GOOD

SENSE;

NATURAL IDEAS
OPPOSED TO

IDEAS THAT ARE SUPERNATURAL;

BEING A TRANSLATION FROM THE

"BON SENS" OF THE CURE MESLIER.

Detexit quo doloso vaticinandi furore sacerdotes mysteria, illis
saepe ignota, audacter publicant,
PETRONII SATYRICON.

LONDON;
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY B. D . COUSINS,
18, DUKE-STREET,

LINCOLN'S-INN-FIELDS.

TO THE PUBLISHER OF "GOOD SENSE."
DEAR SIR,

•Having read through this American translation, I cannot help making
a few remarks about it, which may be useful to your readers. The
translation is considerably too literal, abounding in Gallicisms. , This
defect is the more to be regretted, as even the original is composed in
so rough a style, that, to use a very appropriate though perhaps vulgar
4/
simile, the author may be said to remind one of a cart horse, whose
%
\
trotting is inelegant, though his kicks are most formidable.* I have
jj
ventured to anglicize some of the translator's phrases, though in con>J
sequence of particular circumstances, I have been obliged to leave the
first sheet, and a great part of two others, in their primitive state of
barbarism. But the translation is at any rate faithful; though the
American twice mistook between " d£crets" and " secrets," and
**
omitted, through negligence, half a dozen lines at the end of a few
/*
chapters. Sometimes however I have adopted his omissions, con^
sidering them judicious; and indeed I regret that he was not more
^ . daring in them; as, languid, or ill placed, sentences may be cecals
sionally found, such as that about Pandora's box, which terminates
L^
this energetic work in a manner which appears to me disgraceful.
At your request, I translate the Index, which is given in the edition
I use (Paris 1802 or 1822,) and which I suppose was wanting in the
edition used by the American translator, or he would not have omitted
presenting his readers with so concise and forcible an abstract of the
work. On the other hand, the edition I use does not contain the two
last paragraphs of the preface, being apparently omitted by an oversight of the printer.
Appended to this French edition is an extract from the " Testament
of the Cure Meslier " by Voltaire, which would occupy about thirty
of your pages, and which I have not thought worth translating, because,
like all Voltaire's works, it is merely Deistical, and enters into a
minute criticism of religious books, best criticised by the silence of
disdaim Far different from the " Testament," the " Bon Sens " is the
strongest atheistical work I ever read. Many of the sentences remind
one of Diderot: indeed we know, from a letter of Grimm's that
Diderot assisted d'Holbach in the " System of Nature." Now the
Bon Sens is attributed to d'Holbach by Barbier, as we may learn from
the following extract (from Barbier's Dictionary) given in thq preface
to the last edition of the Systeme de la Nature (Paris 1822.)
30 f Le Bon Sens; or, Natural Ideas opposed to Supernatural.
London. (Amsterdam. Michael Key.) 1772 in 12mo." An excellent abridgment of the Systeme de la Nature, free'd from arbitrary
ideas, and by the clearness, facility, and precision of its style, adapted
to the meanest comprehension.
Thus Barbier : but I leave all persons to form their own opinion.
You hav^e rightly observed to me, that the diffuse style of the
" System of Nature" is too much opposed to the concise style of
the " Bon Sens " for any one to attribute them to the same author. It
is also my opinion, that no man can write inelegantly on purpose. I t
is true, d'Holbach w a f J ^ £ ^ / ^ s ^ r i l e smd modest of all men: but it
* Voltaire says in a letter IsonS^Vthis^^©. 1763) " II est vrai que cela est
ecrit du style d'un cheval de carrosse ; mais qu'il cruebien apropos !" But this is
apparently said of a work of Voltaire's own, different from the Bon Sens, though
both may perhaps be abridged from the same original publication.
+ i.e. The thirtieth of d'Holbach's fifty works, (all I believe, anonymous or
"•ymous,) upon Religion, Politics, Agriculture, and Mineralogy.

iv
v

must have been a great, and almost inconceivable, triumph over literary vanity, to assume the barbarous style of the Bon Sens. And
what was to be gained by it ? A book is not the better adapted to
•dull comprehensions, because the relative parts of phrases are devoid
of all parallelism, and because the first sentence of paragraphs so
repeatedly begins with «' Pour peu que" and the last sentence with
(an often very illogical) " enfin" or " en un mot." Whoever therefore wrote the book, the style would induce me to imagine that we
ought really to attribute it to some poor country clergyman.
Voltaire has always mentioned the Curb's work in such a mysterious
manner, that one might almost doubt whether the nominal author was
•not a mere ens mtionis. His existence however is fully proved by
the formal account given of him in the " Dictionnaire Universel."
(Paris, 1810.)
" Jean Meslier, Cure of Entrepigny, a village in Champagne, was
the son of a serge-weaver * of the village of Mazerni. He is well
known by a writing published, after his death, under the title of the
Testament of John Meslier. It is a declamation against all the doctrines of Christianity. The style is such as one might expect from a
country cure. The work may be found in the " Evangile de la Raisori" in 8vo, and in the " Recueil Necessaire" 1765 in 8vo. Meslier
was always a man of pure morals; and every year gave his poor
parishioners the surplus of his income. Some persons represent him
as a proud and misanthropical man, who endeavoured to disturb the
repose of his flock by disseminating dangerous opinions among them.
He died in 1733, aged 55. Anacharsis Clootz proposed to the National Convention that a statue should be erected to this cure; but
nothing to that effect was executed." Thus, the author of the Dictionnaire Universel, whose article very much resembles that given by
Ladvocat, (although the Librarian of the Sorbonne) is of course more
bigotted. Clootz's proposition, above alluded to, produced the following decree, made on the 27th Brumaire, year I I . : " The National
Convention refers, to its committee of public instruction., the proposition made by one of its members, to erect a statue to Jean Meslier, cure
of Entrepigny in Champagne, the first priest who had the courage and
good faith to abjure the errors of religion."
To conclude: I think it very possible, that John Meslier might
have left behind him a last will and testament of 366 8vo. pages,
accordingly as is stated in his life, collected from Voltaire, and given
at the beginning of the last Paris edition of the Bon Sens. But how
far the Bon Sens itself may be derived from this Testament, I know
not. If this Testament had been as strongly Atheistical as the work
now before us, I do not think so pious a Deist as Voltaire would have
given himself the trouble of abridging it Again : d'Holbach, in the
title page, does not say that his work is an abridgment: for surely
when he gave it the title of " Le Bon Sens (or Common Sense) of the
Cure Meslier," he could not wish to imply, that it was the Esprit of
the Cur6 Meslier, or a judicious abstract of some larger work of the
cure's.
Hoping that some better informed person will throw more light
upon the subject, I remain, &c. &c.
N. T.
P . S. I regret that I have left so many Barbarisms in the American
translation; but I was afraid that I might be accused of presumption,
^and of altering merely for the sake of altering.
* D'un ouvrier en Serge.

THE

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
WHEN we coolly examine the opinions of men, we are surprised to
find, that even in those opinions, which they regard as the most essential, nothing is more uncommon than common sense; or, in other
words, nothing is more uncommon than a degree of judgment sufficient
to discover the most simple truths, or reject the most striking absurdities, and to be shocked with palpable contradictions. "We have an
example of it in Theology, a science revered in all times and countries,
by the greatest number of men ; an object regarded by them the most
important, the most useful, and the most indispensable to the happiness of society. An examination, however slight, of the principles
upon which this pretended science is founded, forces us to acknowledge
that these principles, formerly judged incontestable, are only hazardous
suppositions, imagined by ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm or
knavery, adopted by timid credulity, preserved by custom which never
reasons, and revered solely because not understood. " Some," says
Montaigne,* " make the world think that they believe what they do
not; others, in greater number, make themselves think that they believe what they do not, not knowing what belief is."
In a word, whoever will deign to consult common sense upon
religious opinions, and will bestow on this inquiry the attention that is
commonly given to any objects we presume interesting, will easily perceive that those opinions have no foundation; that Religion is a mere
castle in the air. Theology is but the ignorance of natural causes
reduced to a system; a long tissue of fallacies and contradictions. In
every country it presents us with romances void of probability, the hero
of which is himself composed of qualities impossible to combine. His
name, exciting in all hearts respect and fear, is only a vague word,
which men have continually in their mouths, without being able to
affix to it ideas or qualities, which are not contradicted by facts, or
evidently inconsistent with one another.
Our notions of this being (of whom we have no idea,) or rather, the
word by which he is designated, would be a matter of indiiFerence, if
it did not cause innumerable ravages in the world. Prepossessed with
the opinion that this phantom is a reality of the greatest interest to
them, men, instead of concluding wisely from its incomprehensibility,
that they are not bound to regard it, infer on the contrary, that they
cannot sufficiently meditate upon it, that they must contemplate it,
and reason upon it, without ceasing, and never lose sight of it. Their
invincible ignorance, upon this subject, far from discouraging them,
irritates their curiosity ; instead of putting them upon guard against
their imagination, this ignorance renders them decisive, dogmatical,
imperious, and even exasperates them against all who oppose doubts
to the reveries which their brains have begotten.
What perplexity arises when it is required to solve an insolvable
* Essays, B. 2, ch. 12.
A

VI

PREFACE.

problem ; unceasing meditation upon an object impossible to understand, but in which however he thinks himself much concerned,
cannot but excite man to be ill humoured, and produce a fever in his
brain. Let interest, vanity, and ambition, co-operate ever so little
with this unfortunate turn of mind, and society must necessarily be
disturbed. This is the reason that so many nations have often been
the scene of the extravagances of senseless visionaries, who, believing
their empty speculations to be eternal truths, and publishing them as
such, have kindled the zeal of princes and their subjects, and made
them take up arms for opinions represented to them as essential to the
glory of the Deity, and to the happiness of empires. In all parts of
our globe, fanatics have cut each other's throats, publicly burnt each
other, committed without a scruple and even as a duty, the greatest
crimes, and shed torrents of blood. For what ? To strengthen, support, or propagate the impertinent conjectures of some enthusiasts, or
to give validity to the cheats of some impostors, in the name and
behalf of a being who exists only in their imagination, and who has
made himself known only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has
caused upon the earth.
Savage and furious nations, perpetually at war, adore, under divers
names, some God conformable to their ideas, that is to say, cruel, carnivorous, selfish, blood-thirsty. We find, in all the religions of the
earth, " a God of armies," a "jealous God,1' an " avenging God," a
" destroying God," a " God," who is pleased with carnage, and whom
his worshippers consider it as a duty to serve to his taste. Lambs,
bulls, children, men, heretics, infidels, kings, whole nations, are sacrificed to him. Do not the zealous servants of this barbarous God think
themselves obliged even to offer up themselves as a sacrifice to him ?
Madmen may every where be seen, who, after meditating upon their
terrible God, imagine that to please him they must do themselves all
possible injury, and inflict on themselves, for his honour, the most
exquisite torments. The gloomy ideas more usefully formed of the
deity, far from consoling them under the evils of life, have every where
disquieted their minds, and produced follies destructive to their
happiness.
How could the human mind make any considerable progress while
tormented with frightful phantoms, and guided by men, interested in
perpetuating its ignorance and fears ? Man has been forced to vegetate
in his primitive stupidity: he has been taught nothing but stories about
invisible powers upon whom his happiness was supposed to depend.
Occupied solely by his fears, and by unintelligible reveries, he has
always been at the mercy of his priests, who have reserved to themselves the right of thinking for him, and of directing his actions. ^
Thus man has remained a child without experience, a slave without
courage, fearing to reason, and unable to extricate himself from the
labyrinth, in which he has so long been wandering. He believes himself forced to bend under the yoke of his gods, known to him only by
the fabulous accounts given by his ministers, who, after binding each
unhappy mortal in the chains of prejudice, remain his masters, or else
abandon him defenceless to the absolute power of tyrants, no less
terrible than the gods, of whom they are the representatives upon
earth.
Oppressed by the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it
has been impossible for the people to know and pursue their happiness.

PREFACE,

Vli

As Religion, so Politics and Morality became sacred things, which the
profane were not permitted to handle. Men have had no other Morality than what their legislators and priests brought down from the
unknown regions of heaven. The human mind, confused by its theological opinions, ceased to know its own powers, mistrusted experience,
feared truth and disdained reason, in order to follow authority. Man
has been a mere machine, in the hands of tyrants and priests, who alone
have had the right of directing his actions. Always treated as a slave,
he has contracted the vices of a slave.
Such are the true causes of the corruption of morals, to which Religion opposes only ideal and ineffectual barriers. Ignorance and servitude are calculated to make men wicked and unhappy. Knowledge,
Reason, and Liberty, can alone reform them, and make them happier.
But every thing conspires to blind them, and to confirm them in their
errors. Priests cheat them, tyrants corrupt, the better to enslave
them. Tyranny ever was, and ever will be, the true cause of man's
depravity, and also of his habitual calamities. Almost always fascinated by religious fiction, poor mortals turn not their eyes to the
natural and obvious causes of their misery; but attribute their vices to
the imperfection of their natures, and their unhappiness to the anger
of the gods. They offer up to heaven vows, sacrifices, and presents,
to obtain the end of their sufferings, which in reality are attributable
only to the negligence, ignorance, and perversity of their guides, to
the folly of their customs, to the unreasonableness of their laws, and
above all, to the general want of knowledge. Let men's minds be
filled with true ideas; let their reason be cultivated; let justice govern
them; and there will be no need of opposing to the passions such a
feeble barrier as the fear of the gods. Men will be good, when they
are well instructed, well governed, and when they are punished or
despised for the evil, and justly rewarded for the good, which they do
to their fellow citizens.
In vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we
begin by curing them of their prejudices. It is only by showing them
the truth, that they will perceive their true interests, and the real
motives that ought to incline them to do good. Instructors have longenough fixed men's eyes upon heaven; let them now turn them upon
earth. An incomprehensible theology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable
mysteries, puerile ceremonies, are too fatiguing to be any longer endured.
Let the human mind apply itself to what is natural, to intelligible
objects, sensible truths, and useful knowledge. Let vain chimeras be
banished; and reasonable opinions will of their own accord enter into
heads, thought to be destined to perpetual error.
Does it not suffice to annihilate or shake religious prejudice, to shew
that what is inconceivable to man, cannot be made for him ? Does it
require anything but plain common sense to perceive, that a being,
incompatible with the most evident notions—that a cause continually
opposed to the effects which we attribute to it—that a being, of whom
we can say nothing without falling into contradiction—that a being,
who, far from explaining the enigmas of the universe, only makes them
more inexplicable—that a being, whom for so many ages men have so
vainly addressed to obtain their happiness, and the end of their sufferings—does it require, I say, anything but plain common sense to perceive—that the idea of such a being is an idea without model, and
that he himself is merely a phantom of the imagination ? Is anything
A 2

Vlll

PREFACE.

necessary but common sense to perceive, at least, that it is folly and
madness for men to hate and torment one another about unintelligible
opinions concerning a being of this kind ? In short, does not every
thing prove, that Morality and Virtue are totally incompatible with
the notions of a God, whom his ministers and interpreters have described, in every country, as the most capricious, unjust, and cruel of
tyrants, whose pretended will, however, must serve as law and rule to
the inhabitants of the earth.
To discover the true principles of Morality, men have no need of
theology, of revelation, or of gods: They have need only of common
sense. They have only to commune with themselves, to reflect upon
their own nature, to consult their visible interests, to consider the
objects of society, and of the individuals who compose it; and they
will easily perceive, that virtue is advantageous, and vice disadvantageous to such beings as themselves. Let us persuade men to be
just, beneficent, moderate, sociable; not because such conduct is demanded by the gods, but because it is pleasure to men. Let us advise
them to abstain from vice and crime; not because they will be
punished in the other world, but because they will, be punished for it
in this.—These are, says a great man,* means to prevent crimes—these
are punishments; these are those to reform manners—these are good
examples.
Truth is simple ; error is complex, uncertain and circuitous. The
voice of nature is intelligible; that of falsehood is ambiguous, enigmatical, mysterious. The way of truth is straight; that of imposture
is crooked and dark. Truth, forever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all upright minds; the lessons of reason are formed to
be followed by all honest men. Men are unhappy, only because they
are ignorant; they are ignorant, only because every thing conspires to
prevent their being enlightened; they are wicked only because their
reason is not sufficiently developed.
By what fatality then, have the first founders of all sects given to
their gods ferocious characters, at which nature revolts ? Can we
imagine a conduct more abominable, than that which Moses tells us
his God showed towards the Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds
boldly to declare, in the name and by the order of Ms God, that Egypt
shall be afflicted with the greatest calamities that can happen to man ?
Of all the different ideas, which they wish to give us of a supreme
being, of a God, creator and preserver of mankind, there are none
more horrible, than those of the impostors, who represented themselves
as inspired by a divine spirit.
Why, 0 theologians! do you presume to inquire into the impenetrable mysteries of a great being, whom you consider inconceivable to
the human mind ? You are the first blasphemers, when you imagine
that a being, perfect according to you, could be guilty of such cruelty
towards creatures whom he has made out of nothing. Confess, with
us, your ignorance of a creating God; and forbear, in your turn, to
meddle°with mysteries, which man seems unworthy of knowing.
Montesquieu.

THE

FOLLOWING"IS A TRANSLATION
OP THE

TABLE OF CONTENTS,
GIVEN IN T H E F R E N C H EDITION OF 1822
CHAP.

PAGE

1. APOLOGUE

•... •

2,
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

1

3. What is Theology ?
2
r,
Man is born with any ideas of Religion.
>
2
It is not necessary to believe in a God
2
Religion is founded on credulity.
3
All religion is an absurdity.
............
3
The idea of God is impossible
3
On the Origin of Superstition
3
On the Origin of all Religion
3
Religious fears expose men to become a prey to impostors.
3
12. 13. Religion seduces ignorance to the aid of the marvellous
4
14. There would never have been any Religion if there had
not been ages of Stupidity and Barbarism
4
15. All religion was produced by the desire of domination..
4
16. What serves as a basis to Religion is of all things the
most uncertain. . .
. *4
4
17. 18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of
a God
4,5
19. The existence of God is not proved
5
20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit . . . . . .
5
21. Spirituality is an absurdity
5
22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter
5
23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology ? .
6
24. It would be less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than
to adore a spiritual Deity
6
25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition aftid action . .
6
26. What is God?
6
27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology . . * . . . . .
6
28. To adore God, is to adore a
fiction
7
29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God, and the
impossibility of knowing the Divine essence
7
30. Believing in God is neither (less)* safe, nor (more)*
criminal than not believing in him
7
* I think the author means exactly the contrary.—Ed.
(A 3

X
CHAP"

PAGE

31. Belief in God is merely a habit mechanically acquired
in infancy
.*
8
32. Belief in God is a prejudice established by passing thro'
successive generations
•
8
33. On the Origin of Prejudices
8
34. On the effects of Prejudices
8
35. The Keligious principles of modern Theology could not
be believed if they were not instilled into the mind before the age of reason
9
I 36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God
9
37, 38. The wonders of nature may be explained by natural
causes
9
39, 40. The world has never been created: Matter moves
of itself.
10
41. Additional proofs that motion is essential to Matter, and
that consequently it is unnecessary to imagine a Spiritual
Mover
10
, 42. The existence of Man by no means proves the existence
of God
11
43. Nevertheless, neither Man nor the Universe are the
effects of chance
...
12
44, 45. The order of the Universe does not prove the existtence of a God
. . . 12, 13
46. A pure Spirit cannot be intelligent: it is absurd to adore
a divine intelligence
•
14
47, 48. All the qualities, which Theology gives to its God
are contrary to the Essence which is attributed to
him
14
49. It is absurd to say that the human race is the object and
end of the formation of the Universe
14
50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God
15
51. It is not true that the object of the formation of the Universe was to render Man happy
15
52. What is called Providence is but a word without meaning
15
53. This pretended Providence is less occupied in preserving
than in disturbing the world, and is less the friend than
the enemy of Man
16
54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being
17
55. God cannot be considered immutable
17
! 56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes.
What is a God that cannot change any thing ?
18
57. The vanity of the consolations which Theology opposes
to the evils of this life The hope of a paradise and
of a future life, is but imaginary
18
58. Another romantic revery
19
59. It is in vain that Theology attempts to clear its God
from human defects: either this God is not free, or
else he is more wicked than good
19

XI
CHAP.

PAGE.

60, 61. It is impossible to believe that there exists a God
of infinite goodness and power
20, 21
62. Theology makes of its God a monster of absurdity,
injustice, malice, and atrocity—a being supremely execrable
21
63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears
22
64. There is no real difference between Religion, and the
most sombre and servile Superstition
22
65. To judge from the; ideas which Theology gives us of
the Deity, the love of God is impossible
22
66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being
22
67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions
23
68. The pretended works of God by no means prove what
are called the Divine Perfections
24
69. The perfection of God is not rendered more evident by
the pretended creation of angels
24
70. Theology preaches the Omnipotence of its God, yet
constantly makes him appear impotent
24
71. According to all religious systems, God would be the
most capricious and most foolish of beings
24
72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God
26
73. The foreknowledge attributed to God would give the
men whom he punishes for their guilt, a right to complain of his cruelty
25
74. Absurdity of the theological stories concerning Original
Sin, and concerning Satan
25
75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the
priests
26
76. If God has been unable to render human nature incapable of sin, he has no right to punish man
26
77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God ought to be
a mystery for man
27
78. Ought the unfortunate to look for consolation, to the
sole author of their misery
,
28
79. A God, who punishes the faults which he might have
prevented, is a mad tyrant, who joins injustice to folly
28
80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity
29
81. But we must not hence conclude that Society has no
right to punish the wicked
31
82. 83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will 31, 32
84. God himself, if there were a God, would not be free:
hence the inutility of all Religion
32
85. According even to the principles of Theology, man is
not free a single instant
32
86. There is no evil, no disorder, and no sin, but must be
attributed to God: consequently God has no right either
to punish or r e c o m p e n c e . . . . . . . , ,
,
32

XII
CHAP.

PAGE.

87. The prayers which men offer to God sufficiently prove,
that they are not satisfied with the divine economy....
88. It is the height of absurdity to imagine, that the injuries
and misfortunes, which man endures in this world, will
be repaired in another world
89. Theology justifies the evil and the wickedness, permitted by its God, only by attributing to him the principle, that " Might makes Right," which is the violation
of all Right
90. The absurd doctrine of Redemption, and the frequent
exterminations attributed to Jehovah, impress one with
the idea of an unjust and barbarous God
91. Can a being, who has called us into existence merely
to make us miserable, be a generous, equitable, and
tender father ?
*...
92. Man's whole life, and all that occurs here below, deposes
against the liberty of Man, and against the justice and
goodness of a pretended God
93. It is not true, that we owe any gratitude to what is
called Providence..
,.
94. It is folly to suppoose that Man is the king of nature,
the favourite of God, and unique object of his labours
95. A comparison between Man and brutes
96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants
97. A refutation of the excellence of Man
98. An Eastern Tale
99. It is madness to see nothing in the universe but the
goodness of God, or to think that this universe is only
made for Man
100. What is the Soul? We know not. If this pretended
Soul were of a different essence than the Body, their
union would he impossible
101. The existence of a Soul is an absurd supposition; and
the existence of an immortal SowZastill more absurd
supposition
102. It is evident that Man dies in toto
103. Incontestable arguments against the Spirituality of the
Soul
104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes, to which
Theologians are constantly having recourse
105. 106. It is false that Materialism degrades the human race 43,
107. The idea of a future life is only useful to those, who
thereby make a trade of public credulity
108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling:
and, even if it were consoling, it would not follow, that
it was therefore true
109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination. What is called internal conviction is but the

33
33

34
35
35
35
36
37
38
38
39
39
40
41
42
42
43
43
44
44
44

xiii
CHAP.

PAGE

effect of habit.
God is a chimera; and the qualities, attributed to him, reciprocally destroy one another..
46
110. Religion is but a system imagined in order to reconcile
contradictions by the aid of mysteries
46
111, 112, 113. Absurdity and inutility of all Mysteries,
which were only invented for the interests of Priests.. 47, 48
114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal
Religion
*
48
115. What proves, that Religion is unnecessary, is, that it is
unintelligible
49
116. Ail Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude
of creeds, all opposite to one another, and all equally
foolish..
49
117. Opinion of a famous Theologian
50
118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory, nor less
chimerical than the God of the Theologians
50
119. It by no means proves the existence of God to say,
that, in every age, all nations have acknowledged some
Deity or other
.51
120. All Gods are of a savage origin : all Religions are monuments of the ignorance, superstition, and ferocity of
former times : modern Religions are but ancient follies,
re-edited with additions and corrections.
51
121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism..
52
122. The more a religious opinion is ancient and general, the
moreitought to be suspected
53
123. Mere scepticism in religious matters, can only be the
effect of a very superficial examination.. „
53
124. Revelations examined
55
125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself to
Men, or ever spoke to them ?.»•
55
126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever
performed
56
127 to 130. If God has spoken, is it not strange that he should
have spoken so differently to the different religious sects ?
—Obscurity and suspicious origin of our oracles—Absurdity of all miracles.—Refutation of the reasoning of
Pascal concerning the manner in which we must judge
of miracles .
56 to 57
131. Every new revelation is necessarily false and impious..
58
132. The blood of the martyrs testifies against the truth of
the miracles, and against the divine origin attributed to
Christianity
58
133. The fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of
missionaries, by no means prove the truth of Religion..
59
134. Theology makes of its God an enemy to Reason and
Common Sense.
•
60

xiv
CHAP

135. Faith is irreconcileable with Reason; and Reason is
preferable to Faith
136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms every one is
reduced, who would substitute Faith for Reason ! . . . .
1?7. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another
man, what is of the greatest importance to himself
138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds
139. To teach, that any one Religion has greater pretensions
to truth than another, is not only an absurdity, but is a
cause of discontent and tumult in states... „
140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality
141. Religion is the weakest barrier that can be opposed to
the passions
,
142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion
143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings, who,
in general, are cruel and capricious tyrants, like him
whose representatives they call themselves
144. Origin of " the divine right of kings," the most absurd,
ridiculouSi and odious, of usurpations
145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations: it makes
despots licentious and wicked, and their subjects abject
and miserable
146 Christianism has propagated itself by preaching implicit
obedience to despotism, of which, like every other Religion, it is the firmest support
147. The only object of religious principles is to eternize the
tyranny of kings
„
148. How fatal it is to persuade kings that they are responsible for their actions to God alone !
149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom
150. Tyranny sometimes finds the segis of Religion a weak
obstacle to the despair of the people
151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes by delivering
them from fear and remorse
152. What is an enlightened Sovereign ?
153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood
154. The quackery of priests
155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils.
«
•
156. Every Religion is intolerant, and is consequently destructive to benevolence
157. The evils of a state Religion
158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime, by teaching
that God sometimes made use of national ferocity for
the attainment of his object

PAGE

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XV

CHAP.

159. Refutation of the argument, that the evils attributed to
Religion are but the bad effects of human passions....
160. Religion is incompatible with Morality
161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable
162. A society of Saints would be impossible
163. Human nature is not depraved; a Morality, which
opposes human nature, is not made for human beings.
164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission
165. The dogma of the remission of sins was invented for the
interests of the priests
166. Who fear God ?
167. Hell is too absurb an invention to be able to prevent
crime
,«,
168. On the bad foundation of religious morals and religious
virtues
169. Christian Charity, as it is preached and practised by
Theologians!
170. Confession, priestcraft's mine of gold, is the destruction
of the true principles of Morality
171. The supposition of the existence of a God is by no
means necessary to Morality
172. Religion and its supernatural Morality are fatal to the
public welfare
173. The union of Church and State is a calamity both to the
subject and the sovereign
174. National Religions are generally burthensome and ruinous . .
175. Religion paralyses Morality
176. Fatal consequences of Devotion
177. The idea of a future life is neither consoling to man, nor
necessary to Morality
178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man,
and has as many motives for doing good
179. An Atheistical king would be far preferable to the many
very religious and very wicked kings
180. Philosophy produces Morality
181' Religious opinions have but little influence upon the
conduct
182. Reason conducts man to Irreligion and Atheism ; because Religion is absurb, and the God of the Priests is a
malicious and savage being
183. Fear alone makes Theists and devotees
184. Can we, and ought we, to love God ?
185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities by the
different ideas every where formed of them
186. The existence of God, which is the basis of Religion,
has not yet been demonstrated

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XVI.
CHAP,

PAGE

187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers are
188. Pride, presumption, and badness of heart, are oftener
found in priests, than in Atheists and Unbelievers
189. Prejudices last but for a time: no power is durable
which is not founded upon truth, reason and e q u i t y . . . .
190. What an honourable-power the ministers of the Gods
would obtain, if they became the apostles of reason and
the defenders of liberty !
191. What a glorious and happy revolution it would be for
the world, if Philosophy were substituted for Religion.
192. The recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death
proves nothing against the reasonableness of unbelief
193. It is by no means true, that Atheism breaks all the bonds
of society
194. Refutation of the often repeated opinion, that Religion
is necessary for the vulgar..
195. Logical and argumentative systems are not adapted to
the capacity of the vulgar . . - . . ;
196. On the futility and danger of Theology,
197,198. On the evils produced by implicit faith
100
199. History teaches us,.that all Religions were established
by impostors in days of ignorance., ^.
200. All Religions whether ancient or modern, have mutually borrowed from one another their abstract reveries and
ridiculous ceremonies .'.'..•.'
201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right
path
;'
7......:..,
202. Theology explains nothing
203. 204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded the progress of intellect **..**
104
205. It cannot be too often repeated and proved, that Religion is an extravagance and a calamity
206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of our N
misfortunes

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106
106

GOOD SENSE.
APOLOGUE.
§ 1. THERE is a vast empire, governed by a monarch, whose
strange conduct is very proper to confound the minds of his sub«
jeots. He wishes to be known, loved, respected, obeyed; buc
never shews himself to his subject, and every tiling conspires to
render uncertain the ideas formed of his character.
The people, subjected to his power, have, of the character and
laws of their invisible sovereign, such ideas only, as his ministers
give them. They, however, confess, that they have no idea of
their master; that his ways are impenetrable; his views and nature
totally incomprehensible^ These ministers, likewise, disagree upon
the commands which they pretend have been issued by the sovereign, whose instruments they call themselves. **They announce
them differently to each province of the empire. They defame
^ne another, and mutually treat each other as impostors and false
Achers. The decrees and ordinances, they take upon themselves
to promulgate, are obscure ; they are enigmas, little calculated to
be understood, or even divined, by the subjects, for whose instruction they were intended. The laws of the concealed monarch require interpreters; but the interpreters are always disputing upon
the true manner of understanding them; Besides, they are mat
consistent with themselves; all they relate of their concealed prince
is only a thread of contradiction. They utter concerning him not a
single word, that does not immediately confute itself. They call
him. supremely good ; yet there is no one, who does not complain
of his decrees. "They suppose him infinitely wise; and under his
administration every thing appears to contradict reason and good
sense.*^They extol his justice; and the best of his subjects aie
generally the least favoured* They assert, he sees every thing; yet
his presence avails nothing. He is, say they, the friend of order ;
yet throughout his dominions, all is in confusion and disorder. He makes all for himself; and the events seldom answer his designs. - He foresees every thing; but cannot prevent anything.- He impatiently suffers offence, yet gives every
one the power of offending him.
Men admire the wisdom
and perfection of his works; yet his works, full of imperfection, are
B

2

GOOD SENSE.

of short duration. He is continually doing and undoing; repairing
what he has made ; but is never pleased with his work. In all his
undertakings, he proposes only his own glory ; yet is never glorified. His only end is the happiness of his subjects; and his subjects, for the most part want necessaries. Those, whom he seems
to favour are generally least satisfied with their fate; almost all
appear in perpetual revolt against a master, whose greatness they
never cease to admire, whose wisdom to extol, whose goodness to
adV>re, whose justice to fear, and whose laws to reverence, though
never obeyed!
This EMPIRE is the WORLD : this MONARCH G O D ; his

MINIS-

TERS are the PRIESTS; his SUBJECTS MANKIND.

2. There is a science that has for its object only things incomprehensible. Contrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what
cannot fall under our senses. Hobbes calls it the kingdom of darkness. It is a country, where every thing is governed by laws, contrary to those which mankind are permitted to know in the world
the? inhabit. In this marvellous region, light is only darkness,
evidence is doubtful or false; impossibilities are credible: reason
is a deceitful guide; and good sense becomes madness. This
science is called theology, and this theology is a continual insult to
the reason of man.
3. By the magical power of " ifs," " buts," " perhaps's,"
"what do we know," &c. heaped together, a shapeless and unconnected system is formed, perplexing mankind, by obliterating
from their mindsy. ideas the most clear, and rendering uncertain
truths the most evident. By reason of this systematic confusion,
nature has become an enigma, inexplicable to man; the visible
world has disappeared, to give place to regions invisible; reason ;
compelled to yield to imagination, who leads to the country ofTi'er
self-invented chimeras.
4. The principles of every religion are founded upon the idea of
a GOD. NOW, it is impossible to have true ideas of a being, who
axts upon none of our senses. All our ideas are representations of
sens%le objects. What then can represent to us the idea of God,
*?irfiTch is evidently an idea without an object ? Is not such an idea
as impossible, as an effect without a cause ? Can an idea without
an archetype be anything, but a chimera? There are, however,
divines, who assure us that the idea of God is innate; or that we
have this idea in our mother's womb. Every principle is the result
of reason; all reason is the effect of experience; experience is
acquired only by the exercise of our senses: therefore, religious
principles are not founded upon reason, and are not innate.
5 Every system of religion can be founded only upon the nature
of God and man ; and upon the relations, which subsist between
them. But to judge of the reality of those relations, we must have
some idea of the divine nature. Now, the world exclaims, the
divine nature is incomprehensible to man; yet ceases not to assign
attributes to this incomprehensible God, and to assure us, that it

GOOD SENSE.

8

Is our indispensable duty to find out that God, whom it is impossible to comprehend.
The most important concern of man is what he can least comprehend. If God is incomprehensible to man, it would seem reasonable never to think of him ; but religion maintains, man cannot
with impunity cease a moment to think (or rather dream) of his
God.
6. We are told, that divine qualities are not of a nature to be
comprehended by finite minds. The natural consequence must he,
that divine qualities are not made to occupy finite minds. Bui
religion tells us, that the poor finite mind of man ought never to
lose sight of an inconceivable being, whose qualities he can never
comprehend. Thus, we see, religion is the art of turning the atteiu
tion of mankind upon subjects they can never comprehend.
7. Religion unites man with God, or forms a communication be^
tween them; yet do you not say, God is infinite? If God be
infinite, no finite being can have communication or relation with
him. Where there is no relation, there can be no union, communication, or duties. Jf there be no duties between man and his
God, there is no religion for man. Thus, in saying God is infinite, you annihilate the religion for man, who is a finite being.
The idea of infinity is to us an idea without model, without archetype, without object.
8 If God be an infinite being, there cannot be, either in the
present or future world, any relative proportion between man and
his God. Thus, the idea of God can never enter the human mind.
In supposition of a life, in which man would be much more enlightened, than in this, the idea of the infinity of God would ever
remain the same distance from his finite mind. Thus the idea of
God will be no more clear in the future, than in the present life.
Thus, intelligences, superior to man, can have no more complete
ideas of God, than man, who has not the least conception of him in
his present life.
9. How has it been possible to persuade reasonable beings, that
the thing, the most impossible to comprehend, was the most essential to them? It is because they have been greatly terrified; because, when they fear, they cease to reason; because, they have
been taught to mistrust their own understanding; because, when
the brain is troubled^ they believe every thing, and examine nothing.
10. Ignorance and fear are the two hinges of all religion. The
uncertainty in which man finds himself in relation to his God, is
precisely the motive that attaches him to his religion. Man is fearful in the dark, in moral, as well as physical darkness. His fear
becomes habitual, and habit makes it natural; he would think that
he wanted something, if he had nothing to fear.
11. He, who from infancy has habituated himself to tremble
when he hears pronounced certain words, requires those words and
needs to tremble. He is therefore more disposed to listen to one,
who entertains him in his fears, than to one, who dissuades him

4

GOOD SENSE*

from them. The superstitious man wishes to fear; his imagination
demands it; one might say, that he fears nothing so much, as to
have nothing to fear.
Men are imaginary invalids, whose weakness empirics are interested to encourage, in order to have sale for their drugs. They
listen rather to the physician, who prescribes a variety of remedies,
than to him, who recommends good regimen, and leaves nature to
herself.
12. If religion were more clear, it would have less charms for
the ignorant, who are pleased only with obscurity, terrors, fables,
prodigies, and things incredible. Romances, silly stories, and the
tales of ghosts and wizards, are more pleasing to vulgar minds than
true histories.
13. In point of religion, men are only great children. The
more a religion is absurd and filled with wonders, the greater ascendancy it acquires over them. The devout man thinks himself
obliged to place no bounds to his credulity; the more things are
inconceivable, they appear to him divine; the more they are incredible, the greater merit, he imagines, there is in believing them.
14. The origin of religious opinions is generally dated from the
time, when savage nations were yet in infancy. It was to gross,
ignorant, and stupid people, that the founders of religion have in
all ages addressed themselves, when they wished to give them their
Gods, their mode of worship, their mythology, their marvellous and
frightful fables. These chimeras, adopted without examination by
parents, are transmitted, with more or less alteration, to their children,
who seldom reason any more t^an their parents.
15. The object of the first legislators was to govern the people ;
and the easiest method to effect it was to terrify their minds, and
to prevent the exercise of reason. They led them through winding bye-paths, lest they might perceive the designs of their guides ;
they forced them to fix their eyes in the air, for fear they should
look at their feet; they amused them on the way with idle stories;
in a word they treated them as nurses do children, who sing lullabies, and scold, to put them to sleep, or make them be quiet.
16. The existence of a God is the basis of all religion. Few
appear to doubt his existence; yet this fundamental article utterly
embarrasses every mind that reasons. The first question of every
catechism has been and ever will be, the most difficult to resolve.*
17. Can we imagine ourselves sincerely convinced of the existence
of a being, whose nature we know not; who is inaccessible to
all pur senses: whose attributes, we are assured every moment,
* In the year 1701, the holy fathers of the oratory of Vendome
maintained in a thesis, this proposition—that, according to St. Thomas, the existence of God is not, and cannot be, a subject of faith;
Dei existentia .nee ad fldem attinet, nee attinere protest juxta
Sanctum Thomam. Vide Basnage, History of the Works of Learned
Mei', YPI. xvii. p. 277. "

GOOt) SENSE.

5

are incomprehensible to us ? To persuade me that a being exists or
can exist, I must be first told what that being is. To induce me to
believe the existence or the possibility of such a being, it is neces-sary to tell me things concerning him that are not contradictory, and
do not destroy one another. In short, fully to convince me of the;
existence of that being, it is necessary to tell me things that I cart
understand, and prove to me, that it is impossible that such a being'
should not exist.
18. A thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually destroy one another, and which can neither be conceived nor
united in thought. Conviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony of our senses, which alone give birth to our ideas,
and enable us to judge of their agreement or disagreement. That,
which exists necessarily, is that, whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. These principles, universally acknowledged, become
erroneous, when applied to the existence of a God. Whatever has
been hitherto said upon the subject, is either unintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear absurd to every
rational man.
19. All human knowledge is more or less clear and perfect. By
what strange fatality have we never been able to elucidate the
science of God ? The most civilized nations, and among them the
most profound thinkers, are in this respect no more enlightened than
the most savage tribes and ignorant peasants ; and, examining the
subject closely, we shall find, that, by the idle speculations and
subtle refinements of men, the divine science has been only more
and more obscured. Every religion has hitherto been founded only
upon what is called, in logic begging the question ; it takes things
for granted, and then proves by suppositions, instead of principles.
20. Metaphysics teach us, that God is a pure spirit. But,
herein is modern theology superior to that of the savages ? The
savages acknowledge a great spirit, for the master of the world.
The savages, like all ignorant people, attribute to spirits all the
effects, of which their experience cannot discover the true causes.
Ask a savage, what moves your watch ? He will answer you, it is
a spirit. Ask our divines, what moves the universe? They
answer, it is a spirit*
21. The savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some
idea to the word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the
^eeze, the breath, that invisibly produces discernible effects. By
subtilizing every thing, the modern theologian becomes as unintel-j
Jlgibte to himself as to others. Ask hirn, what he understands by U
spirit 1 He will answer you, that it i&ari unknown substance, perfectly simple, that has no extension, tnat has nothing common with
matter. Indeed, is there any one, who can form the least idea of
such a substance ? What then is a spirit, to speak in the language
of modern theology, but the absence of an idea ? The idea of
spirituality is yet an idea without model.
22. Is it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal ex*

GOOD SENSE.

istence from the bosom of matter, whose existence is demonstrated
by all the senses, and whose effects we experience every moment,
which we see act, move, communicate motion, and incessantly
generate, than to attribute the formation of things to an unknown
jpower, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive from his nature what
he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual essence, can create
neither matter nor motion ? Nothing is more evident, than that the
idea they endeavour to give us, of the action of mind upon matter,
represents no object, or is an idea without model.
23. The material Jupiter of the ancients could move, compose,
destroy, and create beings, similar to himself; but the God of
modern theology is a sterile being. He can neither occupy any
place in space, nor move matter, nor form a visible world, nor
create men of gods. The metaphysical God is a worker without
hands, fit only to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.
24. Since a God was indispensably requisite to men, why did
they not worship the Sun, that visible God, adored by so many
nations ? What being had greater claim to the homage of men,
than the day-star, who enlightens, warms, and vivifies all beings;
whose presence enlivens and regenerates nature, whose absence
seems to cast her into gloom and languor ? If any being announced
to mankind, power, activity, benificence, and duration, it was certainly the Sun, whom they ought ro have regarded as the parent of
nature, as the soul of the world, as the divinity. At least, they
could not, without folly, dispute his existence, or refuse to acknowledge his influence and his blessings.
25. The theologian exclaims to us, that God wants neither hands
nor arms to act; that he acts by his will. But pray, who or what
is that God, who has a will, and what can be the subject of his
divine will?
Are the stories of witches, sylphs, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins,
&c. more absurd and difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action of mind npcn matter? When we admit such a God,
fables and reveries may claim belief. Theologians treat men as
children, whose simplicity makes them believe all the stories they
hear.
26. To shake the existence of God, we need only to ask a theologian to speak of him. As soon as he has said a word upon the
subject, the least reflection will convince us, that his observations
are totally incompatible with the essence he ascribes to his Goo^
[What then is God ? It is an abstract word, denoting the hidden
power of nature; or it is a mathematical point, that has neither
length, breadth or thickness. A philosopher, speaking of theolcfgians, has ingeniously observed, that they have discovered the
solution of the famous problem of Archimedes—a point in the heavens, whence they move the world*
27. Religion prostrates men before a being, who, without exten* David Humea

GOOD SENSE.

T

sion, is infinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, allpowerful, who never executes his will; a being, sovereignly goodj,
who creates only disquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in
whose government all is in confusion and disorder. What then, can
we imagine, can be the God of theology ?
28. To avoid all embarrassment, we are told, " that it is not
necessary to know what God is; that we must adore without
knowing him; that we are not permitted to extend our rash views
to his attributes." But, before we know that we must adore a God,
must we not know certainly, that he exists ? But, how can we assure
ourselves, that he exists, if we never examine whether the various
qualities, attributed to him, do really exist and agree in him ? Indeed, to adore God, is to adore only the fictions of one's ^ n
imagination, or rather, it is to adore nothing.
29. In view, without doubt, of confounding things the more^
theologians have not been pleased to declare, what their God is ;
they tell us only what he is not. By means of negations and
abstractions, they think they have composed a real and perfect
being, while, in truth, it is only ideal. Mind is that, which is not
body. An infinite being is a being, who is not finite. A perfect
being is a being, who is not imperfect. Indeed, is there any one
who can form real ideas of such a mass of privations, or absence
of ideas ? That, which excludes all idea, can it be anything but
nothing ?
To pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of
human conception, is to grant, that God is not made for man. To
assure us, that, in God, all is infinite, is to own that there can be
nothing common to him and his creatures. If there be nothing
common to God and his creatures, God is annihilated for man, or,
at least, rendered useless to him. " G o d , " they will say, "has
made men intelligent, but he has not made him omniscient;" hence
it is inferred, that he has not been able to give him faculties sufficiently enlarged to know his divine essence. In this case, it is
evident, that God has not been able nor willing to be known by his
creatures. By what right then would God be angry with beings,
who were naturally incapable of knowing the divine essence ?
God would be evidently the most unjust and capricious of tyrants,
if he should punish an Atheist for not having known, what by his
nature, it was impossible he should know.
30. To the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more
convincing than fear. It is therefore, that theologians assure us,
we must take the safest part; that nothing is so criminal as incredulity 5 that God will punish without pity every one who has the
temerity to doubt his existence; that his severity is just, since madness or perversity only can make us deny the existence of an enraged monarch, who without mercy avenges himself on Atheists.
If we coolly examine these threaten in gs, we shall find, they always
suppose the thing in question. They must first prove the existence
of a God, before they assure us, it is safest to believe, and horrible

fi

GdOD SENS&.

to doubt or deny his existence. They must then prove, that it is
possible and consistent, that a just God cruelly punish men for
having been in a state of madness, that prevented their believing
the existence of a being, whom their perverted reason could not
conceive. In a word, they must prove, that an infinitely just God
can infinitely punish the invincible and natural ignorance of man
•with respect to the divine nature. Do not theologians reason very
strangely? They invent phantoms, they compose them of contradictions ; they then assure us, it is safest not to doubt the existence
of these phantoms they themselves have invented. According to
this mode of reasoning, there is no absurdity, which it would not
be more safe to believe, than not to believe.
All children are Atheists; they have no idea of God. Are they
thelf criminal on account of their ignorance ? At what age must
they begin to believe in God t It is, you say, at the age of reason.
But at what time should this age commence ! Besides, if the pro*
foundest theologians lose themselves in the divine nature, which
they do not presume to comprehend, what ideas must the people
of the world, women, artisans, in a word, those who compose the
mass of mankind, have of him ?
31. Men believe in God only upon the word of those, who have
no more idea of him than themselves. Our nurses are our first
theologians. They talk to children of God as if he were a scarecrow ; they teach them from the earliest age to join their hands
mechanically. Have nurses then more true ideas of God, than the
children whom they teach to pray to him ?
32. Religion, like family estate, passes, with its incumbrances,
from parents to children. Few men in the world would have a
God, had not pains been taken in infancy to give them one. Each
would receive from his parents and teachers the God whom they
received from theirs; but each, agreeably to his disposition, would
arrange, modify, and paint him in his own manneF.
33. The brain of man, especially in infancy, is tike soft wax, fit
to receive every impression that is made upon it. Education furnishes him with almost all his ideas at a time, when he is incapable
of judging for himself. We believe we have received from nature,
or have brought with us in our birth, the true or false ideas, which,
in a tender age, had been instilled into our minds; and this persuasion is one of the greatest sources of our errors.
34. Prejudice contributes to cement in us the opinions of those
who have been charged with our instruction. We believe them
much more experienced than ourselves; we suppose they are fully
convinced of the things which they teach u s ; we have the greatest
confidence in them; by the care they have taken of us in infancy, we judge them incapable of wishing to deceive us. These
are the motives that make us adopt a thousand errors, without
other foundation than the hazardous authority of those by whom
we have been brought up. The prohibition likewise of reasoning upon what they teach us, by no means lessens our

GOOD SENSE.

9

confidence; but often contributes to increase our respect for their
opinions.
35. Divines act very wisely in teaching men their religious principles before they are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or their left hand from their right. It would be as difficult
to instil into the mind of a man, forty years old, the extravagant notions that are given us of the divinity, as to eradicate them from the
mind of him who had imbibed them from infancy.
36. It is observed, that the wonders of nature are sufficient to
lead us to the existence of a God, and fully to convince us of this
important truth. But how many are there in the world who have
the time, capacity, or disposition, necessary to contemplate Nature
and meditate her progress ? Men, for the most part, pay no regard to it. The peasant is not struck with the beauty of the sun,
which he sees every day. The sailor is not surprised at the regular
motion of the ocean ; he will never draw from it theological conclusions. The phenomena of nature prove the existence of a God
only to some prejudiced men, who have been early taught to behold the finger of God in every thing whose mechanism could embarrass them. In the wonders of nature, the unprejudiced philosopher sees nothing but the power of nature, the permanent and
various laws, the necessary effects of different combinations of
matter infinitely diversified.
37. Is there anything more surprising than the logic of these
divines, who, instead of confessing their ignorance of natural causes,
seek beyond nature, in imaginary regions, a cause much more unknown than that nature, of which they can form at least some idea ?
To say, that God is the author of the phenomena of nature, is it
not to attribute them to an occult cause ? What is God ? What
is a spirit? They have causes of which we have no idea. O wise
divines! Study nature and her laws; and since you can there
discover the action of natural causes, go no to those that are supernatural, which, far from enlightening, will only darken your
ideas, and make it utterly impossible that you should understand
yourselves.
38. Nature, you say, is totally inexplicable without a God.
1#>at is to say, to explain whit you understa d very little, you have
need of a cause which you understand not at all. You think to
elucidate what is obscure, by doubling the obscurity j to solve difficulties, by multiplying them. O enthusiastic phil< sophers I To
prove the existence of a God, write complete treatises of botany ;
enter into a minute detail of the parts of the human body; launch
forth into the sky, to contemplate the revolution of the stars ; then
return to the earth to admire the course of waters; behold with
transport the butterflies, the insects, the polypi, and the organised
atoms, in which you think you discern the greatness of your God.
All these things will not prove the existence of that God •, they will
prove only, that you have not just ideas of the immense variety of
matter, and of the effects, producible by its infinitely diversified com*

JO

GOOD SENSE.

binations, that constitute the universe. They will prove only your
ignorance of nature; that you have no idea of her powers, when you
judge her incapable of producing a multitude of forms and beings,
of which your eyes, even with the assistance of microscopes, never
discern but the smallet part. In a word, they will prove, that,
for want of knowing sensible agents, or those possible to know,
you find it shorter to have recourse to a word, expressing an inconceivable agent.
39. We are gravely and repeatedly told, that there is no effect
ivithout a cause; that, the world did not make itself. But the universe is a cause, it is not an effect; it is not a work ; it has not
been made, because it is impossible that it should have been made.
The world has always been; its existence is necessary; it is its
own cause. Nature, whose essence is visibly to act and produce*
requires not, to discharge her functions, an invisible mover, much
more unknown than herself. Matter moves by its own energy, by
a necessary consequence of its heterogeneity. The diversity of
motion, or modes of mutual action, constitutes alone the diversity
of matter. W e distinguish beings from one another only by the
different impressions or motions which they communicate to our
organs.
40. You see, that all is action in nature, and yet pretend that
nature, by itself, is dead and without power. You imagine, that
this all, essentially acting, needs a mover! What then is this
mover? It is a spirit; a being absolutely incomprehensible and
contradictory. Acknowledge then, that matter acts of itself, and
cease to reason of your spiritual mover, who has nothing that is
requisite to put it in action. Return from your useless excursions ; enter again into a real world; keep to second causes, and
leave to divines their first cause, of which nature has no need, to
produce all the effects you observe in the world.
41. It can be only by the diversity of impressions and effects,
which bodies make upon us, that we feel them ; that we have perceptions and ideas of them ; that we distinguish one from another;
that we assign them properties. Now, to see or feel an object, the
object must act upon our organs; this object cannot act
upon us, without exciting some motion in u s ; it cannot
excite motion in us, if it be not in motion itself. At ihe
instant I see an object, my eyes are struck by i t ; I can have no
conception of light and vision, without motion, communicated to
my eye, from the luminous, extended, coloured body.. At the
instant I smell a body, my smell is irritated, or put in motion, by
the parts that exhale from the odoriferous body. At the moment
I hear a sound, the tympanum of my ear is struck by the air, put
in motion by a sonorous body, which would not act if it were not
in motion itself. Whence it evidently follows, that, without motion, T can neitherfeel, see, distinguish, compare, judge, nor occupy
my thoughts upon any subject whatever.
We are taught in the schools, that the essence of a thing is that

GOOD SENSE.

11

from which all its properties flow.* Now, it is evident, that all
the properties of bodies, of which we have ideas, are owing to motion, which alone informs us of their existence, and gives us the
first conceptions of them. I cannot be informed of my own existence but by the motions I experience in myself. I am therefore forced to conclude, that motion is as essential to matter as
extension, and that matter cannot be conceived without it.
Should any person deny that motion is essential and necessary
to matter, they cannot, at least, help acknowledging that bodies,
which seem dead and inert, produce motion of themselves, when
placed in a fit situation to act upon one another. For instance;
phosphorus, when exposed to the air, immediately takes fire. Meal
and water, when mixed, ferment. Thus dead matter begets motion
of itself. Matter has then the power of self-motion; and nature,
to act, has no need of a mover, whose pretended essence would
hinder him from acting.
42. Whence comes man? What is his origin? Ts he then
the effect of a fortuitous concourse of atoms ? Did the first man
spring, ready formed, from the dust of the earth ? I know not.
Man, appears to me, like ail other beings, a production of nature.
I should be equally embarrassed to tell whence came the first
stones, the first trees, the first lions, the first elephants, the first
ants, the first acorns, &c. as to explain the origin of man. We are
incessantly told to acknowledge and revere the hand of God, of an
infinitely wise, intelligent and powerful maker, in so wonderful a
work as the human machine. I readily confess that the human
machine appears to be surprising. But as man exists in nature, I
am not authorised to say that his formation, is above the power of
nature. But I can much less conceive of this formation, when to
explain it, I am told, that a pure spirit, who has neither eyes, feet,
hands, head, lungs, mouth nor breath, made man by taking a little
clay, and breathing upon it.
We laugh at the savage inhabitants of Paraquay, for calling
themselves the descendants of the moon. The divines of Europe
call themselves the descendants, or the creation of a pure spirit.
Is this pretension much more rational ? Man is intelligent;
thence it is inferred, that he is .the work only of an intelligent being,
and not of a nature, which is void of intelligence. Although nothing is more rare, than to see man make use of this intelligence, of
which he seems so proud, I will grant that he is intelligent, that his
wants develope this faculty, that society especially contributes to
cultivate it. But I see nothing in the human machine, and in the
intelligence with which it is endued, that announces very precisely
the infinite intelligence of the maker to whom it is ascribed. I see
that this admirable machine is liable to be deranged; I see, that
his wonderful intelligence is then disordered, and sometimes
* Essentia est quid primuum in re, fons et radix omnium rei propria

tatum.

12

GOOD STStfSE.

totally disappears; I infer that human intelligence depends upon
a certain disposition of the material organs of the body, and thai
we cannot infer the intelligence of God, any more from the intelligence of man, than from his materiality. All that we can infer
from it, is, that God is material. The intelligence of man no more
proves the intelligence of God, than the malice of man proves the
malice of that God, who is the pretended maker of man. In spite
of all the arguments of divines, God will always be a cause contradicted by its effects, or of which it is impossible to judge by its
works. We shall always see evil,, imperfection, and folly, result
from such a cause, that is said to be full of goodness, perfection and
•wisdom.
43. " W h a t ! " you will say, " is intelligent man, is the universe, and all it contains, the effect of chancel" N o ; I repeat it?the universe is not an effect; it is the cause of all effects; every
being it contains is the necessary effect of this cause, which sometimes shews us its manner of acting, but generally conceals its operations. Men use the word chance to bide their ignorance of true
causes, which, though not understood, act not less according to
certain laws. There is no effect without a cause. Nature is a
word, used to denote the immense assemblage of beings, various
matter, infinite combinations, and diversified motions, that we bebold. All bodies, organized or unorganized, are necessary effect©
of certain causes. Nothing in nature can happen by chance.
Everything is subject to fixed laws. These laws are only the necessary connexion of certain effects with their causes. One atom
of matter cannot meet another by chance; this meeting is the effect
of permanent laws, which cause every being necessarily to act as it
does, and hinder i*. from acting otherwise, in given circumstances.
To talk of the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or to attribute some
effects to chance, is merely saying that we are ignorant of the
laws, by which bodies act, meet, combine, or separa'e.
Those who are unacquainted with nature, the properties of'
beings, and the effects which must necessarily result from the concurrence of certain causes, think, that everything takes place by
chance. It is not chance that has placed the sun in the centre of
our planetary sys em; it is by its own esssence that the substance
of which it is composed must occupy that place, and thence be
diffused to vivify the beings inhabiting the planets.
44. The worshippers of a God find, .above all in the .order
of the universe, an invincible proof of the existence of an
intelligent and wise being, who governs it. But this order is nothing but a series of movements necessarily produced by causes or
circumstances, which are sometimes favourable, and sometimes
hurtful to u s : we approve of some, and complain of others.
Nature uniformly follows the same round; that is, the same
causes produce the same effects, as long as their action is not disturbed by other causes, which force them to produce different
effect?. "When the operation of causes, whose effects we

GOOD SENSE,

23

experience, is interrupted by causes, which, though unknown, are not the less natural and unnecessary, we are confounded ; we cry out, a miracle! and attribute it to a cause much
more unknown than any of those acting before our eyes.
The universe is always in order. It cannot be in disorder. It
is our machine alone that suffers when we complain of disorder
The bodies, causes^ and beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in the manner in which we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove of their effects. Earthquakes, volcanos, inundations, pestilences, and famines are effects as necessary, or as
much in the order of nature, as the fall of heavy bodies, the courses
of rivers, the periodical motions of the seas, the blowing of the
winds, the fruitful rains, and the favourable effects, for which men
praise God, andKhank him for his goodness.
To be astonishep! that a certain order reigns in the world, is to
be surprised that the same causes constantly produce the same
effects. To be shocked at disdorer, is to forget, that when things
change, or are interrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer
be the same. To wonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that
anything can exist; it is to be surprised at any one's own existence.
What is order to one being, is disorder to another. All wicked
beings find that everything is in Order, when they can with impu«
nity put everything in disorder. They find, on the contrary, that
everything is in disorder, when they are disturbed in the exercise of
their wickedness.
45. Upon supposition that God is the author and mover o
nature, there could be no disorder with respect to him. Would
not all the causes, that he should have made, necessarily act according to the properties, essences, and impulses given them ? If
God should change the ordinary course of nature, he would not be
immutable. If the order of the universe, in which man thinks he
sees the most convincing proof of the existence, intelligence, power
and goodness of God, should happen to contradict itself, one might
suspect his existence, or, at least, accuse him of inconstancy, impotence, want of foresight and wisdom in the arrangement of things;
one would have a right, to accuse him of an oversight in the choice
of the agents and instruments, which he makes, prepares, and puts
in action. In short, if the order of nature proves the power and
intelligence of the Deity, disorder must prove his weakness, instability and irrationality.
u say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the unverse with
his immensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could
not act without his agency. But in this case, you admit, that
your God is the author of disorder, that it is he who deranges
nature, that he is the father of confusion, that he is in man, and
moves him at the moment he sins. If God is every where, he is in
me, he ac s with me, he is deceived with me, he offends God with
me, and combats with me the existence of God. O, theologians!
you never understand yourselves, when you speak of God,

14

GOOD SENSE.

46. In order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary to
have ideas, thoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and
wishes, it is necessary to have organs ; to have organs it is necessary
to have a body ; to act upon bodies, it is necessary to have a body ;
to experience disorder, it is necessary to be capable of suffering.
Whence it evidently follows, that a pure spirit can neither be intelligent, nor affected by what passes in the universe.
Divine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing
common with those of men. Very well. How then can men judge,
right or wrong, of these views ; reason upon these ideas: or admire
this intelligence ? This would be to judge, admire, and adore that,
of which we can have no ideas. To adore the profound views of
divine wisdom, it is not to adore that, of which we cannot possibly
judge ? To admire these views, is it not to admire without knowing
why? Admiration is always the daughter of ignorance. Men
admire and adore only what they do not comprehend.
47. All those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible
with a being, who, by his very essence, is void cf all analogy with
human beings. It is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves from this difficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed to the Divinity ; they enlarge them to infinity, where they
cease to understand themselves. What results from this combina' tion of man with God, or from this theanthropy ? A mere
chimera, of which, if anything be affirmed, the phantom, combined
with so much pains, instantly vanishes.
Dante, in his poem upon Paradise, relates, that the Deity appeared to him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris,
whose lively colours generated each other ; but that, looking
steadily upon the dazzling light, he saw only his own figure. While
adoring God, it is himself, that man adores.
48. Ought not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can
have none of the human qualities, virtues, or perfections ? Our
virtues and perfections are consequences of the modifications of
our passions. But has God passions as we have ? Again : our
good qualities consists in our dispositions towards the beings with
whom we live in society. God, according to you, is an insulated
being. God has no equals—no fellow-beings. God does not live
in society. He wants the assistance of no one. He enjoys an unchangeable felicity. Admit then, according to your own principles, that God cannot have what we call virtues, and that man
cannot be virtuous with respect to him.
^
49. Man, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race
to be the sole object of God in creating the universe. Upon what
does he found this flattering opinion ? Upon this we are told ;
that man is the only being endued with an intelligence, which
enables him to know the Deity, and to render homage worthy of
him. We are assured, that God made the world only for his own
glory, and that it was necessary that the human species should come
into this plan, that there might be some one to admire his works,

GOOD SENSE.

15

and glorify him for them. But, according to these suppositions,
has not God evidently missed his object? 1st. Man, according to
yourselves, •will always labour under thecompletest impossibility of
knowing his God, and the most invincible ignorance of his divine
essence. 2dly. A being, who has no equal, cannot be susceptible
of glory; for glory can result only from the comparison of one's
own excellence with that of others. 3dly. If God be infinitely
happy, if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homage of
his feeble creatures? 4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours, is not glorified ; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the
world represent him as perpetually offended; their sole object
is to reconcile sinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God.
50- If God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than
man with ants. Would the ants of a garden reason pertinently
concerning the intentions, desires, and projects of the gardener ?
Could they justly imagine, that the park of Versailles was planted
for them alone, by an ostentatious monarch, and that the sole object
of his goodness was to furnish them with a superb residence ? But,
according to theology, man is, with respect to God, far below what
the vilest insect is to man. Thus, by theology itself, which is
wholly devoted to the attributes and views of the Divinity, theology
appears a complete folly.
51. We are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's
only object was the happiness of man. But, in a world made purposely for him, and governed by an omnipotent God, is a man in
reality very happy ? Are his enjoymen s durable ? Are not his
pleasures mixed with pains? Are many persons satisfied with their
fate ? Is not man continually the victim of physical and moral
evils ? Is not the human machine, which is represented as a
master-piece of the Creator's skill, liable to derangement in a thousand ways? Should we be surprised at the workmanship of a
mechanician, who should shew us a complex machine, ready to
stop every moment, and which, in a short time, would break in
pieces of itself?
52. The generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for
the wants, and watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures,
is called Providence. But, when we open our eyes, we find that
God provides for nothing. Providence sleeps over the greater part
of the inhabitants of this world. For a very small number of men
who are supposed to be happy, what an immense multitude groan
under oppression, and languish in misery ! Are not whole nations
forced to deprive themselves of bread, to administer to the extravagances of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than their
oppressed slaves ?
At the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon
the goodness of Providence, while they exhort us to repose our
confidence in her, do we not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen
catastrophes, exclaim, that Providence sports with the vain projects
of man, that she frustrates their designs, that she laughs at their

16

GOOD SENS£.

efforts, that profound wisdom delights to bewilder the minds of
mortals ? But, shall we put confidence in a malignant Providence,
who laughs at, who sports with mankind ? How will one have me
admire the unknown ways of a hidden wisdom, whose manner of
acting is to me inexplicable ? Judge of it by effects, you will say.
I d o ; and I find, that these effects are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful to me.
Men think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world,
there is much more good than evil to every individual of mankind.
Supposing the goods, we enjoy from Providence, are to the evils, as
a hundred to ten; will it not still follow, that, for a hundred degrees
of goodness, Providence possesses ten. of malignity; which is incompatible with the supposed perfection of the divine n%ture.
Almost all books are filled with the most flattering praises of
Providence, whose attentive care is highly extolled. It would seem as
if man, to live happy here below, needed not his own exertions. Yet,
without his own labour, man could subsist hardly a day. To live,
he is obliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and labour without intermission. Without these second causes, the first cause, at least in most
countries, would provide for none of our wants. In all parts of the
globe, we see savage and civilized man in a perpetual struggle with
Providence. He is necessitated to ward off the strokes directed
against him by Providence, in hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hailstorms, inundations, droughts, and the various accidents, which so
often render useless all his labours. In a word, we see man continually occupied in guarding against the ill offices of that Providence, which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness.
A bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to
pass through those places, where men have built large cities. Is
not this man's reasoning as rational, as that of many learned men,
who incessantly talk of final causes, or who pretend that they clearly
perceive the beneficent views of God in the formation of all things.
53. Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests
herself in the preservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it is she, who governs the world, we find her as
active in destroying, as in forming; in exterminating, as in producing. D o s she not every moment destroy by thousands, the very
men, to whose preservation and welfare we suppose her continually
attentive ? Every moment she loses sight of her beloved creature.
Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she annihilates his
harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes she desolates
them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man. She
arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates
his existence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the
universe ?
If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of
Providence towards the human race and all sensible beings, we
should find, that far from resembling a tender and careful mother,
she resembles rather those unnatural mothers, who instantly for-

GOOD SENSE.

17

getting the unfortunates of their licentious love, abandon their
infants, as soon as they are born, and who, content with having
borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of fortune.
The Hottentots, in this respect much wiser than other nations,
who treat them as barbarians, refuse, it is said, to worship God ;
because, say they, if he often does good% he often does evil. Is not
this manner of reasoning more just and conformable to experience,
than that of so many men, who are determined to see, in their God,
nothing but goodness, wisdom and foresight, and who refuse to see
that the innumerable evils, of which this world is the theatre, must
come from the same hand, which they kiss with transport?
54, The logic of common sense teaches, that we cannot, and
ought not, to judge of a cause, but by its effects. A cause can
be reputed constantly good, only when it constantly produces
good, useful, and agreeable effects. A cause, which produces
both good and evil, is sometimes good, and sometimes evil. But
the logic of theology destroys all this. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold in this wcrld, prove to
us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and this cause is God.
Although this world is full of evils; although disorder often reigns
in i t ; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate; we must
be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and
immutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign to believe it0
Every thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearest
manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can
judge of the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the
means, which he employs to attain his proposed object. The
object of God, is it is said, the happiness of n,an. Yet, a like
necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings, who are born only
to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man is filled
with joy and bitterness ; good is every where attended with evil;
order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction. If you tell me, that the designs of God are mysterious, and
that his ways are impenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is
impossible for me to judge whether God be intelligent.
55. You pretend, that God is immutable 1 What then produces
a continual instability in this world, which you make his empire ?
Is there a state, subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions^
than that of this unknown monarch ? How can we attribute to an
immutable God, sufficiently powerful to give solidity to his
works, the government of a nature, in which everything is in continual vicissitude ? If I imagine I see a God of uniform character
in all the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a God can
I see in their continual misfortunes ? You tell me, it is our sins,
which compel him to punish. I answer, that God, according to
yourselves, is then not immutable, since the sins of men force him
to change his conduct towards them. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be constantly the
same?

18

GOOD SENSE*

56. The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings there
enjoy and suffer, that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a disagreeable manner. These effects
are necessary; they result necessarily from causes, which act
only according to their properties. These effects necessarily please
or displease me, by a consequence of my own nature. This
same nature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things,
and to seek, desire, and procure ©thers. In a world, where
every thing is necessary, a God, who remedies nothing, who
leaves things to run in their necessary course,—is he anything
but necessity, or necessity personified ? It is a deaf and useless
God, who can effect no change in general laws, to which he is himself subject. Of what importance to me is the infinite power of a
being, who will do but very little in my favour?
Where
is the infinite goodness of a being, indifferent to my happiness? Of what service to me is the favour of a being, who,
being able to do me an infinite good, does not do me even a finite
one?
57. When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under
the government of a good God, we are told, by way of consolation,
that the present world is only a passage, designed to conduct man
to a happier one. The divines assure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they shut our mouths, by
saying, that God could communicate to his creatures neither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for himself
alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of
another life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man,
who, by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of
surviving themselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more
durable happiness. 2dly. How can we conceive that a God, who
knows every thing, and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures, should yet want so many experiments, in
order to be sure of their dispositions ? 3dly. According to the calculations of our chronologists, our earth has existed six or seven
thousand years. During that time, nations have, under different
forms, incessantly experienced afflicting vicissitudes and calamities.
History exhibits the human species at all times tormented and
ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by wars, inundations,
famines, plagues, &c. Are such long trials then likely to inspire
us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity ? Do
such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the
future state, his goodness is preparing for us ? 4thly. If God is
so kindly disposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness, could he not at least have communicated the
degree of happiness, of which finite beings are susceptible here
below? To be happy, must we have an infinite or divine happiness ? 5thly. If God could not make men happier than they are
here below, what will become of the hope of a paradise, where it
is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable bliss? If

GOOD SENSE.

19

God neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only
residence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he
can or will avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea ?
It is more than two thousand years, since, according to Lactantius,
the sage Epicurus observed: u either God would remove evil out
of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not: or he has
neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he has both the power and
will. If he has the will, and,not the power, this shews weakness,
which is contrary to the nature of God. If he has the power, and
not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary to his
nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and
malignant, and consequently cannot be God. If he be both willing
and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whencf
comes evil, or why does he not prevent it?'* Reflecting minds
have been waiting a reasonable solution of these difficulties, for
more than two thousand years; and our divines tells us, that they
will be removed only in a future life.
58. We are told of a pretended scale of beings. It is supposed,
that God has divided his creatures into different classes, in which
each enjoys the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible.
According to this romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the
celestial angels, all beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to
their nature. Experience explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie.
In this world, all sensible beings suffer and live in the midst of
dangers. Man cannot walk without hurting, tormenting, or killing
a multitude of sensible beings, who are in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a multitude of evils, foreseen or
unforeseen, which may lead him to his destruction. Is not the
idea of death alone sufficient to disturb him in his most exquisite
enjoyments? During the whole course of his life, he is exposed
to pains ; he is not sure, a moment of his existence, to whicb he is
so strongly attached, and which he regards as the greatest present of
the Divinity.
59. The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which
it is susceptible: since it is not the God who made it, it must have
great qualties and great defects. But we answer, that, as the world
must necessarily have great defects, it would have been more con»
formable to the nature of a good God, not to have created a world,
which he could not make completely happy. If God, who was,
according to you, supremely happy, before the creation of the
world, could have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world, Why did he not remain at rest? Why must man
suffer? Why must man exist? What imports his existence to
God? Nothing, or something? If his existence is not useful or
necessary to him, why did he not suffer him to remain in nothing ?
If his existence is necessary to his glory, he had need of man; he
was deficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an
unskilful workman for making an imperfect work; because he must
work, well or ill, upon penalty of starving. This workman is ex-

20

600t> SENSE.

disable; but your God is not. According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? He has, you say, every
thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does he not do it ?
Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness, unless you
admit, that God was necessitated to do what he has done, without
being able to do it otherwise. Yet, you assure us, that your God
is free. You say also, that he is immutable, although it was in
Time that he began and ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of this world. O theologians! Vain are your
efforts to free your God from all the defects of man. This perfect
God has always some human imperfection.
60. " Is not God master of his favours ? Can he not give them ?
Oan he not take them away ? It does not belong to his creatures
to require reasons for his conduct. He can dispose of the works of
his own hands as he pleases. Absolute sovereign of mortab, he
distributes happiness or misery, according to his good pleasure."
Such are the solutions given by theologians to console us for the
evils which God inflicts upon us. We reply, that a God, who is
infinitely good, cannot be master of his favours, but would by his
nature be obliged to bestow them upon his creatures ; that a being,
truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good; that a being,
truly generous, does not take back what he has given; and that
every man, who does so, dispenses with gratitude, and has no right
to complain of finding ungrateful men.
How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians
ascribe to God, be reconciled with religion, which supposes, a covenant, or mutual engagements between God and men ? If God
owes nothing to his creatures, they, on their part, can owe nothing
to their God. All religion is founded upon the happiness that men
think they have a right to expect from the Deity, who is supposed
to say to them : Love me, adore me, obey me : and I will make you
happy. Men, on their part, say to him : Make us happy, be faithful
to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you, and obey
your laws. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures, distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his gifts,
does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of ail
religion ? Cicero has justly observed, that if God is not agreeable
to man, he cannot be his God.* Goodness constitutes deity; this
goodness can be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys;
as soon as he is unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the
divinity. An infinite goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor
exclusive. If God be infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his
creatures. The unhappiness of a single being would suffice to
annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an infinitely good and
powerful God, it is possible to conceive that a single man should
suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible
arguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.
Nisi Deus homini plaucerit, Deus non erit.

GOOD SENSE.

21

,61. According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life
are chastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God.
But why are men guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him
more to say: " Let every thing in the world be in order; let all my
subjects be good, innocent, fortunate, than to say: " Let every
thing exist V Was it more difficult for this God to do his work
well, than to do it so ill ? Was it farther from the non-existence of
beings to their wise and happy existence, than from their nonexistence to their senseless and miserable existence?
Religion tells us of a hell: that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness, God reserves infinite torments for the
majority of men. Thus after having rendered mortals very unhappy
in this world, religion tells them, that God can render them still
more unhappy in another 1 The theologian gets over this, by
saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to his justice.
But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty, is not
an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having been
infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable
being? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a
God filled with implacable fury ?
62. Divine justice, as painted by our divines, is undoubtedly a
quality very proper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideas of modern theology, it is evident, that God has
created the majority of men, with the sole view of putting them in
a fair way to incur eternal punishment. .Would it not have beA
more conformable to goodness, reason, and equity, to have created
only stones or plants, and not to have created sensible beings; .
than to have formed men, whose conduct in this world might subject
them to endless punishment in the other ? A God perfidious and
malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him
to the danger of being damned, cannot be regarded as a perfect
being; but as an unreasonable, unjust, ill-natured, and atrocious
monster. Very far from composing a perfect God, theologians have
formed the most imperfect of beings. According to theological
notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, having put out the
eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up in a
dungeon, where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe
their conduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour
all those, who, while walking about, should hit against each other ;
but who would magnificently reward the few whom he had not
deprived of sight, for their address in avoiding to run against their
comr&des. Such are the ideas, which the dogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity !
Although men are continually repeating that their God is infl«°
nitely good; yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe
nothing of the kind. How can we love what we do not know?
How can we love a being, whose character is only fit to throiv us
into inquietude and trouble 1 How can we love a being, of_ whom

22

GOOD SENSE.

all that is said tends to render him an object of utter detestation ?
63. Many peop^ make a subtle distinction between true religion
and superstition. They say, that the latter is only a base and in^
ordinate fear of the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God, and loves him sincerely ; whereas, the superstitious man sees him only an enemy, has no confidence in him, and
represents him to himself as a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his
benefits, lavish of his chastisements. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the same ideas of God ? At the same time that we are
told, that God is infinitely good, are we not also told, that he is
very easily provoked, that he grants his favours to a few peopl e
only, and that he furiously chastises those, to whom he has not been
pleased to grant them ?
64 If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where
we find a mixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good
and evil which we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes good, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting our love, must generate distrust, fear, and
uncertainty. There is then no real difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servile superstition. If the th ei st
sees God only in a favourable light; the bigot views him in the mos
hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful, that of the other i
melancholy ; but both are equally delirious.
% 5 . If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears in the
^character most proper to inspire aversion. Devotees, who tell us,
that they sincerely love their God, are' either liars or fools, who see
their God only in profile. It is impossible to love a being, the very
idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whose judgments make us
tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon a God,
who is reputed to be barbarous enough to damn us ? Let not
divines talk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love,
which men ought to have for their God. A son can by no means
love his father, when he knows him to be cruel enough to inflict
upon him studied torments for the least faults he may commit. No
man upon earth can have the least spark of love for a God, who
reserves chastisements, infinite in duration and violence, for ninetynine-hundred ths of his children.
66. The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made
of that God, whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings.
Cruelty in men is the last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind
must revolt at the bare recital of the torments, inflicted on the
greatest criminal; but cruelty is much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The most sanguinary tyrants, the
Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, at least, some motives for
tormenting their victims, and insulting their sufferings. These
motives were, either their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the
design of frightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of

GOOD SENSE.

23

making a display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarous curiosity. Can a God have any of these motives ? In
tormenting the victims of his wrath, he would punish beings, who
could neither endanger his immoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other hand, the punishments of the
other life would be useless to the living, who cannot be witnesses
of them. These punishments would be useless to the damned,
since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the time
of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of
his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself, and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the
whole human race;—is there in nature a man who feels cruel
enough coolly to torment, I do not say his fellow-creature, but any
sensible being whatever, without emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having anything to fear? Confess then,
O theologians! that, even according to your own principles, your
God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men.
Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments. I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite; that the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite;
that a God, who is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that
the offences of his creatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good, can neither be infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures
an infinite duration, solely for the pleasure of eternizing their torments.
Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious
roguery, or the blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine
of eternal punishments. If there is a God, whom we can offend or
blaspheme, there are not upon earth greater blasphemers than those,
who dare to say, that this same God is a tyrant, perverse enough to
delight, during eternity, in the useless torments of his feeble creatures,,
67. To pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men,
is to annihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in
other respects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the
order of the universe; that he can kindle the thunder in the hand
of his God ; that he can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is
stronger than his God, that he is the arbiter of his will, that it
depends upon him to change his goodness into cruelty. Theology
continually pulls down, with one hand, what it erects with the other.
If all religion is founded upon a God, who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable contradiction.
All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of
the Deity. But no sooner do they display to us his conduct, than
we see nothing but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and
folly. God, it is said, created the world for himself; and yet,
hitherto, he has never been able to make himself suitably honoured
by it. God created men in order to have, in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see men in continual
revolt against him,

24

GOOD SENSE.

68. They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we
demand proofs of them, they point us to his works, in which, they
assure us, these perfections are written in indelible characters. All
these works are, however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is
ever regarded as the most marvellous work, as the master-piece of
the Deity, is full of imperfections, which render him disagreeable
to the eyes of the almighty Being, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and odious to its author, that
he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But if the fairest of God's
works is imperfect how can we judge of the divine perfections ?
Can a work, with which the author himself is so little pleased,
induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, considered in
a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless
evils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of
faults ; yet we are unceasingly lold, that he is the most beautiful
work of the most perfect of beings.
69. In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that
heretofore God has not better succeded, nor given stronger proofs of
his perfection. Do we not see, in many religions, that angels, pure
spirits, have even attempted to dethrone him ? God proposed the
happiness of angels and men; yet, he has never been able to render
happy either angels or men ;—the pride, malice, sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of the perfect Creator.
70 All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that
God does what he can> and man what he will. Every system of
religion presents to us an unequal combat between the Deity on one
part, and his creatures on the other, in which the former never comes
off to his honour. Notwithstanding his omnipotence, he cannot
succeed in rendering the works of his hands such as he would have
them. To complete the absurdity, there is a religion, which pretends, that God himself has died to redeem mankind ; and yet, men
are not farther from anything, than they are from what God would
have them.
71. Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes
the Divinity to act in every country. Did he really exist, we
should see in him the most capricious, and senseless being. We
should be compelled to believe, that God made the world only to
be the theatre of his disgraceful wars with his creatures ; that he
created angels, men, demons, and evil spirits only to make himself
adversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders
men free to offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects,
too obstinate to submit; and all this merely for the pleasure of
being angry, appeased, reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they
have made. Had the Deity at once formed his creatures such as
he would have them, what pains would he not have spared himself,
or, at least, from what embarrassments would he not have relieved
his theologians !
Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself

GOOD SENSE.

, 25

evil. He resembles those empirics, who mflici upon themselves
wounds, to have an opportunity of exhibiting to the public the
efficacy of their ointment. But we see not, that the Deity has
hitherto been able radically to cure himself of the evil, which he
suflfc ~ from man.
.
,4 ,aod is the author of a l l ; and yet, we are assured that evil
does riot come from. God. Whence then does it come? From
man. But, who made man ? God. Evil then comes from God.
If he had not made man as he is, moral evil QT sin would not have
existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore chargeable
to G/od. If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we are
forced to infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, wSio
made man, has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would
be an effect contrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.
73. Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing
beforehand whatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns
to his glory, nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man.
If God foreknows the future, must he not have foreseen the fall of
his creatures, whom he had destined to happiness ? If he resolved
in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it
was his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it
could not have happened. If God's foreknowledge of the sir of
his creatures had been necessary or forced, one might suppose iat
he has been constrained by his justice to punish the guilty ; but,
enjoying the faculty of foreseeing, and the power of predetermining
everything, did it not depend upon God not to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense with creating
beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing, and
rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree ? Of what consequence
is it whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an
anterior decree, an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree,
an effect of his justice ? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter
the fate of the unhappy? Would they not have the same right to
complain of a God, who, being able to omit their creation, has notvTithslanding created them, although he plainly foresaw that his
justice would oblige him, sooner or later, to punish them ?
74. " Man, you say, when he came from the hands of God, was
pure, innocent, and good ; but his nature has been corrupted, as a
punishment for sin." If man, when just out of the hands of his
God, could sin, his nature was imperfect. Why did God suffer
him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted ? Why did God permit
him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feeble to resist
temptation? Why dic\ God create a satan, an evil spirit, a
tempter ? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the
human race, annihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are
naturally enemies of our happiness; or rather, why did God create
evil spirits, whose victories and fatal influence over mankind, he
must, have foreseen ? In fine, by uwhat strange fatality in all rec

26

GOOD SENSE.

ligions of the world, has the evil principle such a decided advantage
over the good principle, or the divinity ?
75. There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour
to the heart of an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this
pious man thought he must announce to his audience, that he ' ^d,
thank heaven, at last discovered, by dint of meditation, a sur« < y
*
of rendering all men happy. " The devil/5 said he, " tempts men
only to have in hell companions of his misery. Let us therefore
apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven and hell; let us
prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole church,
to consent to a reconciliation writh the devil, to restore him to
favour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put
an end to his malicious projects against mankind." Perhaps the
honest monk did not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God
to the ministers of religion. They have too much interest in their
dissensions, to be instrumental in an accommodation between two
enemies, upon whose combats their own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted and to sin, and the ministry
of priests will be useless, Manicheism is evidently the hinge of
every religion; but unhappily, the devil, invented to clear the deity
from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, every moment, the impo*Aice or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.
. The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. God could not communicate to him impeccability, which
is an inalienable attribute of his divine perfection. But if God
could not make man impeccable, why did he give himself the pains
to make man, whose nature must necessarily be corrupted, and
who must consequently offend God? On the other hand, if God
himself could not make human nature impeccable, by what right
does he punish men for not being impeccable ? It can be only by
the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest is called
violence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest of beings. God would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for
not sharing with him his divine perfections, or for not being able to
be gods like him.
Could not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind
of perfection, of which their nature is susceptible ? If some men
are good, or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not
that God done the same favour, or given the same dispositions to
all beings of our species ? Why does the number of the wicked
so much exceed the number of the good ? Why, for one friend,
has God ten thousand enemies, in a world, which it depended
entirely upon him to people with honest men ? If it be true, that,
in heaven, God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men
who shall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would
he not have had a more numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composed it of all men, to whom, in creating them, he
could grant the degree of goodness necessary to attain eternal happi-

GOOD SENSE.

27

ness ? Filially, would it not have heen shorter not to have made
man, than to have created him a being full of faults, rebellious to
his creator, perpetually exposed to cause his own destruction by a
fatal abuse of his liberty ?
Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only
angels very docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free;
some have sinned ; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty
by revolting against their master. Could not God have created only
angels, of the good kind ? If God has created angels, who have not
sinned, could he not have created impeccable men, or men who
should never abuse their liberty ? If the elect are incapable of
sinning in heaven, could not God have made impeccable men upon
earth 1
77. Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance
which separates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of
God a mystery to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our
master. Is this answer satisfactory? Since, according to you, my
eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a right to examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happiness that men
submit to the authority of a God. A despot, to whom men submit
only through fear, a master, whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereign totally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent
beings. If the conduct of God is a mystery to us, it is not made
for us Man can neither adore, admire, respect, nor imitate aeonduct, in which every thing is inconceivable, or, of which he can
often form only revolting ideas; unless it is pretended, that we
ought to adore every thing of which we are forced to be ignorant,
and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for that reason
an object of admiration. Divines! You never cease telling us that
the designs of God are impenetrable; that, his ways are not our
ways, nor his thoughts our thoughts; that it is absurd to complain
of his administration, of the motives and springs of which we are
totally ignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with
injustice, because we cannot comprehend them. But when you
speak in this strain, do you not perceive, that you destroy with
your own hands all your profound systems, whose only end is to
explain to us the ways of the divinity, which, you say, are impenetrable ? Have you penetrated his judgments, his ways, his designs ? You dare not assert it, and though you reason about them
without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do.
If, by chance, you know the plan of God, which you wish us to
admire, while most people find it so little worthy of a just, good,
intelligent, and reasonable being, no longer say, this plan is impenetrable. If you are as ignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously confess they comprehend nothing
in it, or that they see in it nothing divine. Cease to persecute for
opinions of which you understand nothing yourselves; cease to
defame each for dreams and conjectures, which every thing seems
10 Contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible and really useful to
c2

28

GOOD SENSE.

men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways of God,
about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves.
By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom,
forbidding us to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God
before the tribunal of our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge
our master, divines (each us nothing but the embarrassment they
are in, when it is required to account for the conduct of a God,
whose conduct they think marvellous only because they are utterly
incapable of comprehending it themselves.
78. Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin.
Diseases, famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to
chastise wicked men. Thus, they make no scruple of attributing
these evils to the severity of a just and good God. But do not
these scourges fall indiscriminately upon the good and bad, upon the
impious and devout, upon the innocent, and guilty ? How, in this
proceeding, would they have us admire the justice and goodness of
a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many wretches,
whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes,
since they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of
the events of this world. This being the case, ought they not to
impute their sufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort ! Unfortunate father! Thou consolest thyself in the bosom
of Providence, for the loss of a dear child, or beloved wife, who
made thy happiness. Alas! Dost thou not see, that thy God has
killed them ? Thy God has rendered thee miserable, and thou deforest thy God to comfort thee for the dreadful afflictions he has
sent, thee!
The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded in destroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, clear,
and natural ideas, that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice,
accustom themselves to regard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestial goodness. Are they in affliction, they are
ordered to believe that God loves them, that God visits them, that
God wishes to try them. Thus religion has attained the art of
converting evil into good! A profane person said with reason— If
God Almighty thus treats those'whom he loves, I eammtly beseech
him never to think of me,
Meu must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their
God, who is called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing afflictions are marks of his favour! Would an
evil genius, a demon, be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies,
than the God of goodness sometimes is, who so often exercises his
severity upon his dearest friends ?
79. What shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches
without intermission over the preservation and happiness of his
weak and short-sightea children, and who yet leaves them at liberty
to wander at random among rocks, precipices, and waters; who
rarely hinders them from following their inordinate appetites; who
permits them to handle, without precaution, murderous arms, at

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29

the risk of their life? What should we think of the same father
if, instead of imputing to himself the evil that happens to his poor
children, he should punish them for their wanderings in the most
cruel manner ? We should say, with reason, that this father is a.
madman, who unites injustice to folly.
' A God, who punishes faults, which he could have prevented, is a
being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and equity. A foreseeing God
would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having to punish it. A good
God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew to be inherent
in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punish,
him for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. To
punish weakness is the most unjust tyranny. Is it not calumniating a just God, to say, that he punishes men for their faults, even
in the present life ? How could he punish beings, whom it belonged to him alone to reform, and who, while they have not grace,
cannot act otherwise than they do?
According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in
his present state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without divine grace, he is never able to do good. Now, if the nature
of man, left to itself, or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines to evil, or renders him incapable of good, what becomes of
the free-will of man? According to such principles, man can
neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man for the good he
does, God would only reward himself; by punishing man for the
evil he does, God would punish him for not giving him grace,
without which he could not possibly do better.
80. Theologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all
their principles conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavouring to
justify the Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. They suppose, that without grace,- man is necessitated to
do evil. They affirm, that God will punish him, because God has
not given him grace to do good !
Little reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitated in all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the
system of theologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of
such or such parents? Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not
to imbibe the opinions of his parents or instructors ? If 1 had been
born of idolatrous or Mahometan parents, would it have depended
upon me to become a Christian? Yet, divines gravely assure us,
that a just God will damn without pity all those, to whom he has
not given grace to know the Christian religion!
Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not
asked whether he is willing, or not, to come into the world. Nature
does not consult him upon the country and parents she gives him.
His acquired ideas, his opinions, his notions true or false, are necessary fruits of the education which he has received, and of which he
has not been the director. His passions and desires are necessary
consequences of the temperament given him by nature, and of the
ideas with which he has been inspired. During his whole life, his
c 3

30

GOOD SENSE,

volitions and actions are determined by his connexions, habits,
occupations, pleasures, and conversations; by the thoughts, that
are involuntarily presented to his mind; in a word, by a multitude
of events and accidents, which it is out of his power to foresee or
prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity, he knows not what he
shall will, or do, the succeeding moment. From the instant of his
birth to that of his death, he is never free. You will say that lie
wills, deliberates, chooses, determines; and you will hence conclude
that bis actions are fiee. It is true, that man wills, but he is not
master of his will or his desires; he can desire and will only what
he judges advantageous to himself; he can neither love pain, nor
detest pleasure. It will be said, that he sometimes prefers pain to
pleasure; but then he prefers a momentary pain with the view of
procuring a greater and more durable pleasure. In this case, the
prospect of a greater good necessarily determines him to forego a
less considerable good.
The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate
him ; lie is not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his
tenderness; he is not master of his imagination or temperament.
Whence it evidently follows, that man is not master of his volitions
and desires. " But man," you will say, " can resist his desires;
therefore he is free." Man resists his desires, when the motives,
which divert him from an object, are stronger than those whicli
incline him towards it; but then his resistance is necessary. A man,
whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater than his love of
money, necessarily resists the desire of stealing.
" Are we not free, when we deliberate?" But, are we masters
of knowing or not knowing, of being in doubt or certainty ? DelU
beration is a necessary effect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. When we are sure, or think we are sure,
of these consequences, we necessarily decide, and we then act necessarily according to our true or false judgment. Our judgments,
true or false, are not free; they are necessarily determined by the
ideas we have received, or which our minds have formed.
Man is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to
choose what he judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he
free, when he suspends his choice; he is fojced to suspend it until
he knows, or thinks lie knows, the qualities of the objects presented
to him, or, until he has weighed the consequences of his actions.
" Man," you will say, " often decides in favour of actions, which
he knows must be detrimental to himself; man sometimes kills
himself; therefore he is free." I deny it. Is man master of reasoning well or ill ? Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon
the opinions he has formed, or upon the conformation of his machine ? As neither one nor the other depends upon his will, they
are no proof of liberty. " If I lay a wager, that I shall do, or not
do a thin?, am I not free; Does it not depend upon me to do it or
not?" No, I answer; the desire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do, or not to do the thing in question.

31

GOOD SENSE.
9

" Bat, supposing I consent to lose the wager V Then the desire
of proving to me that you are free, will have become a stronger
motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this motive will
have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do, the thing in
question.
" But, you will say, I feel free." This is an illusion, that may
be compared to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the
pole of a heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its
course. Man, who thinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he
has power to move the universe, while he is himself unknowingly
carried along by it.
The inward persuasion that we are free to do, or not to do a
thing, is but a mere illusion. If we trace the true principle of our
actions, we shall find, that they are always necessary consequences
of our volitions and desires, which are never in our power. You
think yourself free, because you do what you will; but are you free
to will, or not to will; to desire, or not to desire ? Are not your
volitions and desires necessarily excited by objects or qualities
totally independent of you ?
81. " If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free,
by what right does society punish criminals, who infest it? Is it
not very unjust to chastise beings, who could not act otherwise than
they have done V If the wicked act necessarily according to the
impulses of their evil nature, society, in punishing them, acts necessarily by the desire of self-preservation. Certain objects necessarily produce in us the sensation of pain ; our nature then forces
us to hate them, and avert them from us. A tiger, pressed by
hunger, springs upon the man, whom he wishes to devour; but
this man is not master of his fear, and necessarily seeks means to
destroy the tiger.
82. " If every thing be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas
of men are fatal; and, if so, how or why should we attempt to
reform them V* The errors of men are necessary consequences of
their ignorance ; their ignorance, prejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of their inexperience, negligence, and want of
reflection, in the same manner as delirium or lethargy are necessaty
effects of certain diseases. Truth, experience, reflection, and reason,
are remedies calculated to cure ignorance, fanaticism and follies, in
the same manner as bleeding is proper to calm delirium. But, you
will ask, why does not truth produce this effect upon many disordered heads ? It is because some diseases resist all remedies ; because it is impossible to cure obstinate patients, who refuse the
remedies presented to them ; because the interest of some men, and
the folly of others, necessarily oppose the admission of truth.
A cause produces its effect, only when its action is not interrupted by stronger causes, which then weakens or render useless,
the action of the former. It is impossible that the best arguments
should be adopted by men, who are interested in error, prejudiced
in its favour, and who decline all reflection; but truth must neces-

32

GOOD SENSE,

s'arily undeceive honest minds, who seek her sincerely. Truth is a
cause; it necessarily produces its effects when its impulse is not
intercepted by causes, which suspend its effects.
83. " To deprive man of his free will, is, it is said, to make him
a mere machine, an automaton. Without liberty, he will no longer
have either merit or virtue.'3 What is merit in man ? It is a manner of acting which renders him estimable in the eyes of his fellowbeings. What is virtue ? It is a disposition which inclines us to
do good to others. What can there be contemptible in machines,
or automatons, capable of producing effects so desirable ? Marcus
Aurelius was a very useful spring to the vast machine of the Roman
empire. By what right would a machine despise a machine, whose
springs facilitate its action ? Good men are springs, which second
society in its tendency to happiness; the wicked are ill-formed
springs, which disturb the order, progress, and harmony of society.
If, for its own utility, society cherishes and rewards the good, it also
harasses and destroys the wicked, as useless or hurtful.
84. The world is a necessary agent; All the beings that compose it are united to each other, and cannot act otherwise than they
do, so long as they are moved by the same causes, and endued with
the same properties. Do they lose properties ? They will necessarily act in a different way. God himself,admitting for a moment
his existence, cannot be considered as a free agent, If there existed
a God, his manner of acting would necessarily be determined by the
properties inherent in his nature; nothing would be capable of arresting or altering his will. This being granted, neither our actions,
prayers,nor sacrifices could suspend, or change his invariable conduct
and immutable designs; whence we are forced to infer that all
religion would be useless.
85. Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves,
they would see, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be
reputed free an instant. Do they not suppose man continually
dependant on his God ? Are we free, when we cannot exist and
be preserved without God, and when we cease to exist at the pleasure of his supreme will ? If God has made man out of nothing ;
if his preservation is a continued creation; if God cannot, an instant, lose sight of his creature; if whatever happens to him is an
effect of the divine will; if man can do nothing of himself; if all
the events, which he experiences, are effects of the divine decrees;
if he does no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain that a man enjoys a moment's liberty ? If God did not preserve him in the moment of sin, how could man sin? If God then
preserves him, God forces him to exist, that he may sin.
86. The Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted subjects are the greater part of mankind; and it is said, he
has a right to reward the subjects who remain faithful to him, and
to punish the rebellious. This comparison is not just in any of its
parts. God presides over a machine, every spring of which he has
created. These springs act agreeably to the manner in which God

GOOD SENSE,

33

has formed them ; he ought to impute it to his own unskilfulness
if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of the machine,
into which it was his will to insert them. God is a created king,
who has created to himself subjects of every description ; who has
formed them according to his own good pleasure, whose will can
never find resistance. If God has rebellious subjects in his empire,
it is because God has resolved to have rebellious subjects. IH the
sins of men disturb the order of the world, it is because it is the
will of God that this order should be disturbed.
Nobody dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under
the government of a just God, we see nothing but acts of injustice
and violence. Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems
banished from the earth ; a few men sport, unpunished, with the
peace, property, liberty, and life of others. All is disorder in a
world governed by a God, who is said to be infinitely displeased
with disorder.
87. Although men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness,
justice, and beautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never
satisfied with it. Do not the prayers, continually addressed to
heaven, shew, that men are by no means satisfied with the divine
dispensations? To pray to God for a favour, shews diffidence of
his watchful care; to pray to him to avert or put an end to an evil,
is to endeavour to obstruct the course of his justice,' to implore
the assistance of God in our calamities, is to address the author
himself of these calamities, to represent to him that he ought, for
our sake, to rectify his plan, which does not accord with our
interest.
The Optimist, or he who maintains that all is well, and who incessantly cries that we live in the best world possib!e,to be. consistent,
should never pray; neither ought he to expect another world,
where man will be happier. Can there be a better world than the
best iv or Id possible? Some theologians have treated the Optimists
as impious, for having intimated that God could not produce a
better world than that in which we live. According to these doctors, it is to limit the power of God, and to offer him insult. But
do not these divines see, that it shews much less indignity to God,
to assert that he lias done his best in producing this world, than to
say, that, being able to produce a better, he has had malice enough
to produce a very bad one ? If the Optimist, by his system, detracts from the divine power, the theologian, who treats him as a
blasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends the goodness of
God in espousing the cause of his omnipotence.
88. When we complain of the evils of which our world is the
theatre, we are referred to the other world, where it is said, God
will make reparation for all the iniquity and misery, which, for a
time, he permits here below. But if God, suffering his eternal
justice to remain at rest for a long time, could consent to evil
during the whole continuance of our present world, what assurance
have we, that, during the continuance of another world, divine

34

GOOD SENSE,

justice will not, in like manner, sleep-over the misery of its inhabitants ?
The divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that God is
patient, and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure.
But they do not see that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable, and omnipotent being? Can God then permit injustice,
even for an instant ? To temporize with a known evil, announces
either weakness, uncertainty, or collusion. To tolerate evil, when
one has power to prevent it, is to consent to the commission of evil.
89. Divines every where exclaim, that God is infinitely just;
but that his justice is not the justice of man. Of what kind or
nature then is this divine justice ? What idea can I form of a
justice, which so often resembles injustice? Is it not to confound
all ideas of just and unjust to say, that what is equitable in God
is iniquitous in his creatures? How can we receive for our model
a being, whose divine perfections are precisely the reverse of
human ?
" God, it is said, is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His
supreme power, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do
with the works of his own hands according to his good pleasure.
A worm of earth, like man, has no right even to complain.'' This
arrogant style is evidently borrowed from the language used by the
ministers of tyrants, when they stop the mouths of those who
suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the language of the
ministers of a God, whose equity is highly extolled; it is not made
to be imposed upon a being who reasons. Ministers of a just
God! I will inform you then, that the greatest power cannot confer upon your God himself the right of being unjust even to the
vilest of his creatures. A despot is not a God. A God who arrogates to himself the right of doing evil, is a tyrant; a tyrant is
not a model for men ; he must be an object execrable to their eyes.
Is it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity, they
make him every moment the most unjust of beings! As soon as
we complain of his conduct, they think to silence us by alledging
that God is master; which signifies, that God, being the strongest, is
not bound by ordinary rules. But the right of the strongest is the
violation of all rights. It can seem a right only to the eyes of a
savage conqueror, who in the heat of his fury imagines that he may
do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims whom he has
conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to
slaves blind enough to believe that every thing is lawful to tyrants
whom to resist they feel too weak.
In the bosom of the greatest calamities, do not devout persons,
through a ridiculous simplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in
terms, exclaim, that the Almighty is master. Thus, inconsistent
reasoners, you sincerely believe that the Almighty (a Being, one
of whose first attributes is goodness,) sends you pestilence, war,
and famine ! You believe that the Almighty, this good being, has
the will and right to inflict the greatest evils you can bear l Cease5
_

GOOD SENSE.

35

at least, to call your God good, when he does you evil; say not
that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossible
for you to ward off the blows of his caprice.
God, say you, chastises only for our good. But what real good
can result to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars, corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed under the iron sceptre of a succession of merciless
tyrants, annihilated by the scourges of a bad government, whose
destructive effects are often felt for ages ? The eyes of faith must
be strange eyes, if with them we can see advantages in the most
dreadful and durable calamities, in the vices and follies with which
our species is afflicted.
90. What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have,
who are taught to believe, that their God, in view of reconciling to
himself the human race, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of
their fathers, has put to death his own son, who was innocent and
incapable of sinning ? What should we say of a king, whose subjects should revolt, and who, to appease himself, should find no
other expedient than to put to death the heir of his crown, who had
not participated in the general rebellion ? " It is,55 the Christian
will say, " through goodness to his subjects, unable of themselves
to satisfy divine justice, that God has consented to the cruel death
of his son." But the goodness of a father to strangers does not
give him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son.
All the qualities which theology ascribes to God reciprocally destroy
one another. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at
the expense of the exercise of another.
Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian ? The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; Jehovah
causes the pestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy
thousand subjects are exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch,
whom the goodness of God resolved to spare.
91. Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all
religions delight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to
accuse him of iniquity. They fear, that, like the tyrants of this
world, truth will offend him, and redouble upon them trie weight of
malice and tyranny. They hearken therefore to their priests, who
tell them, that their God is a tender father; that this God is an
equitable monarch whose object in this world is to assure himself
of the love, obedience, and respect of his subjects; who gives them
liberty of acting only to afford them an opportunity of meriting his
favours, and of acquiring an eternal happiness, which he does not
owe them. By what signs can men discover the tenderness of a
father, who has given life to the greater part of his children merely
to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter existence ? Is
there a more unfortunate present, than that pretended liberty, which,
we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and thereby to incur
eternal misery ?
92. By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part

36

GOOD SENSE,

has not the Deity forced them to act? Thrown into the world
without, their consent, provided with a temperament of which they
are not masters, animated by passions and desires inherent in their
nature, exposed to snares which they have not power to escape,
hurried away by events which they could not foresee or prevent,
unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career, which may lead
them to punishments horrible in duration and violence.
Travellers inform us, that, in a country of Asia, reigns a Sultan,
full of fantastical ideas, and very absolute even in his whims. By a
strange madness, this prince spends his time seated at a table,
upon which are placed three dice and a dice-box. One end of the
table is covered with pieces of silver, designed to excite the avarice
of his courtiers and people, by whom the Sultan is surrounded. He,
knowing the foible of his subjects, addresses them nearly as follows :
Slaves, I wish your happiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you,
and make you all happy. Do you see these treasures ? Well, they
are for you ? strive to gain them ; let each in his turn, take the
box and dice ; whoever has the fortune to throw sires, shall be master
of the treasure. But, Iforewarn you, thai he who has not the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitatedfor ever into
a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be burned with a
slow fire. Upon this discourse of the monarch, the company look
at each other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so
dangerous a chance. What! says the enraged Sultan, does no one
offer to play f I tell you then you must. My glory requires that
you should play. Play then ; obey without replying. It is well to
observe, that the dice of the despot are so prepared, that out of a
hundred thousand throws, there is but one, which can gain the
number required. Thus the generous monarch has the pleasure of
seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravished from
him. Mortals! this SULTAN is your G O D ; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN ; his DUNGEON is HELL, and it is you who hold the DICE !

93. Divines repeatedly assure us, that we owe to Providence
infinite gratitude for the numberless blessings she bestows upon us.
They loudly extol the happiness of existence. But, alas! how
many mortals are truly satisfied with their mode of existence ? If
life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it not mixed ? Does
not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to empoison the most
peaceable and fortunate life ? Are there many, who, if it were in
their power would begin again, at the same price, the painful career,
in which, without their consent, destiny has placed them ?
You say, that existence alone is a great blessing. But is not this
existence continually troubled, with chagrins, fears, and maladies,
often cruel and little deserved ? May not this existence, threatened
on so many sides, be torn from us every moment ? Where is the
man, who, after living some time in the world, has not been deprived
of a dear spouse, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss
every moment intrudes upon his thoughts ? There are few, who
have not been forced to drink of the cup of misfortune ; there are

GOOD SENSE,

37

few who have not desired their end. Finally, it did not depend
upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird then be so very
grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining him in
his cage fofc his diversion and afterwards for his nourishment?
94. Notwithstanding the infirmities, chagrin, and misery, which
man is forced to undergo in this world ; in spite of the dangers, his
alarmed imagination shews him in another, he has nevertheless the
folly to think himself the favourite of his God, the object of all his
cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines, that the whole
universe is made for him; he arrogantly calls himself the king of
nature, and values himself far above other auimals. Mortal! upon
.what canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest
thou, upon thy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties,
which enable thee to exercise an absolute empire over the beings
which surround thee. But, weak sovereign of the world, art thou
sure a moment of the continuance of thy reign? Do not the
smallest atoms of matter which thou despisest suffice to tear thee
from thy throne, and deprive theo of life ? Finally, does not the
king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thou speakest
of thy soul! But dost thou know what a soul is ? Dost thou not
see, that this soul is only the assemblage of thy organs, from which
results life ? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals
who live, think, judge, and compare, like thee; who seek pleasure
and avoid pain, like thee ; and who often have organs which serve
them better than thine ? Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties ;
but do these faculties, of which thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals ? Dost thou often make use of that reason,
in which thon gloriest, and to which religion commands thee not to
listen? Are those brutes which thou disdainest, because they are
less strong or less cunning than thou art, subject to chagrin, to
mental pains, to a thousand frivolous passions, to a thousand imaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey ? Are they, like
thee, tormented by the p?.st, alarmed at the future? Confined
solely to the present, does not what you call their instinct, and
what I call their intelligence, suffice to preserve and defend them,
and to supply them with all they want? Does not this instinct, of
which thou speakest with contempt, often serve them better than
thy wonderful faculties? Is not their peaceful ignorance more
advantageous to them than those extravagant meditations and
worthless researches which render thee unhappy, and for which thy
zeal urges thee even to massacre the beings of thy so noble species?
Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled imagination, which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternal
torments, by which they think it followed ?
Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put to death
his sons, exclaimed ; It is much better to be Herod's hog than his
son. As much may be said of man, This dear child of Providence runs far greater risks than all other animals ;—-after having

38

GOOD SENSE.

suffered muchjin this world, does he not imagine that he is in danger
of suffering eternally in another ?
95. Where is the precise line of distinction between man and
the ariimals whom he calls brutes ? In what does he differ essentially from beasts ? It is, we are told, by his intelligence, by the
faculties of his mind, and by his reason, that man appears superior
to all other animals, who, in ail their actions, move only by physical
impulses, in which reason has no share. But finally, brutes,
having fewer wants than man, easily do without his intellectual
faculties, which would be perfectly useless in their mode of existence. Their instinct is sufficient; while all the faculties of man
scarcely suffice to render his existence supportable, and to satisfy
the wants which his imagination, his prejudices, and his institutions
multiply to his torment.
Brutes are not struck by the same objects as man; they have
not the same wants, desires, nor fancies; and they very soon arrive
to maturity, while the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment and free exercise of its faculties, and to such a use of them as
is conducive to his happiness.
96. We are assured that the human soul is a simple substance.
It should then be the same in every individual of the human
species, who ought all to have the same intellectual faculties ; yet
this is not the case. Men differ as much in the qualities of the
mind as in the features of the face. There are human beings as
different from one another as man is from a horse or a dog. What
conformity or resemblance do we find between some men ? What
an infinite distance is there between the genius of a Locke or* a
Newton, and that of a peasant, Hottentot, or Laplander?
Man differs from other animals only in his organization, which
enables him to produce effects of which they are not capable. The
variety observable in the organs of individuals of the human species
suffices to explain the differences in what is called their intellectual
faculties. More or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the
blood, mobility in the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibres
and nerves, must necessarily produce the infinite diversity which we
observe in the minds of men. It is by exercise, habit and education, that the mind is unfolded and becomes superior to that of
others : man, without culture and experience, is as void of reason
and industry as the brute. A stupid man is one whose organs move
with difficulty, whose brain does not easily vibrate, whose blood
circulates slowly. A man of genius is he whose organs are flexible,
whose sensations are quick, whose brain vibrates with celerity.
A learned man is he whose organs and brain have been long exercised upon objects to which he is devoted.
Without culture, experience, or reason, is not man more contemptible and worthy of hatred, than the vilest insects or most
ferocious beasts? Is there in nature a more detestable being than
a Tiberius, a Nero> or a Caligula ? Have those destroyers of the

GOOD SENSE.

39

human race, known by the name of conquerors, more estimable
souls than bears, lions, or panthers ? Are there in the world animals more detestable than tyrants ?
97. The superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself over other animals, soon vanishes in the eyes of reason, when
we reflect on human extravagances. How many animals shew
more mildness, reflection, and reason, than the animal who calls
himself reasonable above all others? Are there among men, so
often enslaved and oppressed, societies as well constituted as those
of the ants, or the bees, or the beavers ? Do we ever see ferocious
beasts of the same species rendezvous in plains to mangle and destroy one another without profit ? Do we ever see religious wars
among them ? The cruelty of beasts towards other species arises
from hunger, the necessity of nourishment; the cruelty of man
towards man arises only from the vanity of his masters and the folly
of his impertinent prejudices. Speculative men, who imagine, or
who endeavour to make us believe, that all in the universe was
made for man, are much embarrassed when we ask, how so many
hurtful animals, who continually infest our abode, can contribute to
the happiness of man. What known advantage results to the friend
of the gods from being bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat, devoured
by vermin, torn in pieces by a tiger, &c. ? Would not all these
animals reason as justly as our theologians, should they pretend that
man was made for them ?
9 8 . AN EASTERN TALE.

At some distance from Bagdad, a dervise, renowned for his
sanctity, passed his days in an agreeable solitude. The neighbouring inhabitants, to obtain an interest in his prayers, daily flocked to
his hermitage to carry him provisions and presents. The holy man,
without ceasing, gave thanks to God for the blessings with which
his providence loaded him. " O Allah V9 said he, " how ineffable
is thy love to thy servants. What have I done to merit the favours
that I receive from thy bounty? O Monarch of the skies! O
Father of nature! what praises could worthily celebrate thy munificence and thy paternal care ! O Allah! how great is thy goodness
to the children of men!" Penetrated with gratitude, our hermit
made a vow to undertake, for the seventh time, a pilgrimage to
Mecca. The war which then subsisted between the Persians and
Turks could not induce him to defer the execution of his pious
enterprise. Full of confidence in God, he se s out under the inviolable safeguard of a respected habit. He passes through the hostile
troops without any obstacle ; far from being molested,- he receives,
at every step, marks of veneration from the soldiers of the two parties. At length, borne down with fatigue, he is obliged to seek
refuge against the rays of a scorching sun; he finds it under the
cool shade of a group of palm-trees, whose roots were watered by
a limpid stream, In this solitary place, whose peace was disturbed

40

GOOD SENSE,

only by the murmur of waters and the warbling of birds, the man
of God finds not only an enchanting retreat, but a delicious repast,
He has only to put forth his hand to gather dates and other pleasant
fruits; the brook affords him the means of quenching his thirst.
A green turf soon invites him to sleep; upon waking he performs
the sacred ablution, and exclaims in a transport of joy, " O Allah !
how great is thy goodness to the children of men \" After this
perfect refreshment, our saint, full of strength and gaiety, pursues
his way; it leads him for some time across a smiling country, which
presents nothing to his eyes but flowery hillocks, enamelled
meadows, and trees loaded with fruit. Affected by this sight, he
ceases not to adore the rich and liberal hand of providence, which
appears every where providing for the happiness of the human race.
Going a little farther, he finds some mountains, that are pretty difficult to pass; but having once arrived at the summit, a hideous
spectacle suddenly appears to his view. His soul is filled with
horror. He discovers a vast plain entirely laid waste'Vith fire and
sword ; he beholds it covered with more than a hundred thousand
carcases, the deplorable remains of a bloody battle, lately fought
upon this field. Eagles, vultures, ravens and wolves were greedily
devouring the dead bodies with which tfie ground was strewed.
This sight plunges our pilgrim into a gloomy meditation. Heaven,
by special favour, had enabled him to understand the language $f
beasts. He heard a wolf, gorged with human flesh, cry out in the
excess of his joy, " O Allah ! how great is thy goodness to the
children of wolves. Thy provident wisdom takes care to craze the
minds of these detestable men, who are so dangerous to our species.
By an effect of thy Providence, which watches over thy creatures,
these destroyers of our race cut one another's throats, and furnish
us with sumptuous meals. O Allah ! how great is thy goodness to
the children of wolves !"
99. A heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings
of heaven; a calmer mind finds in it both good and evil. " I
exist," say you ; but is this existence always a good ? " Behold,"
you say, "that.sun, which enlightens us; this earth, which for you
is covered with crops and verdure ; these flowers, which bloom to
regale your Senses; these trees, which bend under the weight of
delicious fruits; these pure waters, which run only to quench your
thirst; those seas, which embrace the universe to facilitate your
commerce; these animals, which a foreseeing nature regenerates for
your use." Yes ; I see all these things, and I enjoy them when I
can. But in many climates, this so beautiful sun is almost always
hidden from my eyes; in others, its excessive heat torments me,
creates storms, produces frightful diseases, and parches the fields ;
the pastures are without verdure, the trees without fruit, the crops
are scorched, the springs are dried u p ; I can with difficulty any
longer subsist, and now complain of the cruelties of a#nature, which
to you always appears so beneficent. If these seas bring me spices,
wealth, and useless commodities, do they not destroy numberless

GOOD SENSE,

41

mortals, who are foolish enough to seek them 1 The vanity of man
persuades him that he is the sole centre of the universe; he creates
to himself alone a world and a God ; he thinks himself of sufficient
consequence to derange nature at his pleasure. But, concerning
other animals, he reasons like an atheist. Does he not imagine,
that the individuals of species different from his own are automatons
unworthy of the blessings of universal providence, and that brutes
cannot be objects of his justice or goodness ? Mortals regard the
happy or unhappy events, health or sickness, life or death, plenty
or want, as rewards or punishments for the right use or abuse of the
liberty with which they erroneously imagine themselves endowed.
Do they reason in the same manner concerning brutes ? No.
Although they see them, under a just God, enjoy and suffer, equally
subject to health and sickness, live and die, like themselves, it
never occurs to them to ask by what crime these beasts could have
incurred the displeasure of their Creator? Have not philosophers,
blinded by their religious prejudices, in order to free themselves
from embarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that
beasts have no feeling ?
Will men never renounce their foolish pretensions? Will they
never acknowledge that nature is not made for them ? Will they
never see that this nature has placed equality among all beings she
has produced ? Will they never perceive that all organized beings
are equally made to be born and die, enjoy and suffer ? Finally,
far from having any cause to be puffed up with their mental facuU
ties, are they not forced to grant that these faculties often make
them more unhappy than beasts, in which we find neither opinions,
prejudices, vanities, nor follies, which every moment decide the
welfare of man ?
100. The superiority which men arrogate over other animals, is
chiefly founded upon their opinion, that they have the exclusive possession of an immortal soul. But ask them what this soul is, and
they are puzzled. They will say, it is an unknown substance—*a
secret power distinct from their bodies—a spirit, of which they have
no idea. Ask them how this spirit, which they suppose to be, like
their God, wholly void of extension, could combine itself with their
extended, material bodies, and they will tell you they know nothing
about it; that it is to them a mystery ; that this combination is an
effect of the omnipotence of God, These are the clear ideas that
men form of the hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they
consider as the main spring of all their actions !
If the soul is a substance essentially different from the body,
and can have no relation to it, their union would be not a mystery,
but an impossibility. Besides, this soul being of a nature different
from the body, must necessarily act in a different manner; yet we
see that this pretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced
by the body, and that these two substances, essentially different,
always act in concert. You will say that this harmony is also a
mystery. But I will tell you, that I see not my soul, that I know

42

GOOD SENSE.

and am sensible of my body only, that it is this body which feels,
thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys; and that all these faculties are
necessary results of its own mechanism, or organization.
101. Although it is impossible for men to form the least idea of
the soul, or the pretended spirit, which animates them, yet they
persuade themselves that this unknown soul is exempt from death.
Everything proves to them that they feel, that they think, that they
acquire ideas, that they enjoy and suffer, only by means of the
senses, or material organs of the body. Admitting even the existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging that it depends
entirely upon the body, and undergoes, conjointly with it, all its
vicissitudes; and yet it is imagined that this soul has nothing, in
its nature, similar to the body; that it can act and feel without the
assistance of the body ; in a word, that this soul, freed from the
body, and disengaged from its senses, can live, enjoy, suffer, experience happiness, or feel excruciating torments. Upon such a tissue
of conjectural absurdities is built the marvellous opinion of the
immortality of the soul. If I ask, what are the motives for believing the soul immortal, they immediately answer, that it is because
man naturally desires to be immortal: But, because you desire a
thing ardently, can you infer that your desire will be fulfilled ? By
what strange logic can we dare affirm that a thing cannot fail to
happen, because we ardently desire it ? Are desires, begotten by
the imagination, the measure of reality ? The impious, you say,
deprived of the flattering hope of another life, wish to be annihilated. Very well: may they not then as justly conclude, from their
desire, that they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from
your desire that you shall exist for ever ?
102. Man dies entirely. Nothing is more evident to him who
has the exercise of his reason. The human body after death is no
longer anything but a mass incapable of producing those motions,
of which the assemblage constituted life; we see that it has no longer
circulation, respiration, digestion, speech, or thought. It is pretended that the soul is then separated from the body ; but to say
that this soul, with which we are unacquainted, is the principle of
life, is to say nothing, unless that an unknown power is the hidden
principle of imperceptible movements. Nothing is more natural
and simple than to believe that the dead man no longer lives :
nothing is more extravagant than to believe that the dead man is
still alive. We laugh at the simplicity of some nations, whose custom is to bury provision with the dead, under an idea that it will
be useful and necessary to them in the other life. Is it then more
ridiculous or absurd to suppose that men will eat after death, than
to imagine that they will think, that they will be actuated by
agreeable or disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoy or suffer, and
that they will experience repentance or delight, after the organs,
adapted to produce sensations or ideas, are once dissolved and reduced to dust. To say that the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after the death of their bodies, is in other words to say, that

GOOD SENSE.

43

men will see without eyes, hear without ears, taste without palates,
smell without noses, and touch without hands or skin. And
nations, who consider themselves very reasonable, can adopt their
ideas !
103. The dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the
soul to be a simple substance; in a word, a spirit. But I ask
again, what is a spirit? " It is," say you, " a substance void of
extension, incorruptible, having nothing common with matter/ 5 If
so, how is your soul born, and how does it grow, how does it
strengthen or weaken itself, how does it get disordered and grow
old, in the same progression as your body ?
To all these questions you answer, that these are mysteries. If
so, you cannot understand them. If you cannot understand them,
why do you decide about a thing, of which you are enable to form
the least idea? To believe or affirm anything, it is necessary, at
least, to know in what it consists. To believe in the existence of
your immaterial soul, is to say, that you are persuaded of the existence of a thing, of which it is impossible for you to form any
true notion ; it is to believe in words without being able to affix to
them any meaning. To affirm that the tiling is as you say, is the
height of folly or vanity.
104. Are not theologians strange reasoners? Whenever they
cannot divine the natural causes of things, they invent those which
they call supernatural, such as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable
agents, or rather words, much more obscure than the things they
endeavour to explain. Let us remain in nature, when we wish to
account for the phenomena of nature; let us be content to remain
ignorant of causes too delicate for our organs; and let us be persuaded, that, by going beyond nature, we shall never solve the
problems which nature presents.
Even upon the hypothesis of theology (that is, supposing an allpowerful mover of matter), by what right would theologians deny
that their God has power to give this matter the faculty of thought?
Was it then more difficult for him to create combinations of matter,
from which thought might result, than spirits who could think? At
least, by supposing a matter which thinks, we should have some
notions of the subject of thought, or of what thinks in us ; whereas,
by attributing thought to an immaterial being, it is impossible Lto
form the least idea of it.
105. It is objected against us, that materialism makes man a mere
machine, which is thought very dishonourable to the whole human
species. But, will it be much more honourable for man if we
should say, that he acts by the secret impulses of a spirit, or by a
certain I know not what, that animates him in a mariner totally
inexplicable.
It is easy to perceive that the supposed superiority of spirit over
matter, or of the soul over the body, has no other foundation than
men's ignorance of the nature of this soul, while they are more
familiarized with matter•, with which they imagine they are ac-

44

GOOD SENSE,

quainted, and of which they think they can discern the springs.
But the most simple movements of our bodies are, to every man who
studies them, enigmas, as inexplicable as thought.
106. The high value which so many people set upon spiritual
substance, has no other motive than their absolute inability to define
it intelligibly. The contempt shown for matter by our metaphysicians arises only from the circumstance, that familiarity begets
contempt. When they tell us, that the soul is more excellent and
noble than the body, they only say, that what they know not at all
must be far more beautiful than what they have some feeble ideas of.
107. The dogma of another life is incessantly extolled, as useful.
It is maintained, that even though it should be only a fiction, it is
advantageous, because it deceives men, and conducts them to virtue.
But is it true, that this dogma makes men wiser and more virtuous ?
Are the nations, who believe this fiction, remarkable for purity of
morals ? Has not the visible world ever the advantage over the
invisible? If those, who are intrusted with the instruction and
government of men, had knowledge and virtue themselves, they
would govern them much better by realities than by fictions. But
legislators, crafty, ambitious and corrupt, have every where found it
shorter to amuse nations with fables, than to teach them truths, to
unfold their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and real
motives, in fine, to govern them in a rational manner. Priests
undoubtedly had reasons for making the soul immaterial; they
wanted souls and chimeras to people the imaginary regions which
they have discovered in the other life. Material souls would, like
all bodies, have been subject to dissolution. Now, if men should
believe that all must perish with the body, the geographers of the
other world would evidently lose the right of guiding men's souls
towards that unknown abode; they would reap no profits from the
hope with which they feed them, and the terrors with which they
oppress them. If futurity is of no real utility to mankind, it is, at
least, of the greatest utility to those who have assumed the office of
conducting them thither.
108. " But, it will be said, is not the dogma of the immortality
of the soul comforting to beings, who are often very unhappy here
below ? Though it should be an error, is it not pleasing ? Is it not
a blessing to man to believe that he shall be able to survive
himself, and enjoy hereafter a happiness which is denied him upon
earth ? v Thus, poor mortals I you make your wishes the measure
of truth; because you desire to live for ever, and to be happier, you
at once conclude that you shall live for ever, and that, you shall be
more fortunate in an unknown world than in this known world,
where you often find nothing but affliction ! Consent therefore to
leave, without regret, this world which gives the greater part of you
much more torment than pleasure. Submit to the order of nature,
which demands that you, as well as all other beings, should not
endure for ever. But what will become of me? asketh thou, O
mortal! Thou wilt be what thou wast, millions of years ago.

GOOD SENSE,

45

Thou wast'then, I know not what; resolve then to become instantaneously I know not what, which thou wast millions of years ago;
return peaceably to the universal mass, from which, without thy
knowledge, thou earnest in thy present form, and pass away without murmuring, like all the beings who surround thee.
We are incessantly told, that religion has infinite consolations for
the unfortunate, that the idea of the soul's immortality, and of a
happier life, is very proper to elevate the heart of man, and to
support him under the adversity which awaits him upon earth. It
is said, on the contrary, that materialism is an afflicting system,
calculated to degrade man ; then it puts him upon a level with the
brutes, breaks his courage, and shews him no other prospect than
frightful annihilation, capable of driving him to despair and
suicide, whenever lie is unhappy. The great art of theologians is
to blow hot and cold, to afflict and console, to frighten and
encourage.
It appears by theological fiction?, that the regions of the other
life are happy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to
become worthy of the abode of felicity ; nothing more easy than to
obtain a place in the abode of torment, which God is preparing for
the unfortunate victims of eternal fury. Have those then, who
think the other life so pleasant and nattering, forgotten, that according to tliem, that life is to be attended with torments to the greater
part of mortals/ Is not the idea of total annihilation infinitely
preferable to the idea of an eternal existence, attended with anguish
and gnashing of teeth ? Is the fear of an end more afflicting, than
that of having had a beginning! The fear of ceasing to exist is a
real evil only to the imagination, which alone begat the dogma of
the other life.
You say, Christian ministers! that the idea of a happier life is
joyous. Admitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable
and solid existence, than that he enjoys here below. But, if paradise is inviting, you will grant that hell is frightful. Heaven is very
difficult, and hell very easy to be merited. Do you not say, that a
narroio way leads to the happy regions, and a broad way to the
regions of misery ? Do you not often say, that the numher of the
elect is very small, and thai of the reprobate very large ? Is not
grace, which your God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation ? Now, I assure you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I had rather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn
for ever; that the fate of beasts is to me more desirable than that of
the damned; that the opinion, which relieves me from afflicting
fears in this world, appears to me more joyous than the uncertainty
arising from the opinion of a God, who, master of his grace, grants
it to none but his favourites, and permits all others to become
worthy of eternal torment. Nothing but enthusiasm or folly can
induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures, attended with uncertainty and insupportable fears, to an evident system, which must
encourage.

46

GOOD SfuNSE.

109. All religious principles are a work of pure imagination, in
which experience and reason have no share. It is extremely
difficult to combat them, because the imagination, once prepossessed
by chimeras, which astonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning.
To combat religion and its phantoms with the arms of reason, is
like using a sword to kill gnats; as soon as the blow is struck, the
gnats and chimeras come hovering round again, and resume in the
mind the place, from which they were thought to have been for
ever banished.
When we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence
of a God, they instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy
that existence, an inward sense, a deep persuasion, an invisible
inclination, inherent in every man, which holds up to his mind, in
spite of himself, the idea of an almighty being, whom he cannot
entirely expel from his mind, and whom he is compelled to
acknowledge, in spite of the strongest reasons that can be urged.
But whoever will analyze this inward sense, upon which such stress
is laid, will perceive, that it is only the effect of a rooted habit,
which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs,
subjects the greater part of men, and often even the most enlightened, to the prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward
sense, or this deep persuasion, against the evidence, which demonstrates, that whatever implies a contradiction cannot exist ?
We are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God ivS not
demonstrated. Yet, by all that men have hitherto said of him,
nothing is better demonstrated, than that his God is a chimera,
whose existence is totally impossible ; since nothing is more evident, than that a being cannot possess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable, as those, which every religion upon earth
attributes to the Divinity. Is not the theologian's God, as well as
that of the Deist, a cause incompatiabte with the effects attributed
to it? Let them do what they will, it is necessary either to invent
another God, or to gran*, that he, who, for so many ages, has
been held up to the terror of mortals, is at the same time very
good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable and fickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason,
system and means; a friend of order and permitting disorder, very
just and very unjust, very skilful and very unskilful. In short,
are we not forced to confess, that it is impossible to reconcile the
discordant attributes, heaped together upon a being, of whom we
can say not a single word without falling into the most palpable
contradictions? Let any one attribute a single quality to the
Divinity, and it is universally contradicted by the effects, ascribed
to this cause.
110. Theology might justly be defined the science of contradictions. Every religion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable notions. By the aid of habit and terror, man becomes
obstinate in the greatest absurdities, even after they are exposed in
the clearest manner. All religions are easily combated, but with

GOOD SENSE.

47

difficulty extirpated. Reason avails nothing against custom, which
becomes, says the proverb, a second nature. Many persons, in
other respects sensible, even after having examined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere to it in contempt of the most striking
arguments. Whenever we complain of understanding nothing in
religion, of finding at every step shocking absurdities, of seeing impossibilities, we are told, that we are not made to understand the
truths of religion; that reason goes astray, and is but an unfaithful
guide, capable of leading us to perdition; and moreover, that what
isfolly in the eyes of man, is wisdom in the eyes of God, to whom
nothing is impossible. In short, to surmount, by a single word, the
most insurmountable difficulties, presented on all sides by theology,
they get rid of them by saying these are mysteries!
i l l . What is a mystery ? By examining the thing closely^ I soon
perceive that a mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable
absurdity, a manifest impossibility, over which theologians would
oblige men humbly to shut their eyes. I n a word, a mystery is
whatever our spiritual guides cannot explain.
It is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understand
nothing of what they teach. It is impossible to examine what we
do not comprehend ; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves
to be led. If the religion were clear, priests would find less business here below.
Without mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential
to it; a religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in
terms, The God who serves as the foundation of natural religion
or deism, is himself the greatest of mysteries to every mind, that
will attend to it.
112. Every revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas,
unintelligible principles, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals
which appear to have been invented solely to confound reason.
Every religion announces a hidden God, whose essence is a mystery ;
consequently, the conduct, ascribed to him, is no less inconceivable
than his essence. The Deity has never spoken only in an enigmatical and mysterious manner, in the various religions, which he has
founded in different regions of our globe; he has every where revealed himself only to announce mysteries; that is, to inform mortals, that he intended they should believe contradictions, impossibilities, and things to which they are incapable of affixing any clear
ideas.
The more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power
it has to please the imagination of men, which finds in it continual
food. The darker a religion is, the more it appears divine, that is,
conformable to the nature of a hidden being, of whom they have no
ideas.
It is the property of ignorance to prefer the unknown, the hidden,
the fabulous, the marvellous, the incredible, or even the terrible, to
wliat is clear, simple and true. Truth does not operate upon the
imagination in so lively a manner as fiction, which, in other respects,

18

GOOD SEUSE.

every one is able to arrange in his own way. The vulgar ask no
better than to listen to fables; priests and legislators, by inventing
religions and forging mysteries, have served them to their taste.
They have thereby attached to themselves enthusiasts, women, and
fools, Beings of this stamp are easily satisfied with reasons, which
they are incapable of examining. The love of simplicity and truth
is to be found only among the few, whose imagination is regulated
by study and reflection.
The inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their
parson, than when he introduces Latin into his sermon. The ignorant always imagine that he who speaks to them of things they do
not understand, is a learned man. Such is the true principle of
the credulity of the people, and of the authority of those who pretend to guide nations.
113. To announce mysteries to men is to give and withhold ; it
is to talk in order not to be understood. He who speaks only
obscurely, either seeks to amuse himself by the embarrassment
which he causes, or finds his interest in not explaining himself too
clearly. All secrecy indicates distrust, impotence and fear.
Princes and their ministers make a mystery of their projects, for
fear their enemies should discover and render them abortive. Can
a good God amuse himself with the perplexity of his creatures ?
Can a God enjoying an irresistible power, fear that his views will
be traversed? What interest then could he have in commanding
his ministers to announce to them riddles and mysteries?
It is said that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally incapable of understanding the divine dispensations, which can be to
him only a series of mysteries : God cannot disclose to him secrets
necessarily above his reach. If so, I answer again, that man is
not made to attend to the divine dispensations; that these dispensations are to him by no means interesting; that he has no need of
mysteries which he cannot understand; and, consequently, that a
mysterious religion is no more fit for him than an eloquent discourse is for a flock of sheep.
114. The Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in
the different countries of our globe, that in point of religion men
regard one another with hatred and contempt. The partisans of the
different sects think each other very ridiculous and foolish : the mysteries most revered in one religion are objects of derision to
another. God, in revealing himself to mankind, ought, at least, to
have spoken the same language to all, and saved their feeble minds
the perplexity of enquiring which religion really emanated from
him, or what form of worship is most acceptable in his sight.
A universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion.
By what fatality then are there so many different religions upon
earth ? Which is really the true one, among the great number of
those, each of which exclusively pretends to be the true one?
There is great reason to believe that no religion enjoys this advantage. Division and disputes upon opinions are indubitable signs

49

GOOD SENSE

©f the uncertainty and obscurity of the principles upon which we
build.
115. If religion were necessary to all, it ought to be intelligible
to all. If this religion were the most important concern of men,
the goodness of God would seem to demand that it should be to
them of all things the most clear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it
not then astonishing that this thing, so essential to the happiness of
mortals, is precisely that which they understand the least, and
about which, for so many ages, their teachers have the most disputed ? Priests of the same sect have never as yet agreed upon the
manner of understanding the will of a God who has been pleased
to reveal himself.
The world we inhabit may be compared to a public fair, in
which are several empirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the
passengers by decrying the remedies sold by his brothers. Each
shop has its customers, who are persuaded that their quacks possess the only true remedies ; and notwithstanding a continual use
of them, they perceive not the inefficacy of these remedies, or
that they are as infirm as those who run after the quacks of a different shop.
Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy.
The devout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by the application of remedies. The wise man abstains from
them entirely; he pays attention to his diet, and in other respects
leaves nature to her course.
116. To a man of sense nothing appears more ridiculous than
the opinions which the partisans of the different religions with
equal folly entertain of each other. A Christian regards the Alcoran,
that is, the divine revelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing
but a tissue of impertinent reveries and impostures insulting to the
divinity. The Mahometan, on the other hand, treats the Christian
as an idolater and a dog* He sees nothing but absurdities in his
religion.^ He imagines he has a right to subdue the territory of the
Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive the religion
of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes that nothing is more
impious and unreasonable than to worship a man, or to believe in
the Trinity. The Protestant Christian who without scruple worships a man, and firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the
trinityy ridicules the catholic Christian for believing, furthermore,
in the mystery of transubstantiation ; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous, because he kneels to worship some bread, in
which he thinks he sees the God of the universe. Christians of
every sect regard as silly stories, the incarnations of Vistnou, the God
of the Indies; they maintain that the only true incarnation is that
of Jesus, son of the God of the universe, and of the wife of a carpenter. The deist who calls himself the follower of a religion,
which he supposes to be that of nature, content with admitting a
God of whom he has no idea, makes a jest of all the mysteries
taught by the various religions in the world.
D

50

GOOD SEKSE.

117. According to a celebrated divine, if a God, who is the
greatest of mysteries, be admitted, it is absurd not to admit any
other. " If by faith," says he, " we believe in a true God, a singular substance, nothing should appear incredible. This chief of
mysteries being once admitted, reason ought not to be shocked at
any other. As for me, I admit a million of things, which I understand not, as readily as I believe one truth that is above my
capacity."*
Is there anything more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious,
than the creation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though
immutable, operates continual changes in the world ? Is anything
more incompatible with every notion of common sense, than to believe that a supremely good, wise, equitable, and powerful being
presides over nature, and by himself directs the movements of a
world full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders, which by a single
word, he could have prevented or removed ? In fine, whenever we
admit a being as contradictory as the God of theology, how can we
reject the most impiobable fables, astonishing miracles, and profound mysteries.
118. The Deist exclaims: " Abstain from worshipping the cruel
and capricious God of theology; mine is a being infinitely wise
and good ; he is the father of men, the mildest of sovereigns; it is
he who fills the universe with his benefits." But do you not see
that every thing in this world contradicts the good qualities which
you ascribe to your God ? In the numerous family of this tender
father almost all are unhappy. Under the government of this just
sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Among those
blessings you extol, and which alone your enthusiasm would see,
I behold a multitude of evils of every kind, against which you
obstinately shut your eyes. Forced to acknowledge that your
beneficent God, in contradiction with himself, distributes good and
evil with the same hand, for his justification you must, like the
priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent, therefore,
another God, for yours is no less contradictory than that of
theologians.
A good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of
evil; a God full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is
often oppressed; a perfect God, who produces none but imperfect
and miserable works; are not such a God and his conduct as great
mysteries, as that of the incarnation ?
You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be
persuaded, that the God of the universe could change himself into
a man, and die upon a cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of
the incarnation appears to you very absurd. You think nothing
more ridiculous, than a God, who transforms himself into bread,
and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousand different places.
* Rational Library, vol. i. p. 84. The above passage is taken from
Hardouin, of the Society of JesiiSo

51

GOOD SENSE.

But are all these mysteries more contradictory to reason than a
God, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men ? Is man,
according to you, free, or not free ? In either case, your God, if
he has the shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him.
If man is free, it is God who has made him free; therefore God is
the primitive cause of all his actions; in punishing him for his
faults, he would punish him for having executed what he had given
him liberty to do. If man is not free to act otherwise than he does,
would not God be the most unjust of beings, in punishing him for
faults, which he could not help committing.
The minor, or secondary absurdities, with which all religions
abound, are to many people truly striking; but have not the
courage to trace out the source whence these absurdities must necessarily have flowed. They see not, that a God full of contradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only served to disorder
men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession of
chimeras.
119. The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny
the existence of a God, by saying that all men, in all- ages and
countries, have acknowledged the government of some divinity or
other; that every people upon earth have believed in an invisible
and powerful being, who has been the object of their worship and
veneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who
are not persuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to
human nature. But, can an error be changed into truth by the
belief of all men? A great philosopher has justly observed, that
" general tradition, or the unanimous consent of mankind is no
criterion of truth."* Another sage had before saio1, '•* that a host
of learned men were insufficient to alter the nature of error and
convert it into truth." f
There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved
round the earth, while the latter remained immoveable in the centre
of the whole system of the universe. Little more than two centuries have elapsed, since this error was detected. There was a time,
when nobody would believe the existence of the antipodes, and
when every one was persecuted, who had temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmly believes it. All
nations upon earth, with the exception however of a few men who
are less credulous than the rest, still believe in sorcerers, ghosts,
apparitions, and spirits; no sensible man, however, thinks himself
obliged to adopt such nonsense. But the most sensible people
consider it their duty to believe in a universal spirit!
120, All the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin. They
have evidently been imagined by stupid people, or presented, by
ambitious and crafty legislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations,
who had neither capacity nor courage maturely to examine the
objects, which through terror they were made to worship.
* Bayle.

+ Averroes.
D2

52

GOOD SENSE,

By closely examining the God, whom we see still adored in our
days even by the most polished nations, we are forced to acknowledge that he evidently bears marks of a savage nature. To be
savage is to acknowledge no right but force; it is to be cruel
beyond measure; to follow only one's own caprice; to want
foresight, prudence and reason. Ye nations, who call yourselves
civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, the God,
on whom you lavish your incense ? Are not the descriptions given
you of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous,
revengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man,
who has not yet cultivated his reason ? O men ! You adore only
a great savage, whom you regard, however, as a model to imitate,
as an amiable master, as a sovereign full of perfection.
The religious opinions of men in every country are ancient and
durable monuments of the ignorance, credulity, cowardice, and
barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a child fond of the
marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing.
Ignorant of the ways of nature, he attributes to spirits, to enchantments, and to magic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His
priests appear to him sorcerers, in whom he supposes a power
purely divine, before whom his confounded reason humbles itself,
whose oracles are to him infallible decrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.
In point of religion, men have, for the most part, remained in
their primitive barbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies
revived, or presented;under some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers, serpents, trees, idols of every kind;
if the wise Egyptians paid homage to crocodiles, rats, and onions,
do we not see nations, who think themselves wiser than they,
respectfully worship bread, into which they imagine, that through
the enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended ; Is
not the Bread-God the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this
respect, are as irrational as the most savage ?
121. The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have
ever disclosed themselves in religious practices, so often either
cruel or extravngant. A spirit of barbarity still survives, and
penetrates the religions even of the most polished nations. Do we
not still see human victims offered to the divinity ? To appease
the anger of a God, who it always supposed as ferocious, jealous,
and vindictive, asa savage, do not those, whose manner of thinking
is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments, by the
command of sanguinary laws ? Modern nations, at the instigation
of their priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of
barbarous nations; at least, do we find, that it has ever entered the
heads of savages to torment for opinions, to search the thoughts,
to molest men for the invisible movements of their brains ?
When we see polished and learned nations, such as the English,
French, Germans, &c, continue, notwithstanding their knowledge,
to Hneel before the barbarous God of the Jews, that is of th^

GOOD SENSE.

53

most stupid, credulous, savage, unsociable people that ever existed
•on earth; when we see these enlightened nations divided into sects,
defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculous
opinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable God; when we see men of ability foolishly devote their time
to meditate the will of this God who is full of caprice and folly,
we are tempted to cry out; O men, you are still savage! In point
of religion, you are yet but children!
122. Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity,
negligence, and stupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the
more, as he finds them generally established. Men, for the most
part, examine nothing: they blindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, above all others, are those which
they have the least courage and capacity to examine: as they
comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be silent, or at
least are soon destitute of argument. Ask any man among the
vulgar, whether he believes in a God ? He will be much surprised
that you can doubt it. Ask him again, what he understands by
the word God? You throw him hto the greatest embarrassment;
you will perceive immediately, that he is incapable of affixing any
real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats. He will tell you,
that God is God; and you will see, he knows neither what he
thinks of it, nor his motives for believing in it.
All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God?
By no means. But division upon an opinion proves not its
evidence; it is rather a sign of uncertainty and obscurity. Does
the same man always agree with himself in the notions he forms of
his God ? No. His idea of him varies with the changes, which
his machine experiences;—another sign of uncertainty. Men
always agree with themselves and others in demonstrative truths.
In any situation, except that of insanity, every one knows that two
and two make four, that the sun shines, that the whole is greater
than its part; that justice is a benefit; that benevolence is necessary to merit the affection of men; that injustice and cruelty are
incompatible with goodness. Are they thus agreed when they
speak of God ? Whatever they think, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects they attribute to him.
Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each forming
different ideas of it, will paint it in a different manner. You will
find no resemblance between the features, each has given to a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in giving us a picture
of God, do but give us one of a great chimera, in whose features
they never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who
exists only in their imaginations. There are not two individuals
upon earth, who have, or can have, the same ideas of their God.
123. It might perhaps with more truth be said, that men are
either Sceptics or Atheists, than that they are firmly convinced of
ehe existence of a God. How can we be assured of the existence
of a being, whom we could never examine, of whom it is impossiD 3

54

GOOD SENSE*,

ble to conceive any permanent idea, whose various effects upo?3
ourselves prevent us from forming an invariable judgment, the
notion of whom cannot be the same in two different minds ? How
can we imagine ourselves clearly convinced of the existence of a
being, to whom we are*every moment forced to attribute a conduct,
opposed to the ideas, we had endeavoured to form of him ? Is it
then possible firmly to believe what we cannot conceive ? Is not
such a belief adhei ing to the opinions of others without having
any of our own. Priests govern the faith of the vulgar; but do not
priests themselves acknowledge that God is to them incomprehensible ? Confess then, that a full and entire conviction of the^existence of a God is not so general, as is imagined.
Scepticism arises from a want of the motives sufficient to form a
judgment. Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish,
and the arguments which combat the existence of a God, some
persons have doubted and withheld their assent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined. Is it possible
to doubt of anything evident? Sensible people ridicule an absolute
scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who should
doubt of his own existence, or that of the sun, would appear
perfectly ridiculous, or might otherwise be suspected dissimulation.
Is this more extravagant than to doubt of the non-existence of an
evidently impossible being ? Is it more absurd to doubt of one's
own existence, than to hesitate upon the impossibility of a being,
whose qualities reciprocally destroy one another ? Do we find a
greater probability for believing the existence of a spiritual being,
than the existence of a stick without two ends ? Is the notion of an
infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits an
infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square
triangle ? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result
only from a superficial examination of theological principles, which
are in perpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles.
To doubt, is to deliberate upon the judgment we ought to form,.
Scepticism is only a state of indetermination, resulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible for any one to be
sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revert to its
principles, and closely examine the notion of the God, who serves
as its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence,
weakness, indifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt
is to fear the trouble of examining things, which are thought little
interesting. But religion being presented to men as their most
important concern in this and the future world, scepticism and
doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual anxiety and must
really constitute a sort of bed of thorns. Every man who has not
courage to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all
religion is founded, can never know for what religion to decide : he
knows not what he should believe or not believe, admit or reject,
hope or fear : in a word, he can no longer resolve upon anything.

6 0 0 D SENSE.

55

Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. This indifference is founded upon the absolute assurance,
or at any rate upon the probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion that a thing which is pretended to be important
is not so, or is only indifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of
the thing, without which it would be impossible to have this
persuasion. Those who call themselves sceptics in the fundamental
points of religion, are commonly either indolent or incapable of
examining.
124. In every country upon earth, we are assured, that a God
has revealed himself., What has he taught men ? Has he proved
evidently that he exists ? Has he informed them where he resides?
Has he taught them what he is, or in what his essence consists ?
Has he clearly explained to them his intentions and plan ? Does
wJhat he says of this plan correspond with the effects which we
seo? No. He informs them solely, that he is what he is ; that he
is a hidden God ; that his ways are unspeakable; that he is exasperated against all who have the temerity to fathom his decrees, or to
consult reason in judging of him or his works.
Does the revealed conduct of God answer the magnificent ideas
which theologians would give us of his wisdom, goodness, justice,
and omnipotence ? By no means. In every revelation, this
conduct announces a partial and capricious being, the protector of
but one favourite people, and the enemy of all others. If he deigns
to appear to some men, he takes care to keep all others in an
invincible ignorance of his divine intentions.
Every private
revelation evidently announces in God, injustice, partiality and
malignity.
Do the commands, revealed by any God, astonish us by their
sublime reason or wisdom ? Do they evidently tend to promote
the happiness of the people, to whom the Divinity discloses them ?
Upon examining the divine commands, I see, in every country,
nothing but strange ordinances, ridiculous precepts, impertinent
ceremonies, puerile customs, an etiquette unworthy of the monarch
of nature, oblations, sacrifices, and expiations, useful indeed to the
ministers of the God, but very burthensome to the rest of the
citizens. I see likewise, that these laws often tend to render men
unsociable, disdainful, intolerant, quarrelsome, unjust, and inhuman
to every one, who has not received the same revelations, the same
ordinances, or the same favours from heaven.
125. Are the precepts of morality, announced by the Deity,
really divine, or superior to those which every reasonable man might
imagine ? They are divine solely because it is impossible for the
human mind to discover their utliity. They make virtue consist in
a total renunciation of nature in a voluntary forgetfulness of rea?on,
a holy hatred of ourselves. Finally, these sublime precepts often
exhibit perfection in a conduct, cruel to ourselves, and perfectly
useless to others.
Has a God appeared ? Has he himself promulgated his laws ?

56

GOOD SENSE.

Has he spoken to men with his own mouth? I am told, that
God has not appeared to a whole people 5 but that he has always
manifested himself through the medium of some favourite personages?
who have been intrusted with the care of announcing and explaining
his intentions to the profane. The people have never been permitted to enter the sanctuary; the ministers of the gods have alone
had the right to relate what passes there.
126. If in every system of divine revelation, I complain of not
seeing either the wisdom, goodness, or equity of a God ; if I suspect
knavery, ambition, or interest in the great personages, who have interposed between us and heaven; it is replied, that God has confirmed by shining miracles the mission of those, who have spoken
in his name. But was it not more simple for him to appear in
person, to explain his nature and will ? Again, if I have the curiosity to examine these miracles, I find, that they are improbable
tales, related by suspected people, who had the greatest interest in
giving out that they were the messengers of the Most High.
What witnesses are appealed to in order to induce us to believe
incredible miracles ? Weak people, who existed thousands of
years ago, and who, even though they could attest these miracles,
may be suspected of being duped by their own imagination, and
imposed upon by the tricks of dexterous impostors. But, you
will say, these miracles are written in books, which by a constant
tradition have been transmitted to us. By whom were these books
written ? Who are the men who have transmitted and perpetuated!
them ? They are either the founders of religions themselves, or their
adherents and assigns. Thus, in religion, the evidence of interested parties becomes irrefragable and incontestable.
12%. God has spoken differently to every people upon earth.
The Indian believes not a word of what He has revealed to the
Chinese; the Mahometan considers as fables what He has said to
the Christian ; the Jew regards both the Mahometan and Christian
as sacrilegious corrupters of the sacred law, which his God had
given his fathers. The Christian, proud of his more modern revelation, indiscriminately damns the Indian, Chinese, Mahometan, and
even the Jew, from whom he receives his sacred books. Who is
wrong or right ? Each exclaims, I am in the right I Each
adduces the same proofs: each mentions his miracles, diviners^
prophets, and martyrs. The man of sense tells them, they are all
delirious; that God has not spoken, if it is true that he is a spirit^
and can have neither mouth nor tongue ; that without borrowing
the organ of mortals, the God of the universe could inspire his
creatures with what he would have them learn ; and that, as they
are all equally ignorant what to think of God, it is evident that it
has not been the will of God to inform them on the subject.
The followers of the different forms of worship which are established in this world accuse one another of superstition and impiety.
Christians look with abhorrence upon the Pagan, Chinese, and
Mahometan superstition. Roman Catholics treat, as impious, Pro*

GOOD SENSE.

6?

Instant Christians; and the latter incessantly declaim against the
superstition of the Catholics. They are all right. To be impious,
is to have opinions offensive to the God we adore; to be superstitious, is to have of him false ideas. In accusing one another of
superstition, the different religionists resemble humpbacks, who reproach one another with their deformity.
Are the oracles which the divinity has revealed to nations by his
different messengers, remarkable for clearness ? Alas I no two men
interpret them alike. Those who explain them to others are not
agreed among themselves. To elucidate them, they have recourse
to interpretations, to commentaries, to allegories, to explanations:
they discover mystical sense very different from the literal sense.
Men are everywhere wanted to explain the commands of a God,
who could not or would not announce himself clearly to those
whom he wished to enlighten. God always prefers to use the
organ of men, who may be suspected of being deceived themselves,
or of having reasons for wishing to deceive others.
120. The founders of religion have generally proved their missions by miracles. But what is a miracle ? It is an operation
directly opposite to the laws of nature. But who according to you
had made those laws ? God. Thus, your God, who, according to
you, foresaw every thing, counteracts the laws, which his wisdom
prescribed to nature! These laws were then defective, or at least in
certain circumstances they did not accord with the views of the
same God, since you inform us that he judged it necessary to
suspend or counteract them.
It is said that a few men, favoured by the Most High, have received
power to perform miracles. But to perform a miracle, it is necessary
to have ability to create new causes capable of producing effects contrary to those of common causes. Is it easy to conceive that God can
give men the inconceivable power of creating causes out of nothing ?
Is it credible that an immutable God can communicate to men power
to change or rectify his plan, a power which by his essence an immutable being cannot have himself? Miracles, far from doing
much honour to God, far from proving the divinity of a religion,
evidently annihilate the idea given us of God, of his immutability,
incommunicable attributes, and even his omnipotence. How can
a theologian tell us that a God, who must have embraced the whole
of his plan, who could have made none but perfect laws, and who
cannot alter them, is forced to employ miracles to accomplish his
projects, or can grant his creatures the power of working prodigies
to execute his divine will? An omnipotent being, whose will is
always fulfilled, who holds in his hand the hearts and minds of his
creatures, has only to will to make them believe whatever he
desires.
130. What shall we say of religions that prove their divinity by
miracles, which they take care to render suspected ? How can we
credit miracles recorded in the sacred books of the Christians,
where God boasts of hardening the hearts and blinding those whom
D 4

58

GOOD SENSE.

he wishes to destroy; where he permits malicious spirits and magicians to work miracles as great as those of his servants ; where it is
predicted that Antichrist shall have power to perform prodigies
capable of shaking the faith even of the elect ? In this case by
what signs shall we know whether God means to instruct or ensnare
us ? How shall we distinguish whether the wonders we behold
come from God or from the devil ?
To remove our perplexity, Pascal gravely tells us, that it is
necessary to judge the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by
the doctrine; that the doctrine proves the miracles, and the miracles
the doctrine. If there exist a vicious and ridiculous circle, it is
undoubtedly in this splendid reasoning of one of the greatest
defenders, of Christianity. Where is the religion that does not
boast of the most admirable doctrine, and which does not produce
numerous miracles for its support?
Is a miracle capable of annihilating the evidence of a demonstrated truth? Although a man should have the secret of healing
all the sick, of making all the lame to walk, of raising all the dead
of a city, of ascending into the air, of stopping the course of the
sun and moon, can he thereby convince me that two and two do
not make four, that one makes three, and that three make only
one; that a God whose immensity fills the universe could have
been contained in the body of a Jew; that the ETERNAL can die
like a man; that a God, who is said to be immutable, provident,
and sensible, could have changed his mind upon his religion, and
reformed his own work by a new revelation ?
131. According to the very principles either of natural or revealed theology, every new revelation should be regarded as false;
every change in a religion emanated from the Deity- should be
reputed an impiety, a blasphemy. Does not all reform suppose,
that, in his first effort, God could not give his religion the solidity
and perfection required? To say that God, in giving a first law,
conformed to the rude ideas of the people whom he wished to
enlighten, is to pretend that God was neither able nor willing to
render the people, whom he was enlightening, so reasonable as was
necessary in order to please him.
Christianity is an impiety, if it is true that Judaism is a religion
which has really emanated from a holy, immutable, omnipotent,
and foreseeing God. The religion of Christ supposes either defects
in the law which God himself had given by Moses, or impotence or
malice in the same God, who was either unable or unwilling to
render the Jews such as they ought to have been in order to please
him. Every new religion, or reform of ancient religions, is
evidently founded upon the impotence, inconstancy, imprudence, or
malice of the Divinity.
132. If history informs me that the first apostles, the founders
or reformers of religions, wrought great miracles; history also informs me that these reformers and their adherents were commonly
buffeted, persecuted, and put to death, as disturbers of the peace of

GOOD SENSE.

69

nations. I am therefore tempted to believe that they did not perform the miracles ascribed to them; indeed, such miracles must
have gained them numerous partisans among the eye-witnesses,
who ought to have protected the operators from abuse. My
incredulity redoubles, when I am told that the workers of miracles
were cruelly tormented, or ignominiously executed. How is it possible to believe that missionaries, protected by a God, invested with
his divine power, and enjoying the gift of miracles, could not have
wrought such a simple miracle as to escape the cruelty of their
persecutors?
Priests have the art of drawing from the persecutions themselves
a convincing proof in favour of the religion of the persecuted. But
a religion which boasts of having cost the lives of many martyrs,
and informs us that its founders, in order to extend it, have suffered
unheard of punishments, cannot be the religion of a beneficent,
equitable, and omnipotent God. A good God would not permit
men, intrusted with announcing his commands, to be ill-treated.
An all-powerful God, wishing to found a religion, would proceed in
a manner more simple and less fatal to the most faithful of his servants. To say that God would have his religion sealed with blood,
is to say that he is weak, unjust, ungrateful, and sanguinary; and
that he is cruel enough to sacrifice his messengers to the views of
his ambition.
133. To die for religion proves not that the religion is true or
divine; it proves, at most, that it is supposed to be such. An
enthusiast proves nothing by his death, unless that religious fanaticism is often stronger than the love of life. An imposter may
sometimes die with courage; he then makes, in the language of
the proverb* a virtue of necessity.
People are often surprised and affected at sight of the generous
courage and disinterested zeal which has prompted missionaries to
preach their doctrine, even at the risk of suffering the most rigorous
treatment. From this ardour for the salvation of men, are drawn
inferences favourable to the religion they have announced. But in
reality this disinterestedness is only apparent. He who ventures
nothing should gain nothing. A missionary seeks to make his fortune by his doctrine. He knows that if he is fortunate enough to
sell his commodity he will become absolute master of those who
receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming the object of
their attention, respect, and veneration; he has every reason to believe that his wants will be supplied. Such are the true motives
which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers and missionaries who traverse the earth.
To die for an opinion proves the truth or goodness of that opinion
no more than to die in battle proves the justice of a prince's cause,
to whose interest thousands have the folly to devote their lives.
The courage of a martyr, elated with the idea of paradise, is not
more supernatural than the courage of a soldier, intoxicated with
the idea of glory, or impelled by the fear of disgrace. What is

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the difference between an Iroquois, who sings while he is burning
by inches, and the maityr ST. LAURENCE, who upon the gridiroia
insults his tyrant ?
The preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the
weakest ; apostles generally practise a perilous trade, to which they
foresee the consequences. Their courageous death proves neither
the truth of their principles nor their own sincerity, any more than
the violent death of the ambitious man, or of the robber, proves
that they were right in disturbing society, or that they thought themselves authorised in so doing. The trade of a missionary was
always flattering to ambition, and formed a convenient method of
living at the expence of the vulgar. These advantages have often
been enough to efface every idea of attendant dangers.
134. You tell us, theologians! that what is folly in the eyes of
wen, is wisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of
the ivise. But do you not say that human wisdom is a gift of
heaven ? In saying this wisdom displeases God is but folly in his
sight, and that he is pleased to confound it, you declare that your
God is the friend only of ignorant people, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present for which this perfidious tyrant promises to
punish them cruelly at some future day. Is it not very strange that
one can be the friend of your God, only by declaring one's self the
enemy of reason and good sense ?
135. According to our divines, faith is an assent without evidence.
Whence it follows that religion requires us firmly to believe inevident things, and propositions often improbable or contrary to reason.
But when we reject reason as a judge of faith, do we not confess
that reason is incompatible with faith ? As the ministers of religion
have resolved to banish reason, they must have felt the impossibility
of reconciling it with faith, which is visibly only a blind submission to priests, whose authority seems to many persons more
weighty than evidence itself, and preferable to the testimony of the
senses.
" Sacrifice your reason; renounce experience; mistrust the testimony of your senses ; submit without enquiry to what we announce
to you in the name of heaven." Such is the uniform language of
priests throughout the world ; they agree upon no point except
upon the necessity of never reasoning upon the principles which
they present to us as most important to our felicity!
1 will not sacrifice my reason; because this reason alone enables
me to distinguish good from evil, truth from falsehood. If as you
say, my reason comes from God, I shall never believe that a God,
whom you call so good, has given me reason, as a snare, to lead me
to perdition. Priests! do you not see, that by decrying reasons
you calumniate your God, from whom you declare it to be a gift.
I will not renounce experience; because it is a guide much more
than the imagination or authority of our spiritual guides. Experience teaches me that enthusiasm and interest may blind and lead
them astray themselves; and that the authority of experience ought

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61

to have much more influence upon my mind than the suspicious
testimony of many men, who I know are either very liable to be
deceived themselves, or otherwise are very much interested in
deceiving others.
I will mistrust my senses, because I am sensible they sometimes
mislead me. But, on the other hand, I know that they will not
always deceive me. I well know that the eye shews me the sun
much smaller than it really i s ; but experience, which is only the
repeated application of the senses, informs me that objects always
appear to diminish as their distance increases; thus I attain to a
certainty that the sun is much larger than the earth; thus my
senses suffice to rectify the hasty judgments which they themselves
had caused.
In warning us to mistrust the testimony of our senses, the priests
annihilate the proofs of all religion. If men may be dupes of
their imagination; if their senses are deceitful, how shall we believe
the miracles, which struck the treacherous senses of our ancestors?
If my senses are unfaithful guides, I ought not to credit even the
miracles wrought before my eyes
136. You incessantly repeat that the truths of religion are above
reason. If so, do you not perceive that these truths are not adapted
to reasonable beings ? To pretend that reason can deceive us, is to
say, that truth can be false; that the useful can be hurtful. Is reason any thing but a knowledge of the useful and true ? Besides,
as our reason and senses are our only guides in this life, to say they
are unfaithful, is to say, that our errors are necessary, our ignorance
invincible, and that, without the extreme of injustice, God cannot
punish us for following the only guides it was his supreme will to
give.
To say, we are obliged to believe things above our reason, is as
ridiculous as to say, that God requires us, without wings, to ascend
into the air. To assure us, that upon some objects we are not
allowed to consult reason, is to say, that, in the most interesting
matter, we must consult only imagination, or act only at random*
Our divines say, we must sacrifice our reason to God. But
what motives can we have to sacrifice our reason to a being, who
makes us only useless presents, of which he does not intend we
shall make use ? What confidence can we put in a God, who,
according to our divines themselves, is malicious enough to harden
the heart, to strike with blindness, to lay snares for us, to lead us
into temptation? In fine, what confidence can we put in the
ministers of this God, wno, to guide us more conveniently, commands us to shut our eyes ?
137. Men are persuaded, that religion is to them of all things
the most serious, while it is precisely what they least examine for
themselves. In pursuit of an office, a piece of land, a house, a
place of profit; in any transaction or contract whatever, every one
carefully examines all, takes the greatest precaution, weighs every
word of a writing, is guarded against every surprise. Not so in

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religion; every one receives it at a venture, and believes it upon
the word of others, without ever taking the trouble to examine.
Two causes concur to foster the negligence and carelessness of
men, with regard to their religious opinions. The first is the despair
of overcoming the obscurity, in which all religion is necessarily
enveloped. Their first principles are only adapted to disgust lazy
minds, who regard them as a chaos impossible to be understood.
The second cause is, that every one is averse to being too much
bound by severe precepts, which all admire in theory, but very few
care to practise with rigour. The religion of many people is like
old family titles, which they have never taken pains to examine, but
which they deposit in their archives to have recourse to them occasionally.
138. The disciples of Pythagoras paid implicit faith to the doctrine of their master; he has said it, was to them the solution of
every problem. The generality of men are not more rational. In
matters of religion, a curate, a priest, an ignorant monk, becomes
master of the thoughts. Faith relieves the weakness of the human
mind, to which application is commonly painful; it is much more
convenient to depend upon others, than to examine for one's self.
Inquiry, being slow and difficult, equally, displeases the stupidity
of the ignorant, and the ardour of the enlightened. Such is undoubtedly the reason why Faith has so many partisans.
The more men are deficient in knowledge and reason, the more
zealous they are in Religion. In every religious faction, a mob of
women, assembled by their directors, display immoderate zeal for
opinions, of which it is evident they have no idea. In theological
quarrels, the populace, like ferocious beasts, fall upon all those,
against whom their priest is desirous of exciting them. A. profound ignorance, boundless credulity, weak intellect, and warm
imagination, are the materials, of which are made bigots, zealots,
fanatics, and saints. How can the voice of reason be heard by
them who make it a principle never to examine for themselves, but
to submit blindly to the guidance of others ? The saints and the
populace are, in the hands of their directors, automatons, moved at
pleasure.
139. Religion is an affair of custon and fashion. We must do
as others do. But, among the numerous religions in the world,
which should men choose? This inquiry would be too painful and
long. They must therefore adhere to the religion of their fathers,
to that of their country, to that of their prince, which, having force
on its side, must be the best. Chance alone often decides the religion of a man, and a nation ; the French would now be as good
Mussulmans as they are Christians, had not their ancestors formerly
baffled the efforts of the Saracens.
If we judge of the intentions of Providence by the events and
revolutions of this world, we are compelled to believe, that He is
very indifferent about the various religions upon earth. For thousands of years, paganism, polytheism, idolatry, were the prevailing

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religions. We are now assured, that, during the above period, the
most flourishing nations had not the least idea of God; an idea,
regarded as so essential to the happiness of man. Christians say,
(excepting the Jewish people, that is, a handful of wretches,) all
mankind lived in the grossest ignorance of their duties towards God,
and had no notions of him, but what were insulting to his Divine
Majesty. Christianity, growing out of Judaism, very humble in
its obscure origin, became powerful and cruel under the Christian
emperors, who, prompted b) holy zeal, rapidly spread it in their
empire by means of fire and sword, and established it upon the
ruins of paganism. Mahomet and his successors, seconded by
Providence or their victorious arms, in a short time banished the
Christian religion from a part of Asia, Africa, and even Europe;
and the gospel was then forced to yield to the Koran.
In ali the factions or sects which, for many ages have distracted
Christianity, the best argument has been always that of the strongest
party; the arms and will of princes have alone decided which
doctrine is most conducive to the happiness of nations. May we
not hence infer, either that the Deity feels little interested in the
religion of men, or that he always declares in favour of the opinions
which best suit the interest of earthly powers; in fine, that he
changes his plan to accommodate their fancy ?
A king of Macassar, tired of the idolatry of his fathers, took a
fancy to abandon it. The council of the monarch deliberated a
long time to decide whether they should send for Christian or
Mahometan divines. Utterly incapable of discerning the best of
the two religions, they resolved to send for missionaries of both at
the same time, and embrace the doctrine of those who should have
the fortune to arrive first. It was not doubted, but that God, who
disposes the winds, would thus explain his will himself. The
missionaries of Mahomet being most diligent, the king and his
people did as had been resolved ; the missionaries of Christ were
rejected through the. fault of their God, who prevented their seasonable arrival.* God evidently consents that chance should decide
the religion of nations.
Rulers infallibly decide the religion of the people. The true
religion is always the religion of the prince; the true God is the
God, whom the prince desires his people to adore; the will of the
priests, who govern the prince, always becomes the will of God.
A wit justly observed, that the true religion is ahvays that, on xuhose
side are the prince and the hangman. Emperors and hangmen long
supported the gods of Rome against the God of Christians; the
latter, having gained to his interest the emperors, their soldiers, and
their hangmen, succeeded in destroying the worship of the Roman
gods. The God of Mahomet has dispossessed the God of Christians of a great part of the dominions which he formerly occupied.
* See the historical account of the kingdom of Macassar. Paris,
1688.

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GOOD SEKSE.

In the eastern part of Asia is a vast, flourishing, fertile, populous
country, governed by such wise laws, that the fiercest conquerors
have adopted them with respect. I mean China. Excepting
Christianity, which was banished as dangerous, the people there
follow such superstitions as they please, while the 'mandarins^ or
magistrates, having long known the errors of the popular religion,
are vigilant to prevent the bonzes or priests from using it as an instrument of discord. Yet we see not, that Providence refuses his
blessing to a nation, whose chiefs are so indifferent about the worship that is rendered to him. On the contrary, the Chinese enjoy a
happiness and repose worthy to be envied, by the many nations
whom religion divides, and often devastates.
We cannot reasonably propose to divest the people of their
follies; but we may perhaps cure the follies of those who govern
the people, and who will then prevent the follies of the people from
becoming dangerous. Superstition is to be feared only when
princes and soldiers rally round her standard; then she becomes
cruel and sanguinary, Every sovereign, who is the protector of
one sect or religious faction, is commonly the tyrant of others,
and becomes himself the most cruel disturber of the peace of his
dominions.
140. It is incessantly repeated, and many sensible persons are
induced to believe, that religion is a restraint necessary to men;
that without it, there would no longer exist the least check for the
vulgar; and that morality and virtue are intimately connected with
it. " The fear of the Lord," cries the priest, " is the beginning
of wisdom. The terrors of another life are salutary, and are proper
to curb the passions of men.
To perceive the inutility of religious notions, we have only to
open our eyes and contemplate the motals of those nations, who
are the most under the dominion of religion. We there find proud
tyrants, oppressive ministers, perfidious courtiers, shameless extortioners, corrupt magistrates, knaves, adulterers, debauchees, prostitutes, thieves, and rogues of every kind, who have never doubted
either the existence of an avenging and rewarding God, the torments of hell, or the joys of paradise.
Without the least utility to the greater part of mankind, the
ministers of religion have studied to render death terrible to the
eyes of their followers. If devout Christians could but be consistent, they would pass their whole life in tears, and die under Jthe
most dreadful apprehensions. What can be more terrible than
death, to the unfortunate who are told that it is horrible to fall
into the hands of the living God; that ive must work out our salvation, with fear and trembling} Yet we are assured, that the death
of the Christian is attended with infinite consolations, of which the
unbeliever is deprived. The good Christian, it is said, dies in the
firm hope of an eternal happiness which he has strived to merit.
But is not this firm assurance itself a presumption punishable in
the eyes of a severe God ? Ought not the greatest saints to be

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ignorant whether they are worthy of love or hatred? Ye Priests!
who are silent upon the torments of hell, while consoling us with
the hope of the joys of paradise; have you then had the advantage
to see your names and ours inscribed in the book of life.
141. To oppose to the passions and present interests of men the
obscure notions of a metaphysical, inconceivable God,—the incredible punishments of another life,—or the pleasures of the heaven,
of which nobody has the least idea,—is not this combating realities
with fictions. Men have never any but' confused ideas of their
God : they see him, if I may so express it, only in clouds. They
never think of him when they are desirous to do evil: whenever
ambition, fortune, or pleasure allures them, the God, his threatenings and promises are forgotten. In the things of this life, there is
a degree of certainty, which the most lively faith cannot give to the
things of the other life.
*
Every religion was originally a curb invented by legislators^ who
wished to establish their authority over the minds of rude nations.
Like nurses who frighten children to oblige them to be quiet, the
ambitious used the name of the gods to frighten savages ; and had
recourse to terror in order to make them support quietly the yoke
they wished to impose. Are then the bugbears of infancy made for
riper age ? At the age of maturity, no man longer believes them,
or if he does, they excite little emotion in him, and never alter his
conduct.
142. Almost every man fears what he sees much more than what
he does not see ; he fears the judgments of men of which he feels
the effects, more than the judgments of God of whom he has only
fluctuating ideas. The desire of pleasing the world, the torrent of
custom, the fear of ridicule, and of the censure of one's neighbours,
have more force than all religious opinions. Does not the military
man, through fear of disgrace, daily expose his life in battle, even
at the risk of incurring eternal damnation ?
The most religious persons have often more respect for a varlet,
than for God. A man who firmly believes, that God sees everything, and that he is omniscient and omnipresent, will be guilty,
when alone, of actions, which he would never do in presence of
the meanest of mortals. Those, who pretend to be most fully convinced of the existence of a God, every moment act as if they believed the contrary.
143. " Let us, at least, it will be said, cherish the idea of a God,
which alone may serve as a barrier to the passions of kings." But,
can we sincerely admire the wonderful effects, which the fear of this
God generally produces upon the minds of princes, who are called
his images ? What idea shall we form of the original, if we judge
of it by the copies!
Sovereigns, it is true, call themselves the representatives of God,
his vicegerents upon earth. But does the fear of a master, more
powerful than they are, incline them seriously to study the welfare

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GOOD SENSE.

of the nations, whom Providence has intrusted to their care ? Does
the pretended terror, which ought to be inspired into them by the
idea of an invisible judge, to whom alone they acknowledge themselves accountable for their actions, render them more equitable,
more compassionate, more sparing of the blood and treasure of their
subjects, more temperate in their pleasures, more attentive to their
duties ? In line, does this God, by whose authority kings reign,
deter them from inflicting a thousand evils upon the people to whom
they ought to act as guides, protectors, and fathers ? Alas ! If
we survey the whole earth, we shall see men almost every where
governed by tyrants, who use religion merely as an instrument
to render more stupid the] slaves whom they overwhelm under the
weight of their vices, or whom they sacrifice without mercy to their
fatal extravagancies.
Far from being a check upon the passions of kings, Religion, by
its very principles, frees them from all restraint. It transforms them
into divinities, whose caprice the people are never permitted to
resist. While it gives up the reins to princes, and on their part
breaks the bonds of the social compact, it endeavours to chain the
minds and hands of their oppressed subjects. Is it then surprising,
that the gods of the earth imagine everything lawful for them, and
regard their subjects only as the vile instruments of their caprice or
ambition ?
In every country, Religion has represented the Monarch of
nature as a cruel, fantastical, partial tyrant, whose caprice is law ?
the Monarch God, is but too faithfully imitated by his representatives upon earth. Religion seems every where invented solely to
lull the people in the lap of slavery, in order that their masters may
easily oppress them orrendar them wretched with impunity.
144. To guard against the enterprises of a haughty pontiff who
wished to reign over kings, to shelter their persons from the attempts
of credulous nations excited by the priests, several European princes
have pretended to hold their crowns and rights of God alone, and
to be accountable only to him for their actions. After a long contest between the civil and spiritual power, the former at length triumphed ; and the priests, forced to yield, acknowledged the divine
rights of kings and preached them to the people, reserving the
liberty of changing their minds and of preaching revolt, whenever
the divine rights of kings clashed with the divine rights of the clergy.
It was always at the expence of nations, that peace was concluded
between kings and priests; but the latter, in spite of treaties, always
preserved their pretensions.
Tyrants and wicked princes, whose consciences continually reproach them with negligence or perversity, far from fearing their
God, had rather deal with this invisible judge who never opposes
anything, or with his priests who are always condescending to the
rulers of the earth, than with their own subjects. The people, reduced to despair, might probably appeal from the divine rights of

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67

their chiefs. Men, when oppressed to the last degree, sometimes
become turbulent; and the divine rights of the tyrant are then forced
to the natural rights of the subjects.
It is cheaper dealing with gods than men. Kings are accountable for their actions to God alone ; priests are accountable only to
themselves. There is much reason to believe, that both are more
confident of the indulgence of heaven, than that of earth. It is
much easier to escape the vengeance of gods who may be cheaply
appeased, than the vengeance of men whose patience is exhausted.
" If you remove the fear of an invisible power, what restraint
will you impose upon the passions of sovereigns?'5 Let them
learn to reign; let them learn to be just; to respect the rights of the
people; and to acknowledge the kindness of the nations, from
whom they hold their greatness and power. Let them learn to fear
men, and submit to the laws of equity. Let nobody transgress
these laws with impunity; and let them be equally binding upon
the powerful and the weak, the great and the small, the sovereign
and the subjects.
The fear of gods, Religion, and the terrors of another life, are the
metaphysical and supernatural bulwarks, opposed to the impetuous
passions of princes! Are these bulwarks effectual? Let experience resolve the question. To oppose Religion to the wickedness
of tyrants, is to wish, that vague, uncertain, unintelligible speculations may be stronger than propensities which everything conspires
daily to strengthen.
145. The immense service of religion to politics is incessantly
boasted; but, a little reflection will convince us, that religious
opinions equally blind both sovereigns and people, and never enlighten them upon their true duties or interests. Religion but too
often forms licentious, immoral despots, obeyed by slaves, whom
everything obliges to conform to their views.
For want of having studied or known the true principles of administration, the objects and rights of social life, the real interests
of men and their reciprocal duties, princes, in almost every country,
have become licentious, absolute and perverse; and their subjects
abject, wicked, and unhappy. It was to avoid the trouble of studying these important objects, that recourse was had to chimeras,
which, far from remedying anything have hitherto only multiplied
the evils of mankind, and diverted them from whatever is most
essential to their happiness.
Does not the unjust and cruel manner in which so many nations
are governed here below, manifestly furnish one of the strongest
proofs, not only of the small effect produced by the fear of another
life, but also of the non-existence of a Providence, busied with the
fate of the human race ? If there existed a good God, should we
not be forced to admit, that in this life he strangely neglects the
greater part of mankind? It would seem, that this God has
created nations only to be the sport of the passions and follies of
his representatives upon earth.

m

GOOD SENSE.

146- By reading history with a little attention, we shall perceive
that Christianity, at first weak and servile, established itself among
the savage and free nations of Europe only intimating to their
chiefs, that its religious principles favoured despotism and rendered
them absolute. Consequently, we see barbarous princes suddenly
converted; that is, we see them adopt, without examination, a
system so favourable to their ambition, and use every art to induce
their subjects to embrace it. If the ministers of this religion have
since often derogated from their favourite principles, it is because
the theory influences the conduct of the ministers of the Lord, only
when it suits their temporal interests.
Christianity boasts of procuring men a happiness unknown to
preceding ages. It is true, the Greeks knew not the divine rights
of the tyrants or of the usurpers of the rights of their country.
Under paganism, it never entered the head of any man to suppose,
that it was against the will of heaven for a nation to defend themselves against a ferocious beast, who had the audacity to lay waste
their possessions. The religion of the Christians was the first that
screened tyrants from danger, by laying down as a principle that
the people must renounce the legitimate defence of themselves.
Thus Christian nations are deprived of the first law of nature,
which orders man to resist evil, and to disarm whoever is preparing to destroy him! If the ministers of the church have often
permitted the people to revolt for the interest of heaven, they have
never permitted them to revolt for their own deliverance from real
evils or known violences.
From heaven came the chains, that were used for fettering the
minds of mortals. Why is the Mahometan everywhere a slave ?
Because his prophet enslaved him in the name of the Deity, as
Moses had before subdued the Jews. In all parts of the earth, we
see, that the first legislators were the first sovereigns and the first
priests of the savages to whom they gave laws.
Religion seems invented solely to exalt princes above their
nations, and rivet the fetters of slavery. As soon as the people are
too unhappy here below, priests are read} to silence them by
threatening them with the anger of God. They are made to fix
their eyes upon heaven, lest they should perceive the true causes of
their misfortunes, and apply the remedies which nature presents.
147. By dint of repeating to men that the earth is not their true
country; that the present life is only a passage; that they are not
made to be happy in this world; that their sovereigns hold their
authority of God alone, and are accountable only to him for the
abuse of it; that it is not lawful to resist them, &c, priests have
eternized the misgovernment of kings and the misery of the people;
the interests of nations have been basely sacrificed to their chiefs.
The more we consider the dogmas and principles of religion, the
more we shall be convinced that their sole object is the advantage
of tyrants and priests without regard to that of societies.
To mask the impotence of its deaf gods, religion has persuaded

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mortals that iniquities always kindle the wrath of heaven. People
impute to themselves alone the disasters that daily befal them. If
nations sometimes feel the strokes of convulsed nature, their bad
governments are but too often the immediate and permanent causes
from whence proceed the continual calamities which they are forced
to endure. Are not the ambition, negligence, vices, and oppressions of kings and nobles, generally the causes of scarcity, beggary,
wars, pestilences, corrupt morals, and all the multiplied scourges
which desolate the earth ?
In fixing men's eyes continually upon heaven: in persuading
them that all their misfortunes are effects of divine anger; in providing none but ineffectual and futile means to put an end to their
sufferings, we might justly conclude that the only object of priests
was to divert nations from thinking about the true sources of their
misery, and thus to render it eternal. The ministers of religion conduct themselves almost like those indigent mothers, who, for want
of bread, sing their starved children to sleep, or give them playthings to divert their thoughts from afflicting hunger.
Blinded by error from their very infancy, restrained by the invisible bonds of opinion, overcome by panic terrors, their faculties
blunted by ignorance, how should the people know the true causes
of their wretchedness ? They imagine that they can avert it by invoking the gods. Alas! do they not see, that it is in the name of
these gods, that they are ordered to present their throats to the
sword of their merciless tyrants, in whom they might find the
obvious cause of the evils under which they groan, and for whom
they cease not to implore in vain the assistance of heaven ?
Ye credulous people! In your misfortunes redouble your
prayers, offerings, and sacrifices; throng to your temples; butcher
victims without number; fast in sack-cloth and ashes; bathe yourselves in your own tears; and, above all, completely ruin yourselves
to enrich your gods! You will only enrich their priests. The
gods of heaven will be propitious only when the gods of the earth
shall acknowledge themselves men, like you, and shall devote to
your welfare the attention you deserve.
148. Negligent, ambitious, and perverse princes are the real
causes of public misfortunes. Useless, unjust reiterated wars depopulate the earth. Encroaching and despotic governments absorb
the benefits of nature. The rapacity of courts discourages agriculture, extinguishes industry, produces want, pestilence, and misery.
Heaven is neither cruel nor propitious to the prayers of the people;
it is their proud chiefs, who have almost always hearts of iron.
It is destructive to the morals of princes to persuade them that
they have God alone to fear when they injure their subjects, or
neglect their happiness. Sovereigns! It is not the gods, but your
people that you offend when you do evil. It is your people and
yourselves that you injure when you govern unjustly.
In history nothing is more common than to see religious tyrants;
nothing more rare than to find equitable, vigilant, enlightened

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princes. A monarch may be pious, punctual in a servile discharge
of the duties of his religion, very submissive and liberal to his
priests, and yet at the same time be destitute of every virtue and
talent necessary for governing. To princes religion is only an instrument destined to keep the people moie completely under the
yoke.
By the excellent principles of religious morality, a tyrant who,
during a long reign, has done nothing but oppress his subjects,
wresting from them the fruits of their labour, sacrificing them without mercy to his insatiable ambition,—a conqueror who has usurped
the provinces of others, slaughtered whole nations, and who, during
his whole life, has been a scourge to mankind,—imagines his conscience may rest, when, to expiate so many crimes, he has wept at
the feet of a priest, who generally has the base complaisance to
console and encourage a robber, whom the most hideous despair
would too lightly punish for the misery he has caused upon
earth.
149. A sovereign sincerely devout is commonly dangerous to the
state. Credulity always supposes a contracted mind ; devotion
generally absorbs the attention which a prince should pay to the
government of his people. Obsequious to the suggestions of his
priests he becomes the sport of their caprices, the favourer of their
quarrels, and the instrument and accomplice of their follies, which
he imagines to be of the greatest importance. Among the most
fatal presents which religion has made the world, ought to be
reckoned those devout and zealous monarchs, who, under an idea of
working for the welfare of their subjects, have made it a sacred
duty to torment, persecute, and destroy those who thought differently
from themselves. A bigot, at the head of an empire, is one of the
greatest scourges which heaven in its fury can send upon earth. A
single fanatical or knavish priest, listened to by a credulous and
powerful prince, suffices to put a state in disorder, and the world in
combustion.
In almost all countries priests and pious persons are intrusted
with forming the minds and hearts of young princes destined to
govern nations. What qualifications have instructors of this stamp !
By what interest can they be animated ? Full of prejudices themselves, they will teach their pupil to regard superstition as most
important and sacred; its chimerical duties as most indispensible
intolerance and persecution as the true foundation of his future
authority. They will endeavour to make him a party leader, a
turbulent fanatic, a tyrant; they will early stifle his reason, and
forewarn him against the use of it; they will prevent truth from
reaching his ears; they will exasperate him against true talents, and
prejudice him in favour of contemptible ones; in fine, they will
make him a weak devotee, who will have no idea either of justice
or injustice, nor of true glory, nor of true greatness, and who will
be destitute of the knowledge and virtues necessary to the government of a great nation. Such, in epitome, is the plan of the educa^

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tion of a child destined one day to create the happiness or misery
of millions of men!
150. Priests have ever shown themselves the friends of despotism,
and the enemies of public liberty : their trade requires abject and
submissive slaves, who have never the audacity to reason. In ari
absolute government, who ever gains an ascendancy over the mind
of a weak and stupid prince, becomes master of the state. Instead
of conducting the people to salvation, priests have always conducted them to servitude.
In consideration of the supernatural titles which religion has
forged for the worst of princes, the latter have commonly united
with priests, who, sure of governing by opinion the sovereign himself, have undertaken to bind the hands of the people and to hold
them under the yoke. But the tyrant, covered with the shield of
religion, in vain flatters himself that he is secure from every stroke
of fate; opinion is a weak rampart against the despair of the
people. Besides, the priest is a friend of the tyrant only while he
finds his account in the tyranny; he preaches sedition, and demolishes the idol he has made, when he finds it no longer sufficiently
conformable to the interest of God, whom he makes to speak at his
will, and who never speaks except according to his interests.
It will no doubt be said that sovereigns, knowing all the advantages which religion procures them, are truly interested in supporting it with all their strength. If religious opinions are useful to
tyrants, it is very evident that they are useful to those who govern
by the laws of reason and equity. Is there then any advantage in
exercising tyranny ? Are princes truly interested in being tyrants ?
Does not tyranny deprive them of true power, of the love of the
people, and of all safety ? Ought not every reasonable prince to
perceive that the despot is a madman, and an enemy to himself?
Should not every enlightened prince beware of flatterers, whose
object is to lull him to sleep upon the brink of the precipice which
they form beneath him.
151. If sacerdotal flatteries succeed in perverting princes and
making them tyrants; tyrants, on their part, necessarily corrupt
both the great and the humble. Under an unjust ruler, void of
goodness and virtue, who knows no law but his caprice, a nation must
necessarily be depraved. Will this ruler wish to have, about his
person, honest, enlightened, and virtuous men ? No. He wants
none but flatterers, approvers, imitators, slaves, base and servile
souls, who conform themselves to his inclinations. His court will
propagate the contagion of vice among the lower ranks. All will
gradually become corrupted in a state, whose chief is corrupt. It
was long since said, that " Princes seem to command others to do
whatever they do themselves."
Religion, far from being a restraint upon sovereigns, enables them
to indulge without fear or remorse, in acts of licentiousness as injurious to themselves as to the nations whom they govern. It is
never with impunity that men are deceived. Tell a sovereign that

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GOOD SENSE.

he is a god; he will very soon believe that he owes nothing to any
one. Provided he is feared, he will care very little about being
loved : he will observe neither rules nor relations with his subjects,
nor duties towards them. Tell this prince that he is accountable
for his actions to God alone, and he will soon act as if he were
accountable to no one.
152. An enlightened sovereign is he who knows his true interests; who knows that they are connected with the interests of
his nation; that a prince cannot be great, powerful, beloved, or
respected, while he commands only unhappy slaves; that equity,
beneficence, and vigilance will give him more real authority over
his people than the fabulous titles said to be derived from heaven.
He will see that religion is useful only to priests, that it is useless
to society and often troubles it, and that it ought to be restrained in
order to be prevented from doing injury. Finally, he will perceive,
that, to reign with glory, he must make good laws and inculcate
virtue, and not found his power upon impostures and fallacies.
153. The ministers of religion have taken great care to make of
their God a formidable, capricious, and fickle tyrant. Such a God
was necessary to their variable interests. A God who should be
just and good, without mixture of caprice or perversity; a God who
had constantly the qualities of an honest man, or of a kind sovereign, would by no means suit his ministers. It is useful to
priests that men should tremble before their God, in order that they
may apply to them to obtain relief from their fears.
" No man is a hero before his valet de chambre." It is not
surprising that a God, dressed up by his priests so as to be terrible
to others, should rarely impose upon them, or should have but very
little influence upon their conduct. Hence, in every country their
conduct is very much the same. Under pretext of the glory of
their God they everywhere play upon ignorance, degrade the mind,
discourage industry, and sow discord. Ambition and avarice have
at all times been the ruling passions of the priesthood. The priest
everywhere rises superior to sovereigns and laws; we see him everywhere occupied with the interests of his pride, of his cupidity, and
of his despotic revengeful humour. In the room of useful and
social virtues he everywhere substitutes expiations, sacrifices, ceremonies, mysterious practices, in a word, inventions lucrative to
himself and ruinous to others.
The mind is confounded and the reason is amazed upon viewing
the ridiculous customs and pitiful means which the ministers of the
gods have invented in every country to purify souls, and render
heaven favourable to nations. Here they cut off part of a child's
prepuce to secure for him divine benevolence; there they pour
water upon his head to cleanse him of crimes, which he could
not as yet have committed. Jn one place they command him to
plunge into a river, whose waters have the power of washing away
all stains; in another he is forbidden to eat certain food, the use of
which will not fail to excite the celestial wrath j iri other countries

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GOOD SENSE.

they enjoin upon sinful man to come periodically and confess his
faults to a priest, who is often a greater sinner than himself,
& c , &c, &c.
154, What should we say of a set of empirics, who, resorting everyday to a public place, should extol the goodness of their remedies,
and vend them as infallible, while they themselves were full of the
infirmities which they pretend to cure ? Should we have much
confidence in the recipes of these quacks, though the) stun us with
crying, " take our remedies, their effects are infallible; they cure
every body except us." What should we afterwards think, should
those quacks spend their lives in complaining that their remedies
never produce the desired effect upon the sick who take them ? In
fine, what idea should we form of the stupidity of the vulgar, who,
notwithstanding these confessions, should not cease to pay dearly for
remedies, the inefficacy of which every thing tends to prove?
Priests resemble those alchymists who boldly tell us they have the
secret of making gold, while they have scarcely clothes to cover
their nakedness.
IJje ministers of religion incessantly declaim against the corruption of the age, and loudly complain of the little effect of their
lessons, while, at the same time, they assure us that religion is the
universal remedy, the true panacea against the wickedness of mankind. These priests are very sick themselves, yet men continue to
frequent their shops, and to have faith in their divine antidotes,
which, by their own confession, never effect a cure!
155. Religion, especially with the moderns, has tried to identify
itself with Morality, the principles of which it has thereby totally
obscured. It has rendered men unsociable by duty, and forced
them to be inhuman to every one who thought differently from themselves, Theological disputes, equally unintelligible to each of the
enraged parties, have shaken empires, caused revolutions, been fatal
to sovereigns, and desolated all Europe. These contemptible quarrels have not been extinguished even in rivers of blood. Since the
extinction of paganism the people have made it a religious principle
to become outrageous whenever any opinion is advanced which
their priests think contrary to sound doctrine. The sectaries of a
religion which preaches in appearance nothing but charity, concord,
and peace, have proved themselves more ferocious than cannibals or
savages whenever their divines excited them to destroy their
brethren. There is no crime which men have not committed under
the idea of pleasing the Divinity, or appeasing his wrath.
The idea of a terrible God, whom we paint to ourselves as a
despot, must necessarily render his subjects wicked. Fear makes
only slaves, and slaves are cowardly, base, cruel, and think every
thing lawful, in order to gain the favour or escape the chastisements
of the master whom they fear. Liberty of thinking alone can give
men humanity and greatness of soul. The notion of a tyrant-god
tends only to make them abject, morose, quarrelsome, intolerant
slaves.
E

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GOOD SENSE,

Every religion which supposes a God easily provoked, jealousy
revengeful, punctilious about his rights or the etiquette with which
he is treated ;—a God little enough to be hurt by the opinions
which men can form of him;—a God unjust enough to require that
we have uniform notions of his conduct; a religion which supposes
a God necessarily becomes restless, unsociable, and sanguinary;
the worshippers of such a God would never think that they could,
without offence, forbear hating, and even destroying every one who
is pointed out to them as an adversary of this God ; they would
think that it would be to betray the cause of their celestial monarchy
to live in friendly intercourse with rebellious fellow-citizens. If we
love what God hates, do we not expose ourselves to his implacable
hatred ?
Infamous persecutors, and devout men-eaters ! Will you never
discern ihe folly and injustice of your intolerant disposition ? Do
you not see that man is no more master of his religious opinions,
his belief or unbelief, than of the language which he learns from
infancy, and which he cannot change? To tell a man to think like
you, is it not to require a foreigner to express himself as yoty lo ?
To punish a man for his errors, is it not to punish him for having,
been educated differently from you ? If I am an unbeliever, is it
possible for me to banish from my mind the reasons that have
shaken my faith ? If your God gives men leave to be damned,,
what have you to meddle with ? Are you more prudent and wise
than this God, whose rights you would avenge.
156. There is no devotee who does not, according to his temperament, hate, despise, or pity the adherents of a sect different from his.
own. The established religion, which is never any other than that,
of the sovereign and the armies, always makes its superiority felt in
a very cruel and injurious manner by the weaker sects. As yet
there is no true toleration upon earth ; men every where adore a,
jealous God, of whom each nation believes itself the friend, to the
exclusion of all others.
Every people boasts of adoring alone the true God, the universal
God, the Sovereign of all nature. But when we come to examine
this Monarch of the world, we find that every society, sect, party,
or religious cabal, makes of this so powerful God only a pitiful
sovereign, whose care and goodness extend only to a small number
of his subjects, who pretend that they alone have the happiness
to enjoy his favours, and that he is not at all concerned about the
others.
The founders of religions, and the priests who support them,
evidently proposed to separate the nations whom they taught from
the other nations; they wished to separate their own flock by distinguishing- marks; they gave their followers gods, who were hostile to the other gods; they taught them modes of worship, dogrrias ,
and ceremonies apart; and, above all, they persuaded them that
the religion of others was impious and abominable. By this unworthy artifice the ambitious knaves established their usurpation

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GOOD SENSE.

®ver the minds of their followers, rendered them unsociable, and
made them regard with an evil eye all persons who had not the same
mode of worship and the same ideas as they had. Thus it is that
Religion has shut up the heart and for ever banished from it the
affection that man ought to have for his fellow-creature. Sociability,
indulgence, humanity, those first virtues of all morality, are totally
incompatible with religious prejudices.
157. Every national religion is calculated to make man vain, unsociable, and wicked ; the first step towards humanity is to permit
every one peaceably to embrace the mode of worship and opinions
which he judges to be right. But this conduct cannot be pleasing
to the ministers of religion, who wish to have the right of tyrannising
over men even in their thoughts.
Blind and bigotted princes! You hate and persecute heretics,
and order them to execution, because you are told that these
wretches displease God. But do you not say that your God is full
of goodness? How then can you expect to please him by acts of
barbarity which he must necessarily disapprove ? Besides, who has
informed you that their opinions displease your God ? Your
priests ? But who assures you that your priests are not themselves
deceived or wish to deceive you ? The same priests ? Princes !
It is then upon the hazardous word of your priests that you commit
the most atrocious crimes under the idea of pleasing the Divinity !
158. Pascal says, " that man never does evil so fully and cheerfully as when he acts from a false principle of conscience."*
Nothing is more dangerous than a religion which lets loose the
ferocity of the multitude, and justifies their blackest crimes. They
will set no bounds to their wickedness when they think it authorized
by their God, whose interests they are told can make every action
legitimate. Is religion in danger ?—the most civilized people immediately become true savages, and think nothing forbidden. The
more cruel they are, the more agreeable they suppose they are to
their God, whose cause they imagine cannot be supported with too
much warmth.
All religions have authorized innumerable crimes. The Jews,
intoxicated with the promises of their God, arrogated the rights.of
exterminating whole nations. Relying on the oracles of their God,
the Romans, like true robbers, conquered and ravaged the world.
The Arabians, encouraged by their divine prophet, carried fire and
sword among the Christians and the idolaters. The CHRISTIANS,
under pretext of extending their holy religion, have often deluged
both hemispheres in blood.
In all events favourable to their own interest, which they always
call the cause of God, priests show us the finger of God. According
to these principles, the devout have the happiness to see ihe finger
of God in revolts, revolutions, massacres, regicides, crimes, prostitutions, horrors; and, if these things coutribute ever so little to the
* Vide Thoughts of Pascal, X X X V I I I .
E

2

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GOOD SEKSE.

triumph of religion, we are told that " God uses all sorts of means
to attain his ends." Is anything more capable of effacing every
idea of morality from the minds of men, than to inform them that
their God, so powerful and perfect, is often forced to make use of
criminal actions in order to accomplish his designs ?
159. No sooner do we complain of the extravagancies and evils
which Religion has so often caused upon the earth, than we are
reminded that these excesses are not owing to Religion ; but " that
they are the sad effects of the passions of men." But I would ask,
what has let loose these passions ? It is evidently Religion; it is
zeal that renders men inhuman, and serves to conceal the greatest
atrocities. Do not these disorders then prove that religion, far from
restraining the passions of men, only covers them with a veil which
sanctifies them, and that nothing would be more useful than to tear
away this sacred veil of which men often make such a terrible use?
What horrors would be banished from society if the wicked were
deprived of so plausible a pretext for disturbing it!
Instead of being angels of peace among men, priests have been
demons of discord. Alledged their conscience, they have pretended
to receive from heaven the right of being quarrelsome, turbulent,
and rebellious. Do not the ministers of the Lord think themselves
aggrieved, and pretend that the divine Majesty is offended, whenever sovereigns have the temerity to prevent them from doing evil?
Friests are like the spiteful woman who cried fire ! murder! assassination ! while her husband held her hands to prevent her from
striking him.
160. Notwithstanding the bloody tragedies which Religion often
acts, it is insisted, that, without Religion there can be no Morality.
If we judge theological opinions by their effects, we may confidently
assert that all Morality is perfectly incompatible with men's religious
opinions.
" Imitate God,55 exclaim the pious. But what would be our
Morality should* we imitate this God! and what God ought we
to imitate? The God of the Deist? But even this God cannot
serve us as a very constant model of goodness. If he is the author
of .all things, he is the author both of good and evil. If he is the
author of order, he is also the author of disorder, which could not
take place without his permission. If he produces, he destroys ; if
he gives life, he takes it away; if he grants abundance, riches,
prosperity, and peace, he permits or sends scarcity, poverty, calamities, and wars. How then can we receive as a model of permanent beneficence, the God of Deism or natural religion, whose
favourable dispositions are every instant contradicted by all the
effects we behold? Morality must have a basis less tottering than
the example of a God, whose conduct varies, and who cannot be
called good, unless we obstinately shut our eyes against the evil
which he causes or permits in this world.
Shall we imitate the beneficent the mighty Jupiter of heathen
antiquity ? To imitate such a god, is to admit as a model a

GOOD SENSEo

77

rebellious son, who ravishes the throne from his father. It is to
imitate a debauchee, an adulterer, one guilty of incest and of base
passions, at whose conduct every reasonable mortal would blush.
What would have been the condition of men uader paganism, had
they imagined, like Plato, that virtue consisted in imitating the gods I
Must we imitate the God of the Jews! Shall we find in
Jehovah a model for our conduct? This is a truly savage god,
made for a stupid, cruel, and immoral people ; he is always furious,
breathes nothing but vengeance, commands carnage, theft, and unsociability ; the conduct of this god cannot serve as a model to that
of an honest man, and can be Jmitated only by a chief of robbers.
Shall we then imitate the Jesus of the Christians ? Does this
God, who died to appease the implacable fury of his father, furnish
us an example which men ought to follow ? Alas! we shall see in
him only a God, or rather a fanatic, a misanthrope, who, himself
plunged in wretchedness and preaching to wretches, will advise
them to be poor, to combat with and stifle nature, to hate pleasure,
seek grief, and detest themselves. He will tell them to leave father,
mother, relations, friends, &c. to follow him. " Fine morality !''
you say. It is undoubtedly admirable: it must be divine, for it is
impracticable to men. Rut is not such sublime morality calculated
to render virtue odious? According to the so much boasted
morality of the maw-God, of the Christians, a disciple of his iri
this world must be like Tantalus, tormented with a burning thirst,
which he is not allowed to quench. Does not such morality give
us a wonderful idea of the author of nature? If, as we are
assured) he has created ail things for his creatures, by what strange
whim doei he forbid them the use of the goods he has created for
them. Is pleasure then, which man continually desires, only a
snare, which God has maliciously laid to surprise his weakness ?
161. The followers of Christ would have us regard, as a miracle,
the establishment of their Religion, which is totally repugnant to
nature, opposite to all the propensities of the heart, and inimical to
sensual pleasures. But the austerity of a doctrine renders it the
more marvellous in the eyes of the vulgar. The same disposition,
which respects inconceivable mysteries as divine and supernatural,
admires as divine and supernatural, a Morality that is impracticable, and superior to the powers of man.
To admire a system of Morality, and to put it in practice, are two
very different things. All Christians admire and extol the Morality of
the gospel; but it is practised only by a very small number of saints,
admired by those who, under pretext that they are deficient in
strength or grace, excuse themselves from imitating their conduct.
The whole world is more or less infected with a Religious morality, founded upon the opinion, that to please the Divinity, it is
absolutely necessary to render ourselves unhappy upon earth. In
all parts of our globe we see penitents, solitaries, Jaguirs, and fanatics, who seem to have profoundly studied the means of tormenting
themselves, in hoaour of a being whose goodness all agree in cele-

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GOOD-SENSE,

braiing. Religion, by its essence, is an enemy to the joy and
happiness of men. " Blessed are the poor, blessed are they, who
weep; blessed are they, who suffer; misery to those, who are in
abundance and joy. Such are the rare discoveries, announced by
Christianity!
162. What in every religion is a Saint! A man, who prays,
and fasts, who torments himself, and shuns the world ; who, like an
owl, delights only in solitude, abstains from all pleasure, and seems
frighted at every object, which for a moment, may divert him from
his fanatical meditations. Is this virtue'! Is a being of this cast
kind to himself, or useful to others ? Would not society be dissolved, and man return to a savage state^ if every one were fool
enough to wish to be a Saint ?
It is evident, that the literal and rigorous practice of the divine
Morality of the Christians would prove the infallible ruin of
nations. A Christian, aiming at perfection, ought to free his mind
from whatever can divert it from heaven, his true country; upon
earth, he sees nothing but temptations, snares, and rocks of perdition. He must fear science as hurtful to faith ; he must avoid
industry, as a means of obtaining riches, too fatal to salvation; he
must renounce offices and honours, as capable of exciting his pride,
and calling off his attention from the care of his soul. In a word,
the sublime Morality of Christ, were it practicable, would break
all,.the bonds of society.
- /jy^ilnt' tii^society is as useless, as a Saint in the desert; his
humour is morose, discontented, and often turbulent; his zeal sometimes obliges him in conscience to trouble society by opinions or
dreams, which his vanity makes him consider as inspirations from on
high. The annals of every religion are full of restless Saints, intractable Saints, and seditious Saints, who have become famous by
the ravages, with which,for the greater glory of'God, they have desolated the universe. If Saints, who live in retirement are useless,
those who live in the world are often very dangerous.
The vanity of acting a part, and the desire of appearing illustrious in the eyes of the short-sighted vulgar by a singular conduct,
commonly constitute the distinguishing character of great Saints.
Pride persuades them, that they are extraordinary men far above
Human nature, beings much more perfect than others, favourites whom
God regards with much more complaisance than the rest of mortals.
Humility, in a Saint, is commonly only a more refined pride than
that of the generality of man. Nothing but the most ridiculous
vanity can induce man to wage continual war against his own
nature.
163. A morality, which contradicts the nature of man, is not
made for man. " But, say you, the nature of man is depraved.'*
In what consists this pretended depravity? In having passions?
But, are not passions essential to man ? Is he not obliged to seek,
desire, and love what is, or what bethinks is, conducive to his happiness ? Is he not forced to fear and avoid what he judges disagree-

GOOD SENSE.

19

able or fatal ? Kindle his passions for useful objects; connects his
welfare with those objects; divert him, by sensible and known
motives, from what may injure either him or others, and you will
make him a reasonable and virtuous being. A man without passions would be equally indifferent to vice and to virtue.
Sacred Doctors! you are all always repeating to us that the nature
of man is perverted ; you exclaim, " that all flesh has corrupted its'
way, that all the propensities of nature have become inordinate."
In this case, you accuse your God ; who was either unable or unwilling, that this nature should preserve its primitive affection. If
this nature is corrupted, why has not God repaired it? The Christian immediately assures me, that human nature is repaired; that
the death of his God has restored its integrity." How then, I would
ask, do you pretend that human nature, notwithstanding the death
of a God, is still deoraved? Is then the death of your God wholly
fruitless? What becomes of his omnipotence and of his victory
over the Devil, if it is true that the Devil still preserves the empire,
which, according to you, he was always exercised in the world?
According to Christian theology, Death is the wages of sin. This
opinion is conformable to that of some negro and savage nations,
who imagine that the Death of a man is always the supernatural
effect of the anger of the Gods. Christians firmly believe, that
Christ has delivered them from sin; though they see, that, in their
Religion, as in others, man is subject to Death. To say that Jesus
Christ has delivered us from sin, is it not to say, that a judge has
pardoned a criminal, while we see that he leaves him for execution ?
164. If shutting our eyes upon whatever passes in the world,
we would credit the partisans of the Christian Religion, we should
believe, that the coming of their divine Saviour produced the most
wonderful and complete reform in the morals of nations. " The
Messiah," according to Pascal, "was alone to produce a great,
elect, holy, and chosen people; to lead, support, and introduce
them into the abode of peace and holiness ; to render them holy
before God, make them the temple of God, save them from the
anger of God,, deliver them from the dominion of sin, give them
laws, engrave these laws upon their hearts, offer himself to God for
them, break the head of the devil ."* This great man forgot to
point out the people, upon whom his divine Messiah produced the
miraculous effects of which he so emphatically speaks; it seems,
they are not as yet in existence.
If we do but examine the Morals of Christian nations, and listen
to the clamours of their priests, we shall be forced to conclude, that
Jesus Christ, their God, preached and died, in vain; his omnipotent will still finds in men, a resistance, over which he cannot, or
will not triumph. The Morality of this divine Teacher, which his
disciples so much admire and so little practise, is followed, in a
whole century only by half a dozen obscure saints, and fanatics, and
* Vide Thoughts of Pascal, XV.

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qOOD SENSE.

unknown monks, who alone will have the glory of shining in the
celestial court, while all the rest of mortals, though redeemed by
the blood of this God, will be the prey of eternal flames.
165. When a man is strongly inclined to sin, he thinks very little
about his God. Nay more, whatever crimes he has committed, he
always flatters himself that this God will soften, in his favour,,the
rigour of his decrees. No mortal seriously believes, that his conduct can damn him. Though he fears a terrible God, who often
makes him tremble, yet, whenever he is strongly tempted, he
yields; and he afterwards sees only the God of mercies, the idea
of whom calms his apprehensions. Does a man commit evil ?
he hopes, he shall have time to reform, and promises to repent at a
future day.
In religious pharmacy, there are infallible receipts to quiet consciences: priests, in every country ; possess sovereign secrets to
disarm the anger of heaven. Yet, if it be true tnat the Deity is appeased by prayers, offerings, sacrifices, and penances, it can no
longer be said, that Religion is a check to the irregularities of men i
they will first sin, and then seek the means to appease God. Every
Religion which expiates crime and promises a remission of them, if
it restrain some persons, encourages the majority to the commission
of evil.
Notwithstanding his immutability, God, in every Religion in the
world, is a true Proteus. His priests represent him at one time
armed with severity, at another full of clemency and mildness;
sometimes cruel and unmerciful, and sometimes easily melted by
the sorrow and tears of sinners. Consequently, men see the Divinity only on the side most conformable to their present interests. A
God always angry would discourage his worshippers, or throw them
into despair. Men must have a God, who is both irritable, and
placable. If his anger frightens some timorous souls, his clemency
encourages the resolutely wicked, who depend moreover upon recurring, sooner or later, to the means of accommodation. Jf the
judgments of God terrify some faint-hearted pious persons, who
by constitution and habit are not prone to evil, the treasures of
divine mercy encourage the greatest criminals, who have reason
to hope they participate therein equally with the others.
166. Most men seldom think of God, or, at least, bestow on
him little serious attention. The only ideas we can form of him
are so devoid of object, and are at the same time so afflicting, that
the only imaginations they can long arrest are those of melancholy
hypochondriacs, who do not constitute the majority of the inhabitants of this world. The vulgar have no conception of God; their
weak brains are confused, whenever they think of him. The man
of business thinks only of his business; the courtier of his intrigues;
men of fashion* women, and young people of their pleasures; dissipation soon effaces in them all the fatiguing notions of Religion.
Tke ambitious man, the miser, and the debauchee, caiefully avoid
speculations too feeble to counterbalance their various passions.

M

®mt> SESSE.

Who Is awed by the idea of a God ? A few enfeebled men, morose
and disgusted with the world; a few, in whom the passions are
already deadened by age, by infirmity, or by the strokes of fortune.
Religion is a check, to thosS alone who by their state of mind and
body, or by fortuitous circumstances, have been already brought
to reason. The fear of God hinders from sin those only, who are
no longer able to commit it.
To tell men, that the Deity punishes crimes in this world, is to
advance an assertion, which experience every moment contradicts.
The worst of men are commonly the arbiters of the world, and are
those whom fortune loads with her favours. To refer us to another
iife, in order to convince us of the judgments of God, is to refer
us to conjectures, in order to destroy facts, which cannot be doubted.
167. Nobody thinks of the life to come, when he is strongly
smitten with the objects he finds here below. In the eyes of a passionate lover, the presence of his mistress extinguishes the flames
of hell, and her cnarms efface all the pleasures of paradise. Woman, you leave, say you, your lover for your God. This is either
because your lover is no longer the same in your eyes, or because
he leaves you, and it is necessary to fill up the vacancy that is
made in your heart.
Nothing is more common, than to see ambitious, perverse, corrupt, and immoral men, who have some ideas of Eeligion, and
sometimes appear even zealous for its interest. If they do not
practise it at present, they hope to do it at a future day : they lay
it up, as a remedy, which will be necessary to tranquillize the conscience for the evil they still intend to commit. Besides, the party
of devotees and priests being very numerous, active, and powerful,
,is it not astonishing, that rogues and knaves seek its support to
attain their ends. It will undoubtedly be said, that many honest
people are sincerely religious, and that without profit \ but is uprightness of heart always accompanied with knowledge?
It is urged, that many learned men, many men of genius, hav©
been strongly attached to Eeligion, This proves, that men of
genius may'have prejudices, be pusillanimous, and have an imagi*
nation which misleads them and prevents them from examining
subjects coolly. Pascal proves nothing in favour of. Religion,
unless that a man of genius may be foolish on some subjects, and
k but a child, when he is weak enough to listen to his prejudices.
Pascal himself tells us, that the mind may be strong and contracted,
enlarged and weak.* He previously observes, that a man may
have a sound mind, and not understand every subject equally imlf;
for there are some, who, having a sound judgment in a certain order
of things, are bewildered in others,
168. What is virtue according to theology ? It is, we are told,
the conformity of the actions of man to the will of Qod. But,
what is God ? A being, of whom nobody has the least conception^
'• %m Thoughts of Pascal, X X X I .
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GOOD SENSE.

and whom every one consequently modifies in his own way. What
is the will of God ? It is what men, who have seen God, or whom
God has inspired, have declared to be the will of God. Who
are those, who have seen God? They are either fanatics, or
rogues, or ambitious men, whom we cannot readily believe upon
their word.
To found Morality upon a God, whom every man paints to himself differently, composes in his way, and arranges according to
his own temperament and interest, is evidently to found Morality
upon the caprice and imagination of men; it is to found it upon
the whims of a sect, a faction, a party, who will believe they have
the advantage to adore a true God to the exclusion of all others.
To establish Morality or the duties of man upon the divine will,
is to found it upon the will, the reveries and the interests of those,
who make God speak, without ever fearing that he will contradict
them. In every Religion, priests alone have a right to decide
what is pleasing or displeasing to their God ; we are certain, they
will always decide, that it is what pleases or displeases themselves.
The dogmas, the ceremonies, the morals, and the virtues, prescribed by every religion in the world, are visibly calculated only
to extend the power or augment the emoluments of the founders
and the ministers of these religions. The dogmas are obscure, inconceivable, frightful, and are therefore well calculated to bewilder
the imagination, and to render the vulgar more obsequious to the
will of those who wish to domineer over them. The ceremonies
and practices procure the priests riches or respect. Religious
morals and virtues consist in a submissive faith, which prohibits
the exercise of reason; in a devout humility, which insures priests
the submission of their slaves; in an ardent zeal, when Religion,
that is, when the interest of these priests, is in danger. The only
object of all religious virtues is evidently the advantage of the
ministers of Religion.
169. When we reproach theologians with the barrenness of their
divine virtues, they emphatically extol charity, that tender love of
one's neighbour, which Christianity makes an essential duty of its
disciples. But, alas? what becomes of this pretended charity,
when we examine the conduct of the ministers of the Lord ? Ask
them, whether we must love or do eood to our neighbour, if he be
an impious man, a heretic, or an infidel, that is, if he do not think
like them ? Ask them, whether we must tolerate opinions conr
trary to those of the religion they profess ? Ask them, whether the
sovereign can show indulgence to those who are in error ? Their
charity instantly disappears, and the established clergy will tell you;,
that the prince bears the sword only to support the cause of the Most
High; they will tell you that, through love for our neighbour, we
must prosecute, imprison, exile, and burn him. You will find no
toleration except among a few priests, persecuted themselves, who
will lay aside Christian charity the instant they have power to persecute in their turn.

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83

The Christian religion, in its origin preached by beggars and
Miserable men, under the name of charity, strongly recommends
alms. The religion of Mahomet also enjoins it as an indispensable
duty. Nothing undoubtedly is more conformable to humanity,
than to succour the unfortunate, to clothe the naked, to extend the
hand of beneficence to every one in distress. But would it not be
more humane and charitable to prevent the source of misery and
poverty ? If religion, instead of deifying princes, had taught them
to respect the property of their subjects, to be just, to exercise only
their lawful rights, we should not be shocked by the sight of such
a multitude of beggars in their dominions. A rapacious, unjust,
tyrannical government multiplies misery: heavy taxes produce
discouragement, sloth, and poverty, which in their turn beget robberies, assassinations, and crimes of every description. Had sovereigns more humanity, charity, and equity, their dominions would
not be peopled by so many wretches, whose misery it becomes impossible to alleviate.
Christian and Mahometan states are full of large hospitals,
richly endowed, in which we admire the pious charity of the kings
and sultans who erected them. But would it not have been more
humane to govern the people justly, to render them happy, to excite
and favour industry and commerce, and to let men enjoy in safety
the fruit of their labours, than to crush them under a despotic
yoke, to impoverish them by foolish wars, to reduce them to beggary, in order that luxury may be satisfied, and then to erect splendid buildings, which can contain but a very small portion of those,
who have been rendered miserable ? Religion, by its virtues, has
only deluded men; instead of preventing evils, it always applies
ineffectual remedies.
The ministers of heaven have ever known how to profit by the
calamities of others. Public misery was, if I may use the expression, their element. They have every where become administrators
of the property of the poor, distributers of alms, depositaries of
charitable donations; and thereby they have at all times extended
and supported their power over the unhappy, who generally compose the most numerous, restless, and seditious part of society.
Thus the greatest evils turn to the profit of the ministers of the
Lord.
Christian priests* tell us, that the property they possess is the
property of the poor, and that it is therefore sacred. Consequently, the sovereign and the people have eagerly accumulated
upon them lands, revenues, treasures. Under colour of charity,
our epiritual guides have become extremely opulent, and in the face
of impoverished nations enjoy wealth, which was destined solely
for the unfortunate; while the latter, far from murmuring, applaud
H pious generosity, which enriches the church, but Tarely contributes to the relief of the poor.
* In Roman Catholic countries.

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GOOD SENSE.

According to the principles of Christianity, poverty itself is &
virtue; indeed, it is the virtue which sovereigns and priests oblige
their slaves to observe the most rigorously. With this idea, many
pious Christians have of their own accord renounced the perishable
riches of the earth, distributed their patrimony among the poor, and
retired into deserts, there to live in voluntary indigence. But this
enthusiasm, this supernatural taste for misery, has been soon forced
to yield to nature. The successors of these volunteers in poverty
sold to the devout people their prayers, and their intercessions with
the Deity. They became rich and powerful. Thus monks and
hermits lived in indolence, and under colour of charity, impudently
devoured the substance of the poor.
The species of poverty, most esteemed by Religion, is poverty of
mind. The fundamental virtue of every Religion, that is, the most
useful to its ministers, is faith* It consists in unbounded credulity, which admits, without enquiry, whatever the interpreters of
the Deity are interested in making men believe. By the aid of this
wonderful virtue, priests became the arbiters of right and wrong, of
good and evil; they could easily cause the commission of crimes
to advance their interest. Implicit faith has been the source of the
greatest outrages that have heen committed upon earth.
170. He, who first taught nations, that, when we wrong Man
we must ask pardon of God, appease him by presents, and offer
Aim sacrifices, evidently destroyed the true principles of Morality.
According to such ideas many persons imagine that they may obtain
of the king of heaven, as of kings of the earth, permission to be
unjust and wicked, or may at least obtain pardon for the evil they
may commit.
,
Morality is founded upon the relations, wants, and constant interests of the inhabitants of the earth; the relations, which subsist
between God and Men, are either perfectly unknown, or imaginary.
Religion, by associating God with Man, has wisely weakened, or
destroyed, the bonds, which unite them. Mortals imagine they
may injure one another with impunity, by making suitable satisfae^
tion to the almighty being, who is supposed to have the right of
remitting all offences committed against his creatures.
Is any thing better calculated to encourage the wbked or harden
them in crimes, than to persuade them that there exists an invisible
being, who has a right, to forgive them the acts of injustice, rapine,
perfidy, and outrage that they commit against society ? Encouraged
by these destructive ideas, the most perverse men perpetrate the
most horrid crimes, and believe they make reparation by imploring
divine mercy,* their conscience is at rest, when a priest assures them
that heaven is disarmed by a repentance, which, though sincere, isvery useless to the world. The priest consoles them in the name
of the Deity, if they consent, as a reparation of their faults, to
share with his ministers the fruits of their frauds and robberies.
A Morality, connected with Religion, is necessarily subordinate
to it. In the mind of a devout man, God must be regarded mora

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85

than his creatures; it is better to obey him, than men. The interests of the celestial monarch must prevail over those of weak
mortals. But the interests of heaven are obviously those of its
ministers; whence it evidently follows, that in every religion,
priests, under pretext of the interests of heaven, or the glory of 6od ?
can dispense with the duties of human morality, when they clash
with the duties which God has a right to impose. Besides, must
not he, who has power to pardon crimes, have a right to command
the commission of crimes ?
171. We are perpetually told, that, without a God there would
be no moral obligation; that the people and even the sovereigns
require a legislator powerful enough to constrain them. Moral
constraint supposes a law; but this law arises from the eternal and
necessary relations of things with one another; relations, which
have nothing common with the existence of a God. The rules of
Man's conduct are derived from his own nature which he is capable
of knowing, and not from the Divine nature of which he has no
idea. These rules constrain or oblige us; that is, we render ourselves estimable or contemptible, amiable or detestable, worthy of
reward or of punishment, happy or unhappy, accordingly as we
conform to, or deviate from these rules. The law, which obliges
man not to hurt himself, is founded upon the nature of a sensible
being, who, in whatever way he came into this world, or whatever
may be his fate in a future one, is forced by his actual essence \o
seek good and shun evil, to love pleasure and fear pain. The law,
which obliges man not to injure, and even to do good to others, is
founded upon the nature of sensible beings, living in society, whose
essence compels them to despise those who are useless, and to detest
those who oppose their felicity.
Whether there exists a God or not, whether this God has spoken
or not, the moral duties of men will be always the same, so long as
they retain their peculiar nature, that is, as long as they are sensible
beings. Have men then need of a God whom they know not,
of an invisible legislator, of a mysterious religion and of chimerical fears, in order to learn that every excess evidently tends to
destroy them, that to preserve health they must be temperate;
that to gain the love of others it is necessary to do them good, that
to do them evil is a sure means to incur their vengeance and hatred,
" Before the law there was no sin.5' Nothing is more false than
this maxim. It suffices that man is what he is, or that he is a sensible being, in order to distinguish what gives him pleasure or displeasure. It suffices that one man knows that another man is a sensible
being like himself, to perceive what is useful or hurtful to him. It
suffices that man needs his fellow-creature, in order to know
that he must fear to excite in him sentiments unfavourable to himself. Thus the feeling and thinking being has only to feel and
think, in order to discover what he must do for himself and others.
I feel, and another feels like me; this is the foundation of all morals,,
172. \Ve can judge of the goodness of a system of Morals?on!y

m

GOOD SEKSE.

by its conformity to the nature of man. By this comparison, we
have a right to reject it, if contrary to the welfare of our species.
Whoever has seriously meditated Religion and its supernatural
Morality ; whoever has carefully weighed their advantages and disadvantages, will be fully convinced, that both are injurious to the
interests of Man, or directly opposite to his nature.
" To arms! the cause of your God is at stake 1 Heaven is outraged ! The faith is in danger! Impiety, blasphemy, heresy!"
The magical power of these formidable words, the reai vaiue of
which the people never understand, have at all times enabled
priests to excite revolts, to dethrone kings, to kindle civil wars, and
to lay waste the world. If we examine the important objects^
which have excited the wrath of heaven and produced so many
ravages upon earth, it appears, that either the foolish reveries and
whimsical conjectures of some theologian who did not understand
himself, or else the pretensions of the clergy, have broken every
social bond and deluged mankind with blood and tears.
173. The sovereigns of this world, by associating the Divinity in
the government of their dominions, by proclaiming themselves his
vicegerents and representatives upon earth, and by acknowledging
they hold their power of him, have necessarily constituted his ministers their own rivals or masters. Is it then astonishing that
priests have often made kings feel the superiority of the Celestial
Monarch ? Have they not more than once convinced temporal
princes, that even the greatest power is compelled to yield to the
spiritual power of opinion ? Nothing is more difficult than to
serve two masters, especially when they are not agreed upon what
they require of their subjects.
The association of Religion with Politics necessarily introduced
a double legislation into states. The law of God, interpreted by
his priests, was often repugnant to the law of the Sovereign, or the
interest of the State. When princes have firmness and are confident
of the love of their subjects, the law of God is sometimes forced to
yield to the wise intentions of the temporal sovereign; but generally the sovereign authority is obliged to give way to the divine
authority, that is, to the interests of the clergy. Nothing is more
dangerous to a prince than to encroach upon the authority of the
Church, that is. to attempt to leform abuses consecrated by religion. God is never more angry than when we touch the divine
rights, privileges, possessions, or immunities of his priests.
The metaphysical speculations or religious opinions of men
influence their conduct, only when they judge them conformable
to their interest. Nothing proves this truth more clearly than the
conduct of many princes with respect to the spiritual power, which
they often resist. Ought not a sovereign, persuaded of the importance and rights of Religion, to believe himself in conscience bound
to receive respectfully the orders of its priests, and to regard them
as the orders of the Divinity himself? There was a time, when kings
and people, more coajsistent in their conduct, were convinced of the

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87

rights of spiritual power, and becoming its slaves, yielded to it
upon every occasion, and were but docile instruments in its hands.
That happy time is passed. By a strange inconsistency the most
devout monarchs are sometimes seen to oppose the enterprises of
those whom they yet regard as the ministers of God. A sovereign,
deeply penetrated with religion, or with respect for his God, ought
to remain prostrate at the feet of his ministers, and regard them as
his true sovereigns. Is there upon earth a power which has a right
to put itself in competition with that of the Most High ?
174. Have princes then, who imagine themselves interested in
cherishing the prejudices of their subjects, seriously reflected upon
the effects which have been, and may be again produced by certain
privileged demagogues, who have a right to speak at pleasure, and
in the name of heaven to inflame the passions of many millions of
subjects ? What ravages would not these sacred haranguers cause,
if they should conspire, as they have so often done, to disturb the
tranquillity of a state!
To most nations, nothing is more burthensome and ruinous than
the worship of their gods. Not only do the ministers of these gods
every where constitute the first order in the state, but they also
enjoy the largest portion of the goods of society, and have a right to
levy permanent taxes upon their fellow-citizens. What real advantages then do these organs of the Most High procure the people,
for the immense profits extorted from their industry ? In exchange
for their riches and benefits, what do they give them but mysteries,
hypotheses, ceremonies, subtle questions, and endless quarrels,
which it often happens that states are again compelled to pay for
with their blood ?
175. Religion, though said to be the firmest prop of Morality,
evideuily destroys its true springs, in order to substitute imaginary
ones, inconceivable chimeras, which, being obviously contrary to
reason, nobody firmly believes. All nations declare that the firmly
believe in a God, who rewards and punishes; all say they are persuaded of the existence of a hell and a paradise; yet, do these ideas
render men better or counteract the most trifling interests? Every
one assures us that he trembles at the judgments of God; yet every
one follows his passions, when he thinks himself sure of escaping
the judgments of Man.
, The fear of invisible powers is seldom so strong as the fear of
visible ones. Unknown or remote punishments strike the multitude
far less forcibly than the sight of a gallows, or the public execution
of a man. Few courtiers fear the anger of their God so much as
the displeasure of their master. A pension, a title, or a riband
suffices to efface the remembrance both of the torments of hell, and
of the pleasures of the celestial court. The caresses of a woman
repeatedly prevail over the menaces of the Most High. A jest, a
stroke of ridicule, a witticism, make more impression upon the,
man of the world than all the grave notions of his religion.
Are we not assured that a true repentance is enough to appease

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GOOD SENSE.

the Deity? Yet we see not that this true repentance is very sincere ; at least, it is rare to see noted thieves, even at the point of
death, restore goods, which they are conscious of having unjustly
acquired. Men are undoubtedly persuaded, that they" shall fit
themselves for eternal fire, if they cannot insure themselves against
it. But, " Some useful compacts may be made with heaven."*
By giving the church a part of his fortune, almost every devout rogue
may die in peace, without concerning himself in what manner he
gained his riches in this world.
' 176. By the confession of the warmest defenders of religion and
of its utility, nothing is more rare than sincere conversions, and, we
might add, nothing more unprofitable to society. Men are not disgusted with the world, until the world is disgusted with them. A
woman demotes herself to God, only when she feels the neglect of
the world, In devotion her vanity acts a part, which occupies her,
and indemnifies her for the loss of her charms. Trifling practices
help to consume her time: cabals, intrigues, invective, scandal, and
zeal, furnish her with the means of acquiring reputation and respect
among the devout party.
If the devout have the talent of pleasing God and his priests,
they have seldom that of being agreeable or useful to society. To
a devotee, religion is a veil, which covers and justifies all her passions : her pride, ill-humour, anger, revenge, impatience, and rancour. Devotion arrogates a tyrannical superiority, which banishes
gentleness, indulgence, and gaiety; it authorises people to censure
their neighbours, to reprove and revile the profane for the greater
glory of God. It is very common to be devout, and at the same
time destitute of every virtue and quality necessary to social life.
177. It is asserted, that the dogma of another life is of the utmost
importance to the peace and happiness of societies; that without it,
men would be destitute of motives to do good. What need is
there of terrors and fables to make every rational man sensible how
he ought to conduct himself upon earth. Does not every one see
that he has the greatest interest in meriting the approbation, esteem,
and benevolence of the beings who surround him, and in abstaining
from every thing by which he may incur the censure, contempt, and
resentment of society ? However short an entertainment, a conversation, or visit, does not each desire to act his part decently, and
agreeably to himself and others ? If life is but a passage,' let us
strive to make it easy: which we cannot effect, if we fail in regard
for those who travel with us.
Beligion, occupied with its gloomy reveries, considers man merely
as a pilgrim upon earth; and therefore supposes that, in order to
travel the more securely, he must forsake, company, and deprive
himself of the pleasures and amusements, which might console him
for the tediousness and fatigue of the road. A stoical and morose
philosopher sometimes gives us advice as irrational as that of Iieli»
* Moliere*

GOOD SENSE.

89

gion. But a more rational philosophy invites us to spread flowers
upon the way of life, to dispel melancholy and panic terrors, to connect our interest with that of our fellow-travellers, and by gaiety and
lawful pleasures, to divert our attention from the difficulties and
cross accidents to which we are often exposed; it teaches us, that,
to travel agreeably, we should abstain from what might be injurious
to ourselves, and carefully shun what might render us odious to our
associates.
178. It is asked, what motives an Atheist can have to do good ?
The motive to please himself and his fellow-creatures ; to live happily and peaceably; to gain the affection and esteem of men, whose
existence and dispositions are much more sure and known, than
those of a being impossible to be known. " Can he, who fears not
the gods, fear any thing?" He can fear men ; he can fear contempt,
dishonour, the punishment and vengeance of the laws; in short, he
can fear himself, and the remorse felt by all those who are conscious
of having incurred or merited the hatred of their fellow-creatures.
Conscience is the internal testimony, which we bear to ourselves,
of having acted so as to merit the esteem or blame of the beings
with whom we live; and it is founded upon the clear knowledge
we have of men, and of the sentiments which our actions must produce in them. The conscience of the religious man consists in
imagining that he has pleased or displeased his God, of whom he
has no idea, and whose obscure and doubtful intentions are ex*
plained to him only by men of doubtful veracity, who, like him,
are utterly unacquainted with the essence of the Deity, and are little
agreed upon what can please or displease him. In a word, the
conscience of the credulous is directed by men who have themselves an erroneous conscience, of whose interest stifles knowledge,
u
Can an Atheist have a conscience? What are his motives to
abstain from hidden vices and secret crimes, of which other men are
ignorant, and which are beyond the reach of laws ? He may be
assured by constant experience that there is no vice, which, by the
nature of things, does not punish itself. Would he preserve this
life ? He will avoid every excess that may impair his health ; he
will not wish to lead a languishing life, which would render him a
burden to himself and others. As for secret crimes, he will abstain
from them, for fear he shall be forced to blush at himseif, from
Whom he cannot fly. If he has any reason, he will know the value
of the esteem which an honest man ought to have for himself. H e
will see that unforeseen circumstances may unveil the conduct
which he feels interested in concealing from others. The other
world furnishes no motives for doing good, to him, who finds none
here below.
179. "The speculative Atheist," says the Theist, " may be an
honest man, but his writings will make political Atheists. Princes
and ministers, no longer restrained by the fear of God, will abandon
themselves, without scruple, to the most horrid excesses/' But,
however great the depravity of an Atheist upon the throne, can it

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GOOD SENSE.

be stronger and more destructive than that of the many conquerors,
tyrants, persecutors, ambitious men, and perverse courtiers, who,
though not Atheists, but often very religious and devout, have notwithstanding made humanity groan under the weight of their
crimes ? Can an atheistical prince do more harm to the world than
a Louis XL, a Philip I I , , a Richelieu, who all united religion with
crime? Nothing is more rare, than atheistical princes; nothing
more common, than tyrants and ministers, who are very wicked and
very religious.
180. A man of reflection cannot be incapable of his duties, of
discovering the relations subsisting between men, of meditating his
own nature, of discerning his own wants, propensities and desires,
and of perceiving what he owes to beings who are necessary to his
happiness. These reflections naturally lead him to a knowledge
of the morality most essential to social beings. Dangerous passions
seldom fall to the lot of a man who loves to commune with himself,
to study, and to investigate the principles of things. The strongest
passion of such a man will be to know truth, and his ambition to
teach it to others. Philosophy is proper to cultivate both the mind
and the heart. On the score of morals and honesty, has not he who
reflects and reasons, evidently an advantage over him who makes it
a principle never to reason?
If ignorance is useful to priests, and to the oppressors of mankind,
it is fatal to society. Man, void of knowledge, does not enjoy his
reason; without reason and knowledge, he is a savage, every instant liable to be hurried into crimes. Morality, or the science of
duties, is acquired only by the study of man, and of what is relative
to man. He, who does not reflect, is unacquainted with true Morality, and walks with precarious steps in the path of virtue. The
less men reason, the more wicked they are. Savages, princes,
nobles, and the dregs of the people, are commonly the worst of
men, because they reason the least.
The devout man never reflects, and is careful not to reason. He
fears all enquiry, scrupulously follows authority, and often, through
an error of conscience, makes it a sacred duty to commit evil. The
unbeliever reasons: he consults experience, which he prefers to prejudice. If he reasons justly, his conscience is enlightened; he finds
more real motives to do good than the bigot whose only motives are
his fallacies, and who never listens to reason. Are not the motives
of the unbeliever sufficiently powerful to counteract his passions ?
Is he blind enough to be unmindful of his true interest, which ought
to restrain him? If so, he will be vicious and wicked. But he will
be neither worse nor better than the numerous believers, who, notwithstanding religion and its sublime precepts, follow a conduct
which religion condemns. Is a credulous assassin less to be
feared, than an assassin who believes nothing ? Is a very devout
tyrant less a tyrant than an undevout tyrant ?
181. Nothing is more uncommon than to see men consistent.
Their opinions never influence their conduct except when eon*

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91

formable to their temperaments, passions, and interests. Daily
experience shews, that religious opinions produce much evil and
little good. They are hurtful, because they often favour the passions of tyrants, of ambitious men, of fanatics, and of priests ; they
are of no effect, because incapable of counterbalancing the present
interests of the greater part of mankind. Religious principles are
of no avail, when they act in opposition to ardent desires though
not unbelievers, men then conduct themselves as if they believed
nothing.
We shall always be liable to err, when we judge of the opinions
of men by their conduct, or of their conduct by their opinions. A
religious man, notwithstanding the unsociable principles of a sanguinary religion, will sometimes by a happy inconsistency, be humane, tolerant, and moderate; the principles of his religion do not
then agree with the gentleness of his character, Libertines, debauchees, hypocrites, adulterers, and rogues, often appear to have the best
ideas upon morals. Why do they not reduce them to practice?
Because their temperament, their interest, and their habits do not
accord with their sublime theories. The rigid principles of Christian morality, which many people regard as divine, have but little
influence upon the conduct of those, who preach them to others.
Do they not daily tell us, to do what they'preach, and not what they
practise ?
t The partisans of Religion, often denote an infidel by the word
libertine. It is very possible that many unbelievers may have loose
morals, which is owing to their temperament, and not to their opinions. But how does their conduct affect their opinions ? Cannot
then an immoral man be a good physician, architect, geometrician,
logician, or metaphysician ? A man of irreproachable conduct may
be extremely deficient in knowledge and reason. In quest of truth,
it little concerns us from whom it comes. Let us not judge of men
by their opinions, nor of opinions by men ; let us judge of men
by their conduct, and of their opinions oy their conformity with experience and reason and by their utility to makind.
182. Every man, who reasons, soon becomes an unbeliever; for
reason shews, that theology is nothing but a tissue of chimeras;
that religion is contrary to every principle of good sense, that it tinctures all human knowledge with falsity. The sensible man is an
unbeliever, because he sees, that, far from making men happier, religion is the chief source of the greatest disorders, and the permanent calamities, with which man is afflicted. The man, who
seeks his own welfare and tranquillity, examines and throws aside
his religion, because he thinks it no less troublesome than useless
to spend his life in trembling before phantoms, fit to impose only
upon silly women or children.
If licentiousness, which reasons but little, sometimes leads to irreligion, the man of pure morals may have very good motives for
examining his religion, and banishing it from his mind. Religious
terrors, too weak to impose upon the wicked m whom vice is deeply

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GOOD SENSE.

rooted, afflict, torment and overwhelm restless imaginations. Courageous and vigorous minds soon shake off the insupportable yoke.
But those, who are weak and timourous, languish under it during
life; and as they grow old their fears increase.
Priests have represented God as so malicious, austere, and terrible
a being, that most men would cordially wish, that there was no
God. It is impossible to be happy, while always trembling. Ye
devout! you adore a terrible God ! But you hate him ; you would
be glad, if he did not exist. Can we refrain from desiring the absence or destruction of a master, the idea of whom destroys our
happiness ? The black colours, in which priests paint the Divinity,
are truly shocking, and force us to hate and reject him.
183. If fear created the gods, fear supports their empire over
the minds of mortals. So early are men accustomed to shudder at
the mere name of the Deity, that they regard him as a spectre, a
hobgoblin, a bugbear, which torments and derpives them of courage
even to wish relief from their fears. They apprehend, that the invisible spectie, will strike them the moment they cease to be afraid.
Bigots are too much in fear of their God to love him sincerely.
They serve him like slaves, who, unable to escape his power, resolve
to flatter their master, and who, by dint of lying, at length persuade
themselves, that they in some measure love him. They make a virtue
of necessity. The love of devotees for their God, and of slaves for
their despots, is only a feigned homage, which they render to force,
and in which the heart has no share.
184. Christian divines have represented their God so terrible and
so little worthy of love, that several of them have thought they must
dispense with loving him ; a blasphemy, shocking to other divines,
who were less ingenuous. St. Thomas having maintained, that we
are obliged to love God as soon as we attain to the use of reason, the
Jesuit Sirmond answered him, that is very soon. The Jesuit Vasquez assures us, that it is enough to love God at the point 'of death.
Hurtado, more rigid, says> we mmt\ love God every year. Henriquezis contented that we love him every jive years ; Sotus, every
Sunday. Upon what are these opinions grounded? asks father Sirmond ; who adds, that Suarez requires us to lorn God sometimes.
But when ? He leaves that to us; he knows nothing about it himself. Now, says he, who will be able to know that, qfivhich such a
learned divine is ignorant. The same Jesuit Sirmond further observes, that God " does not command us to love him with an affectionate love, nor does he promise us salvation upon condition that
we give him our hearts ; it is enough to obey and love him with an
effective love by executing his orders; this is the only love we owe
him; and he_has not so much commanded, us to love him, as
not to hate him/' This doctrine appears heretical, impious, arid
abominable to the Jansenistfc, who, by the revolting severity they attribute to their God, make hirn far less amiable, than the Jesuits,
their adversaries. The latter, to gain adherents paint God in colours
capable of encouragrmsf the ^lost perverse of mortals. Thus nothing

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is more undecided with the Christians, than the important question,
whether they can, ought, or ought not to love God. Some of their
spiritual guides maintain, that it is necessary to love him with ail
one's heart, notwithstanding all his severity ! others, like father
Daniel, think that, an act ofpure love to Godis the most heroic act of
Christian virtue, and almost beyond the reach of human weakness.
The Jesuit Pintereau goes farther; he says, a deliverance from the
grievous yoke of loving God is a privilege of the neiv covenant.*
185. The character of the Man always decides that of his God;
every body makes one for himself and like himself. The man of
gaiety, involved in dissipation and pleasure, does-not imagine, that ?
God can be stern and cross; he wants a good-natured God, with
whom he can find reconciliation. The man of a rigid, morose,
bilious, sour disposition must have a God, like himself; a God of
terror; and he regards, as perverse, those, who admit a placable,
indulgent God. As men are constituted, organized, and modified
in a manner, which cannot be preciselyjthe same, how can they agree
about a chimera, which exists only in their brains?
The cruel and endless disputes between the ministers of the Lord,
are not such as to attract the confidence of those, who impartially
consider them. How can we avoid complete infidelity, upon viewing principles, about which these who teach them to others are never
agreed? How can we help doubting the existence of a God, of
whom it is evident that even his ministers can only term very fluctuating ideas? How can we in short avoid totally rejecting a God,
who is nothing but a shapeless heap of contradictions ? How can
we refer the matter to the decision of priests, who are perpetually
at war, treating each other as impious and heretical, defaming and
persecuting each other without mercy, for differing in the manner of
understanding the truths, they announce to the world ?
186. The existence of a God is the basis of all Religion. Nevertheless, this important truth has not as yet been demonstratedj I do
not say so as to convince unbelievers, but in a manner satisfactory
to theologians themselves. Profound thinkers have at all times
been occupied in inventing new proofs of that truth which is most
interesting to mankind. What are the fruits of their meditations
and arguments? They have left the subject in the same condition
in which they found i t ; they have demonstrated nothing; they
have almost always excited the clamours of their brethren, who
have accused them of having poorly defended the best of causes.
J 87. The apologists of Religion daily repeat, that the passions
alone make unbelievers. " Pride," say they, " and the desire of
signalizing themselves make men Atheists. They endeavour to
efface from their minds the idea of God, only because they have
reason to fear his terrible judgments/' Whatever may be the motives which incline men to irreligion, it is our business to examine
whether their sentiments are founded in truth. No man acts
* Vide Apology for the Provincial Letters, torn. 2.

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GOOD SEKSE.

without motives. Let us first examine the arguments and afterwards the motives. We shall see whether these motives are not
legitimate, and more rational than those of many credulous bigots,
who suffer themselves to be guided by masters little worthy of the
confidence of men.
You say then, Priests of the Lord ! that the passions make unbelievers ; that they renounce Religion only through interest, or
because it contradicts their inordinate propensities; you assert that
they attack your gods only because they fear their severity. But
are you yourselves in defending Religion and its chimeras, truly
exempt from passions and interests? Who reap advantages from
this Religion for which priests display so much zeal? Priests. To
whom does Religion procure power, influence, riches, and honours?
To Priests. Who wage war in every country, against reason,
science, truth, and philosophy, and render them odious to sovereigns and people? Priests. Who profit by the ignorance and vain
prejudices of men ? Priests.-—Friests ! you are rewarded, honoured
and paid for deceiving mortals, and you cause those to be punished
who undeceive them. The follies of men procure you benefices,
offerings, and expiations; while those who announce the most
useful truths are rewarded only with chains, gibbets, and funeralpiles. Let the universe judge between us.
188. Pride and vanity have been, and ever will be, vices inherent
in the priesthood. Is anything more capable of rendering men
haughty and vain, than the pretence of exercising a power derived
from heaven of bearing a sacred character of being the messengers
and ministers of the Most High ? Are not these dispositions perpetually nourished by the credulity of the people, the deference and
respect of sovereigns, the immunities, privileges, and distinctions
enjoyed by the clergy ? In every country the vulgar are much
more devoted to their spiritual guides, whom they regard as divine,
than to their temporal superiors, whom they consider as no more
than ordinary men. The parson of a village acts a much more
conspicuous part than the lord of the manor or the justice of the
peace. Among the Christians a priest thinks himself far above a
king or an emperor. A Spanish grandee having spoken rather
haughtily to a monk, the latter arrogantly said, " Learn to respect
a man who daily has your God in his hands, and your Queen at
his feet Have priests then a right to accuse unbelievers of pride?
Are they themselves remarkable for uncommon modesty or profound
humility ? Is it not evident that the desire of domineering over
men is essential to their trade? If the ministers of the Lord
were truly modest, should we see them so greedy of respect, so
impatient of contradiction, so positive in their decisions, and so
unmercifully revengeful to those whose opinions offend them ?
Has not science the modesty to acknowledge how difficult it is to
discover truth ? What other passion but ungovernable pride can
make men so savage, revengeful, and void of indulgence and gentleness ? What can be more presumptuous than to arm nations'

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and deluge the world in blood in order to establish or defend futile
conjectures?
You say that presumption alone makes Atheists. Inform them
then what your God is; teach them his essence; speak of him
intelligibly; say something about him which is reasonable, and not
contradictory or impossible. If you are unable to satisfy them, if
hitherto none of you have been able to demonstrate the existence of
a God in a clear and convincing manner; if by your own confession, his essence is completely veiled from you, as from the rest of
mortals, forgive those who cannot admit what they can neither
understand nor make consistent with itself; do not tax with presumption and vanity those who are sincere enough to confess their
ignorance; do not accuse of folly those who find themselves incapable of believing contradictions ; and for once blush at exciting
the hatred and fury of sovereigns and people against men, who
think not like you concerning a being of whom you have no idea.
Is any thing more rash and extravagant than to reason concerning an
object known to be inconceivable ?
You say that the corruption of the heart produces Atheism, that
men shake off the yoke of the Deity only because they fear his formidable judgments. But why do you paint your God in colours
so shocking that he becomes insupportable ? Why does so powerful
a God permit hearts to be so corrupt? How can we help endeavouring to shake off the yoke of a tyrant, who, able to do as he
pleases with the hearts of men, consents to their perversion, who
hardens, and blinds them, and refuses them his grace, that he may
have the satisfaction to punish them eternally, for having been hardened and blinded, and for not having the grace which he refused ?
Theologians and priests must be very confident of the grace of
heaven and a happy futurity, to refrain from detesting a master so
capricious as the God they announce. A God who damns eternally,
is the most odious of beings that the human mind can invent.
189. No man upon earth is truly interested in the support of
error, which is forced sooner or later to yield to truth. The general
good must at length open the eyes of mortals; the passions themselves sometimes contribute to break the chains of prejudices. Did
not the passions of sovereigns two centuries ago annihilate in some
countries of Europe the tyrannical power which a too haughty pontiff
once exercised over all princes of his sect ? In consequence of the
progress of political science the clergy were then stripped of the
immense riches which credulity had accumulated upon them.
Ought not this memorable example to convince priests that prejudices triumph but for a time, and that truth alone can insure
solid happiness?
By caressing sovereigns, by fabricating divine rights, for them, by
deifying them, and by abandoning the people, bound hand and foot
to their will, the ministers of the Most High must see that they are
labouring to make them tyrants. Have they not reason to apprehend that the gigantic idols, which they raised to the clouds, wilj

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one day crush them by their enormous weight ? Do not a thousand
examples remind them that these tyrants, after preying upon the
people, may prey upon them in their turn.
We will respect priests, when they become citizens. Let them,
if they please, use the authority of heaven to frighten those princes
who are continually desolating the earth; but let them no more
adjudge to them the horrid right of being unjust with impunity.
Let them acknowledge, that no man is interested in living under
tyranny; and let them teach sovereigns, that they themselves are not
interested in exercising a despotism, which, by rendering them
odious, exposes them to danger, and detracts from their power and
greatness. Finally, let priests and kings become so far enlightened
as to acknowledge, that no power is secure which is not founded
upon truth, reason, and equity.
190. By waging war against Reason, which they ought to have
protected and developed, the ministers of the gods evidently act
against their own interest. What power, influence, and respect
might they not have gained among the wisest of men, what* gratitude would they not have excited in the people, if, instead of
wasting their time about their vain disputes, they had applied themselves to really useful sciences, and investigated the true principles
of philosophy, government, and morals I Who would dare to re*
proach a body with its opulence or influence, if' the members dedicating themselves to the public good, employed their leisure in
study, and exercised their authority in enlightening the minds both
of sovereigns and subjects ?
Priests! Forsake your chimeras, your unintelligible dogmas,
your contemptible quarrels ! Banish, to the regions of imagination, those phantoms which could be useful to you only in the
infancy of nations. Assume, at length, the language of reason.
Instead of exciting persecution against your adversaries; instead
of entertaining the people with silly disputes; instead of preaching
useless and fanatical virtues,—preach human and social morality ;
preach virtues really useful to the world; become the apostles of
reason, the lights of nations, the defenders of liberty, the reformers
of abuses, the friends of virtue; and we will bless, honour and love
you; every thing will insure you a permanent empire over the
hearts of your fellow citizens.
191. Philosophers have every where taken upon themselves a
part, which* seemed destined to the ministers of Religion. The
hatred of the latter for philosophy was only a jealousy of trade.
But, instead of endeavouring to injure and decry each other, all
men of good sense should unite their efforts to combat error, seek
truth, and especially to put to flight the prejudices, that are equally
injurious to sovereigns and subjects, andjof which the abettors themselves sooner or later become the victims.
In the hands of an enlightened government, the priests would
become the most useful of the citizens. Already richly paid by the
state, and free from the care of providing for their own subsistence,

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how could they be better employed than in qualifying themselves
for the instruction of others ? Would not their minds be better
satisfied with discovering luminous truths, than in wandering through
the thick darkness of error ? Would it be more difficult to discern
the clear principles of a Morality made for man, than the imaginary
principles of a divine and theological Morality ? Would men of
ordinary capacities find it as difficult to fix in their heads the simple
notions of their duties, as to load their memories with mysteries, unintelligible words and obscure definitions, of which they can never
form a clear idea ? What time and pains are lost in learning and
teaching things, which are not of the least real utility! What resources for the encouragement of the sciences, the advancement of
knowledge, and the education of youth, well disposed sovereigns
might find in the many monasteries, which in several countries live
upon the people without in the slightest degree profiting them ! But
superstition, jealous of its exclusive empire, seems resolved to form
only .useless beings. To what advantage might we not turn a multitude of cenobites of both sexes, who, in many countries, are amply
endowed for doing nothing ? Instead of overwhelming them with
fasting and austerities; instead of occupying them with barren contemplations, mechanical prayers, and trifling ceremonies; why
should we not excite in them a salutary emulation, which may
incline them to seek the means, not of being dead to the world, but
of being useful to it ? Instead of filling the youthful minds of their
pupils with fables, sterile dogmas, and puerilities, why are not priests
obliged, or invited to teach them truths, and to render them useful
citizens of their country ? Under the present system, men are only
useful to the clergy who blind them, and to the tyrants who fleece
them.
192, The partisans of credulity often accuse unbelievers of insin*ceriiy, because they sometimes waver in their principles, alter their
minds in sickness, and retract at death. When the body is disordered, the faculty of reasoning is commonly disordered with it. At
the approach of death, man, weak and decayed, is sometimes himself sensible that Reason abandons him, and that Prejudice returns.
There are some diseases, which tend to weaken the brain; to create
despondency and pusillanimity ; and there are others, which destroy
the body, but do not disturb the reason. At any rate, an unbeliever
who recants in sickness is not more extraordinary, than a devotee
who neglects in health the duties which his religion explictly enjoins,
CLEOMENES, king of Sparta, showed but little respect for the
gods during his reign; but became superstitious, as he drew near
his end, and, in the view of interesting heaven to prolong his days,
sent for a great number of priests and sacrificers. One of his friends
expressing his surprise, What are you astonished at, says CLEOMENES, I am no longer ivhat I was; and as I am no longer the
mme, I cannot think in the same manner.
The ministers of Religion often contradict in their daily conduct
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GOOD SENSE.

the rigorous principles, they teach to others; in consequence of
which, unbelievers think that they, in their turn, may justly accuse
them of insincerity. If some unbelievers abandon at death, or in
sickness, the sentiments they supported while in healthy do not
priests belie, while in health, the rigid principles of the religion, they
inculcate? Is it easy to find many prelates humble, generous, void
of ambition, enemies of pomp and grandeur, and friends of poverty?
In short, is the conduct of many Christian ministers conformable to
the austere morality of Christ, their God, and their model ?
193. Atheism, it is said, breaks all the ties of society.
Without
the belief' of a God, what will become of the sacredness of oaths %
How shall we oblige a man to speak the truth, who cannot seriously
call the Deity to 'witness what he says ? But, does an oath strengthen
our obligation to fulfil the engagements contracted ? "Will he, who
is not fearful of lying, be less fearful of perjury ? He, who is base
enough to break his word, or unjust enough to violate his engagements, in contempt of the esteem of men, will not be more faithful
therein for having called all the gods to witness his oaths. Those,
who disregard the judgments of men, will soon disregard the judgments of God. Are not princes, of all men, the most ready to swear,
and the most ready to violate their oaths.
194. The vulgar, it is repeatedly said, must have a Religion. If
enlightened persons have no need of the restraint of opinion, it is at
least necessary wrude men, whose reason is uncultivated by education.
But, is it indeed a fact, that religion is a restraint upon the vulgar ?
Do we see, that this religion preserves them from intemperance,
drunkenness, brutality, violence, fraud, and every kind of excess ?
Could a people who have no idea of the Deity conduct themselves
in a more detestable manner, than these believing people, among
whom we find dissipation and vices, the most unworthy of reasonable
beings ? Upon going out of the temples, do not the working classes,
and the populace, plunge without fear into their ordinary irregularities, under the idea, that the periodical homage, which they
render to their God, authorizes them to follow, without remorse,
their vicious habits and pernicious propensities ? Finally, if the
people are so low minded and unreasonable, is not their stupidity
chargeable to the negligence of their princes, who are wholly regardless of public education, or who even oppose the instruction of
their subjects ? Is not the want of reason in the people evidently
the work of the priests, who, instead of instructing men in a rational
morality, entertain them with fables, reveries, ceremonies, fallacies,
and false virtues, which they think of the greatest importance ?
To the people, Iteligion is but a vain display of ceremonies, to
which they are attached by habit, which entertains their eyes, and
produces a transient emotion in their torpid understandings, without
influencing their conduct or reforming their morals. Even by the
confession of the ministers of the altars, nothing is more rare than
that internal and spiritual Religion, which alone is capable of regulating the life of man and of triumphing over his evil propensities..

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GOOD SENSE.

In the most numerous and devout nation, are there many persons,
who are really capable of understanding the principles of their religious system, and who find them powerful enough to stifle their
perverse inclinations ?
Many persons will say, that any restraint whatever is better than
none. They will maintain, that vf religion awes not the greater part,
it serves at least to restrain some individuals^ loho would otherwise
without remorse abandon themselves to crime. Men ought, undoubtedly to have a restraint, but not an imaginary one; their fears
must be well founded, and are then much more proper to restrain
men, than panic terrors and chimeras. Religion frightens only some
pusillanimous souls, whose imbecility of character has already prevented them from being formidable to their fellow citizens. Au
equitable government, severe laws, and sound morality have an equal
power over all; at least, every person must believe in them, and
perceive the danger of not conforming to them.
195. Perhaps it wiil be asked, whether rational Atheism can be
proper for the multitude ? I answer, that any system, which requires discussion, is not made for the multitude. What purpose
then can it serve to preach Atheism ? It may at least serve to
convince all those who reason, that nothing is more extravagant
than to fret one's self, and nothing more unjust than to vex
others for mere groundless conjectures. As for the vulgar who
never reason, the arguments of an Atheist are no more fit for them
than the systems of a natural philosopher, the observations of an
astronomer, the experiments of a chemist, the calculations of a
geometrician, the researches of a physician, the plans of an architect, or the pleadings of a lawyer, who all labour for the people
without their knowledge.
Are the metaphysical reasonings and religious disputes, which
have so long engrossed the time and attention of so many profound
thinkers, better adapted to the generality of men than the reasoning
of an Atheist ? Nay, as the principles of Atheism are founded
upon plain common sense, are they not more intelligible, than those
of a theology, beset with difficulties, which even the persons of the
greatest genius cannot explain ? In every country, the people have a
religion, of the principles of which they are totally ignorant, and which
they follow from habit without any examination; their priests alone
are engaged in theology, which is too sublime for vulgar heads. If
the people should chance to lose this unknown theology, they might
easily console themselves for the loss of a thing, not only perfectly
useless, but also productive of dangerous commotions.
It would be madness to write for the vulgar, or the attempt to
eure their prejudices' all at once. We write for those only who
read and reason: the multitude read but little, and reason still
less. Calm and rational persons will require new ideas; light
will be gradually diffused, and in time reach even the people.
196. If theology is a branch of commerce profitable to theologians, it is evidently not only superfluous, but injurious to the rest
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of society. Self interest will sooner or later open the eyes of mes,
Sovereigns and subjects will one day adopt the profound indifference and contempt, merited by a futile science, which serves only
to make men miserable, without making them better. All persons
will be sensible of the inutility of the many expensive ceremonies,
which contribute nothing to public felicity. Contemptible quarrels
will cease to disturb the tranquillity of states, when we blush at
having considered them important.
Princes 1 instead of meddling with the senseless combats of
your priests; instead of foolishly espousing their impertinent
quarrels, and attempting to make your subjects adopt uniform
opinions—strive to make them happy in this world, and trouble
not yourselves about the fate which awaits them in another. Govern them equitably, give them good laws, respect their liberty and
property, watch over their education, encourage them in theif
labours, reward their talents and virtues, repress licentiousness ;
and do not concern yourselves with their manner of thinking, upon
objects useless to them, as well as to yourselves. You will then
have no need of fictions to secure obedience; you will become the
sole guides of your subjects, who will be uniform in their sentiments
of the love and respect due to you. Theological fables are useful
only to tyrants who are ignorant of the art of reigning over rational beings.
197. Does it then require an extraordinary effort of genius to
comprehend, that what is above the capacity of man, is not made
for him; that things supernatural are not made for natural beings ?
that impenetrable mysteries are not made for limited minds ? If
theologians are foolish enough to dispute upon objects which they
acknowledge to be unintelligible even to themselves, ought society
to take any part in their silly quarrels ? Must the blood of nations
flow to enhance the conjectures of a few infatuated dreamers ? If
it is difficult to cure theologians of their madness and the people of
their prejudices, it is at least easy to prevent the extravagancies of
one party, and the silliness of the other from producing pernicious
effects. Let every one be permitted to think as he pleases 5 bu£
never let him be permitted to injure others for their manner of
thinking. Were the rulers of nations more just and rational, theological opinions would not affect the public tranquillity, more than
the disputes of natural philosophers, physicians, grammarians, and
critics. It is the tyranny of princes which causes theological quarrels to be attended with serious consequences to states. When
kings cease to interfere in theology, the disputes of theologians will
no longer be terrible.
Those, who extol the importance and utility of Religion, ought
to shew us its happy effects, the advantages for instance, which the
disputes and abstract speculations of theology can be to porters,
artisans, and labourers, and to the multitude of unfortunate women
and corrupt servants with which great cities abound. All these
beings are religious; they have what is called an implicit faith *,

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Their parsons believe for them; and they stupidly adhere to the
unknown belief of their guides. They go to hear sermons, regularly
assist at service, and would think it a great crime to transgress any
of the ordinances, to which, in childhood, they are taught to conform. But of what service to morals is all this ? None at all.
They have not the least idea of Morality, and are even guilty of all the
roguery, fraud, rapine, and excess, that is out of the reach of law.
The populace have no idea of their Religion; what they call
Religion is nothing but a blind attachment to unknown opinions
and mysterious practices. In fact, to deprive the people of Religion is to deprive them of nothing. By shaking or overthrowing
their prejudices, we should only lesson or annihilate the dangerous
confidence they put in interested guides, and should teach them to
mistrust those, who, under the pretext of Religion, often lead them
into fatal excesses.
198. While pretending to instruct and enlighten men, Religion
in reality keeps them in ignorance, and stifles the desire of knowing
the most interesting objects. The people have no other rule of
conduct than what their priests are pleased to prescribe. Religion
supplies the place of everything else: but being in itself essentially
obscure, it is more proper to lead mortals astray, than guide them
in the path of science and happiness. Religion renders enigmatical
all Natural Philosophy, Morality, Legislation and Politics. A
man blinded by religious prejudices fears truth, whenever it clashes
with his opinions: he cannot know his own nature, he cannot cultivate his reason, he cannot perform experiments.
Everything concurs to render the people devout; but everything
tends to prevent them from being humane, reasonable and virtuous.
Religion seems to have no other object, than to contract the heart,
and stupify the mind.
Priests have been ever at war with genius and talent, because
well-informed men perceive, that superstition shackles the human
mind, and would keep it in eternal infancy, occupied solely by
fables and frightened by phantoms. Incapable of improvement
itself, Theology opposed insurmountable barriers to the progress of
true knowledge; its sole object is to keep nations and their rulers
in the most profound ignorance of their duties, and of the real
motives, that should incline them to do good. It obscures Morality, renders its principles arbitrary, and subjects it to the caprice
of the gods or of their ministers. It converts the art of governing
men into a mysterious tyranny, which is the scourge of nations. It
changes princes into unjust, licentious despots, and the people into
ignorant slaves, who become corrupt in order to merit the favour
of their masters.
199. By tracing the history of the human mind, we shall easily
be convinced, that Theology has cautiously guarded against its progress. It began by giving out fables as sacred truth : it produced
poetry, which filled the imagination of men with its puerile fictions :
it entertained them with its gods and their incredible deeds. In a
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word, Religion has always treated men, like children, whom it
lulled to sleep with tales, which its ministers would have us still regard as incontestible truths.
If the ministers of the gods have sometimes made useful discoveries, they have always been careful to give them a dogmatical
tone, and envelope them in the shades of mystery. Pythagoras and
Plato, in order to acquire some trifling knowledge, were obliged to
court the favour of priests, to be initiated in their mysteries, and to
undergo whatever trials they were pleased to impose. At this price
they were permitted to imbibe those exalted notions, still so bewitching to all those who admire only what is perfectly unintelligible.
It was from Egyptian, Indian, and Chaldean priests, from the
schools of these visionaries, professionally interested in bewildering
human reason, that philosophy was obliged to borrow its first rudiments. Obscure and false in its principles, mixed with fictions and
fables, and made only to dazzle the imagination, the progress of this
philosophy was precarious, and its theories unintelligible; instead
of enlightening, it blinded the mind, and diverted it from objects
truly useful.
The theological speculations and mystical reveries of the ancients
are still law in a great part of the philosophic world; and being
adopted by modern theology, it is heresy to abandon them. They
tell us u of aerial beings, of spirits, angels, demons, genii,35 and
other phantoms, which are the object of the meditations of our most
profound thinkers, and serve as the basis of metaphysics, an abstract
and futile science, which for thousands of years the greatest
geniuses have vainly studied. Hypothesis, imagined by a few
visionaries of Memphis and Babylon, constitute even now the
foundations of a science, whose obscurity makes it revered as marvellous and divine.
The first legislators were priests; the first mycologists, poets9
learned men, and physicians were priests. In their hands science
became sacred and was withheld from the profane. They spoke
only in allegories, emblems, enigmas,' and ambiguous oracles*—
means well calculated to excite curiosity, to employ the imagination,
and above all to inspire the astonished vulgar with a holy respect
for men, who when they were thought to be instructed by the gods,
and capable of reading in the heavens the fate of the earth, boldly
proclaimed themselves the organs of the Deity,
200. The religions of these ancient priests have disappeared, or
rather have only changed form. Although our modern theologians
regard their predecessors as impostors, yet they have collected many
scattered fragments of their religious systems, the whole of which is
not extant. In our modern Religions we find, not only their metaphysical dogmas, which theology has merely clothed in a new dress9
but also some remarkable remains of their superstitious practices,
their theurgy, their magic, and their enchantments. Christians are
still commanded to respect the remaining monuments of the legislators,
priests, and prophets of the Hebrew Religion, which, in all proba-

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bility, had borrowed its strange practices from Egypt. Thus extravagancies, imagined by knaves or idolatrous visionaries, are still
sacred among the Christians !
If we examine history, we shall find a striking resemblance
among all Religions. In all parts of the earth, we see, that religious
notions, periodically depress and elevate the people. The attention
of man is everywhere engrossed, by rites often abominable, and by
mysteries always formidable, which become the sole objects of meditation. The different superstitions borrow from one another, their
abstract reveries and ceremonies. Religions are in general mere
unintelligible rhapsodies, combined by new teachers, who use the
materials of their predecessors, reserving the right of adding or re«
trenching, whatever is not conformable to their present views. The
religion of Egypt was evidently the basis of the religion of Moses,
who banished the worship of idols : Moses was merely a schismatic
Egyptian. Christianism is only reformed Judaism. Mahometanism is composed of Judaism, Christianism, and the ancient religion of Arabia, &c,
201. Theology, from the remotest antiquity to the present time,
has had the exclusive privilege of directing philosophy. What
assistance has been derived from its divine labours ? It has changed
philosophy into an unintelligible jargon, calculated to render uncertain the clearest truths ; it has converted the art of reasoning into
a science of words; it has carried the human mind into the airy
regions of metaphysics, and there employed it in vainly fathoming
every obscure abyss. Instead of physical and simple causes, this
transformed philosophy has substituted supernatural, or rather, truly
occult causes ; it has explained phenomena difficult to be conceived
by agents still more inconceivable. It has filled language with words,
void of sense, incapable of accounting for things, better calculated
to obscure than enlighten, and which seems invented expressly to
discourage man, to guard him against the powers of his mind, to
make him mistrust the principles of reason and evidence, and to
raise an insurmountable barrier between him and truth.
202. Were we to believe the partisans of Religion, nothing could
be explained without it; naturewouldbea perpetual enigma, and man
would be incapable of understanding himself. But, what does this
Religion in reality explain ? The more we examine it, the more we are
convinced that its theological notions are fit only to confuse ourideas;
they change everything into mystery: they explain difficult things by
things that are impossible.! | I t is a satisfactory explanation of phenomena, to attribute them to unknown agents, to invisible powers, to immaterial causes ? Does the human mind receive much light by being
referred to the depths of the treasures of divine wisdom, to which, we
are repeatedly told, it is vain to extend our rash enquiries ? Can the
divine nature, of which we have no conception, enable us to
conceive the nature of man, which it is found so difficult to
explain 1

104

GOOD SENSE*

Ask a Christian philosopher, what is the origin of the world 1
He will answer, that God created it. What is God? He cannot
tell. What is it to create ? He knows not. What is the cause of
pestilence, famine, wars, droughts, inundations and earthquakes ?
The anger of God. What remedies can be applied to these calamities ? Prayers, sacrifices, processions, offerings, and ceremonies
are, it is said, the true means of disarming celestial fury. But why
is heaven enraged? Because men are wicked. Why are men
wicked ? Because their nature is corrupt. What is the cause of
this corruption ? It is, says a theologian of Europe, because the
first man, beguiled by the first woman, ate an apple, which his God
had forbidden him to touch. Who beguiled this woman into such
folly? The devil. Who made the devil? God. But, why did
God make this devil, destined to pervert mankind ? This is unknown ; it is a mystery which the Deity alone is acquainted with.
It is now universally acknowledged, that the earth turns round
the sun. Two centuries ago, a devout astronomer would have called
this opinion blasphemy, as being irreconcileable with the sacred books
which every Christian reveres as inspired by the Deity himself.
Notwithstanding divine revelation, Christian astronomers at length
depend rather upon evidence, than upon the testimony of their inspired books.
What is the hidden principle of the motions of the human body ?
The soul. What is a soul ? A spirit. What is a spirit ? A substance, which has neither form, nor colour, nor extension, nor parts.
How can we form any idea of such a substance? How can it move
a body ? That is not known; it is a mystery. Have beasts
souls? The Cartesian assures us they are machines. But, do they
not act, feel, and think, in a manner very similar to man ? Mere
illusion ! By what right do you deprive beasts of a soul, which
you attribute to man, though you know nothing at all about it ?
Because the souls of beasts would embarrass our theologians, who
are satisfied with the power of terrifying and damning the immaterial souls of men, and are not so much interested in damning those
of beasts. Such are the puerile solutions, which philosophy, always
in the leading strings of theology, was obliged to invent, in order to
explain the problems of the physical and moral world ?
203. How many evasions and forced constructions thinking men
have used, both in ancient and modern times, in order to avoid an
engagement with the ministers of the gods, who have ever been the
true tyrants of thought ? How many hypotheses and shifts were
such men as Descartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz, forced to invent, in order to reconcile their discoveries with the fables and
mistakes which Religion had consecrated! In what guarded
phrases have the greatest philosophers expressed themselves, even
at the risk of being absurd, inconsistent, or unintelligible, whenever
their ideas did not accord with the principles of theology ! Priests
have been always attentive to extinguish systems which opposed

GOOD SENSE.

105

their interest. Theology was ever the bed of Procrustes, to be
adapted to which, the limbs of travellers, if too long were cut off,
and if too short were lengthened, even if their sinews brake.
Can any sensible man, delighted with the sciences and attached
to the welfare of his fellow-creatures, reflect, without vexation and
anguish, how many profound, laborious, and subtle brains have
been for ages foolishly occupied in the study of absurdities, always
useless, and often hurtful to our species ? What a treasure of
knowledge might have been diffused by many celebrated thinkers,
if instead of engaging in the impertinent disputes of a vain theology,
they had devoted their attention to intelligible objects really important to mankind. Half the efforts which religious opinions have cost
genius, and half the wealth which frivolous forms of worship have
cost nations would have sufficed to instruct them perfectly in
morality, politics, natural philosophy, medicine, agriculture, &c.
Superstition generally absorbs the attention, admiration, and
treasures of the people; their Religion costs them very dear;
but they have neither knowledge, virtue, nor happiness for their
money.
j
204. Some ancient and modern philosophers have been bold
enougb to assume experience and reason for their guides, and to
shake off the chains of superstition, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Strato, and some other Greeks presumed to tear away the
thick veil of prejudice, and to deliver philosophy from theological
shackles. But their systems, too simple, too sensible, and too free
from the marvellous, for imaginations enamoured with chimeras,
were obliged to yield to the fabulous conjectures of such men as
Plato, Socrates, and Zeno. Among the moderns, Hobbes, Spinosa, Bayle, &c. have followed the steps of Epicucus; but their
doctrine has found very few followers, in a word, still too much intoxicated with fables to listen to reason.
In every age, it has been dangerous to depart from prejudices
consecrated by opinion. Discoveries of every kind have been
tacitly prohibited. All, that the most enlightened men could do,
was to speak ambiguously, though, from a base complaisance, they
often mix falsehood with truth. Several had a [double doctrine, one
public and the other secret; the key of the latter being lost, their
true sentiments have often become unintelligible and consequently
useless to us.
How could modern philosophers, who, under pain of the most
cruel persecution, were commanded to renounce reason, and to
subject it to faith, that is, to the authority of priests; how, I say,
could men, thus bound, give free scope to their genius, improve
reason, and accelerate the progress of the human mind ? Jt was
with fear and trembling that even the greatest men obtained a glimpse
of truth ; rarely had they the courage to announce it; those, who
had, were commonly punished for their temerity. Thanks to
Religion, it has ever been unlawful to think aloud, or to combat the
prejudices of which man is every where the victim and the dupe.

106

GOOD SENSE.

205. Every man, sufficiently intrepid to announce truths to the
world, is sure of incurring the hatred of the ministers of Religion.
The latter loudly call to their aid the powers of the earth; they
want the assistance of kings to support both their arguments and
their gods. Their clamours expose too evidently the weakness of
their cause.
" None call for aid but those who feel distressed."
In matters of Religion, man is not permitted to err; though
upon any other subject, he may be mistaken with impunity. In
general, those who err are pitied, and some kindness is shewn to
persons who discover new truths; but, when Religion is thought to
be interested either in the errors or the discoveries, a holy zeal is
kindled, sovereigns exterminate, the populace become frantic, and
nations are in an uproar they know not why.
Can anything be more afflicting, than to see public and private
felicity depending upon a futile science, which is destitute of principles, is founded only on a distempered imagination, and is incapable
of presenting the mind with anything but words void of sense ? In
what consists the so much boasted utility of a Religion, which
nobody can comprehend, which continually torments those who are
weak enough to meddle with it, which is incapable of rendering
men better, and which often makes them consider it meritorious to
be unjust and wicked? Is there a folly more deplorable, and more
justly to be combated, than that, which far from doing any service
to the human race, only makes them blind, delirious, and miserable3
by depriving them of Truth, the sole cure for their wretchedness.
206. Religion has ever filled the mind of man with darkness,
and kept him in ignorance of his real duties and true interests.. It
is only by dispelling the clouds and phantoms of Religion, that we
shall discover the sources of Truth, Reason, and Morality, and the
real motives that should incline us to Virtue. Religion diverts us
from the causes of our evils, and from the remedies which nature
prescribes; far from curing, it only aggravates, multiplies, and perpetuates them. Let us observe them with a celebrated modern,
that " theology is the box of Pandora ; and if it is impossible to
shut it, it is at least useful to inform men, that this fatal box i
open"*
* Lord Bolingbroke's posthumous works.

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