ILLINOIS
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Production Note
Project Unica
Rare Book & Manuscript Library University of Illinois Library at Urbana-Champaign 2015








—w r
¿Awi- ' 2	** f
nn
fr«lv

i**M
SHORT ESSAY, &c.

4
iHfoWEVER fincere and honourable the intentions of a man who offers his thoughts to the public may be, efpecially when he attempts to reafon againft predominant principles, apparently founded on national pride, he will always expofe himfelf to the fufpicion of belonging to the party then in oppofition, of being a difap-pointed man, or being a&uated by perfonal prejudices. As my confcience fully acquits me of any impulfes of thefe kinds, and as I have no other intereft either way, than what ought to be comtnen to men in the middle ranks of foci-ety, I think it a duty incumbent on me, to offer the following thoughts, on the Policy of our making Peace with France.
Whether the war, flill exifting between England and the Republic of France, was avoidable, or not, in the outfet, is a matter of no importai	ance
(AC 4 ]
ance to my fubjeft, nor is it now, of much importance any way. With as little retrofpeft therefore as poffible, I fhall endeavour to ihew, that it is the intereft of this country, to make a a peace with France, on as good terms as the circunfftances will admit.
Every one, acquainted with the prefent Con-ftitution of France, muil know that the Directory is under the greateft controul, and poifeifeS by its principle«, the leaft power of any of the executive governments in Europe, and perhaps in the world; but in confequence of the mighty efforts that have have been made, from within and without their dominion, againft the Revolution, the people, though avowedly fighting for what they think, and call, Freedom, have fubmitted, and ftill adhere to, a revolutionary government. For the fake of a future, but fpe-culative happinefs, they ftill feem difpofed chearfully to acquiefce in it; and by the ikillful management of this opinion, the Direftory will certainly retain at its difpofal, all the refources of that extenfive, populous, and enthufiaftic country, as long as the prefent conteft continues.
Whoever has paid any attention to the meth-
0<^ w*
** > LrtUC[ 5 ]
od and the fpirit, with which that power has conduced itfelf, in the field and the cabinet, during this war, will no longer doubt its capacity, its perfeverance, and the fertility of its genius, in finding means, by which, juflly or unjuftly, it may always ward off the threatening ftorm. Having no doubts myfelf on thefe points, I am much afraid that the redoubled and inveterate fpirit with which our late fuccefs by fea, has infpired this nation againft our enemies, will only bring upon us, the farcailic retort in the fable, “You bite againft a file------
ceafe viper.”
Though the brave Commander, and all the feamen of our fleet of the Nile, have gained immortal honor, and by their exertions the views of Buonaparte have been, in a great degree crippled, ftill he is in poffelfion of Egypt, is very likely to maintain himfelf there, and perhaps, to form a permanent eftablifhment. This, if not prevented in its infancy, may rea-fonably create fome uneafinefs in our minds, on account of our poffeflions in India. By our great ftrength in that country, and the advantage we have in its commerce over all other nations, by the appropriation of our landed revenues to that commerce, we certainly have no B 2	occafionC 6 ]
occafion to be under immediate apprehenfions, of our trade being diverted from that channel, to any confiderable amount, neverthelefs, the confequences in perfpeilive, ought to be to us, an object of ferious confideration.
A depot of arms, in fuch hands, and fo near our fettlements, is to be regarded with a jealous eye ; as fuch an enemy, would be at all times, in a fituation to take the advantage of any unfavourable incidents that might happen to us. Should we not then, a£t wifely, in endeavouring to difpoflefs them of that fituation, by an early negotiation (for I have no hopes of our doing it by other means) before they feel them-felves well eftablifhed in the country ? Egypt, by its local advantages, by its rivers, its fertility, and its improved fortreifes, may prove in the hands of the French, impenetrable to any other nation ; and in fuch a cafe, it muit remain as a fword hanging over our Eaftern empire.
On the fame reafoning, it will be thought, that there is a ilill greater danger in permitting them to be mailers of Ceylon. It would certainly be a defirable poifeihon in our hands; and fo would be the fum of One hundred millions ilerling, by way of imdemnification for our
expencesC 7 ]
expences in this war, if vve could get it; but the bell thing may be purchased at a rate too dear, which would be the cafe in this inftance, was it to coil us only one additional campaign. We have hitherto maintained ourfelves, and profpered in the Eail, without it, even againil Spain, France, Holland, and America united together. A great difference is to be made between giving it back to the Dutch, inflead of the French, for notwithftanding the opinion of many, Holland is, and after a peace muff remain a feparate fovereignty, and ihe will gradually ihake off the influence of France, under whofe di&ates ihe is now obliged to a£l. I know this will be difputed, but I am firmly perfuaded it will prove an abfolute fa£t.
I feel a great pleafure in faying, that of all the diftant colonies, or eftablifhments, our* in the Eail Indies, are the boil fecured, and Hand on the bell foundation ; bccaufe, it is as difficult (and perhaps more fo) to unite the oppo-flte intereft of the country powers, in the pur-fuit of one objeft, there, as it is to bring the powers of Europe, to coalefce for one purpofe. But thefolidity of their tenure, principally con-fiils in this, that every one who goes there, carries out, and retains in his heart, an unalterable
affe&ion[ 8 ]
affeaion for his own country, and he always looks forward with complacence, to the happy moment of his return ; and as he never fepa-rates his intereft from that of the mother country, he never acquires an attachment to the foil. In a colony, it is otherwife. The man who goes thither, leaves no part of his moral exiftence behind him, and his children, in the fecond or third generation, become naturalized, and feel an exclufive predileftion for the land on which they were born. As long, therefore, as we adhere to the fame principle, we have little to fear ; and it is only to be regretted, that the riches of that empire, are not managed with greater oeconomy.
What may have been the objeft of the Briliih cabinet in the beginning, or what it now is, in profecution of this war, it is not my purpofe to inveiligate; yet I cannot help making fome remarks on the very great change, evident in the opinions our miniilers hold this winter, and thofe they held in the laft. In the courfe of the lait feihons of parliament, when the Jbrench made a parade of invading this country, every man mult recoiled, Mr. Pitt's loudly warning us of our danger, and telling us, that if we expected to remain an independant nation, and
would[ 9 3
would not become a province of France, we muft all come forward with our property and perfonal fervices, in defence of our threatened country. The noble and patriotic fpirit, which has fo long been the innate charaiteriitic of an Engliihman, did not belie his expectations. A Volunteer army, added to the Regulars, Yeomanry, and Fencibles, covered the land with bayonets, in an inilant as by magic ; we faw the gentleman and the tradefman, the opulent merchant and the mechanic, incorporated in the fame ranks, at their own perfonal expence ; ahd from the fame fpirit, we alfo found, government generoufly fupported by a voluntary fubfcrip-tion of a million and a half, whereby public confidence was generally reftored.
If we confider the fpirited language which this conduit breathed, and the two attempts which have been made at Negotiations ; not forgetting his Majeity’s moil gracious fpeech in. parliament, at the opening of the lalt feilion, we fhould be led to think, that the very firil favourable opportunity which offered, would have brought into aftion, the pacific difpofiti-ons, avowedly held by our miniftry. The contrary is however now manifeit! Notwithftand-
inging the threatened invafion, has pafled like a phantom, and the fleets of Holland, France and Spain, if not totally deftroyed, are at leail incapacitated, we fee the fame minifters change like camelions, and by this gleam of funihine, fucceed in dazzling the eyes of the multitude, who do not perceive, that thefe great achievements, though brilliant, and glorious to the nation, are of very little importance, as to the main objedt which ought to be in view.
7 hough the country feems to fhare in the exultation of the minifter, as if it was excluhvely its own caufe, I fhall neverthelefs confider, whethei it is confiftent in this refpedf. It has long been a maxim, that the conquering power, can with honour and advantage to itfelf, at any time m^ike overtures of peace. Could not we then, after all our great naval vidtories, particularly that of the Nile, have propofed peace to the French with a good grace ? Would it not have been a real mark of Mr. Pitt’s con-iiflency, and an uncontrovertible proof of his lincenty, in his two former attempts, to obtain this deli fable end ? But inilead of following this dircdl line of his declared policy, we are furprifed, after Lord Nelion’s vidtory, to fee his peaceable difpofition, change into a vehement[ u ]
nient defire for the profecution of the war, and to hear him telling the nation, that it becomes its dignity to proceed with redoubled vigour, and that it belongs to us, to avenge the wiongs of all the fovereigns of Europe. For this pur-pofe, he feels as fanguine as ever in his ex-peftation of being able to renew the fame, if not a more powerful coalition than before; without maturely oonfidering, that the caufes of its inefficiency, and fubfequent diffolution are flill in exiitence, and will operate with equal force, either to prevent its new formation, 01 to make it of as little avail as the former one. The late conclufion of peace indeed between France and the Empire warrants this opinion, in the firft inilance, there is very little doubt left, of the Emperor ihortly doing fo likewife; and what probability is there, of his venturing to renew hoftilities without the concurrence of the King of Pruffia ? Thofe who will reflect on the relative fituation of that Monarch with the two Emperors of the North, I prefume will hardly imagine that he will be difpofed to engage in, any fuch new fcheme. Fiance is his natural ally ; the great Frederic thought fo, and we all know that the cabinet of Berlin is {fill governed by his political principles, though not with the fame oeconomy. Should the Emperor C	nevertheless[ 12 ]
never thelefs be determined to break off his pending negotiation with France, after the late peace of the Empire, what better chance of fuccefs can he forefee by it ? The frontiers of France are now covered againfl all attacks, from the North Sea to Bafle ; and the only open points left for the Emperor, are from the Tyrol into Italy, or through Switzerland. If the peace with the Empire allows it, (which I know not) the other point is, from Suabia, by Rheinfeld, through the Canton of Bafle, entering France between Huningue, and the defiles of the Bifhoprick of Porentrui.
Admitting that the Emperor fhould fucceed in this lait route, it is not to be fuppofed, that he will advance far in the country, without reducing the above fortrefs, and that of Befort, which, if the French were to be furprifed in that quarter, would give them fufficient time, >to aflemble an army that might make head againfl; him, and by their being in full pofleflion of Switzerland, they would be able to cut off his i'upplies, and perhaps his retreat.
Should the Emperor make his principal efforts through Switzerland and Italy, what will probably be the refult ? Thofe, who know any
thingC *3 ]
thing of the firil country, muft be aware that it would prove a work of very great difficulty, as by its nature it would be entirely a war of Polls, in which the French are paricularly expert, and as they are already in poifeifionof them, they would have in that inilance, a great advantage over the Auftrian troops. Having alfo the inhabitants to a£l with them as auxiliaries, they would no doubt make it, a long, a hard, and a bloody conteil. I know that it is the prevail-ing opinion here, that the majority of the people in Switzerland are anxioufiy ready to join the very firil invader, and that they would hail him, as their deliverer. I am forry tc fay that I think differently. I have relided a long time among the Swifs, within thefe lafl five years, and my obfervations lead me to think that they have nothing lefs at heart, than joining, or fubmitting to, the Auftrians, and flill lefs to their former government. I will like-wife venture to affert that all the Proteflant Cantons (which conflitute two thirds of its population] are generally of this opinion; and many amongft the Roman Catholics, particularly thofe of Fribourg, and St. Gall, are of the fame way of thinking. Every experienced foldier however, mull know, that when men are judiciouily incorporated and employed, there is very little C 2	to[ 14 3
to fear from tlie difaffeaion, or difcontent of a number proportionally fmall; and ffiould the French fuipeft any neceffity for it, how eafy is it for them, to difpofe of thoffe who are mimical to the new order of things, by fcattenng them in their different armies, and fupplymg their places by other troops ?
It may be allowed, that the Emperor may have a better profpeft of fuccefs, by attacking them in Italy, and that with his forces, combined with thofe of the King of Naples,* he will be able to overpower the French in that quarter . For arguments fake, we will alfo fup-pofe, that even in one campaign he may fuc-ceed in driving the enemy beyond the Po, and the Tefiino (which is certainly fuppofing a great deal) but what then ? The French will, even in that cafe, occupy a very itrong country; will be poheffed of many difficult paifes, of Mantua, of Turin, of Aleffandri, and many of the beft fortreffes in the world, all in high repair and well appointed, before which, we know, many of the ableft generals, at the head of large armies have failed. But let us admit flill more,
• This was written at the time the King of Naples and hi* army were at Rome-
that[ *5 1
that the Emperor will be able ultimately to drive the French within their old frontiers, how many campaigns, how much money, and how many men will it coil him, to accompliih that ob-jeft ? Even then, he will not be fo well fecured, as he may now be, by a peace.
Though the Emperor may have occafioned delays in the conclufion of the treaty of Campo Formio, by perhaps making new demands on the French, or though the French may have made them on him, it does by no means follow, that he is really difpofed to break off with them again. The Direftory has more to give, or cede to him, than is neceffary to keep him quiet, whenever it fhall fuit the French fo to do : befides, let us not forget how attentive he muff be, and how deeply he is interefted in competition with the King of Pruffia, in the pending fyftem of fecularization in the German Empire, in which, to all probability, France will play the part of Difpenfer-general. This is of greater importance to the Emperor, than what he may obtain by a new war, which muff be a great uncertainty, though he be never fo well fupported by the unbounded exertions of our cabinet.
The[ *6 ]
The intereils of the court of Vienna, widely differ from ours, and at no time more, than at the prefent moment; for our influence on the Continent, is nearly at an end: perhaps fo much the better ! And the Emperor knows, that we can be of very little fervice to him in that great projefted plan of partition ; and it is well it cannot affeft us, for it is not in our power to influence or prevent it.
I perceive, that great hopes are ftill entertained of the effefls likely to arife from the errors and follies, that the French have repeatedly committed fince their Revolution, and more particularly when in profperity. I have ob-ferved that, on the other hand, they have, in adverfity, as uniformly exhibited, wifdom equal to the exigences of their circumflances, which is the lefs furprifing, as it is generally the cafe in common life. We fhould on our parts be cautious that we are not too much elated with our tranfitory fucceffes, though ever fo brilliant in their appearances, for I have long fince thought, that the only chance of our gaining advantages in our conteft with them, muff originate in the center of their own dominion ; but how that is likely to happen is the queftion.
It[ »7 ]
It is now, an opinion pretty generally adopt, ed, that it would have been a much better policy, to have avoided going to war with France at all; and in other parts of Europe, as well as here, many perfons have had fagacity and fenfe enough to forefee, and even foretell, all the miferable confequences that have refulted from it. Convinced by fix years woeful experience, of the improbability (I might fay, the impoffibility) of fubduing the French, by ilrength or intrigue, we are now forcibly led to con-fider, by what means, themifchief already done, may be re&ified or put a flop to. Will it be by the great proje&ed coalition ? I believe not. Will it be by a partial one ? Still lefs. Will it be by the efforts of England alone ? I hope the prejudices on that head, are too completely fubfided, for anyone man to believe it. France is as invulnerable, in regard to what we can do againit her, as we are to what ihe can do againft us: with this difference, that when France has no other open enemies than Great Britain to contend with (which I prefumc e’er long will be the cafe) ihe will be able to fupport the conteft, at one half or one third of the expences we ihall; and I do not hazard too much in faying, with equal refources.
I[ *8 1
I am perfeftly aware, that by our newly adopted fyftem of raifing the fupplies, this country may proceed on a war eilabliihment for lome time longer, but not without dangei . and again I afk, to what purpofe ? I know al-fo that a Hate, by borrowing, and thereby creating fiaitious property to certain limits, in-creafes its riches, and its means ; but convinced of the great difference there is, in the calculation of public and private wealth, I forbear giving any fixed opinion on our finances. Un-lefs it can be however clearly demonftrated, that notwithflanding our annual loans, the flux and reflux of property between the government and the people will continue for a long time to maintain a perfea equilibrium, I feel anxious to fee a flop put to this bold experiment, and a permanent revenue eflabliihed, not only equal to our peace expenditure, but which may be applied to our finking fund, fo as to bear down with rapidity our national debt. But ought we to wait for this, untill it may be too late to accomplish it?
Do the miniilers fuppoie, that the people will for ever maintain them in their poft of Freeholders and Stockholders General of the kingdom, without feeing fome point which they may look
to,[ 20 ]
pertyof individuals having lio road of circulation, and palling from the hand of the proprietor, diredtlv into the public treafury, I mull leave to an abler head to calculate.
The long prevailing inquiry, of “ who are we to treat with,” has at laft fubiided; but we talk now, of the impolfibility of making a lail-ing peace with France ; and we fay, it is better to continue the prefent war, than to expofe our-felves to • a renewal of it, in a iliort tirr^e, at a great additional expence. Was it likely, that in the courfe of two or three years, it ihould be renewed, I might be of this opinion alfo, but the probability appears to me itrongly againil it. In all likelyhood, if we ihould hear to day of a general peace being figned, we ihould hear at the fame time, that one half of the French armies, had quitted their ilandard, and were haf-tening to their own homes; where, fitting foci-ably at their fire-iides in peace, and full of their greatnefs, they would talk over their pail campaigns and rationally confider for what they had fought, and for what they had fubmitted to fo many hardfhips. In order to learn this, they would read and iludy their Conilitution, which with luch care has been held up to them as de-ferving every facrifice they could make. Should
any