, who
1

According to the tables given by Gen. Chambray in his history of
the campaign, 20,000 survivors assembled behind the Vistula in Jan. 1813
out of the 505,000 men who had waged the main campaigns on the Upper
Dwina and beyond the Dnieper.

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began to harass the retreat to Konigsberg. Meanwhile Macdonald by a skilful retreat broke through the Russians and
crossed the Niemen at Tilsit, expecting General Yorck with
a considerable number of Prussians to follow. On the last
day of 1812 the hasty march of the Prussians from his headquarters to rejoin their comrades warned the French leader of
their total defection; and he himself barely escaped with his
remaining regiments to Konigsberg.
On the previous day the Prussian general Yorck had taken
the momentous step of accepting the overtures of the Russians
that the district between Memel and Tilsit should be considered
neutral, and held as such by the Prussians, who were not to
serve against the Russians for two months. In a strict sense
Yorck's act was treason against his sovereign; and it was quite
possible that Frederick William might screen himself from the
Emperor's vengeance at the expense of his general. Yorck
hinted at this when he exclaimed to his enthusiastic officers,
" It is very well for you to talk: but my old head feels loose
on my shoulders." There was another danger, that the
Russians after losing fully half their troops in the past campaign would not venture beyond the Niemen and bind
themselves to another coalition. General Kutusoff pressed
this view on the Czar; but, fortunately for Germany, Alexander
listened to the promptings of Stein and other German patriots,
as well as of his own generous nature, and decided to become
the liberator of Europe. He knew that Napoleon's character,
even his fundamental policy, must impel him to wipe out the
memory of his disaster. Prudence therefore dictated an attack
when the French military system was for the time paralysed,
and northern Germany was eager to cast off its chains. If the
French were not pursued beyond the Vistula, Napoleon would
reassemble the forces of Germany, compel the Court of Berlin
to hold to its compact, and Russia would again have to face
the forces of western and central Europe. It was therefore the

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[CHAP.

best way of defending Russia to appeal to the national hatred of
the Germans against Napoleon, and to carry the war beyond the
Elbe. As for the King of Prussia and his minister Hardenberg,
they could be trusted to join the national cause when it was
safe to do so, and in the meantime to wear the mask skilfully.
The need of forcing Frederick William's hand now explains
the strange course of events. Russian troops began to occupy
Prussia Proper; and on Jan. 18, 1813, Alexander commissioned Stein to act provisionally as governor of East and West
Prussia, and to collect the revenues and arm the Landwehr and
Landsturm, in the name of the Czar. Thus the preparations
for the German War of Liberation were begun by a Prussian
general and a German exile, both of whom were technically
guilty of high treason. The Provincial Estates of East and
West Prussia in their session at Konigsberg (Feb., 1813) overlooked the illegalities of the position and enthusiastically
greeted Yorck's words a\ hope to beat the French wherever I
meet them; and if we are too much outnumbered, we shall
know how to die with honour." Frederick William, after
launching against Yorck an order for trial by court-martial
which was never carried out, now took the significant step of
withdrawing from French influence at Berlin to Breslau, where
the patriotic feeling ran as high as at Konigsberg; and finally
by the vigorous action of the Czar and Stein a Russo-Prussian
treaty of alliance was signed at Kalisch (Feb. 27, 1813), which
is of great importance as marking the second step (the treaties
of 1805 having been the first) towards the reconstruction of
Europe.
The Czar, desirous of reigning as constitutional King of
Poland, refused the preliminaries which would have restored to
Prussia Warsaw and other spoils gained in the second and third
partitions. In place of that proposal, a clause was finally
inserted that Prussia " shall be reconstructed in the statistical,
geographical and financial proportions conformable to her

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extent before the war of 1806." She was to receive her
compensations in North-Germany (excepting the ancient possessions of the House of Hanover) so as to give her " t h e
unity and compactness necessary for constituting an independent State": in particular she was to acquire on the east a
frontier which both in a military and geographical sense would
connect West Prussia with Silesia. This treaty vaguely foreshadowed the changes of the future, viz. the move westwards
of Prussian and Russian influence, the former Power thenceforth becoming almost entirely Germanic, while the Czar's
influence was for the first time to be extended beyond the
Vistula into the very heart of Europe. Furthermore, Prussia's
renunciation of all claims on Hanover facilitated the accession
of England to this, the fourth great Coalition. The signature
of this important treaty had been hurried on by the imperious
action of Stein; and Prussia and Russia passed from a state
of war to a close alliance as quickly as had been the case with
Britain and Spain five years previously. Both alliances were
pushed forward and cemented by statesmen, Canning and Stein,
who lent their great powers to change the war of the governments to a union of the peoples; but in 1813 as in 1808 the
address of statesmen, and even the determination of the Czar,
would have been of little avail but for their co-operation with
an irresistible impulse, the longing of an oppressed nation to
cast off an alien yoke.
The complete failure of Napoleon, in spite of his unvaried
military successes, to extort peace at Moscow has been already
referred to the invincible repugnance of the Great-Russians to
the character of his rule. The passionate devotion to the Czar
expressed by nobles and merchants in meetings at Moscow, and
their readiness to sacrifice their wealth for the common cause,
had a less demonstrative but more effective counterpart in the
quiet but stubborn resolve of the peasants and serfs to have no
dealings with the invaders. The principles of 1789 which had

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been Napoleon's best ally in his campaigns from Areola to
Jena, were as powerless at Moscow as they had been at Cairo.
The Russian social system, based on the Mir or village community, and cemented by devotion to the Czar, offered, it is
true, one weak place to its assailant, the custom of serfdom;
but the Czar had effected in 1803 some important ameliorations in the lot of the serfs; and these were, besides, too
ignorant to understand any proclamation of freedom at the
hand of Napoleon, whom they detested as an infidel and a
sacrilegious plunderer. There was therefore no solidarity of
interest between Napoleon and the inhabitants of Great Russia;
and to his tardy recognition of this fact the disaster of 1812
must be chiefly ascribed. In West and South Germany, on
the contrary, his rule had directly or indirectly conferred
many benefits, abolition of serfdom, immunity from feudal
dues, some approach to personal and religious liberty and
social equality. France was for some time looked upon as the
champion of the lesser States against the rapacious designs
of Austria and Prussia; and but for the material pressure
of the Continental System it is scarcely probable that the
Confederation of the Rhine would have been dissolved in a
single campaign. Napoleon, indeed, still disposed of more
strictly German troops than Prussia and Austria when united
could bring against him; and only by degrees did the confederate troops rally to the national cause. The decisive part in
this great struggle was therefore played by Prussia.
In that unhappy land the name of Napoleon was associated
with no reforms : these had been quietly carried out in the
teeth of his opposition by Stein, Scharnhorst and Hardenberg.
French supremacy only meant to the Prussian people the occupation of the capital and the chief fortresses at their expense,
the sequestration of their revenue for the payment of an elastic
war indemnity, the limitation of their army, the ruin of foreign
commerce, and finally the systematic plundering of their towns

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and villages during the passage of the Grand Army. So intense
and widespread was the hatred of French domination that pity
alone seems to have preserved from popular vengeance the
bands of frost-bitten survivors who in Jan. 1813 crept towards
the ramparts of Thorn and Danzig. French influence was
not more alien to the oriental fatalism of Moscow and the
intense national pride of the Spaniard, than to the spirit of
regenerated Prussia. The cabals of the French or aristocratic
party at Berlin were now powerless against the tide of popular
feeling. Staunch adherents to the old regime, like Yorck and
Bliicher, were at one with the innovators Stein and Scharnhorst;
and there was but one fear, that Frederick William's prudence
would postpone the struggle against Napoleon. Some ardent
civilians had long been preparing for a national German rising
against Napoleon. The enthusiastic patriot Karl Miiller had
even bought weapons and ammunition and had arranged plans
of attack on the French garrisons; and it is stated by Louis
Ompteda that if Frederick William had much longer delayed
he would have been overthrown by a revolution begun by the
people and the army. The identity of feeling between ruler
and subjects was now, however, assured. Indeed, the delay was
only due to the king's desire to gain some guarantee from his
ally for the future position of Prussia; and regret can scarcely
be felt for Frederick William's circumspection, inasmuch as it
yielded the initiative in the proclamation of war to a professor.
While it was still doubtful against whom the volunteers,
just called for by royal proclamation, were to serve, StefTens,
Professor of Physics in the new University of Breslau, called
on the students to enlist for a war against Napoleon. It was
responded to with ardour. A similar zeal was shown by the
youth of Berlin and Konigsberg Universities, and even Halle,
Jena and Gottingen were left almost deserted by the rush of
students to join the muster at Breslau. The gaps still left
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by the throngs of volunteers. Scharnhorst's plan of a Landwehr and Landsturm as second and third lines of reserve, was
now carried into effect (March 17): the 150,000 men who had
passed through the ranks in his short service system now came
forward; and Prussia stood forth a nation in arms, organised
even more completely than France after Carnot's levee en masse.
The enthusiasm of France in 1793 was now rivalled by the
superhuman efforts and sacrifices of Prussia in 1813. Old men
brought their all for the support of regiments of volunteers,
officials renounced their salaries, and sixteen workers in a
Silesian coal-mine, as the results of their toil overtime, brought
221 thalers ( ^ 3 3 ) to equip their comrades for the war: women
brought their jewels, and one girl, whose flowing locks were her
only wealth, shore them off to lay on the altar of the Fatherland. The gifted young poet Korner came from a life of rich
promise at Vienna to serve in the famous Liitzow brigade, and
sealed with his life's blood his devotion to the cause of German
freedom. His warlike songs, with those of Riickert, Kleist,
and others, breathed the passions pervading young and old,
rich and poor, which found their fullest expression in Arndt's
"What is the German's Fatherland?"—that trumpet-call rallying
the Germans of the west and south to the one national cause.
On his side Napoleon determined to maintain his grip on
Spain, Germany and Prussia, as if he had not lost half a million
of men and the districts east of the Vistula. " If I begin by
giving up towns," he exclaimed, " they will end by demanding
kingdoms." Such was his force of will, and so great was his
confidence in the policy of never acknowledging an error and
never receding a single step, a policy which often accelerates
the progress of the victor but generally ends in irretrievable
disaster.
Events in France might well have led him to compromise.
Towards the close of October, 1812, a General Malet, with two
other officers of strong republican opinions, by means of forged

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documents had succeeded in leading some troops to seize
the Minister and Prefect of Police, Savary and Pasquier. A
little more and he would have seized other ministers and proclaimed the republic. The success which for an hour or two
favoured this foolhardy attempt, caused an uneasy feeling,
which was vastly increased by the news of the Emperor's
disaster in Russia; but when he suddenly appeared in Paris
and appealed in his misfortunes to the nation, French generosity
was touched, and no open opposition was offered to his design
of a campaign on the Oder. By calling out all disposable
troops and some 100,000 National Guards, as also by anticipating the conscription of 1814, he hoped to have nearly
500,000 troops without counting his armies in Spain. The
Emperor's uneasiness as to the state of public opinion in France
was, however, betrayed by a singular action. He charged the
Prefect of each Department to enrol a hundred young men of
the best families as guards of honour, not only because he
desired to reinforce his cavalry by some 10,000 men, but
chiefly because these guards would be hostages for,the loyalty
of their families. As Mollien naively remarks—" Napoleon
was sceptical as to the value of devotion on word of honour,
and desired another guarantee." Not a voice was raised by
the servile Senate and Corps Legislatif against the renewal of
offensive warfare, though there was much discontent in the
south and west of France and a slight revolt in the newly
annexed German lands. It was left for the most independent
of his advisers, such as Caulaincourt and Talleyrand, to counsel
negotiations with the Powers; but the utmost concession which
the Emperor would make was that he would request the
intervention of his father-in-law, the Austrian Emperor, with
the offer of a few shadowy concessions to the Czar; but, as
will shortly appear, the Court of Vienna was now prepared
to play a much more active part in the restoration of the
equilibrium of Europe, than that which Napoleon desired to

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assign to it. As to French finances, they were to be strengthened by selling for the benefit of the exchequer the domains
of parishes or communes, at least those which were let out
on lease; and in spite of Mollien's protest against this act of
confiscation, it was carried out—a strange corollary to the
policy of confiscation begun in Nov. 1789.
When his government was reduced to these straits, it is
surprising that Napoleon did not frankly accept the offer of
mediation which his father-in-law sent from Vienna; but he
spurned this suggestion as an infraction of the Franco-Austrian
alliance of 1812, which he tardily endeavoured to cement by
promising to Francis I the restoration of Illyria and acquisitions
in Silesia and Poland, if he would place 100,000 men in the
field against the Russians and Prussians. It was not, however,
to the interests of Austria that French supremacy should again
be assured; and when her intervention was nominally accepted
but virtually rejected, she concluded a secret convention at
Kalisch (March 29) with the Czar, whereby his troops were to
be allowed to enter Cracow. Poniatowski's Poles were thus
compelled to fall back on the province of Galicia and pass
westwards, giving up their arms until they had passed through
the Austrian dominions. Unable to draw the Emperor Francis
from his present attitude of armed neutrality, Napoleon thought
to avert his eventual hostility by conferring the Regency of
France on Marie Louise, which would also be some safeguard
against any enterprise like that of General Malet. This was
almost the only precaution which Napoleon took on the
resumption of the war; and even his panegyrist, Thiers, considers his uncompromising attitude as great a disaster as the
Russian campaign itself.
Napoleon, on leaving the Grand Army, had entrusted the
command to Murat, King of Naples; but that dashing soldier,
ill-adapted for conducting a retreat and anxious for the security
of his throne, abruptly left the army and hurried to Naples,

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throwing the command on the shoulders of the viceroy Eugene.
The latter, after strengthening the French garrisons in the
fortresses on the Oder, fell back on Berlin; and when unable
to hold the capital, he retired to Wittenberg, trusting to the
line of the Elbe as a defence against the victorious allies. The
Russians, after helping to free Berlin, threatened this great
natural barrier on Eugene's front as also at Dresden and
Hamburg.
The citizens of this famous old Free City were too much
exasperated against French rule to wait even for the approach
of the Cossacks led by the adventurous Tettenborn. A riot
occurred at the Altona gate on Feb. 24 owing to the harshness
of the French customs' officers in searching every one who
entered the city. The mob disarmed the guard, tore down
the octroi palisade and imprisoned all the French in the town.
Tettenborn, after persuading or compelling the Duke of Mecklenburg to withdraw from the Confederation of the Rhine,
entered Hamburg (March 18) amidst unbounded enthusiasm.
— " None had ever seen (wrote Varnhagen von Ense) such an
outpouring of passionate joy, nor were Germans deemed
capable of so much emotion; the people even went so far as to
kiss the Cossacks' horses in their excess of rapture." Tettenborn, a native of Hamburg, though now serving under the Czar,
at once declared it a free port, ordered the seizure of all
French property and handed over to the city the goods in the
customs' house valued at ^ 6 0 , 0 0 0 . A levy of troops called
the Hanseatic Legion was held there as at Liibeck and other
towns which now revolted against French rule; but the fortunes of the Hanse Cities rose and fell with the main current
of events higher up the Elbe. Vandamme retook Hamburg at
the end of May, and Davoust was able to renew his despotic
sway in Hamburg up to the end of the year.
Though this campaign in North-Germany was of merely
secondary importance, it furnished many incidents, which

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served to illustrate the character of the whole struggle. An
attack of the enemy on Liineburg threatened to dash the hopes
of its citizens for the long-desired independence; but as the
French were about to shoot those who had most prominently
sympathised with the patriots, the advent of a Russo-Prussian
force aroused the inhabitants from the depths of despair to
transports of joy, and compelled Napoleon's troops to evacuate
the town. There, and indeed everywhere throughout Germany,
the depth of popular feeling may be measured by the ardour
shown by non-combatants, and especially by women. That
faculty of inspiring men to the fray and of restoring the fortunes
of an unequal contest, which Caesar and Tacitus described as
a characteristic of the women of ancient Germany, was once
again called forth at many crises of the War of Liberation;
and the exalted patriotism which Schiller had portrayed as the
formative influence in the life of his noblest female character,
Gertrud, now nerved many a town and district to more
desperate and persistent efforts. It is related that when sympathy was offered to an old woman for the loss of her cottage
by fire in an engagement, she exclaimed, "Well, let it burn, if
it will get the French out of the place more quickly." Some
girls emulated the example of the Maid of Saragossa. In the
fight at Liineburg, a girl distinguished herself by the coolness
and daring with which she braved the bullets of the foe in
order to carry ammunition to her countrymen; and later on a
warlike maiden succeeded in enlisting as a volunteer, and in
concealing her identity, which she only revealed when she lay
dying of a wound.
The position at the opening of the campaign of 1813 was
briefly as follows, Napoleon's garrisons still held the fortresses
of Danzig, Thorn, and Modlin on the Vistula, Stettin, Custrin
and Glogau on the Oder, Spandau, Wittenberg and Magdeburg
on the Havel and Elbe; but the capture by the allies of Hamburg and Dresden had weakened his main line of defence.

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Macdonald had given the sensible advice to evacuate the
fortresses on the Vistula and Oder and concentrate all forces
on the Elbe. Had this been done Napoleon would have had
a great superiority of force. As it was, he had to rely mainly
on the young conscripts lately raised in his Empire, who,
with all their bravery, could not move with the speed and
steadiness of the veterans lost in Russia, or even of those
now blockaded in Polish and Prussian fortresses. H e was
also rather deficient in artillery and very weak in that terrible
cavalry whose charges had so often decided and crowned his
greatest triumphs. At the close of April, 1813, both sides
marched towards the fertile plains of Saxony, which contest
with those of the Low Countries the claim to be the battleground of Europe. Napoleon, as usual, marched his troops at
a rate which outstripped all the efforts of his commissariat
department; and their wants were satisfied partly by requisitions but still more by plunder. According to von Odeleben,
a Saxon officer in his army, the wantonness of the pillage exceeded anything which had yet been seen.—" To set fire to a
house or a village through negligence was an act entirely unnoticed. The cursed Jest la guerre was an excuse for everything." Such conduct, it is true, lightened his commissariat
and accelerated the advance, but it also added fuel to the
hatred long nursed by the peasants of Germany, and ensured
the defection of the Saxons and Bavarians at the first possible
opportunity. In fact, the King of Saxony had declared himself friendly to the allies; and only the sudden irruption of
Napoleon's troops kept him to the French alliance.
The first pitched battle of 1813 was fought near the village
of Liitzen, the scene of the last and greatest victory of Gustavus Adolphus. Napoleon was marching his troops, only onethird of whom were French, towards Leipzig, when near
Liitzen and Gross Gorschen they were attacked on their flank
by the allies (May 2). Drawing back and reforming his lines,
F.R.
18

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Napoleon for a time was forced to maintain the defensive, and
Ney's young conscripts at first gave ground to the Prussians.
Never did Napoleon show greater anxiety as to the issue of
a battle, exposing himself to fire, and riding to animate his
troops when ordered up for the attack. The key of the French
defence was so seriously threatened that only the arrival of
Eugene's and Macdonald's corps, and a charge of the Young
Guard supported by the fire of 60 cannons, restored the
balance of the fight. Finally a second great column of attack
broke the centre of the allies and compelled them to fall back;
but Napoleon's lack of cavalry prevented any pursuit; and as
night fell a squadron of the allied horsemen by a brisk attack
nearly swept off the Emperor and his staff. It is claimed
by German historians that if the first attack had been more
vigorously delivered by Wittgenstein, or that if at the crisis of
the fight the allied cavalry and part of the Russian reserves
had been launched against the foe's right flank, victory must
have been assured. As it was, the Prussians had captured 800
prisoners and 5 cannons without losing any; but the gallant
Scharnhorst received a wound which soon proved fatal. The
retreat of the allies eastwards laid open Dresden to Napoleon;
thereby assuring the wavering fidelity of the Saxons, and
regaining the whole line of the Elbe. H e now sent Ney and
Victor northwards to threaten the Prussians and Swedes near
Berlin; for Bernadotte had brought 25,000 Swedish troops,
in order to earn the prize of Norway promised by Alexander
the year before. The main body of the allies had retired on
Bautzen, where they again sustained a defeat from the Emperor's forces (May 20, 21); but the determination of their officers
and soldiers was seen not only in a stubborn defence, but in
their orderly retreat and the complete success of an ambush
which they laid for their pursuers and the capture of 11 cannons
and many prisoners. Napoleon, however, succeeded in carrying
the war into Silesia; and at the beginning of June his left was

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near Glogau, his centre occupied Breslau, and his right threatened Schweidnitz.
The prospects of the allies looked black indeed. The
prudent Barclay, lately appointed commander-in-chief of the
Russian forces, knew that his men were greatly disorganised
and declared that he must retreat into Poland. Ammunition
was running short: the fortress of Schweidnitz was untenable, and a reinforcement of 20,000 Silesian Landwehr was
useless because their muskets hastily bought in Austria had
no touch-holes bored. With the greatest difficulty Barclay was
dissuaded from a retreat beyond the Oder by the argument
that the allies could at least hold out for six weeks in the
fortresses of Silesia and in the mountains which separate that
province from Bohemia: and that if he retired into Poland,
Austria would certainly withdraw her promise of acceding to
the coalition in six weeks' time if Napoleon rejected her armed
mediation.
On his side the French Emperor had offered the allies
a truce which they now (June 4) gladly accepted as being the
only means of keeping their armies near together and close to
the Bohemian frontier. Napoleon seems to have considered
that the gain of time would enable him to bring up new
levies from France, to add to his weak and overworked
cavalry, and to threaten Vienna from his Illyrian provinces.
H e also hoped that two victories would assure the fidelity of
his father-in-law, as that of Liitzen had won him the reluctant
support of the Saxons; and he naturally expected the discouragement of the Czar and Frederick William to lead to the
peace which was freely discussed at their head-quarters; but
here again he omitted from his reckoning the unquenchable
hatred of the Prussian people. The fear that the armistice
would lead to a dishonourable peace roused the fierce resentment of the patriots. It was nothing that the French were
threatening even Berlin itself. Karl Miiller called the people
18—2

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to go forth like the Helvetii and burn what they left behind;
and inspired by the examples of Saragossa and Moscow, he
exclaimed—"Let us learn as the Russians did, first to go round
and burn, and then find for ourselves poison and dagger as the
Spaniards did. Against those two peoples alone could Napoleon's troops effect nothing." With such a spirit pervading the
peoples, a second Tilsit was impossible.
In striking contrast to this reckless determination to do
and dare all for the Fatherland, stands the cool and calculating
diplomacy of the Court of Vienna. As far back as Sept. 1810
Metternich had foreseen that the impending conflict between
France and Russia would "ensure a decisive importance for
Austria's opinions during the war and at the end of it."
Amidst the disasters of the 1812 campaign the Austrian Government had quietly drawn back Schwarzenberg's corps on Cracow
without offering any opposition to the victors. The prospect
of regaining access to the sea by the recovery of the lllyrian
provinces became more remote with every French victory,
and Metternich now decided that the hour had come for
Austrian intervention. The terms which Austria offered to
Napoleon were the partition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
between Russia, Prussia and Austria; the restoration of the
lllyrian provinces to Austria with a good frontier towards
Italy, and the renunciation by France of her German provinces
beyond the Rhine.
All Metternich's actions were adroitly designed to make
the weight of Austria tell most fully in the balance of power.
Proceeding to the allied head-quarters in Silesia he was
received by Alexander with the mistrust which since 1806
had arisen between him and the Court of Vienna; but the
skilful diplomatist soon convinced him that Francis I meant
well for the allied cause.—" If Napoleon declines our mediation the truce will come to an end and you will find us among
the number of your allies: if he accepts it, the negotiations

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will most certainly show Napoleon to be neither wise nor just,
and then the result will be the same." Having received a
pressing message from Napoleon to go to Dresden, Metternich proceeded thither (June 26) to be greeted by these
menacing words—" So you too want war : well, you shall have
it. I have annihilated the Prussian army at Liitzen: I have
beaten the Russians at Bautzen: now you wish your turn to
come. Be it s o : the rendezvous shall be in Vienna. Men
are incorrigible. Experience is lost upon you...." Metternich
remarked that peace rested with him; but the Emperor retorted that he, the child of fortune, could not give up one
handbreadth of soil—" My reign will not outlast the day when
I have ceased to be strong and therefore to be feared." Later
on, in a fit of rage at being told that his soldiers were boys and
the last that France could give him, he flung his hat into the
corner and declared that a man such as he did not concern
himself much about the lives of a million of men. " The man
is lost," was Metternich's reply to the French generals who
crowded around him after this memorable interview hoping to
hear news of the assurance of peace.
A singular concurrence of events during the armistice
served to strengthen the allied cause. On June 14th and 15th
Great Britain signed at Reichenbach conventions of alliance
and subsidy with Prussia and Russia, whereby these Powers
agreed to keep on foot at least 80,000 and 160,000 men respectively, receiving for the current year the sums of ^666,000
and ; £ i , 133,000. Subsequently it was also arranged that
England should support a German legion of 10,000 men
serving under the Czar. In this convention, which was ratified
with some additions in the following September, the Court
of Berlin definitely renounced all claims on Hanover. The
course of the reaction against Napoleon was thus marked by
the recurrence to a diplomatic situation somewhat similar to
that of Bartenstein in the spring of 1807. But Napoleon's

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position was in reality far more perilous than that from which
the lightning stroke of Friedland had delivered him. The need
of complete accord between the Powers, if they were to make
head against the French Emperor, had been well learnt during
six years of disunion and humiliating subservience. Austria
was now ready to accede to the alliance from which she had
so unaccountably turned away in the spring of 1807; and
Wellington's sword was now thrown with overpowering effect
into the wavering balance of European affairs. His decisive
triumph at Vittoria (June 21) had a marked influence on the
negotiations at Dresden.
On June 30 Napoleon acquiesced in Austria's mediation,
and the armistice was prolonged to August 10. That Power
had, however, signed a treaty with the allies at Reichenbach
(June 27) pledging herself to join them with 150,000 troops if
Napoleon did not accede to her conditions as stated above;
and so far had the rivalry of Austria and Prussia vanished in
their misfortunes, that Austria in the negotiations with Napoleon
then pending, insisted on the restoration of Prussia to the
place of a great Power, little thinking that half a century later
she would be ousted from Germany by the very State which
she now helped to re-create. To face this formidable coalition, the only ally which Napoleon could gain was Denmark.
The Court of Copenhagen, knowing that Bernadotte, Crown
Prince of Sweden, had joined Russia and England, on the
understanding that the kingdom of Norway should be the price
of Swedish assistance to the allies, saw safety only in a close
union with Napoleon—a decision which was to prove fatal to
Danish interests in the near future. The French Emperor,
however, made great and finally successful efforts to gain active
assistance from his brother-in-law Murat, who had retired in
high dudgeon to Naples at the close of 1812. H e also called
Fouche back to favour to fathom "this infernal Austrian
negotiation which is slipping through my fingers."

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Into the details of the negotiations at Prague it is unnecessary
to enter. With a natural feeling of resentment at the
return which Francis was giving for the care lavished on his
daughter at Paris, and with a magnificent confidence that his
genius would conquer as at Austerlitz and Wagram, Napoleon
refused, until it was too late, the Austrian terms that would
have reduced his eastern boundary to the Rhine 1 .
When the armistice ceased on Aug. 10 Napoleon's position
was but little stronger than at its commencement, while that
of the allies was vastly more commanding. Bernadotte with
25,000 Swedes reinforced the Prussians at Berlin and brought
the strength of the northern army to 150,000 men. The accession of Francis I to the coalition gave the allies the help of a
great Austrian army led by Schwarzenberg, who with Russians
and Prussians now began to threaten Napoleon's flank from
the vast natural bastion formed by the mountains of Bohemia.
Blucher's army in Silesia had also been nearly doubled in
strength, and mustered nearly 100,000 strong. To oppose
these there were the corps of St Cyr, Vandamme and Poniatowski, in all about 100,000 men, watching Bohemia; as many
under Macdonald in Silesia; 75,000 menacing Berlin; 50,000
held as a reserve by Napoleon himself; beside Bavarians on
the Inn and Eugene's troops in Italy watching the Austrians
on the Danube and the Drave respectively. From her central
1
The treaties which built up the fourth great Coalition were (1) Russia
and Sweden, March 24,1812: (2) Russia and Prussiaat Kalisch, Feb. 28,1813:
(3) England and Sweden, March 3,1813: (4 and 5) Conventions of subsidy
and alliance between England and Russia and Prussia at Reichenbach,
June 15, 1813: (6, 7 and 8) Definitive-Treaties of alliance between Austria
and Russia and Prussia at Teplitz, Sept. 9, 1813: (9) Preliminary treaty
of alliance between England and Austria at Teplitz, Oct. 3, 1813. In
Oct.—Dec. Austria also made treaties of alliance with Bavaria, Saxony,
Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse, &c. It will be noticed that as in the second
and third Coalitions, Russia and Sweden took the initiative, and that
England was one of the later signatories.

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position Austria was thus able to threaten Napoleon and his
allies in Saxony, Bavaria, North-Italy and Illyria. Though the
French Emperor had regained for himself the central strategic
position of Saxony, yet over the whole area of the war the
advantage of position lay with Austria; and the diplomatists
of Vienna were thus able in the approaching collapse of
French supremacy to substitute Austrian predominance in the
affairs of Germany and Italy. Such were the interests involved in this vast struggle. The allies had in all nearly half
a million of armed men in Central Europe; while Napoleon's
slight numerical inferiority was counterbalanced by the vigour
and unity of action inspired by one master mind. After
twenty years of almost constant war the forces of every people
in Europe except the Turks were confronting each other on
the banks of the Oder and the Elbe, the Ebro and the
Bidassoa.
Keeping with the reserves at about an equal distance
from his three main armies, Napoleon heard of the incursion
into Saxony of the allied Grand Army led by Schwarzenberg,
Barclay and Kleist, which drove in St Cyr's outposts on
Dresden. Hurrying up for the defence of the Saxon capital,
which he had formed into a vast fortified camp, Napoleon
repelled the attack and occupied the hills south of the city.
Reinforced during the night by Marmont and Victor, he on
the next day resumed the offensive, and a dashing charge of
Murat's cavalry cut up the Austrian left and gained a complete
victory (Aug. 27). Swift concentration of troops had once
more gained a victory over the allies, who owing to divided
councils and a defective intelligence department had not
enough troops close at hand to repel so vigorous an attack.
They left ten battalions and a vast number of cannons and
stores in the hands of the victors. For skill of combination
before the attack, and the vigour of its execution, the Battle of
Dresden deserves to rank among Napoleon's greatest victories,

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and refutes the assertions often made as to the decay of his
powers. He fell in the plenitude of his vigour before forces
which no one man could overcome. The pursuit of his beaten
foes was partly paralysed by news of Macdonald's defeat on the
previous day; and he left without due support a strong column
led by Vandamme, which attempted to seize a pass of the ErzGebirge at Kulm and so cut off the retreat of the allies.
A Russian corps, soon reinforced by Austrians, obstinately
contested Vandamme's advance, while a body of Prussians
closed in on his rear. Caught in a trap such as had long
ago been fatal to the Romans at the Caudine Forks, all
Vandamme's troops except a few horsemen had to lay down
their arms (Aug. 30). This blow, which cost Napoleon 15,000
men in killed and prisoners, had been closely preceded by
even worse disasters to his cause. Oudinot's advance on
Berlin had been checked by the allies at Gross Beeren 3 and
though Bernadotte desired to retreat and abandon the capital,
a battle had been forced on by the determined Prussian
General von Biilow which ended in the defeat of the French
(Aug. 23). Three days later a more decisive victory was won
by the allied army in Silesia led by the gallant old Bliicher.
This veteran of over seventy years of age brought the skill
and experience gained under Frederick the Great to rebuild
the fortunes of Prussia. After the disaster of Jena his tenacious
resistance at Liibeck together with that of Gneisenau at Kolberg
stood out in bold relief amidst the tame surrenders of other
Prussian generals. H e had lived on for revenge. Arndt
describes him during the weary years of subjection to the
French, as often spending the heavy hours in lunging with his
sword at an imaginary foe, calling out—Napoleon ! Nothing
is more astonishing than his vitality. His limbs were fine and
round as those of a youth. The upper part of his face seemed
to Arndt a fit abode for the gods, curiously blended with lines
about the mouth and chin which betokened the "cunning of

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the hussar." Such was old " Marshal Forward " who was now
to lead the army of Silesia from the Oder to the Seine. At
the outset this army was pressed back by Macdonald from
Goldberg; but it fiercely assailed that marshal's forces as his
lieutenants (against his orders, he states) were leading them
over the flooded stream of the Katzbach on to a plateau
sodden by the rain. The French were hurled back in wild
confusion (Aug. 26), and in the disorder'of a protracted retreat
left 18,000 prisoners and 103 cannons in the hands of Bliicher's
troops. In September another of Napoleon's best marshals
suffered defeat. Ney was beaten at Dennewitz by the northern
allied army (Sept. 6).
Thus, on the whole, Napoleon had only maintained his
ground at his centre of operations in Saxony, while his lieutenants had been badly beaten in Brandenburg, Silesia and on
the confines of Saxony. The way was thus opened to strike
a blow at his centre, Dresden, or to cut off his communications
with Erfurt and the Rhine. The latter alternative was chosen;
and the allies prepared to effect the long desired junction of
their forces. Bliicher and Schwarzenberg again advanced on
Saxony, but retreated when Napoleon opposed them in force.
When reinforced however by 50,000 reserves from the east,
the allies appointed Leipzig as their rendezvous. By a daring
flank march, Bliicher led his troops through Bautzen, crossed
the Elbe near Torgau, and, constructing an entrenched camp,
waited for Bernadotte's army of the north. The allied movements were, however, much hampered by the tardiness of the
Swedish Crown Prince, who was justly suspected of only
joining in the campaign in order to dethrone Bonaparte and
take his place. At any rate, he did as little as possible against
the French.
Meanwhile Napoleon had been losing much precious time
in efforts to invade Bohemia; but the difficult passes of the
Erz-Gebirge were found to be impenetrable; and in the time

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thus allowed Bliicher with Bernadotte in his rear was beginning
to threaten Leipzig from the north, while the Grand Army
advanced against that city from the south. Leaving Murat to
defend Leipzig against the main army of the allies, Napoleon
hurried northwards to overthrow Bliicher, who foiled his aim
by a wary retreat, thereby enabling the allies on the south to
press Murat back. Alarmed for the safety of Leipzig, the
Emperor determined to rejoin the King of Naples and accept
the battle to which the skilful movements of Bliicher and
Schwarzenberg had reduced him. The position was unfavourable. At his back was an unfortified city the inhabitants of
which were eager for his overthrow. In case of a retreat
westwards there was but one important bridge over the R.
Elster; and by a strange oversight Napoleon gave no definite
orders for the construction of temporary bridges. Thus commenced the greatest series of battles ever fought at any one
place, in which about half a million of men were finally
engaged.
On the first day (Oct. 16) the allied Grand Army failed
to hold against Napoleon three villages which it had captured, still more to cut off his communications on the west.
Napoleon, in fact, hoped by hurrying Marmont's army from
the north side to gain a complete victory; but his marshal
was there fiercely assailed by Bliicher and finally had to
abandon the village of Mockern. This defeat compelled
Napoleon to draw in his own army nearer to Leipzig, and he
vainly sent a request for an armistice. On the 18th Murat,
supported by Napoleon and the Old Guard, maintained an
obstinate resistance to the overwhelming numbers of the
Grand Army; but the French defence on the left wing was
endangered by the desertion of 3600 Saxons and Wurtembergers. Only the speedy arrival of Napoleon and his Old
Guards prevented an immediate collapse at that point. Meanwhile Bernadotte's tardy approach was threatening an even

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worse disaster to the French, and with more energy on his
part their retreat could have been cut off. As it was, they
only had ammunition left for two hours more, and finally fell
back into the crowded streets of Leipzig amidst terrible confusion. A slight wooden structure over the Elster broke down,
and while the stream of fugitives was still surging across the
only other bridge, a premature explosion cut off the rear-guard
which had been bravely defending the subuibs. A few, among
them Macdonald, escaped by swimming or by felled trees;
many more were drowned, including the gallant Poniatowski,
who had received his marshal's baton but three days before;
and thousands were made prisoners. In all Napoleon lost on
those three days 300 cannons, 45,000 men killed, wounded or
prisoners, besides leaving 23,000 in the military hospitals. But
the freedom of Germany, which was fully assured by this gigantic
conflict, had been dearly bought. The allies had sustained
still heavier losses in the field and were in no condition for
a vigorous pursuit. Beset by typhus fever and harassed here
and there by light troops, the remains of Napoleon's army
plodded through the miry lanes of Saxony and Thuringia, past
Liitzen, Auerstadt, and Erfurt, once the scenes of victory and
splendour and now of a hurried and disastrous retreat. Still,
the sunset of his fortunes was gilded by some acts of generosity
worthy of the new Charlemagne. H e had forbidden his
generals to set fire to the suburbs of Leipzig, though the allied
advance would have been thereby retarded. In the hapless
city he had bidden his unwilling ally the King of Saxony to
make the best terms he could with the allies; and he permitted
the rest of the Saxon troops to join the national cause, against
which they had throughout the campaign unwillingly fought.
The Bavarians had allied themselves with Austria a week
before Napoleon's disaster; and their troops now occasioned
him serious trouble and losses at Hanau; but he finally led
about 70,000 men across the Rhine (Nov. 1—2), and returned

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to Paris as in the previous winter with a loss of nearly half a
million of men.
Meanwhile Tettenborn, when driven from Hamburg by
the French, had captured Bremen by a coup de main\ and
after Leipzig he was there reinforced by Bernadotte. The
allies were able also to help a general popular rising against
the French in Holland, and despatched troops against the
Danes in Holstein. The latter came to terms with the allies;
and Bernadotte reinforced by 10,000 Danish troops began to
march towards the lower Rhine. With the exception of Davoust's entrenched position at Hamburg, French rule suddenly
shrank within the limits gained by the revolutionary armies under
Jourdan and Kieber. The garrisons imprudently left in Polish
and German fortresses also began to surrender—Danzig (with
the wrecks of Napoleon's Russian army and 1300 cannons),
Modlin, Zamosk, Stettin, Torgau, Erfurt, &c.: Dresden, Ciistrin, Wittenberg and Magdeburg held out through the winter;
Hamburg and Glogau until the following autumn. The results of the campaign showed that though the possession of
fortresses may be very important, it can rarely reverse the
effects of a decisive defeat in the open field, and that after a
great military disaster such as Leipzig, it may prove, as at Metz
in 1870, to be merely a trap for their garrisons. In all about
190,000 men were cut off from France by the results of the
battles near Leipzig.
Side by side with the collapse of his vast military effort,
Napoleon's political supremacy in Germany and Italy fell with
a rapidity which revealed its hollowness and artificiality.
The Austrians had easily regained Illyria and Dalmatia, where
they were generally welcomed. Jerome Bonaparte's rule in
Westphalia vanished like a dream, and the imposing Confederation of the Rhine dissolved at the first touch of the
allied arms. What would replace it ?
We have already noticed the commanding influence of

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Austria on the course of events, enhanced by Metternich's
skilful diplomacy. That statesman now used all his powers to
counteract the efforts of Stein and other friends of liberty to
gain free institutions for Geimany. He had vainly endeavoured
to dissuade the Czar from handing over to that zealous patriot
the provisional administration of the liberated German lands,
and now set himself to curb the "revolutionary aims" of
young Germany and assure the future supremacy of Austria by
treaties with the States seceding from the Confederation of the
Rhine. The first of these treaties had been with Bavaria
(Oct. 8), which was secured in " the full and entire sovereignty
of all its States, towns, domains," with a secret reservation that
Austria was to gain a good military frontier on the side of
Bavaria and Tyrol. This treaty, acceded to by the other allies,
assured to Bavaria the formerly Prussian lands of Baireuth and
Anspach, as well as the numerous Free Cities and knightly
domains seized in 1803—1806. In this treaty as in many
others—22 were signed in a single day at Frankfurt—the allies
restored lawful princes to their States, largely increased as these
were at the expense of church lands and the estates of the
Imperial Knights; and the princes were invested with "unreserved sovereignty."
In two respects these arrangements were fatal to German
liberty and unity. They abandoned the principle of subordination to some central authority, which had existed in
name down to 1806 and since then in stern reality, to
Napoleon; and the perpetuation of the French Emperor's
policy of mediatisation aggrandised the middle-sized States
and so vastly enhanced the difficulties of future unification.
For the present Metternich only sought to secure the supremacy of Austria by diplomatic bargains which would ensure
the support of the German princes. Thus, amidst all the
efforts made by the people of Germany, their desires for
liberty and effective unity were ignored.

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The Austro-Bavarian treaty also gave the Emperor Francis
a commanding influence over the destinies of Italy. A secret
clause gave him permission to send his troops into Tyrol.
Eugene's positions in Venetia were thus turned, and he was
soon unable to hold the line of the Adige against the invaders.
Italy was in a weak and distracted state. She had poured
forth her best blood for Napoleon on the battle-fields of
Germany, Russia and Spain, while the pressure of his Continental System had ruined her industries and effaced the
memory of his earlier reforms and public works. H e had
awakened, without satisfying, the sentiment of Italian nationality; and at every blow dealt to French supremacy north of the
Alps, there were ominous reverberations throughout the Peninsula, which revealed the stifled discontent of all republicans
and of the partisans of the fallen dynasties.
The people were, however, united only in the wish to
throw off Napoleon's yoke. On all else they were divided.
The old bands of the sanfedists, together with the Carbonari
of the south, declared for the return of the Bourbons; while
some generals in Murat's army, among whom was Pepe,
plotted to gain a constitution similar to that enjoyed by Sicily
under its English protectorate. Republican, Austrian, and
Papal intrigues or plots completed the confusion. For a time
Murat, who again abandoned Napoleon's fortunes, endeavoured
to come to terms with the Austrians and with Lord Bentinck,
the English commander in Sicily. H e desired, in fact, to be
recognised by the allies as King of Italy, and, declaring for
the independence of the Peninsula, he occupied Rome, Ancona
and Bologna. This weakened Eugene's defence of Lombardy,
which was further compromised when Bentinck with an AngloSicilian force, landing in Tuscany, declared that fertile land
freed from the French empire, and occupied Genoa. Eugene,
finding his position untenable, finally (April, 1814) concluded
an armistice with the Austrians, by which his French troops

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were allowed to return to France. Murat soon afterwards
abandoned the hope of becoming king of all Italy, and retired
to Naples.
The Leipzig campaign, therefore, swept away the political
results of all French victories gained since Bonaparte's first
appearance as a general in the Italian riviera. But in the
spheres of intellectual and social development, the mighty
impulse given by the French conquests could not disappear.
Their influence lives on to-day in the ideas, customs and laws
of Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Germany; and among the
most important, if less evident, results of Napoleon's triumphs
must be remembered the strong desire for effective national
unity aroused in the breasts of Germans and Italians, finally to
be consummated at Koniggratz and Sedan.
Compared with the momentous issues decided on the plains
of Saxony, the expulsion of the French from Spain was an
event of secondary importance. In fact, as soon as Napoleon
was menaced by the fourth great Coalition he virtually decided
to abandon Spain. Had that been done promptly, the presence
of 200,000 more tried troops in Saxony would have been fatal
to the allies; but Napoleon's desire to hold as much ground as
possible from the Douro to the Vistula was to lose him everything.
The importance of Wellington's Salamanca campaign in
showing the completely artificial character of Joseph Bonaparte's rule in Spain, has been already explained; and though
the English commander had finally to retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo,
it was only .before a concentration of French armies which lost
them the wealthy province of Andalusia, The numbers of the
French party, which up to the middle of 1812 had been slowly
increasing, were winnowed by failure and still more by the news
of the Russian expedition. At once Napoleon began to recall
the flower of his armies in Spain, to form a nucleus for the
young levies who were to maintain his cause in Germany; and

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Joseph found himself in May 1813 with rather less than
200,000 effectives, including the reserves at Bayonne. Of these
68,000 were needed by Suchet to hold down the warlike Northeast, while 20,000 under Clausel were chasing Mina's guerrillas
in Navarre and Aragon, with what success may be judged from
his final assertion that it would take 50,000 troops three
months to crush the Spaniards of the North. This single fact
will suffice to refute the sneers which many English writers,
including Napier, level at the partisan warfare. It not only
disconcerted French plans by the capture of despatches, but
compelled Joseph's troops to scatter in mobile columns, thus
leaving far fewer men to concentrate against Wellington.
The king, in fact, now found it impossible to hold Madrid, and
retreated towards Burgos, there collecting about 55,000 men at
the beginning of June. Wellington, after many difficulties with
the Cortes and the insubordination of the Spanish and Portuguese troops, assumed the offensive with about 90,000 men,
of whom rather more than half were British. Aided by the
guerrillas of the North and assured of supplies from the
Asturian ports, he began what has been well called the march
to Vittoria. Pushing French detachments beyond the Tormes
and the Douro, he kept extending his left wing so as to outflank
Joseph's army, thus winning many strong positions, including
the castle of Burgos. The French fell back on the upper
Ebro, where they were again outflanked by Wellington's superiority in numbers and tactics. The king had sent an urgent
order to Clausel to cease chasing Mina's guerrillas and come to
his help; but not more than 14,000 men were available, and
they were not to arrive until all was over. Rolled back by
Wellington's left, the French concentrated in good positions
west of Vittoria, their left and centre crowning hills in front of
which flowed the R. Zadora, while their right wing was far in
the rear on the other bank of that river, guarding the bridge
to the north of the town. Marshal Jourdan, the chief of the
F. R.
19

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king's staff, desired to retreat to stronger positions, but he was
overruled on the ground that Clausel was approaching Vittoria
and that it would disgrace 70,000 trained troops to abandon
Spain without fighting a battle.
The king and Jourdan showed a strange lack of energy.
They neglected to strengthen their front by breaking the bridges,
and Vittoria was so blocked by waggons as to hamper any backward movement, Their hope of Clausel's arrival was also disappointed by Wellington's vigorous attack with 83,000 British,
Portuguese and Spanish troops (June 21). General Hill, after
two hours' obstinate fighting, drove the French left from its
strong position on the heights of Puebla, while Wellington's
centre crossed the bridges and carried the hills in the teeth of
deadly volleys from infantry and artillery. " The terrible fire
from our battery (wrote Miot de Melito) could not arrest the
advance of the English, and we observed the intrepidity of
that advance with irresistible admiration." The French fell
back on a second range of heights, which they defended
with desperation; but their line of retreat was by this time
seriously menaced by Graham's persistent and finally successful
attacks on their right wing. Late in the afternoon his horse
cut off the retreat by the direct road to France, while other
squadrons threw into wild disorder the main body of French
in the crowded streets of Vittoria. Artillery-men cut the traces,
and the army fled in utter rout by the eastern road towards
Pampeluna, leaving behind 151 cannon, all the ammunition,
the baggage, and the treasure chests of the army, besides all
the property amassed by King Joseph, his generals, officers
and civilians during five years of warfare, plunder and extortion.
The completeness of the victory surprised even Wellington
himself. Clausel hastily retreated and finally regained France;
but Suchet, though pressed by Mina's guerrillas in the north
and an Anglo-Sicilian force in the south, long held out in
Catalonia; and the obstinate defence of the French garrisons

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at Pampeluna and San Sebastian retarded Wellington's progress. The rest of Spain was, however, irretrievably lost to
Napoleon at Vittoria.
On receiving at Dresden news of that disaster, the Emperor
at once ordered King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan to retire
to country-seats in France, where they were to live in seclusion.
H e also promptly selected Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, as the
leader best able to oppose Wellington; but the marshal's
ambitious wife strongly opposed his acceptance of a post
"where nothing is to be got but blows." Her protests to
Napoleon were cut short by the incisive statement that woman's
province was to obey her husband and a marshal's duty was
to obey his Emperor; and Soult, with his duchess, was hurried
off with orders to defend the Pyrenees inch by inch. Rallying
the French forces, he boldly assumed the offensive, in the
endeavour to succour Pampeluna and San Sebastian, and was
with difficulty beaten back from before the former fortress (July
27—30) and from the crags and defiles of the Pyrenees. Only
the astonishing hardihood of the British infantry, and the thirst
for vengeance of Wellington's Portuguese and Spaniards, could
so speedily have driven their foes from a succession of natural
ramparts, and finally from strong entrenchments on the precipitous bank of the Bidassoa. On his side, Soult showed how
quickly an able general can rally troops disorganised by
disaster, and amply justified the Emperor's recent choice.
Junot, Victor, Ney, Massena, Bessieres, Marmont, Clausel, and
Jourdan had come out of the ordeal of conflict with the great
British leader, with reputations dimmed if not completely
eclipsed. It was reserved for Soult to show that glory could
be gained even in a series of reverses, when these were
inflicted by Wellington and his Peninsular veterans.
The surrender of the French garrisons in San Sebastian and
Pampeluna, on the last day of August and October respectively,
removed the last obstacles to Wellington's invasion of France.
19—2

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When Napoleon was fighting his way back to the Rhine,
nothing remained to him in Spain except a few positions held
for a time by Suchet in Catalonia; and in the spring of 1814
the only results of his Spanish policy were the devastation of
the Peninsula, the loss of fully 200,000 of his best troops, and
a secure foothold gained by Wellington on the soil of France
itself.

C H A P T E R XL
T H E RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE.
"Thou might'st have built thy throne
Where it had stood e'en now: thou didst prefer
A frail and bloody pomp, which Time has swept
In fragments towards oblivion."—SHELLEY.

TALLEYRAND, with a perspicacity which was not blinded
by all the splendours of the Erfurt interview, had there confidentially remarked to the Czar, that all the conquests beyond
the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, were the work of Napoleon,
not of France, and that she must inevitably lose them in
course of time. The remark, which as regards Italy and
Germany, must have seemed in 1808 to be a prophecy of the
remote future, is interesting as showing that at least one
prominent Frenchman was not so fascinated by Napoleon's
genius as to lose the sense of historic perspective or overlook
the silent but resistless forces which tend to re-adjust the
equilibrium of States or peoples. The birth of some great
idea, the spread of a vivifying belief, the advent of some mighty
organizer or warrior, has temporarily bound together and
spurred on even scattered tribes to subdue the inert masses
of half the known world. But the very force of the impact
in course of time evokes energy, if only that of sheer despair.
The peoples subdued or menaced with subjection are thrown

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back on the firmest centres of resistance; their faith becomes
fiercely militant, and the military reaction calls forth a Tancred,
a Cceur de Lion, and the Cid.
Revolutionary France was raised to unparalleled power
by a singular concurrence of all the above-named factors of
national greatness. The growth of the democratic idea, and
fervent belief in Rousseau's gospel of social equality, endowed
her with latent energies soon to be called into unexampled
activity by her two great organizing powers—the Committee
of Public Safety and Bonaparte. It has been briefly shown
in this work, how the French armies, warring against effete
systems, retained their revolutionary ardour, even after that
had spent itself at Paris amidst the degrading strifes of factions.
What must have been the strength of the prime impulse and
the thoroughness of organization, if when Paris was weary of
interminable wars, Napoleon's eagles still could wing their
flight to Cadiz and Moscow? Those two names, however,
recall the fact that military triumphs which overleap the bounds
of racial solidarity, and war against the sympathies or material
interests of the conquered, cannot be long maintained against
the earthquake shocks of some impulse originating in the
popular consciousness or against the denuding influences of
time.
These two potent influences are ever at work in history as
in the physical world, the volcanic process tending to form a
great State along the lines of least resistance, whereupon it is
immediately subjected to the denuding effects of war and diplomacy, or of the constant strivings of the human race for the
fittest conditions of existence. The weathering-away process
is the more usual—witness the gradual dissolution of the
Angevin dominions in France, of the Holy Roman Empire,
and of the Turkish power in south-eastern Europe. The
formative process in the history of States (especially when it is
of the volcanic rather than of the sedimentary character) is

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naturally far more concentrated and interesting. The climax
of interest is of course reached whenever an internal popular
impulse is developed by some great genius to an abnormal
power or intensity. It is for this cause that the revolutionary
and Napoleonic era exhibits triumphs so astonishing, followed
by overwhelming disasters. It is essentially cataclysmic. The
democratic movement, which under a Carnot, Kleber, or
Moreau, might possibly have touched Vienna, Berlin and
Rome, was carried by Napoleon's determination to conquer
England upon the Continent, to the banks of the Guadiana and
the Moskwa. The rebound, the rising of the nations against
an Imperialism that had become intolerable, was proportionately the more violent. It swept away, not only his conquests
over the bitterly hostile peoples of Russia, Prussia and Spain,
but also his rule in Germany and Italy, lands which had at first
welcomed the principles of 1789.
The reaction of the peoples and their rulers against
Napoleon, intensified by their dread of leaving him in power,
was now threatening the limits of revolutionary France. Even
the tide of military events, from Valmy to Friedland and back
again from Baylen to Waterloo, bears witness to the truth of
the statement that the real boundaries of a nation are not
marked by its political limits but by the sphere of its intellectual and spiritual attraction. To the discerning eye, the
confines of France in 1789 were far wider than those of
Napoleon's Empire when it stretched to the Baltic and the
Adriatic. At the earlier date her ideas were permeating the
world. In 1812 the growth of the national principle was
already threatening to drive her back within her strictly
historical limits; and it is significant that the attitude of the
Prussian and German patriots was now distinctly more aggressive than that of their governments.
At the time when the allied sovereigns at Frankfurt were
offering Napoleon the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees as

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the boundaries of his Empire, Arndt issued his important pamphlet—"The Rhine a German river, not Germany's boundary"
—which had a marked influence on public opinion and even
on the diplomatists at Frankfurt and Chatillon. But the
rising tide of German nationality was beginning to alarm the
sovereigns. They were inclined to disregard a public opinion
which they regarded as revolutionary; and peace would
probably have been assured but for Napoleon's determination
not to accept it in the midst of defeat.
It is a wide-spread and very natural error to suppose that
Napoleon's fall was due to the snows of Russia and the rising of
Central Europe. Both notions are incorrect. The Emperor
boasted to Metternich that he had spared Frenchmen in the
Moscow campaign and made other peoples bear the brunt of
it. As a matter of fact, his losses of French troops there were
less than those caused by the constant drain of the Spanish
campaigns. The results of the war of 1813 were far mote
serious; but at most they only shattered his supremacy in
Germany and Italy, and reduced him to limits which Louis
XIV's arms had never been able to gain. The Moscow expedition had lost him only some of the results won at Friedland and Wagram; and the Leipzig campaign after all only
limited France to what she had virtually gained by 1795. The
great majority of Frenchmen now longed for a peace which
would assure to them the quiet possession of what the revolution and its armies had won. Fouche wrote to Napoleon
from Rome at the close of 1813, warning him of the magical
effect of the word independence throughout Italy, and begging
him to content himself with the "natural frontiers" of France.
A similar wish was ldudly expressed even in Napoleon's
Court.
By a strange coincidence the very same offer was now
distinctly sent by the allied sovereigns from Frankfurt, There
was a strong peace party among the allies. Indeed, but for

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the death of Kutusoff in the spring of 1813 it is doubtful
whether the Russian army would have advanced beyond the
Oder; and it is certain that the Czar was now satisfied with
freeing Europe as far as the Rhine. Frederick William, of a
disposition naturally hesitating and rendered more so by years
of calamity, had no wish to venture everything in a campaign
beyond the Rhine. The Emperor Francis, seeing Illyria,
Tyrol, and northern Italy virtually in his power, did not wish
to press his son-in-law further; and Lord Aberdeen, England's
representative at the allied head-quarters, declared—" England
is satisfied; for the power of France is now reduced within
legitimate bounds; and this is all that England ever desired."
The allies therefore drew up the famous offers of peace to
Napoleon (Nov. 9, 1813), leaving to his Empire the * natural
boundaries' of France, the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees:
the unconditional independence of Germany and Spain must
be acknowledged; Italy and Holland must be independent of
France, but their form of government and the Austrian boundary in Italy were to be determined by negotiation. England
was prepared to offer great sacrifices for peace on these terms
and to abandon most of her maritime claims. A congress was
to assemble at some town east of the Rhine, to adjust these
and other questions.,
Extraordinarily favourable though these terms were to a
sovereign who had recently lost two immense armies, Metternich rightly judged that Napoleon would refuse them, and the
sovereigns did not suspend the march towards the Rhine.
The French Emperor consented (Nov. 16) to negotiate, but
only on the general principle of the equilibrium of the Powers,
and gave no definite assent to their terms as a basis for
negotiations. On the contrary the Moniteur bristled with
warlike articles; and the instructions given to Caulaincourt,
his new Minister of Foreign Affairs, prove how wide an interpretation Napoleon gave to the phrase 'natural boundaries':

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the fetes de fiont east of the Rhine were to remain in French
hands, and also a considerable part of Holland: a federal
constitution for Germany was objected to, and Jerome was to
retain his kingdom of Westphalia or gain compensation in
Italy. Even before this virtual rejection of the allied terms,
Napoleon's ambiguous attitude had strengthened the war
party at Frankfurt; and when it heard of Wellington's successes in the south, the revolt of Holland against Napoleon's
rule, and the surrender of French garrisons in Germany, there
was little prospect of similar terms being again offered to
the once redoubtable foe.
It is difficult fully to fathom Napoleon's reasons for not
frankly and unreservedly accepting those conditions. It is
stated by the Baron de Vitrolles, who was soon to play so
important a part in the restoration of the Bourbons, that the
air of uncertainty and extreme moderation in the allied
governments amidst a triumph for which they were not prepared, and their offering terms instead of dictating them,
encouraged Napoleon to hope for the dissolution of the
coalition, or that one French victory would gain him much
better conditions. The Frankfurt terms were, however, not
much less favourable than those to which he had, when too
late, acceded at Prague just after the lapse of the armistice.
It is possible, indeed, that in his remorse at having acceded
to that suspension of arms, so fatal to his fortunes, he had now
steeled himself to the conviction that all signs of moderation,
whether in himself or his foes, were proofs of weakness. His
other illusion, that a new dynasty could not survive a confession of weakness which might be borne with impunity by an
old reigning family, had twice been disproved by the state of
public opinion in France. Malet's venture was made before
the news of the evacuation of Moscow had reached Paris.
After two fatal campaigns there was no attempt to dethrone
Napoleon; and most Frenchmen would have hailed with jo)

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the return to the natural frontiers as a pledge of a peaceful
policy.
But the voice of France now rarely reached the Emperor's
ears, and he remained in the illusion that she was entirely
devoted to his cause so long as he gave her glory and
victory. The campaign of 1814 was to show that he singularly
overlooked the real strength of his position—viz. that he was
the sole effective guardian of the material and social gains
effected by the Revolution. All the rest, the boasts of military
honour and glory, were now mere idle talk to all save a few
infatuated devotees and the veterans of his army. As for his
other assertion, that the allies wished to humiliate France and
that he must win a victory in order to conclude an honourable
peace, it was skilfully refuted by a declaration which the allies
drew up at Frankfurt (Dec. 1) and caused to be circulated
throughout France:—"The Powers confirm to the French
Empire an extent of territory such as France has never had
under her ancient kings; for a brave nation does not lose its
rank because it has in its turn sustained reverses in the course
of an obstinate struggle in which it has fought with its usual
bravery"; and the public offer to the French people of the
* natural boundaries' would, it was hoped, sever the cause of
France from the policy of Napoleon.
Another incident might surely have given him pause. The
Corps Legislatif, usually so obsequious, voted by a majority of
four to one (Dec. 29), an address urging him to declare that
he " would give to Europe and the world the assurance that he
continued the war only for the independence of the French
people and the inviolability of its territory"; and it prayed
him to "guarantee the rights of freedom, security of property,
and to the nation the free exercise of its political rights."
Napoleon's only reply was to order the prorogation of the
Assembly, the destruction of the address, and to launch a
tirade against the authors of the address as bad men " in the

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[CHAP.

pay of England." In fact, his whole attitude at the close of
1813 gives some colour to the charge that he was not altogether averse from war, as tending to stifle political agitation
in France and rally around him all who were interested in
maintaining the material gains of the Revolution.
H e made an effort to detach Spain from the allies by a
treaty with the captive Ferdinand V I I (Dec. 11, 1813), offering to restore to him his throne, on condition that all British
troops evacuated Spain. Ferdinand adroitly referred him to
the Spanish Cortes, which honourably refused to treat apart
from the English Government.
Consequently Wellington's
base of operations in Spain remained unshaken, and he was
able to advance towards Orthez. The sternness with which he
checked plundering by his troops, even by the insubordinate
Spaniards, made a good impression on the French peasantry;
and an official letter from Bayonne declared that the good
order which he maintained did Napoleon's cause more harm
than ten battles.
The decisive blows were, however, to be struck in the
valleys of the Marne and Seine. In spite of the opposition
of the Czar, therein influenced by his old tutor Laharpe and
another Swiss democrat, General Jomini, it was decided not to
observe the neutrality of Switzerland, which had been violated
by Napoleon for ten years past. The allied Grand Army, some
250,000 strong, therefore passed the Rhine at Basel, and,
proceeding to turn the strong defensive line of the Vosges,
finally debouched on the plateau of Langres and menaced
the lines of the rivers which there have their source. A
detached column also marched on Geneva and threatened
Lyons. On the first day of 1814, Blucher led his Silesian army
of about 90,000 men across the Rhine at three points between
Mannheim and Coblentz; while the allied army of the north,
under Bernadotte and von Bulow, began somewhat later to
threaten the Belgian Departments. With the allied forces under

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

301

Wellington and others in Italy and North Germany, the whole
forces opposed to Napoleon promised to exceed 600,000 men,
among whom were Rhenish Confederation troops which had
previously fought for him.
To oppose these masses the French had scarcely 250,000
men ready to take the field; but a Senatus-consultum ordered
the enrolment of 300,000 unmarried men, though the conscription had already been rigorously pressed. It was found
that the conscripts of this time, having been born during
the Reign of Terror, were distinctly below the average
strength; yet it was on these that France now mainly had to
rely. Napoleon, however, still had the advantage of the
central position, which Carnot had turned to such account in
1793: he also rightly counted on the presence of invaders
on the 'sacred soil' to still all divisions, while these would
increase among the allies as they advanced nearer to their goal.
The densest masses of invaders were also mainly Austrians and
Confederate troops of indifferent quality, and were handled by
Prince Schwarzenberg, who had little confidence in himself,
and was constantly hampered by the pacific leanings of the
Emperor Francis. The northern army was reorganizing in
Holland. For the present, therefore, only the Silesian army
was to be met, and its junction with the Grand Army on the
Aube prevented at all costs.
The first events were in favour of the allies. Blucher's
rapid and unexpected advance deprived the French of the two
strong lines of the Moselle and the Meuse, the fortresses on
which rivers he left detachments to observe or besiege. When
his columns reached Brienne without serious resistance (Jan.
26), and were not very far from Schwarzenberg's vanguard, the
campaign seemed, in a strategical sense, decided. H e was
soon undeceived. Napoleon, rallying the French forces which
had been falling back, drove a Prussian column from St
Dizier, and on Jan. 29 hurled back another part of the Silesian

302

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[CHAP.

army at Brienne, where as a youth he had first studied the art
of war; but, on receiving reinforcements from the Grand Army,
Marshal ' Forward/ with about 85,000 men, resumed the
offensive, and inflicted on Napoleon's 40,000 a decisive defeat
at La Rothiere, capturing 3,000 prisoners and 50 cannons
(Feb. 1).
The completeness of the success was in one sense a misfortune. Young officers invited each other to dinner in the
Palais Royal in a week's time. Bliicher himself, regarding the
victory as decisive, desired to march on Paris by way of
Chalons; while the Czar and the Emperor Francis, not desiring
too complete a triumph of the Prussian arms, began to withdraw the support of the Grand Army, and recommended a
leisurely march on Paris, chiefly by way of Troyes. A force of
12 Cossack regiments was to keep the two chief armies in
touch.
It was urged at the allied head-quarters that this
division of forces was necessary to secure provisions; but
General Muffling states in his memoirs that even then it
appeared a device for delaying operations so as not to cut off
Napoleon from the means of concluding peace in the Congress
at Chatillon, where negotiations had been opened; and that
the prospect of Bliicher's army gaining possession of Paris
evidently aroused the jealousy and fears of the two Emperors.
Indeed, when Bliicher had nearly traversed the plains of
Champagne, an order came from the Czar that his forces were
not to enter Paris before the arrival of the sovereigns; and at
the same time a corps Was withdrawn from his command.
Strange to say, the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia suspected
the Czar of desiring to place Bernadotte on the throne of France,
or, as being easier and more conformable to the spirit of the times,
of favouripg a return to a moderate republican government; and
they even entered into a secret treaty (Feb. 14) for garrisoning
Paiis equally, lest the Czar should perpetrate a republican coup
d'etat.

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

303

Owing to these dissensions, all touch was lost between the
Grand Army on the Seine and the forces of Bliicher and
Yorck in the Marne valley. The latter were, on Feb. 5,
between S£zanner and Chalons, and appeared to have interposed a wedge between Napoleon's army retreating from
Troyes, and Macdonald's forces near Epernay; but the Silesian
army, in its effort to cut off Macdonald's direct retreat on Paris
by the Marne valley, left its columns at intervals of more than
a day's march, and thus dangerously exposed to a flank attack
from the south. Napoleon, ever apprised by his marshal of the
enemy's movements, seized the opportunity. Marching by
miry cross-roads from Nogent northwards, he fell with about
30,000 troops on BKicher's severed corps and completely
defeated~them at Champaubert, Montmirair, Chateau-Thierry
and Vauchamps (Feb. 10—34), inflicting total losses of more
than 15,000 men and 50 cannons. These French victories in
the Marne valley had a far more important effect than that of
throwing back the shattered Silesian army on Chalons. They
raised the spirits of the young French conscripts and strengthened the wavering belief in the Emperor's invincibility. Not a
vivat had greeted him ten days before on his entry into Troyes.
The citizens would supply nothing except on compulsion. A
considerable number of the troops—6,000 it was said—deserted
there. Napoleon himself was for some hours deeply depressed.
He complained in his letters that his troops were nearly
starving, and authorised Caulaincourt provisionally to accept
the allied terms; while to his brother Joseph, who was aiding
the government at Paris, he sent orders (Feb. 9) to have everything removed from Compiegne and Fontainebleau which would
serve as a trophy for the enemy. Not only was the devotion
of his soldiers beginning to cool, but the wealthy and mercantile classes were almost to a man hostile. The Due de
Broglie states that the audience at one of the Paris theatres
hissed off the stage a play ordered by the Imperial police,

304

The .Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP.

which in one scene represented the Cossacks plundering and
burning a French village. Nevertheless, the alienation of
urban feeling only served to show more clearly what was the
central support of the imperial edifice. Except in the royalist
west and south, the peasants still looked on the Emperor as
the guarantee for their tenure of lands confiscated during the
revolution. In regard to the material interests of the peasantry,
he was still the crowned Jacobin guarding the agrarian conquests of 1789 against a return of the Bourbons and the emigres.
This feeling was strongest in the centre and east of
France, where feudalism had been most oppressive; and the
allied reinforcements on their march were now often harassed
by National Guards and popular risings. The spirit of his
troops had also been restored by the recent victories. The
terrible cry 'Vive TEmpereur' again menaced the invaders;
and the spirit of Valmy seemed to animate the young conscripts who daily came to fill the ranks. Still more important was the arrival of two divisions' of infantry and one of
cavalry, which he withdrew from Soult's army at the beginning
of February. He would have fallen again on Blucher's army
at Chalons, but for news that the allied Grand Army was now
threatening to overwhelm the divisions of Victor and Oudinot,
which he had left to guard the Seine valley; and the war,
strategically the most interesting of all Napoleon's campaigns,
except perhaps those of Italy and Waterloo, became more than
ever a struggle for the possession of the roads leading down
the Seine, Aube aud Marne towards Paris, on which the two
chief rivers converge.
The student will here observe the immense defensive
importance of a broad and deep river. It is in some respects
a better military defence than a mountain chain. The approach
of the enemy can be observed more readily. There are few
chains which are not penetrable by numerous defiles; and the
invaders, if defeated, can find refuge in them or on the slopes.

X'I.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

305

The passage of the Alps by Hannibal and Napoleon illustrates
the practicability even of a vast range of mountains to armies
led by great commanders; and the battle of Kulm in 1813
shows how a retreating foe may rally in a defile and restore
the fortunes of the war. On the other hand* the passage of
a river or marsh in front of undefeated enemies is one of the
most hazardous of military movements. Its successful performance by Marlborough at Blenheim, and by Wellington
above Oporto, ranks among the great achievements of modern
times; whereas neglect of due precautions in this operation
led to the disasters of Austerlitz, Friedland, and the Katzbach, beside vastly increasing the losses at the JBeresina and
Leipzig. Indeed, the whole course of NapoleonVdefeats may
in a military sense be summarised thus, that after losing
successively the lines of the Niemen, Vistula, Oder, Elbe,
Saale, Rhine, Moselle and Meuse, he was now using all the force
of his genius and indomitable will to hurl back the Silesian
and Grand Armies on the further banks of the Marne and
Seine.
In the former of these efforts he seemed to have almost
succeeded, when he was recalled by the news that part of the
Grand Army was advancing on Paris by the Seine valley.
Retracing his steps, the Emperor hurled his compact forces on
them and at the close of a sharp engagement at Montereau
drove them in much confusion across the river and seized
the bridge before it was cut by the enemy (Feb. 18). The
allies, taught by these severe lessons, saw the need of concentration; and,, as after Ligny and Quatre Bras, foiled
Napoleon's efforts at separating them, by a concentric retreat.
The Grand Army retired towards Troye.s to re-organise, while
Bliicher promised to support them near that town with an
army now strengthened by the arrival of reserves. But more
important than the accession of numbers was the undaunted
bearing of the veteran Field-Marshal,- whose spirit now, as in
F. R.

20

306

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

June 1815, only seemed to rise higher with defeat. All his
energy was now needed to re-invigorate his staff and the allied
sovereigns.-^" In what a position were we on Feb. 22 (wrote
General Muffling) as compared with the 2nd ! Now fugitives,
avoiding a battle with Bonaparte who had probably only half
our numbers."
Remembering the advantages gained by the armistice of
the previous summer, the allies now tried to gain time for
further reinforcements from Germany, by sending overtures
for an armistice to Napoleon, which he refused. A true view
of the situation should have convinced Napoleon that his
brilliant resistance had amply satisfied the honour of France
and retrieved the glory of his arms, that when the northern
allied army was beginning to appear on the arena, the psychological moment had arrived for accepting any terms not
absolutely humiliating. But, either from alarm at the discontent in Paris, or from an exaggerated estimate of his recent
successes1, or because the portentous triumphs of his earlier days
had ingrained in his masterful nature a confidence which
absolutely excluded the thought of ultimate failure, Napoleon
1
This alternative may be supported by a few extracts from his letters
to King Joseph at Paris. Feb. 11 (after Montmirail) " T h e army of Silesia
has ceased to exist I have completely routed it."—Feb. 15 (after
Vauchamps), " T h e peasants have picked up here on the battle-fields more
than 40,000. muskets."—Feb. 18 (just before Montereau), " T h e enemy is
now in a very different position from that which he occupied when he
made the Frankfort proposals: he must now feel almost certain that few
of his troops will recross the frontier."—-Feb. 19, "As soon as the allies
heard that I had forced the bridge of Montereau, they ran away as fast as
they could. Their whole army is terrified."
" I have ordered General
Maison to collect the garrisons in Flanders, to march towards Flanders
and resume operations.',—At the same date he expresses to Eugene the
hope of preserving Italy and making Murat change sides. At that time
von Biilow was at Mons in great force, and Eugene was barely holding
his own.

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

307

once more let slip, until it was too late, an opportunity for a
peace which the allies offered and for which France herself had
long been sighing.
As has been noticed, negotiations between Napoleon and
the allies had been resumed at Chatillon on Feb. 5 ; and at
that time of his despondency after la Rothiere he had given to
his envoy Caulaincourt, Due de Vicenza, almost carte blanche
provided he brought the negotiations to a happy end and
saved Paris from occupation. The apparently decisive results
of the first great battle far within the limits of ancient France,
the news of Murat's defection from the Emperor, the arrival
of the English Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh, with the
welcome news of the determination of his government to
persevere with the war in the South,—all these influences
concurred to raise the expectations of the allies \ and they
firmly declared that they would treat with France in the name
of Europe as forming a single entity. At the second sitting
of the Congress it was resolved to demand that France should
return to her pre-revolutionary frontiers with a few exceptions
determined by mutual convenience. T o this Caulaincourt
took exception, seeing that his government had stipulated for
the Frankfurt terms of Nov. 1813 as the basis for the present
negotiation; and he stated that though the Emperor was ready
to make the greatest sacrifices, he would demur to the limits of
the old monarchy.
We learn from Napoleon's secretary M. Fain, his indignation at these terms—"What can I answer to the republicans in the Senate when they demand from me their
Rhine boundary? God keep me from such disgrace. Tell
Caulaincourt that I reject such conditions. Rather will I
endure the worst evils of war." Nerved by desperation, he
flung himself on the Silesian and Grand Armies with the
surprising results previously described. At one time Macdonald's troops advanced so near Chatillon that the allied
2Q—2

308

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

envoys threatened to break up the Congress, and Caulaincourt
had to beg the French Marshal to retire. Nevertheless, the
allies refused to give way on the chief points at issue, while
Caulaincourt, pursuant to Napoleon's temporising policy,
avoided any definite rupture of the negotiations.
On Feb. 17 the allies presented to the French plenipotentiary the draft of a treaty nearly identical with that which
ultimately became the basis for the reconstruction of Europe;
and, when it was obvious that Napoleon would not accept
these terms, the allies formed by the Treaty of Chaumont
(March 1) a Quadruple Alliance which cemented, far more
intimately and definitely, the compacts framed at Teplitz in
the previous summer. Each of the four Powers now agreed
to keep 150,000 men on active service for the war against
Napoleon. England consented to furnish subsidies to her
three allies at the annual rate of ^5,000,000 to be equally
divided; and she was left free to substitute money, if the
number of her troops could not be made up to the required
total. The treaty was to hold good for twenty years. It
was also secretly agreed that Germany was to form a federal
State.
As for the negotiations at Chatillon, they were protracted
to March 20, without any result; and it was not until the
allies were marching victoriously on' Paris J h a t Napoleon
decided to accept their terms. As in 1813, he let the time
for negotiation pass by, and only gave his assent when it was
too late.
The recent defeats had only served to cement the union
between the allies and to defer their jealousies until victory
had fully crowned their arms. Two days previously fortune
had again deserted Napoleon's cause. At Bar-sur-Aube, the
Russian commander Wittgenstein had administered a severe
check to the French, while at the same time Wellington, after
passing the Gave at Orthez, drove his able adversary Soult

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Eitrope.

309

from strong positions north of the town. The French marshal's retreat eastwards uncovered Bordeaux, to which great
city Wellington was invited by a strong royalist party among
the citizens. Beresford was despatched thither with light
troops; and, supported by their presence, the Due d'Angouleme, eldest son of the Comte d'Artois, entered the city, and
there proclaimed Louis XVIII as king (March 12).
Events marched still more swiftly in the north. The corps
of von Biilow and Wintzingerode were threatening Paris on the
north-east; and as early as Feb. 25 Bliicher had formed the
daring and eventually successful plan of leaving Napoleon to
follow the Grand Army, while he himself marched towards the
capital, arranging with Wintzingerode for a junction at or near
Meaux on the Marne. Pushing the small corps of Marmont and
Mortier down the Marne, his vanguard sustained a check from
them near Meaux; and he soon gladly learnt from Tettenborn's
Cossacks that Napoleon, suddenly awakened from his dream
that the allies were retreating on the Rhine, was marching
noith in hot haste to prevent his junction with the northern
army. This would give time for the Grand Army to threaten
Paris from the Seine valley, while he and von Biilow menaced
it from the Soissons road. In a strategic sense, therefore,
Blucher's march resembles his famous flank march before
Leipzig, which had the effect of gradually bringing irresistible
forces to bear on the objective of the whole campaign—in this
case Paris. The prospects of the allies were improved by the
somewhat tame surrender of the fortress of Soissons by a
French general, and there Bliicher and von Biilow effected the
desired junction, forming an array of 110,000 Prussians and
Russians with 500 cannons (March 4). The assertion of Napoleon's panegyrists that the surrender of Soissons ruined his
campaign is a gross exaggeration. The junction of forces was
the decisive event, not the capture of a third-rate fortress.
Behind the old walls of Soissons there were but 20 cannons

310

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

and about 1000 troops; and many of these were disabled before
the commandant surrendered with the honours of war. Besides, if the place was of such extreme importance, why was it
left with a feeble garrison and deficient ammunition ? Had it
held out for some days longer, the issue of events could hardly
have been very different; for there were other points at which
a junction could have been effected. Blucher was about to
throw bridges across the Aisne when he heard of the surrender.
By threatening the allied flank and communications,
Napoleon transferred the contest to the plateau of Craonne,
where a desperate conflict ended in his favour. The allies fell
back on the strong defence afforded by the natural citadel of
Laon surrounded by wide plains; weakened by dissensions
more than by defeat, they there awaited the attack of half
their numbers. On the first day of battle at Laon (March 9)
the French maintained an equal contest even against these
odds; but at nightfall, the allies carried out with startling
success an attack on the wearied French and threw Marmont's
wing into utter rout. The temporary illness of Blucher and
fear of Napoleon kept the allies from pushing the pursuit.
Deep depression reigned in Napoleon's camp. H e had failed
to drive the allies back on Belgium; and the sole result of
these battles on the Aisne seemed to be the loss of about
15,000 men. Any other commander, on the news that
Schwarzenberg was marching down the Aube, would have
judged that enough had been done to save honour ; but Napoleon, in his determination not to yield to the allied terms,
preferred to struggle on against hopeless odds, and led his
weary troops by way of Soissons (which had been easily retaken), hoping to surprise Schwarzenberg's columns on the
march. Collecting the corps of Ney, who had surprised
Chalons, and of Macdonald, who was contesting the advance
of the Grand Army, Napoleon counted on at least checking

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

311

the timid Austrian commander. A hasty concentration of
Schwarzenberg's marching columns sufficed to avert defeat.
Napoleon, mistaking these movements for that retreat on
the Rhine which ever dominated his imagination, was ordering
a march eastwards on Vitry to hasten their retreat, when his
columns were menaced near Arcis, the birthplace of Danton.
While part of the French were pressing on to Vitry, others
were slowly and methodically attacked at Arcis by vast masses
of the allies who, if effectively handled, ought to have captured them (March 20, 21). As it was, the French suffered
heavy losses; and, as Napoleon's movements towards the
Marne had uncovered the road to Paris, the Czar and his Staff
officers formed the surprisingly daring resolve to march on
Paris, leaving behind a light corps as a screen to their
movements. Bliicher's approach southwards supported them
on their right, and in a rapid march the combined forces
overthrew Marmont's and Mortier's corps at la Fere Champenoise, capturing thousands of prisoners and all Napoleon's
reserve ammunition and stores. Meanwhile the French vanguard severed Schwarzenberg's communications on the upper
Marne and captured its baggage, pontoons, and even some
of the couriers and diplomatists at Chaumont. Thus the
campaign presented the unexampled scene of simultaneous
attempts upon the hostile rear, Napoleon hoping to relieve
his garrisons in the east, to excite a popular rising in that
quarter, and to intimidate the nervous Austrian commander;
while the latter was resolved to dictate terms of peace at Paris.
The French Emperor was committing the same blunder as
at Smolensk, Moscow and Leipzig, that of underrating the
energy and courage of his foes. Alone among his staff he did
not suspect the truth. Near Vitry on March 27, Macdonald
brought him a bulletin of the allies with the news of la Fere
Champenoise. Napoleon's disbelief in its news was strengthened by a curious misprint, March 29 for March 26; but when

312

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

later on Drouot and Macdonald pointed out from internal
evidence that the battle had been fought on the earlier day,
he proceeded to St Dizier to learn the truth, and so lost some
more precious hours, while the vanguard of the allies was
coming within sight of the spires of Paris.
,
At last it had come to this. The Parisians, who in 1792
had been in a frenzy of rage and terror at the capture of
Verdun, were now by this strange series of events suddenly
confronted with the forces of Europe thundering at their gates.
The capital was even more defenceless than when Brunswick's
manifesto had aroused the courage of desperation.
The
lassitude which always follows years of purposeless war, had
now produced a wide-spread desire for the acceptance of any
honourable terms. There was now no levee en masse, still less
any threat of massacring the royalists who listened eagerly for
the Prussian cannons. What was the inner cause of this striking
change in public opinion ? Mainly this; that Napoleon, who in
1799 had seemed about to consolidate and guarantee the
political liberties of France, had finally gagged and enchained
them; so that the chief desire of the urban population of
France was to shake off his yoke as a preliminary to some
other political experiment. And yet the Parisians revolted at
the thought of a foreign occupation, which their city had not
known since the days of Jeanne d'Arc. Some attempts at
barricades were made, but to save the honour of Paris, not
to maintain the rule of Napoleon. Few were nerved by
this last sentiment except possessors of confiscated lands,
the men implicated in the revolutionary excesses, officials,
soldiers, and all whose interests were bound up with the
Emperor's rule.
In the absence of the Empress-Regent, who had departed
for Blois, Joseph Bonaparte published a bombastic call to
arms, which was signally stultified by facts; for there were
hardly weapons sufficient for the 13,000 National Guards of

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Eiirope.

313

Paris ; but the presence of more than 25,000 troops of the
line under Marmont and Mortier, besides Invalides and
pupils of the military schools, promised a defence sufficiently
prolonged to ensure succour from Napoleon. Whether from
fear of his arrival or from desire of avoiding a further effusion
of blood, the allies issued a proclamation urging Paris to
follow the examples of Bordeaux and Lyons—the latter had
been surrendered by Augereau to the Austrians—and so
hasten the advent of peace. It was in vain. At dawn of
March 30, the allies began to march on the villages east
of Paris, while others guarded the Fontainebleau road by
which Napoleon was known to be hurrying to the rescue of
his capital. For hours the combat raged in and around the
village of Pantin; and when the arrival of the Silesian army on
the north brought the number of assailants up to fully .60,000,
the Czar sent overtures to Joseph Bonaparte for a suspension
of hostilities and the surrender of Paris. The Emperor's elder
brother was not cast in that heroic mould which would gladly
have defied the forces of combined Europe even amidst the
ruins of Paris. The prospect of a bombardment and of street^
fighting between 100,000 enraged combatants dismayed his
imagination; and though the relieving army was known to be
near Fontainebleau, he shortly after midday gave directions to
Marmont and Mortier that if they were unable to hold their
positions, they might enter into negotiations with the allied
commanders, and then retire on the Loire. At the,same time
Bliicher's troops began to assail the heights of Montmartre and
were .about to carry the summit when news of the armistice
arrived. Nevertheless, the fierce veteran at once ordered 84
cannons to be placed there to command Paris. Beaten back
on the east side after desperate fighting, Marmont about four
o'clock judged that the claims of honour were satisfied, and that
he might now sue for an armistice to save Paris the horrors
of a bombardment. The French troops were withdrawn into

314

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[CHAP.

Paris, which they were forthwith to evacuate. Joseph had
departed from Paris immediately after giving his message to
Marmont.
Meanwhile Napoleon, after awaking from his cherished
illusion that the allies were retreating on the Rhine, rushed with
his troops from Vitry to save the capital. Near Corbeil he
hears of its surrender, and breaks into bitter taunts against his
brother and generals. Still he is for a last desperate dash,
to arouse and arm Paris against her captors. The sight of
Mortier's vanguard in retreat recalls him to his senses; and he
spends the night in a hostel, some fifteen miles south _of Paris,
gazing at his maps and plans—only to hear in the morning that
the allied sovereigns are entering Paris. The imperious will,
till then unsubdued by disaster, breaks down for a while, only
to re-assert its force in conferences with his marshals at
Fontainebleau. Berthier, Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, Macdonald,
and others there insisted that the troops—even the Guard—were weary, famished, longing for peace, and determined not
to expose Paris to the fate of Moscow. Macdonald showed
him a letter from General Beurnonville, a member of the
Provisional Government just formed at Paris, declaring that the
allies would not treat with Napoleon and that France was to
have a constitution like that of England. This was decisive.
"Very well, gentlemen," said Napoleon, "since it must be so,
I will abdicate....Will you accept the King of Rome as
my successor and the Empress as Regent?"—They all assented.
He began to write his act of abdication. Even then the indomitable resolve flashed forth in a hasty last appeal— H Nonsense,
gentlemen, let us leave all this alone, and march tomorrow.
We shall beat them." The protest of Macdonald and the
silence of the rest spoke the feelings of generals and soldiers;
and Napoleon felt himself powerless.
Such was the strange end of this brilliant campaign, in
which the genius of one man had long held at bay three armies,

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each stronger than his own. And yet, such is the confused
turmoil of war in which the greatest commanders at times
grope but blindly, that the greatest master of the art of military
concentration finally left his capital exposed to an overwhelming
attack; and by an equally singular contretemps it was reserved
for his once vacillating eastern rival to propose and deal
the final stroke. By a singular Nemesis, too, the destinies of
France and Europe lay for a few critical hours in the hands of
Joseph Bonaparte, whose bourgeois qualities seemed designed
by nature as a necessary foil to the commanding gifts which she
had lavished on the second brother; and, as if to crown this
chapter of paradoxes, Napoleon's abdication was finally assured
by mingled advice and compulsion from the very marshals
whose fortunes he had created.
As we have seen, the allies had only recently contemplated
the deposition of Napoleon. After Leipzig they had offered
him the Rhine boundary: after La Rothiere they offered the
limits of 1790; and, even when fortune had again smiled on
their arms at Bar-sur-Aube, the Quadruple Alliance cemented
at Chaumont (March 1) ostensibly proposed to leave Napoleon
in possession of pre-revolutionary France. But even then
there was a secret though powerful impression among the
Prussian, Austrian and English diplomatists that so daring
a genius could not be left in lfmits which would cramp his
energies, and that a peace " founded on legitimism " would
alone be durable. Events were to justify the former belief as
signally as they falsified the latter.
This impression was deepened by the confident declaration (March 11) of the Baron de Vitrolles, spokesman
for the French royalists, to Metternich—"There will be no
peace with Buonaparte, and there will be no France without
the Bourbons." Metternich objected that the allies saw no
signs of attachment to the old dynasty, and that they would
act against the law of nations if they imposed it on France.

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Vitrolles maintained that when Napoleon's power was broken,
the free opinion of France would declare for the Bourbons.
The Czar, however, remained as before opposed to the
return of the Bourbons; and though he had now renounced
the idea-of Bernadotte's accession, yet he still (March 17)
was persuaded that a wisely organised Republic would be
the best for France. Vitrolles' skilful representations to the
allied sovereigns and diplomatists after the rupture of negotiations at Chatillon first prepared them for a declaration that
they would reject all further overtures from Napoleon. The
first public declaration of the allies that they would not treat
with Napoleon or any member of his family was after their
triumphant entry into Paris. They also promised to respect
the limits of ancient France such as it was under the legitimate
kings, as well as to recognise and guarantee the constitution
which the French people should adopt. The Senate was
consequently invited to designate a provisional government.
Up to the last exciting weeks, the very existence of the
Bourbons had been almost forgotten by young France. The
name Louis X V I I I had for years past conjured up visions of a
figure dimly flitting from one asylum to another in the far north,
and occasionally uttering academic protests against the usurpations of his all-powerful rival. The recent proclamation
of Louis XVIII at Bordeaux had first brought into prominence
the possibility of a Bourbon Restoration, which a f&w weeks
before would have seemed a theme of merely antiquarian
interest. Even now the cries at Paris were " Down with
Napoleon"—"No conscription"—"No consolidated duties";
but few were raised for the Bourbons. A small informal
meeting of nobles and wealthy men had, it is true, voted for
the restoration of Louis XVIII, but the proposal was viewed
with indifference or aversion by the mass of the people. Once
more, as in 1791, 1795 a n d I799? ^ w a s evident that the task
of construction would be infinitely more difficult than the

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ever inspiriting efforts for demolition; for the portly old
gentleman who had spent nearly a quarter of a century in
exile since the fateful night of Varennes, though surpassing his
unfortunate brother in ability, commanded little of the sympathy enjoyed by Louis XVI.
The entry into Paris of the Czar and the King of Prussia—•
Francis I was at Dijon—revealed the existence of a small
but vociferous party of royalists who distributed white cockades
to the few who cared to don the Bourbon colour. The
attitude of the many was that of resignation, curiosity, or, at
most, of joy at the tardy advent of peace. Warned that the
lilysee was mined, the Czar occupied Talleyrand's mansion;
and this skilful diplomatist now played a momentous part in
the affairs of France and of Europe.
Having convinced
himself that " under the Bourbons France would cease to be
gigantic, in order again to become great," he now persuaded
his illustrious guest that, to form a durable government, it must
be based on a principle. That principle was legitimism. Its
outward manifestation was Louis XVIII. The wily diplomatist
had touched the Czar's weak side in his appeal to a principle.
There was no more talk of a French Republic, still less of
Bernadotte, whose threats of leading his troops against the
allies if they restored the Bourbons at last unmasked his
designs in undertaking the war. Talleyrand forthwith convened the Conservative Senate, whose duty was to safeguard
the constitution which at every crisis it had violated. It was
now again true to its past. Though less than half its numbers
were present, it appointed a provisional government in place of
Napoleon, who was deposed from his throne and from the
exercise of all his powers (April 2).
In vain did Napoleon send Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt as his commissioners to urge that Marie Louise should be
allowed to act as Regent for the King of Rome. Even Austrian
diplomacy rejected a plan which a few days previously would

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have been welcomed by all the allies. Their determination
was strengthened by the defection of Marmont, whose generals
led the French vanguard within the allied lines (April 5).
Marmont's excuse for desertion was the need of rescuing
France from needless dangers; but she rejected the excuse
and branded his name with infamy. The allied positions
south of Paris were sufficiently strong to have defied the power
of Napoleon had all his troops advanced to renew a hopeless
fight; but even on April 6 he had endeavoured for the last
time to rouse his marshals to an onset. They stoutly refused.
The superhuman pertinacity of his will furnishes the best,
indeed the only, excuse for Marmont's defection, and for that
of Ney which speedily followed. At last, on final pressure
from his marshals, Napoleon put an end to the suspense of the
world by signing (April 11) the Act of Abdication for himself
and his son; and after a thrilling scene of farewell to his
" children "—the Old Guard—he departed for Elba, which the
Czar had suggested as a fit abode. Only the presence of a
Russian escort saved him from massacre at Orgon by a mob
of royalists, whose rancorous hearts were untouched by the
sight of fallen greatness. The story that he attempted to
poison himself before leaving Fontainebleau, probably arose
from his having taken a heavy dose of opium to secure much
needed repose. Had he intended suicide, he would surely
have committed it when surrounded by the rabble of the
Rhone valley. His indulgence to Marie Louise was requited
by her desertion of him; and he never saw her or his son
again.
The last act of the war was a bloody and not very decisive
engagement between Wellington and Soult at Toulouse (April
10). During his hasty retreat on Carcassonne, the French
marshal heard that peace was now secured; and the English
general finished on the upper Garonne the campaigns begun at
the mouth of the Mondego.

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Meanwhile at Paris the ardent royalists were urging the
return of Louis X V I I I without conditions; but Talleyrand
and the Senate were equally determined to have the following
guarantees for constitutional government—two Chambers, a
Ministry responsible to them, a Budget subject to the control
of the Chambers, liberty of the press and of public worship,
admissibility of all Frenchmen to all employments, &c. The
Comte d'Artois was persuaded by the Czar to acknowledge
these principles of a Revolution which his youthful follies
had done so much to provoke, and was declared lieutenantgeneral of the kingdom, until his elder brother, now called to
the throne, should have acceded to the Constitutional Charter.
In this capacity the Comte d'Artois signed (April 23)
Conventions with the allies which were ratified in the Treaty
of Paris (May 30, 1814). The allies now granted conditions of
peace slightly more favourable than those offered to Napoleon
in March. Instead of fixing the limits of France as in 1790,
those of 1792 were now conceded. This implied the retention
by France of the County of Avignon, as also of Salm, Montbeliard, and the district connecting Landau with Alsace. On
the other hand it severed from France all the gains of the
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars except Miihlhausen and
the districts around Philippeville, Saarbriicken, Anne*cy and
Chambery. If France lost heavily on land, she regained
most of her colonial possessions. Perfidious Albion yielded
up all the French colonies conquered by her, except Mauritius, the Seychelles, Tobago and St Lucia. The French
coast claims on Newfoundland were also recognised by us.
France regained Guadaloupe from Sweden and her part of
Guiana from the Portuguese, ceding however to the Spanish
Government the part of St Domingo which had belonged to
Spain before the Treaty of Basel. After twenty years of war,
which added about ^600,000,000 to the National Debt, some
discontent was very naturally felt in England at the magnitude

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[CHAP.

of the restitutions to our late foe; but Lord Castlereagh replied
to some strictures in Parliament on this subject that it was
desirable to give France an occupation for the time of peace:
" It is better (he said) for France to be commercial and
therefore pacific, than a warlike and conquering State."
This naive confession may be commended to the notice of
the class, still numerous, it is to be feared, on both sides of the
Channel, who can see nothing in English policy from 1793 to
1815, save perfidious and violent attempts to seize the trade of
the world and destroy the liberties of France. That the war of
1793 was to some extent a war of principles has been admitted:
that it was so after 1803 has been refuted; and it has been
abundantly shown that English maritime domination was as
distinctly an engine of war, as Napoleon's conquest of the
Continent was an attempt to humble the mistress of the seas.
French declamation against the greed and perfidy of England
is therefore no less irrelevant than the complacently insular
explanation that Napoleon's march to Moscow was solely due
to his overweening ambition. Both combatants played desperately for enormous stakes, and their methods are open to
severe censure. That Napoleon would have granted peace
and prosperity to Europe if he had conquered, is quite
probable. It is certain, however, that England's ultimate
triumph—due to the fact that she had the resources of the
tropics at her back, while Napoleon's policy finally outraged
the sentiments and wants of millions—was followed by the
restitution of most of her conquests and the abandonment of
her chief maritime claims.
It is interesting to observe that in the Anglo-French
additional articles to this Treaty, efforts were strenuously
made by Castlereagh to procure the abolition by France of the
trade in slaves; and also to gain a promise of a commercial
treaty between the two nations. Both questions were, however, adjourned.

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The surrender of nearly all the conquests made in the
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, seemed an unspeakable
ignominy to the generation of Frenchmen who had been
nurtured on the phrase 'natural boundaries'; and the cession
of $?> fortresses with some 12,000 cannons, involved by the
return to the limits of 1792, was felt by ardent royalists as a
terrible blow to the restored dynasty. The shrinkage of the
Napoleonic Empire into the kingdom of France severed
from her rule 15,306,000 Italian, German, Flemish and Dutch
subjects; but, except in Eastern Savoy, very few Frenchspeaking people were transferred to an alien rule. Indeed, the
France of Louis XVIII, as contrasted with that of Louis XVI,
gained districts with nearly half a million souls. Yet the vastness of the immediate loss very naturally obscured these
slight gains on the old historic limits. The allies imposed no
war indemnity on France; and most of the objects of art
taken from the various cities of Europe were left at Paris.
Among the few which were reclaimed in 1814 was the Victory
of the Brandenburg Gate at Berlin, which was received by the
Berliners with unbounded rejoicings. The debt still due from
Prussia to France since 1807 was of course cancelled.
Hard though these conditions seemed to the French, they
can scarcely be considered so, when the magnitude of the
allied efforts and the completeness of their triumph are duly
considered. Talleyrand, Louis XVIII's Minister of Foreign
Affairs, was severely blamed for signing such a treaty, and was
indeed accused of being bribed into it. His refutation is complete and crushing. H e shows in his Memoirs and Appendices
that two-thirds of the French army were prisoners, and half of
Napoleon's empire in the hands of foreign troops; further,
that the Emperor himself when he heard of the march of the
allies on Paris, despatched Caulaincourt to accept their conditions: finally, that now in the complete helplessness of
JFrance, better terms were finally gained by the restored
I
F.R.
21

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[CHAP.

dynasty than Napoleon could have obtained at the close of the
last campaign. These facts were not known to the multitude ;
but they absolve the allies from the charge of trampling remorselessly on France in her helplessness, and of imposing a
weak dynasty in order to plunder her of the natural boundaries.
The Rhine boundary was lost by Napoleon at and after la
Rothiere; and his own ruin was assured by the pertinacity
with which in August 1813 and March 1814 he held out
against the offers of the allies until after the definite rupture of
negotiations.
Sufficient has also been said to disprove the charge that
the allies forcibly imposed the Bourbons on France. On the
contrary, they viewed this alternative with suspicion, they were
virtually forced by Napoleon's obstinacy to depose him, and
then they left French opinion to decide on its form of government. The Restoration was brought about by the energy of
the French royalists, the skill of their spokesmen, Vitrolles
and Talleyrand, and by the vote of the Senate. Among those
who voted for the deposition of Napoleon were some men
prominent in the earlier part of the Revolution, Roger Ducos,
Gregoire, Kellermann, Lanjuinais, Serrurier, &c.; and these
men in deposing the Emperor must have known the truth of
Talleyrand's words to the Czar, " Either Bonaparte or Louis
XVIII, Sire : anything else is an intrigue."
Limits of space preclude any account of Louis XVIIFs
measures during the first restoration. His speech at the opening session of the Chambers showed what a gulf yawned between the ancient regime and the new order of things. The
phrases—"The Charter granted (octroyee) by us," " T h e nineteen years of our reign"—jarred on the ears of the young
generation; and the Charter itself, though granting most of
the points required by the Senate, limited the franchise to
citizens who paid 300 francs a year in direct taxation. Even
in the later days of the Empire, the pretence of universal

\

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suffrage had been kept u p ; and the present limitation of the
franchise to about 80,000 persons was felt as a direct contravention of one of the chief principles of the revolution. Some
features of the imperial regime were continued under Louis
XVIII. The king alone was to propose laws, though the
Chambers might supplicate him to do so. The Senate was to
consist of members nominated for life by the king; and its
debates were to be secret. The Charter also declared an
amnesty for all past acts except those of the most prominent
regicides; and it proclaimed in unmistakable terms the inviolability of all lands and property gainedr during the confiscations of the revolution. The apprehensions, however, of
the holders of confiscated lands were soon re-awakened by the
increasing arrogance of the old nobles and by the demands of
their journals that confiscated lands should now revert to their
ancient possessors. A project for indemnifying these men
was proposed by Macdonald to the Chamber of Peers; but
such a torrent of claims flowed in that the matter had to be
adjourned owing to the embarrassment of the finances, and
only the few national domains which remained unsold were
restored to their former landlords. With this slight exception,
the agrarian settlement was postponed, and was not solved
until the reign of Charles X.
Other questions, such as an attempted limitation of freedom of the Press, irritated public opinion. The slights inflicted on old soldiers, and the honours showered on all who
had intrigued for the royalist cause, disgusted all who during
the Empire had seen honours bestowed according to genius
and deserts. " T h e Court (wrote Marshal Macdonald) was
daily losing ground in public opinion. It seemed as though
the Ministry and their agents were vying with each other as to
which should give proof of the greatest folly, and the entourage
of the King, as to who should exhibit the greatest haughtiness
and conceit."
21—2

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[CHAP,

Equally precarious was the situation in Central Europe.
Throughout this work I have insisted on the divulsive effect
on the first three great coalitions of the jealousies and rivalries
of the Powers concerning Poland, Bavaria, and Hanover.
Each of these questions was worth an army to France. Only
the crushing weight of Napoleon's domination hushed the
quarrels about those States. Not till Prussia was entering on
the death-grapple with her foe in 1807 and 1813, did she
renounce those claims on George I l l ' s Electorate, which
would yield to her the line of the Weser and the fortress of
Hameln as the western bulwarks of her power. That question
had at last been set at rest by the treaty of Teplitz (Sept.
1813). The Leipzig campaign had also shown to the Austrian
Government the possibility of outflanking Eugene's positions
in Venetia, if it came to a close understanding with Bavaria.
Here again, then, it was antipathy to Napoleon and desire
for complete preponderance in distracted Italy, that led
the Hapsburg Emperor to renounce designs on Bavaria which
had for a generation past weakened the Germanic system;
and the Austro-Bavarian Treaty of Oct. 1813 cleared away the
chief elements of discord in South Germany. There still remained, however, the eternal Polish problem, and the closely
allied question of the future of Saxony, not to speak of the reconstruction of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
The re-construction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna
presented, indeed, the vastest political problems ever approached by statesmen and diplomatists. Imagine the soil of
a continent rent by subterranean convulsions and desolated
by floods, till the old land-marks had well-nigh disappeared,
and some conception may be formed of the political confusion
of Europe in the summer of 1814. It is not surprising that
the most meritorious attempts at reconciling the rights of
property with the public welfare should have failed to please
the old proprietors and also to meet the claims of the many.

xi.]

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325

Still less is it to be wondered at that the occasion yielded
a rich harvest to many an adroit pilferer.
Amidst the hurly-burly of war three important compacts
had been struck—those of Kalisch, Teplitz, and Chaumont.
Of their clauses only the following need be recapitulated here
as bearing on the negotiations at Vienna. At Kalisch Prussia
had been promised by the Czar an eastern frontier adapted to
connect the province of West Prussia with Silesia—a phrase
capable of very wide interpretation: for his losses in the east,
Frederick William was to receive compensation in North or
West Germany, so as to bring his realm to the position it held
before 1806. The Treaty of Kalisch therefore foreshadowed
that western extension of Russian and Prussian power which
was ultimately to place the middle course of the Vistula and
the Rhine in their keeping.
The Teplitz Treaties stipulated that after the dissolution of
the Rhenish Confederation, the German rulers of the lands
between Prussia and the Rhine should enjoy " full and unconditional independence." In vain did Hardenberg, Stein and the
Prussian patriots oppose this clause as being fatal to any effective
union of Germany. Stein submitted a plan for two great
German federations, Prussia heading the North and Austria
the South. Metternich, however, desired by friendly compacts
with the other German Governments to assure Austrian supremacy, and also to postpone any attempt at a popular federal
constitution for which the Prussian patriotic party was striving.
Instead of Joseph IPs revolutionary and aggressive policy,
Austria now aimed at heading a sort of Ftirstenbund or League
of Princes, which would keep " the revolution " in check and
quietly pave the way for Hapsburg predominance in German
affairs. Treaties with Bavaria and the other German States
(Oct.—Dec. 1813) assured the triumph of Metternich's policy.
At Chatillon and Chaumont (March 1814) it was resolved that
the States of Germany should be independent but united by a

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[CHAP.

federal bond. The Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814) also
stipulated that the part of Italy which did not fall to Austria
should be composed of sovereign States : that Holland under
the restored House of Orange should receive an accession of
territory, the lands between the new limits of France and the
Rhine being named as compensation for Holland, Prussia,
and the smaller German States. Genoa, which had been occupied by English troops, was to strengthen the reconstituted
kingdom of Sardinia; and the return of the Pope into possession of the Papal States was acknowledged by the Powers,
in spite of the annoyance of Austria, which had hoped to
gain those important territories. A secret understanding was
arrived at by the Powers forming the Quadruple Alliance, that
France was not to interfere in the pending territorial changes.
Beside these compacts of primary importance there are
others which also influenced the transactions at Vienna, and
must therefore be briefly noticed here. Both from Russia
and England the assurance had been given to the Court of
Stockholm that Norway should be the reward of Swedish help
in the struggle against Napoleon. When Denmark was overwhelmed by Bernadotte's forces in Holstein, she concluded
the Treaty of Kiel (Jan. 1814), by which England promised
her good offices to obtain for the Danish realm a fit indemnity for the loss of Norway. Sweden ceded to Denmark
Riigen and Swedish Pomerania; but by a complicated series
of exchanges they ultimately went to Prussia, Denmark taking
Lauenburg. Great Britain retained Heligoland as well as the
Danish fleet captured in 1807—thereby refusing to make
reparation for that high-handed action. It is true that after
the Danes had rejected the final offer of England to regard
the fleet as a pledge, it was taken as a prize of war; but its
restoration at the general peace was nevertheless morally
binding.
During a visit of the allied sovereigns to London it was

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decided (July 1814) that Belgium should form the addition to
Dutch territory foreshadowed in the Treaty of Paris. An
illusory attempt was made to safeguard the interests of the
Belgians in this artificial arrangement, which avowedly aimed
at building up a barrier state on the north-east of France. A
month later England agreed to restore to Holland the Dutch
colonies (all of which had been conquered) with the very
important exceptions of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara,
Essequibo and Berbice. England, however, agreed to pay a
sum not exceeding ^3,000,000 towards the fortification of the
frontier fortresses in the south of Belgium.
The Austro-Bavarian alliance was strengthened by a secret
Convention (June 1814) transferring nearly the whole of Tyrol,
Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and the Inn-viertel to the Hapsburg
dominions; while Austria ceded in return Wurzburg (held by
her Arch-Duke Ferdinand), and promised to secure for Bavaria
as much land as possible on the left bank of the Rhine.
The retention by Bavaria of Anspach and Baireuth—formerly
Prussian principalities—was also tacitly agreed on, as in the
preceding treaty of Oct. 1813.
Treaties between Spain and the Powers recognised the
restoration of Ferdinand VII as King of Spain and its
colonies. Some States also yielded to English solicitations
for the abolition of the traffic in slaves. " There is hardly a
village (wrote Castlereagh to Sir H. Wellesley in Spain) that
has not petitioned on this subject: both Houses of Parliament
are pledged to press it; and the Ministers must make it the
basis of their policy."
Such was the general condition of European affairs before
the commencement of the Congress of Vienna (Nov. 3, 1814).
The visit of Alexander and Frederick William to London
had revealed sharp differences between the Czar's opportunist
Liberalism and the desires of the English Government to
support legitimist claims. Moreover, ever since the violation

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[CHAP.

of Swiss neutrality, there had been a personal feud between
the Czar and Metternich, which was to develop into a life-long
struggle ending in the complete success of the diplomatist.
In 1814 the victory was in the main to Alexander. " I shall
keep what I hold :...I have given Saxony to Prussia: Austria
consents:" such were his menacing words to Talleyrand, the
plenipotentiary of France. Alexander's determination to keep
all, or nearly all, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was supported
by the pleadings of Laharpe and Czartoryski that he would
resuscitate the Kingdom of Poland. Prussia, in return for
sacrificing two-thirds of her former Polish lands, was determined
to have the whole of Saxony besides a great gain of territory in
western Germany. Austria and England were strongly opposed
to the extension of the Czar's power beyond the Vistula; while
France, Austria and Bavaria equally objected to the extermination of the .Kingdom of Saxony as fatal to the balance of
power in Germany. Austria, France, and Great Britain were,
therefore, naturally opposed to the Russo-Prussian claims.
Wellington himself, writing from Mons in August 1814, had
advocated an understanding between England and France as
safeguarding the interests and even the peace of Europe.
Castlereagh also favoured an understanding with our late foe
as a check to " improvident schemes and undue pretensions."
It is evident, then, that the desire for accord existed at
Downing Street; and that Talleyrand's claim in his letters
to Louis XVIII, of having formed that entente cordiale, is
exaggerated. Indeed, he was at first filled with the usual
French belief in the utter selfishness of British policy, as
contrasted with his own edifying advocacy ot "principles";
but the first few weeks at Vienna sufficed to reveal the
difference between Castlereagh's tone and that of the three
Continental Powers, especially Russia and Prussia. There
was thus once again a possibility of that Anglo-French alliance
which Voltaire and Adam Smith had advocated, for which

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Pitt and Fox, Mirabeau and the youthful Talleyrand, had
used their gifts of eloquence and statesmanship, only to see
their hopes vanish before the aggressive claims of the Jacobins
and the rampant militarism of the Napoleonic regime. After
more than twenty years of bitter hostility between the two
nations, the disciple of Mirabeau now again began to realise
the practicability of that alliance which his master probably
inculcated on his death-bed, and which he himself vainly
strove to effect in the autumn of 1792.
To so dextrous a diplomatist as Talleyrand it was not
difficult to- reveal the hollowness of the accord between the
four other great Powers. His skilful refutation of their claim
to be "allies" as against monarchical France, and his disavowal of all the compacts made before the Congress, speedily
lifted France from the depths to which Napoleon's obstinacy
had hurled her. Threats that France must be made to feel
some of the hardships which the Napoleonic arms had inflicted
on Prussia and other lands, were deftly parried by the legitimist
shield: France had returned to her lawful sovereigns and to
her historic limits:—"We Frenchmen must be good Europeans.
France ought to demand and does demand nothing, absolutely
nothing, beyond a just re-division (of Europe) among the
Powers, i.e. the balance of power." This last principle of
policy, which has long been regarded as the climax of artificiality and yet was so natural as a protest against the predominance of France, was defined to mean—"a combination
of the rights, the interests, and the relations of the Powers
among themselves, by which Europe seeks to ensure (1) that
the rights and possessions of a Power shall not be attacked by
one or several other Powers: (2) that one or several other
Powers shall never attain to domination over Europe: (3) that
the combination adopted shall render difficult or impossible
a rupture of the established order and of the tranquillity of
Europe." Talleyrand's adroit acceptance of the very claims

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[CHAP.

for which the Powers had since 1805 been persistently contending, completely enfiladed the allied position, the climax
of diplomatic comedy being reached when he blandly insisted,
in spite of the impotent protests of some of the plenipotentiaries,
that the Congress should be held according to the principles of
international law1.
The two burning questions at the Congress which nearly
involved Europe in a general conflagration, were those of
Poland and Saxony. The King of Saxony had since Tilsit
held the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which the Czar was now
determined to revive as a Kingdom of Poland, subject to some
cessions to Prussia. Even so the Court of Berlin dreaded such
an extension of the Czar's power, and regarded the possession
of the whole of Saxony as inadequate compensation for the
loss of the lands around Warsaw. England and Austria
for a time persuaded Prussia to protest against the Czar's
Poh'sh claims, but pressure which the Czar put on Frederick
William and through him on his plenipotentiary, Hardenberg,
renewed the Russo-Prussian accord (Nov. 6). Theoretically,
the most skilful way of countermining their claims would have
been for England and France to protest against the two last
partitions of Poland, which the former had never acknowledged,
and to have declared for the complete independence of Poland
as in 1791 ; but that was felt by Castlereagh and finally by
Talleyrand to be impracticable, and after admitting the principle of partition there was no valid argument against the
Czar's claim that in return for his immense services to the
1
Matters of general ^concern were settled in a Commission of the Great
Powers. German affairs were to be adjusted in a separate Commission
in which Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Hanover {not
Saxony) were represented. The reconstruction of Germany is treated veiy
briefly here, as it forms the subject of another volume of this series, "The
Foundation of the German Empire, 1815—1871." This volume will also
contain a map of Central Europe after 1815.

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

331

European cause he must have the lion's share of the Duchy of
"Warsaw.
In that case, Prussia insisted on obtaining Saxony, the
administration of which, hitherto in the hands of the Russians,
was now by the Czar's orders transferred to the Berlin
Government. This arrangement, acquiesced in conditionally
for a time by Austria and England, was strongly opposed
by France, Bavaria and the German Princes, who signed
a protest that " without a free and independent Saxony,
there is no stable federal Germany." Metternich and Castlereagh were also brought by Talleyrand to see the importance
of keeping Saxony with strength little impaired; and the
conclusion of peace between Great Britain and the United
States (Dec. 24, 1814) on the basis of the status quo ante bellum,
left the former free to take a firmer tone in European matters.
T h e dislike of our Prince Regent and all German princes
to Prussian predominance also helped to range England side
by side with France, Austria and the German States, who
cloaked their fears of Prussian aggrandisement under their
professions of horror at the spoliation of a king. The work of
the Congress, wrote Talleyrand to Castlereagh, was to close
the Revolution and restore the lawful sovereigns—a perfectly
unwarrantable assumption: all but one of the revolutionary
dynasties (he referred to that of Murat) had vanished: all but
one of the old reigning families, that of Saxony, had been
restored: it remained for the Congress to show its devotion
to principles by dethroning the usurper, and restoring the
much persecuted King of Saxony to his governing powers.
European Liberalism also protested against a plan which would
hand over the Saxons to an alien rule. On the other hand
there certainly was some feeling in Saxony in favour of union
with Prussia, as a step towards that unification of Germany
which had nerved the Germans to the efforts of 1813. " T h e
far-sighted and energetic spirits (wrote Varnhagen von Ense)

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[CHAP.

were all on the side of Prussia." The splendid efforts which
speedily raised her from an abyss of degradation to heights
never reached even by Frederick the Great, her new institutions,
and the seemingly sure prospect of Parliamentary Government,
aroused the eager hopes of all Germans who longed to sweep
away the barriers raised by feudality and particularism, and to
unite with the one German State which appeared able to
guarantee the safety and liberty of the Fatherland. Following
the general lead of Stein, this "unitarian sect," as it was
sneeringly called by Metternich, urged that the Saxons did not
form a nation, that their absorption by Prussia would powerfully aid the work of German unification, to which the middlesized States then, as ever, formed the chief obstacle, and that
the Saxon King's opposition to the national cause, and his
faithlessness to Austria in 1813, justified his complete deposition. A suggestion that the king should receive as compensation some German lands west of the Rhine, was objected
to as certain to create a satellite of France on Germany's weak
side.
Thus raged the diplomatic contests, aggravated by the
haughty tone of the Czar, which so annoyed Castlereagh as to
evoke from him the declaration that England would not accept
laws from anybody. The Powers began to arm as if for war;
and Talleyrand attained a brilliant diplomatic triumph by the
formation of a secret compact between England, France and
Austria, to which Bavaria, Hanover and the Netherlands soon
acceded, for resistance to the Russo-Prussian demands.
Whether French soldiers would have fought side by side with
English and Austrians, or the British Parliament would have
sanctioned a war for this purpose, is at least problematical;
but the compact enabled Talleyrand to boast to Louis X V I I I
that the coalition against France was dissolved for ever, and
that she now had alliances which she could hardly have hoped
to gain in fifty years. Further, he was at once admitted to

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The Reconstruction

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all the conferences of the Great Poweis. Satisfied with his
success, and unwilling to push his sovereign into an unpopular
war, Talleyrand now abated his claims, as did all parties in
the dispute. Alarming news of Bonapartist intrigues in France
and Italy helped on the solution of the Polish and Saxon
difficulties. Metternich showed the danger of dethroning the
Saxon King and giving him lands on the confines of France,
and now offered that Prussia should take rather more of Saxony
than had lately been conceded. The Czar consented to leave
the fortress of Thorn to Prussia; and to calm the fears of
Austrian militaiy authorities, the important city of Cracow
with its district was to remain a free Republic. The Liberal
principles of the Czar were emphasized in a clause that all
parts of Poland as it was before the partitions should enjoy
" a representation and institutions which should ensure the
preservation of their nationality."
As regards the Saxon question, Castlereagh finally persuaded Austria and France to concede not only the fortress of
Wittenberg but that of Torgau to Prussia, thereby safeguarding
the southern approaches to Berlin. She was also to acquire
the more thinly peopled half of Saxony, with 850,000 inhabitants, on the north, east and west, reducing that kingdom to its
present extent.
On the side of Poland, Prussia regained from her spoils
of the second and third partitions only Danzig, Thorn
and the province of Posen; but by her great gains in the
west (noted below') she became the chief purely Germanic
power, and stood forth as the natural protectress of the
1
Her former lands west of the Elbe, the Alt-Mark, with Magdeburg,
Halle, Erfurt, Eichsfeld, Paderborn, Minden, Mlinster, and Cleves, returned to her sway, beside other lands which helped to build up the
present Westphalian and Rhenish provinces. On the other hand she
sacrificed Anspach and Baireuth to Bavaiia, and Hildesheim and East
Frisia to Hanover—now made n kingdom.

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[CHAP.

weaker German States not only against Russia but also against
France.
Strange to say, she viewed with apprehension the
acquisition of the Roman-Catholic Rhenish Province, so long
subject to France, as entailing great difficulties and expenses for defence. On their side, the French diplomatists
regarded it as a triumph to maintain the independence of
the richer half of Protestant Saxony, and to yield to Prussia the
population of the Rhine lands, which she would assimilate with
great difficulty. Both sides then failed to discern that the
guardian of the Rhine would naturally become the champion
of Germany against France. It is difficult, indeed, to see how
German unity could have been accomplished, had the allies
acceded to Hardenberg's plan of acquiring all Saxony and
indemnifying its king with lands west of the Rhine, and Bonn
as his capital. The due Pasquier at that time saw the advantages of having a firm foe to Prussia established in that
commanding position; but the French diplomatists in their
excessive zeal for the legitimist cause, preferred to maintain
the Saxon Government in Dresden and Leipzig in order to
trim the balance in German affairs. Events were to show that
in this respect Talleyrand, Metternich and Ca'stlereagh were
Prussia's best friends; for the efforts to defend her long and
straggling frontiers braced her to the contest which ended
in the annexation of the intervening German States, and the
consolidation of that unity for which Germany was not fully
prepared in 1815.
A question discussed at great length in the Congress was
the compensation to Bavaria for her cessions to Austria and
for her efforts in the allied cause. Mainz, the key of Germany
on the west, was coveted by her; and Austria, according to
treaty promise, endeavoured to procure that stronghold for her
satellite; but it was felt to be too important a fortress for a
growing State like Bavaria to hold, and with its adjoining land
was assigned to Hesse-Darmstadt, subject to its being garri-

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

335

soned by Prusso-Austrian troops as a federal fortress. The
claims of Bavaria to the lands about Hanau, Frankfurt, Fulda
and Mannheim were set aside, as tending to sunder southern
from northern Germany; and she was finally limited to gains
which formed approximately her present territories. As these
were neither conterminous nor so extensive as she had hoped
for, the seeds of dissension were thereby sown between her and
Austria. Hesse-Cassel and Oldenburg were revived in nearly
their old extent; as also were the Free-Cities of Hamburg,
Liibeck, Bremen and Frankfurt, now the only survivors of the
51 which existed in 1789. The 12 Imperial villages had of
course been entirely absorbed. The shocks of revolution had
completely shattered the rights of the petty ' immediate'
princes, and had also blotted out from the map of Germany
the 73 ecclesiastical States or domains which had governing
powers. The concentrating tendencies of this era may be
summed up in the statement that of about -300 sovereign
States existing in Germany at the death of Frederick the Great,
only 39 remained at the fall of Napoleon to build up the new
Germanic Confederation.
While these and other territorial changes were approaching
a settlement, staitling news arrived which promptly hushed all
minor differences. The last faint possibilities of war between
the Powers vanished when it was known that Napoleon had
eluded the vigilance of French and English cruisers off Elba
and was sailing northwards. Talleyrand at once remarked
that he would land in Italy, then in a ferment of agitation;
but Metternich shrewdly conjectured that Paris was his aim.
Three landings of Napoleon Bonaparte on the Provengal
coast will serve to remind posterity of the vicissitudes in his
extraordinary career. In the spring of 1793, after the expulsion of his family from Corsica, he lands in France to
carve his way by his sword, either in the service of the Sultan,
of the English East India Company, or of the regicide re-

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[CHAP.

public. The autumn of 1799 sees him disembark at Frejus,
after almost miraculously escaping Nelson's cruisers, to be
enthusiastically greeted as the conqueror of the East and the
only possible saviour of France. And now on March 1, 1815
he lands near Cannes with about a thousand men to rouse
France against the Bourbons and emigrant nobles.
The people of Provence were deaf to his appeals, but the
potency of his fascination over the army was at once evident.
Many of the soldiers in garrison at Antibes climbed down the
ramparts to join their Emperor. His activity and skill were
phenomenal. H e baffled the designs of the authorities for his
capture by a speedy detour through the difficult mountainroad to Grenoble, thus avoiding the lower Rhone valley, the
ardent royalism of which he had reason to remember. Proclamations scattered among the people aimed at reviving the
old illusions, that he was in 1814 conqueror at all points and
only the treachery of Augereau at Lyons and Marmont at
Paris thwarted the complete success of his movement for
cutting the communications of the allies. "Soldiers ! we have
not been beaten. Two men, who rose from our ranks, betrayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor."
— " Your general, called to the throne by the choice of the
people, and raised on your shields, has come back to you:
come and join him.—The eagle with the national colours will
fly from steeple to steeple right to the towers of Notre Dame."
To the citizens he protested the right of each country to
have the ruler that it chose, and to reject a rule forced on it
by foreigners. The splendour of his personality hid from the
general eye the unreality of these claims, and France threw
herself at his feet as readily as in 1799. The garrison of
Grenoble, when ordered to capture the Emperor in the interests of France and of peace, marched to fulfil its duty.
Muskets were raised to fire, when Napoleon, opening the wellknown grey over-coat, exclaimed " Let him among you who

XT.]

The Reconstruction of Europe,

337

wishes to kill me, fire." What else cSuld the generous French
soldiers do than cheer for the Emperor and mount the
tricolour cockades long carried in their knapsacks! This
dramatic -scene decided the whole course of events. Napoleon's Guards afterwards assured Macdonald that, had they
been fired upon by the Grenoble garrison, they would have
laid down their arms and retired home, since most of them had
come with him to France only to escape from the weary exile
at Elba. As it was, the gates of Grenoble were now pulled
down by the excited citizens and Napoleon entered in triumph.
At Lyons Macdonald's ardent appeals to the royal troops to
join in a cheer for the king were answered by stony silence.
Officers and soldiers alike were disgusted with the shower of
honours to emigrant nobles and chouans, and the neglect of
services rendered on many a famous battle-field. The Comte
d'Artois hurriedly left Lyons escorted by a single trooper, and
Macdonald with one general barely escaped from the town
which in 1793 had fought desperately for the royalist cause.
Events now rapidly trended in the direction of burlesque.
Ney had declared that he would bring back Napoleon in an
iron cage. He promptly took all his troops, the chief remaining support of the Bourbon throne, over to the Emperor.
At Paris nothing was heard but loud protestations of loyalty to
the king, while measures were secretly taken to ensure favours
from the usurper on his arrival. At a royal session of the
Senate, the Comte d'Artois and his sons threw themselves into
the king's arms, swearing fidelity to the Charter which they
detested Louis XVIII declared that he would die on his
throne in defence of his people: four days later he hurriedly
left Paris for Lille and Ghent. Finally, on the night of March
20 Napoleon, escorted by a vast torchlight procession, entered
the Tuileries amidst a delirium of excitement.
The glamour of this transformation-scene failed to impose
on the minds of the thinking few. They besought the soldiers
F. R.

22

33^

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP.

and people not to plunge Europe again into a war which was
inevitable with Napoleon on the throne. The chiefs of the
constitutional party, Laine, Lafayette and others, pointed out
the securities for liberty and peace which Louis XVIII's
Charter and general policy assured. It was in vain. Napoleon
or his partisans skilfully proclaimed that he intended to follow
a-pacific policy, that he had a friendly understanding with
Austria, that he came to restore liberty and prevent the return
of the old feudal dues. What did soldiers and peasants care
for the tame constitutional rule of the Bourbons, and Talleyrand's diplomatic triumphs at Vienna ? They saw only the
insolence of the emigrant nobles and their avowed intention of
recovering their old lands.
In some respects, then, 'this startling revolution resembled
that of 1789. Fear of a return to the old abuses, at any rate
when the Comte d'Artois should mount the throne, was the
most potent motive with civilians. But, though in part a
social and agrarian revolution, it yet bore a closer resemblance
to that of Fructidor than to the essentially popular movements
of 1789. After all it was in the main the work of the army.
The return of a quarter of a million of soldiers imprisoned in
England, Spain, Russia, and Germany would at any time
have been a formidable danger to a new government. To the
Bourbons it was fatal. Still, it is only fair to say that with
such materials the work of building up a firm government was
almost impossible. The example of Imperial Rome exhibits
the difficulties of staying the course of revolutions begun by
the Praetorians, save by the advent of some general with
commanding powers or by the destruction of the disturbing
elements. Unfortunately for France, the return of the great
general involved war with Europe.
Napoleon's sincerity in his professions of a pacific policy
has been hotly discussed. In a striking address he spoke of
having heard at Elba, as in a tomb, the voice of posterity:

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

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he protested that he now desired peace, that although he
would never have signed the peace of Paris, yet he would
faithfully observe it: that the repose of a constitutional king
would accord with his declining years, and that his sole desire
was to save the Revolution. The value of these declarations
was unfortunately lessened by his previous conduct. When
menaced by the forces of united Europe in the heart of France,
when scarcely 100,000 wearied troops followed his eagles, he
had persisted in his refusal to accept the historic limits of
France, until the time for negotiations had passed. Even before their rupture he wrote to his brother Joseph (Feb. 18,
1814) "If I had signed peace on the terms of the ancient
limits, I should have rushed to arms in two years, and I should
have told the nation that I had signed not a peace but a
capitulation." When he penned those words three-fourths of
his veterans were in the power of the allies. Is it conceivable
that now, when he had the prospect of speedily forming a
great army, he would have renounced for ever the hope of
regaining those natural frontiers, the loss of which the French
regarded as a national disgrace? Was it possible for the
guardian of the revolution to abandon the conquests of Jourdan
and Kle'ber? The question, if regarded in a broad spirit, i.e.
in regard to the dominant sentiment in France and Germany,
reveals an inherent antagonism respecting the ownership of
the Rhine Province. That the French army would of its own
initiative have attempted to regain the natural frontiers, is
highly probable; for it never regarded itself as beaten in fair
fight even in 1812—1814. That peace could not have lasted
long must be conceded even by those who believe in Napoleon's
pacific professions. The advent of the great warrior precipitated a perhaps inevitable struggle, rendering it short, dramatic
and decisive; for if on the one hand Napoleon's return restored
to France the greatest captain of modern times, the fear of
his prowess at once banded the rest of Europe against her.
22—2

340

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

[CHAP.

Talleyrand's skilful work of dissolving the coalition against
France was swept away in a moment; and the Powers at
Vienna declared (March 13) that in violating the Convention
which established him at Elba, Napoleon placed himself outside the pale of civil and social relations, and was an enemy
and disturber of the repose of the world. This stern denunciation would, it was hoped, stay his progress to Paris.
It had no such effect, except on the few Frenchmen whose
heads were not turned by the excitement of that stirring
march. Napoleon on his side cherished the illusion that the
Powers were on the point of fighting about Saxony; and he
strove to sow further dissensions by sending to the Czar a
copy of Talleyrand's secret compact against Russia and Prussia.
Alexander contented himself with embarrassing Metternich by
showing him the full copy, and then burnt it with the words
" Let us forget all that: the question now is to overthrow our
common enemy." A treaty of alliance was signed among the
Powers (March 25), each agreeing to send 150,000 men to
secure his deposition and effectual banishment. On the ratification of this treaty a declaration was added by Great Britain, with
the warm approval of the Czar, stating that she did not bind
herself to procure the restoration of the Bourbons. In spite of
this reservation the British Government was subjected to sharp
censure in Parliament for binding the country by treaty without consent of the nation. In regard to constitutional right,
the censure was just; but the further declaration of belief by
the Opposition in Napoleon's professions of peace betrayed a
singular credulity. The Ministerial contention that to let
him consolidate his power would only aggravate an inevitable
struggle, was consonant with all past experience.
The other Powers acceded to the British declaration concerning the Bourbons; and all the European States, including
Switzerland and Denmark, joined the league against Napoleon.
Under a show of paternal compulsion Marie Louise with' her

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

341

son remained at Vienna, beguiled by the prospect of the
Duchy of Parma for herself. Eugene also continued his
residence at Vienna, but without any hopes of retrieving a
brilliant past.
Napoleon's efforts to reconcile the constitutional and old
Jacobin parties to his rule met with little success. The
royalist resistance in the west and south was repressed without
much difficulty; and an Additional Act, which promised
to crown the Imperial edifice with the long delayed pinnacle
of political and civic liberty, gained some approval. A compromisex was necessary, though it accorded ill with his own
ideas of sovereignty. Shrewd observers like Caulaincourt
remarked that even so he did not give the liberty which
France expected, that his habits of demanding entire obedience
frequently carried him away, and that in fine " he was not in
his own saddle." These were the opinions of his Foreign
Minister, an outspoken but trusty friend. For the rest, he made
Davoust Minister of War, Carnot Minister of the Interior, and
for Police he had to put up with that time-serving intriguer,
Fouche, who in his new capacity carefully sounded the ground
at Vienna in his own interests, and further remarked to
Pasquier that when once Napoleon had departed for the war,
the constitutionalists would be masters at Paris! Suspecting
that the ground beneath him was mined, Napoleon desired an
imposing display of devotion to his cause, so as to " nationalise
the war," as Talleyrand phrased it.
The Additional: Act, drawn up by Benjamin Constant the
leading constitutionalist and friend of Mdme. de Stael, but
amended in some points by Napoleon, granted a freer representation to France than that accorded by Louis XVIIFs
Charter. Nominees appointed for life and with hereditary
functions were to form the Chamber of Peers. The Chamber
of Deputies was to consist of deputies elected directly by
electoral colleges, themselves chosen by adult Frenchmen:

342

The Revolutionary

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[CHAP.

it could be dissolved by Napoleon provided that another was
convened in six months. Liberty of the press was fully
accorded; but the proposal to prohibit confiscation was
thwarted by Napoleon himself. The Additional Act failed
to satisfy the zeal for liberty which had lately burst forth
with redoubled energy after the long restraints of imperial
despotism. In a plebiscite it was accepted by 1,300,000 votes,
but the vast majority did not go to the urn—a striking contrast
to the enthusiasm of 1799 and 1804. Now, the Emperor's
promises of liberty were no more believed by the constitutionalists and old Jacobins, than were his pacific professions by
the rest of Europe,—a terrible Nemesis which blighted what
was at least an interesting experiment.
Once more, in this phase of the Revolution, the attempts
at reconstruction revealed differences and discords, which
lay hid amidst the dramatic scenes of destruction. A Champ
de Mai, an imposing scene which aimed at recalling the
Federation Festivals of 1790—1792, excited the enthusiasm of
the soldiery as the eagles were entrusted to their keeping; but
it aroused the discontent of all friends of liberty at a renewal
of imperial pageantry. So wide-spread were the murmurs that
Fouche', his Minister of Police, ventured to privately advise the
Emperor to proclaim his son Napoleon II and retire to America.
The new Chamber of Deputies now took an almost menacing
tone. The Girondin Lanjuinais was chosen its president, and
his words with those of Lafayette soon warned Napoleon
of the determination to have done with the old imperial
regime. The very name ' Additional Act to the Constitutions
of the Empire' was interpreted by friends of liberty as a sign
that Napoleon's views on government had not changed. The
Vendeans were still in arms in the west; and disquietude gained
ground at the Tuileries as it appeared that France was torn
by dissensions, while the forces of united Europe were marching
against her. A furious proclamation by the Prussians suggested

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

343

a further comparison with the events of 1792. But how
different the position of the European peoples now ! Years of
disaster had brought temporary accord between governments as
between rulers and subjects; and the national hatreds against
Napoleon now rendered a military promenade, like that of
Custine to Frankfurt, an utter impossibility. Amidst general
forebodings in France, the Emperor alone remained unshaken,
ever buoyed up by his indomitable will, and displaying a
confidence which might be called sublime but that it again
entailed a useless effusion of blood. After further troubles with
the deputies he departed for the Belgian frontier, trusting
by sheer force of military genius to hurl back his foes, and as
at Marengo and Austerlitz to bring .the monarchs of Europe
and the republicans of France alike submissive to his feet.
Napoleon's three last campaigns exhibit a fierce concentration of effort. That of Russia dragged its weary length through
half a year. The freedom of Germany was decided in four
months' fighting. The overthrow of the French Empire was
assured in half that time; and the attempt at its reconstruction
was baffled in the most exciting trilogy of war which the world
has ever witnessed.. No three days of human history have
called forth so perennial a flood of discussion and dispute
as those which hurled the Emperor from his throne; but
into the controversies which still rage around many of their
incidents, it is both undesirable and impossible to enter at
length.
On June 15 the allied generals were only beginning to
concentrate their troops; and as these were dispersed over
nearly all the space between Mons, Namur and Brussels, they
were quite unprepared to render mutual support. Blucher's
unrelenting energy brought together most of his men between
Ligny and Charleroi, while Wellington's scattered forces were
uniting more slowly. This remissness of the British commander has exposed him to just and merited censure. A

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[CHAP.

speedier concentration of the allied forces would have gained
them the defensive line of the Sambre with its bridges at and
near Charleroi. Napoleon had rightly judged that Bliicher,
with his dashing "hussar spirit," would concentrate his men
more speedily than the cooler and more methodical Wellington;
and in his Memoirs he claims it as his intention to strike first
at the Prussians and then at the Anglo-Dutch forces, thus
forcing them on " divergent lines of retreat." The two allied
armies were exposed to the same strategic movement which in
1796 lurried back the Austrian and Sardinian armies from the
Apennines on Milan and Turin respectively. Here, in his last
campaign as in his first, Napoleon hoped to defeat his foes in
succession and drive them back on their ultimate bases of
operation, in this case Wesel and Antwerp respectively. But
years of disaster had taught the allies the absolute need of
close and effective support; and, as in 1813—1814, Napoleon's
blows only served to weld their cause into a firmer unity.
If the allies are open to criticism for their slackness in face
of a foe who had often decided a campaign at the first blow,
yet on the other hand some of Napoleon's arrangements have
been censured quite as sharply. It is true that he lacked the
support of many of his ablest Marshals. Massena and Moncey
were effete; Berthier was detained in Germany, where he met
a violent death; Macdonald, Marmont, Oudinot, St Cyr and
Victor remained true to the royalist cause; Augereau's services
were rejected as those of a traitor; Morder fell ill; Clausel
was holding down the royalist South; Suchet was awaiting the
advance of the Austrians and Russians on the east, and Brune
was skirmishing with the Austro-Sardinian forces in the Maritime Alps. But the Emperor made the singular mistake of
condemning two of the ablest of his Marshals, Davoust and
Soult, to positions which afforded no fit scope for their ability,
energy, and tenacious courage. To the former, in spite of his
remonstrances, was confided the command of Paris; while Soult

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Ettrope.

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had to replace Berthier in the merely executive duties of Chief
of the Staff. Moreover, only at the last moment did Napoleon
entrust Ney with any command, as if to mark his distrust of
him, after that Marshal's early defection to the royalists; and
it was not until the first shots had been exchanged at Charleroi,
that Grouchy, essentially a cavalry general, was placed in command of the right wing of the army, in spite of Soult's protests.
To this strange redistribution of duties must be mainly
attributed the extraordinary blunders which brought the campaign to so speedy a conclusion. With 124,000 highly trained
troops and 340 guns swiftly approaching two armies still partly
in their cantonments, Napoleon might itave hoped for another
Ulm. Certain it is that his own energy was at this time but
slightly impaired by the internal disease which had troubled
him once before, in 1812. For vigour of conception and
swiftness of execution his first blows in 1815 recall the days of
Marengo and Eckmiihl. Blucher's army numbered about
120,000 men, nearly all Prussians, and mostly animated by
their leader's hatred of Napoleon; but even among his troops
there was a strong French feeling in the Saxon and West
German contingents. Wellington headed a motley array of
31,000 British troops, 29,000 Dutch-Belgians, 22,000 Hanoverian-Brunswickers, 6,000 King's German Legion, &c.—in all
about 93,000 men. Such a force was necessarily wanting in
cohesion, while the fidelity of the. Belgians was deservedly
questioned. Most of the British and Hanoverian troops had
never stood fire before, a fact which condemned the Duke to
defensive tactics. His army could therefore be little more
than the pivot on which that of Blucher moved. Against
such armies Napoleon might hope to hurl his 124,000 French
veterans with every hope of success. The results of his secret
and speedy advance were at once apparent. On June 15th
he drove the Prussian vanguard from Charleroi, pushing it
back on the road leading to Fleurus and Ligny, while Ney

346

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[CHAP.

gained possession of the high-road to Brussels as far as
Frasnes, within three miles of Quatre Bras. It is claimed by
many writers who desire to throw all the blame of Napoleon's
disaster on his lieutenants, that Ney had received a verbal
order to seize this important post; while in reply it is urged
that Ney's troops had had a very long march ending with an
engagement, and were unsupported by Count d'Erlon's corps,
which was far. in the rear. Had Ney seized this important
position on the 15th, it is improbable that Bliicher would have
accepted battle next day at the exposed position of Ligny.
Even as it was, though Napoleon's aim of driving back the
Prussians out of touch with Wellington had not been realized,
yet the communications between the allied armies were
seriously menaced by the triumphant French advance, for
which both Bliicher and Wellington were unprepared. The
latter, who was not informed of Napoleon's attack on Charleroi till the evening of the 15th,- was not shaken in his belief
that the French main advance would be by way of the Mx>nsBrussels road to cut off his communications with the sea; and
yet, when it was of the highest importance to ascertain Napoleon's plans, the Duke thought it not incompatible with his
duties to attend the Duchess of Richmond's ball at Brussels.
Indeed, it was in contravention of Wellington's first orders,
that the Prince of Saxe-Weimar occupied the important position at Quatre Bras with Dutch-Belgian troops; and, but for
his promptitude, that post would have been occupied without
fighting by Ney. Riding hastily to the front on the morning
of the 16th, Wellington gave to Bliicher a promise of support
in case he himself was not attacked in force, cautioning
Bliicher however against accepting battle in so advanced a
position and on a slope so exposed to the French cannonade.
The statement of most Prussian writers that he gave an
absolute promise of support, is quite without foundation.
The military position at noon of the 16th was briefly

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

347

as follows. Bliicher with about 80,000 troops, of whom about
one-third were Landwehr, held a strong but exposed position
on a slope extending between Ligny and neighbouring villages,
where he intended to defend his communications with the
fortress of Namur on the east, and the Namur—Quatre Bras
road in his rear, which still provided access to Wellington's
vanguard. Billow's corps was far away in the rear. The
British troops were beginning to approach Quatre Bras. Their
presence in force would have relieved the pressure on Bliicher's
exposed right, only some five miles distant from the DutchBelgian brigade; but for a long time Wellington could scarcely
hold his own. On his side Napoleon with 67,000 men hoped
to cut or! Bliicher's right in St Amand by an attack on the
Prussian centre at Ligny; and he ordered Ney, after seizing
Quatre Bras, to march on the Prussian rear and help in
capturing the whole of its right wing. The Emperor, however,
under-estimated Bliicher's forces.
Ney's operations were
clogged by the tardy advance of d'Erlon's corps in his rear ;
and this delay, due to friction and mistakes in Ney's newly
constituted staff, saved the allies from serious disaster.
With only half his full forces, the French Marshal began
his attack on Quatre Bras about two o'clock, when scarcely
any British troops were there. The Dutch-Belgians fell back
after a creditable resistance, until the arrival of the Duke of
Brunswick's brigade and Picton's division restored the fight.
Even so, the superiority of the French in cavalry and
artillery wrought havoc among the allied infantry; and only
the gallantry of the 42nd and 44th regiments withstood an
attack on flank and rear by the French lancers. The rout
of some Dutch-Belgian and Hanoverian Landwehr regiments
left the issue doubtful even late in the afternoon when Wellington had a superiority of numbers.
Meanwhile Napoleon, on hearing the first sound of Ney's
cannon, had begun to assail the Prussians. After a fierce

348

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era,

[CHAP.

cannonade and charges on the villages of St Amand and Ligny
which at first were bravely repulsed, he was ready to commence
the decisive move of his Guards on Blucher's centre, when
Vandamme reported the approach on his flank of a hostile
force. The combat slackened for nearly two hours, until
the approaching column was ascertained to be the belated
corps of d'Erlon, which, when marching to reinforce Ney,
had been ordered off to join Napoleon by a special despatch
from the Emperor. After this long delay about seven o'clock
the Old Guard was launched against Ligny, with decisive
effect. Bliicher, coming up from St Amand, where he had
presumed the supreme struggle would be, was overthrown and
much hurt in one of a series of cavalry charges, and was
saved only by the skill and courage of his aide-de-camp, who
skilfully concealed him until a charge of Uhlans brought rescue
to their chief. Indeed such was the tenacity of the Prussian
troops that after a loss of 15,000 killed and wounded they
retired under cover of the darkness and in good order, beating
off the onsets of the French horse. The delay in Napoleon's
final attack, caused by d'Erlon's unlucky corps, saved Bliicher
from protracted pursuit. The same cause had hampered Ney's
operations. H e has been severely blamed for leaving a whole
corps more than two hours in his rear, but he is not responsible
for its deviation towards Napoleon's army. Imperiously recalling it to his own command when it was about to turn
the Prussian flank at St Amand, he yet derived no succour
from i t ; and thus 19,000 troops were left oscillating between
two battles and taking part in neither.
Their weight, if thrown into the wavering balance at Quatre
Bras, must have been decisive. As it was, the gradual arrival
of British reinforcements decided that bloody contest in favour
of the allies. Kellermann's cuirassiers were not brought into
action until the British and German infantry were so well
posted as to beat back the hero of Valmy and Marengo with

xi.]

The Reconstruction of Europe.

349

crushing loss.; and after six hours of desperate fighting Ney
was eventually driven back on Frasnes with the loss of 4,000
men, Wellington's losses, however, being even heavier. Among
the slain was the gallant Duke of Brunswick, the hero of the
attempt of 1809. The allied success at Quatre Bras was rendered fruitless by the Prussian reverse at Ligny; and the AngloDutch forces fell back promptly on the Waterloo position.
The fate of the campaign now depended on the vigour of
Napoleon's pursuit and
the direction taken by
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Bras—Brussels high-road.
A partial reconnaissance ordered by Soult early pn the 17th
seemed to indicate that the Prussians were retreating eastwards
towards Namur, their immediate base of operations. So strong
was Napoleon's belief in this, the natural move of a beaten

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(01

350

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

{CHAP.

army, that not till noon did he order Grouchy with 33,000 men
to pursue Bliicher's forces. In vain did the Marshal—he had
lately received his baton—remark that his troops were wearied,
that the Prussians had 18 hours' start, and that the direction of
their retreat was not known. Napoleon soon repeated his commands more explicitly; for in the meantime news had arrived
that 20,000 Prussians were near Gembloux. Grouchy accordingly received written instructions (now known in their entirety)
to explore in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, and find
out whether Bliicher's forces„ "are separating themselves from
the English or whether they are intending still to unite, to
cover Brussels or Liege, and to try the fate of another battle."
Grouchy did not start till 2 P.M. on June 17. Rain began to
fall heavily, so retarding his progress that twelve hours elapsed
before he found out definitely that the Prussians had marched,
not south-east towards Namur, but northwards to Wavre.
The credit for the initial move in this direction belongs to
Gneisenau, and is consonant with his undaunted spirit. Yet
even he hesitated in taking the decisive step of abandoning
the Prussian communications with the Rhine, and boldly
joining Wellington at the first opportunity. It was the septuagenarian Blucher, weak and bruised from his fall at Ligny,
who took the responsibility and therefore deserves the credit
for this final resolve. The student will observe that, whereas
up to 1809 the defeats of the coalition forces became disasters
owing to want of persistent mutual support, from 1813 and
onwards the allies clung together as the only means of safety.
Their concentration near the Bohemian frontier of Silesia after
the defeat at Bautzen, Bliicher's flank marches from Silesia
to join von Bulow on the Elbe, and again in 1814 from the
Seine to join him on the Aisne, foreshadowed the prudently
daring movement which assured tjie final triumph at Waterloo.
On Wavre, therefore, the Prussians began to concentrate;
and the arrival of Billow's and Thielemann's fresh corps

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Etirope.

351

brought the Prussian forces up to 90,000 men. News of this
was sent to Wellington, who replied that he would accept
battle at the Waterloo position if one Prussian corps were
sent to support him; but the definite assurance of even that
amount of support did not reach the Duke till the early
morning of the eventful Sunday. In the first case, therefore,
it was Wellington alone who decided to trust in the bravery
of his British and German troops and the strength of the position to repulse an army which excelled his own in cohesion,
experience, and numbers. Indeed, owing to the Duke's inability to support the Prussians at Ligny, there seems to have
been in Blucher's staff some fear that Wellington would retreat
on Brussels and leave his allies exposed. At any rate, it
was not till they heard the welcome sound of the cannon at
Waterloo, that any vigorous attempt was made to advance.
The same winged messenger should have reminded Grouchy
that the very letter of his instructions (which for long afterwards he suppressed) required a half-left turn to intercept any
flank march of the Prussians towards Waterloo. A warm
remonstrance to this effect by General Gerard only confirmed him in the strange belief that he ought to attack the
Prussians at Wavre. H e did so, gained his point, and lost
the campaign.
Wellington's position at Mont St Jean extended along
the ridge of a slope at the back of which ran a rough road,
while further in his rear were the village of Waterloo and the
forest of Soignies. The front of his right flank was strengthened
by the chateau and wood of Hougomont, his centre by the
spacious farm-buildings of la Haye Sainte, commanding the
Brussels high-road. A shallow valley separated the allies from
the rather higher ridge east and west of la Belle Alliance
along which extended Napoleon's imposing lines. To confront 72,000 French, of whom 15,700 were cavalry, Wellington
could muster only 67,000, of whom not quite 24,000 were

352

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

British; and he had only 156 cannons against the enemy's
246. But his skilful arrangement of most of his troops behind
the brow of the ridge screened them fiom the terrible losses
of the Prussians on the St Amand-Ligny slope. The Iron
Duke's tactics offered throughout the day a masterly defence
against foes whose effective strength for the first four hours
of fighting was nearly double his own. Only one error in his
dispositions has been remarked, viz. his leaving 18,000 men
at Hal so far away to the west, as to be useless on the day
of battle. By that time it was fairly obvious that Napoleon
was attempting to crush the allies in succession, not to sever
the English communications with the sea.
The Emperor's delay in beginning the battle until nearly
noon has been sharply criticised; but it was necessary for the
movements of his formidable cavalry and artillery to let the
ground harden after 16 hours of heavy rain; and if, as seems
certain, the Prussians deferred their march from Wavre until
the cannonade was heard, the delay had none of the decisive
consequences which have often been stated. The ardour
of the French troops converted what was intended to be a
subordinate attack, that on the wood and mansion of Hougomont, into a fierce and prolonged contest; but this advanced
post was stubbornly held by the English Guards and their supports throughout the day against double their numbers. The
key of the British position was, however, la Haye Sainte, held
by part of the King's German Legion. After a cannonade from
the overwhelming French artillery, which decimated an exposed
Dutch-Belgian brigade, the Emperor was about to order an
attack in force on the allied left centre, when he observed
troops far away towards Wavre. The uncertainty was ended
by the capture of a Prussian hussar who was bearing to Wellington news of von Billow's advance. Soult thereupon, just
after 1 P.M., added a postscript to a despatch urging Grouchy
"not to lose an instant in approaching and joining us, and to

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe*

353

crush Biilow whom you will catch in the very act"; but this
order did not reach him till 6 P.M. In Grouchy's defence it is
urged that an earlier despatch approved of his movement on
Wavre. But this did not reach him till 4 P.M., up to which
time he alone is responsible for neglecting to observe and
check the Prussian movements towards their allies.
For the present, Napoleon was satisfied with detaching some
light cavalry to the right, and sending lepeated messages to
his Marshal, all of which reached him too late. Evidently, however, Ney's attack on Wellington's centre must be pushed home
with irresistible force; and this apparently accounts for the
denseness of the columns hurled on la Haye Sainte. A persistent attack in that formation against foes disordered by a severe
cannonade had rarely failed to secure the victory, as at Wagram,
Borodino, Liitzen, and Ligny; and the criticism lavished on
the unusual massiveness of the columns seems irrelevant. They
actually mounted the crest and their menacing appearance
sufficed to break up the Dutch-Belgians in their front; but
there the French masses were received by a withering fire;
and a prompt charge of Picton's men drawn up hastily in a line
two-deep, rolled one column down the slope with heavy losses.
As the French cuirassiers advanced to renew the contest they
too met the fearful shock of Ponsonby's household brigade and
fled in confusion; while the Scots Greys, Inniskillings and
Royal Dragoons overthrew and cut up the other two of d'Erlon's
columns, which lost in all some 3,000 prisoners and two eagles.
The ' Union Brigade/ pursuing its furious career, rode up the
French slope, sabred the gunners and disabled many cannons;
but the hostile cavalry, previously inactive, now rode them
down, inflicting severe losses in their retreat, until the French
lancers themselves received prompt punishment.
Thus to and fro swept the tide of battle for the first four
hours, the advantage being in the main with Wellington. The
artillery fire was now redoubling in intensity, a sure prelude to
F. R.
23

354

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

another attack in force, this time by the chief mass- of the
French cavalry on Wellington's right and centre. The French
tactics here too have been severely criticised;. but Napoleon's
belief in the power of cavalry was justified by all previous experience; and his surmise that Wellington's untrained troops
were demoralised by the hail of grape-shot was correct. Moreover, at la Haye Sainte a Hanoverian regiment had been completely dispersed by his cuirassiers—the only success there
gained by his troops. These grand cavalry charges may also
be defended as a speedy though wasteful method of snatching
at a victory which was rendered more and more doubtful by
the slow but steady approach of the Prussians on the French
right flank. After giving a general assent to the employment of his cavalry against Wellington's squares, Napoleon
about 4.30 P.M. repaired to Planch enoit, then first seriously
menaced by von Billow's corps; while Ney for two hours hurled
his heavy cavalry against Wellington's right centre. The Duke's
dispositions to meet these living avalanches are worthy of all
praise. Sheltering his squares behind the crest of the slope
from the hail of grape-shot which preluded each onset of the
horsemen, Wellington left his artillery alone exposed to view.
The cannoneers, after dealing death among the approaching
squadrons, unlimbered their guns and ran for shelter to the
squares. These defied all the efforts of the chivalry of France,
which swerved from them and vainly sought to cleave an entry.
Foiled at the very time when they imagined themselves masters
of the ridge, the successive waves of cavalry surged back again,
hard pressed by the allied horsemen or galled by shot and shell.
Though again and again the French brigades enveloped the
British and German squares and apparently carried the position, yet no French infantry was at hand to maintaia the
ground won, nor could the allied cannons be carried off, and
neglect to give due support to these cavalry charges seems to
be Ney's chief blunder on that day. The exploits of the French

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

355

horse at Marengo, Jena, Eylau, the Somosierra, Borodino, and
Dresden—the last of which perhaps inspired Ney's tactics—
could not be repeated on the ridge of Waterloo, and by 6 P.M.
the French cavalry was exhausted. During the same critical
time a French infantry attack on la Haye Sainte was again
steadily repulsed by the King's German Legion; and at 6
Wellington's position was intact 1 .
Napoleon's chief blunder on the 18th seems to have been
his neglect to oppose any but a few light troops to the
Prussian vanguard when crossing the defile below St Lambert;
for Grouchy was known to be too far off to hinder any but the
Prussian rear-guard. About 4.30 von Biilow deployed his
troops on the French flank; and an hour later, after sharp
fighting, 30,000 Prussians gained a hold on the outskirts of
Planchenoit; but Lobau's corps and the Young Guard drove
them out for a time until reinforcements arrived. This temporary diversion of French infantry to face the flank attack,
probably accounts for its lack of due support to the cavalry
and to the second great onset on la Haye Sainte. But the
battalions of the German Legion, which for seven hours held
this exposed post, had at last exhausted their ammunition,
and shortly .after 6 their few survivors retired to the allied
lines. Had Ney possessed sufficient reserves of infantry and
cavalry, Wellington's centre might now have been pierced.
The shattered allied lines there and on the right were for
some time in the greatest danger, and only the tact of
Wellington and his staff in drawing in supports from his
1
Mr Ropes, in his careful and exact review of the Waterloo campaign,
follows Charras in stating 4 P.M. as the time when la Haye Sainte was
finally taken. This, however, must refer to a temporary lodgment gained
by the French. The evidence of Kennedy, staff officer of the division so
seriously menaced, and the Journal of the King's German Legion, seem to
show that it was not completely taken till 6 P.M. But Judge O'Connor
Morris in the English Historical Review for Jan. 1895, fixes the time earlier.

23—2

356

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

extreme wings, sufficed to make good the fearful gaps. All
three armies were in a critical position; and Napoleon, feeling
the pressure of von Billow's renewed attack on Planchenoit,
was convinced that only a supreme effoit of his Old Guard
could win the day. That was still possible; for not more
than 35,000 Prussians as yet menaced him, and Wellington
had scarcely so many trustworthy troops still available.
About 7 o'clock the Emperor hurled against Wellington's
right centre eight battalions of his Guard, supported by masses
of infantry. These veterans of the revolutionary and Napoleonic
wars, led by Ney in person, supported by horse artillery and
their own Chasseurs, steadily mounted the slope. The leading
part of their column was plied with a destructive fire from
Napier's guns and from a Dutch-Belgian battery, while the line
of Maitland's Guards shattered their front.
Halkett's two
regiments on their flank crushed every attempt at deploying,
and an advance in line rolled the veterans down the slope in
complete disorder, as the second part of their great column
marched up to retrieve the fight. This fared even worse.
Galled in front by a steady cannonade and volleys of musketry,
it was charged on the flank by Colborne's 52nd regiment, and
driven in utter rout into the valley. The other French troops
fell back, and Wellington, feeling the touch of Ziethen's Prussians on his left, gave to his troops the long desired order for a
general advance. His wisdom in holding back the British
horsemen was now manifest. The brigades of Vivian and
Vandeleur did fearful execution among the disordered French;
and the Emperor, in his fallacious bulletin, ascribed the loss of
the battle to these effective onsets of the British horse. That
these, supported by a general advance of the allies, drove
back the wrecks of the French squadrons and two reserve
battalions of the Old Guard, cannot be questioned. Yet it
would be disingenuous not to recognise the importance of the
Prussian share in this momentous victory. Wellington's final

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

357

advance would have been most hazardous had not Ziethen's
fresh corps then hurled itself on the French right. The invincible energy of Bliicher, von Billow, Ziethen, and their
devoted troops overcame the serious obstacles to the advance,
and launched in all some 41,000 men against the French.
Yet so stubbornly did the Comte de Lobau defend Planchenoit that not till after the final advance of Wellington's line
was it yielded to von Billow's men. Then all was panic and
disaster on the road to Charleroi, and under the protracted
pursuit of the Prussians—their revenge for Jena—the French
fled beyond the Sambre with the loss of all their artillery,
ammunition and stores. Napoleon himself escaped capture
only by precipitate flight. Had he fallen into the hands of
Gneisenau's troopers, they would have shot him on the spot.
The tactics of Napoleon and Ney have been severely censured, as always happens after disaster. To the present writer
they do not appear to differ materially from the Emperor's
usual method of freely sacrificing his men in order to wear
away and confuse his foes at all points until the final blow
could be delivered with crushing effect. To launch heavy
columns of attack after the enemy had suffered from the first
onsets and crushing cannonade, had till then almost invariably
won the day against continental foes. These tactics were foiled
by the tenacious defence of Hougomont and la Haye Sainte
and still more by Wellington's dextrous use of the brow of the
ridge to screen his troops from the tempest of iron and to
hide his defensive moves. Time after time did the French
horse and foot mount the slope in triumph, only to be shattered
by volleys from the squares or from the thin red lines which
mangled their front and then charged with the bayonet.
Tactics which had succeeded elsewhere were baffled by the
natural strength of the position, by the invincible courage and
steadiness of Wellington's best troops in meeting the columns
with an outflanking attack in line, and by the deadliness of the

358

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

British musketry fire, which had been proved in every battle
from Corunna to this final contest. Colonel Tomkinson, in
his recently published diary of the campaigns of 1808—1815,
points out the advantages of the line formation for experienced
and steady troops against a massive column. This can only
move slowly and emit a scanty fire, while the lines can destroy
the head of the column, harass its flanks, and complete its
disorder with the bayonet. These tactics, employed with decisive effects at Albuera and other battles of the Peninsula,
received their final and most dramatic illustration on the
slopes of Mt St Jean, where the veterans before whom Europe
had trembled for the last decade were broken by less than
their own number of British regulars. On the other hand, the
fearful losses of the allies, amounting to more than one-fourth
of the British troops and the King's German Legion, with 6,700
Prussians, bespeak the vigour of the French attacks. How
Wellington could have held his ground, had Grouchy marched
against the Prussian flank, and \ so secured for Napoleon's
army freedom to act in front, it is difficult to conceive. Yet,
however severe the blame which may be lavished on Ney and
Grouchy, a considerable shaie of it must rebound on the
Emperor, who at a few hours' notice assigned duties to these
Marshals for which they were not well suited. Even before
his defeat at Dennewitz, Ney's splendid fame was that of a
desperate fighter and gallant corps leader, rather than that of
a skilful tactician; while on Grouchy, known till 1815 only as a
dashing cavalry general, devolved a task which called for some
strategic insight. Had their places been filled by Soult and
Davoust, justly renowned for their combination of skill and
tenacity, the issue must have been different.
Attempts have often been made to account for the disaster
by the decay of Napoleon's bodily and mental powers. It is
true, of course, that he did not display the freshness and
clearness of conception of his Italian campaigns, and that the

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

359

fatigues caused by his multifarious energy at Paris and by the
lightning strokes with which he astonished the allies, somewhat told on a frame which had lost the elasticity of youth;
but the endeavour to exhibit the commander as oppressed by
bodily torpor at the crisis of his destinies, is a ludicrous distortion of facts. Whatever hesitation he displayed in the
middle of the battle was due to the unexpected success of
Wellington's defensive tactics, to the delay in Grouchy's fulfilment of his own reiterated orders, and to the increasing vigour
of the Prussian attack. Enough has been stated above to
prove that the errors on the French side were due, not to the
Emperor's obesity, but to the somewhat strange redistribution
of duties which accompanied the hasty reorganization of his
vast and complicated engine of war.
Napoleon's main army now presented the scene, unparalleled except at Jena, of an army of veterans utterly
broken up in a single day. Grouchy, after beating the
Prussian rear-guard at Wavre, hastily fell back on Namur.
Thence he retired to Dinant, Rheims, and Soissons, where a
feeble attempt at resistance was offered. In fact, the triple
line of fortresses which had foiled the allies in 1793-4 now
scarcely delayed their conquering march. Meanwhile at Paris
the Emperor was endeavouring to invest himself with dictatorial powers. Carnot also urged the necessity of declaring
the country to be in danger, and of rousing the people against
the allies. But the spirit of 1793 had vanished. Fouche
skilfully maintained in the Imperial Council the need of relying on the Chambers, not on a dictatorship which would
dissolve them. Cajoling the Bonapartist deputies with the
hope of a proclamation of Napoleon I I as a last resort, the
quondam regicide now began to weld together parties against
the Emperor. It was also reserved for the earliest hero of the
revolution to deal a blow at the pretensions of its last and
greatest dictator. Lafayette brought forward and carried a

360

The Revolutionary

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Era.

[CHAP.

series of propositions that the independence of the nation was
menaced, that whoever attempted to dissolve the Chamber
was guilty of high treason and that the Ministers must repair
to its sittings. These and other signs convinced Napoleon
that his work was done, and he a second time abdicated in
favour of his son Napoleon I I i with the noble parting injunction—" Let all unite for the public safety, in order to remain
an independent nation." Strange to say, the act of abdication
was written by his brother Lucien, who had helped him to
power in 1799; and it was opposed in the Council of Ministers
only by Carnot, who in 1804 had left France rather than acknowledge the Empire.
At the end of June the allies were before Paris. Some
combats ensued in the neighbourhood, Bliicher's troops driving
the French from Sevres, and occupying the commanding
plateau of Chatillon, while Wellington threatened the capital
from the north. The news of the Austro-Russian advance and
the departure of Napoleon for the coast, facilitated the conclusion of an armistice which was drawn up at St Cloud,
July 3 ; and five days later Louis X V I I I re-entered Paris.
On that same day Napoleon embarked on a frigate at Rochefort, intending to sail for the United States; but being watched
by British cruisers he placed himself under the protection of
the captain of H.M.S. Bellerophon. In pursuance of the
declaration of the allies at Vienna, the fallen Emperor was
finally conveyed to St Helena. After his refusal to abide by
the Elba compromise, and the fearful effusion of blood which
occurred in the Hundred Days, the need of some such final
decision must be manifest to all but the devotees of heroworship. The special malignity which some writers discern
in England's action (e.g. Dumas, who describes it as that of
Judas to the new Saviour of mankind) is solely the result of
a vivid imagination. The recent treaty between the Powers
bound them to prosecute the war until Bonaparte was put

xi.]

The Reconstruction

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361

"absolutely beyond the possibility of exciting further troubles."
On the other hand, the lack of dignity and consideration shown
to the great man at St Helena must be held largely responsible
for the growth of a new Promethean legend, which was to have
a strange influence on Europe in 1848—1870.
The world now needed first and foremost some security
for peace. This was the chief reason for restoring the phlegmatic and unwarlike Louis XVIII to the French throne. An
effort was made by Fouche to procure the accession of the
Duke of Orleans; but in spite of the former declarations of
the allies, they now insisted on the restoration of Louis XVIII,
who announced from Cambrai that he came to interpose himself a second time between the allies and the French armies.
Certainly, under no other rule than his could France have
escaped heavy losses of territory to the Powers, especially to
the incensed Prussians. With the greatest difficulty Blucher was
dissuaded by Louis X V I I I and Wellington from blowing up
the pout dTena. The irate veteran at Wellington's banquet
in Paris proposed as a toast—" May the diplomatists not spoil
with their pens what the soldiers have won with their swords " ;
and this expressed the general resolve of the Prussian government, army and people that France must be punished by the
cession of Alsace-Lorraine to the Fatherland. Some of the
German newspapers even stated that France must now be
partitioned to reduce her to the weakness from which Germany
had lately been rescued. It is recorded, indeed, by the due
de Pasquier, the new French Minister for the Interior, that
had Napoleon remained at large, France would have been
subjected to some such treatment. Now that he was on his
way to St Helena, such a proposal lost all validity. Nevertheless, a strong claim was made by Prussia that Alsace-Lorraine
should revert to Germany. "Not till then (so ran the Prussian
Declaration) will France find herself in her true line of defence,
with the Vosges and her double line of fortresses from the

362

.

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

Meuse to the sea; and not till then will France remain quiet."
Even Metternich, the champion of old dynasties, now declared
that the offensive power of France must be reduced by the
cession or demolition of all her first line of fortresses, i.e. from
Lille to Strassburg, while Stein suggested that Alsace-Lorraine
should be ruled by an Austrian Archduke. There is much
to be said in support of these claims both from the standpoint
of historic right and of temporary expediency. Those lands
had been German, and Prussia's demand for a better boundary
for her distant Rhine Province was in a military sense incontestable. Her army had suffered severely, and after a triumph
more decisive than Jena, she might reasonably expect a territorial gain half as large as that wrung from her at Tilsit.
Finally, her plenipotentiaries Hardenberg and Humboldt declared that, as the forbearance of the Powers towards France
in 1814 had only led up to the Hundred Days, it was now
necessary to employ sterner measures and to prefer the safety
of Europe to the prestige of the Bourbons.
Against these arguments drawn from past and present
conditions, the Governments of Great Britain and Russia urged
the necessity of founding peace on a lasting basis. In a statesmanlike Memoir of Aug. n , Wellington set forth the impolicy
of so exasperating French public opinion as to mar the settlement. Granting that that land was still left " in too great
strength for the peace of Europe," he yet pointed out that
" revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world, than
France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular Government ; and that is the situation in which we ought to endeavour
to place her." The views of the Czar were analogous, viz. that
the allies should endeavour to strengthen as far as possible
the cause of constitutional monarchy in France, not to enfeeble
it by demanding territorial cessions which would wound the
national pride; and that only so could the European equilibrium
be assured. It was further pointed out that Germany under

xi.]

The Reconstrtiction

of Europe.

363

an almost nominal form of union such as that now proposed,
would be far too weak to hold Alsace-Lorraine against the
bitter hostility of France. Had German unity been effected
in 1815, it is probable that these provinces would then have
been detached from France.
The final success of the Anglo-Russian arguments led to the
terms of the Treaty of Paris (Nov. 20, 1815), whereby France
was to recede within her limits of 1790, surrendering to the
Netherlands the districts around Marienburg and Philippeville,
to the Prussian Rhine-Province part of the Saar valley, to the
Bavarian Palatinate Landau and its environs, and to the
Kingdom of Sardinia Chambery and Annecy. Allied troops to
the number of 150,000 were to occupy the French fortresses of
the east and north for a time not exceeding five years, and
France was to pay a war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs (about
:£ 28,000,000). The Powers likewise stipulated that the French
army was to be temporarily disbanded, and that all the works
of art and literary treasuies seized by the French, "contrary to
every principle of justice and to the usages of modern warfare,"
should be restored to their rightful owners.
For the second time, then, the desire to establish the
Bourbon rule saved France from the vengeance of German
patriots, and averted from her the application of that undisguised
force by which Prussia had been nearly crushed out of existence
at Tilsit. That France was completely at the mercy of the
allies, and could have been partitioned, is indisputable. A
mere relic of her army remained, while nearly a million armed
men lived on her from July to November; but it was to the
interest of Russia and England to respect her historical
boundaries in the interests of orderly government. Had the
French royalists and Charles X exhibited similar moderation,
their rule might have become far firmer than ever that of
Louis XVI had been. France, it is true, continued to chafe
at the settlement of 1815; but the verdict of time has on

364

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

the whole justified the wisdom of the compromise as regards
her frontiers on the east and north. Certainly, history records
no instance of efforts so great ending with victory so complete,
yet crowned with such self-abnegation, as the efforts of Great
Britain during the Hundred Days.
After spending enormous
sums on her own troops, and subsidising all the allies, she
gained nothing which had not been virtually decided before
the adjournment of the Congress of Vienna. Weak and tardy
in her first opposition to the Jacobin designs on Holland,
she had at last won the decisive triumph on the scene of her
earlier reverses; and after long stemming the tide of French
conquests, she now, with the help of the Czar, set limits
to the westward rush of the nationalist reaction, which
threatened to overwhelm France.
In its effect on the map of Europe the democratic impulse
may be compared to a mighty tidal wave which, sweeping on
from the Seine to the Tiber, the Tagus and the Moskwa, produces a reflux as powerful in its ultimate effects. When the
old limits are reached, the spectator can at once discern the
mighty work of levelling, simplification and destruction of effete
or artificial barriers accomplished in the interval. European
affairs, mostly arranged by the Congress of Vienna at the time
of Napoleon's entry into Paris, were soon settled after his
abdication. My task will be completed by a brief survey of
the political and social changes effected in this great formative
period of our modern world.
After an unparalleled dilation and contraction of influence,
France in Nov. 1815 returned almost exactly to her frontiers of
1790, having absorbed and assimilated the small fragments of
foreign States within her frontiers. A similar process is observable in her political and social institutions. The revolution
found her a monarchy strangely hampered by the complicated
political and commercial rights or privileges of the provinces;
it left her a strongly centralised State wherein all the functions

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

365

of government were clearly denned by the Charter. Indeed,
the collision between Rousseau's theories and the old monarchy
ended by vesting the latter with powers not much less than
those claimed by Louis XVI in his Royal Session of June 23,
1789. The chief difference was revealed in the first article
of the royal Charter—" The French are equal before the law,
whatever may be their title or rank." The principles of civil
equality and religious liberty were now frankly accepted by
Louis X V I I I ; and the chief social and political results of
the revolution were to survive the royalist reaction of 1824—
1830.
The changes effected in the Germanic system were analogous to those in France. The frontiers of the new German
Confederation (1815—1866) were almost the same as those of
the old Empire which it was intended to replace, except that
Savoy and the Austrian Netherlands (save Luxemburg), together
with a few outlying districts, had now fallen away from the old
connection. As has been previously indicated, the shocks of
this terrible epoch had been fatal to nearly all the small States
and Free Cities, and only 39 sovereign States survived, while
the larger States, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, & c , now
possessed more compact territories than ever before. Austria
gave up her distant and scattered Flemish and Swabian possessions, but vastly increased and consolidated her lands by the
absorption of Salzburg, Trent and other bishoprics, as also by
the recovery of Milan, Mantua, Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia,
besides gaining Ragusa and Cattaro. She now ceased to touch
France and to be the natural champion of Germany on the
west; but her vast gains in Italy were none the less a challenge
,to France, and were destined to renew the strife of centuries
in that unhappy land. For her losses in Poland, Prussia gained
largely in Saxony and the Rhine lands, her growth following
the general trend of military events westwards in the final campaigns against Napoleon. Though Austria retained her old

366

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

position of supremacy in the Germanic system, yet these territorial changes bequeathed to Prussia the burden of defending
Germany against France; and the events of half a century later
were to solve the question of German dualism in favour of the
Power which successfully grappled with its heavy responsibilities.
The Federal Constitution was soon seen to be little more
than a Fiirstenbund, a league of the Governments, impotent to
secure unity in internal affairs, and apparently designed for the
suppression of liberty in the several States. After heroic efforts
in the cause of national independence and political liberty, the
general failure of Germans to secure either of these aims
aroused bitter discontent against the rulers who now, except in
the south, evaded their promises of constitutional government.
On social matters, here as elsewhere, the influence of the
French domination was more abiding than on constitutional
forms. In very few strictly German States was serfdom reestablished. With few exceptions the social results of the
Germanic revolution survived in all the lands between the
Rhine and the Niemen; and the Napoleonic code of laws long
remained in force in the German provinces west of the Rhine.
In Italy the same general results are still more observable,
viz. the permanence of most of the social reforms brought by
the French occupation, but an approximate restoration of the
previous boundaries and forms of government. Murat's final
efforts to arouse a national feeling in his favour had failed
because they had been ambiguous and ill-sustained. His
General Pepe declared that a bold proclamation of a national
war against the Austrians would have rallied 60,000 men to his
standard. As it was, he was soon overwhelmed in a brief
campaign in the Papal Legations and fled to France (May
1815). In the autumn a final madcap attempt to wrest the
crown from the Bourbons resulted in his capture and execution.
Between the Austrians in the north and the Bourbons in the

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

367

south, Italy was now a prey to a calamitous and bloody reaction, which caused Murat's rule long to be regarded with regret.
"Within the space often years (wrote General Pepe) we hadmade
more progress than our ancestors had done in three centuries.
We had acquired the French civil, criminal and commercial
codes. We had abolished the feudal system, and justice was
administered with improved methods." The same regrets were
felt throughout Italy. Her old republics, except that of San
Marino, had disappeared, that of Genoa being incorporated
with the Kingdom of Sardinia, while Venetia formed part of
Austria's Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom. Modena was restored
to the House of Este, and Tuscany to the Austrian Archduke
Ferdinand, while Marie Louise gained Parma for herself, though
not for her son. The Ionian Isles, formerly belonging to
Venice, were now declared a free and independent State under
the protectorate of Great Britain, which had wrested them from
France in 1809—1814. The temporary administration of
Sicily and Genoa by Lord Bentinck accentuated the contrast
presented by the now unfettered rule of the Spanish Bourbons
and the House of Savoy respectively; and though in both cases
the English Government had given promises more or less binding for the continuance of popular liberties, it allowed them to
be trampled on with impunity. Hence Sicily and Genoa were
in the van of all the insurrectionary movements of the years 1820
—1860. For the present, Italy was too exhausted to offer any
resistance to her domestic tyrants or to the Austrians encamped
in her northern and central fortresses; but, as in Germany,
the new groupings of the population under the French supremacy had aroused that sentiment of nationality which was
finally to achieve the unification vainly attempted in 1815.
As Saidinia was strengthened to form on the side of Italy a
barrier State against France, so too the House of Orange
received an important aggrandisement in the Belgian Provinces,
holding the old barrier fortresses against her on the north-east

368

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

—an artificial arrangement which ignored the differences of language, religion and sentiment between Dutch and Belgians. As
a set-off to the loss of their German lands, the younger branch
of this family received the Duchy of Luxemburg, for which the
King of the Netherlands was to have a vote in the German Confederation. Luxemburg was to rank, with Mainz and Landau,
as a federal fortress.
The course of the reaction in Spain merits little attention.
In May 1814 Ferdinand VII had been received with tumultuous acclaim by the people of Madrid, and perceiving the
slight support accorded to the democratic Constitution of
1812 he speedily annulled it and resumed the royal powers in
their entirety. It was in vain that our envoy Sir H. Wellesley
protested against the wholesale arrests of the Spanish Liberals
and the restoration of the Inquisition. English appeals for the
abolition of the slave trade met with no better result. After a
heedless rush into advanced democracy Spain relapsed into a
mediaeval policy which spared only some of the agrarian reforms of the years 1809—1811. The restoration of the House
of Braganza in Portugal ultimately led to similar proceedings
in that country.
At the other extremity of Europe the cause of national
independence was compromised by the forcible union of
Norway with the Swedish Crown. Instead of gaining the
complete independence which they desired, the Norwegians
now had to accept a distasteful connection, owing to the
assistance of Sweden and the hostility of Denmark to the
allied cause in 1812—1813. Norway was virtually the exchange for Finland, ceded by Sweden to the Czar in 1809;
and, as has been noticed above, the small duchy of Lauenburg
was finally the meagre compensation awarded to the Danish
Crown for the loss of Norway.
Strange to say, it was in Poland that the cause of liberty
and independence seemed to have suffered least in 1815.

xi.]

The Reconstruct^

of Europe,

369

True to his early promises of reigning as constitutional king of
Poland, Alexander granted a constitution to his new realm
similar to that established in France by Louis XVIII's Charter,
with the proviso that all officials should be Poles and that
Polish should be the official language. " T h e general impression (wrote Czartoryski at Warsaw) at the promulgation of the
Constitution has been as favourable as could be desired....Its
principles have attached the people to your Majesty." The
joy was brief. The arbitrary proceedings of the Grand-Duke
Constantine, Russian commander in Poland, soon overrode
the new popular liberties; and the Poles, whose lot presents
some curious parallels to that of France in 1791, 1807 and
1815, were ten years later to see their charter set aside by the
unbending autocrat Nicholas. Every revolutionary outbreak
in France sent a thrill through oppressed Poland. Its sole
effect was to rivet tighter the Muscovite chains; and the chief
result of Alexander's Polish policy was to introduce the Czar's
power into the heart of Europe.
For the rest, the Congress of Vienna declared the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland (now reorganised in 22 cantons), and affirmed the principle of the free navigation of
rivers, and of the abolition of the slave trade. The chief
obstacle to British efforts for the complete vindication of this
last great principle, was the determined opposition of our late
allies, Spain and Portugal.
Such were the general results of the revolutionary era.
The conflicts which unhappily burst forth between democracy
and the old Governments produced approximately the results
which two such dissimilar thinkers as Burke and Hobespierre
had foretold as certain to be entailed by a warlike policy.
After the dictatorial actions of the secret committees had
saved social equality at the expense of political liberty, it was
not difficult for a young genius who combined all the gifts
F. R.
24

370

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic

Era.

[CHAP.

which France then so urgently needed, to impose his will on
her, and through her on Europe. But the second of these
dictatorships signally reversed many of the cherished aims of
the earlier revolutionary thinkers and statesmen. In place of
that federation of small friendly republics wherein Rousseau
foresaw a new and peaceful future, there sprang Minerva-like
from the revolution a military Empire which imposed laws on
Europe and drove the peoples into revolt. It is impossible to
over-estimate the disasters to the cause of political liberty
from its close association with an aggressive policy. The
Girondin War of 1792, so fatal to the Constitution of the
previous year, and the war policy of 1793 which involved all
Europe in flames, threw back the cause of freedom in France
for more than half a century, and extinguished the last hopes
of Polish independence. Of the principles of 1789 France in
1804—1814 retained only social equality, which Napoleon
safeguarded at the expense of liberty and the fraternity of
nations. Lafayette scarcely exaggerated when in 1815 he
described him as " t h e greatest foe, considering his circumstances, which liberty ever had." The task of reconciling the
often conflicting claims of liberty and social equality has ever
been found most difficult, even in times of profound peace;
and to the inexperienced legislators of France success was
perhaps impossible amidst the storms of popular tumult. The
revolution produced no leader except the great Mirabeau who
was capable of preventing the fatal divergence of those principles, which began after his death. Thenceforth the revolution lost all solidarity of aim, and its difficulties were
vastly enhanced by the inflexible rigidity of Girondin and
Jacobin policy both at home and abroad. All the tenacious
mental characteristics of the young Corsican caporal, and his
early training in the civil strifes of Ajaccio and Paris, unfortunately tended in the direction of a military autocracy such
as the policy of France increasingly required. Throughout

xi.]

The Reconstruction

of Europe.

371

this work an attempt has been made to exhibit the direct
descent of the Napoleonic regime from that dictatorship of
1793-4 which naturally resulted from the warlike policy of
the Girondins and Jacobins.
In the sphere of social equality, however, Napoleon remained to the end a true democrat. Side by side with his
work of destruction, he will always be remembered as having
consolidated or founded the social and agrarian systems of
France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Germany;
while his invasions virtually compelled the legislators of Prussia
and Spain to adopt a similar policy. This is his true glory,
that even amidst the tempests of war, his matchless genius for
organisation quietly laid the foundations of the chief social
systems of the Continent.
After the cause of social equality had been carried by the
French arms as far as the Niemen, the nationalist reaction
against the Napoleonic domination began to gather strength.
In Germany, and to some extent even in Spain, the desire for
national independence linked itself with the cause of popular
liberty; and the spirit of 1789 thenceforth inspired the coalition far more than the Napoleonic armies. The allied cause,
however, suffered no less than the earlier democratic impulse
from its close association with the exploits of generals and the
bargains of diplomatists; and the conflict of two principles
not necessarily opposed resulted in a curtailment of popular
liberties which left Europe maimed, exhausted, and in a state
of arrested development.

24—2

APPENDIX I.

A LIST OF T H E MOST ACCESSIBLE AND TRUSTWORTHY
WORKS DEALING W I T H THIS PERIOD.
(Limits of space preclude any attempt at forming a complete bibliography. An asterisk is affixed to the foreign works which have been
translated into English.)
T H E FRENCH REVOLUTION (PART I. 1789—1799).
A.

HISTORIES : —

Sorel's VEurope et la Revolution francaisex also the works of Carlyle,
Fyffe, Hausser, Louis Blanc, Mallet, *Mignet, Morse Stephens, Oncken,
Quinet, *Sybel, and *Taine. Le Regne de Louis XVI (1774—1789) by
Droze. UAncien Regime by *Tocqueville and *Taine. Dix Ans de
Paix armie (1783—1793) by the Viscount de Barral-Montferrat. La France
en 1789 by Boiteau. Le Comite de Salut Public by Gros. VHistoire de la
Terreur by Mortimer-Ternaux.
B.

BIOGRAPHIES:—

*Marie Antoinette by M. de la Rocheterie: Mdme. de Lamballe by M.
Bertin: Voltaire, Diderot {2 vols.), Rousseau (2 vols.) by Mr John Morley,
and his articles on Turgot, Condorcet, Robespierre, &c. in his Miscellanies:
'Correspondance de Mirabeau et la Marck edited by Bacourt: Mirabeau et la
Constituante by Reynald: Mirabeau by Mezieres: Du.mont's ""Souvenirs
sur Mirabeau : J&tude stir Madame Roland et son temps by Dauban :
Madame Roland'by Miss Mathilde Blind : Les Femmes celebres de 17.89—
1815 et leur influence dans la Revolution by Lairtullier: *Portraits de
Femmes by Sainte-Beuve: Condorcet by Robinet: La Vie privee de Danton

374

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era,

and Le Prods des Dantonistes by Robinet: Marat by Chevremont: Robespierre by Hamel: St. Just by Hamel: Hoche by Rousselin: Kleber by
Ernouf: Marceatc by Maze: Dubois Crance by Jung: Memoires sur Carnot
by his son: Bonaparte et son temps by Jung: the monographs of Chuquet.
C. The chief Memoirs dealing mainly with the years 1789—1799 are
those of Bailly, Barbaroux, Barere, Bertrand-Molleville, Beugnot, Bouille,
Brissot, Buzot, *Mdme. de Campan, des Cars, Chevernay, Clery, Dumouriez, Ferrieres, Mdme. de Genlis, Lafayette, Latude, * Mallet du Pan,
*Pasquier, Pontecoulant, Mdme. Roland, Mgr. de Salomon, Thibaudeau,
Thiebault, Mdme. de Tourzel, Mdme. de Staal-Delaunay, and Weber. The
travels of Arthur Young in France (1787—1790), the journal of Forster of
Mainz, and the Correspondence of A. Miles also throw valuable light on
this period.
D. Of the many Essays and miscellaneous works on this period the
following may be noted:—Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution with
Mackintosh's reply, Vindiciae Gallicae: Mdme. de Stael's * Considerations
stir la Revolution francaise: Helen M. Williams' Sketches of Manners (&c.
in the French Republic: Aulard's j&tudes et lecons sur la Revolution
francaise: Aulard's Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de Vlitre Supreme'.
Aulard's Les Orateurs de la Constituaitte, Les Orateurs de la Legislative
et de la Convention, La SocietS des Jacobins, and Recueil des Actes du Comite
de Salut public: Morse Stephens' Orators of the French Revolution: Oscar
Browning's Varennes and other Essays, and his edition of Earl Gower's
Despatches from Paris: Croker's Essays on the French Revolution: Alger's
Englishmen in the French Revolution and Glimpses in the French Revolution : Dickinson's Revolution and Reaction in Modern France.
T H E FRENCH REVOLUTION (PART II. 1799—1815).
A.

HISTORIES : —

Bignon, Capeflgue, FyfTe, *Lanfrey, Morse Stephens, Oncken, Thibaudeau, and * Thiers. Military Llistory by Jomini: Great Campaigns
by Adams: Captain Mahan's Lnfluence of Sea Power on the Frettch Revolution and Empire.
B.

BIOGRAPHIES :—

Fournier, O'Connor Morris, Seeley, * NapoUon intime by Levy, and a
number of untrustworthy attacks on, or panegyrics of, Napoleon, which
need not be named. Davoust by Chenier and by Mazade: Massina by
Amic: Murat et ses derniers jours by Galvani and by la Rocca: Ney by

Appendix.

375

Welschinger and by Verronnais: Soult by Desprez and by Clerc: Vandamme by du Casse: Maret by Ernouf: Les Diplomales Europiens by
Capefigue: Mdme. de Stael by Sorel and by Lady Blennerhassett.
C. The chief Memoirs dealing mainly with the years 1799—1815 are
those of the duchesse d'Abrantes,*Bausset, Joseph Bonaparte, Lucien
Bonaparte, Jerome Bonaparte, *Bourrienne, Broglie, Chaptal, Chateaubriand, Drouet (Comte d'Erlon), Fain's Manuscrit de 18 \i—1814, *Fouche,
*Guizot, Hyde de Neuville, *Macdonald, *Marbot, Marmont, Massena,
*Meneval, *Miot de Melito, Mollien, *Pasquier, Pingaud, Puymaigre,
*Mdme. de Remusat, Rochechouart, *Savary,*Segur, * Talleyrand, and
Vitrolles.
D. Among the many miscellaneous works dealing with this period the
following may be named :—Roederer's La pre7?iiere et la seconde Annies du
Consulat: * Saint-Amand's La Femmje du premier Consul'. Mdme. de
Stael's Dix Annies d'Exil: Ernouf's Les Francais en Prusse (1807—
1808): Ernouf's Souvenirs dhm officier polonais: *Mdme. Durand's
Napolion et Marie Louise: Vandal's Napolion et Alexandre'. Houssaye's
1314: Benjamin Constant's Les Cent yours: *Saint-Amand's La duchesse
d"1 Angouleme et les deux Restaurations: Helen M. Williams' Narrative of
Events in France in 1815.
Napoleon's correspondence, though far from complete, is the best
authority for his policy. Part of it has been edited by Captain Bingham in
a spirit hostile to Napoleon. Louis Bonaparte's Des Ldies Napolioniennes
(1839) and the late Prince Napoleon's NapGleon and his Detractors are
official presentations of the Napoleonic legend.
GREAT BRITAIN (1789—1815).
HISTORIES : —

Massey's Reign of George III: James' Naval History.
BIOGRAPHIES : —

Pitt by Lord Stanhope and by Lord Rosebery: Fox by Lord J. Russell
and by Wakeman: Canning by Stapleton: Wellington by Brialmont:
Nelson by L. Browne, Laughton and Southey : Brougham's Life and
Times written by himself: Brougham's Historical Sketches of Statesmen of
the Time of George III: Craufurd a?id his Light Division by Rev. A. H.
Craufurd.

376

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANEOUS W O R K S : —

T h e Wellington Despatches: Castlereagh's Memoirs and Correspondence:
the Correspondence of the first Earl of Malmesbury: the Correspondence of
James, first Earl of Gharlemont (vol. 11): the Correspondence of A . Miles:
the Correspondence of the Right H o n . George R o s e : Memoirs and Correspondence of Collingwood.
Beamish's History of the King's German Legion, and the Memoirs of
Kincaird, Sir G. Napier, *Ompteda, Capt. Patterson, and Col. Tomkinson,
illustrate the course of the wars of 1808—1815. T h e Waterloo Campaign
may be studied in the works of Siborne, von Ollech, Ropes, and in the
Waterloo Letters.
Tooke's History of Prices, many pamphlets in the Pamphleteer, and the
works of Cobbett, will illustrate the economic and social conditions of the
time.
GERMANY.
HISTORIES :—

*von Sybel, H'ausser, Duncker, Oncken's Das Zeitalter der Revolution,
des Kaiserreiches, und der Befreiungskriege:
Treitschke's Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert
(vol. 1): Perthes' Politische
Zustande
und Personen in Deutschland (1795—1813): Beitzke's Die
Freiheitskriege
(1813—1814): Kriegsgeschielite der Jahre 1813—1814 by Muffling and by
P l o t h o : Cathcart's Commentaries on the War in Russia and
Germany
1812—1813: Krones' Geschichte der Neuzeit Oesterreichs: Beer's Zehn
Jahre oesterreichischer Politik (1801—i8ro): Leger's Flistoire de FAutricheHongrie: Coxe's Memorials of the House of Austria:
Scholl's Congrh de
Vienne: von Lerchenfeld's Geschichte Baierns unter Maximilian
Joseph I.
BIOGRAPHIES:—

Stein by Pertz and by Seeley: Bliicher by Scherr and by Blasendorf:
Yorck by Droysen: Gneisenau by Pertz: Scharnhorsl by L e h m a n n : Schill
by Barsch: von Billow by Varnhagen von E n s e : Karl Muller by Varnhagen von Ense.
MEMOIRS :—

* A r n d t , von Boyen, Hardenberg, *Metternich, * Muffling, * Christian
Ompteda, Louis Ompteda, *von Odeleben, * F . Perthes, Radetzky,
Steffens, Stern, * Varnhagen von Ense.
T h e political pamphlets of Arndt, Gentz, Karl Muller, Fichte's Reden
an die deutsche Nation and Freytag's Bilder aus der deutschen
Vergangenheit (vol. iv) give many details of German life and thought.

Appendix.

377

ITALY.
The history of Signor Botta on the French domination in Italy needs to
be corrected and supplemented by the critical works of Peschieri and
Parenti, as well as by the histories—Franchetti's Storia d''Italia dal 1789 al
1799, De Castro's Storia d' Italia dal 1799 al 1814, Tivaroni's Storia critica
del risorgi?7iento italiano (vols. I—11), Vimercati's Histoire d'ltalie de 1789
d 1863, Turotti's Storia delle armi italiane dal 1794 al 1815, Carutti's Storia
delta Casa di Savoia durante la revoluzione e V Impero francese, Lumbroso
(Giacomo) Roma e lo Stato romano dopo V 89, Colletta's Storia del reame di
Napoli dal 1734 al 1825.
MEMOIRS:—

Alfieri, Azeglio (Massimo d') / miei ricordi (vol. 1), Balbo (Cesare)
Autobiografia, Bigarre, du Casse's Memoires d* Eugene, Leopardi (Monaldo)
Autobiografia, *Macdonald, Melzi (Duca di Lodi), *Miot de Melito,
* Pepe, Thaon de Revel, Thiebault, and Zucchi.

SPAIN.
Baumgarten's Geschichte Spaniens seit 1789: Napier's History of the
Peninsular War: Wellington's Despatches.
Tjie Memoirs or Diaries of Broglie, Kincaiid, *Marbot, Marmont,
*Miot de Melito, Sir G. Napier, *Ompteda, Captain Patterson, Soult,
Colonel Tomkinson, and Beamish's History of the King's German Legion,
deal with parts of the Peninsular War.

RUSSIA.
Bernhardi's Geschichte Russlands (vol. I, 1814—1831): Rambaud's Histoire de Russie: Vandal's Napoleon et Alexand7-e: Tatistcheff's Alexandre I
et Napolion: VHistoire de Vexpedition en Russie by the Count de Segur,
and a damaging criticism on this work by General Gourgaud: also the
accounts of the 1812 campaign by Cathcart, Chambray, Clausewitz,
Marbot, and Wilson.
Memoirs by*Prince Czartoryski, Tehichagorf, and Ernouf's Souvenirs
d^un of/icierpolonais.

378

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era,
T H E SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES.

HISTORIES :—

Carlson's Geschichte Schwedens: Dunham's History of Denmark,
Sweden, and Norway: Fryxell's History of Sweden: Vertot's Histoire des
revolutions de Sutde*
Memoires de Suremain.
HISTORIES OF TREATIES.
The collections of Garden and Martens, and Koch and Scholl's Histoire
des Traites entre les Puissances de VEurope, 1648—1815.

APPENDIX II.
LIST

OF T H E C H I E F APPOINTMENTS, DIGNITIES

AND

HONOURS &c. BESTOWED BY NAPOLEON.

[An asterisk is affixed to the names of his Marshals. ]
*Augereau. Due de Castiglione.
*Bernadotte. Prince de Ponte Corvo.
* Berthier. Chief of the Staff. (Prince de Neufchatel.) Prince de
Wagram.
*Bessieres. Due d'lstria. Commander of the Old Guard.
Bonaparte, Joseph. (King of Naples.) King of Spain.
,,
Louis. King of Holland.
„
Lucien. Prince de Canino.
,,
Jerome. King of Westphalia.
* Brune.
Cambaceres. Arch-Chancellor. Due de Parma.
Caulaincourt. Due de Vicenza. Master of the Horse. Minister of
Foreign Affairs (1814).
Champagny. Due de Cadore.
Chaptal. Minister of the Interior. Comte de Chanteloupe.
Clarke. Minister of War. Due de Feltre.
Daru. Minister of War. Comte.
* Davoust. Prince d'Eckmuhl. Governor of Hamburg.
Drouet. Comte d'Erlon.
Drouot. Comte. Aide-Major of the Guard.
* Duroc. Due de Friuli.
Eugene (Beauharnais). Viceroy of Italy.

380

The Revohittonary and Napoleonic Era.

Fesch (Cardinal). Grand Almoner.
Fouche. Minister of Police (1801—1810). Due d'Otranto.
Jomini. Baron.
*Jourdan. Comte.
*Junot. Due d'Abrantes.
* Kellermann. Due de Valmy.
*Lannes. Due de Montebello.
* Lefebvre. Due de Danzig.
* Macdonald. Due de Taranto.
Maret. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1811—1814). Due de Bassano.
* Marmont. Due de Ragusa.
*Massena. (Due de Rivoli.) Prince d'Essling.
Miot. Comte de Melito.
Mollien. Comte. Minister of the Treasury.
* Moncey. Due de Conegliano.
Montholon. Comte.
*Mortier. Due de Treviso.
* Mouton. Comte de Lobau.
*Murat. (Due de Berg.) King of Naples.
*Ney. (Due d' Elchingen.) Prince de la Moskwa.
*Oudinot. Due de Reggio.
Pasquier, Due de. Prefect of Police.
* Poniatowski.
Rapp. Comte.
Remusat. Chamberlain.
Reynier. Due de Massa.
Savary. Due de Rovigo. Minister of Police.
Sebastiani. Comte.
* Serurier.
*Soult. Due de Dalmatia.
* St Cyr, Marquis de.
* Suchet. Due d'Albufera.
Talleyrand. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1799—1807). Grand
Chamberlain (1804—1808). Prince de Benevento.
* Victor. Due de Belluno.

INDEX.
Aboukir Bay, 109, n o , 129, 130
Absenteeism, 20—21
Addington Ministry, The, 128, 131,
142—3, 145
Additional Act, The, 341—2
Albuera, Btl. of, 226
Alexander I, 149—156, 159—161,
172—179, 198—200, 206, 210—
213, 240—5, 247—258, 263—279,
297—317, 324—333, 362, 364,
369
Alkmaar, 114
Allvintzi, General, 101
Alsace, 20, 42, 61, 65, 83, 102, 361
—3
America, North, 30—31, 33, 35,
40, 46, 217, 331
Amiens, Peace of, 130—132, 143
Ancients, Council of, 95, 96, 105,
114—116
Anspach, 6, 158, 160, 286, 327
Areola, Btl. of, 101
Armed Neutrality League, 128—
130, 242
Arndt, 192, 268
Artois, Comte d', 38, 4 1 , 59, 145—
6, 309, 3 i 9 ' 337. 3 3 8
Aspern, Btl. of, 204
Assembly, National, 38—43
„
Constituent, 43—58, 6 1 ,
73>85
,,
Legislative, 61—67, 79
Assignats, 52, 62, 6^, 78, 83, 84,
106
Auerstadt, Btl. of, 170'
Augereau, General, 105, 313, 336,
344
Austerlitz, Btl. of, 161

Australia, 139
Austria, 3—9, 1.3—16, 54, 60, 64,
68, 73—4, 77, 89, 91—92, 99—
103, 105, i n , 113,124—7, i 3 2 —
3, 141, 149—151, 199, 201—207,
210—213, 241, 266, 269, 276—
287, 308, 319, 324—335, 340, 360
—366
Avignon, 319
Babeuf, 96
Badajoz, 224, 226, 228
Baden, 133, 146, 155, 167
Bagration, 251—3
Bailly, 39, 42, 56, 6^, 85
Baireuth, 6, 286, 327
Banalite, 20, 200, 231
Barbaroux, 63, 66, 81
Barclay, General, 252—3, 256, 275,
280
Barere, 79, 84
Barnave, 44, 49, 56, 85
Barras, 95, 96, 98, 107, 115—116
Bartenstein, Treaty of, 173, 277
Basel, Peace of, 9 1 , 319
Bastille, The, 41—42
Batavian Republic, see Netherlands
(Dutch)
Bautzen, Btl. of, 274
Bavaria, 7, 28, 74, 9 1 , 103, 133,
155, 161, 162, 167, 202—7, 250,
284—287, 324—335, 363, 365
Baylen, Btl. of, 196
Belgium, 10—11, 13, 14, 15, 65,
78, 79> H4> 3*7> 363, 3<55, 3<57>
370
Berlin Decrees, T h e N i 7 i , 178
Bernadotte, 90, 116, 166, 246, 274,

382

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

278, 279, 282—5, 300, 302, 316,
326
Berthier, 100, n o , 136, 166, 225,
344
Bessieres, 228, 258, 291
Billaud-Varenne, 84
Bliicher, 171, 267, 279, 281—4, 300
—313, 343—3<>i
Bonaparte, Napoleon, passim.
„
Joseph, 165, 196, 198,
200—201, 209, 221, 225—6, 288
—292, 303, 312—15, 339
„
Louis, 166, 213—214
„
Lucien, 115—117, 360
„
Jerome, 176, 251, 285
Borodino, Btl. of, 254, 259
Boulogne, 144—5, 156—8.
Bourbons, T h e , 3, n , 13, 14, 30,
53, H I , 126, 146, 152, 165, 199,
235> 304.3I5—17» 3^2, 336—340,
360—367
Bourrienne, 100, 164, 214—215,
246
Breisgau, 103—104, 126, 132
Brienne, Lomenie de, 34—35
Brissot, 63, 64
Brittany, 37, 82, 94, 123, 128
Broglie, D u e de, 106, 228, 251, 303
Brumaire, Coup d'etat of, 115—117
Brune, General, 118
Brunswick, D u k e of, 66, 68—69,
90, 169—170
Brunswick-Oels, D u k e of, 204, 205,
2°9> 347, 349
Billow, General von, 300, 309, 350,
352, 357
Burke, 73, 369
Busaco, Btl. of, 222—3
Buzot, 44, 63, 81
Cadoudal, Georges, 145—6
Cahiers, 35—36, 40
Calendar, Revolutionary, 70, 147
Calonne, 34
Cambaceres, 122, 134
Camperdown, Btl. of, 107
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 103—
105, 107, 125, 132
Camus, 52

Canning, 178—9, 196
Cape, T h e , 131, 142, 167, 198, 327
Carnot, 83, 89, 94, 96, 07, 98, 105,
109, 125, 341, 359, 360
Castiglione, Btl. of, 100
Castlereagh, Lord, 307, 320, 327—
333
Catherine I I , 9 — n , 15—16, 59—
60, 73' 77> 9 1 _ 2 > ? I X
Caulaincourt, 269, 297, 303, 307—
8, 321
Centralisation of power, n — 1 2 , 46,
57» 65, 79—80, 85, 93, 95, 118,
122—124, 134—135, 140, 181—2,
i9°> 2 3 6 > 335, 3 6 6 , 37o
Ceylon, 131, 143
Chaptal, 83, 136, 139, 216, 220
Charles, Archduke, 154, 159, 203—
205, 209
Charles I V , 194—6.
Chaumette, 84, 85
Chaumont, Treaty of, 308, 315, 325
Chauvelin, 74—76
Cherasco, Convention of, 99
Church, T h e Roman Catholic, 6, 9,
10, 17, 23, 36, 51—2, 78> 82 > IQ6>
119, 132—3, 135
Cintra, Convention of, 197
Cisalpine Republic, T h e , 101, 103,
104, i n , 118, 126, 131, 140
Ciudad Rodrigo, 222, 226, 228, 229
Clausel, 228, 289—290, 344
Clergy, T h e , 9, 10, 17—19, 31, 35,
43, 44, 45, 65, 94, 106, 119, 135,
136, 230, 235
Cleves, 6, 91, 133, 161, 333
Coalition, First, 78, 9 1 , 92, 99, 103,
165
Coalition, Second, n o , 112, 118,
125—126
Coalition, Third, 149—169, 173—8,
181, 203 (note).
Coalition, Fourth, 265—279
Code, T h e Civil, 70, 116, 138
„ T h e Napoleonic, 138
Collot d'Herbois, 84
Commercial Treaty (1786), 23, 37
Committee of General Security, 46,
80, 85, 93, 95

Index.
Committee of Public Safety, 79—
93, 95> 97—8, 120, 219
Commune, T h e Paris, 48, 65—68, 84
-88,5,3
Communism, 96
Concordat, T h e , 52, 135—6
Condorcet, 63, 70, 128, 136
Constitution, French (iVQi), 46—
47, 53—54» 56—58, 62, 64, 123,
134, 230—1
Constitution, French (1793), 85, 134
»
( I 795i ? 94—95»
98, 114—116, 134
Constitution, French (1799), 57, 120
—122, 134
Constitution, French (1802), 134
„
»
(1814), 322—3
„
Polish (1791), 69—70,

77
,,
Spanish (1812), 231—2
Consulate, T h e , 119—147
„
T h e (for life), 134
Continental System, T h e , 141, 144,
172, 176—7, 184, 206, 213—218,
235—6, 238—9, 241—8
Convention, French, 12, 67, 70—

76, 79—96
Corday, Charlotte, 81
Cordeliers' Club, T h e , 49, 66
Corvees, 32, 34, 70
Couthon, 87—88
Craonne, Btl. of, 310
Custine, 70, 85
Czartoryski, 150—155,212, 240—1,
328, 369
Dalberg, 28, 168
Danton, 49, 50, 64, 67—8, 7 T , 72,
78, 80, 85—86
Davoust, 90, 251, 254, 260, 271,
278, 285, 341
Delaunay, 41
Denmark, 9, 128, 176, 178—9, 197,
200, 241, 278, 285, 326, 340, 308
Departmental System, T h e , 50—51,
52—3. 85, 123—4, 231
Desaix, General, 125
Desmoulins, Camille, 48—50, 7 1 ,

86

383

Diderot, 21, 25
Directory, T h e , 57, 95—120
Divorce, Napoleon's, 210—11
Dresden, Btl. of, 280, 355
Dubois-Crance, 117
Ducos, 115—116
Dumouriez, 64—70, 74, 78—80, 85,
118
Dunkirk, 83
Duport, 44, 49
Eckmuhl, Btl. of, 203
Economists, T h e , 22, 31
Education, National, 70, i n , 136
—7> 193
Egypt, 107, 1 0 9 — i n , 131, 143.
Elba, 143, 335, 337
Empire, T h e Holy Roman, 2, 7, 17,
20, 6 1 , 64, 70, 73, 78, 9 1 , 126,
132—3, 149, 168, 185
Encyclopaedists, T h e , 25, 34
Enghien, D u e d', 146, 149, 150
England, 7, 8, 13, 15, 54, 7 2 - 5 ,
77, 82, 89—90, 92, 94, 100,
102, 103, 107, 112, 124, 126, 128
— 1 3 1 , 140—145, 151—156, 164,
177—181, 184, 202—204, 214—
217, 238—9, 242—4, 277, 287,
297> 3°°> 308, 319—20, 324—332,
340—364
Erfurt, 198—200, 202, 210, 212,
218, 240
Erlon, Count d', 346, 348, 353
Essling, Btl. of, 204
Etruria, K m of, 126, 142, 213
Eugene Beauharnais, 204, 236, 248,
258—60, 271, 274, 279, 287, 306,
34i
Eylau, Btl. of, 173
Federation festival, 53
Ferdinand V I I , 194—196, 201, 230,
30°> 327> 368
Feudalism, 17—21, 42, 58, 6g} i n ,
163, 186—7, 200, 218, 231
Feuiilants, T h e , 56, 61—64, 79' 85
Fichte, 169, 192—3
Finland, 9, 177, 179, 199

384

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era.

Five H u n d r e d , Council of, 95, 96,
105, 114—116
Fleurus, Btl. of, 89
Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 180, 194
Fouche, 94, 154, 178, 200, 210, 219,
296, 341, 342, 359
Fox, 145, 165, 167
France, passi?n.
Francis, 64, 73, 78, 9 1 , 103, 124,
149, 168, 199—200, 202—7, 269,
27<>> 279, 301—2, 317, 324—
335
Frederick the Great, 3—7, 11, 19,
*4> 39
Frederick William I I , 7—9, 14, 08,
in
Frederick William I I I , i n , 153—
4, 159—162, 166—176, 185—193,
201, 244, 263—7, 275, 325
Friedland, Btl. of, 173
Friesland, East, 6, 175, 333
Fructidor, Coup ifetat of, 105, 114
Gabelle, 32, 70
Game Laws, T h e , 20, 44
Geneva, 109, 125
Gensonne, 63
Germany, 2—7, 14, 17—20, 27, 28,
6 1 , 64, 70, 91—2, i n , 118, 124,
126—128, 132—3, 138, 141, 143,
144, 149—152, 160—176, 185—
193, 198—200, 202—207, 209,
215, 217—219, 237, 239, 240, 263
— 8 , 271—288, 295—8, 301, 308,
321, 324— 335, 362—366, 371
Girondins, T h e , 62—75, 79—84,93,
96, 370
Gneisenau, 169, 188, 244—5, 350
Godoy, 194—0
Goethe, 27, 69, 192, 199, 213
Gregoire, 43, 52
Gross Beeren, 281
Grouchy, 350—9
Guadet, 63, 81
Gustavus I I I , 9, 60, 92
Gustavus I V , 151, 179
H a m b u r g , 153, 214—218, 271, 272,

335

Hanover, 158, 160, 161, 167—8,
175, 181, 250, 265, 324, 332—3,
365
Hardenberg, 186—7, 191, 264, 266,
325> 33<>> 334
Hayti, 92, 139, 319
Hebert, 49, 50, 71, 84, 85
Helvetic Republic, see Switzerland
Helvetius, 23
Hesse-Cassel, 9 1 , 133, 168, 175,
335
Hoche, 90, 94, 102
Hofer, 205—207
Hohenlinden, Btl. of, 126
Holland, see Netherlands
Houchard, 85
Humboldt, W . von, 193
Hungary, 6, 10, 14, 64
Illuminati, T h e , 28, 70,.111, 133
India, 30, 97, 107, 142—3, 198
Indulgents, T h e , 8 1 , 86
Inlendants, The, 18, 42, 50, 124
Ionian Isles, T h e , 102—3, 107,131,
142, 176, 367
Isnard, 63
Italy, 19, 29, 98—104, n o , 112—
114, 124—126, 138, 140,142, 143,
154, 165, 204, 215, 232—7, 248,
285, 287—8, 296, 324—326, 365
—7> 37o
Jaccbins, T h e , 49, 54, 59, 62—75,
81—85, 92, 93, 96> 97. 98> I O 5 —
6, 114—117, 119, 120, 126—7
Jacqueries, 42, 44, 62
Jassy, Treaty of, 15
Jemmappes, Btl. of, 69
Jena, Btl. of, 170
Joseph I I , 6, 7—13, 16, 39, 78
Josephine de Beauharnais, 98, 147,
200, 2 1 0 — n
Jourdan, 83, 89, 90, I O I , 112, 114,
116, 289—290
Jovellanos, 230—1
Julich, 133
J u n o t , 136, 181, 194, 291

Index.
Kalisch, Convention of, 270
,,
Treaty of, 264, 325
Kellermann, 69, 104, 125, 348
Kleber, 82, 90, n o
Korner, 268
Kosciusko, 91
Kulm, Btl. of, 281
Kutusoff, 254, 256—259, 263, 297
Lafayette, 33, 35, 42, 48—9, 54, 64,
66, 338, 342, 359, 370
Lamarck, 54
Lameth, 44, 49, 50, 56
Landwehr, 188, 268, 347
Lannes, 100, 159
Laon, Btl. of, 310
L a Rcveillere, 96, 98, 106
L a Rothiere, Btl. of, 302, 315
Lavoisier, 85
Legion of Honour, 137—8
Leipzig, Battles near, 283—4
Leopold I I , 11, 13, 14, 64
Licences, Trade, 214
Liege, Bishopric of, 12 — 13, 69
Ligny, Btl. of, 346—8
Ligurian Republic, The, i©4, 126,
131, 140, 154
Lodi, Btl. of, 100
Lombardy, 100, 103, 287, 367
Lonato, Btl. of, 100
Lorraine, 20, 30, 361—3
Louis X I V , 1, 2, 18, 20, 89, 92,
103, 122, 164, 219
Louis X V , 19, 23—24, 30, 85, 126
Louis X V I , 13, 30—42, 52—55, 60
—68, 71—72, 85
Louis X V I I , 82, 94
Louis X V I I I , 94, 309, 316-—323,
328—338, 360—365
Louisa, Queen, 162, 175, 176, 224
Lou vet, 63, 78.
Luneville, Treaty of, 126—128, 131
Liitzen, Btl. of, 273—4
Lyons, 21, 53, 8 1 , 87, 90, 131, 313,

337
Macdonald, 89, 90, 113, 147, 227,
252, 273, 274, 281—284, 303, 307,
310—17, 323, 337, 344

F.R.

385

Mack, 154, 156—159
Mainz, 28, 70, 82, 132, 133, 334
Malesherbes, 35
Malet, 268, 270, 298
Malta, 107, 109, 112, 124,129—131,
142—3, 153, 167, 214, 219
Mantua, 99—101, 125
Marat, 49, 50, 71—72, 78, 81
Marbot, 221, 222, 261
Marceau, 90
Marengo, Btl. of, 124—6
Maret, 74, 247
Maria Theresa, 30, 31, 39
Marie Antoinette, 30—31, 54, 84,
212

Marie Louise, 211—213, 270, 312,
318, 340, 367
Marmont, n o , 204, 283, 291, 309,
311—14, 318, 344
Marseillaise, the, 66, 69
Massena, 90, 100, 112, 113, 124,
136, 165, 222—224, 291, 344
Maurepas, 31
Maximum Law, 80, 83
Mediation, Act of, 108, 141
Mediatisation, 168, 286
Melas, General, 124—5
Metternich, 153, 156, 2 0 6 , 2 4 2 , 2 4 6 ,
248, 286, 315, 325—335> 34°
Milan, 99—100, 112, 180
Miles, A., 62, 74—75
Mina, 227, 289
Miot de Melito, 142, 209, 226, 290
Mirabeau, 34, 39, 43—49, 51—55.
136, 37o
Modena, 101, 103, 126, 132, 367
Mollien, 216, 219, 220, 247, 269,
270
Moniteur, T h e , 50, 141, 297
Montesquieu, 4, 21
Montgelas, 133, 202
Montmirail, Btl. of, 303
Moore, Sir John, 200—201
Moreau, 90, 101, 102, 125—6, 146
—7
Mortier, 311, 313, 344
Moscow, Occupation of, 256—8
Mounier, 49, 50
Mountain, T h e , 63, 71—75, 8 0 - - 8 S

25

386

The Revolutionary

and Napoleonic Era.

Miihlhausen, 109, 319
Municipal Reform (French), 42, 190
Municipal Reform (Prussian), 189
Murat, 90, 95, n o , 159, 166, 171,
195—196, 235, 253—4, *57> 2 ? o ,
278, 280—4, 287—8, 307, 331,

366
Naples, n , 104, 112, 126, 131, 143,
165, 196, 235, 270, 367
Napoleon, passim
National Guards, The, 42, 48, 51, 66,
68, 82, 94—5, 269, 304, 312
Natural boundaries, T h e , 65, 92,
2

96—9> 32*» 339

Necker, 33—40, 45, 47, 49> 52, 53
Neerwinden, Btl. of, 78, 82
Nelson, 109, 112, 129, 157—8
Netherlands, Austrian, 7, 10—11,
I3> 29> 69, 73—4, 7 8 , 89, 103
Netherlands, Dutch, 2, 7, 8, 11, 15,
29> 54> 73—74' 77> 89, 103, 107,
114, 118, 131—3, 140—2, 144,
150—2, 154, 166, 175, 209, 213
—14, 218, 285, 288, 297, 326—7,

363, 367—8, 371
Ney, 222, 224, 253—4, 260, 262,
274, 291, 310—314, 337, 345—
349» 353—8
Nice, 69—70, 73, 99, 104, 125
Non-jurors, 52, 82, 106, 119, 135
N o o t k a Sound, 13, 53
Norway, 179, 278, 326, 368.
Ocana, Btl. of, 209
Oldenburg, 217, 240, 242, 248, 335
Orders in Council, 171, 180, 2 I 4 —
216
Orleans, D u k e of, 40, 48, 79, 85,
86, 361
Orthez, Btl. of, 308
Pache, 79
Palm, 169
Paoli, 82, 97
Papal States, T h e , 100,101,108,165,
197, 202, 213, 233—235, 326
Paris, Treaty of (1814), 319, 326
„
»
.» (1815)1 363

Pariements, The, 18, 24, 31—43, 45,
5o
Parma, n , 126, 140, 341, 367
Pasquier, Due, 35, 4 1 , 269, 341
Paul I, 112, 114, 129—131
Peninsular W a r , 197, 200—201, 208
— 9 , 213, 220—232, 288—292
Pepe, General, 287, 367
Petion, 44, 63, 66, 81
Physiocrats, The, 22
Pichegru, 89, 106, 145—6
Piedmont, see Sardinia
Pillnitz, Declaration of, 60—61
Pitt, 9, 13, 73—74, 103, 112, 128,
165
Plenary Court, 34
Poland, 4, 5, 8—10, 14, 16, 59—60,
73, 77, 82, 89, 90—91, 132, 151,
172, 175, 210, 215, 240, 242—4,
248, 250—1, 264, 3^4—333, 3 6 8
—9
Pombal, i r , 39
Poniatowski, Prince, 251, 270, 279,
284
Pope, T h e , 101, 104, 108, 126, 135,
147, 165, 197, 210, 233—4, 240,
326
Portugal, 11, 39, 112, 131, 143, 178
—180, 194, 222—224, 239, 319,
368
Potsdam, Convention of, 160
Prairial, Law of, 87
Presburg, Treaty of, 162
Provence, Comte de, 59, 60, 94, 309
Prussia, 3—9, 13—16, 19—20, 59,
64, 66, 68, 73, 77, 89, 90, 91—2,
128, 132—3, 138, 142, H 3 ' I 4 9 —
154, 159—162, 166—177, 184—
193' 213, 241, 244—5, 263—8,
274—286, 319, 321, 324—335'
340—366
Pyramids, Btl. of the, 109
Quatre-Bras, 347—9
Quesnay, 22
Rastadt, Congress of, 104, m — 1 1 3
Ratisbon, Btl. of, 203

Index.
Reichenbach, Peace of (1790), 14—
i 5 , 54
Reichenbach, Treaties of (1813), 279,
280
Reichs-deputation, T h e , 133
Revolutionary Tribunal, 80—85, 87
Rewbell, 96, 114
Rhine, Confederation of the, 133,
167—8, 170, 175, 187, 203, 216,
248, 266, 285—6, 301
Rights of Man, 45
Rivoli, Btl. of, 101
Robespierre, 26, 44, 49, 64, 71, 78
—89, 97, 120, 128, 369
Roland, 63, 71
Roland, Madame, 63, 75, 8 1 , 85,
86, 128
Rome, 104, 108, 112, 233—235, 326
Rousseau, 21, 26—7, 40, 44, 46, 49,
55, 56, 61, 69, 70—71, 87, 98,
191
Royal Session, The, 38—40
Russia, 5, 7—11, 15, 54, 60, 6g, 73,
77, 9 1 , 112—114, 128, 142, 149—
156, 159—161, 167, 172—176,
198—201, 207, 210—213, 240—
271, 3J9> 324—335' 340, 3^0—4,
369
Salamanca, Btl. of, 228
Salzburg, 103, 126
Saragossa, 196, 201
Sardinia, Kingdom of, 65, 92, 99,
104, 112, 131, 140, 142, 150—2,
319, 326, 363, 367
Savary, 146, 269
Savoy, 69—70, 73, 99, 104, 319,
3 2 I > 363
Saxony, 60, 9 1 , 168, 175, 273, 280
— 4 , 288, 328—334, 365
Scharnhorst, 188, 266—8, 274
Scheldt, T h e , 8, 73—4
Schill, 204, 209
Schiller, 27—28, 192—272
Schonbrunn, Treaty of (1805), 162
Schonbrunn, Treaty of (1809), 206,
210
Schwarzenberg, 260, 262, 276, 279,
280, 282, 301, 310—11

337

Sebastiani, 142
Secularisations, T h e , 132
Seigneurial Courts, T h e , 17, 44, 200,
231
Senate, 121—122, 127, 134, 136,
146, 182, 269, 301
Sentimentalism, 27, 98
September Massacres, T h e , 68, 86
Serfdom, 19—20, 32, 44, 186—7,
218
Servan, 68
Sicily, 214, 219, 235, 367
Sieyes, 44, 46, 50, 51, 57, 114—123,
133
Sistova, Peace of, 15
Slave Trade, T h e , 320, 327, 367
Smith, Sir Sydney, 110
Smolensk, 252—3, 260
Social Contract, T h e , 26
Soult, 201, 208, 222, 224, 229, 291,
308—9, 318, 344—358
Spain, 9, 13, 19, 53—4, 78, 90, 92,
107, 126, 131, 138, 139, 143, 144,
180—1, 193—8, 200—1, 208—9,
213, 220—232, 238—9, 288—292,
319' 368, 371
St Cyr, 147, 165, 252, 253, 259, 260,
2
7 9 ' 344
St John, Knights of, 107, 109, 130
—132
St Just, 26, 71, 79, 83, 84—89
St Vincent, Btl. of, 107
Stael, Mdme. de, 96, 136, 220
States General, 35—39
Stein, 185—191, 204, 232, 245—258,
263—267, 276—7, 286, 325, 332,
362
Stockach, Btl. of, 112
Suchet, 222, 289, 290, 292, 344
Suspects, L a w of, 84
SuvorofT, 77, 9 1 , 113
Sweden, 2, 3, 8, 9, 60, 128—129,
149—152, 172, 176—179, 213,
245—7, 278, 319, 326, 368
Swiss Guards, 66—7
Switzerland, 2, 108—109, i n — 1 1 4 ,
138, 141, 142, 150—152, 216,
288, 300, 340, 369, 371

388

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era,

Talavera, Btl. of, 208
Talleyrand, 4 4 , 4 5 , 51—52, 107, 115,
119, 120, 131, 160, 166, 168, 177
— 8 , 199—200,211,219, 221, 269,
292, 316—19, 321—334, 340
Tallien, 87, 94
Teplitz, Treaties of, 279, 324, 325
Terror, Reign of, 26, 83—88, 92,
117

Tettenborn, 262, 271, 285, 309
Thermidorian Reaction, T h e , 88, 93
—95,
Tiers Etat, 35—40
Tilsit, Treaty of, 174—177,199, 240,
242—3
Tithes, Abolition of, 51, 73
Tolentino, Treaty of, 101
Torres Vedras, 223—4, 239
Toulon, 83, 85, 97
Trade-Gilds, 22, 32, 45, 190
Trafalgar, 157—8
Trebbia, Btl. of the, 113
Tribunate, The, 121, 127, 134, 138,
181—2
Trinidad, 131, 143
Triple Alliance (1788), The, 8—10,
I3> 73> 20
Tugendbund, T h e , 193
Turgot, n , 22, 31—34, 39, 60
Turkey, 8, 9, 15—16, 54, 60, 73,
112, 131, 151, 172,174—7,198—
200, 202, 218, 245—7, 253
Tuscany, 104, 112, 126, 132, 367
Tyrol, 3, 11, 100, 125, 132, 162,
202—7, 286, 287, 297, 327

Valmy, 69, 304
Vandamme, 271, 279, 281, 348
Varennes, Flight to, 55—6, 59
Vendee, La, 11, 67, 72, 82, 94, 98,
123
Venetia, 102—104, 162, 204, 234,
287, 365, 367
Vergniaud, 63, 84
Veto, T h e Liberum, 4, 9, 59—60
Veto, Royal, 46—7, 64
Victor, 208, 260, 274, 291, 304, 344
Vienna, Congress of, 324—335,
364—9
Villeneuve, 157
Vitrolles, Baron de, 298, 315—16
Vittoria, Btl. of, 278, 289—290
Voltaire, 21, 24—25 * 27, 32, 60
W a g r a m , Btl. of, 205
Walcheren, 209
Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, 138,174,
175, 187, 204, 206, 240—1, 276,
324—333
Waterloo, Btl. of, 352—8
Wattignies, Btl. of, 83
Wellesley, Sir A., 197, 201, 205, 209
Wellington, D u k e of, 222—232,
278, 288—292, 300, 305, 308, 318,
328> 343—362
Westphalia, Kingd. of, 175
Whitworth, Lord, 140, 142
Wilna, Btl. of, 262
Wittgenstein, 261, 274, 308
Wiirmser, General, 100
Wiirtemberg, 133, 155, 167, 330

Ulm, Btl. of, 156, 158—9
University of Berlin, 193
„
„ France, 137, 193

Yorck, General, 263—4, 267, 303
York, D u k e of, 90, 114, 118
Young, Arthur, 21, 33, 68, 185

Valais, 141, 217

Zurich, Btl. of, 113

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